Fire Hydrant of Freedom
Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities => Politics & Religion => Topic started by: Crafty_Dog on August 15, 2008, 10:30:28 PM
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Feels like time to open this thread. Here's a humdinger from Stratfor:
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Geopolitical Diary: Countermoves to a Russian Resurgence
August 15, 2008
Poland and the United States announced an agreement on Thursday to station elements of a U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) system permanently on Polish territory. As part of the deal, Poland will also be provided with Patriot air defense batteries and an as-yet-unspecified number of U.S. Army personnel.
The world is only beginning to feel the ripples from the Kremlin’s decision to decisively exercise military power in Georgia. Moscow has now demonstrated that it is just as willing to use military tools as it is to use economic tools (it is the world’s single largest energy producer) and political tools. In short, Russia is back as an active player on the regional stage. And, as the Polish BMD deal indicates, other states have opinions on how to deal with that. Around the world, other states are considering their options.
Most of the countries of Central Europe — and especially the strategically vulnerable Baltic states — want the same thing that Poland seems to be getting: an explicit deployment of U.S. ground forces on their turf. The idea being that Russia will think long and hard about doing something to them if U.S. forces are not only precommitted to their defense as NATO allies but already physically on station in their territory. We expect many more such deals to be worked out in the weeks and months to come as the United States and NATO essentially shift their Cold War-era deployments several hundred miles to the east.
In Western Europe, the concern is of a slightly different type. While many share the Central Europeans’ concern about Russian military power, none are any longer frontline states. Their concern is more economic. Many European states — most notably, Germany — rely on Russian natural gas exports to keep their economies going. While the Central Europeans are looking for American deployments, the Western Europeans are more likely to funnel their efforts into finding alternative sources of natural gas, or alternatives to natural gas itself. Those that have the technology will also simply try to use less natural gas.
In the Arab world, the players that matter are Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states. These players see Russia primarily as an economic competitor. They also have a pre-existing hammer with which to beat the Russians. Arab oil money was essential to the development of the anti-Soviet Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s and the second Chechen insurgency in 1999. All of these states have helped crack down on those movements’ ideological progeny — al Qaeda — since the 9/11 attacks. However, all retain the ability — and the money — to turn the tap back on should the United States be willing.
Iran and Turkey are more complicated. Neither of the states always sees eye to eye with the Americans, but neither particularly cares for a resurgent Russia.
Iran, Turkey and Russia border the Caucasus. And none wants to see one of the other two become ascendant. Russian domination would threaten Turkey’s energy supplies. Russia’s fondness for sparking separatist conflicts in its rivals would raise complications for heterogeneously populated Iran.
But, at the same time, Turkey and Iran (much less the United States) are not natural partners against Russia. The Caucasus has long been a bit of a free-for-all, with geopolitical alliances shifting irregularly. Just as Russia has political, economic and military tools to bring to bear along its entire periphery, both Iran and Turkey can do the same in the Caucasus. It is going to be a very messy region.
China has even more mixed feelings. It would dearly love to tap Central Asia’s energy resources, but is concerned about clashing with pre-existing Russian interests. China is not so much threatened by Russia as it is desperate to avoid adding any more challenges to its already burgeoning list. There is a logic to China attempting to extend its influence north and west, but only if Russia is otherwise occupied. In essence, China wants to pretend that nothing has changed — unless Russia finds itself besieged by everyone else, at which point Beijing would love to take advantage.
All of these responses are potentially effective ones, but what they all have in common is that they cannot be applied overnight. It takes time to build a base and deploy troops to Poland. Shifting one’s economy away from natural gas requires substantial — and expensive — restructuring. Whipping up a Third Chechen War cannot be done in a weekend. Ankara and Tehran simply figuring out their options will take weeks. And China is loath to take the lead on anything regarding Russia right now.
Russia, in contrast, has gotten its energy exports — and income — to post-Cold War highs. Its military is gunning for a fight, and politically it is once again unified. The Kremlin does not require prep time to make its next moves.
The challenge for all of those seeking to contain a Russian resurgence is as simple to state as it is complex to initiate: to do so quickly enough and with enough partners that a Russia with two free hands cannot pre-empt.
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GEORGIA CAN BE PUTIN'S AFGHANISTAN
Written by Dr. Jack Wheeler
Monday, 11 August 2008
Time to stop the hand-wringing about Russia's re-igniting the Cold War by invading Georgia. Time to start thinking of what a golden opportunity this presents.
First the reality. Russia, before, during, and after the Soviet Union was and remains a brutal imperialist dictatorship. The Soviet Union was simply the same old Czarist Russian imperialism with Marxism-Leninism as an ideological rationale. The fall of the USSR only meant the fall of the rationale.
So Russia is back to where it has always been, with the Russian compulsion for brute force bullying as its way of dealing with the world. It is no accident, comrades, that Russians were the Soviets, and it is no surprise whatever that they are behaving like Soviets in Georgia today.
Thus the fundamental reality of how to conduct foreign policy with Russia, however distasteful it may be to the squishes at the State Department chronically afflicted with terminal testicular atrophy:
The only thing Russians in the Kremlin understand and respect is superior force and the willingness to use it against them. If you don't give them a punch in the mouth and a bloody nose the moment they start to bully you, they will keep bullying you until you start fighting back hard - or you capitulate and obey their orders.
It's either-or, win-lose. Those are their rules. As Lenin expressed, Kto-kovo?, Who-whom? For Lenin, this was the only question that mattered, who conquers whom? Just as Lenin was the perfect Communist, so was he the perfect Russian.
Ronald Reagan won the Cold War by understanding that if those are the Russians' rules, then we had to play by them. Which is why he announced at his first cabinet meeting as president in January 1981: "Here's my strategy on the Cold War: We win, they lose."
The golden opportunity Putin is giving us by invading Georgia is that it gives us the perfect excuse to play by his rules. The way you play is this: identify Russian weaknesses and vulnerabilities, then exploit them to the hilt.
Putin, has, for example, some $40 billion (yes, with a ‘b') in personal hidden bank accounts in Switzerland and elsewhere in the name of various third-party cut-outs. Arrangements could be made to seize or attach them. Putin needs to be personally wiped out financially.
Russians are conducting a cyber-war upon Georgia. Pentagon hacker teams should be unleashed to conduct cyber-war upon Russian computer systems.
Every bit of intel and SIGINT (electronic or signal intelligence) we can get should be given to the Georgians.
But most important, the Georgians need Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and Javelin anti-tank missiles.
As explained by Col. Ralph Peters in The Phony, Brutal, Sloppy, and Inept Invasion of Georgia, the most striking feature of this war so far has been the incredibly incompetent performance of the Russian pilots. They've missed more targets than they've hit.
The Russians' mighty Red Army was defeated in Afghanistan by disorganized tribesmen armed with Stinger missiles. As the Afghans learned, take the Russians out of the air and they can be beaten on the ground. And the Afghans only had RPGs (rocket propelled grenade launchers) against Russian armor. They didn't have any Javelins.
The Georgians are better fighters, are far better trained and organized than the Afghan Mujahaddin. 2,000 Georgian soldiers have been fighting hard, battle-trained, in Iraq with Coalition forces - and are being flown back to Georgia.
Putin is serving himself up on a platter. Give the Georgians Stingers and Javelins, give them additional material and intel support, and they can make Georgia Putin's Afghanistan.
It is absolutely necessary for this to happen. Georgia is where Russian barbaric imperialism must be stopped. It can be stopped, but the action to do so must be now, before Russia's seizure of Georgia is consolidated. Then Ukraine is next.
I am calling upon every conservative leader to support freedom fighters in Georgia as they did in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua 25 years ago, and demand that President Bush provide that support as did President Reagan.
That's what defeated Soviet imperialism then, that's what can defeat Russian imperialism now. The Russian bear must be put back in its cage.
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Another quality analysis from Stratfor:
By George Friedman
On Sept. 11, 1990, U.S. President George H. W. Bush addressed Congress. He spoke in the wake of the end of Communism in Eastern Europe, the weakening of the Soviet Union, and the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein. He argued that a New World Order was emerging: “A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor, and today that new world is struggling to be born. A world quite different from the one we’ve known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.”
After every major, systemic war, there is the hope that this will be the war to end all wars. The idea driving it is simple. Wars are usually won by grand coalitions. The idea is that the coalition that won the war by working together will continue to work together to make the peace. Indeed, the idea is that the defeated will join the coalition and work with them to ensure the peace. This was the dream behind the Congress of Vienna, the League of Nations, the United Nations and, after the Cold War, NATO. The idea was that there would be no major issues that couldn’t be handled by the victors, now joined with the defeated. That was the idea that drove George H. W. Bush as the Cold War was coming to its end.
Those with the dream are always disappointed. The victorious coalition breaks apart. The defeated refuse to play the role assigned to them. New powers emerge that were not part of the coalition. Anyone may have ideals and visions. The reality of the world order is that there are profound divergences of interest in a world where distrust is a natural and reasonable response to reality. In the end, ideals and visions vanish in a new round of geopolitical conflict.
The post-Cold War world, the New World Order, ended with authority on Aug. 8, 2008, when Russia and Georgia went to war. Certainly, this war was not in itself of major significance, and a very good case can be made that the New World Order actually started coming apart on Sept. 11, 2001. But it was on Aug. 8 that a nation-state, Russia, attacked another nation-state, Georgia, out of fear of the intentions of a third nation-state, the United States. This causes us to begin thinking about the Real World Order.
The global system is suffering from two imbalances. First, one nation-state, the United States, remains overwhelmingly powerful, and no combination of powers are in a position to control its behavior. We are aware of all the economic problems besetting the United States, but the reality is that the American economy is larger than the next three economies combined (Japan, Germany and China). The U.S. military controls all the world’s oceans and effectively dominates space. Because of these factors, the United States remains politically powerful — not liked and perhaps not admired, but enormously powerful.
The second imbalance is within the United States itself. Its ground forces and the bulk of its logistical capability are committed to the Middle East, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States also is threatening on occasion to go to war with Iran, which would tie down most of its air power, and it is facing a destabilizing Pakistan. Therefore, there is this paradox: The United States is so powerful that, in the long run, it has created an imbalance in the global system. In the short run, however, it is so off balance that it has few, if any, military resources to deal with challenges elsewhere. That means that the United States remains the dominant power in the long run but it cannot exercise that power in the short run. This creates a window of opportunity for other countries to act.
The outcome of the Iraq war can be seen emerging. The United States has succeeded in creating the foundations for a political settlement among the main Iraqi factions that will create a relatively stable government. In that sense, U.S. policy has succeeded. But the problem the United States has is the length of time it took to achieve this success. Had it occurred in 2003, the United States would not suffer its current imbalance. But this is 2008, more than five years after the invasion. The United States never expected a war of this duration, nor did it plan for it. In order to fight the war, it had to inject a major portion of its ground fighting capability into it. The length of the war was the problem. U.S. ground forces are either in Iraq, recovering from a tour or preparing for a deployment. What strategic reserves are available are tasked into Afghanistan. Little is left over.
As Iraq pulled in the bulk of available forces, the United States did not shift its foreign policy elsewhere. For example, it remained committed to the expansion of democracy in the former Soviet Union and the expansion of NATO, to include Ukraine and Georgia. From the fall of the former Soviet Union, the United States saw itself as having a dominant role in reshaping post-Soviet social and political orders, including influencing the emergence of democratic institutions and free markets. The United States saw this almost in the same light as it saw the democratization of Germany and Japan after World War II. Having defeated the Soviet Union, it now fell to the United States to reshape the societies of the successor states.
Through the 1990s, the successor states, particularly Russia, were inert. Undergoing painful internal upheaval — which foreigners saw as reform but which many Russians viewed as a foreign-inspired national catastrophe — Russia could not resist American and European involvement in regional and internal affairs. From the American point of view, the reshaping of the region — from the Kosovo war to the expansion of NATO to the deployment of U.S. Air Force bases to Central Asia — was simply a logical expansion of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was a benign attempt to stabilize the region, enhance its prosperity and security and integrate it into the global system.
As Russia regained its balance from the chaos of the 1990s, it began to see the American and European presence in a less benign light. It was not clear to the Russians that the United States was trying to stabilize the region. Rather, it appeared to the Russians that the United States was trying to take advantage of Russian weakness to impose a new politico-military reality in which Russia was to be surrounded with nations controlled by the United States and its military system, NATO. In spite of the promise made by Bill Clinton that NATO would not expand into the former Soviet Union, the three Baltic states were admitted. The promise was not addressed. NATO was expanded because it could and Russia could do nothing about it.
From the Russian point of view, the strategic break point was Ukraine. When the Orange Revolution came to Ukraine, the American and European impression was that this was a spontaneous democratic rising. The Russian perception was that it was a well-financed CIA operation to foment an anti-Russian and pro-American uprising in Ukraine. When the United States quickly began discussing the inclusion of Ukraine in NATO, the Russians came to the conclusion that the United States intended to surround and crush the Russian Federation. In their view, if NATO expanded into Ukraine, the Western military alliance would place Russia in a strategically untenable position. Russia would be indefensible. The American response was that it had no intention of threatening Russia. The Russian question was returned: Then why are you trying to take control of Ukraine? What other purpose would you have? The United States dismissed these Russian concerns as absurd. The Russians, not regarding them as absurd at all, began planning on the assumption of a hostile United States.
If the United States had intended to break the Russian Federation once and for all, the time for that was in the 1990s, before Yeltsin was replaced by Putin and before 9/11. There was, however, no clear policy on this, because the United States felt it had all the time in the world. Superficially this was true, but only superficially. First, the United States did not understand that the Yeltsin years were a temporary aberration and that a new government intending to stabilize Russia was inevitable. If not Putin, it would have been someone else. Second, the United States did not appreciate that it did not control the international agenda. Sept. 11, 2001, took away American options in the former Soviet Union. No only did it need Russian help in Afghanistan, but it was going to spend the next decade tied up in the Middle East. The United States had lost its room for maneuver and therefore had run out of time.
And now we come to the key point. In spite of diminishing military options outside of the Middle East, the United States did not modify its policy in the former Soviet Union. It continued to aggressively attempt to influence countries in the region, and it became particularly committed to integrating Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, in spite of the fact that both were of overwhelming strategic interest to the Russians. Ukraine dominated Russia’s southwestern flank, without any natural boundaries protecting them. Georgia was seen as a constant irritant in Chechnya as well as a barrier to Russian interests in the Caucasus.
Moving rapidly to consolidate U.S. control over these and other countries in the former Soviet Union made strategic sense. Russia was weak, divided and poorly governed. It could make no response. Continuing this policy in the 2000s, when the Russians were getting stronger, more united and better governed and while U.S. forces were no longer available, made much less sense. The United States continued to irritate the Russians without having, in the short run, the forces needed to act decisively.
The American calculation was that the Russian government would not confront American interests in the region. The Russian calculation was that it could not wait to confront these interests because the United States was concluding the Iraq war and would return to its pre-eminent position in a few short years. Therefore, it made no sense for Russia to wait and it made every sense for Russia to act as quickly as possible.
The Russians were partly influenced in their timing by the success of the American surge in Iraq. If the United States continued its policy and had force to back it up, the Russians would lose their window of opportunity. Moreover, the Russians had an additional lever for use on the Americans: Iran.
The United States had been playing a complex game with Iran for years, threatening to attack while trying to negotiate. The Americans needed the Russians. Sanctions against Iran would have no meaning if the Russians did not participate, and the United States did not want Russia selling advance air defense systems to Iran. (Such systems, which American analysts had warned were quite capable, were not present in Syria on Sept. 6, 2007, when the Israelis struck a nuclear facility there.) As the United States re-evaluates the Russian military, it does not want to be surprised by Russian technology. Therefore, the more aggressive the United States becomes toward Russia, the greater the difficulties it will have in Iran. This further encouraged the Russians to act sooner rather than later.
The Russians have now proven two things. First, contrary to the reality of the 1990s, they can execute a competent military operation. Second, contrary to regional perception, the United States cannot intervene. The Russian message was directed against Ukraine most of all, but the Baltics, Central Asia and Belarus are all listening. The Russians will not act precipitously. They expect all of these countries to adjust their foreign policies away from the United States and toward Russia. They are looking to see if the lesson is absorbed. At first, there will be mighty speeches and resistance. But the reality on the ground is the reality on the ground.
We would expect the Russians to get traction. But if they don’t, the Russians are aware that they are, in the long run, much weaker than the Americans, and that they will retain their regional position of strength only while the United States is off balance in Iraq. If the lesson isn’t absorbed, the Russians are capable of more direct action, and they will not let this chance slip away. This is their chance to redefine their sphere of influence. They will not get another.
The other country that is watching and thinking is Iran. Iran had accepted the idea that it had lost the chance to dominate Iraq. It had also accepted the idea that it would have to bargain away its nuclear capability or lose it. The Iranians are now wondering if this is still true and are undoubtedly pinging the Russians about the situation. Meanwhile, the Russians are waiting for the Americans to calm down and get serious. If the Americans plan to take meaningful action against them, they will respond in Iran. But the Americans have no meaningful actions they can take; they need to get out of Iraq and they need help against Iran. The quid pro quo here is obvious. The United States acquiesces to Russian actions (which it can’t do anything about), while the Russians cooperate with the United States against Iran getting nuclear weapons (something Russia does not want to see).
One of the interesting concepts of the New World Order was that all serious countries would want to participate in it and that the only threat would come from rogue states and nonstate actors such as North Korea and al Qaeda. Serious analysts argued that conflict between nation-states would not be important in the 21st century. There will certainly be rogue states and nonstate actors, but the 21st century will be no different than any other century. On Aug. 8, the Russians invited us all to the Real World Order.
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America Must Choose
Between Georgia and Russia
By SERGEY LAVROV
August 20, 2008
In some Western nations an utterly one-sided picture has been painted of the recent crisis in the Georgia-South Ossetia conflict. The statements of American officials would lead one to conclude that the crisis began when Russia sent in its troops to support its peacekeepers there.
Meticulously avoided in those statements: The decision of Tbilisi to use crude military force against South Ossetia in the early hours of Aug. 8. The Georgian army used multiple rocket launchers, artillery and air force to attack the sleeping city of Tskhinvali.
Some honest independent observers acknowledge that a surprised Russia didn't respond immediately. We started moving our troops in support of peacekeepers only on the second day of Georgia's ruthless military assault. Yes, our military struck sites outside of South Ossetia. When the positions of your peacekeepers and the civilian population they have been mandated to protect are shelled, the sources of such attacks are legitimate targets.
Our military acted efficiently and professionally. It was an able ground operation that quickly achieved its very clear and legitimate objectives. It was very different, for example, from the U.S./NATO operation against Serbia over Kosovo in 1999, when an air bombardment campaign ran out of military targets and degenerated into attacks on bridges, TV towers, passenger trains and other civilian sites, even hitting an embassy.
In this instance, Russia used force in full conformity with international law, its right of self-defense, and its obligations under the agreements with regard to this particular conflict. Russia could not allow its peacekeepers to watch acts of genocide committed in front of their eyes, as happened in the Bosnian city of Srebrenica in 1995.
But what of the U.S.'s role leading up to this conflict? U.S. involvement with the Tbilisi regime—past and future—must be addressed to fully understand the conflict. When the mantra of the "Georgian democratic government" is repeated time and time again, does it mean that by U.S. standards, a democratic government is allowed to act in brutal fashion against a civilian population it claims to be its own, simply because it is "democratic"?
Another real issue is U.S. military involvement with the government of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Did Washington purposely encourage an irresponsible and unpredictable regime in this misadventure? If the U.S. couldn't control Tbilisi's behavior before, why do some in the U.S. seek to rush to rearm the Georgian military now?
Russia, by contrast, remains committed to a peaceful resolution in the Caucasus.
We'll continue to seek to deprive the present Georgian regime of the potential and resources to do more mischief. An embargo on arms supplies to the current Tbilisi regime would be a start.
We will make sure that the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan endorsed in Moscow on Aug. 12 is implemented, provided the parties to the conflict cooperate in good faith. So far we are not sure at all that Tbilisi is ready. President Saakashvili keeps trying to persuade the world that the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali was destroyed not by the Georgian attack but by the Russian forces who, according to Mr. Saakashvili, bombed the city after they entered it.
Russia is committed to the ongoing positive development of relations with the U.S. That kind of agenda is set forth in the Foreign Policy Concept—the framework document that sets out the basic directions of Russia's foreign policy—recently approved by President Dmitry Medvedev.
However, it must be remembered that, as between any other major world powers, our bilateral relationship can only advance upon the basis of reciprocity. And that is exactly what has been missing over the past 16 years. I meant precisely that when I said that the U.S. will have to choose between its virtual Georgia project and its much broader partnership with Russia.
The signs are ominous. Several joint military exercises have been cancelled by the Americans. Now Washington suggests our Navy ships are no longer welcome to take part in the Active Endeavour counterterrorism and counterproliferation operation in the Mediterranean. Washington also threatens to freeze our bilateral strategic stability dialogue.
Of course, that strategic dialogue has not led us too far since last fall, including on the issue of U.S. missile defense sites in Eastern Europe and the future of the strategic arms reduction regime. But the threat itself to drop these issues from our bilateral agenda is very indicative of the cost of the choice being made in Washington in favor of the discredited regime in Tbilisi. The U.S. seems to be eager to punish Russia to save the face of a failed "democratic" leader at the expense of solving the problems that are much more important to the entire world.
It is up to the American side to decide whether it wants a relationship with Russia that our two peoples deserve. The geopolitical reality we'll have to deal with at the end of the day will inevitably force us to cooperate.
To begin down the road of cooperation, it would not be a bad idea to do a very simple thing: Just admit for a moment that the course of history must not depend entirely on what the Georgian president is saying. Just admit that a democratically elected leader can lie. Just admit that you have other sources of information—and other objectives—that shape your foreign policy.
Mr. Lavrov is the foreign minister of the Russian Federation.
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Geopolitical Diary: The Georgian-Russian Conflict and a Return to Iran
August 20, 2008 | 0139 GMT
Meanwhile, back at the ranch, the Iranians waited, starving for attention. When last we visited them, the Iranians had met with the United States and the rest of the permanent members of the Security Council, including Russia, had concluded a meeting at which the Iranians were supposed to deliver their answer to demands that they freeze their uranium enrichment program. The United States had given Iran two weeks to provide a clear and satisfactory answer. After the meeting, the United States announced that the Iranians had failed to deliver and therefore new sanctions would be imposed, per prior agreement with the members of the negotiating group.
Just before this, of course, the United States and Israel had very publicly increased the pressure on Iran, carefully orchestrating a sense of impending attack. The Israelis had staged a mock attack on Greece to demonstrate their military capabilities and the United States had carefully released information about the secret exercise’s existence. Reports circulated of Israeli aircraft operating at U.S. air bases in Iraq. The Internet was awash with rumors of a massive U.S. fleet on its way to the Persian Gulf to blockade Iranian ports. Let us pause here for a moment and address all those who wrote in to us asking why we didn’t mention this fleet. For the record, we didn’t write about it because there is no fleet. It was just one of those things that make the blogosphere an exciting place to visit.
Moving forward. At the time, we regarded these threats by the United States as bluffs, but the possibility of sanctions against Iran as very real. And then Georgia intervened. Now, bluffing the Russians on Georgia took precedence over bluffing the Iranians and the U.S. administration went quiet on Iran. Moreover, the very real possibility of additional sanctions has become less real, since the Russians were a key element to those sanctions. If the Russians don’t participate, the Iranians will have to buy European goods through the Russians, an inconvenience with a mark-up but hardly a threat to their national security.
Therefore, as we return to the Iranian crisis, it becomes important to consider what the Russians are going to do and the questions that arise therefrom. First, given the response from NATO on Tuesday that it is still prepared to give NATO membership to Georgia in the future, we ask — are the Russians prepared to participate in the Iranian sanctions regime called for by the United States? Second, and far more important, what is the red line for the Russians? To be more precise, at what point in the American response on NATO do the Russians decide to counter by increasing arms shipments to the Iranians, including the advanced S-300 air defense system, as well as resume supplying nuclear technology for Tehran’s civilian reactor? The United States is at the point where it needs to decide which issue takes priority, Georgia or Iran. We do not see an easy way for the United States to press the Russians on Georgia while also expecting Russian cooperation on Iran.
The Iranians also have important decisions to make. In our view, the Iranians had basically made the decision, in part because they felt isolated from all great powers, to accept the neutralist solution in Iraq and negotiate some settlement on the nuclear program. Now the Iranians must be thoughtfully considering the Russian position toward them and watching to see how far U.S.-Russian relations deteriorate and whether they can recruit an ally. If they can, then all bets on Iraqi stability could be off. Meanwhile, Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr re-emerged from the shadows Tuesday threatening to help drive the Americans from Iraq. That is usually a sign that Iran is testing the water.
Our guess is that the Americans will deal with the problem at hand, which is Iraq and Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. That will mean that after a period of delivering strong messages to the Russians, the United States will back off from doing anything that will cause the Russians to retaliate in Iran. In turn, we will soon see warnings made to Russia replaced by warnings made to Iran, and Russia, having started to reshape its sphere of influence, will resume its cooperation with the United States. Thus, we would expect to see Iran on the front pages again shortly.
If this doesn’t happen, if the administration keeps pounding the Russians and leaves the Iranians back at the ranch, then a very quick and strategic re-evaluation has taken place and we are in a different place indeed. Thus, we will likely see the next phase of this evolution unfold on the front page of the New York Times and Washington Post when the administration leaks new, highly secret plans to attack Iran.
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Russia's Aggression Is a Challenge to World Order
By LINDSEY GRAHAM and JOE LIEBERMAN
August 26, 2008; Page A21
In the wake of Russia's invasion of Georgia, the United States and its trans-Atlantic allies have rightly focused on two urgent and immediate tasks: getting Russian soldiers out, and humanitarian aid in.
But having just returned from Georgia, Ukraine and Poland, where we met with leaders of these countries, we believe it is imperative for the West to look beyond the day-to-day management of this crisis. The longer-term strategic consequences, some of which are already being felt far beyond the Caucasus, have to be addressed.
Russia's aggression is not just a threat to a tiny democracy on the edge of Europe. It is a challenge to the political order and values at the heart of the continent.
Corbis
Slobodan Milosevic exploited ethnic grievances.
For more than 60 years, from World War II through the Cold War to our intervention in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the U.S. has fostered and fought for the creation of a Europe that is whole, free and at peace. This stands as one of the greatest strategic achievements of the 20th century: the gradual transformation of a continent, once the scene of the most violent and destructive wars ever waged, into an oasis of peace and prosperity where borders are open and uncontested and aggression unthinkable.
Russia's invasion of Georgia represents the most serious challenge to this political order since Slobodan Milosevic unleashed the demons of ethnic nationalism in the Balkans. What is happening in Georgia today, therefore, is not simply a territorial dispute. It is a struggle about whether a new dividing line is drawn across Europe: between nations that are free to determine their own destinies, and nations that are consigned to the Kremlin's autocratic orbit.
That is the reason countries like Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic States are watching what happens in the Caucasus so closely. We heard that last week in Warsaw, Kiev and Tbilisi. There is no doubt in the minds of leaders in Ukraine and Poland -- if Moscow succeeds in Georgia, they may be next.
There is disturbing evidence Russia is already laying the groundwork to apply the same arguments used to justify its intervention in Georgia to other parts of its near abroad -- most ominously in Crimea. This strategically important peninsula is part of Ukraine, but with a large ethnic Russian population and the headquarters of Russia's Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol.
The first priority of America and Europe must be to prevent the Kremlin from achieving its strategic objectives in Georgia. Having been deterred from marching on Tbilisi and militarily overthrowing the democratically elected government there, Russian forces spent last week destroying the country's infrastructure, including roads, bridges, port and security facilities. This was more than random looting. It was a deliberate campaign to collapse the economy of Georgia, in the hope of taking the government down with it.
The humanitarian supplies the U.S. military is now ferrying to Georgia are critically important to the innocent men, women and children displaced by the fighting, some of whom we saw last week. Also needed, immediately, is a joint commitment by the U.S. and the European Union to fund a large-scale, comprehensive reconstruction plan -- developed by the Georgian government, in consultation with the World Bank, IMF and other international authorities -- and for the U.S. Congress to support this plan as soon as it returns to session in September.
Any assistance plan must also include the rebuilding of Georgia's security forces. Our past aid to the Georgian military focused on supporting the light, counterterrorism-oriented forces that facilitate Tbilisi's contribution to coalition operations in Iraq. We avoided giving the types of security aid that could have been used to blunt Russia's conventional onslaught. It is time for that to change.
Specifically, the Georgian military should be given the antiaircraft and antiarmor systems necessary to deter any renewed Russian aggression. These defensive capabilities will help to prevent this conflict from erupting again, and make clear we will not allow the Russians to forcibly redraw the boundaries of sovereign nations.
Our response to the invasion of Georgia must include regional actions to reassure Russia's rattled neighbors and strengthen trans-Atlantic solidarity. This means reinvigorating NATO as a military alliance, not just a political one. Contingency planning for the defense of all member states against conventional and unconventional attack, including cyber warfare, needs to be revived. The credibility of Article Five of the NATO Charter -- that an attack against one really can and will be treated as an attack against all -- needs to be bolstered.
The U.S. must also reaffirm its commitment to allies that have been the targets of Russian bullying because of their willingness to work with Washington. The recent missile-defense agreement between Poland and the U.S., for instance, is not aimed at Russia. But this has not stopped senior Russian officials from speaking openly about military retaliation against Warsaw. Irrespective of our political differences over missile defense, Democrats and Republicans should join together in Congress to pledge solidarity with Poland, along with the Czech Republic, against these outrageous Russian threats.
Finally, the U.S. and Europe need a new trans-Atlantic energy alliance. In recent years, Russia has proven all too willing to use its oil and gas resources as a weapon, and to try to consolidate control over the strategic energy corridors to the West. By working together, an alliance can frustrate these designs and diminish our dependence on the foreign oil that is responsible for the higher energy prices here at home.
In crafting a response to the Georgia crisis, we must above all reaffirm our conviction that Russia need not be a competitor or an adversary. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Democratic and Republican administrations have engaged Russia, sending billions of dollars to speed its economic recovery and welcoming its integration into the flagship institutions of the international community. We did this because we believed that a strong, prosperous Russia can be a strategic partner and a friend. We still do.
But Russia's leaders have made a different choice. While we stand ready to rebuild relations with Moscow and work together on shared challenges, Russia's current course will only alienate and isolate it from the rest of the world.
We believe history will judge the Russian invasion of Georgia as a serious strategic miscalculation. Although it is for the moment flush with oil wealth, Russia's political elite remains kleptocratic, and its aggression exposed as much weakness as strength. The invasion of Georgia will not only have a unifying effect on the West, it also made clear that Russia -- unlike the Soviet Union -- has few real allies of strategic worth. To date, the only countries to defend Russia's actions in the Caucasus have been Cuba and Belarus -- and the latter, only after the Kremlin publicly complained about its silence.
In the long run, a Russia that tries to define its greatness in terms of spheres of influence, client states and forced fealty to Moscow will fail -- impoverishing its citizens in the process. The question is only how long until Russia's leaders rediscover this lesson from their own history.
Until they do, the watchword of the West must be solidarity: solidarity with the people of Georgia and its democratically elected government, solidarity with our allies throughout the region, and above all, solidarity with the values that have given meaning to our trans-Atlantic community of democracies and our vision of a European continent that is whole, free and at peace.
Mr. Graham is a Republican senator from South Carolina. Mr. Lieberman is an Independent Democratic senator from Connecticut.
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Another post this AM
Russia Is Dangerous But Weak
August 26, 2008; Page A19
'In Russia," wrote the great scholar of Russian imperialism Dietrich Geyer many years ago, "expansion was an expression of economic weakness, not exuberant strength."
Keep this observation in mind as Vladimir Putin and his minions bask in the glow of Western magazine cover stories about Russia's "resurgence" following its splendid little war against plucky little Georgia. The Kremlin is certainly confident these days, buoyed by years of rising commodity prices and a bullying foreign policy that mistakes fear for respect -- the very combination that made the Soviet Union seem invincible in the 1970s.
But the Soviet Union wasn't invincible. And here's a crazy thought: The same laws of social, economic and geopolitical gravity that applied in Brezhnev's U.S.S.R. apply equally in Mr. Putin's KGB state.
Take something as basic as demography. "In the next four decades," noted CIA Director Michael Hayden earlier this year, "we expect . . . the population of Russia to shrink by 32 million people [to about 110 million]. That means Russia will lose about a quarter of its population. To sustain its economy, Russia increasingly will have to look elsewhere for workers. Some of them will be immigrant Russians coming from the former Soviet states, what the Russians call the near abroad. But there aren't enough of them to make up that population loss. Others will be Chinese and non-Russians from the Caucasus, Central Asia and elsewhere, potentially aggravating Russia's already uneasy racial and religious tensions."
Or take oil and gas production, which accounts for one-third of the country's budget, 64% of its export revenue, 30% of foreign direct investment, and a little more than 20% of gross domestic product.
There's bad news here, too. Oil production is set to decline this year for the first time in a decade, a decline that is widely expected to accelerate rapidly in 2010. Of Russia's 14 largest oil fields, seven are more than 50% depleted. Production at its four largest gas fields is also in decline. Russia drilled about four million feet of new wells last year. In 1990, it drilled 17 million.
None of this is because Russia is necessarily running out of oil and gas: Existing fields could be better managed, and huge expanses of territory remain unexplored. Instead, it is a function of underinvestment, incompetence, corruption, political interference and crude profiteering. "If you're running Gazprom but you don't really own it, then your interest is in maximizing short-term profits, not long-term development," a Western diplomat told McClatchy's Tom Lasseter.
Amazingly, the system is of deliberate design, as if nothing was learned from the collapse of communism. Parastatal companies are rarely if ever efficient. Yet Mr. Putin has gone about effectively nationalizing entire industries. Foreign investors crave predictability. Yet Mr. Putin has created conditions which his own president, Dmitry Medvedev, calls "legal nihilism." Foreign customers of Russia's commodities seek reliable supplies. Yet Mr. Putin has made no secret of his willingness to turn the energy spigot off whenever it suits his political convenience.
With the exception of Robert Mugabe, no other leader has so completely fouled his own nest as Mr. Putin, or squandered so much international good will. In 2003, Mr. Putin formed, with Germany and France, a coalition of the unwilling to oppose the invasion of Iraq. It was a coalition he might have built on to consolidate Russia's place in, and perhaps eventually atop, Europe. Even Condoleezza Rice seemed prepared to go along, with her reported inane comment that the U.S. should "forgive" Russia while "ignoring" Germany and "punishing" France.
Instead, we have the spectacles of Russia's nasty meddling in Ukraine's 2004 disputed presidential election, the murder in Britain of ex-KGB man Alexander Litvinenko in 2006, and to cap it off this month's Georgia venture.
Now the Poles have agreed to U.S. missile defense, John McCain's call to expel Russia from the G-8 suddenly seems credible, and even European leftists are looking askance at the man they once cheered for his Iraq stance. No doubt Mr. Putin despises these people -- and can afford to, as long as Europe remains overwhelmingly reliant on Russian energy and energy prices remain high.
But those prices are bound to fall, as they always have. What will Russia be left with then? And what will it mean for Mr. Putin's clique, where the possibility of infighting has only grown with the split between his ex-KGB siloviki pals who wanted the presidency and the members of Mr. Medvedev's camp who got it?
For much of its history, Russia has been a weak state masquerading as a strong one -- a psychological profile in insecurity. That's why it has generally sought its advantage internationally by acting as an opportunistic spoiler, as it now does over Iran, rather than as a constructive partner seeking to magnify its influence (à la Britain) or as a rising power patiently asserting its place (à la China).
How does one deal with a neurotic? Not by coddling him. Russia is dangerous but it's also weak, and it would be good to find ways to remind it of that latter fact. Stinger missiles for Georgia would be a start.
Write to bstephens@wsj.com
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Strategic Forecasting, Inc.
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GEOPOLITICAL DIARY: THE BLACK SEA AND REVIVING THE COLD WAR
Russia began the week with a blunt message to the West: You may need us, but we
don't need you.
First, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev told the Russian press that NATO isn't
sincere in its desire to cooperate with Russia, and therefore Russia is prepared to
completely break ties with the Western military alliance. According to Medvedev,
even if NATO chooses to cut ties with Russia, "nothing terrible will happen" to
Moscow.
Second, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced that World Trade
Organization membership no longer interests Moscow. He added that Russia would soon
be pulling out of several WTO-related agreements, thereby paving the way for Russia
to formally withdraw its membership bid after more than a decade of negotiations.
Third, the Russian Duma and Federal Council unanimously approved a nonbinding
resolution calling for the recognition of the Georgian breakaway regions of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. Though this is largely a symbolic gesture for now, the
Russians are making clear that they can turn the Kosovo precedent on the West in a
snap.
In yet another blow to the West, Azerbaijan shipped approximately 200,000 barrels of
crude to Iran on Monday. This is no ordinary economic transaction; Azerbaijan is the
origin of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that circumvents Russia and transports
Caspian oil to the West. A recent pipeline explosion combined with Russian military
action in Georgia effectively have knocked the pipeline offline, leaving Baku with
no choice but to look south and sell to Iran to maintain some level of oil income.
This energy deal runs completely counter to U.S. strategy to keep Iran in a
financial stranglehold. Through both direct and indirect means, Russia has
simultaneously thrown a monkey wrench into the West's plans to evade Russian energy
bullying tactics while undermining Washington's pressure policies against Iran.
The Russians are getting increasingly bolder in their actions against the West,
taking full advantage of the fact that NATO can do little to seriously undermine
Russia's moves in the Caucasus. But Russia is not invincible -- especially when it
comes to Russian defenses against the West in the Black Sea.
The Black Sea is absolutely critical to Russian defense. Though NATO does not
currently have the capability to project power through land forces against Russia,
it does have the naval assets to give the Russians pause. Already, nine Western
warships (including U.S., Polish, Spanish, Turkish, and token Bulgarian and Romanian
vessels) have made their way into the Black Sea in the name of humanitarian aid for
Georgia. Russia is accusing the West of building up a NATO strike group in this body
of water with which to threaten Russia's hold on the Caucasus, and perhaps beyond.
The Russians simply cannot allow an increased NATO presence in this particular body
of water to remain unanswered. The Black Sea is an important buffer for what is a
direct line to the Russian underbelly, the Ukrainian plains and the land bridge that
extends between the Black and Caspian Seas. Russia is well-aware of its weaknesses
when it comes to defending this crucial frontier. The Black Sea, and the Aegean
beyond it, essentially comprises a NATO lake. Controlled by Turkey through the
Dardanelles, the Turkish and U.S. naval presence combined could easily overwhelm the
Russian Black Sea Fleet. The last thing Moscow wants is a U.S. naval strike force in
the Black Sea threatening Moscow's control of the Caucasus, crucial for its
logistical and supply links to Russian troops in Georgia.
And so, the Russian response is already beginning to take effect. The Black Sea Navy
flagship "Moskva" sailed from Sevastopol today, and the Russians are likely to
deploy more of their current -- albeit limited -- naval assets out of the Crimean
Peninsula. Such moves are only likely to give NATO forces more cause to beef up
their naval presence in the Black Sea, further contributing to the Kremlin's sense
of insecurity.
At that point, the next logical step for the Russians is to start spending some of
their three quarters of a trillion dollars in reserves on covert operations that
would force the United States to split its attention. It was not too long ago that
the Russian intelligence powerhouse excelled in starting up fires in Latin America,
Africa, Europe and the Middle East to keep the West preoccupied. In the Cold War
days, the Russian FSB and KGB were neck-deep in backing groups like the Sandinistas
in Nicaragua, the Red Brigades in Italy and the Palestine Liberation Organization
across the Middle East. Names and ideologies have since shifted, but it is not
beyond the Russian FSB to spread its tentacles once again into certain areas of the
world where it can poke and prod the West.
This type of tit-for-tat escalation defined the Cold War. Now that the Black Sea has
come into play, we are now just a few short steps from having this fracas in the
Caucasus fully revive those Cold War tensions. Russia may have been looking for a
relatively risk-free option to confront the United States with the war in Georgia.
But now that we are seeing hints of a NATO naval build-up in the Black Sea, the
Russians may be getting more than they asked for.
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The Medvedev Doctrine and American Strategy
September 2, 2008
Stratfor
By George Friedman
The United States has been fighting a war in the Islamic world since 2001. Its main theaters of operation are in Afghanistan and Iraq, but its politico-military focus spreads throughout the Islamic world, from Mindanao to Morocco. The situation on Aug. 7, 2008, was as follows:
The war in Iraq was moving toward an acceptable but not optimal solution. The government in Baghdad was not pro-American, but neither was it an Iranian puppet, and that was the best that could be hoped for. The United States anticipated pulling out troops, but not in a disorderly fashion.
The war in Afghanistan was deteriorating for the United States and NATO forces. The Taliban was increasingly effective, and large areas of the country were falling to its control. Force in Afghanistan was insufficient, and any troops withdrawn from Iraq would have to be deployed to Afghanistan to stabilize the situation. Political conditions in neighboring Pakistan were deteriorating, and that deterioration inevitably affected Afghanistan.
The United States had been locked in a confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program, demanding that Tehran halt enrichment of uranium or face U.S. action. The United States had assembled a group of six countries (the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) that agreed with the U.S. goal, was engaged in negotiations with Iran, and had agreed at some point to impose sanctions on Iran if Tehran failed to comply. The United States was also leaking stories about impending air attacks on Iran by Israel or the United States if Tehran didn’t abandon its enrichment program. The United States had the implicit agreement of the group of six not to sell arms to Tehran, creating a real sense of isolation in Iran.
Related Special Topic Page
The Russian Resurgence
In short, the United States remained heavily committed to a region stretching from Iraq to Pakistan, with main force committed to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the possibility of commitments to Pakistan (and above all to Iran) on the table. U.S. ground forces were stretched to the limit, and U.S. airpower, naval and land-based forces had to stand by for the possibility of an air campaign in Iran — regardless of whether the U.S. planned an attack, since the credibility of a bluff depended on the availability of force.
The situation in this region actually was improving, but the United States had to remain committed there. It was therefore no accident that the Russians invaded Georgia on Aug. 8 following a Georgian attack on South Ossetia. Forgetting the details of who did what to whom, the United States had created a massive window of opportunity for the Russians: For the foreseeable future, the United States had no significant forces to spare to deploy elsewhere in the world, nor the ability to sustain them in extended combat. Moreover, the United States was relying on Russian cooperation both against Iran and potentially in Afghanistan, where Moscow’s influence with some factions remains substantial. The United States needed the Russians and couldn’t block the Russians. Therefore, the Russians inevitably chose this moment to strike.
On Sunday, Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev in effect ran up the Jolly Roger. Whatever the United States thought it was dealing with in Russia, Medvedev made the Russian position very clear. He stated Russian foreign policy in five succinct points, which we can think of as the Medvedev Doctrine (and which we see fit to quote here):
First, Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law, which define the relations between civilized peoples. We will build our relations with other countries within the framework of these principles and this concept of international law.
Second, the world should be multipolar. A single-pole world is unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot allow. We cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict.
Third, Russia does not want confrontation with any other country. Russia has no intention of isolating itself. We will develop friendly relations with Europe, the United States, and other countries, as much as is possible.
Fourth, protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us.
Finally, fifth, as is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors. We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries, our close neighbors.
Medvedev concluded, “These are the principles I will follow in carrying out our foreign policy. As for the future, it depends not only on us but also on our friends and partners in the international community. They have a choice.”
The second point in this doctrine states that Russia does not accept the primacy of the United States in the international system. According to the third point, while Russia wants good relations with the United States and Europe, this depends on their behavior toward Russia and not just on Russia’s behavior. The fourth point states that Russia will protect the interests of Russians wherever they are — even if they live in the Baltic states or in Georgia, for example. This provides a doctrinal basis for intervention in such countries if Russia finds it necessary.
The fifth point is the critical one: “As is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests.” In other words, the Russians have special interests in the former Soviet Union and in friendly relations with these states. Intrusions by others into these regions that undermine pro-Russian regimes will be regarded as a threat to Russia’s “special interests.”
Thus, the Georgian conflict was not an isolated event — rather, Medvedev is saying that Russia is engaged in a general redefinition of the regional and global system. Locally, it would not be correct to say that Russia is trying to resurrect the Soviet Union or the Russian empire. It would be correct to say that Russia is creating a new structure of relations in the geography of its predecessors, with a new institutional structure with Moscow at its center. Globally, the Russians want to use this new regional power — and substantial Russian nuclear assets — to be part of a global system in which the United States loses its primacy.
These are ambitious goals, to say the least. But the Russians believe that the United States is off balance in the Islamic world and that there is an opportunity here, if they move quickly, to create a new reality before the United States is ready to respond. Europe has neither the military weight nor the will to actively resist Russia. Moreover, the Europeans are heavily dependent on Russian natural gas supplies over the coming years, and Russia can survive without selling it to them far better than the Europeans can survive without buying it. The Europeans are not a substantial factor in the equation, nor are they likely to become substantial.
This leaves the United States in an extremely difficult strategic position. The United States opposed the Soviet Union after 1945 not only for ideological reasons but also for geopolitical ones. If the Soviet Union had broken out of its encirclement and dominated all of Europe, the total economic power at its disposal, coupled with its population, would have allowed the Soviets to construct a navy that could challenge U.S. maritime hegemony and put the continental United States in jeopardy. It was U.S. policy during World Wars I and II and the Cold War to act militarily to prevent any power from dominating the Eurasian landmass. For the United States, this was the most important task throughout the 20th century.
The U.S.-jihadist war was waged in a strategic framework that assumed that the question of hegemony over Eurasia was closed. Germany’s defeat in World War II and the Soviet Union’s defeat in the Cold War meant that there was no claimant to Eurasia, and the United States was free to focus on what appeared to be the current priority — the defeat of radical Islamism. It appeared that the main threat to this strategy was the patience of the American public, not an attempt to resurrect a major Eurasian power.
The United States now faces a massive strategic dilemma, and it has limited military options against the Russians. It could choose a naval option, in which it would block the four Russian maritime outlets, the Sea of Japan and the Black, Baltic and Barents seas. The United States has ample military force with which to do this and could potentially do so without allied cooperation, which it would lack. It is extremely unlikely that the NATO council would unanimously support a blockade of Russia, which would be an act of war.
But while a blockade like this would certainly hurt the Russians, Russia is ultimately a land power. It is also capable of shipping and importing through third parties, meaning it could potentially acquire and ship key goods through European or Turkish ports (or Iranian ports, for that matter). The blockade option is thus more attractive on first glance than on deeper analysis.
More important, any overt U.S. action against Russia would result in counteractions. During the Cold War, the Soviets attacked American global interest not by sending Soviet troops, but by supporting regimes and factions with weapons and economic aid. Vietnam was the classic example: The Russians tied down 500,000 U.S. troops without placing major Russian forces at risk. Throughout the world, the Soviets implemented programs of subversion and aid to friendly regimes, forcing the United States either to accept pro-Soviet regimes, as with Cuba, or fight them at disproportionate cost.
In the present situation, the Russian response would strike at the heart of American strategy in the Islamic world. In the long run, the Russians have little interest in strengthening the Islamic world — but for the moment, they have substantial interest in maintaining American imbalance and sapping U.S. forces. The Russians have a long history of supporting Middle Eastern regimes with weapons shipments, and it is no accident that the first world leader they met with after invading Georgia was Syrian President Bashar al Assad. This was a clear signal that if the U.S. responded aggressively to Russia’s actions in Georgia, Moscow would ship a range of weapons to Syria — and far worse, to Iran. Indeed, Russia could conceivably send weapons to factions in Iraq that do not support the current regime, as well as to groups like Hezbollah. Moscow also could encourage the Iranians to withdraw their support for the Iraqi government and plunge Iraq back into conflict. Finally, Russia could ship weapons to the Taliban and work to further destabilize Pakistan.
At the moment, the United States faces the strategic problem that the Russians have options while the United States does not. Not only does the U.S. commitment of ground forces in the Islamic world leave the United States without strategic reserve, but the political arrangements under which these troops operate make them highly vulnerable to Russian manipulation — with few satisfactory U.S. counters.
The U.S. government is trying to think through how it can maintain its commitment in the Islamic world and resist the Russian reassertion of hegemony in the former Soviet Union. If the United States could very rapidly win its wars in the region, this would be possible. But the Russians are in a position to prolong these wars, and even without such agitation, the American ability to close off the conflicts is severely limited. The United States could massively increase the size of its army and make deployments into the Baltics, Ukraine and Central Asia to thwart Russian plans, but it would take years to build up these forces and the active cooperation of Europe to deploy them. Logistically, European support would be essential — but the Europeans in general, and the Germans in particular, have no appetite for this war. Expanding the U.S. Army is necessary, but it does not affect the current strategic reality.
This logistical issue might be manageable, but the real heart of this problem is not merely the deployment of U.S. forces in the Islamic world — it is the Russians’ ability to use weapons sales and covert means to deteriorate conditions dramatically. With active Russian hostility added to the current reality, the strategic situation in the Islamic world could rapidly spin out of control.
The United States is therefore trapped by its commitment to the Islamic world. It does not have sufficient forces to block Russian hegemony in the former Soviet Union, and if it tries to block the Russians with naval or air forces, it faces a dangerous riposte from the Russians in the Islamic world. If it does nothing, it creates a strategic threat that potentially towers over the threat in the Islamic world.
The United States now has to make a fundamental strategic decision. If it remains committed to its current strategy, it cannot respond to the Russians. If it does not respond to the Russians for five or 10 years, the world will look very much like it did from 1945 to 1992. There will be another Cold War at the very least, with a peer power much poorer than the United States but prepared to devote huge amounts of money to national defense.
There are four broad U.S. options:
Attempt to make a settlement with Iran that would guarantee the neutral stability of Iraq and permit the rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces there. Iran is the key here. The Iranians might also mistrust a re-emergent Russia, and while Tehran might be tempted to work with the Russians against the Americans, Iran might consider an arrangement with the United States — particularly if the United States refocuses its attentions elsewhere. On the upside, this would free the U.S. from Iraq. On the downside, the Iranians might not want —or honor — such a deal.
Enter into negotiations with the Russians, granting them the sphere of influence they want in the former Soviet Union in return for guarantees not to project Russian power into Europe proper. The Russians will be busy consolidating their position for years, giving the U.S. time to re-energize NATO. On the upside, this would free the United States to continue its war in the Islamic world. On the downside, it would create a framework for the re-emergence of a powerful Russian empire that would be as difficult to contain as the Soviet Union.
Refuse to engage the Russians and leave the problem to the Europeans. On the upside, this would allow the United States to continue war in the Islamic world and force the Europeans to act. On the downside, the Europeans are too divided, dependent on Russia and dispirited to resist the Russians. This strategy could speed up Russia’s re-emergence.
Rapidly disengage from Iraq, leaving a residual force there and in Afghanistan. The upside is that this creates a reserve force to reinforce the Baltics and Ukraine that might restrain Russia in the former Soviet Union. The downside is that it would create chaos in the Islamic world, threatening regimes that have sided with the United States and potentially reviving effective intercontinental terrorism. The trade-off is between a hegemonic threat from Eurasia and instability and a terror threat from the Islamic world.
We are pointing to very stark strategic choices. Continuing the war in the Islamic world has a much higher cost now than it did when it began, and Russia potentially poses a far greater threat to the United States than the Islamic world does. What might have been a rational policy in 2001 or 2003 has now turned into a very dangerous enterprise, because a hostile major power now has the option of making the U.S. position in the Middle East enormously more difficult.
If a U.S. settlement with Iran is impossible, and a diplomatic solution with the Russians that would keep them from taking a hegemonic position in the former Soviet Union cannot be reached, then the United States must consider rapidly abandoning its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and redeploying its forces to block Russian expansion. The threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War was far graver than the threat posed now by the fragmented Islamic world. In the end, the nations there will cancel each other out, and militant organizations will be something the United States simply has to deal with. This is not an ideal solution by any means, but the clock appears to have run out on the American war in the Islamic world.
We do not expect the United States to take this option. It is difficult to abandon a conflict that has gone on this long when it is not yet crystal clear that the Russians will actually be a threat later. (It is far easier for an analyst to make such suggestions than it is for a president to act on them.) Instead, the United States will attempt to bridge the Russian situation with gestures and half measures.
Nevertheless, American national strategy is in crisis. The United States has insufficient power to cope with two threats and must choose between the two. Continuing the current strategy means choosing to deal with the Islamic threat rather than the Russian one, and that is reasonable only if the Islamic threat represents a greater danger to American interests than the Russian threat does. It is difficult to see how the chaos of the Islamic world will cohere to form a global threat. But it is not difficult to imagine a Russia guided by the Medvedev Doctrine rapidly becoming a global threat and a direct danger to American interests.
We expect no immediate change in American strategic deployments — and we expect this to be regretted later. However, given U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s trip to the Caucasus region, now would be the time to see some movement in U.S. foreign policy. If Cheney isn’t going to be talking to the Russians, he needs to be talking to the Iranians. Otherwise, he will be writing checks in the region that the U.S. is in no position to cash.
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The Market Will Punish Putinism
By JUDY SHELTON
September 3, 2008; Page A23
The financial abyss is the deepest abyss of all; you can keep falling into it your whole life.
-- Ilf and Petrov
"The Golden Calf" (1931)
In the early years of the Soviet Union, Marxist policies for a "workers' paradise" wrought such devastation on the Russian economy that Vladimir Lenin was forced to restore certain aspects of market capitalism -- limited private ownership, trade with foreign countries -- to salvage the future of Bolshevism. The line above comes from a famous Russian satire about two scoundrels who took full advantage of the widespread corruption under the New Economic Policy (NEP) to accumulate illegal fortunes.
Fear of financial failure is a recurring nightmare for Russians, who recall with angst the collapse of the Soviet economy at the end of the 1980s. The following decade, in August 1998, a newly constituted Russian Federation defaulted on its government bonds as the ruble lost two-thirds of its value in less than a month, plunging the nation back into bankruptcy.
While humiliation still lingers in the national psyche, Russia has seemingly entered a new phase in its struggle to reconcile totalitarian tendencies with capitalist rewards. Today, oil revenues ostensibly provide a bulwark against economic losses caused by government misjudgments.
But even as Russian tanks assert a physical claim on Georgian territory, Moscow is already feeling the consequences in fiscal terms. Foreign investment capital -- the lifeblood of Russian equity and credit markets -- is draining out as the world recoils.
Group of Seven leaders should take particular note of this spontaneous market phenomenon -- and also take heart. Because no matter what sanctions the European Union might choose to impose, no matter how severely the world's leading industrialized nations jointly condemn their "fellow G-8 member" -- nothing will punish Russia more than to watch the dream dissolve yet again.
Vladimir Putin, who used to chase rats with a stick in the stairwell of his crumbling apartment block during his Leningrad boyhood, today seeks to thrash what he perceives as a hostile world order. He vows to "put an end to the unipolar world ruled by the U.S.," and has shown his willingness to raise the specter of financial ruin -- his nation's deepest fear -- to indulge this obsession.
The irony of the story, and the tragedy, is that Mr. Putin needs little assistance from the U.S. and its trans-Atlantic allies to destroy Russia's own standing in the international political and economic order.
The rout in Russian stock markets actually began before the invasion of Georgia, prompted by Mr. Putin's rumblings of despotic displeasure in late July. The shares of Mechel, one of Russia's leading mining and metals companies, plunged 38% on the New York Stock Exchange after Russia's prime minister publicly accused the company of selling raw materials to foreigners at lower prices than those charged domestically. Perhaps it was Mr. Putin's ominous advice (widely viewed as a sinister threat) to Mechel's owner and director, who was hospitalized at the time -- "I think Igor Vladimirovich should get better as quick as possible, otherwise we'll have to send him a doctor" -- that chilled investor sentiment, wiping out $6 billion in shareholder value in one day.
Only hours earlier, Robert Dudley, president of the Anglo-Russian energy company TNK-BP, was forced to flee Moscow after systematic harassment by government authorities. Locked in a power struggle for managerial control, the joint venture is Russia's third-largest oil producer; its Russian principals want to wring maximum cash payments out of the business while the British side argues for capital investment to increase future production. Analysts suspect the Kremlin is fully complicit in the effort to oust the foreigners -- denying visas to the company's British employees, launching tax investigations, tapping residential phones.
Since the attack on Georgia began in early August, the decline in Russian financial markets has accelerated sharply. The benchmark RTS Index of leading Russian stocks has slumped to its lowest level in two years. The ruble has registered its biggest monthly decline against the U.S. dollar in more than nine years as foreign investors rush to retrieve their capital -- some $25 billion in the last three weeks, according to French investment bank BNP Paribas. The amount of debt raised by Russian companies in August has fallen 87% from July levels. The issuance of new equity has come to a virtual halt -- a mere $3 million was raised in August compared to $933 million in July.
To combat the alarming magnitude of capital desertion, officials at Russia's central bank have scrambled to raise interest rates, allowing the yield on domestic ruble bonds to increase by 150 basis points. But complaints about the tightened credit situation have already begun among Russia's powerful industrial oligarchs. One of them, Vladimir Potanin, paid a recent visit to Mr. Medvedev to let him know that Russian companies' restricted access to world financial markets was causing difficulties. The billionaire businessman suggested that the government tap state reserves to ease the liquidity crisis. Mr. Medvedev quickly acquiesced, promising to unveil a new program of easy credit before the end of September.
It is part of the continuing pattern for Russia -- forever trying to have it both ways with "private" companies in cahoots with the Kremlin, entrepreneurial ambition subject to Big Brother's approval, and capitalism without democracy. It's a pattern that has consistently led Russia to blame outsiders for woes incurred as the result of its inherent dissonance, and to petulantly abandon earlier aspirations for global integration.
And it has always led to the financial abyss. Even now, the outlines of the old command-style economic blueprint are emerging as Mr. Putin promotes his 12-year development plan for the country. The foreign capital required to fund it is disappearing by the minute, however, which means the plan must be altered. Expect the nastiness to ratchet upwards as Mr. Putin wields his stick against his purported enemies. On Friday, he threatened to cut supplies to Europe of "oil, gas, petroleum chemicals, timber, metals, fertilizers" should it align with the U.S. in confronting Russian aggression against bordering nations. In Moscow, reports are circulating that Lukoil executives have been notified by the Kremlin to be prepared to restrict oil deliveries to Poland and Germany through the Druzhba pipeline. (In Russian, druzhba means "friendship" -- a perfect tribute to Orwellian doublespeak.)
What Mr. Putin has yet to learn is that capital does not respond well to extortion. Global investors are not impressed by economic threats to cut off supplies to vital customers. Indeed, they abhor the elevated "country risk" associated with political adventurism.
But what can the West do to express its rejection of such tactics? Preventing Russia from joining the World Trade Organization means little to a country that disdains the rules of free trade -- on Friday, Moscow banned poultry imports from the U.S. -- and blatantly circumvents antimonopoly policies. Russia's refusal to acknowledge intellectual property rights is consistent, if unscrupulous; according to researchers at the Brookings Institution, Mr. Putin plagiarized much of his dissertation for a Ph.D in economics in 1997 from a management study written by two professors at the University of Pittsburgh in 1978.
The most farsighted move Western governments could make would be to set up a fast-track approach to European Union membership for the most vulnerable of Russia's neighbors: Ukraine. As a parallel step, an interim monetary facility should be arranged to help the country make an early transition to the euro; if the EU balks, the U.S. should offer Kiev the opportunity to dollarize. Investors will be drawn to the stability and freedom of conducting business in a major reserve currency.
Mr. Putin, who harbors dreams of a vast ruble zone across the former Soviet empire, won't like it. But he has to understand: Sometimes the invisible hand strikes back.
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Missile Offense
September 10, 2008; Page A14
WSJ
The Kremlin has been dusting off old Bolshevik intimidation techniques since the U.S. signed a missile defense partnership with Poland last month. The Russian foreign ministry promised that its response "would go beyond diplomacy," and a Russian general mused that this meant its nuclear missiles would have to target Poland. Who would have thought such talk would find an accommodating ear in the U.S. Congress?
That will be the question when Illinois Republican Representative Mark Kirk offers an amendment in the coming days to the Defense Appropriations bill to restore funding for missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. The money was struck in May by Democrats who justified the cuts by claiming that the Iranian threat was not developing quickly and a deal with Poland hadn't been signed. Now Iran has tried to orbit its first satellite and a deal with Poland is in place, so we'll soon see if House Democrats and Barack Obama change with the new reality.
Even as Polish leaders were risking Russia's wrath by signing the U.S. deal, California Democrat Ellen Tauscher declared that the missile defense partnership was proceeding way too fast. Ms. Tauscher wrote on the left-wing Huffington Post last month that the U.S.-Polish pact would "build an ideologically-based system that is untested and certainly not ready, against a threat that has not yet emerged."
Ms. Tauscher chairs the House Strategic Forces Subcommittee and so can be a real obstacle to the Polish deal and other attempts to forge closer alliances with countries on the Russian periphery. Ditto for House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee Chairman John Murtha, who loves earmarks but can't see fit to help our Polish allies.
As distressing, these missile defense objections have been echoed by Barack Obama spokeswoman Wendy Morigi, who recently explained the Presidential candidate's position as "Congress will not and should not fund a system until testing has proven that it works, and that testing will not be completed until 2010 at the earliest."
The timing of these remarks couldn't have been worse. Polish leaders finally struck the missile deal, after months of national debate, in the wake of Russia's invasion of Georgia. The agreement is largely symbolic, since the 10 interceptors couldn't possibly stop a Russian attack and are really aimed at Iran. But the symbolism is still useful as a message to Moscow that its Georgian imperialism won't cower everyone in Eastern Europe. It is also an expression of Poland's confidence in America as an ally. "We're determined this time around to have alliances backed by realities, backed by capabilities," says Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski.
On Monday, Mr. Sikorski met with Mr. Kirk and John McCain in Chicago to discuss missile defense in Poland. While some have questioned whether the deal signed in August will get through Poland's parliament, Mr. Sikorski tells us there will be no problem with ratification, most likely by the end of the year. On the other hand, U.S. failure to honor its new commitments to Poland would be disastrous to the country's faith in NATO. "We do feel that NATO should revive its role as a military organization," Mr. Sikorski notes.
