Fire Hydrant of Freedom
Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities => Politics & Religion => Topic started by: Crafty_Dog on August 11, 2008, 06:55:31 AM
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Woof All:
It looks like the situation in Georgia requires its own thread.
I begin with the observation that it looks like Stratfor's predictions in the wake of our support of Kosovo's independence are being born out.
Anyway, here's the appeal of the president of Georgia in today's WSJ to kick things off.
Marc
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The War in Georgia
Is a War for the West
By MIKHEIL SAAKASHVILI
August 11, 2008; Page A15
Tbilisi, Georgia
As I write, Russia is waging war on my country.
On Friday, hundreds of Russian tanks crossed into Georgian territory, and Russian air force jets bombed Georgian airports, bases, ports and public markets. Many are dead, many more wounded. This invasion, which echoes Afghanistan in 1979 and the Prague Spring of 1968, threatens to undermine the stability of the international security system.
AP
An apartment building, damaged by a Russian air strike, in the northern Georgian town of Gori, Saturday, Aug. 9.
Why this war? This is the question my people are asking. This war is not of Georgia's making, nor is it Georgia's choice.
The Kremlin designed this war. Earlier this year, Russia tried to provoke Georgia by effectively annexing another of our separatist territories, Abkhazia. When we responded with restraint, Moscow brought the fight to South Ossetia.
Ostensibly, this war is about an unresolved separatist conflict. Yet in reality, it is a war about the independence and the future of Georgia. And above all, it is a war over the kind of Europe our children will live in. Let us be frank: This conflict is about the future of freedom in Europe.
No country of the former Soviet Union has made more progress toward consolidating democracy, eradicating corruption and building an independent foreign policy than Georgia. This is precisely what Russia seeks to crush.
This conflict is therefore about our common trans-Atlantic values of liberty and democracy. It is about the right of small nations to live freely and determine their own future. It is about the great power struggles for influence of the 20th century, versus the path of integration and unity defined by the European Union of the 21st. Georgia has made its choice.
When my government was swept into power by a peaceful revolution in 2004, we inherited a dysfunctional state plagued by two unresolved conflicts dating to the early 1990s. I pledged to reunify my country -- not by the force of arms, but by making Georgia a pole of attraction. I wanted the people living in the conflict zones to share in the prosperous, democratic country that Georgia could -- and has -- become.
In a similar spirit, we sought friendly relations with Russia, which is and always will be Georgia's neighbor. We sought deep ties built on mutual respect for each other's independence and interests. While we heeded Russia's interests, we also made it clear that our independence and sovereignty were not negotiable. As such, we felt we could freely pursue the sovereign choice of the Georgian nation -- to seek deeper integration into European economic and security institutions.
We have worked hard to peacefully bring Abkhazia and South Ossetia back into the Georgian fold, on terms that would fully protect the rights and interests of the residents of these territories. For years, we have offered direct talks with the leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, so that we could discuss our plan to grant them the broadest possible autonomy within the internationally recognized borders of Georgia.
But Russia, which effectively controls the separatists, responded to our efforts with a policy of outright annexation. While we appealed to residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia with our vision of a common future, Moscow increasingly took control of the separatist regimes. The Kremlin even appointed Russian security officers to arm and administer the self-styled separatist governments.
Under any circumstances, Russia's meddling in our domestic affairs would have constituted a gross violation of international norms. But its actions were made more egregious by the fact that Russia, since the 1990s, has been entrusted with the responsibility of peacekeeping and mediating in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Rather than serve as honest broker, Russia became a direct party to the conflicts, and now an open aggressor.
As Europe expanded its security institutions to the Black Sea, my government appealed to the Western community of nations -- particularly European governments and institutions -- to play a leading role in resolving our separatist conflicts. The key to any resolution was to replace the outdated peacekeeping and negotiating structures created almost two decades ago, and dominated by Russia, with a genuine international effort.
But Europe kept its distance and, predictably, Russia escalated its provocations. Our friends in Europe counseled restraint, arguing that diplomacy would take its course. We followed their advice and took it one step further, by constantly proposing new ideas to resolve the conflicts. Just this past spring, we offered the separatist leaders sweeping autonomy, international guarantees and broad representation in our government.
Our offers of peace were rejected. Moscow sought war. In April, Russia began treating the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as Russian provinces. Again, our friends in the West asked us to show restraint, and we did. But under the guise of peacekeeping, Russia sent paratroopers and heavy artillery into Abkhazia. Repeated provocations were designed to bring Georgia to the brink of war.
When this failed, the Kremlin turned its attention to South Ossetia, ordering its proxies there to escalate attacks on Georgian positions. My government answered with a unilateral cease-fire; the separatists began attacking civilians and Russian tanks pierced the Georgian border. We had no choice but to protect our civilians and restore our constitutional order. Moscow then used this as pretext for a full-scale military invasion of Georgia.
Over the past days, Russia has waged an all-out attack on Georgia. Its tanks have been pouring into South Ossetia. Its jets have bombed not only Georgian military bases, but also civilian and economic infrastructure, including demolishing the port of Poti on the Black Sea coast. Its Black Sea fleet is now massing on our shores and an attack is under way in Abkhazia.
What is at stake in this war?
Most obviously, the future of my country is at stake. The people of Georgia have spoken with a loud and clear voice: They see their future in Europe. Georgia is an ancient European nation, tied to Europe by culture, civilization and values. In January, three in four Georgians voted in a referendum to support membership in NATO. These aims are not negotiable; now, we are paying the price for our democratic ambitions.
Second, Russia's future is at stake. Can a Russia that wages aggressive war on its neighbors be a partner for Europe? It is clear that Russia's current leadership is bent on restoring a neocolonial form of control over the entire space once governed by Moscow.
If Georgia falls, this will also mean the fall of the West in the entire former Soviet Union and beyond. Leaders in neighboring states -- whether in Ukraine, in other Caucasian states or in Central Asia -- will have to consider whether the price of freedom and independence is indeed too high.
Mr. Saakashvili is president of Georgia.
See all of today's editorials and op-eds, plus
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War in the Caucasus
FROM TODAY'S WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE
August 11, 2008
"War has started," Vladimir Putin said Friday as Georgian and Russian forces fought over the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia. Since then, the Prime Minister has personally overseen an escalation of hostilities that suggests Russia's true aim is demolishing Georgia's fledgling democracy.
Regardless of who fired the first shots late last week -- each side blames the other -- it became clear over the weekend that Russia intended from the start to turn that small battle into a broader assault. As Georgian troops withdrew from South Ossetia yesterday in hopes of negotiating a cease-fire, thousands of Russian soldiers reportedly were unloading from warships in the Black Sea into another separatist Georgian area, Abkhazia, to create a second front. Russian warplanes bombed cities well inside Georgia, including military bases and the civilian airport near the capital Tbilisi. Moscow has long since gone beyond merely pushing back on Georgia.
On Saturday Mr. Putin explicitly rejected "a return to the status quo" of just a few days ago, when rebels and Russian "peacekeepers" controlled the breakaway regions. Mr. Putin was meeting with generals near the Russia-Georgia border after flying home from the Beijing Olympics, leaving no doubt who was in charge of a war that the Kremlin has long sought (hint: not President Dmitry Medvedev).
Western leaders should have seen this coming. Russia has baited the hot-tempered Georgian leader, Mikheil Saakashvili, with trade and travel embargoes as well as saber-rattling. Georgia has had to tolerate a few thousand Russian troops on its soil. And in April, Russia downed a Georgian drone over Abkhaz -- that is, Georgian -- air space. Russia in recent years has also granted citizenship to the separatists. That looks like premeditation now. President Medvedev pledged Friday to "protect the lives and dignity of Russian citizens, no matter where they are located."
Despite this aggression, the West has proved unwilling to push back against Moscow in the Caucasus. When the U.S. proposed NATO "membership action plans" for Georgia and Ukraine at an April summit in Bucharest, Germany vetoed the move. Berlin didn't want to anger Moscow, a fact that the Russians surely noticed as they contemplated when, or if, to move against the government of Mr. Saakashvili, whom they have long despised as a reformer outside of the Kremlin's orbit. (Mr. Saakashvili writes about the war on a nearby page.)
Europe depends on Russian energy supplies and is loath to stand up to Moscow to help Georgia, which is seen to have made trouble for itself. But this is a crucial moment in the West's relationship with Russia. The rest of the Caucasus, home of other imperfect democracies and critical partners in the Continent's bid for energy security, will take its future cues from how Europe and the U.S. do or don't support Tbilisi.
Now it's up to NATO and especially the U.S. to persuade Moscow to stand down. Washington has publicly described the weekend's events as a "disproportionate and dangerous escalation on the Russian side" and warned of a "significant, long-term impact on U.S.-Russian relations."
Everyone acknowledges that Russia is back as a world power. But it has no right to use its renewed strength to punish democratic neighbors and prevent them from choosing their own futures. Mr. Putin needs to hear that using Ossetia as a pretext for imperialism will have consequences for Russia's relationship with the West.
See all of today's editorials and op-eds, plus video commentary
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August 11, 2008 | 0151 GMT
The war between Georgia and Russia appears to be drawing to a close. There were Russian air attacks on Georgia on Sunday and some fighting in South Ossetia, and the Russians sank a Georgian missile boat. But as the day ended the Russians declared themselves ready to make peace with Georgia, and U.N. officials said the Georgians were ready to complete the withdrawal of their forces from South Ossetia.
At this point, the Russians have achieved what they wanted to achieve, quite apart from assuring South Ossetia’s autonomy. First, they have driven home the fact that in the end, they are the dominant power not only in the Caucasus but also around their entire periphery. Alliance with the United States or training with foreign advisers ultimately means little; it is not even clear what the United States or NATO would have been able to do if Georgia had been a member of the alliance. That lesson is not for the benefit of Georgia, but for Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, and even Poland and the Czech Republic. The Russians have made it clear that, at least at this moment in history, they can operate on their periphery effectively and therefore their neighbors should not be indifferent to Russian wishes.
The second lesson was for the Americans and Europeans to consider. The Russians had asked that Kosovo not be granted independence. The Russians were prepared to accept autonomy but they did not want the map of Europe to be redrawn; they made it clear that once that starts, not only will it not end, but the Russians would feel free to redraw the map themselves. The Americans and Europeans went forward anyway, making the assumption that the Russians would have no choice but to live with that decision. The Russian response to the Georgian attack on South Ossetia drives home the point that the Russians are again a force to be reckoned with.
There has been sharp rhetoric from American and European officials, but that rhetoric can’t be matched with military action. The Europeans are too militarily weak to have any options, and the Americans have quite enough on their plates without getting involved in a war in Georgia. In some ways the rhetoric makes the Russians look even stronger than they actually are. The intensity of the rhetoric contrasted with the paucity of action is striking.
The Americans in particular have another problem. Iran is infinitely more important to them than Georgia, and they need Russian help in Iran. Specifically, they need the Russians not to sell the Iranians weapons. In particular, they do not want the Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles delivered to the Iranians. In addition, they want the Russians to join in possible sanctions against Iran. Russia has a number of ways to thwart U.S. policy not only in Iran, but also in Afghanistan and Syria. These are areas of fundamental concern to the United States, and confronting the Russians on Georgia is a risky business. The Russians can counter in ways that are extremely painful to the United States.
There is talk that the Russians might want a new government in Georgia. That is probably so, but the Russians have already achieved their most important goals. They have made it clear to their neighbors that a relationship with the West does not provide security if Russia’s interests are threatened. They have made it clear to the West that ignoring Russian wishes carries a price. And finally, they have made it clear to everyone that the Russian military, which was in catastrophic shape five years ago, is sufficiently healed to carry out a complex combined-arms operation including land, air and naval components. Granted it was against a small country, but there were many ways in which the operation could have been bungled. It wasn’t. Russia is not a superpower, but it is certainly no longer a military cripple. Delivering that message, in the end, might have been the most important to Russia.
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The conflict in the small former Soviet state of Georgia has taken a new twist.
So far, apart from Russian airstrikes, most of the combat has been limited to the north-central Georgian secessionist province of South Ossetia. But on Aug. 11, Russia beefed up its 2,500-strong peacekeeping force in Abkhazia — a secessionist region in northwestern Georgia — to more than 9,000 troops. And now the Russian Defense Ministry has announced — and the Georgian Interior Ministry has confirmed — that Russian forces have advanced up to the western Georgian city of Senaki.
The presence of Russian troops in Senaki has a number of important implications.
First, the Russian forces used in the operation approached from Abkhazia. There has been a U.N. buffer force between Abkhaz- and Georgian-controlled territory, so for Russian forces to be near Senaki, the Russians would have had to move through — and ultimately beyond — that buffer. Georgia’s best troops are also typically kept near Abkhazia, suggesting that those forces have been either bypassed or destroyed. Several reports indicate the Georgians are engaged in combat with Abkhaz forces in the upper reaches of the Kodori Gorge, so it seems likely they were bypassed.
Second, Senaki sits astride a railroad juncture that links the rest of the country not only to Abkhazia, but to Georgia’s largest port: Poti. The Russians have already bombed Poti several times, but taking Senaki completely removes the port from the equation.
Third, another Georgian city — Samtredia — is only an hour’s march from Senaki. Samtredia sits astride the Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa oil pipeline, transit fees from which are a major portion of Georgia’s economic wherewithal. But its military significance for Georgia cannot be overstated.
Samtredia is where Georgia’s transport links to its only other ports, Supsa and Batumi, merge with its link to Poti. (Technically, Sukumi is also a Georgian port, but the Abkhaz have controlled it since achieving de facto independence in 1993.) Should Samtredia fall, Russia will have, in effect, enacted a naval blockade of Georgia without using its navy. The city is also the only land link of any meaningful size to Turkey. While Turkey — along with the rest of the world — does not want to get involved in the conflict, the capture of Samtredia effectively blocks any potential land-based reinforcements from reaching Georgia via Turkey.
Furthermore, there is only one road and rail line that leads east from Samtredia to the rest of the country. This transport corridor is, in essence, the backbone of the entire country. Should Samtredia fall, there is really nothing that can be done — by Georgia or anyone else — to stop the Russians from taking over Georgia outright, one piece at a time, at their leisure.
In essence, the Russians are a heartbeat away from being able to dictate terms to the Georgians without even glancing in the direction of Tbilisi.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/11/opinion/11kristol.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print&oref=slogin
August 11, 2008
OP-ED COLUMNIST
Will Russia Get Away With It?
By WILLIAM KRISTOL
In August 1924, the small nation of Georgia, occupied by Soviet Russia since 1921, rose up against Soviet rule. On Sept. 16, 1924, The Times of London reported on an appeal by the president of the Georgian Republic to the League of Nations. While “sympathetic reference to his country’s efforts was made” in the Assembly, the Times said, “it is realized that the League is incapable of rendering material aid, and that the moral influence which may be a powerful force with civilized countries is unlikely to make any impression upon Soviet Russia.”
“Unlikely” was an understatement. Georgians did not enjoy freedom again until 1991.
Today, the Vladimir Putins and Hu Jintaos and Mahmoud Ahmadinejads of the world — to say nothing of their junior counterparts in places like Sudan, Zimbabwe, Burma and North Korea — are no more likely than were Soviet leaders in 1924 to be swayed by “moral influence.” Dictators aren’t moved by the claims of justice unarmed; aggressors aren’t intimidated by diplomacy absent the credible threat of force; fanatics aren’t deterred by the disapproval of men of moderation or refinement.
The good news is that today we don’t face threats of the magnitude of Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. Each of those regimes combined ruthless internal control, a willingness to engage in external aggression, and fervent adherence to an extreme ideology. Today these elements don’t coexist in one place. Russia is aggressive, China despotic and Iran messianic — but none is as dangerous as the 20th-century totalitarian states.
The further good news is that 2008 has been, in one respect, an auspicious year for freedom and democracy. In Iraq, we and our Iraqi allies are on the verge of a strategic victory over the jihadists in what they have called the central front of their struggle. This joint victory has the potential to weaken the jihadist impulse throughout the Middle East.
On the other hand, the ability of Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas to get away with murder (literally), and above all the ability of Iran to pursue its nuclear ambitions effectively unchecked, are setbacks for hopes of peace and progress.
And there is no evidence that China’s hosting of the Olympics has led to moderation of its authoritarianism. Meanwhile, Russia has sent troops and tanks across an international border, and now seems to be widening its war against Georgia more than its original — and in any case illegitimate — casus belli would justify.
Will the United States put real pressure on Russia to stop? In a news analysis on Sunday, the New York Times reporter Helene Cooper accurately captured what I gather is the prevailing view in our State Department: “While America considers Georgia its strongest ally in the bloc of former Soviet countries, Washington needs Russia too much on big issues like Iran to risk it all to defend Georgia.”
But Georgia, a nation of about 4.6 million, has had the third-largest military presence — about 2,000 troops — fighting along with U.S. soldiers and marines in Iraq. For this reason alone, we owe Georgia a serious effort to defend its sovereignty. Surely we cannot simply stand by as an autocratic aggressor gobbles up part of — and perhaps destabilizes all of — a friendly democratic nation that we were sponsoring for NATO membership a few months ago.
For that matter, consider the implications of our turning away from Georgia for other aspiring pro-Western governments in the neighborhood, like Ukraine’s. Shouldn’t we therefore now insist that normal relations with Russia are impossible as long as the aggression continues, strongly reiterate our commitment to the territorial integrity of Georgia and Ukraine, and offer emergency military aid to Georgia?
Incidentally, has Russia really been helping much on Iran? It has gone along with — while delaying — three United Nations Security Council resolutions that have imposed mild sanctions on Iran. But it has also supplied material for Iran’s nuclear program, and is now selling Iran antiaircraft systems to protect military and nuclear installations.
It’s striking that dictatorial and aggressive and fanatical regimes — whatever their differences — seem happy to work together to weaken the influence of the United States and its democratic allies. So Russia helps Iran. Iran and North Korea help Syria. Russia and China block Security Council sanctions against Zimbabwe. China props up the regimes in Burma and North Korea.
The United States, of course, is not without resources and allies to deal with these problems and threats. But at times we seem oddly timid and uncertain.
When the “civilized world” expostulated with Russia about Georgia in 1924, the Soviet regime was still weak. In Germany, Hitler was in jail. Only 16 years later, Britain stood virtually alone against a Nazi-Soviet axis. Is it not true today, as it was in the 1920s and ’30s, that delay and irresolution on the part of the democracies simply invite future threats and graver dangers?
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GM:
Question: So what do we do about the leverage the Russians have with regard to Iran?
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All:
Here's these from the NYTimes. Caveat lector:
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By ANDREW E. KRAMER and ELLEN BARRY
Published: August 10, 2008
GORI, Georgia — In retreat, the Georgian soldiers were so tired they could not keep from stumbling. Their arms were loaded with rucksacks and ammunition boxes; they had dark circles under their eyes. Officers ran up and down the line, barking for them to go faster.
Weary residents heading south said they were beginning to feel betrayed by the United States, an ally of Georgia, as diplomacy had fallen short of expectations.
All along the road was grief. Old men pushed wheelbarrows loaded with bags or led cows by tethers. They drove tractors and rickety Ladas packed with suitcases and televisions. As a column of soldiers passed through Gori, a black-robed priest came out of his church and made the sign of the cross again and again. One soldier, his face a mask of exhaustion, cradled a Kalashnikov.
“We killed as many of them as we could,” he said. “But where are our friends?”
It was the question of the day. As Russian forces massed Sunday on two fronts, Georgians were heading south with whatever they could carry. When they met Western journalists, they all said the same thing: Where is the United States? When is NATO coming?
Since the conflict began, Western leaders have worked frantically to broker a cease-fire. But for Georgians — so boisterously pro-American that Tbilisi, the capital, has a George W. Bush Street — diplomacy fell far short of what they expected.
Even in the hinterlands, at kebab stands and in farming villages, people fleeing South Ossetia saw themselves as trapped between great powers. Ossetian refugees heading north to Russia gushed their gratitude to Dmitri A. Medvedev and Vladimir V. Putin, the Russian leaders. Georgians around Gori spoke of America plaintively, uncertainly. They were beginning to feel betrayed.
“Tell your government,” said a man named Truber, fresh from the side of the Tbilisi hospital bed where his son was being treated for combat injuries. “If you had said something stronger, we would not be in this.”
He had not slept for three days, and he was angry — at himself, at Georgia, but mainly at the United States. “If you want to help, you have to help the end,” he said.
Meanwhile, the influx of Ossetians into southern Russia continued Sunday, as the police escorted convoys of minibuses up the Zaramakh highway and through the mountain tunnel that is the only route into Russia. The Russian authorities estimated that 34,000 refugees had crossed the border, and 3,000 more evacuations were planned for Monday. The Ossetians emerged onto a four-lane highway whose edges had been chopped to pieces by columns of Russian armor. Around them were mountains shrouded by fog. Tatiana Gobozoyeva was riding in a van with 20 other refugees, many of whom had spent four days huddled in dirty basements. She said she considered the United States responsible for the Georgian aggression.
Pyotr Bezhov, who fled the violence with his daughter Oksana on Sunday, stood by a dusty dirt road.
“The biggest problem here is you, your country,” he said. “You said that the Soviets were an evil empire, but it’s you that are the empire.
“Not you personally, of course,” he added. “But your government.”
On the other side of the line of battle, Georgians had begun to question the strength of their alliance with the United States.
In recent years, Mr. Bush has lavished praise on Georgia — and the so-called Rose Revolution that brought Mikheil Saakashvili to power — as a model of democracy-building. The feeling was mutual: when Mr. Bush visited Tbilisi in 2005, the authorities estimated that 150,000 people showed up to see him. He famously climbed up on a platform and wiggled his hips to loud Georgian folk music.
Those exuberant days seemed very distant around Gori on Sunday, as people fled, leaving behind corn fields and apple orchards. A group of men tried mightily to push a truck with a blown-out tire, but it got stuck on the road, and they finally abandoned it.
Gato Tkviavi lingered in Tirzini, a village of one-story houses where cows were wandering through the streets. Asked where the border with South Ossetia was, he pointed at his feet. “The border is where the Russians say it is,” he said. “It could be here, or it could be Gori.”
The grimmest among the Georgians were the soldiers, haggard, unshaven and swinging their Kalashnikovs. A group of them had piled onto a flatbed truck, crowding on in such numbers that some were sitting on the roof, their feet dangling over the windshield.
One, who gave his name as Major Georgi, spoke with anger. “Write exactly what I say,” he said. “Over the past few years, I lived in a democratic society. I was happy. And now America and the European Union are spitting on us.”
Andrew E. Kramer reported from Gori and Ellen Barry from Moscow. Michael Schwirtz contributed reporting from Tbilisi, Georgia, and Matt Siegel from Vladikavkaz, Russia.
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By C. J. CHIVERS
Published: August 10, 2008
As the bloody military mismatch between Russia and Georgia unfolded over the past three days, even the main players were surprised by how quickly small border skirmishes slipped into a conflict that threatened the Georgian government and perhaps the country itself.
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Justyna Mielnikiewicz for The New York Times
A bombed apartment in Gori, Georgia, with posters of Georgia’s president and President Bush. There was no sign over the weekend that the Kremlin was willing to negotiate with Georgia.
Multimedia
Graphic
A History of Enmity
Related
Russians Push Past Separatist Area to Assault Central Georgia (August 11, 2008)
On Slog to Safety, Seething at West (August 11, 2008)
In Brooklyn, Georgians Pray and Frantically Call Families (August 11, 2008) Several American and Georgian officials said that unlike when Russia invaded Afghanistan in 1979, a move in which Soviet forces were massed before the attack, the nation had not appeared poised for an invasion last week. As late as Wednesday, they said, Russian diplomats had been pressing for negotiations between Georgia and South Ossetia, the breakaway region where the combat flared and then escalated into full-scale war.
“It doesn’t look like this was premeditated, with a massive staging of equipment,” one senior American official said. “Until the night before the fighting, Russia seemed to be playing a constructive role.”
But while the immediate causes and the intensity of the Russian invasion had caught Georgia and the Western foreign policy establishment by surprise, there had been signs for years that Georgia and Russia had methodically, if quietly, prepared for conflict.
Several other long-term factors had also contributed to the possibility of war. They included the Kremlin’s military successes in Chechnya, which gave Russia the latitude and sense of internal security it needed to free up troops to cross its borders, and the exuberant support of the United States for President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia, a figure loathed by the Kremlin on both personal and political terms.
Moreover, by preparing Georgian soldiers for duty in Iraq, the United States appeared to have helped embolden Georgia, if inadvertently, to enter a fight it could not win.
American officials and a military officer who have dealt with Georgia said privately that as a result, the war risked becoming a foreign policy catastrophe for the United States, whose image and authority in the region were in question after it had proven unable to assist Georgia or to restrain the Kremlin while the Russian Army pressed its attack.
Russia’s bureaucratic and military groundwork was laid even before Mr. Saakashvili came to power in 2004 and positioned himself as one of the world’s most strident critics of the Kremlin.
Under the presidency of Vladimir V. Putin, Russia had already been granting citizenship and distributing passports to virtually all of the adult residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the much larger separatist region where Russia had also massed troops over the weekend. The West had been skeptical of the validity of Russia’s handing out passports by the thousands to citizens of another nation.
“Having a document does not make you a Russian citizen,” one American diplomat said in 2004, as Russia expanded the program.
But whatever the legal merits, the Kremlin had laid the foundation for one of its public relations arguments for invading: its army was coming to the aid of Russian citizens under foreign attack.
In the ensuing years, even as Russia issued warnings, Mr. Saakashvili grew bolder. There were four regions out of Georgian control when he took office in 2004, but he restored two smaller regions, Ajaria in 2004 and the upper Kodori Gorge in 2006, with few deaths.
The victories gave him a sense of momentum. He kept national reintegration as a central plank of his platform.
Russia, however, began retaliating against Georgia in many ways. It cut off air service and mail between the countries, closed the border and refused Georgian exports. And by the time the Kodori Gorge was back in Georgian control, Russia had also consolidated its hold over Chechnya, which is now largely managed by a local leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, and his Kremlin-backed Chechen forces.
Chechnya had for years been the preoccupation of Russian ground forces. But Mr. Kadyrov’s strength had enabled Russian to garrison many of its forces and turn its attention elsewhere.
Simultaneously, as the contest of wills between Georgia and Russia intensified, the strong support of the United States for Mr. Saakashvili created tensions within the foreign policy establishment in Washington and created rival views.
Some diplomats considered Mr. Saakashvili a politician of unusual promise, someone who could reorder Georgia along the lines of a Western democracy and become a symbol of change in the politically moribund post-Soviet states. Mr. Saakashvili encouraged this view, framing himself as a visionary who was leading a column of regional democracy movements.
Other diplomats worried that both Mr. Saakashvili’s persona and his platforms presented an implicit challenge to the Kremlin, and that Mr. Saakashvili made himself a symbol of something else: Russia’s suspicion about American intentions in the Kremlin’s old empire. They worried that he would draw the United States and Russia into arguments that the United States did not want.
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This feeling was especially true among Russian specialists, who said that, whatever the merits of Mr. Saakashvili’s positions, his impulsiveness and nationalism sometimes outstripped his common sense.
The risks were intensified by the fact that the United States did not merely encourage Georgia’s young democracy, it helped militarize the weak Georgian state. In his wooing of Washington as he came to power, Mr. Saakashvili firmly embraced the missions of the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. At first he had almost nothing practical to offer. Georgia’s military was small, poorly led, ill-equipped and weak. But Mr. Saakashvili’s rise coincided neatly with a swelling American need for political support and foreign soldiers in Iraq. His offer of troops was matched with a Pentagon effort to overhaul Georgia’s forces from bottom to top. At senior levels, the United States helped rewrite Georgian military doctrine and train its commanders and staff officers. At the squad level, American marines and soldiers trained Georgian soldiers in the fundamentals of battle. Georgia, meanwhile, began re-equipping its forces with Israeli and American firearms, reconnaissance drones, communications and battlefield-management equipment, new convoys of vehicles and stockpiles of ammunition.
The public goal was to nudge Georgia toward NATO military standards. Privately, Georgian officials welcomed the martial coaching and buildup, and they made clear that they considered participation in Iraq as a sure way to prepare the Georgian military for “national reunification” — the local euphemism of choice for restoring Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgian control.
All of these policies collided late last week. One American official who covers Georgian affairs, speaking on the condition of anonymity while the United States formulates its next public response, said that everything had gone wrong. Mr. Saakashvili had acted rashly, he said, and had given Russia the grounds to invade. The invasion, he said, was chilling, disproportionate and brutal, and it was grounds for a strong censure. But the immediate question was how far Russia would go in putting Georgia back into what it sees as Georgia’s place. There was no sign throughout the weekend of Kremlin willingness to negotiate. A national humiliation was under way.
“The Georgians have lost almost everything,” the official said. “We always told them, ‘Don’t do this because the Russians do not have limited aims.’ ”
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Crafty,
Russia has hardly been a friend in regards to Iran and has done more to impede progress than help. It's been nothing but a chess piece for them. Georgian troops have fought alongside ours, it's long past time we start acting with honor towards our friends rather than abandoning them when it's useful.
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And now it serves their interest to help Iran with Anti aircraft missiles and nixing economic pressure via the UN.
You're a bright and unusually well informed man GM. Specifically what do you suggest we do?
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1. A "Berlin airlift" support of food, medicine and weapon to Georgia.
2. A "come-to-jesus" meeting with Putin. Medvedev can sit in if Vladi wants. We explain that Georgia's borders will be respected, and guarded by US military assets. If Putin wants a war, we make it plain he'll get one.
3. Immediate air cover for Georgia. Establish a line that Russia can decide to cross or not.
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http://michellemalkin.com/2008/08/11/is-georgia-in-2008-like-hungary-in-1956/
Is Georgia in 2008 like Hungary in 1956?
By see-dubya • August 11, 2008 07:27 AM
I’ve said before that America needs to take up for her allies. It keeps the world safe:
The world works as well as it does–and, granted, that’s pretty marginal–in large part because the United States guarantees the security of its allies. Places like Taiwan and South Korea churn out magic toilets and miniature automobiles knowing that the United States will respond to incursions and aggression with overwhelming and sustained force. So far, our defense of the fledgling Iraqi government has confirmed that arrangement.
America does what it says. If you have an American security guarantee–and I’m looking at you,Saudi Arabia and Pakistan–you don’t need to build a nuclear arsenal. America honors its commitments, and the world keeps ticking–well, arrhythmically stuttering, anyhow–because there are big U.S. guns ready to retaliate against aggression. No better friend. No worse enemy. If America is backing you, you’re golden.
Unless I’m mistaken, we’ve signed no security guarantees with Georgia. But we are discussing bringing them into NATO, we’re training and supplying their soldiers, and they’ve been fighting in Iraq on our side.
So we’re not bound to do anything to help Georgia–except by our commitment to supporting freedom and opposing tyranny around the world. We’ve staked much of our identity as a nation on exactly that commitment, and as Georgian President Saakashvili notes, our reputation is under scrutiny:
If Georgia falls, this will also mean the fall of the West in the entire former Soviet Union and beyond. Leaders in neighboring states — whether in Ukraine, in other Caucasian states or in Central Asia — will have to consider whether the price of freedom and independence is indeed too high.
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We’ve faced such a situation before, and we chose, I think, quite poorly. We promised too much, and we delivered too little.
In 1956, Hungary was a member of the Warsaw Pact. After Stalin’s death, when Krushchev came to power, there was a bit of liberalization in Russia and Hungary picked up on that. In fact, they decided, spontaneously, to have a revolution and kick the commies out. Which they did, smashing the statue of Stalin in the process*, until Russia said “oh no you didn’t” and marched back in on November 4th and took it over again, with much repression and execution in their wake.
The story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution is laid out here. This assessment bears excerpting:
Although the governments of the free world watched the Hungarian Revolution with deep admiration, they never seriously considered providing military support, nor condemnation strong enough to stop the brutal actions of the Soviet Union.
However, the heroes of 1956 did not die or suffer in vain. They demonstrated such uncommon bravery, such a universal yearning for freedom from foreign tyranny, that the whole world was forced to see the true face of communism at last.
If it is condemnation of Russian aggression that may make a difference, we’ll have plenty of that. Russia is, as Saakashvili notes, at war with Georgia, and their war has spread far beyond South Ossetia and into the rest of the country. Putin’s transparent rationalizations hide an avaricious agenda of conquest, and he must be opposed. We see the true face of Putin at last, and he’s every bit as ugly as the totalitarian Evil Empire which proceeded him (to which he bears an unmistakable family resemblance.)
Russia’s attacks are not only without justification, but they’re also indiscriminate and far out of any doctrine of proportion. No imminent threat justifies their actions. Nothing except a desire to punish and subjugate Georgia motivates their shelling of civilian targets far from South Ossetia. Russia should be ashamed of itself and of its leader.
I hope this naked aggression backfires on Russia like their catastrophic invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. They poured blood and treasure into that project for years, and earned the world’s opprobrium even as they hastened their empire’s downfall through their folly. We helped that defeat happen, of course, and I want to see us help out again.
Exactly how we do so…well, that’s the tough part, isn’t it?
On the other hand: one controversial detail of the uprising is whether or not Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty had extended false hope to the revolutionaries of military relief from America and/ or the U.N. A contemporary analysis of RFE/RL programmimg (available in pdf here) suggests there is some truth to that charge.
We must be careful in Georgia not to repeat that mistake. We must not bluff, and we can’t promise or imply what we will not back up. The stakes are too high.
But they’re too high to do nothing, as well.
*The Times of London article linked above notes that a statue of Stalin still stands in the town of Gori, Georgia –because it’s Stalin’s birthplace. No wonder Putin wants it back. It’s like Mount Vernon for him.
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{Post by See-Dubya.} Some more good points here at the Sundries Shack and at Ace’s. Oh, and once again, Tom Clancy’s writing…well, a Clancy-branded video game…feels eerily prophetic about world events.
I don’t like it when Clancy proves prophetic about world events. They’re never nice events.
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http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1218446173615&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter
Bear claw on the trigger
Aug. 11, 2008
DAVID STROMBERG , THE JERUSALEM POST
Alexander Solzhenitsyn was Russia's last voice of conscience, binding it morally to the horrors of its Stalinist period. Josef Stalin, born Dzugashvili, was of course Georgian, but was famously ashamed of his ethnicity and, like Solzhenitsyn, was a believer in the greatness of Russia. And while it's difficult to overstate Solzhenitsyn's role in exposing the brutality of the Gulag, the Russia that reemerged and eventually embraced both him and Stalin has again become an imperialist aggressor.
Less than a week after Solzhenitsyn's death, Russia has entered into its first post-Soviet armed conflict outside its borders. Did Solzhenitsyn see this coming? He might have: In February of this year, Dmitry Rogozin, Moscow's representative to NATO, threatened the use of armed force in support of Serbia during the riots surrounding Kosovo's declaration of independence. An alarming statement, though it would have been complicated for Russia to navigate tanks to Belgrade through the former Eastern Bloc, more than half of which is now part of the European Union. Russia barked, but couldn't bite. And so it waited.
ON THURSDAY night, Russia got the provocation it needed: Georgian troops launched a surprise attack in a bid to take control of Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, a region that Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili had promised to reintegrate into Georgia's territory. This time, the maneuver was much simpler: Reinforcements for the peacekeeping troops already stationed there had only to travel through a long tunnel that connects the breakaway region to North Ossetia, which is part of the Russian Federation.
And it seems that the bombers shown off at last year's air show in Moscow were also standing by. They struck the Georgian city of Gori, the outskirts of the capital of Tbilisi and the Black Sea port of Poti - which are, respectively, 13, 91 and 189 kilometers from South Ossetia. Parts of Russia's Black Sea fleet are converging on the coast of Georgia's breakaway region of Abkhazia. All of which Solzhenitsyn might also have seen coming.
The decidedly westward-leaning Saakashvili gained power in the Rose Revolution of 2004, posing trouble for Russia with his proclaimed alliance with the US. In March 2006, after many tough words, Russia banned the import of Georgian wine and sparkling water - two key revenue producers for the country. This was done on the pretext that the products were of poor quality.
But Saakashvili wasn't intimidated, and in October of that year Georgia arrested and deported four Russian military officers it accused of spying. Russia severed all ties and enforced a total land, air and economic embargo. Then it started harassing all Georgian nationals in a hunt for illegal workers. In a Solzhenitsyn-like twist, there were reports that police called public school teachers asking them for the addresses of children with Georgian last names, whose parents they would then arrest. Georgians started to be deported by the planeload.
SAAKASHVILI FACED calls from the opposition to step down because of the great economic and social distress caused by his policies, and so in 2007 he called early elections, which he won by a slim margin. This gave him confidence to continue the pursuit of yet another campaign goal: to make Georgia a NATO member. Georgia's candidacy was raised at a NATO summit in April, only two months after Rogozin's warning to NATO about Russia's readiness to use force. Russia stated that it would regard Georgia's entry into NATO as a direct threat. The US backed Georgia's bid, while France and Germany made up the main opposition. Ironically, as a NATO member, Georgia would never have been able to mount this week's arguably misguided offensive.
And like several other conflicts in the world, this one also involves oil: The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which runs from Azerbaijan through Georgia and Turkey, brings oil directly from Central Asia to Europe, bypassing Russia. The issue isn't just Russia's monopoly and the subsequent danger of lost revenue. Russia uses its status as Europe's main supplier of natural gas to exert or divert diplomatic pressure, so any energy inputs it doesn't control threaten that power.
As small as it is, Georgia is the first country in the world to take a stand against Russia. From Russia's point of view, a pipeline in Georgia would be less dangerous if its leader kowtowed to Vladimir Putin - the same president-turned-prime minister that Solzhenitsyn befriended toward the end of his life, implicitly and explicitly approving Russia's intentions of imperialist, Eastern Orthodox-tinged aggression.
And while Solzhenitsyn earned the status of a saint for protesting the repression he experienced in the Soviet Union, by supporting the current Russian authority - and being blind to its tightening grip on Mother Russia and its neighbors - he has forfeited the possibility of being called a prophet.
The writer is editor of Zeek: Russified, a volume of works by contemporary Russian Jewish writers, poets and artists.
I definitely feel that the US should help militarily and economically but where are we going to get the troops from? :?
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Rachel,
We have lots of fighter jocks that haven't had much to do as our enemies in the sandboxes have no air forces to speak of. We could rapidly deploy air assets to Georgia to enforce "no fly zones" and provide intel, medivac and close air support as needed. Let's just see how far Pootie-poo wants to push this.
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We don't even have enough troops for both Afg/Pak and Iraq-- let alone to keep pressure on Iran and you think we can take on the Russkis on their own border?
I agree about the consequences throughout the momentarily free FSU.
Once again (NK, Syria, Iran, etc) the Bushies have barked without bite and yet again have gotten caught at it. Good job getting Ukraine into the orbit of the free. Good job getting Poland and ______ to take the Star Wars missiles to defend Europe from Iranian missiles. STUPID to push the Russkis by backing the separation of Kosovo-- and the same logic we used there, they use now in Georgia. STUPID to push for Georgia into NATO. 5-10 years ago it may have made sense to diminish Russia while it was down, but with the oil revenues, the fact that our forces are at full capacity and our "allies" are weenies, and Putin having re-established the strong Russian state wiser hands would not have pushed it so far so fast so overextended.
BTW a friend with contacts in Russia told me of a phone conversation he had yesterday. He said his Russian friend was VERY guarded on the phone, but did mention a book which is going round called "The Northern Alliance" wherein the Russians ally with Iran. For the Iranians the motive is to bring down Israel and for the Russians its to drive the US out of the MidEast.
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Crafty,
Air power only.
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GM,
What happens after you use air power only. What then? Air Power worked great in Afghanistan and Iraq at first. It doesn't win the whole war. You don't think there could be consequences :?
A couple more jpost articles
This sort of fits in with the northern alliance idea
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1218104259162&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Analysis: Back to the USSR
Aug. 10, 2008
ISABELLA GINOR and GIDEON REMEZ , THE JERUSALEM POST
As we write, reports are coming in that after a bombardment by Russia's aircraft, its tanks are advancing on the Georgian town of Gori - the birthplace of Iosif Djugashvili, better known as Stalin.
This throwback to the heyday of the Soviet Union is more than symbolic. Historical analogies are never perfect, but our sense of déjà vu was acute as we watched Moscow's Soviet-style move to reassert its domination of the USSR's former fief.
Moscow perceives a threat to its strategic interests from a small regional actor. It prods its neighboring clients to commit such provocations that the adversary is drawn into military action that "legitimizes" a massive, direct intervention to "defend the victims of aggression."
In our recent study Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviets' Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War, we demonstrated that this was the scenario employed by the USSR to instigate the 1967 conflict. Then, it was the unexpectedly devastating effect of Israel's preemptive strike that thwarted the planned Soviet intervention. Against Georgia this week, the ploy has so far worked much better.
As in our Middle Eastern precedent, a major motive for Moscow's move was to prevent its encirclement by nuclear-armed Western pacts. When the United States announced its intent to deploy missile defenses in the new NATO members Poland and the Czech Republic, Russia declared this to be a measure that would be met with a military response. Its alarm grew when President George W. Bush visited Ukraine and Georgia, inviting them, too, into NATO. But at the pact's summit in Bucharest in April, when the European allies demurred, Russia saw its chance - and pounced.
Georgia has assiduously courted US protection, if not a full NATO guarantee. It sent 2,000 soldiers to Iraq, who are being recalled to face the Russian invasion. Washington has provided Georgia with materiel and advisers, and so did Israel - at least until Russia pressed it to stop, reportedly in return for promises to withhold advanced weapons from Syria.
The South Ossetia separatists are already claiming US intervention - saying there are black people among the Georgian casualties. But even if some American personnel went discreetly into action, that would not suffice to deter Russia from bringing Georgia to heel, if not physically occupying the country. And then the Western loss will not be limited to the independence of a small, remote, struggling democracy.
Russia would achieve another strategic goal: regaining control of the vital flow of Caspian Sea oil to Western (and Israeli) consumers via pipelines that pass through Georgia to its own ports - now already blockaded by the Russian navy - and to Turkey's.
But Moscow's apparent disregard for the hitherto internationally sacrosanct borders and sovereignty of the 15 former Soviet Socialist Republics may have even farther-reaching consequences. Russia itself enjoyed immunity for its suppression of Chechnya's independence bid, as the latter was only an autonomous component of the Russian Federation. By the same token, South Ossetia and Abkhazia (where Russian marines have landed to assist separatists in opening a second front) are integral parts of Georgia. In calling these often-arbitrary borders into question, Russia has opened a vast Pandora's box.
Absent a resolute Western response, the next in line for Russian designs will be another would-be NATO candidate: Ukraine, which Moscow has already berated for backing Georgia. Ukraine's eastern mining and industrial regions are heavily populated by Russian-speakers; the Crimea, whence Ukraine seeks to eject the Russian Black Sea Fleet's main base, was part of Russia until the 1950s.
After "coming to the rescue of Russian citizens" in South Ossetia (locals who were issued Russian passports, or actual settlers from across the border), Moscow may demand the repatriation of its people from Ukraine - along with their land.
In respect to Israel, too, Russian leaders often proclaim a "special relationship" based on the "hundreds of thousands of Russian people" who reside here. This may still be far over the horizon - but you read it here first: Some day, a "representative delegation" of these "Russians" may invoke the Ossetian precedent to appeal for protection from Moscow. With a large part of the Russian fleet moved by then from Sevastopol, Crimea, to Tartus, Syria, such an intervention may be at least as feasible as in 1967.
Former Georgian: South Ossetia is like our Golan
The Jerusalem Post Internet Edition
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1218104259179&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter
Former Georgian: South Ossetia is like our Golan
Aug. 10, 2008
abe selig , THE JERUSALEM POST
As fighting between Russian and Georgian troops in the breakaway republic of South Ossetia continued to escalate on Sunday, feedback about the conflict from Russian and Georgian-Israelis seemed almost as complicated as the fighting that's raging between their countries.
In Neve Yaakov, a northern Jerusalem suburb home to many Georgian immigrants, support for their country remained high.
"South Ossetia is like our Golan Heights," said Sara Tzur, who was born in Georgia but came to Israel at a young age. "We're like the Israelis, and the Russians are like the Syrians - they want to take a mountainous, beautiful part of country away from us."
Tzur explained that while she has no problem with the Russians living in Israel, she is worried about her family members that remain in Georgia.
"Ninety percent of my family is here," she said, "But a few of them are still there in Gori, which is where a lot of fighting has been going on, we've been in touch with them, but it's hard to say what will be."
Down the street, Mordechai Achyashmini said the situation was troubling.
"I came here in 1974," he said. "And even then, they were fighting over South Ossetia. It comes as no surprise."
But Achyashmini also asserted that he had no problem with Russians or Ossetians, and that the problem was a political one, not ethnic.
"Even there, there were very few problems between us," he said. "The problem now is that a lot of people are being killed and people on both sides are losing family and friends. That is how long wars get started, and if Russia goes all the way in, they will cause a lot of damage."
Another Georgian woman, who preferred to remain unnamed, said she supported her native country but understood the Russian side.
"Georgia has to show that it's strong," she said, but Russia also has to make sure that these smaller countries around her know she is still in control. So I say, at what cost? If Georgia tries to take on Russia, they'll surely lose."
But inside a Russian bookstore in downtown Jerusalem, Baruch Sorokin had a different opinion.
"Ultimately the Russians will lose," he said of his former countrymen. "They say that a man who sits on a tank of gasoline shouldn't smoke, but that's exactly what the Russians are doing, they're sitting on top of Georgia and smoking."
Sorokin explained that in trying to exert their control over former Soviet satellite nations such as Georgia, the Russians were going into a fight that had been smoldering on the Georgian side for years.
While the South Ossetians are loyal to Moscow, Georgians as a whole resent Soviet rule to this day, and align themselves with the West in order to prevent Russian meddling in their affairs.
"Of course the Russians can win militarily," he said. "But they lost control over these regions when the Soviet Union collapsed, so going back and trying to show strength will only cause them distress, in the long-term."
Sorokin also gave three reasons for the current military flare-up, citing the Ossetian issue, political ramifications, including Russian animosity towards the West over what they saw as interference in Kosovo in the 1990's, and thirdly, what Sorokin stressed most of all, oil.
"There's an oil pipeline that runs through Azerbaijan and the Russians want control over it," he said. "If the Georgians gave them that, the Russians would stop fighting and abandon the Ossetians immediately. That's all they really want," he said smiling, "oil."
Nearby, inside the Five Brothers Plus Russian supermarket, other Russian immigrants chimed in.
"The Georgians say the Russians started it, the Russians say the Georgians started it, but who really knows?" asked Nina, as she worked at the butcher counter in the back. "All I know is they're fighting terribly there, and I feel bad for them, I love Georgians, they come in here all the time."
Another woman, Marina from Belarus, said she remembered the hatred for Georgians she heard growing up. "The Russians hate all of them," she said. "The Georgians the Caucasians, the Ossetians, it doesn't matter, they just want to control everyone."
But a second woman behind the butcher counter interrupted her, "You don't know what you're talking about. I'm from Moscow and my son still lives in Moscow, and as bad as they want to make us look, it's the government. The Russian government is doing what they please, the Russian people don't have anything to do with it."
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Rachel,
I'm no military expert, but to the best of my understanding, air power could make a difference right now, and it's the only thing we could have positioned in Georgia anytime soon. As mentioned before, most of our ground forces are kind of busy right now and couldn't be deployed in any significant numbers to make a difference.
Besides, if we own the skies, then it would stop Russia's bombing of Georgian cities quickly.
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Monday, August 11, 2008
The Trouble with Georgia
Ryan suggested that I weigh in on the current conflict in South Ossetia and in the former Soviet republic of Georgia, which I mention in passing in my book as one of the bigger post-Soviet political fiascos.
It turns out that I am somewhat qualified to write on the subject: when I was in grad school (linguistics) I studied Abkhaz, the curious language spoken by the indigenous population of the separatist republic of Abkhazia. (Abkhazia is involved in the current conflict, working to flush Georgian forces out of the Kodor gorge, which is the one piece of their territory that remains under nominal Georgian control, as well as providing volunteers to help the South Ossetian side.) Later, finding that the Abkhaz side was woefully underrepresented, I started a web site, Apsny.org ("Apsny" being the Abkhaz word for Abkhazia), where, with help from Prof. Hewitt of the School of Oriental and African Languages in London, Prof. Chirikba, an Abkhaz linguist, and many others, I tried to present facts uncurried by extreme nationalist sentiments. At that time, the internet was dominated by the Georgian side, which was eager to accuse the Abkhaz of atrocities while discounting their own role in the bloody and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to regain control of the breakaway republic, in which some ten thousand people had died and many more had been displaced. For my diligent service, which spanned more than a decade, I received voluminous hate mail and many death threats from the Georgian side, as well as official expressions of gratitude from the Abkhaz side. Be that as it may, I find both the Georgians and the Abkhaz quite amazing, I am sure that the world would be much poorer without them, and I wish they would leave each other in peace, so that I can go and visit either place as I wish.
For obvious reasons, my view of the Caucasus region has always been colored by my interest in linguistics. While the Caucasus mountains are certainly some of the highest and most impressive in the world, it is also a mountain of exotic and often unrelated languages. While Abkhaz, Chechen, and some others form a single North Caucasian family of languages, Georgian (Kartvelian) is only vaguely related to Basque, spoken in France and in Spain, while Ossetian is distantly related to Persian. For thousands of years, the region has been a mosaic made up of fiercely independent tribes, of which Georgians (Kartvelians) were only one of the largest. This made them more capable of forming a viable political entity (a kingdom, initially), but never could they aspire to dominating their neighbors, to whom they were not even vaguely related, either ethnically or linguistically. And language did play a big role: although bilingualism and even multilingualism were by no means rare, none of the tribes were too eager to learn the language of any other tribe en masse. For instance, prior to their being conquered and absorbed into the Russian Empire, the Chechens were a trilingual society, using Arabic in the mosque, Turkish in the market, and one of the "home languages" in the home village. After the Russian conquest, which was very bloody and resulted in the annihilation of several smaller tribes, among them the Ubykh, who simply would not surrender, the Russian language became the lingua franca of the entire region.
To the conquering Russians, Georgia represented the rich, creamy heart of the incredibly tough nut of the Caucasus region. In contrast to the many small and taciturn mountain tribes, many of them either Moslem or animist, here was an Orthodox Christian nation with great traditions of art, music, architecture, poetry, an unparalleled joie de vivre, and a delicious national cuisine. Georgians easily secured for themselves a pleasant role within the empire. Leaving administrative chores to the Russians and commerce and the trades to the Armenians, they were free to indulge in more pleasant pursuits, such as feasting, falconry, and entertaining foreign visitors. This trend had carried over into Soviet times, making Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic a favored tourist destination, a prosperous place complete with amusing wines, delicious food, an exuberantly friendly population that spoke your language, and majestic mountains for a backdrop. In the interest of maintaining public order, the Russians tried to be even-handed in their treatment of the non-Georgian tribes. Knowing full well just how much trouble they can be, they administered their territories as autonomous units within Georgia. One of the more glaring exceptions to this was the arbitrary administrative inclusion of Abkhazia within Georgia, which was done by Joseph Stalin (Dzhugashvili), who was a Georgian, and which in many ways laid the ground for the current conflict.
Their being so well coddled within the fold of the great empire cultivated in the Georgians a sense of exceptionalism and entitlement vis à vis their smaller and poorer neighbors, which, once the Soviet Union collapsed and the Russians departed, gave rise to a particularly rabid, venomous, and ultimately self-destructive brand of nationalism. The first post-independence Georgian leader, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was killed rather quickly. Part of his nationalist rhetoric involved labeling other tribes, such as the Abkhaz and the Ossetians, as newcomers and gypsies, who are only welcome as "guests" on Georgian soil. Next up was Eduard Shevardnadze, who was Foreign Minister of the USSR under Gorbachev, and who was more or less handed Georgia as his personal fiefdom by the West, as his reward for idly standing by and smiling pleasantly while the Berlin wall was being torn down. He was given UN recognition and foreign aid, and told to go ahead and try to preserve "Georgia's territorial integrity." At this he failed miserably, causing a senseless bloodbath and a flood of refugees. Shevardnadze slowly sank into a morass of corruption and national decay, until finally even the West decided that he smelled bad and unceremoniously replaced him with a shiny new face: the American-educated Mikhail Saakashvili. And this brings us to the current conflict, which he started. It is unclear why he decided to start it, but then his American education might offer a clue: the US doesn't seem to need good reasons to start wars either.
It may be difficult for some people to grasp why it is that the Abkhaz or the Ossetians do not much fancy suddenly becoming Georgian, so let me offer you a precise analogy. Suppose Los Angeles, California, were to collapse as the USSR once did, and East L.A. quickly moved to declare its independence. Suppose, further, that the 88% of its population that is Hispanic/Latino voted that the other 12% were free to stay on as "guests," provided they only spoke Spanish. The teaching of English were to be forbidden. After some bloody skirmishes, East L.A. split up into ethnic enclaves. Then some foreign government (say, Russian, or Chinese) stepped in and started shipping in weapons and providing training to the Latino faction, in support of their efforts to restore East L.A.'s "territorial integrity." As a non-Hispanic resident of East L.A., would you then (1) run and hide, (2) stay and fight, or (3) pick up a copy of "Spanish for Dummies" and start cramming?
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The Abkhaz and the South Ossetians have made their preference very clear by applying for and being issued with a Russian passport. That's right, the majority of the present native population of these two "separatist enclaves" are bona fide citizens of the Russian Federation with all the privileges appertaining thereto. Lacking any other options, they are happy to accept protection from Russia, use Russian as their lingua franca, and fight for their right to be rid of Georgians once and for all. One of the privileges of being a Russian citizen at this stage, when Russia has recovered from its political and economic woes following the Soviet collapse, is that if some foreign entity comes and shells a settlement full of Russian citizens, you can be sure that Russia will open one amazingly huge can of whoop-ass on whoever it feels is responsible. Add to that the atrocities allegedly perpetrated by the Georgian forces, such as finishing off wounded Russian peacekeepers, and you can see why the normally shy and reticent Russian army might get behind the idea of making sure Georgia no longer poses a military threat to anyone. The Georgians have really done it to themselves this time, and we should all feel very sorry for them. They are not evil people, just incredibly misguided by their horrible national politicians. The West, and the US in particular, bear responsibility for enabling this bloodbath by providing them with arms, training, and encouraging them to fight for their "territorial integrity."
This, it will no doubt turn out, was the wrong thing to do. The term "Georgia's territorial integrity" has been bantered about and proffered lamely as an excuse for an untenable status quo for almost two decades now, with poor results. In the meantime, the territorial integrity of another semi-defunct state, Serbia has been sacrificed on the altar of geopolitics. Kosovo, which is Serbia's historical homeland, has been cleansed of Serbians, and alienated from Serbia proper. For those who are vague on the details of that conflict, here is a summary. Kosovo became majority-Albanian due to Albanians' higher birth rate. The Albanians then formed Kosovo Liberation Army, which fought Serbians for independence and lost. Albanians then fled en masse to Albania. The US and NATO then intervened, bombed Kosovo and Serbia, repatriated the refugees, and turned Kosovo into a UN protectorate. The next step from the West's point of view is to recognize Kosovo's independence, taking it away from Serbia forever.
If Kosovo is to Serbia as Abkhazia and South Ossetia are to Georgia, what, you might ask, is the key difference that mandates a different outcome for the latter? Well, there are quite a few (neither is Georgia's historical homeland, both fought for independence and won, both are populated by indigenous tribes rather than newcomers from across the border), but the most salient seems to be this one: Serbia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia are all BAD (aligned with Moscow) while Georgia is GOOD (aligned with the West and US, and wants to join NATO). Morality, which, I am sure, underpins Western and US foreign policy, dictates that the bad be punished, and the good rewarded. I submit to you that such self-serving logic is a political dead end, and that if senseless bloodshed is to be stopped and peace is to be restored to the Caucasus, Western and US leaders will have to activate several additional brain cells, and stop mindlessly repeating the meaningless phrase "Georgia's territorial integrity."
http://cluborlov.blogspot.com/
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Funny enough, Beslan is located in North Ossetia. I have studied the Chechens as well, still I had no clue as to the complexities of this region's ethnicities and history.
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@GM: That was a very interesting piece, wasn't it?
@Rachel: We appreciate your posts from Israeli sources.
From a very different POV, here's the WSJ:
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Vladimir Bonaparte
August 12, 2008; Page A20
The farther Russia's tanks roll into Georgia, the more the world is beginning to see the reality of Vladimir Putin's Napoleonic ambitions. Having consolidated his authoritarian transition as Prime Minister with a figurehead President, Mr. Putin is now pushing to reassert Russian dominance in Eurasia. Ukraine is in his sights, and even the Baltic states could be threatened if he's allowed to get away with it. The West needs to draw a line at Georgia.
No matter who fired the first shot last week in the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia, Moscow is using the separatist issue as an excuse to demolish Georgia's military and, if possible, depose its democratically elected government. Russian forces moved ever deeper into Georgia proper Monday. They launched a second front in the west from another breakaway province, Abkhazia, and took the central city of Gori, which lies 40 miles from the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. These moves slice the country in half and isolate its ports, most of which Russia has bombed or blockaded. Moscow dismissed a cease-fire drawn up by European nations and signed by Georgia.
Russian bombers have also hit residential and industrial areas, making a mockery of Moscow's charge that Georgia is the party indiscriminately killing civilians. Russian claims of Georgian ethnic cleansing now look like well-rehearsed propaganda lines to justify a well-prepared invasion. Thousands of soldiers and hundreds of tanks, ships and warplanes were waiting for Mr. Putin's command.
While the rape of Chechnya was brutal, this is the most brazen act of Mr. Putin's reign, the first military offensive outside Russia's borders since Soviet rule ended. Yet it also fits a pattern of other threats and affronts to Russia's neighbors: turning off the oil or natural-gas taps to Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and even to NATO-member Lithuania; launching a cyberassault on Estonia; opposing two antimissile sites in NATO members in Eastern Europe that couldn't begin to neutralize Russia's offensive capabilities.
Our emphasis on NATO here is no coincidence. The Georgia invasion is a direct slap at the Western alliance. Tbilisi, like Kiev, has been pushing for NATO membership. Mr. Putin decided to act while some alliance members, led by Germany, dallied over their applications. Georgia was first. Ukraine, which has been pushing Russia to move its Black Sea fleet's headquarters out of the Crimea, could be next.
The alliance needs to respond forcefully, and it can start today. NATO officials have granted Russia a special meeting before deciding what to do about Georgia -- though we don't recall Russia briefing NATO about its plans in the Caucasus. The meeting is an opportunity to relay to Moscow that Georgian and Ukrainian membership is back on the table and that the alliance is considering all options for Georgia, from a humanitarian airlift to military aid, if Russia doesn't withdraw immediately.
Mr. Putin is betting that the West needs him for oil and deterring Iran's nuclear ambitions more than he needs the West. He's wrong -- not least since his "cooperation" on Iran consists of helping Tehran stall for time and selling the mullahs advanced antiaircraft missiles. Russia also needs the West's capital and especially its expertise in developing its oil and gas fields at least as much as the West needs Russian energy supplies.
The U.S. and Europe need to make all of that clear. Forcing Russia to veto a strong condemnation of its own actions at the U.N. Security Council would be one way to turn the pressure up. And speaking of pressure, where are all the peace protesters during this war? They can't all be in China.
As for the U.S., this is perhaps the last chance for President Bush to salvage any kind of positive legacy toward Russia, amid what is a useful record elsewhere in Eurasia. While Mr. Bush has championed the region's fledgling democracies, he and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice badly misjudged Mr. Putin. Now would be a good moment for Mr. Bush to publicly acknowledge his misjudgment and rally the West's response.
John McCain had the Russian leader pegged better, which speaks well of his foreign-policy instincts. The Republican Presidential candidate has long said that Russia should be booted from the G-8 and yesterday he outlined a forceful Western strategy on Russia that stops short of military action. Barack Obama has in the past indicated support for the Georgia and Ukraine NATO bids, but the Democratic candidate has yet to explain in any detail how he would respond to the current conflict.
There's one other way the U.S. could hit Russia where it hurts: by strengthening the dollar. The greenback's weakness has contributed greatly to the record oil prices that have in turn made Russia flush with petrodollars and fueled Mr. Putin's expansionist ambitions. Crude prices continued to fall yesterday, below $115 a barrel, and further deflating that bubble would do more to sober up an oil-drunk Kremlin than would any kind of economic sanctions.
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Vladimir Putin's Russia isn't the former Soviet Union, bent on ideological confrontation around the world. But it is a Bonapartist power intent on dominating its neighbors and restoring its clout on the world stage. Unless Russians see that there are costs for their Napoleon's expansionism, Georgia isn't likely to be his last stop.
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And one more, this from the ever thoughtful Stratfor:
The war between Georgia and Russia appears to be drawing to a close. There were Russian air attacks on Georgia on Sunday and some fighting in South Ossetia, and the Russians sank a Georgian missile boat. But as the day ended the Russians declared themselves ready to make peace with Georgia, and U.N. officials said the Georgians were ready to complete the withdrawal of their forces from South Ossetia.
At this point, the Russians have achieved what they wanted to achieve, quite apart from assuring South Ossetia’s autonomy. First, they have driven home the fact that in the end, they are the dominant power not only in the Caucasus but also around their entire periphery. Alliance with the United States or training with foreign advisers ultimately means little; it is not even clear what the United States or NATO would have been able to do if Georgia had been a member of the alliance. That lesson is not for the benefit of Georgia, but for Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, and even Poland and the Czech Republic. The Russians have made it clear that, at least at this moment in history, they can operate on their periphery effectively and therefore their neighbors should not be indifferent to Russian wishes.
The second lesson was for the Americans and Europeans to consider. The Russians had asked that Kosovo not be granted independence. The Russians were prepared to accept autonomy but they did not want the map of Europe to be redrawn; they made it clear that once that starts, not only will it not end, but the Russians would feel free to redraw the map themselves. The Americans and Europeans went forward anyway, making the assumption that the Russians would have no choice but to live with that decision. The Russian response to the Georgian attack on South Ossetia drives home the point that the Russians are again a force to be reckoned with.
There has been sharp rhetoric from American and European officials, but that rhetoric can’t be matched with military action. The Europeans are too militarily weak to have any options, and the Americans have quite enough on their plates without getting involved in a war in Georgia. In some ways the rhetoric makes the Russians look even stronger than they actually are. The intensity of the rhetoric contrasted with the paucity of action is striking.
The Americans in particular have another problem. Iran is infinitely more important to them than Georgia, and they need Russian help in Iran. Specifically, they need the Russians not to sell the Iranians weapons. In particular, they do not want the Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles delivered to the Iranians. In addition, they want the Russians to join in possible sanctions against Iran. Russia has a number of ways to thwart U.S. policy not only in Iran, but also in Afghanistan and Syria. These are areas of fundamental concern to the United States, and confronting the Russians on Georgia is a risky business. The Russians can counter in ways that are extremely painful to the United States.
There is talk that the Russians might want a new government in Georgia. That is probably so, but the Russians have already achieved their most important goals. They have made it clear to their neighbors that a relationship with the West does not provide security if Russia’s interests are threatened. They have made it clear to the West that ignoring Russian wishes carries a price. And finally, they have made it clear to everyone that the Russian military, which was in catastrophic shape five years ago, is sufficiently healed to carry out a complex combined-arms operation including land, air and naval components. Granted it was against a small country, but there were many ways in which the operation could have been bungled. It wasn’t. Russia is not a superpower, but it is certainly no longer a military cripple. Delivering that message, in the end, might have been the most important to Russia.
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I'm reminded of a Chinese phrase "Kill the chicken to scare the monkey". It strikes me that this may be exactly how China moves on Taiwan. A blitzkrieg while the free world dithers.
Best line I saw about this: "A Tsar is born. "
I'm curious to see how much Obama's standing in the polls was affected by this crisis.
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I agree completely that China must be getting ideas.
Here's a bigger thought piece from Stratfor:
The Russian invasion of Georgia has not changed the balance of power in Eurasia. It simply announced that the balance of power had already shifted. The United States has been absorbed in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as potential conflict with Iran and a destabilizing situation in Pakistan. It has no strategic ground forces in reserve and is in no position to intervene on the Russian periphery. This, as we have argued, has opened a window of opportunity for the Russians to reassert their influence in the former Soviet sphere. Moscow did not have to concern itself with the potential response of the United States or Europe; hence, the invasion did not shift the balance of power. The balance of power had already shifted, and it was up to the Russians when to make this public. They did that Aug. 8.
Let’s begin simply by reviewing the last few days.
On the night of Thursday, Aug. 7, forces of the Republic of Georgia drove across the border of South Ossetia, a secessionist region of Georgia that has functioned as an independent entity since the fall of the Soviet Union. The forces drove on to the capital, Tskhinvali, which is close to the border. Georgian forces got bogged down while trying to take the city. In spite of heavy fighting, they never fully secured the city, nor the rest of South Ossetia.
On the morning of Aug. 8, Russian forces entered South Ossetia, using armored and motorized infantry forces along with air power. South Ossetia was informally aligned with Russia, and Russia acted to prevent the region’s absorption by Georgia. Given the speed with which the Russians responded — within hours of the Georgian attack — the Russians were expecting the Georgian attack and were themselves at their jumping-off points. The counterattack was carefully planned and competently executed, and over the next 48 hours, the Russians succeeded in defeating the main Georgian force and forcing a retreat. By Sunday, Aug. 10, the Russians had consolidated their position in South Ossetia.
(click image to enlarge)
On Monday, the Russians extended their offensive into Georgia proper, attacking on two axes. One was south from South Ossetia to the Georgian city of Gori. The other drive was from Abkhazia, another secessionist region of Georgia aligned with the Russians. This drive was designed to cut the road between the Georgian capital of Tbilisi and its ports. By this point, the Russians had bombed the military airfields at Marneuli and Vaziani and appeared to have disabled radars at the international airport in Tbilisi. These moves brought Russian forces to within 40 miles of the Georgian capital, while making outside reinforcement and resupply of Georgian forces extremely difficult should anyone wish to undertake it.
The Mystery Behind the Georgian Invasion
In this simple chronicle, there is something quite mysterious: Why did the Georgians choose to invade South Ossetia on Thursday night? There had been a great deal of shelling by the South Ossetians of Georgian villages for the previous three nights, but while possibly more intense than usual, artillery exchanges were routine. The Georgians might not have fought well, but they committed fairly substantial forces that must have taken at the very least several days to deploy and supply. Georgia’s move was deliberate.
The United States is Georgia’s closest ally. It maintained about 130 military advisers in Georgia, along with civilian advisers, contractors involved in all aspects of the Georgian government and people doing business in Georgia. It is inconceivable that the Americans were unaware of Georgia’s mobilization and intentions. It is also inconceivable that the Americans were unaware that the Russians had deployed substantial forces on the South Ossetian frontier. U.S. technical intelligence, from satellite imagery and signals intelligence to unmanned aerial vehicles, could not miss the fact that thousands of Russian troops were moving to forward positions. The Russians clearly knew the Georgians were ready to move. How could the United States not be aware of the Russians? Indeed, given the posture of Russian troops, how could intelligence analysts have missed the possibility that the Russians had laid a trap, hoping for a Georgian invasion to justify its own counterattack?
It is very difficult to imagine that the Georgians launched their attack against U.S. wishes. The Georgians rely on the United States, and they were in no position to defy it. This leaves two possibilities. The first is a massive breakdown in intelligence, in which the United States either was unaware of the existence of Russian forces, or knew of the Russian forces but — along with the Georgians — miscalculated Russia’s intentions. The United States, along with other countries, has viewed Russia through the prism of the 1990s, when the Russian military was in shambles and the Russian government was paralyzed. The United States has not seen Russia make a decisive military move beyond its borders since the Afghan war of the 1970s-1980s. The Russians had systematically avoided such moves for years. The United States had assumed that the Russians would not risk the consequences of an invasion.
If this was the case, then it points to the central reality of this situation: The Russians had changed dramatically, along with the balance of power in the region. They welcomed the opportunity to drive home the new reality, which was that they could invade Georgia and the United States and Europe could not respond. As for risk, they did not view the invasion as risky. Militarily, there was no counter. Economically, Russia is an energy exporter doing quite well — indeed, the Europeans need Russian energy even more than the Russians need to sell it to them. Politically, as we shall see, the Americans needed the Russians more than the Russians needed the Americans. Moscow’s calculus was that this was the moment to strike. The Russians had been building up to it for months, as we have discussed, and they struck.
The Western Encirclement of Russia
To understand Russian thinking, we need to look at two events. The first is the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. From the U.S. and European point of view, the Orange Revolution represented a triumph of democracy and Western influence. From the Russian point of view, as Moscow made clear, the Orange Revolution was a CIA-funded intrusion into the internal affairs of Ukraine, designed to draw Ukraine into NATO and add to the encirclement of Russia. U.S. Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton had promised the Russians that NATO would not expand into the former Soviet Union empire.
That promise had already been broken in 1998 by NATO’s expansion to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic — and again in the 2004 expansion, which absorbed not only the rest of the former Soviet satellites in what is now Central Europe, but also the three Baltic states, which had been components of the Soviet Union.
The Russians had tolerated all that, but the discussion of including Ukraine in NATO represented a fundamental threat to Russia’s national security. It would have rendered Russia indefensible and threatened to destabilize the Russian Federation itself. When the United States went so far as to suggest that Georgia be included as well, bringing NATO deeper into the Caucasus, the Russian conclusion — publicly stated — was that the United States in particular intended to encircle and break Russia.
The second and lesser event was the decision by Europe and the United States to back Kosovo’s separation from Serbia. The Russians were friendly with Serbia, but the deeper issue for Russia was this: The principle of Europe since World War II was that, to prevent conflict, national borders would not be changed. If that principle were violated in Kosovo, other border shifts — including demands by various regions for independence from Russia — might follow. The Russians publicly and privately asked that Kosovo not be given formal independence, but instead continue its informal autonomy, which was the same thing in practical terms. Russia’s requests were ignored.
From the Ukrainian experience, the Russians became convinced that the United States was engaged in a plan of strategic encirclement and strangulation of Russia. From the Kosovo experience, they concluded that the United States and Europe were not prepared to consider Russian wishes even in fairly minor affairs. That was the breaking point. If Russian desires could not be accommodated even in a minor matter like this, then clearly Russia and the West were in conflict. For the Russians, as we said, the question was how to respond. Having declined to respond in Kosovo, the Russians decided to respond where they had all the cards: in South Ossetia.
Moscow had two motives, the lesser of which was as a tit-for-tat over Kosovo. If Kosovo could be declared independent under Western sponsorship, then South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two breakaway regions of Georgia, could be declared independent under Russian sponsorship. Any objections from the United States and Europe would simply confirm their hypocrisy. This was important for internal Russian political reasons, but the second motive was far more important.
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin once said that the fall of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical disaster. This didn’t mean that he wanted to retain the Soviet state; rather, it meant that the disintegration of the Soviet Union had created a situation in which Russian national security was threatened by Western interests. As an example, consider that during the Cold War, St. Petersburg was about 1,200 miles away from a NATO country. Today it is about 60 miles away from Estonia, a NATO member. The disintegration of the Soviet Union had left Russia surrounded by a group of countries hostile to Russian interests in various degrees and heavily influenced by the United States, Europe and, in some cases, China.
Resurrecting the Russian Sphere
Putin did not want to re-establish the Soviet Union, but he did want to re-establish the Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union region. To accomplish that, he had to do two things. First, he had to re-establish the credibility of the Russian army as a fighting force, at least in the context of its region. Second, he had to establish that Western guarantees, including NATO membership, meant nothing in the face of Russian power. He did not want to confront NATO directly, but he did want to confront and defeat a power that was closely aligned with the United States, had U.S. support, aid and advisers and was widely seen as being under American protection. Georgia was the perfect choice.
By invading Georgia as Russia did (competently if not brilliantly), Putin re-established the credibility of the Russian army. But far more importantly, by doing this Putin revealed an open secret: While the United States is tied down in the Middle East, American guarantees have no value. This lesson is not for American consumption. It is something that, from the Russian point of view, the Ukrainians, the Balts and the Central Asians need to digest. Indeed, it is a lesson Putin wants to transmit to Poland and the Czech Republic as well. The United States wants to place ballistic missile defense installations in those countries, and the Russians want them to understand that allowing this to happen increases their risk, not their security.
The Russians knew the United States would denounce their attack. This actually plays into Russian hands. The more vocal senior leaders are, the greater the contrast with their inaction, and the Russians wanted to drive home the idea that American guarantees are empty talk.
The Russians also know something else that is of vital importance: For the United States, the Middle East is far more important than the Caucasus, and Iran is particularly important. The United States wants the Russians to participate in sanctions against Iran. Even more importantly, they do not want the Russians to sell weapons to Iran, particularly the highly effective S-300 air defense system. Georgia is a marginal issue to the United States; Iran is a central issue. The Russians are in a position to pose serious problems for the United States not only in Iran, but also with weapons sales to other countries, like Syria.
Therefore, the United States has a problem — it either must reorient its strategy away from the Middle East and toward the Caucasus, or it has to seriously limit its response to Georgia to avoid a Russian counter in Iran. Even if the United States had an appetite for another war in Georgia at this time, it would have to calculate the Russian response in Iran — and possibly in Afghanistan (even though Moscow’s interests there are currently aligned with those of Washington).
In other words, the Russians have backed the Americans into a corner. The Europeans, who for the most part lack expeditionary militaries and are dependent upon Russian energy exports, have even fewer options. If nothing else happens, the Russians will have demonstrated that they have resumed their role as a regional power. Russia is not a global power by any means, but a significant regional power with lots of nuclear weapons and an economy that isn’t all too shabby at the moment. It has also compelled every state on the Russian periphery to re-evaluate its position relative to Moscow. As for Georgia, the Russians appear ready to demand the resignation of President Mikhail Saakashvili. Militarily, that is their option. That is all they wanted to demonstrate, and they have demonstrated it.
The war in Georgia, therefore, is Russia’s public return to great power status. This is not something that just happened — it has been unfolding ever since Putin took power, and with growing intensity in the past five years. Part of it has to do with the increase of Russian power, but a great deal of it has to do with the fact that the Middle Eastern wars have left the United States off-balance and short on resources. As we have written, this conflict created a window of opportunity. The Russian goal is to use that window to assert a new reality throughout the region while the Americans are tied down elsewhere and dependent on the Russians. The war was far from a surprise; it has been building for months. But the geopolitical foundations of the war have been building since 1992. Russia has been an empire for centuries. The last 15 years or so were not the new reality, but simply an aberration that would be rectified. And now it is being rectified.
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I hope I do not overload, but here is another-- this one forwarded to me by a friend in Germany. He comments that he disagrees with the idea that Merkel is friendly to Putin, but on the whole thinks the piece sound.
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http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article4488503.ece
August 9, 2008
How Georgia fell into its enemies' trap
The fighting in the Caucasus should be a deafening wake-up call to the West
Edward Lucas
When is a victory not a victory? When it dents your country's image, scares your allies and gets you into an unwinnable war with a hugely stronger opponent.
That is the bleak outlook for Georgia this weekend, after what initially looked like a quick military win against the separatist regime in South Ossetia. Georgia's attack followed weeks of escalating provocations, including hours of heavy shelling by the Russian-backed breakaway province and signs of large-scale Russian reinforcement.
Thanks to American military aid, Georgia's 18,000-strong armed forces are the best-trained and equipped fighting force in the Caucasus. But it is one thing for them to defeat the raggle-taggle militia of a tinpot place like South Ossetia (population 70,000). It is another for a country of less than five million people to take on Russia (population 142 million). Now the Kremlin is reacting strongly. Russian warplanes are reportedly striking targets in Georgia. Reinforcements are pouring in. And the Kremlin's mighty propaganda machine is lumbering into action while a cyber-attack appears to have crippled Georgia's websites.
For it is the information war, not what happens on the ground, that will determine the victor of this conflict. Russia is portraying Georgia as the aggressor, an intransigent and unpredictable country determined to restore its supremacy over an unwilling province by means of military force and “ethnic cleansing”. Such a country, clearly, would be unfit to receive Western support.
Background
Russia and Georgia on brink of war
Georgia pounds Russian-backed rebels
Tensions for Nato over Georgia and Ukraine
Analysis: global energy threatened by conflict
That seems to be working. European leaders have long been dubious about Mikhail Saakashvili, a charismatic US-educated lawyer who stormed to power in the Rose Revolution of 2005. Where the fans of the Georgian President see charm and brains, his critics - such as the German Chancellor Angela Merkel - see a dangerously headstrong and erratic leader. A crackdown on the Opposition in November, bullying of the media and instances of abuse of power among senior officials have allowed detractors to draw uncomfortable parallels between Georgia and Vladimir Putin's Russia.
These are misplaced: Georgia is not perfect, but it is not a dictatorship. Its leadership does not peddle a phoney ideology, such as the Kremlin's mishmash of Soviet nostalgia and tsarist-era chauvinism. It has a thriving civil society, vocal opposition and ardently wants to be in the EU and Nato. Moral grounds alone would be enough reason for supporting it against Russian aggression.
But on top of that is a vital Western interest. The biggest threat Russia poses to Europe is the Kremlin's monopoly on energy export routes to the West from the former Soviet Union. The one breach in that is the oil and gas pipeline that leads from energy-rich Azerbaijan to Turkey, across Georgia. If Georgia falls, Europe's hopes of energy independence from Russia fall too.
Yet the West is both divided and distracted. America will be furious if reports turn out to be true that Russian warplanes bombed an airfield where Pentagon military advisers are based. But a lame-duck president is not going to risk World War Three for Georgia. In Europe, Georgia's allies are mostly small ex-communist states such as Lithuania; heavily outnumbered by those such as Germany that prize their relations with Russia, seemingly, above all else. It seems Russia is ready to hit back hard, in the hope of squashing the West's pestilential protégé.
In short, it looks more and more as though Georgia has fallen in to its enemies' trap. The script went like this: first mount unbearable provocations, then wait for a response, and finally reply with overwhelming military force and diplomatic humiliation. The idea that Georgia sought this war is nonsense. Recovering control of South Ossetia from its Russian-backed rulers has been a top priority for the Georgian authorities for years. But nobody thought it would come by military means. The Georgian strategy had been to use soft power, underlining its prosperity and the corruption-
busting successes of Mr Saakashvili's rule. That contrasted sharply with the isolation and cronyism of South Ossetia, which survives only on smuggling and Russian subsidies.
Now that strategy is in ruins. As things stand, Georgia will be fighting not to regain South Ossetia or even to deter aggression, but to survive. It is hard to see any good outcome. Georgia has failed to win a quick victory: crucially, it failed to block the Roki tunnel under the Caucasus mountains, normally used as a smugglers' highway, but now the route for Russian heavy weapons that Georgia cannot counter for long. Worse, the authorities in Abkhazia, Georgia's other breakaway region, may mount an attack, either on its own or with Russian help.
The fighting should be a deafening wake-up call to the West. Our fatal mistake was made at the Nato summit in Bucharest in April, when Georgia's attempt to get a clear path to membership of the alliance was rebuffed. Mr Saakashvili warned us then that Russia would take advantage of any display of Western weakness or indecision. And it has.
Edward Lucas is the author of The New Cold War (Bloomsbury)
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I agree with those assessments. We Fcuk'ed up badly. :|
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The way I see it, the world currently has three superpowers, America, Russia and China. The rest of the world including EU, Africa. the Middle East, Latin America, etc, are just fillers with no real power (NATO has a serious lack of testosterone). Each superpower has its sphere of influence which also acts as its security buffer. Tibet belongs to China, The Caucasus belongs to Russia and the Caribbean belongs to the USA. Cuba is a curious exception and it is socialist only because whoever was in charge of the Bay of Pigs invasion made a major botch of it to the point of forcing Kennedy into the undesirable position of having to trade trucks, busses, spare parts and other hardware for the Bay of Pigs prisoners of war.
America did not help Hungary in 1956 and it did not help Czechoslovakia later. On the other hand America did help Britain to regain the Falklands from Argentina. If the Georgians expected help from America or the EU they were badly mistaken because neither party is in a position to take on the Russians. The most Bush could and did do was to fire off speech number 15 which was promptly ignored by Putin and company, the people who were calling the moves in this particular game.
This particular incident calls for the intervention by the UN, the perfect cover for talking loudly and doing nothing.
This is how I see it from my rather cynical sideline.
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Welcome Back
To the Great Game
By MELIK KAYLAN
August 13, 2008; Page A17
Last year, President Mikheil Saakashvili invited me along on a helicopter flight to see Tskhinvali, South Ossetia's capital, from the air. We viewed it at some distance to avoid Russian antiaircraft missiles manned by Russian personnel.
He pointed out a lone hilltop sprinkled with houses some 10 miles inside Georgian territory -- scarcely even a town. Much of the population, namely the Georgians, had long ago been purged by Russian-backed militias, leaving behind a rump population of Ossetian farmers and Russian security forces posing as Ossetians. "We have offered them everything," he said, "language rights, land rights, guaranteed power in parliament, anything they want, and they would take it, if the Kremlin would let them."
AP
Russian armed vehicles en route to Tskhinvali, Aug. 9, 2008.
Moscow's thin pretense of protecting an ethnic group provided just enough cover for Georgia's timorous friends in the West to ignore increasing Russian provocations over the past few years. Moscow, it now seems, intends to "protect" large numbers of Georgians too -- by occupying and killing them if that's what it takes -- and prevent them from building their own history and pursuing their democratic destiny, as it has for almost two centuries.
As we worry about another Russian imperialist adventure in Georgia, we shouldn't lose sight of the bigger picture either: To wit, Moscow has always had a clear strategic use for the Caucasus, one that concerns the U.S. today more than ever.
Having overestimated the power of the Soviet Union in its last years, we have consistently underestimated the ambitions of Russia since. Already, a great deal has been said about the implications of Russia's invasion for Ukraine, the Baltic States and Europe generally. But few have noticed the direct strategic threat of Moscow's action to U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Kremlin is not about to reignite the Cold War for the love of a few thousand Ossetians or even for its animosity toward five million Georgians. This is calculated strategic maneuvering. And make no mistake, it's about countering U.S. power at its furthest stretch with Moscow's power very close to home.
The pivotal geography of the Caucasus offers the Kremlin just such an opportunity. Look at a map, and the East-meets-West, North-meets-South vector lines of the region illustrate all too clearly how the drama now unfolding in the Caucasus casts Moscow's shadow all across Central Asia and down into the Middle East. In effect, we in the West are being challenged by Russian actions in Georgia to show that we have the nerve and the stamina to secure the gains not just of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but of the entire collapse of Soviet power.
Between Russia and Iran, in the lower Caucasus, sits a small wedge of independent soil -- namely, the soil of Azerbaijan and Georgia combined. Through those two countries runs the immensely important Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which delivers precious oil circuitously from Azerbaijan to Turkey and out to the world. This is important not just because of the actual oil being delivered free of interference from Russia and Iran and the Middle East, but also for symbolic reasons. It says to the world that if any former Moscow colonies wish to sell their wares to the West directly, they have a right to do so, and the West will support that right. According to Georgian authorities, Russian warplanes have tried to demolish the Georgian leg of that pipeline several times in the last days. Their message cannot be clearer.
Besides their own pipeline, Georgia and Azerbaijan offer a fragile strategic conduit between the West and the "stans" of Central Asia -- including Afghanistan -- an area that the Soviets once controlled in toto. We should remember that an isolated Central Asia means an isolated Afghanistan. Look at the countries surrounding Afghanistan -- all former Soviet colonies, then Iran, then Pakistan.
The natural resources of Central Asia, from Turkmenistan's natural gas to Kazakhstan's abundant oil, cannot reach the West free of Russia and Iran except through that narrow conduit in the Caucasus. Moscow's former colonies in Central Asia are Afghanistan's most desirable trading partners. They are watching the strife in Georgia closely. It will tell them whether or not they will enter the world's free markets without a Russian chokehold on their future -- or, whether they, and their economies, are doomed for the foreseeable future to remain colonies in all but name. And it won't be long before Moscow dictates to them exactly how to isolate Kabul. Moscow is perfectly aware, even if we are not, that choking off the bottleneck in the Caucasus gives Iran and Russia much say over our efforts in Afghanistan.
In Iraq too, the Kremlin's projection of power down through Georgia will soon be felt. Take another look at the map. If Russia is allowed to extend its reach southwards, as in Soviet times, down the Caucasus to Iran's borders, Moscow can support Iran in any showdown with the West. Iran, thus emboldened, will likely attempt to reassert itself in Iraq, Syria and, via Hezbollah, in Lebanon.
We could walk away from this challenge, hoping for things to cool off, and let the Russians impose sway over the lower Caucasus for now. But no one will fail to notice our weakness. If we don't draw the line here, it doesn't get easier down the road with any other border or country. We would be risking the future of Afghanistan, and the stability of Iraq, on the good will of Moscow and the mullahs in Tehran. This is how the game of grand strategy is played, whether we like it or not.
Mr. Kaylan is a New York-based writer who has reported often from Georgia.
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Bush and Georgia
August 13, 2008; Page A16
On June 13, 1948, the day after the Soviet Union took the first step in its blockade of Berlin, U.S. General Lucius Clay sent a cable to Washington making the case for standing up to the Soviets. "We are convinced that our remaining in Berlin is essential to our prestige in Germany and in Europe. Whether for good or bad, it has become a symbol of the American intent." The Berlin Airlift began 13 days later.
Sixty years on, U.S. credibility is again on the line as the Bush Administration stumbles to respond to the Russian invasion of Georgia. So far the Administration has been missing in action, to put it mildly. The strategic objective is twofold: to prevent Moscow from going further to topple Georgia's democratic government in the coming days, and to deter future Russian aggression.
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President Bush finally condemned Russia's actions on Monday after a weekend of Olympics tourism in Beijing while Georgia burned. Meanwhile, the State Department dispatched a mid-level official to Tbilisi, and unnamed Administration officials carped to the press that Washington had warned Georgia not to provoke Moscow. That's hardly a show of solidarity with a Eurasian democracy that has supported the U.S. in Iraq with 2,000 troops.
Compared to this August U.S. lethargy, the French look like Winston Churchill. In Moscow yesterday, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, acting as president of the European Union, got Russia to agree to a provisional cease-fire that could return both parties' troops to their positions before the conflict started. His next stop was Tbilisi, on the heels of a visit from Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner.
If both sides agree to a cease-fire, Mr. Sarkozy promises that Europe will consider sending peacekeepers to enforce it. We trust he will find volunteers from the former Soviet republics, which see the writing on the wall if Russian aggression in Georgia is left unchallenged. The leaders of Poland, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia flew to Tbilisi this week in a show of solidarity.
NATO also met yesterday and denounced the invasion, while stopping short of promising military aid to Georgia. Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said the allies "condemned and deplored [Russia's] excessive, disproportionate use of force," and demanded a return to the status quo ante.
The NATO leader also said Georgia's potential membership remains "very much alive" and that it would be a member of NATO one day. Georgia and Ukraine's applications come up again in December, and perhaps even Germany, which blocked their membership bids earlier this year, will now rethink its objections given that its refusal may have encouraged Russia to assume it could reassert control over its "near abroad."
Much as it respects and owes Georgia, the U.S. is not going to war with Russia over a non-NATO ally. But there are forceful diplomatic and economic responses at its disposal. Expelling Russia from the G-8 group of democracies, as John McCain has suggested, is one. Barring Russia's long desired entry into the World Trade Organization is another. Russian leaders should also be told that their financial assets held abroad aren't off limits to sanction. And Moscow should know that the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi on the Black Sea are in jeopardy. A country that starts a war on the weekend the Beijing Olympics began doesn't deserve such an honor.
The Georgian people also deserve U.S. support. One way to demonstrate that would be a "Tbilisi airlift," ferrying military and humanitarian supplies to the Georgian capital, which is currently cut off by Russian troops from its Black Sea port. Secretary of State Rice or Defense Secretary Robert Gates should be in one of the first planes. After the fighting ends, the U.S. can lead the recovery effort. And since the Russians are demanding his ouster, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili deserves U.S. support too. Moscow wants a puppet leader in Tbilisi, and U.S. officials are playing into Valdimir Putin's hands with their media whispers that this is all Mr. Saakashvili's fault.
Reshaping U.S. policy toward Russia will take longer than the months between now and January 20, when a new President takes office. But Mr. Bush can at least atone for his earlier misjudgments about Mr. Putin and steer policy in a new direction that his successor would have to deal with. If that successor is Barack Obama, this is an opportunity to shape a crucial foreign policy issue for a novice who could very well go in the wrong direction.
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The alternative is ending Mr. Bush's tenure on a Carter-esque note of weakness. To paraphrase General Clay: Whether for good or bad, how the U.S. responds to Russia's aggression in Georgia has become a symbol of American credibility. By trying to Finlandize if not destroy Georgia, Moscow is sending a message that, in its part of the world, being close to Washington can be fatal. If Mr. Bush doesn't revisit his Russian failures, the rout of Georgia will stand as the embarrassing coda to his Presidency.
See all of today's editorials and op-eds, plus video commentary, on Opinion Journal.
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A Georgian-Russian Peace Deal and the French Connection
August 13, 2008
According to French President Nicholas Sarkozy, an agreement has been crafted that would end the war between Russia and Georgia and creating a framework for implementing a peace plan. According to Russian media, Russia has agreed to a cease-fire and a withdrawal from Georgian territory. Russian troops would continue to be based in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while Georgia would agree not to use force and would permit humanitarian aid into areas of conflict. Georgia would also agree to the start of international talks on the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia has not agreed to this yet, but Sarkozy’s next stop is Tbilisi where he will put the proposal in front of the Georgian government.
The proposal boils down to this. Militarily, both sides will return to the status quo ante. However, now there will be Georgian and international recognition of the right of Russian troops, called peacekeepers, to be stationed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Most important, Georgia will agree to formal discussions on the status of these two regions. That means that Georgia acknowledges that their status is not settled but is subject to negotiation. Implicitly that recognizes that Georgian claims to the two regions as integral parts of Georgia are suspended pending negotiation. Georgia, in effect, would formally give up the right to unilaterally decide the future of regions inside its own borders.
The Georgians now have a problem. If they accept these terms, they are in practice accepting the redrawing of Georgia’s borders. In any negotiation involving the Ossetians, Abkhazians or Russians, no one will agree to return these regions to Georgian control. Given the military reality of the presence of Russian troops, Georgia’s wishes will be irrelevant. On one hand, all this does is continue the de facto situation of the last 16 years. On the other, it forces the Georgians to cross a psychological and political line, similar to what Serbia faced with the independence of Kosovo. This is the Russian intent.
However, if the Georgians reject the plan outright, they appear to be intransigent in the face of hard reality. If they put Sarkozy in the position of having to return to Moscow without a Georgian agreement, they have no assurance of continued mediation — let alone protection against the Russians, who are still on Georgian soil and who hold the upper hand militarily. Without a long-term cease-fire, the Russians are free to resume combat operations, this time with the excuse that Georgia has rejected their attempts to offer peace terms that seemed reasonable to the president of France and the European Union. The Georgians might make a counteroffer, but it is unlikely that Sarkozy wants to play shuttle diplomacy between Moscow and Tbilisi, and it is unlikely that the Georgians are going to get a better deal.
They face a stark choice: accept the idea that South Ossetia and Abkhazia will not return to Georgian rule, or resume fighting — only this time they will also appear to have torpedoed a chance for peace rather than accept the status quo that existed before. It will be hard for the Georgians to accept this arrangement, but it will be impossible for them to refuse. This will create a political crisis in Georgia that will focus on the judgments made by Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili. The Russian desire to see him replaced might come true democratically, as the romance of resistance fades into the bitterness of defeat.
The United States has expressed satisfaction with the evolution of events in Georgia. Having made suitable gestures of disapproval, the United States is quite happy to see the crisis ended. This will of course generate major repercussions in the region — a crisis of confidence in guarantees from the West in general and from Washington in particular. This will be particularly intense in Ukraine, which sees itself as an American ally, and in the Baltics, which are members of NATO. All are under Russian pressure to some extent and all are questioning the value of Western guarantees.
In some ways, the willingness of Sarkozy to negotiate a settlement and deliver it to the Georgians makes the situation worse. It is clear that France, the United States and the rest of the Western alliance have no appetite for confronting Russia over Georgia. Sarkozy’s eagerness to put an end to the conflict without protecting Georgia’s territorial claims makes perfect sense under the circumstances, but it can also be seen as an eagerness to end the war and return relations with Russia to their prior state.
There are some extreme measures NATO could take, from forward-deploying substantial forces in the Baltics to announcing the admission of Ukraine and even Georgia into NATO or at the least deploying some troops to Georgia. The agreement does not seem to preclude the latter. So the United States might deploy a small number of troops to Georgia to guarantee its future security against Russia. The problem with this is that it comes after the crisis, not during, and that Russia doesn’t seem to be easily impressed these days.
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Aug 14, 2008 23:32 | Updated Aug 15, 2008 2:17
Analysis: What does Moscow want in Georgia?
By BRENDA SHAFFER
The Jerusalem Post
In the last two weeks, many of us have learned that Tskhinvali is the capital of South Ossetia; that South Ossetia is a region a bit bigger than Luxembourg that is legally part of Georgia but ruled de facto by Moscow; that the guy who formally replaced Putin is Dmitry Medvedev; that the president of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili, has two "a"s in a row in his surname and is a Columbia University graduate.
What is this conflict about? What are the ramifications, regionally, globally and for the Middle East? And is there a viable way to solve this conflict?
The South Ossetian conflict with Georgia is not about nationalism or religion. It is about power politics and Moscow's desire to retain influence in the former Soviet states that border it.
During the Soviet breakup, hundreds if not thousands of groups were concerned about their future security and would have been happy to use the opportunity to gain independence.
In fact the real story of the Soviet breakup is not about conflict, but its absence.
Only six conflicts emerged in the region after the breakup - two wars and four secessionist conflicts. While hundreds of ethnic and religious groups live side-by-side in the Caucasus and Central Asia, few actively sought independence following the end of rule from Moscow, which teaches us that ethnic conflict is not the main source of violence, but rather something else.
The only groups that achieved de facto independence within former Soviet republics were those that Moscow supported.
Moscow actively aided the de facto independence of groups that resided in geographically strategic points: Nagorno-Karabagh (ethnic Armenians in Azerbaijan); South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia; and Transniestria in Moldova.
Moscow's support of these groups' secession provided leverage for Russia in these new states during the Soviet breakup and until today. Minority groups in Georgia were especially enticing objects for support: Georgia is the key to the land-locked Caspian region. If you control Georgia, or it is unstable, there is no need for Russia to muscle the rest of the Caucasus and Central Asia: all these land-locked states need Georgia to access the sea and to export their energy resources to Europe without transiting Russia.
In contrast, the Kremlin didn't support its fellow Russians, for example in the Baltic states, who were shipwrecked abroad when the Soviet Union collapsed, without language or citizenship rights.
The South Ossetian conflict emerged in the early 1990s, on the eve of the Soviet breakup.
Why did it reerupt now?
Five factors seem to be at play. First, this spring Georgia asked to join NATO. Despite Washington's unequivocal support for Tbilisi, European states expressed reservations about accepting Georgia before it resolved its border conflicts with Russia. The re-firing of the conflict will surely increase the potency of that concern and push Georgia's NATO membership beyond the horizon.
Second, Russia wants to retain its domination of the European natural gas market. Europe's energy dependence on Russia is growing from day to day, and this endows Moscow with significant income and political clout. A large part of the natural gas that Russia markets to Europe is actually from Central Asia, and Moscow coerces those states to sell it to Russia at half the price for which it then resells it to Europe. In recent months, Central Asian states have explored circumventing Russia and transporting their gas resources directly to Europe via Georgia. The present conflict clearly upsets these plans.
Third, the Kremlin made it clear that if Washington recognized the independence of Kosovo (as it did), Moscow would recognize and support the independence of the secessionist regions in the Caucasus. Russia is extremely vulnerable to ethnic conflict (remember Chechnya and friends?) and did not want the Kosovo precedent on the table.
Fourth, Moscow wants to foil US plans to deploy ballistic missile shields in Eastern Europe. Threatening a close ally of the US gets the message to Washington.
Fifth, following the installation of Dmitri Medvedev as president of Russia, in-fighting in the Kremlin seems to be at play, and Moscow's disproportionate response to Tbilisi may be influenced by this.
What does this new war mean for the Caucasus region, globally and for the Middle East? If Washington fails to act effectively, the conflict will deal a big blow to US credibility in the former Soviet Union and beyond. If Georgia, Washington's darling, is not supported in its hour of need, then how can Tashkent or Baghdad feel at ease?
This war also has ramifications for the international efforts to prevent Iran from attaining nuclear weapons. Russia's policy toward Iran is generally affected by the state of US-Russian relations. If the sides do not come to an understanding on the Georgia conflict soon, Moscow can not be expected to cooperate with the US on Iran.
Is there a way out of this crisis? There seem to be two policy options on the table. One is that the US, the states of the former Soviet Union and newly independent countries in Eastern Europe take a united and tough stand.
The second option is that the US offers a new grand bargain to Russia: Washington gives in on issues that are important to Moscow, such as missile defense and Kosovo, and the US gets its way in the Caucasus and Iran.
The second option seems the best for the US and Israel, but the first seems the most likely, considering the current climate of relations between Washington and Moscow.
Dr. Brenda Shaffer is a faculty member at the University of Haifa, specializing in the politics of the Caucasus, Central Asia, Iran and energy issues.
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1218710367279&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
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I trust we all know who the author of this piece is:
WSJ
How the West
Fueled Putin's
Sense of Impunity
By GARRY KASPAROV
August 15, 2008; Page A13
Russia's invasion of Georgia reminded me of a conversation I had three years ago in Moscow with a high-ranking European Union official. Russia was much freer then, but President Vladimir Putin's onslaught against democratic rights was already underway.
"What would it take," I asked, "for Europe to stop treating Putin like a democrat? If all opposition parties are banned? Or what if they started shooting people in the street?" The official shrugged and replied that even in such cases, there would be little the EU could do. He added: "Staying engaged will always be the best hope for the people of both Europe and Russia."
The citizens of Georgia would likely disagree. Russia's invasion was the direct result of nearly a decade of Western helplessness and delusion. Inexperienced and cautious in the international arena at the start of his reign in 2000, Mr. Putin soon learned he could get away with anything without repercussions from the EU or America.
Russia reverted to a KGB dictatorship while Mr. Putin was treated as an equal at G-8 summits. Italy's Silvio Berlusconi and Germany's Gerhardt Schroeder became Kremlin business partners. Mr. Putin discovered democratic credentials could be bought and sold just like everything else. The final confirmation was the acceptance of Dmitry Medvedev in the G-8, and on the world stage. The leaders of the Free World welcomed Mr. Putin's puppet, who had been anointed in blatantly faked elections.
On Tuesday, French President Nicolas Sarkozy sprinted to Moscow to broker a ceasefire agreement. He was allowed to go through the motions, perhaps as a reward for his congratulatory phone call to Mr. Putin after our December parliamentary "elections." But just a few months ago Mr. Sarkozy was in Moscow as a supplicant, lobbying for Renault. How much credibility does he really have in Mr. Putin's eyes?