The Tauscher-Obama objections will make Polish leaders wonder if their new agreement will be undercut by the next Administration, or in a Congress likely to be run by Democrats for years to come. And the comments will delight Vladimir Putin, who would like nothing better than to show Poles and Ukrainians that it's risky to trust the inconstant Americans.
The Pentagon has made significant progress in missile defenses this decade, and our allies are eager to participate in their development. Once sites are developed, either at home or abroad, they can be upgraded as the technology improves. The point of defenses is to deploy them before a threat is real, so we aren't caught by surprise. The Tauscher-Obama "ideologically-based" hostility to the Polish agreement helps to explain why a majority of Americans aren't sure they trust Democrats on matters of national security.
See all of today's editorials and op-eds, plus video commentary, on Opinion Journal.
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The Russian Resurgence and the New-Old Front
September 15, 2008
By Peter Zeihan
Related Special Topic Page
The Russian Resurgence
Russia is attempting to reforge its Cold War-era influence in its near abroad. This is not simply an issue of nostalgia, but a perfectly logical and predictable reaction to the Russian environment. Russia lacks easily definable, easily defendable borders. There is no redoubt to which the Russians can withdraw, and the only security they know comes from establishing buffers — buffers which tend to be lost in times of crisis. The alternative is for Russia to simply trust other states to leave it alone. Considering Russia’s history of occupations, from the Mongol horde to Napoleonic France to Hitler’s Germany, it is not difficult to surmise why the Russians tend to choose a more activist set of policies.
As such, the country tends to expand and contract like a beating heart — gobbling up nearby territories in times of strength, and then contracting and losing those territories in times of weakness. Rather than what Westerners think of as a traditional nation-state, Russia has always been a multiethnic empire, heavily stocked with non-Russian (and even non-Orthodox) minorities. Keeping those minorities from damaging central control requires a strong internal security and intelligence arm, and hence we get the Cheka, the KGB, and now the FSB.
Nature of the Budding Conflict
Combine a security policy thoroughly wedded to expansion with an internal stabilization policy that institutionalizes terror, and it is understandable why most of Russia’s neighbors do not like Moscow very much. A fair portion of Western history revolves around the formation and shifting of coalitions to manage Russian insecurities.
In the American case specifically, the issue is one of continental control. The United States is the only country in the world that effectively controls an entire continent. Mexico and Canada have been sufficiently intimidated so that they can operate independently only in a very limited sense. (Technically, Australia controls a continent, but with the some 85 percent of its territory unusable, it is more accurate in geopolitical terms to think of it as a small archipelago with some very long bridges.) This grants the United States not only a potentially massive internal market, but also the ability to project power without the fear of facing rearguard security threats. U.S. forces can be focused almost entirely on offensive operations, whereas potential competitors in Eurasia must constantly be on their guard about the neighbors.
The only thing that could threaten U.S. security would be the rise of a Eurasian continental hegemon. For the past 60 years, Russia (or the Soviet Union) has been the only entity that has had a chance of achieving that, largely due to its geographic reach. U.S. strategy for coping with this is simple: containment, or the creation of a network of allies to hedge in Russian political, economic and military expansion. NATO is the most obvious manifestation of this policy imperative, while the Sino-Soviet split is the most dramatic one.
Containment requires that United States counter Russian expansionism at every turn, crafting a new coalition wherever Russia attempts to break out of the strategic ring, and if necessary committing direct U.S. forces to the effort. The Korean and Vietnam wars — both traumatic periods in American history — were manifestations of this effort, as were the Berlin airlift and the backing of Islamist militants in Afghanistan (who incidentally went on to form al Qaeda).
The Georgian war in August was simply the first effort by a resurging Russia to pulse out, expand its security buffer and, ideally, in the Kremlin’s plans, break out of the post-Cold War noose that other powers have tied. The Americans (and others) will react as they did during the Cold War: by building coalitions to constrain Russian expansion. In Europe, the challenges will be to keep the Germans on board and to keep NATO cohesive. In the Caucasus, the United States will need to deftly manage its Turkish alliance and find a means of engaging Iran. In China and Japan, economic conflicts will undoubtedly take a backseat to security cooperation.
Russia and the United States will struggle in all of these areas, consisting as they do the Russian borderlands. Most of the locations will feel familiar, as Russia’s near abroad has been Russia’s near abroad for nearly 300 years. Those locations — the Baltics, Austria, Ukraine, Serbia, Turkey, Central Asia and Mongolia — that defined Russia’s conflicts in times gone by will surface again. Such is the tapestry of history: the major powers seeking advantage in the same places over and over again.
The New Old-Front
But not all of those fronts are in Eurasia. So long as U.S. power projection puts the Russians on the defensive, it is only a matter of time before something along the cordon cracks and the Russians are either fighting a land war or facing a local insurrection. Russia must keep U.S. efforts dispersed and captured by events as far away from the Russian periphery as possible — preferably where Russian strengths can exploit American weakness.
So where is that?
Geography dictates that U.S. strength involves coalition building based on mutual interest and long-range force projection, and internal U.S. harmony is such that America’s intelligence and security agencies have no need to shine. Unlike Russia, the United States does not have large, unruly, resentful, conquered populations to keep in line. In contrast, recall that the multiethnic nature of the Russian state requires a powerful security and intelligence apparatus. No place better reflects Russia’s intelligence strengths and America’s intelligence weakness than Latin America.
The United States faces no traditional security threats in its backyard. South America is in essence a hollow continent, populated only on the edges and thus lacking a deep enough hinterland to ever coalesce into a single hegemonic power. Central America and southern Mexico are similarly fractured, primarily due to rugged terrain. Northern Mexico (like Canada) is too economically dependent upon the United States to seriously consider anything more vibrant than ideological hostility toward Washington. Faced with this kind of local competition, the United States simply does not worry too much about the rest of the Western Hemisphere — except when someone comes to visit.
Stretching back to the time of the Monroe Doctrine, Washington’s Latin American policy has been very simple. The United States does not feel threatened by any local power, but it feels inordinately threatened by any Eastern Hemispheric power that could ally with a local entity. Latin American entities cannot greatly harm American interests themselves, but they can be used as fulcrums by hostile states further abroad to strike at the core of the United States’ power: its undisputed command of North America.
It is a fairly straightforward exercise to predict where Russian activity will reach its deepest. One only needs to revisit Cold War history. Future Russian efforts can be broken down into three broad categories: naval interdiction, drug facilitation and direct territorial challenge.
Naval Interdiction
Naval interdiction represents the longest sustained fear of American policymakers. Among the earliest U.S. foreign efforts after securing the mainland was asserting control over the various waterways used for approaching North America. Key in this American geopolitical imperative is the neutralization of Cuba. All the naval power-projection capabilities in the world mean very little if Cuba is both hostile and serving as a basing ground for an extra-hemispheric power.
The U.S. Gulf Coast is not only the heart of the country’s energy industry, but the body of water that allows the United States to function as a unified polity and economy. The Ohio, Missouri, and Mississippi river basins all drain to New Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico. The economic strength of these basins depends upon access to oceanic shipping. A hostile power in Cuba could fairly easily seal both the Straits of Florida and the Yucatan Channel, reducing the Gulf of Mexico to little more than a lake.
Building on the idea of naval interdiction, there is another key asset the Soviets targeted at which the Russians are sure to attempt a reprise: the Panama Canal. For both economic and military reasons, it is enormously convenient to not have to sail around the Americas, especially because U.S. economic and military power is based on maritime power and access. In the Cold War, the Soviets established friendly relations with Nicaragua and arranged for a favorable political evolution on the Caribbean island of Grenada. Like Cuba, these two locations are of dubious importance by themselves. But take them together — and add in a Soviet air base at each location as well as in Cuba — and there is a triangle of Soviet airpower that can threaten access to the Panama Canal.
Drug Facilitation
The next stage — drug facilitation — is somewhat trickier. South America is a wide and varying land with very little to offer Russian interests. Most of the states are commodity providers, much like the Soviet Union was and Russia is today, so they are seen as economic competitors. Politically, they are useful as anti-American bastions, so the Kremlin encourages such behavior whenever possible. But even if every country in South America were run by anti-American governments, it would not overly concern Washington; these states, alone or en masse, lack the ability to threaten American interests … in all ways but one.
The drug trade undermines American society from within, generating massive costs for social stability, law enforcement, the health system and trade. During the Cold War, the Soviets dabbled with narcotics producers and smugglers, from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to the highland coca farmers of Bolivia. It is not so much that the Soviets encouraged the drug trade directly, but that they encouraged any group they saw as ideologically useful.
Stratfor expects future Russian involvement in such activities to eclipse those of the past. After the Soviet fall, many FSB agents were forced to find new means to financially support themselves. (Remember it was not until 1999 that Vladimir Putin took over the Russian government and began treating Russian intelligence like a bona fide state asset again.) The Soviet fall led many FSB agents, who already possessed more than a passing familiarity with things such as smuggling and organized crime, directly into the heart of such activities. Most of those agents are — formally or not — back in the service of the Russian government, now with a decade of gritty experience on the less savory side of intelligence under their belts. And they now have a deeply personal financial interest in the outcome of future operations.
Drug groups do not need cash from the Russians, but they do need weaponry and a touch of training — needs which dovetail perfectly with the Russians’ strengths. Obviously, Russian state involvement in such areas will be far from overt; it just does not do to ship weapons to the FARC or to one side of the brewing Bolivian civil war with CNN watching. But this is a challenge the Russians are good at meeting. One of Russia’s current deputy prime ministers, Igor Sechin, was the USSR’s point man for weapons smuggling to much of Latin America and the Middle East. This really is old hat for them.
U.S. Stability
Finally, there is the issue of direct threats to U.S. stability, and this point rests solely on Mexico. With more than 100 million people, a growing economy and Atlantic and Pacific ports, Mexico is the only country in the Western Hemisphere that could theoretically (which is hardly to say inevitably) threaten U.S. dominance in North America. During the Cold War, Russian intelligence gave Mexico more than its share of jolts in efforts to cause chronic problems for the United States. In fact, the Mexico City KGB station was, and remains today, the biggest in the world. The Mexico City riots of 1968 were in part Soviet-inspired, and while ultimately unsuccessful at overthrowing the Mexican government, they remain a testament to the reach of Soviet intelligence. The security problems that would be created by the presence of a hostile state the size of Mexico on the southern U.S. border are as obvious as they would be dangerous.
As with involvement in drug activities, which incidentally are likely to overlap in Mexico, Stratfor expects Russia to be particularly active in destabilizing Mexico in the years ahead. But while an anti-American state is still a Russian goal, it is not their only option. The Mexican drug cartels have reached such strength that the Mexican government’s control over large portions of the country is an open question. Failure of the Mexican state is something that must be considered even before the Russians get involved. And simply doing with the Mexican cartels what the Soviets once did with anti-American militant groups the world over could suffice to tip the balance.
In many regards, Mexico as a failed state would be a worse result for Washington than a hostile united Mexico. A hostile Mexico could be intimidated, sanctioned or even invaded, effectively browbeaten into submission. But a failed Mexico would not restrict the drug trade at all. The border would be chaos, and the implications of that go well beyond drugs. One of the United States’ largest trading partners could well devolve into a seething anarchy that could not help but leak into the U.S. proper.
Whether Mexico becomes staunchly anti-American or devolves into the violent chaos of a failed state does not matter much to the Russians. Either one would threaten the United States with a staggering problem that no amount of resources could quickly or easily fix. And the Russians right now are shopping around for staggering problems with which to threaten the United States.
In terms of cost-benefit analysis, all of these options are no-brainers. Threatening naval interdiction simply requires a few jets. Encouraging the drug trade can be done with a few weapons shipments. Destabilizing a country just requires some creativity. However, countering such activities requires a massive outlay of intelligence and military assets — often into areas that are politically and militarily hostile, if not outright inaccessible. In many ways, this is containment in reverse.
Old Opportunities, New Twists
In Nicaragua, President Daniel Ortega has proven so enthusiastic in his nostalgia for Cold War alignments that Nicaragua has already recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the two territories in the former Soviet state (and U.S. ally) of Georgia that Russia went to war to protect. That makes Nicaragua the only country in the world other than Russia to recognize the breakaway regions. Moscow is quite obviously pleased — and was undoubtedly working the system behind the scenes.
In Bolivia, President Evo Morales is attempting to rewrite the laws that govern his country’s wealth distribution in favor of his poor supporters in the indigenous highlands. Now, a belt of conflict separates those highlands, which are roughly centered at the pro-Morales city of Cochabamba, from the wealthier, more Europeanized lowlands. A civil war is brewing — a conflict that is just screaming for outside interference, as similar fights did during the Cold War. It is likely only a matter of time before the headlines become splattered with pictures of Kalashnikov-wielding Cochabambinos decrying American imperialism.
Yet while the winds of history are blowing in the same old channels, there certainly are variations on the theme. The Mexican cartels, for one, were radically weaker beasts the last time around, and their current strength and disruptive capabilities present the Russians with new options.
So does Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, a man so anti-American he seems to be even a few steps ahead of Kremlin propagandists. In recent days, Chavez has already hosted long-range Russian strategic bombers and evicted the U.S. ambassador. A glance at a map indicates that Venezuela is a far superior basing point than Grenada for threatening the Panama Canal. Additionally, Chavez’s Venezuela has already indicated both its willingness to get militarily involved in the Bolivian conflict and its willingness to act as a weapons smuggler via links to the FARC — and that without any heretofore detected Russian involvement. The opportunities for smuggling networks — both old and new — using Venezuela as a base are robust.
Not all changes since the Cold War are good for Russia, however. Cuba is not as blindly pro-Russian as it once was. While Russian hurricane aid to Cuba is a bid to reopen old doors, the Cubans are noticeably hesitant. Between the ailing of Fidel Castro and the presence of the world’s largest market within spitting distance, the emerging Cuban regime is not going to reflexively side with the Russians for peanuts. In Soviet times, Cuba traded massive Soviet subsidies in exchange for its allegiance. A few planeloads of hurricane aid simply won’t pay the bills in Havana, and it is still unclear how much money the Russians are willing to come up with.
There is also the question of Brazil. Long gone is the dysfunctional state; Brazil is now an emerging industrial powerhouse with an energy company, Petroleo Brasileiro, of skill levels that outshine anything the Russians have yet conquered in that sphere. While Brazilian rhetoric has always claimed that Brazil was just about to come of age, it now happens to be true. A rising Brazil is feeling its strength and tentatively pushing its influence into the border states of Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia, as well as into regional rivals Venezuela and Argentina. Russian intervention tends to appeal to those who do not feel they have meaningful control over their own neighborhoods. Brazil no longer fits into that category, and it will not appreciate Russia’s mucking around in its neighborhood.
A few weeks ago, Stratfor published a piece detailing how U.S. involvement in the Iraq war was winding to a close. We received many comments from readers applauding our optimism. We are afraid that we were misinterpreted. “New” does not mean “bright” or “better,” but simply different. And the dawning struggle in Latin America is an example of the sort of “different” that the United States can look forward to in the years ahead. Buckle up.
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http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=afNLX2fe1IFs&refer=europe
Medvedev Confronts U.S. on Missiles After Obama Win (Update1)
By Sebastian Alison and Lyubov Pronina
Nov. 5 (Bloomberg) -- Russian leader Dmitry Medvedev said he would deploy new missiles in Europe, confronting the U.S. hours after Barack Obama won the American presidential election.
Medvedev said he would place a short-range Iskander missile system in Russia's exclave of Kaliningrad, wedged between Poland and Lithuania, to ``neutralize'' a planned U.S. missile-defense system ``if necessary,'' Medvedev said. A radio-jamming installation in Kaliningrad will also be aimed at elements of the U.S. system in Poland and the Czech Republic, he said.
In the annual state-of-the-nation address today in the Kremlin, Medvedev avoided mentioning Obama while highlighting areas of tension between the two countries. Russian-U.S. ties are at their frostiest since the end of the Cold War, frayed by the planned missile shield, the war in Georgia and the U.S. push to admit Georgia and Ukraine to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
``This is a warning to Obama -- a bright, clear warning -- that tough negotiations are ahead,'' Alexander Rahr, a Russia expert at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin, said by telephone. Medvedev's ``fist-waving'' on the missile shield may be premature, since Obama has shown less support for the system than President George W. Bush, Rahr said.
Missile Shield
While Obama's positions on the war in Georgia and NATO's eastward expansion are similar to those of the Republican candidate, John McCain, and Bush, he has indicated greater flexibility on the missile shield.
Obama said he'll back the plan ``if it works and if it can be financially feasible,'' Michael McFaul, a Russia specialist at Stanford University who advised Obama during the campaign, said in an interview last month.
While announcing Russia's long-promised military response to the U.S. missile shield, Medvedev also expressed hope that Obama, unlike Bush, would engage with Russia on issues of common interest.
``Progress in Russian-American cooperation would be of critical importance,'' Medvedev said, adding that relations are going through a difficult period.
Medvedev said before the election that he was prepared to work with any new leader in Washington, though he expressed a veiled preference for Obama: ``It would be easier to work with people with a modern outlook, rather than those whose eyes are turned back to the past,'' he said. He congratulated Obama on his election victory by telegram, the Kremlin said.
Financial Crisis
The Russian leader renewed his criticism of the U.S. for the global financial crisis, saying that U.S. failure to coordinate its economic policy with other countries allowed a ``local'' crisis to cause ``a fall on the markets of the whole planet.'' He also said the U.S. provoked the war between Russia and Georgia in August, a position he had voiced before.
Medvedev chose the day when global attention was focused on the U.S. to announce a number of sweeping changes in domestic policy, including the extension of the Russian president's term in office to six years from four.
Russian presidents are now limited to two consecutive four- year terms. Putin, as president from 2000 until May of this year, strengthened the office by centralizing power. He became Medvedev's prime minister, and will be eligible to run in the next presidential contest.
Term Extension
``Increasing the term is timely,'' Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin told reporters after Medvedev's speech in Moscow today. ``It will allow the economy to work in a more stable manner. Six years is a good term.''
Medvedev said members of the State Duma, the lower house of parliament, should have their terms extended to five years from four, and that the government should report to parliament on an annual basis.
On the global financial crisis, Medvedev said the U.S., the European Union and the so-called BRIC countries -- Brazil, Russia, India and China -- must work together to create an economic system that will be ``more fair and more secure.'' He added that ``we must radically reform the political and economic systems. Russia, at all events, will insist on this.''
Medvedev travels to Washington on Nov. 15 for a summit on the financial crisis. Presidential spokeswoman Natalya Timakova said last week that no decision had been made on whether Medvedev would meet the new president during his visit.
`Barbaric Aggression'
His calls for a new global order come after the worst month for Russian investors in a decade. The 50-stock RTS Index dropped 36 percent in October, the biggest monthly decline since the government devalued the ruble and defaulted on domestic debt in 1998. Investors have withdrawn about $140 billion from Russia in the last three months, according to BNP Paribas SA.
Medvedev began his address in the Kremlin by blaming the U.S. for Russia's five-day war with Georgia in August, which followed attempts by President Mikheil Saakashvili to take by force the breakaway region of South Ossetia.
``The barbaric aggression against South Ossetia'' was encouraged by the U.S. and Russia's military response was used by NATO as an excuse to send warships to the Black Sea, Medvedev said.
To contact the reporter on this story: Sebastian Alison in Moscow at Salison1@bloomberg.net; Lyubov Pronina in Moscow at lpronina@bloomberg.net
Last Updated: November 5, 2008 09:02 EST
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**Russia, not cutting a break to our woefully unready president-elect.**
http://formerspook.blogspot.com/
About that Test...
While President-elect Obama basks in the glow of his electoral victory, our adversaries are apparently working on that "test" that Joe Biden talked about.
Just hours after Mr. Obama president-elect, Russia announced that it will base surface-to-surface missiles within range of our planned missile defense site in Poland.
According to Russian President Dimitry Medvedev, Moscow will deploy short-range SS-26 Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad region to "neutralize" the planned missile defense system. He also stated that Russia plans to jam a radar located in the Czech Republic, used to detect in-bound missiles and guide the Polish-based interceptors.
With a range of at least 400 km, Iskander missiles based in Kaliningrad would be able to target the defensive site in Poland. The proposed deployment is the most serious challenge to U.S. plans to base missile defenses in eastern Europe. Washington has stated (repeatedly) that the defensive shield is designed to protect the continent from missiles launched from rogue states, such as Iran. Moscow rejects that argument, claiming that the system is actually aimed at Russia.
While Moscow has long opposed U.S. missile defenses in Europe, the timing of today's announcement is no accident. Mr. Medvedev and his political puppet master, Vladimir Putin, are quite aware of yesterday's election results in the United States. With the departure of George Bush, who championed the deployment, the Russians are mounting a challenge to his successor, who is opposed to "unproven" missile defense systems.
In some respects, the SS-26 movement to Kaliningrad is the first "shot across the bow" of the incoming administration. Moscow is waiting to see if Obama has "steel in his spine," and will stand up to a deliberate Russian provocation. So are our eastern European allies, who wonder if the new president will stand with them against the Russian bear.
***
On a related note, Iran is warning the U.S. "not to violate its airspace." Get ready for that 3 a.m phone call.
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http://hotair.com/archives/2008/11/06/russia-has-some-change-ready-for-obama/
Putin (Martial artist, chess player and would-be neo-Tsar of a new Russian empire) makes his opening move and waits to see Obama's reaction. Anyone betting on Obama to not Fcuk this up?
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FWIW my current thinking is that Bush has left the US in a bad position with Russia by badly overplaying our hand and by not understanding what was at stake.
He should have expanded our military back in 2004 as his opponent Senator Kerry said-- but he was too fcuking full of hubris to admit that we needed to do so.
THEN he kept on treating Russia like we weren't extended and could extend right up to their borders.
He failed to appreciate that what Russia's play in Georgia was about was about Central Asian gas and oil. See e.g. my post today in the Russia Big Picture (or something like that) thread.
So, while I certainly agree that McCain would be a far better president-elect to have at this moment and that we may soon come to deeply regret having an utter neophyte at the helm, as an American my first concern is what AMERICA should do.
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The whole Russia issue was neglected since the Clinton administration. Putin has been subtly making moves, prepping the environment, waiting for his moment. Now the guy that should be wearing the trainee hat is about to be running things, Putin sees his chance to force us to turn tail and abandon our allies.
What can we do? We can show the weakness that europe loves or hold our ground and see who blinks first. Don't think that others aren't watching carefully, waiting to see if Obama isn't just as weak and inept as I/they expect.
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In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Empire, I think it understandable for the US (not just Clinton) to have relaxed mentally. OTOH Bush, with alleged Russian expert Condi Rice at his elbow, chose to pursue a very particular policy and signs were there to see e.g. Kosovo. If we weren't busy elsewhere it may well have been a valid approach, but we WERE busy elsewhere and IMHO he badly overplayed our hand. It IS an ugly situation that BO has inherited and I fear he will make it uglier.
I hated what the Dems did to Bush over Iraq and I AM A BETTER AMERICAN THAN THE DESTRUCTIVE ONES WERE-- so for me the frame of referenceis what is good for America.
Specifically WHAT should we do in response to the Russian actions?
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Our choices:
1. Abandon our allies and usher in a new era of American weakness.
2. Locate a Russian pressure point and push it. As bad as our economy is, theirs is much worse.
3. Make a deal, trade something they want in exchange for them backing off on this point.
4. Direct confrontation. See who blinks first.
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The decline of oil prices and continuing Russian demographic weakness suggest that we need not run for the hills just yet :wink:
Here's this from today's WSJ:
Obama's Russia Test Article
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'Mark my words. It will not be six months before the world tests Barack Obama. . . . I guarantee you it's gonna happen." Joe Biden's famous campaign gaffe-as-prophecy was off by six months. How Mr. Obama responds to the Kremlin's provocation this week will offer an important glimpse of his Administration's approach to foreign policy.
In the yearly state of the nation address on Wednesday, President Dmitry Medvedev blamed the Georgia war, Russia's tanking markets and declining bilateral relations on a "selfish" and "mistaken, egotistical and sometimes simply dangerous" America. Presumably for effect, the national address was moved from last month to Wednesday, and started and ended with anti-U.S. tirades.
The Russian President also announced plans to deploy missiles in the Kaliningrad enclave between NATO members Poland and Lithuania unless America drops plans to deploy missile defenses in Europe. He added that Russia would jam U.S. radar. This would be an act of war if an Iranian missile, the intended target of the defenses, slipped through the net and hit America or its allies.
The U.S. struck agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic to put missile interceptors and radar on their territory after long negotiations. The countries agreed at some political risk, and clearly the Kremlin is hoping it can intimidate the new Administration into disavowing that commitment. It bears repeating that the system in no way diminishes Russia's own nuclear deterrent.
The State Department responded with its typical thunder, calling the speech "disappointing." President Bush, the U.S. head of state for another two-plus months, has said nothing. Mr. Obama's aides say the President-elect doesn't want to undermine Mr. Bush during the transition, and is focused on building his Administration.
That's fine. But he could help U.S. interests and himself merely by putting on record that an Obama-led America won't be intimidated by threatening outbursts from Russian leaders and will be a reliable partner to its allies in Europe. Any hint of doubt from the next Administration on this point will send shivers through our NATO allies and encourage more bad behavior by Russia and others. The Kremlin is doing Mr. Obama a favor by testing him so early.
All the more because Congressional Democrats have given the impression that U.S. support for Poland or NATO aspirants Ukraine and Georgia is negotiable. Money for the missile defense program was struck in May by Democrats who claimed the threat from Iran wasn't materializing quickly and a deal with Poland hadn't been signed. Some funding was restored after Poland agreed to host 10 missile-defense interceptors in August. We also hear from liberal quarters that America really is to blame for the deteriorating relationship with Moscow. The Kremlin has heard that too.
No matter who's in charge at the White House, the U.S. won't easily get along with a Russia that chokes off political freedoms at home and threatens neighboring democracies. Fortunately, America has built up strong alliances with free European countries that are, in turn, now willing to help defend the U.S. and Europe against a rogue missile threat. It'd be nice to hear from the next President that he stands by these alliances.
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It's not just Russia that watching Obama very closely. The whole world is watching, but our enemies around the world are watching to see just how much of a victim Obama is willing to be.
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U.S., Russia: The Future of START
Stratfor Today » November 6, 2008 | 2139 GMT
DIMA KOROTAYEV/AFP/Getty Images
Topol-M mobile intercontinental ballistic missilesSummary
The bilateral strategic arms control regime between the United States and Russia — essentially static for many years — could be revitalized in 2009. In December of next year, the so-called START I treaty between the United and Russia will expire, and both sides have a keen interest in its extension and ultimate replacement.
The Russian Resurgence
“The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms” (known colloquially as START I) will expire on Dec. 5, 2009. Though real substantive action is unlikely before President-elect Barack Obama enters office, some meaningful action on a bilateral strategic arms agreement between the United States and Russia may be on the horizon.
The expiration of START has been anticipated for years now, but Washington has shown little interest in moving forward on strategic arms control. Even before the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. national security establishment was struggling with a deep uncertainty about the need for nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold War world and no longer wanted to be locked into a highly structured and inflexible treaty governing force structure.
START I, crafted just before the Soviet collapse, is characteristic of Cold War-era treaties — complex, detailed and entailing a rigorous declaration, inspection and verification regime. By comparison, the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT, also known as the Moscow Treaty), signed in 2002, is an astonishingly short document, amounting to a single page. This brevity was possible (and, more important, the treaty was verifiable) because SORT was underpinned by the START I regime. SORT will not endure much beyond the expiration of START I, requiring only that on the last day of 2012 the United States and Russia shall have an aggregate number of deployed strategic warheads of between 1,700 and 2,200 apiece.
This specific range of aggregate warhead totals — 1,700 to 2,200 — actually came from a Pentagon study on post-Cold War requirements for an effective nuclear deterrent. Essentially, the White House took what the Pentagon wanted to do anyway and crafted a treaty asking Russia to do the same thing.
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But both Washington and Moscow want something here. The United States — despite its strong desire for maximizing flexibility — does recognize the value of a long-term, verifiable and stable nuclear balance with Russia. With a properly tailored regime of regular declarations and inspections, the Pentagon can establish, with an acceptable degree of confidence, the status of Russia’s nuclear forces and significantly reduce the burden on operational forces to monitor and hedge against the unknowns. Despite the fact that it won the Cold War, the United States has no interest in going back to the days of nuclear brinkmanship. It has become accustomed to and welcomes the ongoing stability of the post-Cold War nuclear balance, so long as it retains enough flexibility to have options for dealing with other nuclear powers.
Thus, while the United States seems interested only in something loose like SORT, a somewhat longer document (though significantly shorter than START I, if Washington has its way) will almost certainly be necessary to establish declaration, inspection and verification regimes that will ensure an acceptable degree of confidence in the fidelity of both sides. Washington considers this an opportunity to set aside START I and tailor a regime for the 21st century. But if that agreement cannot be crafted quickly, an extension of START I may be considered — if only to bridge the gap.
For Russia, there is a strong desire for a long-term cap on the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Moscow remembers all too well how U.S. defense spending during the Reagan years helped drive the Soviet Union into the ground. Russia is well aware that it cannot hope to compete in another arms race with the resources and raw economic power of the United States.
Meanwhile, old age is wreaking havoc on Moscow’s nuclear arsenal, where delivery systems are becoming increasingly archaic and nowhere near enough replacements are being produced fast enough to sustain the arsenal. Thus, the further Russia can convince the United States to reduce its own arsenal, the more obtainable a long-term arsenal quantitatively comparable to Washington’s can be.
But while the Kremlin signed SORT from a position of weakness, Moscow today sees an opportunity to approach the United States from a position of strength. In 2009, Russia will come to the table having consolidated its political, economic and military power under the tenure of President (now Prime Minister) Vladimir Putin and having essentially annexed two secessionist territories from Georgia. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s Nov. 5 State of the State address was filled with defiance — not the least because, from the Kremlin’s point of view, not only is Obama amenable to such an agreement but he also will be weak in dealing with Russia and peripheral states of the former Soviet Union. (Whether this proves to be the case is another question.)
At the end of the day, the Kremlin will want a new agreement. But it will not be rubber-stamping any numbers brought directly from the Pentagon this time around. It will push for a more rigorous treaty that keeps the scale of the U.S. arsenal down and constrains Washington’s flexibility. And it will push hard — or use concessions as a lever — to challenge the proposed U.S. ballistic missile defense installations slated for Poland and the Czech Republic.
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Russia locating new missile launchers near a missile defense site? Sounds like a problem already solved. Also sounds like George Bush proved right at least this once by history and events. Obama (version 1.0) opposed missile defense (and favored tax increases). Somehow he figured out to 'delay' tax increases in a challenged economy. Maybe he will also 'delay' unilateral disarmament, especially the defensive systems, until the Soviet resurgent, KGB-run, nuclear warhead missile threat subsides.
My solution would be to match Russia's recognition of South Ossetia with our recognition of Kaliningrad. If they declare independence, join the EU and NATO, maybe they can keep the missiles aim them a different direction.
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Geopolitical Diary: Russia, Obama and the S-300
December 18, 2008
There has been extensive discussion of the idea that U.S. President-elect Barack Obama might be tested early in his term by foreign powers, much as other presidents have been tested. If reports in the Russian media are correct, Obama’s first test is starting to take shape: According to RIA Novosti news agency, Russia is in the process of “implementing a contract” that would ultimately deliver the S-300 strategic air defense system to Iran.
Rumors concerning the S-300 have been on-again, off-again for years, but RIA Novosti reported that “Moscow has earlier met its obligations on supplying Tor-M1 systems to Iran and is currently implementing a contract to deliver S-300 systems.” The news agency also quoted Alexander Fomin, deputy head of the federal agency in charge of Russia’s military exports, as saying, “Russia’s military and technical cooperation with Iran has a positive impact on stability in this region.” Fomin added, “We have developed, are developing and will continue to develop this cooperation further. The region’s security to a large extent depends on this.” The article follows reports that an Israeli military delegation traveled to Moscow in recent days to try to dissuade Russia from delivering the weapons.
The importance of the S-300 — specifically the more modern PMU series — is that it would increase the difficulty of air attacks against Iran. The first stage of any attack is the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). Except in the case of a sudden attack on a single target, SEAD is a precursor to any sustained air campaign, and given the relatively large number of Iranian nuclear sites, taking out those facilities would involve such an extended campaign. Having to suppress a series of S-300PMU batteries would extend substantially the number of sorties and the time required for this phase of the attack.
This would affect both Israeli and American calculations. Given the size of Israel’s air force and the distances involved, the additional attrition and time involved in the SEAD phase might well extend an Iran campaign beyond Israel’s capabilities. It is not clear whether the S-300 would take a conventional Israeli option off the table, but it certainly would make things more difficult should Israel decide to carry out the attack. The United States would have greater ability to make such a move, but Washington’s recent agreement with Baghdad stipulates that Iraq cannot be used as a base for attacks against neighboring countries. And the Turks do not want the Americans to attack Iran from their soil. Put simply, the introduction of the S-300 would push the difficulty of a non-nuclear attack to the limit for Israel and complicate matters for the United States.
Of course, this is what the Russians mean to do. We do not know what happened during the conversations U.S. Sen. Richard Lugar and former secretary of state Henry Kissinger held in Moscow in recent days, but the Russians clearly have decided to turn up the heat. Russia has shifted its position from not wanting to increase tensions through the sale of the S-300 to seeing the sale as stabilizing the region — which it would do at the expense of potentially reducing U.S. and Israeli options.
Moscow does not want the Iranians to have nuclear weapons, but the Russian view is that the Iranians are rather far away from developing them. The more important issue for Russia is forcing the Americans to recognize Moscow’s sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union - by withdrawing their support for Ukraine, Georgia and other countries in the region. For the United States, the Iranian issue has been a priority. The Russians have just made it clear that if the Americans do not give them what they want, they will complicate U.S. policy on Iran as much as they can.
Obama takes office in about a month. It is not clear what point the Russians have reached in actually transferring S-300s, but in a month’s time, they could be either on the verge of transferring or already in the process. That means Obama will be forced to respond very quickly to Russia’s action. His options include forcing some sort of confrontation with the Russians; doing nothing, and thus accepting Russia’s intrusion into a core American interest; moving rapidly to deal with Iran; or (and we doubt intensely that he would choose this option) moving to strike Iran before the S-300s become operational.
It may be that American defense analysts will conclude that the S-300 does not significantly affect the balance of power in the region. But the S-300 does affect the psychological balance. The Iranians will feel that they are far less isolated than the Americans want them to feel, and that change alone will have a significant effect. Whether viewed militarily or politically, Russia’s action matters.
This is not a situation on the scale of the Cuban missile crisis, but it is a significant challenge to American interests on Russia’s part. If Obama does nothing, he will be seen as weak; if he gives the Russians what they want, he will be seen as an appeaser. And if he moves toward a major crisis or even military action, he will be seen as overly aggressive. With this move, Russia’s aim was to push Obama into a corner and say, in Russian, “Welcome to the big leagues.”
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By LEON ARON
Russia faces a particularly nasty version of the global recession (at a minimum), and perhaps an economic "perfect storm." Regardless of how bad its economy gets, two broad political trends, each carrying profound implications for Russia's foreign policy and U.S.-Russian relations, are bound to emerge.
David KleinThe first will be a growing dissatisfaction with the government, which may lead to a political crisis. The second will be a reactionary retrenchment: increased internal repression and more of its already troubling foreign policy. Managing the relationship with Moscow in the face of these trends is something President-elect Barack Obama and his administration should start thinking about now.
The size and depth of Russia's economic problems -- and thus the amount of political turbulence -- will depend primarily on two variables. The first is the ruble decline. The national currency is steadily depreciating and has reached an all-time low against the euro despite the central bank's having spent $161 billion on its defense since mid-September. The ruble's losing at least 25% to 30% of its value is a given; the key political issue is whether the weakening can be managed into a gradual decline, or whether the depreciation turns into a panicky flight from the currency. (Already last September Russians dumped around 160 billion rubles to buy $6 billion -- the highest demand for dollars since the aftermath of the 1998 financial crisis.)
The second factor is oil prices. Last year, oil revenues accounted for at least one-fifth of Russia's GDP and half of state revenues. At $40 a barrel, the state budget goes into a 3%-4% deficit. In the past eight years, the national economy has mirrored fluctuating oil prices. So the 7%-8% growth projected for 2008 will have to be cut at best to 1%-2% for 2009. Zero growth or contraction are distinct possibilities.
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Such a predicament is most dangerous politically for a country whose population has become used to incomes increasing 8%-10% every year since 2000. Growing disappointment is sure to follow, first among the elites and then people at large.
Despite the reduction of the poverty rate to 14% from 20% in the last five years, tens of millions of Russians continue to live precariously: A recent poll found that 37% of all families have money enough only to cover food. Unemployment and inflation (already 14%, year-on-year, in November) may well push these people over the edge and into the streets.
Perilous for any regime, such disenchantment would be especially worrisome in a country where the legitimacy of the entire political structure appears to rest on the popularity of one man, Vladimir Putin, whose astronomic ratings stemmed largely from the relative economic prosperity he has presided over. This dangerously narrow legitimacy will be sorely tried in the coming months.
Forestalling or at least containing inevitable political consequences of the economic crisis is likely to be at the root of the other political tendency: an attempt by the Putin-led elite, coalesced around Gazprom, Rosneft, state corporations and the loyal industrial "oligarchs," to pre-empt challenges by beefing up the authoritarian "vertical of power." The rewriting of the constitution to give the president 12 consecutive years in office signals the implementation of this strategy. The amendment was overwhelmingly passed by both houses of the Federal Assembly within three weeks in November, ratified by all 83 regional parliaments in less than a month. President Dmitry Medvedev signed it into law yesterday.
One scenario bruited about in Moscow has Mr. Medvedev taking full responsibility for the crisis and resigning to free the Kremlin for the caretaker prime minister (Mr. Putin), soon to be re-elected president.
A bill introduced in the Duma on Dec. 12 expands the definition of treason, punishable by up to 20 years in prison, to "taking action aimed at endangering the constitutional order, sovereignty and territorial integrity" of Russia. That same day the parliament approved the elimination of the right to jury trials for defendants charged with treason. The ruthlessness with which the riot police troops, the OMON, attacked protesters, journalists and bystanders in Vladivostok over the weekend of Dec. 20 may be a preview of things to come.
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– James BacchusA reactionary crackdown will also mean the continuation and intensification of the already incessant and deafening propaganda portraying Russia as a "besieged fortress," surrounded by the U.S.-led enemies on the outside and undermined by the "fifth column" of the democratic political opposition within. In the words of one of the most astute independent columnists, the courageous Yulia Latyinina, the rabid anti-Americanism, which has become a linchpin of the regime's domestic political strategy, is likely to turn into a full-blown "hysteria."
The key lesson of George W. Bush's dealings with Russia is that the Kremlin's foreign policy priorities are determined by the changing ideology and the domestic political agenda of Russia's rulers to a far greater degree than by anything the U.S. does or does not do. (Which is why the U.S. exit from the antiballistic missile treaty was accepted with equanimity in 2002, while the intent to install a rudimentary antimissile system provoked Moscow's fury in 2007.) If reaction advances at home, the Kremlin will continue a truculent or outright aggressive foreign policy of resurgence and retribution, intended, among other things, to distract from and justify domestic repression. The recovery of geostrategic assets lost in the Soviet collapse will remain Moscow's overarching objective, especially in the territory of the former Soviet Union.
The Obama White House will have to navigate a difficult and narrow path in its relations with Moscow in 2009 between continuing to engage Moscow on the key issues of mutual concern (Iran, missile defense, nonproliferation, terrorism), on the one hand, and the broader strategic goal of assisting democratic stabilization in Russia.
But no matter what the Kremlin leaders and their propaganda stooges say in public, anything interpreted as approval or even a mere sign of respect by America, first and foremost by its president, is a huge boost to the government's domestic popularity and legitimacy. So the natural, almost protocol-dictated, inclination of the new administration to show good will must be balanced against firm support for the return to political and economic liberalization in Russia. Throwing diplomatic lifelines to a regime that refuses to choose such a path out of the crisis is not in America's -- and Russia's -- long-term interests.
Mr. Aron is director of Russian studies at the American Enterprise Institute and the author, most recently, of "Russia's Revolution: Essays 1989-2007" (AEI, 2007).
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The Russia-NATO Council will meet on Monday for its first gathering since the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008. The official agenda calls for discussions between the NATO ambassadors and Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitri Rogozin on the fallout from the war. However, this topic is ancient history in the minds of most of the alliance members and Russia.
There is a much bigger and more important topic on the table: NATO needs supplementary routes to get supplies to troops to Afghanistan and is looking to create routes that transit Central Asia — an area where Russia is czar.
We have been closely following the actions of the United States, the Central Asian states and Russia over this issue. The recent moves began with a meeting in early December between two heavyweights, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Henry Kissinger, an unofficial White House adviser. This meeting did not seem to go well: In the days following, Russia announced a number of defense deals with countries unfriendly to Washington, like Iran. But a shift occurred soon afterward, when the United States began to pursue negotiations with the Central Asian states — with a tour by U.S. Central Command chief Gen. David Petraeus — without Russia’s blessing. Russia began countering the United States’ moves this past week and will continue to do so, with a series of meetings in the same states over the next two weeks.
Negotiations have never moved so quickly on matters concerning Central Asia. This part of the world tends to move at a much slower pace, dragging out meetings and decisions — especially on security deals — for years. Security negotiations between the United States and Russia have rarely moved this fast either since the two powers divided up allies after World War II. But the moves are aggressive now, because Washington needs to lock down a new supply route leading from Central Asia to Afghanistan now rather than later.
Petraeus faces a deadline for submitting his team’s strategy on Afghanistan to U.S. President Barack Obama and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This document is mainly a strategy piece laying out the core objectives for the year — everything from denying Pakistan leverage to undermining the Taliban’s support in key districts. The logistics and tactical details of alternate supply routes do not necessarily have to be included in this document, but having an alternate supply route plays into every other detail.
The other reason for accelerating negotiations for an alternative route is that the U.S. military’s plan to increase troops in Afghanistan is now in motion. The United States and NATO feel that they rely too heavily on routes through Pakistan, along which roughly 75 percent of supplies to Afghanistan travel. The immense logistical demands of the operations already under way — let alone the increased operations Washington has planned — are well beyond the capacity of aerial resupply alone.
By the time the spring thaw arrives, U.S. and NATO and Taliban offensives will be in full swing. The Pentagon will be surging troops into Afghanistan as fast as possible. That surge will require even more vehicles, more ammunition, more fuel, more food and supplies, spare parts and the like — some of which will need to begin arriving ahead of the troops that will be using them.
Simply to keep reliance on Pakistani routes from increasing, some alternative arrangement is necessary. Based on Petraeus’ recent trip and other maneuvers, a Central Asian route is the clear priority. And time is of the essence. But an arrangement with Russia almost certainly will be needed to secure acquiescence from states in that region.
The Americans and Russians are spending more time countering each other than finding a deal. They have not yet met with each other since the Central Asians were brought into the negotiations. They will meet at the Russia-NATO Council on Monday, but Moscow is not looking for talks that are not between those at the top. This means Russia wants to meet with either Obama or new Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Rumors have been flying of upcoming meetings, but every time the United States offers to meet, the Russians swerve as if the negotiations were a game.
This is because the Russians know that the Americans are in a hurry. The Russians feel they are in a position of strength and that they can keep drawing the matter out until the United States comes to the table with an enticing deal. This would involve much larger issues than Afghanistan: It means movement between Washington and Moscow over the future of all former Soviet turf. Until then, the Russians are going to savor having the upper hand while the United States scrambles.
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http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article5599603.ece
Russian military a 'paper tiger' despite symbolic comeback, says IISS
Russia may be flexing its military muscle once again, sending warships into international waters and dispatching long-range bombers on reconnaissance trips, but the former superpower remains a paper tiger, a respected London think-tank has concluded.
The recent warship manoeuvres in the Mediterranean and Latin America were just “symbolic” gestures, carried out by the former maritime giant that was able to deploy only a small number of ships while the rest of the fleet was tied up at home without enough money to keep them in business, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) said.
In February last year, a naval force led by the carrier Admiral Kuznetsov completed a two-month deployment, including a period in the Mediterranean – one of the longest of its kind since the Cold War, the IISS said in its annual Military Balance. A second naval deployment took place in October en route to an exercise with the Venezuelan Navy, and a Russian warship has joined the anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden.
Oksana Antonenko, senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the institute, however, told a press conference at the launch of the Military Balance: “In military terms it was all very modest. This is not a major military comeback, it was just a symbolic deployment.”
She cast doubt on Russia’s ability to project force, and despite the “victory” of Russian troops in Georgia last August, their performance had highlighted their limited capabilities. She predicted that next year Moscow’s defence budget would suffer from an even greater deficit. “It’s hard to envisage a substantial increase in defence spending,” she said.
The IISS assessment clashes with the high-profile foreign policy approach adopted by Vladimir Putin, the Russian Prime Minister. There was not enough money, she said, for Russia to achieve what it wanted in military terms.
There was also “a lack of consensus” between different sections of the Russian Armed Forces, with some elements of the army hierarchy wanting to remain focused on territorial defence, and the nuclear establishment insisting on the Army training for force projection beyond Russia’s security borders.
Radical reform, however, was being introduced, with the aim of converting the “top-heavy divisions” into more flexible brigades, and the Military Balance said that national pride in Russia’s military forces was being restored.
Russia remained “very sensitive”, Ms Antonenko said, to Nato’s enlargement programme, particularly since Georgia and Ukraine had been put on the list of potential new members of the alliance. Dialogue with the Russian military was suspended after the brief war in Georgia and is only now being reinstated.
Ms Antonenko, however, said that there was no clear understanding in Moscow of what Nato was trying to do with its enlargement programme, and she called for a totally different dialogue between Russia and the alliance. Up until now there had only been a “virtual relationship” with Moscow.
She saw signs of a better working arrangement with the announcement that Russia was willing to consider allowing Nato to use a northern corridor through Russian territory for ferrying supplies to alliance troops in Afghanistan.
John Chipman, director-general and chief executive of IISS, said that in the aftermath of the conflict in Georgia, the Russians had announced plans for radical reforms, including turning the Army into a fully professional force. “This restructuring could make Russian armed forces more capable to operate against modern threats and potentially better interoperable with western forces,” he said.
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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7853736.stm
Russia has accused Georgia of capturing a Russian soldier in the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia, Russian news agencies report.
A Russian defence ministry spokesman said soldier Alexander Glukhov had been seized in the Akhalgori region.
Georgia's interior ministry said the soldier had surrendered to its police, requesting Georgian citizenship.
The Akhalgori region was under Tbilisi's control until last August's war between Georgia and Russia.
During the brief war, Georgia's attempts to regain control of South Ossetia were repelled by Russian forces.
Tbilisi has urged Moscow to withdraw forces from Akhalgori after the conflict ended with an EU-brokered ceasefire.
'Provocation'
"A preliminary investigation has revealed that Alexander Glukhov was captured by Georgian forces in the Akhalgori region of South Ossetia and taken to Tbilisi," Russian defence ministry spokesman Colonel Alexander Drobyshevsky told Russian news agencies.
Col Drobyshevsky said the defence ministry was demanding that Tbilisi hand back the soldier.
The spokesman also described comments by the Georgian defence ministry as "provocation".
Tbilisi said the 21-year-old deserted the Russian army on Monday night.
In a televised interview filmed by the Georgian army, Alexander Glukhov said he decided to seek asylum in Georgia because he was fed up with poor conditions in the Russian army.
He also said that he had to go without food in the Russian army during the cold winter.
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God, this sounds like the coldest days of the Cold War in conquered eastern Europe :x
Lets follow up on this at http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=1673.0
PS: Very glad to see your peregrinations bring you our way once again 8-)
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frigging russians. they cost my company several large aerospace contracts in Georgia last summer. I'm looking forward to the day that the muslims turn on them as all rabid, gutless ungrateful animals do.
Something some of you may not know, The Republic of Georgia is the home to one of the largest populations of Jews outside of Israel and has existed in place longer then any other. One of the partners of our families firm is Israeli and set us up there to do business. Wonderful people, i think they felt betrayed by the west when Russia rolled them and the western media falsely reported events there. The russians and muslims instigated that whole mess. The russians and their puppets have been shelling them since the fall, assassinating politicians and intimidating Georgians living on the border. Not one event has made it into the MSM.
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Lets follow up on this at http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=1673.0
:-)
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Russia offers Obama olive branch on missiles: report
Wednesday, Jan 28, 2009 1:27PM UTC
By Christian Lowe
MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia has halted plans to deploy missiles near the Polish border, a Russian news agency quoted the military as saying on Wednesday, in the clearest sign yet Moscow is seeking better ties with the new U.S. administration.
Moscow had threatened to deploy the missiles to counter a missile shield proposed by former President George W. Bush for eastern Europe. President Barack Obama has not reversed Bush's decision but has said he would consider it on its merits.
Analysts said if confirmed the Russian move -- which follows a phone conversation this week between Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev -- could open the way for renewed dialogue on other issues that divide their countries.
"The earlier Russian announcement that they were going to deploy missiles ... and point them at NATO allies was unwelcome. If that decision has now been rescinded, it is a good step," said NATO spokesman James Appathurai.
The U.S. envoy to NATO had earlier said that, if confirmed, the Russian move would be a "positive step."
Medvedev said a day after Obama's election victory he was ordering the deployment of Iskander missile systems to Russia's Western outpost of Kaliningrad, which borders European Union members Poland and Lithuania.
"The implementation of these plans has been halted in connection with the fact that the new U.S. administration is not rushing through plans to deploy" elements of its missile defense shield in eastern Europe, Interfax quoted an unnamed official in the Russian military's general staff as saying.
It was not clear though if the report represented a firm shift in policy. There was no confirmation from the Russian military that the Iskander deployment was being suspended and a Kremlin official said he could not offer immediate comment.
The threat of deploying the Iskander missiles was largely symbolic because, military analysts said, Russia does not have enough operational missile systems to station in Kaliningrad.
The missile issue is likely to be on the agenda if, as expected, Medvedev and Obama meet on April 2 on the sidelines of a Group of 20 summit in London.
"It (the suspension of missile deployment) is a signal to Obama of Moscow's goodwill," Yevgeny Volk, an analyst in Moscow with the Heritage Foundation think tank, told Reuters.
"In response they want a decision not to deploy the missile defense shield in eastern Europe."
Obama also faces a series of other challenges in dealing with Russia, including bridging differences over Iran, NATO expansion and strategic arms control.
Some observers believe the Kremlin may be softening its assertive foreign policy style because the economic slowdown -- which has seen the rouble lose about a quarter of its value since July -- has dented its confidence.
U.S. POLICY SHIFT?
The administration of former U.S. President George W. Bush angered the Kremlin with its push to deploy interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic.
It said the system was needed to protect from potential missile strikes by what it called "rogue states" -- specifically Iran and North Korea.
The White House has not announced any change of policy on the missile shield, but a nominee for a top Pentagon post in the Obama administration said this month the plan would be reviewed as part of a regular broad look at policy.
Russia has argued that the proposed system would threaten its own national security and was further evidence -- along with the eastward expansion of the NATO alliance -- of Western military influence encroaching near its borders.
The row over the shield has helped drive diplomatic ties between Moscow and Washington to their lowest level since the end of the Cold War.
But Russian officials have said they are encouraged by early signals from the Obama administration and hopeful of a fresh start in their relations.
(Additional reporting by David Brunnstrom in Brussels; Writing by Christian Lowe; Editing by Ralph Boulton)
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Russian stability threatened by anger over economy
The financial crisis is threatening to destabilise Russia amid unprecedented calls for the resignation of Vladimir Putin and his government.
The prime minister, who is accustomed to adulation, is facing one of the sternest challenges of his political career as an economic slow down triggers growing public discontent.
The normally supportive Communist Party has called for country wide protests on Saturday, threatening to harness "a wave of popular rage".
Officials said they expected at least 600,000 people to take part in demonstrations held across dozens of cities. Among calls for improved living standards, the protests will also demand the resignation of Mr Putin and his cabinet.
According to opinion polls, Mr Putin remains popular, enjoying an approval rating of 83 per cent. Even now, with the economy under strain, there is no sign of a challenger, who could usurp his place in the heart of most Russians.
Yet the Kremlin is planning a hardline response with several of the demonstrations being banned outright and the law has been changed to remove the right of protest organisers to trial by jury.
Seeking to show his affection among the people remained undimmed, Mr Putin's ruling party is forcing factory workers in to holding public rallies of loyalty this week that will proclaim the prime minister's wisdom and munificence.
Commentators say the administration's unease is understandable. Mr Putin has built his reputation on rebuilding Russia's economy – shattered in the decade following the collapse of communism – and pursing an aggressive policy that returned the country to international prominence.
Now, however, the economy is starting to stumble – a fact that could undermine the prime minister's ambition to carve a global role for Russia.
Government figures show the Russian economy shrank 0.7 per cent in December, the first year-on-year decline since the 1990s. One million people lost their jobs in the same month as falling oil prices undermined Russia's energy driven economy.
The Kremlin's unease has been deepened by the spectacle of mass protests on Russia's periphery and beyond. Police have broken up violent anti government protests in Latvia and Lithuania, whilst smaller demonstrations have erupted in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary, all of which are struggling to deal with the financial crisis.
Protests in Iceland forced the government to call early elections last week. In Russia itself, a country where most are too afraid to protest even if they wanted to, a small but growing number is willing to take to the streets.
Analysts say they do not expect these weekends' protests to be large enough to threaten the government but warn that they could mark the beginning of a dangerous trend.
"The number of unhappy people is still manageable but is on the rise," said Nikolai Petrov, of the Moscow Carnegie Centre. "There is especial danger in cities and towns where local industry has collapsed."
Last month, the Kremlin was jolted from its complacency when thousands took to the streets of Vladivostok, Russia's third city. They marched to protest Mr Putin's decision to raise tariffs on imported cars by up to 80 per cent, a move that could prove economically devastating in the Russian Far East and is expected to cost 100,000 jobs.
Alarming for the Kremlin, the demonstrations took on a political hue with protesters demanding the entire government's resignation. To deep embarrassment in Moscow, placards urged Japan – where most of Russia's imported cars come from – to colonise Vladivostok. With second hand foreign cars popular among middle class Russians the protests spread.
In St Petersburg, one placard called on Mr Putin to " switch to a trolley" – a reference to the fact that the prime minister is ferried around in an imported Mercedes. Such direct criticism is virtually unheard of.
More disturbingly, the Vladivostok police defied orders to quell the demonstrations. Even ruling party officials in the region publicly stated their support for the protest. Moscow was forced to send Special Forces from the capital to end the peaceful protests violently. Dozens of demonstrators injured and up to 200 arrested.
The rebellion by state officials is unprecedented in the Putin era and raises doubts over how strong loyalty to the prime minister really is in Russia's far slung regions.
That danger has been compounded by the fact that the communist party, normally loyal to the Kremlin, is spear heading this weekend's protest and defying orders banning the marches. Facing growing discontent the Kremlin has resorted to a familiar scapegoat: the West.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/4361629/Russian-stability-threatened-by-anger-over-economy.html
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Geopolitical Diary: A New Phase in U.S.-Russian Relations?
January 29, 2009 | 0051 GMT
Russia has suspended its plans to deploy Iskander short-range ballistic missiles to its Kaliningrad enclave because the new U.S. administration is “not rushing through” with plans to establish a missile shield in central Europe, Interfax reported Wednesday, citing an unnamed Russian military official. The same day, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin delivered a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos that, though it carried many well-worn anti-Western themes, ended with Putin wishing the new U.S. administration well — a shift from his scathing words for Barack Obama before the inauguration.
These two statements appear to signal a momentary easing of tensions between Moscow and Washington. More importantly, they show that Russia is trying to feel out the contours of the Obama administration’s foreign policy.
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev had announced the plans to deploy missiles to Kaliningrad — a tiny Russian enclave sandwiched between Poland and the Baltic states — on Nov. 5, the day after Obama’s election. The timing of that announcement (which was intentionally delayed to coincide with the election) was a pointed signal that Moscow would not pull any punches with the incoming administration. There has been some question over the status of Iskander missile production and deployment, and it is still not clear whether a unit even exists that is trained, equipped and prepared to deploy to Kaliningrad — but the announcement itself marked a deliberate escalation of tensions between Russia and the United States.
Those tensions had already been growing for several years. When Putin took power as president in 1999, his goal was to restore Russia to some semblance of its former prominence as a global power, after the free-fall of the 1990s. A major component of his plan involved keeping the United States out of Russia’s way – and especially out of the former Soviet region, which Moscow still considered its own proper sphere of influence. Thus, when George W. Bush took office in 2001, Putin attempted to form a close bond with his administration in order to win support and recognition of that sphere of influence. For example, Putin was the first world leader to call Bush following the 9/11 attacks, and Moscow offered to (and did) assist Washington in the ensuing war in Afghanistan.
But whatever amity there may have been did not last long. While Russia continued to claw its way back from its post-Soviet nadir, the United States pushed back in 2004 by supporting the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the eastward expansion of the NATO alliance. From Russia’s perspective, these actions were a betrayal. By the time Putin and Bush had entered their second terms, it was clear that a geopolitical standoff reminiscent of the Cold War had begun to form. Last year, frictions went beyond mere rhetoric, with Russia’s war against U.S.-allied Georgia and Washington’s signing of missile defense deals with Poland and the Czech Republic.
Now different men hold the two presidencies — Medvedev took the helm in Moscow in 2008 and Obama was inaugurated just over a week ago — but the question remains whether anything fundamental has changed. Russian leaders may have not liked what Bush did, but they at least felt they understood him. Obama, only a few days into his administration, remains an unknown quantity from Moscow’s point of view.
In Russia, the change of administration did not mean a change in policy — effectively, the Putin regime remains in place. By the same token, Moscow did not take Obama’s campaign pledge of “change” seriously, and leaders there have not expected any kind of rapprochement to follow his inauguration. Indeed, Putin made it quite clear in the days before Obama’s inauguration that the United States has a lot of work to do if it wants to regain Russia’s trust any time soon — or ever.
But the Kremlin is now beginning to rethink its position. The government in Moscow does not trust Obama, but it does recognize that Obama needs the Russians. He has pledged to expand the war in Afghanistan — but with NATO supply routes in Pakistan under serious threaten, Washington needs another route into that theater – and the most readily available routes pass either through Russia proper or through former Soviet territories.
And so U.S.-Russian relations are at a pivotal point. Russia is trying to figure out the new American administration, to see whether it is willing to make concessions in exchange for help on the Afghan issue. On that front, Washington is sending mixed signals. Obama has stated that he wants to rethink missile defense in Europe — a key condition for any deal with Russia — and has said in general terms that he wants to redefine NATO, certainly an interesting possibility from Moscow’s perspective. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has said, however, that the redefinition of NATO would involve clearing up arms-reduction treaties with Russia and that the United States would focus on achieving energy security for Europe (meaning helping the Europeans find alternatives to Russian supplies). Both moves potentially threaten some of Russia’s greatest means of leverage.
In this context, the announcement that Russia is putting off the Kaliningrad missile deployment could mean one of two things.
First, it could be a tentative gesture designed to sound out the new administration. The early days of the Obama presidency are an opportunity for Russia to find out how serious Obama and his team really are. The U.S. push to establish new supply routes to Afghanistan is proceeding too quickly for Russia to wait — so Moscow could be floating a trial balloon and watching for the response, while actively attempting to shape the new administration’s behavior. In “pulling back” its deployment plans for the Iskander, Russia could be creating an opening for the United States to respond in kind. However, Moscow has chosen its opening gambit carefully: If there is no reciprocation, the deployment can move ahead – and the missiles would directly threaten U.S. ballistic missile defense installations in Poland once they are built.
The other possible explanation for Russia’s announcement could be that the United States already has made an offer behind the scenes. Talks occurred on the sidelines of the informal Jan. 26-27 Russia-NATO Council meeting in Brussels. This was an ambassador-level meeting, though Russian envoy Dmitri Rogozin did hint at a possible arrangement in the works. On the first day of the talks, Rogozin blasted Washington for wanting to use former Soviet territory for shipments to Afghanistan, but he changed his tune on the second day, saying there was a possibility the United States and Russia could strike a deal. This could indicate that a preliminary deal has, in fact, already been struck. If so, the Kaliningrad discussion and Putin’s comments, both of which came soon after, could have been a gesture to show Moscow’s genuine interest in negotiating.
This does not mean Russia could not change its mind once again on Kaliningrad. Provided that the missiles are built and there is a crew in place that can operate them, it is simply a question of deployment. Russia will not commit itself to any concessions recklessly, but it appears the Russians are opening a door for Washington to prove that change, indeed, has come.
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Putin: Financial crisis is 'perfect storm'Story Highlights
Russian PM Putin: Global economic crisis a "perfect storm"
Chinese Premier Wen: Developed, developing nations need to cooperate
Political leaders must be "forward-thinking" in addressing crisis, Wen says
Wen predicts 8 percent growth in China in 2009 following 9 percent in 2008
By Simon Hooper
CNN
DAVOS, Switzerland (CNN) -- Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao called Wednesday for the complete reform of the world's financial systems during keynote speeches at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland.
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said the financial crisis constituted a "perfect storm."
1 of 2 The global economic meltdown dominated the agenda on the opening day of the annual meeting of powerbrokers and opinion formers, with Putin telling delegates that the crisis constituted a "perfect storm."
While economists and analysts could -- and should -- have predicted the crisis, Putin said, instead it had "come unexpectedly, just as winter comes unexpectedly to Russia every year."
"Just a year ago, American delegates speaking from this rostrum emphasized the U.S. economy's fundamental stability and its cloudless prospects. Today, investment banks, the pride of Wall Street, have virtually ceased to exist," Putin commented.
But he said Russia wished U.S. President Barack Obama's new administration success in tackling the country's economic problems and said Moscow was ready to join international efforts to address the crisis.
"We expect all our partners in Europe, Asia and America, including the new U.S. administration, to show interest in further constructive cooperation in dealing with all these issues," Putin said.
He said it was time to "do away with virtual money" and establish an "economy of real values" grounded in a "just and efficient global economic architecture."
Earlier, Chinese Premier Wen called for greater cooperation between developed and developing nations in tackling the global financial crisis and building a new world economic order.
He also warned that further action was needed internationally to "restore market confidence" and protect world economic growth.
"Political leaders must be forward-looking," Wen told delegates. "They should be responsible to the entire international community as well as to their own countries and people."
Wen admitted that the economic crisis had severely affected China's businesses, notably because of falling demand for Chinese exports. But he said the fundamentals of China's economy remained in "good shape," predicting 8 percent growth in 2009, following 9 percent growth in the previous 12 months.
He called for a raft of measures to be implemented to address the root causes of the crisis and create a "new international financial order."
They included the reform of supra-national financial institutions to grant more power to developing nations and the establishment of a multilateral trading regime.
"In tackling the crisis, practical cooperation is the effective way," Wen said. "The financial crisis is a test of the readiness of the international community to enhance cooperation and a test of our wisdom."
Earlier, several dozen pro-Tibetan demonstrators gathered peacefully in Davos about a kilometer from the conference venue to protest over Wen's presence at the annual meeting of powerbrokers and opinion formers.
More than 2,500 participants from 96 countries are attending this year's meeting, including 40 heads of state or government.
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/BUSINESS/01/28/davos.wef.wedsnesday.wrap/index.html
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Moscow welcomes President Obama's plan for cut in nuclear weapons
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From Times Online
February 4, 2009
Moscow welcomes President Obama's plan for cut in nuclear weapons
Tony Halpin in Moscow
Russia moved swiftly today to extend a hand to President Obama over American plans for big cuts in nuclear weapons.
Sergei Ivanov, the Deputy Prime Minister, said that Russia was ready to sign a new strategic missile treaty with the United States after The Times disclosed that Mr Obama is to seek an 80 per cent reduction in stockpiles.
"We welcome the statements from the new Obama Administration that they are ready to enter into talks and complete within a year, in this very confined timeframe, the signing of a new Russian-US treaty on the limitation of strategic attack weapons," said Mr Ivanov, a hawkish former defence minister once seen as a candidate to become president of Russia.
He added: "We are also ready for this, undoubtedly."
The landmark Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start) signed by the US and the Soviet Union in 1991 is due to expire in December. It reduced stockpiles held by the two states from 10,000 to 5,000 but there has been little progress in negotiating a successor treaty.
Talks faltered in part over President George W. Bush's enthusiasm for siting a missile-defence shield in eastern Europe, a move that infuriated Russia. Mr Obama has not said whether he will press ahead with the plan to put ten interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar station in the Czech Republic.
A delay in the programme could ease Russian concerns and pave the way for talks to cut the number of nuclear warheads to 1,000 each. An official in the US Administration told The Times: “We are prepared to engage in a broader dialogue with the Russians over issues of concern to them.”
The significance of missile defence as an obstacle to successful negotiations was underlined by a former chief of staff for the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces. Colonel-General Viktor Yesin said that a deal on missile cuts made sense only if Washington accepted Moscow's security concerns.
"If the American Administration really intends to radically cut Russia's and the US's strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,000 warheads, this would undeniably be a step that could promote real nuclear disarmament," he told Interfax news.
"However, with such considerable reductions of nuclear arsenals, an equal level of security for Russia and the US could be ensured only on condition that Washington drops the idea of deploying . . . its missile defence system in Europe."
Andrei Piontkovsky, executive director of the Strategic Studies Centre in Moscow, said that defence experts in Russia understood that the US missile shield posed no military threat, but Vladimir Putin, the Prime Minister and former president, was determined to prove that the West could not decide anything in Eastern Europe without Moscow's approval.
"The Start treaty for Russia is a symbol that it is still a superpower, so I think the Kremlin would be satisfied with the fact that Obama is not pushing this issue [missile defence] ahead," Mr Piontkovsky said.
Pavel Felgengauer, one of Russia's leading defence analysts, told The Times that Mr Obama would face domestic pressure to accelerate the missile-defence programme after Iran's success in launching a satellite into space yesterday.
"This puts a serious shadow over the arms-control negotiations because it was assumed that the Democrats would freeze or postpone deployment of this project until the missile threat emerged. Now it has," he said.
"The pressure is going to be on the new US Administration to continue deployment and maybe even speed it up. With missile defence in Europe getting this new impulse from Tehran, that makes it even more difficult to achieve results with Russia."
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle5660089.ece
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His Glibness's weak vacilations already begin to bear insipid fruit :-P
Geopolitical Diary: Prague Stalls on Lisbon Treaty
February 4, 2009
After a long and arduous debate, the lower house of the Czech parliament voted Tuesday on the Lisbon Treaty, a key document meant to streamline decision making in the European Union and serve as its proto-constitution.
Or at least that was the plan.
Instead, Prague has delayed the debate and the subsequent vote yet again, this time until Feb. 15. The official reason is that the relevant parliamentary committees have not yet examined the treaty — originally drafted in September 2007 — sufficiently to reach a unified stance. However, the real reason has nothing to do with Prague’s suspicion of the Lisbon Treaty, with the Czech Republic’s case of euroskepticism or even with the European Union. At issue is the geopolitical choice that Prague feels pressured to make between a resurging Moscow on one side and, on the other, a new American administration that is undecided on its level of commitment to ballistic missile defense (BMD) installations in Europe.
In short, Prague is struggling to decide to whom it will turn for protection and with whom it needs agreements in order to avoid becoming collateral damage in a Moscow-Washington fight — something with which all of its Central European neighbors can certainly empathize.
The Czechs currently hold the rotating EU presidency. This fact has been something of a running embarrassment for the bloc, since the Czech Republic is the one country (apart from the notoriously euroskeptical Ireland) that has stalled on ratifying the core treaty that is supposed to make the EU more efficient. However, Prague’s skepticism toward the Lisbon Treaty and the general idea of greater European political unity is long held. Fundamentally, the Czech Republic’s fear is that under the new treaty, its own foreign policy agenda would be subject to Brussels’ approval — particularly since Lisbon sets out provisions for streamlining and centralizing decision-making on EU foreign policy (such as the creation of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and of a “president of the European Union,” a position that would be held by a person rather than a country and would serve for two and a half years).
For a country that historically has been stuck between competing land powers in Europe (Germany, Austria, Poland and the Soviet Union/Russia), giving away control over foreign policy is tantamount to surrendering its only means of expressing a modicum of independence. The Czechs are hardly alone in this way of thinking. The Poles, Balts and Hungarians, for example, are all newer to the EU, and would be on the front line in any potential conflict with Russia. They want to retain the ability to bargain on their own terms, not become bargaining chips for Paris and Berlin to trade with Moscow.
To compensate, all of these states — but most notably Poland and the Czech Republic — have been looking not to Western Europe for security, but to the United States. These two countries have struck preliminary deals to host BMD sites (Poland would host the missile sites and the Czech Republic would house the radar installations). It is not so much that these sites would provide any direct defense against Russia — in fact, Prague even offered to include the Russians in the project — but that they would be manned by Americans, that is important. Having U.S. boots on Czech and Polish soil — even if just a few hundred technicians and support security staff — would ward off the Russians like garlic would vampires. Or so Warsaw and Prague hope.
However, the election of U.S. President Barack Obama has changed the calculus for Warsaw and Prague. Obama thus far has been noncommittal on whether the United States will continue its BMD plan in Central Europe, and this has rattled Prague and Warsaw to the core. For them, the perception of U.S. dithering — no matter the stated reason — signals possible abandonment in order to prevent a larger U.S. clash with Russia.
Prague is therefore delaying its vote on the Lisbon Treaty again, holding off a decision until it gets firmer security commitments from Washington. If the United States does abandon the Czech Republic, Prague’s choices would be to try to reshape the Lisbon Treaty in order to form a better set of protective measures — which would be highly difficult if not impossible — or to turn toward the Kremlin to strike a deal.
Either way, Central Europeans will be looking for assurances that they would not become stepping-stones in a Russian path to Western Europe once again.
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It appears that quite a few pieces in the U.S.-Russian game moved this past weekend and Monday at the Munich Security Conference. Though the public negotiations between U.S. Vice President Joe Biden and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov were tense, both men left the meeting talking favorably about the U.S.-Russian relationship. But there was another American powerhouse in Munich, and not by coincidence.
Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was at the conference to accept an award for his past role on the international stage — yet Kissinger’s principal role on that stage appears to be ongoing. U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration virtually subcontracted Kissinger to deal with the Russians well before Obama’s inauguration took place. Kissinger has a long and sordid history with the Russians. He is a Cold War veteran who understands what Russia wants and what it is willing to trade to get it — an essential skill for any successful negotiations, and something the Russians respect.
Kissinger quietly visited Moscow on behalf of Obama in December, meeting casually with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and secretly with the real dealmaker, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Now he has returned to the negotiating table in Munich. But Kissinger has never been recognized formally as part of Obama’s plan. This is because Kissinger isn’t formally part of the U.S. government, and as a Republican from the Nixon administration he is despised by many within Obama’s party.
But these are hardly the only meetings that affect the Russians. Biden met with the Russians in Munich to discuss the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). U.S. Central Command chief Gen. David Petraeus toured the Central Asian states to broker a deal on new routes to Afghanistan without taking into account the larger deal on the table with Russia. And U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is being as active as one would expect the secretary of state to be. Not only are members of Obama’s public team taking on different issues, but none of the talks seem to fit together into a holistic plan. Put another way, Moscow feels it is receiving schizophrenic signals from such a scattered approach.
If anything, such an approach is undermining the Kissinger effort, which is attempting to forge some sort of grand bargain that includes the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the soon-to-expire START, NATO expansion to Ukraine and Georgia, U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) installations slated for Poland and Czech Republic, Russia’s push for preeminence in Central Asia and routes for NATO supplies through former Soviet turf to Afghanistan.
Thus far in the talks, Kissinger has not budged on any major items of friction. This is certainly something that has gotten the Russians’ attention; they were pretty sure they held the upper hand. In fact, Kissinger has explicitly noted that the United States had no intention of trading an Afghanistan supply route for recognition — in public or private — of a Russian sphere of influence.
The Russian leadership is well aware that it is operating on borrowed time. The Russian demographic picture is nothing short of horrid, but there is a bit of a respite as Russians born during the 1980s Soviet baby boom are now having their own kids. This is slightly delaying the enervating impact of a population that is simultaneously dwindling and aging. But after the next three to five years, all trends are down. This is not to say Russia as a state will die in the next few years, but instead that it needs to push back Western influence as far as possible before Russia’s (probably terminal) decline begins. So it looks as if the Russians are pulling back from demanding a deal on the entire picture and working from the short list of items which are most critical because these are the items that change the strategic picture in ways that most worry the Russians.
That list consists of NATO expansion, BMD and START. The NATO item is fairly self-explanatory: every country that joins NATO is one less that can be a buffer between NATO and Russia. But BMD is a more complex issue. Russia’s real concern with BMD in Poland is not the BMD systems, but U.S. boots on the ground in a former Warsaw Pact buffer state. It is uncomfortably close for Moscow. While Russia is certainly uncomfortable with the long-term trajectory and implications of a renewed American focus on BMD, in this case, Russia is using BMD mostly to publicly attack developments on the world stage, harkening back to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
But the granddaddy of them all is START. Renewing the treaty would keep the Russians and the Americans at precisely the same level of strategic nuclear arms. This is far more than simply ego. START allows Russia to demand American attention at any time on any strategic issue — that’s what happens when the other guy has as many nukes as you do.
U.S. policy for the past decade has been that START does not need to be renewed (it expires in December) because the Russians cannot afford the price in dollars or skilled manpower to maintain their deterrent. Why bother negotiating a treaty that will limit American policy options when there is no need to give concessions to the Russians? From the Russian point of view, a continuation of START limits the Americans and keeps the Russians in the game. But an end to START forces the Russians to compete on everything, and there are not a lot of fields in which the Russians can consistently succeed against the combined West.
And so the willingness of Kissinger, Biden and Clinton all to put START on the negotiating table is a gesture that the Russians could not fail to notice. In fact, negotiations seem to already be affected. Russia gave a little on the U.S. plans for a Central Asia route to Afghanistan: On Feb 9, Kazakhstan — which hardly even breathes these days without checking with the Kremlin — announced that it will allow American military shipments to Afghanistan. Just a small glimpse of what it might look like to work with the Russians.
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Why Nurture Russia's Illusions?
Excessive deference only strengthens Putin's hand.
By MATTHEW KAMINSKI
Barack Obama wants to make friends with Russia, "press the reset button" as his Veep proposed the other day.
Sounds familiar. Bill Clinton bear hugged Boris Yeltsin and George W. Bush peered into successor Vladimir Putin's soul. Yet relations haven't been this bad since Konstantin Chernenko's days at the Kremlin.
So what? America is on a roll in Eurasia. Democracy, open markets and stability spread across the region in the Clinton and Bush eras. From Estonia to Georgia to Macedonia, free people want to join the West.
At every step of the way, Russia sought to undermine this great post-Cold War project. Grant that the Kremlin acts in defense of its perceived interests but so should the U.S., and continue down this same path.
Here Foggy Bottom's finest chime in: Yes, but imagine a world with a friendly Russia, able to help us, say, stop Iran's atomic bomb program. So let's not push so hard to deploy anti-Iran missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic that Russia hates -- use, if necessary, the excuse that costs and feasibility require further study. Back off on closer NATO ties for Ukraine and Georgia. Make Russia feel important and consulted. Joe Biden sketched out this sort of bargain at last weekend's Munich security conference.
The conceit is we can win the Kremlin over by modifying our behavior. Before Mr. Obama tries, he should be aware of recent history. On missile defense, American diplomats spent as much time negotiating with Russia as with the Central Europeans, offering Moscow the chance to join in. Nothing came of it. On Kosovo independence and Iran sanctions, Russia blocked the West at the U.N.
Last spring, NATO snubbed Georgia and Ukraine in a signal of good will to Mr. Putin. The day after, Mr. Putin privately told Mr. Bush that Ukraine wasn't "a real country" and belonged in the Russian fold. Five months later, Russia invaded Georgia and de facto annexed its breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Mr. Obama may be tempted to think Russia can be won over. After all, they would seem to need America (short for the West) far more than America needs Russia. We're not the enemy. Russia's real strategic challenges are in the East: China looks ravenously at the vast, mineral-rich, lightly populated Siberian steppe cut off from Moscow (to this day, you can't drive across Russia). And to the South: The arc of Islamic extremism, starting with a possibly nuclear Iran, a competitor for Caspian energy and influence.
And as Mr. Putin discovers each day his economy sinks further, Russia failed to take advantage of sky-high oil prices to diversify away from energy. It sells nothing of value to the world aside from gas, oil and second-rate weapons. Its infrastructure is decaying and its population in decline.
A Kremlin leader with a long-term view would see these grave threats to Russia's future and rush to build a close partnership with the West. But the interests of Mr. Putin and his small, thuggish, authoritarian clique don't necessarily coincide with that of Russia.
The Obama magic dust doesn't seem to work on a regime defined and legitimized by its deep dislike for America. Dmitry Medvedev, the Putin underling in the president's office, moved the state of the nation address to the day after the American election to spin the outcome for the domestic audience. The U.S., he said into the winds of pro-American sentiment sweeping across the world in the wake of the Obama win, was "selfish . . . mistaken, egotistical and sometime simply dangerous."
The Kremlin then welcomed Mr. Obama into the White House with the administration's first serious foreign policy headache. Taking $2 billion from its fast-depleting reserves, Russia bullied and bribed Kyrgyzstan to close a U.S. military airfield, the main transport hub for supplies going into Afghanistan. Russia's desire for a "sphere of influence" trumps the threat of resurgent extreme Islamism in its southern underbelly.
The thinking here is Cold War porridge. But the Russians were never offered a new narrative. Mikhail Gorbachev's idea of a "European family" and Yeltsin's reforms foundered. Mr. Putin went back to a familiar recipe: Russia, empire-builder and scourge of the West.
A Cold War mentality lingers in America, too. A foreign policy caste rich in Sovietologists by habit overstates Russia's importance. The embassy in Moscow is huge; bilateral meetings inevitably become "summits," like in the old days.
Mr. Obama's fresh start is a good time for a reality check. The U.S. can work with Russia, seen in its proper place. To even suggest that the Russians have a special say over the fate of a Ukraine or our alliance with the Czechs lets Mr. Putin nurture the illusion of supposed greatness, and helps him hang on to power.
Ultimately it's up to the Russians to decide to be friends. One day, someone in the Kremlin will have to confront a hard choice: Does an isolated and dysfunctional Russia want to modernize and join up with the West, look toward China, or continue its slow decline? Until then, Mr. Obama better stock up on aspirin and dampen his and our expectations about Russia.
Mr. Kaminski is a member of the Journal's editorial board.
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I am sympathetic emotionally with this piece, but practical questions remain concerning supply routes to Afg, Russian enabling of Iranian nukes, the vulnerability of Georgia, etc. Arguably Bush left us overextended, especially with regard to Russia. What does our world strategy look like if Russia decides were are putting them in a corner and that they must be as difficult and disruptive as possible? They may "deserve" it, but are we able to back it up?
Also, any chance that there is any merit to some of the Russian thinking? E.g. were we right to back Bosnia's breakaway? What happened to early Clinton promises that NATO would not expand east?
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Canadian Jets Scramble to Meet Russian Plane Before Obama Visit
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February 27, 2009
Canadian Jets Met Russian Plane Before Obama Visit
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Filed at 10:42 a.m. ET
TORONTO (AP) -- Canada's defense minister said fighter jets were scrambled to intercept a Russian bomber in the Arctic on the eve of President Barack Obama's visit to Ottawa last week.
Peter MacKay said Friday that the bomber never made it into Canadian airspace. But he said two Canadian CF-18 jets met the bomber in international airspace and sent a ''strong signal that they should back off.''
''They met a Russian aircraft that was approaching Canadian airspace, and as they have done in previous occasions they sent very clear signals that are understood, that the aircraft was to turnaround, turn tail, and head back to their airspace, which it did,'' MacKay said.
''I'm not going to stand here and accuse the Russians of having deliberately done this during the presidential visit, but it was a strong coincidence,'' he said of the Feb. 18 incident.
Obama arrived in Canada the next day.
MacKay said it happened when Canada's security focus would be on Ottawa, but he said resources weren't stretched.
Attempts to reach the Russian Embassy in Ottawa or officials in Moscow were not immediately successful.
Soviet aircraft regularly flew near North American airspace during the Cold War but stopped after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Several years ago, Russian jets resumed these types of flights.
MacKay said the Russians give no warning prior to the flights. Canadian government officials, including MacKay, have asked the Russian ambassador and defense minister to give Ottawa notice of such flights. The requests have fallen on deaf ears.
''They simply show up on a radar screen,'' MacKay said. ''This is not a game at all.
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2009...cept.html?_r=1
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Second post:
B1B
Unloaded/Loaded Wt:192,000/326,000 lbs
Dry Thrust:240KN
Armament: 59,000 lbs
Top Speed: Mach 1.25
Range: 7,500 mi
Ceiling: 60,000 feet
TU-160
Unloaded/Loaded Wt:242,000/590,000 lbs
Dry Thrust:520KN
Armament: 88,000 lbs
Top Speed: Mach 2.2
Range: 10,800 mi
Ceiling:50,000 feet
The Blackjack is a more capable airframe and it has a small RCS. They are producing more advanced versions now.
The Canadians say it was a Bear, Russians say it was a Blackjack.
http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=1335735
OTTAWA -- Canada will not tolerate Russian intrusions into Canadian airspace, Prime Minister Stephen Harper said Friday after it was disclosed that two Russian bombers were intercepted just outside the Canadian Arctic shortly before U.S. President Barack Obama's visit to Ottawa this month.
"I have expressed at various times the deep concern our government has with increasingly aggressive Russian actions around the globe and Russian intrusions into our airspace," the prime minister said at a news conference in Saskatoon.
"This government has responded every time the Russians have done that. We will continue to respond; we will defend our airspace."
Earlier Friday, Defence Minister Peter MacKay disclosed that two CF-18 fighter jets met at least one Russian bomber within 24 hours of the U.S. president's trip to Ottawa on Feb. 19 just outside of Canada's Arctic airspace.
The incident set off a round of bitter sniping between Moscow and Ottawa that was a throwback to the Cold War era.
Initially there was confusion over the number of Russian planes involved -- it turned out to be two, not one -- while Russian sources mocked Canada's assertion that they were given no notice of the flights.
With Mr. Obama poised to leave U.S. soil for the first time as president on Feb. 19, the joint Canada-U.S. aerospace command, Norad, picked up the approaching aircraft.
Canadian jets were scrambled and sent "very clear signals" to the Russian aircraft to "turn tail and head back to its own airspace," which were followed without incident, Mr. MacKay said.
Later Friday, Canadian defence and Norad officials confirmed a second Russian plane was involved in the incident, and identified the two aircraft as Tupolev Tu-95 propeller driven bombers, a type of aircraft known as the "Bear."
Vladimir Drik, an aide to the Russian chief of staff, speaking to RIA Novosti news agency confirmed the Feb. 18 flight, but indicated a different model of Tupolev carried out the mission.
"The Tupolev-160 fulfilled all its air patrol tasks. It was a planned flight."
He said the crew acted solely within the limits of international air agreements and did not violate Canadian airspace.
Typically Blackjacks are not seen until its too late and many are not seen at all:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti...iles-Hull.html
A Russian nuclear stealth bomber was able to fly within 90 seconds of the British coast without being picked up by radar, it was revealed today.
The supersonic ‘Blackjack’ jet flew completely undetected to within just 20 miles from Hull in one of the worst breaches of British security since the end of the Cold War.
RAF radar eventually picked up the plane, but the only two pairs of fighter jets used for air alerts were on other duties.
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Lame, insipid, and stupid on so many levels:
Clinton gift gaffe: 'Overcharge'
GENEVA—Secretary of State Hillary Clinton opened her first extended talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov by giving him a present meant to symbolize the Obama administration’s vow to “press the reset button” on U.S.-Russia relations.
She handed a palm-sized box wrapped with a bow. Lavrov opened it and pulled out the gift: a red button on a black base with a Russian word peregruzka printed on top.
“We worked hard to get the right Russian word. Do you think we got it?” Clinton asked.
“You got it wrong,” Lavrov said.
Instead of "reset," Lavrov said the word on the box meant “overcharge.”
Clinton and Lavrov laughed.
“We won’t let you do that to us,” she said. Trying to recover, Clinton said the new administration was serious about improving relations with Moscow. “We mean it, and we’re looking forward to it.”
Lavrov said he would put the button on his desk and he and Clinton pushed the button together, before sitting down for their meeting.
A State Department official said the misspelling on the button was being corrected, in time for the post-meeting news conference.
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0309/19719.html
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Can't even lick Putin's boots correctly. :roll:
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BOHICA Hillary
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http://hotair.com/archives/2009/03/14/russia-takes-the-biden-challenge/
Russia takes the Biden Challenge
posted at 10:02 am on March 14, 2009 by Ed Morrissey
Joe Biden warned us that Barack Obama would get tested by unfriendly nations in the first six months of his administration because of his inexperience. That prediction now looks like sunny optimism. Just days after China aggressively challenged the US Navy in international waters in the South China Sea, Russia now says they may start basing bombers in Venezuela — and Cuba:
A Russian Air Force chief said Saturday that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has offered an island as a temporary base for strategic Russian bombers, the Interfax news agency reported.
The chief of staff of Russia’s long range aviation, Maj. Gen. Anatoly Zhikharev, also said Cuba could be used to base the aircraft, Interfax reported. …
Zhikharev said Chavez had offered “a whole island with an airdrome, which we can use as a temporary base for strategic bombers,” the agency reported. “If there is a corresponding political decision, then the use of the island … by the Russian Air Force is possible.”
Interfax reported he said earlier that Cuba has air bases with four or five runways long enough for the huge bombers and could be used to host the long-range planes.
It took John Kennedy more than a year to precipitate a military standoff with the Soviet Union over Cuba in the 1962 missile crisis. It’s taken the Obama Amateur Hour less than two months.
Recall that Barack Obama ran in part on a campaign to “restore diplomacy” in foreign relations. Hillary Clinton made a big show of bringing a “reset button” to her first meeting with her Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov, in which the button was labeled incorrectly and not spelled in Cyrillic. This followed her bumbling show at the EU, making it clear to the Russians that our foreign service was in complete disarray, run by imcompetents.
Can you imagine Russia trying this with George Bush? For that matter, can you imagine Bush losing Kyrgyzstan — and a vital military route — to Putin? Russia is doing this now because Putin and Medvedev understand that they can get away with it.
The Kremlin later said that Zhikarev spoke “hypothetically”. We’ll see. I’d guess that it won’t take long for Moscow to start landing bombers 90 miles off our coast if the Obama administration continues the feckless performance we’ve seen thus far.
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Geopolitical Diary: Russia Moves From Offense to Defense
April 6, 2009
Related Special Topic Page
A World Redefined: The Global Summits
U.S. President Barack Obama capped a conference-filled tour of Europe on Sunday with a speech at the EU-U.S. summit in Prague, Czech Republic, where he discussed nuclear disarmament the unity of Europe and the United States within NATO.
More importantly, Obama finally made a statement that we had been expecting: The United States will stand firm on its commitment to deploy a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in central Europe. This marks a shift from his position during the election campaign, when he said he would reconsider the Bush administration’s stance on the issue. Obama chose his words carefully in explaining his decision: He said that as long as a threat from Iran persists, the United States intends to move forward with its BMD plans — but should the Iran threat be eliminated, the driving force for missile defense construction in Europe would be removed. The key is that Obama recognizes there are other reasons for BMD. There was no need to elaborate on these reasons, since his speech came the same day that North Korea attempted to launch a satellite into space.
Considering that his speech was delivered in the Czech Republic — one of two countries that Obama praised for showing courage in their decisions to host aspects of the BMD system — it was clear that the main audience for his remarks was Russia.
The past week of meetings — particularly the sit-down between Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev — clearly showed just how far each country could push the other. The Russians came into the week feeling confident that they could push Washington to back off its commitment to BMD in Europe. They also felt comfortable about success in achieving other goals, like getting the United States to bend on nuclear arms reduction treaties and NATO expansion to Ukraine and Georgia.
However, not only did the meeting between Obama and Medvedev not go as expected, but it now appears that Moscow’s worst nightmares are coming true.
Russia’s concerns about the BMD program are well known. Not only would the program give the United States a military presence in Poland – a former Warsaw Pact state — but it also would mean Washington would help to build up Poland’s own military forces. Russia then would have a new (and vehemently anti-Russian) military threat to contend with to its west; moreover, that force would stand between Russia and its more traditional European foe, Germany. But there are also deeper, longer-range Russian concerns about the implications of BMD.
This highly complicates the security situation on Russia’s European frontier and limits how far west Russia can expand its influence as part of its overall resurgence.
But the BMD announcement is just one part of the United States’ plan to counter that resurgence. During the week of summits in Europe, Washington also made sure that Russian leaders knew their former demands — particularly regarding NATO expansion to Ukraine and Georgia — had not been settled. A membership plan was not agreed for these states during the NATO summit on April 3 and 4, but the conference’s closing statement made it clear that the door was still wide open for their eventual inclusion in the alliance.
Many European heavyweights, like France and Germany, are opposed to pushing Russia further on the NATO expansion issue, but — as the Russians know well from the color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia — the United States does not need its NATO allies to pursue and support Ukraine or Georgia independently. In essence, the United States has moved the sphere of play between Washington and Moscow from central Europe back into the former Soviet states.
Russia is not taking this shift lightly. Moscow had a long list of options to consider if the summits did not go well, and it is now beginning to make its moves. Moscow had an opportunity to remind Europe of its energy dependence on Russia, it took the next step in pushing the United States out of Central Asia, and set in motion a reversal in the Ukrainian government. Russia also is forming a plan to shake up the Georgian government this week.
Though these moves are significant and important, they are still confined to the former Soviet sphere. From the outside, it looks as if the Russians are about to run out of time to solidify their position on real Western turf and are assuming a more defensive posture to protect their hold over former Soviet territory. But both the Russians and the Americans know Moscow has the upper hand in this area, and it won’t take much to finish this part of the game.
The next issue to watch, then, is Turkey. It is part of the United States’ plans to counter Russia, and Obama has begun a two-day visit to this NATO state. At the same time, Ankara could be working out a deal with Armenia — a state that is allied with Russia — in a move that could tip the balance of power in the Caucasus. Moscow needs to watch and counter the larger threat coming from the U.S. moves here, on Russia’s southern flank. Since Moscow has leverage of its own with Turkey, Ankara is a wild card.
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In this particular case and it's an important one, standing up to the Russians over deploying missile defense and partnering with former Soviet republics that are among the most pro-American places in the world, it would appear that Obama is doing the right things for the right reasons.
(In the case of failing to get help in Afghanistan, Obama is learning that unilateralism is a case of having allies we can't count on, which is an American problem, not a Republican one.)
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***which is an American problem, not a Republican one***
I don't recall a sitting president continue to stoop so low as to endlessly blame the previous administration on so many problems.
And to go over seas and make public appearances while humiliating the previous pres.!
It is really disgraceful.
Reagan could have done the same to Carter but he had class and stood up for his country and not criticized it to the world.
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U.S., Russia: Washington's Latest Offer to Moscow
Stratfor Today » June 18, 2009 | 1939 GMT
SAUL LOEB/AFP/Getty Images
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev (L) and U.S. President Barack Obama in London on April 1Summary
Ahead of U.S. President Barack Obama’s trip to Russia, STRATFOR has received unconfirmed information indicating that Washington could be willing to yield to Moscow on the issue of ballistic missile defense in Eastern Europe if Moscow gives Washington assurances on issues related to Afghanistan and Iran. It could be that the United States is willing to make a deal with Russia in the short term, but overall Washington has made it clear that Afghanistan and Iran take priority over Eastern Europe.
Analysis
In the lead-up to U.S. President Barack Obama’s July 6-8 visit to Russia, a flurry of public negotiations is taking place. However, one of the tougher subjects being negotiated more privately is Russia’s demand that the United States abandon its plans to place ballistic missile defense (BMD) installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. STRATFOR has received unconfirmed information on what the United States may be considering conceding to the Russians in order to gain assurances on other critical issues — like Iran and Afghanistan — from Moscow.
In the negotiations between Moscow and Washington, there are myriad issues on the table — some of which Russia feels confident in handling, like NATO expansion to Georgia and Ukraine or renegotiating START. Then there are other issues that Russia considers more difficult, like the BMD plans. For Russia, this issue is about more than BMD; it is about an actual U.S. military presence on the former Soviet border. When Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev met in April, Russia was prepared to push its demand to keep BMD installations out of Poland, but the United States held firm on the issue.
However, since April, Washington has become more concerned with its war in Afghanistan, the destabilization of neighboring Pakistan, and more recently the post-election situation in Iran. Enmity between Washington and Moscow could make all of these situations more difficult. The United States knows Russia has some very old but powerful ties to Afghanistan and its Islamist groups. There is little proof yet that Russia has been meddling in Afghanistan, but there is potential. With Pakistan entrenched in chaos, the United States is still interested in using supplementary logistical routes for military supplies bound for Afghanistan, and the only real alternative to Pakistan is Russia’s turf in Central Asia — and even Russia itself — though Russia has frozen all talks on the use of such routes.
And then there is Iran. Russia has given Iran rhetorical backing in recent years. Russia also helped to build Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant and continually threatened the West with further military deals with Tehran (though it has consistently abstained from selling Iran strategic air defense systems). But Obama seems committed to negotiating with Iran, even though its anti-U.S. president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad most likely will serve a second term, and Washington does not need Russia to interfere or escalate tensions.
For quite some time, STRATFOR has noted that with U.S. foreign policy focused on fighting the Afghan war and on negotiations with Iran, the question regarding Russia’s resurgence has not been whether the United States will make concessions to the Russians, but how much and how publicly.
STRATFOR sources in Moscow have said that the latest offer from the Americans reportedly entails abandoning the Polish/Czech Republic arrangement and instead incorporating existing Russian radars into the existing U.S. BMD architecture. This proposal has advantages and disadvantages both technically and geopolitically.
From a technical perspective, the matter is problematic. U.S. ballistic missile defenses rely upon X-band radar for tracking and plotting intercepts. Russia’s Gabala early warning radar in Azerbaijan — one of the radar systems being considered for U.S. use — is of the older Pechora type, and operates at a different frequency than the X-band. While the Gabala radar would certainly be useful for early warning and monitoring Iranian missile tests, it is also oriented toward the Indian Ocean, so that an Iranian ballistic missile launched at Western Europe or the continental United States would quickly pass out of its field of view. The territory of Azerbaijan would also be too close to Iran for basing ground-based midcourse defense interceptors.
A newer, next-generation Voronezh-DM type radar at Armavir in the Russian Caucasus was activated and put on alert in February. The newer radar is thought to have more direct applicability to U.S. BMD efforts, but is still fixed in orientation — in this case toward Africa — so that while Iran and Western Europe both fall within its coverage, an Iranian missile launch directed at the United States would likely be on the periphery of the radar’s field of vision. More study would likely be necessary to determine its precise utility and how exactly it would fit into an overall scheme. But from a technical perspective, it could likely only serve as a complement to — not a replacement for — the fixed X-band radar slated for the Czech Republic.
That said, there are alternatives to placing an X-band radar in the Czech Republic. The United States also has a mobile deployable X-band radar (though the one currently in place in Israel reportedly experienced some technical issues during emplacement), and BMD-capable Aegis-equipped warships could be parked in the Black and Mediterranean seas as well as the North Sea east of the United Kingdom.
There also remains the issue of basing for interceptors. The ground-based midcourse defense interceptors slated for Poland require fixed concrete silos. Poland is about as good a spot as any, though an alternative site could be considered. In addition, it has been suggested that an Iranian missile caught with sufficient warning and with proper tracking data could be engaged by an interceptor based in Alaska.
Ultimately, from a purely technical standpoint, doing a deal with the Russians that sacrifices the Poland and Czech Republic sites in exchange for some access to Russian radar data does not seem particularly compelling. But the United States’ issues with Russia are much larger and more complex than BMD meant to defend against Iran. Washington could still decide that using alternative methods to guard against Iranian ballistic missiles is sufficient, and a larger deal with Moscow is worth the sacrifice.
There is also the possibility that the United States is striking a deal with Russia in the short term in order to get its house in order over Afghanistan and Iran, while in the longer term keeping its door open with Poland and the Czech Republic (though as BMD technology continues to mature, Washington will field increasingly flexible and mobile systems; the need for a fixed installation is fleeting). But such a scheme would be tricky since Moscow does not entirely trust Washington, and Warsaw will most likely not be pleased that the United States has abandoned it, even temporarily, in order to appease the Russians.
But from a geopolitical viewpoint, the United States has made it clear that its priorities are Afghanistan and Iran at the moment, not Russia or its resurgence. Conceding on Poland would not only create a more amiable Russia that could help with Afghanistan and Iran, it would also prevent the Afghan and Iranian situations from getting more difficult for the United States.
This plan seems reasonable geopolitically, but many within the administration are not on board, as they know the ramifications of a deal with Moscow. Such a deal could lose the faith of those NATO allies that depend on the United States to protect them from a resurgent Russia (not just Poland, but many former Soviet states that continue to feel pressure from Moscow). It would also mean effectively surrendering ground to Russia that — even when the United States has more room to maneuver — could be difficult to win back. Both of these consequences are something Moscow wants, so the Kremlin is closely examining the latest offer regarding BMD. Russia is concerned that Washington could rescind the offer because of the plan’s technical shortcomings and because the implications for the perception of America’s commitment to its NATO allies are very apparent to some within the administration.
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Russia Holds Largest War Games Since War With Georgia _ In Signal To Georgia, And To US
Thousands of troops, backed by hundreds of tanks, artillery and other heavy weaponry, began rumbling through the North Caucasus on Monday, as Russia began its largest military exercises since last year's war with Georgia.
The Caucasus 2009 war games are being seen by many experts as a warning shot for nearby Georgia, where the government says it has rearmed armed forces and where NATO recently wrapped up its own exercises.
Experts say the exercises may also be signal to the United States that Russia will give no ground on its efforts to maintain an exclusive sphere of influence in Georgia and other former Soviet republics. The games run through July 6 _ the day that President Barack Obama arrives in Moscow for a highly anticipated summit with Russia's Dmitry Medvedev.
Defense Ministry official say more than 8,500 troops will take part, along with nearly 200 tanks, armored vehicles, 100 artillery units and several units from Russia's Black Sea naval fleet.
The exercises, which are being personally overseen by Gen. Nikolai Makarov, the chief of Russia's General Staff, are structured around a theoretical crisis situation that spirals out of control into open fighting, the ministry said.
Tensions remain high between Russia and Georgia, which lost authority over the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia during the war in August. Russia has been building military bases, storage facilities for supplies and roads in the two regions, which Moscow recognized as independent, and around 6,000 troops are based in each region.
Moscow has been openly hostile to Georgia's ambitions to join NATO and has signaled that it would not tolerate any other ex-Soviet republics from joining the alliance.
Still, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili has not backed down on his drive for NATO membership and his efforts to draw closer to the United States.
Last month, NATO wrapped up a month of its own training exercises in Georgia, though just a few hundreds troops participated. Despite the small size of the games, Russia was irked, calling them a provocation.
Deputy Defense Minister Col. Gen. Alexander Kolmakov was quoted by Russian media on Monday as saying that the Caucasus 2009 exercises were adjusted as a result of the NATO games and would be "quite major, as compared with those that were conducted in Soviet times."
NATO and Russia over the weekend agreed to resume military ties that had been frozen after the Georgian war.
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/...n5120564.shtml
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Geopolitical Diary: Obama Goes to Moscow
July 6, 2009
U.S. President Barack Obama left for Moscow on Sunday for his summit with Russian leaders. The meetings have both a personal and geopolitical dimension, and in this case the two intersect, at least for the short run. The Russians have let it be known through multiple channels that they view Obama as a weak leader. The Russians don’t have any idea what kind of leader Obama is, but they are trying to goad him.
The context for this, of course, is the famous summit between John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna in 1961. Tradition has it that Kennedy came to the meeting unprepared and retreated in the face of pressure from Khrushchev. Khrushchev decided that Kennedy would be a weak adversary, and this caused Khrushchev to become more aggressive, culminating in the Cuban missile crisis. Whether it happened this way is subject to dispute, but it sets the stage for this summit. Obama has been compared to Kennedy. That is not a great comparison when dealing with the Russians, so Obama has to go to Moscow to prove he is no Kennedy.
As far as the Russians are concerned, the audience for this summit is not limited to the Americans. Russia is far more interested in the European — particularly the German — perception of the summit. If Obama comes across as too weak, the Russians can tell the Germans that he is a weak champion. If he comes across as too aggressive, they can tell the Germans that he is dragging them into another Cold War. At this point, the core of Russian strategy is to deepen tensions between the Americans and the Germans. The Russians are not betting on personalities to carry the day, but this is one step in the long resurrection process the Russians have put into play.
Obama has tried to open the summit with his own head games. After saying that former Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is too deeply enmeshed in Cold War thinking, the Americans started implying that President Dmitri Medvedev — Putin’s putative boss — was a much more reasonable person and that they were much more interested in dealing with him than with Putin. If Obama’s Achilles’ heel is Europe and the Europeans’ wariness of him, the Russian vulnerability might lie in the fact that Medvedev could be developing ambitions of his own. More likely, the vulnerability is in Putin’s nascent paranoia about Medvedev’s intentions. In either case, the Americans have tried to set up the meeting in such a way that Putin might feel excluded.
Such games have limited value, but they become more important as chances that the summit will achieve anything substantial decline. The Americans charged that Putin was enmeshed in Cold War thinking. The Russians shot back that it isn’t the Russians that are building the NATO bloc — the ultimate Cold War tool — and expanding it wherever it can go. Washington then said that on the key question of ballistic missile defense in Poland, the Russians must understand that the missiles would be there against Iran and not against Russia. The Russians, of course, understand this fully, though they might not agree with it. Their problem is not who the missiles are directed against, but that they would be present in Poland. And Obama’s problem is that if he gives them up without major concessions in return, he will appear exactly as he can’t afford to: weak.
Just before take-off, the Russians gave Obama a present: an offer to allow the United States to transport weapons across Russian territory to troops in Afghanistan. That is not a trivial concession, but it is not one the United States really needs at the moment, nor is the United States likely to want to become dependent on routes that could be closed easily.
Three major issues remain: U.S. relations with states of the former Soviet Union, the status of Poland as a forward U.S. base or a neutral zone, and Russian support for the U.S. stance on Iran.
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Russian Subs Patrolling Off East Coast of U.S.
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WASHINGTON — A pair of nuclear-powered Russian attack submarines has been patrolling off the eastern seaboard of the United States in recent days, a rare mission that has raised concerns inside the Pentagon and intelligence agencies about a more assertive stance by the Russian military.
The episode has echoes of the cold war era, when the United States and the Soviet Union regularly parked submarines off each other’s coasts to steal military secrets, track the movements of their underwater fleets — and be poised for war.
But the collapse of the Soviet Union all but eliminated the ability of the Russian Navy to operate far from home ports, making the current submarine patrols thousands of miles from Russia more surprising for military officials and defense policy experts.
“I don’t think they’ve put two first-line nuclear subs off the U.S. coast in about 15 years,” said Norman Polmar, a naval historian and submarine warfare expert.
The submarines are of the Akula class, a counterpart to the Los Angeles class attack subs of the United States Navy, and not one of the larger submarines that can launch intercontinental nuclear missiles.
According to Defense Department officials, one of the Russian submarines remained in international waters on Tuesday about 200 miles off the coast of the United States. The location of the second remained unclear. One senior official said the second submarine traveled south in recent days toward Cuba, while another senior official with access to reports on the surveillance mission said it had sailed away in a northerly direction.
The Pentagon and intelligence officials spoke anonymously to describe the effort to track the Russian submarines, which has not been publicly announced.
President Obama spoke by telephone with President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia on Tuesday, but it was not clear whether the subject of the submarines came up, although another source of friction between the two countries did. Mr. Medvedev called Mr. Obama to wish him a happy birthday and the White House said the president used the opportunity to urge Russia to work through diplomatic channels to resolve rising tensions with Georgia.
The submarine patrols come as Moscow tries to shake off the embarrassment of the latest failed test of the Bulava missile, a long-range weapon that was test fired from a submarine in the Arctic on July 15. The failed missile test was the sixth since 2005, and some experts see Russia’s assertiveness elsewhere as a gambit by the military to prove its continued relevance.
“It’s the military trying to demonstrate that they are still a player in Russian political and economic matters,” Mr. Polmar said.
One of the submarines is the newer Akula II, officials said, which is quieter than the older variant and the most advanced in the Russian fleet. The Akula is capable of carrying torpedoes for attacking other submarines and surface vessels as well as missiles for striking targets on land and at sea.
Defense Department officials declined to speculate on which weapons might be aboard the two submarines.
While the submarines have not taken any provocative action beyond their presence outside territorial waters of the United States, officials expressed wariness over the Kremlin’s motivation for ordering such an unusual mission.
“Anytime the Russian Navy does something so out of the ordinary it is cause for worry,” said a senior Defense Department official who has been monitoring reports on the submarines’ activities.
The official said the Navy was able to track the submarines as they made their way through international waters off the American coastline. This can be done from aircraft, ships, underwater sensors or other submarines.
“We’ve known where they were, and we’re not concerned about our ability to track the subs,” the official added. “We’re concerned just because they are there.”
Once among the world’s most powerful forces, the Russian Navy now has very few ships regularly deployed on the open seas. Moscow has contributed warships to the international armada searching for Somali pirates. In addition, a flotilla of Russian warships participated in exercises with Venezuela last year.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/wo...trol.html?_r=1
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"Yoo-hoo, Barry, what'cha gonna do?" I think is the point of the sub provocation.
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Exactly.
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Well, what DO you think he/we should do?
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Aside from the 2012 elections? Gird your loins and hope the worst thing Obama does is wreck the economy.
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Well, what DO you think he/we should do?
Park a destroyer on top of the subs and SONAR ping the snot out of them making sure all on board get no sleep, then sneak an attack sub in behind them to trail them in silence and run attack drills. Note Russia's belligerence, remind them that this behavior last time around forced them into an arms race that they lost, causing their empire to crumble, question whether they want a return to those days, and state that the ballistic missile defense they are very much against will be implemented fully in view of their habit of provocation. State we can't do much about their penchant for killing journalists and critics opposed to their thugocracy, while making clear that does not mean we are unable to define our interests and protect them.
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Well, what DO you think he/we should do?
Park a destroyer on top of the subs and SONAR ping the snot out of them making sure all on board get no sleep, then sneak an attack sub in behind them to trail them in silence and run attack drills. Note Russia's belligerence, remind them that this behavior last time around forced them into an arms race that they lost, causing their empire to crumble, question whether they want a return to those days, and state that the ballistic missile defense they are very much against will be implemented fully in view of their habit of provocation. State we can't do much about their penchant for killing journalists and critics opposed to their thugocracy, while making clear that does not mean we are unable to define our interests and protect them.
Yeah, if we had a president who wasn't wearing a trainee hat and didn't have a head full of leftist anti-americanism, he'd do exactly that.
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http://hotair.com/archives/2009/08/04/great-news-russian-attack-subs-spotted-off-east-coast-of-us/
Great news: Russian attack subs spotted off east coast of U.S.
POSTED AT 9:55 PM ON AUGUST 4, 2009 BY ALLAHPUNDIT
You know what this calls for? An Obama speech in Red Square about the common humanity that unites us in a struggle for blah blah blah blah.
But the collapse of the Soviet Union all but eliminated the ability of the Russian Navy to operate far from home ports, making the current submarine patrols thousands of miles from Russia even more surprising for military officials and defense policy experts.
“I don’t think they’ve put two first-line nuclear subs off the U.S. coast in about 15 years,” said Norman Polmar, a naval historian and expert on submarine warfare…
The submarine patrols come as Moscow tries to shake off the embarrassment of the latest failed test of the Bulava missile, a long-range weapon that was test fired from a submarine in the Arctic on July 15. The failed missile test was the sixth since 2005, and some experts see Russia’s assertiveness elsewhere as a gambit by the military to prove its continued relevance…
While the submarines had not taken any provocative action beyond their presence outside territorial waters of the United States, officials expressed wariness over the Kremlin’s motivation for ordering such an unusual mission.
“Any time the Russian Navy does something so out of the ordinary it is cause for worry,” said a senior Defense Department official who has been monitoring reports on the submarines’ activities.
A few possibilities off the top of my head for What This Might Mean in addition to the NYT’s “Bulava missile” theory. (1) Russia wants to see how much The One will let them get away with, just as Biden predicted would happen last year. (2) Russia’s pissed at Biden for his crack a few weeks ago about their economy “withering” and is flexing some muscle in response. (3) Russia’s looking to expand its presence in the western hemisphere more generally, which explains its naval exercises with Venezuela in December. (4) Russia’s gearing up to make another move on Georgia and is putting The One on notice that they’re not to be trifled with when they do. (5) Russia’s got a fee-vah and the only prescription is more bare-chested Putin photos, and a display of military strength in America’s backyard makes for nice optics on the front page tomorrow next to Vlad’s pecs. You’re free to vote for more than one theory — they’re hardly mutually exclusive — but as of right now I’m leaning towards number 4.
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Another test for BHO?
Russia Charges US Is Rearming Georgia
By VOA News
05 August 2009
A top Russian diplomat says the United States is quietly rearming the Georgian military, and he warns the U.S. move will force Moscow to react.
Deputy Foreign Minister Grigori Karasin leveled the accusation Wednesday in Moscow. He did not describe the weapons, nor indicate what form Russia's response would take.
A top Russian general says Moscow is not planning any offensive in the Caucasus as the anniversary of last year's brief war with Georgia approaches on Friday. However, General Anatoly Nogovitsin says Russia's armed forces are alarmed by Georgia's military buildup.
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Alexander Vershbow told a U.S. Senate panel Tuesday that U.S. resources are currently aimed at training Georgian forces. But he said other forms of help could be offered in the future.
Tuesday, President Barack Obama and Russian counterpart Dmitri Medvedev spoke by telephone about reducing tensions in Georgia.
U.S. Vice President Joe Biden also telephoned Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Biden stressed the need to avoid actions that could further destabilize the region.
Moscow has warned it will use "all available force" to protect the pro-Russian populations of South Ossetia and a second breakaway territory, Abkhazia.
Georgian President Saakashvili told the Reuters news agency Sunday that he knows Georgia can not use the military to retake control of South Ossetia or Abkhazia.
Russian forces swept into Georgia August 7, 2008, following Georgian attempts to regain control of breakaway South Ossetia by force. Georgia said it only shelled South Ossetian targets after Russian forces invaded.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov Wednesday called the war an "unforgiveable adventure" launched by Mr. Saakashvili. He told Russian television hundreds of lives were lost in the conflict, which he described as a tragedy for the Georgian people.
Moscow later recognized both territories as independent countries, despite strong protests from Western governments.
http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-08-05-voa21.cfm
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Oy vey.
====================
By CLIFFORD J. LEVY
Published: September 27, 2009
MOSCOW — The Kremlin has long responded to proposals for tougher sanctions against Iran with arms folded and a scowl. Last week, that attitude began softening, bringing the Obama administration closer to a diplomatic coup in its efforts to contain the Iranian nuclear program.
President Obama and President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia on Friday at the Group of 20 meeting in Pittsburgh.
But the relatively conciliatory statements by Russia’s president, Dmitri A. Medvedev, present an opening to the administration that could turn out to yield little. Russia, a neighbor of Iran, is far more intertwined with it geopolitically than any other world power, and has more concerns about upsetting relations.
Russia is also reluctant to mass the might of the United Nations Security Council against a single country, especially at Washington’s behest. That in part explains why Russia has historically sought to dilute sanctions, as it did in previous rounds against Iran.
Moreover, the Kremlin might go slowly because it senses that in a world where it has less influence than it did during Soviet times, it can use its veto power in the Security Council to ensure attention and respect. If Russia were to accede right away to calls for a crackdown, it would risk becoming just another country lining up behind the United States. The Kremlin’s pride would almost certainly not allow that.
Already, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, appears to be positioning Russia to back away from the supportive stance suggested by Mr. Medvedev’s comments.
Asked about the announcement on Friday by the United States, Britain and France that Iran had failed to disclose a secret uranium enrichment plant, Mr. Lavrov said it was not evident that Iran had done anything wrong. He said it was premature to assert that new sanctions were necessary.
“As I understand it, there is no clarity regarding the legal issues,” Mr. Lavrov said.
He also chided the Western powers for not telling Russia earlier that their intelligence agencies had discovered the Iranian enrichment plant.
Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin, Russia’s paramount leader, who tends to be more hawkish than Mr. Medvedev toward the United States, in recent days has not echoed Mr. Medvedev’s views on sanctions.
Still, Moscow’s overall outlook toward the United States has unquestionably warmed in recent months, largely because of President Obama’s drive to “reset” relations, and that could ultimately be pivotal.
Mr. Obama’s decision this month to cancel an antimissile system in Eastern Europe proposed by the Bush administration has achieved a particularly galvanizing effect. The Kremlin had deemed the antimissile system a direct threat to Russia, though the United States had said it was intended to protect against attacks from countries like Iran.
Mr. Medvedev regularly expressed his appreciation for Mr. Obama last week, drawing a contrast with the tensions between Moscow and Washington in the later Bush years. Obama administration officials cited Mr. Medvedev’s remarks as proof that their attempt to engage Moscow was paying off, and could lead to action against Iran.
“We do have various doubts about what Iran is doing,” Mr. Medvedev said last week. “If all possibilities for influencing the situation have been exhausted, we could consider international sanctions.”
“Sometimes, there is no other option,” he added.
Russia has said that it does not want Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, but it has also articulated misgivings about Western assertions of Iranian nuclear advances. While Russia is not one of Iran’s largest trading partners, it does sell military hardware to Iran and is building a civilian nuclear power plant there.
What is clear is that Russia considers sanctions as not solely an Iranian issue, but one of several that revolve around its dealings with Washington. It is negotiating a treaty to reduce the size of strategic nuclear forces, and remains alarmed by the possible expansion of NATO into former Soviet republics like Ukraine and Georgia.
If those issues are handled to the Kremlin’s liking, then it will be more apt to agree to stiff sanctions.
“For Russia, Iran is a very good bargaining chip,” said Vladimir Sotnikov, a senior research associate at the Center for International Security in Moscow. “And that is why, for now, I don’t think that Russia is going to be ready to wholly support major new sanctions.”
The dynamic is complicated by China, another sanctions opponent with a Security Council veto. The Kremlin can publicly show more leeway toward sanctions — in essence, offering gratitude to Mr. Obama for canceling the antimissile system in Eastern Europe — while knowing that China may continue standing in their way.
China trades heavily with Iran, and its skeptical comments on Friday after the announcement about the new enrichment plant indicated how reluctant it may be on sanctions.
At the same time, though, if China senses that Russia is more amenable, the Chinese may feel that they have to shift because they do not want to be isolated.
And Mr. Medvedev’s criticism of Iran last week has put more pressure on its leadership before nuclear talks on Thursday in Geneva between Iran and the United States and five other powers, including Russia.
Even so, in interviews over the weekend, experts in Moscow were somewhat unconvinced that the Kremlin would back forceful steps against Iran, though they did not rule it out.
Vladimir Sazhin, a commentator at the state-run Voice of Russia radio and one of the nation’s leading Iran analysts, said it was important to understand that Russia considered Iran to be a vital ally on regional issues. After the disputed Iranian presidential election in June, in fact, Mr. Medvedev congratulated President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Both countries are on the Caspian Sea and have territory in the Caucasus Mountains. (The Soviet Union had a border with Iran, but Russia is now about 100 miles away, separated from Iran by another former Soviet republic, Azerbaijan.) Both Russia and Iran want to prevent NATO from setting up bases in the region.
Mr. Sazhin said Russia had been pleased that Iran had not questioned Russia’s actions in Chechnya, a Muslim region in the Caucasus where the federal authorities have fought two brutal civil wars to put down a separatist Muslim insurgency.
“The Kremlin’s politics come down to the fact that they do not want to inflame relations with Iran, because of Russia’s regional interests,” Mr. Sazhin said.
Mr. Sazhin said he would not be surprised if Mr. Medvedev continued to imply that he was open-minded toward sanctions, in large part because the Russian leadership realizes that China may not relent and Iran will find a way to prolong the dispute.
“The Kremlin can play a good game because it knows that nothing will probably come of it,” he said.
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Biden's Visit to Central Europe
Stratfor Today » October 7, 2009 | 2156 GMT
White House officials said Oct. 7 that U.S. Vice President Joe Biden will travel to three Central European countries to discuss ballistic missile defense infrastructure and bilateral security ties. The purpose of Biden’s visit is twofold: to reassure Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania that the United States is still a powerful security guarantor, and remind Russia that the United States has clout in its geopolitical backyard. The timing of the visit coincides with the U.S.-Russian tussle over Iran’s burgeoning nuclear program.
Analysis
The White House confirmed Oct. 7 that U.S. Vice President Joe Biden will visit Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania from Oct. 20 to Oct. 24. According to the Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza, the visit will include talks regarding supporting infrastructure for the U.S. SM-3 ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans, which U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced on Sept. 17.
The intent of Biden’s visit to Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania is to assure Central Europe — but particularly Warsaw — that the United States has not abandoned the region following its decision to withdraw Bush administration plans for a ground-based interceptor BMD system. Most of Central Europe interpreted that decision as a move to appease Russia, since the United States wants the Kremlin to stop helping advance the Iranian nuclear program and eventually pressure Iran to abandon it.
However, since the U.S. decision to withdraw plans for the BMD system in Poland and the Czech Republic, Russia has not responded by pulling back its support for Iran. Instead, Russia has recently reiterated that support. From Moscow’s perspective, Russia never viewed the U.S. decision to scrap BMD in Central Europe as a concession; Russia still has not seen any real evidence of U.S. pullback as the United States is still maintaining strong ties to Central Europe. Furthermore, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Borodavkin made it clear on Oct. 6 that Moscow intends to continue its military-technological cooperation with Iran, though it will strictly adhere to the framework of international laws.
Enter U.S. Vice President Joe Biden.
Biden and U.S. Foreign Policy
Biden is a serious player when it comes to the Obama administration’s foreign policy. This will not be Biden’s first — or last — high-profile mission. In May, he went on a tour of the Balkans to try to calm regional tensions. In July, he went to two key states on the Russian periphery, Georgia and Ukraine. Biden’s visit to Tbilisi and Kiev followed U.S. President Barack Obama’s meeting with his Russian counterpart Dmitri Medvedev, a visit that the United States felt Russians did not take seriously. Biden’s trip to Ukraine and Georgia was therefore a not-so-subtle reminder to Moscow that Washington can still exert power in the Russian sphere of influence, even in states that Russia feels it has brought under its control.
It should therefore not come as a surprise that Biden is going to three key Central European states immediately following the Kremlin’s explicit intent to continue cooperation with Iran. Biden’s purpose is to say things that the U.S. administration is thinking but does not want to say without plausible deniability. He is known for his “blustery rhetoric” and “outbursts”; therefore the Obama administration can always distance itself from the actual language he uses, but the rest of the world — especially Russia — knows to listen carefully.
In effect, Biden is actually being deployed much as the National Security Council (NSC) chief often is — as the man who knows what the president really thinks. Secretaries of state are frequently marginalized because they are selected for political reasons whereas the head of the NSC is almost always a key foreign policy player. Furthermore, Biden is known as a blunt critic of Russia; during his visit to Ukraine and Georgia he explicitly said that Russia would ultimately bend to the U.S. will due to its tattered economy and in effect called Russia a weak state. Russians understandably do not like Biden, but they understand his role very well. He is therefore a perfect tool for the Obama administration to remind Russia that United States can make aggressive moves in the region — an obvious reminder to the Kremlin that it is more profitable to play ball with the United States.
Biden’s Visit in the Geopolitical Context
With that in mind, it is worth analyzing what the U.S. relationship is with the countries that Biden will be visiting. For Poland and the Czech Republic, Biden’s visit will define U.S. relations, while in Romania, Biden is expected to strengthen the already close — and unwavering — military ties.
The U.S.-Polish relationship took a hit following Obama’s decision to pull back the BMD system from Poland. Poland’s immediate reaction was one of shock, or one of trying to hide that the country was in shock with many analysts and politicians assuring the public that they “expected the decision”. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk tried to put a positive spin on the decision by saying that the new U.S. plans were beneficial for Europe, while Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski hinted at plans to tie Polish national security more closely to the European Union.
However, Poland is in a geographically unenviable position. It occupies the vast expense of plains between Germany and Russia, but matches neither country’s population nor economic resources. It can certainly strive to have cordial relations with both, but it cannot depend on either for security guarantees, and it cannot come to a consensus about making deals with Germany or Russia. The idea of tying its security to the European Union is complicated because the European Union has few concrete security guarantees. Even with the Lisbon Treaty likely to be ratified, it is unclear how Poland would spur the rest of Europe to speak with a common voice on security and defense matters.
With its geography forcing Poland to look nervously both ways, its only foreign policy strategy is to look for allies beyond its neighborhood as an external security guarantor. Between World War I and World War II, Warsaw turned to London and Paris; after the retreat of the Soviet Union, Warsaw turned to Washington. Poland therefore can take Obama’s spur and build better relations with Germany and France in terms of security arrangements, and the plan for its EU Presidency, set for 2011, calls for working close with France on the bolstering of EU defense policy, an example of this strategy. However, considering the limitations of European security guarantees, the alternative for Poland is to let the emotions on the BMD pullback pass and listen to what the United States has to offer instead.
The Czech Republic is in a less critical situation. Its location on the European continent is not directly exposed to Russia and it is integrated geographically in the German defensive perimeter. It is also a smaller and less powerful player than Poland; therefore, it is less worried about its security since there is less it can do about its own security than Poland. Czech public opinion has also been much more vociferously opposed to the U.S. BMD system than Polish public opinion, and Czech politicians did not have a consensus on the matter, which has been passed up by both former Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek’s government as well as the current government of Prime Minister Jan Fischer. Nonetheless, Biden will seek to reassure the Czechs that the United States is still a player in the region and that it is not necessary for Prague to discount the United States as a security ally.
Finally, Biden’s visit to Central Europe will finish with a stop in Romania. Romania does not have a reason to feel abandoned by the United States since it was never part of the BMD system. The United States has made Romania home for four of its lily pad bases since 2005, bases that house pre-positioned equipment and can be ramped up into a proper base in times of crisis.
While Washington’s entanglements in the Middle East colored the initial thinking on close Romanian-U.S. relations — Romania is a great European location to project air power into the Middle East — it is also a direct line into the Russian underbelly. Romania sits on the only other geographical access point — other than the North European Plain — between Russia and the European Continent as the Carpathian Mountains block off the route in between. This is the Bessarabian lowlands between the Carpathian Mountains and the Black Sea. Romania also has shown interest in aggressively looking to project its own power into neighboring Moldova, which Moscow considers part of its sphere of influence.
Biden’s visit to Central Europe is therefore part of the ongoing contest between Russia and the United States for influence in Europe, but also the broader geopolitical tussle over Iran. With Russia confirming that it intends to continue its collaboration with Tehran, the United States is sending Biden to Central Europe as a message that it too can continue playing hardball where it hurts Russia.
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http://reason.com/blog/2009/10/14/shrewd-gutsy-and-naive
Reason Magazine
Shrewd, Gutsy, and Naive?
Michael C. Moynihan | October 14, 2009
To his legion of online supporters, Obama's first foreign policy coup was caving to Russian pressure on missile defense, they claimed, in exchange for Moscow's assistance in applying sanctions on Tehran. Brendan Nyhan argued that Obama didn't "appease" Moscow because the move was "part of a quid pro quo in which Russia agreed to support tougher sanctions against Iran." Ubiquitous liberal blogger Matt Yglesias scoffed that, contra Obama's critics, in the "real world, Obama’s approach is working" by getting Russia behind the administration's Iran policy. In Salon, Juan Cole argued that Obama "has been rewarded with greater Russian cooperativeness on Iran." "The US right wing accused Obama of a failure of nerve," Cole wrote, "But in fact his move was shrewd and gutsy, since he predisposed Russia to increased cooperation with the US in regard to Iran's nuclear research program."