In reality, Mr. Sarkozy is attempting to remedy a crisis he helped bring about. Last April, France opposed the American push to fast-track Georgia's North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership. This was one of many missed opportunities that collectively built up Mr. Putin's sense of impunity. In this way the G-7 nations aided and abetted the Kremlin's ambitions.
Georgia blundered into a trap, although its imprudent aggression in South Ossetia was overshadowed by Mr. Putin's desire to play the strongman. Russia seized the chance to go on the offensive in Georgian territory while playing the victim/hero. Mr. Putin has long been eager to punish Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili for his lack of respect both for Georgia's old master Russia, and for Mr. Putin personally. (Popular rumor has it that the Georgian president once mocked his peer as "Lilli-Putin.")
Although Mr. Saakashvili could hardly be called a model democrat, his embrace of Europe and the West is considered a very bad example by the Kremlin. The administrations of the Georgian breakaway areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are stocked, top to bottom, with bureaucrats from the Russian security services.
Throughout the conflict, the Kremlin-choreographed message in the Russian media has been one of hysteria. The news presents Russia as surrounded by enemies on all sides, near and far, and the military intervention in Georgia as essential to protect the lives and interests of Russians. It is also often spoken of as just the first step, with enclaves in Ukraine next on the menu. Attack dogs like Russian nationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky are used to test and whip up public opinion. Kremlin-sponsored ultranationalist ideologue Alexander Dugin went on the radio to say Russian forces "should not stop until they are stopped." The damage done by such rhetoric is very slow to heal.
The conflict also threatens to poison Russia's relationship with Europe and America for years to come. Can such a belligerent state be trusted as the guarantor of Europe's energy supply? Republican presidential candidate John McCain has been derided for his strong stance against Mr. Putin, including a proposal to kick Russia out of the G-8. Will his critics now admit that the man they called an antiquated cold warrior was right all along?
The conventional wisdom of Russia's "invulnerability" serves as an excuse for inaction. President Bush's belatedly toughened language is welcome, but actual sanctions must now be considered. The Kremlin's ruling clique has vital interests -- i.e. assets -- abroad and those interests are vulnerable.
The blood of those killed in this conflict is on the hands of radical nationalists, thoughtless politicians, opportunistic oligarchs and the leaders of the Free World who value gas and oil more than principles. More lives will be lost unless strong moral lines are drawn to reinforce the shattered lines of the map.
Mr. Kasparov, leader of The Other Russia coalition, is a contributing editor of The Wall Street Journal
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http://www.ibdeditorials.com/IBDArticles.aspx?id=303690021329576
Verbatim of the press conference with Georgia President and Secretary Rice
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Note the date of this one
THE GOLDEN FLEECE OF FREEDOM
Written by Dr. Jack Wheeler
Thursday, 12 May 2005
When you were a kid, do you remember reading the great epic of Greek mythology called Jason and the Argonauts? Sent on a mission he is not expected to survive by the man who has usurped his throne, Jason assembles a crew of heroes, including Hercules, Orpheus, Castor and Pollux, and sails in the great ship Argo across the Euxine Sea to the distant land of Colchis to capture the legendary Golden Fleece.
It’s a marvelous adventure story which the ancient Greeks believed was not myth but true. And sure enough - it turns out that Colchis was a real place and there really was a Golden Fleece. At the east end of the Black Sea (the Greeks called it the Euxine), there is a range of huge mountains called the Caucasus. The mountain streams that poured down the Caucasus and into the Euxine carried so many particles of gold that the folks who lived there - the Colchians - would peg sheep skins in the streams to trap the gold particles in the wool.
Colchis is one of the most ancient lands in the world. It’s where the original Caucasians came from. Today it is called Georgia. This week, George Bush sailed in Air Force One to modern Colchis to be wildly welcomed by hundreds of thousands of Georgian Argonauts thanking him for rescuing the Georgian Golden Fleece from its former conqueror, Russia.
It’s hard to even begin describing how cool Georgia is. Here’s an example:
This is the fortress town of Shatili in an extremely remote Caucasus region in Georgia called Khevsureti. It was built by the Crusaders 1,000 years ago. The Khevsur people who live here trace their ancestry back to these Crusaders and until the 1930s still wore chain mail in feud-battles with other towns. I took this picture in 1991.
Or how about this:
This is Ush-Guli high in the Caucasus in a region known as Svanetia. It’s the highest village in Europe and even more remote than Khevsureti. Although it’s a World Heritage site, very few people ever are able to reach it. I got there by helicopter. The people of Ush-Guli are overwhelmingly friendly - perhaps a bit too much so. Having a meal with Svanetians involves endless toasts, drinking from ram’s horns filled with their local firewater. The drunkest I ever got in my life was in Ush-Guli.
Then again, most everywhere you go in Georgia, people are overwhelmingly friendly. Great food, great wine, those endless toasts, thousands of years of history - yet they spent those millennia fighting off foreign invaders: Romans, Persians, Arabs, Seljuk Turks, Mongols, the hordes of Tamerlane, Safarid Persians, Ottoman Turks, and finally the Russians who annexed Georgia in 1801.
Throughout the centuries - centuries of attempts to force Islam upon them - they clung to their Christian faith, which they had adopted in the 1st century AD. Many of the oldest Christian churches in the world are in Georgia. The very country is named after its patron saint, St. George (fl. 300 AD), with a long succession of kings named Georgi.
When the Bolsheviks took over the Russian Revolution on October 25, 1917, Georgians broke free, declaring an independent state on May 26, 1918. The new Soviet Russian government signed a treaty recognizing Georgian independence on May 7, 1920. It was of course a ruse. The Red Army invaded in February, 1921. Even though the leader of the Soviet Union, Josef Dzhugashvili - who assumed the name Stalin or “steel” in Russian - and his head of the Soviet KGB, Lavrenti Beria, were both Georgian (Stalin was born in Gori in 1879, Beria in Mingrelia in 1899), they oppressed their fellow countrymen worse than the Czars.
Just as they rejected Islam and remained Christian, so did the Georgians reject Communism. When the Soviet Union began to disassemble after the fall of the Berlin Wall (November 9, 1989), they broke free again, led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the Father of Georgian Independence.
I first met Gamsakhurdia in June, 1991. He had written the Georgian Declaration of Independence passed by parliament on April 8, and had been elected president on May 26 - while Gorbachev was still trying to hold the USSR together. It was an intense time and he was a little preoccupied. Nonetheless he had me and my son Brandon (age 7) flown all over the country in his private helicopter. I fell in love with the place.
But the next dozen years were not kind to Georgia. A former Soviet apparatchik, Edvard Shevardnadze, was able to stage a coup in December 1991, and had Gamsakhurdia assassinated on December 31, 1993. Not until December 2003, with the “Rose Revolution,” did Georgia at last become democratic and truly free.
Well, maybe. It almost seems that Russians have a defective gene that compels them to be imperialists. If they can’t re-colonize Georgia, then they’ll do their best to bite off parts off it. Notice on this map of Georgia the regions of Abkhazia, Ajaria, and South Ossetia:
In all three regions, the Kremlin stationed Russian troops, supported separatist movements, and instigated civil wars. The new Georgian president, Mikhail Saakashvili, was finally able to kick out the mafiocracy of Aslan Abashidze from Ajaria in May 2004, but the Russians refuse to get their soldiers out of Abkazia and South Ossetia to this day.
So little wonder that over a quarter million Georgians turned out to hear the President of the United States celebrate the day, April 9, 1991, the statue of Lenin was pulled down at the very spot where he was speaking, and tell them “Americans respect your courageous choice for liberty - as you build a free and democratic Georgia, the American people will stand with you.” They cried tears of gratitude when his words were meant for Russia: “The territory and sovereignty of Georgia must be respected by all nations.” (You can read the entire speech here .)
The people of Georgia recognize George Bush as the savior and protector of freedom that he is. Why can’t the Russians? Churchill said Russia was an enigma wrapped in a riddle inside a puzzle. Why can’t they live in peace with their neighbors instead of always wanting a piece of their neighbors? Part of the answer must lie in there being no word for “peace” in the Russian language.
The Russian word mir is always translated as “peace.” But mir doesn’t mean peace, it means order. For us peace means freedom, people being left alone without violence so they can conduct their lives and work towards their goals peacefully. For Russians, peace means conformity: when people are all good little boys and girls and do what they are told by their rulers, you have order and therefore peace.
Put succinctly: “Peace” in English means the absence of violence. “Peace” in Russian - Mir -- means the absence of disobedience.
Mir, Russian peace, can only come by being forcefully imposed on people and is always win-lose. As Lenin said, there is but one question of any importance in human relations: Kto-Kovo? Who-Whom? Who wins, who loses? For Lenin, the only way to win was to make someone else lose. The concept of win-win, of mutual cooperation for mutual benfit was incomprehensible to him (literally, like creating something out of nothing). Putin, the ex-KGB agent looks at the world the same way. It’s the Russians’ fatal mind-flaw.
Until Putin and his fellow Russians abandon Kto-Kovo, the people of Georgia and those of other former Russian colonies will continue to look upon them as threats - and to seek protection from America. The people of Georgia are determined that their Golden Fleece of Freedom never be stolen from them again.
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While it is easy and perhaps right to admire and respect the Georgians, one needs to be practical too. And, sometimes one needs to be fair and put ourselves in the other (Russian) person's shoes. Aren't we being a little bit hypocritical in our condemnation of Russia when we would probably have done the same thing if Mexico became a close Russian/Iranian/North Korean ally with talk of a missile defense system?
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-react17-2008aug17,0,2584755.story
A good point is raised.
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While nearly everyone here touts McCain's foreign policy experience, and rightfully so, one must questio the reason for his position on Georgia given that McCain's top foreign policy and national security advisor Scheunemann up until May 15th of this year was still being paid by the government of Georgia as a lobbyist. "There's been an exchange of money (a lot of money) when he's been advising McCain to take some action". Surely McCain could do better?
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-advisor17-2008aug17,0,6476734.story
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http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2008_08/014312.php
August 16, 2008
BUSH AND SAAKASHVILI....Josh Marshall on the Russo-Georgian war:
The truth is that the US screwed up here in a big way. This isn't to excuse the Russians. But we pumped the Georgians up as our big Iraq allies, got them revved up about coming into NATO, playing all this pipeline politics, all of which led them to have a much more aggressive posture toward the Russians than we were willing, in the final analysis, to back up. So now they've gotten badly mauled.
I've read variations on this theme about a hundred times now, and I really feel like some pushback is in order. The idea that we somehow prompted Mikheil Saakashvili to undertake his invasion of South Ossetia last week just doesn't bear scrutiny.
Look: Saakashvili came to power on a Georgian nationalist platform of recovering Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He's been jonesing for an excuse to send troops in for years, regardless of anything the U.S. did or didn't do. Likewise, Putin has been eagerly waiting for an excuse to pound the crap out of him in return — again, regardless of anything the U.S. did or didn't do. (You don't think Russia was able to mount a highly precise counterattack within 24 hours just by coincidence, do you?)
Now sure, in general, Kosovo + missile shield + NATO enlargement + resurgent Russian nationalism formed the background for this war, and maybe the U.S. has played a bad hand on this score. But Bush administration officials have said for months (i.e., before the war started, meaning this isn't just post hoc ass covering) that they've urged Saakashvili to stay cool. And I believe them. What else would they do, after all? There was never any chance that we were going to provide Georgia with military help in case of a Russian invasion, and it's improbable in the extreme that anyone on our side said anything to suggest otherwise. When Saakashvili says, just hours before sending troops into South Ossetia, that he understands this means war with Russia but he "cannot imagine the West not coming to Georgia's aid," he's being delusional.
The U.S. should have played a smarter, longer-term game here. But that said, supporting Georgia's future entry into NATO and helping to modernize their military really isn't the same thing as encouraging Saakashvili to start a war with Russia. It just isn't.
—Kevin Drum 1:37 PM
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While it is easy and perhaps right to admire and respect the Georgians, one needs to be practical too. And, sometimes one needs to be fair and put ourselves in the other (Russian) person's shoes. Aren't we being a little bit hypocritical in our condemnation of Russia when we would probably have done the same thing if Mexico became a close Russian/Iranian/North Korean ally with talk of a missile defense system?
**I very much doubt it. We don't act now, with multiple Mexican military incursions onto US soil, attacks on border law enforcement.**
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-react17-2008aug17,0,2584755.story
A good point is raised.
**It's hardly a good point. We freed the Iraqis from Saddam and are rebuilding the country. I doubt very much Russian troops are building schools and giving medical treatment to Geogians right now.**
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**It's hardly a good point. We freed the Iraqis from Saddam and are rebuilding the country. I doubt very much Russian troops are building schools and giving medical treatment to Geogians right now.**
[/quote]
Ahhh lately we sure aren't doing a very good job of rebuilding ; and we did a heck of a job destroying Iraq.
– Education: According to a 2005 analysis by the United Nations University, since the 2003 invasion, 84 percent of Iraq’s higher education institutions had been “burnt, looted or destroyed.”
– Medical Care: Before the U.S. invasion, there were 34,000 doctors registered in Iraq; an estimated 20,000 have left since then. “It’s definitely worse now than before the war,” Eman Asim, a Ministry of Health official who oversees the country’s 185 public hospitals, told the New York Times in 2004.
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**It's hardly a good point. We freed the Iraqis from Saddam and are rebuilding the country. I doubt very much Russian troops are building schools and giving medical treatment to Geogians right now.**
Ahhh lately we sure aren't doing a very good job of rebuilding ; and we did a heck of a job destroying Iraq.
– Education: According to a 2005 analysis by the United Nations University, since the 2003 invasion, 84 percent of Iraq’s higher education institutions had been “burnt, looted or destroyed.”
– Medical Care: Before the U.S. invasion, there were 34,000 doctors registered in Iraq; an estimated 20,000 have left since then. “It’s definitely worse now than before the war,” Eman Asim, a Ministry of Health official who oversees the country’s 185 public hospitals, told the New York Times in 2004.
[/quote]
**Yeah, good to cite old and probably misleading sources, and again missing the point. What we do and why we do it is different than what is done elsewhere.**
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Actually, the source I quoted was approximately two years after the invasion; rather appropriate timing I would think given that the purpose was a comparison of damage caused by the two actual invasions. And you brought up schools and medical; I simply pointed out "what we did" i.e. the result IS the same. My point, the article's point is that we shouldn't be hypocrites. As to the "noble" cause WHY we we invaded Iraq? Well, Bush keeps changing the answer so often, I have lost track of the all the given reasons. It seems like lie after lie; I am still waiting for the truth... oil maybe?
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Well, Saddam's thugs aren't feeding dissidents feet first into industrial plastic shredders anymore. His two sociopathic sons have committed their last rapes. People vote. Iraqi Kurdistan is a major success story.
No, Iraq won't be a setting for Club Med resorts anytime soon, but at least they have a chance at a better future. Expect Russia to do anything like that?
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http://www.blockbuster.com/catalog/movieDetails/256405
Check it out and see just how wonderful life was under Saddam.
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Saddam was not a nice guy; but check out the players in Sudan, N. Korea, Africa etc. etc. etc; they are/were worse; why don't we go after them? In the end, Bush decided he really didn't like Saddam; personal I guess, but not really a good reason to go to war. All of Bush's original "logical" reasons seemed to have been disproved as lies, mistakes and mirrors.
And since we invaded Iraq, according to the W.H.O./Iraq study over $200,000 innocent civilians have died. Other studies have put the number at over 400,000+ innocent deaths directly caused by the war; collateral damage I think they call it. But I doubt if it was your family that you would call it "collateral damage". Not to mention as pointed out above the damage to the infrastructure. Plus I don't think anyone (as you have pointed out) is offering any guarantees that the killing will stop after we leave - it may even get worse. One must wonder, given the hundreds of thousands of innocent deaths, the destruction of the country, and the potential for a bloody civil war if Iraq is truly better off? And is the world safer? Time will tell...
My point and the article's point? America should not be a hypocrite. I don't approve of Russia going into Georgia, but we too have caused death and destruction. And I bet we would do it again if Russia or Iran or N. Korea came calling and wanted to be close friends with our Mexico neighbor, putting "defense" missiles in our back yard.
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Its the NYTimes so caveat lector. That said, this seems to be an interesting read.
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Helene Cooper, C. J. Chivers and Clifford J. Levy and written by Ms. Cooper.
WASHINGTON — Five months ago, President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia, long a darling of this city’s diplomatic dinner party circuit, came to town to push for America to muscle his tiny country of four million into NATO.
On Capitol Hill, at the State Department and at the Pentagon, Mr. Saakashvili, brash and hyperkinetic, urged the West not to appease Russia by rejecting his country’s NATO ambitions.
At the White House, President Bush bantered with the Georgian president about his prowess as a dancer. Laura Bush, the first lady, took Mr. Saakashvili’s wife to lunch. Mr. Bush promised him to push hard for Georgia’s acceptance into NATO. After the meeting, Mr. Saakashvili pronounced his visit “one of the most successful visits during my presidency,” and said he did not know of any other leader of a small country with the access to the administration that he had.
Three weeks later, Mr. Bush went to the Black Sea resort of Sochi, at the invitation of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. There, he received a message from the Russian: the push to offer Ukraine and Georgia NATO membership was crossing Russia’s “red lines,” according to an administration official close to the talks.
Afterward, Mr. Bush said of Mr. Putin, “He’s been very truthful and to me, that’s the only way you can find common ground.” It was one of many moments when the United States seemed to have missed — or gambled it could manage — the depth of Russia’s anger and the resolve of the Georgian president to provoke the Russians.
The story of how a 16-year, low-grade conflict over who should rule two small, mountainous regions in the Caucasus erupted into the most serious post-cold-war showdown between the United States and Russia is one of miscalculation, missed signals and overreaching, according to interviews with diplomats and senior officials in the United States, the European Union, Russia and Georgia. In many cases, the officials would speak only on the condition of anonymity.
It is also the story of how both Democrats and Republicans have misread Russia’s determination to dominate its traditional sphere of influence.
As with many foreign policy issues, this one highlighted a continuing fight within the administration. Vice President Dick Cheney and his aides and allies, who saw Georgia as a role model for their democracy promotion campaign, pushed to sell Georgia more arms, including Stinger antiaircraft missiles, so that it could defend itself against possible Russian aggression.
On the other side, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, National Security Adviser Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Burns, the new under secretary of state for political affairs, argued that such a sale would provoke Russia, which would see it as arrogant meddling in its turf, the officials and diplomats said.
They describe three leaders on a collision course. Mr. Bush, rewarding Georgia for its robust troop contribution to Iraq — at 2,000, the third highest, behind the United States and Britain — promised NATO membership and its accompanying umbrella of American military support. Mr. Putin, angry at what he saw as American infringement right in his backyard, decided that Georgia was the line in the sand that the West would not be allowed to cross. And Mr. Saakashvili, unabashedly pro-American, was determined to show, once and for all, that Georgia was no longer a vassal of Russia.
With a vastly more confident Russia, flush with oil money, a booming economy and a rebuilt military no longer bogged down in Chechnya, the stars were aligned for a confrontation in which Russia could, with a quick show of force, teach a lesson to the United States, Georgia and all of the former Soviet satellites and republics seeking closer ties with the West.
“We have probably failed to understand that the Russians are really quite serious when they say, ‘We have interests and we’re going to defend them,’ ” said James Collins, United States ambassador to Russia from 1997 to 2001. “Russia does have interests, and at some point they’re going to stand up and draw lines that are not simply to be ignored.”
Georgia Makes Its Moves
The stage for the confrontation was set in January 2004, when Mr. Saakashvili handily won the presidency after leading protests against a rigged election the previous year. He made the return of separatist areas to Georgian control a central plank of his platform.
It was a potent theme. Georgia had lost the wars against separatists in the 1990s, and Russia’s involvement stung Georgians. Mr. Saakashvili saw international law on his side. His young government, a small circle of men in their 30s with virtually no military experience, openly endorsed this thinking.
Georgia increased its troop contribution to Iraq, and in return the United States provided more military training. The Georgians clearly saw this as a step toward building up a military that could be used to settle problems with the separatists at home.
Whether they intended to build a military for fighting or deterrence is unclear. American officials said they repeatedly and bluntly told their Georgian counterparts that the Iraq mission should not be taken as a sign of American support, or as a prelude, for operations against the separatists. And it was obvious that Russia’s army, which at roughly 641,000 troops is 25 times the size of Georgia’s, could easily overwhelm the Georgian forces.
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Nevertheless, the career foreign policy establishment worried that the wrong signals were being sent. “We were training Saakashvili’s army, and he was getting at least a corps of highly trained individuals, which he could use for adventures,” said one former senior intelligence analyst, who covered Georgia and Russia at the time. “The feeling in the intelligence community was that this was a very high-risk endeavor.”
Mr. Saakashvili proceeded against other separatist enclaves — retaking one, Ajaria, in 2004, and advancing high into the mountains of the upper Kodori Gorge in Abhkazia in 2006 to sweep away bands of criminals who had long controlled the place.
Georgia labeled it a police operation, but it was a military one: Mark Lenzi, then the country director for the nonprofit International Republican Institute, visited the region and says he saw that military markings on a helicopter had been freshly painted over with the word “police.”
Mr. Lenzi, who worked with Mr. Saakashvili’s young government, says that in retrospect, there were risks that were not adequately assessed. “It was a combustible,” he said. “But it was a little bit of the price we were willing to pay for the military cooperation in Iraq.”
He added: “I go back to the democracy thing. I’m not saying I gave them a big pass here. But looking back I should have pressed harder.”
By last November, Mr. Saakashvili’s democratic credentials were becoming checkered. Accused by the opposition of corruption, arrogance and centralization, he struck back against demonstrators and declared a state of emergency. After he won a snap election this year on a vote that the opposition said was subtly rigged, Mr. Saakashvili turned his attention back to the enclaves.
Georgia had new military equipment and the experience of Iraq. Russia had engaged in several brief air attacks and had shot down a pilotless reconnaissance plane over Georgian soil.
Inside the Saakashvili government, officials were seething. Batu Kutelia, a first deputy minister of defense, framed the presence of Russia in the enclaves with intensity. “Tell me,” he asked a reporter over dinner this spring, “would you share your wife?”
Several Georgian officials said that night that seizing South Ossetia would be militarily easy. But there was a difference between any operation in the remaining enclaves and the successful reclamation of Ajaria and the Kodori Gorge: the remaining enclaves had large numbers of Russian troops.
Russian Anger
Russia, too, was laying down its markers, strenuously protesting the West’s intention to recognize the breakaway Serbian province of Kosovo, set on independence after the long Balkans wars of the 1990s. The Russians insisted that independence for Kosovo would be a serious affront. Last February, the United States and the European Union, over Russia’s vehement objections, recognized an independent Kosovo.
Mr. Putin and other Russian officials drew a parallel with Kosovo: If the West could redraw boundaries against the wishes of Russia and its ally Serbia, then Russia could redraw boundaries in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
By April, before the Russians had a chance to grow accustomed to an independent Kosovo, they were being confronted with what they saw as more meddling in their backyard. On April 3, the night before the NATO summit meeting in Bucharest, Romania, Mr. Bush attended a dinner with European leaders and annoyed the Germans and French by lobbying long and hard for Ukraine and Georgia to be welcomed into a Membership Action Plan that prepares nations for NATO membership.
Mr. Bush lost that battle, but won two others the next day that would anger Russia: NATO leaders agreed to endorse a United States missile defense system based in Eastern Europe, and the Europeans said invitations to the membership plan for Georgia and Ukraine might come in a year, at the next summit.
NATO leaders had invited Mr. Putin to Bucharest to speak, seeking to offset the impression that the alliance was hostile to Russia. He was cordial but clear, saying that Russia viewed “the appearance of a powerful military bloc” on its borders “as a direct threat” to its security. “The claim that this process is not directed against Russia will not suffice,” Mr. Putin said. “National security is not based on promises.”
The next day, Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin went to Sochi. “It definitely wasn’t what I would call a ‘look-into-your-eyes-and-see-your-soul’ meeting,” said a Bush administration official, referring to Mr. Bush’s famous line after he first met Mr. Putin. Mr. Bush had dinner with Mr. Putin and his protégé and successor, Dmitri A. Medvedev, at the Russian resort, which is near Georgia. The official said the discussion centered on Ukraine and Georgia, and Mr. Putin warned, again, against the NATO push.
Asked how Mr. Bush reacted to the warning, the official said: “It wasn’t anything we hadn’t heard before.”
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It appeared that the Bush administration misread the depth of Russia’s fury. A Bush administration official said the Americans understood that Russia was angry, but believed that they could forestall a worsening of the relationship by looking for other possibilities for cooperation.
Ms. Rice offered up an 11-page “strategic framework declaration” examining areas where the two nations could work together, which was hammered out with Sergey V. Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, that night in Sochi. The statement included language describing how they would in the future address the issue of missile defenses the United States had proposed basing in Eastern Europe. The United States promised to work toward “assuaging” Russian concerns.
Washington Weighs In
Nine days later, on April 16, Mr. Putin took action. In one of his last formal acts as president, he issued an order that Russia was broadly expanding support for Abkhazia and South Ossetia and would establish legal connections with the regions’ separatist governments.
Washington was quick to rally around Mr. Saakashvili. Senator John McCain, whose campaign foreign policy adviser, Randy Scheunemann, had represented Georgia as a lobbyist, was the first to blast Russia. Mr. McCain, who already was the Republicans’ presumptive presidential nominee, telephoned Mr. Saakashvili to offer support, and then told reporters on April 17 that “we must not allow Russia to believe it has a free hand to engage in policies that undermine Georgian sovereignty.” On April 21 came a statement from a “deeply troubled” Senator Barack Obama, the leading Democratic candidate.
“There’s no doubt that the Georgians have carefully cultivated a broad base of support in Washington,” said Stephen Sestanovich, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and foreign policy adviser to the Obama campaign who has hosted dinner parties for Mr. Saakashvili in Washington.
Within the Bush administration, “the fight between the hawks and the doves” erupted anew, said one administration official. In this case, the people he called the “hawks” —Mr. Cheney and the assistant secretary of state for Europe, Daniel Fried — argued for more American military aid for Georgia; the “doves” — Ms. Rice, Mr. Hadley, Mr. Burns — urged restraint.
The United States was already providing Georgia with military aid, equipment and training, and Ms. Rice, for the time being, won the fight against adding American-provided Stinger missiles to Georgia’s arsenal.
On April 21, Georgia accused Russia of shooting down the pilotless Georgian plane over Abkhazia and released what it said was a video of the encounter. Mr. Putin responded that he had expressed “bewilderment” to Mr. Saakashvili at Georgia’s sending reconnaissance planes over Abkhazia.
A senior adviser to Mr. Saakashvili said Mr. Cheney’s office was more openly critical of the Russians after the episode than was the State Department, which struck a more balanced tone, asking Russia to explain their actions.
Bush administration officials have been adamant that they told Mr. Saakashvili that the United States would not back Georgia militarily in a fight with Russia, but a senior administration official acknowledged that “it’s possible that Georgians may have confused the cheerleading from Washington with something else.”
In May and June, Russia increased the number of troops in South Ossetia and sent troops into Abkhazia, who Moscow said were going for humanitarian purposes, Georgian and American officials said.
Ms. Rice traveled to Tbilisi, Georgia, in July, where, aides said, she privately told Mr. Saakashvili not to let Russia provoke him into a fight he could not win. But her public comments, delivered while standing next to Mr. Saakashvili during a news conference, were far stronger and more supportive.
And when she brought up NATO membership, mentioning that the Bush administration had pushed for it in Bucharest, Mr. Saakashvili jumped on the opportunity to get a public commitment that the administration would bring the matter up again with NATO before leaving office.
“So are you going — I understood you are going to give a tough fight for us in December,” he said.
Ms. Rice: “Always, Mr. President. We always fight for our friends.”
The Buildup
The Russians and the Georgians give different accounts of who provoked whom in the weeks before Aug. 7. Each side accuses the other of premeditated attack. While the public line from the Bush administration has been that Russia and Mr. Putin are largely to blame, some administration officials said the Georgian military had drawn up a “concept of operations” for crisis in South Ossetia that called for its army units to sweep across the region and rapidly establish such firm control that a Russian response could be pre-empted.
They note that in January, the Georgian Ministry of Defense released a “strategic defense review” that laid out its broad military planning for the breakaway regions. As described by David J. Smith of the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, the document sets out goals for the Georgian armed forces and refers specifically to the threat of conflict in the separatist regions.
American officials said that they had clearly told their Georgian counterparts that the plan had little chance of success, given Kremlin statements promising to protect the local population from Georgian “aggression” — and the fact of overwhelming Russian military force along the border.
The shelling from South Ossetia to Georgia proper increased significantly in August. On the morning of Aug. 1, five Georgian police officers were wounded by two remotely detonated explosions on a bypass road in South Ossetia, Georgian officials said. Troops from Georgia battled separatist fighters, killing at least six people; the Georgians accused the South Ossetian separatists of firing at Georgian towns behind the shelter of Russian peacekeepers.
On Aug. 6, the separatists fired on several Georgian villages, Georgian officials said. The Russian Defense Ministry and South Ossetian officials say that Georgians provoked the escalation by shelling Russian peacekeeping positions in the region’s capital of Tskhinvali, along with civilian areas.
The Georgians said the separatists stepped up their shelling. Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili of Georgia called Mr. Fried and told him that her country was under attack, and that Georgia had to protect its people. Mr. Fried, according to a senior administration official, told the Georgian not to go into South Ossetia. The Georgians moved in on Aug. 7.
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**It always amazes me how the left seems not to care how many lives are lost by the people they claim to care for so much. Never a dictator you can't side with, so long as he's anti-american, right JDN? Who cares about the Vietnamese and Cambodians the left delivered into mass graves, right? Why not do the same to the Iraqis and Georgians too? Keep the left's streak going.**
Pinning Civilian Deaths on the Great Satan
By Mark D. Tooley
FrontPageMagazine.com | Friday, October 13, 2006
A British medical journal is once again inflating the number of Iraqis killed during the U.S.-led liberation of that country -- and pillars of the Religious Left have welcomed the chance to demonize the United States. The Lancet, is claiming that the freeing of Iraq has caused more than 600,000 deaths. The study interviewed 1,849 families and found that 547 people died in the post-invasion period, whereas these families remembered only 82 dying during a similar period before the invasion. From these 465 additional deaths, the study confidently extrapolated that 654,965 civilians have died from Operation Iraqi Freedom.
As one blogger points out, the study claims that more Iraqi civilians have been killed over the last three years than were German civilians killed during five years of intense Allied bombing during World War II.
That is a remarkable claim indeed, but one eagerly embraced by Religious Left activists Jim Wallis of Sojourners and Bob Edgar of the National Council of Churches, who are eager for macabre new grist for their antiwar, anti-American tirades.
“From now on, any political debate on Iraq must start here and be disciplined by these FACTS,” Wallis asserts. “Not by politics, not by arguments, not by visions of democracy in the Middle East, but by the deaths caused to so many of God’s children.”
Edgar sounded a similar note of confidence about the study’s assertions. “When I first heard that nearly two-thirds of a million Iraqis have been killed I was shocked and horribly saddened,” he said. “The perpetrators of this war can no longer tell us this is 'collateral damage' as they prosecute this war. They must face up to the widespread death and destruction that is being inflicted daily upon innocent men, women, and children living in a country that never attacked the United States.”
Even the study acknowledges that two-thirds of these supposed 600,000-plus civilian deaths were caused by insurgents and sectarian violence, not by the Allied forces. At least Wallis makes reference to this. But naturally he and Edgar will latch onto the study as definitive validation of their demand for immediate U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq, although such a precipitous withdrawal would certainly increase the sectarian strife, send an invitation to jihadists, and result in a bloodbath as did our withdrawal from Vietnam (which Edgar and Wallis also supported).
“Any politician speaking about the war should be asked how they intend to stop the violence and blood-letting that has overwhelmed that country,” Wallis demands, assuming it is within the power of U.S. politicians to stop Sunnis and Shiites from killing each other. ”Every candidate running for the U.S. Senate or Congress should be asked how they feel about the loss of all these lives and how they intend to stop it,” Wallis further opines, without explaining how any member of the U.S. Congress could stop all “the violence” in any country.
Edgar insists that “nearly every major Christian church leader spoke out against this war before the invasion” because the war “did not remotely meet the criteria of a just war.” Of course, neither Edgar nor Wallis have ever described what exactly would constitute a just war. Wallis is pacifist who believes that force is never justified, and Edgar, although disclaiming the label, is at least opposed to wars waged by the U.S. military, most especially those waged against Communists.
Wallis and Edgar have long experience in opposing the America at war. Both came of age politically by opposing the Vietnam War. Edgar as a young Democratic U.S. Representative from Philadelphia was even a member of the notorious 94th U.S. Congress, which refused to aid the drowning South Vietnamese in 1975 as they were overrun by North Vietnam's Soviet-supplied tanks.
Like others on the anti-war Left, Wallis and Edgar saw the Vietnam War as purely the invention of U.S. interventionism and imperialism. All killed Vietnamese and U.S. servicemen were victims of U.S. folly. American withdrawal from Southeast Asia was the end of Wallis’ and Edgar’s interest in any killing there. The victorious Communists murdered millions in Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos. Thousands more “boat people” would drown at sea or be killed by pirates as they attempted to flee from their “liberated” lands.
We will never know how many more countless deaths occurred because of the corruption and oppression of the Marxist police states that governed Cambodia for another two decades, and which still govern Laos and Vietnam. The sum total of human suffering caused by the poverty and oppression of those tyrannical regimes is incalculable. Southeast Asia without Communism could have replicated the prosperity and freedom of today’s South Korea, Taiwan, or Singapore.
But old Religious Left activists like Edgar and Wallis ignore the fruits of their activism, trying to relive those youthful days today. Even now, they avoid commenting about the many ongoing crimes of the Vietnamese and Laotian Communists, who came to power thanks in part to the causes Wallis and Edgar led, and whose 30 years of persecutions include the torment of Christians and other religious believers.
Similarly, Edgar and Wallis never had much to say about the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis whom Saddam Hussein murdered, a number that would have been even higher without the U.S. and British air forces giving 10 years of protection to the Kurds and southern Shiites. Like others on the left, Edgar and Wallis exclusively blamed the U.S for hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who ostensibly died from United Nations sanctions against Saddam’s regime. Saddam’s own role in hoarding cash, medicines, and food for his own supporters, while withholding such essentials from his perceived enemies, was largely unremarked upon.
Edgar and Wallis do not have the nerve to assert it specifically, but the obvious implication of all their frenzied activism and statements before and after the U.S. led overthrow of Saddam’s regime is that Iraq would be better off if the dictator had been left in power. They should simply say it. At least their argument would be an honest one. Dictators, however brutal, at least can offer a terrible stability.
Perhaps Edgar and Wallis should go a step further. In his bold and ridiculous new 9/11 conspiracy book, Christian Faith and the Truth Behind 9/11, David Ray Griffin blames the United States for 180 million deaths around the world every decade. Griffin, a professor emeritus at United Methodist Claremont School of Theology in California, claims that the U.S., as the hegemon of a global capitalist empire, is responsible for nearly every premature death everywhere. As such, it is worse than Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, and is today the “chief embodiment of demonic power.” Ray’s book, which alleges the Bush administration actually blew up the World Trade Center and Pentagon, was published by the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) publishing house.
Edgar and Wallis, who are eager to accept the dubious claim that the U.S. has killed 600,000 Iraqi civilians, may as well accept Griffin’s bracing thesis in full. Like Griffin, and at variance with traditional Christianity, they see the world as basically an innocent place, sullied only by the demonic presence of the United States. Edgar says he is praying for an end to the “unspeakable horrors” endured by Iraqis, by which he means chiefly the U.S. presence. But the poor Iraqis were suffering unspeakably long before U.S. forces appeared.
A premature exit by the U.S. from Iraq, as from Southeast Asia 30 years ago, could expand those horrors exponentially. But Edgar and Wallis prefer to slay their own favorite, and largely imagined dragon.
Mark D. Tooley directs the United Methodist committee at the Institute on Religion and Democracy.
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The Left, Georgia and Double Standards
By Steven Plaut
FrontPageMagazine.com | Thursday, August 21, 2008
Putin's Russia is, at this very moment, in the process of inventing a new "nation" that is in need of "self-determination" as a shrewd and brutal ploy to break up Georgia. It is has shrewdly coordinated moves by separatists inside Georgia to serve as a justification for its own invasion.
The Putin regime articulates outrage about the mistreatment of the Ossetians, while mysteriously being totally callous about its own human rights abuses inside Russia, especially in Chechnya. It is obvious that the Russians are preaching human rights and self-determination as a weapon to engage in aggression.
The story brings to mind two historical parallels. The first is the campaign by Nazi Germany on behalf of "self-determination" for the Sudeten Germans inside Czechoslovakia in the 1930s. Germany also invented a "people" in need of self-determination inside the small state it had designs on. Thus, it invented claims of human rights abuses and then used the separatist activities of the Sudetens as an excuse to invade and demolish Czechoslovakia. It goes without saying that human rights were respected much more inside Czechoslovakia than inside Nazi Germany. And ethnic Germans already had their own sovereign countries they could migrate to if they were unhappy in the Sudeten areas of Czechoslovakia.
The other historical parallel concerns the invention of a "Palestinian people." The Arabs use the "Palestinian" separatist movement in a similar way to how Russia uses the Ossetian separatists. The Arabs and their apologists invent tales of "human rights abuses" by Israel of "Palestinians" much like Russia invents stories about Georgian mistreatment of Ossetians. Never mind that the human rights of Arabs inside Israel are respected infinitely better than are those of Arabs inside Arab countries, and that non-Arabs inside Arab countries are treated even worse. The world is up in arms about so-called Israeli "apartheid," while in reality Israel is the only Middle East regime that is not an apartheid regime.
Yes, the Georgians did sometimes mistreat the Ossetians and the Ossetians have a far stronger case for self-determination than the "Palestinians." The Ossetians speak their own language unrelated to that of their neighbors and have their own culture. In comparison, the "Palestinians" are far less different culturally and less distinct linguistically from the Arabs in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (whence most of them migrated into "Palestine" in the late 19th and early 20th century).
These phenomena beg a serious question: If the world is horrified at Russian aggression and behavior towards Georgians, where is its outrage at Arab aggression towards Israel and behavior identical to that of Russia? Why are those who dismiss the claims of a right to self-determination by Ossetians not dismissing as a similar Sudeten-style ploy the demands for "Palestinian self-determination?" Why are Palestinians, who enjoy treatment far better than that of the Ossetians and the Chechens, the focus of countless media exposes about their imaginary mistreatment by Israel?
And where are all those solidarity protesters? Where are the "International Solidarity Movement" protesters who like to attack Israeli troops and police and to serve as "human shields" to protect the Palestinian "victims" of Israeli self-defense? Why are they not rushing to Ossetia and Georgia to stand up to the Russian troops, throwing rocks at them and singing Kun-Ba-Ya?
Where are the leftist human shields blocking the path of Russian military vehicles the same way they block Israeli Defense Forces operations? Are they afraid they will not be served the same nice gourmet lattes they get when Israeli forces apprehend them for hooliganism in the West Bank?
Why are leftists not organizing ships to break the Russian blockade of the Georgia coast the same way they are trying to provide sea-borne aid to the Hamas in Gaza? Where are the Rachel Corries and why are they not challenging Russian bulldozer crews? Why are the Anarchists against the Wall not hopping planes to Tbilisi to challenge Russian construction crews erecting walls in Abkhazia and Ossetia? Why are the Israeli leftist professors not holding pro-Ossetian poetry readings and solidarity rallies in Tbilisi?
Here we have the hypocrisy of the members of the political faith exposed for all to see.
Steven Plaut is a professor at the Graduate School of the Business Administration at the University of Haifa and is a columnist for the Jewish Press. A collection of his commentaries on the current events in Israel can be found on his "blog" at www.stevenplaut.blogspot.com.
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Ahhh I have always liked the quote, "I don't care if he's a dictator as long as he's (America) our dictator". So true; we have supported so many despots and butchers to further our own gain and oddly quite a few have come back to bite us. And only then do we act noble and indignant.
We can't be the policeman of the world; tragedy happens, or as GM said, "War is brutal and horrible." GM, I believe YOU said, "If I had to choose between dead enemy civilians and dead US troops, I'ld choose for dead enemies." Obviously, you don't care a whole lot for those innocent civilians - so what's your point or criticism of the "liberal left"?
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Ahhh I have always liked the quote, "I don't care if he's a dictator as long as he's (America) our dictator". So true; we have supported so many despots and butchers to further our own gain and oddly quite a few have come back to bite us. And only then do we act noble and indignant.
**Let's just put aside what we did in rebuilding Germany and Japan post-WWII and examine other dictators we were aligned with. Taiwan and South Korea spring to mind. Initially they were both quite totalitarian when we aligned with them out of pragmatism. Over time, we were able to pressure them into becoming very decent nations with human rights and free elections, not to mention quite a bit of prosperity. Which side of the Korean border would you rather live on? Would you rather live in Taipei or Beijing?**
We can't be the policeman of the world; tragedy happens, or as GM said, "War is brutal and horrible."
**It is brutal and horrible. There is nothing romantic or wonderful about war, much like choosing to have a limb amputated, it's something to do only when there is no other viable option. True enough that we at any one time can't address every wrong in the world and confront every dictator, this does not mean that we can't act in a manner that furthers the cause of human freedom as well as our national interest.**
GM, I believe YOU said, "If I had to choose between dead enemy civilians and dead US troops, I'ld choose for dead enemies." Obviously, you don't care a whole lot for those innocent civilians - so what's your point or criticism of the "liberal left"?
**If I had to choose that an utterly sterile war could be fought where no innocents at all were killed or wounded, that would be my preference. If there was never a need for war ever, that would be even better. The US goes to incredible lengths to avoid the deaths of innocents and tries to provide humanitarian aid while engaging in combat operations. This is because of core American values. The left loves to claim to care about people, but does nothing but love and support the worst dictators and ideologies on the planet, so long as they are sufficiently anti-american.**
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The Real World Order
By George Friedman
On Sept. 11, 1990, U.S. President George H. W. Bush addressed Congress. He spoke in the wake of the end of Communism in Eastern Europe, the weakening of the Soviet Union, and the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein. He argued that a New World Order was emerging: "A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor, and today that new world is struggling to be born. A world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak."
After every major, systemic war, there is the hope that this will be the war to end all wars. The idea driving it is simple. Wars are usually won by grand coalitions. The idea is that the coalition that won the war by working together will continue to work together to make the peace. Indeed, the idea is that the defeated will join the coalition and work with them to ensure the peace. This was the dream behind the Congress of Vienna, the League of Nations, the United Nations and, after the Cold War, NATO. The idea was that there would be no major issues that couldn't be handled by the victors, now joined with the defeated. That was the idea that drove George H. W. Bush as the Cold War was coming to its end.
Those with the dream are always disappointed. The victorious coalition breaks apart. The defeated refuse to play the role assigned to them. New powers emerge that were not part of the coalition. Anyone may have ideals and visions. The reality of the world order is that there are profound divergences of interest in a world where distrust is a natural and reasonable response to reality. In the end, ideals and visions vanish in a new round of geopolitical conflict.
The post-Cold War world, the New World Order, ended with authority on Aug. 8, 2008, when Russia and Georgia went to war. Certainly, this war was not in itself of major significance, and a very good case can be made that the New World Order actually started coming apart on Sept. 11, 2001. But it was on Aug. 8 that a nation-state, Russia, attacked another nation-state, Georgia, out of fear of the intentions of a third nation-state, the United States. This causes us to begin thinking about the Real World Order.
The global system is suffering from two imbalances. First, one nation-state, the United States, remains overwhelmingly powerful, and no combination of powers are in a position to control its behavior. We are aware of all the economic problems besetting the United States, but the reality is that the American economy is larger than the next three economies combined (Japan, Germany and China). The U.S. military controls all the world's oceans and effectively dominates space. Because of these factors, the United States remains politically powerful - not liked and perhaps not admired, but enormously powerful.
The second imbalance is within the United States itself. Its ground forces and the bulk of its logistical capability are committed to the Middle East, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States also is threatening on occasion to go to war with Iran, which would tie down most of its air power, and it is facing a destabilizing Pakistan. Therefore, there is this paradox: The United States is so powerful that, in the long run, it has created an imbalance in the global system. In the short run, however, it is so off balance that it has few, if any, military resources to deal with challenges elsewhere. That means that the United State s remains the dominant power in the long run but it cannot exercise that power in the short run. This creates a window of opportunity for other countries to act.
The outcome of the Iraq war can be seen emerging. The United States has succeeded in creating the foundations for a political settlement among the main Iraqi factions that will create a relatively stable government. In that sense, U.S. policy has succeeded. But the problem the United States has is the length of time it took to achieve this success. Had it occurred in 2003, the United States would not suffer its current imbalance. But this is 2008, more than five years after the invasion. The United States never expected a war of this duration, nor did it plan for it. In order to fight the war, it had to inject a major portion of its ground fighting capability into it. The length of the war was the problem. U.S. ground forces are either in Iraq, recovering from a tour or preparing for a deployment. What strategic reserves are available are tasked into Afghanistan. Little is left over.
As Iraq pulled in the bulk of available forces, the United States did not shift its foreign policy elsewhere. For example, it remained committed to the expansion of democracy in the former Soviet Union and the expansion of NATO, to include Ukraine and Georgia. From the fall of the former Soviet Union, the United States saw itself as having a dominant role in reshaping post-Soviet social and political orders, including influencing the emergence of democratic institutions and free markets. The United States saw this almost in the same light as it saw the democratization of Germany and Japan after World War II. Having defeated the Soviet Union, it now fell to the United States to reshape the societies of the successor states.
Through the 1990s, the successor states, particularly Russia, were inert. Undergoing painful internal upheaval - which foreigners saw as reform but which many Russians viewed as a foreign-inspired national catastrophe - Russia could not resist American and European involvement in regional and internal affairs. From the American point of view, the reshaping of the region - from the Kosovo war to the expansion of NATO to the deployment of U.S. Air Force bases to Central Asia - was simply a logical expansion of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was a benign attempt to stabilize the region, enhance its prosperity and security and integrate it into the global system.
As Russia regained its balance from the chaos of the 1990s, it began to see the American and European presence in a less benign light. It was not clear to the Russians that the United States was trying to stabilize the region. Rather, it appeared to the Russians that the United States was trying to take advantage of Russian weakness to impose a new politico-military reality in which Russia was to be surrounded with nations controlled by the United States and its military system, NATO. In spite of the promise made by Bill Clinton that NATO would not expand into the former Soviet Union, the three Baltic states were admitted. The promise was not addressed. NATO was expanded because it could and Russia could do nothing about it.
From the Russian point of view, the strategic break point was Ukraine. When the Orange Revolution came to Ukraine, the American and European impression was that this was a spontaneous democratic rising. The Russian perception was that it was a well-financed CIA operation to foment an anti-Russian and pro-American uprising in Ukraine. When the United States quickly began discussing the inclusion of Ukraine in NATO, the Russians came to the conclusion that the United States intended to surround and crush the Russian Federation. In their view, if NATO expanded into Ukraine, the Western military alliance would place Russia in a strategically untenable position. Russia would be indefensible. The American response was that it had no intention of threatening Russia. The Russian question was returned: Then why are you trying to take control of Ukraine? What other purpose would you have? The United States dismissed these Russian concerns as absurd. The Russians, not regarding them as absurd at all, began planning on the assumption of a hostile United States.
If the United States had intended to break the Russian Federation once and for all, the time for that was in the 1990s, before Yeltsin was replaced by Putin and before 9/11. There was, however, no clear policy on this, because the United States felt it had all the time in the world. Superficially this was true, but only superficially. First, the United States did not understand that the Yeltsin years were a temporary aberration and that a new government intending to stabilize Russia was inevitable. If not Putin, it would have been someone else. Second, the United States did not appreciate that it did not control the international agenda. Sept. 11, 2001, took away American options in the former Soviet Union. No only did it need Russian help in Afghanistan, but it was going to spend the next decade tied up in the Middle East. The United States had lost its room for maneuver and therefore had run out of time.
And now we come to the key point. In spite of diminishing military options outside of the Middle East, the United States did not modify its policy in the former Soviet Union. It continued to aggressively attempt to influence countries in the region, and it became particularly committed to integrating Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, in spite of the fact that both were of overwhelming strategic interest to the Russians. Ukraine dominated Russia's southwestern flank, without any natural boundaries protecting them. Georgia was seen as a constant irritant in Chechnya as well as a barrier to Russian interests in the Caucasus.
Moving rapidly to consolidate U.S. control over these and other countries in the former Soviet Union made strategic sense. Russia was weak, divided and poorly governed. It could make no response. Continuing this policy in the 2000s, when the Russians were getting stronger, more united and better governed and while U.S. forces were no longer available, made much less sense. The United States continued to irritate the Russians without having, in the short run, the forces needed to act decisively.
The American calculation was that the Russian government would not confront American interests in the region. The Russian calculation was that it could not wait to confront these interests because the United States was concluding the Iraq war and would return to its pre-eminent position in a few short years. Therefore, it made no sense for Russia to wait and it made every sense for Russia to act as quickly as possible.
The Russians were partly influenced in their timing by the success of the American surge in Iraq. If the United States continued its policy and had force to back it up, the Russians would lose their window of opportunity. Moreover, the Russians had an additional lever for use on the Americans: Iran.
The United States had been playing a complex game with Iran for years, threatening to attack while trying to negotiate. The Americans needed the Russians. Sanctions against Iran would have no meaning if the Russians did not participate, and the United States did not want Russia selling advance air defense systems to Iran. (Such systems, which American analysts had warned were quite capable, were not present in Syria on Sept. 6, 2007, when the Israelis struck a nuclear facility there.) As the United States re-evaluates the Russian military, it does not want to be surprised by Russian technology. Therefore, the more aggressive the United States becomes toward Russia, the greater the difficulties it will have in Iran. This further encouraged the Russians to act sooner rather than later.
The Russians have now proven two things. First, contrary to the reality of the 1990s, they can execute a competent military operation. Second, contrary to regional perception, the United States cannot intervene. The Russian message was directed against Ukraine most of all, but the Baltics, Central Asia and Belarus are all listening. The Russians will not act precipitously. They expect all of these countries to adjust their foreign policies away from the United States and toward Russia. They are looking to see if the lesson is absorbed. At first, there will be mighty speeches and resistance. But the reality on the ground is the reality on the ground.
We would expect the Russians to get traction. But if they don't, the Russians are aware that they are, in the long run, much weaker than the Americans, and that they will retain their regional position of strength only while the United States is off balance in Iraq. If the lesson isn't absorbed, the Russians are capable of more direct action, and they will not let this chance slip away. This is their chance to redefine their sphere of influence. They will not get another.
The other country that is watching and thinking is Iran. Iran had accepted the idea that it had lost the chance to dominate Iraq. It had also accepted the idea that it would have to bargain away its nuclear capability or lose it. The Iranians are now wondering if this is still true and are undoubtedly pinging the Russians about the situation. Meanwhile, the Russians are waiting for the Americans to calm down and get serious. If the Americans plan to take meaningful action against them, they will respond in Iran. But the Americans have no meaningful actions they can take; they need to get out of Iraq and they need help against Iran. The quid pro quo here is obvious. The United States acquiesces to Russian actions (which it can't do anything about), while the Russians cooperate with the United States against Iran getting nuclear weapons (something Russia does not want to see).
One of the interesting concepts of the New World Order was that all serious countries would want to participate in it and that the only threat would come from rogue states and nonstate actors such as North Korea and al Qaeda. Serious analysts argued that conflict between nation-states would not be important in the 21st century. There will certainly be rogue states and nonstate actors, but the 21st century will be no different than any other century. On Aug. 8, the Russians invited us all to the Real World Order.
http://www.investorsinsight.com/blogs/john_mauldins_outside_the_box/archive/2008/08/21/the-real-world-order.aspx
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US Ambassador to Russia, John Beyrle, admits that Russian response to Georgian attack was justified.
How about that!
Denny Schlesinger
John Beyrle: Russia provides adequate response to Georgia`s aggression against S. Ossetia
Russia provided an adequate response to Georgia`s aggression against civilians in South Ossetia and Russian peacekeepers staying in the area, U.S. ambassador to Moscow John Beyrle told in an interview with the ‘Kommersant’ daily. According to Mr. Beyrle, Washington had repeatedly warned Georgia against the use of force in South Ossetia. The ambassador emphasized that the six-principle Medvedev-Sarkozy plan should be strictly observed by all the sides involved and added that it would be better if Georgia`s territorial integrity was respected. However, Mr. Beyrle said, the conflict cannot be settled without taking into account the right of the peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on self-determination. Mr. Beyrle welcomes Russia`s WTO membership and opposes the country`s isolation on the international level.
22.08.2008
http://www.ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=eng&q=31505&cid=45&p=22.08.2008
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The Russians still have not completed withdrawal from Georgia. It is clear that, at least for the time being, the Russians intend to use the clause in the cease-fire agreement that allows them unspecified rights to protect their security to maintain troops in some parts of Georgia. Moscow obviously wants to demonstrate to the Georgians that Russia moves at its own discretion, not at the West’s. A train carrying fuel was blown up outside of Gori, with the Georgians claiming that the Russians have planted mines. Whether the claim is true or not, the Russians are trying to send a simple message: We are your best friends and worst enemies. The emphasis for the moment is on the latter.
It is essential for the Russians to demonstrate that they are not intimidated by the West in any way. The audience for this is the other former Soviet republics, but also the Georgian public. It is becoming clear that the Russians are intent on seeing Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili removed from office. Moscow is betting that as the crisis dies down and Russian troops remain in Georgia, the Georgians will develop a feeling of isolation and turn on Saakashvili for leading them into a disaster. If that doesn’t work, and he remains president, then the Russians have forward positions in Georgia. Either way, full withdrawal does not make sense for them, when the only force against them is Western public opinion. That alone will make the Russians more intractable.
It is interesting, therefore, that a U.S. warship delivered humanitarian supplies to the Georgians. The ship did not use the port of Poti, which the Russians have effectively blocked, but Batumi, to the south. That the ship was a destroyer is important. It demonstrates that the Americans have a force available that is inherently superior to anything the Russians have: the U.S. Navy. A Navy deployment in the Black Sea could well be an effective counter, threatening Russian sea lanes.
While it was a warship, however, it was only a destroyer — so it is a gesture, but not a threat. But there are rumors of other warships readying to transit into the Black Sea. This raises an important issue: Turkey. Turkey borders Georgia but has very carefully stayed out of the conflict. Any ships that pass through Turkish straits do so under Turkish supervision guided by the Montreux Convention, an old agreement restricting the movement of warships through the straits — which the Russians in particular have ignored in moving ships into the Mediterranean. But the United States has a particular problem in moving through the Bosporus. Whatever the Convention says or precedent is, the United States can’t afford to alienate Turkey — not if there is a crisis in the Caucasus.
Each potential American move has a complication attached. However, at this moment, the decision as to what to do is in the hands of the United States. The strategic question is whether it has the appetite for a naval deployment in the Black Sea at this historical moment. After that is answered, Washington needs to address the Turkish position. And after a U.S. squadron deploys in the Black Sea, the question will be what Russia, a land power, will do in response. The Europeans are irrelevant to the equation, even if they do hold a summit as the French want. They can do nothing unless the United States decides to act, and they can’t stop the United States if it does decide to go.
The focus now is on the Americans. They can let the Russo-Georgian war slide into history and deal with Russia later on, or they can act. What Washington will decide to do is the question the arrival of the U.S.S. McFaul in Georgia posed for the Russians.
stratfor
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GEOPOLITICAL DIARY: TURKEY'S OPTIONS
With Cold War tensions building in the Black Sea, the Turks have gone into a
diplomatic frenzy. Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan had his phone glued to his
ear on Thursday speaking to his U.S., British, German, French, Swedish and Finnish
counterparts, as well as to the NATO secretary-general and various EU
representatives. The Turks are also expecting Georgian Foreign Minister Eka
Tkeshelashvili to arrive in Istanbul on Aug. 31. And Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov is due to arrive for a separate meeting with Turkish leaders early next week.
The Turks have a reason to be such busy diplomatic bees. A group of nine NATO
warships are currently in the Black Sea ostensibly on routine and humanitarian
missions. Russia has wasted no time in sounding the alarm at the sight of this NATO
buildup, calling on Turkey -- as the gatekeeper to the Dardanelles and Bosporus
straits between the Black and Mediterranean seas -- to remember its commitment to
the Montreux Convention, which places limits on the number of warships in the Black
Sea. As a weak naval power with few assets to defend itself in this crucial
frontier, Russia has every interest in keeping the NATO presence in the Black Sea as
limited and distant as possible.
Turkey is in an extremely tight spot. As a NATO member in control of Russia's
warm-water naval access to the Black Sea, Turkey is a crucial link in the West's
pressure campaign against Russia. But the Turks have little interest in seeing the
Black Sea become a flashpoint between Russia and the United States. Turkey has a
strategic foothold in the Caucasus through Azerbaijan that it does not want to see
threatened by Moscow. The Turks also simply do not have the military appetite or the
internal political consolidation to be pushed by the United States into a potential
conflict -- naval or otherwise -- with the Russians.
In addition, the Turks have to worry about their economic health. Russia is Turkey's
biggest trading partner, supplying more than 60 percent of Turkey's energy needs
through two natural gas pipelines (including Blue Stream, the major trans-Black Sea
pipeline), as well as more than half of Turkey's thermal coal -- a factor that has
major consequences in the approach of winter. Turkey has other options to meet its
energy needs, but there is no denying that it has intertwined itself into a
potentially economically precarious relationship with the Russians.
And the Russians have already begun using this economic lever to twist Ankara's arm.
A large amount of Turkish goods reportedly have been held up at the Russian Black
Sea ports of Novorossiysk, Sochi and Taganrog over the past 20 days ostensibly over
narcotics issues. Turkish officials claim that Turkish trucks carrying mostly
consumer goods have been singled out for "extensive checks and searches," putting
about $3 billion worth of Turkish trade in jeopardy. The Turks have already filed an
official complaint with Moscow over the trade row -- with speculation naturally
brewing over Russia's intent to punish Turkey for its participation in the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and to push Ankara to limit NATO access to the Black
Sea.
But the Russians are playing a risky game. As much as Turkey wants this conflict to
go away, it still has cards to play -- far more than any other NATO member -- if it
is pushed too hard. As Turkish State Minister Kursat Tuzmen darkly put it, "We will
disturb them if we are disturbed. We know how to disturb them." If Turkey gets fed
up with Russian bullying tactics, there is little stopping it from allowing an even
greater buildup of NATO warships in the Black Sea to threaten the Russian
underbelly.
The Turks could also begin redirecting their energy supply away from the Russians,
choosing instead to increase their natural gas supply from Iran or arrange for some
"technical difficulties" on the Blue Stream pipeline. The Russians also ship some
1.36 million barrels per day of crude through the Black Sea that the Turks could
quite easily blockade. These are the easier and quicker options that Turkey can
employ. But there are some not-so-quick and not-so-easy options for Turks to
consider as well, including riling up the Chechens in the northern Caucasus or the
Turkic peoples in Central Asia and within the Russian Federation to make trouble for
Moscow.
These are not options that Ankara is exactly eager to take, but they remain options,
and will be on both the Turkish and Russian foreign ministers' minds when they meet
in the coming days.
Copyright 2008 Strategic Forecasting, Inc.
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August 29, 2008
With Cold War tensions building in the Black Sea, the Turks have gone into a diplomatic frenzy. Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan had his phone glued to his ear on Thursday speaking to his U.S., British, German, French, Swedish and Finnish counterparts, as well as to the NATO secretary-general and various EU representatives. The Turks are also expecting Georgian Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili to arrive in Istanbul on Aug. 31. And Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is due to arrive for a separate meeting with Turkish leaders early next week.
The Turks have a reason to be such busy diplomatic bees. A group of nine NATO warships are currently in the Black Sea ostensibly on routine and humanitarian missions. Russia has wasted no time in sounding the alarm at the sight of this NATO buildup, calling on Turkey — as the gatekeeper to the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits between the Black and Mediterranean seas — to remember its commitment to the Montreux Convention, which places limits on the number of warships in the Black Sea. As a weak naval power with few assets to defend itself in this crucial frontier, Russia has every interest in keeping the NATO presence in the Black Sea as limited and distant as possible.
Turkey is in an extremely tight spot. As a NATO member in control of Russia’s warm-water naval access to the Black Sea, Turkey is a crucial link in the West’s pressure campaign against Russia. But the Turks have little interest in seeing the Black Sea become a flashpoint between Russia and the United States. Turkey has a strategic foothold in the Caucasus through Azerbaijan that it does not want to see threatened by Moscow. The Turks also simply do not have the military appetite or the internal political consolidation to be pushed by the United States into a potential conflict — naval or otherwise — with the Russians.
In addition, the Turks have to worry about their economic health. Russia is Turkey’s biggest trading partner, supplying more than 60 percent of Turkey’s energy needs through two natural gas pipelines (including Blue Stream, the major trans-Black Sea pipeline), as well as more than half of Turkey’s thermal coal — a factor that has major consequences in the approach of winter. Turkey has other options to meet its energy needs, but there is no denying that it has intertwined itself into a potentially economically precarious relationship with the Russians.
And the Russians have already begun using this economic lever to twist Ankara’s arm. A large amount of Turkish goods reportedly have been held up at the Russian Black Sea ports of Novorossiysk, Sochi and Taganrog over the past 20 days ostensibly over narcotics issues. Turkish officials claim that Turkish trucks carrying mostly consumer goods have been singled out for “extensive checks and searches,” putting about $3 billion worth of Turkish trade in jeopardy. The Turks have already filed an official complaint with Moscow over the trade row — with speculation naturally brewing over Russia’s intent to punish Turkey for its participation in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and to push Ankara to limit NATO access to the Black Sea.
But the Russians are playing a risky game. As much as Turkey wants this conflict to go away, it still has cards to play — far more than any other NATO member — if it is pushed too hard. As Turkish State Minister Kursat Tuzmen darkly put it, “We will disturb them if we are disturbed. We know how to disturb them.” If Turkey gets fed up with Russian bullying tactics, there is little stopping it from allowing an even greater buildup of NATO warships in the Black Sea to threaten the Russian underbelly.
The Turks could also begin redirecting their energy supply away from the Russians, choosing instead to increase their natural gas supply from Iran or arrange for some “technical difficulties” on the Blue Stream pipeline. The Russians also ship some 1.36 million barrels per day of crude through the Black Sea that the Turks could quite easily blockade. These are the easier and quicker options that Turkey can employ. But there are some not-so-quick and not-so-easy options for Turks to consider as well, including riling up the Chechens in the northern Caucasus or the Turkic peoples in Central Asia and within the Russian Federation to make trouble for Moscow.
These are not options that Ankara is exactly eager to take, but they remain options, and will be on both the Turkish and Russian foreign ministers’ minds when they meet in the coming days.
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All those ships in the Black Sea are nothing but a couple of peacocks (USA-NATO) strutting their tail feathers but the real action is on the ground, in Georgia, which has been invaded and split up by the Russians. No matter how many ICBMs you have, control on the ground is based on foot soldiers and not a single USA-NATO soldier has set foot in Georgia nor are they likely to.
The purpose of the strutting is to save face and to feed your friendly media, not to save Georgia from being mauled by the big Russian Bear: Hungary 1956, Checkoslovakia 1968, Georgia 2008.
Sadly, but that's what back yards are for.
Denny Schlesinger
PS: One of my cousins -- now living in Los Angles -- has a piece of the Stalin statue. I recall praying (I was still a believer in those days) for American help which never materialized.
http://www.hungary1956.com/photos.htm
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Denny, Thanks for your wisdom on the situation in Georgia. A hundred or a thousand ships mean nothing if we are committed to non-intervention. Whether we look at our failure to rescue Hungary or our difficulties liberating Iraq, I wish we had the time, resources and resolve to topple more tyrants and give more people a shot at freedom.
What makes many battles impractical IMO is the lack of contribution and sacrifice from other nations. They seem to feel a resentment of America that is stronger than the offense they take to oppression or aggression.
There is the unarmed, worthless UN where Russia has a permanent veto and there is American unilateralism. There isn't much in between.
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US navy ship steams into port where Russian troops stationed
(Bulent Kilic/AFP/Getty Images)
The USS Mount Whitney, pictured here in the Bosphorus, today made a controversial landing at the port of Poti
James Hider in Tbilisi
A US navy flagship has steamed into a Georgian port where Russian troops are still stationed, stoking tensions once again in the tinderbox Caucasus region.
A previous trip by American warships was cancelled at the last minute a week ago amid fears that an armed stand off could erupt in the Black Sea port of Poti.
The arrival of the USS Mount Whitney came as Moscow accused Dick Cheney, the hawkish US vice-president, of stoking tensions during a visit to Tbilisi yesterday, in which he vowed to bring Georgia into the Nato alliance. Russia sees any such move as a blatant Western encroachment on its traditional sphere of influence.
Russia’s leadership has already questioned whether previous US warships that docked at the port of Batumi, to the south, were delivering weapons to rearm the smashed Georgian military, something Washington has denied.
Related Links
Cheney delivers warning to Moscow
Georgia linked to Nato early warning system
Britain values unity in Nato over Georgia
While Russia again questioned the deployment of what it described as "the number one ship of its type in the US navy” on the Black Sea, it said it planned no military action in response. The Russian Army has kept a small number of soldiers in Poti, where local Georgian officials accuse them of looting port authority buildings.
“Naval ships of that class can hardly deliver a large amount of aid,” said Andrei Nesterenko, a Russian foreign ministry spokesman. “Such ships of course have a hold for keeping provisions for the crew and items needed for sailing. How many dozens of tonnes of aid can a ship of that type deliver?"
He said the presence of US warships could contravene international conventions governing shipping on the Black Sea, and - in particular - restricting the entry of naval ships from countries that do not share a Black Sea coastline.
Militarily, the small Russian garrison in Poti would pose almost no threat to a vessel like the Mount Whitney, but the proximity of two hostile forces in such a fraught setting set the political temperature rising again in the Caucasus, a month after Russia’s five day war with Georgia.
The American warship is too large to actually enter the port, where Russia sunk several Georgian navy vessels in its offensive last month. Instead, it is expected anchor offshore and unload its cargo of blankets, hygiene kits, baby food and infant care supplies on to smaller boats.
"I can confirm it has arrived in Poti. Anchoring procedures are still ongoing but it has arrived," said a US naval official.
Moscow, which followed up its crushing military defeat of Georgia by unilaterally recognising the independence of two of its breakaway regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, was fuming that Mr Cheney still insisted on Georgia’s entrance into the Atlantic alliance – something several key NATO members are wary of.
“The new promises to Tbilisi relating to the speedy membership of NATO simply strengthen the Saakashvili regime’s dangerous feeling of impunity and encourages its dangerous ambitions,” said Mr Nesterenko.
Washington has also pledged one billion dollars in aid to help Georgia rebuild after Russia pounded many of its military bases to dust and targeted important infrastructure.
The brief conflict has left thousands of Georgians homeless, including many driven from South Ossetia and the surrounding Russian buffer zone inside Georgia itself.
Georgian officials have accused the Russian-backed Ossetian militias of “ethnically cleansing” remote villages, while Moscow has charged Tbilisi with “genocide” for its heavy handed attack on the breakaway region last month.
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The NY Times is frequently a dishonest newspaper and IMHO the subject matter of this article precisely of the sort wherein the NYT is motivated to lie, mislead, misrepresent, and distort.
Caveat lector:
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TBILISI, Georgia — Newly available accounts by independent military observers of the beginning of the war between Georgia and Russia this summer call into question the longstanding Georgian assertion that it was acting defensively against separatist and Russian aggression.
Georgia moved forces toward the border of the breakaway region of South Ossetia on Aug. 7, at the start of what it called a defensive war with separatists there and with Russian forces.
Instead, the accounts suggest that Georgia’s inexperienced military attacked the isolated separatist capital of Tskhinvali on Aug. 7 with indiscriminate artillery and rocket fire, exposing civilians, Russian peacekeepers and unarmed monitors to harm.
The accounts are neither fully conclusive nor broad enough to settle the many lingering disputes over blame in a war that hardened relations between the Kremlin and the West. But they raise questions about the accuracy and honesty of Georgia’s insistence that its shelling of Tskhinvali, the capital of the breakaway region of South Ossetia, was a precise operation. Georgia has variously defended the shelling as necessary to stop heavy Ossetian shelling of Georgian villages, bring order to the region or counter a Russian invasion.
President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia has characterized the attack as a precise and defensive act. But according to observations of the monitors, documented Aug. 7 and Aug. 8, Georgian artillery rounds and rockets were falling throughout the city at intervals of 15 to 20 seconds between explosions, and within the first hour of the bombardment at least 48 rounds landed in a civilian area. The monitors have also said they were unable to verify that ethnic Georgian villages were under heavy bombardment that evening, calling to question one of Mr. Saakashvili’s main justifications for the attack.
Senior Georgian officials contest these accounts, and have urged Western governments to discount them. “That information, I don’t know what it is and how it is confirmed,” said Giga Bokeria, Georgia’s deputy foreign minister. “There is such an amount of evidence of continuous attacks on Georgian-controlled villages and so much evidence of Russian military buildup, it doesn’t change in any case the general picture of events.”
He added: “Who was counting those explosions? It sounds a bit peculiar.”
The Kremlin has embraced the monitors’ observations, which, according to a written statement from Grigory Karasin, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, reflect “the actual course of events prior to Georgia’s aggression.” He added that the accounts “refute” allegations by Tbilisi of bombardments that he called mythical.
The monitors were members of an international team working under the mandate of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or O.S.C.E. A multilateral organization with 56 member states, the group has monitored the conflict since a previous cease-fire agreement in the 1990s.
The observations by the monitors, including a Finnish major, a Belorussian airborne captain and a Polish civilian, have been the subject of two confidential briefings to diplomats in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, one in August and the other in October. Summaries were shared with The New York Times by people in attendance at both.
Details were then confirmed by three Western diplomats and a Russian, and were not disputed by the O.S.C.E.’s mission in Tbilisi, which was provided with a written summary of the observations.
Mr. Saakashvili, who has compared Russia’s incursion into Georgia to the Nazi annexations in Europe in 1938 and the Soviet suppression of Prague in 1968, faces domestic unease with his leadership and skepticism about his judgment from Western governments.
The brief war was a disaster for Georgia. The attack backfired. Georgia’s army was humiliated as Russian forces overwhelmed its brigades, seized and looted their bases, captured their equipment and roamed the country’s roads at will. Villages that Georgia vowed to save were ransacked and cleared of their populations by irregular Ossetian, Chechen and Cossack forces, and several were burned to the ground.
Massing of Weapons
According to the monitors, an O.S.C.E. patrol at 3 p.m. on Aug. 7 saw large numbers of Georgian artillery and grad rocket launchers massing on roads north of Gori, just south of the enclave.
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At 6:10 p.m., the monitors were told by Russian peacekeepers of suspected Georgian artillery fire on Khetagurovo, an Ossetian village; this report was not independently confirmed, and Georgia declared a unilateral cease-fire shortly thereafter, about 7 p.m.
During a news broadcast that began at 11 p.m., Georgia announced that Georgian villages were being shelled, and declared an operation “to restore constitutional order” in South Ossetia. The bombardment of Tskhinvali started soon after the broadcast.
According to the monitors, however, no shelling of Georgian villages could be heard in the hours before the Georgian bombardment. At least two of the four villages that Georgia has since said were under fire were near the observers’ office in Tskhinvali, and the monitors there likely would have heard artillery fire nearby.
Moreover, the observers made a record of the rounds exploding after Georgia’s bombardment began at 11:35 p.m. At 11:45 p.m., rounds were exploding at intervals of 15 to 20 seconds between impacts, they noted.
At 12:15 a.m. on Aug. 8, Gen. Maj. Marat M. Kulakhmetov, commander of Russian peacekeepers in the enclave, reported to the monitors that his unit had casualties, indicating that Russian soldiers had come under fire.
By 12:35 a.m. the observers had recorded at least 100 heavy rounds exploding across Tskhinvali, including 48 close to the observers’ office, which is in a civilian area and was damaged.
Col. Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn, a spokesman for the Russian Defense Ministry, said that by morning on Aug. 8 two Russian soldiers had been killed and five wounded. Two senior Western military officers stationed in Georgia, speaking on condition of anonymity because they work with Georgia’s military, said that whatever Russia’s behavior in or intentions for the enclave, once Georgia’s artillery or rockets struck Russian positions, conflict with Russia was all but inevitable. This clear risk, they said, made Georgia’s attack dangerous and unwise.
Senior Georgia officials, a group with scant military experience and personal loyalties to Mr. Saakashvili, have said that much of the damage to Tskhinvali was caused in combat between its soldiers and separatists, or by Russian airstrikes and bombardments in its counterattack the next day. As for its broader shelling of the city, Georgia has told Western diplomats that Ossetians hid weapons in civilian buildings, making them legitimate targets.
“The Georgians have been quite clear that they were shelling targets — the mayor’s office, police headquarters — that had been used for military purposes,” said Matthew J. Bryza, a deputy assistant secretary of state and one of Mr. Saakashvili’s vocal supporters in Washington.
Those claims have not been independently verified, and Georgia’s account was disputed by Ryan Grist, a former British Army captain who was the senior O.S.C.E. representative in Georgia when the war broke out. Mr. Grist said that he was in constant contact that night with all sides, with the office in Tskhinvali and with Wing Commander Stephen Young, the retired British military officer who leads the monitoring team.
“It was clear to me that the attack was completely indiscriminate and disproportionate to any, if indeed there had been any, provocation,” Mr. Grist said. “The attack was clearly, in my mind, an indiscriminate attack on the town, as a town.”
Mr. Grist has served as a military officer or diplomat in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Kosovo and Yugoslavia. In August, after the Georgian foreign minister, Eka Tkeshelashvili, who has no military experience, assured diplomats in Tbilisi that the attack was measured and discriminate, Mr. Grist gave a briefing to diplomats from the European Union that drew from the monitors’ observations and included his assessments. He then soon resigned under unclear circumstances.
A second briefing was led by Commander Young in October for military attachés visiting Georgia. At the meeting, according to a person in attendance, Commander Young stood by the monitors’ assessment that Georgian villages had not been extensively shelled on the evening or night of Aug. 7. “If there had been heavy shelling in areas that Georgia claimed were shelled, then our people would have heard it, and they didn’t,” Commander Young said, according to the person who attended. “They heard only occasional small-arms fire.”
The O.S.C.E turned down a request by The Times to interview Commander Young and the monitors, saying they worked in sensitive jobs and would not be publicly engaged in this disagreement.
Grievances and Exaggeration
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Disentangling the Russian and Georgian accounts has been complicated. The violence along the enclave’s boundaries that had occurred in recent summers was more widespread this year, and in the days before Aug. 7 there had been shelling of Georgian villages. Tensions had been soaring.
Each side has fresh lists of grievances about the other, which they insist are decisive. But both sides also have a record of misstatement and exaggeration, which includes circulating casualty estimates that have not withstood independent examination. With the international standing of both Russia and Georgia damaged, the public relations battle has been intensive.
Russian military units have been implicated in destruction of civilian property and accused by Georgia of participating with Ossetian militias in a campaign of ethnic cleansing. Russia and South Ossetia have accused Georgia of attacking Ossetian civilians.
But a critical and as yet unanswered question has been what changed for Georgia between 7 p.m. on Aug 7, when Mr. Saakashvili declared a cease-fire, and 11:30 p.m., when he says he ordered the attack. The Russian and Ossetian governments have said the cease-fire was a ruse used to position rockets and artillery for the assault.
That view is widely held by Ossetians. Civilians repeatedly reported resting at home after the cease-fire broadcast by Mr. Saakashvili. Emeliya B. Dzhoyeva, 68, was home with her husband, Felix, 70, when the bombardment began. He lost his left arm below the elbow and suffered burns to his right arm and torso. “Saakashvili told us that nothing would happen,” she said. “So we all just went to bed.”
Neither Georgia nor its Western allies have as yet provided conclusive evidence that Russia was invading the country or that the situation for Georgians in the Ossetian zone was so dire that a large-scale military attack was necessary, as Mr. Saakashvili insists.
Georgia has released telephone intercepts indicating that a Russian armored column apparently entered the enclave from Russia early on the Aug. 7, which would be a violation of the peacekeeping rules. Georgia said the column marked the beginning of an invasion. But the intercepts did not show the column’s size, composition or mission, and there has not been evidence that it was engaged with Georgian forces until many hours after the Georgian bombardment; Russia insists it was simply a routine logistics train or troop rotation.
Unclear Accounts of Shelling
Interviews by The Times have found a mixed picture on the question of whether Georgian villages were shelled after Mr. Saakashvili declared the cease-fire. Residents of the village of Zemo Nigozi, one of the villages that Georgia has said was under heavy fire, said they were shelled from 6 p.m. on, supporting Georgian statements.
In two other villages, interviews did not support Georgian claims. In Avnevi, several residents said the shelling stopped before the cease-fire and did not resume until roughly the same time as the Georgian bombardment. In Tamarasheni, some residents said they were lightly shelled on the evening of Aug. 7, but felt safe enough not to retreat to their basements. Others said they were not shelled until Aug 9.
With a paucity of reliable and unbiased information available, the O.S.C.E. observations put the United States in a potentially difficult position. The United States, Mr. Saakashvili’s principal source of international support, has for years accepted the organization’s conclusions and praised its professionalism. Mr. Bryza refrained from passing judgment on the conflicting accounts.
“I wasn’t there,” he said, referring to the battle. “We didn’t have people there. But the O.S.C.E. really has been our benchmark on many things over the years.”
The O.S.C.E. itself, while refusing to discuss its internal findings, stood by the accuracy of its work but urged caution in interpreting it too broadly. “We are confident that all O.S.C.E. observations are expert, accurate and unbiased,” Martha Freeman, a spokeswoman, said in an e-mail message. “However, monitoring activities in certain areas at certain times cannot be taken in isolation to provide a comprehensive account.”
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Since Russia invaded Georgia last August, the international community seems stuck on one question about how the war started: Did the Georgian military act irresponsibly to take control of Tskhinvali in the South Ossetia region of Georgia?
Reuters
Russian armor on the move in Georgia, August 2008.
This question has been pushed to the center in large degree by a fierce, multimillion-dollar Russian PR campaign that hinges on leaked, very partial, and misleading reports from a military observer from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) that claimed Georgia responded militarily in South Ossetia without sufficient provocation by Russia. Judging from recent media coverage, this campaign has been successful.
Focusing on this question distracts from Russia's intense, blatant policy of regime change that has long aimed to destabilize Georgia through ethnic manipulation, and thus thwart our democracy while stopping NATO's expansion. Furthermore, it has never been in dispute whether our forces entered South Ossetia. I have always openly acknowledged that I ordered military action in South Ossetia -- as any responsible democratic leader would have done, and as the Georgian Constitution required me to do in defense of the country.
I made this decision after being confronted by two facts. First, Russia had massed hundreds of tanks and thousands of soldiers on the border between Russian and Georgia in the area of South Ossetia. We had firm intelligence that they were crossing into Georgia, a fact later confirmed by telephone intercepts verified by the New York Times and others -- and a fact never substantially denied by Russia. (We had alerted the international community both about the military deployment and an inflow of mercenaries early on Aug. 7.)
Second, for a week Russian forces and their proxies engaged in a series of deadly provocations, shelling Georgian villages that were under my government's control -- with much of the artillery located in Tskhinvali, often within sites controlled by Russian peacekeepers. Then, on Aug. 7, Russia and its proxies killed several Georgian peacekeepers. Russian peacekeepers and OSCE observers admitted that they were incapable of preventing the lethal attacks. In fact, the OSCE had proven impotent in preventing the Russians from building two illegal military bases inside South Ossetia during the preceding year.
So the question is not whether Georgia ordered military action -- including targeting of the artillery sites that were shelling villages controlled by our government. We did.
The question is, rather: What democratic polity would have acted any differently while its citizens were being slaughtered as its sovereign territory was being invaded? South Ossetia and Abkhazia are internationally recognized as part of Georgia, and even some areas within these conflict zones were under Georgian government control before the Russian invasion. We fought to repel a foreign invasion. Georgians never stepped beyond Georgian territory.
My government has urged the international community to open an independent, unbiased investigation into the origins of the war. I first proposed this on Aug. 17, standing with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Tbilisi. I offered to make every shred of evidence and every witness available. Russia has yet to accede to such terms of inquiry.
Also, last Friday I stood for several hours before a commission established by the Georgian Parliament, chaired by a leader of an opposition party, to investigate the conduct of the war. This is the first time that any leader from this part of the world has been scrutinized live on national television for his or her wartime decisions by a legislative investigation. I have also required every member of my administration and military to make themselves available to the committee.
The real test of the legitimacy of Russia's actions should be based not on whether Georgia's democratically elected leadership came to the defense of its own people on its own land, but on an assessment of the following questions. Was it Georgia or Russia (and its proxies) that:
- Pursued the de facto annexation of the sovereign territory of a neighboring state?
- Illegally issued passports to residents of a neighboring democracy in order to create a pretext for invasion (to "protect its citizens")?
- Sent hundreds of tanks and thousands of soldiers across the internationally recognized borders of a neighboring democracy?
- Instigated a series of deadly provocations and open attacks over the course of many months, resulting in civilian casualties?
- Refused to engage in meaningful, bilateral dialogue on peace proposals?
- Constantly blocked all international peacekeeping efforts?
- Refused to attend urgent peace talks on South Ossetia organized by the European Union and the OSCE in late July?
- When the crisis began to escalate, refused to have any meaningful contact (I tried to reach President Dmitry Medvedev on both Aug. 6 and 7, but he refused my calls)?
- Tried to cover up a long-planned invasion by claiming, on Aug. 8, that Georgia had killed 1,400 civilians and engaged in ethnic cleansing -- "facts" quickly disproved by international and Russian human-rights groups?
In today's Opinion Journal
REVIEW & OUTLOOK
Travels With HillaryMumbai and ObamaMore Immigration Losers
TODAY'S COLUMNISTS
Global View: Media Narratives Feed Terrorist Fantasies
– Bret StephensMain Street: What's Good for GM Could Be Good for America
– William McGurn
COMMENTARY
Georgia Acted in Self-Defense
– Mikheil SaakashviliAIG Needs a New Deal
– Maurice R. GreenbergGovernors Against State Bailouts
– Rick Perry and Mark Sanford- Refused to permit EU monitors unrestricted access to these conflict areas after the fighting ended, while engaging in the brutal ethnic cleansing of Georgians?
These are the questions that need to be answered. The fact that none can be answered in Russia's favor underscores the grave risks of returning to business as usual. Russia sees Georgia as a test. If the international response is not firm, Moscow will make other moves to redraw the region's map by intimidation or force.
Responding firmly to the Putin-Medvedev government implies neither the isolation nor the abandonment of Russia; it can be achieved in tandem with continuing engagement of, and trade with, Russia. But it does require holding Russia to account. Moscow must honor its sovereign commitments and fully withdraw its troops to pre-August positions. It must allow unrestricted EU monitoring, and accede to the international consensus that these territories are Georgia. Such steps are not bellicose; they are simply the necessary course to contain an imperial regime.
We all hope that Russia soon decides to join the international community as a full, cooperative partner. This would be the greatest contribution to Georgia's stability. In the interim, we should make sure that we do not sacrifice democracies like Georgia that are trying to make this critical part of the world more stable, secure and free.
Mr. Saakashvili is president of Georgia.
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TBILISI, Georgia -- As ex-Eastern bloc countries from Hungary to Ukraine stumble in the face of the global financial crisis, Georgia, which also suffered a war, has so far largely escaped. The reason: the war.
More than half a billion dollars in mainly U.S. reconstruction aid has already been allocated at high speed since the war between Russia and Georgia in August, filling holes in Georgia's budget and replacing financing for commercial and infrastructure projects that might otherwise have dried up.
A building in Gori, Georgia, smolders after being bombed by Russian jets in August. Reconstruction aid, mainly from the U.S., has replaced commercial financing that might have dried up amid the global financial crisis.
"If there ever was a good time to have a war then this was it," said Roy Southworth, shortly before retiring as country manager for the World Bank in Tbilisi last week.
Georgia was particularly fortunate, he said, with the timing of an Oct. 23 international donor's conference in Brussels, where countries pledged a total of $4.5 billion in aid that should help fill the gap left by an expected drop in foreign investment after the war. "The worst of the financial crisis was still a few days off -- a week or two later and who knows if governments would have been so willing to pledge money," he said.
Most of Georgia's rapid recent economic growth has come from foreign direct investment, which made up close to 20% of gross domestic product in 2007, according to government figures. But the war has put that trend at risk.
Kazakhstan said in September that it had ditched plans to build a $1 billion oil refinery in Batumi, and in October that it might consider selling its gas-distribution business in Georgia. Kazakhstan is a major investor in Georgia but must carefully balance its interests here with keeping its bigger trading partner, Russia, happy.
With growth set to slow sharply to 3.5% this year from 12.4% in 2007, according to World Bank forecasts, unemployment is expected to rise, a prospect that has the government worried.
"Not a single Georgian would have wanted this money as a consequence of war," said Eka Sharashidze, Minister for Economic Development, at a signing ceremony Monday for $10.7 million in U.S. and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development grants and loans to overhaul the water-supply system in the city of Borjomi. "But this support will help Georgia get back on its feet."
Georgia's government can take credit for some of the economic stability during and after the war, said Mr. Southworth. Unlike some other East European economies, Georgia hadn't run up massive deficits prior to the financial crisis that made its currency vulnerable. The government recently said it will cut the nation's flat income-tax rate by five percentage points to 20% in January in an effort to stimulate the economy.
About $570 million of the $1 billion U.S. portion of the international aid has already been allocated, with $250 million to fill a hole in the government's budget, helping to pay politically sensitive state pensions and salaries.
Georgia also has fans in the foreign-investment community willing to wait and see. This year, the country leapt to the 15th-best place to do business in the world in the World Bank's annual rankings. As recently as 2005, Georgia ranked 112th.
Foreign investors "that already invested time or money are continuing, even if they are delayed a few months," said David Lee, general director of MagtiCom Ltd, Georgia's leading mobile-telecommunications company, adding that 70% of all companies in Georgia are his clients. "But the big question is -- will new investors come?"
Mr. Southworth points to a slew of five-star hotels under construction in downtown Tbilisi as a bellwether for how bad the impact gets. Several seem likely to finish almost according to prewar schedules, despite the war. One, to be operated by Hyatt International LLC, is set to receive about $30 million in cheap finance from the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, or OPIC, part of a $176 million loan package for seven projects in late October.
"The OPIC finance is goodwill and assistance because private-equity funds won't invest in Georgia now, they won't take on the country risk or the high political risk," said Kakha Sharabidze, the Tbilisi-based CEO of Loyal Estate, the developer of the project.
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The Moscow Times » Issue 4051 » News
Ria-novosti / AP
Signs of a Kremlin Fearful Of Unrest
12 December 2008By Nikolaus von Twickel / Staff WriterThis is the 12th in a series of reports about the effect of the global financial crisis on Russia.
Sociologist Yevgeny Gontmakher has painted a disturbing picture of what might emerge from the financial crisis.
As Gontmakher sees it, a provincial industrial town will see huge protests after massive layoffs at its main factory next year. The authorities scramble haphazardly to contain the unrest. Violence will spread, ultimately reaching Moscow.
The scenario, published under the headline "Novocherkassk 2009" in Vedomosti last month, is purely fictitious. But it triggered a very real reaction from the authorities. The government's media watchdog fired off a warning to Vedomosti that it was inciting extremism. Vedomosti is part of Independent Media Sanoma Magazines, the parent company of The Moscow Times.
Novocherkassk is a town in the southern Rostov region where Soviet police brutally quashed rioting workers in 1962.
Gontmakher, a deputy social protection minister and Kremlin official in the 1990s, said he had not expected such a response from the government, but the threat is real and growing daily as the crisis takes it toll. "Of course they are worried, and they should be," he said of the government.
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, on the other hand, has said Russia should be able to get through the crisis with minimal problems. He has repeatedly denied that his government bears any responsibility for the crisis, saying the economic downturn spread from the United States and has infected "all the economies of the world."
But Gontmakher is by no means alone in arguing that Russia's political stability, seen as a major achievement of Putin's eight-year presidency, is deceptive. The crisis has already led to a wave of layoffs across the country, despite the fact that Russian companies traditionally reduce wages before shedding staff.
Putin himself acknowledged in his televised question-and-answer session last week that the number of unemployed workers was expected to increase next year to "a little over 2 million" from the current 1.7 million.
In another sign that the government is nervous about disorder, President Dmitry Medvedev last month ordered law enforcement agencies to stamp out any social unrest linked to the crisis. "If someone tries to exploit the consequences of the financial crisis … they should intervene, bring criminal charges. Otherwise, there won't be order," he told senior police officials at a public briefing in St. Petersburg.
Incidentally, Putin and Medvedev visited Novocherkassk this February and laid flowers at a stone in memory of those killed in 1962.
Vladimir Ryzhkov, a former independent State Duma deputy and liberal opposition activist, said much of the crisis has been brought on by the government and its refusal to deregulate the economy, be held accountable by the parliament and allow political competition.
"This crisis did not arise because of events in America. It arose because of [the government's] mistakes," he said.
Ryzhkov said Russian companies would not have secured so much foreign debt during the last three years — decisions that now have led the economy to the brink of bankruptcy — if the parliament had been given oversight over the government's actions. He singled out Medvedev and Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin as being particularly responsible for the current financial straits, noting that Medvedev, who was chairman of Gazprom before acceding to the presidency this spring, and Sechin, Rosneft's chairman, had overseen heavy foreign borrowing by the two state corporations over the past three years.
Yet opinion polls indicate that the government faces little public discontent. Trust in Putin stood firmly at 59 percent in late November while trust in Medvedev dipped slightly from 45 percent to 44 percent, according to a survey by state-run VTsIOM. The poll had a margin of error of 3.4 percentage points.
The government's popularity will depend largely on its ability to stave off the crisis, said Nikita Belykh, the former leader of the Union of Right Forces, who this week was nominated by Medvedev to become the governor of Kirov.
"The Kremlin has enough money to keep the situation under control for a few months. But in the medium term, political changes are inevitable, and there will be clashes between powerful political groups," Belykh said.
Two factors in the government's favor, he said, are its ability to control information through state media and Russians' tendency to be apolitical. However, popular anger against the authorities could increase considerably because the public is feeling increasingly alienated from the country's leadership, he said.
Ryzhkov said the crucial question was whether the government could balance the budget over the first half of 2009. "The turning point will come when they cannot pay off state corporations' gigantic debts anymore," he said.
The government's financial capabilities are largely linked to oil prices, which have fallen to less than $50 a barrel from a high of $147 in July.
"If oil falls below $20, there will be a revolution," said Vladimir Pribylovsky, a political analyst with the Panorama think tank.
He said Putin's popularity rested on the fact that ordinary people had gotten a share of the riches, in stark contrast to the 1990s when a tiny minority got very rich while the majority sank into poverty.
"Crises will break out left and right if the Kremlin oligarchy can no longer share the wealth with the people," Pribylovsky said.
While the economic boom of recent years has increased the real incomes of most people, inequality levels have not come down. Moscow's Gini index, a scientific standard for measuring income distribution, is estimated at 0.6, making the capital one of the world's most unequal cities.
Putin's popularity is almost entirely built on the economic boom, so it could crumble if the economy goes bust, said Olga Kryshtanovskaya, a sociologist who tracks Kremlin politics. "Everyone was happy as long they got government money," she said.
That puts the government in the difficult position of how to trim spending. Cuts to the public sector would upset bureaucrats, while cuts to defense would anger the powerful siloviki.
The government has shown reluctance to speak out openly about the crisis after many people saw their savings vanish in two previous crises — the Soviet collapse in 1991 and the 1998 default. The authorities "only have two choices — to lie or to create a panic. In 1998, they chose the truth and panic, and the result was very bad," Kryshtanovskaya said.
In late November, the Economic Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly warned that a global recession would threaten "to undermine the very foundations of democracy" in many countries.
Interestingly, the government appears to have stepped up its efforts to rein in opposition groups. Last month, remnants of the Union of Right Forces, or SPS, were folded into a new pro-business party called Right Cause, a move that is widely seen as a Kremlin attempt to round out the political spectrum with obedient parties.
Belykh, who resigned from SPS saying cooperation with the Kremlin was unacceptable, raised eyebrows in liberal circles this week with his decision to accept Medvedev's invitation to become governor.
Ryzhkov said that even though Russia's opposition was weak and divided, there were people in the regions who were willing and able to challenge the government. "I will not name anyone, but I can tell you that there are terrific specialists on economic and political reform who could make up a Russian dream team that would fix the flagrant mistakes made by Putin's people," he said.
In the meantime, people are wondering how bad matters will get. Harald Leibrecht, a German lawmaker with the liberal Free Democrats and deputy chairman of the German-Russian parliamentary group, said the Vedomosti incident showed that the situation was not as rosy as depicted by Putin and Medvedev.
"It is very strange but telling" that the newspaper received the warning, Leibrecht said in e-mailed comments.
The warning is probably linked to government fears that the country might slide into the chaos of the 1990s, he said.
The media watchdog, the Federal Service for Oversight over Communications and Mass Media, has the power to ask a court to revoke a newspaper's license after issuing two warnings. But Vedomosti lawyers have decided that last month's warning did not qualify has an official warning but as a reminder.
In any case, the head of the watchdog, Boris Boyarskov, was dismissed last week by Medvedev after four years in the post, Interfax reported Wednesday. The circumstances behind the decision were unclear.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/1010/42/373091.htm
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They are already protesting and getting beat up in Vladivostok:
Hundreds protest car tariffs in Russia's far east (http://article.wn.com/view/2008/12/20/Hundreds_protest_car_tariffs_in_Russias_far_east_z0/)
Car-tariff protesters beaten in Russia's Far East (http://www.wtopnews.com/index.php?nid=111&sid=1555793)
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The story is about unrest, but it also brings to the forefront the contest between free trade versus 'protectionism' that applies everywhere. A story at the link tells of a consumer who won't be able to buy his dream (Japanese) car and concludes with: "Many Russians say they have a right to buy what they want on the free market and do not want to pay to support the Russian auto industry."
The protests in Vladivstok highlight the fact that jobs are tied to the trade business as well, as we see another case of government picking winners and losers.
If you can't secure a competitive contract with your own workers, if you can't build a product that consumers want at competitive prices or if your business is not strong enough and flexible enough to survive a downturn, then go to the government and have them put a tax on your competitors or demand operating capital from the government - from the taxes paid by the workers of successful businesses - to put into the losing enterprise. This could never happen in America... Oops.
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Georgia: Left to Russia's Mercy?
STRATFOR Today » March 10, 2009 | 1041 GMT
VANO SHLAMOV/AFP/Getty Images
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili Summary
The United States and the European Union have let Georgia know that the West cannot protect the small Caucasus country from Russia, even though Georgia is pro-Western and an ally of NATO. Russia knows that Georgia on its own cannot threaten Moscow, but grows concerned when outside powers reach out to support the anti-Russian government in Tbilisi.
Analysis
Related Special Topic Page
The Russian Resurgence
The United States and the European Union have both informed Georgia that the West cannot really protect the small Caucasus state from its larger neighbor, Russia, even though NATO considers Tbilisi an ally. Georgian Prime Minister Nikoloz Gilauri was informed of this shift in position March 5 at the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Brussels. First, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with Gilauri to explain that the United States valued healing relations with the Russians over its commitment to the Georgians. After that, Gilauri went to the Europeans for clarification on their relationship with Georgia. According to STRATFOR sources, EU External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner not only reiterated the U.S. position, she also advised Georgia to re-establish a working relationship with its former master, Russia.
Both the Americans and the Europeans understand that Russia has drawn a line in the sand around Georgia and most of its other former Soviet territories. And if the West wants Russia’s help on any issue — from strong energy ties to Afghanistan to Iran — it must change its relationship with Georgia.
Since the 2003 Rose Revolution brought a vehemently pro-Western and anti-Russian government to Tbilisi, Georgia has sought to solidify its relationship with the West by joining two Western institutions: NATO and the European Union. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States has sought to bring Georgia into NATO in hopes of expanding Western influence into the former Soviet sphere in an area other than Europe.
But Moscow sees Georgia as one of the cornerstones of Russia’s buffer and protection against the West and the other regional powers that touch the Caucasus, like Turkey and Iran. Russia knows that because of its geographic position and layout, Georgia is inherently weak, fractured and chaotic to the point that it cannot stand, let alone consolidate into a threat against Russia, without a benefactor. This has allowed Russia to overlook Georgia’s rebellious nature and anti-Russian sentiments. However, whenever another power begins to flirt with Georgia, Russia steps in to ensure that the country, which Moscow considers its turf, remains true to the Russian objective of keeping other powers at bay.
Geography
Georgia is destined to be a buffer state — and an unstable one at that. It is located in the Caucasus region along the dividing line between Europe and Asia, and it borders Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey. Georgia can be characterized by its river valley, mountain ranges and secessionist regions that split the country into countless pieces.
(click image to enlarge)
First, the only real core of the country exists around the Mtkvari River Valley, which runs like a horseshoe up through the center of the country. Many successful states are based around river valleys, but the Mtkvari flows the wrong way — into the landlocked Caspian, a sea with low coastal populations and thus low trade — to be of any benefit to Georgia. There is another river, the Rioni, that flows down from Georgia’s northern border and into the Black Sea at the port of Poti; however, this river is so shallow that trade is virtually impossible to the bustling Black Sea (or the connecting Mediterranean Sea). But the two rivers split the country into two major regions: one oriented toward Poti and the Black Sea, and the other toward the capital of Tbilisi and the Caspian Sea.
Neither of these cores is large or strong enough to overcome the isolation created by the mountain ranges that slice across most parts of Georgia. The mountains do have some benefits; the northern ranges protect the mainly Orthodox Christian country from Russia’s Muslim Caucasus belt and its myriad militant groups, and they provide limited protection from Russia itself. However, these mountains have created countless pockets of populations that see themselves as independent from Georgia. This has led to the rise of four main secessionist or separatist regions in Georgia, which account for approximately 30 percent of the country’s area and more than 20 percent of its population.
(click image to enlarge)
Abkhazia and South Ossetia
The breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are located on Georgia’s northern border with Russia. Their location and their ethnic links across the Russian border have made them fervently pro-Russian areas. Both have seen some intense wars with Georgia (especially the 1992-1993 Abkhazian War) in their bids for independence. The two regions were known around the world after the August 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia — through these two regions — which ended in Moscow recognizing the secessionist areas’ independence from Tbilisi. Only one other country — and an unimportant one at that — has also recognized the two regions’ independence, though the regions now have a permanent and decisive Russian military presence (3,600 soldiers in each region) to prevent Georgia from retaking the territory. Abkhazia and South Ossetia control the only two easily traversable routes north into Russia, leaving Georgia virtually cut off from any possibility of trade with its northern neighbor. Furthermore, Georgia’s largest and most-developed port, Sukhumi, is located in Abkhazia and is kept from Georgian use.