It would have perhaps been shrewd (but not "gutsy") had the Russians not played the neophyte president like a fiddle. Reuters:
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin warned major powers on Wednesday against intimidating Iran and said talk of sanctions against the Islamic Republic over its nuclear programme was "premature". Putin, who many diplomats, analysts, and Russian citizens believe is still Russia's paramount leader despite stepping down as president last year, was speaking after U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Moscow for two days of talks.
"There is no need to frighten the Iranians," Putin told reporters in Beijing after a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
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http://hotair.com/archives/2009/10/14/russian-security-advisor-we-reserve-the-right-to-nuke-you-preemptively/comment-page-1/#comments
Russian security advisor: We reserve the right to nuke you preemptively
posted at 6:12 pm on October 14, 2009 by Allahpundit
Just a little follow-up to Ed’s post earlier, tracking the progress of The One’s global disarmament efforts.
Hey — the committee did say that Nobel was aspirational.
In an interview published today in Izvestia, Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the Kremlin’s security council, said the new doctrine offers “different options to allow the use of nuclear weapons, depending on a certain situation and intentions of a would-be enemy. In critical national security situations, one should also not exclude a preventive nuclear strike against the aggressor.”
What’s more, Patrushev said, Russia is revising the rules for the employment of nukes to repel conventionally armed attackers, “not only in large-scale, but also in a regional and even a local war.”
Gulp. If I were in Georgia — or in any other country Russia considers part of its sphere of influence — that formulation would make me pretty anxious…
In the interview, he takes a swipe at the United States and NATO, saying that the alliance “continues to press for the admission of new members to NATO, the military activities of the bloc are intensifying, and U.S. strategic forces are conducting intensive exercises to improve the management of strategic nuclear weapons.”
“The military activities of the bloc are intensifying”? After Obama just pulled long-range missile defense out of Poland and the Czech Republic? The oddest thing about this isn’t Moscow’s willingness to nuke its neighbors — I’ve always taken that as a given, even though none of them could ever conceivably threaten Russia — but the fact that they’re willing to rattle their saber so soon after The One made a major concession to them. Are they trying to make him turn hawkish? Because that’s what’s going to happen, whether he wants it to or not, if foreign policy somehow becomes a key issue in 2012. Why not string him along for a bit and see if they can milk a few more concessions out of him? Who knows? He might be willing to yank eastern European missile defense entirely if they play ball on Iran.
Well, at least we know it can’t get much worse. Or can it
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Vladimir Putin and the Russian Inferiority Complex
By James Lewis
Vlad "the poisoner" Putin isn't such a tough guy after all. He's a sucker for Russian power and glory. That is why he has just proclaimed that it's OK for Ahmadinejad and the Twelver Suicide Cult of Tehran to have nuclear weapons. Putin is a fool. Like all the Soviet leaders, he is going to end up harming his nation to pursue his own grandiosity.
The Russian inferiority complex is a cliché of European history. It has always existed, but it is often dated back to Peter the Great, who tried desperately to bring Imperial Russia into the 17th century. Peter went to study ship-building and other new technology in the Netherlands, which is one reason why the Russian flag and the Dutch flag have the same colors. Communism was the way many Russians believed they could leapfrog Europe and America to get to become the most "progressive" nation in the world.
Putin has called the breakdown of the Soviet Empire (by its internal contradictions) the greatest catastrophe of the 20th century. It wasn't that. It was a great blessing, as the Poles and Czechs still remember. Even some Western Europeans haven't forgotten, though they like to rage against the United States. When push comes to shove they always come to Uncle again.
So Putin is desperately trying to make Russia a Great Power again, for reasons of national ego. That's what inferiority feelings do; they make people flip into phony grandiosity. You can see it in the White House today. But Obama's terrible weakness of will is Putin's opportunity. This is a game of fools playing against fools.
What's wrong with Putin's reasoning? Vladimir Putin has proclaimed that any Iranian nuclear attack would be preempted by the Russian Empire, Vsn. 2.00 (vaporware). I mean that about vaporware, because while Russia is playing chess on the international scene, A'jad and his imam, Mohzen Yazdi, are playing Russian Roulette -- The Martyrdom for Allah.
Russia has been defeated before by gamers playing by different rules. Imperial Russia was beaten in 1904 by Imperial Japan, which stunned the Tsar by ignoring the western rules of combat, failing to openly declare war before attacking. Russia played a game of defense and delay, while Japan was relentlessly powered. The Bushido warriors were happy to die for the glory of their Divine Emperor, while Russian soldiers and sailors were not so fanatically devoted to Tsar Nikolas, who went down thirteen years later when the Bolsheviks shot him and his family, and thus ended four centuries of Romanov rule.
The lesson still is unlearned that martyrdom warriors playing from a nontraditional playbook have an inherent advantage over chess players. They are more willing to die. Putin's "preemptive nuclear strategy" makes the crucial assumption that the Russians have penetrated Tehran so deeply that they will be able to predict and preempt that crucial moment when A'jad's finger, hovering over the nuclear button, will descend and launch nukes. But nobody knows that moment of decision, probably not even the Khomeiniacs themselves. Two months ago Iranian college students were getting bloodied in the streets of Tehran by Basiji and Revolutionary Guards. The regime is unstable. Would Hitler have launched nukes rather than be overthrown by the Junker Coup? You bet. Would Tojo? Yes. Would A'jad?
Who knows? Vladimir Putin says he knows. What he is really hoping is that (a) Russia will get more influence and control in the Middle East by driving the Americans back, using Tehran as a proxy; (b) the inevitable nuclear arms race between Sunni Arabs and a new Persian Nuclear Caliphate will allow Russia to coordinate oil prices with OPEC, so as to raise add more gold to its coffers.
Both of those calculations are wild gambles, putting vast numbers of human lives on the line. Putin is letting the nuclear genie out of the bottle; but the original genie is a Persian-Arab Jinn, and the psychology of the Persian and Arab world is still wildly fantasy-driven. Russia is a European nation in its thinking, with a huge Asian appendix. The Arabs and Persians are now going through a massive regression to medieval times, when the Muslims conquered the known world in three generations. They were just more willing to die for Allah than the ancient Persians and Byzantines. Tehran is a throwback to that time. Saudi Arabia never emerged from it.
Putin's cover for the Tehran nuke program may be the biggest strategic mistake in history, bar none. In the next two years it will trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that wiser heads have been desperately trying to prevent. There's a reason why the Saudis have not developed nukes -- it's because they fear that arms race, knowing the long historical split between Sunnis and Shiites. It's not comfortable for the Saudis to see Iranian nukes fifty miles from their oil fields, and a few hundred miles from Mecca and Medina. But now they may have no choice; they have financed Pakistani nukes and missiles, and can all but pick up the phone and have them flown in.
Only American protection has kept the lid on the Middle East. With Obama playing Jimmy Carter, our protective umbrella has lost its credibility. Without credibility none of our defensive guarantees can last -- NATO, Japan, Taiwan, the Middle East. If the Europeans cannot trust the United States to defend it against a strategic attack, they will have to turn to the only alternative, Russia. Over the next decade they will finally have to develop both the political will and the weapons to threaten retaliation. Like the rest of the industrial world, they will also start building missile defenses just as fast as they can.
Between Putin and Obama the world has just been dragged much closer to the precipice. It's amazing what inferiority complexes will do.
Page Printed from: http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/10/vladimir_putin_and_the_russian_1.html at October 15, 2009 - 11:46:57 AM EDT
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Two quotes onthe current situation:
http://pajamasmedia.com/victordavishanson/
To Russia With Love. Do you laugh or cry about our policy with Russia? When we serially cried out “reset” button, blamed Bush for the new Cold War with Russia, and promised to “listen”, we knew the US was walking blindfolded up the steps of Putin’s guillotine. So we humiliated the Czechs and the Poles (who have suffered far worse from the Russians) in exchange for the mythical “help” with sanctions on Iran. Today, Putin’s brief verdict of “premature” on sanctions said it all. If we can reconstruct the Obama/Hillary disaster, it goes something like this: Putin always liked the win/win/win/win idea of a nuclear Iran (the missiles point at the U.S., good profits for Russian companies, tensions in the Gulf always a help with high oil prices, everyone begs Russia to “leash” their new feral nuclear bulldog). So he entraps the idiotic Americans by vague promises of Iranian sanctions in exchange for reestablishing Russian fear and obedience in the former Soviet sphere—while revealing how America’s economic dive and strategic hesitation are proof of a more endemic decline. When Hillary talks of how delighted she is that Russia is “so supportive”, are we to cry for the beloved country? It is as if Putin not only knew he would win on this one, but get the added bonus of showing the world how obsequious, naïve, and impotent the new U.S. was in the bargain.
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http://www.powerlineblog.com/
Throughout the Cold War, except to some extent during the Carter years, the U.S. responded more or less in kind to Russian hard-bargaining. In the modern era, President Bush, prodded by Vice President Cheney, eventually did so as well.
It probably never occurred to the Russians that a U.S. president would come to power hoping to "reset" relations with Russia on some basis other than the hard bargain and the "trust but verify" mentality. Yet this is precisely what has fallen into the Kremlin's lap. From what I've heard, the Russian elites can neither believe their good fortune nor hide their amusement.
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This from Statfor: Who'd a thunk it?
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Poland: Patriot Missiles From the U.S.
Stratfor Today » October 16, 2009 | 1450 GMT
KIM JAE-HWAN/AFP/Getty Images
A fire unit of a U.S. Patriot missile batteryPolish Deputy Defense Minister Stanislaw Komorowski said Oct. 16 that the United States will deploy a Patriot air defense battery to Poland and that the discussions with Washington about hosting part of a U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) system are ongoing. Komorowski made his remarks after talks with U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Alexander Vershbow. Although there is still no official U.S. response to the Polish announcement, the revelation tracks closely with STRATFOR’s forecast that the U.S. cancellation of the Bush-era BMD program in Poland and the Czech Republic does not constitute a serious break with Washington’s intention to maintain Poland as its key ally in Europe.
It is not yet clear what this deployment might actually entail. On one end of the spectrum is a long-term deployment of a Patriot battery. On the other end is a short joint exercise where a U.S. Patriot unit is in Poland only briefly — and perhaps with inert rather than live missiles. The former is a major step for Washington; the latter is merely a signal to Moscow. In any event, nothing irreversible has been done.
But the bottom line is that the potential of U.S. Patriot missiles in Poland will not please Russia, which is why the United States is floating the idea. Russia opposed the original BMD in Poland not because the system would have posed a direct threat, but because it symbolized increasing U.S. presence in a key Central European state near Russia. In a way, the Patriot missiles in Poland are an even greater threat to Russian interests in the region because they are actually operational and will constitute not only a high-tech operational defense for Poland, but also a deepening symbiotic relationship between Warsaw and Washington.
The United States had hoped that with its initial move to scrap BMD in Central Europe, Russia would reciprocate by toning down its support of Iran. Instead, Moscow stated it would continue its military-technical cooperation.
Washington has since made it clear to Moscow that it has the ability to play in Russia’s backyard. The announcement on Oct. 7 that U.S. Vice President Joe Biden will visit Poland, Czech Republic and Romania from Oct. 20-24 was the opening salvo of the latest U.S. offensive. This was followed by Vershbow’s statement on Oct. 9 that the United States would consider adding Ukraine to its BMD network and that it would look to expand its military cooperation with Georgia and Ukraine.
The latest announcement from Poland suggests that the United States will use Vershbow — a former ambassador to Russia who is well versed on former Soviet Union matters and an important player in the U.S. defense establishment — as a prime tool to keep Russia on its toes in the ongoing confrontation over Iran. The Patriots in Poland, along with support of Ukraine and Georgia militarily, are U.S. proof to Russia that Washington has plenty of options to threaten Russia in its periphery.
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Wow, Chuck ain't pulling any punches.
Debacle in Moscow
Obama’s foreign policy is amateurishness, wrapped in naïveté, inside credulity.
By Charles Krauthammer
About the only thing more comical than Barack Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize was the reaction of those who deemed the award “premature,” as if the brilliance of Obama’s foreign policy is so self-evident and its success so assured that if only the Norway Five had waited a few years, his Nobel worthiness would have been universally acknowledged.
To believe this, you have to be a dreamy adolescent (preferably Scandinavian and a member of the Socialist International) or an indiscriminate imbiber of White House talking points. After all, this was precisely the spin on the president’s various apology tours through Europe and the Middle East: National self-denigration — excuse me, outreach and understanding — is not meant to yield immediate results; it simply plants the seeds of good feeling from which foreign-policy successes shall come.
Chauncey Gardiner could not have said it better. Well, at nine months, let’s review.
What’s come from Obama holding his tongue while Iranian demonstrators were being shot and from his recognizing the legitimacy of a thug regime illegitimately returned to power in a fraudulent election? Iran cracks down even more mercilessly on the opposition and races ahead with its nuclear program.
What’s come from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton taking human rights off the table on a visit to China and from Obama’s shameful refusal to see the Dalai Lama (a postponement, we are told). China hasn’t moved an inch on North Korea, Iran, or human rights. Indeed, it’s pushing with Russia to dethrone the dollar as the world’s reserve currency.
What’s come from the new-respect-for-Muslims Cairo speech and the unprecedented pressure on Israel for a total settlement freeze? “The settlement push backfired,” reports the Washington Post, and Arab-Israeli peace prospects have “arguably regressed.”
And what’s come from Obama’s single most dramatic foreign-policy stroke — the sudden abrogation of missile-defense arrangements with Poland and the Czech Republic that Russia had virulently opposed? For the Eastern Europeans it was a crushing blow, a gratuitous restoration of Russian influence over a region that thought it had regained independence under American protection.
But maybe not gratuitous. Surely we got something in return for selling out our friends. Some brilliant secret trade-off to get strong Russian support for stopping Iran from going nuclear before it’s too late? Just wait and see, said administration officials, who then gleefully played up an oblique statement by Pres. Dmitry Medvedev a week later as vindication of the missile-defense betrayal.
The Russian statement was so equivocal that such a claim seemed a ridiculous stretch at the time. Well, Clinton went to Moscow this week to nail down the deal. What did she get?
“Russia Not Budging on Iran Sanctions: Clinton Unable to Sway Counterpart.” Such was the Washington Post headline’s succinct summary of the debacle.
Note how thoroughly Clinton was rebuffed. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov declared that “threats, sanctions, and threats of pressure” are “counterproductive.” Note: It’s not just sanctions that are worse than useless, but even the threat of mere pressure.
It gets worse. Having failed to get any movement from the Russians, Clinton herself moved — to accommodate the Russian position! Sanctions? What sanctions? “We are not at that point yet,” she averred. “That is not a conclusion we have reached. . . . It is our preference that Iran work with the international community.”
But wait a minute. Didn’t Obama say in July that Iran had to show compliance by the G-20 summit in late September? And when that deadline passed, did he not then warn Iran that it would face “sanctions that have bite” and that it would have to take “a new course or face consequences”?
Gone with the wind. It’s the U.S. that’s now retreating from its already flimsy position of just three weeks ago. We’re not doing sanctions now, you see. We’re back to engagement. Just as the Russians suggest.
Henry Kissinger once said that the main job of Anatoly Dobrynin, the perennial Soviet ambassador to Washington, was to tell the Kremlin leadership that whenever they received a proposal from the United States that appeared disadvantageous to the United States, not to assume it was a trick.
No need for a Dobrynin today. The Russian leadership, hardly believing its luck, needs no interpreter to understand that when the Obama team clownishly rushes in bearing gifts and “reset” buttons, there is nothing ulterior, diabolical, clever, or even serious behind it. It is amateurishness, wrapped in naïveté, inside credulity. In short, the very stuff of Nobels.
— Charles Krauthammer is a nationally syndicated columnist.
National Review Online - http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=N2VkYzFkYmQyN2NlMDE4YjcyMjQ4MzEwNGRiNTJlNWE=
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Yes I know Biden is a buffoon, but still this is interesting. Stratfor has often spoken of how geopolitical interests constrain leaders far more than we realized. Given how the Russians have been fcuking with us on Iran, what this piece describes makes sense.
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Biden Rallies Central Europe
U.S. VICE PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN was in Bucharest on Thursday to meet with Romanian government officials, during his whirlwind three-country tour of Central Europe. Biden's trip thus far has been mostly about "reassuring" countries in Central Europe that Washington would not abandon the region to Russia’s influence.
However, during his address at the Bucharest University Central Library, Biden significantly upped the rhetorical ante from merely being reassuring about continued U.S. commitments. He encouraged Central European states to actively subvert Russia's influence in states on its periphery.
Related Link
U.S. Vice President Joe Biden on America, Central Europe, and Partnership in 21st Century
(STRATFOR is not responsible for content from other Web sites.)
After a cursory introduction – during which he discussed plans for the new ballistic missile defense system to be based in Poland -- Biden launched into the meat of his message. "The United States stands against the 19th-century notion of 'spheres of influence.' We will not tolerate it, nor will we be co-opted by it," he said. The point was simple and direct: The United States does not accept Russia's demand that it be given free rein in its periphery. Biden has said this before -- at the Munich Security Conference in February and many other times since -- but what followed on Thursday was an elaboration of a strategy for how Washington intends to pressure Russia and the rest of Central Europe.
"Biden not only encouraged Central European countries to seek political change in their eastern neighbors; he essentially offered them U.S. support in their efforts."
"We know from history that destroying old oppressive regimes is a great deal easier than building new flourishing democracies," Biden said. "But you've delivered on the promise of your revolution. You are now in the position to help others do the same."
And then:
"You can help guide Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine along the path of lasting stability and prosperity. It's your time to lead. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus can benefit from your personal experiences. … And we will partner with you in working to fulfill the promise of 1989. But your leadership needs to be bold and your voices loud."
With this address, Biden not only encouraged Central European countries to actively seek political change in their eastern neighbors; he essentially offered them U.S. support in their efforts. As he concluded in the speech, "We no longer think in terms of what we can do for Central Europe, but rather in terms of what we can do with Central Europe." This is an important detail. Biden was not idly telling the Central Europeans to start fires in neighborhoods to their east. It apparently was a promise from the U.S. vice president that Washington would supply the matches and lighter fluid, and even give them a lift to the bonfire.
In effect, the United States has given Moscow notice that it intends to actively push against its entire periphery and to conscript the Central European states of NATO as its foot soldiers.
It is not surprising that Biden used his trip to Romania to lay out this vision. More than most countries in the region, Romania enthusiastically has sought political change in the former Soviet countries along its borders -- specifically in Moldova. The Romanians were very active during the April election protests in Moldova: They supported pro-Western parties during the upheaval and even offered to give Romanian passports to 1 million Moldovans -- one-quarter of the population.
Bucharest does not currently have the capacity to devote to spurring political change along the Russian periphery; it is embroiled in a serious economic and political crisis. The government collapsed last week and has been replaced by a cabinet of technocrats. Meanwhile, massive strikes are taking place and the presidential elections on Nov. 22 are likely to paralyze the country for more than a month.
Nevertheless, the significance of making this kind of an address in Bucharest will not be lost on Russia and the regimes that Biden referred to as needing "an example." There were multiple revolutions in Central Europe in 1989, and Romania's was particularly violent. Its longtime communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu was overthrown in a revolution that did not resemble the non-violent "color" revolutions that the United States has supported during the past decade. The Romanian revolution was an all out-coup by elements of the army, combined with a mass citizen uprising. It ended with the execution of both Ceausescu and his wife.
Therefore, when Biden states that Central Europeans today should "fulfill the promise of 1989," the countries that Biden claimed need "leadership" will remember the bloody Romanian revolution of 1989. Biden's message to Russia is crystal clear: The Americans are in Eastern Europe, and they’re ready to play hardball.
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Russia, Iran and the Biden Speech
By George Friedman and Peter Zeihan
U.S. Vice President Joe Biden toured several countries in Central Europe last week, including the Czech Republic and Poland. The trip comes just a few weeks after the United States reversed course and decided not to construct a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in those two countries. While the system would have had little effect on the national security of either Poland or the Czech Republic, it was taken as a symbol of U.S. commitment to these two countries and to former Soviet satellites generally. The BMD cancellation accordingly caused intense concern in both countries and the rest of the region.
While the Obama administration strongly denied that the decision to halt the BMD deployment and opt for a different BMD system had anything to do with the Russians, the timing raised some questions. Formal talks with Iran on nuclear weapons were a few weeks away, and the only leverage the United States had in those talks aside from war was sanctions. The core of any effective sanctions against Iran would be placing limits on Iran's gasoline imports. By dint of proximity to Iran and massive spare refining capability, the Russians were essential to this effort -- and they were indicating that they wouldn't participate. Coincidence or not, the decision to pull BMD from Poland and the Czech Republic did give the Russians something they had been demanding at a time when they clearly needed to be brought on board.
The Biden Challenge
That's what made Biden's trip interesting. First, just a few weeks after the reversal, he revisited these countries. He reasserted American commitment to their security and promised the delivery of other weapons such as Patriot missile batteries, an impressive piece of hardware that really does enhance regional security (unlike BMD, which would grant only an indirect boost). Then, Biden went even further in Romania, not only extending his guarantees to the rest of Central Europe, but also challenging the Russians directly. He said that the United States regarded spheres of influence as 19th century thinking, thereby driving home that Washington is not prepared to accept Russian hegemony in the former Soviet Union (FSU). Most important, he called on the former satellites of the Soviet Union to assist republics in the FSU that are not part of the Russian Federation to overthrow authoritarian systems and preserve their independence.
Related Link
U.S. Vice President Joe Biden on America, Central Europe, and Partnership in 21st Century
(STRATFOR is not responsible for content from other Web sites.)
This was a carefully written and vetted speech: It was not Biden going off on a tangent, but rather an expression of Obama administration policy. And it taps into the prime Russian fear, namely, that the West will eat away at Russia's western periphery -- and at Russia itself -- with color revolutions that result in the installation of pro-Western governments, just as happened in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004-2005. The United States essentially now has pledged itself to do just that, and has asked the rest of Central Europe to join it in creating and strengthening pro-Western governments in the FSU. After doing something Russia wanted the United States to do, Washington now has turned around and announced a policy that directly challenges Russia, and which in some ways represents Russia's worst-case scenario.
What happened between the decision to pull BMD and Biden's Romania speech remains unclear, but there are three possibilities. The first possibility is that the Obama administration decided to shift policy on Russia in disappointment over Moscow's lack of response to the BMD overture. The second possibility is that the Obama administration didn't consider the effects of the BMD reversal. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said the one had nothing to do with the other, and it is possible that the Obama administration simply failed to anticipate the firestorm the course reversal would kick off in Central Europe and to anticipate that it would be seen as a conciliatory gesture to the Russians, and then had to scramble to calm the waters and reassert the basic American position on Russia, perhaps more harshly than before. The third possibility, a variation on the second scenario, is that the administration might not yet have a coordinated policy on Russia. Instead, it responds to whatever the most recent pressure happens to be, giving the appearance of lurching policy shifts.
The why of Washington decision-making is always interesting, but the fact of what has now happened is more pertinent. And that is that Washington now has challenged Moscow on the latter's core issues. However things got to that point, they are now there -- and the Russian issue now fully intersects with the Iranian issue. On a deeper level, Russia once again is shaping up to be a major challenge to U.S. national interests. Russia fears (accurately) that a leading goal of American foreign policy is to prevent the return of Russia as a major power. At present, however, the Americans lack the free hand needed to halt Russia's return to prominence as a result of commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Kremlin inner circle understands this divergence between goal and capacity all too well, and has been working to keep the Americans as busy as possible elsewhere.
Distracting Washington While Shoring Up Security
The core of this effort is Russian support for Iran. Moscow has long collaborated with Tehran on Iran's nuclear power generation efforts. Conventional Russian weapon systems are quite popular with the Iranian military. And Iran often makes use of Russian international diplomatic cover, especially at the U.N. Security Council, where Russia wields the all-important veto.
Russian support confounds Washington's ability to counter more direct Iranian action, whether that Iranian action be in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iraq or the Persian Gulf. The Obama administration would prefer to avoid war with Iran, and instead build an international coalition against Iran to force it to back down on any number of issues of which a potential nuclear weapons program is only the most public and obvious. But building that coalition is impossible with a Russia-sized hole right in the center of the system.
The end result is that the Americans have been occupied with the Islamic world for some time now, something that secretly delights the Russians. The Iranian distraction policy has worked fiendishly well: It has allowed the Russians to reshape their own neighborhood in ways that simply would not be possible if the Americans had more diplomatic and military freedom of action. At the beginning of 2009, the Russians saw three potential challenges to their long-term security that they sought to mitigate. As of this writing, they have not only succeeded, they have managed partially to co-opt all three threats.
First, there is Ukraine, which is tightly integrated into the Russian industrial and agricultural heartland. A strong Ukrainian-Russian partnership (if not outright control of Ukraine by Russia) is required to maintain even a sliver of Russian security. Five years ago, Western forces managed to short-circuit a Kremlin effort to firm up Russian control of the Ukrainian political system, resulting in the Orange Revolution that saw pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko take office. After five years of serious Russian diplomatic and intelligence work, Moscow has since managed not just to discredit Yushchenko -- he is now less popular in most opinion polls than the margin of error -- but to command the informal loyalty of every other candidate for president in the upcoming January 2010 election. Very soon, Ukraine's Western moment will formally be over.
Russia is also sewing up the Caucasus. The only country that could challenge Russia's southern flank is Turkey, and until now, the best Russian hedge against Turkish power has been an independent (although certainly still a Russian client) Armenia. (Turkish-Armenian relations have been frozen in the post-Cold War era over the contentious issue of the Armenian genocide.) A few months ago, Russia offered the Turks the opportunity to improve relations with Armenia. The Turks are emerging from 90 years of near-comatose international relations, and they jumped at the chance to strengthen their position in the Caucasus. But in the process, Turkey's relationship with its heretofore regional ally, Azerbaijan (Armenia's archfoe), has soured. Terrified that they are about to lose their regional sponsor, the Azerbaijanis have turned to the Russians to counterbalance Armenia, while the Russians still pull all Armenia's strings. The end result is that Turkey's position in the Caucasus is now far weaker than it was a few months ago, and Russia still retains the ability to easily sabotage any Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.
Even on the North European Plain, Russia has made great strides. The main power on that plain is the recently reunified Germany. Historically, Germany and Russia have been at each other's throats, but only when they have shared a direct border. When an independent Poland separates them, they have a number of opportunities for partnership, and 2009 has seen such opportunities seized. The Russians initially faced a challenge regarding German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Merkel is from the former East Germany, giving her personal reasons to see the Russians as occupiers. Cracking this nut was never going to be easy for Moscow, yet it succeeded. During the 2009 financial crisis, when Russian firms were snapping like twigs, the Russian government still provided bailout money and merger financing to troubled German companies, with a rescue plan for Opel even helping Merkel clinch re-election. With the Kremlin now offering to midwife -- and in many cases directly subsidize -- investment efforts in Russia by German firms such as E.On, Wintershall, Siemens, Volkswagen and ThyssenKrupp, the Kremlin has quite literally purchased German goodwill.
Washington Seeks a Game Changer
With Russia making great strides in Eurasia while simultaneously sabotaging U.S. efforts in the Middle East, the Americans desperately need to change the game. Despite its fiery tone, this desperation was on full display in Biden's speech. Flat-out challenging the Central Europeans to help other FSU countries recreate the revolutions they launched when they broke with the Soviet empire in 1989, specifically calling for such efforts in Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Armenia, is as bald-faced a challenge as the Americans are currently capable of delivering. And to ensure there was no confusion on the point, Biden also promised -- publicly -- whatever support the Central Europeans might ask for. The Americans have a serious need for the Russians to be on the defensive. Washington wants to force the Russians to focus on their own neighborhood, ideally forgetting about the Iranians in the process. Better yet, Washington would like to force the Russians into a long slog of defensive actions to protect their clients hard up on their own border. The Russians did not repair the damage of the Orange Revolution overnight, so imagine how much time Washington would have if all of the former Soviet satellites started stirring up trouble across Russia's western and southern periphery.
The Central Europeans do not require a great deal of motivation. If the Americans are concerned about a resurgent Russia, then the Central Europeans are absolutely terrified -- and that was before the Russians started courting Germany, the only regional state that could stand up to Russia by itself. Things are even worse for the Central Europeans than they seem, as much of their history has consisted of vainly attempting to outmaneuver Germany and Russia's alternating periods of war and partnership.
The question of why the United States is pushing this hard at the present time remains. Talks with the Iranians are under way; it is difficult to gauge how they are going. The conventional wisdom holds that the Iranians are simply playing for time before allowing the talks to sink. This would mean the Iranians don't feel terribly pressured by the threat of sanctions and don't take threats of attack very seriously. At least with regard to the sanctions, the Russians have everything to do with Iran's blase attitude. The American decision to threaten Russia might simply have been a last-ditch attempt to force Tehran's hand now that conciliation seems to have failed. It isn't likely to work, because for the time being Russia has the upper hand in the former Soviet Union, and the Americans and their allies -- motivated as they may be -- do not have the best cards to play.
The other explanation might be that the White House wanted to let Iran know that the Americans don't need Russia to deal with Iran. The threats to Russia might infuriate it, but the Kremlin is unlikely to feel much in the form of clear and present dangers. On the other hand, blasting the Russians the way Biden did might force the Iranians to reconsider their hand. After all, if the Americans are no longer thinking of the Russians as part of the solution, this indicates that the Americans are about to give up on diplomacy and sanctions. And that means the United States must choose between accepting an Iranian bomb or employing the military option.
And this leaves the international system with two outcomes. First, by publicly ending attempts to secure Russian help, Biden might be trying to get the Iranians to take American threats seriously. And second, by directly challenging the Russians on their home turf, the United States will be making the borderlands between Western Europe and Russia a very exciting place.
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A Speech, the Russian Economy and U.S. Relations
AS RUSSIAN PRESIDENT DMITRI MEDVEDEV was preparing to make his second State of the State address on Thursday, some major shifts in Russian domestic and foreign policy appeared to be taking place. Those shifts seemed destined to affect not only the speech, but Russia as a whole.
The address was postponed for a month. The annual State of the State address can be delivered anytime in October or November, but STRATFOR sources in the Kremlin have said that the speech was put on hold while Medvedev awaited permission from Russia’s decision-maker-in-chief, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, on launching massive economic reforms.
“The speech will be a test for U.S.-Russian relations.”
These reforms reportedly will be the heart of Medvedev’s speech. The global financial crisis hit Russia pretty hard, but it also has revealed some deep and dangerous inefficiencies in the Russian economy that could seriously damage the country in the future. As previously discussed, in order to combat these inefficiencies, Medvedev – along with his mentor, Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov, and Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin — have come up with a plan to invite Western investment and technology back into the country, taking many key companies private and quashing mismanagement — mostly by the security services — in some critical Russian corporations.
These reforms have been highly controversial: They not only would reverse the centralization of the Russian economy – a trend that has been under way for the past four years – but would deprive many within the Federal Security Bureau (FSB) of their economic power.
On Wednesday, the day before Medvedev’s speech, we learned that criminal investigations have been launched into 22 state companies — all of which are tied to the FSB. Also, late Tuesday night, Medvedev signed a document calling for a major overhaul of state firms.
These are signs that Putin has signed off on the plan by Medvedev’s clan to reform the Russian economy. The president’s speech was expected to make those changes public.
But the speech also was to be a test for U.S.-Russian relations. The Russian presidents — first Putin, then Medvedev — have used the State of the State address as a vehicle for criticizing the West. Last year, Medvedev used Soviet-era rhetoric and declared Russia’s return to the ranks of the world’s great powers.
Relations between the United States and Russia seem to have taken a sharp downturn since that speech, with Washington continuing its support for former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states like Georgia and Poland, and with Russia continuing its support for Iran.
But Russia’s stance may be shifting. In the past week, Medvedev has said that he might be open to shifting Moscow’s position on Iran to support Western-organized sanctions. There also have been a string of statements out of Russia’s Foreign Ministry, pushing for Iran to agree to a nuclear deal with the West.
The question is whether Russia means it or not. Medvedev may be opening a window of opportunity for the United States on the Iran issue. The Russians know they need Western investment and technology in order to strengthen and stabilize their economy. But the West has not wanted to deal with Russia while there were no guaranteed protections for investors and Russia was supporting anti-Western regimes like Tehran.
Moscow could be stringing all these issues together — conceding on Iran, while giving the West an opportunity to forge a new economic relationship with Russia.
The tone of Medvedev’s speech therefore was expected to signal whether Russia is really going to extend an olive branch to the West or continue with the current standoff.
All of these gestures — the speech, economic reforms and shifts on Iran — come just ahead of a meeting between Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama, who will talk in Singapore on Sunday. And that could be the true litmus test of how serious both sides are about a change in relations.
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Paulson claims Russia tried to foment Fannie-Freddie crisis
By Krishna Guha in Washington
Published: January 29 2010 21:06 | Last updated: January 29 2010 21:06
Russia proposed to China that the two nations should sell Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bonds in 2008 to force the US government to bail out the giant mortgage-finance companies, former US Treasury secretary Hank Paulson has claimed.
The allegation is in his memoir On the Brink in which he also suggests that Alistair Darling, the UK chancellor, blocked a rescue takeover of Lehman Brothers by Barclays Bank when he refused to support special treatment by UK regulators.
Mr Paulson said that he was told about the Russian plan when he was in Beijing for the Olympics in August 2008. Russia had gone to war with Georgia, a US ally, on August 8.
“Russian officials had made a top-level approach to the Chinese, suggesting that together they might sell big chunks of their GSE holdings to force the US to use its emergency authorities to prop up these companies,” he said.
Fannie and Freddie are known as GSEs or government sponsored enterprises.
“The Chinese had declined to go along with the disruptive scheme, but the report was deeply troubling,” he said. A senior Russian official told the Financial Times that he could not comment on the allegation.
Separately, Mr Paulson makes it clear that he believes that Mr Darling prevented a takeover of Lehman by Barclays out of fear that it would endanger the UK bank.
Mr Paulson said that Mr Darling telephoned him on Friday September 12 – as the US authorities were scrambling to find a buyer for Lehman – to express concern about a possible Barclays deal. Mr Paulson said that he did not realise at the time that this was a “clear warning”.
He was stunned to discover on Sunday September 14 that the UK Financial Services Authority would not approve the merger on an accelerated timetable or waive the requirement for a shareholder vote.
Tim Geithner, then president of the New York Fed, called Callum McCarthy, the head of the UK’s Financial Services Authority, to ask him to waive the vote requirement.
“But the FSA chief put the onus on Darling, saying that only the chancellor of the exchequer had the authority to do that,” Mr Paulson said.
He said that Mr Darling “made it clear, without a hint of apology in his voice, that there was no way Barclays would buy Lehman”. Lehman filed for bankruptcy the next day.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2010. Print a single copy of this article for personal use. Contact us if you wish to print more to distribute to others.
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A Russian-American Faceoff in Moscow
U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY CLINTON arrived in Moscow on Thursday for the latest session of the Middle East Quartet, which comprises Russia, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations. The main topics for the meeting, which is scheduled to begin on Friday and last through the weekend, include Iran and reviving peace talks between the Israelis and Palestinians. In addition to this multilateral session, there will also be several bilateral meetings held on the sidelines. STRATFOR is particularly interested in one of these sideline meetings; it was announced at the last minute, and will be held between Clinton and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Clinton and Putin have plenty to talk about at the moment. As representatives of two of the world’s most powerful countries, it is only natural that Russia and the United States would brush up on each other and share competing goals and interests. But current geopolitical circumstances have put Moscow and Washington not only within each other’s field of vision, but also practically in each other’s face. And this goes beyond the oft-delayed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) talks, and is only tangentially related to the Israelis and Palestinians.
“The United States, even with the many pressing issues it is dealing with, has not completely shied away from playing in Russia’s near abroad.”
With the United States embroiled in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and cautiously seeing its way through a shaky economic recovery, Washington’s attention has largely been focused on its immediate problems at hand. This has given Russia an opportunity to build up levers in its near abroad over the past few years, and allowed it to regain much of the influence it lost in the aftermath of the Cold War, particularly in the former Soviet states. Russia has not only resurged in places like Ukraine, Georgia and Kazakhstan, it has leveraged its strengthened position in its own neighborhood to support key players that are thorns in Washington’s side, and serve to distract the United States even further, especially when it comes to Iran.
This support comes in many forms, from threatening to sell missile defense systems to Iran, to hobbling the “crippling” sanctions that Israel has demanded the United States enact over Iran’s nuclear program. The support also includes the nuclear program itself, with Russia assisting Iran in the construction of the Bushehr nuclear plant. It has been publicly stated that the plant is meant only for peaceful purposes, but it is inherently provocative given Iran’s refusal to make its nuclear operations transparent.
But the United States, even with the many pressing issues it is dealing with, has not completely shied away from playing in Russia’s near abroad. Washington has adamantly refused to turn away support for pro-Western countries like Georgia, and is currently participating in NATO air exercises over the Baltic countries in a show of solidarity with these small countries who are growing increasingly nervous over Russia’s next move. These crucial countries are next on Moscow’s list of states it is attempting to pull back into its sphere of influence. And with these countries, Washington has simply refused to budge.
It is perhaps no coincidence that one day after these exercises began — and on the very day that Clinton landed in Moscow — Russia let loose a barrage of rhetoric in support for Iran. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin took the opportunity to call for strengthening ties with Iran in a meeting with his Iranian counterpart. Putin then upped the ante when he said that the Bushehr nuclear power plant, which has long been set for completion, but which never can seem to get finished due to technical (though really political) reasons, will be completed and become operational this summer. While many statements have been made about Bushehr finishing “soon” or “late this year,” previous such statements were not made by Putin himself, and the timetable was never this specific or early. Clinton immediately responded to Putin’s statement, urging that the launch of the plant be delayed until Tehran proves it is not pursuing nuclear weapons; in other words, indefinitely.
And this sets the stage for Clinton’s meeting with Putin. Clearly, the two will not be going into their meeting on friendly turf. Even if there is a breakthrough in the START talks, and the reset button is pushed a thousand times, Russia and the United States will remain in a tense standoff. Both countries are making demands on one another and not backing down, and both are acting as if they do not need to back down to achieve their goals. The latter, of course, is far from the truth. Whether and how they will budge, and on what issues, will help determine everything including START, the Israeli-Palestinian talks and really strategic issues like Iran.
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Woof,
Since this is turning into a battle of wills between Russia and a American company this probably works here on this thread better. However, with the global economy as it is now, I see more conflicts and interactions between governments with restricted freedoms and companies from more democratic nations becoming more of a problem in the future, with companies finding themselves at odds with diplomatic efforts and government policies of other nations as well as their own. China to has had very contentious relations with internet companies as well as others.
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39157877/ns/business-the_new_york_times
P.C.
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Summary
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev on Sept. 22 signed a decree banning Russia from transferring heavy military equipment, including the S-300 strategic air defense system, to Iran. On the same day, the United States expressed interest in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia joining the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, which Russia has wanted since the Baltic states gained their independence. This trade-off is the result of Moscow and Washington reaching an informal agreement on several contentious issues. However, these concessions are not without problems and loopholes.
Analysis
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev signed a decree Sept. 22 banning Russia from transferring the S-300 strategic air defense system, armored vehicles, warplanes and helicopters to Iran, in compliance with the U.S.-led U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against the country. On the same day, the United States said it is interested in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) joining the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), which Russia has been pushing for since the countries gained their independence and began joining Western institutions.
These developments come as Moscow and Washington have reached at least an informal temporary agreement on a series of contentious issues between them and on the eve of the foreign ministers’ meeting of the NATO-Russia Council in New York. But the concessions by Russia and the United States come with problems and loopholes.
Russia’s decision to ban the transfer of heavy military equipment to Iran falls under Russia’s agreement to the UNSC sanctions against Iran, signed in June. The decree also bans several Iranians involved in Iran’s nuclear activities from transiting Russian territory and prohibits Russian legal entities or individuals from rendering financial services to operations if there are reasons to believe the operations might be related to Iran’s nuclear activities. The ban on nuclear-related personnel and financial services is interesting because Russia built the bulk of Iran’s Bushehr nuclear facility and still has some 200 scientists in Iran running the plant.
Russia’s move is meant to make a statement: Moscow and Washington are coordinating on the Iran issue. Russia wavered on agreeing to the U.S.-designed sanctions for years in order to use its vote as leverage against the United States, as tensions were rising between Moscow and Washington. Iran traditionally was part of the game between the two countries; for example, when Washington pursued military agreements with Georgia, Moscow would do the same with Iran.
But in the past six months, Russia and the United States seemed to have evolved from this tenuous relationship and have come to a temporary agreement on a series of issues. Russia signed onto the Iran sanctions, agreed to allow increasing amounts of U.S. military supplies to transit its territory to Afghanistan, and agreed to upgrade and repair NATO members’ military equipment used in Afghanistan. In turn, Washington has agreed to a series of large modernization deals in Russia and has backed off its bilateral relationships with many former Soviet states (like Georgia and Ukraine), allowing Russia time to consolidate its power in the former Soviet sphere.
Medvedev’s decree comes as Washington is considering opening talks with Tehran. Iran was more able to stand up to the United States while Russia was its primary power patron. Russia’s apparent abandonment of Iran decreases Tehran’s leverage in any future talks with Washington.
But as with most of Russia’s concessions, there is a loophole in the decree. The document specifies that vehicles, vessels or aircraft under the Russian state flag will not transfer military equipment to Iran. This means Russia could deliver the equipment using other states’ territory or transportation methods. Russia also could fulfill its military contracts with Iran through its military industrial joint ventures with its neighbors, such as Kazakhstan and Belarus. In short, Russia has quite a bit of room to maneuver should it need to use Iran as leverage against the United States again.
On the same day as Russia’s latest concession to the United States, U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder said the Baltic states should join the CFE — a Cold War arms control treaty that is a central pillar of Europe’s military-security and conventional arms control architecture. The CFE places explicit and itemized ceilings on conventional military hardware — such as main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, attack helicopters and fighter aircraft — throughout the European theater for both NATO and the former Warsaw Pact states (including Russia west of the Urals). Russia’s problem with the CFE is that it was signed before many of the post-Soviet states existed — when Soviet forces were stationed in East Berlin, not when NATO was encroaching on St. Petersburg. The Baltic states’ absence from the CFE is one of Russia’s biggest fears because the three countries are NATO members and are on Russia’s doorstep.
Washington has made similar statements on the CFE before, but this latest statement comes as Russia is increasing pressure on the Baltic states to become more neutral toward Russia. The Baltics have already been concerned during the past few months about losing their traditional Western patron, Poland, and the trio could see any pressure to join the CFE as the United States also giving in to Russia.
Like the Russian concession, the U.S. statement on the CFE is not without its problems. There is no guarantee the Baltics will follow through on Washington’s suggestion. The United States has announced before that it is interested in the Baltics joining the treaty, but no such action has been taken yet. And while the United States has given assurances about pulling back its support for Georgia, the Baltic states remain NATO members — unlike Georgia — and continue to enjoy the alliance’s security guarantee.
Washington and Moscow are using hollow, rhetorical promises to each other in order to maintain the warming trend in their bilateral relations. In order to resolve larger issues of interest for each state — such as the U.S. standoff with Iran and the war in Afghanistan, and Russia’s resurgence and drive for modernization — the countries need each other. Neither the United States nor Russia believes the current detente will last; rather, Washington and Moscow are working to deal with larger issues in the short term.
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Thursday, November 18, 2010 STRATFOR.COM Diary Archives
U.S.-Russian Relations in Pre-Summit Flux
Just days before the NATO summit in Lisbon in which Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama will meet, Medvedev has postponed his annual State of the State address from Nov. 22 to Nov. 30 to account for a possible shift in U.S.-Russian relations, according to STRATFOR sources in Moscow.
Over the past six months, Moscow and Washington had set many of their disagreements aside to achieve more critical goals. Russia wanted aid on its modernization and privatization programs, a cessation of Western support for Georgia and Ukraine, and a freeze on ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans in Russia’s periphery. The United States wanted Russia to sign onto sanctions against Iran and to drop support for Tehran, as well as provide increased logistical support for the war in Afghanistan. On all these issues, there was some sort of common ground found, meaning that Moscow and Washington seemed to have struck a temporary detente.
“START seems to be just the beginning of a possible breakdown in the “reset” with Russia.”
One bellwether to judge U.S.-Russian relations has been the new START Treaty — the nuclear arms reduction treaty between the United States and Russia. Obama and Medvedev agreed on START in April and it looked as if it would pass in both countries’ legislatures, especially in time for the November NATO summit. STRATFOR sources in Moscow even indicated that a delegation from the United States two months ago ensured that relations were in a warming period and that START would be signed.
But there has been a shift in Washington in the past month since the November U.S. elections.
Since the elections, the U.S. Senate — which must ratify START – has shifted positions. There are senators who are either vociferously opposed to the START document or against it in its current form. There is even a concern that since the elections, START may not even make it to the floor for debate. Russian officials have directly linked the Senate’s stall on START to a possible break of any reset in relations between Moscow and Washington. Part of the Senate debate on START is whether the United States should even contribute to Russia’s modernization program, which Obama agreed to on Medvedev’s last visit. A delay or reversal on either issue on the U.S. side is an indication that Washington is either divided over the future of Russian relations or is starting to cool from its recent warming.
But problems in the Senate over relations with Russia seem to be just the beginning of a possible breakdown in the “reset” with Russia.
The next issue is that at the NATO summit, there is the NATO treaty on BMDs that could possibly include Russia’s participation in some yet undefined format in any future BMD projects. But this Russian participation would not preclude Washington from making a bilateral deal on setting up missile defense installations – in countries such as Poland and Czech Republic. While Russia would enjoy being included in a NATO treaty on BMD, it is much more concerned with Washington’s bilateral deals on BMD projects in Central Europe. This is an issue Russia had previously assumed was frozen, but without the new NATO treaty covering U.S. bilateral deals, the issue of BMD in Central Europe is back on the table much to Russia’s chagrin.
Lastly, there are rumors that military support from the West is returning to Georgia. At this time, STRATFOR cannot confirm these rumors from Moscow sources, but if true, every guarantee Russia struck over the summer with the United States on forming a temporary detente has been abandoned.
This is the fear Moscow has going into this NATO summit over the weekend. Russia seems to be unsure if all the recent signs over the past few weeks on START, modernization, BMD and Georgia are really a decision in the United States to return to an aggressive stance with Russia, or if there are other explanations, like party politics in Washington. This is why Medvedev has pushed back his State of the State address, and sources say that a second version of the speech is being written in which the president won’t be so warm on relations with the United States.
What happens next will be key. If the U.S. has abandoned its understandings with Russia, then it is time for Moscow to reciprocate. This could mean that everything from resuming support for Iran to pulling back on support for the mission in Afghanistan could be considered in the Kremlin.
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Senior Eurasia analyst Lauren Goodrich examines the prospects for this weekend’s crucial NATO summit in Lisbon on the alliance’s future.
Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.
Colin Chapman: NATO is at a crossroads. Friday and Saturday see the most important meeting of the organization since the end of the Cold War. The meeting to be held in the Portuguese capital Lisbon will be attended by the president of Russia for the first time. So does NATO face just a facelift or a transformation?
Welcome to Agenda. And joining me to discuss this is STRATFOR Senior Eurasia Analyst Lauren Goodrich. Lauren, the agenda looks very different at this NATO summit. It’s not going to be about Afghanistan, is it?
Lauren Goodrich: Not at all. This is the most critical NATO summit in over a decade because they’re going to be drafting the Strategic Concept Document. This Strategic Concept Document is pretty much the mission statement of NATO. It’s the third one drafted since the fall of the Soviet Union. The Strategic Concept during the Cold War, of course, was to contain the Soviets. But after the fall of the Soviet Union, the strategic concept changed to pretty much deal with the fall of the Soviet Union at first, and then shifted again in 1999 in order to expand NATO’s ability to intervene outside the Eurasian theatre. This allowed NATO to militarily intervene in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, etc… So now it’s time for the third strategic concept document to actually be drafted. This one is going to set what is NATO’s focus for the next decade. What is the threat for the next decade?
Chapman: So what is the threat in the next decade?
Goodrich: Well that’s the problem. You have 28 members now of NATO all with differing interests and different definitions of what a threat is. This is where we go into pretty much how NATO is divided into three camps.
The first camp is what I would call the Atlanticists – the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Denmark. The Atlanticists are interested in the non-Eurasian theatre. They want NATO to focus on the threats that we’ve seen recently such as the war in Afghanistan and nontraditional threats such as terrorism.
The second camp is actually the core Europeans led by the French and Germans. They are interested in limiting NATO, a leaner NATO, having the members not be as committed and limiting their ability to commit. And also having NATO work with other organizations such as the United Nations.
The third group within NATO which is the Intermarium states. This is the more interesting group because it’s newer NATO members - mainly the ones from Central Europe. What they see as a threat is what the core and the root level NATO theat was going back to the beginning of NATO - the Soviets. And the Central Europeans want NATO to focus back on the Russians.
Chapman: It’s called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but after this is it going to emerge as something completely different?
Goodrich: Well that depends on the Strategic Concept Document that’s drafted this weekend. But how do you draft a common document when you have so many diverging interests in NATO at this moment? The Strategic Concept Document looks like it’s only going to show how divided the alliance is now.
Chapman: Let me throw that question back to you. Could this all really be resolved in just two days?
Goodrich: Well the negotiations over this concept document have been going on for quite a while now. But we are not seeing any ability for them to come together. Even in the past week we’ve seen statements out of France and the Poles, the United States, United Kingdom, the Germans - everyone’s on a different page.
Chapman: Lauren – why did the Russians accept an invitation to attend – what do they expect to get out of it?
Goodrich: Well the NATO summit is actually in two parts. The first part is the NATO summit in which they will be discussing the Strategic Concept Document. The second part is actually the Russian-NATO summit, which is why Russian President Dmitri Medvedev was invited. Medvedev is going with two goals. The first goal is to see what comes out of the first part of the summit. The more divided NATO is especially over the Strategic Concept Document, the better it is for the Russians. The Russians know that as long as NATO is divided, it can never agree on things like expansion – especially into the former Soviet states. Or declaring Russia as the target of their focus.
The second is for Medvedev to sit down with U.S. President Barack Obama. This is the very first one-on-one since the U.S. elections. The Russians were very wary going into these elections because they know the Republicans tend to have a firmer, more aggressive take on Russia. Since the elections, which did not go in Obama’s favor occurred, Russia has grown wary as to whether Obama would stick to his previous commitments on having warmer relations with Russia.
Chapman: I suppose one of the ironies of all this is just as things look as if they could change, they might not change because of the state of America’s politics.
Goodrich: Very much so. The United States and Russia seemed as if they were on a warming period under Barack Obama – starting in about April – but really fleshing out over the summer. The United States and Russia decided that it was better to have a temporary detente between their two countries in order to focus on more important issues of the moment.
For the United States this meant that they needed Russia to agree to sanctions on Iran and logistical support for Afghanistan. For Russia, this meant that they needed the U.S. to cease support for Georgia and Ukraine, freeze ballistic missile defense plans in Central Europe, as well as aiding Russia in its modernization and privatization programs. Both sides actually agreed to all of this until the elections.
The START Treaty ended up being the bellwether of whether this temporary detente was being successful or not. It looked like it was going to slide through both legislatures in both Russia and the United States easily - until the elections. So now we have a stall on START.
Chapman: So summing up, its’t NATO really just playing into Russia’s hands? As these groups in NATO argue about the future, the Russians just get on about their own business.
Goodrich: Very much so. They’re counting on the divisions within NATO. As long as it’s divided Russia will have a much easier time in order to clamp down on its resurgence especially in its former Soviet states and be able to start even pushing on the NATO members themselves.
Chapman: Thanks very much Lauren. Lauren Goodrich there, and that’s Agenda for this week. I’m Colin Chapman. See you next time.
=================
Thursday, November 18, 2010 STRATFOR.COM Diary Archives
U.S.-Russian Relations in Pre-Summit Flux
Just days before the NATO summit in Lisbon in which Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama will meet, Medvedev has postponed his annual State of the State address from Nov. 22 to Nov. 30 to account for a possible shift in U.S.-Russian relations, according to STRATFOR sources in Moscow.
Over the past six months, Moscow and Washington had set many of their disagreements aside to achieve more critical goals. Russia wanted aid on its modernization and privatization programs, a cessation of Western support for Georgia and Ukraine, and a freeze on ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans in Russia’s periphery. The United States wanted Russia to sign onto sanctions against Iran and to drop support for Tehran, as well as provide increased logistical support for the war in Afghanistan. On all these issues, there was some sort of common ground found, meaning that Moscow and Washington seemed to have struck a temporary detente.
“START seems to be just the beginning of a possible breakdown in the “reset” with Russia.”
One bellwether to judge U.S.-Russian relations has been the new START Treaty — the nuclear arms reduction treaty between the United States and Russia. Obama and Medvedev agreed on START in April and it looked as if it would pass in both countries’ legislatures, especially in time for the November NATO summit. STRATFOR sources in Moscow even indicated that a delegation from the United States two months ago ensured that relations were in a warming period and that START would be signed.
But there has been a shift in Washington in the past month since the November U.S. elections.
Since the elections, the U.S. Senate — which must ratify START – has shifted positions. There are senators who are either vociferously opposed to the START document or against it in its current form. There is even a concern that since the elections, START may not even make it to the floor for debate. Russian officials have directly linked the Senate’s stall on START to a possible break of any reset in relations between Moscow and Washington. Part of the Senate debate on START is whether the United States should even contribute to Russia’s modernization program, which Obama agreed to on Medvedev’s last visit. A delay or reversal on either issue on the U.S. side is an indication that Washington is either divided over the future of Russian relations or is starting to cool from its recent warming.
But problems in the Senate over relations with Russia seem to be just the beginning of a possible breakdown in the “reset” with Russia.
The next issue is that at the NATO summit, there is the NATO treaty on BMDs that could possibly include Russia’s participation in some yet undefined format in any future BMD projects. But this Russian participation would not preclude Washington from making a bilateral deal on setting up missile defense installations – in countries such as Poland and Czech Republic. While Russia would enjoy being included in a NATO treaty on BMD, it is much more concerned with Washington’s bilateral deals on BMD projects in Central Europe. This is an issue Russia had previously assumed was frozen, but without the new NATO treaty covering U.S. bilateral deals, the issue of BMD in Central Europe is back on the table much to Russia’s chagrin.
Lastly, there are rumors that military support from the West is returning to Georgia. At this time, STRATFOR cannot confirm these rumors from Moscow sources, but if true, every guarantee Russia struck over the summer with the United States on forming a temporary detente has been abandoned.
This is the fear Moscow has going into this NATO summit over the weekend. Russia seems to be unsure if all the recent signs over the past few weeks on START, modernization, BMD and Georgia are really a decision in the United States to return to an aggressive stance with Russia, or if there are other explanations, like party politics in Washington. This is why Medvedev has pushed back his State of the State address, and sources say that a second version of the speech is being written in which the president won’t be so warm on relations with the United States.
What happens next will be key. If the U.S. has abandoned its understandings with Russia, then it is time for Moscow to reciprocate. This could mean that everything from resuming support for Iran to pulling back on support for the mission in Afghanistan could be considered in the Kremlin.
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I preface this by noting
a) that IMHO Bush's approach to Russia failed and left us in a very weak position; and
b) that Reagan wanted to share Star Wars with the Russians. Now, a mere 25 years or so later, Obama appears to be thinking of something similar.
Reporting from Washington —
As he flew to Yokohama, Japan, this month, President Obama was on the way to the sleeper event of the fall, a peripheral get-together almost entirely overlooked amid a battery of colossal global summits.
Hardly anyone outside the White House even knew of the one-on-one with the Russian president, quietly scheduled for a Sunday morning two weeks ago.
Even Obama's team didn't realize that he and Dmitry Medvedev were on the brink of a deal that could eventually bring the Russians in on a plan to build a missile defense system in Europe in cooperation with NATO, the organization whose longtime mission was to keep Moscow's nuclear threat in check.
For weeks, Russian negotiators had been putting the brakes on missile talks. One top Obama advisor was ready to let it go for at least a year.
But it was to be a lesson in summitry for a White House entourage — officials, advisors and journalists — that had been focused on the big-name acronym summits this month. Especially stinging for Obama had been the failure to achieve key objectives at the G-20 summit of industrialized nations days earlier in Seoul, leaving the United States on its own in dealing with its fragile economy and high unemployment rate.
In the realm of diplomacy, though, deals that seem entirely on track can fall apart when the titans convene. And newer, more significant ones can appear out of thin air.
"It's interesting," deputy national security advisor Ben Rhodes said in retrospect, "how a bilateral meeting at one summit is necessary to yield results at another."
Just before boarding Air Force One to Yokohama, the president shook off the headlines that had irritated him in Seoul. Such meetings don't always produce "revolutionary progress," he said, but rather "evolutionary progress."
The Nov.13-14 trip to Japan was devoted almost entirely to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. A meeting on the sidelines with Medvedev was expected to be just another get-together for the two fortysomething lawyers.
That Sunday morning, the presidents and their top advisors arranged themselves around a long table in a small meeting room of the InterContinental Yokohama Grand Hotel and started talking about previously negotiated issues: Afghanistan, trade, the START arms treaty they'd signed but not ratified.
On missile defense, Obama knew that the negotiators in Brussels had not worked out the important issues, such as how to agree on common threats or resume joint-defense exercises. He turned the conversation there anyway. And as he did, advisors in the room were surprised by Medvedev's demeanor.
"He was leaving himself wiggle room," said one senior Obama administration official who was there, "and not committing to anything. But he was clearly very friendly and open to what the president was saying."
That meant something to the Americans at the table. In treaty talks the year before, when Medvedev had wanted to give some ground but hadn't yet built support for it back home, they'd seen him adopt the same mien.
Four days later, U.S. Ambassador Ivo Daalder, Obama's NATO point man in Brussels, called to report a development. The Russian brakes were off, he said.
Indeed, at the final summit of the month — of North Atlantic Treaty Organization leaders in Lisbon — the Russians shook hands on some surprising plans, although the details have yet to be worked out. Medvedev agreed to work toward cooperation with NATO on a missile shield designed to protect Europe and the United States, beginning with a study of each side's technologies and how they might be interwoven.
Missile defense was no longer a problem in U.S. and NATO relations with Russia, Daalder said. Instead, it was now "a means to foster greater cooperation with Russia."
The plan is far from reality. Medvedev is imposing some conditions that have to be studied, and it may be more likely that the best result will be cooperative development of separate NATO and Russian missile defense systems.
Still, analysts say there was a breakthrough in Lisbon, owing in large part to the "reset" in relations with Russia that began when Obama came to office and pledged to start over with Moscow.
"This was an important moment to show we're moving beyond that confrontational relationship," said Stephen Flanagan, former Russia advisor to President Clinton and a now scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Just getting Medvedev to show up for the NATO summit was a feat, he said, as was the fact that the European nations welcomed his presence.
Obama sees the Russian relationship as a long game, said Mike McFaul, his top Russia advisor. The reboot of the American relationship had to come first, and a fresh start with NATO could follow.
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Venezuela acquires 1,800 antiaircraft missiles from Russia
BOGOTA, COLOMBIA -
Russia delivered at least 1,800 shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles to Venezuela in 2009, U.N. arms control data show, despite vigorous U.S. efforts to stop President Hugo Chavez's stridently anti-American government from acquiring the weapons.
The United States feared that the missiles could be funneled to Marxist guerrillas fighting Colombia's pro-American government or Mexican drug cartels, concerns expressed in U.S. diplomatic cables obtained by WikiLeaks and first reported in the Spanish newspaper El Pais.
It had been unclear how many of the Russian SA-24 missiles were delivered to Venezuela, though the transfer itself was not secret. Chavez showed off a few dozen at a military parade in April 2009, saying they could "deter whatever aerial aggression against our country." A high-level Russian delegation told American officials in Washington in July of that year that 100 of the missiles had been delivered in the first quarter of 2009.
Then earlier this year, Russia reported to the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms, which records the transnational sale of weaponry, that the deal totaled 1,800 missiles.
The U.N. registry did not reveal the model of the delivered weaponry. But the American commander for military forces in Latin America, Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser, publicly expressed concern this year that Venezuela was purchasing as many as 2,400 of the missiles, also called the IGLA-S.
Matt Schroeder, a missile expert at the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, said the missiles are among the most sophisticated in the world and can down aircraft from 19,000 feet.
"It's the largest recorded transfer in the U.N. arms registry database in five years, at least. There's no state in Latin America of greater concern regarding leakage that has purchased so many missiles," he said, referring to reports of Venezuelan arms flowing to Colombian guerrillas.
The database also shows that from 2006 through 2008, Russia delivered to Venezuela 472 missiles and launching mechanisms, 44 attack helicopters and 24 combat aircraft, purchases funded by Venezuelan oil sales.
A self-styled Socialist who claims that successive U.S. governments want to topple him, Chavez told his countrymen during the 2009 military parade that "we don't want war with anyone, but we are obligated to prepare." Months later, in December 2009, he said in a nationally televised address that "thousands of missiles are arriving" but did not say what kind.
Secret American cables said that the United States was concerned about the Chavez government's acquisition of Russian arms, which also included attack helicopters, Sukhoi fighter planes and 100,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles.
A State Department cable on Aug. 10, 2009, to embassies in Europe and South America said Russian sales to Venezuela total "over $5 billion last year and growing." There was also concern about Spain's plans to sell aircraft and coastal patrol boats to Venezuela.
The cables show how both the Bush and Obama administrations tried to stop the arms sales by highlighting the possibility that the weapons could end up with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, a rebel group that Colombian officials say has received material support from Chavez's government.
"In early March, Secretary Clinton raised the sale with Russian FM Sergey Lavrov," the August 2009 cable says, referring to Hillary Rodham Clinton and Russia's foreign minister.
A cable from Washington to Moscow dated Feb. 14, 2009, said FARC computer files seized by Colombia's army indicated that Venezuela tried to facilitate arms market deals for the rebels. It expressed fear that missiles acquired by the FARC, which is mired in the drug trade, could wind up with Mexican cartels that "are actively seeking to acquire powerful and highly sophisticated weapons."
Chavez has long denied that his government assists the FARC. A spokeswoman for the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington said diplomats there could not respond to the allegations by U.S. officials. The Venezuelan Foreign Ministry in Caracas did not respond to phone calls.