Adjara and Samtskhe-Javakheti
On Georgia’s southern border are the Adjara and Samtskhe-Javakheti regions. Georgia considers Adjara, which borders Turkey, an autonomous republic (like Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Georgia has fought to keep a hold on this region because it is the country’s most prosperous and is home to Georgia’s second-largest port, Batumi. The region attempted a major uprising in 2004, but without a major international backer — like Abkhazia and South Ossetia had — it failed to break free from Tbilisi.
Samtskhe-Javakheti differs from Adjara in that its majority population is ethnically Armenian, not Georgian. The region is closely tied to Yerevan, through which Russia pushes its influence. Tbilisi is also desperate to keep control over this area, because Georgia’s two major international pipelines — the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the South Caucasus natural gas pipeline — run from Azerbaijan to Turkey through the region. Samtskhe-Javakheti has called for autonomy like Georgia’s other three secessionist regions, though it is not yet organized enough to fight for such independence.
Economy
Because of Georgia’s geographically fractured and isolated condition, it has no real or substantial economy. Georgia’s main economic sector is agriculture, which only brings in less than 10 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) but accounts for more than 55 percent of the workforce.
The problem with Georgia counting on agriculture is that all the good farmland is in the country’s west, far from the capital. (The rest of the country is too mountainous for agriculture.) The country cannot transport its agricultural goods easily or cheaply. Because of their location, size and direction, Georgia’s rivers cannot really transport goods, so Georgia is forced to use roads and some rail, which absorb every scrap of money the country has. These transport problems mean that vast amounts of crops spoil in Georgia’s fields, and the cost of domestic goods is higher than that of goods imported from Turkey or Russia.
The country’s next two economic sectors are heavy industry, which cannot run without supplies imported from Russia, and tourism, which has dropped off exponentially since the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. Georgia has thus had to rely on foreign cash to make up for its gap in revenues. In 2007, the country received $5.2 billion — approximately 55 percent of its GDP — in foreign direct investment, though most of that came from the pipelines crossing Georgia from Azerbaijan to Turkey.
Politics
Despite Georgia’s splintered geography, population and economy, the country is politically consolidated. Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili came to power after the Rose Revolution, which was Western-funded and organized. Since then, he and his party have kept a tight grip on Tbilisi, winning the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections with more than 95 percent of the vote. Any opposition is split among dozens of minuscule groups that have yet to show any signs of unifying. Also, Saakashvili has thus far befriended, crushed or booted out of the country any viable opposition candidates.
Saakashvili and his group are firmly anti-Russian, but they understand that political power is not enough to challenge Russian influence in the country. This is why Georgia has had to rely on foreign backers — mainly Europe and the United States — to give any sort of protection to the small, structurally troubled state. There is a regional power Georgia could turn to in Turkey. However, Ankara understands that Russia has marked the state as its turf, and Turkey has decided that Georgia is not worth the messy fight in order to gain influence in the Caucasus.
And Europe and the United States do not have the advantage of being geographically close to Georgia in order to keep their influence present. It would be easy for Europe and/or the United States to project power into Georgia via its seaports, but in order to get across and hold Georgia, troops would have to take multiple routes, as the Russians did in 2008. That would not be a simple process for powers that do not border Georgia.
The Russian View
Russia does not really care if Georgia is friendly to it, nor does it care if Tbilisi is pro-Western. Georgia simply cannot threaten Russia, and Moscow has too many ways to destabilize the small state. Because of its geographic makeup and infrastructure, Georgia is easy to destabilize and easily opened to Russian power projection, as messy as that process is.
However, Moscow does feel threatened about Georgia’s ability to swipe at Russia’s underbelly with the assistance of a powerful foreign backer. Russia views Georgia much like the United States views Cuba: The small country cannot do much damage acting out on its own, but if a foreign power begins to flirt with the state, then Russia must immediately and forcefully pull it back into its sphere.
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April 8, 2009 | 1943 GMT
Georgian opposition politicians making a statement in Tbilisi on March 27Summary
Georgian opposition movements have planned mass protests for April 9, mostly in Tbilisi but also around the country. These protests could spell trouble for President Mikhail Saakashvili. The Western-leaning president has faced protests before, but this time the opposition is more consolidated than in the past. Furthermore, some members of the government are expected to join in the protests, and Russia has stepped up its efforts to oust Saakashvili.
Intelligence Guidance (Special Edition): April 8, 2009
Opposition parties inside Georgia are planning mass protests for April 9, mainly in the capital city of Tbilisi but also across the country. The protests are against President Mikhail Saakashvili and are expected to demand his resignation. This is not the first set of rallies against Saakashvili, who has had a rocky presidency since taking power in the pro-Western “Rose Revolution” of 2003. Anti-government protests have been held constantly over the past six years. But the upcoming rally is different: This is the first time all 17 opposition parties have consolidated enough to organize a mass movement in the country. Furthermore, many members of the government are joining the cause, and foreign powers — namely Russia — are known to be encouraging plans to oust Saakashvili.
The planned protests in Georgia have been scheduled to coincide with the 20th anniversary of the Soviet crackdown on independence demonstrators in Tbilisi. The opposition movement claims that more than 100,000 people will take to the streets — an ambitious number, as the protests of the past six years have not drawn more than 15,000 people. But this time around, the Georgian people’s discontent is greatly intensified because of the blame placed on Saakashvili after the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008. Most Georgians believe Saakashvili pushed the country into a war, knowing the repercussions, and into a serious financial crisis in which unemployment has reached nearly 9 percent.
Georgia’s opposition has always been fractured and so has only managed to pull together sporadic rallies rather than a real movement. But the growing discontent in Georgia is allowing the opposition groups to finally overcome their differences and agree that Saakashvili should be removed. Even Saakashvili loyalists like former Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze and former Georgian Ambassador to the United Nations Irakli Alasania have joined the opposition’s cause, targeting Saakashvili personally. The problem now is that opposition members still do not agree on how to remove the president; some are calling for referendums on new elections, and some want to install a replacement government to make sure Saakashvili does not have a chance to return to power. But all 17 parties agreed to start with large-scale demonstrations in the streets and go from there.
If the movement does inspire such a large turnout, it would be equivalent to the number of protesters that hit the streets at the height of the Rose Revolution, which toppled the previous government and brought Saakashvili into power in the first place.
Saakashvili and the remainder of his supporters are prepared, however, with the military on standby outside of Tbilisi in order to counter a large movement. During a demonstration in 2007, Saakashvili deployed the military and successfully — though violently — crushed the protests. But that demonstration consisted of 15,000 protesters; it is unclear if Saakashvili and the military could withstand numbers seven times that.
(click image to enlarge)
There is also concern that protests are planned in the Georgian secessionist region of Adjara, which rose up against and rejected Saakashvili’s government in 2004 after the Rose Revolution. This region was suppressed by Saakashvili once and has held a grudge ever since, looking for the perfect time to rise up again. Tbilisi especially wants to keep Adjara under its control because it is home to the large port of Batumi, and many of Georgia’s transport routes to Turkey run through it. If Adjara rises up, there are rumors in the region that its neighboring secessionist region, Samtskhe-Javakheti, will join in to help destabilize Saakashvili and the government. Georgia already officially lost its two northern secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Russian occupation during the August 2008 war and is highly concerned with its southern regions trying to break away.
These southern regions, like the northern ones, have strong support from Russia; thus, Moscow is square in the middle of tomorrow’s activities. Russia has long backed all of Georgia’s secessionist regions, but has had difficulty penetrating the Georgian opposition groups in order to organize them against Saakashvili. Though none of the 17 opposition groups are pro-Russian, STRATFOR sources in Georgia say Russian money has been flowing into the groups in order to nudge them along in organizing the impending protests.
Russia has a vested interest in breaking the Georgian government. Russia and the West have been locked in a struggle over the small Caucasus state. That struggle led to the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war, after which Moscow felt secure in its control over Georgia. Since Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama met April 1 and disagreed over a slew of issues, including U.S. ballistic missile defense installations in Poland and NATO expansion to Ukraine and Georgia, Russia is not as secure and is seeking to consolidate its power in Georgia. This means first breaking the still vehemently pro-Western Saakashvili. This does not mean Russia thinks it can get a pro-Russian leader in power in Georgia; it just wants one who is not so outspoken against Moscow and so determined to invite Western influence.
The April 9 protests are the point at which all sides will try to gain — and maintain — momentum. The 2003 Rose Revolution took months to build up to, but the upcoming protests are the starting point for both the opposition and Russia — and opposition movements in Georgia have not seen this much support and organization since the 2003 revolution. April 9 will reveal whether or not things are about to get shaken up, if not completely transformed, in Georgia.
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Intelligence Guidance (Special Edition): April 8, 2009
April 8, 2009 | 2035 GMT
VANO SHLAMOV/AFP/Getty Images
A Georgian political youth group at a rally in Tbilisi on April 8Editor’s Note: The following is an internal STRATFOR document produced to provide high-level guidance to our analysts. This document is not a forecast, but rather a series of guidelines for understanding and evaluating events, as well as suggestions on areas for focus.
Related Special Topic Page
Weekly Updates
Related Link
Red Alert: A Possible Revolution Simmering in Georgia
April 9 may see the first real movement against the Georgian government since it came to power in the 2003 pro-Western “Rose Revolution.” This is not an anti-Western movement to change the regime, but a movement to oust President Mikhail Saakashvili, who has been blamed for getting Georgia into the August 2008 war with Russia. The Georgian opposition — made up of 17 typically fractious parties — wants to have a government in place that can at least work with the Russians, since they currently occupy the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (which make up 20 percent of the country).
The 17 opposition parties have organized for the first time and claim that they will have 100,000 people hit the streets of the Georgian capital, Tbilisi — the largest number of demonstrators since the Rose Revolution. Saakashvili is prepared, however; there are reports that the Georgian military has already deployed outside Tbilisi in order to counter the demonstrations. But the Georgian military consists of only approximately 21,000 active soldiers, and most of them are deployed on the borders of the northern Russian-occupied secessionist regions.
There are also rumors of demonstrations spreading across the country, with one possible in the secessionist region of Adjara. Adjara was the scene of an anti-Rose Revolution uprising just after Saakashvili took power, though the new president forcefully brought the region under control. Russia’s influence in the situation is being seen, though Moscow typically has trouble working with the moderately anti-Russian opposition movements. Reports of Russian money flowing in to help organize Thursday’s demonstrations, and Russian support for Georgian secessionist movements, put Russia in the thick if things.
If this is a true revolution against the government, it will take time to build up. The April 9 protests will show whether or not the opposition can gain momentum. Going into this possibly country-breaking event, there are several questions STRATFOR is asking:
Can the opposition actually get 100,000 people on the streets of Tbilisi?
What are the movement’s plans if it does get such large numbers on the streets?
How will the much-smaller military clamp down on the capital to ensure more protesters don’t move into Tbilisi?
Where is the Georgian military deployment pulling from — particularly in the case of the troops on the borders with Abkhazia and South Ossetia — in order to protect the capital?
Will Saakashvili finally give in to the opposition?
Are the southern secessionist regions of Adjara and Samtskhe-Javakheti prepared to join in the uprising?
Are the northern secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia planning on taking advantage of the Georgian government and military’s preoccupation?
Is this a ploy for Russia to move back into the country?
Is the West prepared to intervene — either overtly or covertly — to support Saakashvili?
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hope the link comes through live:
Presidents of Russia, Turkey adopt strategic declaration: “The presidents of Russia and Turkey adopted a joint declaration following talks in Moscow on Friday to promote ties and enhance bilateral friendship and partnership. Turkish President Abdullah Gul arrived for his first four-day visit to Russia [in February]….They also vowed to move quicker in settling issues related to defense cooperation….Turkey receives about 65% of its gas from Russia, which is pumped via Ukraine and the Blue Stream pipeline that passes directly from Russia to Turkey under the Black Sea. Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko told reporters on Friday that Russia could sign an energy contract worth more than $60 billion with Turkey on the construction of a nuclear power plant and power supplies to the country for the next 15 years. He said four reactors for a potential nuclear plant in Turkey could cost $18 billion-$20 billion….’I believe my current visit will open up a new page in the history of Russian-Turkish ties,’ Gul said.”
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Turkey: Challenges To Ankara's Influence in the Caucasus
Stratfor Today » April 20, 2009 | 1648 GMT
VLADIMIR RODIONOV/AFP/Getty Images
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev (L) shakes hands with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Russia on April 17
Summary
Recent top-level meetings between Azerbaijan and Russia revealed the obstacles that Turkey faces in attempting to broaden its sphere of influence in the Caucasus. While Azerbaijan is threatening to move its natural gas eastward toward Russia and edge the Turks out, the Turks are exploring their options with the Europeans while continuing to probe the limits to its cooperation with Russia in the Caucasus.
Analysis
A series of meetings between top Azerbaijani and Russian officials in Moscow that were held April 16-18 have shed light on what exactly Turkey is up against in trying to enlarge its footprint in the Caucasus.
STRATFOR has been closely tracking negotiations between Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia. Turkey’s attempt to restore diplomatic relations with Armenia and fortify Ankara’s foothold in the Caucasus was being done under Moscow’s close supervision. Russia was willing to allow Turkey to patch things up with Yerevan, so long as Ankara stayed true to its pledge to remain neutral in Russia’s ongoing tussle with the West.
However, Russia came to doubt Turkey’s intentions when U.S. President Barack Obama made clear to the world during his visit to Ankara in early April that the United States and Turkey were reinvigorating their alliance, and that Washington would be Ankara’s biggest supporter in its regional rise. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, was deeply resentful that its Turkish patrons were leaving Baku out of the negotiations with Armenia and leaving the contentious Nagorno-Karabakh issue out of the deal. As far as Baku is concerned, if Turkey betrays Azerbaijan by striking a deal with Armenia that does not include a demand for Yerevan to return Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan, then the Azerbaijanis have no choice but to turn to Moscow to try and keep the Turks in line. So, the Russians invited Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to Moscow for talks.
Aliyev was apparently treated quite well during his three-day trip to Moscow, where he met with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, President Dmitri Medvedev and Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin. The Russians allowed Aliyev to vent against Turkey and reassured him that Moscow would stand behind Baku. Shortly after Aliyev’s meetings with Putin and Sechin, he told Russia’s Vesti state television channel in an interview that he would like Russia to serve as a transit state for Azerbaijan to transport natural gas to Europe. In other words, Europe can forget about trying to diversify its energy supply away from Russia through Turkey. With Azerbaijan now shifting into Moscow’s camp due to its recent falling out with Ankara, Aliyev is threatening to send his country’s natural gas east through Russia to reach the Europeans, thereby giving Moscow more political leverage in its energy relationship with Europe.
According to a STRATFOR source in Baku, Aliyev made this statement because Russia and Azerbaijan struck a deal to expand the Soviet-era natural gas pipelines running between the two countries. During the trip, Azerbaijan’s state-owned energy firm SOCAR signed a deal with Gazprom to send natural gas extracted from the second phase of Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field (which is expected to become operational in November 2009) to Russia and on to Europe. Shah Deniz contains 1.2 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves and, in its first phase of production, pumps 8.6 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually, which goes to Europe. The second phase of the field is expected to pump another 8.6 bcm annually. This deal between Azerbaijan and Russia is a major blow to Turkey, who was expecting to sign the Shah Deniz deal at the April 16 Black Sea Economic Cooperation summit in Yerevan so that it could reap more revenues from transiting Azerbaijan’s natural gas to Europe via Greece.
As STRATFOR reported, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan earlier requested to be present at the Russian-Azerbaijani talks in Moscow so that he would not be caught by surprise by any deals between Moscow and Baku (such as the aforementioned Shah Deniz deal) that would edge the Turks out of the energy equation. Though Moscow granted Erdogan’s request to attend the meeting, Erdogan did not show up. Instead, STRATFOR was told that he sent a Turkish delegation to Moscow for talks while he spent the weekend in Hannover, Germany, where he attended former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s birthday party.
During Aliyev’s meeting with the Turkish officials who did show up in Moscow, Aliyev apparently lashed out against Ankara over its perceived betrayal, telling the Turkish delegation “we were supposed to be one nation of two states, yet you have left us in the dark and have now lost our confidence.” Fearful that the Turks would sidestep the Nagorno-Karabakh issue to make the deal with Armenia go through, Aliyev made clear that he could not tolerate Turkey’s refusal to share documents that were being exchanged between Turkey and Armenia that detailed the timetable and conditions attached to normalizing relations. He also expressed his disappointment with the Russians and Europeans for leaving Azerbaijan out of these talks, but Putin and Sechin assuaged him by pointing out that the Russians were the ones bringing Azerbaijan back into the fold. Azerbaijan will follow up with these talks with Russia when Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian travels to Moscow on April 24.
Given Azerbaijan’s threats to cut energy cooperation with Turkey and send its natural gas east toward Russia, the Turks are backing off the Armenia deal for the time being. The timetable for announcing a peace deal has already been delayed indefinitely, and Erdogan made a gesture to Baku when he announced during his trip to Hannover that “a decision to open the border gate with Armenia will depend on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue being solved. If the Armenian occupation of Azeri territory continues, Turkey will not open its border gate.”
Turkey has set the Nagorno-Karabakh condition to temporarily calm Baku, but Ankara is still keeping its options open with Armenia. A STRATFOR source in Baku explained that the Turkish negotiators told Aliyev that Turkey would not be the one mediating Armenian-Azerbaijani talks over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and would not set firm conditions on the Armenians to resolve the territorial dispute. In essence, Turkey is signaling to Baku that it is washing its hands of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in order to keep its negotiations with Yerevan alive. The Armenians, meanwhile, see the writing on the wall and are privately discussing what to do now that the Turks are clearly waffling on the deal.
The Turks are not about to bend to Russian and Azerbaijani demands that easily. After all, Turkey knows Azerbaijan cannot put all its trust in Moscow, who is backing Baku’s chief rivals in Yerevan simultaneously. Azerbaijan still needs Turkey’s support and is using these talks with Russia to grab Ankara’s attention. At the same time, Turkey wants to test how far it can actually go in cooperating with the Russians in the Caucasus before the Russians feel threatened enough by Ankara’s relationship with the West to pull the plug on the Armenia deal.
Erdogan also wants to see how he can use these negotiations to gain leverage in Turkey’s talks with the Europeans, particularly on energy issues and Turkey’s EU accession bid. If the Europeans get serious about Turkish EU membership, Turkey could find it worthwhile to stand up against Russian wishes in the Caucasus by signing on to energy projects that circumvent the Russian network. Erdogan likely discussed these issues while in Germany, and this will be the main item on the agenda when Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan arrives in Prague on April 21 for an EU-Turkey ministerial meeting. So far, the Turks appear to be unimpressed by the European Union’s recent move to open chapters on taxation and on social policy and employment in its EU membership negotiations. Turkey wants to see the Europeans demonstrate their seriousness in these talks by opening a key chapter on energy and by assuring Ankara that these talks will actually lead somewhere.
Nonetheless, German and French opposition to Turkey’s EU accession will not be easy to overcome, and all it takes is one veto in the EU voting bloc to kill Ankara’s chances of making it into the club should talks even progress that far to begin with. Turkey will take its time to explore its options in Europe while it stalls on Armenia, but the Russians are already laying the groundwork with Azerbaijan to constrain Turkey’s moves in the Caucasus.
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Georgia: An 'Attempted Coup'
Stratfor Today » May 5, 2009 | 1244 GMT
Jeff Zelevansky/Getty Images
Georgian President Mikhail SaakashviliA number of Georgian troops — rumored to be a few tank battalions — staged a mutiny May 5 at a military base in Mukhrovani, approximately 12 miles outside of Tbilisi. According to reports, the mutiny began when soldiers at the base began disobeying orders.
Details are sketchy, though the Georgian Interior Ministry has deployed tanks and armored troops to the base to quell what the government is calling a “Russian backed coup.” Representatives from the Interior Ministry have said that a coup plot within this section of the military has been known for months and most of its leaders have already been arrested, while one leader — a special forces commander — remains at large.
But the government overall is already blaming Moscow, saying that the “rebellion appeared to be coordinated with Russia.” Moscow certainly does have an interest in instability inside Georgia at the moment, with the highly contested next phase of NATO exercises in Georgia set to begin May 6. Russia has already increased the pressure on its other former Soviet states who are participating in the exercises, and Kazakhstan has already pulled out. But its pressure on Georgia escalated as Russia moved its last batch of intended troops into Georgia’s separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the past two weeks, bringing the number of Russian troops on Georgian turf up to 7,500. But STRATFOR sources in Georgia have said that there is no word of those Russian troops actually moving into Georgia proper at this time — quelling rumors of another round of war.
Though this “attempted coup” at the Mukhrovani base does seem somewhat controlled by Georgian Interior Ministry forces, it is a clear sign of the much larger instability rumbling inside Georgia. STRATFOR had spoken of dissenters within the Georgian military who blame the president solely for giving the order for invading South Ossetia, prompting a war in which Russia got involved. But this dissent multiplied in April when the typically fractured opposition movement inside the country began to organize against Saakashvili, whom they blame for the war with Russia, holding mass protests across the country. Those protests have continued for over a month, though the number of protesters is smaller — approximately 15,000 — compared to the nearly 60,000 who hit the streets originally.
But STRATFOR said in April to carefully watch Georgia and to not expect a large, concerted coup against Saakashvili but a slowly building counter movement. Now the military is starting to dissent — though currently only a few thousand of the 21,000 active troops, it is yet another group that Saakashvili does not have under his control. The tides are building against Saakashvili, though the president holds firm to his post.
STRATFOR has been chronicling the Russian involvement in this counter movement against Saakashvili, and sources are saying that the Kremlin has funded the opposition movements in the past few months. At this moment, Russia has a clear interest in escalating the instability in the country with NATO staging very public exercises in Georgia and not heeding Russia’s warnings that this is indeed its turf. Now we need to continue keeping a close eye on the Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While there may be no movement yet into Georgia proper, Moscow’s escalation is already being seen in other places.
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Geopolitical Diary: A Case of Georgian Deja Vu
May 6, 2009
STRATFOR is experiencing deja vu: Events in Georgia are calling to mind those that led up to the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008.
Tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi escalated yet again on Tuesday, when Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili claimed to have “thwarted” a Russian-backed coup from within the Georgian military and accused Russia of “massing up naval forces and warships in the sea off the coast” — all while Georgia was preparing for large (by its standards) military exercises in conjunction with NATO.
There have been other recent developments:
Since early April, Russia has increased its troop presence in Georgia’s breakaway regions from 3,000 to more than 7,600. Three months before the August war broke out, Russia had doubled its troop strength there from 1,500 to 3,000.
Russia has been accused of building up its naval presence off the coast of Abkhazia. In the months before the war, there were accusations that Russia was expanding that region’s ports.
Georgia and NATO will launch the next phase of NATO exercises in Vaziani on Wednesday — nearly the same exercises as the ones held at Vaziani three weeks before the Russo-Georgian war began.
Small-arms fire across the South Ossetian-Georgian border resumed in April. Last year, cross-border firing gave way to mortar attacks that precipitated Georgia’s invasion of South Ossetia.
But while Russia may be ready for another round of conflict — or at least ready to create the illusion of another round, as a means of pressuring its smaller neighbor — there are other significant shifts under way in Georgia, and these are creating levels of pressure that Tbilisi has never before faced.
Political unrest in Georgia has reached a pitch not seen since the 2003 Rose Revolution that brought Saakashvili to power. Mass protests began in early April and have persisted, albeit with dwindling numbers of demonstrators, to the present. Saakashvili has seen members of his own inner circle break away and join the traditionally weak opposition. Moreover, the allegations that a coup plot was being hatched within the Georgian military signals that Saakashvili cannot rely on support from the military, which blames him for dragging the country into the war with Russia.
Typically, the inner workings of Georgian politics have no geopolitical significance, since these affairs have more to do with personalities than shifts in alignment toward the West or Russia. But right now, everything that provides outsiders with opportunities to influence Tbilisi matters, because Georgia is the cornerstone of Russia’s foreign policy agenda toward the West and within the Caucasus. Georgia is Russia’s Achilles’ heel as Moscow attempts to re-establish its influence in all corners of the former Soviet region and create a geographic buffer between Russia and other global powers.
But Georgia’s relevance as that cornerstone is now being tested: Dynamics in the rest of the Caucasus region are shifting for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union. Turkey, a key member of NATO, is moving to normalize relations with Armenia, Georgia’s neighbor to the south. And that means that the three small states in the Caucasus — Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia itself — are re-evaluating their allegiances to NATO and Russia. Armenia, a Russian ally, is negotiating with Turkey; Azerbaijan, Turkey’s brother nation, is turning to Russia; and Turkey is balancing its relationship with all parties involved. If they could hold Armenia, balance Turkey and reconnect with Azerbaijan, the Russians would not need to worry about what happens with Georgia, which would be locked into the Soviet sphere by default.
And that brings us full circle to the sense of deja vu involving Russia and Georgia: namely, Moscow once again dominating Tbilisi. From the outside, all the circumstances today appear similar to those of August 2008, but upon closer inspection, Georgia is dealing with two other significant and destabilizing trends. Georgia has never been a stable country. Traditionally, it has faced challenges stemming either from Russia, from domestic political tensions or from its neighbors in the Caucasus — but never from all three at once.
The redefinition of Georgia is taking place, and forces largely beyond its control are remaking Tbilisi’s role in the region.
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Indications of War Preparations
Stratfor Today » August 5, 2009 | 2139 GMT
Summary
Aug. 5, 2009, is looking eerily similar to Aug. 5, 2008, in the Caucasus as the first anniversary of the Russo-Georgian war creeps closer. Just like last year, STRATFOR is closely watching the region for any signs that another war could break out.
Analysis
In August 2008, war broke out between Russia and Georgia. Though the two countries had been rattling sabers for years, several key geopolitical and technical indicators convinced STRATFOR that war would indeed break out between Georgia and Russia in the summer of 2008.
Geopolitical Diary: Shades of a Second War
Aug. 5, three days before the anniversary of the start of that war, similar activity is evident. Another fracas in the Caucasus is far from inevitable, but the geopolitical conditions are ripe for Russia to make another move against Georgia. Thus, several triggers need to be monitored in the days and weeks ahead.
What follows is a list of indicators STRATFOR has been following in the Caucasus that could mean preparations for war are under way. We have also listed a few key indicators that we saw in 2008 but have yet to see this year. STRATFOR will follow up with a more analytical examination of Russia’s deeper motives for creating another crisis in the Caucasus.
In place since the August 2008 war:
Russian troops have remained inside Georgia’s secessionist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia since August 2008. Russia has established facilities and a military presence consisting of roughly 1,000 troops (though the actual numbers are disputed) in each breakaway province. With these troops stationed inside Georgia, within striking distance of the country’s major east-west road and rail infrastructure and the capital city, Moscow has established a military reality in Georgia that not even the United States is currently disposed to alter. In 2008, a military exercise in North Ossetia (in Russia proper) preceded the invasion of Georgia, with the units involved in the initial thrust in a heightened state of readiness when hostilities began. Depending on the current disposition of Russian troops and their military objectives, some mobilization might be necessary for an invasion of Georgia. However, given the proximity of Russian troops to Georgia proper and the dearth of firm intelligence out of the region, such mobilization might not be detected or recognized until hostilities have already broken out.
In the last month:
STRATFOR has received unconfirmed reports that possibly 10,000 troops from Chechnya loyal to the Kremlin are in the republic of Ingushetia, which borders Chechnya, following a separate security situation in the region. Though this is not directly related to Georgia, the troops are conveniently located just 31 miles from the Roki Tunnel, which is where Russia began its operations — including funneling soldiers and tanks into South Ossetia, and later Georgia — in 2008.
U.S. Vice President Joe Biden visited Georgia in late July in what was overall an embarrassment for the Georgians, since the United States did not give any noticeable meaningful support for Georgia and said it refused to sell weapons to or provide monitors for Tbilisi. However, after this trip, Biden gave an interview in which he came out verbally swinging against Moscow, stating that Russia is on a demographic and economic decline and will ultimately have to face its withering geopolitical position. This did not go unnoticed by Moscow.
While Biden was in Georgia, key Russian security and defense officials, including First Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov and Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev, were in South Ossetia to meet with the breakaway republic’s leadership. Several military intelligence officials also attended the meeting.
The past two weeks have seen the most noise on the South Ossetian-Georgian border since the August 2008 war. Though tensions never fully ended — gunfire has been traded sporadically across the border — there have been reports recently of mortar fire from both sides, something rarely seen since 2008.
The Georgians allegedly have planned a civilian march from Tbilisi to the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali, rumored to coincide with the Aug. 8 anniversary of the war. However, it should be mentioned that plans for such a march have been made several times in previous months but failed to materialize. The South Ossetians have said any such march would be seen as an “attempted invasion.” The secessionist region has closed its border.
Russia said July 29 that this week, it could deploy unmanned aircraft in Georgia that could carry out attacks 6-15 miles inside the country. Russia also said it could send Antonov An-2 and An-3 aircraft, which are capable of carrying people and supplies to small, primitive airstrips.
Upcoming indicators and potential triggers:
Aug. 6: Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin will travel to Turkey to meet with his counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. These two leaders — well aware of each other’s resurgent position — must thoroughly discuss any possible moves that either will make in the region, including moves in Georgia.
Aug. 8: The anniversary of the start of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war.
Aug. 9: The 10-year anniversary of Putin’s coming into power.
While the above indicators are firmly in place and eerily reminiscent of the lead-up to the 2008 war, there are two crucial indicators from 2008 that STRATFOR has yet to see this year:
Before hostilities erupted into full-scale war last year, the Russians dropped leaflets by air into South Ossetia and Abkhazia warning of “Georgian aggressions.” This, in effect, led to the second indicator:
There was a mass movement of civilians from South Ossetia and Abkhazia into Russia, mainly into the republic of North Ossetia. While Russia could be warning the breakaway provinces’ populations of impending conflict by other means (considering Russia now maintains a significant troop presence in both regions), STRATFOR sources in Abkhazia have yet to witness such developments on the ground.
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Geopolitical Diary: Putin Goes to Turkey
August 7, 2009
After baring his chest for the cameras in the Siberian wilderness, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin shirted up and made his way to Ankara on Thursday for a long-anticipated visit with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Putin has a close relationship with Erdogan. They meet regularly at Putin’s holiday getaway in Sochi, on the Black Sea coast, to privately discuss many topics in which any foreign intelligence agency would take considerable interest. There was much for them to discuss in Ankara, but unlike previous Putin-Erdogan summits, this meeting was meant to be in the media spotlight.
Russia and Turkey are both at critical junctures. Russia — where Putin will mark a decade in power on Sunday — is moving to lock down its influence in the former Soviet region, while the United States remains preoccupied with its wars in the Islamic world. Turkey, emerging from the 90-year geopolitical slumber that followed the Ottoman period, is in the process of rediscovering its old areas of influence in the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Central Asia.
With overlapping spheres of influence, Russia and Turkey must be extremely careful not to step on each other’s toes. The two have battled each other multiple times throughout history, but circumstances require them to cooperate for now. The Russians realize they have limited time to implement their agenda for Eurasia, with the United States tied up elsewhere, and they don’t need Turkey — a NATO member and critical ally for the Americans — to get in the way. The Turks, still heavily dependent on Russia for a steady energy supply, are still feeling out old stomping grounds and prioritizing expansion plans, which leaves them with little compulsion to draw Moscow’s anger.
Therefore, Putin and Erdogan have staged a high-profile meeting to show the world — Europe and the United States, in particular — that relations are progressing smoothly.
Energy deals announced Thursday were part of this show. Less than a month after Turkey signed onto the exorbitant Nabucco pipeline project (designed to ship Central Asian natural gas through the Caucasus and Turkey, bypassing Russia on the way to European markets), Erdogan — joined by Putin and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi — made a display of signing the equally ambitious South Stream pipeline deal. South Stream is designed to ship Russian natural gas through Turkey’s territorial waters in the Black Sea to Bulgaria, for distribution to Europe. The politics of the day, the technical impediments and the skyrocketing costs of both projects make both Nabucco and South Stream unfeasible for the moment.
Still, there are plenty of political implications when such hollow energy deals are announced. The Russians, who were kept informed by Erdogan that the Nabucco announcement would be made in mid-July, get to remind Western powers that their friends in Ankara won’t help them evade Russia when it comes to European energy security. Turkey gets to assert itself as an indispensable player to both the East and West — saying yes to every project, while buying time to lay the groundwork for its own geopolitical expansion. Most of all, these bilateral visits allow the Turks to demonstrate that the days when Turkey was simply a western outpost along the Russian periphery are gone, and that the country is now an independent global player in its own right.
But beneath these political atmospherics, Putin and Erdogan also had very serious matters to discuss in Ankara. War drums are beating over both Georgia and Iran: Russia is contemplating another show of force in Georgia, and the United States is pressuring Iran to come to the negotiating table over its nuclear program before September ends. These are two areas where Putin and Erdogan are likely to bump heads.
Russia, extremely irked by Washington’s seemingly flippant attitude toward its demands, is drawing attention to the levers it holds in Iran — reminding U.S. President Barack Obama of the implications of failing to take Moscow seriously. The Turks, however, have no interest in seeing a U.S.-Russian showdown over Iran that would bring further turmoil to the Middle East — especially as Ankara is charting out a course to consolidate Turkish influence in its Muslim backyard. Erdogan will continue to cooperate with Putin, but he also might be reminding him of certain levers Turkey possesses that could complicate life for the Russians if they push the envelope on Iran. The options include everything from Turkey — the gatekeeper of Black Sea access — allowing a major NATO build-up that threatens Russia, to boosting defense support for Georgia with major weapons transfers.
The Russians are still contemplating exactly how to maneuver against Washington, but at the same time, Putin is keeping Turkey in sight while determining the costs and benefits of Russia’s next move in this geopolitical chess match.
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Summary
The U.S. military said Aug. 14 that it will continue to train Georgian troops for a deployment to Afghanistan. The United States insists that the training will be limited to assisting Georgian forces on the ground in Afghanistan and that it will not provide weapons to the small country. But Russia is strongly opposed to the continued military cooperation between United States and Georgia, and Moscow will have no choice but to respond to the perceived interference in its sphere of influence.
Analysis
The United States will resume its military training mission in the former Soviet republic of Georgia on Sept. 1 in order to prepare a select contingent of troops for deployment to Afghanistan, Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell said Aug. 14. Morrell said the training would only help Georgian troops contribute to the Afghan operations and is not intended to act as a counterweight to Russian military influence along Georgia’s borders or within the separatist regions.
The United States has continually trained Georgian troops for deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 — this has kept approximately a dozen U.S. military personnel inside of Georgia. Tbilisi pulled Georgian troops out of Iraq in August 2008 after Russia invaded Georgia (they were flown back to Georgia in U.S. military aircraft). The United States also froze its training of Georgian troops during and following the Russo-Georgian war, but resumed smaller military officer training in the past month. However, now Tbilisi has repledged 750 troops for Afghanistan, and between 10 and 50 U.S. Marines will train the Georgian troops — this training will focus specifically on counterinsurgency and tactical proficiencies appropriate to the U.S. and NATO efforts in Afghanistan.
Georgia has regularly requested that the United States or NATO help train its military on defensive operations that will help the country counter an invasion by its more powerful, conventionally armed neighbor: Russia. But that request was clearly rejected during U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden’s visit to Tbilisi in July. Biden and the Pentagon assured Russia that it had nothing to fear because the training would be limited strictly to helping the Georgian forces on the ground in Afghanistan and no weapons would be provided to Georgia. Also, the only troops to be trained by the United States will be leaving Georgia to deploy — an issue that proved problematic in August 2008 when many of the best-trained Georgian troops (in terms of unit cohesion and basic tactical proficiencies) were not in the country when Russian troops entered Georgia.
But even though the U.S. training is not as focused on developing the tactics and skills necessary for Georgia to defend itself as Tbilisi would like, the continued connection between the United States and Georgia — especially militarily — goes against Russian wishes. Moscow has made it clear since the August 2008 war that Georgia lies in Russia’s sphere of influence and the United States should stop its push for a pro-Western Georgia via politics, military or inclusion into Western organizations like NATO.
Having the Georgians participate militarily with NATO operations offends Moscow. Russian relations with the United States have worsened following U.S. President Barack Obama’s trip to Moscow in which he refused to back down on his support for Georgia, Ukraine and U.S. ballistic missile defense plans in Poland. Now, the United States is demonstrating this continued support in Georgia. Russia has already started to respond by turning up its own military heat near Georgia, indicating that Russian forces are prepared on the ground to launch another invasion at any moment.
But the Russians need to respond not only to Georgia, but also to the United States’ continued dismissal of Russia’s returning status as a great power. Acting out against the United States in Georgia is significant, but Russia has already proven that it is the decisive power in this region. What STRATFOR is watching for is other arenas in which Russia could act out against the United States, such as Iran and Europe. However, it is clear that Moscow will continue its pressure on Georgia.
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I'm still hoping for a post from a forum member who is well-informed about Georgia.
In the meantimes, here is this-- it is from the NYT, so caveat lector:
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South Ossetia Tries to Disarm Its Citizens
Russians and South Ossetians fought together last August north of Tskhinvali, during the brief war against Georgia.
By ELLEN BARRY
Published: August 14, 2009
TSKHINVALI, Georgia — For years, there was not much difference between a civilian and a soldier in South Ossetia, which was embroiled in a long struggle to separate from Georgia.
David G. Sanakoyev, for example, wore a tie during the day. As South Ossetia’s ombudsman for human rights, he handled complaints about prison conditions or unlawful firings. Three times a week, after work, he changed into camouflage and took up a position at the territory’s border, rotating in and out of combat duty until morning.
Then he put his suit back on, and returned to his desk — a pattern interrupted only once, he recalled, when he was shot through the thigh in a Georgian ambush.
This has been the strange way of life inside South Ossetia, on and off, since the end of the Soviet Union. The tiny population of this valley — factory workers, university students, farmers and smugglers — has been turned into a loosely organized fighting force, deployed along the boundary that separates South Ossetia from Georgian-controlled territory.
Now, with Russia guaranteeing its security, South Ossetia is asking residents to turn in their weapons voluntarily. The police have opened 50 criminal prosecutions for illegal weapons and plan to offer $300 to $400 for each Kalashnikov rifle, a top official said.
The program is a test of confidence, a year after the war between Russia and Georgia.
Mr. Sanakoyev said he had never owned a gun but felt it was still too early to disarm.
“Life has changed,” he said. “But inside, you don’t yet feel that life has changed.”
Twenty years ago, few people in this valley were armed. The first clash between Ossetians and Georgians was fought with wooden bats and hunting rifles in 1989, after an estimated 12,000 Georgian demonstrators surrounded Tskhinvali to protest its first separatist bid. In the two days of violence that followed, six people died, according to Human Rights Watch.
That began a great surge of arming. Timur Tskhovrebov, then working as a tomato farmer, became “a specialist in stealing from Soviet warehouses,” he recalled, with a broad, reminiscent smile. The commander of a 10-man local militia, he would bribe a sentry, throw a mattress over the barbed-wire fence, and clamber in and out, arms loaded with weapons, for two hours until the next sentry arrived.
“This is only one way,” said Mr. Tskhovrebov, 51. “It’s the most honest way. You just steal them.”
As they withdrew into Russian territory, Soviet troops were ready to make deals, in any case. A Kalashnikov could be traded for a Zhiguli or Lada car or, in the case of villagers, a cow. Whole arsenals, put up for sale in Chechnya, supplied South Ossetia.
Irina Kozayeva, a 74-year-old woman with a cloud of hennaed hair, recalled the awe she felt at her first major purchase: a 12.7-caliber machine gun, a World War II-era weapon often mounted on Soviet tanks and capable of shooting down aircraft.
“When I saw it, I closed the door and laid it down on the rug,” she said. “I almost fainted. The sight of such a weapon can make you crazy.”
Ossetians’ attachment to their weapons grew fierce during those years, said Dmitri Medoyev, South Ossetia’s ambassador to Russia. Before the first clashes, authorities in Georgia had stripped many Ossetian hunters of their rifles, and then the Soviet Army twice betrayed Ossetia by withdrawing its forces, Mr. Medoyev said, so “we, the population, cannot trust anyone.”
In addition to a small army, Tskhinvali contrived a defense based on the Swiss armed forces, in which every adult man was required to show up, prepared to fight, during periods of tension.
For an Ossetian, Mr. Medoyev said, “a weapon is an essential part of daily life, his worldview, his accessory, if you will.” Asked how many guns were owned privately, he said, “As many as there are people in the population, that’s how many weapons there are.”
“Of course,” he added, “I’m not counting small children.”
But conditions have changed since last August, said Vitaly G. Gassiyev, South Ossetia’s first deputy interior minister. At a brand-new Russian base in Tskhinvali, dozens of tanks and self-propelled artillery are lined up a few minutes’ drive from Georgian positions, making it unlikely that Ossetian volunteers will be called to the front anytime soon.
By disarming, Mr. Gassiyev said, South Ossetia was using the lessons Russia had learned in the north Caucasus, where wars left a residue of crime, with “guns in hands and lots of uncontrolled elements.”
Two weeks ago, the call went out for people to turn in their arms voluntarily. So far, the police have collected or confiscated 100 machine guns — among them 15 American-made M-4 carbines, presumably lost by Georgian soldiers — and 110 pounds of explosives. In the near future, the police are planning to offer citizens from $370 to $470 in exchange for turning in guns and other weapons.
“I think the project will work without question,” Mr. Gassiyev said. “There is a guarantee of security now.”
When the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe tried to sell this idea to Ossetia’s populace several years ago, it was met with ridicule, recalled Magdalena Frichova, who monitored the conflict in South Ossetia for 10 years for the International Crisis Group. But last year’s war has transformed the dynamics in Ossetia, she added, and Russia may feel a need to ensure control in a region where small militias have thrived.
“This is the fear for the Russians, that it’s going to become like the north Caucasus,” Ms. Frichova said. “You have all these armed groups that aren’t under a command.”
Nerves were still strung tight last week at a border post south of Tskhinvali. The Russian border patrol was nowhere in sight, and two Ossetian men, one in camouflage, were watching cows grazing in no man’s land, waiting for something to happen, just as they have for 18 years. A Georgian police post in Ergneti was visible through the summer foliage. Five days before, the two men said, a rocket-propelled grenade was shot from the Georgian side and exploded in the air.
“If you call someone your brother, but he shoots at you, is he still your brother?” said the man in camouflage, his face weathered by the sun. “For 18 years, they have devoured us. They are jackals, jackals.” He refused to give his name.
His friend, Timur, 39, had left military service after the war, and was watching in slacks and a turtleneck. This year has been quiet, he allowed, but not calm, not yet. Asked about the government’s program to collect weapons, he grinned mischievously.
“Officially, I have given up my gun,” he said.
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The Turkish-Russian Struggle Over the Caucasus
TURKISH PRIME MINISTER RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN travels to Moscow Tuesday for a two-day trip in which he will meet with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev. Although Erdogan and Putin are chummier with each other than they are with most world leaders, this meeting has been planned and postponed a number of times in recent months.
The relationship began to decline last summer as Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party continued pushing for a peace deal with Armenia that would open up another major outlet for Turkish expansion in the Caucasus, a mountainous region that encompasses the states of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Russia, however, had been busy building up clout in this region long before the Turks started focusing on neighborhood relations again. Since Armenia is essentially a client state of the Russians, it was Moscow that was calling the shots every time Turkey attempted a dialogue with Yerevan.
Russia has been happy to chaperone these negotiations for Ankara while seizing the opportunity to get on the good side of a critical rival in the Black Sea region. At the same time, Russia was not about to grant Turkey its wish of an Armenian rapprochement that would encroach on Russia’s own sphere of influence in the Caucasus. Moreover, Russia had a golden opportunity at hand to encourage Turkey to alienate Azerbaijan, its tightest ally in the region. Azerbaijan sees Turkey’s outreach to Armenia –- an enemy of Azerbaijan that occupies disputed territory inside of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh region –- as an outright betrayal to the historic brotherly alliance between Turkey and Azerbaijan. While keeping Georgia in a vice and Armenia’s moves in check, Russia strategically coaxed Turkey’s allies in Azerbaijan into an alliance that would provide Moscow with a crucial lever to control the flow of energy to Europe. Turkey, meanwhile, has been left empty-handed: no deal with Armenia and very angry allies in Azerbaijan.
“Gazprom’s chief said Baku was considering a deal in which all of Azerbaijan’s natural gas could be sold to Russia.”
Just one day prior to Erdogan’s trip to Moscow, the Russians decided to flaunt their rapidly developing relationship with Azerbaijan. Following a meeting between Russia’s natural gas behemoth, Gazprom, and the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), Gazprom’s chief Alexei Miller said Monday that Baku was considering a deal in which all of Azerbaijan’s natural gas — present and future — could be sold to Russia. This would in effect allow Moscow to sabotage any plans by Turkey and Europe to diversify energy flows away from Russia.
Azerbaijan has already been prodding Turkey with its blossoming relationship with Russia, throwing out threats here and there of sending more of its natural gas to Russia instead of Turkey. But if Azerbaijan has actually agreed to such a deal with Moscow to send not just some, but all of its natural gas to Russia, then a major shift has taken place in the Caucasus — one in which the Turks cannot afford to remain complacent.
Azerbaijani national security rests on its ability to diversify its trade and political alliances to the greatest extent possible. If Azerbaijan entered into a committed relationship with the Russians, however, it would be just as vulnerable as Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, Turkmenistan or any other state in the Russian periphery that is frequently subjected to Russian economic and military pressure tactics to fit Moscow’s political agenda. What, then, would encourage such a fundamental shift in Azerbaijani foreign policy?
Our first task is to verify with the Azerbaijanis whether the Gazprom chief is speaking the truth in claiming such a deal. Miller, after all, has been known to spin a few tales from time to time when it comes to Russian energy politics. If the story is true, then we need to nail down what caused the shift in Baku to sacrifice its energy independence to Moscow. Russia would have to pay a hefty price for such a deal, and that price could very well be tied to Azerbaijan’s territorial obsession: Nagorno-Karabakh.
If Azerbaijan is prepping its military to settle the score with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, and we have heard rumors building to this effect, it would want guarantees from Moscow to stay out of the fray. We have no evidence of this hypothesis as of yet, but it is some serious food for thought for Erdogan as he makes his way to Moscow.
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January 27, 2010 | 2219 GMT
JACQUESCOLLET/AFP/Getty Images
Zurab Nogaideli in July 2006The leader of Georgian opposition party the Movement for a Fair Georgia, former Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli, said Jan. 26 that his party would like to form a partnership with United Russia, the ruling party in Russia led by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Nogaideli stated that “previous experience has shown that this kind of cooperation works,” adding that his recent visits to Moscow resulted in the release of detained Georgian teenagers from the breakaway region of South Ossetia as well as a resumption of civilian flights between Georgia and Russia.
Nogaideli’s proposal is indicative of a growing movement within the Georgian opposition that favors a more pragmatic and workable relationship with Russia than the strongly pro-Western and anti-Russian stance of Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili. While Saakashvili has grown increasingly unpopular among the Georgian public ever since the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the country’s opposition has been largely fractured, split between 14 or more parties unable to pose a united front against Saakashvili. That may now be changing, as significant elements of the opposition have seen the writing on the wall in Ukraine and have begun to rally around Nogaideli and his proven record of being able to work with the Russians.
A partnership between the Georgian opposition and the Russian ruling party, by far the most dominant political force in Russia, would be an unprecedented move. While United Russia has yet to respond officially to Nogaideli’s request, the very fact that it was made undoubtedly is pleasing to Moscow (and unpleasant to Saaskashvili). There will be much to discuss on Nogaideli’s upcoming trip to Moscow to meet with Putin in February.
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Next Steps for Ankara and Moscow
WORLD LEADERS FROM ACROSS EURASIA and the Middle East will be gathering in Istanbul Tuesday for a Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) summit hosted by the Turkish leadership. Some of the high-profile attendees include Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Syrian President Bashar al Assad, Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev.
With Turkish-Israeli relations in serious jeopardy in the wake of the flotilla crisis, the war in Afghanistan in flux, Moscow contemplating a shift in foreign policy with the West and the United States trying to juggle all of the above, the geopolitical intensity surrounding the summit is all too apparent.
The headlining issue of the conference will of course be the Turkish-Israeli flotilla crisis. Not surprisingly, Israel decided to send a lower level diplomat from its consulate in Turkey rather than having a senior official come under fire by the Turkish hosts. Turkey will use the CICA platform — as well as a summit beginning Wednesday in Istanbul with Arab foreign ministers as part of the Turkish-Arab Cooperation Forum — to highlight what Turkey sees as the gross illegality of Israel’s actions that resulted in the death of eight Turkish citizens in international waters off the Gaza coast. Turkey does not intend to let this issue rest. The issue is not even really about Gaza, anymore. On the contrary, Turkey views its current crisis with Israel as an opportunity to accelerate its regional rise to fame.
For this plan to work, Turkey needs to go beyond the public censures and pressure Israel into making a very public concession to Ankara. The problem for Turkey is that there is no Arab consensus to build on in forging this campaign against Israel. The Arab states are happy to engage in the rhetoric alongside Turkey, but when it comes to taking action against Israel, the impetus falls flat. Though Turkey will attempt to galvanize the Arabs at the Wednesday summit, it is not clear to STRATFOR that Ankara will be able to overcome the challenge of Arab fractiousness and weakness in formulating its response to Israel.
“Turkey is not the only one with its hands full at this summit.”
Turkey will also be spending some quality time during the CICA summit with the Iranian president. Iran is happy to see the flotilla crisis deflect attention away from its own nuclear controversy with the West, but it’s also not enthused about Turkey soaking up the spotlight and hijacking Iran’s role in defending the Palestinians. Wanting their piece of the action, the Iranians have announced that they will send their own aid ships to the Gaza coast, while privately hinting that they will try to score a moral victory in attempting to recreate the Mavi Marmara incident by provoking Israeli forces into an attack. An Iranian-provoked confrontation with Israel in the Mediterranean is precisely what the Turks cannot afford. Such a move would draw the United States to Israel’s side and undercut Turkish momentum in a snap. The Turks will use the summit as an opportunity to share some of the spotlight with Ahmadinejad and thus try to keep Tehran from scuttling its own agenda, but Iranian tenacity on this issue may also be hard to beat.
Turkey is not the only one with its hands full at this summit. Putin has a slew of private meetings lined up with the leaders of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. His sideline meetings in Istanbul come after Russia held a week of meetings in Germany and the Baltic states and ahead of a visit to France. Rather than an attempt to rack up frequent flyer miles, the prime minister’s busy agenda stems from a major shift Russia is seriously contemplating making in its foreign policy toward the West.
The strategic thrust behind the shift is a Russian desire to obtain Western technology to modernize the Russian economy in everything from energy to space to telecommunications. Russia has internally acknowledged that for it to get its hands on this technology –- and ensure Russia’s competitiveness as a global power in the years to come –- it needs to appear more pragmatic to the West in making its foreign policy moves. This doesn’t mean Russia is ready to be any less nationalistic, just a little more willing to strike deals to get what it wants. The only reason Russia can even think about making such a dramatic shift is because it has spent the past several years carefully laying the groundwork in the former Soviet Union states in preparation for this very moment.
Russia wants to make sure that before it follows through with this plan, it gets some assurances from Europe and the United States that they will reward Russian cooperation with the technological cooperation Moscow is seeking and respect the sphere of influence Russia has recreated. At the same time, Putin -– acting as the enforcer on this issue -– is talking to the former Soviet states to make sure they understand that any Russian opening to the West is not a signal of Russia relenting in its former Soviet space, but a sign of Moscow dealing with the West on its own terms and in the time of its choosing. In other words, Putin wants to make sure Ukraine, Georgia, the Central Asians and the Baltic states don’t get any ideas about trying to flirt with the West the second they see Moscow shift.
While Putin delivers this stern reminder to Ukraine and the Central Asians, he will also be meeting separately with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The Russians are wary of Turkey’s regional resurgence and want to ensure that the two don’t bump heads in pursuing their respective agendas. But the Russians have a plan for this, too. By regularly waving deals on energy and peace agreements in the Caucasus, Russia is keeping its relationship with Turkey on an even keel. Putin is not (yet), however, scheduled to meet with the Iranian president, something that will not go unnoticed in Tehran. The Iranians, picking up on the leaks of a coming Russian foreign policy shift, have already spent the past weeks publicizing their ire against Moscow and warning the Russians against turning on them for a grand bargain with the United States. The Russians are not at the point of throwing Iran under the bus (Iran is still a very useful lever for them in dealing with Washington), but it doesn’t hurt Moscow to keep the Iranians on edge as Russia feels out the West and contemplates a major foreign policy shift that may be on the horizon.
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By George Friedman
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited some interesting spots over the July 4 weekend. Her itinerary included Poland and Ukraine, both intriguing choices in light of the recent Obama-Medvedev talks in Washington. But she also traveled to a region that has not been on the American radar screen much in the last two years — namely, the Caucasus — visiting Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.
The stop in Poland coincided with the signing of a new agreement on ballistic missile defense and was designed to sustain U.S.-Polish relations in the face of the German-Russian discussions we have discussed. The stop in Ukraine was meant simply to show the flag in a country rapidly moving into the Russian orbit. In both cases, the trip was about the Russians. Regardless of how warm the atmospherics are between the United States and Russia, the fact is that the Russians are continuing to rebuild their regional influence and are taking advantage of European disequilibrium to build new relationships there, too. The United States, still focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, has limited surplus capacity to apply to resisting the Russians. No amount of atmospherics can hide that fact, certainly not from the Poles or the Ukrainians. Therefore, if not a substantial contribution, the secretary of state’s visit was a symbolic one. But when there is little of substance, symbols matter.
That the Poland and Ukraine stops so obviously were about the Russians makes the stops in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia all the more interesting. Clinton’s statements during the Caucasian leg of her visit were positive, as one would expect. She expressed her support for Georgia without committing the United States to any arms shipments for Georgia to resist the Russians, who currently are stationed inside Georgia’s northern secessionist regions. In Azerbaijan and Armenia, she called on both countries to settle the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed region within western Azerbaijan proper. Armenia took control of the region by force following the Soviet collapse. For Azerbaijan, the return of Nagorno-Karabakh under a U.N. resolution is fundamental to its national security and political strategy. For Armenia, retreat is not politically possible.
This means Clinton’s call for negotiations and her offer of U.S. help are not particularly significant, especially since the call was for Washington to help under the guise of international, not bilateral, negotiations. This is particularly true after Clinton seemed to indicate that the collapse in Turkish-Armenian talks was Turkey’s responsibility and that it was up to Turkey to make the next move. Given that her visit to the region seems on the surface to have achieved little — and indeed, little seems to have been intended — it is worth taking time to understand why she went there in the first place, and the region’s strategic significance.
The Strategic Significance of the Caucasus
The Caucasus is the point where Russia, Iran and Turkey meet. For most of the 19th century, the three powers dueled for dominance of the region. This dispute froze during the Soviet period but is certainly in motion again. With none of these primary powers directly controlling the region, there are secondary competitions involving Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, both among these secondary powers and between the secondary powers and the major powers. And given that the region involves the Russians, Iranians and Turks, it is inevitable that the global power would have an interest as well — hence, Hillary Clinton’s visit.
Of all the regions of the world, this one is among the most potentially explosive. It is the most likely to draw in major powers and the most likely to involve the United States. It is quiet now — but like the Balkans in 1990, quiet does not necessarily reassure any of the players. Therefore, seven players are involved in a very small space. Think of it as a cauldron framed by Russia, Iran and Turkey, occasionally stirred by Washington, for whom each of the other three major powers poses special challenges of varying degrees.
The Caucasus region dominates a land bridge between the Black and Caspian seas. The bridge connects Turkey and Iran to the south with Russia in the north. The region is divided between two mountain ranges, the Greater Caucasus to the north and the Lesser Caucasus in the south; and two plains divided from one another, one in Western Georgia on the Black Sea and another, larger plain in the east in Azerbaijan along the Kura River. A narrow river valley cuts through Georgia, connecting the two plains.
The Greater Caucasus Mountains serve as the southern frontier of Russia. To the north of these mountains, running east to west, lies the Russian agricultural heartland, flat and without any natural barriers. Thus, ever since the beginning of the 19th century, Russia has fought for a significant portion of the Caucasus to block any ambitions by the Turkish or Persian empires. The Caucasus mountains are so difficult to traverse by major military forces that as long as Russia maintains a hold somewhere in the Caucasus, its southern frontier is secure. During the latter part of the 19th century and for most of the Soviet period (except a brief time at the beginning of the era), the Soviet position in the Caucasus ran along the frontier with Turkey and Persia (later Iran). Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were incorporated into the Soviet Union, giving the Soviets a deep penetration of the Caucasus and, along with this, security.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the three Caucasian republics broke free of Moscow, pushing Russia’s frontier north by between about 160 to 320 kilometers (100-200 miles). The Russians still maintained a position in the Caucasus, but their position was not secure. The northern portion of the Caucasus consisted of Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan and others, all of which had significant Islamist insurgencies under way. If the Russians abandoned the northeastern Caucasus, their position was breached. But if they stood, they faced an interminable fight.
Georgia borders most of the Russian frontier. In the chaos of the fall of the Soviet Union, various Georgian regions attempted to secede from Georgia with Russian encouragement. From the Georgian point of view, Russia represented a threat. But from the Russian point of view, Georgia represented a double threat. First, the Russians suspected the Georgians of supporting Chechen rebels in the 1990s — a charge the Georgians deny. The more important threat was that the United States selected Georgia as its main ally in the region. The choice made sense if the United States was conducting an encirclement strategy of Russia, which Washington was doing in the 1990s (though it became somewhat distracted from this strategy after 2001). In response to what it saw as U.S. pressure around its periphery, the Russians countered in Georgia in 2008 to demonstrate U.S. impotence in the region.
The Russians also maintained a close relationship with Armenia, where they continue to station more than 3,000 troops. The Armenians are deeply hostile to the Turks over demands that Turkey admit to massacres of large number of Armenians in 1915-16. The Armenians and Turks were recently involved in negotiations over the normalization of relations, but these talks collapsed — in our view, because of Russian interference. The issue was further complicated when a U.S. congressional committee passed a resolution in March condemning Turkey for committing genocide, infuriating the Turks.
One of the countercharges against Armenia is that it has conducted its own massacres of Azerbaijanis. Around the time of the Soviet breakup, it conducted a war against Azerbaijan, replete with the ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis in a region known as Nagorno-Karabakh in western Azerbaijan, leaving Azerbaijan with a massive refugee problem. While the U.N. Security Council condemned the invasion, the conflict has been frozen, to use the jargon of diplomats.
The Importance of Azerbaijan
For its part, Azerbaijan cannot afford to fight a war against Russian troops in Armenia while it also shares a northern border with Russia. Azerbaijan also faces a significant Iranian problem. There are more Azerbaijanis living in Iran than in Azerbaijan; Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is a prominent Azerbaijani-Iranian. The Soviets occupied all of Azerbaijan during World War II but were forced to retreat under British and American pressure after the war, leaving most of Azerbaijan inside Iran. The remainder became a Soviet republic and then an independent state.
The Azerbaijanis are deeply concerned about the Iranians. Azerbaijan is profoundly different from Iran. It is Muslim but heavily secular. It maintains close and formal relations with Israel. It has supported the war in Afghanistan and made logistical facilities available to the United States. The Azerbaijanis claim that Iran is sending clerics north to build Shiite schools that threaten the regime. Obviously, Iran also operates an intelligence network there.
Adding to the complexity, Azerbaijan has long been a major producer of oil and has recently become an exporter of natural gas near the capital of Baku, exporting it to Turkey via a pipeline passing through Georgia. From the Turkish point of view, this provides alternative sources of energy to Russia and Iran, something that obviously pleases the United States. It is also an obvious reason why Russia sees Azerbaijan as undermining its position as the region’s dominant energy exporter.
The Russians have an interest, demonstrated in 2008, to move southward into Georgia. Obviously, if they were able to do this — preferably by a change in government and policy in Tbilisi — they would link up with their position in Armenia, becoming a force both on the Turkish border and facing Azerbaijan. The Russians would like to be able to integrate Azerbaijan’s exports into its broader energy policy, which would concentrate power in Russian hands and increase Russian influence on Russia’s periphery. This was made clear by Russia’s recent offer to buy all of Azerbaijan’s natural gas at European-level prices. The Turks would obviously oppose this for the same reason the Russians would want it. Hence, the Turks must support Georgia.
Iran, which should be viewed as an Azerbaijani country as well as a Persian one, has two reasons to want to dominate Azerbaijan. First, it would give Tehran access to Baku oil, and second, it would give Tehran strategic bargaining power with the Russians, something it does not currently have. In addition, talk of present unrest in Iran notwithstanding, Iran’s single most vulnerable point in the long term is the potential for Azerbaijanis living in Iran to want to unite with an independent Azerbaijani state. This is not in the offing, but if any critical vulnerability exists in the Iranian polity, this is it.
Consider this from the American side. When we look at the map, we notice that Azerbaijan borders both Russia and Iran. That strategic position alone makes it a major asset to the United States. Add to it oil in Baku and investment by U.S. companies, and Azerbaijan becomes even more attractive. Add to this that its oil exports support Turkey and weaken Russian influence, and its value goes up again. Finally, add to it that Turkey infuriated Azerbaijan by negotiating with Armenia without tying the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh to any Turkish-Armenian settlement. Altogether, the United States has the opportunity to forge a beneficial relationship with Azerbaijan that would put U.S. hands on one of Turkey’s sources of oil. At a time when the Turks recognize a declining dependence on the United States, anything that could increase that dependence helps Washington. Moreover, Azerbaijan is a platform from which Washington could make the Iranians uncomfortable, or from which to conduct negotiations with Iran.
An American strategy should include Georgia, but Georgia is always going to be weaker than Russia, and unless the United States is prepared to commit major forces there, the Russians can act, overtly and covertly, at their discretion. A Georgian strategy requires a strong rear base, which Azerbaijan provides, not only strategically but also as a source of capital for Georgia. Georgian-Azerbaijani relations are good, and in the long run so is Turkey’s relation with these two countries.
For Azerbaijan, the burning issue is Nagorno-Karabakh. This is not a burning issue for the United States, but the creation of a stable platform in the region is. Armenia, by far the weakest country economically, is allied with the Russians, and it has Russian troops on its territory. Given that the United States has no interest in who governs Nagorno-Karabakh and there is a U.N. resolution on the table favoring Azerbaijan that serves as cover, it is difficult to understand why the United States is effectively neutral. If the United States is committed to Georgia, which is official policy, then it follows that satisfying Azerbaijan and bringing it into a close relationship to the United States would be beneficial to Washington’s ability to manage relations with Russia, Iran and Turkey.
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Azerbaijan a month ago and Clinton visited this weekend. As complex as the politics of this region are to outsiders, they are clearly increasing in importance to the United States. We could put it this way: Bosnia and Kosovo were obscure concepts to the world until they blew up. Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are equally obscure now. They will not remain obscure unless strategic measures are taken. It is not clear to us that Clinton was simply making a courtesy call or had strategy on her mind. But the logic of the American position is that it should think strategically about the Caucasus, and in doing so, logic and regional dynamics point to a strong relationship with Azerbaijan.
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PC:
Good subject and nice follow up-- I had not seen what Microsoft has done.
That said, I'm thinking of our various threads on different aspects of Russia, this one might be a better place to continue it:
http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=1103.50
TIA,
M.
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Summary
An agreement likely to be signed Sept. 24 by Russian and Kyrgyz military delegations comes amid continued unrest in Kyrgyzstan and fresh tensions in its southern neighbor, Tajikistan. Moscow has planned for years to increase its military presence in the Central Asian core, but these recent events have accelerated that plan. However, the region comes with its own share of geographic and demographic challenges, and it is unclear how involved Russia wants to become in its attempts to enforce stability there.
Analysis
A Russian military delegation led by Col. Gen. Valery Gerasimov, deputy commander of the Armed Forces General Staff, has been in Kyrgyzstan since Sept. 19, holding talks with its Kyrgyz defense counterparts. The delegation is set to sign an agreement Sept. 24 to create a unified Russian base structure in Kyrgyzstan. This will consolidate Russia’s four military facilities in the country — an air base in Kant, a naval training and research center at Lake Issyk-Kul, and seismic facilities in the Issyk-Kul and Jalal-Abad regions — under a single, joint command.
It remains unclear what this unified Russian base structure in Kyrgyzstan will actually entail; officials from both countries have been vague on its format and purpose. But what is clear is that Russia, which has been undergoing a reorganization of its military command structure this year, is laying the groundwork for a more pronounced and efficient military presence in a region that faces its fair share of geographic and security challenges.
Kyrgyzstan has seen much turmoil over the past several months, most notably a Russian-backed uprising in April that ousted former President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Bakiyev had been using the U.S. Transit Center at Manas, a key logistical hub in Kyrgyzstan for U.S. operations in Afghanistan, as leverage to get more money out of both Russia and the United States. This was a key factor that led to the Kyrgyz president’s ouster and the ushering in of a more Russia-friendly interim government led by Roza Otunbayeva. Pacifying the country after the coup has been a challenge for the interim leadership. Violence broke out again in June in the southern regions of Osh and Jalal-Abad, prompting Bishkek to request that Russia increase its military presence in the country.
Russia has thus far not made any major military moves in the country beyond temporarily reinforcing its Kant air base with a company of 150 paratroopers, which have since been withdrawn. But according to STRATFOR sources, Moscow is considering a major infusion of up to 25,000 troops into Central Asia in the next few months and through 2011. These troops previously served in the North Caucasus but have since been withdrawn and are waiting to redeploy elsewhere.
This comes amid heightened security concerns in neighboring Tajikistan after the escape of 25 high-profile Islamist militants from a Dushanbe prison. The escapees sought refuge in the mountainous Rasht Valley, which has become the scene of continuing clashes between security forces and militants. This violence has caused much worry in Kyrgyzstan, which borders the Rasht area, prompting Bishkek to close the border between the two countries.
Tensions in Tajikistan and continuing uncertainty in Kyrgyzstan have lent new urgency to Moscow’s long-term plan to consolidate its presence in these former Soviet states by boosting its military footprint in the region. But 25,000 troops, especially Russian troops intended to establish a sustained presence, are not deployed quickly or easily. Significant logistical and infrastructural preparations are required.
Hence the discussions this week between the Russian and Kyrgyz military delegations. The agreement likely will see Russia increase the length of its leases on bases in the country to 49 years. There are also unconfirmed rumors that it could open a new facility in Osh. In exchange, Russia would pay more to lease these facilities, likely at least partially in the form of military hardware and small arms (Russia currently pays Kyrgyzstan $4.5 million annually for its military facilities, compared to the $60 million per year the United States pays for the U.S. Transit Center at Manas). There are also discussions of Russian state-owned energy firm Gazpromneft’s participating in a joint venture with a Kyrgyz state company to supply jet fuel to aircraft at Manas, providing Russia with yet more potential leverage over the U.S. presence in Central Asia.
It is notable that Russia is making such agreements with Kyrgyzstan — and Tajikistan — just as security tensions in the countries are on the rise. However, the protocols to be signed on Sept. 24 will be just that, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has said there would not be any conclusive deals until Kyrgyzstan holds its parliamentary elections in October and ushers in a permanent government rather than the interim government that currently leads the country.
Ultimately, while Russia is clearly looking to move a big contingent of troops to the region, it remains unclear just how deeply entangled in the region Russia wants to become. Moscow has a strong national interest in ensuring that it dominates Central Asia and keeps out other powers, particularly the United States. But that need not necessarily entail major military engagement. Stationing troops there is an important step. Having those troops become directly and actively involved in the militant landscape — facilitated by complex demography, Islamist ideology and rugged geography — is another step entirely. Russia has exceptionally long borders and interests far beyond Central Asia. While it looks poised to commit multiple divisions to the region, the Kremlin will remain wary of becoming bogged down in intractable, insurgent conflict.
Read more: Russia Prepares for Military Consolidation in Kyrgyzstan | STRATFOR
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The Tajikistan Attacks and Islamist Militancy in Central Asia
September 23, 2010
By Ben West
Militants in Tajikistan’s Rasht Valley ambushed a military convoy of 75 Tajik troops Sept. 19, killing 25 military personnel according to official reports and 40 according to the militants, who attacked from higher ground with small arms, automatic weapons and grenades. The Tajik troops were part of a nationwide deployment of security forces seeking to recapture 25 individuals linked to the United Tajik Opposition militant groups that had escaped from prison in Dushanbe on Aug. 24. The daring prison break was conducted by members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and saw five security guards killed and the country put on red alert. According to the Tajik government, after the escape, most of the militants fled to the Rasht Valley, an area under the influence of Islamist militants that is hard to reach for Tajikistan’s security forces and thus rarely patrolled by troops.
Sunday’s attack was one of the deadliest clashes between militants and the Tajik government since the Central Asian country’s civil war ended in 1997. The last comparable attack was in 1998, when militants ambushed a battalion of Interior Ministry troops just outside Dushanbe, killing 20 and kidnapping 110. Sunday’s incident was preceded by a Sept. 3 attack on a police station that involved a suicide operative and a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in the northwest Tajik city of Khujand that killed four police officers. Suicide attacks are rare in Tajikistan, and VBIEDs even more so. The Khujand attack also stands out as it occurred outside militant territory. Khujand, Tajikistan’s second-largest city after the capital, is located at the mouth of the Fergana Valley, the largest population center in Central Asia.
This represents a noticeable increase in the number and professionalism of militant operations in Tajikistan. Regardless of whether the September attacks can be directly linked to the Aug. 24 jailbreak in Dushanbe, the sudden re-emergence of attacks in Tajikistan after a decade of quiet in Central Asia deserves our attention. In short, something is percolating in the valleys of Central Asia that has reawakened militant groups more or less dormant for a decade. This unrest will likely continue and possibly grow if Tajik security forces can’t get control of the situation.
The Central Asian Core’s Divided Geography
Greater Central Asia, which encompasses southern Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and western China, comprises the northeastern frontier of the Muslim world. A knot of mountain ranges defines the geography of the region’s core, which forms a buffer between the Chinese and Russian spheres of influence. The region’s rugged terrain acts as a force multiplier for local populations seeking their own sovereignty, complicating foreign powers’ efforts to control the region.
(click here to enlarge image)
The Fergana Valley is the best-suited land in Central Asia for hosting a large population. Soviet leader Josef Stalin split the valley up between the Soviet republics that would become the countries of Central Asia to ensure the region remained divided, however. Uzbekistan controls most of the basin itself; Tajikistan controls the most accessible entrance to the valley from the west; and Kyrgyzstan controls the high ground around the valley. Uzbekistan also controls several exclaves within Kyrgyzstan’s portion of the valley, affording the Uzbek government and Uzbek citizens (including militants) access fairly deep into Kyrgyz territory. Meanwhile, the Rasht Valley follows the Vakhsh River across the Tajik-Kyrgyz border, giving locals (again including militants) a passage through the mountainous border region south of the Fergana Valley. These complex geographic and political divisions ensure that no one country can dominate Central Asia’s core, and hence Central Asia itself.
The Militants of Central Asia
An often-confusing assortment of militant groups has called Central Asia home since the end of the Soviet Union, many of which have split or joined up with one another. The most significant players in the region’s militant landscape include:
Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP). Founded in 1990, it was the first Islamist political party to gain Soviet recognition. After it was banned throughout Central Asia in 1992, many of its members resorted to violence.
Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). The Tajik branch of the IRP, the IRPT was active during the Tajik civil war of 1992-97 but has since turned to the political sphere.
United Tajik Opposition (UTO). UTO was an umbrella organization for the groups that fought against the Moscow-backed Tajik government during the Tajik civil war, but most of its members turned to politics at the end of the war. UTO derived much of its strength from constituent Islamist groups like the IRP, but it also encompassed the Democratic Party of Tajikistan and the ethnic Gharmi group.
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). Founded in East Jerusalem in 1953, HT seeks to establish a worldwide caliphate. The group is present in more than 40 countries; its Central Asian base is Uzbekistan. The group promotes ideological extremism, though it does not directly engage in violence. Even so, the region’s security forces have targeted it.
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). A militant Islamic group aligned with al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, IMU was formed in 1998 after the UTO turned to politics. Its ultimate aim was to transform Uzbekistan into an Islamic state. IMU leaders since have spread to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Islamic Jihad Union/Group (IJU). The IJU split off from IMU; it has a small presence in Europe.
Movement for the Islamic Revival of Uzbekistan (MIRU). MIRU was formed in 1994 and was incorporated into the IMU in 1998.
East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). A group primarily focused on independence for the northwestern Chinese region of Xinjiang, ETIM is thought to have ties with the IMU.
Islamic Movement of Turkistan (IMT). Like ETIM, IMT is thought to have ties with the IMU.
Islam and Militants in Central Asia
Historically, the moderate form of Islam known as Sufism predominated in Central Asia, with Salafism (a far more conservative form of Islam also called Wahhabism) being very much in the minority. Islam was strongly suppressed during Russian, and later Soviet, rule, however. Soviet security forces frequently raided mosques and madrassas, and Muslim religious leaders were routinely arrested. Generations of religious repression saw Sufism’s role in the region decline as Central Asians became more secular. Salafism was able to capitalize on this vacuum as the Central Asian Soviet republics gained independence in 1991, aided materially and in manpower by their co-religionists beyond the Soviet sphere. Sufism, by contrast, was much more localized and could not draw on such resources.
By 1991, when Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan all got independence, many Salafists in Central Asia (and elsewhere) had incorporated violence into their ideology, classifying them as jihadists. With growing influence, groups like the IRPT (although banned in 1993) allied with secular opposition groups to fight the government during Tajikistan’s five-year civil war. During this time, radical Islamists who turned to violence attacked Dushanbe from their bases in the Rasht and Tavildara valleys in northern Tajikistan as well as from Kunduz and Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan, where they relied on the large population of Tajik-Afghans (some of whom had ties to the Taliban and al Qaeda) for support. After the civil war, many IRPT leaders joined the political process, leaving only a hardened remnant in the valleys to the north or in Afghanistan.
Later, the IMU began its campaign to bring down the Uzbek government in 1998. Uzbek President Islam Karimov used a heavy hand against the IMU and other Islamists. The IMU accordingly found it easier to operate in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, including the Uzbek exclaves of So’x and Shohimardon.
By 2000, militants faced government crackdowns throughout Central Asia, though they could still operate in Tajikistan and across the border in Afghanistan. The IMU, for example, was largely wiped out after 9/11 and the subsequent U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in the battle of Kunduz. The Taliban and IMU had decided to make a stand against the Northern Alliance and U.S. forces in Kunduz, but the Taliban withdrew, leaving the IMU to fend for itself. The IMU lost one of its two founding members and leaders, Juma Namangani, in the subsequent crushing defeat. While the IMU managed a few more large-scale attacks in Tashkent, including suicide attacks on the Israeli and U.S. embassies and the Uzbek prosecutor general’s office in 2004, this did not signal a resurgence. Its remaining members relocated along with other fractured militant groups to northwestern Pakistan, where they took advantage of smuggling opportunities to raise funds. In August 2009, the IMU’s other founder and leader, Tahir Yuldashev, died in a suspected U.S. missile strike in Pakistan. The involvement of Yuldashev and his fighters in the Islamist insurgency in Pakistan shows just how far the IMU had deviated from its original goal of toppling the Uzbek government. While the Uzbek and Tajik governments routinely blame attacks such as the Sept. 19 raid on the IMU, the group is no longer the coherent movement it was in the late 1990s.
Islamist Militant Fragmentation
Now, governments frequently use the IMU as a catchall phrase for Islamists in Central Asia who would like to overthrow the regions’ governments. In reality, various factors divide the region’s militants, and continuing to use convenient labels like IMU frequently masks real shifts and complexities in Central Asia’s militant landscape. These groups are divided by the particular conditions of their areas of operation, by ethnicity and tribe, and by their particular cause.
Groups like the IMU depend on commanders of militants in places like the Rasht, Tavildara or Fergana valleys to carry out the attacks. The situations in each valley are quite different. For example, the increasing Tajik military presence in the Rasht Valley means militant commanders there will have different missions from commanders in the Fergana Valley, to say nothing of the IMU members fighting NATO forces in Afghanistan or smuggling drugs in Pakistan. The name IMU to a large degree has become a generic label for Islamic militant activity in a similar fashion to how the devolution of al Qaeda has shifted the original understanding of the group and its name.
Ethnicity and tribal structures also complicate the picture. Central Asia is a hodge-podge of ethnicities, including Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kyrgyzs, Turkmen, Kazakhs and Uighurs. They speak different languages and have different customs, leading to highly localized, clan-based loyalties. Various groups and subgroups frequently cross national borders, making the activities of some factions more transnational in their ambitions or more interested in creating their own state rather than taking power from the government of the day.
And militants’ shifting causes vary considerably. In hostile terrain like that of Central Asia, it is difficult enough to survive, much less adhere to consistent ideological goals. Groups like the IRPT frequently started as peaceful political groups, fractured, and then became more militant during the Tajik civil war, only to rejoin the political process.
The Regional Outlook
The past has shown that violence in one country can quickly spread to its neighbors. Thus, while Uzbekistan has largely mitigated the militant threat through strict security measures, it remains vulnerable due to its proximity to the chaotic countries of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the geographically distorted borders around the Fergana Valley.
The Afghan question also looms large. With the United States and NATO set to begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan in less than a year, Central Asian countries will face a much less restrained Taliban in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s relative weakness in northern Afghanistan will mitigate this threat, but the region will nonetheless be in limbo after NATO withdraws. For their part, Central Asia’s militants hope the Western withdrawal and the hoped-for Taliban rise to power will restore Afghanistan as a militant safe haven from which to pursue their home-country ambitions. And this prospect, of course, makes Central Asian governments quite uneasy.
Complicating matters, Russia is moving to protect its interests in Central Asia by moving up to 25,000 troops to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to increase security at its military installations there. Central Asian states are looking to balance their security needs in light of a destabilizing Afghanistan by accepting more Russian troops.
Between increasing militant activity in Tajikistan after years of relative quiet, the impending Western withdrawal from Afghanistan and a resurgent Russia, Central Asia faces challenging times ahead.
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Woof,
You never know where a war crimes criminal will show up.
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42145729/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts
P.C.
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Why Russia, Turkey Look Toward Armenia and Azerbaijan
Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian announced Thursday that he would personally be on the first civilian flight from Armenia into the newly rebuilt airport in Nagorno-Karabakh when it opens in May. (Nagorno-Karabakh is an Armenian-backed secessionist region enclosed within Azerbaijan.) Azerbaijan had earlier announced that it would shoot down any plane over its occupied territories. For now, the issue is at a standoff as both sides have laid a challenge that could not only propel the region back into the brutal war of the 1990s, but could also pull in some global heavyweights. That said, STRATFOR is looking beyond the political theater that normally, and incessantly, takes place between Yerevan and Baku to whether this has been orchestrated by the country that has held the peace between the two, Russia.
The southern region of the Caucasus has seen countless struggles in the past century, though one of the most enduring is between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis over Nagorno-Karabakh. Soviet rule from the 1920s onwards stifled these battles for the most part. But as soon as the Soviet Union’s disintegration looked imminent, conflict flared up when Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence from Azerbaijan, with intention to unify with Armenia. Free of being restrained by Moscow, Azerbaijan defended its territory and a full-scale war erupted, stretching across Armenia and Azerbaijan until Russia brokered a cease-fire.
“Both Ankara and Moscow know that any Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict would not remain contained within the region.”
Though simmering hostilities have continued, there are two reasons the conflict has remained frozen. First, beginning in the mid-1990s, neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan had the resources to continue fighting. Armenia’s economy was, and is, non-existent for the most part. Without the financial means, it would be impossible for Armenia to launch a full-scale war. At the same time, Azerbaijan’s military has been too weak, thus far, to assert control over the occupied lands.
After nearly two decades, the issue is beginning to thaw again as the balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan is beginning to change. Baku has grown exponentially stronger in the past six years. Rich with energy-wealth, Azerbaijan has started creating a modern and competent military and the largest out of the Caucasus countries. Moreover, Azerbaijan’s close ally, Turkey, has renewed its commitment to defend Azerbaijan in any conflict with Armenia, recently signing a strategic cooperation agreement to this end. On the other hand, Armenia has been reduced to a satellite of Russia for the most part, with little independent foreign policy, politics or economy. Being folded under Russia’s wing, Armenia feels protected against its rival. These two shifts have led to an increase in tensions between Baku and Yerevan over whether either is bold enough to revive hostilities.
The involvement of Turkey and Russia is the main cause of deterrence that is holding the two sides back. Both Ankara and Moscow know that any Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict would not remain contained within the region. Each power would be expected by Baku and Yerevan to defend their respective ally — whether they actually would is unclear. Therefore, the standoff has become more about Moscow and Ankara holding back each side and not allowing the instability to become exacerbated to the extent of an open conflict or war.
However, two other issues are also evolving. First, Baku is becoming more powerful than Moscow is comfortable with. It is not that Russia is concerned it cannot handle Azerbaijan on its own, but Russia is attempting to maintain a regional balance by dominating each of the three Caucasus states in its own way. Baku’s resource wealth and hefty foreign connections are beginning to tip those scales in comparison to the other two states. Still, Russia has held back as to not launch a larger conflict with Turkey, which Moscow is wary to provoke.
This is where the second development comes in. Turkey is engulfed in other large conflicts and is one of the key members in the Middle Eastern theater helping the United States suppress the instability. Turkey is struggling within NATO to carve out a leadership role and is embroiled in a standoff with some European NATO members over how extensive the Libyan intervention ought to be. Ankara is also using its influence in the Iranian-Saudi struggle over Bahrain and the Arab world in general. There are also domestic politics to consider, with important elections coming up in June for Turkey. Such a string of endless conflicts also has the United States, which has deep relations with both Yerevan and Baku, preoccupied.
On the other hand, Russia isn’t wrapped up in any of those issues. Moreover, Moscow feels pretty confident these days with its position globally. First, Russia has been largely successful in its resurgence into its former Soviet sphere. Second, as of the past few months, it has even more room to maneuver now that the West is dealing with the instabilities in the Islamic theater. Third, Europe is torn over taking part in those conflicts and its need to focus on its own set of domestic challenges, both economically and politically. Lastly, the conflicts have caused energy prices to soar and many countries to demand more supplies — of which Russia is the winner. Russian international reserves crossed over the $500 billion mark on March 18 for the first time in two and a half years. The last time Russian reserves were in the $500 billion range, Moscow confronted Georgia in August 2008.
If there ever were a time for Russia to look at the more difficult issues it has avoided — like the standoff between Azerbaijan and Armenia or challenging an ascendant Turkey that does not seem to be slowing down, it would be now. It is most likely that Russia is not looking to launch a new conflict, but instead it wants to test how assertive Azerbaijan feels with its strengthening position against Armenia and just how willing Turkey is to dance with the bear. It is easier to feel such things out when the rest of the world is looking elsewhere.
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Russia's Crime of the Century
How crooked officials pulled off a massive scam, spent millions on Dubai real estate, and killed my partner when he tried to expose them.
BY JAMISON FIRESTONE | APRIL 20, 2011
If there remains any pretense that justice and rule of law exist in Moscow today, that notion should now be counted as pure fantasy. The case of Sergei Magnitsky -- a senior partner at my law firm who was imprisoned, tortured, and murdered after his efforts to shed light on a massive governmental fraud by Interior Ministry officials stealing subsidiaries of my client's company, the Hermitage Fund, and the $230 million of taxes they had paid -- has illuminated the cruelty and criminality of Russian legal enforcement. And new evidence released last week on YouTube as part of the broad campaign seeking justice for Sergei, goes even further -- exposing the blatant theft, impunity, and ill-gotten gains of senior Russian tax officials who were complicit in the fraud and subsequent murder of my colleague.
The very bureaucrats -- government tax officials on modest salaries in Moscow Tax Office 28 -- exposed by Sergei three years ago of perpetrating the massive fraud stashed millions of dollars in overseas bank accounts, created offshore companies, and purchased luxury villas in Dubai, Montenegro, and Moscow. Worse still, the Kremlin and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, in particular, have refused -- out of embarrassment, inability, culpability, or incompetence -- to review and prosecute what is now overwhelming evidence of this clear crime.
When I opened my law firm, Firestone Duncan, in Moscow in 1993, I was aware of the dangers of doing business in Russia. The stories about "mafia" groups of tracksuited thugs extorting businesses were well known to me. What I never expected was that the Russian mafia would merge with the government; its members are now the same officials who are supposed to be protecting the public.
The story begins in July 2007, when Russian Interior Ministry officers Artem Kuznetsov and Pavel Karpov raided my law offices in Moscow and seized without a warrant two vanloads of documents and corporate seals (imprints that go along with the signature on any signed document in Russia) from companies belonging to my firm's clients, including the Hermitage Fund, which had once been Russia's largest foreign investor. At the time, one of my junior lawyers protested that their search was illegal. He was taken into a conference room by the officers and beaten so severely that he was hospitalized for three weeks.
A few months later, we learned that the materials seized by the police had been handed over to a criminal group that used them to fraudulently re-register the companies under the name of a frontman, the convicted murderer, Viktor Markelov. Markelov had been recently released from pretrial detention on an unrelated kidnapping and extortion charge involving the same officers, Kuznetsov and Karpov. The seized documents were also used to create $1 billion of fake backdated contracts. Markelov and two other ex-convicts were made directors of the re-registered companies and, through their lawyers, pleaded guilty in several regional courts to $1 billion in these fake liabilities. We learned this from a bailiff in the St. Petersburg court who called our office looking for hundreds of millions of dollars of assets to satisfy those claims.
At this point, Sergei got involved. He started investigating the scheme and, after a few weeks, pieced the story together through court records, registration files, and bank statements. He prepared a number of very detailed criminal complaints against the police officers and perpetrators involved in the massive fraud. These complaints were filed with the most senior Russian law enforcement authorities on Dec. 3, 2007. The police did nothing.
Three weeks later, on Christmas Eve 2007, the stolen firms under Markelov's name applied for a refund of $230 million in taxes that the Hermitage Fund companies had paid one year earlier. It was the largest tax refund in Russian history -- and it was granted in one day by Olga Stepanova, head of Moscow's Tax Office 28, and her colleague in Moscow Tax Office 25, Elena Khimina. The money was then wired to a small Russian bank, Universal Savings Bank, owned by another convicted criminal, Dmitry Kluyev. The money then left Russia through the Austria-based Raiffeisen bank and was later funneled through Citibank and JPMorgan Chase.
We were shocked by the theft of the Hermitage companies and the fake court judgments, but when we discovered the $230 million refund, we knew something was spectacularly wrong. It wasn't just a crime against Hermitage -- it was also a massive crime against the Russian state. Something had to be done. Sergei, in particular, was adamant that criminal complaints be filed with every single law enforcement agency in Russia. His logic: Even if there were a few bad apples in the system, surely once the Russian leadership realized that hundreds of millions of dollars had been stolen from state coffers, then the "big guns" would be rolled out to arrest the corrupt officials and criminals involved. Sergei volunteered to give a sworn testimony to the Russian State Investigative Committee about the collaboration of Russian police and tax officials with organized criminals in stealing millions from taxpayers.
Sergei testified against officers Kuznetsov and Karpov on Oct. 7, 2008. The next month, on Nov. 24, he was arrested by three subordinates of Kuznetsov under a case opened by Karpov. He was thrown behind bars at the Interior Ministry's detention center on Petrovka Street in Moscow, where they tortured him to force him to withdraw his testimony and sign a false confession saying he was the one who stole the $230 million.
The case against Sergei was assigned to Maj. Oleg Silchenko of the Interior Ministry. Silchenko transferred Sergei between detention centers in secrecy; refused to allow Sergei contact with his wife, mother, and children; denied all his legal requests; and put emotional and psychological pressure on him to retract his testimony against officers Kuznetsov and Karpov. Sergei, however, continued while in detention to insist on his testimony while in detention -- evidence that exposed the partnership between government officials and organized crime. But Silchenko did not investigate Sergei's evidence. Silchenko was working together with Kuznetsov -- who had been assigned to this investigation by senior Russian Interior Ministry brass -- to cover up the theft of the $230 million
The more Sergei insisted on his testimony in sworn statements and in court, the more pressure Silchenko applied to him. He was put in a cell with eight inmates and only four beds so the detainees had to sleep in shifts. In December 2008, he was put in a cell with no heat and no windowpanes -- he nearly froze to death. Later, he was moved to another cell with no toilet, just a hole in the floor where the sewage overflowed.
After six months of this treatment, Sergei -- who went into detention a healthy 36-year-old man -- had lost 40 pounds. He developed pancreatitis and gallstones and needed medical attention. In July 2009, Sergei was moved to Butyrka, a maximum-security facility that had no medical facilities. At Butyrka, Silchenko repeatedly denied medical care to Sergei, hoping that it would break him. Sergei remained defiant and continued to write complaints about his innocence and the pressure applied to him. But nearly one year after his arrest, on the night of Nov. 16, 2009, he became gravely ill. He was transferred to the intensive-care wing of Matrosskaya Tishina detention center, but instead of receiving medical attention, he was put in a straitjacket, chained to a bed, and left by himself in an isolation cell for one hour and 18 minutes while doctors waited right outside the door until they were certain he was dead.
On the eve of the one-year anniversary of Sergei's death, the Interior Ministry called a news conference to announce the findings of Silchenko's investigation. The entire highly sophisticated $230 million tax fraud conspiracy was pinned on two minor criminal participants, Markelov and one other frontman who turned themselves in and "confessed" to the crime, and who in turn named three dead men as their accomplices. The two confessors were tried in secret hearings and were given the minimum sentence of five years. They were not asked about the stolen money or their connections with officers Kuznetsov and Karpov.
In the news conference, the Interior Ministry announced that Sergei had masterminded the fraud. He was accused of organizing the very conspiracy to which he had alerted the government. The government's sole evidence of Sergei's guilt was the hearsay of the two convicts who "confessed" to their role in the crime and who Sergei had asked authorities to arrest in early December of 2007 before any money was stolen.
Furthermore, Interior Ministry officials stated that according to their findings, the tax officials were innocent and were themselves victims of the crime. They had simply been tricked into refunding the money. They went on to say that the bank that received the stolen funds was owned by another dead person. To cap it all they announced that the stolen government money could not be found -- a truck transporting the records had apparently crashed and exploded. Karpov, Kuznetsov, and Silchenko were credited with "solving" the case of the stolen $230 million. The Russian government promoted and decorated them with the honor of "Russia's Best Investigators." And the criminals were now safe to enjoy the proceeds of their crime. Enjoy them they did.
But Sergei's friends -- outraged by the Russian state's continued efforts to vilify the whistle-blower while protecting the corrupt -- continued to pursue an independent investigation in hopes of bringing to justice those responsible for the tax fraud and Sergei's untimely death. Through the work of nearly 100 sources inside and outside Russia, we now have a much clearer picture of the economics behind this crime. Three weeks after approving the fraudulent refund, the entire top management of Moscow Tax Office 28 began buying multimillion dollar properties at the Kempinski Palm Jumeirah -- a luxury hotel and housing complex on an artificial palm-shaped island off the coast of Dubai. The Kempinski properties were paid for by three tax officials using the same bank account at Credit Suisse. The head of Moscow Tax Office 28 also bought a $20 million avant-garde house in Moscow's most exclusive neighborhood, Rublevskoe Shosse, designed by Moscow's most famous architect, Alexei Kozyr, and a $700,000 beach house in the seaside town of Bar in Montenegro.
The scale of the crime and the coverup is truly astounding. It directly involves the Russian deputy interior minister, the deputy general prosecutor, the head of the economic counterespionage unit of the secret police, the heads of Moscow Tax Offices 25 and 28, and a dozen judges, as well as hundreds of functionaries throughout the system. But the Kremlin has shown little willingness to prosecute this case. Instead, Medvedev has tried to deflect attention away from it and portray Sergei's case as an important investigation of Russian prison conditions after a possible death in detention due to "negligence."
As this farce plays out, Medevedev continues to make reassuring statements that he is serious about fighting corruption, that the rule of law is sound, and that international investors have nothing to fear in Russia. It is clear that the Kremlin is prepared to let things lie. But around the world, governments, activists, and independent civilians are speaking up. In 2010, Sergei was posthumously awarded Transparency International's Integrity Award. In Russia, too, there is overwhelming public support to launch an official independent investigation into his case. Russia's leading human rights activist, Lyudmila Alexeyeva, head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, filed a criminal complaint in March of 2010 against officers Silchenko, Kuznetsov, and Karpov, as well as their subordinates, for Sergei's torture and murder. Valery Borschev, head of the Moscow Public Oversight Commission, a Moscow NGO that focuses on prisoners' rights, said that Sergei was kept in torturous conditions and killed to cover up the crime he exposed.
Western governments have begun taking steps to contain this corruption inside Russia. The European Parliament recently passed a resolution calling on EU member states to impose visa sanctions and asset freezes on the Russian officials responsible for the tax fraud, Sergei's death, and the coverup. And on April 15, U.S. Rep. James McGovern reintroduced the Justice for Sergei Magnitsky Act to the House of Representatives to effectively do the same.
It is imperative for both Russia and the United States that this bill be passed. There will be no progress in Sergei's case -- or for Russian justice as a whole -- unless the West forcefully sanctions the corruption and cronyism gripping Russia today. Measures such as the EU resolution and the Justice for Sergei Magnitsky Act would put effective "soft" pressure on Russian officials to clean their own house. This would not weaken U.S.-Russia relations but redefine and strengthen them.
The U.S. government has a duty to its people to keep Russian lawlessness from reaching its shores -- or those of friendly nations, such as the United Arab Emirates. Russia and the United States are bound by numerous treaties, the success of which presupposes a level of honesty and integrity of the officials and legal systems of both countries. Sergei's case -- more precisely, Medvedev's unwillingness, or perhaps inability, to bring the perpetrators of this massive government conspiracy to justice -- demonstrates the fallacy of the supposition. It is dangerous to U.S. interests to be forced to rely on and to grant comity to information, decisions, and requests made by foreign officials who are abusing the implicit trust that these treaties rely upon.
This case has the potential to be Russia's Watergate: The evidence unearthed by Sergei would expose the graft and cronyism that is corroding Russia's core. Acting upon it would not only cleanse the system of a score of corrupt officials but would set a new standard of expected behavior and send a message to Russians that the president would support them if they fight corruption. But left ignored, Medvedev's war on corruption and any pretense of rule of law in Russia are but a sham.
Jamison Firestone is the managing partner of Firestone Duncan, a U.S. law firm headquartered in Moscow.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/20/russia_s_crime_of_the_century?page=full
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Analyst Eugene Chausovsky examines the current politics of energy infrastructure from the Caucasus region to central Europe as the European Union seeks alternatives to Russia.
Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.
Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski continued his weeklong tour of the Caucasus region on July 27, where he is visiting Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Poland, which currently holds the rotating presidency of the European Union, is trying to establish closer ties to all of these countries. Of these countries, Azerbaijan represents the most important, both to Poland and to wider Europe.
Azerbaijan is important both for its strategic location and for its energy, particularly as a growing natural gas producer and exporter. The latter is what Azerbaijan has been heavily courted by the West as demonstrated by Poland’s recent initiative to restart energy negotiations with Azerbaijan along with Turkmenistan, which is a major natural gas producer and exporter under the format of the EU. The reason that these countries are so important to the EU is that they would represent a formidable alternative to Russian energy supplies, which Moscow uses not only as an economic but also as a political tool. The EU has been focusing specifically on two energy projects: Nabucco and Trans-Caspian.
Nabucco is a project that would take natural gas from Azerbaijan, across Turkey, through southeastern Europe to the gas-trading hub of Vienna, via a pipeline. Nabucco will be very difficult to construct, however, and, because of Nabucco’s high cost and capacity, another source of energy must be included into the project. And that is where the Trans-Caspian pipeline comes in. The Trans-Caspian project would connect Turkmenistan’s natural gas supplies to Azerbaijan, across the Caspian Sea, and would make Nabucco a much more viable project, at least in terms of securing suppliers.
But it is for this reason that these projects face substantial resistance from outside powers. Russia knows that if Nabucco were to come online, it would be a significant blow to Russia’s use of energy as a tool of influence in Europe, particularly central Europe. Therefore, Russia has been working to block the progress of Nabucco and foster divisions within the various European partners included in the project.
The Trans-Caspian project has also faced substantial resistance from Russia, as well as Iran, and is being contested on the legal and political grounds. So despite the fact that Poland has demonstrated an interest in reviving the Nabucco and Trans-Caspian projects, both of these projects to face many political and technical obstacles.
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Russia is interested in building natural gas storage facilities in Turkey, officials from Russia's Gazprom said March 20. Over the winter, Gazprom redirected natural gas from its storage facilities in Europe after a spike in demand in Turkey. Now, Gazprom wants to build underground natural gas storage facilities in Turkey to help when supplies dwindle in the future.
Gazprom's proposal is part of Russia's larger strategy -- in both Turkey and Europe -- to increase Moscow's energy leverage with its customers. Although Ankara will be wary of giving Moscow more influence in Turkey, there is little it can do at the moment to withstand the Kremlin's strategy.
Analysis
Energy is one of the cornerstones of the Russo-Turkish relationship. Russia provides approximately 58 percent of Turkey's natural gas supplies, making it Turkey's largest natural gas supplier. Ankara has long sought ways to reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas, since Moscow traditionally uses its energy supplies as political leverage with many of its customers. For its part, Russia wants to keep Turkey tied to it through energy and to prevent other suppliers from helping Ankara diversify its natural gas sources. Thus, Russia wants to increase its leverage in its energy relationship with Turkey.
Russia is working on a complex strategy to strengthen its position relative to its Western energy customers, particularly in Europe. The first element of the strategy is to move Russia away from its primary role of natural gas supplier and increase its ownership of other natural gas-related assets. The second element is to lock many of Moscow's customers into 10-to-15-year contracts, which Russia has made more appealing by offering natural gas at a discount.
Russia is in negotiations to purchase electricity networks in Germany, natural gas distribution networks in Greece, and electricity and distribution networks in Italy. Moscow has also shown interest in the natural gas distribution networks in the Czech Republic. Russia has struck tentative deals with Germany, Italy and others on 10-year contracts with natural gas price discounts of between 10 and 30 percent. Amid Europe's financial difficulties, the discounts are welcomed. Russia knows that many long-term energy diversity programs are under way in Europe and so is trying to prepare for when those become operational by striking long-term deals.
This European strategy appears to be expanding into Turkey with Gazprom's announcement of interest in building natural gas storage facilities there. Turkey is already on Gazprom's list of countries that could take part in renegotiations on natural gas price contracts, according to Stratfor sources. Russia and Turkey's contract on supplies sent via the Blue Stream pipeline is set to expire in 2013, though the contract on Russian supplies that transit Bulgaria has many years left. Turkey could enter into larger negotiations, like the Europeans, and receive a discount of 10 percent or more. The problem is that Russia will insist on a long-term contract, likely spanning at least 10 years, and Turkey will resist such a deal because it anticipates an increase of natural gas supplies from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz II project in approximately 5 years.
In the short term, however, the possibility of cheaper natural gas and Russia's constructing natural gas storage in Turkey are attractive ideas. Russia's offer comes as Turkey is in a pricing dispute with its second-largest natural gas provider, Iran. Turkey currently pays Iran $505 per thousand cubic meters (mcm) of natural gas -- a steep price compared to the $400 per mcm it pays Russia. Turkey also regularly experiences reliability problems with supplies from Iran, especially in the winter. While Ankara has been careful to maintain a working relationship with Tehran to help Iran circumvent sanctions, Turkey also would likely be interested in more security if more problems arose with Iranian supplies, particularly amid increasing sanctions on Iran from the United States and Europe.
Moscow would be more inclined to provide a greater discount on natural gas supplies to Ankara if the negotiations included Russia gaining assets in Turkey, as it would if it built natural gas storage facilities there. Such facilities could relieve the stress on Turkey's supplies should issues with Iran grow more problematic. Cheaper natural gas and more secure supplies from Russia make Moscow's offer attractive to Ankara. However, either agreement would give Russia greater leverage in Turkey, since Russia would own assets in the country and Turkey would be locked into a long-term contract.
Ankara could want to diversify its natural gas supplies away from Russia and prevent Moscow from gaining more energy -- and ultimately political -- leverage in Turkey. But Ankara has little recourse against Russia's strategy right now. New natural gas supply options -- increased supplies from Iran, the Azerbaijani expansion of Shah Deniz II or liquefied natural gas alternatives -- are years away, and problems with Iran are jeopardizing Turkey's current supplies. Russia might be the only option Turkey has in the short term.
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Read more: Russia's Energy Plans for Turkey | Stratfor
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Central Asian Tensions
January 30, 2013 | 1000 GMT
By Robert D. Kaplan and Lauren Goodrich
If the West is disillusioned by the Arab Spring, what may eventually happen in Central Asia is beyond its worst imaginings. The Middle East, for all its challenges, has no legacy of Stalinism, boasts Western-educated elites, knows something of capitalism and the free market and is proximate to Europe via the Mediterranean. European colonialism in the Middle East was benign in the extreme compared to that of Stalin's Soviet Union in Central Asia. There is no legacy in the Middle East of mass deportations and eradications of whole intelligentsias, as there is in Central Asia. Central Asia, in terms of modern political consciousness, is the back of beyond.
Indeed, much of Central Asia, including the demographically and geographically pivotal states of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, has yet to enter a post-Soviet phase. Such states are still governed by the same Leonid Brezhnev-style central committeemen as in the days before the collapse of the Berlin Wall. But political change of some sort must come. Central Asia probably has a big future in the news.
Throughout Central Asia, Islamic consciousness has risen over the past two decades as a moral force against the rule of often brutal, sterile and corrupt authoritarian regimes. A wild card in this regard is Afghanistan. Following the withdrawal of substantial numbers of American troops from the country in 2014, the possibility arises that Islamic fighters from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan will return to their ethnic homelands and sow unrest. Yet the real chance of epochal change in former Soviet Central Asia may come less from Islamic revolution than from the passing of aged leaders themselves, who have no credible successors of the same stature, while the institutions required for successful political liberalization remain problematic. Each of these states has populations willing to challenge the regime in question. The fact is, Central Asian political elites lack essential political legitimacy, even as their populations evince less in the way of civil societies than the populations of many Arab states. The leaders themselves may in certain cases enjoy cult-like status. But that won't be true of those who follow them.
Whereas states like Yemen and Libya in the Middle East are mere geographical expressions, their borders may still have more meaning than those of Central Asian states like Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan: Designed by Stalin, these so-called states were deliberately meant to conflict with ethnic settlement patterns, so as to make it impossible for them to break free of the Soviet Union. Wherever the Arab Spring leads us, the Palestinian Territories excepted, borders in the Middle East may be on the whole less disputable than those in Central Asia, should revolts take hold there.
Central Asia, with the exception of Tajikistan, is Turkic. But by further breaking the region up into ethnicities -- Uzbek, Kazakh, Turkmen, Kyrgyz -- and creating official republics, even as they made sure the clan system everywhere remained intact, the Soviets ensured that pan-Turkism would have a hard time rearing up. The result, given Stalin's artificial borders, are states that are mutually suspicious of each other and that are partial misnomers themselves. For example, there are large Uzbek populations in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, even as Tajiks dominate the slum encampments on the hills in the cities of Bukhara and Samarkand inside Uzbekistan.
Uzbekistan, with 27.6 million people, is by far the most populous country in the region, with close to half of the whole population of Central Asia. This is mainly because Uzbekistan has a cartographic appendage in the northeast that encompasses most of the Fergana Valley -- the demographic inkblot of Central Asia, with 10 million people. Whereas much of Central Asia is high and dry terrain, the Fergana is a well-watered depression, suitable to agriculture and packed with large populations of Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kyrgyz. Ethnic rioting between these groups has been a periodic feature of post-Soviet life.
In 2005, Uzbek forces opened fire on Uzbek protesters in the Fergana (in Andijan specifically), as part of a clampdown that drew condemnation from Washington and other capitals in the West. Moscow loved this because it estranged the United States from Uzbekistan (leading eventually to the closure of a U.S. air base) and isolated Uzbekistan from straying too far from its relationship with Russia. Russia knows that Uzbekistan -- because of its demographic heft and particularly assertive ethnic nationalism -- constitutes the biggest threat to Russian domination of the region. But while Uzbek nationalism is vibrant, Uzbekistan as a state is weak. The clans who run the state from the capital of Tashkent are estranged from those who dominate the Fergana Valley, where much of the population lives. Politics are kept in check by President Islam Karimov, 74, who may run the most oppressive regime in the former Soviet Union. The West hates Karimov because of his human rights record. But it is not out of the question that, following Karimov, interethnic chaos will create a humanitarian disaster worse than his rule.
Kazakhstan to the north has aligned itself with Russia to balance against Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan, whose land area is larger than the rest of former Soviet Central Asia combined, is part of a customs union that includes Russia and Belarus. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, 72, conscious of the ethnic threat from Uzbekistan, actually wanted the Soviet Union to continue to exist beyond 1991. Kazakhstan may be territorially vast, but its population of 15.4 million is split between those bordering Russia and those clustered deep in the south close to the ethnic cauldron of the Fergana Valley and Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Thus, it is vulnerable to political unrest.
Kyrgyzstan, with a population of 5.4 million, is in a state of constant instability because of an obvious reason journalists ignore: It is geographically divided, with the capital of Bishkek in the extreme north part of the Kazakh plain and more integral to Kazakhstan, while different clans occupy the teeming Fergana in Kyrgyzstan's southwest, separated from Bishkek by formidable mountains. You see the pattern: The Fergana is where most everyone actually lives, and it is divided among several artificial states with capitals relatively far away. It is ethnic unrest in the Fergana (as played out a little more than a decade ago), in combination with a political crisis in one or more of these capitals, that has the potential to unravel the region.
Tajikistan already had a civil war in the 1990s. Burdened by Central Asia's roughest terrain and bordering the Fergana to the north and war-torn Afghanistan to the south, Tajikistan is internally divided by clans. With virtually no industrial economy or energy production at home, many of its young men either work in Russia and Kazakhstan or fight in Afghanistan.
It is Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in particular that, unlike some other Central Asian countries, are propped up by energy wealth: principally oil in Kazakhstan and natural gas in Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan, far to the west of the Fergana, is geographically and demographically isolated, and to a greater extent than Kazakhstan, is playing China against Russia. Turkmenistan received $5 billion in loans from Beijing in 2011 and $4 billion in 2010 in order to facilitate Turkmen natural gas exports to China.
Central Asia constitutes the world's most fascinating geopolitical experiment. Its legal borders make little sense. It is fabulously rich in hydrocarbons and strategic minerals and metals. (Kazakhstan is about to become the world's largest producer of uranium and has the world's second-largest chromium, lead and zinc reserves.) It will increasingly be crisscrossed by energy pipelines in all directions. And it is politically unstable. Russia and China are battling for influence here. What the map looks like in Central Asia decades hence is perhaps harder to predict than anywhere else on the globe.
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Read more: Central Asian Tensions | Stratfor
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http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139049/leon-aron/the-putin-doctrine?cid=soc-facebook-in-snapshots-the_putin_doctrine-031013
From the article:
Much in Russian foreign policy today is based on a consensus that crystallized in the early 1990s. Emerging from the rubble of the Soviet collapse, this consensus ranges across the political spectrum -- from pro-Western liberals to leftists and nationalists. It rests on three geostrategic imperatives: that Russia must remain a nuclear superpower, a great power in all facets of international activity, and the hegemon -- the political, military, and economic leader -- of its region. This consensus marks a line in the sand, beyond which Russia cannot retreat without losing its sense of pride or even national identity. It has proven remarkably resilient, surviving post-revolutionary turbulence and the change of political regimes from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin.
After his election as president in 2000, Putin added to this agenda an overarching goal: the recovery of economic, political, and geostrategic assets lost by the Soviet state in 1991. Although he has never spelled it out formally, Putin has pursued this objective with such determination, coherence, and consistency that it merits being called the Putin Doctrine. Domestically, the doctrine has guided the regime to reclaim the commanding heights of the economy (first and foremost, the oil and natural gas industries) and reassert its control over national politics, the judicial system, and the national television networks, from which an overwhelming majority of Russians get their news. In foreign and security policy, the doctrine has amounted to a reinterpretation of Russia's geostrategic triad, making its implementation and maintenance considerably more assertive than originally intended. Although U.S. President Barack Obama has signaled lately that he will attempt to revive the "reset" with Russia, Washington's best option may well be a strategic pause: a much-scaled-down mode of interaction that reflects the growing disparity in values and objectives between the two countries yet preserves frank dialogue and even cooperation in a few select areas.
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Summary
Russia continues to exploit tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan by reinforcing security ties with both countries. During a June 24 visit to Armenia, Russian Security Council chief Nikolai Patrushev said Moscow would overhaul the Russian 102nd military base in Gyumri. One week earlier, Moscow delivered the first installment of a $1 billion weapons package to Azerbaijan. Achieving a military balance among the Caucasus states is not Russia's primary objective. Rather, Moscow wants to bolster security ties with its two neighbors while ensuring they remain at odds over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
Analysis
The military base in Gyumri has long been a mainstay of Russia's security presence in the Caucasus. Established in the Soviet era, the base hosts roughly 3,000 of the 5,000 Russian soldiers stationed in Armenia. In 2010, Russia and Armenia agreed to extend Russia's lease of the base to 2044. The agreement also provided for an upgrade to the base's military hardware. In addition to its technical capabilities, the base symbolizes Russia's intent to defend Armenia if it were ever attacked (Armenia is in a geopolitically tense region).
The 102nd military base is a particularly important component of Armenia's relationship with Azerbaijan, with which Yerevan has a tenuous relationship. From 1988 to 1994, the two countries fought a war over the Nagorno-Karabakh territory but tensions over the issue remain. In fact, skirmishes occur regularly around the Line of Contact, the area along the Azerbaijan-Armenia border near Nagorno-Karabakh.
Baku has said it would reclaim the territory by force, and revenue earned from its vast energy resources have enabled it to build up a military that surpasses Armenia's. What prevents Azerbaijan from following though on this claim is Russia. Indeed, Moscow's military presence in Armenia is the single greatest deterrent to large-scale military action from Azerbaijan, which cannot and will not fight Russia militarily.
A Favorable Balance
Russia has a complicated relationship with Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is the most independent state in the region. Unlike Armenia, which is a member of the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization, and Georgia, which seeks membership in NATO, Azerbaijan eschews military alliances for various bilateral security arrangements. These include arrangements with Turkey and Israel, with which it has signed several major weapons deals.
In the Caucasus, Russia Secures its Position by Exploiting Regional Tensions
Russia has also supplied Azerbaijan with weapons, though over the past two years arms shipments have been halted. However, on June 18 Russia announced that it would begin delivering weapons in accordance with a $1 billion deal it had struck with Azerbaijan between 2011 and 2012. The agreement includes main battle tanks, self-propelled artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems. A Russian defense official said the agreement had been postponed to avoid "upsetting the military balance" in the Caucasus region. He added that the deal went through because of pressure from Russia's arms industry, which relies on exports.
Russia cares less about helping Armenia and Azerbaijan militarily than about its own security position. One of the best ways to secure this position is to ensure that its two neighbors remain combative over Nagorno-Karabakh. This is why Moscow responded to Armenia's concerns over the Azerbaijani arms deal by pledging to upgrade the 102nd military base. It needed to reassure Yerevan that it would not abandon its security commitments. This creates a situation where Armenia is even more dependent on Russia than it once was, but where Azerbaijan is no less likely to cease hostilities with Armenia. And it does not change the fact that Baku cannot act militarily for fear of Russian reprisal.
Ultimately, Russia favors its security relationship with Armenia over its defense ties with Azerbaijan because the former is more strategically valuable. As long as Russia maintains its military presence in Armenia -- and in the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in neighboring Georgia -- Azerbaijan's options in the region are limited and Russia's position is secure. Given that no outside powers are prepared to challenge Russia in the region militarily, it is likely that Moscow will maintain this dominant position for the near- to midterm.
Read more: In the Caucasus, Russia Secures Its Position by Exploiting Regional Tensions | Stratfor
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Interesting geopolitical implications here; I have posted previously about this-- freeing central Asian gas from the monopsony (one buyer as vs one seller of monopoly) of Russia, the implications in this regard of the Russian invasion of Georgia, etc.
Azerbaijan's Natural Gas Plans with Europe
Media Center, Image
June 27, 2013 | 1258 Print Text Size
Azerbaijan's Natural Gas Plans with Europe
On June 28, a consortium of energy companies developing the Caspian Sea field -- including BP, Total and Azerbaijani state-owned SOCAR -- is expected to officially announce the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline has been chosen as its link from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz II natural gas field to the Continent via the route known as the Southern Corridor. On June 26, the consortium behind the rival Nabucco West project announced that it had not been selected. The Shah Deniz II field in the Caspian Sea is set to provide an estimated 16 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year when it comes online around 2017 or 2018 -- an especially attractive development for European countries eager to diversify their supplies from their traditional provider, Russia, which currently provides roughly 130 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Europe each year.
Though either project would have supported Europe's efforts to diversify its energy supplies, the Trans-Adriatic project is smaller in scale and more manageable than Nabucco West, and its more southern supply route -- which will run from Turkey to Italy -- poses less of a strategic threat to Moscow. The pipeline will increase Azerbaijan's access to European energy markets, and choosing it rather than the more ambitious Nabucco West project mainly reflects an understanding between Baku and Moscow that will allow Russia to maintain a strong energy foothold in Europe.
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Summary
Located between Europe and Asia and replete with energy and mineral resources, the Caucasus has long held the attention of regional and global powers. The countries of the Caucasus were in disarray after the fall of the Soviet Union: Armenia and Azerbaijan fought over Nagorno-Karabakh, while Georgia struggled with the secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But over the past decade the Caucasus states have achieved relative domestic political stability and have developed their own distinct foreign policies.
In the future, Russia, Turkey and Iran will remain active in the Caucasus, but a deeply fragmented Europe will not even be able to interact with the world as a unified force, let alone have a major impact on the region. Washington's involvement will not be as obvious, but the region is of too great a strategic interest to the United States to be ignored.
Analysis
After holding its least controversial presidential election in years in February, Armenia looks poised for relative political stability. With generally the weakest economy of the Caucasus states, Armenia has relied on Russia, which owns many major assets in the country's energy, transit and telecommunications sectors. Russia has also served as Armenia's security guarantor, helping to prevent another outbreak of war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, the separatist region in Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan found stability much sooner, at least during the presidency of Heydar Aliyev from 1993 to 2003. Like his predecessor and father, current President Ilham Aliyev has sought to balance between Azerbaijan's larger neighbors while developing the country as an energy producer and exporter.
Georgian Politics Shift as Ties with Russia Grow
The most dynamic political situation in the Caucasus is in Georgia, which witnessed the Rose Revolution in 2003 and, most recently, the rise of billionaire tycoon Bidzina Ivanishvili and his Georgian Dream movement. Ivanishvili has been consolidating power since becoming prime minister in October 2012, and with President Mikhail Saakashvili unable to run for another term, the country's presidential election in October could be another turning point in Georgian politics. Even if Ivanishvili's candidate lost, impending constitutional changes will limit the power of the presidency, meaning late 2013 will likely be the end of Saakashvili's decadelong domination of Georgian politics.
Future Policy Direction
Given its newfound political stability and its dependence on Russia, Armenia's foreign policy is unlikely to change much in the next few years. Russia's military presence and subsidization of Armenia's economy are the strongest sources of influence that any foreign power has in Armenia, and Yerevan will likely only increase its cooperation with Moscow. Russia's support of Armenia, while a source of tension between Azerbaijan and Russia, will likely keep full-scale war from erupting over Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijan will hold a presidential election in October, but with few significant challengers, Aliyev is likely to win, enabling him to continue to focus on Baku's emergence as an energy power. However, success could depend on the European market -- a worrisome proposition for Baku. With other sources of energy becoming available, European natural gas consumption is not expected to climb significantly in the coming years. Moreover, Georgia is a crucial transit state for existing and future Azerbaijani pipeline projects to Europe, and Georgia's new government appears to be set to work more closely with the Russians. Azerbaijan must consider that Russia could use its ties in Georgia to pressure Baku into compliance on various issues. To counter warming Russo-Georgian relations, Azerbaijan will probably increase energy, political and security cooperation with Turkey, though the Turks would not be able to provide the kind of energy diversification and leverage that Azerbaijan hopes to find in Europe.
Saakashvili's Georgia has been thoroughly oriented toward the West, but Ivanishvili campaigned on building closer ties with Russia. This will be the greatest shift of the Ivanishvili era. Change has been gradual so far, and Georgia has continued its Western-oriented course at least rhetorically, but its regional partners -- Azerbaijan and Turkey -- are nervous that a wider political shift could be imminent.
The Policies of Regional Powers
Other powers' strategies for the Caucasus will also affect the region's developments. Most important is Russia, which aims to block any foreign influence in the region, particularly Western influence. To do so, it will maintain its already strong position in Armenia and deepen its foothold in Georgia. Both will be key to Moscow's efforts to shape the actions of Azerbaijan, the most strategically important and most independent of the Caucasus countries. The potential for warmer ties with Georgia under Ivanishvili and his political camp could encourage Azerbaijan to be more accommodating toward Russia.
Turkey is a major consumer of Azerbaijani oil and natural gas and serves as a key transit state for energy bound for Europe. Though it may be uncomfortable for Azerbaijan given its desire to diversify its export market, Turkish demand for its natural gas and the uncertainty of the European energy market will bind the two together. Russia's military presence in Armenia and in Georgia's breakaway territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, will also encourage the two to enhance defense ties. Still, Russia is the main supplier of Turkey's energy, and that fact will preclude Turkey from becoming too close to Azerbaijan in the security realm.
Iranian relations with Armenia (mostly limited to the economic sphere) and Georgia will remain mostly the same, but the occasional diplomatic row could arise between Iran and Azerbaijan. Tehran will keep pressure on Baku through religious and cultural groups in Azerbaijan, though their effect will be limited. There is also the chance of a military buildup in the Caspian Sea as Iran tries to strong-arm Azerbaijan into cutting back its cooperation with Israel.
Given the ongoing crisis that is fracturing the European Union, Europe cannot be relied upon to finance strategic projects in the Caucasus. Similarly, the United States is working to reduce its role in various parts of the world and is thus unlikely to become more involved in the Caucasus. However, the rebalancing of U.S. foreign policy means the United States will be more reliant on foreign partners to accomplish its goals. Due to the uncertainties of its future relations with Georgia in the Ivanishvili era, the United States could look to Azerbaijan to fill the role of partner in the Caucasus.
Azerbaijan's growth as an energy producer and exporter will make it a dynamic player, while Armenia will build on its close economic and security relationship with Russia. But it is the specifics of Georgia's political evolution that are the least clear and that have the greatest potential to alter the trends in the Caucasus.
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Summary
Georgia's presidential election in October will take place during a time of profound domestic and foreign policy changes. Such changes are but the latest manifestation of a long and complicated history that is ultimately rooted in geography. Georgia's strategic location in the Caucasus has subjected it to foreign influence and domination by powers from multiple directions. And its internal geography, which is marked by the Greater Caucasus and Lesser Caucasus mountain ranges, has made uniting the country as difficult as repelling outside forces. Geography will continue to shape Georgian domestic and foreign policy in the future, regardless of who wins the election, just as it has in the past.
Analysis
Located in a transcontinental zone between Europe and Asia, Georgia has been dominated or otherwise divided by Western and Eastern powers for most of its history. Indeed, its occupation and partition goes back millennia. In the pre-Christian era, the kingdom of Kartli-Iberia, located in what is now modern day Georgia, experienced influences from the ancient Greeks to the West and the ancient Persians to the East. Throughout the first millennium, Georgia was divided between the Byzantine and Persian empires, though its adoption of Christianity in the early part of the millennium brought it closer to Byzantium culturally.
Beginning with the reign of David the Builder, Georgia experienced a "Golden Age" in the 11th and 12th centuries, when foreign forces were driven out of the country and various kingdoms and principalities were brought unified into a Georgian state. This unification was short-lived, however, as the Mongol invasion of the 13th century ended Georgia's independence and ushered in a long period of decline that subjected the country to further foreign influence. When Byzantium fell to the Ottomans, Georgia's trade ties with Western Europe were severed, and thus began several centuries of domination by Ottomans and Persians. Once more closely connected to the Byzantine Empire, Georgia now found itself enveloped by Eastern powers.
This East-West divide started to erode in the late 18th and 19th centuries, when a new imperial power -- Russia -- overtook Georgia in its quest to dominate the Caucasus region. Georgia initially called on Russia, a fellow Orthodox country, to protect it against the Muslim Persians and Ottomans, but it was eventually incorporated into the Russian Empire itself. Under Imperial Russian rule, the Transcaucasus railway was built across central Georgia, uniting eastern and western Georgia with a transport route for the first time in its history.
Still, Georgia could not overcome its internal divisions. Because of the country's mountainous terrain, Georgia's various non-Georgian ethnic groups have maintained autonomy for millennia. These groups, which include Abkhazians, Ossetians, Svans, Armenians and Turks, preserved their culture and identity just as Georgia as a nation was able to survive centuries of occupation and division. When the Russian Empire collapsed and gave rise to the Soviet Union (between which Georgia had a very brief and unstable period of independence), the Soviets organized Georgian territory so as to exploit ethnic and inter-communal differences. Best exemplifying the Soviet reorganization are the Abkhazians and Ossetians, who were given their own autonomous territories -- Abkhazia and South Ossetia, respectively -- within the Georgian Soviet republic.
Georgia became independent after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, but its geographic realities endured, leaving it with two major problems. First, it was still surrounded by large foreign powers, and second, it was still divided internally by numerous ethnic groups that did not want to be fully incorporated into Georgia. This was further aggravated by a weak government, which was reeling from the absence of Soviet economic support, and by an aggressive nationalistic approach pursued by the country's first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Georgia descended into civil war early in the post-Soviet era. The war included military conflict with breakaway republics in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both supported by Russia, which was still relatively strong despite the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Russia's backing of these breakaway territories and its enduring interest in Georgia eventually piqued the interests of Europe and the United States. Former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze sought to counter Russian influence by cooperating with the West militarily and economically through alliances with NATO and the European Union. Current President Mikhail Saakashvili intensified these efforts. For their part, Western powers were interested in Georgia because they saw it as security leverage against Russia. Moreover, because of its location Georgia could serve as an energy transit route, linking neighboring Azerbaijan to Europe, that bypassed Russia. The current Russian-EU/NATO competition over Georgia mirrors similar competitions by rival powers that have gone on for centuries.
Looking East
For the past decade, the Georgian government under Saakashvili has tried to orient the country to the West, during which Georgia's relations with Russia deteriorated. Relations bottomed out in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, which began over a conflict in South Ossetia. Saakashvili incorrectly predicted that the war would earn the support of NATO. The military alliance simply was not prepared to intervene directly in the war in the face of Russian military action. While Georgia was a committed NATO ally, it was not a NATO member and therefore not subject to Article 5 of the NATO charter that guarantees collective defense among members.
Georgia: A Historical Battleground Between East and West
The war prompted South Ossetia and Abkhazia to formally declare independence from Georgia, and Russia quickly increased its military presence and support in these territories. It also damaged relations between Russia and Georgia -- so much so that the two countries broke off economic and diplomatic ties.
While most Georgians believed that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are a rightful part of Georgia, many were wary of Saakashvili's assertiveness, which provoked the Russian military aggression. Furthermore, trade with Russia was an important part of Georgia's small economy. Russia had been the largest destination market for Georgian wine, mineral water and agricultural exports.
It is under these conditions that Saakashvili and his United Naitonal Movement suffered a major setback in parliamentary elections in October 2012. Georgia's opposition had been severely divided since the 2003 Rose Revolution, but 2011 saw the emergence of billionaire retail tycoon Bidzina Ivanishvili. Ivanishvili cobbled together much of the fractious opposition parties into the Georgian Dream movement, the ultimate objective of which was to defeat Saakashvili and end his monopoly of political power. Combined with Saakashvili's declining support in the midst of worsening economic conditions, Ivanishvili's substantial finances and grassroots support help beat the United National Movement, earning the billionaire the post of prime minister.
Since then, Ivanishvili and his camp have consolidated power at the expense of Saakashvili's political bloc. Numerous Saakashvili loyalists in key sectors such as the judiciary, industry and security have been replaced with those loyal to Ivanishvili. Many important figures within the United National Movement, including Saakashvili's former prime minister, Vano Merabishvili, have been detained and could face imprisonment. The upcoming presidential election, for which Saakashvili is ineligible to run, could further damage Saakashvili, who himself could face detention on corruption charges. Not only are Saakashvili and his party polling at historical lows, but a constitutional change that would go into force concurrently with elections would give greater powers to the parliament at the expense of the presidency -- thus ensuring that Ivanishvili and his movement will be in a strong position regardless of the outcome.
In terms of Georgia's foreign policy, this has significant implications. Ivanishvili campaigned on a platform of strengthening ties with Russia, particularly in the economic sphere. Already significant changes have been made, with Georgia resuming trade of key goods with Russia and discussions of increased cooperation in other areas, such as energy and security, showing greater potential. Depending on how the internal political situation plays out during and after elections, it is possible that Georgia could be undergoing another broader strategic re-orientation, this time in favor of Russia.
However, several obstacles stand in the way of a complete foreign policy realignment. First, Ivanishvili has maintained, at least nominally, that membership in the European Union and NATO remain Georgia's top foreign policy priorities. Furthermore, Russia's military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain a fundamental deterrent toward any comprehensive normalization of ties between Tbilisi and Moscow. But increasingly it appears as though the fervently pro-Western and anti-Russian orientation of Georgia under Saakashvili, already weakened over the past year, will come to an end after the presidential election.
The emergence of Ivanishvili and his Georgian Dream movement represents the latest oscillation in Georgia's foreign policy orientation. But these fluctuations have always been constrained by geography; the larger and stronger powers that surround Georgia -- not the Georgian government -- ultimately shape the country's external and internal policies. Even if such decisions are made subjectively in Tbilisi, history has shown that these will eventually be shaped and corrected by the vast impersonal forces of geopolitics.
Read more: Georgia: A Historical Battleground Between East and West | Stratfor
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Not the first time I've seen this reported on a minor website of unknown reliability. If we had trustworthy media, we could ignore this , , ,
http://tatoott1009.com/2013/07/19/they-are-keeping-everyone-distracted-while-disaster-is-about-to-strike-russia-just-said-they-are-at-full-readiness-for-war-against-who/
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Azerbaijan and Turkey's Evolving Military Ties
Analysis
July 19, 2013 | 0501 Print Text Size
Azerbaijan and Turkey's Evolving Military Ties
Azerbaijani soldiers prepare for a military parade in Baku in 2008. (OSMAN KARIMOV/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
Increasing military ties between Azerbaijan and Turkey will give both countries more flexibility in the strategic but sensitive Caucasus region, though numerous impediments to deeper relations remain in the short to medium term. Following an opening ceremony at the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry's Garaheybat Training Center, Azerbaijan and Turkey launched joint military drills July 16. The exercises, which will run until July 28, will be held in Baku and Nakhchivan and are the largest such drills ever between the two countries.
Azerbaijan and Turkey have cooperated in the military sphere since Baku established independence following the fall of the Soviet Union. The two countries have strengthened military ties in the past few years; they have engaged in more frequent and larger military exercises, and Azerbaijan has increased its weapons purchases from Turkey. But despite the strong and growing cooperation, Russia remains a major security challenge for Azerbaijan both in terms of its dependence on Russian arms exports and because of the conventional military presence of Russia in the region.
Analysis
Azerbaijan is located in the Caucasus region, a transcontinental zone between Europe and Asia. It is surrounded by three major regional powers -- Russia, Turkey and Iran -- which largely shape its foreign policy and orientation. The other two countries in the Caucasus, Georgia and Armenia, also influence Azerbaijani decision making in the security sphere. In particular, Armenia's strong relationship with Russia -- 5,000 Russian troops are stationed in Armenia -- has shaped Azerbaijan's security strategy.
Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a war over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory from 1988 to 1994, during which Armenia seized the territory and several contiguous regions that were formerly part of the Soviet republic of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan's defeat, combined with Russia's subsequent de facto backing of Armenia, forced it to build up its military spending on the back of its growing energy production and exports. It also spurred Baku to look for other guarantors and partners as part of its security strategy. An important country in this regard has been Turkey, with which Azerbaijan shares cultural, linguistic and historical roots and which Baku sees as a significant factor in its security position.
History of Military Cooperation
Azerbaijan's military ties to Turkey trace back to its first years as an independent state. In 1992, the two countries signed an agreement to establish ties in military education. In 1993 amid the war over Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey imposed a full economic embargo on Armenia in support of Azerbaijan and subsequently closed its border with Armenia. In the following years, many broad agreements and protocols were signed between Azerbaijan and Turkey, including a border protocol in 1997 and an agreement on training and assistance for Azerbaijan's State Border Service by Turkey's armed forces in 2003.
Azerbaijan and Turkey
The dynamic shifted in 2009, when Turkey attempted to normalize relations with Armenia and the leadership of the two countries began discussions on reopening the border. This prompted a significant backlash from Azerbaijan, which felt that no such normalization should occur as long as the Nagorno-Karabakh issue remained unresolved. Azerbaijan threatened to raise the price of its oil and natural gas exports to Turkey and reached out to Russia to show Ankara that it had other options. Turkey responded by abandoning the talks with Armenia and tying any normalization between the countries to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.
To reassure Baku of their bilateral relationship, Turkey established a strategic partnership with Azerbaijan in December 2010 that prioritized security cooperation and assistance. The agreement, which consisted of 23 articles and five chapters, guaranteed mutual assistance in the event that either country was subject to a "military attack or aggression." The pact also called for closer cooperation in defense and military-technical policy and joint training between the two states.
Since the strategic partnership was established, there has been a significant increase in cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey in two areas: weapons production and sales and military exercises. In 2011, the countries signed an agreement to jointly produce 107 mm and 122 mm rocket artillery. A year later, Turkey's Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corp. sold more than $600,000 worth of weapons and ammunition to Azerbaijan. More recently, the Turks have delivered several different models of their Otokar Cobra armored vehicles to Azerbaijan, and they are currently training the Azerbaijanis in their use. Several other deals are in the works, including production of BOA thermal weapon sights and Azerbaijan's purchase of Turkish mobile field hospitals. The Turks are also looking to sell their T-155 Firtina self-propelled howitzers to Azerbaijan despite German objections. (Germany makes the power plant for the vehicles, but the Turks purportedly have found a replacement engine.)
Joint military exercises between Azerbaijan and Turkey have also increased in both frequency and scope in recent years. In 2011 and 2012, the two armies conducted both counterterrorism and tactical exercises in Turkey. Also in 2012, Azerbaijani and Turkish special operations forces -- with Georgian participation -- held "Caucasus Eagle" exercises. The latest exercises are the largest such drills between Azerbaijan and Turkey in the past two decades. An infantry division is doing exercises in Baku, and a mechanized infantry division will conduct drills in the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakchivan (the latter of which is also notable due the proximity to Iran). The sides agreed to hold such exercises on an annual basis.
Strategy and the Future
The growing ties between Azerbaijan and Turkey are a counterbalance to the partnership that Russia has with Armenia. In 2010, Armenia approved an extension of the lease of Russia's military base in the country to 2044, and Moscow is providing more modern equipment to Armenia's armed forces. For Baku, better ties with Ankara strengthen its confidence in a tense region, and weapons purchases enable Azerbaijan to build up its military in the hope of one day re-engaging Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. From the Turks' perspective, Azerbaijan is a lucrative market for their weapons industry and provides a foothold in the Caucasus region, where Russia has a very strong position.
However, there are significant limits on the effectiveness of Azerbaijan's security relationship with Turkey. Despite the growing ties between the two in terms of weapons transfers and production, there is a significant amount of Soviet-era equipment in use in the Azerbaijani military. The majority of the Azerbaijani armed forces' hardware is still from Russia or former Soviet states, as is the infrastructure used to maintain this hardware. Azerbaijan has sought cooperation with Turkey to improve on its current weapons systems and revamp its equipment, but a complete renovation is expensive and takes time. Azerbaijan has also looked to other countries, such as Israel, to improve and modernize its weapons systems.
But the Azerbaijani military has and will continue to maintain a relationship with the Russian armed forces out of necessity. Indeed, it recently signed a $1 billion weapons package deal with Moscow that includes main battle tanks, self-propelled artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems.
While Azerbaijan will not be able to eschew Russia completely in favor of Turkey, there does appear to be a notable evolution underway in Baku and Ankara's cooperation in military matters. Azerbaijan has been gradually diversifying its weapons systems, and Turkey serves as an important component of that. In the meantime, the ongoing military exercises show a larger commitment in the joint training of ground forces between the two countries. Given that this is the first year for such exercises, it will be important to track their level of sophistication in the future.
Russia remains the dominant military force in the Caucasus, and that is not likely to change in the near to medium term. However, in recent years Azerbaijan has been building up the ability to project force, and its growing cooperation with Turkey shows that their partnership is becoming more substantial. This lays the groundwork for potential security shifts in the region, and Russia and Armenia will no doubt be watching these developments closely and planning accordingly.
Read more: Azerbaijan and Turkey's Evolving Military Ties | Stratfor
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5 Years Later, Reflecting on the Russia-Georgia War
Geopolitical Diary
Thursday, August 8, 2013 - 16:58 Text Size Print
Five years ago Thursday, Russian tanks crossed the Roki Tunnel from the Russian republic of North Ossetia into South Ossetia in Georgian territory. In the course of the full-scale war that lasted the next five days, Russia destroyed much of Georgia's military and dismantled its vital supply lines and transport infrastructure. Moscow also established a military presence in the breakaway territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and recognized the territories as independent states. The Russian army did not venture farther into Georgia proper but stopped within striking distance -- a little more than 45 kilometers (about 30 miles) away -- of Tbilisi, the Georgian capital.
Today, the Russian military remains in the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Only a handful of countries in Latin America and Oceania have joined Russia in recognizing the republics as independent states; not even Moscow's closest allies in the former Soviet space have granted their recognition. But that is effectively irrelevant. The message that Russia intended to send, that Western support for Georgia was hollow and that Russia was back as a regional power, was received and reverberates to this day.
The root of the Georgian conflict can be found not in South Ossetia but rather in Europe. The expansion of the European Union and NATO into Eastern and Central Europe beginning in the late 1990s and going well into the 2000s entrenched Western influence in the former Soviet periphery while undermining the influence of Moscow. It was the West's recognition of Kosovo's independence from Serbia, a traditional ally of Russia, in early 2008 that set the process of war in motion. Despite Moscow's opposition to Kosovar independence, much of the West, including France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, proceeded with the recognition anyway. Only a few months later, at a NATO summit in Bucharest, the military bloc promised Georgia and fellow former Soviet state Ukraine that they would eventually become members.
These actions came at a time when many in the West still saw Russia as the weak and chaotic state of the 1990s that was barely held together by former Russian President Boris Yeltsin. But Russian President Vladimir Putin was not Boris Yeltsin. By 2008, Putin had consolidated much of the bureaucracy and oligarchs under his control, and the Russian economy had been buoyed by years of high energy prices. In Putin's view, the West had repeatedly taken actions that undermined Russia's national interests, and now was the time to react.
Georgia was the perfect setting for Russia's response. Under the leadership of President Mikhail Saakashvili, Georgia had become firmly oriented toward the West, and although it sought accession into the European Union and NATO, it had not yet gained admission and was not automatically subject to Article 5, NATO's collective defense treaty. In addition, because of its small size and strategic location immediately adjacent to Russia's North Caucasus region and far from mainland Europe, Georgia served as an excellent platform for Russia to project military power. A war with Georgia provided Russia with three opportunities: to degrade Georgia's military capabilities, to demonstrate that its own military was still very effective and, most important, to make the West appear weak in its commitment to its partners in the Russian periphery. In August 2008, Russia accomplished all three.
The consequences of the war extended well beyond Georgia. NATO, not Russia, was now seen by many as impotent and indecisive, while Moscow was looked at as a strong and effectual military power. Regardless of the realities of their actual capabilities, this was the popular perception, especially in the former Soviet states; the war changed their thinking about relations with Russia.
In the years since the war, this perception has been a major factor in the behavior of the states in the former Soviet periphery. Ukraine has officially dropped its NATO ambitions and outlawed membership in any military bloc. Countries that were already aligned with Russia, such as Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, have only increased their security ties with Moscow. Even Georgia has changed; the emergence of Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, who defeated Saakashvili's camp in the 2012 parliamentary elections, has led the country to modify its stance toward Russia. Ivanishvili has sought to build closer economic ties with the Russians, and although he has officially maintained his commitment to integration with the West, the national attitude in Georgia has taken on a more pragmatic view of Russia.
The consequences of the five-day war are very visible even five years later. Russia will not return to superpower status on par with the United States as it was during the Soviet era. But even its staunchest opponents cannot deny its role as a substantial, though flawed, regional power, particularly at a time when the European Union is going through a deep political and economic crisis and alignment with the West is no longer as attractive as it was a decade ago. In this way, the Russo-Georgian war is more than just an event to reflect upon; it is a source of guidance for the countries of the region when it comes to planning ways of dealing with Moscow in the future.
Read more: 5 Years Later, Reflecting on the Russia-Georgia War | Stratfor
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Meet the Syrian Rebel Commander Assad, Russia and the U.S. All Fear
Tarkhan Batirashvili, Ethnic Chechen, Leads Group Deeply at Odds with Western-Backed Rebels in Syria
By Alan Cullison
Nov. 19, 2013 11:34 p.m. ET
For months, Syrian government forces hunkered down at a remote air base north of Aleppo, deftly fending off rebel assaults—until one morning a war machine rumbled out of the countryside, announcing that the Chechens had arrived.
The vehicle was notable for its primal scariness: Rebels had welded dozens of oil-drilling pipes to the sides of the armored personnel carrier, and packed it with four tons of high explosives, according to videos released online by the rebels.
It was piloted by a suicide driver, who detonated the vehicle at the base, sending a ground-shaking black cloud into the sky in an attack that analysts said finally cleared the way for rebels to storm the airfield.
Chechens Get Involved in Syria
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Some ethnic Chechens and Russian-speaking Islamists have for the first time joined a call to international jihad in large numbers, giving a new potency to rebels seeking to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Thomas Dworzak/Magnum Photos for The Wall Street Journal
The final capture of the airport in August immediately boosted the prestige of its unruly mastermind Tarkhan Batirashvili, according to analysts—an ethnic Chechen whose warring skills, learned in the U.S.-funded Georgian army, are now being put to use by a group deeply at odds with more mainstream Western-backed rebels.
The jihadi commander has recently emerged from obscurity to be the northern commander in Syria of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), an al Qaeda-connected coalition whose thousands of Arab and foreign fighters have overrun key Syrian military bases, staged public executions and muscled aside American-backed moderate rebel groups trying to topple President Bashar al-Assad.
Conversations with Mr. Batirashvili's relatives and two of his former army commanders reveal a complex portrait of a modern jihadist from the former Soviet Union, motivated by misfortune as much as newly found religious zeal.
Born to a Christian father and Muslim mother, he served in an intelligence unit of the Georgian army before opportunities dried up at home and he left for holy war, friends and former colleagues said.
Efforts to reach Mr. Batirashvili were unsuccessful. And a website, fisyria.com, which boasts of his accomplishments, didn't respond to requests for comment.
The arrival of Mr. Batirashvili, known by his Arab nom de guerre Emir Umar al-Shishani, comes as other ethnic Chechens and Russian-speaking Islamists have for the first time responded in large numbers to the call of an international jihad in Syria.
Enlarge Image
Tarkhan Batirashvili, in 2008 as a soldier in Georgia and earlier this year as a rebel commander in Syria. Right: fisyria.com
Fighting in tightknit groups, the men have awed and repelled fellow jihadists with their military prowess and brutality, talking to one another in Russian or Chechen and to outsiders in the formal Arabic of the Quran, according to accounts of fellow rebels. Some have carved out fiefdoms inside Syria, enraging locals by collecting taxes and imposing Islamic Shariah law.
Even by the gruesome standards of the war in Syria, their rise has become notable for its unusual violence. One rebel from Russia's Dagestan, for instance, was chased out of the country after he appeared in an online video where he beheaded three locals for supporting the Syrian government, according to analysts with ties to the rebel groups. And just last week, Mr. Batirashvili's group apologized for mistakenly beheading a wounded soldier who actually turned out to be an allied rebel commander.
The prominence of the rebels on the battlefield has turned the conflict into a geopolitical struggle between the U.S. and Russia, which has long accused the West of ignoring the danger of Islamists in the troubled Chechen region, where an insurgency has been active for decades.
While people close to Mr. Batirashvili say he views the war as a chance to strike a blow against one of the Kremlin's allies, he has also talked of his hatred of America. In a recent interview with a jihadi website, he described Americans as "the enemies of Allah and the enemies of Islam."
Until recently, Mr. Batirashvili had few outward religious convictions, former colleagues said. But like many Chechens he wanted to fight the Kremlin wherever he had the chance. "He had that kind of hatred for them," said Malkhaz Topuria, a former commander who has watched his onetime subordinate's stardom grow in videos posted on the Internet. "It was in his genes."
Moscow has mostly crushed its Islamist rebellion in the North Caucasus region, but a top Kremlin official warned last month of the new "terrorist international" in Syria, which could eventually return its focus on the mother country.
U.S. intelligence estimates that as many as 17,000 foreigners are fighting on the side of rebels in Syria. About half fight for the ISIS; of those, officials in Russia say, at least a thousand are from the country's North Caucasus and from Europe, where many Chechens have sought asylum since the collapse of the Soviet Union and hostilities in Chechnya in the 1990s.
While the Russian-speaking Islamists represent a fraction of the total rebels, many have risen to positions of power because of their history of fighting a standing army in Russia, according to analysts.
Kremlin officials say that these fighters are picking up more military experience, as well as contacts to Arab financiers who bankrolled uprisings elsewhere in the Middle East and Africa.
"One day, it's highly likely many of these fighters will return to their home republics in the Caucasus, which will clearly generate a heightened security threat to that region," said Charles Lister, analyst at IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre.
The Chechen region has come under scrutiny lately in the U.S. in the wake of this year's Boston Marathon bombing. The alleged bomber on trial, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, has roots in Chechnya and posted videos online recruiting fighters to Syria.
Mr. Batirashvili's ability to work with foreign jihadis appears to have been vital to his rise within the ISIS, which has become the main umbrella group for foreign fighters in Syria, including Saudis, Kuwaitis, Egyptians and even Chinese, according to analysts.
The ISIS, originally founded as an umbrella organization for Iraqi jihadists, views the war in Syria as a means not only to overthrow the Assad regime but a historic battleground for a larger holy war and the establishment of a larger Islamic state, Mr. Batirashvili said in an interview recently with a jihadist website.
Some of the men respond to appeals on YouTube under a generic call to fight for an Islamic state under Shariah law, according to analysts. Most fly into Turkey and then slip over the porous border into Syria, according to interviews with fellow Islamists.
Mr. Batirashvili hailed from outside Russia's borders, but hostility to Kremlin rule pulsed around him. His parents were ethnic Chechens from Georgia's Pankisi Gorge, a rugged valley that borders Chechnya that has been a traditional safe haven for fighters opposing Russia.
Mr. Batirashvili got his first exposure to the rebel spirit as a shepherd boy, living in a brick hut with no plumbing in the village of Birkiani, his father Temuri said. There, Mr. Batirashvili helped Chechen rebels cross secretly into Russia and sometimes he joined the fighters on missions against Russian-backed troops, his father said.
After high school, he joined the Georgian army and distinguished himself as master of various weaponry and maps, said Mr. Topuria, his former commander, who recruited him into a special reconnaissance group.
Russia has long accused the U.S. of irresponsibly funding the Georgian army, which it says in turn supports Islamists—a charge the Georgians and the U.S. deny.
Mr. Batirashvili was easygoing and popular with fellow soldiers and steered clear of discussing religion, though he did acknowledge his Muslim family, Mr. Topuria said.
Mr. Batirashvili rose fast in the army, being promoted to sergeant in a new intelligence unit, where his monthly salary of about $700 was more than he had ever made in his life, his father and former commanders said.
A representative for the Georgian army confirmed only the basic facts of his service in the army, declining to comment on any other activities.
When Georgian forces were ordered to attack the Russian-backed breakaway province of South Ossetia in 2008, Mr. Batirashvili was near the front line, spying on Russian tank columns and relaying their coordinates to Georgian artillery units, a former commander said. The war lasted five days.
Two years later Mr. Batirashvili's life began to unravel. He was diagnosed with tuberculosis in 2010 and confined to a military hospital for several months. When he emerged, he was deemed unfit for the military and discharged, the ministry said.
Returning home, Mr. Batirashvili was "very disillusioned," his father said. The local police force wouldn't hire him, and his mother died after having fought cancer for years.
"He was very nervous, and worried about money," a former Georgian army commander said. He said Mr. Batirashvili also appeared to be helping Islamist rebels inside Russia, and asked the former commander for help finding some military-grade maps of Chechnya.
In September 2010, Mr. Batirashvili was arrested for illegally harboring weapons, the defense ministry said, and sentenced to three years in prison.
The ministry refused to provide further details about the case.
Mr. Batirashvili's cousin Jabrail said he was released from jail after about 16 months in early 2012 and immediately left the country. "He had plenty of time to sit and think in jail about how he had been treated," his cousin said. "He served in the army in the most dangerous places, and then when he got sick they took his job and then they put him in prison."
In a recent interview with the jihadi website, Mr. Batirashvili said that prison transformed him. "I promised God that if I come out of prison alive, I'll go fight jihad for the sake of God," he said.
Though Mr. Batirashvili announced that he was headed for Istanbul, his father said it was clear he was planning to offer his services to Islamists. Members of the Chechen diaspora in the Turkish capital were ready to recruit him to lead fighters inside Syria, and an older brother had gone there months before, his father said.
"We argued about [his decision] bitterly," he said. "But he was a man with no job, no prospects. So he took the wrong path."
His former army commanders also lost contact with him, and only received word of his whereabouts this spring when Georgia's army intelligence service contacted them.
The army, they said, wanted help identifying a jihadi leader who had appeared lately in videos from Syria. The man spoke Russian with a Georgian accent, they said.
When he opened the first video, "I recognized him immediately," one of his commanders said. Mr. Batirashvili had traded in his Georgian army fatigues for a traditional South Asian shalwar kameez shirt and had grown a red beard that reached down to his chest.
But his speech, barely above a mumble, and his habit of staring at the ground as he talked were the same, he said.
In videos, Mr. Batirashvili was first identified as commander of a group calling itself Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar, or "Army of Emigrants and Helpers." He called for donations, claiming jihadists finally had a chance to establish an Islamic state in the Middle East.
This summer, videos identified him as a newly named commander of the ISIS. His speeches, delivered in Russian, are distributed over a website, www.fisyria.com, which brags of his group's victories and frequently appeals for donations.
In a recent report, International Crisis Group said that Mr. Batirashvili's army has imposed extremist rule of law in areas he controls, shooting into peaceful demonstrations and detaining activists for offenses that include nonviolent dissent and smoking cigarettes during Ramadan.
Mr. Batirashvili's father said he hasn't heard from his son for almost two years and gets news of him mostly through his older brother, who has been fighting with him in Syria. He said he doubts his son's beard was grown out of any religious conviction.
"He just switched armies, and now he's wearing a different hat," he said.
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http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2014/02/05/the_circassians_and_the_olympics_did_the_age_of_genocide_begin_in_sochi.html
From the article:
As Richmond writes, the Treaty of Paris, which ended the war, had “declared Circassia a part of Russia but did not accord the Circassians the same rights as Russian Subjects. The Russians could deal with them as they wished, and St. Peterburg chose to treat them as an enemy population occupying Russian land.” The Circassians were, in effect, stateless people.
After the war ended, Alexander decided that rather than attempting to pacify the Circassians, they should be forcibly relocated to Turkey. And in 1859 the military began a campaign of destroying Circassian villages and massacring their inhabitants to drive them to the coast.
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There is much here in the attitude with which I disagree, but it does seek to address something I find really important-- as several of my posts here over the last number of years suport.
http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2012/10/the-wars-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-are-not-just-about-oil-theyre-also-about-gas.html
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Note the discussion of Central Asian gas seeking market alternatives to Russia-- a point I have made many times
Borderlands: The View from Azerbaijan
Geopolitical Weekly
Monday, May 12, 2014 - 03:00 Print Text Size
Stratfor
By George Friedman
I arrive in Azerbaijan as the country celebrates Victory Day, the day successor states of the former Soviet Union celebrate the defeat of Germany in World War II. No one knows how many Soviet citizens died in that war -- perhaps 22 million. The number is staggering and represents both the incompetence and magnificence of Russia, which led the Soviets in war. Any understanding of Russia that speaks of one without the other is flawed.
As I write, fireworks are going off over the Caspian Sea. The pyrotechnics are long and elaborate, sounding like an artillery barrage. They are a reminder that Baku was perhaps the most important place in the Nazi-Soviet war. It produced almost all of the Soviet Union's petroleum. The Germans were desperate for it and wanted to deny it to Moscow. Germany's strategy after 1942, including the infamous battle of Stalingrad, turned on Baku's oil. In the end, the Germans threw an army against the high Caucasus guarding Baku. In response, an army raised in the Caucasus fought and defeated them. The Soviets won the war. They wouldn't have if the Germans had reached Baku. It is symbolic, at least to me, that these celebrations blend into the anniversary of the birth of Heydar Aliyev, the late president of Azerbaijan who endured the war and later forged the post-Soviet identity of his country. He would have been 91 on May 10.
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Baku is strategic again today, partly because of oil. I've started the journey here partly by convenience and partly because Azerbaijan is key to any counter-Russian strategy that might emerge. My purpose on this trip is to get a sense of the degree to which individual European states feel threatened by Russia, and if they do, the level of effort and risk they are prepared to endure. For Europe does not exist as anything more than a geographic expression; it is the fears and efforts of the individual nation-states constituting it that will determine the course of this affair. Each nation is different, and each makes its own calculus of interest. My interest is to understand their thinking, not only about Russia but also about the European Union, the United States and ultimately themselves. Each is unique; it isn't possible to make a general statement about them.
Some question whether the Caucasus region and neighboring Turkey are geographically part of Europe. There are many academic ways to approach this question. My approach, however, is less sophisticated. Modern European history cannot be understood without understanding the Ottoman Empire and the fact that it conquered much of the southeastern part of the European peninsula. Russia conquered the three Caucasian states -- Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan -- and many of their institutions are Russian, hence European. If an organic European expression does exist, it can be argued to be Eurovision, the pan-continental music competition. The Azerbaijanis won it in 2011, which should settle any debate on their "Europeanness."
But more important, a strategy to block Russia is hard to imagine without including its southern flank. There is much talk of sanctions on Russia. But sanctions can be countered and always ignore a key truth: Russia has always been economically dysfunctional. It has created great empires and defeated Napoleon and Hitler in spite of that. Undermining Russia's economy may be possible, but that does not always undermine Russia's military power. That Soviet military power outlived the economically driven collapse of the Soviet Union confirms this point. And the issue at the moment is military.
The solution found for dealing with the Soviet Union during the Cold War was containment. The architect of this strategy was diplomat George Kennan, whose realist approach to geopolitics may have lost some adherents but not its relevance. A cordon sanitaire was constructed around the Soviet Union through a system of alliances. In the end, the Soviets were unable to expand and choked on their own inefficiency. There is a strange view abroad that the 21st century is dramatically different from all prior centuries and such thinking is obsolete. I have no idea why this should be so. The 21st century is simply another century, and there has been no transcendence of history. Containment was a core strategy and it seems likely that it will be adopted again -- if countries like Azerbaijan are prepared to participate.
To understand Azerbaijan you must begin with two issues: oil and a unique approach to Islam. At the beginning of the 20th century, over half the world's oil production originated near Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan. Hence Hitler's strategy after 1942. Today, Azerbaijani energy production is massive, but it cannot substitute for Russia's production. Russian energy production, meanwhile, defines part of the strategic equation. Many European countries depend substantially on Russian energy, particularly natural gas. They have few alternatives. There is talk of U.S. energy being shipped to Europe, but building the infrastructure for that (even if there are supplies) will take many years before it can reduce Europe's dependence on Russia.
Withholding energy would be part of any Russian counter to Western pressure, even if Russia were to suffer itself. Any strategy against Russia must address the energy issue, begin with Azerbaijan, and be about more than production. Azerbaijan is not a major producer of gas compared to oil. On the other side of the Caspian Sea, however, Turkmenistan is. Its resources, coupled with Azerbaijan's, would provide a significant alternative to Russian energy. Turkmenistan has an interest in not selling through Russia and would be interested in a Trans-Caspian pipeline. That pipeline would have to pass through Azerbaijan, connecting onward to infrastructure in Turkey. Assuming Moscow had no effective counters, this would begin to provide a serious alternative to Russian energy and decrease Moscow's leverage. But this would all depend on Baku's willingness and ability to resist pressure from every direction.
Azerbaijan lies between Russia and Iran. Russia is the traditional occupier of Azerbaijan and its return is what Baku fears the most. Iran is partly an Azeri country. Nearly a quarter of its citizens, including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, are Azeri. But while both Azerbaijan and Iran are predominantly Shiite, Azerbaijan is a militantly secular state. Partly due to the Soviet experience and partly because of the unique evolution of Azeri identity since the 19th century, Azerbaijan separates the private practice of Islam from public life. I recall once attending a Jewish Passover feast in Baku that was presided over by an Orthodox rabbi, with security provided by the state. To be fair, Iran has a Jewish minority that has its own lawmaker in parliament. But any tolerance in Iran flows from theocratic dogma, whereas in Azerbaijan it is rooted in a constitution that is more explicitly secular than any in the European Union, save that of France.
This is just one obvious wedge between Azerbaijan and Iran, and Tehran has made efforts to influence the Azeri population. For the moment, relations are somewhat better but there is an insoluble tension that derives from geopolitical reality and the fact that any attack on Iran could come from Azerbaijan. Furthering this wedge are the close relations between Azerbaijan and Israel. The United States currently blocks most weapons sales to Azerbaijan. Israel -- with U.S. approval -- sells the needed weapons. This gives us a sense of the complexity of the relationship, recalling that complexity undermines alliances.
The complexity of alliances also defines Russia's reality. It occupies the high Caucasus overlooking the plains of Azerbaijan. Armenia is a Russian ally, bound by an agreement that permits Russian bases through 2044. Yerevan also plans to join the Moscow-led Customs Union, and Russian firms own a large swath of the Armenian economy. Armenia feels isolated. It remains hostile to Turkey for Ankara's unwillingness to acknowledge events of a century ago as genocide. Armenia also fought a war with Azerbaijan in the 1990s, shortly after independence, for a region called Nagorno-Karabakh that had been part of Azerbaijan -- a region that it lost in the war and wants back. Armenia, caught between Turkey and an increasingly powerful Azerbaijan, regards Russia as a guarantor of its national security.
For Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh remains a critical issue. Azerbaijan holds that U.N. resolutions have made it clear that Armenia's attack constituted a violation of international law, and a diplomatic process set up in Minsk to resolve the crisis has proven ineffective. Azerbaijan operates on two tracks on this issue. It pursues national development, as can be seen in Baku, a city that reflects the oil wealth of the country. It will not endanger that development, nor will it forget about Nagorno-Karabakh. At some point, any nation aligning itself with Azerbaijan will need to take a stand on this frozen conflict, and that is a high price for most.
Which leads me to an interesting symmetry of incomprehension between the United States and Azerbaijan. The United States does not want to sell weapons directly to Azerbaijan because of what it regards as violations of human rights by the Azerbaijani government. The Americans find it incomprehensible that Baku, facing Russia and Iran and needing the United States, cannot satisfy American sensibilities by avoiding repression -- a change that would not threaten the regime. Azerbaijan's answer is that it is precisely the threats it faces from Iran and Russia that require Baku to maintain a security state. Both countries send operatives into Azerbaijan to destabilize it. What the Americans consider dissidents, Azerbaijan sees as agents of foreign powers. Washington disputes this and continually offends Baku with its pronouncements. The Azerbaijanis, meanwhile, continually offend the Americans.
This is similar to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Most Americans have never heard of it and don't care who owns it. For the Azerbaijanis, this is an issue of fundamental historical importance. They cannot understand how, after assisting the United States in Afghanistan, risking close ties with Israel, maintaining a secular Islamic state and more, the United States not only cannot help Baku with Nagorno-Karabakh but also insists on criticizing Azerbaijan.
The question on human rights revolves around the interpretation of who is being arrested and for what reason. For a long time this was an issue that didn't need to be settled. But after the Ukrainian crisis, U.S.-Azerbaijani relations became critical. It is not just energy; rather, in the event of the creation of a containment alliance, Azerbaijan is the southeastern anchor of the line on the Caspian Sea. In addition, since Georgia is absolutely essential as a route for pipelines, given Armenia's alliance with Russia, Azerbaijan's support for Georgian independence is essential. Azerbaijan is the cornerstone for any U.S.-sponsored Caucasus strategy, should it develop.
I do not want to get into the question of either Nagorno-Karabakh or human rights in Azerbaijan. It is, for me, a fruitless issue arising from the deep historical and cultural imperatives of each. But I must take exception to one principle that the U.S. State Department has: an unwillingness to do comparative analysis. In other words, the State Department condemns all violations equally, whether by nations hostile to the United States or friendly to it, whether by countries with wholesale violations or those with more limited violations. When the State Department does pull punches, there is a whiff of bias, as with Georgia and Armenia, which -- while occasionally scolded -- absorb less criticism than Azerbaijan, despite each country's own imperfect record.
Even assuming the validity of State Department criticism, no one argues that Azerbaijani repression rises anywhere near the horrors of Joseph Stalin. I use Stalin as an example because Franklin Roosevelt allied the United States with Stalin to defeat Hitler and didn't find it necessary to regularly condemn Stalin while the Soviet Union was carrying the burden of fighting the war, thereby protecting American interests. That same geopolitical realism animated Kennan and ultimately created the alliance architecture that served the United States throughout the Cold War. Is it necessary to offend someone who will not change his behavior and whom you need for your strategy? The State Department of an earlier era would say no.
It was interesting to attend a celebration of U.S.-Azerbaijani relations in Washington the week before I came to Baku. In the past, these events were subdued. This one was different, because many members of Congress attended. Two guests were particularly significant. One was Charles Schumer of New York, who declared the United States and Azerbaijan to be great democracies. The second was Nancy Pelosi, long a loyalist to Armenian interests. She didn't say much but chose to show up. It is clear that the Ukrainian crisis triggered this turnout. It is clear that Azerbaijan's importance is actually obvious to some in Congress, and it is also clear that it signals tension over the policy of criticizing human rights records without comparing them to those of other countries and of ignoring the criticized country's importance to American strategy.
This is not just about Azerbaijan. The United States will need to work with Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary -- all of whom have been found wanting by the State Department in some ways. This criticism does not -- and will not -- produce change. Endless repetition of the same is the height of ineffectiveness. It will instead make any strategy the United States wants to construct in Europe ineffective. In the end, I would argue that a comparison between Russia and these other countries matters. Perfect friends are hard to find. Refusing to sell weapons to someone you need is not a good way to create an alliance.
In the past, it seemed that such an alliance was merely Cold War nostalgia by people who did not realize and appreciate that we had reached an age too wise to think of war and geopolitics. But the events in Ukraine raise the possibility that those unreconstructed in their cynicism toward the human condition may well have been right. Alliances may in fact be needed. In that case, Roosevelt's attitude toward Stalin is instructive.
Read more: Borderlands: The View from Azerbaijan | Stratfor
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The Effects of the Ukraine Crisis Reach the Caucasus
Analysis
June 24, 2014 | 0400 Print Text Size
The Effects of the Ukraine Crisis Reach the Caucasus
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at a news conference in Moscow on May 26. (VASILY MAXIMOV/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
The standoff between Russia and the West over the former Soviet periphery is having ripple effects throughout the region, and the Caucasus is a prime area for potential change. In its efforts to reduce its dependence on Russian energy, Europe is focused on countries in the region, particularly on Azerbaijan. In response, Russia has stepped up its activity in the Caucasus and is particularly focused on Nagorno-Karabakh, a region that Armenia and Azerbaijan dispute. It is not yet clear that a major change is in the making, but Russia's flurry of diplomatic activity regarding the region suggests that anything is possible.
Analysis
Located between Europe and Asia, the Caucasus region is characterized by a web of complex relationships. First, there is Georgia, which is oriented toward the West and at odds with Russia. The government in Tbilisi aspires to join the European Union and NATO, to the point, in fact, that it fought a war with Russia in 2008 over its NATO ambitions. Then there is Armenia, a staunchly pro-Russian state that has eschewed any meaningful interaction with the West. Driving Armenia's closeness with Russia is its adversarial relationship with Azerbaijan, the third country in the Caucasus.
Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a war over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh in the late Soviet and early post-Soviet period, and frictions remain to this day. Its relationship with Armenia notwithstanding, Azerbaijan is neither overwhelmingly pro-Russian nor pro-Western. Rather, Baku has used its extensive energy resources to balance between both sides while at the same time building up its military to potentially re-engage Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Caucuses and Nagorno-Karabakh
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Adding to these complexities in the Caucasus is the position of other regional powers. Turkey has a strong relationship with Azerbaijan and is a crucial part of the Southern Corridor energy route, through which Baku exports its energy supplies to Europe. Turkish ties with Armenia are not so strong, however, because of Turkey's support for Azerbaijan and the mass killings of Armenians at the end of the Ottoman period. Iran has a solid relationship with Armenia but is suspicious of Azerbaijan; Baku has close security ties with Israel, and northern Iran boasts a large Azeri minority. Finally, the United States has influence in all the Caucasus countries but has not shown a serious level of commitment to any of them.
Impermanent Relationships
These relationships are impermanent, of course. Ties are constantly shifting, and as they reset they affect the entire region, sometimes in unexpected ways. This is particularly true amid the confrontation between Russia and the West.
The standoff has centered on Ukraine but already reverberates elsewhere. Indeed, Georgia is undergoing the same process of EU integration that set off the uprising in Ukraine, and Tbilisi will sign the same EU association and free trade agreements that Ukraine and neighboring Moldova are set to formally conclude with the bloc at a summit on June 27. In response, Russia has become more assertive not only in Ukraine -- where it annexed Crimea and has tacitly supported separatists -- but also in the Caucasus. Georgia's move toward EU integration has prompted Russia to more seriously promote its own integration bloc, the Eurasian Economic Union. Armenia will join the Russian-led grouping at the beginning of 2015. Russia has also beefed up its security presence in Armenia and Georgia (specifically in the breakaway Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia), a worrying sign for Azerbaijan.
Russia is not alone in becoming more active in the region. As a way to counter Russia's influence and lessen their own energy dependence on Russia, the Europeans have increasingly looked to the Caucasus region as an alternative energy provider. Key in this regard is Azerbaijan, which could serve as an exporter and transit state for significant amounts of natural gas from its own fields and potentially from those in Turkmenistan, Iran and even Iraq. This development has bolstered the position of Baku, which is always looking for opportunities to diversify its partnerships. At the same time, however, the increased attention from Europe is a serious challenge to Russia's position as Europe's energy supplier. Add to this a renewed U.S. interest in the Caucasus, and in Azerbaijan specifically, and this has the potential to rework the power structure of the entire region.
Sensing the changes underway, Russia has altered its own strategy. For example, it is engaging Baku on the energy front, resuming imports of natural gas from Azerbaijan and signing several cooperation deals with Azerbaijani state energy firm SOCAR. Russian diplomats have also become more active in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed the matter June 23 with his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev. On the same day, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with his Armenian counterpart, Edward Nalbandian, and promised that Moscow would do its best to find a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Russia is key to any peaceful settlement of the issue because of its strong political relationship with Armenia and its military presence there. But the Russian government also knows that Azerbaijan is a pivot in the Caucasus and must at least be kept neutral. Greater U.S. engagement with Azerbaijan gives Baku substantial leverage.
Though it is notable that Russia is simultaneously engaging Armenia and Azerbaijan on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, a major shift is not necessarily imminent. There has been a lot of push and pull over the disputed region over the past two decades, with little to show for it. But the standoff between Russia and the West has caused all the players in the region to review their position on all major issues, including Nagorno-Karabakh. Whether that leads to a change and what that change actually would look like remains unclear, but the feverish diplomatic activity between Russia and the other states in the region suggest that all options are on the table.
Read more: The Effects of the Ukraine Crisis Reach the Caucasus | Stratfor
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NYT: Russia’s Next Land Grab
In the context of Putin running Russia, this seems quite plausible to me:
Russia’s Next Land Grab
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/10/opinion/russias-next-land-grab.html?_r=1
WASHINGTON — UKRAINE isn’t the only place where Russia is stirring up trouble. Since the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, Moscow has routinely supported secessionists in bordering states, to coerce those states into accepting its dictates. Its latest such effort is unfolding in the South Caucasus.
In recent weeks, Moscow seems to have been aggravating a longstanding conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan while playing peacemaking overlord to both. In the first week of August, as many as 40 Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers were reported killed in heavy fighting near their border, just before a summit meeting convened by Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin.
The South Caucasus may seem remote, but the region borders Russia, Iran and Turkey, and commands a vital pipeline route for oil and natural gas to flow from Central Asia to Europe without passing through Russia. Western officials cannot afford to let another part of the region be digested by Moscow — as they did when Russia separated South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia, just to the north, in a brief war in 2008, and when it seized Crimea from Ukraine this year.
Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is not new. From 1992 to 1994, war raged over which former Soviet republic would control the autonomous area of Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous region with a large Christian Armenian population of about 90,000 within the borders of largely Muslim Azerbaijan. The conflict has often been framed as “ethnic,” but Moscow has fed the antagonisms. That war ended with an Armenian military force, highly integrated with Russia’s military, in charge of the zone. The war had killed 30,000 people and made another million refugees.
Even today, Armenia controls nearly 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory, comprising most of Nagorno-Karabakh and several surrounding regions. Despite a cease-fire agreement since 1994, hostilities occasionally flare, and Russian troops run Armenia’s air defenses. Moscow also controls key elements of Armenia’s economy and infrastructure.
More to the point, Russia has found ways to keep the conflict alive. Three times in the 1990s, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed peace agreements, but Russia found ways to derail Armenia’s participation. (In 1999, for example, a disgruntled journalist suspected of having been aided by Moscow assassinated Armenia’s prime minister, speaker of Parliament and other government officials.)
An unresolved conflict — a “frozen conflict,” Russia calls it — gives Russian forces an excuse to enter the region and coerce both sides. Once Russian forces are in place, neither side can cooperate closely with the West without fear of retribution from Moscow.
The latest violence preceded a summit meeting on Aug. 10 in Sochi, Russia, at which Mr. Putin sought an agreement on deploying additional Russian “peacekeepers” between Armenia and Azerbaijan. On July 31, Armenians began a coordinated, surprise attack in three locations. Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham H. Aliyev, and defense minister were outside their country during the attack and Mr. Aliyev had not yet agreed to attend the summit meeting. But the Armenian president, Serzh A. Sargsyan, had agreed to; it’s unlikely that his military would have initiated such a provocation without coordinating with Russia. (The meeting went on, without concrete results.)
Before the meeting, Moscow had been tightening its grip on the South Caucasus, with Armenia’s tacit support. Last fall, Armenia’s government gave up its ambitions to sign a partnership agreement with the European Union and announced that it would join Moscow’s customs union instead.
Renewed open warfare would give Russia an excuse to send in more troops, under the guise of peacekeeping. Destabilizing the South Caucasus could also derail a huge gas pipeline project, agreed to last December, that might lighten Europe’s dependence on Russian fuel.
But astonishingly, American officials reacted to the current fighting by saying they “welcome” the Russian-sponsored summit meeting. Has Washington learned nothing from Georgia and Ukraine? To prevent escalation of the Caucasus conflict, and deny Mr. Putin the pretext for a new land grab, President Obama should invite the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia to Washington and show that America has not abandoned the South Caucasus. This would encourage the leaders to resist Russia’s pressure. The United Nations General Assembly session, which opens next week, seems like an excellent moment for such a demonstration of support.
Washington should put the blame on Russia and resist any so-called conflict resolution that leads to deployment of additional Russian troops in the region.
Finally, the West needs a strategy to prevent Moscow from grabbing another bordering region. Nagorno-Karabakh, however remote, is the next front in Russia’s efforts to rebuild its lost empire. Letting the South Caucasus lose its sovereignty to Russia would strike a deadly blow to America’s already diminished ability to seek and maintain alliances in the former Soviet Union and beyond.
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Russia-NATO Competition Mounts in Georgia
Analysis
December 8, 2014 | 10:02 GMT Print Text Size
Georgia
Georgian troops parade at a ceremony to mark independence day in Tbilisi on May 26. (VANO SHLAMOV/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
In the ongoing competition between Russia and the West over the former Soviet periphery, the Caucasus nation of Georgia has long been a significant site of tension. With the crisis in Ukraine grinding on, Georgia is pushing to more closely integrate with both NATO and the European Union. For its part, Moscow is working to establish a bigger footprint in the pro-Russia breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These integrations increase the risk of escalation on the security front. A return to full-scale conflict, however, is unlikely. Instead, tensions in the trilateral relationship between Georgia, Russia and NATO will mount and continue to play a key role in influencing the broader standoff between Moscow and the West.
Analysis
In the decades since the fall of the Soviet Union, Georgia has played a pivotal role in the competition for influence between Russia and the West over what was once Soviet territory. In 2003, Georgia underwent a Western-supported transition, known as the Rose Revolution, which brought the pro-European Union and pro-NATO government of Mikhail Saakashvili. In 2008, Russia responded by initiating the Russo-Georgia War. With this, Moscow intended to both counter Georgia's Western orientation and make plain NATO's unwillingness to come to Tbilisi's defense. This strategy worked. The Saakashvili government had failed in its bid to seriously integrate Georgia into NATO and provoked Russia's ire. This failure led, in 2012, to the emergence of Bidzina Ivanishvili's more pragmatic Georgian Dream government, which favored maintaining a cooperative approach toward Moscow.
Collective Defense Blocs USE ME
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This past year has seen yet another swing in the competition over Georgia. The crisis in Ukraine has pulled a number of countries closer to the West — Georgia among them. Along with Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia has signed the key Association and Free Trade Agreement with the European Union. Tbilisi has also continued to pursue NATO membership. At the beginning of the 2000s, NATO was divided and Russia was resurgent. This is no longer the case. Today, the military alliance is more interested in directly engaging with Georgia.
The Dec. 4 visit of NATO Secretary General's Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia James Appathurai to Georgia made these changes apparent. Appathurai met with Georgian leaders, including Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili and Defense Minister Mindia Janelidze, and said that significant progress had been made in implementing the cooperation package, which Georgia endorsed at the most recent NATO summit in September. This package includes plans to engage in joint exercises, embed trainers to assist in building Georgia's defense capacity and to establish a NATO training center. Although Appathurai said training center details are still under discussion, plans could be finalized by the next NATO ministerial meeting in February 2015.
Russia has long viewed Georgia's receiving membership in NATO to be a red line. At the moment, Georgia's moves still fall far short of actual membership; NATO would first have to grant a membership action plan, something that it has not been willing to do. Regardless, the recent developments are a concern for Moscow, particularly when placed the context of the Ukraine crisis.
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan: Similar States, Worlds Apart
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Russia has responded by building its ties to the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which declared independence from Georgia after the 2008 war. Moscow has increased the scope and frequency of military exercises in both territories. It even launched large-scale drills in South Ossetia on Dec. 2 just as Georgian officials were meeting with NATO representatives in Brussels. Russia has also signed a new integration treaty with Abkhazia that expands Moscow's military and security influence in the territory. A similar treaty with South Ossetia is likely to follow in the near future.
These developments have led to increased friction between Moscow and Tbilisi. They have also contributed to Russia's broader standoff with the West — a standoff that shows no signs of abating. Fresh memories of open conflict between Russia and Georgia have given rise to concerns that this might once again come to pass. Russian military forces are stationed less than 50 kilometers (31 miles) from Tbilisi and, with both countries more active when it comes to training and exercises, the risk of escalation does seem quite real.
This perception is deceptive. A number of factors stand in the way of a return to full-scale war. Unlike in Ukraine, Russia already holds a strong position in Georgia's breakaway territories. Moving forces deeper into Georgia would take Russia out of the politically supportive environment of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and risk a bloody and costly war of attrition. A renewed military conflict would only galvanize Western and NATO support for Georgia, compounding the situation for Russia. Although troubling for Moscow, Tbilisi's cooperation with the security bloc has been relatively limited. Many NATO members are still opposed to incorporating the small and distant country. An aggressive Russian military action could potentially change that equation. And, at the moment, Russia does not need to intervene to prevent NATO integrations. Furthermore, Georgia's current government is internally divided, as seen in recent dismissals and resignations of high-ranking Cabinet members. This division could stop the country's NATO integration plans — something that Appathurai noted on his visit.
Still, Tbilisi has continued in its efforts to get closer to the security bloc. In the context of the Ukrainian crisis, NATO appears to be taking these ties more seriously. A number of factors still stand in the way of full integration. Regardless of the outcome, Georgia's ambitions will undoubtedly play a significant role in shaping Russia's planning of its future relationships around the region.
Read more: Russia-NATO Competition Mounts in Georgia | Stratfor
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Second post. Note date.
Russia Uses Competition Over Resources to Increase Leverage in Central Asia
Analysis
August 4, 2014 | 09:12 GMT Print Text Size
Russia Uses Competition Over Resources to Increase Leverage in Central Asia
Summary
The borders of modern-day Central Asian states were drawn by Soviet policymakers under the direction of Josef Stalin in the 1920s and 1930s. Soviet officials sought to prevent each republic from becoming too independent or powerful within the region. As a result, today's Central Asian states depend highly on one another for key natural resources such as water and natural gas.
While Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan enjoy significant energy wealth, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan rely on imports for most of their oil and natural gas. Conversely, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are located at the headwaters of two of the region's major rivers, giving them access to ample water resources as well as the ability to reduce water flows to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, which are situated downstream. The strong interdependencies among Central Asian states have contributed to a rise in tensions since the countries became independent in 1991. The population of Central Asia has nearly doubled since that time, further straining the supply of natural resources. As it did during the Soviet era, the Kremlin is now using the divisions among Central Asian states to prevent a single nation or group of states from dominating the others, something that could threaten Russia's position as the regional power.
Analysis
Since mid-April, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have been embroiled in yet another dispute over natural gas supplies. Tensions between the two countries have also run high over Kyrgyzstan's plans for constructing new hydroelectric dams, which could periodically reduce water flows to Uzbekistan throughout the year. Russia is quietly using the two conflicts to enhance its own position while gaining leverage over Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. At a time when Kyrgyzstan is hesitantly beginning to pursue Customs Union membership and Uzbekistan is in the midst of an internal power struggle over President Islam Karimov's succession plans, the Kremlin is trying to put Russia in a better position to shape the political evolutions of both countries.
Kyrgyzstan's Natural Gas Woes
Northern Kyrgyzstan, home to its capital, Bishkek, is connected to major natural gas pipelines linking the region to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Southern Kyrgyzstan, including its cities Osh and Jalal-Abad, are connected to pipelines running east to west from Uzbekistan. But Kyrgyzstan does not have a pipeline connecting its north to its south, meaning that although northern Kyrgyzstan has been able to diversify its imports, southern Kyrgyzstan has remained highly dependent on natural gas flowing from Uzbekistan. On April 14, four days after Russian state energy company Gazprom officially took over Kyrgyz energy firm KyrgyzGaz, Uzbekistan cut off natural gas deliveries to Kyrgyzstan. The company argued that its contract needs to be renegotiated with Gazprom. As a result, southern Kyrgyzstan, including the city of Osh, has lost its access to natural gas supplies.
Russia Uses Competition Over Resources To Increase Leverage In Central Asia
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Russia is taking advantage of the situation by brokering a solution that enhances its leverage over Kyrgyzstan's leaders. As the new owner of KyrgyzGaz, Gazprom is responsible for negotiating with Uzbekistan. But so far it has not used its influence to compel Uzbekistan to resume natural gas supplies to Kyrgyzstan. The Kremlin means to keep Kyrgyz loyalty and eventually absorb it into its Customs Union. However, Kyrgyzstan's accession has stalled as the country's leaders ask Russia for more financial aid and exemptions from Customs Union rules. Moreover, Kyrgyz Deputy Prime Minister Taiyrbek Sarpashev said July 24 that the country may attain full membership only after several transitional phases, a process that could take five years, starting in 2015.
The natural gas shortage in southern Kyrgyzstan will only put more pressure on Bishkek throughout its accession talks, particularly as natural gas demand increases ahead of the cold winter months. In May, protesters blocked a highway in Osh. Small protests have taken place in Bishkek, and Stratfor sources say southerners are traveling north to protest. If shortages continue into the fall and winter, protests will likely become larger and more disruptive. In the past, mass protests have toppled Kyrgyz governments. To forestall such an outcome, the government will likely make more concessions to Russia in its Customs Union negotiations. And if Bishkek does in fact cater to Moscow's wishes, Russia will probably encourage Uzbekistan to start exporting natural gas to Kyrgyzstan again.
Kyrgyzstan's Electricity Ambitions
In addition to using its influence over natural gas flows, Russia is also trying to use the region's water issues to its advantage. For several decades, Kyrgyz leaders have pushed for the construction of large hydroelectric dam projects, which would enable Kyrgyzstan to become a major exporter of electricity, rather than a country suffering from chronic electricity shortages. The Kyrgyz government is currently working on a feasibility study for exporting electricity to China's Xinjiang province, and it also has aspirations for exporting electricity to Pakistan and Afghanistan.
There are currently at least five major proposed hydroelectric dam projects for the Naryn River. With a gross domestic product of just $7.2 billion, Kyrgyzstan cannot afford to construct the new hydroelectric plants without significant financial assistance from foreign investors. So far, Russia has been the only country to offer large-scale financial assistance and political support for the projects, meaning that they hinge completely on Moscow. As a result, progress has stalled as Russia has failed to deliver much of its pledged funding.
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The largest of the projects is the 1,900-megawatt Kambarata-1 hydroelectric dam project, but it has remained in the planning stage since the Soviet era. A feasibility study conducted by Canadian firm SNC-Lavalin International Inc. found that the estimated cost of the project is $3 billion, a sum Kyrgyzstan cannot afford on its own. Though Moscow pledged $2 billion for the project in 2009 and came to an official agreement regarding the dam during Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Kyrgyzstan in 2012, major funding from Russia has yet to materialize. Moreover, once the dam is constructed, Kyrgyzstan will likely need Russian financial and technical support for the dam's maintenance. Another project, the 350-megawatt Kambarata-2, has seen limited progress. It opened its first section in 2010 with the help of a small Russian loan and currently generates 50 to 70 megawatts hours.
Russia says it will continue to commit money to the Kyrgyz projects. But it has deliberately neglected to honor those commitments because the outstanding water issues give Moscow power over Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, so long as they remain unresolved.
Leverage Over Uzbekistan
Just as the Kremlin wants to pressure Kyrgyzstan to join the Customs Union, it also wants to gain leverage in Uzbekistan. Unlike Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan is the most independent country in Central Asia; it seeks to become a leader in the region after leaving Russia's sphere of influence. In 2012, Uzbekistan suspended its membership in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, demonstrating Uzbekistan's willingness to chart its own course away from Russia-sponsored regional integration projects. Therefore, the Kremlin has prioritized establishing the kind of influence in Uzbekistan that it has in other post-Soviet states
To that end, supporting Kyrgyzstan's hydroelectric projects benefits Russia. Agriculture makes up about 28 percent of the Uzbek economy. Cotton exports remain vital, accounting for roughly 17 percent of export revenue. If Kyrgyzstan completes work on its large hydroelectric projects, its reservoirs will need to be filled completely in order to feed the dams. The timeline for completing this process, which could range from months to years, will determine the impact on the downstream countries. Once the reservoirs are filled, Kyrgyzstan will also be able to have some control over the flow of the river, allowing more water through when more electricity is needed and less when the demand is lower.
However, Kyrgyzstan's decisions regarding water levels may not necessarily line up with agricultural demands in downstream countries such as Uzbekistan. The construction of the projects would therefore give Kyrgyzstan significant leverage over Uzbekistan; Kyrgyz officials would have the power to reduce water flows at will.
Unsurprisingly, Uzbekistan strongly opposes Kyrgyzstan's hydroelectric projects. Russia's repeated public commitment to help Kyrgyzstan finance the construction of new hydroelectric plants thus gives the Kremlin additional influence and leverage in Bishkek and Tashkent. For Kyrgyzstan, Russia's pledge to finance large-scale hydroelectric plants offers hope for solving the country's electricity problems. It also offers hope for helping the country harness its only abundant natural resource — water — to become a profitable electricity exporter. For Uzbekistan, Russia's promises to fund or withhold funding from Kyrgyz projects are a reminder that Russia has can still undermine country's water security significantly.
Kyrgyzstan has long been a largely pro-Russia state. While the country's leaders have decided to apply for Customs Union membership, social tensions and the unpopularity of some Customs Union regulations are presenting a challenge for the Kyrgyz government. Uzbekistan, on the other hand, has been one of the more independent-minded post-Soviet states. Nevertheless, the Kremlin may see the country's ongoing power struggle as an opportunity for gaining future influence. Russia will continue using those tensions so long as it benefits it to do so.
Read more: Russia Uses Competition Over Resources to Increase Leverage in Central Asia | Stratfor
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http://news.yahoo.com/russia-ratifies-deal-georgias-breakaway-republic-092253835.html
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As Russian forces consolidate their gains in Ukraine over the flat protests of Western leaders, the specter of Russian revanchism is keeping much of Eastern Europe on edge. But lumbering tanks and legions of insta-separatists aren’t the only concern. Ukraine isn’t Russia’s only target.
Perhaps most alarming are the warning signs going off in Georgia, a steadfast Euro-Atlantic partner where a pro-Western political consensus has long been a foreign-policy calling card. A long-standing opponent of Russian military adventurism, Georgia sought escape velocity from Russian regional dominance by courting membership in Euro-Atlantic structures and earned a reputation as an enthusiastic and credible Western partner. But
Western quiescence in the face of Russian territorial aggression is starting to have an effect.
Western quiescence in the face of Russian territorial aggression is starting to have an effect. After decades of acrimony in which Georgians have watched Russian proxies occupy 20 percent of their territory and ethnically cleanse some 300,000 of their compatriots, certain groups are starting to ask if maintaining close ties to the West is worth all the loss. Increasingly, Georgians are beginning to think that it isn’t.
The groups spearheading Russian influence operations in Georgia fly beneath the international radar under the cloak of local-language media and the oft-repeated surety of pro-Western sentiment. But they can be seen protesting in Tbilisi streets, preaching in Georgian churches, and holding improbably well-funded campaign rallies ahead of elections. The evidence shows that Russian influence in Georgia is growing stronger. (In the photo, a Stalin impersonator poses at a memorial service for the Soviet dictator in his Georgian hometown of Gori.)
But at Washington roundtables and in private conversations, Western officials and experts tend to downplay the possibility of Russian-exported propaganda taking root in Georgia. The root of this complacency is tied to regular polling from the U.S.-funded International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) that has consistently showed public support for Euro-Atlantic integration at between 60 and 70 percent. Successive governments have relied on this popular approval to justify their Western-facing foreign-policy agendas.
So support for Euro-Atlantic integration is broad. But is it deep? Those who have spent time with ordinary Georgians say the reality, as is often the case, is far more complex.
There, in a scene in the popular Georgian soap opera Chemi Tsolis Dakalebi (My Wife’s Best Friends), revelers at a wedding reception are interrupted by an announcement that Georgia has just been awarded a long-coveted “MAP” (membership action plan), a prelude to NATO membership. The announcement shocks the crowd into a stunned silence, which then gives way to raucous cheers. One character, while clapping and celebrating along with the others, turns to another partygoer and asks: “What’s a MAP?”
While the scene colorfully illuminates NATO’s outsized social, and even civilizational, pull among Georgians, it also suggests a harsher truth: that Georgian society’s Western moorings may be more emotive than well-informed. The headline numbers from public opinion polls don’t tell the whole story. Look deeper into the data, and the picture is much more worrisome.
According to an NDI poll last August, integration with the West was at best a tertiary issue for Georgians. Instead, “kitchen table” issues dominated respondents’ concerns, with worries about jobs (63 percent) and poverty (32 percent) eclipsing other issues. NATO and EU integration came in far behind at 10th and 17th, respectively. And of 21 issues polled, Georgians picked NATO and EU membership as the top issues the government spent too much time discussing.
But most concerning, buried deep in the survey results, were signs of growing support for joining the Eurasian Union, a Moscow-led EU “alternative.” A full 20 percent favored the idea of Georgian membership. This percentage has risen steadily from 11 percent in late 2013 to 16 percent in mid-2014. Who are these Georgians who would surrender their country’s sovereignty to the same power that keeps a steely grip on Georgian territory and carves other neighboring states with impunity?
Part of the answer can be found in a budding segment of the nongovernmental sector, consisting of innocuously named pro-Russian groups like the “Eurasian Institute,” “Eurasian Choice,” and “The Earth Is Our Home.” Many of these organizations pop in and out of existence as needed — the “Peace Committee of Georgia” one week, something else the next — but they are often tied to the same group of pro-Russian ideologues and policy entrepreneurs who make regular pilgrimages to Moscow and, according to Georgian officials in the ruling party and the opposition, almost certainly receive Kremlin funding. Their common message isn’t high-church Russian apologia or Soviet nostalgia, but rather “Eurasianism” and “Orthodox civilization” — Kremlin shorthand for Putinism. Appeals to Georgian social conservatism, economic vulnerability, and lingering anger over past government abuses are winning converts within a population increasingly impatient with Georgia’s unrequited love affair with the West.
In mid-2014, Eurasianist groups made headlines for their raucous opposition to an anti-discrimination bill making its way through the Georgian parliament. Their opposition centered on language in the bill banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which opponents claimed was tantamount to promoting non-heterosexual lifestyles. But they didn’t come to the protests alone — accompanying the pro-Russian activists were unmistakably garbed clerics from the Georgian Orthodox Church.
The church, too, was nonplussed over the anti-discrimination bill and called for language protecting sexual minorities to be ejected. One of the oldest existing Christian churches in the world, the Georgian Orthodox Church is both a touchstone for Georgian nationalism and reliably polls as the most trusted institution in the country. But the church’s common cause with the Eurasianists was not limited to tactical alliances over anti-gay rhetoric. Although nominally in favor of Georgian membership in the European Union, influential factions within the Orthodox hierarchy openly stoke religious nationalism and express admiration for Russia.
Today, church representatives are increasingly seen as a vanguard for reactionary activity. In mid-2013, clergy members were on the front lines of a horrifying anti-gay pogrom in central Tbilisi. Church officials have justified protests against and attacks on Georgian Muslims. And church leaders have called the West “worse than Russia,” sometimes describing the 2008 Russian invasion as a kind of heavenly intervention against Western integration. Such language is echoed by Georgia’s Eurasianist NGOs.
The growing profile of pro-Russian organizations and the sharpening anti-Western stance of the church is converging with a third leg in an emerging pro-Russian triad: the revitalization of anti-Western political parties.
Since the 2012 change in power, pro-Russian politicians have risen from the darkest margins of Georgian political life into an increasingly viable political force.
Since the 2012 change in power, pro-Russian politicians have risen from the darkest margins of Georgian political life into an increasingly viable political force.
Onetime pro-Western advocate turned pro-Russian political agitator Nino Burjanadze has fashioned a political coalition aimed squarely at breaking Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic consensus. In presidential and local elections in 2013 and 2014, respectively, Burjanadze managed to get about 10 percent of the vote, armed with Eurasianist rhetoric and fueled by massive influxes of what was likely Russian money. And the rapidly growing Alliance of Patriots — a populist party with anti-Western leanings, which recently held a major rally in Tbilisi — won almost 5 percent in June 2014. If these numbers hold, parliamentary elections in 2016 could very well yield a very differently oriented Georgian government. A 15 percent result would be more than enough to send pro-Russian deputies into parliament in force, shattering cross-partisan foreign-policy unity and potentially playing kingmakers in coalition talks.
Irakli Alasania, Georgia’s former defense minister, has Russia on his mind. “There are very active pro-Russia groups and thousands of protesters who are against Western integration,” he told me recently, referring to the Alliance of Patriots rally. He expressed worry that the current government is downplaying a growing Russian threat. With his own Free Democrats now part of the parliamentary opposition, the ruling Georgian Dream coalition’s ranks of solidly pro-Western parties has noticeably thinned, and the leverage of socially conservative, protectionist factions within the coalition has increased.
But this is probably only the beginning. If trends hold, Georgia’s foreign-policy consensus — long taken for granted in the West — could begin to unravel in earnest. Although Georgian Dream, to its credit, has managed to skate the knife’s edge between geopolitical pragmatism and Euro-Atlantic enthusiasm, it is increasingly losing popularity among once-hopeful voters. As things stand, parliament in 2016 looks like it will be very different from today’s parliament. The pro-Western opposition United National Movement will likely see its 51 seats slashed by half or more. In its place is likely to be a collection of openly anti-Western deputies from Burjanadze’s coalition and the Alliance of Patriots. If it stays together, Georgian Dream may well remain the largest parliamentary bloc, but the introduction of large anti-Western groupings into parliament could compel it to dilute, or even abandon, its pro-Western policies out of political necessity.
This trajectory ought to be a cause for deep concern. Even a Georgia that tried to split its orientation between the West and Moscow would likely sink into the quicksand of Russian dominance, as have each of the other paragons of this strategy — Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Kazakhstan. This result would mean the consolidation of Russian geostrategic supremacy over the Caucasus and, with it, a complete Russian monopoly over trans-Eurasian energy and trade flows.
There are ways the West could throw a much-needed lifeline to Georgian liberals.
There are ways the West could throw a much-needed lifeline to Georgian liberals. While the association agreement with the European Union signed last June is surely a welcome symbol, and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area has great future potential, the real prize for most ordinary Georgians is the prospect of visa-free travel to the EU. If this is introduced this year, as widely hoped, this could be a real boon for Western credibility. And if not outright NATO membership, other strong gestures, such as U.S. major non-NATO ally status, would be a relatively painless upgrade that would enshrine what is essentially the status quo while recognizing Georgia’s long-outsized dedication and contributions to the Euro-Atlantic space.
What is clear is that the days of taking Georgia’s pro-Western consensus for granted are quickly coming to a close. Russian influence is resurgent across its periphery, from Eastern Europe to the Caucasus to Central Asia, and Georgia remains a long-coveted prize. It may have taken successive military interventions, information warfare, and influence operations, but Moscow looks to be turning a corner in its bid to regain Georgia — both by hook and by crook.
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Why Russia Will Send More Troops to Central Asia
Analysis
April 11, 2015 | 12:59 GMT
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Russian soldiers take part in the August 2014 Indestructible Brotherhood joint military exercises at the Ala-Too training ground in Kyrgyzstan. (VYACHESLAV OSELEDKO/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
Russia is making a concerted effort to increase its military and security presence throughout Central Asia, just not for the reasons it would have you think. Though the Kremlin is concerned with the threat of spillover violence from Islamist militancy in Afghanistan — its purported motive for deploying more troops — it is far more alarmed by what it sees as Chinese and Western encroachment into lands over which it has long held sway. It is this concern that will shape Moscow's behavior in Central Asia in the years to come.
Analysis
Central Asia has played an important role in the projection of Russian military power since the Russian Empire's expansion in the 18th and 19th centuries. During this period, Russia established military outposts as it competed with the British Empire for influence in the region. By the mid-19th century, Russia had brought modern-day Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan into its empire. In the early 20th century, the countries were incorporated into the Soviet Union.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia retained a military presence in Central Asia and played a major role in regional conflicts, such as the 1992-1997 Tajik civil war. Today Russia still has military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Kazakhstan is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a military bloc dominated by Moscow. And while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are not members of the bloc, they do have important security and military ties with Russia through arms purchases.
Concerns of Militancy
Russia's long-standing influence in Central Asian military affairs frames several of the country's recent moves. On April 2, the base commander of Russia's 201st military base in Tajikistan said Russia would increase the number of troops stationed there from 5,900 to 9,000 over the next five years and add more military equipment through 2020. Then on April 3 an unnamed source in the General Staff of the Russian armed forces told Kommersant that Russia was prepared to grant Tajikistan $1.2 billion in military aid over the next few years. Russian military specialists were reportedly dispatched to Turkmenistan's border with Afghanistan on March 24 as well. Turkmen officials have yet to confirm this, but local media report that Ashgabat requested Russian assistance to protect the Afghan border.
Officially, these developments are tied to growing concern over violence spilling over from Afghanistan into Central Asia. It is a legitimate fear for many Central Asian governments as NATO and the United States draw down their forces in Afghanistan. Regional governments have voiced discomfort with the increased militant presence in northern Afghanistan, including the Taliban and the Islamic State.
Russia has echoed this fear. Russian President Vladimir Putin's special representative for Afghanistan alleged that Islamic State fighters in the north are training thousands of militants near the Tajikistan and Turkmenistan borders. Collective Security Treaty Organization summits have focused on the issue, and Tajikistan urged the bloc to do more to counter the threat at the April 1-2 Dushanbe summit.
Despite a definite uptick in militant attacks in northern Afghanistan, no concrete evidence has emerged of attacks over the border in Central Asian states. Central Asia's last major wave of regionwide militancy was 1999-2001, when the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan conducted attacks in the Fergana Valley in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan following 9/11, however, wiped out much of the group. Surviving elements then dispersed throughout the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area.
Since then, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan have seen some attacks by Islamist militants. But many were related to political dynamics, not the movement in Afghanistan. A spillover of Afghan militancy is possible, but so far the threat is minimal.
More Pertinent Factors
Because Islamist spillover from northern Afghanistan is still a relatively minor threat, Russia's push into Central Asia may have other motivations. Moscow is engaged in a tense standoff with the West over Ukraine, just one theater in the competition for influence along the former Soviet periphery. Central Asia is another key region in this contest. The region possesses sizable oil and natural gas resources that are attractive to the European Union as it seeks to diversify energy supplies and end its dependence on Russia. Europe has already pursued Turkmenistan to join the Trans-Caspian pipeline project.
The United States has also been active in Central Asia, particularly from a security standpoint. The United States no longer uses Central Asian military bases that had been logistical centers for operations in Afghanistan, such as the Kant Air Base in Kyrgyzstan or the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan. These bases, however, have left a regional legacy. Washington maintains some security operations that include counternarcotics training with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
The United States has also expressed interest in increasing its commitment. The commander of U.S. Central Command, Gen. Lloyd Austin, said the United States was willing to provide military equipment and technology to support Turkmenistan's efforts to secure its border with Afghanistan. The United States also announced in January that it would grant over 200 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles to Uzbekistan previously used in the U.S. Northern Distribution Network in Afghanistan. Such gestures point to a U.S. desire to develop more cooperative security relationships with Central Asian states.
Moscow's military and security expansion efforts stem partly from its concern about these gestures. But Russia has not limited itself to deploying military personnel. Moscow has expanded the scope and membership of its Eurasian Union to include broader cooperation on issues including border controls. Kazakhstan is already a member, and Kyrgyzstan will soon join. Russia increased the number of exercises held by Collective Security Treaty Organization members. It also called on Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to cooperate more with the security bloc, though both have been hesitant.
However, Moscow's ability to solidify its position in Central Asia will be limited. Russia has a weak economy. Already, many Central Asian migrants who once worked in Russia have left, causing a decline in Russian remittances to the region. The West, and particularly the United States, will continue to have influence in the region. China, too, will continue to make economic and energy inroads.
Meanwhile, instability in the region will probably increase. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan both have potential succession crises in the offing. Moreover, demographic growth and competition over water resources are likely to threaten the region's security. Russia will see its position in Central Asia tested in the coming years. Islamist militancy is just one concern among many for Moscow and Central Asian governments.
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I have posted many times on this matter of the geopolitical significance of central Asia gas and how Russia needed it in order to control Europe:
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Russia Carries On With Turkish Stream Pipeline
Analysis
May 22, 2015 | 16:10 GMT
Russian energy company Gazprom has made it clear that it intends to move forward with the construction of the Turkish Stream natural gas pipeline as quickly as possible, whether or not the project can overcome political obstacles in Europe. Earlier in May, Gazprom notified a subsidiary of Italian energy firm Saipem that it could begin laying pipes for the planned 63 billion-cubic-meter pipeline in the Black Sea and also resumed a contract with Germany's Europipe for 150,000 metric tons of pipe for the project. Russia said it plans to start constructing the underwater portion of the pipeline in June.
Gazprom has already told Europe that it plans to cease using its current export route through Ukraine in 2019 and shift those natural gas supplies to the Turkish Stream pipeline. But the Europeans believe Russia will not follow through with its plans if Europe does not build the infrastructure necessary to deliver gas from Turkey to the markets currently serviced by the Ukrainian route. Meanwhile Russia has invested enough and has sufficient supplies available to at least begin construction on the first of Turkish Stream's four parallel pipelines, each with a capacity of about 16 billion cubic meters. Russia is banking on Europe caving in by the time Gazprom is ready to start constructing the other pipelines. Even if Europe does not compromise in the medium term, Gazprom can use a smaller version of Turkish Stream to supply the small but growing Turkish natural gas market.
Analysis
One of Russia's tools for influence in Europe is its status as the dominant producer of natural gas and oil for the Continent. Moscow also uses its pipeline networks to exert influence over transit states such as Belarus and Ukraine as well as European countries further downstream.
For much of the 2000s, Russia's primary export route into Europe was a main line through Ukraine that branched out as it headed west toward Austria, Italy, Germany and other major consumers. This meant that whenever Russia and Ukraine had a dispute that led to a cutoff of natural gas to Ukraine, as occurred in 2006 and 2009, it invariably impacted the supply of energy to the rest of Europe. To avoid repeating this scenario, Moscow mustered enough financial and political support to build the Nord Stream pipeline, which now delivers natural gas across the Baltic Sea directly to Germany, Gazprom's largest European customer.
South Stream was meant to be the southern route that would bypass Ukraine by delivering natural gas across the Black Sea directly to Bulgaria and then to Central and Southeastern Europe. The financial and political support for South Stream came more slowly than support for its northern counterpart, but by the end of 2013, South Stream had enough resources to begin awarding contracts for pipe-laying, pipe fabrication and other construction-related services. However, the crisis in Ukraine halted the project before all the contracts had been awarded, and what little political support it had in Southeastern Europe evaporated under strong political pressure from the European Commission and more dominant European countries. At the same time, Russia spiraled into another major financial crisis, leaving funding for such large projects in question.