The August 2009 cable notes that Russian ammunition sold to Venezuela was found in FARC hands and that U.S. officials raised the issue with Russian diplomats visiting Washington.
The American efforts to derail Russian and Spanish arms sales to Venezuela appeared to strain U.S. relations with both countries.
In a meeting in Moscow in 2005, Anatoliy Antonov, who oversaw disarmament issues for the Russian foreign ministry, told a U.S. Embassy official that Washington was trying to restrict Russian access to the arms market.
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I almost put this in the nuclear war thread, but it addresses larger issues as well and so I put it here.
===============
Colin: The United States Senate approves the much-debated nuclear treaty with Russia. But is it really a new start? In the end, many Republicans decided to back the treaty and it achieved the required two-thirds majority with a vote of 71 for, 26 against.
Colin: Welcome to Agenda, today with George Friedman. George, in terms of global geopolitics, how important is this Senate vote?
Dr. Friedman: From the point of view of this particular treaty, it’s not very significant at all. The reduction in warheads really doesn’t affect the balance of terror, apart from everything else because there is no balance of terror. This is an issue from 30 years ago. That’s when it mattered. Now, it really doesn’t. However, it did matter from the standpoint of the ability of President Obama to conduct foreign policy. If he couldn’t take this fairly innocuous treaty and get it through the Senate, it would have indicated that really his foreign policy capabilities were crippled. At the same time, as Republicans pointed out, it left open a bunch of questions that weren’t properly part of this treaty but really mattered, such as the Russian relationship to ballistic missile defense, the status of tactical nuclear weapons, and more importantly the general relationship between the United States and Russia.
Colin: Will this essentially Republican decision refresh Obama?
Dr. Friedman: No, what Obama had on this was a near-death experience, which he survived. But there’s very little victory here because in the end what he got was a fairly vanilla treaty, and the other issues between the U.S. and Russia really weren’t expressed. What you really did see was the extent to which rather an uncontroversial treaty — endorsed by Republicans and Democrats, the secretary of state, and all sides and so on, and the shows that Obama put on how — close it came to not passing. I mean I think that’s the most important thing. Obama is back against the wall in making foreign policy and what this entire incident shows is just how weak he is. This should not have been a debate.
Colin: Would it smooth the path of some of those negotiations you’ve just mentioned, such as with Iran and over a European ABM system?
Dr. Friedman: Well, let’s begin with why this treaty emerged and why it became important. After the famous restart button incident with Hillary Clinton, there was a question of how to get relations with Russia better. And the theory was that it was important to have something to build confidence and this treaty was an easy thing to do and get the two sides used to working together. Well, that didn’t happen — it almost fell apart, it didn’t build confidence. Most importantly, the theory that confidence building would change the American or the Russian position on Iran or their position on ballistic missile defense — I think it was basically flawed. Russia and the United States disagree on some really important issues that affect the national security of each country. There’s some overlap in their views, there’s some difference in their views, neither country is going to change their position because they got the warm and fuzzy feeling from getting this passed.
Colin: The treaty still leaves much of nuclear arms reduction still to do, but presumably it will alleviate the fears of European countries like Germany.
Dr. Friedman: The Germans have really serious disagreements with the United States, both over financial matters and over the future of NATO. I doubt that the Germans are going to relax over this because I don’t think they regard it as that significant. It may well have been that if it had failed it would have increased nervousness, and I really think that’s the way this treaty should be viewed. Had Obama not been able to get this passed, there would have been some serious questions, not so much about the United States, but about Obama’s credibility as president. That he got it passed doesn’t solve those problems. It doesn’t alleviate the question of whether or not Obama is capable and in control of his foreign policy because he shouldn’t have had a crisis in the first place over it.
Colin: Is it a given that the treaty will now pass through Russia’s Duma?
Dr. Friedman: Well, I think the Russians will probably pass it and I think they’re going to have a parallel crisis over it to show that the Russians also have a democratic system, they also have to ratify it and it’s not a slam dunk that they will. So the Russians will now posture serious questions, and they’ll posture the serious questions not because Putin and Medvedev don’t control the Duma, but because they don’t want to have been almost embarrassed by the U.S. Senate without almost embarrassing them back.
Colin: Assuming it’s all signed and sealed by, say, March, what will then be the next step in negotiations between the United States and Russia?
Dr. Friedman: Well, I mean it’s the same steps that are in place right now. Russian relations with the former Soviet Union, the status of NATO and EU expansion, the Iranian question, a host of issues. The Russians have shifted their policy somewhat from a singular focus on rebuilding the former Soviet Union — their sphere of influence at least — beyond that. They feel that they’ve achieved the core of what they needed to achieve. And they’re prepared now to be more flexible, both for example in terms of what their prepared to tolerate in Ukraine and in terms of what they’re willing to negotiate with the European and the Americans. So the Russians have entered a new sphere. The Americans, at the same time, are now in a deep debate over every issue on the table, including foreign policy, with clearly a disagreement between the Republicans and the Democrats over core issues such as the relationship with Russia. I think we will see the Russians testing the Americans around the periphery, in places like Georgia, Moldova and the Baltics. They will be trying to test how strong or weak Obama is, how resolute he is. I think what they come away with from this entire affair is the old Russian understanding that where there’s weakness, move. And I think they’re smelling a great deal of weakness.
Colin: George, thank you.
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I found this piece glib on concerns about our limiting our anti-missile defense capabilities, but the larger discussion interesting.
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Making Sense of the START Debate
December 28, 2010
By George Friedman
Last week, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which had been signed in April. The Russian legislature still has to provide final approval of the treaty, but it is likely to do so, and therefore a New START is set to go into force. That leaves two questions to discuss. First, what exactly have the two sides agreed to and, second, what does it mean? Let’s begin with the first.
The original START was signed July 31, 1991, and reductions were completed in 2001. The treaty put a cap on the number of nuclear warheads that could be deployed. In addition to limiting the number of land- and submarine-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and strategic bombers, it capped the number of warheads that were available to launch at 6,000. The fact that this is a staggering number of nuclear weapons should give you some idea of the staggering number in existence prior to START. START I lapsed in 2009, and the new treaty is essentially designed to reinstate it.
It is important to remember that Ronald Reagan first proposed START. His initial proposal focused on reducing the number of ICBMs. Given that the Soviets did not have an effective intercontinental bomber force and the United States had a massive B-52 force and follow-on bombers in the works, the treaty he proposed would have decreased the Soviet quantitative advantage in missile-based systems without meaningfully reducing the U.S. advantage in bombers. The Soviets, of course, objected, and a more balanced treaty emerged.
What is striking is that START was signed just before the Soviet Union collapsed and implemented long after it was gone. It derived from the political realities that existed during the early 1980s. One of the things the signers of both the original START and the New START have ignored is that nuclear weapons by themselves are not the issue. The issue is the geopolitical relationship between the two powers. The number of weapons may affect budgetary considerations and theoretical targeting metrics, but the danger of nuclear war does not derive from the number of weapons but from the political relationship between nations.
The Importance of the Political Relationship
I like to use this example. There are two countries that are historical enemies. They have fought wars for centuries, and in many ways, they still don’t like each other. Both are today, as they have been for decades, significant nuclear powers. Yet neither side maintains detection systems to protect against the other, and neither has made plans for nuclear war with the other. This example is from the real world; I am speaking of Britain and France. There are no treaties between them regulating nuclear weapons in spite of the fact that each has enough to devastate the other. This is because the possession of nuclear weapons is not the issue. The political relationship between Britain and France is the issue and, therefore, the careful calibration of the Franco-British nuclear balance is irrelevant and unnecessary.
The political relationship that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1980s is not the same as the relationship that exists today. Starting in the 1950s, the United States and Soviet Union were in a state of near-war. The differences between them were geopolitically profound. The United States was afraid that the Soviets would seize Western Europe in an attack in order to change the global balance of power. Given that the balance of power ran against the Soviet Union, it was seen as possible that they would try to rectify it by war.
Since the United States had guaranteed Europe’s security with troops and the promise that it would use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union to block the conquest of Europe, it followed that the Soviet Union would initiate war by attempting to neutralize the American nuclear capability. This would require a surprise attack on the United States with Soviet missiles. It also followed that the United States, in order to protect Europe, might launch a pre-emptive strike against the Soviet military capability in order to protect the United States and the balance of power.
Until the 1960s, the United States had an overwhelming advantage. Its bomber force gave it the ability to strike the Soviet Union from the United States. The Soviets chose not to build a significant bomber force, relying instead on a missile capability that really wasn’t in place and reliable until the mid-1960s. The Cuban missile crisis derived in part from this imbalance. The Soviets wanted Cuba because they could place shorter-range missiles there, threatening the B-52 fleet by reducing warning time and threatening the American population should the B-52s strike the Soviet Union.
A complex game emerged after Cuba. Both sides created reliable missiles that could reach the other side, and both turned to a pure counter-force strategy, designed to destroy not cities but enemy missiles. The missiles were dispersed and placed in hardened silos. Nuclear submarines, less accurate but holding cities hostage, were deployed. Accuracy increased. From the mid-1960s on the nuclear balance was seen as the foundation of the global balance of power.
The threat to global peace was that one side or the other would gain a decisive advantage in the global balance. Knowledge of the imbalance on both sides would enable the side with the advantage to impose its political will on the other, which would be forced to capitulate in any showdown.
The Russo-American Strategic Balance
Therefore, both sides were obsessed with preventing the other side from gaining a nuclear advantage. This created the nuclear arms race. The desire to end the race was not based on the fear that more nuclear weapons were dangerous but on the fear that any disequilibrium in weapons, or the perception of disequilibrium, might trigger a war. Rather than a dynamic equilibrium, with both sides matching or overmatching the other’s perceived capability, the concept of a treaty-based solution emerged, in which the equilibrium became static. This concept itself was dangerous because it depended on verification of compliance with treaties and led to the development of space-based reconnaissance systems.
The treaties did not eliminate anxiety. Both sides continued to obsessively watch for a surprise attack, and both sides conducted angry internal debates about whether the other side was violating the treaties. Similarly, the deployment of new systems not covered by the treaties created internal political struggles, particularly in the West. When the Pershing II medium-range ballistic missiles were deployed in Europe in the 1980s, major resistance to their deployment from the European left emerged. The fear was that the new systems would destabilize the nuclear balance, giving the United States an advantage that might lead to nuclear war.
This was also the foundation for the Soviets’ objection to the Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed “Star Wars.” Although Star Wars seemed useful and harmless, the Soviets argued that if the United States were able to defend itself against Soviet attack, then this would give the United States an advantage in the nuclear balance, allowing it to strike at the Soviet Union and giving it massive political leverage. This has always been the official basis of the Russian objection to ballistic-missile defense (BMD) — they said it upset the nuclear balance.
The United States never wanted to include tactical nuclear weapons in these treaties. The Soviet conventional force appeared substantially greater than the American alliance’s, and tactical nuclear weapons seemed the only way to defeat a Soviet force. The Soviets, for their part, would never agree to a treaty limiting conventional forces. That was their great advantage, and if they agreed to parity there it would permanently remove the one lever they had. There was no agreement on this until just before the Soviet Union collapsed, and then it no longer mattered. Thus, while both powers wanted strategic stability, the struggle continued on the tactical level. Treaties could not contain the political tension between the United States and the Soviet Union.
And now we get to the fundamental problem with the idea of a nuclear balance. The threat of nuclear war derived not from some bloodthirsty desire to annihilate humanity but from a profound geopolitical competition by the two great powers following the collapse of European power. The United States had contained the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union was desperately searching for a way out of its encirclement, whether by subversion or war. The Soviet Union had a much more substantial conventional military force than the United States. The Americans compensated with nuclear weapons to block Soviet moves. As the Soviets increased their strategic nuclear capability, the American limit on their conventional forces decreased, compensated for by sub-strategic nuclear forces.
But it was all about the geopolitical situation. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the Soviets lost the Cold War. Military conquest was neither an option nor a requirement. Therefore, the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance became meaningless. If the Russians attacked Georgia the United States wasn’t about to launch a nuclear war. The Caucasus is not Western Europe. START was not about reducing nuclear forces alone. It was about reducing them in a carefully calibrated manner so that no side gained a strategic and therefore political advantage.
New START is therefore as archaic as the Treaty of Versailles. It neither increases nor decreases security. It addresses a security issue that last had meaning more than 20 years ago in a different geopolitical universe. If a case can be made for reducing nuclear weapons, it must be made in the current geopolitical situation. Arguing for strategic arms reduction may have merit, but trying to express it in the context of an archaic treaty makes little sense.
New START’s Relevance
So why has this emerged? It is not because anyone is trying to calibrate the American and Russian nuclear arsenals. Rather, it goes back to the fiasco over the famous “reset button” that Hillary Clinton brought to Moscow last March. Tensions over substantial but sub-nuclear issues had damaged U.S.-Russian relations. The Russians saw the Americans as wanting to create a new containment alliance around the Russian Federation. The Americans saw the Russians as trying to create a sphere of influence that would be the foundation of a new Moscow-based regional system. Each side had a reasonable sense of the other’s intentions. Clinton wanted to reset relations. The Russians didn’t. They did not see the past as the model they wanted, and they saw the American vision of a reset as a threat. The situation grew worse, not better.
An idea emerged in Washington that there needed to be confidence-building measures. One way to build confidence, so the diplomats sometimes think, is to achieve small successes and build on them. The New START was seen as such a small success, taking a non-objectionable treaty of little relevance and effectively renewing it. From here, other successes would follow. No one really thought that this treaty mattered in its own right. But some thought that building confidence right now sent the wrong signal to Moscow.
U.S. opposition was divided into two groups. One, particularly Republicans, saw this as a political opportunity to embarrass the president. Another argued, not particularly coherently, that using an archaic issue as a foundation for building a relationship with Russia allowed both sides to evade the serious issues dividing the two sides: the role of Russia in the former Soviet Union, NATO and EU expansion, Russia’s use of energy to dominate European neighbors, the future of BMD against Iran, Russia’s role in the Middle East and so on.
Rather than building confidence between the two countries, a New START would give the illusion of success while leaving fundamental issues to fester. The counter-argument was that with this success others would follow. The counter to that was that by spending energy on a New START, the United States delayed and ignored more fundamental issues. The debate is worth having, and both sides have a case, but the idea that START in itself mattered is not part of that debate.
In the end, the issue boiled down to this. START was marginal at best. But if President Barack Obama couldn’t deliver on START his credibility with the Russians would collapse. It wasn’t so much that a New START would build confidence as it was that a failure to pass a New START would destroy confidence. It was on that basis that the U.S. Senate approved the treaty. Its opponents argued that it left out discussions of BMD and tactical nuclear weapons. Their more powerful argument was that the United States just negotiated a slightly modified version of a treaty that Ronald Reagan proposed a quarter century ago and it had nothing to do with contemporary geopolitical reality.
Passage allowed Obama to dodge a bullet, but it leaves open a question that he does not want to answer: What is American strategy toward Russia? He has mimicked American strategy from a quarter century ago, not defined what it will be.
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http://www.postbulletin.com/news/stories/display.php?id=1441481
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U.S. Vice President Joe Biden kicked off the official part of his two-day tour to Moscow today. It is his first visit to Russia since taking office. The trip comes at a very interesting time in which Russian-U.S. relations are pretty ambiguous after the so-called “reset” in 2009. All the hostilities and differences of years past still remain.
Vice President Biden is someone that Moscow watches very closely. This is because of a 2009 speech Biden gave at the Munich conference in Bucharest in which he blasted the Russians for maintaining a Soviet mentality in attempting to dominate Eurasia. Since then, there was the so-called “reset” in which Russia and the United States pulled back from being overtly aggressive into attempting to show that relations were warmer and that there was more flexibility and they could work together and cooperate on many issues.
The main reasons for the so-called “reset” are: first, Russia was becoming more comfortable in its dominance over the former Soviet states that it could change tactics. Russia could start moving back and forth between being unilaterally hostile to more cooperative in order to use each tactic depending on what worked best for the relationship at that time. At the same time, the United States was becoming dangerously entrenched in the Islamic theater to the point where it pretty much couldn’t give any focus or bandwidth into its relationship and issues in Eurasia. It got to the point to where the United States needed Russia to help out with certain issues in the Islamic theater, such as Iran and Afghanistan. But the problem is that all the differences of pasts still remain.
The number one issue between Russia and the United States is the division of their power and dominance in Eurasia. Russia, as I said, has dominated the former Soviet states but it has also in recent years created a strategic bargain with Germany and France, creating this very powerful axis across the European continent. At the same time, the United States has created a very solid alliance with not only Poland but the Central Europeans. This is geographically divided Europe. Not only that, it has started to divide and bleed over into NATO relations — seeing a fracture along the exact same geographic lines between Russian issues and Russian influence in the United States’ power.
So the question is what happens when the United States starts wrapping up in the next few years its focus on the Islamic theater and actually has the ability to turn back into Eurasia? What happens to all the differences that have been put aside that will naturally lead to a conflict between the United States and Russia once again? This is the question which Biden is discussing with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. This is the issue in which the United States is starting negotiations with Russia before things lead back to an overt conflict. This is not an easy discussion, a simply resolvable discussion or one in the short term, but it is the issue that will define Eurasia as a whole as well as NATO itself for the coming years.
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http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/10/31/fbi-releases-russian-spy-trove/?hpt=hp_c2
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Interesting. Please post on the Intel thread as well.
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Dispatch: Perceptions Versus Reality in the Russian Elections
December 5, 2011 | 2256 GMT
Click on image below to watch video:
Senior Eurasia Analyst Lauren Goodrich examines the international and domestic reactions to Russia’s preliminary election results.
With votes still being counted, Russia’s Central Election Commission announced today that the ruling United Russia party is projected to take 49.54 percent of the vote—which means that the party, which is run by Premier Vladimir Putin, will still hold majority of seats when the parties that did not meet threshold fall away from consideration.
As STRATFOR has said, United Russia’s hit has been orchestrated as part of a large smoke-and-mirrors campaign called “managed democracy” in which Russia’s election system and parliament look more democratic, while Putin still holds full control behind the curtain.
This theater continued to play out today where the Kremlin is possibly purging top United Russia figures – like State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov – from his position, in order to restructure United Russia after its slide from dominating Duma. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev came out and said that such a restructuring was normal for any democratic political party, who needs to constantly change in order to meet the needs of the people.
So the Kremlin is continuing to play out its intended perception of United Russia acting as a real democratic group, instead of the authoritarian party of the past.
But what is interesting is that despite United Russia still holding onto majority power, Western media has been calling these elections a major hit to Putin’s power. The West also came out against the elections in general, with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton saying that she was “seriously concerned” how fair the elections were.
It is to be expected that the Russian elections most likely had some fraudulent practices – as is common in most Russian elections. However, even if United Russia garnered less vote than is being projected, Putin still has control and heavy influence over the other political parties projected to get into Duma —the Communist Party, Just Russia, and the Liberal Democratic Party. Even today, the leaders of Just Russia and the Communist Party said that they would work on many issues with United Russia—even using words like “coalition”, showing that they are not really opposition parties.
But what the West is trying to push is the idea that Putin is not as strong of a leader as he was in the past—true or not. The West (especially the US) has to push this idea because Putin is set to return to the Russian presidency in March. Putin’s return has set many countries on edge – particularly those that are on the frontline between Russia’s sphere of influence and the West’s, mainly Central Europe.
The US is looking to guarantee that it is still a strong partner to protect those countries – but with many physical guarantees (like missile defense) still years away, the US is currently looking to ensure that Russia isn’t as strong as may be perceived. And in order to do this, the US is hitting at the perception of Putin and his hold over his own country.
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Central Europe Watches As Washington, Moscow Clash Over BMD
In a meeting with military attaches in Moscow on Wednesday, Russian Gen. Nikolai Makarov, chief of the General Staff of Russian armed forces, said that the Russian military has begun to implement several military measures in response to U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans in Europe. These measures, which Russian President Dmitri Medvedev outlined in a televised address two weeks earlier, include activating an early warning radar in Kaliningrad and strengthening Russia’s defensive capabilities for strategic nuclear forces installations.
“Central Europeans are caught in the middle. In the face of a resurgent Russia, a concrete security commitment from Washington is exactly what these countries need. “
In the same speech two weeks ago, Medvedev stressed Russia’s desire to cooperate with Washington in a joint BMD framework, and said measures such as deploying advanced offensive systems — including Iskander mobile short-range ballistic missiles — would only be enacted if “the aforementioned measures prove to be insufficient.”
But Russia has wasted no time following through on many of those harsher measures. On the same day as Makarov’s statements, the press service of Russia’s Western Military District said that an S-400 surface-to-air missile regiment will be placed on combat duty in Kaliningrad before the end of the year. Meanwhile, the chief of the Belarusian Armed Forces’ General Staff said his country expects to receive Tor-M2 surface-to-air missile systems from Russia this month, adding that an Iskander deployment to the country would soon follow.
Russian opposition to U.S. BMD plans is nothing new. For Russia, the fundamental issue at hand is not the BMD system itself (which is nominally geared toward countering the ballistic missile capabilities of states like Iran), but the U.S. military presence the system would bring with it. U.S. BMD plans are focused on Central Europe, which abuts Russia’s former Soviet periphery. Moscow can’t help but feel threatened by the U.S. military commitment to the region that the system represents.
Russia Escalates Its Opposition
While Russia has publicly expressed its opposition to U.S. BMD plans on many occasions over the past few years, Wednesday marked a clear escalation by Moscow on the issue, particularly since Russia softened its stance on U.S. missile defense after the so-called “reset” in Russo-American relations in 2009. The timing of this escalation is important. On Thursday, a foreign minister-level Russia-NATO Council meeting will take place in Brussels, and Moscow has grown increasingly frustrated with Washington’s unwillingness to even discuss the BMD issue with Russia in the weeks leading up to the meeting.
According to STRATFOR sources, the United States has also been preparing to take BMD off the agenda for Thursday’s meeting, and possibly even exclude it from the more significant NATO-Russia summit slated for March in Chicago. Russia continues to press the issue and demand talks, with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stating that he plans to clarify Medvedev’s position on the issue during Thursday’s meeting.
More important than the timing of the upcoming meeting is the development of a more significant shift, between Washington and Moscow, over the position of U.S. BMD. Washington has no shortage of issues to deal with. It must wrap up the war in Afghanistan; address Iran’s increased influence in strategic Middle Eastern countries like Iraq and Syria; shift its focus to the Western Pacific region; and prepare for a possible economic collapse in Europe that would have global implications. These concerns have served to distract Washington and limit its room for maneuver outside of the theaters it is already committed to. The last thing the United States needs is another crisis on its hands.
Conversely, Russia has seen its position steadily improve. Unlike the United States, the Russian military is not drawn into protracted conflicts far from home. Russia is flush with cash from energy revenues and has been looking to take advantage of the crisis raging in Europe. Most importantly, Russia has increased its leverage vis-à-vis Washington thanks to the United States’ increased reliance on the Russian-dominated Northern Distribution Network (NDN), at the expense of Pakistan-based supply lines into Afghanistan. Moscow has already begun threatening to close the NDN if its interests over BMD are not taken into account.
Central Europeans are caught in the middle. In the face of a resurgent Russia, a concrete security commitment from Washington is exactly what these countries need, and the BMD system has come to serve as a symbol of that future commitment. Russia knows this and has worked to chip away at this commitment by attempting to wedge the United States between two bad scenarios: either abandon the BMD system and with it the Central Europeans, or risk a potential disruption to Washington’s pressing commitment in Afghanistan. Essentially, Russia is attempting to force the United States to make a decision — over whether it wants the NDN now or BMD later — hoping that Washington leaves the Central Europeans out to dry.
Yet Russia knows that, whatever levers it may hold against the United States, it is not immune to global economic problems and to blowback from Afghanistan. Moscow knows it must be careful not to press its current advantage too far. The United States, despite its current relatively poor position, is still the dominant power on which the global system pivots. It can bring a range of forces to bear against Moscow if it deems them necessary. Ultimately, in any sparring match between the United States and Russia, neither player can deliver a knockout punch. And however long the match between the two powers drags out, it is the Central Europeans that will continue to be caught in the middle.
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Russia's Plan to Disrupt U.S.-European Relations
December 13, 2011
By Lauren Goodrich
Tensions between the United States and Russia have risen in the past month over several long-standing problems, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and supply lines into Afghanistan. Moscow and Washington also appear to be nearing another crisis involving Russian accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The crises come as Washington struggles over its many commitments in the world and over whether to focus on present events in Afghanistan or future events in Central Europe. Russia has exploited the U.S. dilemma, using its leverage in both arenas. However, if Moscow takes its aggressive moves too far, it could spark a backlash from the United States and Central Europe.
The Persisting Disagreement over BMD
The U.S. BMD scheme for Europe has long been a source of U.S.-Russian tensions. Washington argues that its European BMD program aims to counter threats emerging from the Middle East, namely Iran, but its missile defense installations in Romania and Poland are not slated to become operational until 2015 and 2018, respectively, by which time Russia believes the United States will have resolved its issues with Iran. Moscow thus sees U.S. missile defense strategy as more about the United States seeking to contain Russia than about Iran. Moscow does not fear that the United States is seeking to neutralize or erode Russia’s nuclear deterrent, however; the issue is the establishment of a physical U.S. military footprint in those two states — which in turn means a U.S. commitment there. Romania and Poland border the former Soviet Union, a region where Russia is regaining influence.
Russia previously pressured key states in the Bush-era BMD scheme, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, to reconsider acceding to such plans. This assertiveness peaked with its 2008 invasion of Georgia, which both proved that Moscow was willing to take military action and exposed the limits of U.S. security guarantees in the region. The Russian move in Georgia gave the Central Europeans much to think about, prompting some attempts to appease the Kremlin. Still, these states did not abandon all faith in the United States as a strategic counter to Russia.
Russia has since shifted its BMD strategy. Instead of categorically opposing the plan, Moscow proposed a cooperative, integrated scheme. The Kremlin reasoned that if Iran and other non-Russian threats were the real reason for expanding missile defense, then Russian involvement — which would strengthen the West’s defenses — would be welcomed. Russia’s BMD capabilities span the Eurasian continent, though their practical utility to and compatibility with U.S. systems is questionable. This plan was seen as a way to take a more conciliatory approach with the same end goal: blocking the placement of U.S. troops in Eastern Europe.
The United States and most of NATO refused Russia’s proposals, however, leaving the door open for the Kremlin to introduce a new defense strategy, which Russian President Dmitri Medvedev outlined Nov. 23. Medvedev emphasized that Russia had exercised the “political will” to open a fundamentally new chapter in relations with the United States and NATO, only to have the United States spurn the offer. U.S. resistance to Russian inclusion in the BMD system forced Moscow to make other arrangements to counter U.S. plans in Central Europe — precisely the outcome it had hoped for.
Medvedev also said that if United States continues to refuse BMD cooperation with Russia, Moscow would carry out plans for the deployment of the Iskander mobile short-range ballistic missiles and the activation of an early-warning radar system in Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea that borders NATO members Poland and Lithuania. He said Russia also would consider the deployment of other Iskander systems, particularly along his country’s western and southern borders, and would hasten to fit its ballistic missiles with advanced maneuverable re-entry vehicles and penetration aids, a process that has long been under way. The prospect of Russian strategic weapons targeting BMD facilities was also raised. Medvedev added that more measures could be implemented to “neutralize the European component of the U.S. missile defense system,” concluding that all these steps could be avoided in favor of a new era of partnership between the United States and Russia if Washington so desired.
The U.S. Dilemma
The United States was expected to respond to Russia’s renewed strategy during the Dec. 8 meeting between NATO and Russian foreign ministers in Brussels. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton avoided doing so, however, reiterating that the BMD scheme was about Iran, not Russia. Clinton’s move highlights the dangerous U.S. position with regard to Russia. Washington has no intention of abandoning its commitment to Central Europe in the face of a resurging Russia, but commitments elsewhere in the world may prevent the United States from resisting Russia in the short term.
At present, Washington is struggling to halt the deterioration of relations with Pakistan, which have reached a new low after a U.S. helicopter strike on the Afghan-Pakistani border killed some two dozen Pakistani servicemen. After the strike, the Pakistanis forbade the shipment of fuel and supplies for the NATO-led war effort in Afghanistan across the Pakistani border, leaving the United States and its allies wholly dependent on the Northern Distribution Network, at least temporarily. Moscow used this as an opportunity to remind Washington that it could cut this alternative route, leaving NATO and the United States in a catastrophic position in Afghanistan — a move tied directly to Russia’s negotiations over missile defense.
While Russia has used previous threats against U.S. interests, such as increased support for Iran, as leverage in its BMD negotiations, its present threat marks a new dynamic. Washington called Moscow’s bluff on its threatened support for Iran, knowing Russia also did not want a strong Iran. But it cannot so easily dismiss the specter of interrupted supplies into Afghanistan, as this puts more than 130,000 U.S. and allied troops in a vulnerable position. Consequently, the United States must work to mitigate the BMD situation.
American Olive Branch or New Crisis?
In recent months, the United States has cultivated one potential olive branch to defuse short-term tensions. Previously, there was little the United States could offer Russia short of abandoning U.S. strategy in Central Europe. When tensions escalated in 2009 and 2010, the United States offered to facilitate large economic deals with Russia that included modernization and investment in strategic sectors, mainly information technology, space and energy. Since Russia had just launched its sister programs of modernization and privatization, it jumped on the proposal, reducing tensions and eventually joining U.S. initiatives such as sanctions against Iran. Now, the United States is extending another carrot: WTO membership.
Russia has sought WTO membership for 18 years. Even though it has the 10th largest economy in the world, it has failed to win accession to the 153-member body. Though the country’s extreme economic policies have given members plenty of reason to exclude Russia, the main barriers of late have been political. For its part, Moscow cares little about the actual economic benefits of WTO membership. The benefits it seeks are political, as being excluded from the WTO made it look like an economically backward country (though its exclusion has given it a convenient excuse to rail against the United States and Georgia).
As Russia sorted through its economic disputes with most WTO members, Georgia alone continued to block its bid because of the Russian occupation of the disputed Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In recent months, Georgia has dropped its opposition under U.S. pressure — pressure that originated from Washington’s need for something to offer the Russians. With all obstacles cleared, the WTO should approve Russia’s candidacy Dec. 15-16, apparently giving the United States the olive branch it sought.
Unfortunately for the United States, however, once Russia is voted in, each member-state must “recognize” Russia as a member. No WTO members, not even Georgia, have indicated that they intend to deny Russia recognition. But there is one country that cannot legally recognize Russian membership: the United States.
The United States still has a Soviet-era provision in federal law called the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which bars trade relations with certain countries guilty of human rights violations (namely, the Soviet Union). The measure continued to apply to Russia after the Soviet collapse, though every U.S. president has waived its provisions by decree since 1992. Only Congress can overturn it, however, and until it does so, the United States cannot recognize Russia as a WTO member.
The White House has called for the provision’s immediate repeal, but with Congress and the White House divided over so many issues, it seems unlikely the issue will be resolved swiftly — if at all — under the current Congress and presidency. This gives Russia another opportunity to increase U.S.-Russian tensions. Indeed, Moscow could noisily decry the insult of the United States making Russian WTO accession possible only to derail it.
Balancing Crisis and Strategy
Just how many crises in U.S.-Russian relations does Moscow want, and what is its goal? Moscow’s strategy involves using these crises with the United States to create uncertainty in Central Europe and to make the Europeans uncomfortable over perceptions that the United States has forced Russia to act the way it is acting. Thus, it is not a break between Russia and the United States that Moscow seeks but a break between Europe and the United States.
Indications are emerging that the Central Europeans are in fact growing nervous, particularly following Medvedev’s new defense strategy announcement. With the United States not responding to the renewed Russian aggression, many Europeans may be forgiven for wondering if the United States is planning to trade its relationship with Central Europe in the short term to ensure the supply lines via Russia into Afghanistan remain open. It isn’t that the Central Europeans want a warmer relationship with Russia, only that they may feel a need to hedge their relationship with the United States. This was seen this past week with Poland announcing it would be open to discussions with Russia over missile defense (albeit within the paradigm of separate BMD systems), and with the Czech Republic, a previous American missile defense partner, signing multibillion-dollar economic deals with Russia.
But with more opportunities arising for Russia to escalate tensions with the United States, Moscow must avoid triggering a massive crisis and rupture in relations. Should Russia go too far in its bid to create an uncomfortable situation for the Europeans, it could cause a strong European backlash against Russia and a unilateral unification with the United States on regional security issues. And it is in Russia’s interest to refrain from actually disrupting the Northern Distribution Network; Moscow is seeking to avoid both complications in the Afghan theater that could hurt Russian interests (one of which is keeping the United States tied down in Afghanistan) and a strong U.S. response in a number of other areas. Moscow must execute its strategy with precision to keep the United States caught between many commitments and Europe off balance — a complex balancing act for the Kremlin.
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http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304177104577305182847032866.html?mod=WSJ_hp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsSecond
By CAROL E. LEE
SEOUL—U.S. President Barack Obama told Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on Monday that his re-election campaign has tied his hands in resolving differences with Russia over U.S. plans for a missile-defense system in Europe, and suggested an agreement would be more likely after November
"This is my last election, and after my election I'll have more flexibility," Mr. Obama said to Mr. Medvedev after a meeting in Seoul, according to audio picked up by television cameras that apparently wasn't intended to be heard by reporters. (!!!)
"I understand," Mr. Medvedev replied.
"I transmit this information to Vladimir," he added, referring to incoming Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The White House confirmed that the exchange came after a discussion about the missile-defense shield, saying in a statement that the issue, which has strained U.S.-Russia relations, won't be resolved before Americans vote in November.
Mr. Medvedev said on Friday that Russia was unconvinced that a planned U.S.-led missile defense shield in Europe is meant to deter an attack by countries such as Iran.
continued
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Manchurian president.
Pretty sloppy tradecraft, KGB recruited assets are not supposed to openly meet with their handlers to avoid this very thing.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304177104577305182847032866.html?mod=WSJ_hp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsSecond
By CAROL E. LEE
SEOUL—U.S. President Barack Obama told Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on Monday that his re-election campaign has tied his hands in resolving differences with Russia over U.S. plans for a missile-defense system in Europe, and suggested an agreement would be more likely after November
"This is my last election, and after my election I'll have more flexibility," Mr. Obama said to Mr. Medvedev after a meeting in Seoul, according to audio picked up by television cameras that apparently wasn't intended to be heard by reporters. (!!!)
"I understand," Mr. Medvedev replied.
"I transmit this information to Vladimir," he added, referring to incoming Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The White House confirmed that the exchange came after a discussion about the missile-defense shield, saying in a statement that the issue, which has strained U.S.-Russia relations, won't be resolved before Americans vote in November.
Mr. Medvedev said on Friday that Russia was unconvinced that a planned U.S.-led missile defense shield in Europe is meant to deter an attack by countries such as Iran.
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It wouldn't surprise me if OBama asked him for a campaign donation and promised after the election he would cut Vladimir a good deal.
This certainly makes one speculate that Obama, if he wins, will absolutely cut lose on his leftist agenda far beyond what we have seen.
I wonder if this was before or after he handed over all the codes.
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While no one's political attention seems to be on questions like how to deal with Russia, it is an area where the candidates could not disagree more. A few excerpts of a NY Times piece below. Question is presented as to whether Romney will be a better negotiator in America's interests by starting with a stronger stance (while Obama already signaled his desire to make greater concessions after his reelection).
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"Mr. Obama, who came to office promising to “reset” relations with Moscow, only to find that Russia can be a difficult partner."
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"Mr. Romney signaled his stance toward Russia two years ago, when he argued that the New Start missile treaty with Russia should be rejected, putting him at odds with a long line of former Republican secretaries of state and defense."
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"Mr. Romney felt the missile treaty was a bad deal partly because it would impede American defenses..."
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"Mr. Romney also criticized a White House decision scrapping a proposed antiballistic missile shield in Eastern Europe..."
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/12/us/politics/romneys-view-of-russia-sparks-debate.html?_r=2
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By HILLARY CLINTON
Later this summer, Russia will join the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the culmination of a process that began nearly two decades ago. This is good news for American companies and workers, because it will improve our access to one of the world's fastest-growing markets and support new jobs here at home.
U.S.-Russian bilateral trade isn't reaching anything close to its full potential today. While that trade has increased over the past few years, America's exports to Russia still represent less than 1% of our global exports. Given the potential for expanding these links, Russia's WTO membership will be a net benefit for our economy.
But there is one obstacle standing in the way. American businesses won't be able to take advantage of this new market opening unless Congress terminates the application of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and extends "permanent normal trading relations" (PNTR) to Russia.
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Russian President Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama on Monday
.Jackson-Vanik, which restricts U.S. trade with countries that limit their people's emigration rights, was adopted by Congress in the early 1970s to help thousands of Jews leave the Soviet Union. It long ago achieved this historic purpose.
Now it's time to set it aside. Four decades after the adoption of this amendment, a vote to extend permanent normal trading relations to Russia will be a vote to create jobs in America. Until then, Russia's markets will open and our competitors will benefit, but U.S. companies will be disadvantaged.
Extending permanent normal trading relations isn't a gift to Russia. It is a smart, strategic investment in one of the fastest growing markets for U.S. goods and services. It's also an investment in the more open and prosperous Russia that we want to see develop.
As the demonstrations across Russia over the past six months make clear, the country's middle class is demanding a more transparent and accountable government, a more modern political system, and a diversified economy. We should support these Russian efforts.
When Russia joins the WTO, it will be required—for the first time ever—to establish predictable tariff rates, ensure transparency in the publication and enactment of laws, and adhere to an enforceable mechanism for resolving disputes. If we extend permanent normal trading relations to Russia, we'll be able to use the WTO's tools to hold it accountable for meeting these obligations.
The Obama administration is under no illusions about the challenges that lie ahead. WTO membership alone will not suddenly create the kind of change being sought by the Russian people. But it is in our long-term strategic interest to collaborate with Russia in areas where our interests overlap.
Already our work together over the past three years has produced real results, including the New Start Treaty to reduce strategic nuclear weapons, an agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation, military transit arrangements to support our efforts in Afghanistan, and cooperation on Iran sanctions. With permanent normal trading relations, we would add expanded trade to the list.
To be sure, we have real differences with Russia. We disagree fundamentally about the situation in Georgia. On Syria, we are urging Russia to push Bashar al-Assad to implement former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's six-point plan, end the violence, and work with the international community in promoting a transition.
In addition, President Obama and I have clearly expressed our serious concerns about human rights in Russia. And we have taken steps to address these challenges, including support for programs that promote human rights, rule of law, and civil society there. We have strengthened ties between nongovernmental organizations in both countries, from political activists to groups working for women's rights. Following the tragic death of Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer who blew the whistle on official corruption, we imposed restrictions to ensure that no one implicated in this crime can travel to the United States. We are continuing to work with Congress on addressing these issues.
Some argue that continuing to apply Jackson-Vanik to Russia would give us some leverage in these areas of disagreement. We disagree—and so do leaders of Russia's political opposition. They have called on the U.S. to terminate Jackson-Vanik, despite their concerns about human rights and the Magnitsky case. In fact, retaining Jackson-Vanik only fuels more anti-American sentiment in Russia.
Russia's membership in the WTO will soon be a fact of life. Failing to extend permanent normal trading relations will not penalize Russia, nor will it provide a lever with which to change Moscow's behavior. It will only hurt American workers and American companies. By extending those trading relations, we can create new markets for our people and support the political and economic changes that Russia's people are demanding. These reforms will ultimately make Russia a more just and open society as well as a better partner over the long term for the U.S.
Ms. Clinton is U.S. secretary of state.
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/13/dark_soldiers_of_the_new_order
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http://www.theblaze.com/stories/report-russian-nuclear-attack-sub-patrolled-waters-off-gulf-for-a-month-undetected/
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/17/yes_russia_is_our_top_geopolitical_foe?page=full
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http://pjmedia.com/blog/severe-economic-crisis-in-russia-looms/?singlepage=true
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President Obama has lost much of his poll advantage on foreign policy, and in this case Mitt Romney's debating skills have nothing to do with it. The real world is doing the job, notably with the attacks in Benghazi but also in Russia, where Mr. Obama once vowed to "reset" relations for the better.
Last week, the Russian government unilaterally pulled out of a two-decade old partnership with the U.S. to safeguard nuclear and chemical weapons. The so-called Nunn-Lugar program, named after its Senate authors, was a genuine post-Cold War success. It nudged Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to give up their atomic missiles and ensured that loose Soviet nukes didn't fall into terrorist hands. Well, so much for that.
This slap in the face follows Moscow's decision last month to close the U.S. Agency for International Development mission to Russia. USAID helped feed Russia in the darkest days after the Soviet collapse. But its recent support for local vote monitors and other Russian NGOs—as part of a modest democracy-building effort—cramped Vladimir Putin's authoritarian style. Then this week the Washington Free Beacon reported that Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is shutting down its Russian broadcasts after six decades because of a new law restricting foreign-owned media.
Meanwhile, Russia continues to obstruct international action to end the Syria crisis. Moscow has vetoed three U.N. resolutions on Syria while arming a Damascus regime that has killed 30,000 in 19 months. On Wednesday, Turkey intercepted a Syrian passenger jet coming from Moscow. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said the plane was carrying Russian military equipment and ammunition.
President Obama may not wish to publicly bury this part of his foreign policy, but Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is happy to oblige. Last week, he told the Moscow daily Kommersant: "If we talk about the 'reset,' it is clear that, using computer terminology, it cannot last forever. Otherwise it would not be a 'reset' but a program failure." Failure about sums it up.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/world/europe/moscow-reopens-a-communication-channel-with-washington.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20121114&_r=0
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I just read Putin's *grandfather* was a "celebrity" cook.
He was get this, the cook for Stalin, AND Lenin, AND, get this, - Rasputin.
Now of course the destroyer of the US, no not Putin, I mean Obama, is going to offer what to the KGB's Tsar of the oligarchs (Putin)?
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"is going to offer what...."
I mean with reference to his "off the mike" comment to Medved (that was still on the mike) "just wait until after the election".
WEll I learned first hand how EASY it is to bribe people as witness to what happened to us from the music entertainment industry.
Let this be a lesson to everyone else how easy it is to bribe Americans to take the cash at the same time they give the country away. :cry: :cry:
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http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/28/u-s-had-plans-to-nuke-the-moon/?hpt=hp_c1
From the article:
It was a top-secret plan, developed by the U.S. Air Force, to look at the possibility of detonating a nuclear device on the moon.
It was hatched in 1958 - a time when the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a nuclear arms race that would last decades and drive the two superpowers to the verge of nuclear war. The Soviets had also just launched Sputnik 1, the world's first satellite. The U.S. was falling behind in the space race, and needed a big splash.
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The Russians Think We’re Wrecking the World on Purpose
Posted By David P. Goldman On March 19, 2013 @ 1:09 pm In Uncategorized | 189 Comments
“In Russia, most analysts, politicians and ordinary citizens believe in the unlimited might of America, and thus reject the notion that the US has made, and continues to make, mistakes in the [Middle East]. Instead, they assume it’s all a part of a complex plan to restructure the world and to spread global domination,” writes Fyodor Lukyanov on the Al Monitor website today. Lukyanov, who chairs Russia’s Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, laments what he derides as a “conspiracy theory.” Nonetheless, he reports, President Vladimir Putin and the Russian elite think that the United States is spreading chaos as part of a diabolical plot for world domination:
From Russian leadership’s point of view, the Iraq War now looks like the beginning of the accelerated destruction of regional and global stability, undermining the last principles of sustainable world order. Everything that’s happened since — including flirting with Islamists during the Arab Spring, U.S. policies in Libya and its current policies in Syria — serve as evidence of strategic insanity that has taken over the last remaining superpower.
Russia’s persistence on the Syrian issue is the product of this perception. The issue is not sympathy for Syria’s dictator, nor commercial interests, nor naval bases in Tartus. Moscow is certain that if continued crushing of secular authoritarian regimes is allowed because America and the West support “democracy,” it will lead to such destabilization that will overwhelm all, including Russia. It’s therefore necessary for Russia to resist, especially as the West and the United States themselves experience increasing doubts.
It’s instructive to view ourselves through a Russian mirror. The term “paranoid Russian” is a pleonasm. “The fact is that all Russian politicians are clever. The stupid ones are all dead. By contrast, America in its complacency promotes dullards. A deadly miscommunication arises from this asymmetry. The Russians cannot believe that the Americans are as stupid as they look, and conclude that Washington wants to destroy them,” I wrote in 2008 under the title “Americans play monopoly, Russians chess.” Russians have dominated chess most of the past century, for good reason: it is the ultimate exercise in paranoia. All the pieces on the board are guided by a single combative mind, and every move is significant. In the real world, human beings flail and blunder. For Russian officials who climbed the greasy pole in the intelligence services, mistakes are unthinkable, for those who made mistakes are long since buried.
From a paranoid perspective, it certainly might look as if Washington planned to unleash chaos. The wave of instability spreading through the Middle East from Syria is the direct result of American actions. I wrote yesterday in Asia Times Online:
Syria’s Sunni majority started an insurgency against the minority Alawite government of Basher al-Assad in response to the ill-named Arab Spring uprisings in North Africa. America’s abrupt dismissal of its long-ally Hosni Mubarak and the ascendancy of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood emboldened Syria’s long-suffering Sunni majority to stake its claim to power. Like Mubarak, the Assads suppressed the Muslim Brothers, but far more viciously, leveling the Sunni town of Hama in 1982 with casualties estimated at between 20,000 and 40,000.
Western policy thus provoked Syria’s civil war. The prospect of a Sunni fundamentalist regime in Egypt under American patronage, the emergence of the ”Sunni Awakening” in Iraq during the Petraeus ”surge”, and the victory of Western-backed Sunni jihadists over Libya’s Gaddafi, gave Syria’s Sunnis little choice. America’s fecklessness with respect to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, moreover, gave Saudi Arabia and Turkey strategic reasons to fund and arm various branches of Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood.
In this tightly scripted tragedy, America’s blundering provided the impetus for each step, except, of course, for the blundering of the European Union. The Europeans forced Assad to undertake agricultural reforms among the conditions for a new trade treaty, forcing tens of thousands of small farmers off their land in the Sunni Northeast of the country, into tent cities around Damascus.
Iran responded to the Sunni insurgency in the obvious way, by sending Revolutionary Guard regulars as well as its Lebanese-based Hezbollah auxiliaries into Syria to fight for its ally, the Assad regime. Iran’s involvement prevents the loosely organized insurgent coalition from toppling a minority regime.
The depleted ranks of the regular Syrian army will be replenished with Iranian soldiers or surrogates. The Alawite regime will continue to commit atrocities in order to convince its own base as well as the Syria’s Christian, Kurdish and Druze minorities that they must fight to the death because Sunni vengeance would be horrible. Saudi Arabia will continue to filter jihadists and weapons into Syria and Turkey will continue to provide logistical support.
Could the Americans really have been such idiots?, the Russians ask. Of course we could. George Bush and his advisers actually believed that we were going to bring democracy to Iraq and the rest of the Middle East. The Russians understood matters differently. Fyodor Lukyanov writes:
In the summer 2006, when then-President George W. Bush came to St. Petersburg for a summit of the “Big Eight,” an interesting dialogue took place between him and Russian President Vladimir Putin at a news conference. Bush drew attention to the challenges posed by democratic freedoms, especially freedom of the press, in Russia — and then noted that things had gotten much better in Iraq. Putin immediately responded, “Well, we really would not want the kind of democracy they have in Iraq.” The room filled with applause, and not everyone heard Bush’s response: “Just wait, it’s coming.” What Bush had in mind was increased stability in Iraq, but it sounded more ominous: you’ll see, democracy will be brought to you as well…
If the Russians sound mad, consider this: there is another substantial body of opinion that sees an evil conspiracy behind American blundering in the Middle East, and it votes for Ron Paul and Rand Paul. I am not suggesting that Sen. Rand Paul is a paranoid, I hasten to clarify: I have never met the man and don’t presume to judge his state of mind. But his popularity stems in no small measure from conspiracy theorists who think that the U.S. government really is planning to criss-cross the continental United States with killer drones and pick off American citizens on their home soil. A lot of the same people think that America invaded Iraq on behalf of the oil companies (who would make a lot more money if Iraq were zapped by space aliens) or by the Israelis (who never liked the project from the outset). A fair sampling of such paranoia gets posted on the comments section of this site.
Thus we have the strangest pair of bedfellows in modern politics, the Russians and the rubes. Try to explain to them that George W. Bush was a decent and well-intentioned man without a clue as to the consequences of his actions, and they will dismiss it as disinformatsiya. Tell them that the New York Times and the Weekly Standard both believed in the Arab Spring as the herald of a new era of Islamic democracy, and they will see it as proof of a conspiracy embracing both the Democratic and Republican establishments. How, the paranoids ask, could two administrations in succession make so many blunders in succession? It stretches credibility. I wish it were a conspiracy. The truth is that we really are that dumb.
Article printed from Spengler: http://pjmedia.com/spengler
URL to article: http://pjmedia.com/spengler/2013/03/19/the-russians-think-were-wrecking-the-world-on-purpose/
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By GARRY KASPAROV
When Secretary of State John Kerry arrived in Moscow on Tuesday to meet his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov and President Vladimir Putin, the announced list of topics included finding "common ground" on Syria. It also mentioned antiterror cooperation in light of the Russian origins of Boston Marathon bombing suspects, the Tsarnaev brothers. It is very unlikely Mr. Kerry found common ground on either subject.
The humanitarian catastrophe in Syria is of no concern to Mr. Putin, as is clear from the Kremlin's support for the murderous Assad regime. Mr. Putin also seeks to stoke the instability that helps keep the price of oil high. The similar pattern of Russian interference in Iran and Venezuela is no coincidence. Energy revenue is what keeps Mr. Putin and his gang in power and therefore oil prices are always his top priority.
Terror would seem to be a more likely area for U.S.-Russian collaboration, especially regarding the virulent brand of Islamist extremism that has been bubbling over in Russia's southwestern Caucasus region since the fall of the Soviet Union. Yet the Kremlin's cooperation on the Islamist threat has been remarkably selective.
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U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry waits for Russia's President Vladimir Putin before their meeting in Moscow on Tuesday.
Soon after the suspects' names in the Boston bombing became known, the Russian security services announced that they had warned the FBI about the elder Tsarnaev, Tamerlan, in 2011. But what about during and after Tamerlan's visit to Russia's North Caucasus in 2012? That's when he reportedly was indoctrinated and trained by radicals in Dagestan.
Why were there no communications in 2012 from the FSB (the successor of the KGB) about a suspected radical, an American no less, training in the hottest of Caucasus terrorist hotbeds and then returning to the U. S.? It is beyond belief that the extensive police state that monitors every utterance of the Russian opposition could lose track of an American associating with terrorists.
Tamerlan reportedly met with Makhmud Mansur Nidal, a known terror recruiter, and William Plotkin, a Russian-Canadian jihadist. Both men were killed in Dagestan by the Russian military just days before Tamerlan left Russia for the U.S. If no intelligence was sent from Moscow to Washington, all this talk of FSB cooperation cannot be taken seriously.
This would not be the first time Russian security forces seemed strangely impotent in the face of an impending terror attack. In the Nord-Ost theater siege by Islamist Chechens in 2002 and the Beslan school hostage attack by Chechen and other Islamist radicals in 2004, it later came to light that there were FSB informants in both terror groups—yet the attacks went ahead unimpeded. Beslan was quickly used by Mr. Putin to justify shredding the last vestiges of Russian democracy by eliminating the election of regional governors.
With such a track record, it is impossible to overlook that the Boston bombing took place just days after the U.S. Magnitsky List was published, creating the first serious external threat to the Putin power structure by penalizing Russian officials complicit in human-rights crimes. Practically before the smoke in Boston cleared, Mr. Putin was saying "I told you so" and calling for cooperation.
Secretary Kerry's visit validated every Putin instinct. The Russian president kept the American waiting in a hall for three hours—no doubt impressing Mr. Putin's cronies. On Wednesday, Mr. Kerry was allowed to meet with a small group of Russian human-rights activists whose activities have been under assault as the Putin government cracks down ever harder on free speech and all forms of opposition.
But the meeting avoided mention of the two most significant developments in Russian human rights: the Magnitsky List and the dozens of protesters arrested at a political protest in Bolotnaya Square in Moscow a year ago. Mr. Putin is creating a new generation of political prisoners, with show trials unseen since Joseph Stalin, and Mr. Kerry goes to Russia to find common ground? As for Syria, the day after Mr. Kerry left, the Journal reported that advanced Russian S-300 antiaircraft missiles were headed to Syria.
Islamist terror is a genuine threat that will continue to take Russian and American lives unless it is met with a strong response. But having a shared enemy does not mean having shared values. Respect for human life and individual rights are the most potent weapons the civilized world possesses and where any discussion of common ground must begin. The Putin regime's dubious record on counterterrorism and its continued support of terror sponsors Iran and Syria mean only one thing: common ground zero.
Mr. Kasparov, a contributing editor of The Wall Street Journal, is the leader of the Russian pro-democracy group United Civil Front and chairman of the U.S.-based Human Rights Foundation.
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After all the trouble Nobel Prize winner Pres. Obama and then Sec Clinton went to, resetting relations with a gag gift that actually translated "overcharge", the 'tell Vladimir I will have more flexibility to disarm after my reelection' US President went out of his way to rip him personally in a recent press conference. I was listening live and it sounded planned and scripted.
“I know the press likes to focus on body language, and he's got that kind of slouch, looking like the bored kid at the back of the classroom,”
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Russian president Vladimir Putin was "infuriated" by President Obama's joke that he looked "like the bored kid in the back of the classroom," according to a Kremlin official quoted anonymously by the New York Times.
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/319301-report-putin-infuriated-by-obamas-bored-kid-quip#ixzz2dMrB9Fcv
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What harm can a little ad hominem Presidential rip to a world audience do...
Russian news service Interfax is citing military sources as saying Moscow is dispatching an anti-submarine ship and a cruiser to the Mediterranean. Interfax says the moves are being made due to the "well-known situation" there -- referring to the Syria crisis. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-08-29/russia-dispatches-sub-cruiser-uk-sends-6-jets-cyprus-china-repeats-dire-consequences
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Russia's View on the Possible Syria Intervention
Analysis
August 29, 2013 | 0849 Print Text Size
Russia's View on the Possible Syria Intervention
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov during a news conference on Syria on Aug. 26. (KIRILL KUDRYAVTSEV/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
Russia has emphasized its opposition to a military intervention in Syria at the U.N. Security Council, but a U.S. operation in Syria could actually benefit Moscow. The Russian and Chinese envoys to the United Nations walked out of the Security Council meeting in New York on Aug. 28 after U.S. Permanent Representative Samantha Power called for immediate action in Syria. The United Kingdom also submitted a draft resolution to the five permanent members of the Security Council -- Russia, the United Kingdom, China, the United States and France -- that called for "authorizing all necessary measures to protect civilians" in Syria, including an armed operation in the country.
Russia has long used its relationship with the Syrian regime against the West, particularly the United States. Despite warnings from the West, Moscow has supplied the Syrians with weapons and provisions during their two-year conflict. Russia's plan has long been to use its ties to Syria to prevent the West from going too far in areas that truly affect Russia, including issues that involve former Soviet states.
Analysis
Russia's position at the Security Council is that it does not want to vote on the option for intervention in Syria without having seen the U.N. inspectors' report on whether the regime used chemical weapons. With the U.N. experts in Syria until Aug. 31, no one has seen what the investigation has uncovered. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Gatilov said, "Certain states are ready to use force even before U.N. experts make public the results of their investigation. Our country will be committed to international law."
Limits to Russian Support for Syria
For Russia, Syria is a bargaining chip, not a country that affects Russia's primary interests. While Russia supports the regime in Damascus, its support does not extend to militarily defending the regime should the West move to intervene. Russia does have a military presence in Syria at the port of Tartus, but it is not willing to put its own military personnel at risk in defense of Damascus. Nor has Russia shown any inclination to move its military or air defense systems, such as the S-300, to Syria in recent days.
With a possible U.S. military intervention closing in, if Russia wanted to raise the risk level for a U.S. operation then its window to act could already be closed. In addition, Russia does not want to attempt a military reply in Syria, as it did in 1999 in Kosovo, and risk looking foolish. In the Kosovo War, Western countries ignored Russia's opposition to military intervention and took measures before a U.N. Security Council decision. In response, Russia deployed 200 airborne troops to the Kosovar capital, Pristina, to head off the NATO troops' arrival. However, French and British troops limited Russian troops to the airport, embarrassing Moscow. Of course, Russia in 1999 was far weaker than Russia today, but the uncertainty of trying to militarily aid Syria is not worth the risk for Moscow.
In addition, Russia may use Syria as leverage with the West, but it will not support the Syrian regime to the point that it would break relations with key Western partners such as the United Kingdom or France, which are part of the U.S. intervention plans. Moscow's relationships with London and Paris have grown more important in recent months following a string of energy and economic deals. At a time when cracks in the Russian economy are starting to show, Russia will not alienate those European partners -- especially not for Syria's situation.
Russia's Plan
Russia is attempting to turn the situation to its favor in other ways. First, the Moscow media campaign is in full swing. Russia is stressing how brash the United States would be if it moved toward a military operation without Security Council support or before the U.N. investigation is complete. In Russian Deputy Premier Dmitri Rogozin's words, the United States is behaving as if it were a "monkey with a hand grenade."
In turn, the Russians are promoting themselves as pragmatists when it comes to Syria. Russia will continue this spin going into next week, when it will host the G-20 Summit in St. Petersburg, which U.S. President Barack Obama will attend. Another reason for its commitment to diplomacy thus far is that Russia wants to ensure that the world's leaders will still attend the summit.
Ultimately, Russia would benefit if the United States became bogged down in another domestically unpopular military intervention in the Middle East. Even if it went with a limited and quick military intervention, the United States would have a difficult time handling the post-war situation and the intervention's ramifications across the region. Russia used earlier opportunities, when the United States was bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, to strengthen its country and reassert its influence in its region. Russia's re-emergence continues today in the former Soviet states and Europe, so having Washington preoccupied in the Islamic world gives Russia more room to work.
But a U.S. intervention in Syria also presents an opportunity for Moscow and Washington to work together after the military campaign, thawing the current cold between the two. The United States has given signs that even if it does intervene, it does not aim to break the regime in Damascus. Russia has close ties with many elites in the regime and could be in a position to try to negotiate a diplomatic option to extricate Bashar al Assad from the situation.
For the United States and Russia, tensions have been worsening in recent months over a series of issues, including Russia's decision to grant asylum to NSA leaker Edward Snowden, Russia's resurgence in Europe and the two sides' differing views on Syria. Although it would seem to make relations even worse if the United States ignored Russia's opposition to a military intervention in Syria, it would clear one major disagreement from the table in the long term while presenting an opportunity for the two to work together. Then again, such opportunities have come and gone in the past with both sides unwilling to break the standoff.
Read more: Russia's View on the Possible Syria Intervention | Stratfor
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http://www.barenakedislam.com/2013/09/04/a-letter-from-vladimir-putin-to-barack-hussein-obama/
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I really am laughing "out loud".
Keep it up and I may be able to survive three and a quarter more years - though I don't know about the country.
At least if we were going to have a nerd as CiC it should have been an IT/CEO stud like a Gates, or Ellison. Then we could have had a "Revenge of the Nerds 3" with them beating the heck out of Putin.
Thanks CD!
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Syria, America and Putin's Bluff
Geopolitical Weekly
Tuesday, September 10, 2013 - 04:07 Print Text Size
Stratfor
By George Friedman
In recent weeks I've written about U.S. President Barack Obama's bluff on Syria and the tightrope he is now walking on military intervention. There is another bluff going on that has to be understood, this one from Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Putin is bluffing that Russia has emerged as a major world power. In reality, Russia is merely a regional power, but mainly because its periphery is in shambles. He has tried to project a strength that he doesn't have, and he has done it well. For him, Syria poses a problem because the United States is about to call his bluff, and he is not holding strong cards. To understand his game we need to start with the recent G-20 meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia.
Putin and Obama held a 20-minute meeting there that appeared to be cold and inconclusive. The United States seems to be committed to some undefined military action in Syria, and the Russians are vehemently opposed. The tensions showcased at the G-20 between Washington and Moscow rekindled memories of the Cold War, a time when Russia was a global power. And that is precisely the mood Putin wanted to create. That's where Putin's bluff begins.
A Humbled Global Power
The United States and Russia have had tense relations for quite a while. Early in the Obama administration, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton showed up in Moscow carrying a box with a red button, calling it the reset button. She said that it was meant to symbolize the desire for restarting U.S.-Russian relations. The gesture had little impact, and relations have deteriorated since then. With China focused on its domestic issues and with Europe in disarray, the United States and Russia are the two major -- if not comparable -- global players, and the deterioration in relations can be significant. We need to understand what is going on here before we think about Syria.
Twenty years ago, the United States had little interest in relations with Russia, and certainly not with resetting them. The Soviet Union had collapsed, the Russian Federation was in ruins and it was not taken seriously by the United States -- or anywhere else for that matter. The Russians recall this period with bitterness. In their view, under the guise of teaching the Russians how to create a constitutional democracy and fostering human rights, the United States and Europe had engaged in exploitative business practices and supported non-governmental organizations that wanted to destabilize Russia.
The breaking point came during the Kosovo crisis. Slobodan Milosevic, leader of what was left of Yugoslavia, was a Russian ally. Russia had a historic relationship with Serbia, and it did not want to see Serbia dismembered, with Kosovo made independent.
There were three reasons for this. First, the Russians denied that there was a massacre of Albanians in Kosovo. There had been a massacre by Serbians in Bosnia; the evidence of a massacre in Kosovo was not clear and is still far from clear. Second, the Russians did not want European borders to change. There had been a general agreement that forced changes in borders should not happen in Europe, given its history, and the Russians were concerned that restive parts of the Russian Federation, from Chechnya to Karelia to Pacific Russia, might use the forced separation of Serbia and Kosovo as a precedent for dismembering Russia. In fact, they suspected that was the point of Kosovo. Third, and most important, they felt that an attack without U.N. approval and without Russian support should not be undertaken both under international law and out of respect for Russia.