South Stream was canceled in December 2014. Almost immediately, it was replaced with the Turkish Stream plan, which is being designed to send the same amount of natural gas to Turkey as its ill-fated predecessor, almost directly across the border with Bulgaria. For Russia, Turkish Stream achieves the same goal as South Stream, but without the political constraints of transporting gas to EU member Bulgaria. And in return for its support of the new project, Turkey is hoping to get a 10.25 percent discount on its energy supply from Russia.
Turkish Stream
Russia is now using the contractors and subcontractors it enlisted for South Stream to accelerate the development of Turkish Stream. The contracts with Europipe and Saipem are just two of many that are likely to be migrated from the canceled project to its replacement. Gazprom is also likely prioritizing work on the first of the four planned parallel pipelines, each of which would carry about one-fourth of Turkish Stream's planned capacity. Gazprom hopes to have the first pipeline finished by December 2016.
Neither the Russian government nor Gazprom have the financing in place for the entire Turkish Stream project. Instead, they have opted to take a piecemeal approach. With oil and natural gas prices low, financing the later portions of Turkish Stream could be a challenge for Gazprom until Russia's economy improves.
Even before Russia envisioned Turkish Stream, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for Gazprom to concurrently finance both South Stream and another planned energy project, the Power of Siberia pipeline to China — the combined cost of which would exceed $100 billion. This was one of the main reasons Gazprom sought international financial partners for both projects. Russia has secured significant financing from China for the Power of Siberia project, though Gazprom has complained that China has been slow in delivering the money. Russia has also swapped the order in which it initally planned to construct the two pipelines to China, choosing to prioritize the Altai pipeline, which will transport natural gas from western Siberia to the border with China between Kazakhstan and Mongolia. Choosing to construct this shorter pipeline first gives Gazprom more flexibility in financing Turkish Stream given limited Western capital.
Getting foreign participation from Europe is even more difficult for the Turkish Stream project than it was for South Stream. Even if the West relaxes sanctions on Russia, business confidence in long-term contracts with Russia will remain relatively low, meaning that Russia must offer fairly high rates of return. Politically, Turkish Stream is highly unpopular in Europe. The Europeans are making every effort possible to develop alternatives, such as the Trans-Anatolian, Trans-Adriatic and Trans-Caspian pipelines, which could transport natural gas from Turkmenistan to Europe. Companies in Europe are throwing their support and finances behind some of these other projects.
A major worry for Moscow is that Russia will build Turkish Stream but have no means of transporting Europe's natural gas beyond the Turkish border. Right now, almost all of Europe's natural gas transportation infrastructure goes either from Northwestern Europe, bringing natural gas from the North Sea into Central and Southeastern Europe, or from Ukraine westward or southward. None of the infrastructure is designed to bring natural gas from the extreme southeast to other markets. In essence, Turkey and Bulgaria are at the end of Eurasia's natural gas supply chain networks. Moving natural gas to the north and west was a problem with South Stream as well, but Russia eventually found partners to extend the pipeline all the way into Central Europe. Because of the European Union's Third Energy Package, Gazprom cannot build and operate pipelines in Europe, so it must wait for the Europeans to develop the infrastructure. The Trans-Adriatic and Trans-Anatolian pipelines are designed to solve this problem for natural gas from the Caspian region, but the initial capacity for the Trans-Adriatic is exempt from Europe's open access rules, meaning Gazprom cannot use it anytime soon.
Differences Between Nord Stream and Turkish Stream
A similar process existed for the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline. Gazprom began awarding the construction contracts and building the pipeline well before Moscow and Berlin finalized the political agreement for the project and before Gazprom had hammered out the final details concerning the onshore distribution networks. However, there are two major differences between Nord Stream and Turkish Stream.
First, Germany is Europe's wealthiest economy, and its industrial base provided the money needed to finance and build the infrastructure for Nord Stream. There is no equivalent sponsor country for Turkish Stream. The biggest consumer in the immediate region is obviously Turkey, which currently gets half of its Russian natural gas through Ukraine — notably, close to the same amount it could get through one of Turkish Stream's four planned pipelines, about 15 billion cubic meters. Turkey would not need to build a lot of infrastructure, since Turkish Stream would tap into existing pipeline networks north of Istanbul that deliver natural gas southward via the Ukrainian route. Italy could gain from the project, but it is already tied into other networks and is not heavily reliant on Russian natural gas. Economic constraints on many of the countries in Southeastern Europe, including Turkey, limit the financial backing available for projects such as Turkish Stream. Russia's best hope is that Western Europe would provide loands or other menas to incentivize the construction of networks to link to the planned Russian pipeline, but doing so would undermine the Europeans' policy of support for Ukraine and is thus politically unpopular in the European Union.
Second, Nord Stream was built in an entirely different geopolitical environment. Germany has become relatively assertive in negotiations with the Kremlin over the future of Ukraine. Nord Stream was planned and built without this tension as a backdrop. Moreover, Brussels has a greater political imperative to protect Ukraine's integrity and prominence. Its role as a transit state is key, because if Russia disrupts natural gas supplies to Ukraine, the Europeans will get involved, making the consequences more daunting for Moscow. Nord Stream was also built during a time of high energy prices, meaning high returns on investments in energy projects. Now that oil and natural gas prices are low, similarly high returns are unlikely.
Building the entire Turkish Stream pipeline project will be a complicated and protracted process, and the project may never reach its full potential. However, Russia's approach reveals a nuanced, low-risk plan for the pipeline. The capacity of the first of four planned pipelines is roughly equivalent to all of the natural gas that Russia delivers to Turkey through Ukraine. Moreover, the pipeline network that carries supplies from Ukraine to Turkey is already filled to capacity. Turkey is one of Russia's most important natural gas markets in the long term, and its natural gas demand has more than doubled over the past 10 years. By the mid 2020s, Turkey's natural gas demand could amount to the entire volume carried by the first two legs of Turkish Stream, and it will almost certainly need the amount of natural gas carried by the first leg even sooner.
This means that moving forward with Turkish Stream serves dual purposes: If the Europeans build the necessary infrastructure for Russia to tap into, then Moscow will have no problem accelerating the rest of the project. If not, then the new pipeline will still allow Russia to expand its export potential to the rapidly growing Turkish energy market.
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How Turkmenistan Can Alter the Russia-West Standoff
Geopolitical Diary
June 25, 2015 | 23:32 GMT
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On Thursday, Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak expressed interest in potentially increasing Russia's natural gas imports from Turkmenistan. The same day, the Kazakh parliament ratified an agreement on the delineation of the Caspian Sea boundaries between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. While seemingly mundane and unrelated, these two events are interconnected and reflect Turkmenistan's potential to fundamentally alter an important element of the standoff between Russia and the West.
Turkmenistan's importance stems from two factors: its energy resources and its location. The country produces 77 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year and exports 44 bcm annually. Its natural gas reserves, an estimated 17.5 trillion cubic meters, are among the world's largest, making it a major global natural gas producer and exporter capable of becoming an even more important energy player down the road.
But it is Turkmenistan's location that has elevated the country in the standoff between Russia and the West. Situated astride the Caspian Sea and between major energy consumers to the east and the west, Turkmenistan has become a key component of the "Southern Corridor" energy route that the European Union has been giving increasing consideration to as a means of reducing Europe's dependence on Russian energy. This route, which would facilitate the transport of energy supplies from the Caspian region through the Caucasus and Turkey and onward to Europe, is explicitly meant to avoid Russia, both as a supplier and transit route for energy.
Until now, Azerbaijan has been the only meaningful contributor to the Southern Corridor, primarily through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and South Caucasus pipelines, which have been transporting oil and natural gas respectively for the past decade. But the volumes that Azerbaijan exports to Europe are relatively small, and even the slated expansion of production and exports from the Shah Deniz II natural gas field, which is set to come online in 2018, is expected to add only around 10 bcm of natural gas supplies to Europe. But if another legitimate natural gas producer — like Turkmenistan — were to add to the natural gas supplies from Azerbaijan, the possibility of real diversification from Russia would go up considerably.
This consideration spawned an intense European diplomatic offensive over the past few months in an effort to persuade Turkmenistan to contribute to the Southern Corridor. The European Union is particularly interested in the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, which would be a relatively short conduit connecting Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan along the Caspian Sea.
However, two major issues stand in Europe's way. One is the legal status of the Caspian Sea, with maritime boundaries in dispute among the littoral states of Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. It has been a thorny issue for decades, and numerous summits and meetings have led to little concrete movement toward a legal resolution. But recent developments, including today's bilateral ratification between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan over their border and statements by Kazakh Foreign Minister Erlan Idrissov that a "breakthrough" could be reached on the legal convention at the next Caspian summit in Astana in 2016, show that this issue may not be an obstacle for long.
The other, more difficult, issue is Russia itself. As it does in the rest of Central Asia, Moscow has political, social, economic and security influence over Ashgabat. Combined with Turkmenistan's self-imposed isolationism, centralized political system and wariness of Western involvement, Russia's leverage has made Ashgabat cautious when it comes to working with Europe, especially on strategic projects that threaten Russian interests and could provoke Moscow's ire.
But Turkmenistan is not willing to do Russia's bidding unconditionally. Ties between Ashgabat and Moscow have been strained since 2009, when a pipeline blast ruptured a major energy connection between the two countries. Previously, Turkmenistan had been sending more than 90 percent of its natural gas to Russia. But after that incident, Ashgabat sped up work on alternative pipeline projects, redirecting much of its exported natural gas to China. Though Turkmenistan is still reluctant to openly and officially commit to any Southern Corridor projects with Europe, Ashgabat has been more willing to discuss the matter and show that it is at least interested. Russia's pronouncement that it is open to increasing imports from Turkmenistan again is likely an acknowledgment that Ashgabat has other options — as well as that Turkmenistan's strategic importance has increased in light of Russia's weakened position and the West's more assertive actions in challenging Moscow in its near abroad.
Turkmenistan's decision to either remain aloof from Europe's attempts to diversify from Russian energy or to commit officially to participating in the Southern Corridor could have significant consequences. Ashgabat is likely to hold its cards close to its chest as long as it can, but watching for any indications of which direction Turkmenistan is leaning will be tremendously important to gauging the fate of the broader conflict between Russia and the West.
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Russia Quietly Encroaches on Georgia
Analysis
July 28, 2015 | 09:00 GMT
Protesters wave Georgian flags in the village of Khurtaveli, close to the breakaway Georgian territory of South Ossetia, July 17. (VANO SHLAMOV/AFP Photo)
Summary
With Russia's help, the disputed territory of South Ossetia is encroaching more deeply into Georgia, but the expansion is unlikely to escalate into a major conflict. On July 10, Russian-backed South Ossetian forces unilaterally placed border markers close to the Georgian villages of Tsitelubani and Orchosani. The newly occupied area incorporated 1,605 meters (almost a mile) of the BP-operated Baku-Supsa pipeline. Though this symbolic show of power is important in its own right, it is part of a larger trend: The South Ossetians have slowly been pushing their boundaries southward into Georgian territory over the past several years. The drive is prompted by several factors, including Russia's insecure military position in South Ossetia, which lacks geographic depth and is threatened by the West's increased military activities in the Black Sea region. However, despite the slow advancement into Georgian territory, Russia is unlikely to stage a major military campaign any time soon.
Analysis
Since the war between Georgia and Russia-backed South Ossetia ended in 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been no clearly demarcated line between Tbilisi-controlled and separatist-controlled territory. After the war, Tbilisi governed large parts of the territories that belonged to the South Ossetian autonomous republic during Soviet times, including most of the strategically important Akhalgori region. Although skirmishes along the dividing line occasionally took place, they did not devolve into something serious until 2008, when war broke out between Georgia and Russia. In August 2008, South Ossetian and Russian forces occupied the Akhalgori region and pushed past the demarcated border to occupy land controlled by Tbilisi. Since then, the South Ossetians, with Russian help, have been actively building defensive infrastructure to fend off any possible Georgian assault.
Following the 2008 war, the Russians began creeping into Georgian territory rather than forcefully advancing on it. In 2010, reports surfaced alleging that Russian forces had pushed the border 2 kilometers southward in the Akhalgori region. Authorities quickly denied the reports, but Tbilisi had to admit that the border had indeed advanced farther into Georgian territory since the 2008 war, particularly near the Perevi village in eastern South Ossetia. In March 2013, Russian and South Ossetian forces fenced in five villages, comprising some 100 hectares. Later, in May and September of the same year, the Russians moved farther south and occupied the mainly Georgian-populated villages of Ditsi and Dvani. In Dvani alone, the border moved by some 600 meters. But these moves were dwarfed this year by Russia's July 10 advance into the Georgian-populated villages of Tsitelubani and Orchosani.
Russia's Strategic Motivations
Moscow had military superiority over Georgia in the war of 2008. However, Russian forces faced an important strategic challenge thereafter: how to defend South Ossetia, which unlike the other breakaway territory of Abkhazia, does not share a long border with Russia. Instead, South Ossetia is almost completely surrounded by Georgian territory. And Tskhinvali — the capital of South Ossetia and a strategically important city on the route north to the major Caucasian pass Djava — is very close to the Georgian border, which inhibits the Russian forces from having geographic depth for effective defense. Furthermore, there are no major rivers or mountain ranges running along the contact line between the Georgian and separatist regions. In fact, there is no geographic barrier at all until Gori — a strategically important city at the center of the country. Moving southward provides the Russians with a necessary geographic depth, which, along with the development of defensive infrastructure, would buy them time if conflict broke out again. Nevertheless, the Russians would still find the lack of natural obstacles problematic if it came to open warfare.
The timing of the July 10 advance is also interesting because of the evolving political situation and rising Western military influence in the South Caucasus amid the broader standoff between Russia and the West. Georgia's integration efforts with the European Union present a major problem for Russia. In addition, Moscow is especially worried about the increasing military cooperation, constant defense meetings and military drills taking place between Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey — intended to protect the major infrastructure projects running through all the three countries. Russia is also likely uncomfortable with the fact that the Georgian military has been holding joint military drills with U.S. and NATO forces more and more regularly over the past several months. In fact, many previous Russian pushes southward also took place as Tbilisi made major steps toward integration with the European Union and NATO, so it is unsurprising that the most recent push would coincide with the NATO-sponsored military drills dubbed Agile Spirit that are currently taking place in Georgia.
Although tactical border movements seem like an unusual political response, they are important when it comes to ensuring Russia's defensive capabilities in South Ossetia. A NATO training center is set to open in Georgia later this year, which will enhance Tbilisi's military capabilities and boost the Western military presence on Georgian soil. It is within this context that Russia is working to also expand its capabilities in the area. And this improvement aligns with Russia's broader regional policies; at the beginning of this year, the Kremlin announced it would strengthen its bases in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Armenia. It also recently provided Armenia with a $200 million loan for military purchases.
Georgia can be divided roughly into two parts, east and west, connected only through the east-west highway. The section of the BP-operated pipeline that falls within the recently-seized territory may be important for Russia, but the highway, which serves as a major trade route for land transportation from Azerbaijan to the Black Sea ports and east Turkey, is no less important. Because two BP-operated pipelines, the Baku-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, roughly run along this major highway, Russian posturing there sends a clear message to the West that Russia has a great deal of control over energy as well as Caspian and European trade. Though so far energy flows through the Baku-Supsa have not been hindered, and BP and Western governments alike seem relatively calm, by advancing southward Russia has acquired an additional tool for influencing regional governments and BP in the South Caucasus region.
Thus, Russia's recent moves in South Ossetia are motivated by its security and strategic concerns in the territory and are part of its overall military strategy in the South Caucasus. Though a major Russian military operation into Georgia is very unlikely at the moment, it is clear that both sides, Georgia and South Ossetia with Russian support, are trying to improve their position within the given restraints. Georgia is trying to connect to its NATO and Western allies and is trying to improve its own military capabilities. South Ossetia, on the other hand, is integrating security efforts with Russia and is trying to gradually nudge the border outward to increase the depth of its territory, enabling Tskhinvali to better defend itself.
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Summary
Heightened militancy along Afghanistan's northern border in recent months is gaining attention, both within Central Asia and outside the region. And world powers are becoming more focused on stopping it. At a recent Commonwealth of Independent States summit on Oct. 16, Russian President Vladimir Putin said the bloc's member states could create a joint task force to patrol the border. Meanwhile, Russian officials have hinted that Moscow may return its forces to the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border. Other countries, including Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, appear to be seeking their own approaches to tackling the border threat that could involve the United States. These developments indicate that the border between Afghanistan and the Central Asian states could heat up in the coming months, both militarily and politically. However, the threat of rising militancy is only one factor among many — not the least of which is the U.S.-Russia standoff — that will determine how the conflict plays out.
Analysis
The borders between Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have long been important from a security standpoint for countries inside and outside the region. Historically, they did not exist as concretely as they do now; rather, constant warfare in the region meant that frontier areas frequently changed hands. However, beginning in the 19th century, the spread of the Russian Empire into Central Asia and the British Empire into what is now Afghanistan solidified the country's modern political borders. Then, in the early 20th century, the transition from the Russian Empire to the Soviet Union led to the official closure of Afghanistan's borders for the first time in history, creating significantly different political and cultural identities among the ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens in Afghanistan and within the Soviet Union.
But though the border was officially closed, ties were far from severed between the ethnic groups. Because of the geography of the area, interaction and movement between the peoples of Central Asia and Afghanistan were difficult to stop. This was exemplified by the large movement of people from Tajikistan to Afghanistan and back during the Tajik Civil War of 1992-1997 and once again with the rise of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), whose members frequently traveled in and out of Afghanistan during the militant group's rise in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
But the militancy problem was soon resolved, at least temporarily, with the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks. The intervention effectively destroyed much of the IMU and sent the rest of its members into the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, at which point the militant group ceased to pose an existential threat to regimes in Central Asia. In the ensuing decade, there were only a few sporadic attacks attributed to the IMU (and even those reports were questionable) within Central Asia. However, with the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and with the subsequent rise of the Islamic State throughout the Middle East and South Asia, the border between Central Asia and Afghanistan is once again a hot spot and a source of significant preoccupation for external powers.
The increased presence and activity of militant groups, especially the Taliban and the Islamic State, are of particular concern. In late September, Taliban forces took the strategic northern Afghan city of Kunduz, and there have been several shootouts and attacks on or near Afghanistan's border posts with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Security officials from Central Asia have claimed that as many as tens of thousands of Islamic State- or Taliban-affiliated militants are operating in northern Afghanistan and that their numbers and materiel are only growing.
Russia's Stake
This is especially worrisome for Russia, which is the dominant external power in Central Asia and the leader of the Commonwealth of Independent States political grouping, which counts several Central Asian states as members. At the bloc's Oct. 16 summit in Astana, Putin announced that the group's leaders had agreed to create a joint task force to defend the bloc's borders in case of crisis. While the specifics of the task force, including how it would be composed or where it would be deployed, were not given, the announcement was clearly made with Afghanistan in mind. Discussion on the country dominated the summit. Putin's announcement also came after several Russian security officials hinted that Russia could redeploy troops to Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan, where Russian troops served as border guards until 2005.
While this talk indicates the serious possibility that Russia's security presence in Central Asia will grow, not all countries in the region would be supportive of such an increase. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are members of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) military bloc, and the latter two countries host Russian military bases. But Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan traditionally have been much more resistant to joining Russia-led alliances or integration projects. Indeed, Stratfor has received reports that the two countries have decided to shun Russia's border task force initiative and may instead pursue a bilateral agreement on joint border security related to Afghanistan.
There are several recent developments that would seem to corroborate these reports of a bilateral agreement between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. One is the meeting between the two countries' presidents in Tashkent on Oct. 8, during which they discussed security cooperation and the countering of international terrorism. Another is Turkmenistan's public rebuttal of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev's statement, which he made alongside Putin prior to the Commonwealth of Independent States summit, that there had been a growing number of security incidents along the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border. This comment was accompanied by statements by the Russian and Kazakh leaders that Central Asian countries and Russia need to work together to jointly counter the threat of Islamist extremism coming out of Afghanistan, something Turkmenistan implicitly suggested it does not agree with.
Turning to the United States
As it turns away from Russia, Turkmenistan appears to be turning toward another foreign power, the United States, to counter the threat from Afghanistan. On Oct. 15, a delegation led by Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov traveled to Washington to discuss economic and security issues. The visit followed reports that Turkmenistan had requested increased U.S. military aid, which was acknowledged by U.S. Central Command Gen. Lloyd Austin but has not been confirmed by Ashgabat. Uzbekistan also received military assistance from the United States earlier this year in the form of more than 300 mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles, in what was the largest transfer of U.S. military equipment to a Central Asian country ever seen; however, Uzbekistan also recently held security consultations with Russia.
Therefore, concerns about a spillover of militant activity from Afghanistan into Central Asia appear to be becoming more politicized as larger opposing powers are drawn into the mix. In fact, concrete evidence has yet to emerge of a true rise in Islamist militant activity within Central Asia itself. And both Russia and the United States have interests in the region that go beyond the immediate security situation, though stemming the spread of militancy from Afghanistan is certainly a legitimate concern for both. Russia, for its part, is interested in remaining the dominant military and political power in Central Asia and in keeping other external players out. The United States is interested in challenging Russian primacy and influence throughout the former Soviet periphery. The Central Asian states, too, may have ulterior motives for playing up security threats, since it could give them pretense to crack down on opposition elements at home.
This is not to say that the threat of militancy spilling over from Afghanistan into Central Asia is not a real one: Militancy and instability in northern Afghanistan are certainly on the rise, and Turkmenistan allegedly deployed as much as 70 percent of its military along the Afghan border. But the fact remains that the numerous other complex and opaque strategic considerations in play will likely make the Afghan border an important locale for wider struggles in the coming months and years.
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Summary
After a decades-long standoff, Armenia and Azerbaijan may be making diplomatic progress toward resolving their bitter dispute over the breakaway territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Both countries claim the semi-autonomous region, which lies along the southern half of their shared border, but since the end of a six-year war over the territory in 1994, Armenia has exercised control there and in seven adjacent regions also wrested from Azerbaijani rule. For 15 years, Russian support for Armenia has kept Azerbaijan from mounting another viable challenge to retake Nagorno-Karabakh. However, Russia's increasingly fragile position amid its standoff with the West and Azerbaijan's ability to leverage this change may soon prompt deals on several of the regions adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh.
Analysis
The dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan is one of several frozen conflicts in the former Soviet space that have persisted since the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the end of the war in the early 1990s, there was a period of relative calm. But over the past year, military clashes along the border have intensified as Azerbaijan has increased cross-border raids and shootouts.
In what may be a harbinger of changes to come, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made an unannounced visit to Armenia on Nov. 9 in what some local media have billed as a "secret" trip to discuss Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia has played a significant role in the dispute, both as the main mediator in political negotiations between the two countries and as Armenia's de facto security guarantor. (Russia has 5,000 troops in Armenia.) But after years of defending Armenia's claims, Russia may be more open to negotiating with Azerbaijan now that Moscow is under increased pressure from the West.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is being seen as a potential alternative energy supplier to the Europeans, and Baku is using its newfound political clout to lobby Moscow to change its position on Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan has expanded economic and security cooperation and has cultivated a more active diplomatic relationship with Russia. At the same time, it is becoming more aggressive toward Armenia, conducting cross-border raids and initiating shootouts along the line of conflict more frequently.
A Diplomatic Resolution
Stratfor has previously laid out several potential directions the Nagorno-Karabakh standoff could go. As Azerbaijan grows bolder, it may reach an agreement with Armenia that gives it control of the regions surrounding the breakaway territory. If the diplomatic route fails, Azerbaijan may increase the scale of its military activities. And of course, there is always the possibility that the tense standoff will drag on, tensions unabated.
Recent developments suggest the three major parties involved are seriously considering the first scenario: a diplomatically brokered resolution to the conflict. On Nov. 11, several Armenian newspapers, referring to their own sources as well as to media reports from Russia, ran articles and commentaries framing Lavrov's recent visit to Yerevan as an appeal for Armenia to return five out of seven territories adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. In exchange, Russia would place its own troops in these territories to guarantee that war would not resume and also to convince Azerbaijan to end its economic blockade of Armenia. Citing sources involved in the negotiation process, the Russian daily Kommersant added that the Lachin corridor — a key supply route into Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia proper — would remain in Armenia's control, as would the region of Kalbajar. Azerbaijan, for its part, would end military hostilities and commit itself to peace talks.
Though neither country has confirmed these reports, there are several reasons to take them seriously. Of particular note is the specificity about the terms of the rumored negotiations. There have been alleged leaks pertaining to talks over Nagorno-Karabakh before, but none of them included this level of concrete detail. Moreover, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan has on multiple occasions said that Armenia could accept relinquishing control of Nagorno-Karabakh's adjacent regions as long as a secure land link were maintained and international security guarantees were implemented — which would be the case according to the purported current deal. Russia has also recently been signaling its intention to deepen security ties with Armenia through the transfer of military helicopters and the establishment of a joint air defense system, which is an important prerequisite for Yerevan to even consider giving territorial concessions in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. The leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh have also hinted to local media that the Russian military may use the airport in the breakaway territory's capital for counter-terrorism exercises.
Armenia's Reservations
Of course, the reports emerging in local media — no matter how credible the source may be — do not guarantee that Armenia will indeed relinquish control of the regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. The dispute is still an extremely sensitive political issue in Armenia, where the public feels a strong sense of national ownership over the territory. The last Armenian president to seriously negotiate a change to the status quo, Levon Ter-Patrosyan, was even forced to resign by popular demand. To make any concession, Armenia's current government would need guarantees it could survive a negotiated settlement. But given Armenia's weak economy and increasing social unrest, making concessions to Azerbaijan could be particularly inflammatory at the moment. Even if the government could make a negotiated settlement over Nagorno-Karabakh politically feasible, there would be extremely challenging logistical issues, including the status of the roughly 500,000 mostly Armenian residents residing in the surrounding regions (the exact number of which is disputed).
If negotiations do proceed, other external powers, notably Turkey and the United States, will likely try to shape any diplomatic resolution to align with their own strategic interests. Both Ankara and Washington are increasingly focused on the Caucasus region, as demonstrated by the U.S. naval chief's recent visit to Azerbaijan and by Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's plan to visit Baku in his first foreign trip since the formation of a new government in Turkey.
That being said, it cannot be ignored that the diplomatic activity related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has seen a marked uptick in recent months, and there are increasingly detailed elements of the negotiations that are being leaked to the local and Russian media. The constraints on both Russia and Armenia also suggest that these countries cannot maintain their position on preserving the status quo on the conflict indefinitely. Therefore, the likelihood that control of the regions adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh will change hands is increasing, and the parameters of a potential deal — if one is able to be made — are becoming slowly but increasingly clear.
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Summary
The standoff between Russia and the West is once again heating up, but this time tensions are centered on the Caucasus. On Nov. 11, Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed his government to sign an agreement with Armenia to create a joint missile air defense system in the region. Not long after, the Armenian government confirmed that Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev is expected to visit Armenia in late November to officially sign the air defense system deal.
The move, though reminiscent of Moscow's actions in Central Asia and Belarus in previous years, comes at a time when Russia is being forced to respond to a wider array of challenges than ever before. Threats are rising from the Near East, while the West is ramping up its military activities in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh moves closer to changing its political status. And as Russia increases its military presence in Armenia, its competition with major regional powers for influence in the South Caucasus will intensify, adding to the growing list of issues Russia must contend with outside its borders.
Analysis
Russia has been pursuing the creation of a joint air defense system with Belarus and several Central Asian countries for some time. If constructed, the system would help Moscow better prepare for a range of threats growing beyond Russia's borders, including NATO's military buildup in Eastern Europe and rising terrorism in Afghanistan.
Putin's Nov. 11 order would create another similar system in Armenia that would protect the airspace far south of the Russian border. It would most likely involve air defenses and Russian combat jets deployed in Russia's Southern Military District. But it would also be located in a geopolitically complex region where many other regional players have significant strategic interests. An expanding military presence will put Russia in direct competition with Turkey's ambitions in the South Caucasus and Georgia's cooperation with NATO and U.S. forces. It will also put the brakes on Azerbaijan's goal of retaking its separatist Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven adjacent territories.
For Armenia's part, the joint air defense deal comes at an opportune time. Its government has received mounting criticism from Armenian politicians and media amid a growing belief that the country's membership in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization and its reliance on Russia as a security guarantor have yielded few results, particularly as Azerbaijan pursues a more assertive military posture around Nagorno-Karabakh. Under the new agreement, Armenian air defenses will be strengthened, and the country will likely see new air defense equipment, radios, radar systems and combat helicopters deployed to its territory. Armenian Minister of Territorial Administration and Emergency Situations Armen Yeritsyan also recently announced that the Stepanavan Airport, located a mere 20 kilometers (about 12 miles) from the Armenia-Georgia border, will host Russian Mi-24 and KA-32 heavy helicopters starting in 2016. While these aircraft do not amount to a projection of Russian force because of their limited range, they do reflect the Kremlin's broader policy of boosting its air capabilities in Armenia — a process that dates back to January 2014, when Russia announced that it would strengthen Armenia's Erebuni Airport with Mi-24P, Mi-8MT and Mi-8SMV helicopters. Along a similar vein, Nagorno-Karabakh's president has said Russian forces may use his region's Stepanakert Airport for air operations, an offer that may be in response to the recent uptick in air cooperation between Armenia and Russia.
Russia's growing military presence in the South Caucasus will be especially worrisome to Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia's longtime rivals in the region. The two countries have ramped up their joint military exercises with Georgia over the past year, posing a heightened threat to Armenia, whose strategic position is already weak. Since Turkey already had less ability than Russia to project power into the South Caucasus, the Kremlin's recent moves will only increase the gap between Russian and Turkish influence there, thus intensifying their competition for sway in the wider region. Meanwhile, Russia's stronger aerial presence in Armenia could alter the military balance of power between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani politicians have already voiced concerns about the air defense agreement, and on Nov. 11 — the same day Putin gave his orders to sign the deal — Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev visited his country's S-300 anti-aircraft missile brigade, the unit responsible for Azerbaijan's aerial defenses.
The timing of the deal is significant for a number of reasons. First, it signals Russia's response to recent developments in the ongoing standoff between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. As talks progress on Armenia handing over to Azerbaijan several regions adjacent to the breakaway territory, Russia will boost its military presence in the South Caucasus to ensure the security of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh and to make any further territorial concessions more politically palatable to Yerevan. Second, as Russia becomes more involved in the Syrian conflict, Moscow is keen to increase its ability to monitor its southern borders — a goal that a military presence in Armenia, with its proximity to the Middle East, is ideally suited to achieve.
Beneath these more immediate motives, the Kremlin also has several deeper, long-term strategic interests in mind. From Moscow's perspective, Georgia is moving closer — perhaps dangerously so — to the West. The country recently opened a NATO training center, and it continues to hold regular exercises with U.S. forces. In June and July, Georgia signed deals with France to procure an advanced system that would guarantee its air defense. Given the fact that Georgia was placed under a Western military embargo after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, these events indicate an important turnaround taking place in relations between Georgia and the West. They also show that the air superiority Moscow heavily relied on to win its last conflict with Georgia may no longer be so assured.
Maintaining an advantage in air capabilities will remain a high priority for Moscow and will continue to drive Russia's military buildup in the South Caucasus. The Kremlin's latest air defense deal with Armenia is just another part of that effort as Moscow looks to counter rising threats from the Near East and Western encroachment upon the Russian periphery.
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Becomes today's headlines....
http://news.sky.com/story/1593241/putin-downing-of-jet-a-stab-in-the-back
I'm sure Putin will be fine with this.
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Nothing to see here. It was only Russia.
I wonder if we will ever get the real story on this. I would trust the Turkey version as much as I would trust either the Russian or US version.
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My initial read is that whereas the Russians felt free to march into our HQ in Baghdad and give us one hour to get the fk out of their way, they now know better with the Turks. This ain't the first time they fuct with Turkish airspace and they were warned plenty this time.
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I have underlined on this forum this matter of gas pipelines in this region for many years now.
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Forecast
Turkish demand for energy will keep rising as the country industrializes, leaving Turkey reliant on energy imports for the foreseeable future.
Turkey will leverage its substantial negotiating power in TurkStream talks with Gazprom to secure significant discounts on Russian natural gas.
Turkey will continue to pursue other pipeline projects as part of its longer-term strategy to position itself as a regional energy transit hub to gain influence with its neighbors.
Analysis
Editor's Note: Stratfor closely monitors the ebbs and flows of world energy. Aside from production, the transportation of crude oil, natural gas and petroleum products is of paramount concern for oil-producing nations. For energy consumers, transit routes are indispensible lifelines. A huge amount of the world's energy is transited through pipelines, across the Eurasian landmass in particular. In this periodic series we will examine some of the most geopolitically significant pipelines running through Europe and Asia. In this installment, Stratfor examines TurkStream, the successor to South Stream, from the Turkish perspective.
Europe and Russia continue to spar for political influence in Eurasia in the latest battle over Russia's TurkStream pipeline project, formerly known as Turkish Stream. But as the two major powers pursue loftier goals of power and containment, Turkey — a country with regional aspirations of its own — is quietly maneuvering to secure its position as a crucial energy transit hub at the crossroads of the Middle East, Europe and Asia.
A Growing Need for Energy
Turkey's position on Russia's TurkStream pipeline is far more straightforward than that of Europe or Russia. In short, Turkey lacks energy resources and has always relied on significant imports to meet the demands of its economy. As Turkey continues to industrialize and take its place as a regional power, its energy needs will only grow, and perhaps quite rapidly.
Russia maintains a comfortable hold on its position as Turkey's largest supplier of natural gas. In 2014, Russian natural gas accounted for 55 percent of Turkish natural gas consumption. Ankara is uneasy about Turkey's heavy reliance on Russian natural gas, particularly in light of the two countries' greater competition for influence in the Black Sea and the Caucasus. These concerns are only deepened by the fact that Turkey lies at the end of the supply chain routing Russian natural gas through Ukraine, putting it at risk of supply shortages in the event that Russia cuts off flows to Ukraine. But no alternative supplier currently exists to satisfy Turkey's domestic consumption.
Given its lack of options, Turkey will most likely choose to support the TurkStream project in the end. Still, it will probably hold out on finalizing any deal until it can pressure Gazprom, Russia's state-owned natural gas company, into granting Turkey heavy discounts on Russian natural gas in exchange for its backing.
Larger Goals Drive Ankara's Strategy
Beyond the immediate benefit of guaranteeing cheaper natural gas for Turkish consumers, the TurkStream pipeline will play into Turkey's longer-term aspirations of establishing itself as a key energy transit hub at the intersection of Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Turkey hopes to then use its newfound role to reshape its partnerships and reassert its influence in the wider region.
With this objective in mind, Ankara has long promoted the majority of energy transit projects that would pass through Turkey. Some of these projects include the Blue Stream II, which would have transported Russian natural gas to the Levant; the ill-fated Nabucco pipeline, which would have sent Azerbaijani natural gas to Central Europe; and most recently, the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, which will send Azeri natural gas to Europe. In each case, Turkey stood to benefit by collecting both transit fees and natural gas supplies from the pipelines running across its territory.
Interactive
Interactive: Veins of Influence
The TurkStream pipeline would offer a similar opportunity at a time when Turkey is gaining a greater ability to take advantage of its strategic location. In previous years, a number of geopolitical constraints have undermined Turkey's value as a potential energy transit state. Western sanctions against Iran, for example, have tabled the option of sending Iranian natural gas to Europe, while the state of relations between Moscow and Brussels has largely determined the success or failure of several proposed routes. But the recent agreement between Iran and the West could pave the way for exporting Iranian natural gas to Europe by the mid-to-late 2020s, while Moscow and Brussels have begun to put their full political thrust behind the TurkStream and TANAP projects, respectively. With these developments, Turkey may now be in a better position to leverage its location to push for pipelines that traverse its borders.
With several alternative pipeline routes to Europe in play, Russia is seeing its own options narrow. The European Union is continuing to push forward with all of its Southern Gas Corridor projects, for which Turkmenistan has long been viewed as a potential source of natural gas. Although the controversial issue of piping natural gas across the Caspian Sea historically has been a deal-breaker for any Trans-Caspian route, Moscow has signaled that the Caspian countries may well sign a deal establishing maritime rights during the upcoming 2016 Caspian Summit. Meanwhile, the possibility of Iran emerging as a new European supplier in the wake of Russia's South Stream failure has left the Kremlin scrambling to find a viable transit alternative to Ukraine, and quickly. Turkey may be the only logical partner Russia has left.
None of this is to say Turkey will not be taking a risk by backing the TurkStream project. Turkey remains heavily dependent on Russian natural gas, although it has asserted that TurkStream will not increase its reliance on Russian supplies. Ankara has argued that it will merely be swapping Russian natural gas imported via Ukraine with imports sourced from TurkStream and that Russia's increased dependence on Turkey as a transit state will balance their energy relationship somewhat.
But the TurkStream project also will not prevent Turkey from seeking other alternatives, and it has not affected the construction of the TANAP project. Ultimately, the power in the TurkStream negotiations lies with Ankara, which will use its advantage to pursue its own regional ambitions. Meanwhile, Russia, lacking any other southern corridor options, will have little choice but to meet Turkey's demands.
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Forecast
As Russia's financial circumstances worsen, many of the country's Muslim republics will try to attract outside investment by implementing Islamic finance tools and establishing joint banks with Muslim countries, despite federal regulations.
Fearing the potential political and social consequences, the Kremlin will try to keep the regions' Islamic financing and Persian Gulf ties to a minimum unless they funnel through Moscow.
The prospect of the Muslim republics growing distant from the Russian government or being influenced by foreign states will continue to trouble Moscow, particularly since many of those regions pose the greatest internal threats to Russian security.
Analysis
As Russia's economy continues to stagnate, the country's 83 regions are being forced to compete with one another for outside investment to stay afloat. The quest for funding was a popular theme at the recent St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, where regional governments and corporations tried to woo foreign partners and financiers. Some regions have focused their campaigns on Asia and Europe: The Kaluga and Kaliningrad provinces, for example, have signed investment deals with Bavaria, and Kaluga's governor visited Vietnam earlier in the year seeking funding. But four of Russia's Muslim republics — Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chechnya and Dagestan — have set their sights on Muslim states in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, a strategy that has put Moscow on edge.
Making Ends Meet
Russia's Muslim population is growing rapidly, thanks to high fertility rates and an influx of immigrants from predominantly Muslim Central Asia. Now nearly 13 percent of Russians are Muslim, and most live in the country's eight autonomous Muslim republics: Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chechnya, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia, Dagestan and Adygea. Under Russian law, these regions — autonomous republics because of their non-Russian majorities — can choose their own languages, constitutions, presidents and security structures. Moscow granted the regions these freedoms, albeit begrudgingly, in the wake of the North Caucasus wars in an effort to quell secessionist sentiment and instability.
The Muslim republics' economies vastly differ from one another. Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, for instance, are two of the most developed regions in Russia because of their oil and agricultural wealth. Both regional governments control their own energy firms, which provide the bulk of the regions' budgets, as well as their own banking systems. In fact, according to Forbes, Tatarstan's two largest banks rank among Russia's most reliable banking institutions. Chechnya and Dagestan, meanwhile, are still struggling to overcome the damage caused by nearly two decades of war with Russia, as are their neighbors in the North Caucasus. Economic growth in these republics relies on federal subsidies, which have been substantial in recent years. Over the past decade, Kremlin funds have made up 80 to 90 percent of the Chechen and Dagestani budgets and more than half of the other North Caucasus regions' budgets. Similarly, the banking systems of Chechnya and Dagestan are dependent on Russia's federal banking system, a stark contrast to the independent banks of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.
Despite their economic differences, Russia's Muslim republics have been uniformly hurt by the collapse in global oil prices. Growth has slowed in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, while the North Caucasus regions have seen their subsidies halved amid the Russian recession. For the past two years, Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov has even had to dip into his administration's private reserves to make up for his region's budgetary shortfalls (though, admittedly, the reserves were built with funds gained by docking civil servants' salaries). Moscow has not stepped in to address the issue, leaving Russia's regions to look for external investment and financial support on their own.
Finding Financiers in the Muslim World
Some of Russia's Muslim republics have more experience in finding outside backers than others. Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have been fairly successful in maintaining the interest of foreign investors for the past 10 years; Tatarstan is considered Russia's best region for investment, while Bashkortostan is among the top 10. Each has industrial and high-tech economic zones and enough independence from Moscow to strike deals with foreign partners. By contrast, the republics of the North Caucasus have attracted very little foreign investment over the years.
Across the board, though, Russia's Muslim republics are weighing the merits of adopting Islamic lending laws to solve their financial predicament. Unlike conventional finance rules, these laws prohibit lenders from charging interest. Instead, loans more closely resemble investments in specific projects, deriving profit from those projects' success. Islamic financing mechanisms are also often backed by physical assets, making them less risky than their conventional counterparts. From the republics' perspective, the use of Islamic financing would draw the interest not only of Muslim consumers at home but also of other Muslim states.
But their plan has hit a snag: Islamic financing has been legally banned in Russia because it does not require interest payments as traditional financial instruments do. Some Islamic finance tools that resemble profit-sharing agreements between lender and borrower have also been prohibited because they are technically classified as "commercial activities," which Russian banks cannot participate in. Some banks, including federal ones, have found loopholes to skirt the law. Others, such as those in the Muslim republics, have simply ignored it outright, issuing transactions under Islamic banking guidelines or negotiating with foreign financial groups to start implementing them.
The Kremlin, meanwhile, has neither fully supported nor blocked the regions' use of Islamic financing. In March, the Central Bank of Russia approved a roadmap for Tatarstan to begin exploring Islamic banking mechanisms as a test case. The government has yet to change Russian laws on the matter, however, and according to Tatar banks, Russian banks have stalled talks on joint projects with Tatar banks and foreign lenders over the past year. So Tatarstan has struck out on its own. Last year, the region's largest bank, AK Bark, began to issue Islamic bonds that come with far lower rates and fees than its eurobonds do. At the same time, Tatar insurance operator Alliance began to sell an Islamic financial product called Halal Invest.
Tatarstan is hoping that its use of Islamic finance will pull in investment from members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), with which the region has had close ties for some time. In the past few years, funding from the Gulf states has indeed risen dramatically, jumping from $60 million in 2011 to $760 million in 2015. Most of the new money has been funneled toward the Smart City being built in Tatarstan's capital, Kazan. The special economic zone will host biomedical, hospital and academic research centers, along with information technology development labs, employing some 50,000 people in total. By venturing into Islamic financing, Tatarstan is attempting to secure even more resources for its cornerstone project. To that end, it has entered into talks with Saudi Arabia's Islamic Development Bank, which has promised to make Tatarstan the Islamic finance hub of Russia within the next few years.
Chechnya has not been far behind. Like Tatarstan, Chechnya has sought partnerships with the Gulf states — including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — over the past few years. Kadyrov has discussed several construction projects in Grozny with Saudi and Emirati officials, though both delegations expressed concern over the region's lack of Islamic money-transfer systems. In response, the Chechen president announced early in 2016 that his region would open an Islamic bank and consult with an Emirati investment firm to establish a joint venture with a GCC partner. A high-ranking Saudi delegation is scheduled to visit Chechnya in the coming months to revisit investment talks.
Bashkortostan and Dagestan have been slower to follow in Tatarstan and Chechnya's footsteps. Bashkortostan has close ties to Tatarstan and has opted to wait and see whether its efforts to create a viable Islamic financing system pan out. Similarly, Dagestan has put off creating its own system until it sees how nearby Chechnya's fares.
Russia Moves to Minimize the Gulf's Clout
The question now is whether Russia will allow Gulf state financing to continue. For years, Moscow avoided making deals with the Gulf states because of its complicated relationships in the region. But when its ties to the West began deteriorating in 2014, Russia began to look for other partners. After sapping up its major investment avenues in China, the Kremlin finally began to reach out to the GCC. Between 2014 and 2015, the Gulf states pledged some $25 billion in funding for Russia — but Moscow kept those funds tightly controlled through the Russian Direct Investment Fund.
Now that the Gulf states are reaching deeper into Russia by bypassing Moscow and negotiating directly with the regions, the Kremlin is faced with a dilemma. On one hand, it cannot afford to prop up the Muslim republics on its own. On the other, it also cannot allow the regions to fall into disrepair for fear of the instability it may cause, and it is unwilling to alienate its rapidly expanding Muslim population. But from Moscow's perspective, the rise of Islamic financing is worrisome for a couple of reasons. For one, the Sharia principles inherent in Islamic financing do not mesh with those of Russia's banking system. Moreover, the GCC is interested in promoting Sharia principles more broadly within the republics' communities — something that runs counter to Russia's history of clamping down on strong, independent Islamic ideologies among its people. The Kremlin will accept the Gulf states' money — if it chooses to do so — only as long as it can ensure that the funds go to projects that will not undermine its hold on the Muslim republics.
In addition, Moscow is concerned that the diversification of the republics' investment and business options could further distance them from the federal banking system, or by the same token, grant them greater independence. Nearly all of Russia's Muslim republics have experienced bouts of secessionism, though some have been stronger than others. The Kremlin, therefore, will be careful not to give the regions too much room to establish robust and independent financial systems. Indeed, Tatarstan's two biggest banks have already complained that Russia's federal banks, VTB and Sberbank, are aggressively trying to expand in the region, pressuring Tatar banks to give up some of their business in the process.
The Kremlin is also wary of GCC states gaining direct avenues of influence in Russia's Muslim republics. Concerns about color revolutions and infiltration by other states have led the Kremlin to enact a series of draconian laws that label any foreign money entering Russia a "foreign agent." Moscow has also begun monitoring all Russian entities that do business with foreign corporations. Because the Kremlin does not consider the Gulf states allies, it will likely scrutinize partnerships involving their firms even more closely. That said, not all GCC companies have political agendas. Though Mazcorp, for example, maintains deep ties with Abu Dhabi's royal family, the Saudi-based Islamic Development Bank comprises 56 member states and cannot easily be used by Riyadh to advance its goals abroad.
Russia is especially distrustful of ties forged between the GCC and certain Muslim republics, such as Chechnya. For more than two decades, Moscow has firmly maintained that the GCC states (alongside the United States) instigated the First and Second Chechen Wars. The Kremlin claims that Saudi Arabia, in particular, implanted its Wahhabist doctrine in the region and provided arms, supplies, training and support — largely through various charities and humanitarian organizations — to Chechen militants. June negotiations between Kadyrov and Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's aide have undoubtedly rekindled Moscow's fears. During the talks, the two discussed Saudi Arabia and other Arab states participating in joint training at Chechnya's International Special Forces Training Center.
Moscow will likely continue to put national security and Russian unity ahead of the needs of its growing Muslim population, no matter how dire the regions' financial situations become. Though the Kremlin cannot force its Muslim republics to ignore the opportunities presented by Islamic financing and investment, it will do what it can to insert itself in the process to rein in their budding relationships with the rest of the Muslim world.
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http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/10/14/what-erdogans-pivot-to-putin-means/
Obama handling of Syria continues to become more incoherent and more damaging to American interests. Putin has not only, thanks to White House dithering and irresolution, managed to reinsert Russia into Middle East politics in a spoiler role and his gains have not just included a deepening and commercially beneficial relationship with Iran and the weakening of the European Union and Merkel’s leadership in it over the refugee issue; he has also, thanks to the incoherence of American policy, managed to drive a thick wedge into NATO by further alienating Turkey from the West and, especially Washington.
As for what a naive and vainglorious President Obama once (back in those days when he collected Nobel Peace Prizes and was hailed as the second coming of Abraham Lincoln by a clueless and infatuated press corps) identified as a central goal of his foreign policy—the reconciliation of America with the Muslim world—his callous abandonment of the Syrian Sunnis to their increasingly genocidal foes has done as much, if not more, to tarnish America’s reputation among Sunni Arabs than anything any of his predecessors managed to do going back to Harry Truman.
The issues in Syria are difficult and the alternatives are few, but President Obama’s Syria policy is one of the shabbiest and sorriest displays of serial ineptitude that has unfolded in world politics in all these many years. That his emissaries and representatives attempt to cover the nakedness of their policy with grandiose rhetorical denunciation of the crimes that Obama’s incompetence has enabled merely underscores the horrifying moral and political emptiness of the President’s approach to world politics.
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Picking Up Where the West Leaves Off
Analysis
December 9, 2016 | 09:00 GMT Print
Text Size
Members of Poland's and Lithuania's special operations forces descend from a helicopter during joint military exercises in Croatia in 2009. As the Russia-West conflict intensifies, the countries stuck in the middle will increase their cooperation. (STRINGER/AFP/Getty Images)
Forecast
Shifting European and U.S. politics will weaken the West's support for states along Russia's periphery, or at least give that impression.
As Western countries become more divided and Russia's position strengthens, Eurasian countries will band together and increase their cooperation with one another.
Ukraine and Georgia will be particularly energetic in their pursuit of regional integration as they look to their neighbors for strength and protection.
Analysis
This year has rattled Western politics to their core. The Brexit vote laid bare the deep rifts crisscrossing the Continent, while far-right and anti-establishment parties across Europe have gained momentum. Across the Atlantic, the United States witnessed a similar political upheaval in the surprise November election of Donald Trump as the country's next president. With several more votes scheduled for 2017 in many of the European Union's biggest member states, including France, Germany and now perhaps Italy, next year is shaping up to be just as turbulent as the last.
The effects of these sweeping changes will ripple beyond the United States and Europe. Russia, in particular, could have a chance to gain the upper hand in its tense standoff with the West, which has been ongoing since Ukraine's Euromaidan uprising in 2014. Not only will the upcoming transitions in the United States and Europe weaken the West's resolve to maintain its sanctions against Russia, but they will also shift the West's attention inward to its own divisions. This may give Moscow room to strengthen its influence among the nations in its periphery.
The states that lie between Russia and Europe will no doubt feel the impact of the political upsets occurring outside their borders. Countries that once belonged to the Soviet Union have watched the changes underway with growing unease, and they are likely re-evaluating their stances toward the competing giants looming on their eastern and western flanks. All of them, from those in Eastern Europe to those in the Caucasus, will have to prepare for a new geopolitical environment in which Russia may no longer be able to be ignored and the West may no longer be able to be counted on.
An Eastern European Union?
As these countries reassess their situations, they will likely turn to each other for help. Ukraine will be particularly important to watch: For the past three years, it has relied on the West's backing in its spat with Russia over the eastern region of Donbas. But now, as the European Union fragments and as the incoming U.S. administration weighs its commitment to NATO allies and its collaboration with the Kremlin, Ukraine cannot be sure that Western economic, political and defense aid will continue.
And so it will look to its neighbors as an insurance policy in the event that NATO and the United States scale back their military presence in Central and Eastern Europe. Neither Poland nor the Baltic states are in a position to fully replace EU or NATO forces, but they could form a supplemental alliance of sorts with Ukraine. In fact, Ukraine has already begun to ramp up its joint training and military exercises with Poland and Lithuania, and it will probably continue to do so in the coming year.
Mutual defense may not be the only thing Ukraine seeks from its neighbors. Poland and the Baltic states have made great strides in diversifying their energy portfolios away from Russian natural gas by building liquefied natural gas import terminals and pipeline interconnectors throughout the region. Ukraine, which is also working to reduce its dependence on Russian energy by reversing natural gas flows from Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, will likely try to join their burgeoning energy network in the years ahead. After all, greater energy connectivity with Poland and the Baltics — including a planned pipeline linking Ukraine and Poland with a capacity of 5 billion cubic meters that will be complete by 2020 — could give Kiev more opportunities for energy diversification.
Cooperation in the Caucasus
The nascent Ukrainian bloc is not the only one of its kind. Like Ukraine, Georgia has become concerned by the potential withdrawal of Western aid. Tbilisi is currently engaged in a dispute with Moscow over the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and it has tried to integrate more closely with the European Union and NATO. Both organizations, however, have repeatedly put off Tbilisi's requests for membership plans. As their focus turns inward in the years ahead, Georgia's aspirations for deeper integration with Europe will be put in even greater jeopardy.
Georgia, too, will respond to the West's distraction by cozying up to two of its key neighbors and allies, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Tbilisi has already forged sturdy economic and energy ties with Baku and Ankara that will likely grow stronger in the coming years. Georgia serves as a vital transit state for oil and natural gas flowing from Azerbaijan to Turkey through the South Caucasus Pipeline, and construction is underway on the Trans-Anatolian and Trans-Adriatic pipelines. The two projects will bring an extra 16 bcm of natural gas from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz II field to Turkish and European markets by 2018 and 2020, respectively. Along with the pipelines will come new transportation links, with the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway scheduled for completion in 2017.
The three countries, meanwhile, have also begun to expand their defense cooperation. Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey now hold trilateral military exercises that will probably increase in scope and frequency next year. Georgia's chief of staff of the armed forces has already announced that the biggest exercises the three nations have ever held will take place in summer 2017.
The Ukrainian and Georgian blocs will undoubtedly encounter many challenges in the months ahead. Turkey's reluctance to directly challenge Russia will heavily influence the political dynamics of the Caucasus, while volatility in Ukraine could hamper Kiev's efforts to form a Baltic alliance. At the same time, Europe and NATO will by no means halt their activities in the region. But as the West becomes a more reluctant partner to the Eurasian states on Russia's doorstep, they will have little choice but to lean on each other for support.
Lead Analyst: Eugene Chausovsky
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZjQLVwCNW-8
Stratfor
Analysis
Russian Ambassador to Turkey Andrei Karlov was shot and killed Dec. 19 at an art exhibition in Ankara, where he was delivering a public address. Turkish security forces subsequently killed the gunman, reported to be Mert Altintas, a member of the special forces department of the Turkish National Police and part of Karlov's security detail. Three others were wounded in the attack.
Witnesses reported hearing the gunman shout that he was seeking revenge for Russia's actions in Aleppo, saying in Turkish "We die in Aleppo, you die here." There are many possible motives for the attack on Karlov: Most obviously, it could have been an angry Turkish citizen upset by the recent rebel defeat in Aleppo; it could have also been a jihadist plot seeking retribution for Russian action against terrorist groups in Syria. Regardless, if confirmed that the attacker was a member of the Turkish National Police, which was heavily infiltrated by Gulenists prior to the coup, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan may further clamp down on the Gulenists, whether the attacker actually had links to the group or not.
The attack comes at a bad time: Moscow and Ankara have only recently restored diplomatic ties after Turkey downed a Russian aircraft in November 2015. Though the attack will strain relations between the two countries, however, it is not likely to rupture them altogether. Moscow will lean heavily on Ankara for intelligence-sharing and will demand more autonomy in protecting its assets. Yet neither country is keen to backtrack on the economic and diplomatic progress made over the past year. And now that Turkish forces are active deep within Syria, Ankara needs to maintain a working relationship with Moscow now more than ever. Turkey's foreign minister is scheduled to attend a meeting in Moscow tomorrow with his Russian and Iranian counterparts to discuss Syria. Russian officials have confirmed that the meeting will still take place.
If the attack on the Russian Ambassador is in fact an angry response to Moscow's involvement in the retaking of Aleppo, it is a violent aberration of recent anti-Russia protests, which have been mostly peaceful, at diplomatic buildings worldwide. In fact, pressure is mounting on Russia for a range of reasons. There has been an uptick in thwarted terrorist plots and threats in Russia over the past few months. On Aug 1, the Islamic State called for attacks against Russia. In November, Russian security forces conducted several raids that appeared to link radicalized Central Asian militants and plots against major Russian cities. On Dec. 15, Russian authorities broke up a group allegedly plotting attacks against targets in Moscow. The plots are probably not directly linked to today's assassination, but taken together, they clearly demonstrate the growing threats Russia, and its citizens, face. Moscow is unlikely to shift its approach in Syria in response.
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Editor's Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, Stratfor cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.
Video Transcript:
Colin Chapman: An important but perhaps less well-noticed meeting took place in Turkey this week between the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, and his Turkish opposite number. Syria was high on the agenda of what was called the "Joint Strategic Planning Group." It took place ahead of the Friends of Syria dialogue, to be held also in Istanbul this weekend. Attending were representatives of Western and Arab governments.
Welcome to Agenda. I'm Colin Chapman, this week in Jakarta, and I'm joined by Reva Bhalla, Director of Global Analysis. Reva, Russia and Turkey have diametrically opposed views on Syria, and before he left to go home, Mr. Lavrov said, "If [Syrian President Bashar] al Assad's departure is the priority, the cost of such a geopolitical approach will be more casualties." There's some truth in this, isn't there?
Reva Bhalla: Well of course, Colin, Russia has an interest in preserving its Alawite allies in Damascus, but Putin also has a very clear point. No matter what negotiations are held in Istanbul, in Paris, in Washington, what have you, no negotiation is going to preclude the eventual descent into civil war for the northern Levant. And this is a very familiar history for this region, and so Russia can clearly see the trajectory of the events. It's also not going to get its wish, though, of preserving an allied regime in Damascus — certainly not one that's capable of governing the entire country.
Colin: Now, Syria was the main item on the agenda, but it wasn't the only one. There was a lot of talk about other issues. Lets go through them one by one. For example, the Caucasus where there has been a change of government in Georgia, which will have some impact on Turkey.
Reva: Right, so Turkey and Azerbaijan in particular are very uncomfortable with the political evolution that has taken place in Georgia with the rise of [Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina] Ivanishvili, who made his millions in Russia. Now, Turkey does not want to see its southern corridor energy projects that run from the Caucasus through Turkey and possibly onward to Europe be sabotaged by any sort of political transition that we see in Georgia, especially with pro-Russian tendencies. And so Turkey is basically trying to feel out what is happening in Georgia, its trying to figure out what the Russians' intentions are, how far is it willing to go, and it doesn't want to see these projects obstructed. So far, nothing has been derailed but Turkey is certainly on alert.
Colin: Then there's Cyprus. In the wake of the banking debacle in which a lot of Cypriots and Russians lost their shirts, the Cyprus government and the Russians appear to be talking about offshore oil developments, but that's not particularly good news for Turkey, is it, which has still got many outstanding issues about the future of Northern Cyprus.
Reva: Turkey has been very uncomfortable with this realignment of forces that has taken place in the eastern Mediterranean, with Israel and Cyprus trying to exploit their natural gas reserves and growing close together, putting their own sordid history aside, also aligning with Greece and with Russian backing. And also remember this is Turkey's western maritime flank. It does not want to see a potentially hostile alignment of forces develop. And so Turkey came late to this game but it also wants to desperately scuttle any energy projects that are taking place in the eastern Mediterranean that could strengthen the ties among these countries. And so it doesn't want Cyprus' bailout negotiations with Russia to entail any promises of future energy rights transferred to Russia as Cyprus tries to exploit its own natural gas reserves, certainly not while the Northern Cyprus status is in limbo.
So Turkey, especially over the past few weeks, has been kind of desperately trying to find anybody to mediate the Cypriot conflict. Of course, the Europeans have bigger distractions and are not exactly engaged in the issue, so Turkey is going directly to Russia, again trying to gauge its intentions and trying to get Russian assurances that its not going to go too far. Now Russia, on the other hand, has a strategic interest in building on its existing cultural and religious ties and business ties to this region to further its stake hold in the eastern Mediterranean and use that as well to make sure it can integrate itself into any energy projects that attempt to circumvent Russia's energy hold on the Continent.
Colin: Finally, Turkey is pretty shackled to Russia for its energy requirements — I think the figure is some 70 percent dependency. So logic dictates that these two should really be coming to some kind of friendly agreement. Turkey, of course, is still a long way from ever joining the European Union. Do you think that Turkey is now more or less reconciled to the idea that it has to draw closer to Moscow in its future?
Reva: In short, no, they cannot. As much as Turkey is uncomfortable with being so beholden to Russia through these energy links, it can't escape it. If you just look at Turkish power consumption, expected to rise 30 percent just over the next decade, Turkey cannot avoid getting a stable supply from Russia. Of course, it's going to be pursuing alternative sources of energy, but there are major political complications to trying to develop energy resources and transporting them from northern Iraq, of course as well with Iran. It will be getting natural gas from Azerbaijan with Shah Deniz II fields coming on-line but it still will not be enough to compensate for the huge amount of natural gas that Turkey gets from Russia.
And so Turkey has tried to see the silver lining in this dynamic and has used that in its political rhetoric to tell Russia, "Look, we have this huge energy dependency with you, that's a good thing because that means you don't have to be worried about us encroaching on your turf and overlapping spheres of influence." And so we've already seen this as Turkey has tried to extend its influence in Central Asia, bit by bit. It's trying to show that it's not an intruder and so it's shown that through things like [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan, the prime minister, saying "Allow us into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. We are one of you, we can forget about the Europeans," even though of course Turkey is extremely dependent on European trade. Nonetheless, Turkey is using the political rhetoric to say, "Look, we don't need Europe, we want to be part of your organization. Don't look at us as an intruder. We are one of you." Now, whether the Russians see it that way is of course a whole other question.
Colin: Reva, thank you very much. And that's Agenda for this week, thanks very much for being with us.
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Apparently the assassin shouted ""Aloha Snack bar" which means he was not a Muslim :roll: :lol: :lol:
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Yes i heard that too. I thought he looked Hawaiian.
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Apparently the assassin shouted ""Aloha Snack bar" which means he was not a Muslim :roll: :lol: :lol:
Islam is a religion of peace. If a muslim says or acts otherwise, it is to be ignored and hidden.
MARC: Accidentally I inserted the following here instead of in my own post-- sorry.
OTOH it should be noted that it seems quite clear that Russia has and is committing terrible war crimes in Syria and off the top of my head I would say that a fair case can be made that the ambassador was a fair target for a fair grievance.
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It is tragic that Russia doesn't hold it's self to the high standard of conduct displayed by the Islamic culture of the Middle East.
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http://warontherocks.com/2016/12/the-coming-of-the-russian-jihad-part-ii/
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http://warontherocks.com/2016/12/the-coming-of-the-russian-jihad-part-ii/
Russia should be more welcoming to muslims, like we for the Tsarnaev family.
(http://www.alienscientist.com/pictures/bauman.jpg)
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Summary
This year promises to be a good one for Russia. The country's beleaguered economy is poised to pull out of recession, though its financial problems are far from resolved. Furthermore, upheaval in the European Union and a new presidential administration in the United States could spell an end to, or at least a reduction in, economic sanctions imposed three years ago by the European Union and the United States. For former Soviet countries such as Ukraine, Moldova and particularly Georgia, these changes will require a recalibration of their foreign policy. Facing dim prospects for further integration with the European Union and NATO and uncertain of the new U.S. administration's policies, the government in Tbilisi is rethinking Georgia's relationship with Moscow.
Analysis
Long before the Brexit vote and the U.S. presidential election, Georgia had begun looking for ways to restore its relationship with Russia as its progress with the West stalled. Various trade discussions have been underway between Moscow and Tbilisi for the past year, and the two governments are in regular contact.
A Sign of the Times
Recent developments in Georgia's energy sector suggest that Russia's influence in the country is growing. In late December, Tbilisi and Moscow reached a new agreement allowing the transit of Russian natural gas through Georgia to Armenia. Though a previous deal granted Georgia a 10 percent portion of the natural gas moving through its territory in exchange for its transit, the new arrangement stipulates that Moscow will offer Tbilisi a monetary payment for the service. (The rest of the deal's terms are confidential, according to the Georgian government.) By paying Tbilisi in cash, Moscow will have more leeway to increase the volume of natural gas transported under the agreement. Rumors are swirling, moreover, that Russian energy giant Gazprom has offered to buy 25 percent of the Georgian Gas and Oil Corp., which controls the pipeline that carries natural gas to Armenia. If the deal goes through, it will give Russia its largest presence in Georgia's energy sector since 2006.
As Tbilisi explores deeper economic ties with Moscow, Georgian politicians and voters are weighing their options for integration with Western institutions such as NATO and the European Union. On Jan. 24, lawmakers began debating whether to add a provision to Georgia's Constitution obliging the country's leaders to pursue membership in those organizations as the country's primary foreign policy objectives. Voters are roughly divided over the issue; the most recent polling data shows that 53 percent of Georgians favor European integration — a near 10 percent drop from the year before. Up to 31 percent of Georgians, meanwhile, support improving relations with Russia — almost a 10 percent increase over the previous year.
Reaching Out to the Breakaways
The changes in Russia, Europe and the United States seem to be affecting the relationship between Georgia and its breakaway territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well. Abkhaz and Russian officials resumed talks with their Georgian counterparts to prevent conflict at the demarcation line in Abkhazia in late 2016. At the same time, officials from South Ossetia reported that the territory's leaders planned to open a new trade post on the demarcation line near Akhalgori, a sign that Georgia may resume trade with the region. Tbilisi also floated the idea of changing the country's constitution so that foreigners entering Abkhazia or South Ossetia without first notifying Tbilisi (most of whom are Russian) would face a fine rather than prosecution. In addition, the Georgian government is considering reaching out to leaders in Abkhazia through diplomatic channels. Considering the dire conditions of infrastructure in the breakaway territory, leaders in the Abkhaz capital of Sukhumi will likely welcome Tbilisi's efforts, with Moscow's tacit approval.
Georgia may even consider reinstating diplomatic ties with Russia, which were severed during the short-lived war between the two countries in 2008. Georgia's special representative for Russian issues said Jan. 30 that he has not ruled out the possibility of renewing relations. Keeping the lines of communication with Russia open is especially important for Tbilisi as it tries to avoid losing more territory to the approximately 10,000 Russian troops currently positioned in its breakaway regions.
Tbilisi will try to maintain some flexibility in its foreign policy as Russia's sway increases, not only in the region but also among the Georgian people, and as the political circumstances in the United States and Europe evolve. Still, Georgia will not revise its stance toward the West anytime soon. The country remains steadfast in its commitments to the European Union and NATO, with which it has signed numerous partnership agreements over the years. But given the European Union's inward focus and the uncertainties surrounding the new U.S. administration's policies toward the South Caucasus region, Tbilisi has little choice but to keep its options open.
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Note the role of natural gas routes, the importance of which is something I have underlined in this part of the world for several years now:
There are new signs that trade is beginning to tie Russia and Georgia closer together. On Feb. 13, Georgia's special representative for talks with Russia said both countries had agreed Feb. 7 to establish three trade routes, which would wind through the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and through the Larsi mountain pass (east of South Ossetia). Moscow also reportedly agreed to demands made by Georgia's government in Tbilisi to station international observers to monitor goods traversing the Russian-Abkhazian and Russian-South Ossetian borders. Additional observation posts will likewise be placed on demarcation lines between the breakaway territories and the rest of Georgia.
New trade along these routes would lead to better economic relations between Russia and Georgia. Currently, trade between the two stands at $800 million, making Russia Georgia's third-largest trade partner. And this is not the only development: Tbilisi and Moscow recently reached an agreement that allows Russian natural gas destined for Armenia to transit through Georgia. Many in Georgia, however, see the deal as a disadvantage for the government. In previous arrangements, Russia paid Georgia for the transit with 10 percent of the natural gas. Under the new deal, Russia pays the transit fee with cash and Georgia must buy the natural gas separately. With Georgia likely to increase its natural gas imports, Tbilisi will come to rely more on Russia to meet its future energy needs.
Moreover, Moscow's agreement to station trade observers on the borders between the breakaway territories and Russia is a notable nod to Tbilisi that at one time would have been impossible. After the short-lived Russia-Georgia War in 2008, Moscow cut diplomatic ties with Tbilisi, and they have not been restored. But now, the Kremlin seems to be sending signals to the Georgian government that it's willing to reconcile, at least economically.
There are also indications that pro-Russia sentiment is growing in the country. Recent polls show 53 percent of Georgians favor European integration — a near 10 percent drop from last year. Some 31 percent, meanwhile, support improving relations with Russia — an almost 10 percent increase over the previous year.
These changes are improving relations between Georgia and its breakaway territories as well. Abkhazian and Russian officials resumed talks with their Georgian counterparts to prevent conflict along Abkhazia's demarcation line in late 2016. At the same time, officials from South Ossetia have said the territory's leaders plan to open a new trade post on the demarcation line near Akhalgori. Overall trade with the breakaway region may even resume. Tbilisi floated the idea of changing the country's constitution, too, so that foreigners entering Abkhazia or South Ossetia without first notifying Tbilisi (most of whom are Russian) would face a fine rather than legal prosecution.
Russian-Georgian relations are clearly progressing at the time when geopolitical situation in the former Soviet periphery is in flux. Divisions in the European Union are growing. A new U.S. presidential administration appears more open to working with Russia. So for many former Soviet countries, including Georgia, rethinking the relationship with Moscow is now vital.
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Putin and Erdogan: Addicted to Power
Geopolitical Weekly
April 11, 2017 | 08:00 GMT Print
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Not only do the pasts and motivations of the Russian and Turkish leaders have a great deal in common, but their geopolitical destinies are also deeply intertwined. (OZAN KOSE/AFP/Getty Images)
By Reva Goujon
Absolute power is both reviled and revered. Most in the West will look aghast at blatant power grabs, smirk at narcissistic acts of self-promotion and regularly admonish leaders engaging in tyrannical behavior. But many others will just as easily look in awe at a leader who embodies sheer power. When a country's politics have been more volatile than just, people will more naturally crave a leader who oozes confidence and manifests strength. They will more willfully submit to propaganda, wanting to neither see nor hear stories of evil that can tarnish the image they hold of their protector.
This dichotomy defines two highly consequential leaders of our time: Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, two men who not only have pasts and motivations with a great deal in common, but whose geopolitical destinies are also deeply intertwined.
Born With a Vengeance
Men ought either to be indulged or utterly destroyed, for if you merely offend them they take vengeance, but if you injure them greatly they are unable to retaliate, so that the injury done to a man ought to be such that vengeance cannot be feared.
— Niccolo Machiavelli
Putin and Erdogan were born — and rule — with a vengeance rooted in their personal and national upbringings.
Erdogan's most formative years took place in the grimy district of Kasimpasa, on the edge of the Golden Horn waterway dividing European Istanbul, where poor residents looked up the hill with reproach at the wealthy and hip Taksim district, the symbolic center of the Europeanized elite. Erdogan was raised in a conservative family and attended a religious high school, a social environment that made him leery of prideful secular Turks drinking raki in the bars lining Istanbul's streets. He earned his street smarts making extra money selling Turkish snacks in the rough districts of Istanbul, but he always had bigger ambitions. A childhood friend of Erdogan's noted in the documentary "The Making of a Sultan: The Rise of Erdogan" that the young Tayyip, who loved reciting poetry, would stand in empty boats at the docks and deliver speeches to an imaginary audience, honing his oratory skills. Erdogan would later put those skills to use in rallying millions of conservative Turks who were sick of being sidelined from power by Westernized secular elites and who wanted their turn at the country's helm.
Putin, meanwhile, was raised in a dilapidated apartment building in the war-battered city of St. Petersburg (what was then Leningrad). There was no hot water, and only a single stinking toilet. The communal kitchen was always overcrowded with families squabbling over what little food there was to eat. Early accounts of Putin paint him as a thuggish kid, learning early on that an oversized image of strength was key to survival as he scrapped with other kids in rough neighborhoods. One of the few but more revealing anecdotes from Putin's childhood is written in his carefully curated autobiography, First Person.
There, on that stair landing, I got a quick and lasting lesson in the meaning of the word cornered. There were hordes of rats in the front entryway. My friends and I used to chase them around with sticks. Once I spotted a huge rat and pursued it down the hall until I drove it into a corner. It had nowhere to run. Suddenly it lashed around and threw itself at me. I was surprised and frightened. Now the rat was chasing me. It jumped across the landing and down the stairs. Luckily, I was a little faster and managed to slam the door shut in its nose.
For young Volodya, even a cornered rat will find a way to fight back in a last gasp for survival. This was a lesson that both leaders carried with them in internalizing their national histories.
The West Is Not the Answer
Erdogan, born in 1954, and Putin, born in 1952, grew up in shaky postwar years, never forgetting what it meant to have their countries ravaged from within by insurrection and from beyond by bigger Western powers. Neither fully buy into the idea that their countries will have brighter and more stable futures simply by copying and pasting a template from the West. Not only is this approach unnatural, in their view, but it is also dangerous. For Erdogan, it is even impious.
Several statements made by Erdogan early in his political career reveal his belief that Turkey's national spirit stems from its Islamic heritage, and that the Turkish Republic's embrace of secularism following the fall of the Ottoman Empire was more an aberration than a logical decision in state-building. In a 1996 interview with the daily Milliyet newspaper, a defensive Erdogan is repeatedly asked by the fiercely secular journalist Nilgun Cerrahoglu what his Welfare Party (the predecessor to the Justice and Development Party) actually stood for when it came to religion. Erdogan responded, "Time will tell," and said his party's worldview rested on a system that "depends on the values of our native culture and the spirit of the nation. It is an understanding based on Islam."
Erdogan acknowledges that, pragmatically, Turkey must trade and cooperate on security with the West through mechanisms like its customs union with the European Union and through NATO. But he, along with many of his Kemalist counterparts, lives with the trauma of the draconian Treaty of Sevres that ended the Ottoman Empire and harbors a deep distrust toward Western powers that he accuses of hoping to divide and weaken Turkey. Still, that is where the common ground between Erdogan and the Kemalists ends. Erdogan fundamentally disagrees with the idea that Turkey's national identity is somehow rooted in the West. His is a view that polarizes at least half of his countrymen, who look to the West for inspiration to grow and modernize Turkey. Erdogan nonetheless believes that others, even his most ardent opponents, will eventually come to agree with him once they rediscover their Muslim roots.
Putin shares Erdogan's paranoia of the West. Putin once said that,
"... the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and co-patriots found themselves outside Russian territory. Moreover, the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia itself."
From his KGB posting in 1985-89 in Dresden, where he was charged with stealing Western technology to help Russia catch up with the West, he saw the fall of the Berlin Wall, witnessed the spread of NATO and the European Union into former Warsaw Pact countries, personally fended off riots against his Soviet outpost and then returned to a country in chaos following Mikhail Gorbachev's experiments in liberalization (glasnost and perestroika). He saw the West walk over a weak and embattled Boris Yeltsin, who tried and failed first to prevent NATO from launching a war against Russian-allied Serbs in 1998 and then to secure a role for Russia in the Kosovo peacekeeping mission that followed the war. Putin's Russia needed to be saved, and Putin designated himself as its savior. While Erdogan saw his mission to save Turkey from Western secularists, Putin first went after Russia's oligarchs, who had used an economic opening with the West to plunder the country.
Democracy: A Tool and a Nuisance
For those who carry a deep conviction that they are saving their nation from tragedy and sin, the concept of democracy tends to hold little weight. For Erdogan and Putin, democracy is a tool for gaining power — and a nuisance to navigate once you have it.
In the same 1996 Milliyet interview, Erdogan famously said that "democracy is a means, not an end." He also casually noted that "democracy is a tramway — you climb on to get where you want to go, and then you climb off." His repeated assertion that "laws are made by human beings" implies that laws can easily be lifted to comport with his own vision for the republic. Similarly, Erdogan's inheritance of Turkey's EU accession bid was used as a means to assuage Western onlookers and his own political opponents that Turkey would still keep a foothold in the West, even though Erdogan likely had little expectation of fully adhering to the bloc's democratic norms to complete the accession process.
Putin has also has shown his repugnance for Western lectures on democracy. As he has asserted time and time again, "democracy cannot be exported from one country to another, like you cannot exports revolutions or ideology." In Putin's view, democracy must be a product of a society's developments with its own nuances and timeline. In other words, Russia cannot be rushed and Putin is not about to allow overzealous experimentation in democratization and economic liberalization to shatter Russia once again.
But democracy was a useful tool to build an empire. Indeed, both leaders took similar paths to rise to power and are employing similar tactics to hold onto it. Both worked diligently to mask their more politically unpalatable pasts. Putin commissioned documentaries and biographies to tone down misgivings over his KGB history while Erdogan took care early on to cultivate an image as a "middle-path" Muslim, not an avowed Islamist bent on radically transforming the government. While Putin used his position as deputy mayor and his allies in St Petersburg in the late 1990s to quietly work his way through the corridors of the Kremlin elite, Erdogan placed himself in the public spotlight and passed his first big popularity test as mayor of Istanbul from 1994 to1998.
Both men understood deeply the power of patronage. At the start of their political careers, Putin reined in rapacious oligarchs to earn the people's trust and Erdogan won hearts and minds in Istanbul when he brought clean water to the city, removed trash collecting on the streets and expanded road networks. Both reached the pinnacle of power at the turn of the century, Putin as president in 2000 (after briefly serving as FSB chief and then prime minister) and Erdogan as prime minister in 2003 (his party rose to power in 2002, but Erdogan was temporarily banned from politics by the military-backed establishment). As soon as they reached the top, they worked rapidly to build up networks of loyalists beneath them. They knew that keeping power meant creating deep dependencies in critical institutions and industries as well as on the streets. They were to be seen as the protectors of their people with the power to both punish and reward.
The price of patronage, of course, was unquestionable loyalty. After gutting the oligarchs, Putin made powerful allies in resurrecting national champions in oil, natural gas, nickel, aluminum, steel, diamonds and gold. Erdogan, meanwhile, commissioned massive infrastructure projects with hefty line items and multiple regulatory layers where side sums could be pocketed at every turn. With the procurement and contracting for these projects centered on himself, Erdogan was able to cultivate a powerful network of construction magnates whose wealth depended almost entirely on the quality of their relationship with the Turkish leader. Both presidents accumulated fantastic wealth over the years (by several estimates, Putin is believed to be among the wealthiest people in the world) and have shamelessly displayed their power through oversized presidential palaces built in their names. Some may find it confusing that leaders can ride to power on an anti-corruption crusade and yet, once in power, openly embody the corruptive rot they once vowed to eliminate. But an authoritarian leader can live with such contradiction as long as he has accumulated enough wealth and power to buy allies as needed and convince those beneath him that the loyal will reap the rewards of his rule.
For Putin and Erdogan, laws that get in the way of power can be changed. When Putin reached his presidential term limit in 2008, he installed his subordinate, Dmitri Medvedev, as president while he took the lesser position of prime minister. A loyal Medvedev dutifully signed a constitutional amendment the same year extending presidential terms from four years to six. Putin predictably returned to the presidency in 2012 and, assuming he can win again in 2018, could remain president for a fourth term until 2024.
Erdogan is in the process of engineering his own executive pirouette to consolidate power. When Erdogan reached his three-term limit as prime minister in 2014, he took the less powerful role of the presidency and installed Ahmet Davutoglu as prime minister. Though Davutoglu was long considered an ardent backer of Erdogan, even he grew tired of being politically bulldozed by the president and eventually resigned in 2016. With Binali Yildirim, a more willing executor of his political will, now in place as prime minister, Erdogan is inches away from radically transforming the country's political system and extending his tenure in the process.
On April 16, Turks will vote in a referendum that calls for placing the weight of executive power in the president's hands. Through the proposed constitutional changes, the prime minister's role would be abolished, a vice presidency would be created, parliamentary and judicial oversight over the presidency and his Cabinet would be diminished, and the president (instead of having to remain politically neutral under the existing law) would be allowed to head up his own political party, thus ensuring that lawmakers and deputies understand that their political futures rest directly on their loyalty to the president. Should the public approve these changes, Erdogan would become the acting executive. He would then be eligible to start from a clean slate in 2019 when his current term ends, able to run for the presidency and serve two more terms, potentially staying in power until 2029. (Erdogan is set on remaining president through 2023, the highly symbolic 100th anniversary of the Turkish Republic.)
Hold on Tight
Erdogan and Putin are well beyond the power-building phase of their careers. They are now deep in the act of consolidation, employing whatever creative and heavy-handed tactics are needed to keep them in control. This entails everything from constitutional engineering to drastic steps in controlling the media and silencing the opposition. The two leaders are deeply haunted by their recent memories of the Arab Spring, Euromaidan and Gezi Park uprisings. The specter of social upheaval was not their cue to start reforming and appeasing a growing number of dissidents. On the contrary, it provided the impetus to clamp down and use every opportunity — be it a failed coup or a spectacular terrorist attack — to try to eliminate any whiff of dissent while they still have the power to do so. Both hold deep convictions that if they are not there to navigate their countries through troubled waters in the coming years, their nations' very existence will be at stake. If this sounds like gross egoism, take a step into the mind of an authoritarian personality. For all the effort that goes into making our leaders appear like the common man, they are anything but. As neuroscientist Nayef al-Rodhan explains in his article "The Neurochemistry of Power: Implications for Political Change," the primary neurochemical involved in the reward of power is dopamine, the same chemical transmitter responsible for producing a sense of pleasure. "Power activates the very same reward circuitry in the brain and creates an addictive 'high.'" People wired to crave and seek power are in essence feeding an addiction. And if they feel that power slipping, they become more paranoid, less empathetic and more ruthless in how they govern.
Putin and Erdogan are two authoritarian peas in a pod, ruling over territories that are spread across Europe and Asia. Stretched between East and West, the duality of their nations often collides with their worldview, but solipsistic personalities in high power are also wired to stamp out uncomfortable realities that do not conform to their versions of reality. If the West thinks that lectures on human rights will remold them into democratic visionaries, it is deeply mistaken. These leaders are dripping with power and will go to extreme lengths to insulate themselves from competitors at home and abroad. But they are still political mortals at the end of the day. And the problem with remaining in power for a generation is that it increases the risk of encountering a generational wave of resistance. Erdogan saw the Gezi protesters as young hooligans who needed more discipline and direction in life. He will not hesitate to crack down in full force again.
Putin is facing mass protests in the lead-up to Russia's 2018 election as well, and this time, the demonstrations are dominated by young people who lack the historical memory of much harsher Soviet days. For them, Putin is not a protector from chaos; he is the only dictator they've ever known. This is a generation that has social media at its fingertips to rapidly consume and circulate information. A student at a school outside the city of Bryansk, southwest of Moscow, secretly recorded a debate between students in the class and their principal and teachers before leaking it on social media. In the recording, the students flatly rejected the government's nationalistic reasoning on taking Crimea by force and their teacher's defense of the government's crackdown on opposition activists. An excerpt from the recording reads as follows:
Principal: So you think that life in this country got worse with the arrival of Putin and Medvedev?
Student 1: No, but they've stayed too long. They've just been there [in power] for too long.
Student 2: Yeah.
Principal: Did you live in some other era that I somehow missed? Under whom did you live well? And under Putin and Medvedev things got worse for you?
Student 2: We've studied history.
Principal: Naturally.
Student 2: Well…
Principal: What does "well" mean? I'm asking you, specifically you: Under what ruler did you live well? What do you mean "well"?
Student 2: We've only ever had one ruler, actually.
Principal: You said that things have become worse. But you never lived through the hard years of the 1990s. When, forgive me for saying this, everyone carried around a blade and a firearm, and the country was in chaos. And this was when I was studying in college! This was when it was scary to go out into the street after eight at night. You didn't see this.
The conversation shows a stark contrast between generations: One with a visceral reaction to a much darker past that makes it deeply distrustful of social upheavals and fiercely loyal to a strongman leader; the other, far less risk averse, has only a distant memory from history books and simply is not willing to buy into fear-mongering propaganda designed to keep a few politicians in power. This is perhaps the challenge that neither Putin nor Erdogan may be fully prepared for in their extended political year
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• Russia: The parliament of the Georgian breakaway region of Abkhazia ratified an agreement to establish an information and coordination center that gives Russian law enforcement special powers to operate in Abkhazia. Reports meanwhile suggest that Russia is making moves to take control of South Ossetia, another breakaway region, and that, farther east, Azerbaijan has pulled out of NATO exercises. Russia is looking for leverage over the United States in response to new economic sanctions, and the Caucasus is a good place to start. We need to understand Russia’s plan for the region
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• Russia: Roughly 400 Russian troops held a military drill in Georgia’s breakaway region of Abkhazia. This follows several moves we are watching in the Caucasus and tracks with our Aug. 3 Reality Check. How far in advance was this drill scheduled? Is it part of the general trend we are seeing of Russia making moves here, or is it just a regularly scheduled program?
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I have been hammering the themes in this piece around here for years:
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For Russia, an Opportunity in US Sanctions
Aug 29, 2017
By Ekaterina Zolotova
The standoff between the West and Russia got more complicated when Washington imposed new sanctions against Moscow. The Europeans were quick to criticize the sanctions. Germany’s foreign minister raised concerns about U.S. intentions, France questioned the sanctions’ legality, and the European Commission president made threats that he later had to walk back. Suddenly, to the Kremlin, the sanctions looked less like a setback and more like an opportunity. If Russia can play the victim, it may be able to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the EU, more sympathetic as Brussels may prove to be.
There’s just one problem: Sanctions are just one way the U.S. is pushing back against Russia.
Russia has long been a major supplier to the European energy market. Put another way, Russia’s economy depends on its sales to Europe’s energy market. So Moscow took notice when recently the U.S. delivered its first shipment of liquefied natural gas to Lithuania, a country that at its nearest point is just more than 400 miles (650 kilometers) from Moscow. In fact, U.S. natural gas shipments have been appearing all over Europe lately in the wake of the American shale gas boom. This is the sort of encroachment that Russia is compelled to respond to. The challenge for Moscow is to do so without appearing threatening to Europe and thus pushing it closer to the United States. One place it might be able to do that is the Caucasus, specifically around Georgia and its breakaway republics, the very place where Russia announced its return to history in 2008.
Breakaway Territories
Russia has always kept a close eye on the Caucasus. This complex region has historically been riven by conflict. The most recent was, of course, a war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 over the breakaway Georgian republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Russian troops are still stationed in the republics. In fact, South Ossetia’s military was integrated into the Russian military in July as part of a 2015 agreement that provides for the formation of common defense and security between Russia and South Ossetia. The South Ossetian military is small, and its incorporation will not significantly affect the strength of the Russian army. It does, however, attest to Russia’s long-term plan to absorb a united Ossetia. Whether it can is another question, leaving open the possibility that Moscow will have to make do with a restive republic that is militarily if not politically beholden to the Kremlin.
Russia also plans to strengthen its position in the Caucasus by focusing on energy agreements. It wants to create a vast space for cooperation in Eurasia – with Moscow in the dominant spot, of course. The most important part of this plan for Russia is to establish control over the region’s oil and gas pipelines. Doing so will give Moscow control over energy supplies to Europe even if the supplies are not directly sourced in Russia.
The recently introduced sanctions, as well as the conflict in Ukraine, have delayed Russia’s plans to increase the supply of energy resources to Europe. The Caucasus, through which Europe also receives energy resources, gives Moscow a way to get back on track The Caucasus is poised to become a larger provider of European energy because several countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus (especially Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) are rich in natural resources, including oil and natural gas. And the EU is eager to diversify its energy supply – relying too much on one supplier puts it at risk of disruption. The European Union currently receives almost 40 percent of its oil supplies from the countries that make up the Commonwealth of Independent States, a Russian-led confederation of states that generally cooperates on economic matters. Russia accounts for 27 percent, while Kazakhstan provides almost 7 percent and Azerbaijan about 4 percent.
Europe gets oil from this region through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku-Supsa pipeline, and natural gas flows through the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline. All of these pipelines transit Georgian territory. That’s a source of strength for the Georgian government, but it’s also a vulnerability.
In late July, the Russian armed forces advanced the borders of South Ossetia slightly, putting a small stretch of the Baku-Septa pipeline within South Ossetia’s territory. This gives South Ossetia – or really, Russia – the ability to cut off supplies, or at least siphon off what it wants. Georgia could avoid this stretch of the pipeline, but not without incurring the added cost of loading the natural gas onto trucks or trains and shipping it overland.
Russia’s Reply
Herein lies Russia’s reply to U.S. actions. The U.S. ramped up natural gas deliveries to Europe, so Russia took hold of part of a Georgian pipeline that supplies gas to Europe. The U.S. led seven other countries in Noble Partner 2017, a large-scale military drill in Georgia, so Russia launched its own military drills in the North Caucasus and South Ossetia, which included about 16,000 Russian servicemen. And Russia completed the accession of South Ossetia’s army into Russian forces.
Georgia wants stronger ties with NATO. To strengthen them, it has to distance itself from Russia. But as long as Russia has leverage over the oil and gas passing through Georgian territory, it can’t do that. Georgia was the first country to abandon the post-Soviet identity and try to escape from Russia’s sphere of influence, but it can’t exist isolated from the Caucasus region. This, plus its dependence on energy supplies, obligates Georgia to cooperate with Russia in the energy sector in the Caucasus.
Russia has demonstrated to the U.S. that it can counter U.S. energy imports to Europe and continue to have significant control over the energy flows between the Caspian region and Europe. Recognizing the potential of the Caucasus region, the EU has been participating in the development of its energy sector. So it is important for Russia to maintain and strengthen its influence in the Caucasus. Russia has the ability to influence regional authorities as well as BP, which operates in the South Caucasus. The timing and energy focus of Russia’s pivot to the Caucasus indicate that this is part of Moscow’s response to U.S. sanctions.
It is in Russia’s interest to increase control over the pipelines passing through the territory of Georgia, but every move Russia makes to achieve that goal makes Europe more suspicious of its intentions, thus making it harder to drive a wedge between European countries and the United States.
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Trump appears to be doing the political correct POTUS response to every "disaster"
offer help before and during and after
probably plan to shower Fed money to Texas ( or the Ryans will for sure)
go to seen and look grim
maybe give someone a hug for the cameras
etc ad nauseum
If he did not do this we know what the media will do to him
It will be interesting to see how CNN spins this to make him look BAD.
Perhaps they will now say these efforts are all political instead :wink:
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wrong thread :lol:
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The North Caucasus: Russia’s Soft Underbelly
Oct 26, 2017
Summary
In last week’s Deep Dive on the South Caucasus, we explained how the region’s unforgiving, mountainous terrain has served as both borderland and battleground for empires. This Deep Dive will focus on the North Caucasus, the relatively flat region above the Greater Caucasus mountain range whose terrain has made it vulnerable to Russian domination. Moving forward, however, the weakening of Russia and the re-emergence of political Islam means the region will likely pose a security threat to the Kremlin.
The Region
In sharp contrast with the South Caucasus, the North Caucasus is not composed of separate sovereign states. Instead the North Caucasus is an integral part of Russia, divided between two of the Russian Federation’s eight districts – the North Caucasian Federal District and the Southern Federal District. Most of the region belongs to the North Caucasian district, which split from the Southern district in 2010, a year after the end of the Second Chechen War. With the Southern district lying largely to the north, the North Caucasian district is the only Muslim-majority district in the federation.
(click to enlarge)
The North Caucasus stretches from the Caspian Sea in the southeast to the Sea of Azov in the northwest. The westernmost part of the area, composed of Krasnodar region and the enclave of Adygea, lies within the Southern district. Krasnodar consists mainly of flat lands, which allowed Russia to more easily slavicize the territory after the forced exodus of its Circassian inhabitants in the late 19th century. The rest of the North Caucasus region – the North Caucasian district – has maintained its distinct Muslim identity and hence was configured into a single federal district. This district runs from Krasnodar to the Caspian Sea and consists of the republics of Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan. The region of Stavropol – sandwiched between Krasnodar in the west and Dagestan in the east, and sharing borders with each of the other republics in the south – and North Ossetia are the only majority ethnic Russian and Orthodox Christian units within the North Caucasian district.
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This current administrative arrangement of the North Caucasus is the outcome of the Russians’ centuries-long struggle to subdue this region. Until the North Caucasus was brought to heel during the time of the czarist regime in the late 19th century, the region was what noted Caucasus and Central Asia scholar Marie Bennigsen Broxup referred to as a “barrier” that separated Russia from the heart of the Muslim world. At the same time, the mountainous terrain kept major Muslim powers to the south, such as the Ottoman Turks and the Safavid (and later Qajar) Persians, from truly accessing this region. Though both the Turks and the Persians had sought to expand into the Caucasus region, neither side was able to move past the South Caucasus.
By the 18th century, both the Ottomans and the Persians lacked the modern political, economic and military capabilities Russia and the other Europeans had acquired. Furthermore, they were embroiled in a bitter rivalry in the Middle East, and the Turks were heavily committed in Europe where they were starting to lose territory. Ultimately, the Ottomans and Persians were unable to seize the massive Greater Caucasus mountain range. The Russians, however, had no such trouble. Though a lengthy undertaking, Orthodox Christian Russia was much better positioned to eventually occupy the North Caucasus.
Russian Conquest
From a strategic point of view, Russia must control at least the North Caucasus, and ideally the South Caucasus, because these areas are buffer regions; should they fall into hostile hands, the entire Russian core would become vulnerable. These areas, however, have historically proven difficult to control because of both the terrain and the locals.
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Ivan the Terrible’s 1556 conquest of Astrakhan (an area of the North Caucasus that lies along the northwestern tip of the Caspian Sea) sparked Russian interest in the region. During this initial thrust into the North Caucasus, which lasted until 1604, the Russians reached as far as Dagestan, thanks to the flat terrain in the region’s northern half. This invasion did not last, however. The Ottomans, who were still a powerful force at the time, supported the Dagestanis against the Russian incursion. The Russians were forced to pull back to Astrakhan.
From 1604 to 1783, the region was more or less left to its own devices. Russia had turned its focus to Europe, and the Turks were tied down in their wars with the Persians. This relative isolation allowed Islam, which had been present in the area since the 8th century, to spread rapidly through the central and western parts of the North Caucasus – in large part because of the halt of the Russian efforts to penetrate the area and the support of the Ottoman Turks and the Crimean Tatars.
Under Catherine II, Russia was able to project power into the North Caucasus. From 1783 to 1824, Russia engaged in a systematic campaign to conquer the region. Between 1785 and 1791, the Russians faced massive resistance from the forces of the Ottoman-backed Chechen Sufi leader Sheikh Mansour, who managed to unite much of the North Caucasus. After a major defeat at the hands of these Muslim warriors, on the banks of the Sunzha River in 1785, the Russian army, buoyed by its victory in the Napoleonic Wars, was able to come back and subdue the resistance. Though ultimately defeated, the uprising established among the locals that Islam could serve as both a unifying force and the basis of armed resistance.
This experience led to a series of jihad-inspired campaigns that continued until the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1922. During this time, the North Caucasus saw the decline of the traditional feudal elite and the rise of Sufi orders, further entrenching Islam within the political fabric of the North Caucasus. The U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College scholar Robert F. Baumann explains how Russian efforts to complete their conquest of the region were complicated, as religious fervor proved to be an effective mobilizer of anti-Russian resistance. But though Islamic resistance made the conquest of the region more costly to the Russians, it failed to block the conquest completely.
The ramifications of the Russian conquest of the North Caucasus is not dissimilar to that of British and French colonialism in India and Africa, respectively. As former CIA and national security official Paul Henze notes in a 1996 article, Russian colonialism brought order and development to the North Caucasus – an otherwise chaotic region of tribal highlanders cut off from the rest of the world. Indeed, Moscow provided the region with modern infrastructure in the form of roads, railroads, ports and urban centers, but only after a long campaign to suppress local dissent.
Unlike most other European powers that sought colonies in distant lands, the Russians sought to control a land much closer to home. Indeed, the Caucasus was on Russia’s doorstep, and thus, it was imperative that the Russians fully assimilate the area. They spent a great deal of time trying to convert the people of the region to Orthodox Christianity, operating on the assumption that conversion would aid in assimilation. Ultimately, that policy backfired. Despite the fact that there were many ethno-linguistic groups that inhabited this region, a majority of them had been Muslim for centuries.
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Affinity to religion varies considerably across the region. Islam plays an important role in the identity and ideology of the Chechens and the Dagestanis in the east. Yet, as one moves west, religious fervor tends to taper off. Beyond Islam, there is little commonality among the various peoples of the North Caucasus. They are divided along clan, ethnic, linguistic and territorial lines, and the Russians sought to exploit these differences.
At the social level, traditional feudal Muslim elites and religious scholars sought to preserve their power through two sets of laws. The former emphasized customary laws, while the religious leaders sought to increase their influence by promoting Shariah, or Islamic law. Until the arrival of the Russians, these two competing forces were largely able to coexist.
According to Loyola University historian Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia pursued a complex strategy in its effort to take over the North Caucasus region. In some instances, the Russians found allies. But in others, they resorted to force, especially in terms of the takeover of lands and expulsion of the locals. In need of local partners, Russia would often co-opt the feudal Muslim elite, transforming them into loyalists of Moscow through assimilation. Elites from the North Caucasus were sent to study in Moscow, where many embraced Orthodox Christianity and Russian culture. Yet these individuals did not help promote assimilation in the North Caucasus, as few returned home. By the latter half of the 19th century, the Russians realized they needed people to represent Russian interests in the North Caucasus, and Moscow began to support locals who held grievances toward the landed gentry.
The attempts to convert people of the region to Orthodox Christianity undercut the more crucial interests of securing loyalty to the empire. Attempts at conversion were obviously anathema to the Muslim clergy, but they also triggered opposition from within the traditional elite quarters. For the Russians, who saw conversion as part and parcel of their efforts to advance their imperial interests within the region, it was difficult to alter course. In addition to the need to secularize the process of assimilation, there was ambiguity on how the North Caucasus would be controlled by Moscow. Should it be fully absorbed into the empire as a full-fledged province or should it be treated as a colony?
As the Russians searched for the best way to administer the North Caucasus, the region experienced another outbreak of major resistance. The leader of this campaign was Imam Shamil, who in the mid-19th century established the Caucasian Imamate, an Islamic polity that sought to liberate the area from the Russians. The Russians were forced to recognize that the region’s legal traditions had to be incorporated into their new system of governance. But here the Russians found themselves caught in the existing duality between customary and Islamic laws. Siding with the clergy would have helped undermine the tendency toward armed religious resistance, but the Russians needed local interlocutors who would be willing to adopt Russian customs and thus preferred the local economic and political elites.
As a result, throughout the czarist era, Russia struggled with how best to manage the North Caucasus. The empire eventually succeeded in creating a pro-Russian elite class in the region because, for many local elites, the only path toward European modernization was through Russification. Yet the masses remained loyal to Islamic teachings, and the gulf between the elites and the masses widened. By the late 19th and early 20th centuries, however, the elites and the masses would find common cause through the fusion of religious identity with ethnic nationalism.
The Soviet and Post-Soviet Eras
Already isolated from the rest of the world by geography and Russian subjugation, the North Caucasus became more or less completely cloaked behind the iron curtain of communism and the Soviet Union. Well aware of the struggles their czarist predecessors had to face in the North Caucasus, the Soviets divided the region, lumping its various pieces into different Soviet Socialist Republics. The main Soviet Socialist Republic in the North Caucasus combined Chechnya and Ingushetia to form the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Furthermore, the Soviets maintained a sophisticated and efficient coercive security establishment led by the KGB, allowing them to subdue this historically restive region.
Yet the Chechens openly expressed their discontent and, under the leadership of the nationalist guerilla leader Hasan Israilov, mounted an insurgency against the Soviet regime between 1940 and 1944. To suppress opposition, Soviet leader Josef Stalin ordered the mass displacement of people from the region after accusing the Chechens of having collaborated with the Nazis during World War II. In 1944, some 650,000 people from the region – most of whom were ethnic Chechens – were forced to relocate to Central Asia. The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was dissolved and its areas gerrymandered. It was not until the era of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev that efforts to make amends with the Chechens began. In 1956, the Chechens were returned to their homes. Two years later, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was restored.
The region generally remained calm for the next three decades, only to erupt yet again in the early 1990s when 15 republics declared independence and the Soviet Union dissolved. The South Caucasus divided into three independent republics — Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia — along with a few disputed territories. But the Russians were not willing to allow the North Caucasus, especially Chechnya, which declared independence in 1991, to become sovereign entities. Two back-to-back wars ensued, the first lasting from 1993 to 1996 and the second from 1999 to 2009.
Initially, the Chechen wars were dominated by nationalists, who subscribed to the Sufi religious creed, seeking an independent Chechnya. Gradually, however, Salafists assumed greater control of the fighting against Russian forces. These jihadists eventually moved beyond the goal of establishing an independent Islamic Chechnya to pursue broader, transnational agendas including creating a regional Islamic state that would encompass the broader North Caucasus region. Inspired by al-Qaida and aided by the influx of many Arab foreign fighters, Chechen jihadists modeled themselves after the historic religious warriors who resisted Russians in the North Caucasus since the Russian incursions began in the 16th century. In 2007, a regional movement called the Caucasus Emirate was founded.
With the rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, the Caucasus Emirate group has essentially become irrelevant. Many Chechen militants and those from other parts of the North Caucasus moved to Syria and Iraq to join the jihadist regime. This weakening of the Chechen insurgency in the late 2000s allowed the republic to establish a stable regime led by the Kadyrov clan, which has kept peace for at least a decade. The key to this stability is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s dedicated support of the Kadyrov regime.
If history is any guide, the peace in Chechnya and the wider North Caucasus right now is likely the calm before the next storm. The Islamic religion and the Islamist ideology remain social and political drivers and have forced Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov to increase the role of religion in public life in the republic. This trend, coupled with the declining Russian political economy, suggests that the region will likely see the revival of a Muslim insurgency seeking to exploit Russia’s weakening. If Russia can’t control this area then the other historic players — Turkey and Iran — are in even less of a position to do so.
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As long time readers here know, for many years I have been underlining the rarely mentioned importance of Central Asian natural gas as an alternative for Europe to being supplied by Russia and as a motive for understanding geopolitical actions-- wish this piece had a map:
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How Central Asian Energy Complements the Southern Gas Corridor
Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov attends an opening ceremony for the East-West natural gas pipeline in 2015.
(IGOR SASIN/AFP/Getty Images)
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By Robert M. Cutler for Euractiv
It took the EU several years to move in a Central Asian direction for energy security after the US-sponsored project for a Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) for natural gas fell apart in the late 1990s. Nevertheless, first through the 2004 Baku Initiative and then with the 2007 Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia, it began to take those steps.
The EU followed through with practical effect in 2011 when it initiated negotiations with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan on TCP construction. Last June the Council of the European Union, evaluating the first decade of the EU Strategy for Central Asia, concluded that "the EU will continue to seek to extend the Southern Gas Corridor to Central Asia, and to further promote the EU's multilateral and bilateral energy cooperation" with the countries involved.
Key in this policy are not only the TCP but also the White Stream pipeline, planned to transport Turkmenistan's gas from the South Caucasus directly to EU territory, from Georgia under the Black Sea to Romania. The gas would then flow through existing infrastructure in Ukraine, Slovakia and Czechia to Germany and neighbouring countries. It can also feed new infrastructure being created, such as the Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria pipeline (BRUA).
Recent Developments Accelerate
Events since spring 2017 have greatly accelerated this development. In April 2017, the Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation acquired 10% of the two different White Stream and TCP promoter companies. In May Georgia's prime minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili explained that his country was "working intensively on the project of transporting gas from Turkmenistan to Europe, the White Stream project, which brings new opportunities for the diversification of Europe's energy supply."
Days later Kvirikashvili's advisor Giorgi Vashakmadze declared that the EU "has a special interest in the projects of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline and the White Stream", and in June the Council of the European Union reaffirmed the goal of extending the Southern Gas Corridor into Central Asia. Later that month Maroš Šefčovič, Vice-President of the European Commission welcomed Georgia's accession to the Energy Community and singled out its role in extending the Southern Gas Corridor to additional supply countries.
These developments set the stage for further events in the region itself. In August the leaders of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan signed for the first time an agreement to bring Caspian energy resources to Europe. In December, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov sensationally announced agreement among the five littoral states over the text of a Convention establishing a Caspian Sea legal regime.
Azerbaijani deputy foreign minister Khalaf Khalafov specifically clarified that "rights for laying pipelines are foreseen in the draft Convention" and that "those countries through whose sectors [the pipelines] will run" are the ones that "will coordinate the issue." The final excuse hindering TCP construction has thus disappeared.
Just last month Šefčovič reaffirmed "the Trans-Caspian Pipeline [as] an important, complementary element of the Southern Gas Corridor in order to connect the significant gas reserves of Central Asia to the European markets." The TCP is on the EU's List of Projects of Common Interest, qualifying it for preferential financial regulatory treatment by European institutions. Gas from the TCP's first string looks like reaching Greece and possibly Italy for European distribution in 2020. Gas transiting the second string would arrive in Romania as early as 2022.
For this to happen, necessary steps must be taken expeditiously. Georgia's energy ministry detailed such a step-by-step road-map late last year to the Energy Community (PowerPoint here). According to it, an adequate solution is found to problems of Turkmenistan's policy of selling gas at its border and banning production sharing agreements.
In this road-map, the Government of Georgia will provide early-stage financial investment usually made by oil and gas majors relying on production sharing agreements. It will enable the project promoter companies to conduct engineering and other studies necessary for obtaining a construction permit. They will identify all capital and operational costs, enabling the promoter, in possession of the construction permits, to announce transportation tariffs for gas delivery to be levied on (presumably European) shippers. On that basis, the shippers can then negotiate sale-purchase agreements with Turkmenistan.
How Turkmenistan's Gas Will Come to Europe
The idea that gas from Europe's east should have two entry-points to Europe arose during competition between the Nabucco and South Stream projects. The European Coordinator's 2009 report on implementing the Caspian Development Corporation also adopted this idea. (He even suggested continuing the White Stream pipeline to Trieste, in order to secure different markets for White Stream and Nabucco.) The TCP follows this idea by aiming at two entry-points for Turkmen gas to Europe, one for each of the pipeline's two strings.
The TCP's first string, carrying 16 billion cubic metres per annum (bcma), would pass from Azerbaijan through the South Caucasus Pipeline (now being expanded from SCP to SCPx), then via Turkey's east-west Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) to Greece, whence to Italy by way of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). With comparatively modest incremental outlay, yielding excellent cost/benefit ratios, this system can handle gas from the TCP, significantly enhancing the EU's advantages from the SGC.
The TCP's second string, also for 16 bcma, runs across the Black Sea. It costs less than the Turkish route and targets a different market, satisfying the increasing import needs of Germany and its neighbours. Gas from the TCP's second string, instead of entering Turkey and Greece, would transit Georgia, landing in Romania. The White Stream pipeline would be laid under the Black Sea, using economical and widely available ultra-deep-sea technology. From there, Turkmen gas would reach Central Europe by two routes.
The first route for gas from TCP's second string, once landed in EU territory (Constanța, Romania), may utilise capacity from the Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria pipeline (BRUA) pipeline now under construction. Another intra-European route from Constanța will have larger capacity. This second route would go north by reverse-flow through the Trans-Balkan Pipeline, after Gazprom's contracts with Romania and Ukraine expire in 2019, then through Ukraine's gas transmission system for subsequent distribution to Poland, Austria and, by the Bratstvo pipeline, to Slovakia, Czechia and Germany.
Central Asian Gas Brings More Than Just Gas to Europe
Turkmenistan has always sought to export larger volumes, in search of higher revenues through economies of scale. That is why the country constructed at its own expense the domestic East-West Pipeline (EWP), which transmits the gas up to Turkmenistan's coast on the Caspian Sea. Finished in 2015, the EWP is now capped and filled with gas awaiting further westward transmision.
The East-West Pipeline was designed and built to carry 30-40 bcma. Together with offshore production, that is the quantity Turkmenistan seeks to export. So it is very likely that prospects for TCP's second string will need to be made clear before Turkmenistan commits quantities for the first string. The Georgian ministry's road-map provides a way to accomplish this.
Together with the TANAP/TAP system, the TCP and White Stream projects meet criteria of competition, market integration, security of supply and diversification, required for designation as Projects of Common Interest. They will increase transit capacity of Eastern Partnership countries Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine. They will likewise increase competition and security of supply, and significantly stimulate economic growth, in Georgia and Ukraine.
White Stream and TCP complement the Southern Gas Corridor. They will increase volumes of gas that can be transited to Europe. White Stream especially will create new ways for gas to reach Central and Eastern Europe via Romania. It will support new European infrastructure such as the Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria pipeline (BRUA) and the utilisation of Ukraine's gas storage facilities to Europe's benefit.
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wish this piece had a map:
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(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a1/Baku_pipelines.svg/330px-Baku_pipelines.svg.png)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans-Caspian_Gas_Pipeline
The Trans/Caspian gas pipeline would run under the Caspian Sea from Türkmenbaşy to the Sangachal Terminal, where it would connect with the existing pipeline to Erzurum in Turkey, which in turn would be connected to the Southern Gas Corridor, thus taking natural gas from Turkmenistan to Central Europe.
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Excellent Doug, thank you 8-)
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North Caucasus, Russia: TASS reported that Russia’s National Guard is going to deploy aviation assets to support operations in the North Caucasus and other Russian areas. We have been paying close attention to the situation in the North Caucasus, which is an important area for Russia from a geopolitical perspective because of the access it affords to Moscow. Let’s find out what kinds of operations these are, and exactly where they are. Do they pose a serious threat to stability in the North Caucasus?
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Turkey: Turkish and Uzbek officials are meeting to discuss Afghanistan, and they have a conference set up on the subject that will be held at the end of March in Tashkent. This is not the first Turkish activity we’ve seen in Central Asia in the past couple of weeks. Considering that Turkey has invaded Syria, is active in the Balkans and is turning back Italian ships in the Eastern Mediterranean, it has a lot on its plate right now. We have a good handle on what Turkey is doing in these other areas but not in Central Asia. How do these moves fit with Turkey’s strategy?
• Finding: Turkey is very active in Central Asia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it supported pan-Turk policies in many former satellite states in an effort to establish influence over their Turkic populations. Turkey now influences them through bilateral projects and investments. The government in Ankara wants to become Eurasia’s hub for energy transport while Central Asian countries want transport routes that go through places that are not Russia. Still, Turkey’s bilateral relations with the countries of Central Asia are slow to evolve, and the share of oil and natural gas from Central Asia remains small.
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North Caucasus, Russia: TASS reported that Russia’s National Guard is going to deploy aviation assets to support operations in the North Caucasus and other Russian areas. We have been paying close attention to the situation in the North Caucasus, which is an important area for Russia from a geopolitical perspective because of the access it affords to Moscow. Let’s find out what kinds of operations these are, and exactly where they are. Do they pose a serious threat to stability in the North Caucasus?
• Finding: Planning has been in the works since September 2017 to create two new districts this year for the National Guard: in the south of Russia, with the headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, and in the North Caucasus, in Pyatigorsk. The National Guard deployment is related to the 2018 World Cup in Russia, but there is no information yet on the operations or equipment.
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Uzbekistan, Russia: A delegation from the Uzbek armed forces visited Siberia to observe a Russian military compound in the Central Military District. On one hand, we have seen nascent signs of Uzbekistan improving relations with the U.S., and we’ve talked about how Russia’s declining influence in Central Asia has countries like Uzbekistan moving away from Russia. On the other hand, we have a story like this. Is this a sign of increasing cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan?
Russia: Russia says it has arrested five members of the Islamic State in Dagestan. Instability in the North Caucasus is a serious tripwire for Russian security, and IS establishing a presence there would certainly qualify as instability. Is Russia facing a serious Islamist challenge in this region?
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Uzbekistan: Uzbekistan’s defense minister said the Commonwealth of Independent States, a grouping of former Soviet countries, should strengthen cooperation in the area of air defense. CIS initially set up an air defense system back in 1995. Uzbekistan is in the midst of trying to position itself as a regional leader in Central Asia and does not host any Russian military bases (an exception to the norm in the region). Uzbekistan has recently shown signs of closer collaboration with the U.S. as well. What is Uzbekistan’s end game here?
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Summary
Nearly four years ago, the Islamic State was on top of the world. After seizing large segments of Iraq and Syria, the group announced the establishment of a caliphate on June 29, 2014. Islamist extremists from all over rushed to join the group. Major militaries bent on destroying the group were not far behind. By the end of 2017, the Iraqi government was declaring Iraq “totally liberated” of IS, and the Russian General Staff was touting similar results in Syria.
The same year IS was making headlines in Iraq and Syria, a branch of the group was taking root in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. Its fate has been very different. In April 2017, when U.S. officials estimated there were 700 IS members in Afghanistan, the U.S. military made its intentions to dismantle the group known when it dropped the “mother of all bombs” on IS targets in Nangarhar province. A few months later, a U.S. airstrike in Kunar province killed the leader of the Afghan branch. By November, however, with the war still raging, the top NATO commander in Afghanistan said American forces had killed over 1,600 IS fighters in Afghanistan. In late December, IS blew up a cultural center in Kabul, killing 50 people. Other bombings followed, the largest of which killed almost 70 on April 22, 2018. A few days ago, on June 8, the top U.S. general in Afghanistan said anti-IS operations would intensify during the ongoing temporary cease-fire against the Taliban.
The Islamic State branch in Afghanistan benefited somewhat from the demise of IS in Iraq and Syria. As the latter crumbled, current and would-be foreign fighters – many of whom come from Central Asia – sought out the next battleground, which many decided was Afghanistan. Looking ahead, in much the same way that successes against IS in Iraq and Syria pushed the fight to Afghanistan, successes in Afghanistan could push the fight north, into Central Asia. Thousands of people from Central Asia are believed to have joined IS in Iraq and Syria, so in a way, this would be a homecoming.
Terrorist groups near the borders of several Central Asian countries are already growing more active. More than 15,000 IS fighters are at the southern borders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, the secretary of the Security Council of Russia said in late May. There are reports of IS fighters concentrating in the northeastern Afghan provinces of Badakhshan, Takhar and Kunduz, all of which border Tajikistan. Specifics on the fighters are hard to come by, but Tajikistan’s State Committee for National Security believes they number about 7,000. This includes about 4,000 in Kunduz, an estimated 95 percent of whom are Uzbeks from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (which pledged its loyalty to IS in 2015).
To be fair, many prognosticators – ourselves included – have been waiting for years for the turmoil in Afghanistan and Pakistan to drag down Central Asian states. Yet the Institute for Economics and Peace, which puts out a yearly Global Terrorism Index, placed only Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in the half of countries most affected by terrorism, and even those only barely. (Kazakhstan ranked the worst at 67 – the higher the ranking, the more effect terrorism has on the country – just behind Canada.) Incidents of terrorism actually dropped between 2002 and 2016 in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, according to the index. But think tank indexes don’t change geopolitics, and they can’t fix socio-political or economic stresses. What those indicators say is that Central Asia has a rather high chance to become a new hotbed for terrorists. This would be bad news not just for Central Asia but also for its neighbors, especially China and Russia. In this Deep Dive, we’ll look at the geopolitics and the internal stresses of the region, as well as how Russia and China are preparing to fight back.
An Islamic Arc of Instability
Central Asia is surrounded by a sort of Islamic arc of instability. In the south, it borders Afghanistan and Pakistan. To the east is the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, China’s most unstable region, where a plurality of the population – about 45 percent – is Muslim. And to the west, the restive Caucasus is separated from Central Asia by only the Caspian Sea. The southern section of the instability arc is the most contagious, so although the socio-economic vulnerabilities in each state are fairly comparable, the three that border Afghanistan – Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – are most immediately vulnerable to the spillover of IS and the Taliban.
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Tajikistan has the weakest army and the longest border with Afghanistan – more than 800 miles (1,300 kilometers) – of the Central Asian countries. It is simply incapable of securing its borders and stopping extremists from slipping into its territory. Turkmenistan’s border with Afghanistan is a little more than half as long as Tajikistan’s, but a nearly 500-mile border is not much more defensible. Turkmenistan is also attractive to Islamists because of its sparse population, weak military and the absence of Russian military bases, factors that combine to make it easier to put down roots and spread.
Uzbekistan, on the other hand, may be the best-prepared country in Central Asia to counter an influx of terrorists from Afghanistan. The border is less than 90 miles long and traces the Amu Darya river, a natural obstacle to clandestine crossings. Uzbekistan also has Central Asia’s largest active-duty military, according to a 2017 International Institute for Strategic Studies report, and it inherited a great deal of the Soviet Union’s military equipment when the USSR collapsed.
Farther north, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are shielded from the Afghan border, but they have another threat: Xinjiang. The Chinese state-run Global Times newspaper quoted unnamed sources in 2014 as saying some 300 Chinese Uighurs were fighting with IS in Iraq and Syria. And in the late 1990s, Chinese Uighurs in Xinjiang formed what is now known as the Turkistan Islamic Party, a terrorist group whose goal is to create a caliphate in Xinjiang and Central Asia. Moreover, Kazakhstan’s vast steppes are desirable terrain for jihadist groups, including those that could come from the south, because many areas are sparsely populated and hard to patrol. From there it is also possible to move into Russia and the Caucasus, where allies would not be difficult to find.
Turmoil Inside the Arc
The roots of extremism and terrorism in Central Asia can be clearly traced back to the 1990s, but that isn’t when the first wave of Central Asian terrorism began. The first terrorist movement there was actually the Basmachi movement, a Muslim revolt against the Bolsheviks and the Russian people under the banner of a “holy war,” starting in 1917. The movement was defeated by the Red Army in 1938, but Central Asian Islamism was not extinguished. In the Soviet Union, Muslims could not openly profess their religion and were instead forced to accept state atheism. The successes of Islamists in Afghanistan against the USSR in the 1980s, combined with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, breathed new life into Central Asian Islamism, and a number of groups emerged that began to cooperate with, for example, the Taliban movement.
The strict authoritarianism that took hold in the newly independent states of Central Asia in the mid-1990s was fuel to the Islamist fire. Government efforts to stop the spread of Islam and Islamist groups, which they perceived to be a threat to their power, had the reverse effect. Political opposition became violent resistance, and terrorist movements formed in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, bent on creating an Islamist state inside their territory.
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, established in the late 1990s, became the largest terrorist group in the region. Its mission was to topple the regime of Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who died in 2016, and establish an Islamic state uniting the five states of Central Asia. The IMU was once aligned with al-Qaida but it formally switched loyalties to IS in 2015. Other groups include Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, Jamaat Ansarullah (originally from Tajikistan) and the Turkistan Islamic Party (formerly the East Turkestan Islamic Movement), which mostly threatens China. A newer group, Lashkar-e-Khorasan, has formed with the goal of creating a Central Asian caliphate, though it is not tied to IS, according to Andrei Serenko, a scholar at the Russia-based Center for Studies of Modern Afghanistan. Lashkar-e-Khorasan consists mostly of people from Central Asia.
The motivation of terrorists is a hotly debated topic, but religion alone is rarely a sufficient driver. Extremism usually spreads when there are unfavorable social or economic conditions and the legal avenues for political dissent prove ineffective. Central Asia in the 1990s is a case in point. In the first years of independence, Central Asian countries had poor economic performances, and parts of the population were marginalized.
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Much has changed in the two decades since. Macroeconomic indicators in Central Asia today are positive. The World Bank estimates that Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan all experienced gross domestic product growth of at least 5.3 percent in 2017 and expects 5 percent or better growth for each for at least the next three years, while the GDPs of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan grew by an estimated 4 and 4.6 percent last year, respectively. But their rapid modernization covers up demographic problems and widening social divisions. Poverty and unemployment – especially youth unemployment – are still an issue, even if official statistics don’t always show it. Many are trying to move abroad to find work. Most go to Russia, since Russian is still commonly spoken in post-Soviet states. Some become radicalized. Frustrated youths are the ideal target for jihadist recruiters, and Central Asia has plenty of them.
Pre-Emptive Action
For years, Central Asian extremists concentrated their efforts on Central Asia. But when the Islamic State declared its caliphate in Iraq and Syria in 2014, the most dedicated jihadists in Central Asia rushed to join the effort. Most of the fighters came from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
In early 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin said there were some 9,000 people from Commonwealth of Independent States countries (the five Central Asian states plus Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) fighting in Syria. Uzbekistan led the way with 1,500 citizens fighting alongside IS. Tajik official data said about 1,150 of its citizens in recent years had gone to Syria or Iraq to join IS. Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs says 519 Tajiks are fighting with IS, while 150 more have died and 36 were allowed to return home and avoid criminal prosecution. Kyrgyz authorities estimated that about 600 of their citizens joined extremist groups in Syria and Iraq; Kazakhstan puts its own estimate at 500; and Turkmenistan says 400. Reliable data does not exist – these estimates count only men, for instance – but the totals are in line with the upper end of most other estimates.
The flow of fighters started to reverse when IS began losing ground and running out of funds. The extremists who left for Iraq and Syria years ago return home battle-hardened, experienced and devout. Border authorities attempt to catch them, but some inevitably slip through the cracks. The fear inside the governments of Central Asia is that the returning militants will create sleeper terrorist cells in their countries, recruiting more fighters and ultimately unifying Islamist movements in the region.
Central Asian governments are also concerned that refugees from Afghanistan could become radicalized, or that Taliban or IS fighters could hide among them. However, the number of refugees in Central Asia is still small: At the start of 2017, 729 refugees were registered in Tajikistan, 653 in Kazakhstan, 339 in Kyrgyzstan, and 27 each in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
Central Asian governments have been taking pre-emptive action. Since fall 2015, Tajikistan has closed more than 1,500 mosques in an effort to combat religious extremism. Earlier this year, Russia and Tajikistan carried out joint anti-terrorism drills near the Afghan border. In May 2018, Collective Security Treaty Organization countries launched anti-terrorism drills in Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan, which strives for independence and neutrality, ratified the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Convention on Countering Extremism last June and rejoined SCO counterterrorism drills after a long absence. And the president of Kyrgyzstan said he is not opposed to opening a second Russian military base in the country.
Central Asia’s most powerful neighbors, Russia and China, are keeping a watchful eye on the situation and have been quick to offer help. Both share long borders with Central Asian states and realize that they could be next if terrorism started to spread in the region. In addition, China is cognizant of the threat to its One Belt, One Road projects through Central Asia.
Russia and China, in the framework of the CSTO and the SCO, are working out joint plans with partner states to combat the terrorist threat. After a seven-year hiatus, the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group, designed to help Afghanistan fight terrorism, drugs and crime, met in October 2017 in Moscow. The group met again this year in Beijing. In late April, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said Moscow was increasing the combat readiness of Russian military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to prevent the spread of militants from northern Afghanistan to Russia’s allies in the CSTO.
Iran and the U.S. have also shown an interest in the stability of Central Asia, and Russia and China are wary of their intentions. Whether it’s conspiracy theory or legitimate fear, Russia seems particularly concerned that the U.S. could be encouraging unrest in Central Asia. Instability there could disrupt China’s One Belt, One Road initiative and distract Russia from interfering in areas more important to U.S. foreign policy. On the other hand, the U.S. will never forget what happened in 2001 when Islamism in Afghanistan grew powerful enough to reach even the United States. And as Central Asian governments have already shown in recent years, nothing gets Russian military bases in the region upgraded or joint drills carried out like hyping the threat of terrorism
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Makes points I have been making here for several years about the interplay of Central Asian gas and Russia's desire to be a monopoly to Europe.
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/what-does-new-caspian-sea-agreement-mean-energy-market
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For years now I have underlined the geopolitics of natural gas in Central Asia:
Nov. 1, 2018
By Ekaterina Zolotova
To Reach Pakistan, Saudi Arabia Goes Through Turkmenistan
The Central Asian state could give Riyadh a way into the surging Pakistani natural gas market – and edge Iran out of it.
Energy pipelines carry more than oil or natural gas. They are powerful conduits for economic and political influence. In Pakistan, increasing demand for energy has caught the attention of several possible suppliers eager for the country’s business and fealty. Saudi Arabia, for example, has promised to sell Islamabad $3 billion worth of crude oil on a deferred payment plan as part of an investment deal. It’s a competitive offer for Pakistan, whose precarious finances mean the country needs all the credit it can get. But it’s hardly the only energy arrangement Islamabad is entertaining, and in the realm of natural gas, the kingdom may well be outbid. Iran and Russia have proposed building an offshore pipeline to accommodate Pakistan’s surging demand for natural gas. The three parties signed a preliminary agreement on the pipeline – which would run 1,724 miles (2,775 kilometers) from Iran to India by way of Pakistan – in September. And just like that, Saudi Arabia seemed cut out of Pakistan’s natural gas market.
The kingdom, however, has found another way into the Pakistani market: Turkmenistan. Riyadh recently announced that it would allocate more funds to build the Central Asian state’s portion of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India, or TAPI, natural gas pipeline. The investment is Saudi Arabia’s latest move to check Iran’s influence in Pakistan and the surrounding region, but it could also put Russia on the defensive.
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Too Promising to Pass Up
For Iran and Saudi Arabia alike, Pakistan represents an opportunity. It is the second-most populous majority-Muslim country (like Iran, Pakistan is an Islamic republic) and the only nuclear power in the Muslim world. It would be a valuable ally for either country, and it recently offered to mediate between them to try to resolve Yemen’s civil war. On the energy front, Pakistan is no less promising. Its rapidly growing market adds about half a million customers a year. To keep up with that demand, the government plans to more than triple its annual imports of liquefied natural gas to 37 billion cubic meters by 2030. Though Saudi Arabia is not a natural gas producer itself and has smaller reserves compared with Iran, it can’t afford to miss out on the rising demand for natural gas and LNG in Pakistan.
That’s where Turkmenistan comes in. The country has both ample natural gas reserves and serious problems with export and distribution. For most of their post-Soviet history, Russia was Turkmenistan’s largest natural gas customer – large enough to call the shots in the Turkmen natural gas industry. The government in Ashgabat tried to diversify its export destinations, starting shipments to China and pushing for a more direct route to Europe that would bypass Russia, but its efforts backfired. Nervous about losing control over Turkmenistan’s natural gas supply, Moscow blocked construction of the proposed Trans-Caspian pipeline. Russian natural gas giant Gazprom, meanwhile, gradually reduced its purchases of Turkmen gas until 2016, when it stopped them altogether. As a result, Turkmenistan has no way to move its natural gas west or north.
To the south, its luck hasn’t been much better. Iran, which also opposes building a pipeline under the Caspian Sea, has been embroiled in a dispute with Turkmenistan over natural gas for nearly two years. The trouble started in 2017, when Turkmenistan stopped sending natural gas to Iran, alleging that Tehran owed state-owned energy company Turkmengaz $1.8 billion. Iran sent Turkmenistan a formal complaint in January, and the case has since gone to the International Court of Arbitration. In the meantime, China is the only country buying Turkmen gas – an arrangement too close for Ashgabat’s comfort to its former setup with Russia, and one that isn’t quite paying the bills. The loss of energy export revenue has plunged the Turkmen economy into crisis, complete with high inflation and food shortages. The situation is so dire that Turkmen police have started fining people who come to the capital from other parts of the country to buy food.
Dueling Pipelines
Saudi Arabia can help Turkmenistan get its natural gas to new export markets through the TAPI pipeline. In return, Turkmenistan can keep Pakistan from relying too heavily on Iranian natural gas and, by extension, from becoming too receptive to Iran’s influence. Pakistan expects to receive its first gas shipments from Turkmenistan through TAPI in 2020 – that is, assuming the project reaches completion. The pipeline is set to run from Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh gas field right through Afghanistan’s Kandahar province, where the Taliban recently assassinated the local police chief, before passing into Pakistan and then India. The war in Afghanistan and the insurgent threat there have made construction of the pipeline risky and put off most investors.
And security may be only part of the problem. There’s also the possibility of international opposition to TAPI, namely from Russia. The project is a headache for Moscow. Once completed, the pipeline would further jeopardize Russia’s influence over Turkmenistan, an area it has had close ties with since the 19th century. That Turkmenistan has maintained its neutrality since the Soviet Union’s collapse – declining to join other regional countries in blocs and treaties with Russia, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States – is vexing enough for Moscow. In recent years, Russia has noticeably stepped up its efforts to ensure its presence in Central Asia. But because it’s in no financial position to lend money to Ashgabat, Moscow has relied instead on economic pressure to try to force Turkmenistan’s cooperation. The results have been mixed, and now it stands to lose not only sway with Turkmenistan thanks to TAPI but perhaps also profit: Gazprom is considering helping develop four natural gas fields in Iran and building an LNG plant, along with the offshore pipeline, to facilitate the shipment of Iranian natural gas to Pakistan.
Even so, the prospect of Saudi involvement in Turkmenistan seems to have renewed Russia’s interest in Turkmen natural gas, and Gazprom reportedly is thinking about resuming its imports from the Central Asian country. That means Moscow’s relationship with Riyadh and Tehran could change. Russia historically has been the only power that tends to maintain good relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia, selling weapons to both countries and trying to act as mediator between them. Their overlapping – if not conflicting – interests in Turkmenistan could become the basis of a dispute down the line.
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Highlights
Turkey has moved closer to Russia while its relationships with the United States and the European Union have suffered.
A Turkish realignment toward Russia is not likely to materialize given their vastly different strategic priorities and visions.
For practical reasons, Turkey will take additional steps over the coming months to rekindle its alliance with the United States and its partnership with the European Union.
Turkey's relationship with Russia is historically fraught with suspicion and friction. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the two countries have established an important economic relationship, and they have set a bold, perhaps unreachable target of $100 billion in bilateral trade. Even so, this economic aspiration is counterbalanced by differing prerogatives in the strategic and geopolitical realm. Turkey, representing NATO's eastern flank, has partnered for decades with the United States and the European Union to contain Russian influence in Eastern and Central Europe, as well as the Caucasus. Recent developments in the Syrian civil war have resulted in a strange congruence of interests and seeming cooperation between Ankara and Moscow, but it would be a stretch to argue that this cooperation will deepen into an enduring strategic relationship.
Frayed Relations With the U.S.
Since 2012, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been at odds with the United States, under Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump, for actively supporting Kurdish rebels in Syria to defeat the Islamic State. Turkey considers the Kurdish rebels in Syria an offshoot of the insurgent Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which the Turkish government, as well as the United States, NATO and the European Union, lists as a terrorist organization. In turn, Russia has, with the help of Iran, established a process not only of defeating the Islamic State in Syria but also of defeating all rebel groups fighting the pro-Russian government of Syrian President Bashar al Assad. The situation in Syria has left policy analysts wondering whether Turkey is actively distancing itself from its American and European partners to adopt a closer strategic relationship with Russia.
To be sure, there are many issues that have resulted in a deep schism between Turkey and the United States. U.S. backing of Kurdish rebels can be seen as merely the tip of the iceberg. In return, Turkey has concluded the purchase (if not the actual deployment) of a Russian S-400 missile system to bolster its air defenses in clear preference to the U.S.-made Patriot missile system. U.S. authorities have threatened their Turkish counterparts that if they deploy the Russian missiles the United States will not transfer more than 100 F-35 fighters to Turkey, mainly because the Russian crews who would operate the S-400 batteries would be in a prime position to gain information regarding the F-35's strengths and weaknesses. Further, Erdogan's government has arbitrarily detained U.S. citizens as bargaining chips to compel Washington to accede to Turkish policy demands, specifically regarding Syria. In return, the United States, in addition to sanctioning Turkish Cabinet ministers, has threatened further punitive measures against Turkey — measures that could seriously damage its already debt-ridden and fragile economy.
Instead of mending fences with the United States and requesting emergency financial assistance from the U.S.-dominated International Monetary Fund and/or World Bank, could it be that Erdogan is more interested in turning to new "allies" such as Russia and China to achieve his regional and wider foreign policy agenda? The purchasing of sovereign debt by China is just one avenue by which Beijing is advancing its global ambition of unseating the United States as the sole economic and military hegemon, and it would be quite attractive to Erdogan's government precisely because monetary loans from China are likely to carry fewer conditions than those obtained from the IMF and World Bank. Other than a historical security apparatus rooted in the Cold War, and limited trade relations, there is not much that binds Turkey and the United States together.
Other than a historical security apparatus rooted in the Cold War, and limited trade relations, there is not much that binds Turkey and the United States together.
On the other hand, Russia and Turkey have a significant economic partnership that not only spans a number of critical sectors but also makes Turkey increasingly dependent on Russia. Turkey derives 55 percent of its natural gas needs (natural gas produces 60 percent of its electricity) from Russia, for example. Both countries have also signed an agreement to build at least one Russian nuclear power plant in Turkey. Because of Turkey's potential as a transit hub for Russian natural gas to Europe — one that bypasses Ukraine — Moscow and Ankara are building the TurkStream pipeline, which could begin carrying Russian natural gas through Turkey to the European Union via Bulgaria as early as late 2019. The Russian domestic market is a vital destination for Turkish exports, including but not limited to cars, agricultural produce and textiles.
Further, the influx of 4 million to 5 million Russian tourists to Turkey in 2017 represents 12 percent of the country's total number of tourists and a significant source of revenue. To crown these vital areas of economic synergy, one must bear in mind that Turkey and Russia's bilateral relationship does not depend on shared values such as human rights and democratic governance, a factor that has further embittered Turkey's relationship with the United States and the European Union.
Signs of Improvement
Despite the economic ties, Turkey's supposed realignment toward Russia and China — a clear preference that would put it in the Eurasia camp and possibly out of NATO — is not likely to materialize. Turkey and Russia have vastly different strategic priorities and visions. In the immediate future, Turkey is ambivalent about a Russian- and Iranian-backed military assault on the last rebel-held town of Idlib in Syria. Erdogan has so far succeeded in preventing the operation from taking place. This may not last for much longer. Russia has a clear interest in ending the Syrian civil war and seeing al Assad's government fully in control of the country once again. This concern presents a number of problems for Turkey. The battle for Idlib would result in new waves of refugees destined for Turkey, which already hosts more than 3.5 million Syrians and isn't in a position to cope with more. In addition, it is highly likely that the extremist elements making up the remnants of the Syrian resistance that Turkey has actively supported (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and other Islamic State or former al Qaeda elements) would flee to Turkey and pose an internal security threat.
In the long term, Turkey has little to gain with a re-empowered al Assad government, which is likely to present a resentful posture against Erdogan, precisely because he tried to topple al Assad's government and replace it with a Sunni alternative. Strategically speaking, Turkey also remains largely isolated in the region, and in the event it does not patch up its relationship with its partners, it is likely to face increased security and economic challenges, which its NATO, U.S. and EU anchors so far have largely shielded Ankara from. Consider that Turkey has no real alternative to renewing and maintaining its military capacity independent of U.S.-made products — namely the F-35 fighter. It is for such reasons that Erdogan has recently initiated several overtures to begin rebuilding relationships with allies he has seriously strained. The freeing of U.S. cleric Andrew Brunson in mid-October was a clear attempt to de-escalate tensions with the United States and prevent further sanctions being levied against Turkey. More recently, the apparent murder of The Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul has resulted in Erdogan attempting to marginalize Saudi Arabia in the eyes of the United States and the European Union and to raise Turkey's profile as a more credible partner, by divulging precise intelligence in Khashoggi's death.
Turkey remains more distant toward its once stalwart alliance with the United States and partnership with the European Union than at any other point in recent history. However, in the coming months we are likely to witness more overt measures to rekindle and reaffirm these embittered ties, if only for pragmatic reasons.
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Highlights
The North Caucasus is likely to see more protests and violence over land disputes between Chechnya and neighboring regions in the coming year.
The Kremlin's ability to preserve stability in the region will be tested, and tensions there have the potential to spill over into greater Russia.
Moscow will seek to contain problems in the North Caucasus through crackdowns and with concessions, but holding on to the loyalty of regional leaders and the general population could prove increasingly difficult.
The North Caucasus has long been a difficult region for Russia to control. Pockets of resistance have sprouted in the mountainous area between the Black and Caspian seas for centuries. That opposition runs from the Russian Empire's initial expansion into the North Caucasus in the early 18th century to the separatist conflicts in Chechnya at the end of the 20th century. After coming to power in 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin helped restore relative calm to the region by granting greater autonomy to Chechnya, the home of two separatist wars. However, the actions of the Chechen president are now stirring up tensions with neighboring republics and threatening the stability that is crucial to Moscow.
The Big Picture
The militancy, violence and separatism of the North Caucasus have long posed problems for Russia. While the region has been dormant in recent years, signs indicate that it could become more active and problematic for Moscow in the year to come.
See The Fight for Russia’s Borderlands
The Land Between the Seas
The rocky terrain and complex ethnic diversity of the North Caucasus have long made it difficult for Moscow to effectively incorporate the region into the Russian state. But the strategic location of the region — consisting of the republics of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia and Adygea — made its control imperative for Russia.
The area borders the South Caucasus states of Georgia and Azerbaijan, and it is close to regional powers Turkey and Iran. Significant deposits of oil have been found and exploited in Chechnya and Dagestan, which are also home to important energy transportation infrastructure. In addition, Islamist militants have contributed to a volatile security environment there. Groups such as the Caucasus Emirate have even periodically carried out attacks in the heart of Russia, including Moscow and St. Petersburg.
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https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/04/01/us-stops-f-35-fighter-jet-parts-delivery-to-turkey/?fbclid=IwAR3rt522Zx0n260RKZa83Cuh6rRFSlzZY9KGYpGmZo71pJQpgCeO2cZHMT8
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November 11, 2019 Open as PDF
In Central Asia, Can China Really Compete With Russia?
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
Chinese influence in Central Asia has increased markedly in recent years. For Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and even the relatively more closed-off Turkmenistan, China is becoming not only a major supplier of loans and investment but also a key trading partner. Some may interpret this as an indication that the influence of Central Asia’s historical benefactor, Russia, is diminishing. It seems, however, that Russia isn’t too alarmed by China’s growing influence in the region. That’s because, unlike China, Moscow’s interests in Central Asia are not just economic. Indeed, Russia has historical links to the region and security and political interests there, which will ensure that Moscow will be the dominant player in the region for years to come.
For Russia, maintaining influence in the post-Soviet Central Asian states is critical. These countries form a key buffer zone for Russia, separating the country from unstable areas of the Middle East and terrorist elements. Russia is concerned that terrorist and extremist influences could spread to its southern border and into the Caucasus through Central Asia and threaten to destabilize its southern and eastern regions.
Economic Influence
From an economic point of view, Russia looks at Central Asia as a region with potential. It sees Central Asia as a key route through which it could supply energy and other goods to growing markets like India, China and Pakistan, which, as they face increasing uncertainty from sanctions and the U.S. trade war, could become major consumers of Russian exports. But Moscow is facing increasing competition from Beijing in its historical sphere of influence. After the 2008 global economic crisis, Beijing began to more actively invest in and trade with the countries of Central Asia. China’s foremost interests in Central Asia are economic; Beijing sees these countries as a growing market for Chinese products, critical trade routes for the Belt and Road Initiative, and a source of needed natural resources. Chinese companies produce roughly 20 percent of Kazakh oil. More than 80 percent of Tajik gold deposits are operated by companies that receive Chinese capital, and more than 700 enterprises in Uzbekistan receive Chinese funding. China has also financed the development of Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh gas field and the construction of a gas pipeline through Kazakhstan. The estimated combined cost of these two projects exceeds $8 billion.
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Central Asian countries now owe billions of dollars in debt to China. Uzbekistan alone owes $3.4 billion (21 percent of the state’s external debt); Tajikistan owes $2.9 billion (48 percent of its external debt); and Kyrgyzstan owes $1.7 billion (42.5 percent of external debt). This is raising concerns that Central Asian countries could become ensnared in so-called debt traps, compelling these states to agree to hefty political or economic concessions in order to pay off large loans they can no longer service. In 2011, for example, Tajikistan agreed to lease 1 percent of its territory to China. And Turkmenistan has supplied gas to China at a price three times lower than the market rate.
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The growing Chinese economic influence here could challenge Russia’s historical role as the main benefactor for Central Asia. On economic grounds, Russia can’t really compete with China. Moscow is, however, maintaining a degree of economic influence by strengthening integration with Central Asia, particularly through the Eurasian Economic Union, which includes an integrated single market and common policies on several industries.
Ultimately, the two countries are unlikely to engage in open confrontation in the short term for a couple of reasons. First, Russia can’t afford a confrontation with China. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, China became the only major power that was willing to increase bilateral trade and economic ties with Russia; Russian foreign policy, after all, has long been oriented toward the east. Second, Russia has been a dominant economic force in Central Asia for decades. Its influence has been somewhat diminished as sanctions and economic troubles at home have eroded Russia’s ability to finance the region, but Central Asia and the Caucasus remain heavily dependent on Moscow in terms of both trade and remittances.
Strategic Interests
Moreover, although Russia continues to provide economic assistance to the region, this assistance stems from strategic interests rather than the promise of economic gain. Russia has written off hundreds of millions of dollars in Central Asian debt, including $240 million owed by Kyrgyzstan in 2017 and $900 million owed by Uzbekistan in 2016. For Moscow, developing good relations with these strategically located countries is more important than the potential economic benefit they could offer.
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These countries form a key buffer zone for Russia, separating the country from unstable areas of the Middle East where terrorism and extremism are rife. Russia has a sprawling border with Kazakhstan that’s difficult to protect, and the borders between the Central Asian states are not well defended. The attack carried out by Islamic State militants on the Tajik-Uzbek border last week showed that terrorist organizations have already gained a foothold in the region. This is particularly concerning for Moscow because the militaries and security forces of Central Asian countries are highly dependent on Russia for equipment and training.
Since the formation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in 1992, Russia has been the primary security guarantor for three Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. (Uzbekistan was also part of the CSTO but has withdrawn its membership.) Russia has military bases and facilities in Tajikistan and an air base in Kyrgyzstan, and is helping to strengthen these countries’ own military capabilities. In October, it donated to Tajikistan 320 million rubles ($5 million) worth of military equipment and weapons including a radar station for monitoring airspace and modernized armored reconnaissance and BRDM-2M patrol vehicles. Also in October, the Central Military District’s press service announced the transfer of the S-300 Favorit anti-aircraft missile system to the Tajik-Afghan border. In addition, Uzbekistan has purchased from Russia Typhoon armored vehicles, delivery of which will begin sometime this year, as well as Russian-made BTR-82A armored personnel carriers, Tiger armored vehicles and a Sopka-2 radar station. Russia also plans to supply 12 Mi-35M transport and combat helicopters to Uzbekistan.
Though there has been much talk of China’s growing military presence in Tajikistan (it recently opened a new military base on the Tajik side of their shared border, for example, and held drills with the Tajik military in August), its security operations in Central Asia are mostly carried out within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Whereas Russia wants to remain the dominant military player in the region, China is content to take a backseat and avoid competing with Moscow for regional supremacy. Moreover, Beijing shares many of Moscow’s security concerns in Central Asia and therefore doesn’t feel threatened by Russia’s willingness to support Central Asian countries. China actually has more reasons to cooperate than compete with Russia, at least in the short term.
Despite China’s growing economic and military power, Moscow and Beijing don’t see each other as direct rivals in Central Asia, at least for now. There is indirect competition between the two countries, but their current interests and priorities rarely overlap in such a way that would push them into direct competition. China’s interests in the region are mostly economic, so it will be involved there only inasmuch as it can benefit economically. The deployment of Chinese troops in Tajikistan and the launch of counterterrorism drills with Tajik forces are connected to Chinese concerns over the security of its own investments in Central Asia and elsewhere. Russia, however, has deeper ties in Central Asia, and its interests are more strategic than economic. In tough economic times, it may see increasing competition for influence there, but no country has been able to match Russia’s presence and impact in the region.
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https://www.wsj.com/articles/georgia-on-the-brink-11576801946?mod=MorningEditorialReport&mod=djemMER_h
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Daily Memo: Clashes in the Caucasus, Pre-election Protests in Belarus
Cross-border shelling between Azerbaijan and Armenia continued on Wednesday.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Clashes in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan said it destroyed an Armenian military facility along the Azerbaijan-Armenia border as cross-border shelling, which began on July 12 in the Tovuz region, continued on Wednesday. In Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, more than 1,000 protesters took part in a rally in support of the army, chanting slogans like “Our Karabakh” and “Glory to the army,” according to Russian news outlet RIA Novosti. Meanwhile, Armenian hackers attacked several Azerbaijani news websites, including Day.Az, Milli.Az, AMI Trend and the Azernews and hacked a database operated by the Azerbaijani navy, according to the Facebook page of the hacker group Monte Melkonyan Cyber Army.
Armenian Ambassador to Moscow Vardan Toganyan said Yerevan hoped Russia would use its influence in the region to help de-escalate the situation. However, Armenia’s Defense Ministry said the situation was under control and that it would not ask the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, an alliance of six post-Soviet states, to intervene at this time. Yet, several countries have already commented on the latest round of fighting in the region. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif spoke by phone with officials in Azerbaijan and Armenia to offer to mediate between the two countries. Turkey’s Defense Ministry said it was ready to support Azerbaijan’s armed forces against Armenian aggression. And helicopters from the Russian armed forces’ 102nd base in Gyumri were seen near the Armenia-Turkey border, though the Russian military said they were part of planned exercises being conducted in the Southern Military District.
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Azerbaijan's Slow Drift Toward Turkey
This month’s flare-up may represent more than another clash between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
On July 12, Armenian and Azerbaijani forces clashed in the Tovuz border region – far from the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, where such clashes usually take place – and the sporadic violence has continued ever since. At first, the countries’ two larger neighbors with a geopolitical interest in the region, Russia and Turkey, did not interfere. On July 23, however, Russian forces took part in pre-planned exercises with Armenian troops. The Azerbaijani government promptly announced that it would host large joint air and ground exercises with Turkey. Armenia’s position against Turkey is fixed, a product of a century of bad blood, but Azerbaijan has traditionally attempted to balance between Russia and Turkey. This month’s flare-up, however, may represent more than another scuffle between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. It may instead mark the beginning of a gradual realignment by Baku away from balancing and toward Ankara.
Turkey’s Ascent, Russia’s Descent
Turkey’s and Russia’s interests intersect in the Caucasus. For Russia, having allies in the South Caucasus guarantees a degree of stability in its border regions. Moreover, Azerbaijan provides Russia with strategic access to the Middle East. Turkey, which is enmeshed in the gradual construction of a neo-Ottoman project to establish its dominance in the region, needs allies like culturally close Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan also has energy reserves, which are valuable for Turkey’s ambitions to become a regional gas center.
The Russian and Azerbaijani economies were bound together under the Soviet Union, and the two have maintained close economic, political and energy ties ever since. Their trade relationship is extensive, but Russia’s share of Azerbaijan’s total trade is diminishing: In the 1990s, Russia accounted for about 20-25 percent of Azerbaijan’s trade, but in the 2010s that share hovered around 8 percent. Turkey’s share, on the other hand, has been growing: Total trade between the two amounted to $4.5 billion in 2019 (an increase of 33 percent from the previous year, and higher than the Russian-Azerbaijani figure of $3.02 billion, which was itself the highest in the past 10 years). Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has said he wants bilateral trade with Turkey to reach $15 billion a year and to increase energy exports to Turkey.
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Speaking of energy, Russia and Azerbaijan are increasingly looking like competitors in the oil and gas sector rather than partners. Baku’s attempt to enter the European Union’s energy market through Turkey, bypassing Russia, makes Moscow nervous. Previously, Azerbaijan had used Russian pipeline networks to ship energy to Europe, which gave Russia control over the amount of Azerbaijani supplies in Europe. The construction of pipelines through Turkey, however, is not subject to Russian influence. Such projects, especially gas projects, have become important for Azerbaijan, which supplied 82 percent of its gas exports to Turkey in 2018. These include the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which transports Caspian oil to the Turkish port in Ceyhan, and the South Caucasian gas pipeline from Baku through Georgia to the border with Turkey, both of which were completed over a decade ago. More recent endeavors include the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, which will connect Greece, Albania and southern Italy, and the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline, or TANAP, which was completed in 2018 and merged with the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline. Russia has the TurkStream gas pipeline to Turkey (commissioned in January of this year), which targets the same market as TANAP, but Moscow has struggled to maintain its share of the market. For example, in March 2019, Russia was the leader in gas exports to the Turkish market at 33 percent, but a year later, Azerbaijan had surpassed Russia with 23.5 percent. (In fact, Russia fell into fifth place, with 9.9 percent.)
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The other area in which Turkey is gaining ground on Russia is Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia traditionally acts as a mediator in the conflict, yet it continues to support Armenia, conduct exercises with its military, and supply Yerevan with weapons. Indeed, ever since Vladimir Putin became president again, he seems to have largely ignored the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh while intensifying military cooperation with Armenia through the Collective Security Treaty Organization. (The need for Armenia’s full cooperation in the then-budding Eurasian Economic Union no doubt played a part.) Meanwhile, relations between Russia and Azerbaijan had cooled, thanks to a dispute over the Gabala radar station, Moscow's refusal to sell combat aircraft to Baku, and the ending of an agreement over the transit of Azerbaijani oil through Russian territory.
Turkey, on the other hand, broadly supports Azerbaijan, which it has pledged to back in the current conflict. Partly this is due to Ankara’s neo-Ottoman ambitions in the region that call for the imposition of “One people, two countries” there, and partly it’s due to historically tense relations with Armenia. (Turkey refuses to accede to Armenian demands to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide, and Armenia refuses to ratify the Treaty of Kars, which laid the groundwork for the modern borders of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey.) Turkey also partners with Georgia, which Ankara sees as a transit country and which relies heavily on energy supplies from Azerbaijan.
And then there are the economic factors at play. Since 2014, the Russian economy has been struggling with sanctions and with fluctuations in the price of oil, on which its health depends. The Kremlin has tried to implement the necessary structural reform to stimulate the economy, but its efforts have largely failed, hence its renewed attention on reanimating the economy rather than on finishing expensive boondoggles with other countries. The Turkish economy has its share of problems, but laying itself exclusively at the mercy of the oil markets isn’t one of them.
Russia is losing ground to Turkey in terms of investments as well. Azerbaijan has invested more than $17 billion in the Turkish economy, and Turkey has invested over $12 billion in the Azerbaijani economy. SOCAR, Baku’s state oil company, has new plans and projects that raise total investments in the Turkish economy to about $20 billion. Russia has invested only about $4.7 billion in Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijan has invested $1.2 billion in Russia.
Azerbaijan's Goals
Azerbaijan understands that larger and more powerful countries will always be interested in its affairs. But Baku has its own goals. It’s been independent for only a short time, and it has every intention of maintaining its sovereignty. Like other former Soviet republics, Azerbaijan has a host of economic problems, not least of which is its own dependence on energy exports. It needs allies that will buy its goods and thus fund its government.
But it’s in no hurry to fully commit to any one ally. (Not that anyone has asked it to.) It benefits more from balancing both sides; it’s not part of Europe’s or Eurasia’s formal architecture, but it still needs Russian trade, just as it still needs European energy customers. Turkey is an important economic partner in that regard. But any major move toward one side or the other heightens the risks of internal destabilization and losing all the economic benefits that come with balancing, not just for Azerbaijan but for the region as a whole, since it would necessarily pit Russia against Turkey. It’s simply more profitable for Baku to rely on Russia and Turkey and turn into a logistic hub between Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia.
The country can thus afford some tactical adjustments in the short term that will keep its foreign policy essentially intact. But it’s possible that will change as Russia loses ground to Turkey.
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Daily Memo: Clashes in the Caucasus
Azerbaijan and Armenia have both declared martial law.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Renewed fighting. Clashes erupted in the restive Nagorno-Karabakh region between Armenia and Azerbaijan on Sunday, as both countries declared martial law and accused each other of violating a cease-fire. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said Azerbaijani troops carried out an attack on the disputed region, while Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev accused Yerevan of committing provocations, for which it had been preparing for some time. Both sides also said the other was using mercenaries from Syria. In fact, the Armenian ambassador to Russia said that 4,000 mercenaries were transferred from the war-torn country with the help of Turkey to fight alongside Azerbaijani forces in the conflict.
There were signs prior to Sunday that tensions were escalating in the region. Reports in Armenian media indicated that Azerbaijani troops and equipment had assembled along the border. And on Friday, the U.S. embassies in Baku and Yerevan warned U.S. citizens not to travel to Nagorno-Karabakh and areas near the Absheron Peninsula in Azerbaijan. Clashes are fairly regular in this part of the world, but compared to the last outbreak of fighting in the Tavuz region in July, the number of casualties reported by both sides is more significant this time around. Azerbaijan’s military said that more than 550 Armenian troops were killed in the fighting and that 22 armored vehicles, 15 OSA anti-aircraft missile systems, 18 unmanned aerial vehicles, eight artillery installations and three ammunition depots were lost. Armenia’s Defense Ministry, however, said that the Azerbaijani armed forces lost about 200 troops, 30 armored vehicles and 20 drones. Turkey has reiterated that it fully supports Azerbaijan in the conflict and blamed Armenia for the escalation. Russia, which wants to maintain good relations with both parties, has said only that the conflict should be settled through diplomatic means.
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September 29, 2020 Open as PDF
The Fighting in the Caucasus
By: George Friedman
Fighting has broken out again over Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave inside Azerbaijan nominally controlled by Azerbaijan but governed by ethnic Armenians. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, it has been beset by low-level, intermittent skirmishes, but this round seems to be more serious, with reports from either side suggesting more than 500 Armenian servicemembers and 200 Azerbaijani troops are dead, not to mention that vehicles and other equipment have been destroyed.
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The unusually high body count makes this episode of fighting important, but Nagorno-Karabakh’s geographic location in the Caucasus makes it geopolitically relevant. Empires have fought over this territory for millennia – the most frequent belligerents were Russian, Turkish and Iranian – but now that the states within the Caucasus are independent, it is more of a proxy battleground over precious global real estate. This year, Turkey expressed its support for Azerbaijan, a country with which Turkey has linguistic and cultural affinities. Russia tends to play both sides but has troops based only in Armenia. Iran has a very large ethnic Azeri population, some of whom, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, hold high positions of power. Azerbaijan’s government is basically secular and mistrusts Iranian intentions. Iran is equally cautious; though it has an interest in trade, it has satisfied that interest through Armenia. (Georgia, which fought a war with Russia in 2008, has had closer ties to Azerbaijan and Turkey.)
Russia’s interest in the Caucasus is simple: It was one of the only effective avenues of invading the heartland. (The other, from the west, creates a need for strategic depth, hence Moscow’s enduring interest in Belarus.) The Caucasus is divided into two parts by a river valley. Russia lost the southern portion when the Soviet Union fell, but it still de facto controls the northern portion, and so long as it does, Russia can rest a little easier. However, much of the North Caucasus is rebellious by nature, often because of the radical brand of Islamism that is bred there, which is why Moscow has ruthlessly suppressed movements in places such as Dagestan and Chechnya. The Russian strategy is to prevent a threat from the south by holding the north and keeping the south off balance.
Turkey’s northeastern frontier is anchored in the South Caucasus, bordering Georgia and Armenia. Historically, its interest there has been Russia. Though it still considers Moscow a direct competitor, the fall of the Soviet Union has made the Kurds, who occupy various parts of the Caucasus, Turkey’s number one security interest. Armenia and Turkey have been bitter enemies over what the Armenians regard as a Turkish genocide that took place after World War I, and which the Turks bitterly deny. The distrust between the two countries is intense.
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Northern Iran was occupied during World War II by the Soviets. The area they occupied was largely Azeri, but when they left they kept what is now Azerbaijan while northern Iran was returned to Iran proper. Iran has a complex relationship with Azerbaijan, which is far less Islamic than Iran, and which has energy resources Iran wants. Iran has little interest in Caucasian conflict but is interested in dealing with each of the countries.
These are just some of the reasons that alliances in the Caucasus, already ambiguous at best, shift quickly. Armenia has maintained close ties with Russia, which uses it to maintain a balance of power in the region. Also supporting Armenia is Iran, an important trade partner and buffer state. Turkey is increasingly working with Azerbaijan, a move that is linked to efforts to expand regional Turkish influence. Georgia is close to the U.S. but not as important a priority as the Georgians would like, and it too is moving close to Turkey, with which it has transportation links and mutual interests in the Black Sea.
None of these relationships is fixed in stone and all of them are coupled with complex relations with other countries. No doors are locked, but at the same time wars in this region cannot be waged intensely without the support of either Russia or Turkey (Iran would play a role as a subsidiary of Russia). In that sense, the recent fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh is, much like Syria and Libya, another dimension of the Russo-Turkish rivalry. Already there are reports that Turkey has sent mercenaries from Syria to support Azerbaijan.
The fighting might well die down. Neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia wants to pay a steep price for Nagorno-Karabakh, and neither Russia nor Turkey is ready for a serious test of power, even if they were confident in where they stood. What is most interesting is the absence of the U.S. Washington has a long record of intervening in areas where it has limited interests, and where the price for achieving little will be high. This is why it was involved in the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, on Georgia’s side. It is now content to let Russia, Turkey and Iran balance each other.
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Daily Memo: Confusion Reigns in Nagorno-Karabakh
By: Geopolitical Futures
Scorekeeping in Nagorno-Karabakh. On Monday, day two of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, losses continued to mount. Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian enclave at the center of the fight, said 53 of its soldiers died fighting Azerbaijani forces on Monday, a day after self-reporting 31 deaths. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan published videos of the fighting and made conflicting claims about the damage they had inflicted on the other. Shortly before publication, Armenia's Defense Ministry said a Turkish F-16 shot down an Armenian Su-25 in Armenia's airspace on Tuesday morning, killing the pilot. A Turkish government spokesman denied this.
At the behest of five European states – Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany and the United Kingdom – the U.N. Security Council will discuss the worsening situation in a closed-door session on Tuesday. The Russian State Duma urged an immediate cease-fire and offered to mediate. Amid rumors that Turkey sent Syrian mercenaries to assist Azerbaijan, an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman denied allegations that Tehran had allowed weapons and military hardware to transit through its territory to Armenia, saying the claims were intended to destroy friendly relations between Iran and Azerbaijan.
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France, Russia and the U.S. issued a statement urging a cease-fire and negotiations in Nagorno-Karabakh.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Stop fighting. That was the message to Armenia and Azerbaijan on Thursday from the presidents of France, Russia and the United States. Specifically, the statement by the three co-chairs of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Minsk Group called for the immediate end of hostilities and for the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to resume good faith negotiations without preconditions. Separately, Russian President Vladimir Putin and French President Emmanuel Macron spoke by phone, and according to the French side’s readout, they “shared their concern regarding the sending of Syrian mercenaries by Turkey to Nagorno-Karabakh.” (Turkey backs Azerbaijan in the conflict over the Armenian separatist enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.) It’s an accusation that has been making the rounds in recent days, though Paris offered no evidence to support it, and Russia’s Foreign Ministry has said only that “illegal armed units” from Libya and Syria are present, without attributing responsibility for that presence. In the meantime, Dubai-based Al Arabiya reported that Israel has been sending weapons to Azerbaijan.
As for the fighting itself, the most notable development is that five mortar rounds reportedly landed on Iranian territory, destroying two housing units. Nagorno-Karabakh’s forces also said they had shot down two Azerbaijani planes and a helicopter, the latter of which went down in Iran. Azerbaijan denied this.
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Daily Memo: Iran Nervously Watches Nagorno-Karabakh
Azerbaijani troops are reportedly gathering near the Iranian border.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh risks drawing in others. Azerbaijani forces are gathering near the Iranian border in preparation for an offensive, according to an Armenian Defense Ministry representative. He said Azerbaijan hopes to provoke forces from the mostly ethnically Armenian region of Nagorno-Karabakh into firing at the massing troops, endangering Iran in the process. In the meantime, fighting continues along the Line of Contact in the disputed region, and Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry threatened to retaliate using “weapons with great destructive power” if Armenia deploys Iskander short-range ballistic missiles against it. On Tuesday, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said in an interview that his government and Nagorno-Karabakh were prepared to make concessions if Azerbaijan did the same.
Also on Tuesday, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani spoke with his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, to express his government’s concern and hope for a swift, peaceful resolution. Aliyev reportedly said Azerbaijan’s troops would reoccupy captured land near the border and establish border infrastructure there. The commander of the Iranian Border Guards also said the guards were “vigilant” and had been “moved into the necessary formation.”
Finally, there’s Turkey and Russia. On Tuesday, Turkey’s foreign minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, was in Azerbaijan, where he said Turkey would act “together as one state” with Azerbaijan, if necessary. The Kremlin’s spokesman, on the other hand, stressed Wednesday that Russia’s defense obligations to Armenia, a fellow member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, do not apply to Nagorno-Karabakh.
Taiwan’s $15 billion “step in the right direction.” The United States wants Taiwan to spend a lot more on defense. At an annual semi-official bilateral defense conference on Monday, senior Taiwanese officials gave their U.S. counterparts a lengthy military shopping list. The U.S. side, evidently, didn’t think it was long enough. On Tuesday, David Helvey, the acting U.S. assistant secretary of defense for East Asia, said Taiwan’s proposed $15.2 billion defense budget for the upcoming year – a 10 percent increase over 2019’s budget – is merely a “step in the right direction” and "insufficient to ensure that Taiwan can leverage its geography, advanced technology, workforce and patriotic population to channel Taiwan’s inherent advantages necessary for a resilient defense.”
Taiwan has immense geographical advantages over China, but its military hasn’t been optimized around deterring a seaborne Chinese assault. This is starting to change, and Taiwan’s new defense budget reflects growing political will to take painful measures to boost Taiwan’s deterrence capacity. But it’s unclear just how much more defense spending the Taiwanese economy and political system can sustain. One current problem: Taiwan is apparently spending gobs of money – an astounding $900 million this year alone – just on scrambling to respond to Chinese air incursions.
Additional Intelligence
• The Turkish lira fell to 7.8787 per U.S. dollar, a new low, as fighting continued in the South Caucasus and Washington again warned Turkey not to test its Russian-made S-400 air defense system.
• Former rival Palestinian movements Fatah and Hamas agreed on a roadmap to restructure Palestinian institutions and end division after a round of reconciliation talks.
• Poland’s antitrust office imposed fines totaling 29 billion zlotys ($7.6 billion) on Russian energy giant Gazprom over construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Germany, saying the project breaks fair competition rules and will create increased dependents on Gazprom. Another $61 million in fines were imposed on five international companies involved in the project: France's Engie, Austria's OMV, British-Dutch Shell, and Germany’s Uniper and Wintershall.
• Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is in Qatar for meetings with the country’s emir and defense minister and Turkey’s ambassador.
• The United Kingdom will loan Ukraine 1.25 billion pounds ($1.61 billion) for the construction of naval vessels.
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F-16s Reveal Turkey's Drive to Expand Its Role in the Southern Caucasus
5 MINS READ
Oct 8, 2020 | 20:19 GMT
Confirmation of Turkish F-16 fighter aircraft operating out of Azerbaijan amid conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh illustrates Turkish commitment to challenging Russian hegemony in the Southern Caucasus. Satellite imagery published by The New York Times showed Turkish F-16s at Ganja airbase on Oct. 3, just four days after Armenia claimed that F-16s shot down one of its Su-25 attack aircraft during a mission along the Nagorno-Karabakh frontline. The presence of the Turkish fighter aircraft doesn't prove their involvement in the downing of the jet, but it does demonstrate direct military involvement by Turkey that goes far beyond already-established support, such as its provision of Syrian fighters and military equipment to Azerbaijani forces.
Ankara's resolve to support the Azerbaijani offensive on Armenian-controlled Nagorno-Karabakh poses an immediate challenge to Moscow's position in the Southern Caucasus. So far, Russia has sought to manage tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan to prevent outside powers from stepping into the fray.
July clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan likely provided the opportunity and cover for Turkey to help prepare an Azerbaijani offensive that supports longer term Turkish ambitions in the Southern Caucasus. Turkey has long sought to increase its influence in Azerbaijan to boosts its foothold in the Southern Caucasus, a region where Turkish and Russian ambitions are in competition. Greater tensions with Armenia likely made Azerbaijan more open to greater Turkish support, and hence more willing to contest Armenia's control over Nagorno-Karabakh. Sustained increased activity along the contact line separating Armenian and Azerbaijani forces may have helped obscure preparations for military operations that began Sept. 27.
Four days of clashes on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border that started July 12, at the time the most intense escalation between the two countries since 2016 fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh, triggered close interaction between the Turkish and Azerbaijani military.
On July 16, the Azerbaijani Deputy Minister of Defense and high-ranking military commanders visited Turkey, initiating a conversation that likely led to the planning of currently ongoing operations.
By July 29, Turkish forces joined their Azerbaijani counterparts for two weeks of military exercises that included the deployment of Turkish F-16s to Ganja airbase.
Following the July escalation and intensified interaction with the Turkish military, increased back-and-forth artillery fire on the contact line was sustained while Azerbaijan upgraded defensive positions and moved military equipment forward in preparation for current operations.
Turkey has demonstrated a reliable mitigation strategy with Russia over the course of conflicts in Syria and Libya, limiting the potential for a direct sustained conflict between the two powers. While the move will increase Russo-Turkish tensions, these ultimately will prove manageable under Russian and Turkey's existing model for bilateral mediation and deescalation. Direct military involvement in Azerbaijani operations against Armenia risks creating yet another theater where Turkish and Russian forces directly face each other. The current Turkish involvement has not yet prompted a Russian military response in support of Armenia; Moscow has likely been reluctant to do so in a bid to maintain a balance in its relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Additional Turkish deployments or direct engagement in combat operations may, however, force Russia to deploy forces to Armenian-controlled territory. Should this come to pass, sustained combat between Russia and Turkey still remains unlikely. As proven in conflicts in Syria and Libya — where Russia and Turkey have each supported opposing sides and have even seen limited direct engagements — the two countries have developed a reliable method for deescalation and stabilization. In this case, direct Turkish and Russian deployments are more likely to stabilize the contact line in Nagorno-Karabakh than they are to erupt into a greater conflict. An expansion of Turkish involvement would thus become more likely only if Azerbaijan were to struggle to hold territory.
In the longer term, sustained economic weakness will limit Turkey's ability to support its external ambitions, but at this point, its capabilities will support its aggressive foreign policy. A Turkish perception of future limited capabilities may in fact even propel Turkey to pursue an aggressive foreign policy while it still can. While making its power plays on its periphery, mounting Turkish economic underperformance continues to threaten its ambitions in the long term. The Turkish lira has continued to weaken, forcing the government to adjust its monetary policy, and the lira took a further hit from Turkish involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis. Its current economic struggles will not, however, impede an aggressive foreign policy or even military capabilities in the short-term.
Turkey has conducted multiple military offensives in Syria. It maintains a presence in rebel-held areas of Idlib and along the northern border of Syria despite direct confrontations with the Syrian and Russian militaries.
In response to the Libyan National Army's offensive on Tripoli in April 2019, Turkey deployed military assets to support the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord, prompting increased Russian military support for the Libyan National Army.
In the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey has ratcheted up territorial disputes with Greece and Cyprus as it furthers its ambitions to develop offshore energy resources, leading to a wider standoff with the European Union.
Turkey has also challenged the European Union directly on other issues, using its ability to increase or lower refugee flows for leverage.
In the Southern Caucasus, Turkey has sought to expand its influence through its relationships with Azerbaijan and Georgia, and is now doing so by military involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
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Russia’s Low-Key Problem in Kyrgyzstan
Instability in this overlooked nation could upset the balance of power in Central Asia.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
On Oct. 4, Kyrgyzstan held parliamentary elections that, true to form, ended in political unrest. Rallies broke out the next day, leaving more than 1,200 injured in the ensuing clashes. Protesters seized the parliament building. They released former President Almazbek Atambayev from prison and have called for the removal from office of current President Sooronbai Jeenbekov.
If this sounds familiar, it should. Over the past 30 years, Kyrgyzstan has had few legitimate transfers of power. The country's first president, Askar Akayev, was ousted in 2005 following similar protests. He was replaced by Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who was ousted during a coup in 2010. The interim president, Roza Otunbayeva, held office for just one year before transferring power to the elected president, Atambayev, who passed the post of the president in 2017 to Jeenbekov.
It also bears a likeness to some other areas in Russia’s all-important periphery – namely, Belarus and Nagorno-Karabakh. And though Kyrgyzstan’s is still an exclusively internal affair, the timing raises questions with regard to Bishkek’s relationship with Moscow.
To be clear, that relationship has been largely cooperative. Russia has always wanted to at least preserve its influence in Kyrgyzstan, which, despite its size and lack of wealth, occupies an area that gives Russia strategic depth. Hence why Russia remains one of the key partners in the economy and maintains an important military base in the country. Bishkek has, of course, benefited from Russian largesse, so it has had little reason to abandon Moscow for China (which is interested in its mining operations), the United States or the European Union.
Even so, the Kremlin has expressed concern over what it has called the “mess and chaos” in the country. But it won’t be easy to fix. The mess and chaos are rooted in historical divisions between the north and the south, which are practically completely isolated from each other by mountainous terrain. (This has also left the country relatively weak and vulnerable.) There are no modern highways between the capital and the main regional urban centers; the roads run mainly along the periphery of the country or make up its borders. The south and north of the country are connected by only one transport road from Osh to Bishkek. This terrain makes it very difficult to create a single economic space and accelerate the country's development without significant investments and modern technologies, which Kyrgyzstan doesn’t have.
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There are also notable economic disparities between the north and south. The north borders Kazakhstan and so has received more active development of industrialization and infrastructure than the south, which borders the far poorer and lesser developed areas of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China. It’s a vestige of World War II, when factories and scientific facilities and their attendant workers were relocated from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to northern Kyrgyzstan. The south remained traditionally agrarian, with comparatively weak social infrastructure and insufficient education, medicine, transportation and engineering but with large labor pools.
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On top of these divisions is a society dominated by clans. Kyrgyz citizens transpose a long-standing tradition of tribal affiliation to higher levels of government through the appointment (of family or clan member) to key positions of state. Clans' influence can extend to the prosecutor's office, law enforcement agencies, the Security Council, the media, the banking sector and so on, with each trying to get as much of the pie as it can.
The competition among clans grew more intense after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when an unprecedented surge of nationalism combined with an economic crisis and a transformation of power. Kyrgyzstan’s clans are far too complicated to outline here, but suffice it to say that very broadly speaking, northern clans are considered more progressive, while the southern clans are more conservative, more Islamized and more sympathetic toward separatism. Northern clans are also generally more “Russian” than their southern counterparts, which maintain Uzbek cultural influences. (The current unrest can be seen at least partially in this light. President Jeenbekov is a southerner, while former President Atambayev is a northerner.) These divisions are so stark that when the Soviet Union’s satellites gained independence, there was a real chance what we now call Kyrgyzstan would be broken into two states.
Much to Russia’s chagrin, Kyrgyzstan’s divisions are a cause and a consequence of regional competition. To the north, Kazakhstan is keenly interested in protecting the rights of Kazakhs with property, especially economic infrastructure interests, in Kyrgyzstan. In recent years, Kazakh companies have invested more than $1 billion in the Kyrgyz economy, and several Kazakh businessmen hold large stakes in everything from mining to telecommunications. Uzbekistan, meanwhile, naturally is interested in protecting the rights of ethnic Uzbeks and in ensuring the security of the Fergana Valley. Increased immigration from Uzbekistan has resulted in roughly 14 percent of the Kyrgyz population being ethnically Uzbek. The environment is primed to become a power struggle between Kyrgyzstan’s more powerful neighbors.
Russia would prefer to have a friendly, stable and pro-Russia government in Bishkek rather than have to balance between countries. But just as important, Moscow is worried that other countries – namely, China – could exploit the situation to their benefit. China has already become one of the country's key trading partners; almost 40 percent of all direct investments in Kyrgyzstan come from China. The trade turnover between the countries has almost doubled over the past five years.
Cooperation goes far beyond trade. Various Kyrgyz officials took out loans in China for infrastructure development, mostly for the construction of roads and the repair of a combined heat and power plant. Yet, many Kyrgyz citizens are unhappy with the way Chinese business is being conducted and its consequences for the environment. Anti-China protests pop up every so often, including last year, when an incident between local residents and foreign workers at the Zhong Ji Mining Solton-Sary gold mine left about 50 people injured. (Bishkek suspended the company’s operations.) Kyrgyzstan is also heavily indebted to China, leading Beijing to include it in the list of "financially vulnerable" states. This means that there is a possibility that the largest creditor, China, will dictate the terms, but the Kyrgyz government does not have a clear plan to pay off its debts. Many in Kyrgyzstan therefore worry that the state will have to pay with land, as happened in 1999.
But that’s not even the most immediate of Kyrgyzstan’s economic issues. The country was hit hard by the coronavirus pandemic, with its economy contracting more than any other member of the Eurasian Economic Union. This is a problem for Kyrgyzstan, of course, but since the instability – or potential partition – could upset the balance of power in Central Asia, it’s a problem for Russia too. Russia won’t get involved so long as the clans in Bishkek remain allies with Moscow.
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The Southern Caucasus: Where Post-Soviet and Neo-Ottoman Interests Collide
Sim Tack
Sim Tack
Senior Global Analyst , Stratfor
8 MINS READOct 29, 2020 | 21:00 GMT
The Caucasus Mountains on Oct. 9, 2020.
The Caucasus Mountains on Oct. 9, 2020.
(KIRILL KUDRYAVTSEV/AFP via Getty Images)
Highlights
As fighting rages between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, a much higher level competition for regional influence in the Southern Caucasus is taking place. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, which has its own distinct origins, is just a piece of the broader geopolitical competition between Russia and Turkey as a more ambitious Turkey challenges the status quo in it and Russia's overlapping peripheries. Conflict in Nargorno-Karabakh will eventually subside amid renewed negotiations that will have major implications for Russian and Turkish influence in the broader region....
As fighting rages between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, a much higher level competition for regional influence in the Southern Caucasus is taking place. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, which has its own distinct origins, is just a piece of the broader geopolitical competition between Russia and Turkey as a more ambitious Turkey challenges the status quo in it and Russia's overlapping peripheries.
The Southern Caucasus is a highly complex environment for such competition given its numerous peoples and rivalries. This dynamic has led Russia to approach the crisis cautiously, with Moscow's role centered on attempts to mediate between Armenia and Azerbaijan. But as long as Azerbaijan, enjoying Turkish military support, sees opportunities for battlefield gains, mediation is unlikely to prove fruitful. Eventually, the conflict will produce renewed negotiations that will shape the fate not only of Nagorno-Karabakh, but that will determine the balance between Russian and Turkish influence in the Southern Caucasus.
Russia's Struggles in the Caucasus, Turkey's Opportunities
Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has struggled to maintain dominance and stability on both sides of the Caucasus Mountains. In the Northern Caucasus, part of the Russian Federation, Moscow has struggled to tamp down separatism and terrorism in Chechnya and Dagestan, particularly in the 1990s. In the Southern Caucasus, it has struggled to maintain friendly ties with former Soviet Republics turned independent states. Complicating its efforts and the regional dynamic, growing Turkish foreign policy ambitions stretching from the Middle East to Europe and now the Caucasus are giving rise to a potentially significant challenge to Russia's long-term strategy for the region.
The linchpin of Russia's strategy in the Southern Caucasus has been the delicate balancing act of keeping good diplomatic and economic ties with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Though the situation is often simplified as Russia siding with Armenia, in reality, Russia balances its military presence and interactions with Armenia through arms sales and trade with Azerbaijan. Avoiding antagonizing Azerbaijan has been key to Russia's efforts not to be locked out of the Southern Caucasus entirely, or with nothing more than an Armenian ally in a hostile environment. Azerbaijan’s divided external allegiances between Russia on the one hand and its ties to Turkey and NATO on the other, however, force Russia to also try to limit Azerbaijan's interactions with Turkey or NATO, adding another layer of complexity to Russian relations with Azerbaijan.
This situation provides opportunities for Turkey. Turkish geopolitical ambitions have been on the rise since the country's failed 2016 coup and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's subsequent consolidation of power. Given the natural competition between Russia and Turkey when both seek to assert influence beyond their borders, standoffs between the two have been seen in Syria, Libya and to a lesser degree even in places like Ukraine and Georgia. An earlier escalation in the fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia in July 2020 likely provided the perfect opportunity for Turkey to ramp up its efforts in the region. Supporting Azerbaijan allows Turkey to challenge the effectiveness of Russia's management strategy in the Southern Caucasus and by extension to challenge the geopolitical status quo along Moscow's vulnerable southern periphery.
Turkey has historically competed with Russia for hegemony in this neighborhood, something on display in the Ottoman Empire's northward efforts in the 17th century and more recently in Turkey's Cold War role as NATO's bulwark along the Soviet Union's southern front. Given Ankara's current swelling geopolitical ambitions, a result of Erdogan's nationalist support base, these two nations are once again butting heads in the Caucasus. Competition with Russia has been central to Turkey's "Neo-Ottoman" ambition of expanding its geopolitical influence and military presence farther into the Middle East and North Africa or even of challenging European powers. Syrian and Libyan adventures by both Russia and Turkey have brought them on the verge of conflict, but apparently have not discouraged Turkey, which is now taking the competition into Russia's backyard.
Nagorno-Karabakh Flares up
Prior to the breakout of hostilities on Sept. 27, several months of intense high-level military contacts, joint military exercises and a sudden surge in Turkish arms sales to Azerbaijan helped Turkey prep Azerbaijan to significantly challenge Russia's ability to maintain its spread between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This Turkish activity followed a July escalation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which likely provided an opportunity for Turkey to convince the Azerbaijani leadership of Ankara's greater bid to reshape the status quo in the region. Turkey has directly supported the ongoing combat by facilitating the presence of Syrian fighters among Azerbaijani forces, and even by deploying its own F-16 fighter aircraft in Azerbaijan during the opening phases of the conflict.
The competition between Russia and Turkey is unlikely to lead to an all-out conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, and not just because Moscow and Ankara fear a destructive fight. Despite Turkey's clear role in facilitating or even instigating this challenge to Russia's position in the Southern Caucasus, it does not want full-on competition with Russia at this early stage of its geopolitical resurgence. And for each player, an all-out conflict would hurt already-shaky financial situations at home, and could have serious follow-on effects in the other theaters where they are facing off. Turkey has demonstrated its willingness and ability to compete with Russia in measured ways in Syria and Libya, where active deconfliction and cease-fire agreements have prevented major military standoffs.
Triggering a Russian intervention on Armenia's behalf could eventually prove beneficial for Turkey, because Russian involvement could well wreck the Russia-Azerbaijan relationship.
So far, Turkish and Russian forces have not directly faced each other in Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey and Azerbaijan likely are working to keep this the case, since such a standoff would almost certainly end any Azerbaijani battlefield gains: More Turkish military support that resulted in a Russian deployment would stall the Azerbaijani advance. But for Turkey, triggering a Russian intervention to back Armenia could eventually prove beneficial. This is because Russian involvement on Armenia's behalf could well wreck the Russia-Azerbaijan relationship. Russia recognizes what Turkey also sees, and so has not played a direct military role in the conflict for now.
Faced with the choice between halting Azerbaijani and Turkish military ambitions and sustaining its influence in the Southern Caucasus beyond Armenia, Russia has sought to stop the former and protect the latter via a diplomatic solution to the current fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh. But reaching a negotiated outcome will be difficult, especially while Azerbaijan sees opportunities for more territorial gains. Russia and other international mediators such as the United States and France, which together head the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Minsk Group that leads Nagorno-Karabakh mediation efforts, has managed to organize separated mediation sessions up to the foreign ministerial level. Direct talks between the two belligerents, however, have not happened amid the intense fighting.
Broader Russian Goals
Countries like Georgia and Iran have played a secondary yet critical role in the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, further limiting Russia's desire for an escalation there. Both countries have served as logistical connections to the different actors in the conflict, with Georgia providing a direct air connection between Turkey and Azerbaijan and Iran providing a connection between Russia and Armenia. Though Georgia and Russia have long had an antagonistic relationship given Russia's support for the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia does not want the relationship to worsen. A greater Russian military presence in Armenia certainly would alarm Georgia, potentially triggering closer cooperation between Turkey and Georgia. As for Iran, Moscow has enjoyed fairly positive ties with Tehran, which continues to allow deliveries of Russian arms to Armenia. The Iranian people, however, have less clear-cut views about the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with protests in support of the latter having erupted across Iran during the current crisis.
Continued fighting or escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh will strain Iranian cooperation with Russia, reinforcing Russia's imperative to stabilize the conflict in the Southern Caucasus.
Though the Turkish challenge in the Southern Caucasus may have initially had Russia on the back foot, the outcome of the current crisis could still see Russia maintain or even strengthen its position in the Southern Caucasus. If a mediated settlement is indeed reached, the shape and form of this agreement will define the potential for future escalations and further challenges to Russia's role in the region. Russia and OSCE, for example, have broached the idea of a Russian peacekeeping force separating Armenian and Azerbaijani forces. Azerbaijan could see the prospect of such a deployment as erecting a permanent block against ejecting Armenia from Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia will still try to persuade Azerbaijan to accept one, perhaps in exchange for a number of complex guarantees and procedures. If it can pull off such a deal, and if it lasts, Russia would have achieved its goal of keeping its relationship with Azerbaijan — and might become an even more important broker in the Southern Caucasus despite Turkish efforts to block it.
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https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/12/russias-new-territory/#slide-1
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January 11, 2021
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In Central Asia, a Timely Opportunity for Russia
With many of its other buffers secured, Moscow will turn its attention to the east.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
In our 2021 annual forecast, we noted that this year, like many years before it, Russia would try to add to its strategic depth by reconstructing its near abroad, particularly Central Asia. Having secured its southern borders by deploying peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh and making sure that the current government in Belarus will stay close to the Kremlin, Russia sees the need to create a buffer in the east, where former Soviet states have, since the fall of the Soviet Union, claimed statehood, nationality and neutrality.
Central Asia has an important strategic position. The historic Silk Road connecting East and West passes through the territory of modern Central Asian states, and the roads leading from Europe and the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region intersect there. Since the early 1990s, the region has served as a barrier to less densely populated and less protected Russian lands from external threats, including China's rapid development and the spread of terrorism from Afghanistan. The economic potential of Central Asia, with its natural resources, significant gold and foreign exchange reserves, a growing population and potentially healthy consumer base, is important too. This could prove handy for Russia as it looks for new markets that can buy non-oil exports.
A Forgotten Buffer
Imperial Russia’s “claims” to Central Asia date back to the 19th century, when it fortified the region against the expansion of the British Empire, but it didn’t really bring it to heel until the Soviet era. Moscow deepened its ties to the fledgling republics through massive financial commitments, by constructing factories and by introducing Russian as the official language. Russia also supplied everything the republics’ economies needed.
After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia embraced Central Asia as a buffer to protect its now-vulnerable borders, but it wasn’t Moscow’s top priority. The main threat to Russia came from the West, so it focused more on countries such as Belarus and Ukraine. And unlike the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe, Central Asian states were so closely tied to Russia that they couldn’t really separate from their former overlord even if they had wanted to.
Eventually, though, as global economies became more advanced and integrated, Central Asian states tried to adopt a more-multifaceted foreign policy to strike a balance between Russia and the rest of the world. They needed economic support that they believed Russia alone could not provide.
At the time, the Kremlin didn’t interfere too much; it understood that these states were too weak and immature to chart their own course. Indeed, years under Russian and Soviet governance left a lasting impact on these countries' political systems and economies, which maintained strong centralized governments well after the fall of the union, so they were unattractive to Western businesses. Central Asian states thus continued to orient themselves toward Russia, which continued to guarantee security to new countries. The Kremlin was confident that it had the means to manipulate them even more when the time came.
Even so, Central Asian states have had a taste of freedom, and their governments have begun to move away from Russia accordingly. Soviet identity is disappearing, and more politicians are coming to power independently of Russian influence. They are becoming more open to trade and investment and have joined more international organizations. More countries, including China, the U.S. and Turkey, are thus more willing to engage Central Asia, keeping a natural check on Russian influence. (It’s worth noting, however, that Russia still has the advantage here, since, for example, Russian loans are always on more favorable terms. There’s also less risk to do business with Russia, which usually doesn’t draw the kinds of negative reactions, say, Chinese companies do.)
Even so, each country has its reasons for cooperating or opposing Russia. Kazakhstan – the largest country in Central Asia and, considering the size of its shared border, likely the most important country to Russia – has changed dramatically. In the 1950s and 1960s, for example, Kazakhs were a minority, accounting for just 30 percent of the population. They now account for nearly 70 percent. Kazakhs are increasingly nationalist and increasingly skeptical of Russian behavior in its borders.
In Uzbekistan, the country’s president is implementing new reforms to make Uzbekistan more attractive for foreign investments. It is categorically neutral, much to the chagrin of Russia, and has proved difficult for Moscow to absorb into its Eurasian Economic Union. Russia is trying to prove that entry into the EAEU will give Uzbek producers equal access to other EAEU markets (primarily Russia and Kazakhstan), equal conditions for migrant laborers, and access to Russian investment resources and technologies. In this context, Uzbekistan, which needs additional markets, is having a hard time acting decisively.
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are mired in their own problems, and need too many resources that Russia cannot provide. Tajikistan lacks a foundation for economic restoration and is buckling more and more under the weight of its debt. It has asked investor countries to postpone its debt payments (and interest on them) until mid-2021; doing so would allow it to divert funds to the social sector, including health care, to combat COVID-19. Turkmenistan’s economy is in worse shape than usual, with a fair amount of food shortages to boot.
Acting Quickly
Indeed, the coronavirus pandemic has directly or indirectly affected all the republics of Central Asia. Social restrictions have hurt the economy, especially because of reduced remittances of migrant workers. This has presented an opportunity to Russia, which will try to win Central Asia over by economic rather than military means. The new approach reflects Russia’s long-term need to diversify its economy and aligns with Central Asia’s desire to modernize and grow its economies too. Moscow sees these interests as complementary and so has already begun to actively offer cooperation. For example, Moscow announced that it is ready to expand cooperation with Uzbekistan in power generation, to create joint oil and gas projects worth more than $75 million, and to coordinate production of a COVID-19 vaccine with Kazakhstan .
Helping Russia in this regard is the competition between China and the U.S. Central Asian economies that rely on both will have a hard time choosing between the two, lest they be subject to reprisals from either. That leaves Russia to pick up the pieces.
This all works so long as Central Asia is more or less stable. And the stability of the region will depend at least in part on Afghanistan. And Russia is the first country that will be happy to provide military support if the countries ask for help, as it can increase Moscow’s position in the region. Rumors persist that some in the Taliban intend to start hostilities in Tajikistan. In December, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Moscow was concerned about the continuing degradation of the situation in Afghanistan. Islamic State militants are concentrating in the north of the country for expansion into Central Asia. Central Asia, already rife with ethno-religious tension and economic problems, could be fertile ground for continued violence.
Russia wants to be the major power in Central Asia. It’s well positioned to be just that, but it needs regional states not to rush from one strong ally – such as China and the U.S. – to another. It also needs to keep them from being too nationalist or economically competitive.
These countries are now more vulnerable than ever, but as they gradually recover, they will soon begin to define their interests more clearly – interests that may or may not align with Russia’s. Russia understands it must act quickly if it wants to balance the growing influence of the West and China, maintain its military presence and strengthen its economic influence.
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Brief: Everyone Wants a Piece of Georgia
Russia reasserted control over Armenia and Azerbaijan last year, but Georgia is still in play.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Background: Russia consolidated its dominance in the South Caucasus late last year when it mediated between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh and sent peacekeepers to enforce the ensuing peace. Still, Russia’s southern flank remains vulnerable to foreign influence from competing powers, including Turkey, Iran and the United States.
What Happened: U.S. President Joe Biden’s nominee for secretary of state, Antony Blinken, said Wednesday that NATO’s door is always open to Georgia if it meets membership requirements. A few days earlier, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg underscored that Russia cannot stop Georgia from joining the organization if it so wishes. Separately, Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili is in Brussels until Saturday for meetings with European Council President Charles Michel and EU foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell. The EU officials expressed their support for Georgia’s territorial integrity. And this came after the European Court of Human Rights (which is not affiliated with the European Union) released a ruling Thursday that the Russian government is responsible for violations of Georgian citizens’ rights in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, since those regions are under Russian control. The Georgian government praised the ruling, though the Kremlin pointed out that the court said some of the claims were unfounded. Finally, there’s Turkey, which was also a significant player in backing Azerbaijan in the recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. On Monday, Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia met with Turkey’s ambassador to discuss the bilateral strategic partnership and regional developments.
Bottom Line: Russia’s reassertion of dominance over Armenia and Azerbaijan raises questions about Georgia’s place in the South Caucasus. Moscow already controls the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and it would like to expand its reach to other parts of Georgia. Tbilisi, however, wants to keep its options open. With NATO and the U.S. reaching out, Russia will need to act sooner rather than later if it wants to ensure Georgia doesn’t end up closer to the bloc.
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March 1, 2021
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In Georgia, the Opportunity That Wasn’t
Russia isn’t all that interested in intervening in the embattled country.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
Pressure is building in Georgia, where anti-government protests have reached a fever pitch and the recent detention of the United National Movement party's leader in particular has invited criticism from the West.
If this sounds familiar, it should. Instability is a hallmark of Georgia and the Caucasus more generally. Destabilization there coupled with dissatisfaction from the West gives Russia the opportunity to bring countries in this vulnerable region further into its orbit. It’s too important as a buffer zone, as a transportation hub and as an energy corridor for Russia (or the West, for that matter) to ignore. Even so, it’s unlikely that anyone will be able to fully capitalize on the current conflict.
Georgia gained its independence after the Soviet Union collapsed, but it immediately succumbed to conflict. In 1991, large-scale clashes broke out in the breakaway region of South Ossetia, and in 1992, armed clashes erupted in Abkhazia. Russia helped negotiate settlements between them, but further efforts were complicated by Moscow's official recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 (after fighting a five-day war with Georgia) and by Georgia’s efforts to integrate into NATO. Georgia was more broadly unhappy with the extent of Russia's political and economic influence in the country, which was considerable, and though Tbilisi has never been able to become part of the Western bloc, Russo-Georgian relations were about as low as they could get during this period.
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For all of Russia’s past meddling, though, it has so far yet to intervene in the current bout of unrest. And the explanation for that is simple: Moscow simply does not see a significant threat from third parties or to its own remaining influence in the country.
For one thing, any country interested in improving its station in Georgia understands that doing so entails serious financial commitments. Georgia boasts massive unemployment, corruption and slow economic growth. It doesn’t have any significant resource deposits and has to compete with other countries as a potential transit hub. Neither the West nor Russia is willing to do that right now, and neither arguably can, given the financial attention each has to pay to righting its own economy. Turkey is another potential benefactor with interests in extending its influence in the Caucasus – one that has allocated $14 million for the restoration of Georgia's Marneuli military airfield, bombed by Russian aircraft in 2008, and for the purchase of military goods from Turkish firms – but it, too, has its financial difficulties and employs a more diversified strategy in the region besides. Turkey’s investments in the Georgian military industry are not big enough to change the balance of power, and in any case Ankara wouldn’t want to do anything that started a direct fight with Russia.
Second, it can be difficult to engage with a government such as the one in Tbilisi that clearly doesn’t have a secure hold on power. The two primary belligerents are the ruling Georgian Dream party and the United National Movement, which was in power during the Russo-Georgian War. But it’s not a black and white issue. Both parties agree on a number of issues, including the restoration of territorial integrity, the introduction of Western values and integration into the European Union and NATO. The current standoff, then, is likely less a struggle between ideas and more a competition between leaders. It’s why, for example, the UNM and other opposition parties rejected the results of the 2020 legislative elections (in which the Georgian Dream party won 17 single-mandate constituencies) and boycotted the legislature altogether. Both have significant support and financial resources, and each has some leverage over the other, so there is little reason to think they will soon find a compromise and stop fighting for power.
Third, there is practically no observable shift in the balance of power. Though the current Georgian administration refused to cooperate with Russia, Tbilisi is no closer to “joining” the West now than it was years ago. Moreover, Georgia can’t afford to isolate itself from Russia economically. (Russia is Georgia’s second-largest trade partner, accounting for 13.2 percent of exports and 10.8 percent of imports.) Indeed, Moscow is a major market for Georgian wine and fruit, while the European Union, which technically has a free trade agreement with Georgia, is not. There is also a substantial Georgian diaspora in Russia that remits an estimated $400 million to Georgia every year.
Russo-Georgian Trade
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In fact, the only ties between the two to improve since they cratered in the mid-2000s are economic ones. The embargo on goods was lifted after the UNM lost in the 2012 parliamentary elections. Russia has lifted almost all restrictions on Georgian imports and has restored flights. Improved political relations would depend on the resolution of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts – historically fraught issues with potentially dire consequences that no one can afford.
As for the West, bilateral ties between Georgia and the United States are unusually good right now, and although Washington talks a lot about supporting Georgia's territorial claims, that’s about all it does. In fact, Tbilisi is unhappy with the Biden administration, which promised to be tough on Russia but has since extended the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Moscow understands that the U.S. is in no hurry to incorporate Georgia in NATO because it’s more convenient for Washington to cooperate with the South Caucasus states directly than through NATO. The European Union values Georgia as an alternative supply route for energy resources that would ease its dependence on Russia, but now Brussels is too busy with its own problems – i.e. Brexit and post-pandemic economic recovery – to do much about it.
At this point, both Russia and the West are passive observers, happy to let the situation in Georgia play out on its own, assuming it doesn’t spread beyond the country’s borders. What seems like an opportunity for Russia isn’t. It has too much to deal with, and it has little interest in needlessly running afoul of the West.
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The Hole in Biden’s China Strategy: Central Asia
Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan could help the U.S. combat Beijing and advance human rights.
By Kamran Bokhari
March 16, 2021 6:40 pm ET
The brewing competition between the U.S. and China is the defining conflict of the 21st century. The White House’s recent Interim National Security Strategic Guidance Document, crafted to convey President Biden’s vision for how America will engage with the world, is all about the U.S. vs. China. Yet it fails to mention the region where America has its lightest footprint on the planet: Central Asia.
China is building a land bridge to Europe and the Middle East that runs through Central Asia. The new administration will have to account for the region in its strategic thinking if it hopes to re-engage the world after four years of President Trump’s “America First” policy.
The low priority that Mr. Biden’s team assigns to Central Asia is a legacy of successive administrations dating to the 1991 implosion of the Soviet Union. The U.S. has since engaged Central Asia, but only in a tactical or transactional manner. Take the 2015 establishment of the C5+1. This U.S.-run diplomatic forum has continued to be the channel through which Washington distributes aid to and organizes meetings between the five Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. But it hasn’t brought Washington anywhere close to being able to compete with Beijing and Moscow in the region.
Thirty years since the U.S. gained access to Central Asia, long tucked away in the Kremlin’s shadow, it is time to develop a broader strategy for the region—one that takes into consideration the rapidly evolving geopolitics in Eurasia, as Beijing seeks to fill the vacuum created by Russia’s receding influence.
Three of the region’s five nations have demonstrated significant progress in their transition from post-Soviet statehood. Kyrgyzstan has seen three waves of public unrest in its struggle for a more representative government, starting with the 2005 Tulip revolution, which resulted in the overthrow of the country’s Soviet-era leader. Five years after, Kyrgyzstan experienced a second uprising, which led to the establishment of a parliamentary system. Its most recent bout of mass agitation, which broke out last year, resulted in a fresh election in which voters overwhelmingly opted for a presidential form of government.
Uzbekistan is also on an impressive path to reform. Since the current president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, came to power following Soviet-era strongman Islam Karimov’s death in 2016, the once-isolated country is opening its borders to foreign investment and Western ideas.
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan show much less promise, having been locked into authoritarian regimes since 1991. Natural-gas heavyweight Turkmenistan seems content with limiting its relations to Russia, Iran and China, the last of which purchases upward of 30 billion cubic feet of piped gas a year—roughly one-third of its total gas imports.
But the biggest opportunity for the U.S. may lie in Kazakhstan, where Nursultan Nazarbayev voluntarily stepped down in 2019 after nearly 29 years as part of a planned political transition.
As Central Asia’s largest state by landmass and economic output, Kazakhstan is the natural leader of the region. Under its new president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, it has the potential to be a real strategic partner to America. Already pushing back against both Moscow and Beijing—on issues such as Russian attempts to retain regional influence and aggressive Chinese investments—Kazakhstan can benefit immensely from enhanced engagement with the U.S. A strong Kazakhstan making progress on political reform and economic development can be a model to the region. It may also be a poster child in America’s campaign to encourage secular governance in majority-Muslim countries, to include the rights of women and minorities, as well as best environmental practices.
Kazakhstan may welcome the U.S. support on its path toward democratic reform. It is therefore all the more important that Washington work toward a robust engagement on multiple levels beyond resisting China. The Kazakhs have demonstrated leadership on international diplomacy by hosting several rounds of Syrian peace talks and playing host to talks on Afghanistan and Iran. Kazakhstan can help Washington in shaping a post-U.S. Afghanistan, countering Iran’s nuclear ambition, and containing Turkey as it eyes the trans-Caspian region—where the Caucuses meet Central Asia.
To accomplish this, the Biden administration will have to devote real attention to Central Asia. For starters, the Biden-Harris team should appoint a special envoy to the region. The White House can and should use Kazakhstan’s tradition of hosting multilateral diplomacy and Uzbekistan’s newly opened economy, to pursue diplomatic and economic interests across Eurasia. America’s foreign policy is at a historic moment as Beijing looms. Central Asia could be the key to help revive U.S. leadership in the world.
Mr. Bokhari is director of analytical development at the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy and a national-security and foreign-policy specialist at the University of Ottawa’s Professional Development Institute.
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Russia’s New Strategy for Central Asia
In the face of growing competition and diminished might, Moscow is putting influence before dominance.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
While Russia was grabbing attention with its buildup and withdrawal of military forces along its western border with Ukraine, it was making a different, diplomatic advance in another buffer region: Central Asia. On April 30, leaders from the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) – Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia, as well as observer states – gathered in Kazan, Russia. A few days before the meeting, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu traveled to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which is an observer member of the EAEU. Of course, Russian cooperation with the countries of Central Asia is nothing new. But the meetings were emblematic of a shift in Russian strategy away from the ad hoc approach of past decades and toward something more coherent. Facing rising competition for regional influence, and with diminished political and economic capital to impose its will, Moscow is trying to build up the EAEU and lead by subtler means.
Haphazard Strategy
The Soviet Union, by expanding Moscow’s borders, gave Russia immense security. This security was lost when the USSR collapsed. Once Russia stabilized itself, it devoted more attention to its western frontier, which harbored the more immediate threats of NATO and EU encroachment. The Central Asian states, meanwhile, remained more closely tied to Russia. In addition, the countries of Central Asia had territorial disputes with one another, which reduced the chances that they would merge into a union capable of resisting Russia.
But Central Asia is still a critical region for Moscow. It forms a buffer separating Russia from China and the rest of Asia. Especially important is Kazakhstan, which has no natural barriers with Russia, meaning instability in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia can easily spread into Russia itself. It is also important for Moscow to protect its significant industrial potential concentrated along the Kazakh border, as well as communications linking the central part of Russia with Siberia and the Far East, which run either near or through Kazakhstan. Finally, Central Asia has the potential to become one of the most actively developing regions in the world for the production and transportation of oil and coal, attracting the attention of outside players like the United States, Iran, Turkey and China.