President Bill Clinton and some NATO allies went to war nevertheless. After two months of airstrikes that achieved little, they reached out to the Russians to help settle the conflict. The Russian emissary reached an agreement that accepted the informal separation of Kosovo from Serbia but would deploy Russian peacekeepers along with the U.S. and European ones, their mission being to protect the Serbians in Kosovo. The cease-fire was called, but the part about Russian peacekeepers was never fully implemented.
Russia felt it deserved more deference on Kosovo, but it couldn't have expected much more given its weak geopolitical position at the time. However, the incident served as a catalyst for Russia's leadership to try to halt the country's decline and regain its respect. Kosovo was one of the many reasons that Vladimir Putin became president, and with him, the full power of the intelligence services he rose from were restored to their former pre-eminence.
Western Encroachment
The United States has supported, financially and otherwise, the proliferation of human rights groups in the former Soviet Union. When many former Soviet countries experienced revolutions in the 1990s that created governments that were somewhat more democratic but certainly more pro-Western and pro-American, Russia saw the West closing in. The turning point came in Ukraine, where the Orange Revolution generated what seemed to Putin a pro-Western government in 2004. Ukraine was the one country that, if it joined NATO, would make Russia indefensible and would control many of its pipelines to Europe.
In Putin's view, the non-governmental organizations helped engineer this, and he claimed that U.S. and British intelligence services funded those organizations. To Putin, the actions in Ukraine indicated that the United States in particular was committed to extending the collapse of the Soviet Union to a collapse of the Russian Federation. Kosovo was an insult from his point of view. The Orange Revolution was an attack on basic Russian interests.
Putin began a process of suppressing all dissent in Russia, both from foreign-supported non-governmental organizations and from purely domestic groups. He saw Russia as under attack, and he saw these groups as subversive organizations. There was an argument to be made for this. But the truth was that Russia was returning to its historical roots as an authoritarian government, with the state controlling the direction of the economy and where dissent is treated as if it were meant to destroy the state. Even though much of this reaction could be understood given the failures and disasters since 1991, it created a conflict with the United States. The United States kept pressing on the human rights issue, and the Russians became more repressive in response.
Then came the second act of Kosovo. In 2008, the Europeans decided to make Kosovo fully independent. The Russians asked that this not happen and said that the change had little practical meaning anyway. From the Russian point of view, there was no reason to taunt Russia with this action. The Europeans were indifferent.
The Russians found an opportunity to respond to the slight later that year in Georgia. Precisely how the Russo-Georgian war began is another story, but it resulted in Russian tanks entering a U.S. client state, defeating its army and remaining there until they were ready to leave. With the Americans bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, no intervention was possible. The Russians took this as an opportunity to deliver two messages to Kiev and other former Soviet states. First, Russia, conventional wisdom aside, could and would use military power when it chose. Second, he invited Ukraine and other countries to consider what an American guarantee meant.
U.S.-Russian relations never really recovered. From the U.S. point of view, the Russo-Georgia war was naked aggression. From the Russian point of view, it was simply the Russian version of Kosovo, in fact gentler in that it left Georgia proper intact. The United States became more cautious in funding non-governmental organizations. The Russians became more repressive by the year in their treatment of dissident groups.
Since 2008, Putin has attempted to create a sense that Russia has returned to its former historic power. It maintains global relations with left-wing powers such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Cuba. Of course, technically Russia is not left wing, and if it is, it is a weird leftism given its numerous oligarchs who still prosper. And in fact there is little that Russia can do for any of those countries, beyond promising energy investments and weapon transfers that only occasionally materialize. Still, it gives Russia a sense of global power.
In fact, Russia remains a shadow of what the Soviet Union was. Its economy is heavily focused on energy exports and depends on high prices it cannot control. Outside Moscow and St. Petersburg, life remains hard and life expectancy short. Militarily, it cannot possibly match the United States. But at this moment in history, with the United States withdrawing from deep involvement in the Muslim world, and with the Europeans in institutional disarray, it exerts a level of power in excess of its real capacity. The Russians have been playing their own bluff, and this bluff helps domestically by creating a sense that, despite its problems, Russia has returned to greatness.
In this game, taking on and besting the United States at something, regardless of its importance, is critical. The Snowden matter was perfect for the Russians. Whether they were involved in the Snowden affair from the beginning or entered later is unimportant. It has created two important impressions. The first is that Russia is still capable of wounding the United States -- a view held among those who believe the Russians set the affair in motion, and a view quietly and informally encouraged by those who saw this as a Russian intelligence coup even though they publicly and heartily denied it.
The second impression was that the United States was being hypocritical. The United States had often accused the Russians of violating human rights, but with Snowden, the Russians were in a position where they protected the man who had revealed what many saw as a massive violation of human rights. It humiliated the Americans in terms of their own lax security and furthermore weakened the ability of the United States to reproach Russia for human rights violations.
Obama was furious with Russia's involvement in the Snowden case and canceled a summit with Putin. But now that the United States is considering a strike on the Syrian regime following its suspected use of chemical weapons, Washington may be in a position to deal a setback to a Russia client state, and by extension, Moscow itself.
The Syria Question
The al Assad regime's relations with Russia go back to 1970, when Hafez al Assad, current President Bashar al Assad's father, staged a coup and aligned Syria with the Soviet Union. In the illusion of global power that Putin needs to create, the fall of al Assad would undermine his strategy tremendously unless the United States was drawn into yet another prolonged and expensive conflict in the Middle East. In the past, the U.S. distraction with Iraq and Afghanistan served Russia's interests. But the United States is not very likely to get as deeply involved in Syria as it did in those countries. Obama might bring down the regime and create a Sunni government of unknown beliefs, or he may opt for a casual cruise missile attack. But this will not turn into Iraq unless Obama loses control completely.
This could cause Russia to suffer a humiliation similar to the one it dealt the United States in 2008 with Georgia. The United States will demonstrate that Russia's concerns are of no account and that Russia has no counters if and when the United States decides to act.
The impact inside Russia will be interesting. There is some evidence of weakness in Putin's position. His greatest strength has been to create the illusion of Russia as an emerging global power. This will deal that a blow, and how it resonates through the Russian system is unclear. But in any event, it could change the view of Russia being on the offensive and the United States being on the defensive.
Putin made this a core issue for him. I don't think he expected the Europeans to take the position that al Assad had used chemical weapons. He thought he had more pull than that. He didn't. The Europeans may not fly missions but they are not in a position to morally condemn those who do. That means that Putin's bluff is in danger.
History will not turn on this event, and Putin's future, let alone Russia's, does not depend on his ability to protect Russia's Syrian ally. Syria just isn't that important. There are many reasons that the United States might not wish to engage in Syria. But if we are to understand the U.S.-Russian crisis over Syria, it makes sense to consider the crisis within in the arc of recent history from Kosovo in 1999 to Georgia in 2008 to where we are today.
Read more: Syria, America and Putin's Bluff | Stratfor
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By John Barrasso
When the Obama administration announced its "reset" of relations with Russia in 2009, Americans never expected that it would include making Vladimir Putin the de facto U.S. ambassador to Syria in 2013. Yet the Russian president has in effect taken over U.S. diplomacy with the Bashar Assad regime in Damascus.
The most recent evidence came this weekend with the announcement in Geneva that Secretary of State John Kerry had reached a "framework" deal brokered by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Syria's chemical weapons. Assad is supposed to provide an accounting of all his chemical weapons within a week, international inspections begin in November, and Syria's stockpiles of the weapons must be removed or destroyed by next summer.
Most experts on chemical weapons say the timetable is unworkable. But ridding Syria of chemical weapons is not the point. The Kerry-Lavrov agreement is simply a Russian delaying tactic on behalf of its Syrian ally—a tactic we've seen before.
On May 7, amid reports that chemical weapons had been used in Syria, the Obama administration joined the Russians in announcing plans for an international conference to help end Syria's civil war. Within two weeks, Moscow was supplying Assad with advanced cruise missiles.
Moscow's military support of the Assad regime is one of the main reasons that more than 100,000 Syrians have been killed in the current conflict. On the political front, the Russians have vetoed every attempt by the United Nations Security Council to do something to bring about an end to the civil war. For example, on Feb. 4, 2012—one day after Syrian forces slaughtered 250 of their own citizens—Russia vetoed a resolution that would have condemned the violence there. This was after Russia had weakened the resolution so that it included no sanctions. Mr. Putin's government even voted against a nonbinding resolution that expressed "grave concern at the continuing escalation of violence."
It is extremely unlikely that Russia is suddenly now going to cooperate with the U.S. on Syria. It is downright naïve to think that Mr. Putin will do anything that President Obama asks him to do without exacting a huge price in return. We have also seen this before. For more than four years, the Obama administration has capitulated to Mr. Putin's demands and accepted his rebukes.
It began with the New START treaty on arms control signed in April 2010. U.S. negotiators limited our missile defense deployments, reduced our delivery systems and hampered our ability to monitor Russian missile production plants. In return, Russia gave up little to nothing of value: The U.S., for example, allowed limits on missile delivery vehicles requiring us to make unilateral reductions, as Russia was already well below the limits.
Later, in March 2012, a microphone accidentally picked up President Obama telling Dmitry Medvedev that following his re-election he would have "more flexibility" to grant the Russians further concessions on missile defense. Mr. Medvedev memorably replied: "I will transmit this information to Vladimir."
Russia's actions in Syria are not the only reasons to distrust Mr. Putin. Moscow has opposed attempts by the U.N. in November 2011 to increase sanctions against Iran for its illicit nuclear program. The Russians voted against a December 2011 resolution that expressed only tepid concerns about repression in North Korea. And Russia continues to refuse to extradite the fugitive Edward Snowden, who stole U.S. national-security secrets.
Meanwhile, the human-rights situation in Russia continues to deteriorate. The country is consistently ranked among the world's most corrupt and least free.
Moscow is not even complying with a commitment to eliminate its own chemical weapons. A State Department assessment in January reported that Russia has provided an "incomplete" list of its chemical agents and weapons to be destroyed. It has also missed deadlines to convert former chemical-weapon production plants. Why would we expect Moscow to help enforce similar restrictions against Syria?
Assad is fighting for survival and has no interest in surrendering his chemical weapons voluntarily. Russia wants Assad to stay in power and will not do anything to risk his position. Nor will Mr. Putin need to do so, since the Kremlin has bent the Obama administration to its will before.
Secretary of State Kerry himself has dismissed the plan he is now pursuing. On Monday last week, he said that the U.S. could ask Assad to turn over his chemical weapons, "but he isn't about to do it, and it can't be done." That assessment is likely to prove correct. But Russia and Syria cynically seized on Mr. Kerry's words and now are feigning an effort to prove that it can be done.
Based on the experience of the past four years, the Russians, like the Iranians, are well aware that pretending to go along can buy time until the Obama administration becomes distracted with another issue. The U.S. should be prepared for the diplomatic effort on Syria to fall flat and have more effective alternatives ready.
The president needs to go back to the drawing board and come up with a coherent, realistic Syria policy—one that does not rely on Russia's cooperation.
Dr. Barrasso is a Republican senator from Wyoming.
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"The president needs to go back to the drawing board and come up with a coherent, realistic Syria policy—one that does not rely on Russia's cooperation."
Sen. Barrasso does a very nice job of articulating what we all seem to know about the Russians and this non-solution to a problem that we just elevated to the level of deciding the course of human history.
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http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/09/17/russia-putin-far-east-failure-column/2828717/
From the article:
On the surface, Russia seems to be a nation on the march. Last week, Russia's larger-than-life president, Vladimir Putin, strong-armed the United States into accepting his plan for dealing with Syria's chemical weapons. There are signs Putin is preparing to expand Russia's role in Iran and its nuclear program, which successive American administrations have failed to shut down.
But today's appearance of strength hides growing weakness that could do more damage to American interests than any mischief Russia can cause today. Russia is fast approaching a monumental transformation, one that promises to be as profound as the collapse of the U.S.S.R. 20 years ago. The result could spell the end of the nation as we know it
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New Dimensions of U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Russia
Geopolitical Weekly
Tuesday, February 11, 2014 - 04:13 Print Text Size
Stratfor
By George Friedman
The struggle for some of the most strategic territory in the world took an interesting twist this week. Last week we discussed what appeared to be a significant shift in German national strategy in which Berlin seemed to declare a new doctrine of increased assertiveness in the world -- a shift that followed intense German interest in Ukraine. This week, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, in a now-famous cellphone conversation, declared her strong contempt for the European Union and its weakness and counseled the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine to proceed quickly and without the Europeans to piece together a specific opposition coalition before the Russians saw what was happening and took action.
This is a new twist not because it makes clear that the United States is not the only country intercepting phone calls, but because it puts U.S. policy in Ukraine in a new light and forces us to reconsider U.S. strategy toward Russia and Germany. Nuland's cellphone conversation is hardly definitive, but it is an additional indicator of American strategic thinking.
Recent U.S. Foreign Policy Shifts
U.S. foreign policy has evolved during the past few years. Previously, the United States was focused heavily on the Islamic world and, more important, tended to regard the use of force as an early option in the execution of U.S. policy rather than as a last resort. This was true not only in Afghanistan and Iraq but also in Africa and elsewhere. The strategy was successful when its goal was to destroy an enemy military force. It proved far more difficult to use in occupying countries and shaping their internal and foreign policies. Military force has intrinsic limits.
The alternative has been a shift to a balance-of-power strategy in which the United States relies on the natural schisms that exist in every region to block the emergence of regional hegemons and contain unrest and groups that could threaten U.S. interests. The best example of the old policy is Libya, where the United States directly intervened with air power and special operations forces to unseat Moammar Gadhafi. Western efforts to replace him with a regime favorable to the United States and its allies have not succeeded. The new strategy can be seen in Syria, where rather than directly intervening the United States has stood back and allowed the warring factions to expend their energy on each other, preventing either side from diverting resources to activities that might challenge U.S. interests.
Behind this is a rift in U.S. foreign policy that has more to do with motivation than actual action. On one side, there are those who consciously support the Syria model for the United States as not necessarily the best moral option but the only practical option. On the other, there are those who argue on behalf of moral interventions, as we saw in Libya, and who see removing tyrants as an end in itself. Given the outcome in Libya, this faction is on the defensive; it must explain how an intervention will actually improve the moral situation. Since this faction also tended to oppose Iraq, it must show how an intervention will not degenerate into Iraq-type warfare. That is hard to do, so for all the rhetoric, the United States is by default falling into a balance-of-power model.
The Geopolitical Battle in Ukraine
Russia emerged as a problem for the United States after the Orange Revolution in 2004, when the United States, supporting anti-Russian factions in Ukraine, succeeded in crafting a relatively pro-Western, anti-Russian government. The Russians read this as U.S. intelligence operations designed to create an anti-Russian Ukraine that, as we have written, would directly challenge Russian strategic and economic interests. Moreover, Moscow saw the Orange Revolution (along with the Rose Revolution) as a dress rehearsal for something that could occur in Russia next. The Russian response was to use its own covert capabilities, in conjunction with economic pressure from natural gas cutoffs, to undermine Ukraine's government and to use its war with Georgia as a striking reminder of the resurrection of Russian military capabilities. These moves, plus disappointment with Western aid, enabled a more pro-Russian government to emerge in Kiev, reducing the Russians' fears and increasing their confidence. In time, Moscow became more effective and assertive in playing its cards right in the Middle East, giving rise to the current situations in Syria, Iran and elsewhere.
Washington had two options. One was to allow the balance of power to assert itself, in this case relying on the Europeans to contain the Russians. The other was to continue to follow the balance-of-power model but at a notch higher than pure passivity. As Nuland's call shows, U.S. confidence in Europe's will for and interest in blocking the Russians was low; hence a purely passive model would not work. The next step was the lowest possible level of involvement to contain the Russians and counter their moves in the Middle East. This meant a limited and not too covert support for anti-Russian, pro-European demonstrators -- the re-creation of a pro-Western, anti-Russian government in Ukraine. To a considerable degree, the U.S. talks with Iran also enable Washington to deny the Russians an Iranian card, although the Syrian theater still provides the Kremlin some room to maneuver.
The United States is not prepared to intervene in the former Soviet Union. Russia is not a global power, and its military has many weaknesses, but it is by far the strongest in the region and is able to project power in the former Soviet periphery, as the war with Georgia showed. At the moment, the U.S. military also has many weaknesses. Having fought for more than a decade in the core of the Islamic world, the U.S. military is highly focused on a way of war not relevant to the former Soviet Union, its alliance structure around the former Soviet Union is frayed and not supportive of war, and the inevitable post-war cutbacks that traditionally follow any war the United States fights are cutting into capabilities. A direct intervention, even were it contemplated (which it was not), is not an option. The only correlation of forces that matters is what exists at a given point in time in a given place. In that sense, the closer U.S. forces get to the Russian homeland, the greater the advantage the Russians have.
Instead, the United States did the same thing that it did prior to the Orange Revolution: back the type of intervention that both the human rights advocates and the balance-of-power advocates could support. Giving financial and psychological support to the demonstrators protesting Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich's decision to reject a closer relationship with Europe, and later protesting the government's attempt to suppress the demonstrations, preserved the possibility of regime change in Ukraine, with minimal exposure and risk to the United States.
Dissatisfaction with the German Approach
As we said last week, it appeared that it was the Germans who were particularly pressing the issue, and that they were the ones virtually controlling one of the leaders of the protests, Vitali Klitschko. The United States appeared to be taking a back seat to Germany. Indeed, Berlin's statements indicating that it is prepared to take a more assertive role in the world appeared to be a historic shift in German foreign policy.
The statements were even more notable since, over the years, Germany appeared to have been moving closer to Russia on economic and strategic issues. Neither country was comfortable with U.S. aggressiveness in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Both countries shared the need to create new economic relationships in the face of the European economic crisis and the need to contain the United States. Hence, the apparent German shift was startling.
Although Germany's move should not be dismissed, its meaning was not as clear as it seemed. In her cellphone call, Nuland is clearly dismissing the Germans, Klitschko and all their efforts in Ukraine. This could mean that the strategy was too feeble for American tastes (Berlin cannot, after all, risk too big a confrontation with Moscow). Or it could mean that when the Germans said they were planning to be more assertive, their new boldness was meant to head off U.S. efforts. Looking at this week's events, it is not clear what the Germans meant.
What is clear is that the United States was not satisfied with Germany and the European Union. Logically, this meant that the United States intended to be more aggressive than the Germans in supporting opponents of the regime. This is a touchy issue for human rights advocates, or should be. Yanukovich is the elected president of Ukraine, winner of an election that is generally agreed to have been honest -- even though his constitutional amendments and subsequent parliamentary elections may not have been. He was acting within his authority in rejecting the deal with the European Union. If demonstrators can unseat an elected president because they disagree with his actions, they have set a precedent that undermines constitutionalism. Even if he was rough in suppressing the demonstrators, it does not nullify his election.
From a balance-of-power strategy, however, it makes great sense. A pro-Western, even ambiguous, Ukraine poses a profound strategic problem for Russia. It would be as if Texas became pro-Russian, and the Mississippi River system, oil production, the Midwest and the Southwest became vulnerable. The Russian ability to engage in Iran or Syria suddenly contracts. Moscow's focus must be on Ukraine.
Using the demonstrations to create a massive problem for Russia does two things. It creates a real strategic challenge for the Russians and forces them on the defensive. Second, it reminds Russia that Washington has capabilities and options that make challenging the United States difficult. And it can be framed in a way that human rights advocates will applaud in spite of the constitutional issues, enemies of the Iranian talks will appreciate and Central Europeans from Poland to Romania will see as a sign of U.S. commitment to the region. The United States will re-emerge as an alternative to Germany and Russia. It is a brilliant stroke.
Its one weakness, if we can call it that, is that it is hard to see how it can work. Russia has significant economic leverage in Ukraine, it is not clear that pro-Western demonstrators are in the majority, and Russian covert capabilities in Ukraine outstrip American capabilities. The Federal Security Service and Foreign Intelligence Service have been collecting files on Ukrainians for a long time. We would expect that after the Olympics in Sochi, the Russians could play their trump cards.
On the other hand, even if the play fails, the United States will have demonstrated that it is back in the game and that the Russians should look around their periphery and wonder where the United States will act next. Putting someone in a defensive crouch does not require that the first punch work. It is enough for the opponent to understand that the next punch will come when he is least expecting it. The mere willingness of the United States to engage will change the expectations of Central Europe, cause tensions between the Central Europeans and the Germans and create an opening for the United States.
The Pressure on Russia
Of course, the question is whether and where the Russians will answer the Americans, or even if they will consider the U.S. actions significant at all. In a sense, Syria was Moscow's move and this is the countermove. The Russians can choose to call the game. They have many reasons to. Their economy is under pressure. The Germans may not rally to the United States, but they will not break from it. And if the United States ups the ante in Central Europe, Russian inroads there will dissolve.
If the Russians are now an American problem, which they are, and if the United States is not going to revert to a direct intervention mode, which it cannot, then this strategy makes sense. At the very least it gives the Russians a problem and a sense of insecurity that can curb their actions elsewhere. At best it could create a regime that might not counterbalance Russia but could make pipelines and ports vulnerable -- especially with U.S. help.
The public interception of Nuland's phone call was not all that embarrassing. It showed the world that the United States, not Germany, is leading the way in Ukraine. And it showed the Russians that the Americans care so little, they will express it on an open cellphone line. Nuland's obscene dismissal of the European Union and treatment of Russia as a problem to deal with confirms a U.S. policy: The United States is not going to war, but passivity is over.
Read more: New Dimensions of U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Russia | Stratfor
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U.S. Feels Putin's Sharp Elbows in Ukraine
Obama Learning Moscow Will Go to Great Lengths to Protect Interests in World Hot Spots
WSJ
By Julian E. Barnes and Carol E. Lee
Feb. 19, 2014 7:32 p.m. ET
Why are people protesting in Ukraine? Why has the conflict turned deadly? What are the geopolitics of the conflict? WSJ's Jason Bellini has #TheShortAnswer.
For the Obama administration, the fires burning in Ukraine represent a new international crisis, but one resulting from an all-too-familiar source of consternation: Vladimir Putin.
In hot spots around the world, President Barack Obama repeatedly has encountered the sharp elbows of Mr. Putin: He has buttressed Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, offered a lifeline to Iran and embraced a controversial Egyptian commander as the country's future leader.
Mr. Putin gave asylum to former U.S. intelligence contractor Edward Snowden, who has been leaking American surveillance secrets, and test-launched a new missile.
More
Similarly now in Ukraine, Washington is struggling to come to terms with the fact that Moscow under Mr. Putin is willing to spend a great deal to protect its interests and oppose U.S. goals. Mr. Putin pressured the Ukrainian government to abandon a free-trade deal with the European Union and forced President Viktor Yanukovych to choose aid from Russia over closer ties to the West.
Administration officials have defended their dealings with Mr. Putin, arguing that in some cases—such as international talks over the Syrian civil war and Iran's nuclear program—Russia's core interests have coincided at least partly with U.S. aims.
"American presidents, understandably for strategic reasons, want to forge a relationship with Russia that goes beyond Cold War paradigms," said Damon Wilson, a former Bush administration official now at the Atlantic Council, a think tank.
"But inevitably, they are dragged back to the reality that they are dealing with an interlocutor that isn't prepared to be a partner in that effort," Mr. Wilson said.
The realization that Moscow views the world in terms of "us or them" has been slow to dawn on the Obama administration, but is becoming more apparent to White House and national security officials, foreign-policy experts say.
The administration gave Moscow "every favorable interpretation, every benefit of the doubt" in its first years, said Leon Aron, director of Russian studies at the conservative American Enterprise Institute.
But Mr. Obama has begun to change.
"Even in the administration, they are beginning to understand this is not a question of Putin's mood," Mr. Aron said. "This is the geostrategic framework that Putin operates. This is how he understands re-establishing Russian greatness."
Rebuilding Russia's position on the world stage and its dominance in countries formerly part of the Soviet Union have been a key part of Mr. Putin's agenda. Despite U.S. insistence that geopolitics isn't a "them-or-us," zero-sum game, Mr. Putin has made it clear he doesn't agree.
"If you look at Russian foreign policy it is a negative agenda," said Mr. Wilson of the Atlantic Council.
"The issue is restoring Russian influence by checking American power," Mr. Wilson said.
Asked to comment on the relationship between Mr. Putin and Mr. Obama, Russian officials pointed to an interview Mr. Putin gave to Russian media and the Associated Press in September.
"President Obama was not elected by the American people to be pleasant to Russia, neither was your humble servant elected by the people of Russia to be pleasant to someone," Mr. Putin said in the interview.
"We work, we argue, we are humans, and sometimes someone can get irritated. But I would like to repeat myself: I believe that global common interests are a good foundation for finding solutions together," Mr. Putin said.
Obama administration officials reject the idea that Mr. Putin is gaining the upper hand, noting the problems faced by the governments of Syria and Ukraine—both allies of Moscow.
"Neither of those situations advance Russia's interests in any way," a senior administration official said. "If anything, these and other events demonstrate that people want democracy, they reject corruption, and they want individual opportunity and integration into the global economy."
Still, U.S. officials expressed dismay Wednesday that Moscow has operated in secret in Ukraine while accusing the U.S. of meddling there. "They have not been transparent about what they've been doing in the Ukraine," a senior State Department official said. "And we would completely reject that it is we who have been interfering."
The U.S. took its first concrete steps against 20 Ukrainian officials Wednesday by imposing visa bans.
However, U.S. options beyond diplomatic pressure are seen as strictly limited and some government officials caution against courses of action that may not resolve the crisis.
"All that does is make you look impotent," said another U.S. official. "What can you do that will really make a difference in what is going on there? I am not sure anyone has identified anything."
Since Mr. Putin resumed the Russian presidency in 2012, relations between the two nations have been tense.
That culminated in the summer with Mr. Obama's decision to back out of a one-on-one meeting with Mr. Putin during a trip to Russia. The two instead met on the sidelines of an international summit, a meeting that came at the height of the dispute over Mr. Snowden and as Mr. Obama prepared for possible military strikes on Syria.
Still, some experts believe Mr. Obama must get more directly involved.
"The president has to be willing to get involved, get his hands dirty and be willing to engage with Vladimir Putin, " said Andrew Kuchins, the director of the Russia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
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http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/russia/198998-susan-rice-us-not-interested-in-second-cold-war-but-putin-might
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On this day in 1946 Winston Churchill delivered his Iron Curtain Speech at Westminster College in Fulton Missouri:
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/churchill-iron.asp
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http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/04/john-mccain-ukraine_n_4899085.html
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http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/03/05/going-viral-russia-today-anchor-quits-her-job-at-state-owned-tv-network-live-on-the-air/
======================================
On Today's Program
Gutsy or crazy? Another Russia Today anchor with a death wish: Rips Putin, quits
on air In a scathing rebuke of the propagandist TV network Russia Today, a news
anchor ripped the state-controlled news outlet and tendered her resignation - live
on air. This comes on the heels of another RT anchor strongly criticizing Russian
intervention in the Ukraine. Given how many Russian journalists have
‘mysteriously’ died after criticizing Putin, these anchors have great courage.
Check out the resignation and Glenn's reaction HERE
<http://link.glennbeck.com/52d10b9f0f365bf272f1d1cd1gw1h.9sd7/UxjbiOYQqekjpjgICe455>.
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At a minimum, she might want to start running a Geiger counter over her food.
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/03/05/going-viral-russia-today-anchor-quits-her-job-at-state-owned-tv-network-live-on-the-air/
======================================
On Today's Program
Gutsy or crazy? Another Russia Today anchor with a death wish: Rips Putin, quits
on air In a scathing rebuke of the propagandist TV network Russia Today, a news
anchor ripped the state-controlled news outlet and tendered her resignation - live
on air. This comes on the heels of another RT anchor strongly criticizing Russian
intervention in the Ukraine. Given how many Russian journalists have
‘mysteriously’ died after criticizing Putin, these anchors have great courage.
Check out the resignation and Glenn's reaction HERE
<http://link.glennbeck.com/52d10b9f0f365bf272f1d1cd1gw1h.9sd7/UxjbiOYQqekjpjgICe455>.
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stratfor
Summary
As Russia and the West continue to trade threats over the Ukraine crisis, the Russian Defense Ministry has raised the stakes by saying it is considering halting foreign inspections of its strategic nuclear arsenal. If it followed through on the threat, Moscow would be in clear violation of the New START arms control agreement. To this point, most of the threats or enacted measures over the Crimea standoff have centered on economic reprisal, not anything that could affect security. Russia certainly has concerns about New START and other weapons treaties with the West, but it has no intention of withdrawing and rekindling an arms race it may not be able to afford.
Analysis
Russia has threatened in the past to break or withdraw from New START or the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, which differs from New START in that it bans ground-based intermediate-range missiles (500-5,500 kilometers, or 300-3,400 miles) of the nuclear and the conventional sort. As early as November 2011, then-Russian President Dmitri Medvedev threatened to withdraw from New START, which was signed in April 2010, over differences with the United States regarding the U.S. anti-ballistic missile plans in Russia's periphery.
Not Just Politics
Russia has genuine concerns about the arms control agreements. One issue -- also a worry for the United States -- is that the treaties do not apply to third-party states such as China. Given the massive nuclear advantage that Russia and the United States both have over the rest of the world, this is not yet a serious concern as it relates to New START. (China's rapid military rise and lack of transparency about its military programs, including its nuclear forces, are admittedly increasingly worrisome for Moscow and Washington.) Russia also maintains a large stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons that can be used against conventional threats within its borders without needing to employ its strategic arsenal.
On the matter of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, or INF, it is important to remember that the agreement limits the deployment of all land-based intermediate-range missiles, whether deployed with a conventional or nuclear warhead. This has put both Russia and the United States at a serious disadvantage when it comes to China and its large and growing supply of intermediate-range missiles. Citing that threat, in 2007 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov proposed terminating the INF treaty; the United States refused. There is still reason to believe the Russians are sufficiently concerned over the limitations of the INF deal that they have sought to circumvent or even break it. Specifically, there have been allegations in Western media that the Russians have tested the RS-26 ballistic missile to intermediate ranges. More alarming reports say Russia is developing a ground-launched cruise missile in clear violation of the INF treaty.
As far as the United States is concerned, the limitations of the INF treaty are problematic but necessary to avoid an arms race with Russia in an era of budget cuts. In the Western Pacific, China relies extensively on its arsenal of land-based intermediate-range missiles as part of the country's counter-intervention strategy. With its anti-ship ballistic missiles or cruise and ballistic missiles, China can sink enemy ships, strike bases and crater runways in its immediate vicinity. Since Japan has no land-based cruise or ballistic missiles and the INF agreement restricts the U.S. arsenal, the United States relies disproportionately on air- and sea-launched missiles, with all their associated limitations.
U.S. BMD Efforts in Europe
Click to Enlarge
For Russia, despite its numerous concerns, withdrawing from the INF treaty, or especially New START, would probably trigger another arms race with the United States that Moscow may not be able to afford. It is doubtful whether Russia, which already has a substantial military modernization program underway, has the resources needed to build a sizable arsenal of intermediate-range missiles while also expanding its strategic nuclear triad. Such an effort would at least disrupt Russia's other military priorities.
An even greater concern for Russia -- one that is voiced quite often -- is that the arms control treaties limit Russia's offensive capability at a time when the United States is developing its anti-ballistic missile shield in Europe. Considering the sheer number of delivery systems still allowed by New START and the technological immaturity of anti-ballistic missile systems, Moscow's fear is largely groundless for now. Considering the possibilities of rapid investment and technological progress down the line, however, it is easy to understand Russia's long-term worries. The Russians cannot keep pace with the Americans in terms of funding missile defense technology.
Weighing the Costs
Although the Russians are displeased with New START and especially the INF treaty, they know the consequences of withdrawing from the treaties could make matters worse. Moscow is already investing heavily in modernizing its strategic nuclear strike force through new and improved land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear ballistic missile-equipped submarines. The Russians also recognize that they are at a conventional disadvantage against NATO and China. The modernization of the strategic nuclear force, in conjunction with a fairly aggressive nuclear doctrine, allows Moscow to ensure continued deterrence against potential threats.
Moreover, the trust accumulated over decades of arms control agreements would be severely damaged if Russia were to unilaterally withdraw from the treaties. The Russians, like the Americans, do not want to return to a world of high tension and risk of nuclear war.
Still, the Russians have considerable incentives to raise the possibility of withdrawal from the treaties as leverage in negotiations with the United States, particularly as they attempt to drive Washington toward talks on the neutralization of states in the Russian periphery such as Ukraine and Georgia. At the same time, however, Moscow will be careful not to take its threats too far. Indeed, shortly after the initial threat of withdrawal from New START, Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov said that all inspection missions in Russia will proceed as normal.
In fact, by September 2011, Russia was already in full compliance with the warhead and delivery vehicle limitations of New START while the United States was not. (Obligations must be met by February 2018.) The INF deal is on shakier ground than New START, but the same consequences of withdrawing would apply. While Moscow could one day withdraw from the treaties, it would do so only if it felt its national security was threatened by the agreements, not as a means of retaliation.
Read more: Russia Threatens to Withdraw From Arms Treaties | Stratfor
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Very insightful, IMHO.
http://www.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2014/03/15/putin-the-mask-comes-off-but-will-anybody-care/
Advantage: Russia Putin: The Mask Comes Off, But Will Anybody Care? - Walter Russell Mead
Russia appears to be deliberately fomenting more violence in Ukraine, possibly in advance of an invasion. Putin is no Hitler, but Hitler would recognize his moves.
Violence is spreading throughout Ukraine on a course that looks exactly like conscious and deliberate Russian preparation for a wider war. Without telepathic powers it is impossible to know what is going on in the mind of the one man who can control developments in Ukraine, but overnight the chances of additional Russian military action against its helpless neighbor appeared to grow. On Friday in Donetsk conflict between pro-and anti-Russia groups left one man dead and 26 injured. Now in Kharkiv two more are dead in a similar way as clashes spread through the city. Pro-Russian groups, including it is said ‘rent-a-mob’ demonstrators bussed in from Russia, seem to be behind the violence.
Moreover, there were scattered signs today that the next step is already upon us. Unconfirmed reports from local sources claim Russian troops landed in the Kherson region today—and were repelled. The story is starting to get picked up by news agencies, but rumors run rife at times like this. If true, it would mark the first direct military action by Russia outside Crimea and would be a major escalation of the most serious European international crisis since the Yugoslav wars. Here’s how the FT is reporting it:
Ukraine’s foreign ministry described the events as a “military invasion by Russia” and called on Russia to “immediately withdraw its military forces from the territory of Ukraine”.
“Ukraine reserves the right to use all necessary measures to stop the military invasion by Russia,” the ministry added in a statement.
If that is what is happening, and the preponderance of evidence suggests that it is, Putin appears to be following the Adolf Hitler strategy manual pretty much to the letter.
Putin is no Hitler, and from the standpoint of power he isn’t even a Brezhnev. Still, his actions in Ukraine have been following Adolf’s playbook pretty closely. Adolf wanted to tear up the Treaty of Versailles. Putin is attempting to rip up the post-Cold War settlement in Europe and Central Asia. Like Hitler’s Germany, Putin’s Russia is much weaker than its opponents, so it can’t achieve its goal through a direct military challenge against its primary enemies. Like Hitler’s Germany, Putin’s Russia must be clever until it grows strong, and it must play on its enemies’ hesitations, divisions and weaknesses until and unless it is ready to take them on head to head.
“Keep them guessing” is rule number one. Nobody was better than Hitler at playing with his enemies’ minds. For every warlike speech, there was an invitation to a peace conference. For every uncompromising demand, there was a promise of lasting tranquillity once that last little troublesome problem had been negotiated safely away. He was so successful at it (and Stalin, too was good at this game) in part because his opponents so desperately wanted peace. French politicians like Leon Blum and British leaders like Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain were as hungry for peace (it was the Depression after all, and both countries had suffered immensely in World War One) as Barack Obama and Francois Hollande are today. Commendably and properly, they wanted to fix their domestic economies, create a more just society at home, repair their infrastructure and cut their defense budgets. They were not in the mood for trouble overseas, and so a cold blooded con man found them to be easy marks.
Putin has played on western illusions very successfully for a very long time. Remember all those ‘experts’ (many, alas, in government service) who thought that the Medvedev presidency represented a real shift in Russian politics? How shocked and disappointed people were when Putin stepped smoothly back into the top job? It is the oldest trick in the book: bait and switch. Humiliate John Kerry by making him cool his heels for three hours in the Kremlin, and then dangle hope of a cooperative relationship. Hold out a ‘helping hand’ when the Obama administration has gotten itself into an embarrassing predicament over its Syria red line, then kick Uncle Sam in the teeth at Geneva.
There was never a good reason to believe any of Putin’s talk of peace and cooperation. After the Cold War, America and its allies jammed NATO expansion down Russia’s throat. The European Union worked to expand right up to Russia’s frontiers while making it crystal clear that Russia could never be a member. Putin is no Hitler, but neither is he a Konrad Adenauer, determined to accept defeat and to cooperate wholeheartedly in building his country’s future within the lines drawn by the victors. And the US made Adenauer’s Germany a much better offer than it made Putin’s Russia. You would have to be living in what the Germans call das Wolkenkuckkucksheim, cloud-cuckoo-land, to believe that a man like Putin would passively accept the post-Cold War order.
But cloud-cuckoo-land is exactly where many westerners live, in a resolutely post-historical world where foreign policy is about development, human rights, non-proliferation and trade. If Putin tells us he lives there too, we are hungry to believe him. We don’t want to live in a difficult world. Our grandfathers and great-grandfathers were having a fabulous time in cloud-cuckoo-land back in the 1930s and many of them clung to their illusions until the last possible moment. We want to live in a stable and secure world order but we don’t want to make the sacrifices world order requires—and so we will gaze deeply into the eyes of anybody who is willing to tell us what we most want to hear.
Hitler’s situation was like Putin’s in another way. Like Russia now, Germany in the 1930s was weaker than its western opponents, but its leader had much more power to change course. Hitler’s Germany was an opportunistic predator; it could move quickly, change direction on a dime, and lay plans in secret. His western opponents ran democratic governments where everything moved very slowly, secrets were regularly published in the press and big foreign policy moves were telegraphed well in advance. Hitler used what he had, and took advantage of his supreme personal power and control of the press to make Germany a much more aggressive and dynamic international actor than his lazy, contented and slow-moving opponents. Hitler could move at speed that made his rivals’ heads spin and frequently left them gaping in flat footed amazement at his quick strikes and rapid changes of course. He knew that surprise was one of his chief advantages and he used it to the hilt.
President Putin is not a stupid man. He knows that Russia faces stronger but slower moving opponents. He knows that deception, misdirection and surprise are among his most effective tools. We must expect him to use them often and to use them well. The west ended up looking utterly flatfooted and clueless as Putin moved into Crimea just as it did in 2008 when he moved into Georgia. That is the way Russia wants it.
This use of surprise, by the way, can be very far reaching. Hitler stunned the west by signing his famous non-aggression pact with Stalin, dividing eastern Europe between them. He then surprised Stalin again by attacking him in June of 1941. For people like Hitler and, in his very different way, Putin, blitzkrieg is a tactic for diplomacy and not just for war. We would be total fools not to suppose that Putin and his closest associates are looking for game changing diplomatic moves that would spoil America’s day.
Putin is using another one of Hitler’s favorite methods in Ukraine: turn your ethnic minorities in other countries into a Trojan horse— whether or not that is what those people actually want. Hitler did this with the Sudeten Germans in what is now the Czech Republic. The FT again:
Russia said on Saturday it was looking at requests for help from civilians in Ukraine, a statement which appeared to resemble those made two weeks ago in justification of its military incursion into Crimea.
“Russia is receiving numerous requests for protecting civilians. These requests will be given consideration,” the foreign ministry said. It added a string of claims that Ukrainian militants and mercenaries were threatening civilians, which could not immediately be verified.
There is nothing here that couldn’t have been taken directly out of Adolf’s Guide for Aspiring Hegemons.
Using another instrument that Putin shares with the German, a well tuned, centrally controlled and well funded state propaganda machine with international outlets, you then elevate the ‘mistreatment’ of that minority into a major issue. You scream and rant and rave, demand redress, and fill the airwaves with your warnings and your laments. You can always organize at least some of them to march and wave flags. When the other country’s police (or, better yet, angry counter-mobs) respond, you raise the temperature. Oppression! Murder! Genocide!
It worked for Hitler in the Munich crisis, and it is exactly the card Putin has played in Crimea and perhaps will play in other parts of the ex-Soviet space. After using the German minority in Czechoslovakia as a tool, Hitler gave the west a brief respite (more soft talk about peace) before turning to his next target: Poland. Once again, it was the German minority that gave him his opening. Polish thugs were trampling on their rights. Their protests were being crushed by heartless barbarians. Babies were being ripped from their mothers’ wombs by bloodthirsty Polish mobs. Whatever.
Again, it was Hitler’s propagandist Goebbels who taught the world an important lesson: when you lie, go big. This has been exactly what Russian propaganda over Ukraine has done. And if it works here, we can expect to see the same kind of thing tried elsewhere: in Central Asia, perhaps, when Putin decides the time has come to reunite the Russian motherland with the gas and oil wealth of countries like Kazakhstan. The Baltic republics, already familiar with Putin’s play of the Russian minority card, are braced for more trouble, and well they should be.
This is why the latest news from eastern Ukraine is so ominous: in the Adolf Hitler playbook, stirring up ethnic strife is something you do when the time has come to intervene. If Putin’s plan was to send troops into eastern Ukraine, we’d see Russian speakers in the streets protesting, sometimes with violence, and demanding ‘protection’. “Defending Russian nationals from fascist mobs when the Ukrainian government is unwilling or unable to do so” is just the kind of fig leaf Putin needs; as of today, he’s got it.
But when dealing with a calculating player who has read people like Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, studied under the grandmasters of the old KGB and knows how Adolf did it, we shouldn’t be too confident that we know what’s coming next. Deception, disinformation and disguise are vital to Putin’s kind of foreign policy, and it is very much in his interest to keep us off-base and baffled as much as he can. With that caveat, it’s worth noting what the three likeliest alternatives are.
First, the violence could be a preparation for an invasion that has already been decided in the Kremlin. This is unlikely to happen before the referendum in Crimea — Russia won’t want to upstage its own propaganda spectacle. Let a thumping majority (however acquired) vote for annexation, and then more violence takes place in eastern Ukraine… then boom. More riots, more incursions, more referendums.
Second, it could be that no invasion is intended or wanted at this time. Instead, Russia wants both to demonstrate its power to create crises inside Ukraine and to make the country as ungovernable as possible. A number of western commentators have been consoling themselves with the ‘Putin is trapped’ approach to Ukraine, but looking at the west’s situation the trap may be on our end. We are the ones who now have some kind of obligation to keep Ukraine’s corrupt and incompetent government alive and to keep its chronically lame, oligarch-dominated economy from withering away. We are also the ones who will be blamed if (when) economic miracles fail to occur.
We can also be blackmailed. Are we going to pay Gazprom’s outrageous gas bill for Ukraine, or are we going to let the country freeze in the dark next winter? If the West has taken on the role of paymaster and protector of the Ukrainian state, do we expect Putin to make this any cheaper or easier for us?
Meanwhile, unrest in the east can make Ukraine a much, much more expensive and difficult client for the west — and also increases the nervousness in the Baltic republics and former Warsaw Pact countries. Putin may think that a destabilized Ukraine where he can stir the pot at will is a pretty good thing for Russia — and he can quietly wait to see what develops as he plans his next steps. If nothing else, Ukraine’s is going to make people in places like Kazakhstan pay a lot more attention to Russia’s wishes than before. Let Ukraine simmer and flip your Soviet reconstruction focus to the east. The west didn’t lift a finger to protect Ukraine; the Kazhaks and others will feel very much left alone in a small room with a large bear.
Third, it’s also possible that Moscow is moving opportunistically. It may not have a long term plan, but sees the advantages of stirring things up in eastern Ukraine. Scaring Ukraine and the west is a good thing in itself. And who knows— it may turn out that further opportunities develop.
Any one of these scenarios is plausible, and any one of them offers Putin the prospect of a clear, prestige-enhancing win. The second two look like the smartest plays from the Kremlin’s point of view, but the west would be foolish to assume that Putin calculates the odds in the same ways we do.
We must hope that western leaders finally wake up to the nature of the opponent they face. Putin, I say again, is no Hitler. He isn’t as powerful as Hitler and he isn’t as evil as Hitler. Compared to Stalin, he’s a choirboy. But he’s a smart and able adversary of the west who believes that world politics is a zero sum game. He believes that Russia can only survive and thrive by reconstituting a great power between China and Germany, and that this can only be done by rolling back the post-Cold War expansion of western power across the old Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union.
Dealing effectively with Putin doesn’t require a new Cold War. American foreign policy doesn’t have to become, and shouldn’t become Russo-centric. But unless we take counsel with our allies and put the kind of intellectual and political energy into blocking Russian moves that Russia puts into thinking them through and making them, the world will become a significantly uglier place and it will be much harder to get some important things done.
The biggest cost to Putin of his Crimean adventure may not be the western sanctions, but rather the way that his Ukraine policy makes it harder for him to go back to gulling a complacent west. Not that he won’t try. Once he’s taken as much of Ukraine as he thinks he can get at this point, he is likely to launch a peace offensive, aiming to separate the Germans and the other Europeans from the Americans and let time weaken the outrage that now rolls through the west. Unfortunately, there will be people who are ready to be gulled yet again, but the quick vision the world has seen of the real nature of Putin’s policy and his ruthlessness will make at least some of the people harder to fool once more.
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Barack Obama ordered the first round of sanctions Monday against Vladimir Putin's inner circle in response to the weekend's referendum in Crimea -- just as Putin recognized Crimea's independence and began steps to annex it. "We are imposing sanctions on specific individuals responsible for undermining the sovereignty, territorial integrity and government of Ukraine," Obama said in a statement. "We're making it clear that there are consequences for their actions." More will come, too, he said, if Russia doesn't back down. "Further provocations will achieve nothing except to further isolate Russia and diminish its place in the world." Unfortunately, the pitifully weak sanctions had the opposite of the desired effect: Moscow's stock exchange rose 3.7% as Putin's men laughed at Obama.
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second post
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26609548
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http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303563304579447300718769492?mod=WSJ_hp_RightTopStories&mg=reno64-wsj
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second post
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/03/18/how-sanctions-against-russia-could-signal-the-beginning-of-world-war-iii/
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Putin Invades, Obama Dismantles
The U.S. rushes to obey a nuclear arms treaty while Russia cheats.
April 8, 2014 7:20 p.m. ET
John Kerry told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Tuesday that "Russian provocateurs" had infiltrated eastern Ukraine in order to foment "an illegal and illegitimate effort to destabilize a sovereign state and create a contrived crisis." Also on Tuesday, the Pentagon announced steep cuts to U.S. nuclear forces, four years ahead of schedule, in accordance with the 2010 New Start treaty with Russia.
At this point in Barack Obama's Presidency we should be used to the mental whiplash. But we still feel concussed.
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry testifies during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing. Getty Images
So let's slow down and follow the thread. Russia has seized Crimea and has 50,000 troops as a potential invasion force on the border with eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin is also abrogating the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Kiev agreed to give up its nuclear arsenal—at the time the third largest in the world—in exchange for guarantees of its territorial integrity from Russia, the U.S. and U.K. That memorandum has now proved to be as much of a scrap of paper to the Kremlin as Belgium's neutrality was to Berlin in the summer of 1914.
The Kremlin is also violating the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which bans the testing, production and possession of nuclear missiles with a range between 310 and 3,400 miles. Russia has tested at least three missiles—the R-500 cruise missile, the RS-26 ballistic missile and the Iskander-M semi-ballistic missile—that run afoul of the proscribed range limits.
The Obama Administration has suspected for years that Vladimir Putin was violating the INF Treaty, which supporters hail as the triumph of arms control. The Russians were boasting of their new missile capabilities in open-source literature as far back as 2007. Yet as defense analysts Keith Payne and Mark Schneider noted in these pages in February, "since 2009, the current administration's unclassified arms-control compliance reports to Congress have been mum on the Russian INF Treaty noncompliance."
Opinion Video
Atlantic Council senior fellow Adrian Karatnycky on the origins of renewed pro-Russian protests. Photo credit: Getty Images.
At a minimum, Congress should call on Rose Gottemoeller, confirmed last month as under secretary of state for arms control over strenuous objections from Florida Senator Marco Rubio, to explain what the Administration knew, and what it disclosed, about Moscow's INF violations when she negotiated New Start.
Ms. Gottemoeller has been publicly noncommittal on this point, perhaps because she knew New Start would never have won a two-thirds Senate majority if Russia's INF cheating had been widely known. The episode reminds us of why people like former Arizona Senator Jon Kyl were right to oppose the ratification of New Start.
Which brings us to the Administration's announcement on cutting U.S. nuclear forces to levels specified by New Start four years before the treaty's 2018 compliance deadline. The news comes a few days after Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists reported that "Russia has increased its counted deployed strategic nuclear forces over the past six months." Yet at the same time America's stockpile of warheads and launchers has declined.
Mr. Obama has dismissed Russia as a regional power, but he is maneuvering the U.S. closer to a position of absolute nuclear inferiority to Russia. The imbalance becomes even worse when one counts tactical nuclear weapons, where Russia has a four-to-one numerical advantage over the U.S.
To the surprise of defense analysts, the Pentagon will make the sharpest cuts in the submarine and bomber legs of the nuclear triad, while mostly preserving the silo-based Minuteman ICBMs. This means that the U.S. will maintain a stationary, and vulnerable, nuclear force on the ground while largely dismantling what remains of our second-strike capability at sea and in the air. A crucial part of deterrence is convincing an adversary that you can survive a first strike. It does not help U.S. security to dismantle the most survivable part of the U.S. arsenal.
It's fashionable in the West to dismiss this as "Cold War thinking," but it appears that Vladimir Putin hasn't given up on such thinking or he wouldn't be investing in new nuclear delivery systems.
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Cold War or no, recent events are providing daily reminders that the great-power rivalries of previous centuries are far from over. They have also offered the grim lesson that nations that forsake their nuclear deterrent, as Ukraine did, do so at considerable peril. After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 the Senate refused to ratify Jimmy Carter's SALT II Treaty. Any serious response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine should include a formal and public U.S. demarche about Russian cheating on the INF treaty, while promising to withdraw from New Start if the cheating continues.
Nuclear arsenals aside, the timing of Mr. Obama's nuclear dismantling couldn't be worse as Mr. Putin contemplates his next moves in Ukraine and sizes up a possible Western response. Someone said recently that Mr. Putin plays chess while Mr. Obama plays checkers, but that's unfair to the noble game of checkers.
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Putin Acts, Obama Assesses
Is the American President still interested in his job?
April 14, 2014 7:16 p.m. ET
The White House on Monday said there was "overwhelming evidence" that Russia is stirring the unrest in eastern Ukraine, but President Obama hasn't yet decided if further sanctions are warranted. That's how the Associated Press put its dispatch from Washington on the crisis in Ukraine, and the juxtaposition is a perfect summary of the current state of U.S. foreign policy.
Vladimir Putin uses Russian special forces to cow a neighbor and steal territory, while Mr. Obama agonizes about what to do.
"We are actively evaluating what is happening in eastern Ukraine, what actions Russia has taken, what transgressions they've engaged in," White House spokesman Jay Carney said. "And we are working with our partners and assessing for ourselves what response we may choose." This is from the same President who has been saying for weeks that any further Russian transgressions into Ukraine would be met with harsh sanctions. Mr. Putin must laugh out loud when he reads this stuff.
Meanwhile, the government in Kiev is getting the message that it had better fend for itself and has begun to meet one of the offers from Mr. Putin that it can't refuse. Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov said he is now open to a national referendum that would grant greater autonomy to regions of the country. Mr. Putin wants to hive off eastern and southern Ukraine into what would essentially be a Russian protectorate and leave Kiev with a rump state. The U.S. has refused to send Ukraine lethal military aid, and Kiev may be looking to sue for peace to avoid an outright invasion.
We know Mr. Obama didn't run for President to engage in great power politics, but it is still part of the job description. Is he still interested in doing his job?
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http://www.dickmorris.com/putin-ships-devastating-weapons-to-iran-dick-morris-tv-lunch-alert/?utm_source=dmreports&utm_medium=dmreports&utm_campaign=dmreports
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STRATEGY AFTER CRIMEA
Playing Putin’s Game
WALTER RUSSELL MEAD
Long, serious piece with specific proposals. Worthwhile read!
http://www.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2014/04/15/playing-putins-game/
... Our new policy towards Putin’s new Russia must begin with NATO. Before we can hope to induce Putin’s Russia to respect anything else, we must teach it that NATO is real and that we are in earnest. This probably cannot be done at this point without substantial and visible upgrades to NATO’s presence in the periphery states of the alliance. There will have to be more NATO installations and more US troops in places like Estonia and Romania. Right now, there is a non-negligible chance that Russia might try to create facts on the ground inside one or more of the Baltic Republics. The border defenses of those republics must be reinforced to make that impossible. That move may infuriate Putin but it will also be a healthy reminder of his impotence in the face of genuine allied resolve, and will make a serious war crisis less likely. There is a real security threat to the Baltic states, and any failure to address that proactively would be reckless imprudence. There are burglars in the neighborhood and the windows and doors must be bolted shut.
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Expect nothing but boldly fonted letters of disapproval and euro handwringing.
STRATEGY AFTER CRIMEA
Playing Putin’s Game
WALTER RUSSELL MEAD
Long, serious piece with specific proposals. Worthwhile read!
http://www.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2014/04/15/playing-putins-game/
... Our new policy towards Putin’s new Russia must begin with NATO. Before we can hope to induce Putin’s Russia to respect anything else, we must teach it that NATO is real and that we are in earnest. This probably cannot be done at this point without substantial and visible upgrades to NATO’s presence in the periphery states of the alliance. There will have to be more NATO installations and more US troops in places like Estonia and Romania. Right now, there is a non-negligible chance that Russia might try to create facts on the ground inside one or more of the Baltic Republics. The border defenses of those republics must be reinforced to make that impossible. That move may infuriate Putin but it will also be a healthy reminder of his impotence in the face of genuine allied resolve, and will make a serious war crisis less likely. There is a real security threat to the Baltic states, and any failure to address that proactively would be reckless imprudence. There are burglars in the neighborhood and the windows and doors must be bolted shut.
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Expect nothing but boldly fonted letters of disapproval and euro handwringing.
True, but in an election year we should be able to answer the question of what they should be doing.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/19/world/europe/us-plans-military-drills-in-eastern-europe.html?emc=edit_th_20140419&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193&_r=0
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Noonan: The Bear That Talks Like a Man
Conflict with Russia neither began nor ended with the Cold War.
By Peggy Noonan
WSJ
April 17, 2014 7:13 p.m. ET
On Russia and Ukraine we are experiencing things incrementally and coming to terms with the fact that we have entered a new era. Vladimir Putin has ended the post-Cold War settlement and is redrawing borders. It is childish and obtuse to see his moves and understand them as anything but what they are, the beginning of a time that will sorely try the United States. We have to get busy figuring out how to deal with it, both day to day and in the long term.
In rough connection to that, two books. One reminds us that Moscow was making diplomats' heads explode long before the Cold War. The second is from a futurist who notes history not only is surprising, it can move at quite a clip once it takes one of its turns.
"All the Great Prizes" is John Taliaferro's insightful, smartly observed biography of John Hay, whose fabled career took him from 22-year-old private secretary to Abraham Lincoln to secretary of state, 40 years later, in the administration of Theodore Roosevelt. In between Hay was a diplomat, poet, newspaper editor, fiery editorial writer, presidential biographer and ambassador. He had a warm mind and a cool heart. Hay was graceful, pleasing, broad-gauged, calm, and he counseled the occasionally hotheaded Roosevelt in how to maneuver and deflect. He had a generous and realistic sense of the imperatives of nations.
So it's interesting the Russians drove him wild.
In 1901 Moscow was moving to dominate Manchuria, which gave the willies to everyone in Asia and to the U.S., which had commercial interests. An American consul in the region warned Hay that unless Russia was checked, it would annex Manchuria outright. All the secretary got when he protested to Russia was denials and hurt looks. He complained that he was "dealing with a government with whom mendacity is a science." He wrote to Roosevelt: "I take it for granted that Russia knows as well as we do that we will not fight over Manchuria, for the simple reason that we cannot."
In the end, in 1904, the Japanese moved against Russia in a sneak attack on Port Arthur, almost taking out the Russian fleet. A brutal war commenced. Russia was defeated in a series of battles and experienced widespread unrest at home. Czar Nicholas II had thought the war would contribute to patriotic feeling; instead it sparked demonstrations and riots that were the first violent sign of the revolution that would come a dozen years later.
Peace was pushed and negotiated by Teddy Roosevelt, who became the first American president to win a Nobel Peace Prize—and he deserved it.
By that time Hay had written to him with uncharacteristic anger: "Four years of conflict with [the Russians] have shown me that you cannot let up a moment on them without danger to your midriff. The bear that talks like a man is more to be watched than Adam Zad "—a reference to Rudyard Kipling's Adam-zad, "the Bear that walks like a Man!"
***
For a possible look into the future, the second book, "The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century" by George Friedman, founder of the private intelligence and forecasting firm Stratfor. The book was published four years ago, in January 2010. In one chapter he predicts Russia's future.
"In geopolitics, major conflicts repeat themselves," he writes. "Russia is the eastern portion of Europe and has clashed with the rest of Europe on multiple occasions."
Europeans who have invaded Russia lived to regret it—if they were lucky. Russia in turn has sometimes pushed westward. "At other times, passive and ignored, Russia is taken advantage of. But, in due course, others pay for underestimating it."
The Cold War didn't settle the Russian question, which is: "Where will its frontiers lie and what will be the relationship between Russia and its neighbors?" In the years since 1989 American actions were "insufficient and unfocused." They alerted the Russians to "potential danger from the United States and ensured they would respond to it."
To Russia, "The farther west into Europe its borders extend, the farther conquerors have to travel to reach Moscow. Therefore Russia is always pressing westward," just as Europe presses eastward.
"Russia had its guts carved out after the collapse of communism. St. Petersburg, its jewel, was about a thousand miles away from NATO troops in 1989. Now it is less than one hundred miles away. In 1989, Moscow was twelve hundred miles from the limits of Russian power. Now it is about two hundred miles." Russia does not feel it has to "conquer the world," but that it must "regain and hold its buffers—essentially the boundaries of the old Soviet Union."
Sweeping demographic changes—a slowly growing or declining population, especially among ethnic Russians—would suggest the mid-2010s were the right time to move. Later might be too late.
Europe now, too, is hungry for energy, and Russia supplies it with natural gas. International energy markets may shift in the future, but for now Europe is dependent on Russia, so that Moscow can use its resources to bend neighbors to its will.
Russia, Mr. Friedman predicted, will take actions that will appear to be aggressive but in fact are defensive. It will focus on recovering influence and control in the former Soviet Union, re-creating the system of buffers it once hand. It will then attempt to create a series of buffers beyond the boundaries of the old Soviet Union. It will also try to prevent anti-Russian coalitions from forming.
"It is only a matter of time before Russian influence will overwhelm Kiev," Mr. Friedman wrote. The Russians "must dominate Belarus and Ukraine for their basic national security. . . . Ukraine and Belarus are everything to the Russians. If they are to fall into the enemy's hands—for example, join NATO—Russia would be in mortal danger." Reabsorbing Belarus and Ukraine "into the Russian sphere of influence is a given in the next five years."
The flashpoint after that will be the Baltics—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania—all former parts of the old Soviet Union, all members of NATO. Russia will attempt to neutralize them.
All of this will be not a sudden confrontation but an extended one. The tools the Russians will use will be covert (financing and energizing local Russian minorities), economic (cutting or threatening to cut the flow of natural gas) and military pressure (stationing troops near borders).
At first, Mr. Friedman wrote, the U.S. will underestimate Russia. Then it will be obsessed with Russia.
It will end, he says, with the collapse of Russia.
The extended confrontation will severely strain Russian military and economic power. Internal pressures, poor infrastructure, demographic shifts, and a government consumed by military considerations and distracted from potential domestic advances will have an impact. (Mr. Friedman does not go into this but since we're speculating, one internal factor could be a grinding discord due to resistance to Putinism among educated Russians grown used to free speech.)
The new era, he says, will end as the old Soviet Union did. "Russia broke in 1917, and again in 1991. And the country's military will collapse once more shortly after 2020."
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Weaken Putin With a Russian Brain Drain
President Obama could immediately make it easy for the best and brightest to get special U.S. visas.
By
Edward Luttwak
April 30, 2014 7:16 p.m. ET
With Russia already suffering from capital flight amid economic sanctions and rising tensions over the Ukraine conflict, the U.S. has another option for ratcheting up financial pressure on the Putin regime: Start a brain drain too.
Call it an "anti-sanctions" approach. Blacklisting individuals and companies closely tied to Vladimir Putin is fine, but let's also open America's doors to Russia's best and brightest. The instruments to do so are a pair of special U.S. visas that already exist—the O-1A and the EB-5.
The O-1A is a special visa for individuals of "extraordinary ability" in the sciences, education and business. It entitles them to reside and work for three years, can be followed by an unlimited number of one-year extensions, and often leads to citizenship. There is a parallel O-3 visa routinely issued to the spouses and children of O-1A holders, as well as O-1B visas for artists and entertainers. But these visas are now issued slowly, grudgingly, with only 22,080 O-visas of all types issued in 2013, and they usually require heaps of testimonials to prove extraordinary ability.
Enlarge Image
The Kremlin and St. Basil?s Cathedral in Moscow. Corbis
But President Obama, who is not averse to using executive orders to shape legal matters more to his liking, could simply issue an executive order declaring that in the case of citizens of the Russian Federation, an advanced degree—a doctorate or its equivalent—would suffice for an O-1A visa. If O-1A visas were available to Russians on a large scale, the present outflow of talent from the country, already in the thousands, would likely become a flood. President Putin can ill afford the loss of talent, and the U.S. economy would benefit. If America presented such a visa offer, it would also neatly expose the false depiction of the U.S. as hostile to the Russian people—a theme of Mr. Putin's recent speeches and of the entire Kremlin propaganda apparatus.
Presidential easing of visa rules is hardly unprecedented. On Jan. 19, 2012, for example, Mr. Obama issued Executive Order 13597 streamlining tourist visas and visitor-entry procedures, a measure taken to promote the travel and tourism industry. Surely he could do something similar to help address a crisis that threatens world order.