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Yet, until the 2020s, Russia had no coherent strategy for Central Asia. Instead, its approach often looked chaotic and uncoordinated. In general, it has tried to maintain its influence by distributing loans and strengthening its military presence. In the first decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia directed economic assistance and mostly unprofitable investment to the region – roughly $20 billion worth, about half of which (47 percent) went to the energy sector, with another 22 percent going to nonferrous metallurgy and 15 percent to telecommunications. Russia also continued to act as the security guarantor of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan within the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and built Russian military bases and facilities in the region.
This policy often met with criticism from the Central Asian countries, which had just gained their independence and did not want to auction it off in exchange for Russian loans. It was also unpopular with many Russians, who were unhappy not only with the large number of Central Asian immigrants but also with the government’s allocation of support to the republics rather than Russia’s own sluggish economy.
New Direction
Almost 30 years later, the Kremlin recognizes the need for a more thoughtful and balanced policy. The countries of Central Asia are no longer lost pieces of the Soviet Union but fully independent states with their own foreign relations and no interest in giving up their sovereignty. There are several reasons for Russia’s change of heart.
First, there’s rising competition: Moscow is no longer Central Asia’s only important trading partner and creditor. Second, Russia is approaching or has reached the limits of its western strategy and is up against increased political pressure on that front. Over the past year, Russia has significantly bolstered its relations with Belarus, and its enormous military drills in and around Crimea last month demonstrated that Kyiv and Moscow understand their own limits and what to expect from each other. In the east, however, Russia still needs to develop its strategic depth and further open trading markets. Third, the Kremlin accepted that its previous policy toward Central Asia was just not very effective and actually ignored the territorial disputes in the region, which today are at risk of flaring up.
Under its old policy, Russia had no mechanism for resolving potential military conflicts – like last week’s clashes between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – since Russian military involvement was impossible because Moscow prefers to maintain equally good relations with all parties. Also, the introduction of Russian peacekeepers in the region would likely cause a negative reaction from the West.
Share of Central Asian Trade, 2019
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Other factors likely played a role as well. For example, the pandemic highlighted all manner of existing and potential dangers: economic inequality, massive hidden unemployment, reduced remittances due to social distancing measures, the risk of economic crisis and the ineffectiveness of political and administrative systems.
Social and economic unrest could be a boon for the recruitment efforts of local terrorist groups. Also, the Biden administration returned to the so-called C5+1 (the five republics of Central Asia plus the U.S.) and began discussing the possibility of setting up military bases after the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops from Afghanistan. Turkey’s president, meanwhile, suggested formally upgrading the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States. Finally, the volatility of oil prices and the modest growth of the Russian economy were threatening Russia's investment approach to the region.
Influence Over Control
The details of the new Russian approach still need to be worked out, but it will run through the Eurasian Economic Union, which is not just an economic bloc but also a political forum. Russia can no longer hope to dominate the region – at least not at a price it’s willing to pay. The Kremlin’s future influence will instead be based on psychological warfare and inducements, not direct intervention. To that end, it is important for Russia to show that cooperation with it or with Russian-led projects is a mutually beneficial process, and that its partners will not lose their independence but rather gain influence. The recent Tajik-Kyrgyz conflict is a vivid example of Russia using the EAEU as a platform to resolve a conflict instead of deploying its own peacekeepers or negotiating separately with both sides.
Eurasian Economic Union and Associated Nations
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The military aspect is also changing. Moscow no longer seeks to build up Russian forces in Central Asia, but instead prefers to create a platform for burden-sharing and joint cooperation in which every participating country feels that it is an important and full-fledged member. For example, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu initiated the formation of an anti-Taliban front during his last visit to Uzbekistan. This is supported by the creation of a joint air defense system with Tajikistan and the new strategic partnership with Uzbekistan. The latter headed off an initiative from Washington, which hoped Uzbekistan would serve as a reserve base for countering terrorists in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Western troops.
If its new strategy works, then Russia will be able to increase its importance in the region at minimal cost. More important, it will do so without triggering a backlash from third countries. China is unlikely to oppose it, since Beijing needs a stable Central Asia to implement its Belt and Road strategy. Moreover, if the countries of Central Asia represent one economic space, then the transportation of goods will encounter fewer bureaucratic obstacles. Iranian ambitions in the region can also be gently controlled by Russia, especially if Russia succeeds in attracting Iran to the EAEU, which could help Tehran circumvent U.S. sanctions. Turkey’s economic ambitions in the region will be forced into the background, and a strong Russian presence will reinforce Russian culture and block pan-Turkism from taking root. Finally, if the EAEU represents a platform for negotiations where countries are not dominated by Russia, then Western countries are also unlikely to find a reason to threaten the project with sanctions.
But such a strategy means that Russia will have to settle for increased influence rather than total control and make a number of concessions. Already Moscow has experienced the consequences of the introduction of consensus in the EAEU, when Armenia opposed Azerbaijan’s participation in a meeting of the bloc’s intergovernmental council, against Russia’s wishes. The Kremlin will have to get used to moving more slowly and not always getting its way. The only questions are whether the Kremlin will have the patience and time to implement its new strategy and, more important, whether the Central Asian countries will trust Moscow’s peaceful intentions.
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Brief: China’s Growing Role in Central Asia
China’s success raises questions about Russian influence in the region.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Background: Over a relatively short period, China has strengthened its position in Central Asia, becoming a key trading partner and investor in what is historically Russia’s sphere of influence. China’s success raises questions about Russian influence in the region.
What Happened: Accumulated Chinese investment in Tajikistan surpassed $3.15 billion at the end of 2020, which is 35.5 percent of the total volume of foreign investment in the country and nearly double Russia’s investment ($1.6 billion), the Tajik state investment committee said. Significant inflows of Chinese investment to Tajikistan really began only about a decade ago. Meanwhile, the Kyrgyz government turned to China to ask for help restoring infrastructure and social facilities in its southwestern Batken region.
On May 12, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan at the second 5+1 summit, where he called for the countries to find new avenues for regional cooperation. On the same day, Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry announced that China was offering it a $54 million grant, plus 150,000 free COVID-19 vaccine doses and payment deferrals on Kyrgyz debt to China.
Bottom Line: After a lull last year, China is again emphasizing relations with Central Asia. This may worry Russia, which is in the midst of its own campaign to woo Central Asia but which can’t match China’s ability to provide financial assistance. Moscow may instead try to promote the advantages of membership in its regional integration project, the Eurasian Economic Union, while trying to avoid a direct confrontation with Beijing.
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Land Mines for U.S. Abound in the Caucuses
Azerbaijan is rich with diplomatic possibilities; Armenia complicates matters.
By Walter Russell Mead
June 21, 2021
Azerbaijan released 15 Armenian prisoners of war on Saturday in exchange for the locations of 97,000 Armenian land mines on territory Azerbaijan recaptured in last fall’s Nagorno-Karabakh war. That was a welcome sign that American diplomacy in the Caucasus is alive and well. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s victory in snap elections Monday suggests that the window for diplomacy remains open. But the State Department will have to step carefully. There are plenty of geopolitical land mines left, and U.S. diplomats—who helped arrange the exchange agreement—could set off career-ending explosions if they make a false move.
The Caucasus is one of those complicated faraway but strategically vital regions that Americans often overlook. It’s the only exit oil and gas can take from Central Asia to the West without passing through Russian or Iranian territory. Since the former Soviet republics of the southern Caucasus declared their independence in 1990, there have been numerous conflicts in Georgia, two in Russia’s restive Chechen region, and two between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which is largely populated by ethnic Armenians but internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan.
Caucasian conflicts can have an outsize impact on world order. In 1999 the second Chechen war helped Vladimir Putin assume firm control of the Russian Federation. His 2008 invasion of Georgia marked the beginning of a Russian challenge to the post-Cold War international order. The recent Nagorno-Karabakh war, in which Azerbaijani forces equipped with Turkish and Israeli drones imposed a stinging setback on Armenia’s Russian-supplied army, also marks a shift in world politics as high-tech drone warfare becomes a factor in small-power conflicts.
The problem for U.S. political types engaged in Caucasus policy is that American values and American interests can pull Washington in different directions. U.S. connections with Armenia are strong and deep. American missionaries and educators were closely involved with Armenian communities across the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, and some of the most searing and heart-rending accounts of the Armenian genocide come from American missionaries who saw friends and colleagues slaughtered in 1915.
The large Armenian diaspora community in the U.S. keeps the memory alive, and since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenian-Americans have actively assisted and advocated for their struggling homeland. Practically speaking, Washington cannot conduct a Caucasus policy that ignores the concerns of Armenian-Americans and their Christian allies.
At the same time, Azerbaijan is too important to ignore. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline carries a million barrels of oil a day to Europe and Israel. With last January’s agreement between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan on the joint exploitation of the Dostluq oil-and-gas field in the Caspian, the pipeline’s supply and importance has grown. Azerbaijan is also the only country that borders both Russia and Iran, and a predominantly Shiite country that enjoys close and cordial relations with Israel. The majority of ethnic Azeris live in modern Iran, and the close cultural and economic ties between Iranian and Azerbaijani Azeris are of critical importance for Western powers seeking information about Iran’s nuclear program and other sensitive topics.
Azerbaijani officials speak openly of their desire for closer relations with the West. Armenia meanwhile enjoys friendly back-and-forths with both Moscow and Tehran. During the Nagorno-Karabakh war, Russian supplies for Armenia were shipped through Iran—setting off demonstrations by Iranian Azeris that alarmed authorities in Tehran. Since the conflict last fall, the Kremlin has tightened its grip on Armenia. As has often happened when Christian Armenians have cried out for protection in the past, Moscow alone has answered their calls. Russian peacekeepers and threats are the only forces holding Azerbaijan back from completing its reconquest of Karabakh.
If there were no Armeniaian-Azberbaijani conflict, Azerbaijan, with three times Armenia’s population and 3.5 times its gross domestic product, would be the center of U.S. Caucasus policy—even if concerns about human rights and corruption ruffled relations from time to time. (Freedom House rates Azerbaijan as “not free,” and Transparency International rates it 129 among 180 countries for perceived corruption.) As the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan and draws down forces across the Middle East, it needs local allies to protect its interests. Azerbaijan is high on the very short list of countries in the region both willing and able to help. Building a relationship with Azerbaijan without alienating Armenians is difficult, but Washington has a long history of managing incompatible allies. South Korea and Japan, Israel and Saudi Arabia: American diplomats have specialized in herding cats since World War II.
Last week’s prisoner release offered a welcome opportunity to work with both countries. One hopes the Biden administration can build on this success to make the Caucasus more peaceful and less vulnerable to Russia.
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June 22, 2021
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Brief: Crime Surge in the North Caucasus
The region was already one of Russia's least stable.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Background: The North Caucasus region, with its low level of socio-economic development and separatist undercurrents, is one of Russia’s most unstable. It’s also Russia’s gateway to the South Caucasus and the Middle East – or, alternatively, a path for Russia’s enemies into the Russian heartland. It’s therefore important for Moscow not only to control the region, but also to maintain a semblance of security.
What Happened: Two North Caucasian republics, Chechnya and Ingushetia, saw massive increases in registered crimes in the first five months of 2021. In Chechnya, crime rose by 41.2 percent, and in Ingushetia it jumped 27.5 percent. The top 10 includes other North Caucasus regions like Dagestan and North Ossetia. Earlier this month, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin admitted that public programs intended to develop the North Caucasus had failed.
Chechnya & Ingushetia
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Bottom Line: The Kremlin is focusing more on the North Caucasus, particularly ahead of legislative elections in September. The spike in crime and poor performance of development measures could push the Kremlin to overhaul its plans and create a new strategy to firm up its grip on the region.
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July 7, 2021
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A New Order in the South Caucasus
It’s not clear that the new regional balance can survive its own contradictions.
By: Ridvan Bari Urcosta
When Armenia and Azerbaijan started fighting late last year, it looked like another episode in their interminable conflict. But beneath the surface, three important things happened: First, Turkey gained a seat at the table. Second, Russia and Turkey blocked Western (i.e., American and French) participation in the diplomatic settlement. And third, they laid the groundwork for an alternative regional order that includes the three South Caucasus countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – as well as Russia, Turkey and Iran. Whether this new order can survive Turkey’s rise and its own inherent contradictions is a critical question for the South Caucasus and relations between the three major powers.
The Platform of Six
In December 2020, right after the signing in November of the Russia-brokered cease-fire between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan proposed the establishment of a six-party grouping to end hostilities in the region and avert another war. Like most regional frameworks, the so-called Platform of Six faces several challenges. Most obviously, there’s the rivalry between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which at this point have bookended years of low-level fighting with two wars since the late 1980s. Then there’s Armenia, which has been at odds with Turkey for more than a century due to the 1915 mass killing of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire. Finally, there’s the Russo-Georgian issue. A U.S. partner with ambitions to join NATO, Tbilisi is wary of Moscow, which invaded Georgia in 2008 and continues to occupy parts of the country.
The Platform of Six, Shusha Declaration
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In a sign of just how precarious the new arrangement could be, on June 15 Azerbaijan and Turkey signed the Shusha Declaration, which established the two countries as strategic allies. The agreement stipulates that, in the event of an attack by a third country, the two will take joint initiatives to address the threat and provide each other with the necessary aid and military cooperation. It also left open the possibility of Ankara establishing a military base in the Azerbaijani city of Shusha, despite Moscow’s strict prohibition of such a base. (Russia agreed only to let Turkey operate with it a joint center to monitor the Armenian-Azerbaijani cease-fire.) Notably, the Shusha Declaration also contains a pledge to support pan-Turkish collaboration and to coordinate the work of Azeri and Turkish diasporas – a particularly unnerving prospect for Russia and Iran, both of which host sizable Azeri populations.
To gauge the feasibility of the new diplomatic model, we need to examine the perspectives of the potential participants.
Turkey
As its power grows, Turkey sees an opportunity to make itself the gatekeeper between Europe and the Greater Middle East and Central Asia. For the past decade, an increasingly neo-Ottoman government in Ankara has spread its influence across the region, with the exception of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. Recent Turkish actions in the South Caucasus and Ukraine suggest that may be changing. During last year’s Armenian-Azerbaijani war, very public Turkish military assistance to Azerbaijan’s armed forces proved decisive on the battlefield. Azerbaijan’s victory was also a win for Turkey and highlighted to both sides the benefits of a deeper relationship.
Turkey’s South Caucasus approach has two parts: a strategy of regional cooperation via the Platform of Six plan, and bilateral military and political alliances with strategic partners based on pan-Turkism. Through these endeavors, Ankara hopes to increase its influence in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, and potentially to create a transport corridor from Turkey through Azerbaijan to Central Asia.
However, a stronger Turkey in the South Caucasus and Central Asia raises the possibility of Ankara challenging Russia’s traditional spheres of influence. This would be unacceptable for Moscow and would seriously undermine Russo-Turkish relations. Washington, on the other hand, would approve. The U.S. has an interest in preventing Iran and Russia from expanding their influence in Central Asia, but it doesn’t want to make any serious commitments of its own. Further, Turkey can increase its bilateral military agreements with Ukraine and Georgia, thereby supporting NATO interests even though these two states are not members of the bloc.
Russia
Russia played a decisive role in containing the Armenian-Azerbaijani war and designing and implementing the subsequent peacekeeping mission. The results largely serve Russian interests. But instead of asserting itself as the sole arbiter, Moscow welcomed some level of Turkish participation in order to take some of the burden off itself and avoid direct confrontation with Ankara.
Moscow is not ready to accept Turkish dominance in the South Caucasus, but it is open to an increased role for Turkey that in turn helps stem direct Western influence in the region. From the Kremlin’s perspective, it is better to establish a balance of power and spheres of influence among the regional powers than to let the West dominate the Caucasus. Russia won’t tolerate Turkish interference everywhere, especially not in the North Caucasus, Crimea or eastern Ukraine, but it sees more opportunities for coordination with Ankara than with the West. An added bonus for Russia is that Turkey and Iran can balance each other.
From Russia’s perspective, the Armenian-Azerbaijani war enabled it to achieve several goals. First, Russia increased its military influence in the area by sending thousands of peacekeepers to the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Second, Armenia’s defeat greatly reduced the risk of an Armenian outreach to the West. Third, through the Dagestan region, Russia can create significant zones of economic cooperation with Iran, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan. (Moscow would also like to reopen Yerevan-Baku-Dagestan transit routes, including oil railways between Baku and Nakhchivan.) Fourth, the potential for diplomatic and economic cooperation among the regional players could entice Georgian elites to reconsider their hostility toward Moscow. Finally, the war and its resolution created a high-profile precedent in which non-Western powers were able to settle an international conflict on their own.
Conflict Areas in Armenia and Azerbaijan
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Iran
From the beginning, Tehran abstained from supporting any side in the conflict because it could not afford to get drawn in. It issued boilerplate diplomatic statements regarding the cessation of hostilities and the importance of Armenia’s territorial integrity (and thus Iran’s own security), but it accepted Baku’s right to reclaim lost areas. Iran proposed its own version of the platform called the “3+3” model, differing mostly in name only, through which Tehran emphasized the importance of regional economic cooperation and integration. Both, after all, would help Iran to circumvent U.S. sanctions.
Iran’s geographic location makes its participation essential for any six-member framework to take root. It is the only country that has diplomatic relations with the rest of the members, but its ties go even deeper. For example, Iran is the one territory through which Baku can reach Nakhchivan without crossing Armenia. More, Iranian companies are preparing to help in the reconstruction of war-torn areas. Iran feels that settlement of the decadeslong regional conflict is clandestine of geostrategic opportunities. The revival of economic cooperation in the South Caucasus can reanimate projects meant to connect the communication corridors in the Persian Gulf with the Black Sea region.
Tehran, always keenly aware of geopolitical consequences, doesn’t want Turkey and Azerbaijan to develop a strong military and economic alliance. Instead, Iran favors a strong Russian presence and a stable Armenia.
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan remained pragmatic in its approach to waging war and waging peace. It understood Russia’s limitations, and it knew no one in the region wanted a confrontation between Russia and Turkey. But it also understood that without Russia’s presence in the region it would risk surrendering to Turkish geopolitical projects. Baku therefore agreed to return the territories that were occupied in the 1990s and to mitigate the risks of revolution. In other words, Azerbaijan helped maintain the status quo after the fighting.
Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkey are very concerned with the prospect of revolution in the South Caucasus, especially in how the uprisings could invite Western intervention. And even though President Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly said that the Nagorno-Karabakh question has been answered, the fact that so many territories are populated by ethnic Armenians still in control of Nagorno-Karabakh argues otherwise.
Armenia
Armenia is the weakest economic and military power in the region, one that relies strongly on Iran for its political needs and entirely on Russia for its defense needs. It’s little wonder, then, that it lost the recent war. To some degree, the platform was predicated on Armenia’s legislative elections, as everyone relied on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to honor the cease-fires signed last November. (Pashinyan’s party won a majority in parliament, and Pashinyan himself will continue to fulfill the commitments he personally signed.)
In theory, Yerevan may try to engage Western countries, particularly the U.S. and France, and even boycott the peace process. However, the presence of Russia and Azerbaijan (backed by Turkey) doesn’t change how it feels about Armenia. So everyone is essentially waiting for Yerevan to fulfill its commitments to the peace agreement. Toward that end, the next move is to allow the construction of the so-called Zangezur corridor from Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan, which will include railway and transport connections. It may even include oil and gas pipelines. (The Russian FSB will likely control the corridor.) Moreover, all sides must delimit and demarcate their borders, but only after the peace deal is in place. Without a settlement between Yerevan and Baku, it is simply impossible to build greater projects, short of Azerbaijan building the corridor with the help of its army.
Prospective Trade Corridors in the Caucasus
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Georgia
Of all the countries involved in the platform, Georgia is perhaps the most reluctant, given its strong ties to the West and its problems with Russia. Turkey has already started a diplomatic campaign to address its reticence, claiming Georgian participation in the platform may become an opportunity to eliminate the problems between Tbilisi and Moscow. The government in Tbilisi has sent mixed signals over the platform proposal. Though the president acknowledged Georgia must be involved in the platform’s creation, the Foreign Ministry clarified by saying how difficult it will be to engage with a country (Russia) that occupies territory (Abkhazia) that Georgia considers its own.
For Georgia, the increased role of Turkey guarantees a strategic balance against Russian influence. However, Georgia’s alignment with the West and its desire to join NATO will likely rankle the other members that want to limit Western participation. Either way, the Russia factor remains pivotal for Georgia’s participation. Tbilisi is risking being ousted from the regional projects while jeopardizing its potential NATO membership. For decades, Georgia has benefited from the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, so as relations between Yerevan and Baku improve, Georgia may become a much less attractive market, especially for oil and gas companies.
In sum, the platform, and thus the regional balance of power, is still in flux. Georgia is unlikely to join it, and Iran and Armenia have to approach it pragmatically, rather than enthusiastically. And the region will fail to see the potential of its economic development if Armenia and Azerbaijan don’t sign the peace agreement. The big question is the limits of Turkish-Russian cooperation. While their respective interests may favor stability at the moment, the two countries have a history of warfare. Iran’s presence mitigates the risk of a confrontation between them.
Even so, there may be room for gains under current conditions because all three understand the West could use these conflicts to its benefit. It’s in their interests to resolve conflict where possible. The same can’t be said of the U.S.
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he insular Central Asian country could attract refugees and extremists.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
Last week as the Taliban surged into Kabul, effectively completing their takeover of Afghanistan, attention in surrounding states and major Eurasian powers turned to a different mass movement that was only just beginning: the surge of Afghan refugees out of the country. Massive refugee outflows will strain neighboring economies and societies, and could spread the threat of terrorism to states with little capability to defend themselves. One such state, the weakest of Afghanistan’s neighbors, is Turkmenistan – a country rich in energy resources and poor in military capabilities. Ashgabat’s vulnerabilities will likely force it to abandon its long-standing preference for neutrality, kicking off a competition for influence among its more powerful neighbors.
Fortress Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan is landlocked, but it has significant energy resources and is a valuable transit state in Central Asia. From north to south it forms part of the link between Russia and the Persian Gulf, and from west to east it lies along the route between Europe and the rest of Central Asia. It has the fourth-largest proven gas reserves in the world and is part of the so-called strategic energy ellipse, which combines the hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. Unsurprisingly, Turkmenistan is a flashpoint for regional powers: Russia wants to reassert its influence in the post-Soviet space; Iran shares a long border with Turkmenistan as well as centuries-old cultural and historical links; Turkey is interested in strengthening its political, ideological and economic positions in the region; and China wants access to its cheap energy resources.
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But Turkmenistan is notoriously reclusive and secretive, and reliable information about it is hard to come by. (For example, officially it has not had a single case of COVID-19.) It is the most insular and authoritarian of all the post-Soviet states, a product of its difficult situation after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Post-Soviet Turkmenistan is resource-rich but population-poor; it has the second-most territory but the fewest people among the five Central Asian republics. Ashgabat participates in regional trade and sends its students to study abroad, but its political and military neutrality annoys key partners who would like to see Turkmenistan as their ally. It is not a member of any of the regional economic or political groupings, such as the Eurasian Economic Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States (it is an associated member of the latter group), and it avoids military organizations and alliances like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. This allows Turkmenistan to preserve its sovereignty and avoid giving too much influence to an outside power.
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New Destination
The collapse of the Afghan government threatens to burst the bubble Turkmenistan has crafted around itself. The inflow of Afghans and ethnic Turkmens, who make up the sixth-largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, could pose a far greater threat to Turkmenistan than to other countries in the region precisely because of Ashgabat’s weak economy and system of rigid political control.
Already the Turkmen authorities are preventing Afghans and ethnic Turkmen from crossing the border into their territory, but it’s unclear how long they can hold out. Neighboring Uzbekistan built a barrier along its relatively short border with Afghanistan, the most heavily guarded border in the world. The Tajik-Afghan border is reinforced by the constant presence of Russian troops conducting joint exercises. The Turkmen army lacks the capabilities of its Pakistani and Chinese counterparts, and at any rate its border with Afghanistan is about 800 kilometers (500 miles) and runs through flat plains, which are hard to police yet easy to cross. Much of its military equipment, remnants of the Soviet era, is likely inoperable. Modernization efforts have been inadequate, and the personnel are rumored to be poorly trained and unskilled.
Making matters worse, Turkmenistan has for years suffered chronic food shortages, hard currency shortages and high unemployment, and its budget – which depends on energy exports – is strained. Its economic crisis began many years ago, partly as a result of lost gas revenue due to the termination of its contract with Gazprom in 2016 (the supply agreement was renegotiated in April 2019), as well as hyperinflation and several lean years. Coronavirus restrictions pushed food prices higher, which especially hurt regions that depend on other parts of the country for their supply of vegetables and fruits. Ashgabat introduced coupons for flour, butter, sugar and other basic goods, but even these subsidized products are becoming unaffordable, and there’s rising discontent in some regions over the way local authorities have distributed the subsidies. Opposition figures, especially those living in exile abroad, have criticized the government for its poor handling of the pandemic, natural disasters and the economy.
In Need of Friends
A big influx of refugees could only destabilize the economy further and fuel protests. And in fact, Turkmenistan’s fragility, lack of natural barriers, and enormous gas reserves and pipeline infrastructure could attract those who want to spread terrorism and extremism.
The Turkmen economy is built around energy exports: Almost 90 percent of all its exports consist of energy products, accounting for nearly a quarter of its gross domestic product. But Turkmenistan’s major gas fields are located close to the Afghan border. Moreover, Turkmenistan plays a central role in the network of gas pipelines covering Russia, China and Iran, and is key to plans for a trans-Caucasian gas pipeline to Europe as well as projects to supply gas to India via Afghanistan and Pakistan. Notably, the Taliban support this latter project, known uncreatively as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, since they themselves are interested in a consistent source of energy, but it’s unclear how exactly they plan to protect the infrastructure within Afghanistan if opposition to their return swells. Moreover, other participants in the pipeline may not take kindly to giving the Taliban a role in the project or seeing the Taliban spread their influence beyond Afghanistan’s borders. Given its precarious situation, Turkmenistan can’t afford threats to these pipelines.
Turkmenistan’s diplomatic policy is to be friendly with everyone. It maintains regular contacts with Russia, China, Iran, Turkey and Taliban representatives to ensure the security of its borders, and it describes the relationship between the Afghan and Turkmen peoples as fraternal. But Ashgabat is ill-equipped to prevent the spread of extremism and instability across its borders. This was not a significant challenge as long as the U.S. military was in Afghanistan, but now the economic and security situations have turned against Turkmenistan, and its neutrality is not an asset. Alignment with Russia, Iran, Turkey and/or China could enhance the security of the country, but only if its leaders are prepared to abandon their long-standing policy of neutrality. They probably do not have a choice. The competition for Turkmenistan will soon begin.
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August 30, 2021
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Brief: Russia Reinforces Its Buffer in Central Asia
A series of military drills are intended to shore up defenses and warn off threats.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Background: Central Asia buffers Russia from the ongoing instability in Afghanistan, but Moscow fears that increased migration and the threat of terrorism and extremism could destabilize the region.
Central Asia
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What Happened: The Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization announced plans to conduct military exercises in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan because of the situation in Afghanistan. The drills in Kyrgyzstan will run from Sept. 7 to Sept. 9 and involve several thousand troops. Three more exercises are planned near the Tajik-Afghan border in October, and a fourth is set for November. Separately, about 500 Russian troops in Tajikistan participated in tactical maneuvers on Monday. Previously, Russia transferred T-72 tanks to the Tajik mountains for exercises.
Bottom Line: The last thing Moscow wants is to get involved militarily in Afghanistan. Its priority instead is to reinforce its buffer in Central Asia with troop deployments and exercises. This is also a useful opportunity for Russia to win back some influence in the post-Soviet space and keep other major players out.
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October 6, 2021
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The Threat of Another Caucasus Conflict
Iran and Turkey are upping the ante, but a repeat of last year’s war is unlikely.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
A year after the brief war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, tensions are rising again in the Caucasus – though this time with a different set of contenders. Last Friday, Iran began military exercises near the Azerbaijani border in response to Azerbaijani-Turkish drills, prompting Baku and Ankara to announce more joint drills for this week. The entire region is taking note: Georgia’s defense minister met with officials from Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia’s foreign minister left for Iran, and Russia’s foreign minister will host his Iranian counterpart in Moscow on Wednesday. As bad as things look right now, however, the chances of another outbreak of war are low.
The 2020 Conflict
The Caucasus region is extremely fragmented. Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia are in constant competition to determine their place in the post-Soviet world. At the same time, regional powers Russia, Turkey and Iran compete with one another for resources and influence in the region, part of a clash that goes back centuries. From the 16th to the 18th century, Turkey and Iran were engaged in constant wars for the region until the Russian Empire leapfrogged them both and then solidified its control further by establishing the Soviet system. The Soviet Union’s breakdown reawakened the Caucasus and the larger power struggle for control of it.
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Among the three bigger players, Russia and Turkey have significantly increased their influence since last year’s Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Moscow deployed nearly 2,000 peacekeepers and 90 armored personnel carriers to enforce the eventual armistice. This was extremely important for Russia, which, while still the dominant player in the Caucasus, is less and less capable each year of matching the money and projects offered by the other big players. Maximizing its leverage in the Caucasus is not just a vanity project for the Kremlin: The region borders the North Caucasus republics, which are located within Russian territory and are among its least stable areas. The potential for the Taliban’s seizure of power in Afghanistan to trigger a wave of migrants in the region has heightened Moscow’s anxieties. Close ties with the South Caucasus republics to some extent enable Moscow to control the emergence of potential threats to its own territory. In addition, the southern republics form a buffer protecting Russian interests from Iran and Turkey, and give Russia some leverage in energy corridors that pass through the region.
Turkey, meanwhile, significantly expanded its presence by strengthening economic and military ties with Azerbaijan, including supporting it during last year’s conflict. With neo-Ottoman ideas on the rise in Ankara, Turkey in recent years returned to the region, touting the close ties between itself and Baku and the idea of “two states, one nation.” Energy-deficient Turkey is also interested in the region’s oil and gas reserves and infrastructure, which connects Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Its relationship with Azerbaijan solidified, Ankara’s latest moves include trying to improve ties with Georgia and hinting at the restoration of political dialogue with Armenia.
Iran, unlike Turkey and Russia, mostly stayed out of the last Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, distracted by its economic problems and instability in the Levant. Tehran also feared its involvement would strengthen the separatist movement of ethnic Azerbaijanis within Iran, especially since Iran supplied humanitarian and financial aid to Armenia. With Iran’s help, Armenia secured a corridor to the outside world under the blockade of Azerbaijan and Turkey. Tehran gained nothing from the conflict but an invitation from the leaders of Turkey and Azerbaijan to participate in a “platform of six” (involving the three Caucasus republics and the three regional powers) to unblock transport and economic ties in the region. The six-party talks are unlikely to lead to any tangible results.
Iranian Discontent
Tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan began to grow at the end of the summer. After the 2020 conflict, Azerbaijani border guards gained control of part of a road between two Armenian cities and imposed travel restrictions enabling them to stop foreign (primarily Iranian) trucks to collect transport taxes and duties. Tehran also is critical of Azerbaijan’s close ties with Israel, which supplied Baku with a large number of modern weapons, including drones. Iran already faces growing pressure from the U.S. and Israel over its proxy groups in the Levant, and it does not want another front opened up on its northern border.
Turkey’s growing role in the Caucasus might be an even bigger concern for Iran. Ankara is trying to build its relationships with all of the Caucasus republics and conducting frequent military exercises with Azerbaijan. Last year, Turkish authorities announced plans to build a railway connecting Turkish territory with Azerbaijan, and the two states signed a preferential trade agreement. Special operations forces from Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan held joint exercises in Baku for the first time in early September, followed by joint drills involving Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The latter alignment is seen by Tehran as a direct challenge and a counter to cooperation among Iran, Armenia and Russia.
Iran also looks with concern at Turkey’s growing popularity in Turkic communities as a result of Ankara’s support for Baku. As many as 30 million ethnic Azerbaijanis – about 25 percent of the population – live in Iran. Armenian-Turkish statements about improving relations are also worrying for Tehran, which has traditionally secured the loyalty of ethnic Armenians through patronage. If Turkey manages to reach an accord with Armenia, it would deprive Iran of leverage against Turkey and enable Ankara to extend its power projection deeper into the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
Why There Won’t Be a War
Tehran has deployed multiple launch rocket systems and ballistic missile launchers with a range of up to 700 kilometers (435 miles) in northern Iran, according to reports. Among the Iranian troops deployed to the border are two armored brigades, an airborne brigade, artillery and engineering units, and units equipped with drones. Iranian aviation has concentrated at airfields close to the northern border. In response, Turkish and Azerbaijani drone patrols are constant. Despite the buildup, however, another military confrontation is unlikely for several reasons.
First, Iran’s main foreign policy priorities lie elsewhere. Tehran faces graver threats from the territories of Turkey, Iraq, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Pakistan than from Armenia or Azerbaijan. Iran is embroiled in a proxy war in Syria and has the nuclear standoff with the West. The possible return of Iranian oil to the market has also led Iran to reopen dialogue with its old rival Saudi Arabia, in particular to reach a bilateral settlement regarding Iraq.
Second, Turkey has problems of its own that limit its ambitions. It is tangled up in the Syrian conflict, where cooperation with Iran is a must. Its economy is in shambles. And Turkey could not withstand the simultaneous pressure from Europe and Russia that would follow from another conflict in the Caucasus.
Finally, Iran has calculated that Russia will not allow the emergence of a bipolar order in the region, split between Turkey, Azerbaijan and probably Georgia on the one side and Iran and Armenia on the other. Such a realignment would challenge Moscow’s position in the region. Another conflict would draw in Russia, which would once again play peacemaker and strengthen its position. Moreover, although Iran is suspicious of Russian influence in the Caucasus, Tehran is not ready to enter into confrontation with Moscow. Iranian-Russian cooperation in other areas, like Syria and the oil sector, is more important for Tehran than the Caucasus.
Iran wants to show that it will not tolerate the presence of a competitor in the Caucasus, even if the region isn’t its highest priority, and that it can play the part of regional mediator, partner and adviser. The intended target of this message is Turkey and its would-be partners in the region. At the same time, Moscow, which is not enthusiastic about the growing influence of any state in the Caucasus, is choosing to wait and see.
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November 8, 2021
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Russian Migration Policies: Safety First
Now more than ever, allowing Central Asian migrants into the economy serves both parties.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
Despite the internal economic difficulties caused by the COVID-19 lockdowns and sanctions pressure, Russia has continued to expand its influence in Central Asia using instruments such as the Eurasian Economic Union. But Russia was also successful in its soft-power approaches, namely migration. Allowing more Central Asian migrants into Russia indirectly enhances Moscow's reach and importance in Central Asian economies.
A Ticket to Moscow
Russian involvement in Central Asia boils down to security. Moscow sees the presence of foreign players near its borders as a threat to its security and strives to have at least a buffer zone between them. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia’s resources and favorable geographic location drew the attention of most major powers: China and Asia-Pacific countries from the east; Middle Eastern countries from the south; and the Caucasus, Turkey and Europe from the west and north.
Central Asia
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As important, Central Asian economic instability threatens Russia too. These countries have growing populations, low standards of living, periodic shortages of vital resources, high unemployment and national conflicts. More recently, they have undergone a period of economic slowdown thanks to the pandemic and witnessed a heightened threat of extremism thanks to the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. It therefore behooves Russia to keep Central Asian states from destabilizing. In Kazakhstan, for example, Russia has established cooperation in industry, infrastructure and trade, and is shoring up the Eurasian Economic Union. (It expects a record trade turnover in 2021 of up to $20 billion.) Other countries of the region that are farther away, however, have fewer cooperative policies in place and have more complex economic pictures. Per capita gross domestic product is just over $1,800 in Uzbekistan, $1,300 in Kyrgyzstan and just $800 in Tajikistan.
Migration has therefore been a constant fixture between Central Asia and Russia. In the 1990s, there was a massive influx of so-called forced migration to Russia from countries with unstable political situations, oppression of certain ethnic groups and civil wars. These days, migration is all about labor: Workers leave for higher-paying work in Russia, from where they send remittances home. However, border closures brought on by the pandemic left a lot of people without work. In 2020, the number of migrants in Russia totaled roughly 6 million, down from about 11 million in normal circumstances.
Notably, Russia benefits from Central Asian migrants, who account for about half of all migrants in the country. They provide Russia with reliable manual labor in jobs many Russians don’t want to perform (agriculture, garbage collection, etc.) and create a gray market that allows some companies to save on unreported money. It’s one of the main reasons Russia has visa-free travel agreements with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan – the three biggest sources of migrant labor. These countries benefit too, of course. Migrant remittances account for about 30 percent of the GDPs of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and about 12 percent for Uzbekistan. These remittances are a source of livelihood for many households.
Central Asian Migration
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The pandemic threw a wrench in this otherwise fairly well-oiled machine. According to the Russian Central Bank, the volume of remittances from Tajik workers fell in 2020 by $835 million to $1.7 billion, from Uzbek workers by $282 million to $4.42 billion, and from Kyrgyz workers by $242 million to $1.7 billion. Reduced cash flows, the return of migrants to areas with high unemployment and an increased threat of extremism sounds like a potentially explosive cocktail.
And that excludes the global problems that are affecting all countries right now. Labor markets, for example, are tight, and because the Russian ruble is currently weak and volatile, migrants can in theory choose to work in countries with better exchange rates or find higher-paying jobs. Kazakhs also work in Poland and South Korea in droves, and Turkey signaled an interest in Central Asian labor when the Agency for External Labor Migration signed a cooperation agreement with Turkpermit for the temporary employment of Uzbeks in Turkey.
Eager to discourage this outcome, the Kremlin spent 2021 simplifying its migration policy even more. For example, it announced a “migration amnesty” for 158,000 Uzbek citizens who had previously been banned from Russia. Moreover, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Uzbekistan are launching a project that will allow 10,000 Uzbek citizens to apply for permits for work in Russia even before leaving their home country.
Meanwhile, Moscow is trying to make life a little easier for the migrants already in Russia. Sberbank, Russia’s largest bank, is hiring consultants with Uzbek, Tajik or Kyrgyz language skills. The government plans to open premigration centers in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan that will prepare a complete package of documents for living and working on its territory. And it says it will launch three new offerings on the State Services portal next year, one of which is intended for migrant laborers and will help foreign citizens search for vacancies in Russia, conduct online interviews and conclude employment contracts. By 2030, Russia’s labor market plans to increase the number of legally working foreigners by 1 million to 3.5 million. Despite pandemic restrictions, about 1.6 million Tajiks, about 3 million Uzbeks and some 600,000 Kyrgyz have already entered Russia this year in search of work. In early 2021, after easing travel restrictions and resuming direct flights, some Central Asian families sold whatever they could, including livestock and furniture, to buy tickets to Moscow.
Precarity
Again, none of this is done purely out of the kindness of Russia’s heart. These migration concessions reflect Moscow’s desire to somehow ease economic tensions in the region and stave off a social explosion. Moreover, they may encourage Central Asian states to simplify their own migration policies, which would make it easier for Russia to entice them into deeper cooperation by creating a single space and labor market within the Eurasian Economic Union.
In addition, there are some things that could stand in the way of Moscow’s migration progress. One is the need for work for domestic laborers. Even though migration is generally down since the pandemic, Moscow is considering policies such as prohibiting migrant labor at construction sites to promote Russian workers. Of course, the government would prefer to cope with labor shortages by introducing technological solutions and increasing the productivity and quality of education of Russian workers, but the pandemic created hard choices for everyone. (And in any case, the cold truth is that a lot of this kind of labor is easily replaceable.)
In fact, Russia’s labor shortage started even before the pandemic. In June 2017, Russia’s central bank for the first time included the lack of labor in the list of inflation risks, and the Ministry of Economic Development admitted that in 2018 there was “an increasingly evident shortage of labor resources.” During the pandemic, President Vladimir Putin noted that although Russia needs an influx of migrants, migration policy should not infringe on Russians' rights or opportunities.
Moscow can hem and haw all it wants, but the fact remains that it doesn’t have the spare funds to invest in or provide financial assistance to remote Central Asian states, so it must attract its workers not only to ensure economic productivity but also to ensure a steady flow of remittances to help pacify increasingly precarious populaces. The added benefit for Russia is that it ties labor markets to Moscow and deepens integration in the post-Soviet space.
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Going radioactive
Operations of all financial institutions in Kazakhstan have been suspended, including banks and the stock exchange located in Almaty, as turmoil continues to escalate in the country. Dozens of people were killed this morning and 400 were hospitalized as authorities cracked down on protesters that were said to have stormed government buildings. At least a dozen police officers also died, including one who was found beheaded, while more than 350 were injured.
Snapshot: The protests began in the country's west but quickly spread to Almaty and the capital Nur-Sultan over a worsening energy crisis and rising fuel prices. Sentiment quickly shifted into anti-government riots, feeding off resentment of three decades of rule by ex-president Nursultan Nazarbayev. While hand-chosen successor Kassym-Jomart Tokayev stripped his powerful predecessor of the role as head of the country's security council earlier in the week, that has failed to quell the demonstrators' anger, with Nazarbayev still widely seen as the main political force in the country and believed to control much of the economy.
Following an internet blackout and airport capture, Russia sent in paratroopers under the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which also includes former Soviet states like Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev had appealed for the help, blaming foreign-trained "terrorist" gangs for the violence. The move marks the second action by the Kremlin in as many years to bolster an ally facing unrest, after supporting Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko in 2020.
On watch: Kazakhstan has the largest proven oil reserves in the Caspian Sea region and is a big crude exporter, but perhaps more important than global energy markets, the country accounts for around 40% of global uranium production. Stocks linked to the radioactive metal are climbing on the news as the situation goes from bad to worse. Shares of Cameco (NYSE:CCJ) is up 17% since the protests began, and is up another 4% premarket, while volumes of Sprott Physical Uranium Trust (OTCPK:SRUUF) has already eclipsed prior record highs.
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January 5, 2022
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Russia’s Plan to Woo Azerbaijan
Moscow is doing its best to entice Baku to join its Eurasian alliance.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
Russia spent much of 2021 trying to reestablish the buffers it lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It deployed troops to its western border with Ukraine, increased integration with Belarus, continued its peacekeeping mission in the Caucasus, and deepened cooperation with Central Asian nations. In 2022, Moscow will shift its focus to a country in the South Caucasus that has been balancing between the West and Russia for years: Azerbaijan. And it will do so by using the Eurasian Economic Union, a post-Soviet regional bloc that it dominates, as a tool of coercion.
Hidden Hand
Last month, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev visited Brussels at the invitation of the NATO secretary-general. During their meeting, Aliyev said Azerbaijan is a reliable partner of NATO and maintains close ties with NATO allies, especially Turkey. Comments like these irritate the Kremlin, which wants to limit NATO’s presence along its periphery as much as possible. Azerbaijan is a critical part of this strategy, as it separates Russia from NATO forces in Turkey.
Russia's Buffer Zones
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Of late, Moscow has used a combination of economic cooperation and military involvement (in the form of its peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh) to maintain its foothold in the Caucasus. But considering its deepening economic problems and assortment of other priorities, Russia’s ability to compete for economic influence here is weakening. For example, it accounts for only 5 percent of Azerbaijani exports, while Italy and Turkey (both NATO countries) account for 30 percent and 18 percent, respectively. Baku is also increasing military cooperation with Turkey, which supported Azerbaijan in the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Moscow, however, has a hidden hand to play. Azerbaijan is highly dependent on oil and gas exports to the West. Today, about 68 percent of the country’s total exports are crude oil and related products, and 15.9 percent are petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons. The Kremlin, which understands better than most the pitfalls of relying so heavily on energy exports, is likely anticipating that Baku will want to diversify its overseas sales to reduce its economic vulnerability. But this will be difficult for a country like Azerbaijan, considering the level of competition and lack of demand for its non-energy products. Thus, on the eve of the Azerbaijani president’s visit to Brussels, the Kremlin reminded Baku of the benefits of its partnership.
Just days before Aliyev was set to leave for the NATO meeting, the honorary chairman of the Eurasian Economic Council, a regulatory body of the Eurasian Economic Union, said Azerbaijan could gain observer status in the bloc, whose membership includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. Joining the bloc’s customs union could have significant benefits for Azerbaijan, which receives about 18 percent of its imports from Russia.
Moscow has also given subtle hints elsewhere of the advantages of its cooperation. Various Russian media publications have recently been touting the strong ties between Azerbaijan and EAEU members. For example, the Azerbaijani affiliate of Russia’s Sputnik News website printed an article last month highlighting the benefits of membership. According to the publication, Azerbaijan’s accession to the EAEU would increase the country’s agricultural and non-oil sector exports by $280 million. It also claimed that membership could increase Azerbaijan’s gross domestic product by 0.6 percent over current levels, and that every resident of Azerbaijan would profit by $1,013 – a substantial amount in a country whose per capita GDP is just $4,202.
The Kremlin also recently mentioned a 2018 survey by the Analytical Center for the Government of the Russian Federation that found that almost 40 percent of Azerbaijan’s business community would welcome closer economic relations with the EAEU. These numbers, the Kremlin hopes, will sound enticing in a country whose economy is recovering from the pandemic, but slowly. Although Azerbaijan suffered from the economic effects of the pandemic less than its neighbors – due largely to its energy exports – unemployment, poverty and emigration (mainly to Russia) remain significant problems.
Azerbaijan's Trade
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However, Russia knows that it can’t rely solely on the EAEU’s internal market to attract Azerbaijan, since the economies of some of the bloc’s other members are also struggling. Thus, the EAEU is in talks on a permanent free trade agreement with Iran. (The two parties signed an interim trade deal in 2018.) The bloc also has free trade agreements with Serbia, Vietnam and Singapore, and by 2025, India, Israel and Egypt will be added to the list. This means that by joining the bloc, Azerbaijan will gain access to a number of additional markets, not just those of its five members.
Another benefit is that it would help tame hostilities with Azerbaijan’s historical rival, Armenia. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said his country would not oppose Azerbaijan’s accession if it would contribute to regional peace. The statement is a clear olive branch given the frequent clashes between the two countries.
Obstacles
But there are also obstacles in Russia’s path to pulling Azerbaijan into the EAEU. First, acquiring membership, or even observer status, can be a lengthy process that requires consensus among all EAEU members. Given the legal requirements of joining the bloc, as well as the ongoing tensions with Armenia, negotiations could get complicated. Moscow may have to cater to Azerbaijan for a while to keep it interested, which is difficult to do given the competition in the region.
Second, Baku must consider the reactions of its other allies. Azerbaijan is increasing trade with European countries and close allies with Turkey. It prefers to balance between the West and Russia, rather than taking sides.
Third, the EAEU has internal problems of its own. Member states disagree over a number of issues, and aren’t always willing to concede in order to bridge their divides. It’s also competing for influence with the Commonwealth of Independent States, another Russian-led institution that consists of post-Soviet nations. In addition, the EAEU’s common market is still evolving, with issues over the functioning of the common gas and energy market and migration from less developed to more developed countries.
Ultimately, Azerbaijan must see the benefits of joining; average Azerbaijanis must support the integration process; and there must be no limits to the free movement of goods, even through the conflict-ridden Nagorno-Karabakh region. Without these conditions being met, Azerbaijan is unlikely to want to join the bloc. It’ll be difficult to achieve in the medium term, but for Moscow, this is the best time to make its move, as Baku looks for reliable partners to revive its economy and its traditional partners are mired in their own problems. Pulling Azerbaijan into the EAEU would be a victory for the Kremlin. It’s not an easy path, but it’s one Moscow will follow throughout the coming year.
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Daily Memo: Kazakh Unrest Escalates
The country's president is cracking down on anti-government protests.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Kazakhstan under fire. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said he ordered police and the army to open fire on protesters without warning amid continuing anti-government unrest. Tokayev also said about 20,000 “bandits” had carried out coordinated attacks in Almaty. Troops from the Collective Security Treaty Organization member states, including Russia, are arriving in the country for a peacekeeping operation. Meanwhile, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke by phone with Tokayev and expressed his support. Turkey’s foreign minister also spoke with his Russian, Azerbaijani and Japanese counterparts about the unrest.
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The Response to Kazakhstan’s Crisis Sets the Stage for Future Unrest
The protests in Kazakhstan will likely wind down amid a Russian-led intervention, but the methods used to overcome the crisis will challenge the country’s governance model and strain its government’s pro-Russian geopolitical alignment. On Jan. 6, the leaders of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CTSO) agreed to invoke the organization's Article 4 obligations to send "peacekeeping" forces to Kazakhstan following a request from the country’s president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on Jan. 5. The current contingent of CSTO forces is no larger than 2,500. But more troops could be deployed if necessary, according to the alliance’s Secretary-General Stanislav Zas, who said that troops’ mission and locations would be dependent on the situation in the country, but the deployment is not expected to last more than “a few days or few weeks.” With cable and mobile internet access still intermittent in most regions, accurate reports regarding the protests remain limited. But available information suggests that armed resistance is rapidly declining amid the Kazakh government’s “antiterrorist operation” in the country’s largest city of Almaty, where protesters overran the airport, administrative buildings and presidential residence on Jan. 5. Some peaceful protests may continue in parts of the country, but will not pose a threat to the government.
The CSTO deployment marked the first time that the alliance agreed to invoke Article 4 to deploy military forces, having refused requests on at least two other occasions: from Kyrgyzstan during unrest in 2010, and from Armenia in 2021 amid clashes on its disputed border with Azerbaijan.
The Russian units involved in the “peacekeeping” mission include the 45th Separate Special-purpose Brigade and 31st Separate Guards Air Assault Brigade, as well as elements of the 76th and 98th Airborne Divisions. Units from the Central Military District's 41st Army typically based in the Urals designated for contingency rapid response operations in Central Asia are among those currently deployed near the Ukrainian and Belarusan borders, while one of Russia’s primary peacekeeping units, the 15th Motor Rifle Brigade, is already deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh.
The deployment of CSTO forces to the country will help quell the current round of protests, but risks setting in motion a cycle of anti-Russian sentiment in the country that will strain relations with Moscow. The CSTO deployment sent a strong signal to Kazakh security forces and officials that Kazakhstan's government under President Tokayev has Russia's full backing. But Russia’s involvement in Kazakhstan’s internal affairs risks fueling anti-Russian sentiments in the country now and likely for many years to come. Many supporters of the protests will resent the foreign intervention in Kazakhstan’s domestic affairs — adding to already significant anti-Russian sentiment in the country, which could increase as the ethnic Kazakh and primarily Kazakh-speaking population continues to grow relative to the Russian population. More incidents of harassment or discrimination against Russian nationals in Kazakhstan would push Moscow to respond with more accusations of “Russophobia,” straining bilateral relations.
On Nov. 9, Russian Foriegn Minister Sergei Lavrov condemned what he called a wave of “recent manifestations of xenophobia towards Russian-speaking citizens of Kazakhstan,” which he said were aimed at cultivating local nationalism and discrediting cooperation with Russia. Lavrov cited several high-profile cases of discrimination that the Kazak government had failed to adequately respond to in 2021, including incidents in which members of the nationalist movement Til Maydani ("Wave of Language") insulted and violently harassed Russian-speaking employees at banks, shops and government agencies in the country.
Rising nationalist sentiment among young Kazakhs and pressure to liberalize from the growing urban population will drive demand for change in the country in the coming years and pressure Tokayev’s government toward reform. The potential for unrest is likely to continue rising due to the frustrations of the country's urban middle class, which is disenchanted with the regime for being illiberal and beholden to foreign interests, including Russian ones. The Tokayev government will thus face a choice whether to lean hard into further repressions, or to seek to increase its popularity by slowly continuing modest but legitimate political reforms in the coming years by continuing a policy of distancing itself from the era under the country’s controversial former president Nursultan Nazarbayev. While the government will use a combination of both strategies, it appears likely that the Tokayev government will favor a strategy of increasing its popularity. Indicators of which strategy the government will prioritize may appear in the coming weeks. Harsh repressions are inevitable in the near term, but a continued reluctance to disperse well-attended protests outside Almaty would suggest a commitment to regional Kazakhs for substantive political reforms as opposed to just economic support. Additionally, increasing displays of anti-Russian sentiment among the protesters could push the government to view a distancing from Russia as necessary to ensure its popularity. Later, a flurry of political activity shaking up the county’s stagnant party system — such as the registration of new parties or a fracturing of the ruling Nur Otan party — would suggest the Kazakh government is seeking stability through the popularity of modest reform rather than sheer repression.
Many urban Kazakhs see Tokayev as only marginally preferable to Nazarbayev due to a long relationship between the two men and Tokayev’s own corruption scandals, and are unlikely to approve of Tokayev going forward unless he begins to undertake legitimate reforms toward liberalization and national dialogue.
On Jan. 7, the office of Kazakhstan’s General Prosecutor stated that confirmed participants in the protests could face life in prison. Large jail sentences could be one way that the government will seek to head off the demographic and other trends pushing the country toward more open politics, including anti-Russian sentiments.
Despite domestic pressures towards reform, Kazakhstan’s most influential neighbors, Russia and China, will continue to support harsh government crackdowns on dissent. The protests exemplify why Russia and China — concerned about the rise of both democratic and liberal ideologies on their shared periphery, as well as nationalist and religious sentiments — may explore ways to slow political change in the country and weaken Kazakhstan’s “multivector” foreign policy. Moscow and Beijing are well aware that should current trends continue, demands for political reform in Kazakhstan will likely also continue growing and fuel similar protests in the future. For this reason, both Russia and China will pressure Tokayev to enact harsh measures similar to those seen in Belarus to keep the possibility of democratic political reforms at bay. Moscow could, for example, blame the West (and in particular, the United States) for the protests and push the Kazakh government to end its visa-free regime with the U.S. government that began in 2017, which Russia sees as a contributor to liberalizing tendencies and U.S. soft power influence in Kazakhstan.
On Jan. 7 Chinese President Xi called the unrest in Kazakhstan a “Color Revolution” and suggested external interference (likely an allusion to the United States) caused the protests. The Chinese government is quick to reject anything resembling democratic revolution in its periphery, but Beijing sees the events in Kazakhstan as particularly threatening to its interests given the Central Asian country’s shared border with China’s restive Xinjiang region. Thus, China will continue to support the Kazakh government’s harsh repression of protests. China’s leaders are unhappy about the regional influence victory the CSTO intervention represents for Russia in Central Asia, a region where Beijing and Moscow have competed for influence since the collapse of the Soviet Union. But Beijing is supportive of the mission if it brings the political status quo back to Kazakhstan.
The protests also underscore why the United States will maintain restraint toward Kazakhstan to avoid pushing the country deeper into Moscow or Beijing’s orbit by unnecessarily antagonizing Kazakh leaders and citizens. Washington understands that despite its great physical distance, it is the inevitable beneficiary of the Kazakh government’s “multivector” foreign policy that seeks to play Moscow and Beijing off each other, and of which Tokayev is a long-time proponent. The United States is unlikely to slap sanctions on Kazakh authorities similar to those enacted on Belarus or Belarusian officials in the wake of repressions in that country, despite the violent crackdown in Kazakhstan posing the same human rights violations, as Washington may deem it benefits from a Kazakh foriegn policy that seeks to avoid being drawn too deeply into Russia or China’s orbit. Believing that over the course of the coming years, internal pressure will push the Tokayev government to eventually agree to conduct political reforms and modest liberalization, Washington will likely avoid action or charged rhetoric action that could unnecessarily inflame bilateral tensions or push the Kazakh government to intensify its crackdowns on dissent or retaliate against U.S. organizations and businesses operations in the country.
On Jan. 6, U.S. State Department spokesman Ned Price said Washington was ready “to assist Kazakhstan in solving political and economic problems” that he said caused the protests in the country, adding that assistance, in particular, can be provided “in the fight against corruption.” Price also called on the protesters to “exercise restraint.” The statements and lack of action are in contrast to the rhetoric and sanctions Washington has used in response to unrest and repression in Russia, Belarus, or other countries.
U.S. companies are the leading oil producers in Kazakhstan, underscoring the Kazakh government’s desire to not let Russia and China control the largest sources of the state’s budget revenue by balancing with U.S. influence.
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https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/why-kazakhstan-crisis-much-bigger-deal-western-media-letting?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=406
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Troop withdrawal. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said that the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization’s peacekeeping mission, launched last week amid escalating unrest in the country, was completed and that troops would begin to pull out on Jan. 13. The withdrawal is expected to take no more than 10 days. The United States and European Union have already urged CSTO member states to withdraw their forces as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the foreign ministers of the Organization of Turkic States held an extraordinary meeting on Tuesday to discuss the situation in Kazakhstan.
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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1480020477267652609
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Exercises in Central Asia. Russia began exercises at its military base in Tajikistan involving combat helicopters and the S-300PS long-range air defense system. In Afghanistan, meanwhile, the Taliban said they will send 10,000 militants armed with modern weapons and equipment to the provinces bordering Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
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The Strange Alliance Between Russia and Chechen Jihadists
by Ioannis E. Kotoulas
IPT News
March 11, 2022
https://www.investigativeproject.org/9150/the-strange-alliance-between-russia-and-chechen
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March 28, 2022
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Central Asia Feels the Effects of the Ukraine Crisis
The region’s economies are highly dependent on Russia’s.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
The countries of Central Asia are under increased pressure from the fallout of the war in Ukraine. As former Soviet states, they are still in the process of building their own independent economies and faced a number of political, economic and security challenges even before the conflict began. Now, the weak Russian ruble and heavily sanctioned Russian economy are compounding these problems.
Central Asian nations are fiercely protective of their independence, and thus try to remain as neutral as possible. The Ukraine crisis is no exception. They haven’t recognized the independence of the self-proclaimed Luhansk and Donetsk people’s republics, Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or Kosovo. Nor have they recognized Crimea as Russian territory. Still, they remain heavily reliant on Moscow for both economic and military support, so Russia’s economic problems will also hit these countries hard. Despite their growing links to other countries around the world, they’re unable to cut their long-standing ties with Moscow, even at a time of substantial economic strain in Russia. How they manage to cope, however, will depend on how fast they can adapt to the new realities.
Central Asian Countries' Trade Dependance on Russia
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Economic Fallout
The economies of Central Asia are so intertwined with Russia that if the Russian economy falters, so too will the economies of this region. Thus, the disruptions caused by the sanctions imposed as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will surely cause ripple effects in Central Asia.
Inflation in Central Asia & Russia
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First, the decline of the Russian ruble has already negatively affected the currencies of the region. The Kazakh economy appears to be one of the most affected because of the country’s existing financial difficulties that began after anti-government protests in January, when many withdrew their capital from country for fear of political instability. Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the tenge, Kazakhstan's currency, was worth 427 to the dollar. By March 13, its value plummeted to 524 tenge to the dollar, a new record low. The Central Asian branches of Russian banks like Sberbank and VTB, both of which are subject to U.S. sanctions, are also in limbo. To stop the bleeding, the central banks of Central Asian countries have begun to impose restrictions on the exchange, purchase and sale of foreign currency. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, those conducting business abroad must keep more than 80 percent of their revenue in rubles. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, said earlier this month that it carried out currency interventions worth $198.9 million to support the tenge and banned the export of gold and foreign currency. Uzbekistan is also preparing a series of measures to mitigate the negative effects of the sanctions.
Russia’s economic downturn could also impact employment opportunities for migrant workers from Central Asia as businesses begin to close or suspend operations and as Russian employers start to consider hiring refugees from eastern Ukraine who speak better Russian and have more in common with Russian culture. This would, in turn, affect remittance payments, which are already set to decline in value because of the depreciation of the ruble. This is especially true in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which rely on remittances from Russia for 30 percent, 28 percent and 11 percent of their gross domestic products, respectively, according to World Bank estimates. As the sanctions begin to hit the Russian economy, these payments are likely to decrease. Remittances to Uzbekistan alone could drop by 20-50 percent, according to preliminary estimates.
Central Asian Migration
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There are also potential problems with the transit of goods between Russia and Central Asian countries. Supply chain disruptions, especially for joint ventures, have already been reported. A number of suppliers from third countries have refused to export goods to Russia, which has led to suspensions in operations and layoffs in Central Asia. In Kazakhstan, most oil products are delivered to markets abroad through Russian ports, including the port of Novorossiysk, but many countries have refused to accept oil delivered from Russian harbors.
Inflation, driven largely by panic-buying, has also increased. In Kazakhstan, the prices of several key products have surged. The price of Nutrilon brand baby formula increased from 8,900 tenge to 10,730 tenge, diapers from 7,489 tenge to 10,000 tenge, and bread by 15-20 tenge. In Tajikistan, rumors of another hike in flour prices caused a spike in demand, leading the price of a 50-kilogram bag of flour to jump from 270-280 somoni to 290-325 somoni. Some traders even temporarily suspended sales. In some cases, the panic is well-founded. Earlier this month, Russia introduced a temporary ban on the export of grain and sugar to member states of the Eurasian Economic Union, which includes Central Asian countries Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The ban is especially concerning for countries whose domestic supplies don’t meet their internal needs. Kyrgyzstan, for instance, produces enough wheat to cover only 45 percent of its needs, and Kazakhstan imports about 58 percent of its sugar.
Economic Opportunities
But as the risks mount, Central Asian states are also being presented with new opportunities to expand relations with other countries, gain access to a more diverse supply of foreign goods and act as intermediaries between Russia and the rest of the world. This all could have benefits for Russia, too.
Diversification of foreign trade, more active cooperation with China and Turkey, attraction of U.S. investments and increased trade with the European Union could give Central Asian countries greater access to imports and could open the door to migration into the West, Europe, East Asia, Turkey and beyond, giving Russia access to much-needed resources. This could help Central Asia offset the loss of Russian remittances and give it and Russia access to more technology and goods – though this likely won’t be a quick process.
Moreover, Central Asian countries can become intermediaries for economic transactions between Russia and the rest of the world. As in 2014, Russia may use its Central Asian partners to try to restore logistics networks that were severed by sanctions. Central Asian companies can help deliver supplies to Russian firms and Russian goods to foreign markets, while Russia may try to expand projects and contracts with Central Asian businesses. Such exchanges are already taking place: Russian travel companies began offering tours to Uzbekistan for Russians who want to apply for Mastercard and Visa credit cards.
To make this all feasible, the countries of Central Asia have adopted a neutral stance on the conflict between Russia and the West, and are trying to set boundaries with Moscow. Kazakhstan, for example, refused to completely switch to rubles in its trade within the EAEU and proposed that import customs duties in Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan be distributed and credited in dollars, as usual, while Russian rubles will be used for crediting and distributing import customs duties to Russia and Belarus. The Kazakh government also postponed the signing of an already agreed-to deal with Sberbank on the country’s digital transformation.
But Russia doesn’t have to worry too much about its influence diminishing in these countries. Many migrants from Central Asia will still prefer to work in Russia because they speak Russian and face fewer travel restrictions there. Third countries won’t be willing to offer large enough investments to counterbalance Russian funds, since many developed economies are still recovering from the pandemic and see little opportunity for substantial return on their investments in the region. And Central Asian products will still be in higher demand in Russia than in other parts of the world where competition is stiff and export networks are not as well developed.
As the effects of the sanctions set in, Russia will need friends that can act as an outpost to help Moscow reach more distant frontiers through trade or economic projects. Central Asia stands to benefit too, as this arrangement can help mitigate the effects of the crisis on the region’s economies. To what extent will depend on how quickly Central Asian countries can adapt.
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What say we?
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The U.S. Can Win Over Russia’s Neighbors
Central Asia is also vital for America’s rivalry with China.
By Ariel Cohen
April 7, 2022 6:33 pm ET
Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine has provided the U.S. with a critical opportunity to diminish Russia’s influence over its neighbors by giving them technical assistance, economic development and security that neither Moscow or Beijing can.
The peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus support Ukraine’s struggle. They remember the conquest by their former imperial masters, the czars and communists. They remember the forced Russification and collectivization of agriculture.
Today, many of these countries refuse to back Russia openly and support Ukraine’s territorial integrity, as Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev declared Monday. Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov has refused to recognize the independence of the Moscow-supported secessionist enclaves of Donetsk and Luhansk. Georgia vociferously declared its support of Ukraine, and together with Moldova applied to join the European Union.
Despite their sympathy for Ukraine, Russia’s neighbors still are intimidated by their nuclear-armed ex-master. Yet it’s telling that Moscow feels the need to continue threatening them. Last week, Russian Duma member Mikhail Deliyagin called for the destruction of Azerbaijan’s oil industry and asked followers on social media if nuclear weapons would be an appropriate means. (He later denied he was calling for their use.) Two weeks ago, Russia shut down the pipeline that brings Kazakh oil to the world market at the Russian port of Novorossiysk. The pipeline’s operators say it may be unusable for two months because of storm damage, something industry experts told me isn’t possible. It may be a message to Kazakhstan over Ukraine.
Kazakhstan is under sustained, low-intensity pressure from Russian politicians such as Gennady Zyuganov, who talks about the need to protect Russian-speakers in the north of Kazakhstan—similar to the Russian pretext for invading Ukraine.
The U.S. needs to be ready to step in and provide a geopolitical alternative to Moscow and Beijing. America should offer the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia security and intelligence cooperation, investment, educational opportunities, technical assistance to promote transparency, good governance, legal reforms, and training for private-sector executives and the state apparatus.
Washington and the European Union would also do well to increase their purchases of raw materials, other goods and services from non-Russian Eurasia. Remittances from Russia for migrant workers in Central Asia are economically vital and expected to fall as economic pressure on Russia worsens. In 2020, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan respectively received 31% and 27% of their annual gross domestic product in remittances. Uzbekistan received almost 12%. Sanctions aimed at Russia also should be tailored not to hurt U.S. regional partners.
The war in Ukraine may be the opening salvo of a much broader conflict that will engulf the world. Central Asia is a critical theater as it is surrounded by the four nuclear powers—Russia, China, Pakistan and India—and the aspirant Iran. Controlling this area will be critical to combating the hegemonic aspirations of Moscow and Beijing.
Mr. Cohen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
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April 8, 2022
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Central Asia's Economic Ties to Europe
By: Geopolitical Futures
European Investments in Central Asia
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Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Central Asian countries have been working to develop their own independent economies, with varying degrees of success. Economic development in the region can be disrupted by things like internal unrest, security threats, economic volatility and Russia’s periodic intervention in national and regional affairs. Still, these states have continued to open up to the world by improving relations with different countries and institutions.
One of these institutions is the European Union. In 2019, the bloc released the EU Strategy for Central Asia, a document that outlined its shifting attitude toward countries of the region. Brussels said at the time that it was reassessing its own capabilities in Central Asia, but in fact the shift was a result of the bloc's growing recognition of the region’s potential. These countries' substantial natural resources, significant market potential and logistical value as transit hubs between Europe and Asia gave them new relevance. Investment and economic cooperation between the two regions began to increase, and this will certainly continue in the coming years, especially given Central Asia’s role as a conduit to the heavily sanctioned Russian economy.
Indeed, Moscow may also benefit from this growing economic relationship. And as hostilities between the Kremlin and the West grow, the EU will work to reshape relations with countries that still have economic, political and military ties with Russia, while Central Asian countries continue to stay neutral as best they can by balancing between all parties.
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Note this:
"Amid the growing desire to avoid Russian energy, Azerbaijan’s and Turkey’s roles in European energy security are also growing. Azerbaijan supplies natural gas through Turkey via the Southern Gas Corridor to Italy, Greece and Bulgaria. It has already promised to increase supplies to Italy in 2022 to 9.5 billion cubic meters, compared to about 7 billion cubic meters in 2021."
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April 13, 2022
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Russia Hangs Tight in the South Caucasus
The Ukraine war may allow Moscow to loosen its grip here and there, but it’s not letting go.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
Last week, European Council chief Charles Michel hosted a meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on security in the South Caucasus. On the eve of the meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken also spoke with Pashinyan and Aliyev. Notably, these discussions didn’t include Moscow, the traditional mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but resulted in both countries agreeing to create a commission on delimiting their shared border. Amid Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, Moscow’s exclusion from the talks has raised questions over whether the roles of external players in the region are radically changing.
Russia’s Challengers
The South Caucasus, like Ukraine, is key to Russian security. Not only does the region hold geostrategic importance for the Kremlin as a link to other parts of Asia but it also has military-strategic significance as a buffer from the instability of the Middle East and a protector of the Black and the Caspian seas. Moscow thus has an interest in keeping the region friendly and relatively prosperous and conflict-free.
Russia’s influence in the region was strengthened after the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh, a breakaway region of Azerbaijan. Moscow was key in bringing Azerbaijan and Armenia to the negotiating table and getting peace agreements signed, and deployed peacekeeping forces to the region. Russia is also a critical economic partner for countries of the South Caucasus. In Azerbaijan, 90 percent of grain imports come from Russia, and in Armenia, 69 percent of hydrocarbons came from Russia in 2020. Even in Georgia, which has had a complicated relationship to say the least with Moscow since the 2008 war, Moscow remains its second-largest trading partner after Turkey, accounting for 70 percent of wheat consumed in Georgia.
Russia's Trade Share in the Caucasus
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But Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine has called into question its ability to maintain influence in its border regions, specifically Central Asia and the Caucasus. The countries of Central Asia – being highly dependent on Russia, committed to their neutral status and geographically more distant from Western countries – are less concerning for Moscow. The South Caucasus countries, on the other hand, are more vulnerable to external influence given their deeper links beyond Russia.
Since the Ukraine conflict began, external players have begun to test the waters to determine the durability of Russia’s presence in the South Caucasus. On March 17, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan traveled to Brussels to meet with NATO’s deputy secretary-general and expressed his satisfaction with talks his country held with the alliance. On March 30, Britain’s armed forces minister made his first visit to Baku and met with Azerbaijan’s defense minister and foreign minister. And last week, as mentioned, the EU held talks with the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders and announced the creation of a commission to delimit their border. These talks were scheduled amid rising tensions between the two countries over Armenian accusations that Azerbaijani forces shelled the border village of Artsakh in Nagorno-Karabakh. Beginning on March 21, Azerbaijan reportedly blocked supplies of natural gas from Armenia to residents of the village, and on March 26, Nagorno-Karabakh authorities declared martial law. Moscow’s ability to negotiate a resolution to the dispute was questionable, especially after Azerbaijan’s denial of statements made by Russia’s Defense Ministry about the withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops from the village of Parukh in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Russia was also excluded from some recent regional economic initiatives. On March 31, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Kazakhstan signed a declaration on the Trans-Caspian East-West Corridor. On April 11, the railway departments of these four countries announced that they would create a joint venture called the Middle Corridor to transport goods from China to Turkey and the Black Sea ports. The venture is expected to connect with the North-South International Freight Corridor through the ports of the Caspian Sea and expand the corridor to Iran and Arab countries along the Persian Gulf, East Africa and India, which could complement or even replace trade routes through Eastern Europe.
Amid the growing desire to avoid Russian energy, Azerbaijan’s and Turkey’s roles in European energy security are also growing. Azerbaijan supplies natural gas through Turkey via the Southern Gas Corridor to Italy, Greece and Bulgaria. It has already promised to increase supplies to Italy in 2022 to 9.5 billion cubic meters, compared to about 7 billion cubic meters in 2021.
Too Early
The meeting between Pashinyan and Aliyev was broadly seen as the first step of a departure by Armenia and Azerbaijan from Russia. With Russia bogged down in Ukraine, it would be stretched too thin to extinguish any potential flare-up in the South Caucasus, or so the thinking went. But though there is some truth to this line of thinking, it’s far too early to count Russia out.
For one thing, the tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan are fairly mild, showing themselves only as periodic skirmishes after a truce rather than as a prelude to another full-blown war that could alter the regional balance of power. It’s true that Russia wants stability here, and it’s true that Russia probably doesn’t have the resources to resolve this particular conflict, so it is more than happy to have the EU mediating. In other words, Moscow is confident enough in its position to let someone else do the heavy lifting for now.
For another, there’s ample evidence to suggest Russia has no intention of letting Armenia and Azerbaijan leave its sphere of influence. Immediately after the meeting, Aliyev and Pashinyan held separate phone talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss peacekeeping efforts in the South Caucasus. (Not for nothing, Pashinyan also plans to pay an official visit to Moscow on April 18.) Baku and Yerevan still understand the importance of Russia in this regard, and they have emphasized that Russia will be involved in any decision they make with the EU. And because the U.S. and France have refused to cooperate with Russia as part of the Minsk Group, Moscow is basically the sole mediator within this framework. It still has peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh, and it is still involved in border delimitation between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
In economic terms, Russia is practically irreplaceable in the short term. Countries of the South Caucasus will have a hard time finding another partner ready and able to trade energy and grain at the friendly prices Russia does. And even though the Ukraine war has compelled large European gas buyers such as Germany and Italy to purchase elsewhere, Moscow isn’t particularly worried that Azerbaijan will be able to replace Russian gas: Baku is ready to increase gas supplies to Europe only by 11 percent in 2022, and in any case the maximum capacity of the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline is 16 billion cubic meters per year.
Russia is also too important a transportation partner. State-owned Russian Railways recently announced that it is ready to facilitate transit along the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Russia route. Moscow is also mulling the development of the international North-South Transport Corridor, a special economic zone, construction of containers in the region, and reconstruction of the Volga-Caspian Sea Shipping Canal. It is also rumored to have plans to create a transnational transport corridor to convey agriculture products to Western Asia and the Middle East, where food supplies are hurting from anti-Russia sanctions. All these actions guarantee Moscow a certain amount of influence in the region, especially since these countries, and in particular Azerbaijan, will welcome the economic benefits of being a transportation operator.
Major Pipelines & Routes Across Eurasia
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As the war in Ukraine presses on, Moscow may allow itself to loosen its grip here and there, which will give countries like Azerbaijan and Armenia more room to maneuver with the West, but it will not surrender its influence in the Caucasus wholesale. After all, this region is essential: If Russia is ousted from the Caucasus, the entire space between itself and Turkey and Iran can turn into a zone of confrontation that may spread to Russian territory, which is a nonstarter for Russian security.
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May 9, 2022
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The US Makes Inroads Into Russia's Periphery
With Moscow distracted, Washington is forging ties in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
Countries at war tend to use all the resources they can realistically spare to achieve their desired outcome. The obvious drawback is that the war effort can de-prioritize other important affairs, or can leave the state vulnerable to elements at home and abroad that would like to challenge its power. Such is the case with Russia in Ukraine. The West in general, and the U.S. in particular, is probing Russian positions at other points in the country's periphery, including the Caucasus and Central Asia, where Russian power is as much economic as it is martial.
Opportunism
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is no small matter. Fuel and supplies must be procured and sent, soldiers must be rotated, and injuries and damaged equipment both require repair. It demands vast sums of money that for the Kremlin are increasingly in short supply. Put simply, a lot of Russia’s time, attention and materials are concentrated to its west.
This leaves other areas in Russia’s periphery less attended to. These include the Central Asian countries that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, prioritized building their economies and practicing neutrality so that international conflict wouldn’t hurt their unstable economies. These also include the South Caucasus, a transit hub between Asia and Europe and a supplier of resources to Western countries. All of these areas are critical to Russia's security, so given Russia's military operation in Ukraine, the question is for how long, and to what extent, Russia can ignore them.
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In general, the U.S. has had no direct interest in either Central Asia or the South Caucasus. That’s beginning to change somewhat as Europe looks for alternative routes for energy deliveries, but in reality the West cares about these regions mostly because Russia cares so much about them; they insulate Russia from outsiders and depend on Russia economically. This gives Moscow a ton of influence there, but the flip side is that countries like the U.S. can use Russia’s strategic needs against it. This is precisely why Washington is maintaining its positions in Georgia, looking for new opportunities to pry Armenia away from Russia’s sphere of influence, strengthening cooperation with Azerbaijan, and providing financing in Central Asia that Russia cannot.
Diplomatic activity over the past month attests to Washington’s opportunism. The senior adviser of the U.S. State Department for negotiations in the Caucasus was in Baku from April 24 to April 29 to discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, while the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs met with Azerbaijani authorities on April 27-28.
On May 2, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan met with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to launch a strategic dialogue. During the talks, Armenia and the United States reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening bilateral relations in all areas. This is notable, in that Washington heretofore has seen Armenia as too close to Russia to be pried away. It’s possible we are seeing the beginning of a shift in bilateral relations.
Just last week, the U.S. announced that it had completed the Raven unmanned aerial vehicle training course for Kazakh border guards. New UAV operators will use U.S.-provided Raven drones to assist in monitoring Kazakhstan's borders. Considering Kazakhstan has a long border with Russia and that Russia has been a strong security partner of Kazakhstan before, Russia is wary of this program, to say the least.
The U.S. undersecretary of state for civil security, democracy, and human rights visited Kyrgyzstan on April 14 after spending time in Kazakhstan, where she discussed strategic engagement. Elsewhere, the United States announced it will allocate more than $60 million in security assistance to Tajikistan and transferred $2.3 million worth of trucks to the country. This is a low-risk, high-reward play for Washington, especially if it can persuade some Central Asian officials that they have other choices than partnering with Russia.
Notably, the U.S. isn’t acting alone, using key NATO allies that have a direct interest in Central Asia. One such ally is Turkey, which wants the region’s resources so that it can become a transit hub for Europe, sees it as an untapped market brimming with economic potential, and aims to regain influence with Turkic peoples outside its own borders. (To that end, it has developed extremely close relations with Azerbaijan that were further strengthened when Ankara sided with Baku in the most recent Nagorno-Karabakh war.) To secure Turkey’s help, Washington has indicated that it may approve an arms deal that includes F-16 fighter jets, having previously denied Ankara certain aircraft for buying Russian-made S-400 missile defense systems.
Turkey has also been using the Ukraine conflict to build its influence in Russia’s periphery. Ankara started the process of normalizing relations with Armenia and strengthening cooperation with Central Asia, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan discussing with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev the prospects for developing Kazakh-Turkish strategic partnerships. Erdogan also discussed the expansion of Tajik-Turkish cooperation during a call with Tajik President Emomali Rahmon and earlier signed an agreement on military cooperation, and spoke with Kyrgyzstan’s president to hash out bilateral relations.
Cause for Concern
It’s possible that none of this will shake Russia. Moscow is already deeply integrated into the Central Asian and Caucasian economies and security systems. It remains a key economic partner for these countries, directs investments and provides military assistance when needed. It has firmly entrenched itself in the buffer zones by deploying peacekeepers into Nagorno-Karabakh and by demonstrating the effectiveness of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in Central Asia. More, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia are included in the Eurasian Economic Union customs union and have their own advantages from membership – preferential energy resources, easier access to the Russian market, and so on. Central Asia and the Caucasus are clearly in need of huge and constant flows of investment and an effective mechanism for suppressing unrest and regional conflicts. The United States is unlikely to spend the resources needed to provide everything this region requires.
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Still, Washington’s renewed activity is an unwelcome development for Russia. Some Central Asian and Caucasian countries, being transit, financial or technological hubs, are concerned that they will be adversely affected by the raft of Russian sanctions. Because their fragile economies couldn’t withstand another shock, they’re trying to keep the door open with the West just in case.
It’s simply getting harder for Moscow to balance all the interests at its border, and the U.S. is acting accordingly. Though Russia understands there’s only so much Washington is willing and able to do to help the countries in its buffer region, it can’t afford to ignore it. With much of its forces diverted, the rest may not be enough for everyone all the time.
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Rerouting. Kazakhstan's president ordered that work begin to redirect Kazakh oil exports to a trans-Caspian route that bypasses Russian territory after a Russian court ordered a 30-day suspension of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which normally carries oil supplies from Kazakhstan to the Black Sea. The Kazakh energy minister said, however, that oil exports are still flowing through the CPC.
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Strengthening ties. Uzbekistan and the European Union initiated a new Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement aimed at improving cooperation on foreign and security policy, trade, economic ties, energy, transport and the environment.
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The Drivers and Potential Threats to Deepening Russia-Turkey Ties
7 MIN READAug 23, 2022 | 19:18 GMT
Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Tehran, Iran, on July 19, 2022.
Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Tehran, Iran, on July 19, 2022.
(SERGEI SAVOSTYANOV/SPUTNIK/AFP via Getty Images)
The ongoing war in Ukraine is pushing Russia and Turkey closer together, but pitfalls could still derail their deepening ties. On Aug. 5, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met in Sochi for four hours, the second time in a month. The recent meetings between the two leaders reflect the value both Moscow and Ankara place on their bilateral relationship, which has only deepened since the former invaded Ukraine in February. Despite initially condemning the Ukraine invasion, Turkey has so far avoided imposing sanctions or taking any other concrete actions against Russia. This has enabled Ankara and Moscow to not only preserve, but strengthen, their economic and political ties throughout the course of the war.
During the Aug. 5 meeting in Sochi, Erdogan and Putin agreed to deepen bilateral cooperation in the financial, agriculture, construction, trade and energy sectors.
In February, Turkey voted in favor of the U.N. resolution condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which Erdogan called ''unacceptable.'' But since then, Ankara has avoided sanctioning Moscow. Turkey has also said it would allow Ukraine-bound Russian warships returning to their registered bases to transit the Bosporus Strait, despite Ankara threatening in February to block such vessels by invoking the provisions of the 1936 Montreux Convention. Turkey has allowed Russian aircraft to fly through its airspace throughout the duration of the conflict in Ukraine as well.
The financial fallout from the Ukraine war is increasing Turkey and Russia's immediate importance to each other. By forgoing sanctions, Turkey has made itself a key outlet for some Russian capital that can't go elsewhere. Russia likely views any financial transactions with Turkey as a practical way to move money so long as Ankara remains tightly integrated with Western financial systems. Turkey, for its part, also needs all the foreign currency it can get as it battles its own dire economic crisis at home, which is making Ankara all the more interested in retaining access to the Russian capital. Maintaining economic ties with Russia amid the ongoing Ukraine crisis could theoretically expose Turkey to Western sanctions. However, the political complications of isolating a fellow NATO member will continue to deter the United States and Europe from imposing sanctions on Ankara.
Russian shipments accounted for 3.9% of Turkey's total exports in July, up from 2.6% last July. While Europe remains Turkey's largest trade partner by far, the slight uptick in Russian exports over the past year could indicate the development of a parallel market using Turkish companies as a means of selling to and from Russia.
Five Turkish banks adopted Russia's Mir payments system in early August. Turkey also recently agreed to pay for some Russian energy imports in rubles.
Turkey continues to import large amounts of energy from Russia via pipelines like Turkstream and Blue Stream. Russia provided 45% of Turkey's natural gas in 2021, underscoring Turkey's continued dependence on Russian energy.
A Long and Complicated History
Russia and Turkey have oscillated between competing and cooperating in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia for centuries. When they were empires, both countries held more territory than they do now. And today, they are each led by presidents who embrace visions of controlling or at least influencing more of that territory they once held. But over the decades, those visions have also periodically come into conflict with one another. Today, Russia and Turkey support opposing sides in both Syria and Libya's ongoing conflicts. And in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Turkey's years of arms sales to Azerbaijan collide with Russia's support to Armenia.
Both Turkey and Russia also benefit from using the other as a source of political leverage. Russia has long lorded its massive military and energy industry, as well as its long history of countering U.S. and European influence, over Turkey. But Russia's international isolation due to the Ukraine war is now shifting the power dynamic in Turkey's favor by increasing Ankara's importance to Moscow. For Russia, increased relations with Turkey can help replace some of the economic and political ties it's lost to Western sanctions. Turkey's strong EU ties also grant Anakara the ability to serve as a referee between Russia and its Western adversaries, as evidenced in Turkey's role in mediating the recent grain export deal between Moscow and Kyiv. In addition, by keeping a friendly government in control of the Bosporus Strait, close ties with Turkey help Russia ensure it retains full access to any new territory in the Black Sea seized during the ongoing war in Ukraine.
On July 22, Russia and Ukraine signed a deal in Turkey to allow exports of Ukrainian grain from blockaded ports. Turkey's role in mediating the talks that led to the deal has bolstered Ankara's prominence on the global stage and also likely indicates a desire by Turkey to potentially mediate future peace talks between Moscow and Kyiv.
Turkey's defense procurement agency recently denied claims made by a Russian official that Turkey had requested another Russian S-400 missile system. Turkey's first purchase of the S-400 system in 2017 prompted the United States to impose sanctions. Ankara's denial that it is seeking to purchase another such system reflects its strategy of maintaining military cooperation with Moscow while avoiding drawing Western ire.
However, several developments have the potential to disrupt Turkey and Russia's deepening bilateral relationship, including:
A new Turkish military operation in northern Syria. For months, Turkey has been threatening to militarily expand its buffer zone along the Syrian border in the hopes of resettling up to 1 million Syrian refugees there and blocking Kurdish militants from entering Turkey. Such a military operation, however, would put Turkish troops close to Russian and Russian-supported forces in northern Syria — raising the risk of a military clash akin to the 2015 fighter jet shootdown incident along the Turkish-Syrian border, which sparked a brief but major diplomatic conflict between Moscow and Ankara.
Political shifts in Moscow and/or Ankara. The growing influence of the far-right voices in Russia could eventually turn the Kremlin against Turkey, particularly as Turkey deepens its relations with governments in the Caucasus and Central Asia (which Russia has traditionally considered within its sphere of influence), and as Ankara expands its outreach to ethnic Turkic peoples inside Russia itself. Similarly, in Turkey, isolationist political forces could also become more powerful in the coming years — especially if Erdogan's ruling Justice and Development Party loses ground to less Russia-friendly opposition parties in next year's general elections.
Russian losses in Ukraine. If the Russian military suffers further setbacks in Ukraine and looks weak on the global stage, some political forces in Turkey could argue that it stands to gain more from distancing itself from Russia. Similarly, if Russia begins to focus inward or becomes even more distracted by the Ukraine war, Turkey could take advantage by seeking to partially replace Russian influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, which would, in turn, worsen relations.
Russian advances in the Black Sea. If, by contrast, Russia were to assume control of significantly more territory along the Black Sea as a result of the Ukraine war, Turkey would likely feel threatened by this encroachment, because it controls the outlet of the Black Sea and depends on it for energy production. This could see Ankara respond by blocking Russian ships from transiting the Bosporus Strait. Turkey could also cut some of its economic ties with Moscow, which are particularly crucial to Russia as it tries to skirt Western sanctions.
Closer Turkey-NATO ties. If the conflict against Kurdish militants in southeast Turkey escalates or another militant threat grows within Turkish territory, Turkey will likely increasingly lean on NATO for support via arms sales or intelligence sharing. Moreover, if non-Kurdish militants begin to threaten Turkey's national security, Ankara is also more likely to receive direct support from other NATO countries. Both of these scenarios (but especially the latter) could chafe at Ankara's close ties with Russia.
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By: Geopolitical Futures
The U.S. in Central Asia. The United States is in talks with the governments of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to allow both countries to keep dozens of U.S. military aircraft flown to the two states by Afghan air force pilots as the government in Kabul was collapsing last year, according to a report by Politico. The aircraft are being held in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and would be exchanged for the countries' cooperation in counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan. Washington hasn’t officially commented on the report, but if true, it would likely irritate the Kremlin, which wants to play the role of security guarantor in Central Asia.
Investing in Kazakhstan. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev took part in an investment forum attended by the leaders of major American companies. He touted the expansion of the strategic economic partnership between Kazakhstan and the United States. This is part of the expanding U.S. presence in Central Asia, a traditional buffer zone for Moscow.
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Cracking down. Kazakhstan’s Industry and Infrastructure Development Ministry said on Tuesday that it would require Russian and Belarusian truckers to present necessary paperwork to comply with Western sanctions. The sanctions have banned truckers from both countries from entering the bloc. The requirement was put in place earlier this year but not enforced. According to Russian media, Russian transporters had been warned that Kazakhstan was detaining Russian trucks with goods from Europe.
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Free trade. The foreign ministers of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova signed a protocol to create a free trade zone during a meeting on Thursday. They also discussed ways to increase cooperation and development on trade, energy and transport infrastructure.
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https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-federation-using-mobilisation-kill-201427248.html
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/further-trouble-in-russia-s-backyard-as-recent-fighting-between-allies-creates-new-headache-for-putin/ar-AA12p9Mr?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=d9a70916c9c544548139c5583d3e6371
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October 3, 2022
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Not Even the Ukraine War Changes the Central Asian Equation
Even if Russia’s influence is weakening in relative terms, Moscow knows it can’t be forsaken.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
Russia may be losing its grip on Central Asia. Though the countries of the region are generally thought of as strategic Russian partners – and especially thought of as such by Russia – they have been acting more on their own accord lately in ways that Moscow would rather they not. The most prominent example is Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s refusal to use the MIR payment system, Russia’s version of SWIFT. Kazakhstan has also halted Belarusian and Russian trucks at the border, ostensibly for fear of violating Western sanctions. For years, the foreign policies of Central Asian states were constrained by the strength of Moscow and a lack of alternative partners. But since the Cold War, they have slowly reclaimed more of their sovereignty. And now that the war in Ukraine is weakening Russia’s position there, they have an opportunity to reclaim even more.
It’s worth noting the peculiarity of Russian policy toward Central Asia. In the early part of the 20th century, certain aspects of international affairs such as political economy, law, treaties and so on developed slowly and measuredly under the newly formed Soviet Union. Most international laws were implemented by capitalist states; the Soviet Union was not a capitalist state and as such had foundational and constitutional inconsistencies with certain international norms. However, that changed somewhat after World War II as Moscow's geographic reach expanded far beyond its borders. To reconcile the differences, the Kremlin adopted a dualistic approach to international relations that recognized norms and international treaties with the understanding that international law was meant to manage and regulate relations between two ideologically opposed superpowers. As important, Moscow operated under the assumption of a fraternal brotherhood among socialist states that presupposed cooperation and assistance. Put simply, they had an obligation to help each other out.
Russia's Southern Periphery
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The Soviet Union may be gone, but this curious approach to foreign policy never really went away. If anything, it has become more pronounced with the war in Ukraine. After Russia invaded, it assumed states over which it held influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus would go along with whatever it told them to do. The Kremlin banked on the idea that cooperation with the West was nothing more than a normal expression of the struggle between the two ideologies of the two powers that need to be regulated.
It wasn’t. Central Asian countries have far too many priorities now. They have different ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups, not just Russian Slavs. Central Asian borders are more artificial than most, so these states have to fight to keep what sovereignty they have, even as different cultural, historic and linguistic groups lay claim to precious resources the state also wants ownership over. It’s no surprise, then, that Central Asian nations value their (historically recent) independence and sovereignty. They have never been able to completely forsake Russia, but they are trying to take a more diverse position in world trade, acting independently and increasing investments, opening up more to the world and to international trade, and thus supporting an independent economy. For them, the key to independence is diversification. Being Russia’s lackey doesn’t fit the script.
Share of Central Asian Trade with Russia, 2021
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The script looks something like this: If an activity deprives the nation of a benefit or profit, it is dropped immediately. If it generates the opposite, it is pursued. It’s a formula based on extreme rational self-interest, not on fraternal ties.
Kazakhstan is a case in point. In light of new Western sanctions (and, indeed, in light of sanctions years ago during the Crimean crisis), many in Russia have criticized Kazakhstan’s behavior as anti-Russian, though nothing it has done signifies the wholesale abandoning of Russia. In an effort to ensure its sovereignty, several years ago Kazakhstan began to organize language patrols, increasing the spread of the Kazakh language and decreasing the broadcasting of Russian TV channels. The country's trade has shifted from an exclusively Russian focus to Chinese and global – today there are American, European and Asian companies in the country along with Russian ones. There are new opportunities for countries of the region to be alternative transport routes and investment destinations. Moreover, Kazakhstan opposes Russia’s military operations in Ukraine, does not recognize Crimea, and has refused to recognize the results of the referendums in the four Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine.
Still, Kazakhstan remains dependent on Russian trade and investment, and it needs goods such as cheap Russian grain. Russia’s role in the Collective Security Treaty Organization is also important to Kazakhstan. It was essential to ending the political protests in Astana in January, and it may prove essential again for snap presidential elections in November.
In other words, Kazakhstan is managing a balancing act, one it hopes will allow it to maintain its sovereignty without participating in the struggle between the two powers. Kazakhstan understands that the West isn’t especially interested in the region otherwise. Under the circumstances, then, the country’s decision to avoid secondary Western sanctions is entirely understandable, especially since it hasn’t meant halting all trade with Russia anyway. In fact, trade ties with Russia are more profitable now as other countries look for alternate ways into the Russian market.
Other Central Asian countries are behaving similarly. To say that they will turn to Russia when times get tough would be a mistake. To say they will turn their backs on Russia would be a mistake too. They need the money relationships with the West often come with, but in Ukraine, they also saw how far Russia would go to protect its interests. Central Asia can’t afford to alienate either side.
Add to this the fact that Central Asia’s understanding of the world is fundamentally different from Russia’s. Post-Soviet countries do not believe Soviet-era mindsets will serve their interests. For its part, Moscow won’t have much incentive to change its ways because Central Asia can’t be free of it, but even so, it seems to have tacitly acknowledged its mistake of assuming they would simply carry its water. This is why Russia is biding its time, making concessions to the region and standing pat when countries act in ways that don’t benefit Moscow.
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Azerbaijan Risks Spoiling Budding Armenia-Turkey Normalization
9 MIN READOct 6, 2022 | 20:52 GMT
A demonstrator holds up a placard during a rally in northern Greece in April 2021 to commemorate the 106th anniversary of the Armenian genocide.
(SAKIS MITROLIDIS/AFP via Getty Images)
Despite recent moves, Armenia is unlikely to advance normalization with rival Turkey until there is greater progress made in Yerevan's territorial disputes with Turkey-backed Azerbaijan, risking a collapse in normalization talks that would leave Armenia isolated in the Caucasus. On Oct. 6, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pahsinyan and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan held the first in-person talks between the leaders of the two countries in 13 years as part of an ongoing effort to establish diplomatic relations. In July 2022, Erdogan and Pashinyan pledged in a rare phone call to continue efforts to normalize relations between the two after decades of estrangement, saying they would work to open their borders to third-country nationals and start direct cargo flights between them. The talks came after a rare summit between the two countries' representatives in Moscow on July 1, where the pledges to pursue normalization were initially struck. However, in September, Turkey's ally Azerbaijan began military operations both in disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory and against Armenia proper to militarily pressure Armenia to adhere to the terms of the November 2020 cease-fire that ended the most recent conflict between the two sides, which Azerbaijan decisively won. Russia, which formally backs Armenia, has since been charged with enforcing the cease-fire. But Azerbaijan appears to have taken advantage of Russia's distraction in Ukraine when launching its most recent military operations.
Last month, deadly clashes erupted on the Azerbaijani-Armenian border, marking the worst flare-up of violence between the two countries since the 2020 conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. In a Sept. 14 speech to Armenia's parliament, Pashinyan said his country has lost over 100 soldiers in the latest episode of fighting.
Turkey initially recognized Armenia as an independent country in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But the two never established full diplomatic ties due to Turkey's refusal to recognize the Ottoman-era genocide of the Armenians in 1915-16, as well as Ankara's continued close ties with Armenia's rival, Azerbaijan.
Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993. In July, Turkey and Armenia agreed to open their border to nationals from other countries, but the border remains closed to Turkish and Armenian citizens.
For decades, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been locked in a tense territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, which lies inside Azerbaijan's internationally recognized borders but is largely populated by Armenians. Repeated Armenian-Turkish attempts to normalize relations in the 1990s and 2008-09 failed because of Turkey's unwavering support for Azerbaijan.
During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Turkey provided military aid to Azerbaijan, including Bayraktar TB2 drones, which helped Azerbaijan battle Armenian troops and ultimately gain territory in the disputed region. Russia, which is allied with Armenia through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), stepped in to mediate a cease-fire and provided 2,000 peacekeepers to uphold the agreement.
Armenia has sought normalization with Turkey primarily as it looks for other ways to counter Azerbaijan without Russian aid, but secondarily to increase trade ties, reunite families and enable access to Armenian historical sites inside Turkey. Armenia has long complained of insufficient Russian support in fending off threats from Azerbaijan's military forces. In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Russia did not militarily intervene to protect Armenia in part for fear of triggering a greater conflict with Turkey, which enabled Azerbaijan to seize territory in the disputed region. And now, Armenia is even less able to rely on Russian military power as Moscow deploys more troops to its ongoing war in Ukraine — a reality made clear by Russia's failure to provide fresh support to Armenia in response to Azerbaijan's latest border attacks, despite Yerevan going so far as to invoke the CSTO's mutual defense clause on Sept. 14. From Armenia's perspective, if Russia is unwilling or unable to offer more support, improved relations with Turkey could help it convince Ankara to lobby Azerbaijan to refrain from attacking Armenia. Aside from mitigating the risk of Azerbaijani attacks, Armenian outreach to Turkey is also aimed at fostering new commercial ties; the two traded only around $270 million worth of goods in 2019, but their shared border suggests they could do much more. Normalized diplomatic ties could see the full reopening of the two countries' shared border — helping reunite the roughly 60,000-70,000 Armenians who still live in Turkey with relatives inside Armenia proper after nearly 30 years of separation. Armenians would be able to visit the numerous historical sites from Armenia's past that remain inside Turkey.
Armenia's conventional military ability to counter Azerbaijan is limited. Its armed forces are smaller than Azerbaijan's and largely rely on Soviet and Russian equipment, which proved to be severely disadvantaged against Turkish drones used by Azerbaijan during the 2020 war. These same Soviet and Russian systems are also underperforming today in Ukraine, where Russia's battlefield setbacks have likely only further raised Armenian fears over Moscow's military capacity.
Meanwhile, Turkey is trying to boost its image as an international mediator to offset NATO criticism of its foreign policies, while also improving trade ties with Armenia and maintaining its working relationship with Moscow by potentially aiding a Russian ally. Turkey continues to face Western criticism for its ongoing political and economic ties with Russia amid the war in Ukraine. Normalized ties with Armenia could help Turkey deflect some of this criticism by enabling Ankara to further posture itself as a mediator — a strategy that has also seen Turkey diplomatically intervene in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, where it helped facilitate the grain export deal Moscow and Kyiv signed in July that helped ease global food prices. Increased trade with Armenia could economically benefit cash-strapped Turkey as well, as the two countries' trade ties were dominated by Turkish exports in 2019, suggesting they could find even more market share in the future. In addition, improved relations with Armenia would help strengthen Russo-Turkish relations, as Moscow prefers Turkey's mediation in the region over that of the United States or the European Union.
Turkey's aggressive behavior in the Mediterranean and elsewhere (including Syria and Libya) have periodically prompted Western leaders to call for sanctions against Ankara. In recent weeks, Turkey has escalated its rhetorical threats against Greece's alleged military buildup near the Turkish coast. On Sept. 29, Turkey also said it plans to reinforce the country's military presence in the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in response to the recent lifting of a U.S. defense trade embargo on Cyprus.