The other weapon at Mr. Obama's disposal is the EB-5 visa. The EB-5 is for immigrants who invest money in the U.S. It entitles recipients to immediate permanent-resident "Green Card" status, but in spite of the great volume of foreign investment into the U.S. only 50,141 such visas were issued in 2013 because of complicated and unnecessary employment requirements. If, for example, EB-5 visas were issued on demand to any citizen of the Russian Federation with a clean criminal record and with $5 million deposited in the U.S., the capital outflow from Russia, already reliably estimated in the tens of billions so far this year, would almost certainly spike further—again, to the detriment of Mr. Putin and to America's benefit.
Instituting these "anti-sanctions" would be a dramatic move, likely far more effective than any other action now feasible, and Mr. Obama could do it quickly on his own. But he shouldn't expect much criticism from Congress—this is one kind of immigration reform everyone can support.
Mr. Luttwak is the author, most recently, of "The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy" (Harvard, 2012).
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U.S. Escalates Sanctions Against Russia
President Obama escalated sanctions against Russia on Wednesday by targeting a series of large banks and energy and defense firms in what officials described as the most punishing measures to date for Moscow’s intervention in Ukraine.
While the latest moves do not cut off entire sectors of the Russian economy, as threatened in the past, the administration’s actions go significantly further than the financial and travel limits imposed so far on several dozen individuals and their businesses. The new measures will severely restrict access to American debt markets for the targeted companies.
The moves were coordinated with European leaders, who were meeting in Brussels on Wednesday to consider their own package of penalties against Russia. The Europeans declined to go as far as the United States, instead focusing on a plan to block loans for new projects in Russia by European investment and development banks.
READ MORE »
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/17/world/europe/obama-widens-sanctions-against-russia.html?emc=edit_na_20140716
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U.S. Escalates Sanctions Against Russia
President Obama escalated sanctions against Russia on Wednesday by targeting a series of large banks and energy and defense firms in what officials described as the most punishing measures to date for Moscow’s intervention in Ukraine.
While the latest moves do not cut off entire sectors of the Russian economy, as threatened in the past, the administration’s actions go significantly further than the financial and travel limits imposed so far on several dozen individuals and their businesses. The new measures will severely restrict access to American debt markets for the targeted companies.
The moves were coordinated with European leaders, who were meeting in Brussels on Wednesday to consider their own package of penalties against Russia. The Europeans declined to go as far as the United States, instead focusing on a plan to block loans for new projects in Russia by European investment and development banks.
READ MORE »
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/17/world/europe/obama-widens-sanctions-against-russia.html?emc=edit_na_20140716
Putin yawns.
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http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-15/hungry-u-s-power-plant-turns-to-russia-for-coal-shipment.html?cmpid=yhoo
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http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/383084/russia-strategic-partner-another-bipartisan-ruling-class-fantasy-andrew-c-mccarthy
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U.S. Says Russia Violated Arms Treaty
The United States has concluded that Russia’s test of a ground-launched cruise missile violated a landmark treaty, and informed President Vladimir V. Putin of the findings in a letter on Monday.
The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty bans medium-range missiles, which are defined as ground-launched ballistic or cruise missiles capable of flying 300 to 3,400 miles. It was signed by President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, who was then the Soviet leader, and helped seal the end of the Cold War.
The allegation adds another dispute to a relationship already burdened by tensions over the Kremlin’s support for separatists in Ukraine.
READ MORE »
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/world/europe/us-says-russia-tested-cruise-missile-in-violation-of-treaty.html?emc=edit_na_20140728
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second post
BREAKING NEWS Monday, July 28, 2014 5:14 PM EDT
U.S. and Europe Agree to Sharply Escalate Sanctions on Russia
The United States and Europe put aside their differences and agreed on Monday to sharply escalate economic sanctions against Russia in a set of coordinated actions driven by the conclusion that Moscow has taken a more direct role in the war in Ukraine.
After months in which European leaders were hesitant to go as far as the Americans, the two sides settled on a package of measures that would target Russia’s financial, energy and defense sectors. In some cases, the Europeans may actually leapfrog beyond what the United States has done, forcing Washington to try to catch up.
The agreement came during an unusual five-way video conference between President Obama and his counterparts from Britain, France, Germany and Italy in advance of a European Union meeting scheduled for Tuesday to consider new sanctions against Russia. American and European officials said the leaders agreed that Russia has not only not backed down since the shooting of a Malaysia Airlines passenger jet but has also accelerated its involvement in Ukraine’s burgeoning civil war.
READ MORE »
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/world/europe/us-and-europe-agree-to-escalate-sanctions-on-russia.html?emc=edit_na_20140728
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Anyone think this won't hurt us more than Russia?
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Not clear to me that this is a bad thing; indeed haven't we been mocking His Glibness for his flaccid reactions so far?
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http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/europe/as-sanctions-pile-up-russians-alarm-grows-over-putin-tactics.html?emc=edit_th_20140730&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193&_r=0
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http://csis.org/publication/putins-treaty-problem-lessons-russias-inf-treaty-violations
From the article:
"Those who scoffed should now take the lesson to heart. For one thing, we should reconsider giving Russia the benefit of the doubt for faithful treaty implementation. The old maxim for the Soviets still applies to Russia: trust but verify. Numerous questions remain about Russia’s compliance with the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, the U.S. definition of obligations under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Biological Weapons Convention, to say nothing of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty now honored in the breach."
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With conflict continuing in Ukraine, Russian forces massed on the Ukrainian border and the Russian economy in trouble, now is as good a time as ever to check up on what the average Russian is thinking. Reliable polls are hard to come by in Russia's spin-filled media, but Levada, which released a new round of polls Thursday, is considered by Westerners and Russians alike to be fairly unbiased, making the polls worthy of a deeper look.
What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman Explains.
The polls, which were mostly taken on July 21 (four days after Malaysian Airlines flight 17 crashed in eastern Ukraine), show Russians' views on a number of topics, including Russia's involvement in Ukraine, culpability for the crash and Western sanctions against Russia.
Russia Poll - Ukraine
Click to Enlarge
In the first set of polls, it is clear that most of the Russian population does not support direct military intervention in Ukraine, and only half support technical military assistance (such as consultations between militaries). This sentiment is critical when analyzing the buildup of Russian troops along the border with Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin could have a contingent military plan for Ukraine, but carrying out that plan likely would generate significant domestic backlash.
Russia Poll - Territory
Click to Enlarge
Russians are thinking about Moscow's influence not only in Ukraine, but also in Russia's entire neighborhood. Russians are very aware of their country's geopolitical imperative to maintain buffer space (such as Ukraine) along its borderlands.
One of the primary reasons Russia has cited when threatening to intervene in its neighbors' territories is to protect ethnic Russians residing in those countries. This reason became part of Russia's National Security Doctrine in 2010, something Russia's neighbors -- ranging from the Baltics to Kazakhstan -- have all been wary of. A recent poll shows that the Russian population's support for protecting ethnic Russians abroad has dropped significantly -- 15 percent since March. This is an important shift in sentiment because it decreases support for Russian interventions further outside its borders. Of course, Russians make an exception for Moscow's annexation of Crimea because most Russians feel the territory has always been Russia's.
Russia Poll - Crash
Click to Enlarge
Another poll just released shows that the bulk of the Russian population believes that Ukraine is responsible for the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight 17. In the past two weeks, Russian media has actively diverted attention from the West's assertion that the Kremlin is supporting the separatists who are reportedly responsible for the crash. Such domestic perceptions will be key to Putin's ability to maintain support at home amid growing international admonitions and if new evidence is revealed proving the Kremlin's involvement with the separatists reportedly at fault.
Russia Poll - Sanctions
Click to Enlarge
In addition to Russian media shifting the domestic focus to Ukraine, Russian politicians continually have downplayed -- and at times laughed off -- Western sanctions on Russia. Already, the top concern for Russians is the declining state of the Russian economy, but most of the recent sanctions on Russia do not appear to be a factor in this concern. Most Russians believe that the sanctions will not affect them, only Russian elites.
There are visible splits among Putin's loyalists over the effects of the sanctions on Russia, while the official line from the Kremlin has been that the sanctions will not seriously affect the country. The Kremlin is attempting to prevent domestic sentiment from shifting to panic over the economy. Its strategy appears to be successful thus far, but as the effects of economic stagnation start to trickle down more, the Kremlin will have difficulty maintaining a sense of positivity.
Read more: What the Russians Are Thinking | Stratfor
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=438sGy9IE58#t=33
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a tiny stick. If I was Putin I would be laughing out loud. As an American I am saddened:
****WHITE HOUSE TO PUTIN: Don't 'Even Think About Messing Around' With The Baltics
Business Insider
By Brett LoGiurato 5 hours ago
..S. President Barack Obama (R) shakes hands with Russia's President Vladimir Putin in Los Cabos, Mexico, June 18, 2012
REUTERS/Jason Reed
President Barack Obama's message to Russian President Vladimir Putin when traveling to Europe next week is to not "even think about messing around" with the Baltic states, the White House said Friday.
Obama is traveling to Europe next week for a meeting in Wales with other NATO leaders. He'll also make a stop in Estonia, where he will meet with the leaders of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in an attempt to reassure allies amid burgeoning Russian aggression in Ukraine.
"The two stops are essentially part of the same effort to send a message to the Russians that their behavior is unacceptable," Charles Kupchan, the White House's senior director for European affairs, said in a conference call with reporters Friday afternoon.
"You have in Estonia a large Russian population, and therefore part of the message that the President will be sending is, we stand with you. Article 5 constitutes an ironclad guarantee of your security. Russia, don’t even think about messing around in Estonia or in any of the Baltic areas in the same way that you have been messing around in Ukraine."
NATO's Article 5 requires that all members of the alliance come to the defense of any member that is attacked or targeted.
Ukraine is not a member of NATO, and it has been one of Russia's goals to keep Ukraine from entering into both NATO and the European Union and thus forge closer ties with the West. Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk said Friday the country would begin the process of seeking NATO membership.
When asked about Ukraine's possible future membership, Kupchan said it was not under discussion by NATO at this time but added that the "door is open" to any country that is "willing to contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic space."
Ukraine said it would seek to become a member of NATO.
Russia's neighbors like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — which all have substantial Russian-speaking populations — have grown concerned in the face of increasing Russian intervention in Ukraine, which amplified this week.
Pro-Russian separatist rebels have opened a new front in the cities of Amvrosiivka and Starobeshevo, creating a fear is that Russia is attempting to create a land link between Russia and the strategic peninsula of Crimea. Russia annexed the peninsula special forces troops in March.
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko said Russian troops are leading a separatist counteroffensive in the east, bringing in tanks and firing artillery from inside Ukrainian territory. NATO subsequently backed up his claims, saying more than 1,000 Russian troops had crossed the border and were fighting in Ukraine.
"I think what you’ll see is progress on the defense spending side, progress particularly on increasing the readiness times of NATO forces," Kupchan said.
"Because I think one of the things that we’ve learned from the situation in Ukraine is that oftentimes in this new world that we live in, NATO or individual countries may be facing not armored columns coming across their border, which you can usually see in advance, but guys coming across in masks, you don’t know who they are — what we could call hybrid warfare, or asymmetric warfare. And that requires a very different kind of military response than NATO has traditionally been focused on."
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Potential New Dangers Emerge in the U.S.-Russian Standoff
Geopolitical Diary
Wednesday, September 3, 2014 - 17:48 Text Size Print
The United States and Russia entered a new and more dangerous phase of their pseudo-Cold War this week.
On the surface, it might appear the opposite. Just as U.S. President Barack Obama tried to reassure Europeans on the frontline with Russia that NATO would be there to support them, Russian President Vladimir Putin threw out an expertly timed proposal to defuse the crisis in eastern Ukraine and even compelled Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko to claim a cease-fire agreement had been achieved after a phone call with the Russian leader.
The reality of the situation is that Russia is trying to impose on Kiev and its Western backers yet another frozen conflict on the Russian doorstep, one that Moscow will use to demand respect from a still-defiant United States on the contours of a Russian sphere of influence. In just under three weeks, Russian-backed forces blunted a deep Ukrainian thrust into separatist strongholds. Though Ukrainian forces had plenty of political support from the West, the United States and its NATO partners had much more to risk in putting boots on the ground than did Russia, which was barely cloaking the heavy armor and personnel pouring across the border.
What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman Explains.
This rapid turnaround on the battlefield had two main purposes. The first was to assert Russian military power and convince the West that Moscow would not be afraid to use it in spite of the economic consequences. The second was for Moscow to use its military gains to make it appear that the West was utterly irresponsible in trying to wrest Ukraine out from Moscow's shadow. Now, by dangling an ambiguous cease-fire before the Americans, Russia is essentially telling the United States that to defeat Russia it must fight Russia directly, knowing that NATO is loath to engage directly with the Russian military. And if the West is still unwilling to confront Russia in a direct military conflict, then Russia is quite ready to make a deal.
That deal goes well beyond a cease-fire. Russia wants its buffer in Ukraine recognized and respected, along with sanctions lifted so it can get on with repairing its economy. And with winter approaching, Russia also has the means to turn the screws on Europe's natural gas supply at the same time it holds a clear military advantage on the Ukrainian battlefield.
But the United States is not about to back down completely in the face of Putin's maneuver. Obama arrived in Estonia on Wednesday with a message of commitment, loyalty and security for any country threatened by Russia. To reinforce that message, NATO will attempt to breathe new life and purpose into the institution by creating a 4,000-strong rapid-reaction force capable of deploying at 48 hours' notice to Eastern European countries on the frontline with Russia. This will not amount to the permanent force that these countries are hoping for, but it is a structural reorientation of NATO's mission to stare down Russia once again after a nearly 25-year hiatus. Military exercises to get this message across will follow, and Obama himself provocatively said Wednesday that the door to NATO would remain open to new members, hinting at Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Even if the United States cannot get a unanimous NATO vote to admit these countries, with or without the Europeans, the United States will continue to exploit other means to integrate them into a U.S.-backed defense alliance against Russia.
This, of course, will draw a Russian response in the form of military exercises and redeployments on the western frontier, all while Ukraine remains a useful battleground for Moscow to pressure Kiev. However, this confrontation will not be limited to Ukraine. The key for Russia will be to demonstrate to the West that Russia is not afraid to resort to the unthinkable, even the irrational, in pushing back. Russia announced Wednesday that its strategic nuclear forces will be holding large-scale strategic missile exercises in September. Putin over the weekend also told a youth forum, "I want to remind you that Russia is one of the most powerful nuclear nations. This is a reality, not just words."
Many will initially dismiss Russia's rattling the nuclear saber, but taking a page from its Cold War playbook, Russia could, as an example, arrange to have U.S. technical intelligence pick up the movement of tactical nuclear warheads, allow for a couple of newspaper leaks impossible to trace back and deny, deny, deny. This would be a signal that no U.S. leader could dismiss. We have no evidence to suggest Russia is planning such steps, but we suspect that the nuclear threat is an option that Putin is closely evaluating and one that would certainly give the United States pause.
Read more: Potential New Dangers Emerge in the U.S.-Russian Standoff | Stratfor
Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter | Stratfor on Facebook
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/08/its_time_to_stop_putins_nuclear_arms_buildup_inf_treaty
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http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/11/opinion/joe-nocera-putin-shows-his-hand.html?emc=edit_th_20141011&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193
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See today's entry in the Ukraine thread for closely related analysis
On Dec. 11, the U.S. Senate passed the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, which provides defensive weapons to Ukraine and expand sanctions against Russian defense firms, RFE/RL reported. The bill also authorizes $350 million to provide Ukraine with defensive weaponry but not defensive lethal aid, grants Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia major non-NATO ally status and authorizes $50 million in short-term energy assistance to Ukraine. It is unclear whether the U.S. House of Representatives will have time to bring the bill up for a vote before lawmakers leave for the year.
Read more: U.S.: Senate Passes Bill Providing Weapons, Aid To Ukraine | Stratfor
Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter | Stratfor on Facebook
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With the sharp decline in oil prices, this could be a propitious moment for this move. Wonder what Obama-Kerry will say?
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http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/121214-730423-american-weakness-brings-back-russian-nuclear-aggression.htm
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British Justice vs. Kremlin Impunity
The polonium-poisoning murder of a Russian exile and Putin critic in 2006 finally gets a public inquest.
By Sohrab Ahmari
Updated Jan. 30, 2015 6:34 p.m. ET
WSJ
London
“It has been described as one of the most dangerous post-mortem examinations ever undertaken in the Western world, and I think that’s probably right.”
So testified forensic pathologist Nathaniel Cary on Wednesday, the second day of the inquiry into the 2006 poisoning death of Russian defector Alexander Litvinenko. The proceeding, held at the Royal Courts of Justice, aims to examine the circumstances under which Litvinenko was murdered with radioactive polonium-210, a highly unusual poison and one of many Hollywood-ready elements of the case that has made it a tabloid fixture for nearly a decade.
Some aspects of the inquiry have a definite cloak-and-dagger feel. Also on Wednesday, journalists were barred from the room at one point so that “Scientist A1,” whose day job is to help maintain the U.K. nuclear deterrent, could testify about the deadly substance. The press was ushered into a separate annex, where Scientist A1 could be heard but not seen.
The details of the case largely are more prosaic, when they’re not confusing for a lay audience. The top-secret Scientist A1 was there to tell the inquiry that “one gram of polonium-210 emits one-six-six, zero-zero-zero, zero-zero-zero, zero-zero-zero, zero-zero-zero alpha particles per sec—”
“Pausing right there,” an exasperated barrister interrupted, inadvertently triggering laughter in the courtroom and the press annex. “I may be wrong, but 166 quadrillion per second?”
“Yes, that’s correct,” Scientist A1 replied.
Such arcane details are essential to understanding the case. These alpha particles ravaged Litvinenko’s body from the inside out after he drank tea laced with polonium-210 on Nov. 1, 2006.
He’d been meeting at a posh London hotel with a fellow alumnus of the Russian Federal Security Service, or FSB, and a Russian businessman. Later that day Litvinenko fell ill with nausea and diarrhoea. Soon his hair fell out, his lips thinned to nothing and his face shriveled.
After years of loyal service to the FSB and its predecessor, the KGB, Litvinenko and other FSB colleagues in 1998 held a news conference during which they charged that “the FSB is being used by certain officials solely for their private purposes. It’s being used for settling scores and carrying out private and criminal orders for payment.” Here was an insider laying bare the ugly workings of the new mafia state that had replaced Communism.
The FSB response was swift. Litvinenko was expelled from the service, and prosecutors charged him with “exceeding his official authority.” After being jailed for seven months, he was cleared of that charge, then briefly detained again. His phone was tapped. Prosecutors vowed to bring one fabricated charge after another, as his widow, Marina, told me last year.
The family escaped in 2000 to the U.K., where Litvinenko continued his activism and, his widow says, began cooperating with the British secret service, MI6. In 2002, he published a book alleging that Vladimir Putin had staged a series of Moscow bombings in 1999 and blamed Chechen rebels, all as part of a ploy to ascend the Kremlin throne. Four years later, Russian lawmakers enacted laws authorizing the targeting of state enemies abroad.
Just over three weeks after he drank that fateful tea, Litvinenko was dead. Yet as the testimony at the inquiry on Wednesday made clear, the cause eluded his physicians for almost the entire course of his illness, and would have remained a mystery but for toxicologist John Henry ’s hunch that radiation poisoning may have been to blame—a testament to the assassins’ sophistication and determination to hide their craft. (Henry died in 2007.)
Dr. Cary, the pathologist, described the horrors of polonium poisoning. “It gets into your body . . . ,” he said, “it’s distributed round your body; any cell next door to where it’s distributed is badly affected by the continuous bombardment of alpha rays.” Soon after Litvinenko drank the poisoned tea his body ceased producing the white blood cells responsible for fighting infections and tissue damage. Eventually he suffered complete organ failure.
It’s lucky that other visitors to the bar where Litvinenko took his deadly tea weren’t contaminated, since investigators subsequently picked up traces of polonium-210 all along the trail the suspected assassins took back to Russia. Those suspects, Andrei Lugovoi and Dmitry Kovtun, didn’t attend Wednesday’s hearing and aren’t expected to participate in the nine-week inquiry.
After an investigation involving a hundred or so uniformed officers and another hundred detectives, U.K. prosecutors in 2007 charged Mr. Lugovoi with murder in absentia. Both have repeatedly denied the allegations, and Moscow has refused to extradite them. “I couldn’t care less about what’s happening there,” Mr. Lugovoi, now a member of the Duma, has told Russian media.
The independent inquiry is an effort to provide the comprehensive airing of facts that a criminal trial ordinarily would have done, had the defendants in this case been available to participate in one. Though intended to be painstakingly fair, it will be largely symbolic. And it will help bring closure to Marina, who has been relentless in seeking justice for her late husband.
Yet even this symbolic reckoning with the realities of Mr. Putin’s Russia was delayed at the behest of a British political class that had been eager not to ruffle his feathers. British Home Secretary Theresa May wrote in a 2013 letter to judiciary that “international relations”—a euphemism for relations with Moscow—“have been a factor in the government’s decision-making.”
Now, after the annexation of Crimea, the assault on eastern Ukraine and the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, things have changed. The result, if all goes according to plan, will be a complete public record of the Litvinenko case—at last.
Mr. Ahmari is a Journal editorial-page writer based in London.
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Putin’s Shaky Hold on Power
Russia’s flagging economy and growing discord over the war in Ukraine are converging to destabilize the regime.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annual year-end news conference in Moscow, Dec. 18, 2014. ENLARGE
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annual year-end news conference in Moscow, Dec. 18, 2014. Photo: Reuters
By
David Satter
Feb. 3, 2015 7:20 p.m. ET
321 COMMENTS
The upsurge in fighting in Ukraine, with Russian troops and equipment pouring across the border, is a sign that Russian President Vladimir Putin has decided to engage the West in a dangerous game of “chicken,” the goal of which is to show that the only result of Western pressure on Russia will be renewed slaughter.
Given the objectives of the two sides, a renewal of the fighting was probably inevitable. Russia has fought from the beginning to remove the government in Kiev and prevent Ukraine from acceding to the European Union and NATO. For this purpose rebel control over one-third of the province of Donetsk, with millions of impoverished people and a dysfunctional economy, is clearly insufficient.
The timing of the surge in the fighting, however, in the middle of winter and after weeks of relative calm, is a reflection of a more general situation. The Putin regime needs an end to sanctions not because they are crippling in themselves but because in combination with the growing crisis of the economy and the unpredictable trajectory of the war, they could help lead to the destabilization of Russia.
Related Video
Hermitage Capital CEO Bill Browder on his new book, “Red Notice,” and getting on the wrong side of the Russian dictator. Photo credit: Getty Images.
The fear that pervades the Russian leadership is reflected in a series of recent statements by the country’s leaders. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said on Jan. 27 that if Russia is cut off from the Swift international payment system as punishment for its actions in Ukraine, its response “will know no limits.” Andrei Kostin, the head of VTB, Russia’s second-largest bank, said excluding Russia from Swift would mean “war.” Igor Ivanov, the former foreign minister, said that a confrontation could involve nuclear weapons.
In fact, the Russian leaders now face a crisis of their own making. The steady rise in living standards during the 2000s, stemming from high prices for oil and gas, led to euphoria and an implicit deal between the authorities and the population according to which the authorities would be free to steal as long as the income of the population continued to rise. Living standards did rise but corruption crippled normal development. Now that oil prices have collapsed, Russia has no other comparable source of revenue and Western sanctions are preventing badly needed investment.
Under these circumstances, there is a serious danger of social tension. In Russia today, 110 persons, including Mr. Putin’s cronies, control 35% of the country’s wealth while 50% of adults have total household wealth of $871 or lower. In 2014, food prices rose 15.4%. It is a measure of the government’s concern that it has cut the price of vodka, despite the need to fill the treasury. This is a transparent attempt to use vodka to tranquilize the population.
If the economic situation in Russia continues to worsen, many Russians may come to see that the Ukrainian model of a peaceful and spontaneous rebellion against a corrupt regime can have relevance for them. It was because of the potential power of the Ukrainian example for Russia that Mr. Putin began the war in Ukraine in the first place.
The cost of the fighting has been hidden from Russians but, as the death rate climbs, the war may soon become less popular. The Russian authorities state officially that there are no Russian troops fighting in Ukraine but the movement of thousands of troops is impossible to hide and it is similarly impossible to hide soldiers’ funerals.
In St. Petersburg, calls are coming in to the hot line of the Soldiers’ Mothers organization from parents of soldiers who report anonymously that their children are being commanded to sign contracts that enable them to be sent to Ukraine. Such reports are also coming from a number of other regions.
Lev Shlosberg, the chairman of the Pskov regional division of the Yabloko political party, told Radio Liberty that there has been a change in the mood of the army because of the scale of the losses in Ukraine. He said that there have been massive cases of the canceling of contracts by contract soldiers and the termination of their military service because of an unwillingness to fight in Ukraine.
The military is carefully hiding the dispatch of forces from their places of permanent dislocation. If military planes once flew from the Pskov Airport, they now leave from the airport of the neighboring smaller city of Ostrov. Mr. Shlosberg and members of the press became aware of Russian military deaths in Ukraine by attending and reading about the funerals of soldiers from the 76th Airborne Division, which is based in Pskov. Now, there is an attempt to transport the bodies of those killed to unpopulated areas for funerals. But they are nonetheless seen and news of the high cost of the war is spreading.
The war in eastern Ukraine has been turned into a war of attrition in which the Ukrainian military is mostly holding its positions. Such a war could go on indefinitely. The Russians, however, have not used their air force and they have an estimated 52,000 troops just over the border from Ukraine. They could decide to begin an all-out offensive and drop any pretense of nonintervention. Such a course of action, however, carries risks for the Russians.
The pyramid of power in Russia is very unstable. Capital flight is reaching epic proportions ($63.7 billion in the first quarter of 2014, according to the U.S. State Department) and thousands of Russian officials have made contingency plans to escape with their money to the West.
Mr. Putin and his cronies will not take aggressive action if they fear that they could as a result lose their hold on power. This is why the time for maximum deterrence on the part of the West is now.
Mr. Satter is affiliated with the Hudson Institute, Johns Hopkins University and the Henry Jackson Society in London. His books include “It Was a Long Time Ago, and It Never Happened Anyway: Russia and the Communist Past” (Yale, 2011).
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Second post
American Arms for Ukraine
The arguments against aiding Kiev look increasingly naive.
Feb. 3, 2015 7:44 p.m. ET
The best that can be said about President Obama ’s foreign policy is that he sometimes gets to the right answer after exhausting the other alternatives. The latest example is news that the Administration may finally provide arms to Ukraine to defend itself against Russian aggression.
This is long overdue, and the need is more urgent than ever amid Russia’s mid-winter siege of Ukraine’s southeast. The Russians are supplying rebels who are bent on taking larger chunks of the country for their breakaway state that would link Crimea with Russia proper. This is a repudiation of the Minsk cease-fire accord that Russia signed in September, and it is part of Vladimir Putin ’s strategy of destabilizing the Kiev government so it will fall back into line as part of Greater Russia.
Most of Mr. Obama’s advisers have come around to arming Ukraine, as have pillars of the liberal foreign policy establishment. A new report from seven such eminences—including former Obama Administration defense official Michele Flournoy—recommends that the U.S. send $1 billion in “lethal defensive arms” to Ukraine in each of the next three years. They suggest in particular light anti-armor missiles to counter the Russian advantage in tanks and armored vehicles.
Members of the Ukrainian armed forces stand guard at a checkpoint on the outskirts of Kostyantynivka, Donetsk region. ENLARGE
Members of the Ukrainian armed forces stand guard at a checkpoint on the outskirts of Kostyantynivka, Donetsk region. Photo: Reuters
The arguments against such aid look increasingly self-deluding. One odd fear is that lethal aid will mislead the Ukrainians into thinking the West will fight with them, but surely they know better after a year of begging for defensive arms that haven’t arrived.
“I am convinced that this conflict cannot be solved militarily,” said German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Monday, embracing another popular claim. But Mr. Putin is proving the opposite every day. The question is whether the West will let him get away with it.
Opponents also argue that arming Ukraine will encourage Russia to escalate, and thus Ukraine can never win. It’s true Russia could defeat Ukraine in any full-fledged war, but Mr. Putin has refrained from such a war so far because he knows the costs would be enormous. He prefers conquest on the cheap and dirty. Arming Ukraine will raise the cost for Mr. Putin and may make him more amenable to diplomacy.
All the more so given the likelihood that continued economic pressure will have political consequences for Mr. Putin at home, as David Satter describes nearby. Splendid little wars have a way of becoming long ordeals that even authoritarians can’t sustain.
Mr. Obama’s foreign policy has suffered, among other things, from a mismatch between grandiose ends and timid means. In Ukraine he claims Russia is threatening the entire post-Cold War security system, yet he’ll send Kiev little more than meals ready to eat. Mr. Putin has escalated his attacks this winter precisely because he sees the lack of will behind Mr. Obama’s words. Now is the time to change Mr. Putin’s calculus about the cost of conquest by arming Ukraine.
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The View From NATO’s Russian Front
The Army commander in Europe on Putin’s new way of war, Russia’s growing arsenal, and coping with U.S. military budget cuts.
Frederick B. Hodges ENLARGE
Frederick B. Hodges Photo: Zina Saunders
By Sohrab Ahmari
Feb. 6, 2015 6:45 p.m. ET
Wiesbaden, Germany
‘I believe the Russians are mobilizing right now for a war that they think is going to happen in five or six years—not that they’re going to start a war in five or six years, but I think they are anticipating that things are going to happen, and that they will be in a war of some sort, of some scale, with somebody within the next five or six years.”
So says Lt. Gen. Frederick “Ben” Hodges, commander of U.S. Army Europe. It’s Monday evening at the Army’s Lucius D. Clay garrison near Wiesbaden, a small town in southwest Germany. The air outside is freezing, the ground coated by a thin layer of snow. Moscow lies 1,500 miles east, but Russia comes up almost immediately as I sit down to dinner with Gen. Hodges and one of his aides in a cozy dining room at the base.
“Strong Europe!” reads a sign on one of the walls. Next to it is the U.S. Army Europe insignia, a burning sword set against a blue shield. The two signs represent the strategic framework the three-star general has introduced—building on America’s decades-long role on the Continent—since taking command last year of the 30,000 or so U.S. soldiers stationed in Europe.
The U.S. military presence in Europe is more vital at this moment than it has been in many years. American engagement is essential if the West is to deter a revanchist Russia that has set out to “redraw the boundaries of Europe,” Gen. Hodges says with a native Floridian’s drawl.
He points to the recent increase in violence in eastern Ukraine, where pro-Kremlin forces in January assaulted the Black Sea port of Mariupol, killing 30 civilians, and are now consolidating their gains.
“What’s happening in eastern Ukraine is very serious,” the 56-year-old West Point alumnus says. “When they fired into Mariupol that got my attention. Mariupol is an important place, city of 500,000 on the Black Sea. Russia has to resupply Crimea by sea or air, and that is very expensive, so obviously they would like to do it overland. Mariupol sits right in the way. They would really like to drive right through there.”
What Russian President Vladimir Putin “has done in Ukraine,” he says, “is a manifestation of a strategic view of the world. So when you look at the amount of equipment that has been provided, and the quality and sophistication of the equipment that has been provided to what I would call his proxies . . . they clearly have no intention of leaving there.”
The new weapons Mr. Putin has supplied to these proxies include “some of the latest air-defense systems,” says Gen. Hodges. “They also have brought in some of the latest, most-effective jamming, what we would call electronic-warfare, systems.” This level of assistance suggests Ukraine “is not a foray, not a demonstration. They are deploying capabilities way above and beyond anything that any militia or rebel organization could ever come up with.”
The fact that the political class in the West is still splitting hairs about the nature of the insurgency in Ukraine is testament to the success of the Kremlin’s strategy of waging war without admitting it. “When you saw video of the Spetsnaz [Russian special forces], the so-called little green men” in eastern Ukraine, the general says, “unless you absolutely know nothing about military stuff, how they carry themselves, the fact that they were all perfectly in uniform, that’s hard to do. It’s hard to get soldiers to stay in uniform and everybody carrying their weapon the right way all the time. That’s how you tell the difference between a militia, or rebels who have a variety of uniforms, and this group who are all perfectly in uniform.”
Gen. Hodges then strips his own Ranger badge from a Velcro patch on his uniform sleeve, just as those well-organized soldiers aiding the Ukrainian insurgents are badgeless. “I can take my patch off my uniform and say I’m not in the Army anymore,” he chuckles. “So there’s a reluctance to acknowledge it. I can understand that. This has huge implications. But that’s what so-called hybrid warfare is all about. It’s about creating ambiguity, giving people who don’t want to believe it an excuse to not believe. Or to create enough uncertainty so that the responses are slow, delayed, hesitant.”
Such hesitation has already worked for Mr. Putin, and contrasting Russia’s military buildup with anemic military spending in the West gives the general further reason for concern.
The Russians have “got some forces in Transnistria,” he says of the state that broke away from Moldova in the 1990s. “They’ve got forces in Georgia. And I think they view China as their existential threat, so they’ve got a lot of capacity out there.” The Russian military is thus already somewhat stretched, and Moscow had to carve out from existing units the battalion task groups currently arrayed near eastern Ukraine. Yet “they are clearly on a path to develop, to increase, their capacity,” Gen. Hodges says. Add to this expansion that “they’ve got very good equipment, extremely good communications equipment, their [electronic-warfare] capability, T-80 tanks.” How long will it take for Russia to reach its desired military strength? “I think within another two or three years they will have that capacity,” he says.
Gen. Hodges notes that the Russians already have an advantage in the information battleground: “They’re not burdened with the responsibility to tell the truth. So they just hammer away, and whenever somebody in the West puts out a blog or a tweet, there’s an immediate counterattack by these trolls.”
Russia Today, the Kremlin’s foreign-language television service, is estimated to be within reach of 600 million viewers world-wide. Russia Today’s YouTube channel has received a billion views, making it one of the most-watched channels on the online-video platform.
Then there is the Kremlin’s sheer aggressiveness, not least on the nuclear front. The Pentagon last year announced that it is removing missiles from 50 of America’s underground silos, converting B-52 long-range bombers to conventional use and disabling 56 submarine-based nuclear-launch tubes—all well ahead of the 2018 New Start treaty deadline. Moscow, by contrast, has been simulating nuclear strikes on Western capitals as part of annual exercises.
Gen. Hodges won’t comment on the U.S. strategic-force posture in Europe other than to say he is “confident in that process.” But he adds that the fact that the Russians rehearse nuclear-strike scenarios “shows that they’re not worried about conveying a stark message like that. You know, frankly, you hear this often from many people in the West, ‘Oh, we don’t want to provoke the Russians.’ I think concern about provoking the Russians is probably misplaced. You can’t provoke them. They’re already on a path to do what they want to do.”
Fear of provoking Russia has been part of the recent debate over providing lethal aid to Kiev. As a member of the military, Gen Hodges won’t weigh in directly in the Washington policy debate. “What’s more important is this,” he says. “We have to have a strategy. Just military aid is not a strategy.” Western leaders should first determine what outcome they’d like to see emerge in the region, he says, and then apply a “whole-of-government” approach, including a military dimension, to achieve it.
Before being posted here, and in between multiple post-9/11 deployments to the Middle East, Gen. Hodges served as an Army congressional liaison in Washington. What he learned was that lawmakers’ “interests will tend to be domestic,” he says.
“If you’re the delegation from North Carolina that cares about Fort Bragg, you’re going to want to see as much capability as possible and money spent in North Carolina. Same thing at Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Fort Lewis, Washington,” he says. “But there is no congressman for Wiesbaden, no senator for Bavaria.”
Many Americans and their representatives are tempted to regard Crimea as a distant geographical abstraction—and to say that it’s about time Europeans met their own defense needs instead of financing bloated welfare states. “It’s a fair question,” Gen. Hodges says. “Why won’t the Germans do more? Why won’t the Brits do more? You’ll get that from people in the States. I’ve never been bashful about telling allies, ‘Hey, you have a responsibility here, too. You all agreed to spend 2% of your GDP on defense. Right now only four countries are doing it.’”
Yet the failure of many of European leaders to live up to their defense commitments “doesn’t change our interest,” Gen. Hodges says. “And the U.S. economic link to Europe, to the EU, dwarfs any other economic link in the world, anywhere in the Pacific, China, India, you name it. So if for no other reason it’s in our interest that Europe be stable, that people make money so they can buy U.S. products. . . . We provide capability assurance here by being present here.”
Gen. Hodges says there is also a huge payoff in U.S. security from U.S.-European cooperation. The main lesson of the post-9/11 wars is that “we are not going to do anything by ourselves militarily,” he notes. The U.S. “needs the capacity that other countries can bring.” These benefits come “from a relatively small investment—I mean, U.S. Army Europe is 2% of the Army’s budget and about 5% of the Army’s manpower. . . . You can’t sit back in Virginia, Texas or Oregon and build relationships with people here.” He quotes his predecessor, Lt. Gen. Donald Campbell: “You can’t surge trust.”
Nor can the U.S. project national power world-wide, as it has since the end of World War II, with an overstretched Army. “There are 10 division headquarters in the Army,” he says. “Nine of them are committed right now. I’ve never seen that. I don’t think at the height of Iraq and Afghanistan you had nine out of 10 division headquarters committed against some requirement.” That leaves little in reserve if another conflict breaks out.
To a commander like Gen. Hodges, the strain on the Army caused by budget sequestration is palpable. “With the possibility of sequestration hanging over our head, the Army will have to go to 420,000” personnel, he says. “That’s about another 80,000 below where we are now. . . . The strength of the Army at the height of the buildup was about 560,000.”
What Gen. Hodges fears is a “hollow” Army, in which commanders will have to forego a capable and sufficiently large personnel, readiness or modernization to meet budget requirements. To serve its purpose, however, an Army needs a depth of resources at its disposal.
“We’re not a business,” he says. “If you run a Napa [auto parts] franchise, the last thing you want is anything on the shelf. You basically want it coming out of the delivery truck to the customer, so you don’t have money tied up in inventory. In the military, that’s exactly what you want. You want stuff on the shelf, because you can’t possibly know how many customers you might have.”
In the Army, “customers” are global crises. “What are the three biggest things that have been on the news this past year?” Gen. Hodges asks. “Russia in Ukraine. Ebola. ISIL. A year ago, who had that on their list of things that are going to go wrong? Not all the geniuses in the think tanks and in all the agencies. I certainly didn’t.”
Even with supplies on the U.S. military’s shelves thinning, there is no bigger deterrent to Vladimir Putin and other bad actors than the knowledge that men like Gen. Hodges and the forces he commands are working in customer service.
Mr. Ahmari is a Journal editorial-page writer based in London.
Popular on WSJ
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http://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2015/02/russia-pushes-reset-button-parades-missile-marked-to-be-personally-delivered-to-obama
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/02/24/u-s-military-vehicles-paraded-300-yards-from-the-russian-border/
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National Review
What Six Years of ‘Reset’ with Russia Have Wrought
By Charles Krauthammer — August 27, 2015
On September 5, 2014, Russian agents crossed into Estonia and kidnapped an Estonian security official. Last week, after a closed trial, Russia sentenced him to 15 years.
The reaction? The State Department issued a statement. The NATO secretary-general issued a tweet. Neither did anything. The European Union (reports the Wall Street Journal) said it was too early to discuss any possible action.
The timing of this brazen violation of NATO territory — two days after President Obama visited Estonia to symbolize America’s commitment to its security — is testimony to Vladimir Putin’s contempt for the American president. He knows Obama will do nothing. Why should he think otherwise?
Putin breaks the arms embargo to Iran by lifting the hold on selling it S-300 missiles. Obama responds by excusing him, saying it wasn’t technically illegal and adding, with a tip of the hat to Putin’s patience: “I’m frankly surprised that it held this long.”
Russia mousetraps Obama at the eleventh hour of the Iran negotiations, joining Iran in demanding that the conventional-weapons and ballistic-missile embargos be dropped. Obama caves.
Putin invades Ukraine, annexes Crimea, breaks two Minsk cease-fire agreements, and erases the Russia–Ukraine border. Obama’s response? Pinprick sanctions, empty threats, and a continuing refusal to supply Ukraine with defensive weaponry, lest he provoke Putin.
The East Europeans have noticed. In February, Lithuania decided to reinstate conscription, a move strategically insignificant — the Lithuanians couldn’t hold off the Russian army for a day — but highly symbolic. Eastern Europe has been begging NATO to station permanent bases on its territory as a tripwire guaranteeing a powerful NATO/U.S. response to any Russian aggression.
NATO has refused. Instead, Obama offered more military exercises in the Baltic States and Poland. And threw in an additional 250 tanks and armored vehicles, spread among seven allies.
It is true that Putin’s resentment over Russia’s lost empire long predates Obama. But for resentment to turn into revanchism — an active policy of reconquest — requires opportunity. Which is exactly what Obama’s “reset” policy has offered over the past six and a half years.
Since the end of World War II, Russia has known that what stands in the way of westward expansion was not Europe, living happily in decadent repose, but the United States as guarantor of Western security. Obama’s naïveté and ambivalence have put those guarantees in question.
It began with the reset button, ostentatiously offered less than two months after Obama’s swearing-in. Followed six months later by the unilateral American cancellation of the missile shield the Poles and the Czechs had agreed to install on their territory. Again, lest Putin be upset.
By 2012, a still clueless Obama mocked Mitt Romney for saying that Russia is “without question our No. 1 geopolitical foe,” quipping oh so cleverly: “The 1980s are now calling to ask for their foreign policy back.” After all, he explained, “the Cold War’s been over for 20 years.”
Turned out it was 2015 calling. Obama’s own top officials have been retroactively vindicating Romney. Last month, Obama’s choice for chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that “Russia presents the greatest threat to our national security.” Two weeks ago, the retiring Army chief of staff, Raymond Odierno, called Russia our “most dangerous” military threat. Obama’s own secretary of defense has gone one better: “Russia poses an existential threat to the United States.”
Turns out the Cold War is not over either. Putin is intent on reviving it. Helped immensely by Obama’s epic misjudgment of Russian intentions, the balance of power has shifted — and America’s allies feel it.
And not just the East Europeans. The president of Egypt, a country estranged from Russia for 40 years and our mainstay Arab ally in the Middle East, has twice visited Moscow within the last four months.
The Saudis, congenitally wary of Russia but shell-shocked by Obama’s grand nuclear capitulation to Iran that will make it the regional hegemon, are searching for alternatives, too. At a recent economic conference in St. Petersburg, the Saudis invited Putin to Riyadh and the Russians reciprocated by inviting the new King Salman to visit Czar Vladimir in Moscow.
Even Pakistan, a traditional Chinese ally and Russian adversary, is buying Mi-35 helicopters from Russia, which is building a natural-gas pipeline between Karachi and Lahore.
As John Kerry awaits his upcoming Nobel and Obama plans his presidential library (my suggestion: Havana), Putin is deciding how to best exploit the final 17 months of his Obama bonanza.
The world sees it. Obama doesn’t.
— Charles Krauthammer is a nationally syndicated columnist. © 2015 The Washington Post Writers Group
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It's not rape if it is consensual.
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Fair point.
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For the record he leaves out quite a few inconvenient truths, but a fascinating discourse nonetheless
https://www.facebook.com/ronaldhintonoside/videos/433698610152038/
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http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/10/04/us-russia-vladimir-putin-syria-ukraine-american-military-plans/73147344/
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http://www.allenbwest.com/2015/10/what-russia-is-doing-right-now-could-potentially-cut-all-communications-to-the-us/
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http://observer.com/2016/03/another-defector-dead-in-washington/
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unbelievable.
Putin is assassinating people in our country right under our noses and no repercussions. :?
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unbelievable.
Putin is assassinating people in our country right under our noses and no repercussions. :?
Wouldn't it be great if they could find evidence to link Putin to this murder on US soil.
There still would be no consequence.
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unbelievable.
Putin is assassinating people in our country right under our noses and no repercussions. :?
Wouldn't it be great if they could find evidence to link Putin to this murder on US soil.
There still would be no consequence.
That's why they did it.
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unbelievable.
Putin is assassinating people in our country right under our noses and no repercussions. :?
Wouldn't it be great if they could find evidence to link Putin to this murder on US soil.
There still would be no consequence.
That's why they did it.
A good question would be;
I wonder if the receiving country of anyone that falls in this category, actually considers this happening BEFORE they accept them?
Or..... you could wonder if the US would kill Snowden in Russia if they could get away with it.... or if they've ever had anyone disposed of outside of a declared war..... Castro for example....if not for a lack of trying.
:mrgreen:
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Russian Enclave Seen as a Fault Line of East-West Tensions
By NEIL MacFARQUHARAPRIL 16, 2016
KALININGRAD, Russia — The maritime museum in this Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea caps each summer with its international Water Assembly, an antic parade of small historical vessels from around the Baltics, their crews wearing period costumes as they sail the Pregolya River.
But this year, said Svetlana G. Sivkova, the founding director of Kaliningrad’s Museum of the World Ocean, regular participants from neighboring Lithuania and Poland threatened to stay home.
“They said they could not come to us because Poles and Lithuanians are being beaten on the streets of Kaliningrad,” said Ms. Sivkova, appalled at what she called an abrupt and unwarranted change in mood.
“These are intelligent, educated people,” she added. “It’s horrible propaganda. We had to explain that it’s not true, that we are an open people.”
Kaliningrad — the city and surrounding province share the name — was once the heart of East Prussia and a German redoubt for 500 years before the Red Army captured it from the Third Reich in 1945. In the first 25 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow worked hard to bury Kaliningrad’s reputation as an armed garrison closed to foreigners.
These days, the Kremlin seems determined to do the opposite, and senior Western military officials and other experts now regard the Baltic region as a main fault line in revived East-West tensions.
One of the most confrontational incidents in years occurred on Tuesday about 70 nautical miles off Kaliningrad, where two Russian Su-24 planes buzzed the American guided missile destroyer Donald Cook, simulating an attack. One plane roared within 30 feet of the ship, Pentagon officials said, and prompted protests from Washington.
In another episode on Thursday, a Russian warplane intercepted an American reconnaissance plane at an unsafe distance over the Baltic Sea, CNN reported, citing Capt. Danny Hernandez, a spokesman for the United States European Command.
In the immediate post-Soviet era, Moscow tried to reinvent Kaliningrad, which is more than 200 miles from mainland Russia, as its own duty-free Hong Kong. Factories producing cars, electronics and furniture blossomed. After the provincial government negotiated visa-less travel to Polish border areas, the Ikea outlet in nearby Gdansk became a Russian colony.
“More people visited Europe than big Russia,” said Ilya Shumanov, the local representative of Transparency International, an anti-corruption organization based in Berlin.
In recent years, however, Moscow has heavily armed Kaliningrad, analysts say, equipping secretive bases with the advanced, long-range S-400 antiaircraft missile system and mobile, medium-range Bastion anti-ship missiles. Russia has also held maneuvers here deploying Iskanders, a short-range ballistic missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
During congressional testimony in February, Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, the NATO commander, described Kaliningrad as a “very militarized piece of property” and a “complete bubble” capable of repelling attacks by air, land or sea.
With recent Russian military adventures in Crimea, eastern Ukraine and Syria, President Vladimir V. Putin has left the world guessing — as he so relishes — when or where he might intervene next.
Given his stated policy of safeguarding ethnic Russians who were severed from the motherland after the Soviet Union disintegrated, some fear the next target might be the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. All three former Soviet republics are now members of the European Union and NATO.
An attack on them would trigger NATO’s mutual defense treaty. Any attempt to defend them would have to get past Kaliningrad, wedged between Poland and Lithuania.
In the few conflicts where NATO has intervened, it has always displayed overwhelming force, experts said, but Kaliningrad would be different.
“The overall balance is very hostile to NATO,” said David A. Shlapak, the lead author of a new RAND Corporation study on the Baltics.
Photo
Technicians working at the new water treatment plant for the city of Kaliningrad, which has been using a decrepit system. Economic sanctions, imposed on Russia because of the Ukraine conflict, are expected to stall plans for further development. Credit James Hill for The New York Times
Russians here tend to agree, although they mainly scoff at the idea of such a war. At Baltiysk, home to the Baltic Fleet and Russia’s most western outpost, grizzled fishermen lined the sea wall, barely glancing up at the modern corvettes steaming out to sea.
Any NATO forces attacking Kaliningrad “will get their teeth broken,” one gruff angler said. A navy veteran, he stood beneath a symbol of Russia’s might and glory: a hulking equestrian statue of the Empress Elizabeth Petrovna facing the West.
Kaliningrad residents, watching NATO forces edge ever closer to Russia in recent years, generally seem to support buttressing the military.
“If you are my neighbor and you sit there with an ax, I will get an ax, too,” said Ms. Sivkova, the museum director. “It is foolish, but people say that weapons have been moved to Russia’s borders, so there has to be some parity.”
Yet people here find being cast as a Russian fortress disorienting. In downtown Kaliningrad, the Vorota Cafe and gallery fills the neo-Gothic Sackheim Gate, a leftover from the 17th-century city walls. Parts of the city still resemble Germany, including some suburbs of red-tiled, Gründerzeit villas.
The cafe’s young founders wanted an art space like those in Amsterdam or Berlin, and they were surprised by a question about life on the new East-West fault line.
“It is a strange question, because we look at ourselves as being a bridge, not a fault line,” said Eugene Makarkhin, 26, a computer engineer.
Yet fallout from the deteriorating relations between Russia and the West rains down on Kaliningrad.
BMW, one of the province’s largest employers, recently shelved expansion plans in the face of a 40 percent decline in Russian car sales. Decades of Swedish development aid are coming to a close. Cultural exchanges have been sharply curtailed.
Until the Ukraine crisis, the most dangerous flotilla dispatched from Kaliningrad toward Sweden was raw sewage dumped into the Baltic.
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“Kaliningrad is really one of the last big hot spots,” said Anna Tufvesson, the regional environmental project coordinator for the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency.
Kaliningrad, home to almost half the province’s one million people, was the last major Baltic city without a modern water treatment plant. Sweden has helped build about 30 in the southern Baltic region since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Kaliningrad’s German system, built around 1928 and still in use, basically filtered out old bicycles, dead dogs and not much else, Ms. Tufvesson said.
The modern Kaliningrad sewage plant, delayed for years, should be operating by the end of this year. Ms. Tufvesson expects all Swedish aid to be terminated by 2018.
The aid is another victim of the economic penalties imposed because of the Ukraine conflict. Sanctions cut off European bank loans for development here.
“Cooperation with European countries was a good source of cheap loans, and now we don’t have that possibility,” said Alexander N. Ivaschenko, who runs the Kaliningrad city waterworks. “Due to the sanctions, future projects are frozen.”
Confrontation is eclipsing cooperation. Mr. Putin has fed Western concerns about a possible Baltic conflict by ordering snap military exercises in northwestern Russia and deliberate violations of NATO airspace. While military officials and other experts on both sides say war is unlikely, contingency planning proceeds. Sweden and Finland, Russian neighbors that once professed neutrality, are considering the once unthinkable prospect of joining NATO.
Russia, too weak to confront NATO directly, relies on two methods to punch above its weight, military analysts say. In Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the Kremlin conducted “hybrid warfare,” deploying anonymous Special Forces soldiers nicknamed “little green men,” nationalistic local militias and a news media blitz to seize territory without provoking a large, conventional military response.
Kaliningrad embodies the other method, a concentration of highly effective conventional weapons lethal enough to thwart any invader.
“Hybrid warfare represents one pillar of Russian defense policy,” said a new report on Kaliningrad from the International Institute of Strategic Studies, a research organization in London. “Air defense and guided missile strength represents another.”
There is also the Baltic Fleet. In the post-Soviet years, it shrank to 190 ships from 450 and to two submarines from 42, before the decline was reversed and some new corvettes were delivered in recent years, according to the London institute. The fleet remains strong enough, analysts say, to turn the Baltic into a deadly caldron.
For Americans, the Baltic trip wire revives an old Cold War conundrum, said Dmitri Trenin, the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. The question used to be whether Americans would sacrifice Chicago to save West Berlin, he said. The assumption was that if the United States intervened to rescue the German city from a Soviet incursion, nuclear missiles would have annihilated Chicago.
“This is the same question posed about the Baltic States,” Mr. Trenin said. “Whether the United States would risk a military conflict with Russia for the sake of the Baltic States, knowing full well that Russia is still a nuclear power and when push comes to shove, nuclear will be on the table.”
Kaliningrad residents worry far less about war than about an economy battered by low oil prices, sanctions and a weak ruble. “A passing Mercedes has always proved stronger than the birch trees,” said Solomon I. Ginzburg, an opposition deputy in the local Parliament, meaning that economic aspirations trump nationalism here.
The fact that the “free economic zone” expired on April 1 causes far more consternation than a renewed Cold War. “Nobody knows what will happen,” said Ivan A. Vlasov, the publisher of the Kaliningrad edition of the national RBC website.
The collapsed ruble means Russians have scaled way back on shopping in Poland or attending concerts in Lithuania. They also feel less welcome.
“If you listen to the news from Latvia and Lithuania, it is laughable,” said Albert Prokhorchuk, the general director of Baltma Tours, which last year lost about a quarter of its 4,500 annual visitors from Germany. “The president of Lithuania has basically been saying that people should head for their basements because the Russians are coming.”
Poles still cross the border for cheap gasoline, cigarettes and vodka, but a certain unease prevails on both sides.
“I don’t think it is a place for development anymore,” said Mr. Shumanov, the anticorruption activist. “I think that it is a place for militarization. There is no investment, no money, no real federal interest in the region itself and bad relations with the neighbors.”
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Russia to Build Leader-Class Destroyer That Will Outgun Largest US Warships
http://sputniknews.com/military/20160605/1040814482/russia-leader-class-destroyer.html#ixzz4Al1MxSUf
At this point, WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE.
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I actually was shocked earlier when a Jewish Princeton Professor was a guest on Smerconish on CNN actually came out and agreed with Trump and disagreed with Clinton on the Russia strategy pointing out that our world is much more dangerous now after 8 yrs of Brockster. I thought ok, he is Jewish , he is from Princeton, he is a university professor and the odds are high he will bash Trump and pronounce Hillary Queen but Smerconish seemed just a surprised as me. Like I posted on another thread , why shouldn't we take another look at Nato? At our relationship with Russia?
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2016/07/30/russia_expert_stephen_cohen_trump_wants_to_stop_the_new_cold_war_but_the_america_media_just_doesnt_understand.html
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Interesting.
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From Conservative Review about professor who is central to my previous post on this thread:
https://www.conservativereview.com/commentary/2016/08/trumps-putin-bromance-gets-a-progressive-defender
I don't know what to say if "our side" keeps bashing Trump just as much as as the LEFT.
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http://www.breitbart.com/2016-presidential-race/2016/08/01/report-hillary-clintons-campaign-mgr-john-podesta-sat-board-company-bagged-35-million-putin-connected-russian-govt-fund-2/
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Please post that URL in the Electoral/SEIU thread as well.
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And Trump is correct on detente approach so says Dr Stephen Cohen:
"In effect, Trump has become the pro-détente candidate in the 2016 presidential election, a position once taken by presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, and Reagan. The pro–Cold War party’s refusal to engage Trump on these vital issues, instead of Kremlin-baiting him, Cohen concludes, is detrimental to US national security and to American democracy. "
https://www.thenation.com/article/more-lost-opportunities-to-diminish-the-new-cold-war/
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http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2016/09/08/russia-weighs-south-china-sea-belongs-china/
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Nice work Obama :-P :-P :-P
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/oct/3/us-russia-tension-escalates-as-vladimir-putin-ends/?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiTnpWbVpURm1ObU5oT0RjeSIsInQiOiJkbDQ0d1VRTTBlaVZ1WmFiN2YrbGkzN2dkNjFWbjJJUG5CMHlSTWN2a2Fvdk5icVpnd09hcFFSMnZSbmVTbzY0SjBlY0FpTzFGQm1qTkdMV1pWSUpvZUY3blVKOVFQeTJwTVI1XC9vTFBPK2c9In0%3D
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Russia in Syria:
http://dailycaller.com/2016/10/05/putin-thinks-obama-is-powerless-to-stop-him-heres-why/
Russia moved missiles to northern border of Poland:
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-usa-missiles-confirm-idUSKCN1280IV
And of course along the Ukraine border:
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-usa-missiles-confirm-idUSKCN1280IV
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And one can see what Putin is doing. He is moving the front against Nato westward:
http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/asia/ru.htm
While Obama golfs and campaigns for Hillary.
Trump may be right in getting NATO countries to pay up more. But now is no time to weaken it.
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https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-10-11/i-m-an-anti-putin-russian-and-clinton-makes-me-nervous
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http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3833941/Russia-orders-officials-fly-home-relatives-living-abroad-tensions-mount-prospect-global-war.html
:-o :-o :-o
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Another propaganda piece that suggests we should vote for Hill because Putin "fears" her:
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/15/opinions/putin-clinton-hate-affair-ghitis/index.html
I got it -> :wink:
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Another propaganda piece that suggests we should vote for Hill because Putin "fears" her:
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/15/opinions/putin-clinton-hate-affair-ghitis/index.html
I got it -> :wink:
Yes, her fears that all the emails he has of her's will take all the fun out of blackmailing her.
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http://www.shtfplan.com/headline-news/most-important-russian-battleships-headed-to-syria-for-showdown-this-will-be-it_10202016
:-o :-o :-o
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Many layers to this!!!
Donald Trump Jr. Held Talks on Syria With Russia Supporters
Disclosure of the Paris meetings in October could heighten focus on the president-elect’s desire to cooperate with the Kremlin
By Jay Solomon
Nov. 23, 2016 12:05 p.m. ET
253 COMMENTS
WASHINGTON—Donald Trump’s eldest son, emerging as a potential envoy for the president-elect, held private discussions with diplomats, businessmen and politicians in Paris last month that focused in part on finding a way to cooperate with Russia to end the war in Syria, according to people who took part in the meetings.
Thirty people, including Donald Trump Jr., attended the Oct. 11 event at the Ritz Paris, which was hosted by a French think tank. The founder of the think tank, Fabien Baussart, and his wife, Randa Kassis, have worked closely with Russia to try to end the conflict.
Ms. Kassis, who was born in Syria, is a leader of a Syrian group endorsed by the Kremlin. The group wants a political transition in Syria—but in cooperation with President Bashar al-Assad, Moscow’s close ally.
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President-elect Donald Trump's children won't have formal roles in his White House, but they'll continue to run his business empire. That has ethics watchdogs worried about many potential conflicts of interest. Photo: Andrew Harrer/Bloomberg News
The disclosure of a meeting between the younger Mr. Trump and pro-Russia figures—even if not Russian government officials—poses new questions about contacts between the president-elect, his family and foreign powers. It is also likely to heighten focus on the elder Mr. Trump’s stated desire to cooperate with the Kremlin once in office.
In an interview, Ms. Kassis said she pressed the younger Mr. Trump during the meeting on the importance of cooperating with the Russians in the Middle East.
“We have to be realistic. Who’s on the ground in Syria? Not the U.S., not France,” Ms. Kassis said from Moscow. “Without Russia, we can’t have any solution in Syria.”
Of the president-elect’s son, she said: “I think he’s very pragmatic and is flexible.”
Ms. Kassis later posted comments on her Facebook page about the meeting:
“[Syria’s] opposition got hope that [the] political process will move forward and Russia and the United States will reach accord on the issue of the Syrian crisis, because of Trump’s victory,” she wrote. “Such hope and belief is the result of my personal meeting with Donald Trump junior in Paris in October.”
She added on Facebook that, through the talks with Donald Trump Jr., she believed she succeeded in conveying to the elder Mr. Trump “the idea of how we can cooperate together.”
Kellyanne Conway, a senior adviser to the president-elect, confirmed the younger Mr. Trump’s attendance at the event in Paris. But she played down his direct contact with Ms. Kassis.
“Don was addressing a roundtable in Paris, and she was present for that talk and at a group dinner for 30 people,” she said in an email. “This event featured a number of opinion leaders from all over the world who were interested in the U.S. elections.”
Mr. Baussart’s think tank, the Center of Political and Foreign Affairs, has hosted a number of current and former government officials and leaders of multilateral organizations, according to its website.
Those meetings have included Turkey’s former president, Abdullah Gul; former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan; and James Rubin, a one-time State Department spokesman who advised Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign.
The elder Mr. Trump repeatedly has stressed his desire to work closely with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Syria and to coordinate in fighting the Islamic State terrorist group. His position on Russia emerged as a campaign issue, and Mrs. Clinton called the Republican a “puppet” of Mr. Putin. The elder Mr. Trump denied that accusation.
The Obama administration said it believed the Russian government hacked the emails of the Clinton campaign and the Democratic National Committee in a bid to aid the elder Mr. Trump, a charge Moscow denied. Despite a formal U.S. intelligence assessment accusing the Russians, Mr. Trump maintained that the U.S. didn’t know who the hackers were.
A spokeswoman for Mr. Trump, Hope Hicks, has denied a Russian official’s claim that there had been contact between the campaign and the Russian government.
The Obama administration terminated talks with Russia over Syria last month due to a Russian-backed bombing campaign in Aleppo, the country’s largest city.
The younger Mr. Trump, the executive vice president of The Trump Organization, was a top official in his father’s campaign. Transition officials say none of the Trump children will have formal positions in the new administration, but haven’t ruled out informal roles for them.
Ivanka Trump has sat in on her father’s meetings and phone calls with several world leaders since his election, including one with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
The elder Mr. Trump has criticized the Obama administration for seeking to topple Mr. Assad, arguing that doing so could further strengthen Islamic State and other terrorist groups. The president-elect has argued that allying with Russia, which has deployed its air force to bolster Mr. Assad, was the best option for reducing the terrorist threat emanating from the Middle East country.
Mikhail Bogdanov, deputy head of Russia’s foreign ministry, said last week that Moscow had been reaching out to the elder Mr. Trump’s team to discuss Syria, according to Russian news agency Interfax.
Ms. Kassis, in the interview, said at the October meeting she discussed with the younger Mr. Trump the importance of promoting a secular government in Damascus. She echoed an argument made both by the Assad regime and the Russian government, saying Syria’s armed opposition—even those backed by U.S. forces—are radical Islamists.