But while these drivers may keep Armenia and Turkey engaged in normalization talks, they're unlikely to make much headway until greater progress is achieved in mediating or resolving Armenia's dispute with Azerbaijan. The drivers to normalization will continue, while ome of the constraints to normalization, such as Armenian public opposition to relations with Turkey, have also weakened amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its inability to meaningfully support Yerevan, particularly following Azerbaijan's most recent attacks on Armenia on Sept. 13. However, Armenia is unlikely to advance normalization so long as Turkey backs Azerbaijan's attempts to expand its territory and/or forces Armenia to participate in negotiations with Azerbaijan that would result in painful concessions from Yerevan. Armenia will also similarly remain skeptical of Turkish outreach unless Turkey is able to slow or help freeze Azerbaijani military maneuvers against it. Turkey's government, meanwhile — which faces a tough re-election in 2023 — probably has an upper limit on its willingness to normalize with Armenia as well, as Ankara's unequivocal backing of Azerbaijan is widely popular among Turkish voters.
Azerbaijan's recent border attacks appear aimed at forcing Armenia to sign a treaty that sees Yerevan reduce or renounce control of Nagorno-Karabakh. Such a treaty might also see Armenia cede some border territory to Azerbaijan in the demarcation process, as well as create a transport corridor for Azerbaijan so it can reach its enclave of Nakhchivan (which is surrounded by Armenia, Turkey and Iran). All of these goals are deeply unpopular with the Armenian public.
Another Azerbaijani offensive could cause Armenia to walk away from normalization talks with Turkey, which would sever Yerevan's ties to the one power able to effectively pressure Baku to halt attacks. Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan will come under intense public pressure to break off talks with Ankara if Turkey backs Azerbaijan through another offensive. Pashinyan faced both popular calls for his ousting and a military coup attempt after the defeat in 2020, and has since then faced significant public pushback against signing a greater peace accord with Azerbaijan, which many Armenians oppose. But if Armenia walks away from talks with Turkey, it will be unable to find a partner able to counter Azerbaijan. Russia will remain focused on Ukraine, while the United States and European Union are unwilling to use their comparatively less leverage over Azerbaijan to force an end to the fighting, preferring a diplomatic solution that would ultimately see Armenia renounce all claims to Nagorno-Karabakh.
U.S.-Azerbaijani relations have been anchored by decades of cooperation on counterterrorism operations, as well as moves designed to curb Russian influence in the region; Baku is part of NATO's Partnership for Peace program, which is designed to build trust between NATO and countries seen as potential allies.
Armenia has a strong lobby in the U.S. Congress, in part because it is a democracy in a turbulent region and in part because of sympathy over the genocide. However, Armenia's hosting of Russian forces since the fall of the Soviet Union has prevented deeper relations from developing.
If, however, Armenia is able to normalize its relations with Turkey, and especially if it can do the same with Azerbaijan, it would seriously undermine Russia's influence in the South Caucasus. The economic opportunities and reduced threat of conflict opened by normalized relations with Turkey and particularly Azerbaijan would inevitably prompt Yerevan to increasingly question whether the benefits of maintaining its close economic and security relationship with Russia still outweigh the costs — especially amid Russia's war in Ukraine. On its own, this would result in less Russian influence, and in such a scenario, Moscow would face even greater threats if Azerbaijan then seeks to secure the rapid departure of Russian peacekeepers from its territory and realize the 2021 Shusha Declaration with Turkey; this calls for even closer economic, cultural and, most notably, security ties with Ankara. Significantly, Turkish President Erdogan said in June 2021 that his government would allow the establishment of Turkish (and, by extension, NATO) military installations in Azerbaijan, much to the chagrin of Moscow. While it remains unknown whether Turkey would follow through in doing so, the mere option represents a further erosion of Russia's long-declining influence in Azerbaijan in favor of Turkey.
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By: Geopolitical Futures
Spheres of influence. Meetings continue at the Commonwealth of Independent States summit in Astana, Kazakhstan. The latest highlights: Russian President Vladimir Putin has invited Armenia's prime minister and Azerbaijan's president to meet in Russia, and the foreign ministers of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan discussed the opening of regional transport links and the prospects for concluding a peace treaty between Baku and Yerevan. With Russia’s power in relative decline, events like these are a reminder that Moscow has no intention of giving up on its traditional spheres of influence.
Turkey as a gas hub. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has ordered work to begin in the city of Thrace to make Turkey an international gas hub. The order comes after a similar proposal from Putin, who suggested Turkey could become a new transfer station for EU-bound natural gas. Turkey is a regional power with bigger aspirations, and the project, if completed, would only add to its prestige.
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October 25, 2022
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Central Asia in Uncharted Territory
Russia’s decline marks the next stage in the Soviet Union’s implosion.
By: Kamran Bokhari
Russian influence in Central Asia in recent years has been waning. Moscow’s war in Ukraine has accelerated that process. The resulting vacuum will be part of a familiar cycle, during which no external power is able to impose order. The region – a land bridge connecting Europe with Asia – will be subject to long-term instability at a time when its countries are experiencing historic domestic transformations.
Central Asia has been under Moscow’s hegemony since the late 18th century. Russia’s domination of the region survived two major regime changes: from the czarist empire to the Soviet Union in 1917, and to the Russian Federation following the Soviet implosion in 1991. Yet even after their emergence as sovereign states, the five Central Asian countries remained under Russian tutelage. Even Kazakhstan, the strongest of the five, has pursued a flexible foreign policy, trying to establish relations with the United States and China while maintaining close ties with Russia. Much of this had to do with the Central Asian states’ own weakness to resist Russian influence. Furthermore, despite the economic turmoil of the 1990s, Russia remained a military power. After Vladimir Putin assumed leadership of the country in 2000, Russia embarked upon economic revitalization, largely through energy and commodity exports.
These developments played a key role in Russia’s ability to maintain influence in Central Asia (and other parts of its near abroad, such as the Caucasus). What helped was the absence of any other power to challenge Russia. China has certainly tried to push into the region through its Belt and Road Initiative, but it is constrained by domestic political-economic factors (especially given Chinese President Xi Jinping’s efforts to personalize an institutional autocracy) and its limited military power projection capabilities. As for the United States, Central Asia is the one region in the world where Washington has very little influence.
Central Asia
(click to enlarge)
The Kremlin’s Slow-Motion Decline
Russia, however, suffers from an ineluctable internal problem: The process that led to the implosion of the Soviet Union did not end there; it just slowed down. When the bloc dissolved, Moscow was having a tough time retaining influence over not only the former Soviet republics but also areas that it wanted to retain as part of its post-Soviet federation. Chechnya, which came under Russian control in the early part of the 19th century, is a key example. From the time of its absorption until the 1950s, Chechnya periodically produced resistance movements that challenged Kremlin domination. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Chechens fought two wars for independence (1993-96, 1999-2009) before Russia was able to reestablish its control.
Elsewhere, through the creation of intergovernmental organizations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union, the Russians fashioned instruments through which they could maintain influence in the independent ex-Soviet republics. Of course, there were also areas where Moscow lost complete control, such as the Baltic states, which didn’t just secede but joined NATO.
Even in the South Caucasus, the Russians tried to prevent Georgia’s tilt toward the West through the creation of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. That proved to be insufficient, so Russia invaded Georgia in 2008. Though Georgia remains Western-leaning, Moscow maintains coercive leverage over the country. Similarly, until the 2020 Azerbaijani-Armenian war, Russia was the security guarantor in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Sensing an opportunity, Turkey backed Baku and successfully altered the balance of power with Yerevan and thereby carved out space for itself in what was long part of the Russian sphere of influence.
Ukraine, however, best exemplifies the challenges that the Russians have faced in maintaining their influence in the former Soviet Union. The country is the most significant piece of geopolitical real estate for Russia. Ever since the 2005 Orange Revolution, Ukraine had been struggling to free itself from the Kremlin’s grip. Almost a decade later, in 2014, Ukrainians were finally able to oust the pro-Moscow government, with Russia retaining control over Crimea and the eastern Donbas region.
Russia’s decision to go to war in Ukraine earlier this year was an attempt to reverse the loss of a crucial buffer with the West. Eight months later, Moscow has not only failed, but it is staring at the further weakening of its ability to shape events in its near abroad. Regardless of how the war comes to an end, the Kremlin will increasingly be concerned about its western flank with Europe. This means it will have decreasing bandwidth for its strategic rear, Central Asia.
Implications for Central Asia
The region at the heart of Eurasia will thus increasingly be left to its own devices. Kazakhstan will have to take the lead in creating a new order for the region, which has long been dependent on Moscow for security and stability. It is, after all, the largest economy in the region, and it has a huge interest in securing itself and its southern neighbors from the effects of the weakening of Russia’s geopolitical writ – especially since the region has been linguistically, culturally and economically tethered to Moscow for such a long time. The situation with Russia comes at a time when each country in the region is undergoing significant domestic change.
Kazakhstan itself went through a bout of violent unrest that was brought under control only weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Since then, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev – who succeeded his long-time predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev, barely three and a half years ago – has been trying to consolidate power and usher in political and economic reforms. Even after giving up the presidency, Nazarbayev, who ruled the country from the days of the Soviet Union, held on to power through the chairmanship of the country’s Security Council. He was removed from the post at the start of this year, as Kazakh security forces were trying to quell the unrest. In the months since, the government has been engaged in a delicate process of introducing reforms to assuage the public while maintaining stability.
Likewise, Uzbekistan has also been moving to open up civil society. Turkmenistan last March tapped a new president, Serdar Berdimuhamedow, the son of former President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, who ruled the country for 15 years. The new president is expected to introduce some reforms. Kyrgyzstan, which has seen three political uprisings (2005, 2010 and 2020), also remains mired in uncertainty. Then there is the ethnically non-Turkic nation of Tajikistan, which has been ruled by Emomali Rahmon since shortly after independence and is perhaps more dependent than anyone in the region on Russia for its security, as evidenced by the 7,000 Russian troops stationed in the country.
While Central Asian states warily look toward the northwest, at the weakening of their former liege, they are also deeply concerned at their southeastern flank. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan last year left the Taliban in charge of the Southwest Asian country. Bordering three of the five Central Asian nations, and close to the most heavily populated parts of the region, the Taliban regime has the potential to upset the ongoing domestic transitions. For this reason, most of the Central Asian nations have adopted a policy of pragmatic engagement with Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers in the hope that this strategy will prevent any spillover into their territories.
It was not too long ago that the Kremlin withdrew from Afghanistan. In early 1989, it did not expect that within three years it would no longer control Central Asia either. It did, however, retain influence in the region – and for close to three decades. But that too is becoming a thing of the past. Central Asia is in uncharted territory.
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The Risks of Kazakhstan's Slow Drift From Russia
12 MIN READOct 28, 2022 | 21:21 GMT
Kazakhstan will seek to maintain its current alignment with Russia despite rising bilateral tensions, but Moscow's lack of levers to reverse its declining economic and political influence over Astana could eventually push Russia to threaten to use coercion — or potentially even military action — against the country. In the months since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, numerous events have suggested that the bilateral relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan is worsening. On March 6, a little over a week after Moscow launched its invasion, Kazakh officials approved a pro-Ukraine, anti-war rally in Almaty (Kazakhstan's largest city). Later that month, Kazakhstan then banned Russian military propaganda symbols in public, before canceling traditional May 9 Victory Day parades. At the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said that his country would not recognize the independence of Moscow's statelets in eastern Ukraine — a stance furthered on Sept. 26 when Kazakhstan's foreign ministry stated that it would not recognize Russia's annexations in eastern Ukraine. Most notably, crude oil flows in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline (which exports more than 80% of Kazakhstan's oil and is the single largest source of Kazakh government tax revenues) have experienced four unexpected shutdowns so far this year, at the behest of Russian officials on dubious grounds — fueling speculation that Russia may be trying to demonstrate to Kazakhstan the risks associated with failing to maintain positions in line with Moscow's.
Among Kazakhstan's other actions that rankled Moscow was Kazakh President Tokayev's acceptance of anti-war Russians and those fleeing mobilization, saying his country must ''take care of'' and ''provide safety to'' those escaping the ''hopeless situation'' in Russia, allowing Kazakhstan to become a primary destination for Russian citizens.
Kazakhstan has also provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine and has maintained contact with Ukrainian officials, including President Volodymyr Zelensky, amid the ongoing war.
Additionally, Kazakhstan is attracting money and investment previously destined for Russia, as on Oct. 19, Prime Minister Alikhan Smaiylov told reporters that another 56 international companies that have left Russia in recent months had ''expressed their willingness to settle in Kazakhstan,'' and the country hopes to attract 300 large foreign companies moving out of Russia.
The CPC pipeline was first suspended in March, when the consortium said a storm had damaged two loading moorings, an explanation that drew skepticism from independent observers. CPC deliveries were again interrupted in June following what Russian officials said was the discovery of World War II-era anti-ship ordnance in the area, an explanation widely viewed in Kazakhstan as politically motivated and related to Tokayev's failure to endorse Russia's war. In July, a Russian court then ordered the pipeline to halt flows due to alleged environmental violations, but the ruling was overturned days later. And finally, on Aug. 23, the pipeline was forced to cut flows significantly due to additional unplanned repairs on two of its three mooring points.
Kazakhstan will likely seek to avoid, minimize or downplay any conflict with Russia to protect the two countries' close economic ties and avoid provoking Moscow. Despite recent frictions, there is no indication that Kazakhstan would formally disavow or openly reduce its political and economic alignment with Russia, which remains one of its largest trading partners. Kazakhstan will also remain a member of both Russia's defense bloc, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and Russia's customs union, the Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU). This is because leaving these organizations would immediately destabilize Kazakhstan's economy and create distance from Russia to which Moscow would likely respond with coercion in the future. In fact, mutual trade between Kazakhstan, Russia and the three other ex-Soviet states in the EAEU (Armenia, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan) has grown by 5% in the first eight months of 2022, according to Kazakhstan's prime minister. Furthermore, Kazakhstan will selectively enforce Western sanctions on Russia to avoid falling under secondary sanctions and remain an avenue for economic activity intended to evade Western sanctions on Russia; Kazakh authorities may, for example, ignore gray export schemes to move Western goods to Russia by means of the country. Additionally, despite Tokayev's limited reforms and pro-democratic rhetoric, Kazakhstan is likely to remain an authoritarian state with a poor human rights record, as political power will remain firmly in the hands of the ruling party for the foreseeable future — reassuring Moscow that neither Tokayev nor another political force will engage in sudden action that could jeopardize its influence over the Kazakh government. Moscow will likely carry out propaganda operations to weaken the opposition to Tokayev and allow the Kazakh leadership to cast itself as sufficiently nationalist in exchange for maintaining the two countries' close economic and political ties.
Tokayev and Putin hold regular phone calls and in-person meetings. Tokayev has said he has a close relationship with his Russian counterpart, and on Aug. 19 assured Putin that there were ''no grounds to make any pessimistic forecasts regarding the future of our cooperation.'' Putin has also suggested that personal contacts with the Kazakh president could quickly resolve any real strain in bilateral relations.
Tokayev is all but certain to secure a new seven-year term in Kazakhstan's Nov. 20 snap election, which is likely Putin's main reassurance in the future strength of Moscow's relations with Astana.
However, Kazakhstan's deepening ties with regional powers like China and Turkey indicate a relative decline in Russia's economic and political influence over Astana. Despite its close ties with Russia, Kazakhstan has long had a ''multi-vector'' foreign policy that aims to build ties with other regional and global powers. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, this policy has become particularly active.
Specifically, recent high-level meetings with China and Turkey suggest Kazakhstan is trying to offset its reliance on Russia in the security and economic spheres by bolstering support from Central Asia's two other powers. During an Oct. 12 meeting in Astana, Tokayev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed numerous documents pledging to increase their counties' cooperation on foreign policy and investment, trade and economics, transport and logistics, military industry, energy, and agriculture. Notably, Erdogan stressed that the security and territorial integrity of Kazakhstan is of particular importance to the Turkic states. The summit with Turkey came just a month after Tokayev met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan, during which Xi said China plans to support Kazakhstan by ''protecting its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.'' After the Sept. 14 meeting, Tokayev awarded Xi with Kazakhstan's highest state award for the Chinese leader's efforts to strengthen and develop bilateral political, economic and cultural ties.
Kazakhstan is growing as an alternative transit route for freight between China and the European Union called the Trans-Caspian Corridor. The new corridor is used to ship goods across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, where those goods can then be transported through Turkey and Georgia via railways, before ultimately reaching southeastern EU countries or ports in Bulgaria and Romania by shipping routes in the Black Sea. According to the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route Association, cargo shipments across Central Asia and the Caucasus are expected to reach 3.2 million metric tons in 2022, a sixfold increase over the previous year. The increasing popularity of the Trans-Caspian Corridor will help expand logistics capabilities through Kazakhstan and help ensure lower and more predictable transportation costs to the country. Facilitating trade directly between China and Europe also reflects Kazakhstan's growing economic independence from Russia.
Following Russian halts of the CPC pipeline, Kazakhstan has been seeking to diversify its oil export routes, which Tokayev called a ''strategic task'' for Kazakhstan's government — and one that will deprive Russia of revenues. Tokayev instructed the government to develop the Trans-Caspian Corridor by improving port infrastructure on the Caspian not only for general transit but also for transporting oil exports, and ordered a study into building a pipeline across the Caspian Sea.
China is helping develop Kazakhstan's infrastructure and transportation routes including the Trans-Caspian Corridor, which are largely intended to help bypass Russia. Kazakhstan remains a major destination for Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investment. New BRI investments in Russia, meanwhile, have fallen since the Ukraine invasion, underscoring China's growing interest in Central Asia as an alternative transit corridor to Europe. Chinese companies are also quickly expanding their foothold in other sectors of Kazakhstan's economy, including the country's automotive market — eating into Russian firms' share of the Kazakh market.
In addition to promoting alternative transit corridors, Turkey is helping Kazakhstan beef up its defensive capabilities, which would complicate Russian military action against the country. In May, Kazakhstan signed a deal to begin manufacturing its own medium-altitude, long-endurance Turkish-designed ANKA attack drones, making Kazakhstan the first production base of such drones outside of Turkey.
While the initial effect of Tokayev's domestic reforms will be limited, they will also generate tensions with Moscow. Many of the formal changes to Kazakhstan's political system in recent months have been largely cosmetic. However, Tokayev's rhetoric and actions suggest he's attempting to increase popular participation in the political process, likely in an effort to avoid a repeat of the widespread social unrest that shook the country in January amid a lack of civic or political alternatives for dissent. Tokayev has also been pushing to distance Kazakhstan from Russian culture and identity. During an Oct. 6 address, Tokayev claimed that ''only an independent state will retain its language, land, and religion,'' hinting at the threat of Russia attempting to dictate policies in the areas on Kazakhstan. In a not-so-veiled reference to the events in Ukraine, Tokayev also said that the basis of Kazakh statehood is the integrity of its territory, and called ''democracy, the rule of law and equality'' the main priorities of the ''just Kazakhstan'' he seeks to create. The Kazakh president's embracement of liberal Western ideas (like democracy and separation of powers) will make Russia concerned that the country could become more vulnerable to political change, as more active civil participation could upset political networks Moscow is used to dealing with. In the long term, a more democratic political system would likely also give rise to increasingly nationalist and populist governments that are more likely to see Kazakhstan's close ties with Russia as a barrier to the country's independence and future development.
Moscow signaled its approval of Tokayev's internal changes during a Sept. 1 telephone conversation between Tokayev and Putin, during which the presidents agreed to maintain constant working contacts. This suggests the Kremlin does not believe the impending reforms pose an immediate threat to bilateral relations. But Putin's close relationship with Tokayev will not alone provide a strong enough foundation for Russia to maintain its influence over a country where people's values and interests are increasingly seen as at odds with those of Moscow, and could eventually backfire if Kazakhs begin to view their president as overly subservient to Russia.
Russia believes that maintaining close relations with Kazakhstan is indispensable for the success of the Kremlin's integration projects in the post-Soviet space. Russia also wants to avoid a repeat of the mass unrest that enveloped Kazakhstan at the beginning of the year (which prompted Moscow to intervene to restore order), as another intervention to halt an anti-establishment uprising would only risk further fueling anti-Russian sentiment among Kazakhs. But in mitigating that threat, Moscow will be skeptical of introducing political reforms in Kazakhstan — fearing that such changes will eventually get out from under Tokayev and the elites' control and take the country through events similar to Ukraine's Euromaidan revolution in 2014. Alternative arrangements to Tokayev's regime would risk Kazakhstan becoming too independent in the eyes of Moscow and would only leave Belarus among the major countries still squarely in Russia's political and economic orbit. ''Losing'' Kazakhstan similar to Ukraine would mean the loss of the rest of Central Asia and arguably equally catastrophic for the Kremlin. Therefore, maintaining Kazakhstan's internal stability is Moscow's first priority. The Kremlin's ultimate goal for its ideal future relationship with Kazakhstan may lay in emulating the close partnership Russia has with Belarus, drawing Kazakhstan into deeper integration and possibly through the Union State. Realizing this vision, however, is likely unattainable in the foreseeable future.
As a result, Kazakhstan's slow distancing from Russia could push Moscow to increasingly use threats and coercion, and potentially even military force, to bring Astana to heel. Moscow's ambitions could, albeit many years down the line, lead it to conclude that Astana is on a trajectory to become too distant from Moscow, and that, as it failed to do in Ukraine, Russia should act earlier, taking preemptive military action against the country to reverse — or impose a steep cost on — Kazakhstan's growing distance. Such ideas are often circulated in nationalist media in Russia, which have claimed that Tokayev's domestic agenda and multi-vector foreign policy are thinly disguised efforts to cement trends that will cause the decline of Russian influence in the country. Astana will not formally backtrack on previous agreements and documents governing its relations with Moscow. But in the future, Russia could point to Kazakhstan's internal political reforms and relations with other countries to justify an invasion, using very similar grounds to those it used to justify sending troops into Ukraine in February. The risk of Russia invading Kazakhstan — which would seek to topple the government or annex Russian-speaking areas in the north of the country — remains distant. But the likelihood of this scenario will increase if Astana continues to reduce its political and economic ties with Moscow, and especially if the war in Ukraine ends on relatively favorable terms for Russia. Russia may act sooner rather than later under the idea that the Kazakh government and military would not resist, which may not be the case in the long term.
Recent actions by the Kazakh officials and government suggest the country takes the theoretical possibility of a Russian military intervention seriously. In September, Tokayev signed a decree according to which an additional 441 billion tenges ($939.5 million) will be spent to support the nation's defense sector — a nearly 1.5-fold increase over last year's budget of $1.7 billion. On Aug. 26, the mayor of Almaty said that all Soviet-era bomb shelters for civilians would be restored, a move likely motivated by Ukraine's lack of shelters amid Russia's mass airstrikes on civilian infrastructure in urban areas. Media reports in Kazakhstan have said that around 300 bomb shelters were built in Almaty during Soviet times, but only about 100 are still usable.
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Russia and Iran. At last week’s Eurasian Economic Forum, Russia proposed creating a single logistics operator with Iran and Azerbaijan for the International North-South Transport Corridor, which spans from Russia through the South Caucasus and Iran to India. Meanwhile, Russia and Iran opened a meeting of the Joint Economic Commission on Monday, where they plan to establish a roadmap for future cooperation. Moscow is strengthening relations with Tehran and others as it grows increasingly alienated.
Playing mediator. Relatedly, Russian President Vladimir Putin is meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Sochi to try to negotiate a peace deal following recent violence between the two countries. The three leaders will also discuss the restoration of economic and transport ties between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Russia has been mediating in this conflict to try to expand its own influence in the region
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A fellow student of these things comments:
"Azerbaijan and Armenia aren't friends. And Iran believe that Azerbaijan is really part of Iran. Azerbaijan are allied with Turkey, and have plenty of oil of their own. So, while Putin, I'm sure, wants to try and cobble together some sort of a Eastern EU I will believe it when I see it. But even if it works making friends with these nations won't make up for the revenue Russia made from selling oil to Europe.
"Slowly but surely Russia is beginning to be the most hated and distrusted nation on earth. And should they try to stop the exportation of grain from the Ukraine to a starving mideast and Africa. They will be blamed for killing millions.
"Maybe worse if they use nukes, or cause the nuclear power plant under their control to explode it will kill 50 million people, and make the region unusable for over 200 miles and for 100 years. The truth is that Russia is in deep shit, they need a way out not only for today, but for sometime to come. Because it will take some years before Russia will again be considered a trustworthy nation to do business with. China doesn't trust them, they are only using them for cheap energy, but if they see the tide turn of Russia they will drop them like a hot rock. Russia needs friends and they are hard to come by. The best they could do is kill Putin, claim that he went crazy and beg forgiveness from one and all. But, I don't believe it is in the Russian mindset to apologize."
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(friend comments)
All of that makes sense to me.
Other than the Russians killing Putin and apologizing to the world, doubly not likely, nothing offers an off-ramp to the war.
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Pasting this from the Water thread
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lp0Sxn42TGs
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November 15, 2022
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Russian Influence in the Economies of the South Caucasus
By: Geopolitical Futures
Russian Influence in the Economies of the South Caucasus
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Russia's relationships with the countries of the South Caucasus have seen many unexpected changes since the war in Ukraine began last February. The economic fallout from the invasion – including tougher sanctions, the closure of international businesses in Russia, and Moscow’s disconnection from the SWIFT banking system – led to the first wave of migrants fleeing Russia, many of whom were gainfully employed and able to work remotely. The second wave came after Moscow’s announcement of a “partial mobilization” to aid its war effort. The migrations increased consumer demand and economic activity in the countries of the South Caucasus, leading to improved economic growth forecasts for the region. The second wave also led to a significant increase in trade between Russia and these countries, as businesses work to skirt anti-Russian sanctions by forging ties with neighboring economies.
These countries also face a number of problems resulting from the influx of Russian migrants, however, including rises in inflation and property prices. Their eventual return to their homeland will also present challenges, including reduced economic activity. But the biggest challenge is the increasing interdependence and Russia's growing influence in these countries' economies, perhaps for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. To avoid the pitfalls that come with economic interdependence, Azerbaijan and Armenia have strived for neutrality and diversification of ties, while Georgia has chosen a pro-Western agenda
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I claim considerable prescience here! :-D :-D :-D
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December 16, 2022
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Turkmenistan Targets the European Gas Market
New pipeline infrastructure must be built first.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Turkmenistan Gas Market
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Since Russia invaded Ukraine, Europe has announced its intent to diversify its gas supplies away from Russia. Sensing an opportunity, Turkey is angling to become a natural gas hub and alternative supply route to the European Union from resource-rich countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia. During a trilateral summit on Dec. 14 involving Azerbaijan, Turkey and Turkmenistan, Ankara announced its intention to carry Turkmen gas west through the Caspian Sea.
Since gaining independence, Turkmenistan has strived for neutrality, relying on its huge natural gas reserves. It has sought new export markets for years, and the drop in Russian supplies to Europe is a clear opening. However, new infrastructure must be built first, meaning a solution is far off. Additionally, the Kremlin does not take kindly to competition in the post-Soviet space and, as an important trading partner for Turkmenistan, Moscow has some leverage.
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Daily Memo: Perceptions of Iran and Israel
A new poll sheds light on attitudes in the Caucasus about the two Middle Eastern states.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Attitudes in Azerbaijan. In a recent poll on attitudes toward Iran and Israel conducted by Azerbaijan’s Center for Social Research, 67 percent of respondents in Azerbaijan supported their president’s statement that the country would do everything to protect ethnic Azeris in Iran. Meanwhile, some 61 percent of respondents called Israel a reliable partner and had positive feelings about the opening of an embassy in Israel. Israel’s ambassador to Azerbaijan said on Thursday that countries like Azerbaijan, Turkey and Israel should form a united bloc against Iran.
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Issues that I flagged years ago.
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December 19, 2022
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Uzbekistan’s Virtue of Patience
Appearing to choose sides in the Ukraine conflict, even if it makes economic sense, is a nonstarter.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
Uzbekistan is rich in recoverable hydrocarbons. Natural gas reserves alone are estimated to be close to 2 trillion cubic meters. Oil and gas account for about 16 percent of the country’s gross domestic product and about 20 percent of budget revenue. And although China is its biggest customer, Uzbekistan has been known to ship gas to the West too, using pipelines that traverse Russia and Kazakhstan.
It’s understandable, then, why Russia and Kazakhstan, whose leaders recently met to discuss the creation of a gas union in Central Asia, would want Uzbekistan in their club. But the government in Tashkent isn’t so sure, reportedly saying it would never agree to political conditions in exchange for gas – a not-so-veiled reference to the war in Ukraine. Still, the economic reality in the country demands cooperation with neighbors, even if formal “membership” in a union is a bridge too far.
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Despite its large reserves, Uzbekistan has turned into a net hydrocarbons importer. It is the most populous country in Central Asia, and though its urban population as a percentage of the total population is lower than others, it boasts the region’s most densely populated area in the Fergana Valley. It also has a comparatively well-developed industrial complex, one that is expected to pick back up quickly to offset the economic damages of the COVID-19 pandemic. The war in Ukraine, and the Russian sanctions that followed, have made Central Asian industry, with its cheap labor and proximity to Russian and European markets, more attractive. Some European companies are considering relocating to Uzbekistan, while others are thinking about investing in existing facilities there.
Put simply, the country consumes a lot of energy, and there’s only so much it can do to goose production. Pipelines and other infrastructure are in various states of disrepair, sometimes leading to significant losses. Hydropower is problematic because there isn’t that much water in the country, and constructing nuclear plants is expensive and time-consuming. Roughly 90 percent of Uzbekistan’s electricity is produced by thermal power plants, but they run on natural gas. This has cut into government revenue from gas exports, which are three times lower in 2022 than they were in 2021, and has made it more difficult for the country to honor its electricity export contracts. Cold weather, meanwhile, has led to shortages in both electricity and heating.
The government in Tashkent is thus looking for ways to replenish its coffers and strengthen its export positions, all while finding more sources of gas for consumption. Cooperating with other gas exporters seems like a natural solution, especially considering Uzbekistan is a landlocked country that can’t afford to invest in new projects or offer competitive pricing.
Under the circumstances, Uzbekistan is interested in receiving and exporting additional gas or becoming a transit hub, and Russia is a natural fit. Uzbekistan would get access to a ton of surplus gas, while Russia would increase its power in areas it considers its traditional sphere of influence, all while increasing deliveries to China (via Central Asian markets). This kind of potential leverage could be enough to get Russia to negotiate its prices. Moreover, there is already a system of gas pipelines in place that passes from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia, where the throughput capacity of Uzbekistan’s gas transmission system is 55 billion cubic meters per year. This gives Tashkent even more opportunities to extract transit fees on gas going to Europe and China.
Indeed, this would be in keeping with broader economic cooperation. Russia is a key partner on trade, investment and remittances. Still, Uzbekistan is hesitant to formally join a gas union for a couple of reasons. The first is the issue of neutrality; Uzbekistan gained independence after the fall of the Soviet Union, and it is hypersensitive about maintaining sovereignty. That’s why, for example, the government has halted gas exports. It would rather provide for its citizens itself, even at the expense of the bottom line, than be beholden to someone else. That’s also why it has intensified negotiations with other countries on additional purchases of natural gas, electricity, coal and fuel oil, and why it has banned the use of gas-fired vehicles until next March.
The second (and related reason) is that trade ties and diversification are essential for maintaining independence. Central Asia is marked by a fairly high presence of foreign capital. The gas sector alone is serviced by a state-owned Uzbek company, Russia’s Lukoil, Uzbekneftegaz (with the participation of some Korean companies), Epsilon Development Company, Natural Gas-Stream and New Silk Road Oil and Gas, which are important investors and exporters of technology. There is growing interest – economic and geostrategic – from the United States and the European Union, which often meet with the leaders of the Central Asian countries. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently met with Uzbekistan’s foreign minister on the sidelines of the U.S.-Uzbekistan Strategic Partnership Dialogue, while German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said her recent meeting with Uzbek officials signaled expanding cooperation with Uzbekistan. And this is in addition to, not at the expense of, more traditional partners like Russia and China. Representatives of Beijing recently went to Uzbekistan to discuss the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, and Russia is always looking for new points of contact. Tashkent prefers this kind of state of affairs in ordinary times, but it has even more reason to be cautious about Russia now, lest it run afoul of Western sanctions or be seen as too cozy with an increasingly alienated Russia. That could be deadly for Uzbekistan’s economy.
Perhaps the best option for Uzbekistan would be to join a transit zone in which it receives additional payments for the distillation of gas to large Chinese or European markets, where gas consumption is rising, and then redirect its own production to domestic needs. That would solve the problem of internal shortages and even rake in a few dollars. But Uzbekistan’s cautious foreign policy hovers over all. Hence why its statement about not wanting to join Russia and Kazakhstan should be seen not as an outright refusal but as an attempt to signal that it has no political designs of its own and to shield a future arrangement from sanctions. Either way, Uzbekistan will characteristically take its time. It’s in no more a hurry to join a gas union than it is to open, say, branches of European companies within its borders. In the short term, Tashkent seems content to suffer a relatively tight economy while holding out hope that it can meet its gas needs through one-on-one cooperation with its gas-rich neighbors. The other option – choosing sides or appearing to choose sides in the Ukraine conflict – is a nonstarter. It will simply wait for things to die down.
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Electricity for Europe. Azerbaijan, Hungary, Georgia and Romania signed a deal on Saturday to build an underwater electric cable that will help bring green electricity from Azerbaijan to Europe. The project, which is expected to be concluded in three to four years, aims to reduce Europe’s energy dependence on Russia.
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Shifting stance. Kazakhstan, a close ally of Moscow that has so far refused to openly support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, voted against a U.N. resolution to condemn Moscow’s actions there and demand its withdrawal. This marks the first time the Central Asian country, which did not recognize Russia’s annexation of four Ukrainian regions earlier this year, has taken such a stance in Moscow’s favor since the beginning of the conflict.
Uzbek first. Uzbekistan says it sent a container train to Europe along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route last week for the first time. The train passed through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia to reach its final destination in the Bulgarian port of Burgas. Traffic along the corridor, developed as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, has increased since the beginning of the year.
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January 9, 2023
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Why Tajikistan Is Headed Toward Instability
The Taliban will actively try to destabilize things north of the border.
By: Kamran Bokhari
On Dec. 27, the Islamic State’s franchise in Afghanistan claimed responsibility for an attack that killed the highest-ranking Taliban security official in Badakhshan province, located on the border of Tajikistan. It was merely the latest incident in a series of accelerated attacks by the Islamic State since the Taliban retook control of the country.
It is especially concerning for Tajikistan, which is the most vulnerable of Afghanistan’s neighbors to cross-border instability. It’s little surprise, then, that in sharp contrast with the more pragmatic approaches of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (as well as Russia), Tajikistan has adopted a confrontational attitude toward the Taliban regime. The governments in Tashkent and Ashgabat along with the Kremlin have, for example, relied on the Taliban to keep the Islamic State from spreading into their respective territories. They figure that the Taliban, which is a nationalist jihadist group bent on creating an emirate limited to Afghanistan, is a natural counterweight to the more transnational ambitions of the Islamic State. Tajikistan shares this concern but, because of its historical and geopolitical connections, considers the Taliban a more immediate danger.
Cross-border Tensions
The influence of Afghanistan’s Pashtun minorities on Pakistan is well documented – and for good reason. Pakistan shares a 1,640-mile (2,640-kilometer) border with Afghanistan, and ethnic Pashtuns make up about 42 percent of all Afghans and 18 percent of all Pakistanis, most of whom live on either side of the internationally recognized border between the two.
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The situation is similar with regard to Tajikistan, if only on a somewhat smaller scale. Ethnic Tajiks form Afghanistan’s second-largest ethnic group (27 percent) and most of them inhabit the country’s northern regions bordering Tajikistan, where Tajiks account for 84 percent of the population. The Tajik language is a variant of Dari, which binds together the various Afghan ethnicities.
The Russian Empire and, later, the Soviet Union created barriers that prevented the natural commingling of cultural and linguistic influences in borderlands such as these, but those began to erode during Moscow’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Tajikistan was the main launchpad for the deployment of Soviet forces. Moscow relied on its own ethnic Tajik citizens who, thanks to their ethnolinguistic connections to Afghanistan, helped it understand Afghan society and culture. Many served in the Soviet armed forces, of course, but many others adopted civilian roles as interpreters, advisers and technical experts to try to help Moscow improve the standing of the communist regime in Kabul among the broader Afghan population.
But all the while, Afghans were also influencing Soviet Tajiks, who found an opportunity to reconnect with their shared Persianate heritage. The experience helped them not just enhance their language skills but also revive their religious and ethno-nationalist identity, which had long been contained under Russian and Soviet rule. This was taking place at the same time that Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika reforms were creating the conditions for Tajikistan and other former Soviet republics to declare independence. The Tajikistani veterans of the Soviet war in Afghanistan played a role in the national and religious revival both in the lead-up to independence and afterward.
When Tajikistan declared independence in September 1991, Afghan Islamist insurgent groups were trying to topple the communist regime in Kabul. One of the most powerful factions was Jamiat-e-Islami, an ethnic Tajik Islamist group led by former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani and former military commander and Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud. This group would have a significant impact on Tajikistan’s domestic political scene and the country’s relations with Afghanistan. Within three weeks of the collapse of Afghanistan’s communist regime in April 1992, Tajikistan plunged into a civil war that raged for five years.
Two simultaneous conflicts thus emerged. In Afghanistan, after the collapse of the communist regime, opposing factions unable to reach a power-sharing arrangement began to fight each other in a chaotic intra-Islamist war from which the Taliban would eventually emerge victorious. In Tajikistan, protests against the newly independent state dominated by former Soviet elites quickly descended into a full-scale civil war. The opposition consisted of democratic and Islamist factions hailing largely from the highland regions of the center and southeast, while pro-government factions comprised the lowland areas in the north and southwestern parts of the country.
Southern Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan essentially became a contiguous battlespace. Which makes sense – historically, these two regions were effectively the same area, as evidenced by the fact that large parts of territory on both sides of the border are called Badakhshan. Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province was a stronghold of the Tajik-dominated Jamiat-e-Islami, which was embroiled in a conflict between anti-Soviet guerilla factions for control following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since the fighting was taking place in Kabul, Jamiat-e-Islami could participate in the power struggle at home and help its allies in Tajikistan fight their own government. It offered sanctuary, weapons, supplies and training to the Tajikistani opposition, and there is even evidence that Afghan veterans of the war against the Soviets participated in Tajikistan’s civil war. (It helped that Jamiat-e-Islami’s senior leaders likewise occupied civil and military spots in the rump state in Kabul.)
Decline of the Afghan Tajiks
1994 would prove a significant year for both countries. In Afghanistan, the Taliban emerged on the scene, and in just two years, it would topple the fragile Jamiat-e-Islami-led government. (Jamiat-e-Islami would then retreat and band together with various other groups to form the Northern Alliance.) Meanwhile, in Tajikistan, the government – led by President Emomali Rahmon, who occupies the office still today – had begun to gain the upper hand in the war against what had become the United Tajik Opposition alliance.
With the Rahmon government in Dushanbe pushing UTO southward, and with the Taliban driving the Northern Alliance northward, the cross-border battlespace began to shrink, leading to a realignment in an area where ethnicity trumped ideology and accelerating negotiations between the government and the UTO. The Afghan Tajik movement’s priority was to defend itself against the Taliban, and it could no longer help the UTO. In fact, Jamiat-e-Islami actually facilitated the peace talks between UTO and the government in Tajikistan – which helped end the conflict there.
Jamiat-e-Islami, which was losing territory to the Taliban, was forced to rely on Dushanbe and Moscow. (It was an ironic turn of events; the group went from fighting the Russians in the 1980s to being clients of them in the 1990s.) Once again, Tajikistan became the springboard for military operations in Afghanistan, only this time it was a Russian-backed Islamist faction fighting a rival and much more hardline Islamist opponent. Even so, by the early 2000s, it seemed that the Taliban were well on their way to consolidating power in Afghanistan, particularly with al-Qaida assassinating Massoud on Sept. 9, 2001.
Two days later, the 9/11 attacks took place, which would change the cross-border landscape again. The U.S. operation to remove the Taliban regime shifted the battlespace well south of the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border. For the next two decades, the American intervention, along with the fact that Afghanistan’s ethnic Tajiks were in dominant positions in the Western-backed Islamic Republic of Afghanistan regime, insulated not just Tajikistan but the broader Central Asian region from the ravages of the subsequent Taliban insurgency. The Taliban knew that the mainstay of the opposition to them was ethnic Tajiks in the north.
After all, the Tajik-majority northern region is where the Taliban faced resistance for years after taking control in 1996 and was the launchpad of the ground offensive that toppled the regime in late 2001. The Taliban also understood the cross-border ethnic Tajik phenomenon and the critical role Tajikistan played as a strategic rear guard for their enemies. They knew that it was only a matter of time before the Americans would withdraw from the country and give them the opportunity to retake Kabul. But what they did not want was to return to a situation where the Tajiks and their allies in the north would be a constant threat.
Looking Ahead
For this reason, the Taliban began expanding their insurgency in the north, taking advantage of the public dissatisfaction with warlordism, factionalism and corruption that had emerged among the old Afghan Tajik elite during the U.S. military presence, especially after the Taliban assassinated Rabbani in 2011. The broader infighting within the internationally backed Afghan state after the 2014 elections only helped the Taliban more. By mid-2016, five years before they retook the country, the Taliban had already gained significant ground in 12 of the 22 provinces of Badakhshan, among other areas in the north. This was an unprecedented development; for the first time, the Taliban had been able to penetrate the region of their historic rivals.
And so, when in the summer of 2021 the Taliban seized Kabul, they did so only after first taking most of the north. Unlike when they took power in 1996, this time they eliminated the possibility of major resistance from the Tajiks. Consequently, they deprived Tajikistan of the buffer that had long existed between Tajikistan and the Taliban-controlled southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan. More important, the Taliban are in a position to leverage the trans-border ethno-linguistic demographics to undermine the Tajikistani government.
Hence the hardline stance Dushanbe has adopted toward the Taliban. Rahmon, who has led the country for almost 30 years, has personally witnessed the geopolitical ebb and flow between his country and Afghanistan since the Soviet era. This emerging threat on the southern flank comes at the worst possible time as the Rahmon government faces growing economic difficulties and sees the weakening of longtime ally Russia.
The Taliban’s stance toward Tajikistan is similar to its attitude toward Pakistan. It may not be seeking to act against either neighbor, but trans-border dynamics are such that the Taliban cannot secure their regime without buffer zones. In the case of Pakistan, they don’t have much to worry about; Islamabad is somewhere between ambivalent and sympathetic toward the new government in Kabul. However, Tajikistan’s opposition to the Taliban regime means that they will actively try to undermine security north of the border. Tajikistan is thus headed for instability, which has the potential to spread to neighboring Uzbekistan and the wider region.
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Energy in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan signed a memorandum of understanding with the China National Heavy Machinery Corp. on the construction of a 21-megawatt hydropower plant in Kyrgyzstan. Less than a year ago, the country signed another agreement with a Chinese state-owned company for the construction of a 500-megawatt hydropower plant. Water supplies remain a concern for such projects in Central Asia, but countries outside the region have shown interest in investing, to the irritation of Moscow, which considers Central Asia part of its sphere of influence.
Disruption. Uzbekistan’s Energy Ministry says providers are having trouble servicing some customers amid rising demand for electricity and natural gas due to cold weather. It noted a disruption in supplies from Turkmenistan on Jan. 12 stemming from abnormally cold weather that led to a complete halt in gas imports and a 20 percent drop in electricity imports. In December, Turkmenistan agreed to supply Uzbekistan with an additional 20 million cubic meters of gas per day, part of Uzbek efforts to procure energy outside of Russia. Moscow had proposed creating a gas union with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, but Tashkent rebuffed the idea over fears of incurring Western secondary sanctions.
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Turkish mediation. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a call on Monday with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. They spoke again about creating a regional gas hub in Turkey using Russian natural gas supplies. Meanwhile, Ankara is mediating talks between Russia and Ukraine on another prisoner exchange of up to 1,000 people, according to Turkey’s chief ombudsman. Ankara is trying to establish itself as the top broker in the conflict.
Bypassing Russia. Kazakh company KazMunayGas and the Abu Dhabi Port Group signed an agreement on a strategic partnership during Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to the United Arab Emirates. Under the deal, Kazakhstan and the UAE will create a merchant and tanker fleet to export Kazakh oil through the port of Aktau, bypassing Russia. Kazakhstan has been looking for alternate routes to export its goods, fearing it could incur secondary sanctions by doing business with Russia.
Armenia looks on. Turkey and eight other countries began joint military exercises in Kars, Turkey, near the Armenian border. Among the participating countries is Azerbaijan, with which Yerevan is in talks on a settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
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March 13, 2023
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Capitalizing on the South Caucasus
Neither Washington nor Russia is directly stoking regional unrest, but both can benefit from it.
By: Allison Fedirka
As war continues to rage in Ukraine, the wider conflict between Russia and the West is opening new fronts, ones that won’t see actual battle but are nonetheless useful for gaining influence at the other’s expense. One such front is the South Caucasus, which is essential to Russia’s tactical and strategic objectives in Ukraine and is thus a potential distraction for the United States, which would much rather focus on Eastern Europe.
This isn’t exactly a new development; the war implicated countless nations outside Ukraine the minute it began, particularly economically. The U.S. quarterbacked an aggressive sanctions campaign against Moscow, which set up parallel systems to circumvent it. Similarly, Russia and the U.S. have both developed any number of political and security measures to inflict pressure on each other outside Ukraine. Moscow, for example, sent a naval vessel to the Caribbean and conducted high-profile political meetings, replete with political agreements, with Caribbean nations like Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua. The U.S. initially sent various delegations to improve economic and security ties in Central Asia, which Russia considers its traditional sphere of influence. In neither case did one side go so far as to elicit a direct response from the other.
But the recent activity in the South Caucasus is a little different. Before it invaded Ukraine in 2022, Moscow made a concerted effort to secure its control of the South Caucasus ostensibly to help stabilize the region. In truth, Russia put itself in a position to control a series of frozen conflicts and flashpoints in the region so that it could stabilize or destabilize a country at will. And now that domestic unrest has emerged in the South Caucasus more or less independently of the war in Ukraine, Moscow is poised to take advantage of the situation to its own benefit.
Georgia
On March 7, protesters flooded the streets of Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, in objection to parliament passing legislation in the first reading that would require nongovernmental and civil society groups to register as having foreign support if they receive 20 percent or more of their funding from abroad. After two days of demonstrations, the ruling Georgian Dream party, the bill’s primary supporter, withdrew its support. The parliament formally rejected the law on March 10, and though it can be revived in 30 days if changes are made to the initial draft, it’s likely dead in the water.
Disputed Regions in Georgia
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At the heart of the matter is Georgia’s foreign alignments. The bill’s supporters (and Russian media) compared it to lobbying legislation in the U.S. that seeks only to boost transparency. There are notable differences that these advocates overlook, but the bottom line is that it would have allowed the Georgian government to control the funds that enter the country from abroad. It’s no secret that the U.S. government and associated aid groups give upward of $50 million per year to Georgian NGOs and civil society groups that are active in local politics and to even political parties. (Washington said it would have to reconsider funding if the legislation were passed.)
Protesters saw the bill as an expression of Russian influence. They argued it too closely resembled a similar Russian law from more than a decade ago that was used to suppress political opposition against the Kremlin. European and U.S. officials publicly supported the protesters, and because more than 80 percent of the Georgian population supports EU/Western ties, protests like these blur the line between the airing of a certain domestic grievance and a broader referendum on foreign policy preferences.
It’s unclear whether the protests in Tbilisi will continue. Demonstrators returned to the streets on March 8, after the government announced its plans to backpedal on the legislation and vowed to press on until the bill was officially repealed – which it was on March 10. Still, citizens will likely remain concerned until they are certain the bill can’t be resurrected. There is also the possibility that protests are being orchestrated by outside actors, in which case they may continue under the guise of pro-Europe/anti-Russia protests.
Armenia-Azerbaijan
Then there is Armenia and Azerbaijan. Broadly speaking, Armenia is aligned with Russia, while Azerbaijan maintains stronger ties to the West. But lately, Armenia has been unhappy with the status quo. It wants Russia to take a tougher stance against Azerbaijan, especially with regard to the Lachin corridor in Nagorno-Karabakh, over which the two recently fought a war. Moscow demurred, so Armenia criticized Russia – albeit indirectly, through comments made against the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization’s handling of the issue. It also recently submitted a proposal refusing to appoint a deputy secretary-general to the group and has started to ban certain Russian journalists and media managers from entering the country. However, in early March Russia and Armenia conducted joint air drills involving troops and aircraft from Russia’s air base in Armenia – a notable reminder that cooperation is in each other’s interests.
Nagorno-Karabakh
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But the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict hasn’t gone away. On March 5, fighting broke out between Azerbaijani troops and ethnic Armenian police officers. Two days later, Armenian separatists reportedly blocked a Russian military base in the Khojaly airport. The protesters questioned Russian peacekeeping troops’ capabilities to unblock the road near the city of Shushi and keep the peace in general. They also accused the Russian military of profiting off the food and fuel provided to local populations.
Meanwhile, Washington has been trying to make inroads in the region. Along with the EU, it continues to offer itself as an alternative to Russia for brokering and maintaining peace in Nagorno-Karabakh. On March 6, the U.S. secretary of state’s senior adviser for the Caucasus met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Washington. U.S. officials followed this meeting up with planned visits to Armenia and Georgia. Then on March 10, Azerbaijan’s defense minister received the chief of staff of NATO’s Allied Land Command, who discussed military cooperation and regional instability. The timing of this visit is no coincidence: It was meant to convey to Azerbaijan that it has options and that instability from Georgia need not spill over the border. It also encouraged Azerbaijan not to retaliate to the latest unrest.
The common thread tying all these events together in the South Caucasus is the push and pull between the U.S. and Russia. Geopolitically, the South Caucasus is a region Moscow cannot afford to ignore. It is less strategically imperative to the U.S., even though it provides access to the Black Sea and helps facilitate non-Russian energy exports to Europe. Neither is stoking unrest in the region, but both are trying to capitalize on it. For the West, that means containment and preventing any spillover effects. For Russia, it means using the opportunity to selectively control issues that could stabilize or destabilize the region as needed, even as it maintains a vital buffer zone to its south. The more restless the South Caucasus gets, the more of a problem it will be for Washington – which in turn serves Russian interests.
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April 3, 2023
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Kazakhstan: Democratization in an Era of Geopolitical Churn
Political reforms in the Central Asian giant will impact not just the region but, more importantly, Russia and China.
By: Kamran Bokhari
At a time of geopolitical uncertainty across Eurasia, Kazakhstan is undergoing a political evolution. The country’s transition away from authoritarianism is a rather unique case of a former Soviet state trying to balance between the conflicting imperatives of maintaining continuity and meeting demands for change. The outcome of its democratization experiment will have profound implications for Central Asia, a region that for centuries has been isolated from the West. More important, Russia and China will both be affected by its evolution.
I had the opportunity to travel to Kazakhstan a few weeks ago as part of an independent observer mission to witness early parliamentary polls on March 19. It was my second trip to the country in four months, having been present for the Nov. 20 snap presidential vote. I could bore you with the minutiae of the electoral process, but I won’t; you can get those details from the ample coverage available in open sources. Instead, I want to share the broader impressions that I walked away with – which will hopefully shed light on the direction in which the country is headed and what this means for a region struggling to untether itself from former liege Russia while it tries to resist China’s advances.
Background
First, a few words about the elections themselves and the broader political context. The turnout (a little over 53 percent) was quite low. This was likely due to voter fatigue given that this was the fifth electoral exercise since 2019 and the average Kazakh voter hasn’t seen many changes in that time. More important than the turnout was that, for the first time, independent candidates were allowed to run for office and two new political parties competed in the election.
The ruling Amanat party retained its majority in the 98-seat Majlis (lower house). Its margin of victory, however, was much lower than it was just two years ago (53.9 percent of the vote compared with 71 percent in 2021). The newly formed Respublica party – representing medium and small businesses – won nearly 9 percent and came in third place. Amanat will now have to work with five parties as well as 29 lawmakers elected as independents in the legislature.
Kazakhstan Parliamentary Results 2023
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Kazakhstan’s transition began when Kassym-Jomart Tokayev assumed the presidency in March 2019. Since gaining independence in 1991, Kazakhstan had been ruled by Nursultan Nazarbayev, who decided to step down after nearly three decades as head of state as he was approaching 80. However, Nazarbayev retained the chairmanship of the Security Council, allowing him to have oversight of government institutions even after he handed executive authority to Tokayev.
This arrangement broke down after unrest erupted in January 2022. Though the violence lasted only about 10 days, it was a wakeup call for the government. The unrest was a challenge particularly for Tokayev, who, though he was a senior government figure since the Soviet days, was still trying to find his bearing as president, especially while Nazarbayev still maintained some power. Evidence suggests that figures close to Nazarbayev tried to take advantage of the protests, which erupted over a major hike in fuel prices, to undermine Tokayev and help deplete his authority for their own gain.
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The wealth accumulated by Nazarbayev’s relatives and associates during his reign fueled the public ire. Tokayev was able to manage the crisis, in part by removing Nazarbayev as chairman of the Security Council, effectively sending him into retirement after he posted a video pledging his support to Tokayev. While the president was able to relatively quickly contain the friction within his government, he also had to address the much bigger challenge of broad public dissatisfaction with the country’s political and economic conditions. Tokayev thus embarked on a rather ambitious reform agenda.
By June, he held a referendum on constitutional amendments that changed a third of the national charter. The move brought an end to the super-presidential system of governance – which afforded greater powers to the presidency than parliament – creating more space for the public in the affairs of the state. In a speech to the nation in September, Tokayev unveiled several additional reforms, most notably limiting presidents to a single seven-year term. Until then, there was no limit to how many five-year terms a president could run for.
The Road Ahead
Presidential and parliamentary elections, held in November 2022 and March 2023 respectively, represented the culmination of Tokayev’s efforts to stabilize the country’s political system. But the road ahead will be long and challenging. We in the West tend to gauge democratic progress (or the lack thereof) by looking for evidence of more freedoms, the establishment of rule of law and upholding of human rights. It is a natural tendency given that these are cherished values in democratic systems, but we tend to forget that democratization is a long and messy process.
Each nation that embarks on this nonlinear path has a unique starting point that shapes the scope and scale of its transformation. For a country like Kazakhstan, which gained independence in 1991 and whose political transition began only four years ago, it is remarkable that it can hold well-organized elections, with little sign of systemic voter fraud. Our group toured 70 polling stations in Astana and the Almaty region on both trips. One of the things that stood out was the total absence of security forces. In many other countries that have had far greater experience with the democratic process, it’s common to see security forces deployed on voting day.
Especially in the age of social media, which allows for rapid mass mobilization, elites in historically autocratic polities are forced to strike a balance between maintaining regime stability and catering to demands for reform. In the case of Kazakhstan, I got a strong sense that its transformation is an organic development informed by an understanding that the country cannot realize its national imperatives without reforming the political system and giving the public greater involvement in the country’s governance.
The challenge with these types of reforms is achieving the right balance in terms of how the system is liberalized. The default approach is to limit the extent to which it’s opened up because allowing for too much change too quickly could destabilize the regime. On the other hand, there is also the need to gain public buy-in, which can be achieved only with substantive reforms. Considering that the country saw a major uprising just last year, its political establishment has embarked on what seems to be a substantive reform process, but one that it can manage.
Regional Implications
Unintended domestic consequences aren’t the only thing informing the cautious manner in which Kazakhstan is proceeding with reform. The changes are taking place in a perilous strategic environment. The future of Russia, with whom the country shares the world’s second-longest border, is mired in uncertainty, which could have serious implications for Kazakhstan’s stability and security. Meanwhile, its southern flank is highly vulnerable to the instability radiating out of Afghanistan. From the east, China is trying to fill the vacuum being slowly left by the Russians in Central Asia.
Central Asia
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In this context, Kazakhstan’s internal dynamics suggest that its transition will be bumpy, to say the least. The changes will also have an impact on other parts of Eurasia. There are implications for neighboring Uzbekistan, which is also in a transition of sorts and has a much larger population and fewer resources. That Uzbekistan borders each of the other three smaller Central Asian states means the region cannot remain immune to Kazakhstan’s transformation.
More broadly, a weakening Russia will have decreased influence in Kazakhstan. Moscow will have to contend with a major partner undergoing political reforms while it’s bogged down in Ukraine, a country at an advanced stage of the same phenomenon. Eventually, it will become very difficult for Russia to shield itself from the political reforms taking place around it.
Likewise, Kazakhstan’s political transformation is not in China’s interest. If it’s successful, it could block China’s efforts to expand its influence westward through Central Asia and the rest of Eurasia. In the worst case, political reforms in Kazakhstan and the region could create problems for Beijing’s attempts to manage the restive Uyghur minority in Xinjiang, sandwiched between China’s geopolitical core in the east and its intended sphere of influence well beyond its western periphery. Therefore, both the Russians and the Chinese will be trying to block political reforms in Kazakhstan, but by doing so, they risk creating the instability they fear.
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Caucasus in play. The U.S., meanwhile, is stepping up its involvement in Russia’s own backyard. In the past two weeks, four delegations of high-ranking U.S. officials have visited Armenia, ostensibly to discuss economic, energy and security matters. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Erika Olson is currently in Armenia for talks on the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. (On that subject, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said Yerevan was ready to recognize Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity within the borders of the former Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, adding that mutual recognition of borders was the main condition for a peace treaty.) In addition, Azerbaijan’s foreign minister spoke by phone with Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Derek Hogan and met on Monday with U.S. State Department Senior Adviser on Caucasian Negotiations Louis Bono.
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Friendly with the neighbors. Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen is in Azerbaijan for a meeting with President Ilham Aliyev. The two are expected to discuss regional security and trade. Cohen will next travel to Turkmenistan for the April 20 opening of Israel’s embassy. During the visit, he will also meet with Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov and Foreign Minister Rashit Meredov. With its latest diplomatic moves, Israel appears to be trying to improve ties with countries that neighbor Iran.
Market transition. Addressing the government, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev emphasized the need for his country to transition to a genuine market economy that focuses on satisfying the needs of its citizens. This shift is necessary due to the disruption in conventional economic and logistical connections, which have resulted in record inflation, a sluggish global economy and an increase in national debt. Tokayev also acknowledged the surge in gasoline and diesel prices and recommended that the funds raised from the increase be put toward new oil and gas initiatives. Meanwhile, some energy-sector workers, including former employees of Appak, a Kazakh-Japanese firm that is a subsidiary of Kazatomprom, the state-owned uranium and nuclear energy company, are still protesting their recent dismissal. The Kazakh government is apprehensive about the consequences and is seeking to grant the secret police additional powers to safeguard security. It is also contemplating extending the capabilities of the country's intelligence service to enable it to intervene in social disputes and take action in the event of a crisis
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:wink:
ya just can't get rid of these people and they will not simply go away:
https://www.cnbc.com/2023/05/28/turkeys-president-erdogan-seals-election-victory-to-enter-third-decade-in-power.html
we see this a lot .
this leader that leader is in political trouble and yet when the "election " comes out
they win.
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/19726/china-russia-central-asia
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OPOLITICS
The Plight of Central Asian Migrants in Wartime Russia
14 MIN READAug 17, 2023 | 21:40 GMT
Editor's note: The primary author of this column, Kurtis Yan, is a summer fellow at RANE.
As its war in Ukraine rages on, Russia is finding itself in need of increased manpower to sustain a war with no clear end in sight. And to address this challenge, Moscow is increasingly turning to its growing population of Central Asian migrants.
Though estimates are difficult to discern due to frequent exit and reentry, at least 6 million migrants in Russia officially hail from Central Asia, with millions more likely working and residing in the country illegally. This large pool provides the Russian Armed Forces with an important source of infantry, as well as an influx of desperately needed workers in Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine. Many of these migrants already work in low-paying unskilled positions, making potential war service all the more attractive, given the lucrative financial compensation — and even suggestions of an expedited path to citizenship — offered to those willing to serve Russia in Ukraine.
But Russophilic and nationalist attitudes subject them to racism, xenophobia, and politicization that demeans them and their native countries. One would expect that Central Asian states would disapprove of their citizens being used as cannon fodder in Russia's war, as political punching bags for nationalist and populist voices, and that this would, at a minimum, harm Russia-Central Asia relations. On the contrary, however, a deeper look into the current state of migrant affairs reveals the drivers for Moscow and Central Asia to overcome these tensions over migration to maintain close ties.
The Role, Perception and Politicization of Central Asian Migrants in Russia
In Russian society, Central Asian migrants are often treated as second-class citizens. For instance, announcements for the sale or leasing of living space often ask that buyers be of ''Slavic appearance.'' A more concrete recent example was on July 20, when Sergei Mironov, the leader of Russia's pro-Putin ''A Just Russia - For Truth'' party, proposed a bill that would increase the cost of a work permit for migrants from 1,200 rubles (around $12) to 4,800 rubles (around $48). Mironov's justification dubiously claimed, without evidence, that migrant workers are paid too much, despite the majority of them working in very low-paying jobs; the explanatory note from the Duma, however, argued that migrants have issues adapting ''to Russian society,'' suggesting the goal of the legislation was to benefit politically from migrant-bashing rather than generate significant new revenues for the state. This form of political targeting has grown more prevalent in recent years, especially as the Russo-Ukrainian War continues shaping domestic politics and economics.
The roots of this discrimination can be traced back to the Soviet period. Soviet policy promoted discrimination against Central Asians as Moscow sought to Russify their countries and subjugate non-Slavic peoples to transmigration. For the ethnically Turkic peoples of Central Asia, much of the migration meant moving to an urban center within their respective country in an effort to find better work, but this has led to the loss of their traditional languages and cultures, as higher-paying employment opportunities and life in the more industrialized cities of Soviet Central Asia required knowledge of the Russian language. But even so, the Soviet government often prioritized ethnic Slavs for Communist Party memberships and better-paying posts. Shortly after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the propiska migratory regulation system was abolished, which loosened restrictions on migration from more rural areas to larger cities and allowed for freer movement across the former empire. However, much like people migrating to the Russified capitals of their respective countries throughout the Soviet period, many migrants in the post-Soviet space now make the trek to Russia. Though years of forced Russification and Russian-language knowledge help them integrate and survive in Russia, it has always been challenging for Central Asian migrants to obtain the same quality of life as the average ethnic Russian.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow has continued to promote discriminatory policies against Central Asian migrants and incite public distrust of them. High-ranking officials regularly allege that Central Asia is the gateway for Islamic radicalism into Russia. Russia's police also perpetuate this xenophobia: Migrants are viewed as easy targets for bribes and extortion. Torture and inhumane detainment are rampant, with numerous human rights cases tried over violations and systemic abuse in past years. Institutional tactics are working, as opinion polls show that most Russians favor crackdowns on Central Asian migration as well as increased deportation. As the Islamic and Central Asian share of Russia's population rises because of increased immigration and birth rates, nationalist figures are likely to increasingly bash Central Asian migrants for the alleged degradation of traditional Russian society.
At the same time, the Kremlin understands it can use Central Asian migrant flows to alleviate its own demographic crisis. Russia's population has steadily declined over the past two decades, a trend that will deepen in the coming years. Promises of citizenship can be a useful tool in reducing Russian labor shortages and filling labor in key sectors, particularly now as Russia's demographic issues worsen. Between 2022 and 2023, for example, the number of Tajik migrants who received Russian citizenship skyrocketed from 104,000 to 174,000.
At present, most migrants are male and come from the Central Asian states with lower-than-average wealth — Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan — in order to find new better-paying labor opportunities compared to those at home. The money made in Russia translates into remittance flows that help their families back in Central Asia. Migrants often come to Russia to fill positions in the construction and service sectors or other physical labor (partly because discrimination locks them out of certain jobs) and receive very low pay on average. Despite the low pay and overall harsh living conditions for immigrants, migrant flows from Central Asia have not faltered in recent years. Reasons for this include slower economic development and natural resource scarcity. Labor migration plays a further role in stymying local economic growth, as migrants make more money working in Russia as opposed to working at home, which ultimately perpetuates a cycle of over-dependence on remittances. Remittances comprise around a third of Kyrgyzstan's and Tajikistan's GDPs, making them some of the most dependent on remittances in the world, while over 10% of Uzbekistan's wealth comes from money flowing from Russia.
The Symbiotic Relationship Between Moscow and Central Asian Governments
Despite Russia's exploitative treatment of its citizens, Central Asian states generally maintain favorable relations with Russia. This is in part because the region's autocratic governments actually benefit from transferring a large portion of their labor force to Russia. The states that send the largest migrant flows have less developed infrastructure and struggle to alleviate poverty. By allowing their citizens to work in Russia, these states do not have to improve their local infrastructure, while their departure alleviates unemployment and stabilizes wages. Thus, Central Asian autocrats are less inclined to worry if high percentages of their respective GDPs are made up of remittances; as long as the local population does not put a strain on their local infrastructure, and there is less unemployment and downward pressure on wages, they can have fewer concerns regarding public dissatisfaction and instability. Relatedly, when Central Asian harmony is disrupted, Russia can be a useful tool to strengthen a grip on power and quell the masses, as shown during the January 2022 unrest in Kazakhstan.
For Russia, hosting such vast migrant numbers augments its leverage over its Central Asian partners to ensure that their governments do not act out of line with Moscow's interests. With Russia providing remittance opportunities, the disruption of migrant flows or any disruptions of key economic stability would rupture societal harmony and threaten the power of Central Asia's autocrats. Understanding this, Moscow uses its leverage to prevent Central Asia from leaving its sphere of influence and adopting a pro-Chinese, pro-Turkish or pro-Western platform. China, in particular, is likely to become an increasingly attractive location for Central Asian migrants due to its close physical proximity and aging population.
Additionally, the Kremlin has worked with Central Asian governments to reduce Central Asia's risk of being a gateway for Islamic radicals into Russia. Like Russia, Central Asian autocrats also fear the radicalization of their populations. As migrant flows can reduce the chances of economic dissatisfaction in Central Asia, the hope is that accepting such large numbers of migrants into Russia's more Christian and secular society can help reduce Islamic fundamentalist sentiments, which ultimately reduces the risk of radical Islamic terrorism returning to Central Asia. It's a fundamentally sound strategy, but potentially risky because it involves bringing large numbers of people to Russia, some of whom may have already been radicalized, and also because they may radicalize in response to the discrimination and xenophobia they encounter in Russia.
Central Asian Migrants on the Russian Homefront and in Ukraine
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Central Asian migrants have been pressured to join the Russian army, with officials, politicians and regime commentators weaponizing citizenship and passportization to push the migrants to the front lines. Migrant centers are filled with Russian army recruiters and advertisements, and recruiters have even targeted mosques often frequented by Central Asian migrants. Given the sheer number of undocumented workers in Russia and the tedious length of the citizenship process, recruiters use promises of legalized status or expedited citizenship to convince migrants to join the Russian army by, for example, forcing them to choose between signing an enlistment contract or facing deportation. This also pertains to the Wagner Group, which has targeted Central Asian prisoners in Russia to join the private military company's efforts.
The growing number of Tajiks and other Central Asians living in Russia and receiving Russian residence (and even citizenship) provides the Kremlin with an expanded pool to draw potential soldiers from. Even Russian politicians who criticized Central Asian migrants for overloading Russia's infrastructure and taking jobs are now using the same rhetoric to criticize them for not joining their Russian counterparts on the front lines. On May 6, Duma Deputy Mikhail Matveev questioned where Russia's ''Tajik battalions'' were, advocating for compulsory military service for migrants aspiring for citizenship. He added that Russians are dying and being ''replaced'' by ''Asians'' at home. In a similar vein, on April 16, Investigative Committee Chair Aleksandr Bastrykin accused Central Asian migrants of increased murders, saying that ''while Russians are at the front, migrants are attacking our rear.'' This rhetoric may very well support the increased use of Central Asians in Ukraine as Moscow tries to avoid unpopular new mobilization efforts ahead of the March 2024 presidential election. As ''real'' Russians continue dying on the battlefield, efforts to send Central Asians to the front lines in greater quantities may sufficiently appease nationalist fervor and quell fears of new conscription.
But despite Russia's wartime conditions and intensified anti-migrant rhetoric, migrant flows from Central Asia have not fallen. 1.3 million migrants entered Russia in just the first quarter of 2023, with around half hailing from Uzbekistan. With the war causing a labor shortage in Russia, Central Asian migrants are seen as the source to fill the workforce gaps now more than ever. Russian companies have also sent migrant workers to occupied territories in Ukraine, in order to rebuild destroyed infrastructure and start new construction projects. Other migrants work in factories or even collect dead soldiers and bury them. Despite the dangers, these job prospects are considered more prosperous compared to opportunities in their home countries. Central Asian governments cannot do much to prevent these outflows, but they are attempting to crack down on migrants joining the war. Kazakhstan promised jail time for those who fight for either Russia or Ukraine, including those who sign financial contracts with Wagner Group. While Russian recruitment ads continue targeting Kazakhstan, many are unlikely to risk jail time. But in the near-to-medium term, these efforts will not override the drivers of continued migration because they are relatively halfhearted and only target those who want to leave Central Asia for the purpose of enlistment, as opposed to preventing migrants already in Russia from joining the army,
Moreover, there are already clear signs that Central Asians will continue to migrate to Russia and subsequently participate in Moscow's war efforts in Ukraine. Russia's Labor Ministry estimates the country will need 400,000 more migrant workers by 2030, on top of those already in the country. Currently, foreigners make up 4.2% of all workers employed by Russian companies. But according to the ministry's forecast, that number should increase to 4.7% over the next seven years. As migration continues and Russia's war recruitment intensifies, opportunities arise for bailiffs and creditors to impose exit bans and debt recovery claims that prevent foreign nationals from leaving at the expiration of their legal residence. Over 100,000 migrants are expected to become undocumented by 2024, with exit bans playing a large role in restricting migrant movement. Thus, debts are an important factor that could ultimately pressure more migrants into joining the Russian army or labor projects in Russian-occupied territories. Without legal status and the necessary income to pay off debts, Russian recruiters can capitalize on this and pressure migrants into wartime service.
Migrant Affairs on Regional Geopolitics Going Forward
In the coming months and years, two outstanding and interrelated factors will significantly influence regional geopolitics: The extent to which Moscow discourages migration flows and the extent to which it attempts to draw more Central Asians into participation in the Ukraine war.
The Kremlin's safest course of action is to maintain migrant flows to increasingly draw upon the existing pool of migrants for mobilization purposes, while also marginally limiting the growth of migration to avoid the subsequent backlash. It's a safe course of action because it helps Russia continue the Ukraine war without over-exposing the Kremlin to the socio-political consequences of growing Central Asian migration, as opposed to overly investing in their use in the war or limiting their entry into Russia to score political points from migrant bashing. Therefore, in the long run, Central Asian migrant affairs will likely hold at the status quo of large flows into Russia and moderate politicization within Russia. The Kremlin will look to balance nationalist fervor against Central Asian migration while enabling the potential of migrant populations as the next pool to draw manpower from. Though Central Asian countries have remained neutral in the war and looked to prevent their citizens from joining, it is more likely that Central Asians will continue fighting in the Russian army or working in Russian-occupied territory. For survival and stability, Central Asia's autocrats will continue to accept the racism and poor labor conditions their citizens face in Russia, so long as Russia remains an attractive source for remittance flows. The dependence on Russian employment opportunities is too great to risk rupturing.
But there are low-likelihood, high-impact alternatives to be aware of. For example, the Kremlin could cave into ultranationalist sentiments and drastically limit migration flows. This would not only severely harm Russia's economy, but it would also help bolster the Kremlin's popularity among a key constituency in the near term. For Central Asia, migrants returning to or being forced to stay in their home countries would lower wages, accentuate Central Asia's shortage of natural resources, and increase the chances of domestic instability. Central Asian leaders would warn Moscow that this move would damage their economies if not compensated for, and if Moscow proceeds, then regional leaders would turn to China, Turkey and the West to secure investment.
Alternatively, Moscow could drastically expand the mobilization of Central Asian migrants for labor and infantry in Ukraine while continuing to encourage migration flows from Central Asia. This would work to appease ultranationalists by sending the migrants to the front lines, with the expectation that many will die, and allowing ethnic Russians to avoid mobilization. However, Central Asian autocrats would also be dissatisfied with the clear funneling of their own citizens to the battlefield, which they have tried to restrict.
In any case, to some extent, Central Asians may themselves increasingly choose to work in places other than Russia. Particularly as the Russian Ruble continues to slide on global markets, they may find Russia an increasingly less attractive place from which to send home remittances. New opportunities are opening up for them in, for example, construction in South Korea and for agricultural work in the United Kingdom. But more likely, proximity and cheaper transport costs would motivate migrants to find alternative work in Turkey and China. Turkey already hosts hundreds of thousands of Central Asian migrants, particularly women, and pan-Turkic ties can augment Turkey's image for those seeking work. Likewise, higher-paying labor opportunities can encourage increased migration to China, which could provoke Moscow and increase Sino-Russian competition in Central Asia.
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August 23, 2023
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Water as a Barrier to Central Asia’s Rise
The region’s growing role could be hampered by a long-standing problem.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
Amid growing Western pressure and changes throughout Eurasia, regions that were once considered on the Eurasian periphery are now gaining significance. Chief among them is Central Asia, a region that was historically considered part of Russia’s sphere of influence and is today emerging as a key territory connecting major players like Russia, Iran and China. But one critical issue is increasingly hampering the political ambitions of Central Asian countries: water.
Origins of the Problem
Central Asian states can be divided into two groups: water-rich countries (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) and water-dependent countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). Most water deposits in the region are formed by melting snow and glaciers from the mountains. The two main rivers that flow through the region, the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya, provide water for domestic, agricultural and energy use.
Central Asian Waterways
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But these sources are proving increasingly insufficient. Central Asia has been facing a serious water deficit for several years for several reasons. The first is climate change, which is causing glaciers to melt faster than before, decreased snow cover in the Tian Shan and Pamir-Alay mountain ranges and declining water levels in lakes. Second, outdated infrastructure, including Soviet-era industrial facilities and water management systems, is leading to water loss. In Uzbekistan, for example, 40 percent of water loss is due to poor infrastructure. This second is the mounting tensions between the former Soviet states over how to manage resources. In the Soviet era, Moscow managed the irrigation system for the entire region. After gaining independence, Central Asian countries initially supported the idea of sharing water that flowed through transboundary rivers – which was reinforced by a number of regional agreements. But gradually they began to prioritize their own self-interests. Thus, when water-rich Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan experienced serious energy shortages, they sought to boost domestic production using water, which directly affected downstream countries. Their decisions to build hydroelectric power plants were met with anger in downstream states, which were concerned that such projects would deplete their own supplies.
Water Stress and Dependency | Central Asia
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The third problem is the increasing demand. According to U.N. estimates, the population of the region has grown by 50 percent since the 1990s (from 52 million to 78 million) and is expected to reach more than 100 million by 2050. Water is also needed for irrigation in the agricultural sector, which accounts for up to 15 percent of the Kyrgyz economy, 27 percent of the Tajik economy and up to 26 percent of the Uzbek economy. Hydroelectric power, which accounts for nearly 90 percent of energy in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, is also a growing consumer of water resources.
Meanwhile, the Qosh Tepa irrigation canal in northern Afghanistan is a concern for Central Asia. It aims to transform the country’s agricultural landscape but could cut off supplies from the Amu Darya River to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which could lose up to 15 percent of their flow from the river when the waterway is completed in 2028.
These factors explain why even upstream Kyrgyzstan is facing a shortage this year. On Aug. 1, Kyrgyz authorities declared a state of emergency in the energy sector that will run last until the end of 2026. Earlier this month, the country stopped supplying irrigation water to Kazakhstan due to declining supplies from the Kirov reservoir, which now receives only 1.3 cubic meters per second compared to 13.7 cubic meters per second in 2022. Kazakhstan’s own water shortage threatens irrigation and drinking water supplies, which have resulted in small protests. This week, a state of emergency was declared in six districts of the southern region of Zhambyl due to heat waves and water scarcity. Crop losses this year are expected to increase by 25-30 percent from last year because of the lack of irrigation water and high temperatures. People in Uzbekistan also say they have been forced to conserve water and stagger their usage.
Geopolitical Implications
These issues have implications for Central Asia and beyond. Crop damage from insufficient irrigation is a major concern for the agricultural sector, as well as consumers who could face rising food costs. This could lead to social unrest as populations grow frustrated with spikes in prices for food, energy and utilities. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which rely on food for 20 percent and 10 percent of their total exports, respectively, could see reduced export earnings. Poor quality and inadequate water supplies could also help spread diseases.
As economic and environmental conditions deteriorate, populations could begin to migrate. Rural areas, which account for more than half of the Central Asian population – and which are often low income – could see declining numbers as people grow wary about the state of the agricultural sector and their own livelihoods. The World Bank projects that the number of climate migrants in Central Asia could reach 2.4 million by 2050. Those who choose to leave their homes will be concentrated along Kazakhstan’s southern border, areas surrounding the Ferghana Valley and areas around Bishkek due to declining water access and crop quality. These populations are most likely to move to Central Asia’s neighboring countries (especially Russia and China) in search of work, housing and a better life, which could have security implications.
Conflict between the countries of the region is also a possibility. In 2022, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan saw violent clashes over access to water and land along their border, which hasn’t been fully demarcated. This week, Kazakhstan blocked Kyrgyz vehicles from entering the country after Kyrgyzstan announced that it would reduce water supplies to Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan says the Kazakh move violates Eurasian Economic Union rules on the free movement of goods and undermines the authority of the bloc.
Indeed, the water issue could complicate regional relations, cause friction in regional alliances, and disrupt trade, infrastructure projects and military operations. And as Central Asia’s importance as a transit route and provider of energy and resources grows, these disruptions will have implications beyond the region. Russia and China, in particular, would incur potential economic costs if the region destabilizes. They don’t want to see the EAEU and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization undermined because of disputes over water.
Major players understand that they will have to invest in resolving this issue if Central Asia is to play a significant role in the geopolitics of the region. Thus, the Kyrgyz government earlier this month signed an agreement with Chinese firms on the construction of multiple hydroelectric power plants, which will help generate more energy while reducing water loss by developing more modern infrastructure. Central Asian countries are also likely waiting for proposals from Russia, such as reviving the Soviet-era project of transferring water from Siberia to Central Asia. This case shows that long-standing problems in peripheral regions increasingly have the potential to reach major Eurasian powers.
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September 7, 2023
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Turkey’s Resurgence in the Black Sea Basin
Ankara is seeking to re-establish leadership over a former sphere of influence at Russia’s expense.
By: Kamran Bokhari
Russia’s weakening, especially following its invasion of Ukraine, has serious implications for its southern flank. In the years ahead, Moscow’s ability to project power in the Black Sea basin will decline, and one of the main beneficiaries will be Turkey. Though currently overwhelmed by political and economic problems at home, in the medium to long term Turkey can be expected to fill the strategic vacuum left by Russia’s receding footprint in the Caucasus region.
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The countries of the region are even starting to publicly acknowledge Russia’s decline. In a Sept. 4 interview with Italian paper La Repubblica, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said Russia had failed to ensure his country’s security from an increasingly aggressive Azerbaijan, which since late 2020 has gained the upper hand in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. Responding to the claims, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters that his country continues to be the “guarantor of security” in the region. Peskov also insisted that Moscow has played a consistent role in stabilizing the region and will continue to do so. Separately, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova called Pashinyan’s comments “public rhetoric verging on rudeness” and said that, rather than blaming others, the Armenians should take responsibility for their own actions. A day earlier, the Russian Defense Ministry announced that it had replaced the head of its peacekeeping forces in the South Caucasus, the second change in recent months.
The Armenian prime minister’s comments were extraordinary, especially considering that Yerevan has long been a close ally of Moscow and dependent on the Kremlin for its security and economic well-being. Russia’s reaction was equally telling, reflective of just how weak its position has become – at least in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, both former Soviet republics that have maintained ties with Russia. Pashinyan explained Moscow’s inability to provide for Armenia’s security as a result of the Kremlin’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war. But the fact is that the situation in the South Caucasus predates the conflict in Ukraine.
In the summer of 2020, fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh erupted once again. Azerbaijan retook territories that Armenia had controlled since the end of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, which ended in 1994. The Azerbaijanis were able to force a major reversal in the regional balance of power in large part due to military and intelligence support from their ally Turkey. The Turks took advantage of an opening in what was unquestionably part of Russia’s sphere of influence.
For decades following the Soviet Union’s collapse, Moscow had been the security guarantor of the region – which explains why the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was left frozen in Armenia’s favor for a quarter of a century. Turkey and Azerbaijan saw an opportunity in Russia’s focus on its western neighbor since the ouster in February 2014 of the pro-Russian government in Kyiv. Ankara and Baku realized that Moscow was distracted and unlikely to intervene in Nagorno-Karabakh – despite the fact that it had, and still has, troops stationed in the area. Their bet paid off. When the fighting in 2020 escalated, the most that the Russians could do was formally preside over the cessation of hostilities later that year.
Russia’s peacekeeping operation, which began following the conflict in 2020, was ineffective because Moscow was likely already preparing for the war in Ukraine, which it believed would strengthen its position relative to the West or at least prevent its further decline. Nineteen months into the Ukraine campaign, the Russians find themselves in a far weaker position given the terrible performance of Russian forces on the ground, the economic toll of Western sanctions and, more recently, the infighting within the Kremlin exemplified by the Wagner crisis.
Though Pashinyan only recently expressed it in public, he’s been watching the Russians flounder for some time now. His comments show that he realizes his country can no longer rely on Russia and that he needs a new strategy. He also understands that, despite the U.S.’ official recognition in April 2021 of the 1915 Armenian genocide at the hands of the Ottoman Empire, Washington has done very little to challenge the Turkish-Azerbaijani alignment in the South Caucasus. Indeed, it’s becoming increasingly clear that U.S. and Turkish interests are converging, particularly given the situation in Ukraine. This is why, despite facing opposition at home, Pashinyan has been trying to work with the Turks to insulate his country from an increasingly assertive Azerbaijan.
The Armenians aren’t the only ones in Russia’s near abroad to realize the tectonic shifts underway. The Georgians are also closely watching the situation. They have a lot at stake with the presence of Russian forces in two breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Any further weakening of Moscow could allow them to regain control over these two territories. With signs of growing closeness between Ankara and Tbilisi, Georgia certainly wouldn’t decline Turkey’s help if it was offered.
For now, the Turks are focused on leveraging the Ukraine conflict to enhance their influence in the northern Black Sea basin, which the Russians seized from the Ottoman Empire in the late 18th century. Since 2014, the Turks have opposed Russia’s annexation of Crimea, whose Tartar population they view as their ethnic kin. More recently, Ankara’s role in brokering the now-defunct Black Sea grain deal between Russia and Ukraine and its efforts to revive it are a small but key part of Turkey’s strategy here. Ultimately, the Turks are seeking to re-establish leadership over their former sphere of influence at Russia’s expense.
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Daily Memo: Turkey's Economy, Escalation in the Caucasus
Ankara has a new plan to spur growth.
By: Geopolitical Futures
New plan. The Turkish government unveiled a package of economic reforms that it hopes will launch a structural transformation of the economy over the next three years. A key goal of the plan is to reduce inflation to single digits by 2026 through tight monetary policies and fiscal discipline. Ankara will also encourage investment, especially in technology related to semiconductors, electric vehicles, batteries and critical technology products.
Serious situation. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said at a Cabinet meeting that Azerbaijan has been massing troops along the contact line in Nagorno-Karabakh and on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border for several days. He also said the situation is so serious that the U.N. Security Council needs to take action to avoid an “explosion” in the region.
Surging population. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi said his country needs to lower its birth rate to avoid a “catastrophe.” He suggested that 400,000 births per year would be more sustainable than the current 2.2 million. He also objected to remarks by Egypt’s health and population minister that having children is “a matter of complete freedom,” arguing that leaving the choice up to individuals has implications for society as a whole. Egypt is the most populous country in the Middle East, with roughly 113 million people.
Infrastructure in the Caucasus. Following a Chinese-organized conference in Tbilisi, China’s ambassador to Georgia, Zhou Jian, said Beijing is interested in developing infrastructure projects through the so-called Middle Corridor, a broadly defined trade route that runs through the Caucasus. China has particularly shown interest in Georgia’s deepwater port of Anaklia. The ambassador noted that the Middle Corridor is an important link between the Chinese and European markets.
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September 11, 2023
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Tensions Escalate in Nagorno-Karabakh
The question is when, not if, conflict resumes in this highly volatile region.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
Azerbaijan has been massing troops along the line of contact with Nagorno-Karabakh and on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border for several days. Local media also report the presence of tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts, electronic warfare systems and other equipment. Armenian sources drew particular attention to an increased frequency of cargo flights from Azerbaijan to Israel, presumably for additional weapons. Both sides have accused the other of provocation, and both have warned that another war isn’t out of the question.
It’s not unusual for Azerbaijan and Armenia to level accusations at each other. The broader Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been going on for decades, and it’s been only a few years since Azerbaijan prevailed in the second actual war over the territory. Skirmishes in the region are common, as are periodic drone operations from both sides. But the threat of a new war is another matter entirely. The Caucasus is a strategically important hotbed of geopolitical activity. Russia has long held a presence there, and its influence has only grown since the end of the war, when it sent troops to keep the tenuous peace. The war in Ukraine has also led to an influx of Russian immigrants and has goosed regional trade. Then there is Turkey. The government in Ankara wants to strengthen its role as a regional leader, drawing more attention from the European Union, which has intensified its efforts to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The United States, which ordinarily doesn’t have as much at stake in the Caucasus, is waiting in the wings, ready to use whatever pressure points are available to hurt Russia.
To be sure, the possibility of war is real. Neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia has signed the treaty ending the last war (despite both insisting that they are committed to it). The only road connecting Armenia proper to the ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, a route known as the Lachin corridor, is still subject to a blockade. The breakaway area recently held elections, which the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said violates the principles of international law. Armenians themselves are unhappy with the outcome of the last conflict; after losing, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan conceded that Nagorno-Karabakh belonged to Azerbaijan, inviting criticism from opposition parties and sparking protests among the public. Amid growing discontent and ongoing protests, Pashinyan may feel compelled to correct the situation, if not by returning losses then at least by improving his negotiating position.
The Lachin and Zangezur Corridors | Caucasus
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In this context, Armenia’s attempts to attract the attention of the international community – and, if possible, its assistance – have become clear. For example, Armenia announced joint military exercises with the U.S. from Sept. 11 to Sept. 20, ostensibly to train peacekeeping forces. Pashinyan also spoke by phone with French President Emmanuel Macron to discuss the situation, and he recently criticized his erstwhile ally in Moscow, expressing dissatisfaction with Russian peacekeepers’ inactivity.
Importantly, Yerevan’s actions in this regard can also be interpreted as an attempt to attract the attention of Russia and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization rather than an outright rejection of Moscow. Armenia is known to balance between the West and Russia. Before becoming prime minister, Pashinyan himself advocated for Armenia’s exit from the Eurasian Economic Union. In August, he expressed hope that trade turnover between Armenia and Russia this year would exceed $5 billion. Armenia's Security Council was recently conducting concurrent negotiations with NATO, citing insufficient benefits from its membership in the CSTO, and with Moscow over strengthening bilateral military and political cooperation. Moreover, Yerevan and Moscow both understand that Armenia is economically dependent on Russia, and their economic ties, especially through the EAEU, have only grown stronger in recent years. In the wake of Western sanctions, Armenia became the largest beneficiary of the EAEU, its economy growing by 12.6 percent in 2022 thanks to the expansion of the services, construction and trade sectors facilitated by the bloc. In 2022, trade turnover between Russia and Armenia doubled after most European cargo carriers refused to cooperate directly with Russia.
Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has its own reasons to rattle the saber. Armenia has still not signed a treaty officially renouncing its claims to Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition, Azerbaijan is still cut off from Nakhchivan, which is part of Azerbaijan but separated from the country by Armenian territory. But as important, critical trade and transportation routes are emerging in the region, and Azerbaijan wants to position itself to capitalize off them accordingly. The demand for new routes in the wake of the Ukraine war is high basically everywhere, but Turkey, which is struggling with myriad economic problems, is especially interested in creating new, unencumbered routes now that Black Sea traffic has taken a dip. (Doing so, of course, would also spread its political influence throughout the region, hence talks this summer on a new railway.) Enter the Zangezur corridor, which is meant primarily to link the government in Baku to Nakhchivan but would have added benefits for other interested parties. According to various forecasts, Zangezur could add an additional 5 million to 8 million tons of cargo transportation to the Middle Corridor, a loosely defined trade route from Europe to East Asia that passes through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus. Armenia was supposed to ensure free access from Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan so that the Zangezur-affiliated Horadiz-Aghband-Meghri-Julfa-Arazdeyan railway could be restored, but Baku has accused Yerevan of dragging its feet. Azerbaijan has gone so far as to say that Zangezur will be completed by 2024 with or without Armenia’s participation. It’s possible, then, that Azerbaijan would want to proactively secure the area.
But Azerbaijan and Armenia are not the only competitors in a region as famously unstable as the Caucasus. Turkey is concerned that other countries will try to undermine its position by implementing the Middle Corridor on their own. China’s ambassador to Georgia recently said Beijing is interested in such infrastructure projects, particularly the one at the deep water port of Anaklia. China has also stressed the importance of the Middle Corridor for logistics with Europe, and that collaboration with the EU would be an important venue for relations between Brussels and Beijing. In other words, Azerbaijan and Turkey are highly motivated to finish the project as soon as possible.
None of the majors – the U.S., Russia and the EU – are interested in a full-blown military conflict. The U.S. and the EU simply don’t have much at stake here, and Russia needs the region to be stable. However, each could, in theory, benefit from a minor skirmish. Western powers may believe that if the conflict worsens, it could require Russian intervention and thus distract Moscow from its war in Ukraine. (Russia may believe similarly – that open conflict in the Caucasus could distract the West from Ukraine.) If Pashinyan falls, Moscow would get rid of the ever-balancing leader in Armenia and Russia would likely strengthen its relationship with Azerbaijan, with which it is building a transport project. Another notable mention is Iran, which like many of its neighbors has begun to benefit from its position along the North-South Corridor. Despite its poor relations with Azerbaijan, Tehran doesn’t want a war to break out either. On Sept. 9, the Azerbaijani defense minister met with an Iranian delegation to discuss the situation and military cooperation.
Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh will very likely break out, given the unresolved territorial disputes and the nature of the conflict. The question is when it will happen and how severe it will be. Meanwhile, the geopolitical game in the region will remain unchanged: Russia isn’t going, the United States is ready to irritate Moscow with periodic appearances, and Turkey will further advance its interests.
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September 25, 2023
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Daily Memo: Nagorno-Karabakh Fallout
Turkey and Russia are among the countries that have reacted to the breakaway region's agreement to disarm.
By: Geopolitical Futures
International reaction. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan arrived on Monday in Nakhchivan, an Azerbaijani exclave separated from the rest of Azerbaijan by Armenian territory. He held talks with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on bilateral and regional issues, about a week after Azerbaijan conducted a military operation in the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh that led ethnic Armenian authorities there to agree to disarm. Meanwhile, over the weekend, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh were partly responsible for the situation in the disputed territory, where thousands of ethnic Armenians have reportedly fled from their homes since last week. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Moscow rejected the criticism. Russia’s internal affairs minister arrived in Yerevan on Monday to meet with officials from Armenia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. U.S. Agency for International Development chief Samantha Power is also in Armenia.
More fallout. Relatedly, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic said at a press conference that what has happened in Nagorno-Karabakh has strengthened his country’s resolve to never recognize Kosovo’s independence. Kosovo declared independence in 2008. It has been recognized by many Western nations but not by Russia.
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Excellent find by CCP
https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/20/asia/azerbaijan-armenia-nagorno-karabakh-explainer-intl/index.html
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/20123/new-war-armenia-azerbaijan
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November 17, 2023
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New Visitors in the Caucasus
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman
With all that’s happening in the Middle East, it’s easy to forget about what’s happening in the Caucasus, which careful readers will recall I wrote about a while back. The Ukraine war was moving toward its non-conclusion, and Russia was neglecting its other frontiers (and, frankly, the wider world). The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict was a case in point.
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The situation was this: Azerbaijan and Armenia had been enemies for some time, intermittently clashing over Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnically Armenian enclave located entirely inside Azerbaijani territory, and fighting an all-out war over the area as recently as 2020. Azerbaijan is the more powerful of the two, thanks in part to the money it has made off its considerable energy reserves, but Armenia had historically been buoyed by Russian support. Moscow even helped broker the cease-fire that nominally ended hostilities three years ago. But Russia’s interests in the Caucasus are broad, extending well beyond any supposed allegiance to Armenia. It has since broken faith with Armenia and backed Azerbaijan so that it could keep its southern border secure and, hopefully, gain access to some of the country’s energy resources. This left Armenia with no outside supporters to supply weapons. And in September, Azerbaijan launched a full-scale invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh, effectively “winning” the decadeslong conflict.
It seems as though the United States noticed Russia’s shift from Armenia to Azerbaijan and has tried to take advantage accordingly. Along with France, the U.S. has said it would support the country militarily. Washington has been vague about what it will provide, but the important thing here is that it has announced its intention to have a presence in a region traditionally in Russia’s sphere of influence. Russia’s “defection” had undercut what influence the U.S. had in Azerbaijan and, given Armenia’s weakness, strengthened its position in an area critical to its interests. The U.S. and French response gave Russia exactly what it didn’t need: a source of more vulnerability rather than control.
In a broader context, this is going to be part of the peace negotiations, public or otherwise, over Ukraine between Washington and Moscow. In any negotiation, it is useful to hold cards that threaten an opponent, cards that can be used to gain concessions or, at the very least, make the opponent nervous. Since the Caucasus matters more to Russia than it does to the U.S., pledging military aid to Armenia creates the possibility, however remote, of American action. It’s a potent play, especially considering Russia already had more at risk.
Washington has said nothing of this, of course, but there’s a precedent: In 2008, Russia went to war with Georgia in a conflict that the U.S. helped resolve. But Washington’s relationship with Georgia was important to the U.S. only while the Russians were attacking Georgia; when Russia lost interest, so too did the United States. American (and French) involvement in Armenia, then, should be seen as an effort to enhance their positions for future Ukraine talks. If Ukraine is significantly weakened before then, the U.S. will need as many levers as it can get.
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Moving forward. Armenia and Azerbaijan expressed their intention to normalize relations and sign a peace deal in a joint statement on Thursday. They also announced a prisoner exchange and said they would work on more confidence-building measures, two months after Azerbaijan’s recapture in September of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. A U.S. statement said Secretary of State Antony Blinken looks forward to hosting the foreign ministers of both countries in Washington soon for peace talks. It also said Azerbaijan’s central bank governor and energy minister will visit the United States, though no date was provided.
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"A U.S. statement said Secretary of State Antony Blinken looks forward to hosting the foreign ministers of both countries in Washington soon for peace talks." :roll:
" It also said Azerbaijan’s central bank governor and energy minister will visit the United States, though no date was provided"
did blinks send over a 737 loaded with cash?
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March 21, 2024
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Geoeconomic Integration of Central Asia
The U.S. sees regional integration and global connectivity as the way to loosen the grip of Russia and China.
By: Kamran Bokhari
In a hyperconnected world, Central Asia is the final frontier, a vast region with few links to the international community. In the more than three decades since the end of the Cold War, the region’s remoteness and lack of oceanic access have benefited its gigantic neighbors, Russia and China. But now the United States and its allies are undertaking an ambitious strategy to foster Central Asian integration. The key challenge is how to form a regional bloc from the five nations, which are still defining themselves politically and economically and remain entangled in the geopolitical architectures of Moscow and Beijing.
Central Asia
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Last week, I had the opportunity to participate in the inaugural gathering of the B5+1 Forum in Almaty, Kazakhstan, organized by the Washington-based Center for International Private Enterprise with the support of the U.S. State Department. B5+1 is the business counterpart to the C5+1, a diplomatic framework comprising the United States and the five Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – established in 2015. Conceived during President Joe Biden’s meeting in New York last September with his five Central Asian counterparts, the B5+1 gathers private and public sector leaders to discuss ways to make Central Asia more attractive for foreign investment. During the March 13-15 gathering, participants identified five economic sectors as development priorities: trade and logistics, agribusiness, e-commerce, tourism and renewable energy.
Washington’s strategy is to facilitate regional economic integration while leaving ownership of the process to the Central Asians, whose region has been subject to Moscow’s influence as far back as the founding of the United States. In the decades following the Soviet Union’s breakup, the region was too distant and isolated – and other global challenges were too great – for the U.S. to exert any control. Russia and China continue to enjoy the advantage of proximity, while Beijing also has heaps of cash to dump into developing the region’s infrastructure through its Belt and Road Initiative.
What has changed, however, is that Russia, beleaguered by its war in Ukraine, is losing its grip over the region, while China is battling a serious economic slowdown. In this turbulent environment, the Central Asian states cannot assume that Russia will continue to be willing and able to guarantee their security. Nor can they be sure that Chinese investments, while attractive in the short term, will not have deleterious longer-term effects – as they have in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, for example. Therefore, the Central Asian states have each tried to varying degrees to balance relations with Russia and China while also seeking greatly enhanced ties with the United States and the European Union. After all, if they are going to move beyond autocratic governance and embrace economic reforms, only the U.S. and its allies can help.
The U.S. interest is to make these states resilient enough to withstand the upheaval occurring all around them. Their autocratic legacies, inherited from former liege Russia, coupled with the heavy influence of China mean that their path toward political reform is long and tortuous. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have made noteworthy strides, especially in recent years, but Tajikistan and Turkmenistan remain stuck in authoritarianism.
Cognizant of these constraints and the reality that political reform hinges on a decent measure of economic prosperity, Washington is focused on supporting the latter two states. Hence, the establishment of the B5+1 to complement the existing diplomatic track. Considering that three years ago the Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance document failed to even mention Central Asia, a good deal of progress has been made.
Yet, forging a Central Asian economic union modeled after the European Union or even the Association of Southeast Asian Nations is a major undertaking. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the region’s connectivity indicator – a measure of how much global gross domestic product is reachable – is among the lowest in the world. In theory, greater regional economic integration will make Central Asia more attractive for Western investments. However, maximizing trade between the five nations would require them to develop transnational mechanisms to harmonize regulations and customs procedures and arbitrate disputes.
Another difficulty is that Russia and China do not wish to see the region more globally connected and will thwart such efforts. Both countries want to limit Western influence in the expansive terrain that separates them. This is particularly important for Russia, which is already battling the West along its western frontier. Moscow also recognizes that it is already losing ground in the region to Beijing, which hopes to fill the vacuum Russia is leaving behind. For China, which aspires to build its Eurasian economic thoroughfare known as the Belt and Road Initiative through Central Asia, any increase in the region’s autonomy is potentially threatening.
But the biggest challenge for U.S. efforts to foster regional integration and enhance Central Asia’s global connectivity is financing. China can pour tens of billions of dollars into infrastructure projects for geopolitical reasons, but the U.S. and its allies must rely on the private sector to do most of the heavy lifting. Western firms are motivated by returns on their investments, which is why Washington is urging the Central Asian governments to implement political and economic reforms that render their region attractive to investors.
For a region that is trying to put its Soviet past behind it and has been doing more and more business with the Chinese, the challenge of forming a regional bloc is about transforming norms as much as it is about structural change.