Ms. Kassis said she has discussed her meeting with Donald Trump Jr. with senior Russian officials, including Mr. Bogdanov. Russia’s foreign ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment.
Interfax reported that a meeting between Ms. Kassis and Mr. Bogdanov took place on Nov. 8, but the report didn’t mention the younger Mr. Trump.
“Randa Kassis has played a key role in Russian efforts to bring together Assad regime elements and opposition members acceptable to Moscow,” said Andrew Tabler of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, which has been critical of Mr. Obama’s Syria policy. Mr. Tabler has regularly talked to Russian officials about the conflict. “Such efforts have been key to Moscow’s approach to making Assad the basis for a transition in Syria.”
President Assad, in an interview last week with Portuguese television, said the elder Mr. Trump was potentially a “natural ally” in the Damascus regime’s fight against the rebel armies.
—Michael C. Bender contributed to this article
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From July of this year
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/us/politics/russia-putin-clinton-emails-hacking.html
Teddy and the Russkis:
http://thefederalist.com/2015/03/10/ted-kennedy-secretly-asked-the-soviets-to-intervene-in-the-1984-elections/
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I notice the first piece is in the NYT the second of course is not.
I don't recall LEFTist outrage at Brock's interfering in Israel's election a few years ago.
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Long, worthwhile read from Trump thread, linked below. I posted text in its entirety there because of registration issues at the site. American interest, home of Walter Russell Mead, is a good site for foreign policy analysis, IMO.
"The rest of that post deserves notice in US-Russia thread. What a human tragedy it was the way post-communist Russians sold out their country and the way that the world including our Clinton administration enabled it." Disgraceful. They were basking in Reagan's peace dividend while the old Soviet machine was gearing back to totalitarianism and to AGAIN become our largest geo-political threat.
http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=2551.msg100622#msg100622
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Thank you Doug.
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http://amgreatness.com/2016/12/24/russia-what-is-it-to-us/
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second post
From Red to Silver: The 25th Anniversary of the Fall of the Soviet Union
Analysis
December 25, 2016 | 14:01 GMT Print
Text Size
A crowd watches as a statue of KGB founder Felix Dzerzhinsky is lowered in Moscow's Lubyanka Square on Aug. 22, 1991. (ANATOLY SAPRONENKOV/AFP/Getty Images)
Analysis
Russian President Vladimir Putin once remarked that anyone who "does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart," while anyone who "wants it back has no brain." For nearly 70 years, the Soviet Union's founding communist ideology held the disparate peoples of its constituent socialist republics together. This ideology, antithetical as it was to the tenets of U.S. capitalism, also set the stage for the decadeslong war of worldviews that the United States and Soviet Union waged against each other through the latter half of the 20th century. The Cold War was a conflict unlike any other in history, an indirect battle between two superpowers in which the rest of the world was caught and maneuvered in for nearly half a century. On Dec. 26, 1991, the United States claimed its victory at last when the Kremlin lowered the iconic red flag that had flown over the Soviet Union. Twenty-five years later, the anniversary of the Soviet Union's collapse invites a reflection on the Cold War, its history and its legacy.
Laying the Foundation
No sooner had World War II ended than the preparations for the Cold War began. Before the ink had even dried on the various peace treaties that concluded the Second World War, the Soviet Union and the United States were already shoring up their positions, and their opposition, in Europe. As the Soviets, battered and nearly broken by the war, consolidated control over the so-called Eastern Bloc states, U.S. President Harry Truman said the United States and its allies needed to "show [them] how to behave." Just 25 years into its existence at the time, the Soviet Union was, after all, a young country. What Truman failed to understand, however, was that Moscow was following a strategy that had served it well for centuries under the Russian Empire, seeking security through expansionism. The United States and Western European nations quickly caught on to the Soviet agenda and formed their containment strategy, which evolved in time from the 1947 Truman Doctrine into the NATO military alliance. Even before the United States and Soviet Union formally drew their line between East and West in Europe, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill pronounced that an "iron curtain ha[d] descended across the Continent."
The two nations spent the ensuing decades embroiled in war. But they managed it without ever fighting each other directly. Instead, the conflict played out in proxy battles across nearly every continent; through trade wars; in the perpetual worries of leaders and citizens in each country over the looming threat of nuclear war; and, of course, in an ideological war.
The Soviet Union's Collapse, 25 Years Later
The Soviet system was built on the socialist concept of equality — legal, social and economic — for all people (beginning with workers), a strategic move by the Union's founders more than a reflection of their convictions. The Communist Party presided over this system, directly overseeing the Soviet Union's political apparatuses, economies, industries, press and societies. In its principles and functions, the Soviet model stood in direct opposition to that of the United States, which espoused self-determination, democracy and capitalism. Neither belief system was as ironclad as its champions in Washington and Moscow perhaps imagined, and some ideals inevitably fell by the wayside, unrealized. War, moreover, makes for strange bedfellows; in the course of their conflict, the United States and Russia each supported states that held diverging — if not contradictory — views. Still, the United States saw the Soviets as godless oppressors of freedom and hope, depriving their citizenry of the right to pursue a better life. The Soviet Union, in turn, considered the United States an imperialist superpower trying to become a global hegemon. The Cold War struggle became a moral contest to determine which worldview was correct.
The Beginning of the End
Toward the end of the 1970s, after proxy conflicts and threats of nuclear war by the dozen, it seemed to Washington that Moscow would prevail. In its estimation of the apparently unstoppable Soviet Union, though, the United States failed to appreciate just how unwieldy an entity it was. Whether governing the Russian Empire or today's Russian Federation, Moscow has faced the same geographic constraints and vulnerabilities throughout its long history. With an economy dependent on oil (and, at times, grain), a highly diverse population and competitors beyond its indefensible borders, each variation of Russia behaves at its strongest and weakest much as its predecessor did. The question, then, was never whether the Soviet Union would fall to the West but rather when it would inevitably collapse under its own weight.
The Soviet Union had already shown signs of faltering. When Nikita Khrushchev assumed the Soviet premiership a few years after longtime leader Josef Stalin's death, he proclaimed a "thaw" throughout the Soviet Union. Khrushchev proceeded to relax censorship somewhat, liberalize political and economic policies, and release political prisoners, all the while decrying Stalin's often brutal tactics. (Even the nearly ubiquitous likenesses of the late leader were destroyed or cached away during Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign.) He and the rest of the Party elite knew the Soviet Union would fall apart if it did not evolve. In the decades that followed Khrushchev's shake-up, the country moldered in a cycle of alternating consolidation and liberalization schemes under a string of leaders.
Not With a Bang, but a Whimper
By the 1980s, a perfect storm of political pressures had converged on the Soviet Union. The Soviet political system was atrophying. Three elderly leaders — Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko — died in office in a span of three years as the country fought a bloody and expensive war in Afghanistan. Independent labor unions were sprouting up and gaining political traction across the Eastern Bloc. Meanwhile, oil prices — which made up more than half the country's revenues — plummeted, plunging the mostly hollow Soviet economy into ruin. The Soviet Union was starting to give under the weight of its own problems, a process the United States helped speed along. Washington set off an arms race in the early 1980s with its decision to take an active military position against the Soviets. Between 1980 and 1989, the United States nearly doubled its defense spending, armed mujahideen forces against the Soviets in Afghanistan and flaunted its advanced military capabilities by launching the Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars." The Soviets' efforts to keep up only exacerbated the pressures on their country.
Former U.S. President Ronald Reagan, commemorating the 750th anniversary of Berlin, addresses on June 12, 1987 the people of West Berlin at the base of the Brandenburg Gate, near the Berlin wall. (MIKE SARGENT/AFP/Getty Images)
Mikhail Gorbachev tried to stave off the Soviet Union's demise when he came to power in 1985 by bringing a younger generation of leaders to the Kremlin and introducing a series of liberal political and economic reforms. Gorbachev permitted the countries of the Eastern Bloc to establish independent political systems and struck an arms control agreement with the United States. But the measures were not enough to save the Soviet Union; the seeds of dissolution had already been sown. Just a few days shy of its 69th anniversary, the Soviet Union dissolved, ending the Cold War without so much as a bang. Instead, the Kremlin quietly lowered the Soviet flag — the symbol of one of history's most formidable forces.
In the Wake of the Soviet Union
The Soviet Union's collapse was hailed in the West as a victory for the United States and its allies, proof that the American system and its governing ideology were morally, ethically and technically superior. Perhaps the clearest illustration of Western views toward the end of the Cold War was the Berlin Freedom Concert, which commemorated the opening of the border between East and West Germany in 1989. Televised in more than 20 countries around the world, the concert brought orchestral musicians from both sides of the Berlin Wall together to play Beethoven's 9th Symphony. But instead of "ode to joy," the choir sang "ode to freedom." As the West saw it, the end of the German Democratic Republic represented a triumph for freedom, and the demise of the Soviet Union liberated the world from the so-called Evil Empire.
Without an equal adversary, the United States became a global hegemon, just as the Soviets had feared, and the Western institutional, economic and democratic models spread across many parts of the world. But the fall of the Soviet Union yielded some more unexpected outcomes as well. Despite the proxy wars that had raged throughout the Cold War, the U.S.-Soviet dichotomy kept other conflicts in check. In the waning years of the Soviet Union and for decades after its collapse, wars broke out across the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and the former Soviet states. Many of these conflicts tested the United States' hegemony. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War facilitated the rise of regional powers such as China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Germany and France — some of which diverge from the United States' worldview. Alternative regional coalitions formed or expanded in the wake of the binary alliance system that the Cold War had built, creating competition for the United States.
Though the Soviet Union's dissolution seemed to suggest that Moscow could never again challenge Washington, Russia eventually regained its footing. Now, the Russian Federation is following the same strategy, however flawed, that its Soviet and imperial forerunners pursued. Much as it did in previous eras, Moscow is once again resorting to authoritarian and expansionist tactics to overcome its inherent fragility — this time under the guise of a democratic system and a market-driven (albeit state-influenced) economy. This resurgence has in some ways echoed the rise of the Soviet Union, but having learned from its mistakes, Moscow will not attempt to match the Soviets' global reach. Nonetheless, Russia's comeback has proved that 25 years after the Cold War's end, a stable world order is as elusive as ever.
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Time to begin moving from the Transition thread into the relevant particular threads
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2016/12/30/the-trump-camps-spin-on-russian-interference-is-falling-apart/?tid=sm_fb&utm_term=.c2a46e201f6d
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Has it ever occurred to the LEFT that Trump saying Putin is smart not to retaliate by sending our people home may be a veiled kind of saying he is smart *not to mess* with us.
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:-D
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MOSCOW — The diatribe against the Obama administration on prime-time television by a Russian Foreign Ministry official was hardly unusual in the long history of rocky relations between the United States and Russia.
The administration “demonstrated the belief that the strongest has the right to create evil,” Maria Zakharova, the Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, said on the Christmas Day broadcast.
From Washington’s perspective, it is the Kremlin that generally personifies evil, a point President Obama made on Thursday in punishing Russia for cyberattacks by directing new sanctions against Moscow and expelling 35 Russian diplomats. “The United States and friends and allies around the world must work together to oppose Russia’s efforts to undermine established international norms of behavior,” Mr. Obama said in a statement.
The two statements appeared to be business as usual — each side representing enemy No. 1 for the other. By Friday that mood had been abruptly cast aside, however. President Vladimir V. Putin announced that Russia would do nothing in response to the new American measures, awaiting the next administration, prompting President-elect Donald J. Trump to call him “very smart” in a Twitter post
With the sitting president calling Russia a national security threat and the incoming one praising Mr. Putin, many American voters, long accustomed to being suspicious about Russia, are understandably confused and uneasy. Russia was an enemy on Friday morning, and a friend by the afternoon.
“We are in a whiplash moment right now, and I think it is unprecedented in several respects,” said Cliff Kupchan, the chairman of the Eurasia Group, a political risk assessment firm in Washington, and a former State Department official from the Clinton administration. “The most important one is that the baton is about to be passed from an administration with a very hard line on Russia to one that is very much more sympathetic.”
No clear agreements or even offers are on the table yet, however, bringing uncertainty. “Russia’s relations with the U.S. are currently up in the air — both sides have no clear strategy about how to move them forward,” said Aleksandr Morozov, an independent Russian political analyst.
Until the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and even for years afterward, matters were more black and white. A young American diplomat stationed in Moscow named George F. Kennan established the parameters of the relationship for decades with a famous 1947 policy paper. The Soviet Union was bent on expansion, he wrote, so the main element of any United States policy had to be containment.
Thus began a long roller coaster ride for the two countries, full of periodic upswings as friends when détente was in vogue, inevitably followed by precipitous plummets as foes that left the world shuddering about the prospects of a nuclear Armageddon.
Tensions eased periodically, but it never seemed to last.
President Ronald Reagan, an implacable anti-Communist, surprised the world by reaching out to the man who turned out to be the last leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, to begin negotiations for far-reaching arms control agreements between the two sides.
After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Russian Federation that emerged entered into an extended period of decline and, inevitably, friendship with the United States as a kind of junior partner.
That “junior” aspect rankled, however, particular after Mr. Obama went from seeking to reset relations to dismissing Russia as a “regional power.”
The latest crisis began in 2014, with a revolution in Ukraine that Mr. Putin labeled an American plot — he, as many Soviet leaders have, sees the hidden hand of Washington everywhere. Mr. Putin annexed Crimea and armed rebels in eastern Ukraine, prompting Western economic sanctions, which Mr. Trump has disparaged.
The last confrontation under the Obama administration between Moscow and Washington came to a head this fall after American intelligence agencies concluded that hacking by their Russian counterparts had breached national security, cracking open the computers of the Democratic National Committee to reveal emails that embarrassed Hillary Clinton’s campaign. Mr. Trump initially encouraged the Kremlin to hack even more, breaking with all precedents, not least the Republican tradition of painting Russia as the evil empire, as Mr. Reagan called it.
Mr. Obama waited to react until last week, and it looked as if he might leave his successor a diplomatic tempest, until Mr. Putin, long the master of the unexpected stroke, defused it.
Mr. Trump suddenly gained room to maneuver.
“Trump’s spirit is already here, and already changing Russia’s policies,” said Igor M. Bunin, the director of the Center for Political Technologies, a Moscow research institute. “This will be a great plus for future relations.”
There are still potential pitfalls, however, not least that Congress does not share an affectionate view of Mr. Putin.
Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, plans to open hearings on Thursday on Russia’s efforts to manipulate the presidential election. Much of the Republican establishment in Congress endorsed the new sanctions imposed against Russia, putting them at odds with Mr. Trump.
Senator Amy Klobuchar, Democrat of Minnesota, was with Mr. McCain and Senator Lindsey Graham, Republican of South Carolina, last week to tour the Baltic States, which fear being the next target of the Russian military.
“The Russian cyberattack, and the misinformation and propaganda — they have been living with this for decades,” Ms. Klobuchar said in an interview.
American voters have heard Mr. Trump praise Russia, and some in the far right have hailed Mr. Putin as a hero for espousing conservative values. Yet old instincts die hard.
“I worry about what our relationship with other countries is going to be with a Trump presidency, if we buddy-buddy up to Russia and a leader who is not so democratic in nature,” said Alexis Matter, 35, walking through a Denver shopping mall.
In Sandy Springs, Ga., Chase Williams, 26, the manager of a pet supply store, said that Russia had fallen off the radar in recent years. His fears now were less of the old Cold War over a nuclear weapons attack than a sense that Mr. Putin could outfox the American administration.
“When I say Russia scares me, it’s not because I’m scared of them coming over here and doing something,” Mr. Williams said. “I’m scared when I see a chess player playing checkers — and we are checkers.”
Mr. Putin has made no secret of the fact that he would like to re-establish the consensus reached with the United States at the 1945 Yalta conference that carved the globe into spheres of influence.
Russia no longer has the might needed to assert its right to be a superpower, analysts say, but if nothing else, cyberattacks have underscored that you do not need nuclear weapons or a strong economy to assert global influence.
Some Russian analysts wonder what Mr. Putin can offer Mr. Trump. A former K.G.B. agent, he tends to view the world order as a series of special operations, coming from a different arena than Mr. Trump’s world of business deals. “I don’t think that Putin has a plan,” said Gleb Pavlovsky, a political analyst and former media adviser to Mr. Putin. “I think that he is stunned by the number of bonus points that he has gotten.”
In Syria, President Bashar al-Assad is on the verge of reasserting control over much of the country, thanks largely to Mr. Putin’s intervention. Ukraine presents some problems, but has essentially boiled down into the kind of frozen conflict that Russia uses to destabilize independent-minded neighbors. And all of the attention on the cyberattacks made Mr. Putin look strong.
In those successes, analysts see fodder for Mr. Putin to offer Mr. Trump a manner of foreign policy victory that would give the American leader something tangible to crow about at home in an arena where he lacks experience.
Russia, Iran and Turkey cut Washington out of the Syria negotiations, so Mr. Putin could bring the United States back in and forge a deal on fighting the Islamic State. Mr. Trump has stated that he wants to join forces with Russia in crushing the jihadists. Or the Kremlin could offer some sort of cyberspace deal.
“I think that Putin is in a strong position,” said Nicolai Petrov, a Russian political scientist. “He looks strong in relation to the United States and he has freedom to maneuver, and he can do what he wants to demonstrate that the United States should recognize that Russia is not a regional power but a great power that should be taken into account.”
So, for the moment, Mr. Putin appears a potential friend to Mr. Trump.
Few expect it to last, however. First of all, Mr. Trump is unpredictable. And fundamentally, the two countries are destined to be at odds, because they view the world through different lenses.
Russian policy in recent years has been trying to sow doubt and undermine public faith in Western governments. The Kremlin has relied on a variety of levers — disinformation campaigns, buying influence, cyberattacks — which many analysts expect to show up in crucial elections in the coming year in France and Germany.
“They are trying to create more of a level playing field not by raising Russia up, but through a declining West,” Mr. Kupchan said. “I don’t think Putin is out to make America great again.”
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I note Gerald Seib is now using the Tri-Polar analysis I have been advocating around here for a while now. Perhaps he is another lurker on the forum? :-D
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The intelligence community’s report on Russian meddling in the 2016 election didn’t merely describe nefarious Kremlin deeds. It also put a dent in the strategic worldview that Donald Trump hoped to carry into the White House.
It’s increasingly clear that we’re living in a kind of tripolar world, populated by an America that remains the most important superpower; a rising China; and a newly re-assertive Russia trying to reclaim its seat at the big table.
And while it’s hard to read the enigmatic Mr. Trump, it also appears his vision of how to prosper in that world is to develop friendly ties with Russia on the one hand, thereby improving the American strategic position to challenge China on the other.
In that case, the strategic equation has been seriously undermined by the intelligence community report, which represents a consensus view of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Security Agency. It not only described a concerted effort to interfere with the election, but a much broader effort to undermine the very idea of American democracy.
In a little-noticed closing statement, the report also offered this warning to the incoming Trump administration about the intentions of Russian President Vladimir Putin: “We assess Russian intelligence services will continue to develop capabilities to provide Putin with options to use against the United States, judging from past practice and current efforts. Immediately after Election Day, we assess Russian intelligence began a spearphishing campaign targeting U.S. Government employees” and others, referring to a type of cyberattack. “This campaign could provide material for future influence efforts as well as foreign intelligence collection on the incoming administration’s goals and plans.”
In other words, the intelligence community has just warned the incoming president that his team is the next target.
In response, two influential members of Mr. Trump’s own Republican Party, Sens. John McCain and Lindsey Graham, served notice over the weekend that they are going to push legislation to impose new sanctions on Russia.
All this makes it very tough politically to pursue the Trump vision of a world order in which the U.S. makes common cause with the Kremlin, while simultaneously challenging the Chinese on trade and security matters.
Playing the Russians off against the Chinese was long a standard move in the American strategic handbook. The two Communist giants despised each other and worried about the balance of power tilting the wrong way if the other moved too close to the U.S. In that environment, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once said that the American goal was to maintain closer ties with both Moscow and Beijing than the two did with each other.
Even before last week’s bombshell intelligence report, it wasn’t clear that leveraging Moscow against Beijing is a workable strategy now. “In the old days, there was a lot of juice in triangular diplomacy, because the Soviets and the Chinese were each other’s worst enemies,” says Stephen Sestanovich, once the State Department’s ambassador-at-large for the former Soviet Union. “There’s nothing like that today.…Today you don’t make the Russians and Chinese enemies of each other by being nice to Putin.”
Indeed, Mr. Putin made what appeared to be a friendly and successful visit to Beijing just last June, during which he and Chinese leader Xi Jinping signed a series of deals on bilateral cooperation, including on energy and trade. That reflects a different dynamic between the two than prevailed during the Cold War.
Now, Mr. Trump will enter office clearly intending to challenge China more directly on trade and military activity in the South China Sea, but with less freedom to pursue an offsetting warming of relations with the Russians than seemed likely just a few weeks ago. In short, there will be tensions on both fronts, whether Mr. Trump is happy about that or not.
The best way to deal with that strategic reality, Mr. Sestanovich argues, is to use strong ties with America’s networks of allies, in Europe and Asia, to temper any Russian or Chinese efforts to misbehave.
Moreover, the best leverage the U.S. has with China may lie not in Moscow, but in Beijing’s own self-interest. Outgoing Defense Secretary Ash Carter noted in an interview last week that there is a “strain in Chinese strategic thinking.”
The Chinese seek to challenge the U.S., on both economic and security fronts. At the same time, Mr. Carter noted, there is in Beijing “a recognition that, in order for them to have the prosperity that they need for their people and for political stability, they can’t be picking fights and they can’t be ruining the system that is working for them.”
There’s anxiety about China across Asia, and that anxiety is driving “everyone into our arms” in the region, Mr. Carter said. The best counter to Beijing may simply be to embrace those allies.
Write to Gerald F. Seib at jerry.seib@wsj.com
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Now he is doing it. 10 days before he is out. Only because he is upset that Hillary didn't win. It is the Russians fault. What else can it be. The Russians have been making mores for a long time now.
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2590015/us-army-moves-2500-tanks-trucks-and-military-vehicles-into-europe-in-the-biggest-troop-transfer-since-the-cold-war/
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Working with Russia is not the same as weakness with Russia .
Obama was weak and we see the result. Same as James Earl Carter when Russia invaded Afghanistan.
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/443903/obama-misread-putin-trump-might-not-new-era-big-sticks-common-enemies-mutual-benefit
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I liked that article a lot.
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http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/317571-white-house-denies-relaxing-sanctions-on-russia
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Trump Administration Looks at Driving Wedge Between Russia and Iran
Officials say strategy marries president’s vows to improve relations with Putin and to aggressively challenge Iran’s military presence in Middle East
By Jay Solomon
Feb. 5, 2017 7:47 p.m. ET
119 COMMENTS
WASHINGTON—The Trump administration is exploring ways to break Russia’s military and diplomatic alliance with Iran in a bid to both end the Syrian conflict and bolster the fight against Islamic State, said senior administration, European and Arab officials involved in the policy discussions.
The emerging strategy seeks to reconcile President Donald Trump’s seemingly contradictory vows to improve relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin and to aggressively challenge the military presence of Iran—one of Moscow’s most critical allies—in the Middle East, these officials say.
A senior administration official said the White House doesn’t have any illusions about Russia or see Mr. Putin as a “choir boy,” despite further conciliatory statements from Mr. Trump about the Russian leader over the weekend. But the official said that the administration doesn’t view Russia as the same existential threat that the Soviet Union posed to the U.S. during the Cold War and that Mr. Trump was committed to constraining Iran.
“If there’s a wedge to be driven between Russia and Iran, we’re willing to explore that,” the official said.
Such a strategy doesn’t entirely explain the mixed signals Mr. Trump and his circle have sent regarding Moscow, which have unnerved U.S. allies and caught Republican leaders in Congress off guard.
Related
Russia Open to Pragmatic U.S. Relationship
U.S. Suggests Path to End Russian Sanctions(Feb. 5)
White House Issues Perplexing Statement on Whereabouts of Ukraine Conflict (Feb. 5)
Renewed Fighting in Eastern Ukraine Presents Challenge for Trump’s Plans With Russia(Feb. 3)
Trump’s Bluntness Unsettles World Leaders(Feb. 3)
Russia, Turkey and Iran Agree on Syria Truce Monitoring(Jan. 24)
Days after the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, said a surge in violence in eastern Ukraine demanded “clear and strong condemnation of Russian actions,” Vice President Mike Pence suggested Sunday that Washington could lift sanctions on Moscow soon if it cooperated in the U.S. fight against Islamic State.
Mr. Trump himself spoke again about wanting to mend relations with Mr. Putin in an interview that aired before Sunday’s Super Bowl, saying “it’s better to get along with Russia than not.” After Fox News host Bill O’Reilly said Mr. Putin was a “killer,” the president responded: “What, you think our country’s so innocent?”
But those involved in the latest policy discussions argue there is a specific focus on trying to drive a wedge between Russia and Iran.
“There’s daylight between Russia and Iran for sure,” said a senior European official who has held discussions with Mr. Trump’s National Security Council staff in recent weeks. “What’s unclear is what Putin would demand in return for weakening the alliance.”
But persuading Mr. Putin to break with Tehran would be immensely difficult and—a number of Russian experts in Washington say—come at a heavy cost likely to reverberate across America’s alliances with its Western partners. Nor would Mr. Trump be the first U.S. president to pursue the strategy: The Obama administration spent years trying to coax Russia away from Iran, particularly in Syria, only to see the two countries intensify their military operations there to bolster the Damascus regime.
“If the Kremlin is to reduce its arms supplies to Iran, it is likely to expect a significant easing of sanctions,” said Dimitri Simes, a Russia expert and president of the Center for the National Interest in Washington. “The Russians don’t believe in free lunches.”
The Kremlin has said it aims to mend ties with the U.S. under the Trump administration but in recent months has also signaled its intent to continue to build on its cooperation with Iran.
Moscow and Tehran have formed a tight military alliance in Syria in recent years. The Kremlin is a major supplier of weapons systems and nuclear equipment to Iran.
But the Trump administration is seeking to exploit what senior U.S., European and Arab officials see as potential divisions between Russia and Iran over their future strategy in Syria and the broader Mideast.
“The issue is whether Putin is prepared to abandon [Ayatollah] Khamenei,” said Michael Ledeen, an academic who advised National Security Council Advisor Michael Flynn during the transition and co-wrote a book with him last year. “I think that might be possible if he is convinced we will ‘take care’ of Iran. I doubt he believes that today.”
Russia, Iran and Turkey have been leading talks in Kazakhstan in recent weeks to try to end Syria’s six-year war. Participants in the discussions, which have excluded high-level U.S. diplomats, said Russia has appeared significantly more open than the Iranians to discussing a future without President Bashar al-Assad.
A Russian-backed faction in the talks has promoted the creation of a new Syrian constitution and a gradual transition away from Mr. Assad.
Moscow has pressed the Trump administration to join the talks at a high-level, an invitation not extended while President Barack Obama was in office. Last week, the administration sent only a lower-level official, its ambassador to Kazakhstan.
Mr. Putin largely has succeeded in saving the regime of Mr. Assad from collapse through a brutal air war in Syria over the past 18 months. But the Kremlin is interested in fortifying its long-term military presence in Syria and doesn’t necessarily view Mr. Assad as an enduring partner, these officials said.
Iran, conversely, is wholly wedded to Mr. Assad as its primary partner for shipping weapons and funds to Iran’s military proxies in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, including Hezbollah and Hamas. Any future Arab leader in Syria, even one close to Mr. Assad, is unlikely to tie his position so closely to Tehran.
“Russia is fully aware of the corruption and incompetence of the Assad regime…[and] knows that a stable Syria—a country worth having military bases in the long term—is unattainable with Assad at the helm,” said Fred Hof, a former State Department official who oversaw Syria policy during President Obama’s first term.
He added: “Tehran knows there is no Syrian constituency beyond Assad accepting subordination to [Iran].”
The Obama administration also pursued a strategy of trying to woo Russia away from Tehran. During his first term, Mr. Obama succeeded in getting then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to support tough United Nations sanctions on Iran for its nuclear activities. Moscow also delayed the delivery of antimissile batteries to Tehran, sparking a diplomatic row between the countries.
In return, the Obama White House rolled back missile-defense deployments in Europe that Russia believed weakened its strategic position.
Tensions between Russia and the U.S. flared, though, after Mr. Putin regained the presidency in 2012 and seized the Crimean region of Ukraine in 2014. The U.S. and European Union responded with tough financial sanctions on Mr. Putin’s inner circle.
A number of Russia experts in Washington say they believe Mr. Putin would demand a heavy price now for any move to distance himself from Iran. In addition to easing sanctions, they believe he would want assurances that the U.S. would scale back its criticism of Russia’s military operations in Ukraine and stall further expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership for countries near the Russian border.
Montenegro is scheduled to join NATO this year. The U.S. Senate still needs to vote to approve the bid.
In a report released Friday, the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington think tank, cautioned that even if Moscow were to distance itself from Tehran, it wouldn’t contain the enormous influence that Iran wields over Syria’s economic, military, and political institutions. “Any U.S. effort to subvert Iran’s posture in Syria through Russia will undoubtedly end in failure,” the assessment said.
Russia delivered its S-300 antimissile system to Iran after Tehran, the U.S. and five other world powers implemented a landmark nuclear agreement a year ago. The Kremlin since has talked of further expanding its military and nuclear cooperation with Tehran.
Mr. Trump, though, campaigned on improving relations with Moscow, a theme that Mr. Putin has publicly embraced. Mr. Trump has suggested he could ease sanctions on Russia if the Kremlin took serious steps to cooperate in fighting Islamic State in Syria and Iraq and addressing other national security threats to the U.S.
Mr. Trump and his advisers have made clear since assuming office that constraining Iran would be among their top priorities. They have also privately acknowledged there is no certainty the Kremlin will cooperate.
Last week, the administration declared Iran “on notice” and the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on 25 Iran-linked individuals and entities for their alleged roles in aiding Iran’s ballistic missile program and terrorist activities. The Pentagon also dispatched a naval destroyer, the USS Cole, last week to police the waters around Yemen.
The Trump administration’s show of force has raised concerns that the U.S. and Iran could stumble into a military conflict. But officials close to the Trump administration said they believed the White House could gain the respect of the Kremlin if it showed a commitment to enforcing its warnings to other governments.
“Iran has a continuing operation throughout the region…that is not sustainable, not acceptable, and violates norms and creates instability,” a senior U.S. official said on Friday. “Iran has to determine its response to our actions. Iran has a choice to make.”
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https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/world/europe/russia-cruise-missile-arms-control-treaty.html?emc=edit_na_20170214&nl=breaking-news&nlid=49641193&ref=cta
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https://patriotpost.us/articles/47526
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A Back-Channel Plan for Ukraine and Russia, Courtesy of Trump Associates
By MEGAN TWOHEY and SCOTT SHANEFEB. 19, 2017
President Trump on his way to Charleston, S.C., on Friday. Although he has expressed hope that the United States and Russia can work together, it is unclear if the White House will take a privately submitted peace proposal for Ukraine seriously. Credit Al Drago/The New York Times
A week before Michael T. Flynn resigned as national security adviser, a sealed proposal was hand-delivered to his office, outlining a way for President Trump to lift sanctions against Russia.
Mr. Flynn is gone, having been caught lying about his own discussion of sanctions with the Russian ambassador. But the proposal, a peace plan for Ukraine and Russia, remains, along with those pushing it: Michael D. Cohen, the president’s personal lawyer, who delivered the document; Felix H. Sater, a business associate who helped Mr. Trump scout deals in Russia; and a Ukrainian lawmaker trying to rise in a political opposition movement shaped in part by Mr. Trump’s former campaign manager Paul Manafort.
At a time when Mr. Trump’s ties to Russia, and the people connected to him, are under heightened scrutiny — with investigations by American intelligence agencies, the F.B.I. and Congress — some of his associates remain willing and eager to wade into Russia-related efforts behind the scenes.
Mr. Trump has confounded Democrats and Republicans alike with his repeated praise for the Russian president, Vladimir V. Putin, and his desire to forge an American-Russian alliance. While there is nothing illegal about such unofficial efforts, a proposal that seems to tip toward Russian interests may set off alarms.
Donald Trump’s Connections in Ukraine
Former Trump campaign manager with pro-Russian political ties in Ukraine now under investigation by the F.B.I.
The amateur diplomats say their goal is simply to help settle a grueling, three-year conflict that has cost 10,000 lives. “Who doesn’t want to help bring about peace?” Mr. Cohen asked.
But the proposal contains more than just a peace plan. Andrii V. Artemenko, the Ukrainian lawmaker, who sees himself as a Trump-style leader of a future Ukraine, claims to have evidence — “names of companies, wire transfers” — showing corruption by the Ukrainian president, Petro O. Poroshenko, that could help oust him. And Mr. Artemenko said he had received encouragement for his plans from top aides to Mr. Putin.
“A lot of people will call me a Russian agent, a U.S. agent, a C.I.A. agent,” Mr. Artemenko said. “But how can you find a good solution between our countries if we do not talk?”
Mr. Cohen and Mr. Sater said they had not spoken to Mr. Trump about the proposal, and have no experience in foreign policy. Mr. Cohen is one of several Trump associates under scrutiny in an F.B.I. counterintelligence examination of links with Russia, according to law enforcement officials; he has denied any illicit connections.
The two others involved in the effort have somewhat questionable pasts: Mr. Sater, 50, a Russian-American, pleaded guilty to a role in a stock manipulation scheme decades ago that involved the Mafia. Mr. Artemenko spent two and a half years in jail in Kiev in the early 2000s on embezzlement charges, later dropped, which he said had been politically motivated.
While it is unclear if the White House will take the proposal seriously, the diplomatic freelancing has infuriated Ukrainian officials. Ukraine’s ambassador to the United States, Valeriy Chaly, said Mr. Artemenko “is not entitled to present any alternative peace plans on behalf of Ukraine to any foreign government, including the U.S. administration.”
At a security conference in Munich on Friday, Mr. Poroshenko warned the West against “appeasement” of Russia, and some American experts say offering Russia any alternative to a two-year-old international agreement on Ukraine would be a mistake. The Trump administration has sent mixed signals about the conflict in Ukraine.
But given Mr. Trump’s praise for Mr. Putin, John Herbst, a former American ambassador to Ukraine, said he feared the new president might be too eager to mend relations with Russia at Ukraine’s expense — potentially with a plan like Mr. Artemenko’s.
It was late January when the three men associated with the proposed plan converged on the Loews Regency, a luxury hotel on Park Avenue in Manhattan where business deals are made in a lobby furnished with leather couches, over martinis at the restaurant bar and in private conference rooms on upper floors.
Mr. Cohen, 50, lives two blocks up the street, in Trump Park Avenue. A lawyer who joined the Trump Organization in 2007 as special counsel, he has worked on many deals, including a Trump-branded tower in the republic of Georgia and a short-lived mixed martial arts venture starring a Russian fighter. He is considered a loyal lieutenant whom Mr. Trump trusts to fix difficult problems.
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Andrii V. Artemenko, a Ukrainian lawmaker, at the Women’s March in Washington last month. He said his peace proposal had received encouragement from top aides to Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin.
The F.B.I. is reviewing an unverified dossier, compiled by a former British intelligence agent and funded by Mr. Trump’s political opponents, that claims Mr. Cohen met with a Russian representative in Prague during the presidential campaign to discuss Russia’s hacking of Democratic targets. But the Russian official named in the report told The New York Times that he had never met Mr. Cohen. Mr. Cohen insists that he has never visited Prague and that the dossier’s assertions are fabrications. (Mr. Manafort is also under investigation by the F.B.I. for his connections to Russia and Ukraine.)
Mr. Cohen has a personal connection to Ukraine: He is married to a Ukrainian woman and once worked with relatives there to establish an ethanol business.
Mr. Artemenko, tall and burly, arrived at the Manhattan hotel between visits to Washington. (His wife, he said, met the first lady, Melania Trump, years ago during their modeling careers, but he did not try to meet Mr. Trump.) He had attended the inauguration and visited Congress, posting on Facebook his admiration for Mr. Trump and talking up his peace plan in meetings with American lawmakers.
He entered Parliament in 2014, the year that the former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych fled to Moscow amid protests over his economic alignment with Russia and corruption. Mr. Manafort, who had been instrumental in getting Mr. Yanukovych elected, helped shape a political bloc that sprang up to oppose the new president, Mr. Poroshenko, a wealthy businessman who has taken a far tougher stance toward Russia and accused Mr. Putin of wanting to absorb Ukraine into a new Russian Empire. Mr. Artemenko, 48, emerged from the opposition that Mr. Manafort nurtured. (The two men have never met, Mr. Artemenko said.)
Before entering politics, Mr. Artemenko had business ventures in the Middle East and real estate deals in the Miami area, and had worked as an agent representing top Ukrainian athletes. Some colleagues in Parliament describe him as corrupt, untrustworthy or simply insignificant, but he appears to have amassed considerable wealth.
He has fashioned himself in the image of Mr. Trump, presenting himself as Ukraine’s answer to a rising class of nationalist leaders in the West. He even traveled to Cleveland last summer for the Republican National Convention, seizing on the chance to meet with members of Mr. Trump’s campaign.
“It’s time for new leaders, new approaches to the governance of the country, new principles and new negotiators in international politics,” he wrote on Facebook on Jan. 27. “Our time has come!”
Mr. Artemenko said he saw in Mr. Trump an opportunity to advocate a plan for peace in Ukraine — and help advance his own political career. Essentially, his plan would require the withdrawal of all Russian forces from eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian voters would decide in a referendum whether Crimea, the Ukrainian territory seized by Russia in 2014, would be leased to Russia for a term of 50 or 100 years.
The Ukrainian ambassador, Mr. Chaly, rejected a lease of that kind. “It is a gross violation of the Constitution,” he said in written answers to questions from The Times. “Such ideas can be pitched or pushed through only by those openly or covertly representing Russian interests.”
The reaction suggested why Mr. Artemenko’s project also includes the dissemination of “kompromat,” or compromising material, purportedly showing that Mr. Poroshenko and his closest associates are corrupt. Only a new government, presumably one less hostile to Russia, might take up his plan.
Photo
President Petro O. Poroshenko of Ukraine in Kiev on Wednesday. Two days later in Munich, he warned the West against “appeasement” of Russia. Credit Gleb Garanich/Reuters
Mr. Sater, a longtime business associate of Mr. Trump’s with connections in Russia, was willing to help Mr. Artemenko’s proposal reach the White House.
Mr. Trump has sought to distance himself from Mr. Sater in recent years. If Mr. Sater “were sitting in the room right now,” Mr. Trump said in a 2013 deposition, “I really wouldn’t know what he looked like.”
But Mr. Sater worked on real estate development deals with the Trump Organization on and off for at least a decade, even after his role in the stock manipulation scheme came to light.
Mr. Sater, who was born in the Soviet Union and grew up in New York, served as an executive at a firm called Bayrock Group, two floors below the Trump Organization in Trump Tower, and was later a senior adviser to Mr. Trump.
He said he had been working on a plan for a Trump Tower in Moscow with a Russian real estate developer as recently as the fall of 2015, one that he said had come to a halt because of Mr. Trump’s presidential campaign. (Mr. Cohen said the Trump Organization had received a letter of intent for a project in Moscow from a Russian real estate developer at that time but determined that the project was not feasible.)
Mr. Artemenko said a mutual friend had put him in touch with Mr. Sater. Helping to advance the proposal, Mr. Sater said, made sense.
“I want to stop a war, number one,” he said. “Number two, I absolutely believe that the U.S. and Russia need to be allies, not enemies. If I could achieve both in one stroke, it would be a home run.”
After speaking with Mr. Sater and Mr. Artemenko in person, Mr. Cohen said he would deliver the plan to the White House.
Mr. Cohen said he did not know who in the Russian government had offered encouragement on it, as Mr. Artemenko claims, but he understood there was a promise of proof of corruption by the Ukrainian president.
“Fraud is never good, right?” Mr. Cohen said.
He said Mr. Sater had given him the written proposal in a sealed envelope. When Mr. Cohen met with Mr. Trump in the Oval Office in early February, he said, he left the proposal in Mr. Flynn’s office.
Mr. Cohen said he was waiting for a response when Mr. Flynn was forced from his post. Now Mr. Cohen, Mr. Sater and Mr. Artemenko are hoping a new national security adviser will take up their cause. On Friday the president wrote on Twitter that he had four new candidates for the job.
Correction: February 19, 2017
Because of an editing error, an earlier version of this article gave an incorrect middle initial for Paul Manafort. It is J., not D.
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http://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/02/24/trump-isnt-sounding-like-a-russian-mole/
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https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2017/02/18/no-one-mentions-that-the-russian-trail-leads-to-democratic-lobbyists/#4da56aea3991
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In pushing its Manchurian-candidate-Trump narrative, the media fail to mention the much deeper ties of Democratic lobbyists to Russia. Don’t worry, the media seems to say: Even though they are representing Russia, the lobbyists are good upstanding citizens, not like the Trump people. They can be trusted with such delicate matters.
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The media targeted former Trump campaign manager, Paul Manafort, for consulting for deposed Ukrainian president’s (Yanukovich’s) Party of the Regions. He also worked for billionaire oligarch, Firtash, who stands accused of skimming billions in the Ukraine gas trade in league with Russian oligarchs. The media also singled out Trump’s former national security advisor, General Michael Flynn, for attending a dinner with Putin and appearing on Russia’s foreign propaganda network RT. Trump’s own Russian ties were the subject of intense media coverage of an unverified opposition-research report purportedly prepared by an ex-British spy, who remains in hiding. It seems no enterprising reporter has tried to find him.
The media’s focus on Trump’s Russian connections ignores the much more extensive and lucrative business relationships of top Democrats with Kremlin-associated oligarchs and companies. Thanks to the Panama Papers, we know that the Podesta Group (founded by John Podesta’s brother, Tony) lobbied for Russia’s largest bank, Sberbank. “Sberbank is the Kremlin, they don’t do anything major without Putin’s go-ahead, and they don’t tell him ‘no’ either,” explained a retired senior U.S. intelligence official. According to a Reuters report, Tony Podesta was “among the high-profile lobbyists registered to represent organizations backing Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich.” Among these was the European Center, which paid Podesta $900,000 for his lobbying.
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That’s not all: The busy Podesta Group also represented Uranium One, a uranium company acquired by the Russian government which received approval from Hillary Clinton’s State Department to mine for uranium in the U.S. and gave Russia twenty percent control of US uranium. The New York Times reported Uranium One’s chairman, Frank Guistra, made significant donations to the Clinton Foundation, and Bill Clinton was paid $500,000 for one speech from a Russian investment bank that has “links to the Kremlin that was promoting Uranium One stock.” Notably, Frank Giustra, the Clinton Foundation’s largest and most controversial donor, does not appear anywhere in Clinton’s “non-private” emails. It is possible that the emails of such key donors were automatically scrubbed to protect the Clinton Foundation.
Let’s not leave out fugitive Ukrainian oligarch, Dymtro Firtash. He is represented by Democratic heavyweight lawyer, Lanny Davis, who accused Trump of “inviting Putin to commit espionage” (Trump’s quip: If Putin has Hillary’s emails, release them) but denies all wrongdoing by Hillary.
That’s still not all: Rep. John Conyers (D., Mich.) read Kremlin propaganda into the Congressional Record, referring to Ukrainian militia as “repulsive Neo Nazis” in denying Ukrainian forces ManPad weapons. Conyers floor speech was surely a notable success of some Kremlin lobbyist.
Lobbying for Russia is a bi-partisan activity. Gazprombank GPB, a subsidiary of Russia’s third largest bank, Gazprombank, is represented by former Sen. John Breaux, (D., La.), and former Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R., Miss.), as main lobbyists on “banking laws and regulations, including applicable sanctions.” The Breaux-Lott client is currently in the Treasury Department list of Russian firms prohibited from debt financing with U.S. banks.
In his February 16 press conference, President Trump declared in response to the intensifying media drumbeat on his Russian connections: “I haven’t done anything for Russia.” K-Street lobbyists, on the other hand, have done a lot to help Russia. They greased the skids for a strategic deal (that required the Secretary of State’s approval) that multiplied the Kremlin’s command of world uranium supplies. They likely prevented the shipment of strategic weapons needed by Ukraine to repulse well-armed pro-Russian forces. A fugitive billionaire who robbed the Ukrainian people of billions is represented by one of the establishment’s most connected lawyers.
Gazprombank GPB hired Breux and Lott to gain repeal of sanctions. That’s perfectly fine in Washington; they are playing according established “swamp rules” in their tailored suits and fine D.C. restaurants. General Flynn lost his job when the subject of sanctions was mentioned by the Russian ambassador in their telephone conversation, but that’s the way the media and Washington play.
No wonder that Trump’s’ “drain the swamp” and anti-media messages resonate so well with mainstream America.
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MOSCOW — The Kremlin, increasingly convinced that President Trump will not fundamentally change relations with Russia, is instead seeking to bolster its global influence by exploiting what it considers weakness in Washington, according to political advisers, diplomats, journalists and other analysts.
Russia has continued to test the United States on the military front, with fighter jets flying close to an American warship in the Black Sea this month and a Russian naval vessel steaming conspicuously in the Atlantic off the coast of Delaware.
“They think he is unstable, that he can be manipulated, that he is authoritarian and a person without a team,” Alexei A. Venediktov, the editor in chief of Echo of Moscow, a liberal radio station, said of President Trump.
The Russian president, Vladimir V. Putin, has long sought to crack the liberal Western order, both as a competitor and as a champion of an alternative, illiberal model. To that end, he did what he could to buttress the electoral chances of Mr. Trump, who seemed like a kindred spirit with his harsh denunciations of NATO and the European Union, his endorsement of the British withdrawal from the European Union and his repeated shrugs over Russia’s destabilizing Ukraine.
In this context, Mr. Trump’s election was an unexpected bonus, but the original giddiness has worn off, and Moscow has returned to its tried-and-true formula of creating turmoil and exploiting the resulting opportunities.
“They are all telling each other that this is great, he created this turbulence inside, as we wanted, and now he is focused on his domestic problems and we have more freedom to maneuver,” Mr. Venediktov said. “Let them deal with their own problems. There, not in Ukraine. There, not in the Middle East. There, not in NATO. This is the state of mind right now.”
Sergei A. Markov, a leading analyst friendly to the Kremlin, made much the same point. “Right now the Kremlin is looking for ways that Russia can use the chaos in Washington to pursue its own interests,” said Mr. Markov, a member of the Civic Chamber, a Kremlin advisory group. “The main hope is that the U.S. will be preoccupied with itself and will stop pressuring Russia.”
Any turbulence that Russia foments also gives the Kremlin leverage that it can try to trade in the global arena at a time when it does not have much that others want.
Mr. Venediktov compared the Russian position to an intrusive neighbor who promises to be helpful by avoiding noisy restoration activity at night even though it breaks the apartment building rules in the first place.
Analysts say the Kremlin is aware that the tactic of creating and exploiting disarray can become self-defeating, in that prolonged instability could allow threats like the extremist group Islamic State to flourish.
“It is important for Russia that America does its job in foreign policy,” said Alexey Chesnakov, a periodic Kremlin political adviser and the director of the Center for Current Politics, a trend analysis group in Moscow. “If there is nobody to do that job, it might not be good for us, either.”
The Middle East provides examples of both vectors, analysts say, a moment of chaos to exploit and concerns about achieving stability for the long-term future.
Moscow has begun courting Libya, where Mr. Putin seems to want to prove that the Obama administration and other Western powers made a mistake by working to force Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi from power in 2011. Russia invited various powerful figures to Moscow and sent the country’s lone aircraft carrier, the somewhat dilapidated Admiral Kuznetsov, on a port call to Libya on its way back from Syria last month. Khalifa Haftar, the military commander in eastern Libya, got a tour. The government invited veteran officials and analysts from around the Arab world this week to discuss the future of Libya and Yemen, among other topics.
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Residents at a humanitarian food distribution site in Avdiivka, Ukraine, this month. Some analysts say American attention could be diverted from areas of conflict with Russia, like Ukraine, while President Trump focuses on domestic concerns. Credit Brendan Hoffman/Getty Images
Syria, on the other hand, underscores the limits to Russian power. In the two months since Russian-backed government forces took back the city of Aleppo, there has been little movement in forging peace.
Not least, Russia can ill afford the billions of dollars needed to rebuild the country. For that it needs Washington to help persuade its allies like Qatar and Saudi Arabia, who all seek a political transition away from Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
Like much of the world, nobody in Moscow can figure out who makes Mr. Trump’s foreign policy, never mind what it will be. Since the inauguration, it has become clear that Mr. Trump’s rosy view of Mr. Putin is not shared by the president’s top foreign policy advisers, with the possible exception of Stephen K. Bannon, his chief White House strategist.
“We cannot understand how they will work in concert,” said Igor Yurgens, a Russian economist who is prominent in business and development.
The Kremlin has adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward Mr. Trump, analysts said, expecting the first meeting with Mr. Putin in Europe sometime this summer to set the course for relations.
Dmitry K. Kiselyov, the anchor of the main state propaganda program “News of the Week,” recently pronounced what seemed to be the new party line on the air. “Let’s not judge too harshly, things are still unsettled in the White House,” he said. “Still not a word from there. Only little words, and that doesn’t amount to a policy.”
Just how unsettled was underscored on Monday, when the White House announced plans to increase military spending by $54 billion, an amount just about equal to what Russia spends in total on its military annually.
While the appearance of such turmoil in the White House has probably been surprising, even gratifying, to the Kremlin, analysts say Russia’s government is worried about having too much of a good thing. “It would be better for us to have a predictable partner,” Mr. Markov said. “An unpredictable one is dangerous.”
The perception of weakness calls into question here in Moscow whether Mr. Trump can ever live up to the many statements he made during the campaign about forging closer ties with Mr. Putin and Russia. “The overwhelming view of the Kremlin is that Trump is not very strong,” said Valeriy Solovey, a professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. “He might have sympathy toward Russia, but he is contained within the political establishment.”
Russia’s far right regularly predicts Mr. Trump’s assassination at the hands of the American establishment, a view occasionally echoed on state television.
Alexander Dugin, a nationalist Russian philosopher, called Mr. Trump’s inauguration the happiest day of his life because it signified the demise of the liberal international order. Mr. Dugin seemed most eager for Mr. Trump to get on with his promise to “drain the swamp” in Washington, although he worried about the consequences. “It can kill,” Mr. Dugin said in an interview. “It is not so easy to drain the swamp.”
Since the inauguration, however, enthusiasm for Mr. Trump in official Russia lurched from cool to uncool seemingly overnight. Dmitri S. Peskov, the presidential spokesman, denied that the new skepticism had been ordered from the top. The speed of the change was striking, however.
Russia’s political class marvels at how much time it now spends chewing over the minutiae of the American political system. Some attribute that to the fact that domestic politics are comatose, with Mr. Putin assured of winning another six-year term in 2018.
“Nobody is talking about the Putin election,” said Mr. Chesnakov, the political consultant. “We are discussing relations between Congress and Trump.”
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Very long and very interesting:
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/06/trump-putin-and-the-new-cold-war
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By Mikhail Khodorkovsky
March 8, 2017 6:43 p.m. ET
180 COMMENTS
Russia went glaringly absent from President Donald Trump’s speech to Congress last week. Although Russians expect relations with Washington to change, they are anxiously asking how. Will Mr. Trump confront Moscow with the brash rhetoric he has directed at others? Will he be President Vladimir Putin’s lap dog, as many American critics and Kremlin propagandists predict?
Or will Mr. Trump surprise the world by forging a relationship with Mr. Putin and striking a deal that could help pull my country out of its decline?
Russians wait with both hope and apprehension as they grapple with the uncertainty of Mr. Trump’s message and Mr. Putin’s future. Many expect some kind of deal. In any negotiation, each side must understand the needs and desires of the other. What kind of bargain can Mr. Trump offer, and what can Mr. Putin do in exchange?
ADVERTISING
Let us break with conventional wisdom for a moment and set aside the expected American preconditions for normalized relations—the difficult matters of Syria, Ukraine, Iran, nuclear weapons and more. These are urgent issues. But no real progress is possible if Americans fail to understand the real, and very different, problems that face Mr. Putin, those around him, and Russia itself.
For today’s regime in Moscow, the overriding goal is to defer the inevitable question of leaving power. Military adventurism, like the police state itself, is a means to that end.
Mr. Putin has been in power for nearly 18 years—like Leonid Brezhnev, whose rule (1964-82) became reviled as the “age of stagnation.” Today, as in the late Brezhnev years, Russia’s economy is languishing and the standard of living is falling. Education, science and health care are decrepit. Russians tell pollsters, whom they assume to be agents of the FSB secret police, that they support the regime. Then they don’t go to vote.
As Brezhnev did in Afghanistan, Mr. Putin has boosted his popularity by creating his own unprovoked war in Ukraine, to make Russians feel that he is defending them from an external threat. The Kremlin insists Mr. Putin’s next presidential term will be his last, and that he would like to retire by 2024. But he cannot do so without taking a huge personal risk.
No Russian leader leaves power willingly. Since the Middle Ages, those who did not die a natural death in office were either assassinated, executed, forced to resign, overthrown or some combination thereof. One slight exception is Boris Yeltsin. In 1999 he transferred power to Mr. Putin, who promptly destroyed any positive legacy Mr. Yeltsin might have had. There were also two pretend departures, in 1560 when Czar Ivan the Terrible left the throne temporarily and put another man in his place before returning, and in 2008 when Mr. Putin installed Dmitry Medvedev as a token president for one term.
Russians today understand that a change of regime is inevitable, and that postponement, especially through Mr. Putin’s methods, only worsens the eventual outcome. He enjoys support not because the people love him or are satisfied with his policies. The people support him because they can’t imagine an alternative.
The regime maintains fear about what comes next by eliminating opponents. Most are simply destroyed politically, but some are physically liquidated. Electoral fraud, repressive laws and constant, paralyzing propaganda reinforce the expectation that the current regime will survive
The situation is an ever-deepening spiral. Russian society is losing its reserves of trust. Nobody can guarantee when today’s leaders will leave, and whether that transition will be peaceful and orderly or violent and bloody. Mr. Putin can’t step aside without such guarantees. He is destroying society to postpone his departure. But a damaged and fearful society is incapable of assuring an orderly departure.
Mr. Trump has an opportunity to begin a businesslike dialogue with Mr. Putin—not about the vital issues in the headlines, but about a far more important problem: how to avoid unnecessary conflicts inside and outside Russia by ensuring a smooth transition of power.
It raises important questions that must be considered now: What does the Kremlin have to do at home and abroad to make this soft landing possible? What reciprocal steps and guarantees can the West offer? It’s time for the world to start contemplating a post-Putin world.
Such guarantees are not merely personal. The dialogue must confront some unpleasant realities. Mr. Putin would like to use international agreements to preserve and formalize the “gains” he has achieved in Europe: his conquest of Crimea and neutral status for Ukraine and other states Mr. Putin considers to be inside Russia’s legitimate sphere of influence.
The desire for such concessions may motivate Mr. Putin to discuss the matter of his stepping down while Mr. Trump is in office. That, in turn, could create an opportunity to remove other problems from the table. But it could also tempt the West to appease and buckle under, or to throw up barriers.
In any other scenario, if Mr. Putin is going to be thinking about how to remain in power, he needs the U.S. for only one thing—to play the role of a “safe enemy.” That allows him to rally the Russian people around him, while knowing America presents no actual danger. To expect any other approach from Mr. Putin is a self-delusion that will carry a high cost in the end.
If concessions offered by Mr. Putin are not to America’s benefit, Washington will need to acknowledge that the only workable policy toward the Kremlin is a Cold War-style containment, with clearly defined parameters.
The window for handling Mr. Putin is very narrow. Mr. Trump’s brashness has stopped at attacking Mr. Putin personally. That atypical restraint horrified many Russia hawks in the West. But it may turn out that Mr. Trump took a better approach. Whether accidentally or by design, he has left the door open for Mr. Putin to make a graceful exit. That would be good for everyone.
Mr. Khodorkovsky is founder of the Open Russia movement and a former CEO of Yukos Oil.
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http://freebeacon.com/national-security/opposition-leader-trump-help-russia-drive-putin-power/
The few Russians I knew choose not to speak negatively about Putin.
I have not been able to get a satisfactory reason but I think they see capitalism as the system with lesser evil then the other .
Anyone else know any Russians?
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We Built the Russia Sanctions to Last
Europe has stayed united behind them, and now Merkel seems to have brought Trump along.
By Edward Fishman
March 20, 2017 7:00 p.m. ET
Western sanctions on Russia have always seemed on the brink of collapse. Business interests have opposed them, and perspectives on Russia within the European Union—which requires unanimity to make foreign-policy decisions—have been anything but uniform. Skeptics claimed the West has only a passing interest in Ukraine, whereas Ukraine’s geopolitical disposition is of crucial importance to Russia. The implication was that Moscow could surely wait out Washington and Brussels.
Yet here we are: Sanctions remain in place three years after the West first imposed them and two months after the inauguration of President Trump. And there are few signs that is about to change.
In an otherwise awkward press conference last Friday, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Trump sounded harmonious notes on Ukraine policy. Mr. Trump praised Mrs. Merkel’s “leadership” on conflict resolution in Ukraine, and Mrs. Merkel noted that she was “very gratified to know that the American administration and also the president, personally, commits himself to the Minsk process.” That suggests Mr. Trump assured Mrs. Merkel he will stand by the existing policy of maintaining sanctions until Russia pulls back from eastern Ukraine.
As one of the diplomats involved in creating the sanctions, I am not surprised they have endured. We designed them to be sustainable—to apply meaningful pressure on Russia without risking a short-term economic crisis or overly burdening any one constituency in the U.S. or Europe. And good communication has prevented minor disagreements between Washington and European capitals from snowballing into threats to trans-Atlantic unity.
Why have sanctions proved so resilient? For starters, the EU has shown remarkable leadership and solidarity. Although semiannual decisions on whether to renew sanctions have caused jitters, the outcomes were never seriously in doubt. Despite frequent anti-sanctions rhetoric, no EU leader has challenged them head-on, and the EU’s biggest player—Mrs. Merkel’s Germany—has been a consistent supporter.
Even though any single EU member could veto sanctions, potential spoilers such as Russia-friendly Greece and Hungary have never posed a practical threat. That’s because a motion to break unanimity by a small country could cause a constitutional crisis in the EU. Many EU states might even refuse to implement a veto, undermining the legal and normative solidarity of the union writ large. None of the would-be spoilers are interested in accelerating the deterioration of the EU, so the veto option has never made sense.
Another reason sanctions have endured is that they haven’t harmed the U.S. or European economy in any serious way. Western sanctions on Rosneft, the world’s largest publicly traded oil producer by output, did not push oil prices upward, even as they froze some of the company’s major development projects. The same is true for sanctions against Russia’s six largest banks, which squeezed their finances but did not lead to broader contagion.
Because blowback was so limited, “sanctions fatigue” was turned on its head. Instead of becoming harder to stomach over time, sanctions faced their most intense business opposition in the beginning. As American and European companies have found alternative markets, living with Russia sanctions has become progressively easier for them.
A third reason for the durability of sanctions is that the U.S. and EU quickly settled on criteria for lifting them. In March 2015, all 28 EU leaders agreed that the core economic sanctions were “clearly linked to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements,” the peace accords to resolve the Ukraine conflict. The Group of Seven leaders echoed the sentiment in June 2015.
This benchmark greatly simplified the EU’s semiannual decisions to renew sanctions. As long as Russia and its proxies continued to control parts of eastern Ukraine, there was no justification to undo sanctions. Only new rollback criteria endorsed by all EU leaders could alter this dynamic.
It is fair to ask whether the rise of Donald Trump has changed this equation. It isn’t far-fetched to assume Mr. Trump might try to cancel sanctions or that his rhetoric will erode cohesion in the EU.
The president does have the authority to end U.S. sanctions unilaterally. Unlike in the Iran context, Congress has been a paper tiger on Russia, frequently denouncing the Kremlin’s actions in Ukraine but passing no significant laws that enhance or even codify existing sanctions. And in Europe, Mr. Trump’s “America first” rhetoric will only increase suspicions—hitherto groundless—that the U.S. is using sanctions to strengthen the competitive positions of American companies.
But it now seems doubtful that trans-Atlantic sanctions will end in the way most frequently envisioned: with the EU throwing in the towel. The irony of the present moment is that the EU—so often dismissed as “soft” on Russia—has emerged as the West’s bulwark. Even German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel, one of Europe’s most vocal critics of sanctions, is encouraging Washington to hold firm.
Brussels’ unity on this critical issue should stand as a lesson that the EU is hardly feckless; it is a tremendous boon to American foreign policy. It may be frustrating to corral a bloc of more than two dozen European states, but when the EU settles on a policy, it can be a potent and steadfast force.
Mr. Fishman, a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council, served at the State Department, 2013-17.
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http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/325606-democrats-step-up-calls-that-russian-hack-was-act-of-war
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http://chargedaffairs.org/on-china-and-russia-strategy-for-the-new-administration/
"...the United States should work to improve relations between Russia and countries adverse to China such as Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam, at least on the economic front."
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About the author of above post:
http://chargedaffairs.org/author/caleb-marquis/
John Bolton on threats to US. He seems to categorize China and Russia as long term threats vs more immediate threats such as terrorism, N Korea
He might well agree with Caleb Maruis on some of hs strategy which is kind of vague :
http://www.breitbart.com/radio/2017/02/23/bolton-trump-needs-long-term-strategy-keep-russia-check-europe-middle-east/
I tried to find something written on Rex Tillerson's views on Russia China and all that comes up is mostly LEFTist slanted criticism:
"Tillerson skips Nato for meeting with Putin" etc.
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Please post the last two posts on the Foreign Policy thread as well!
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Bush looked into Putin's eyes and saw his soul, Putin grabbed Baraq's "flexible" pussy, and it would appear it is now Trump's turn.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/29/us-gen-votel-russia-providing-weapons-support-tali/d
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https://pjmedia.com/trending/2017/03/29/russiagate-hillary-clinton-and-john-podestas-troubling-ties-to-russia/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrXivDENEF4
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https://pjmedia.com/trending/2017/03/29/russiagate-hillary-clinton-and-john-podestas-troubling-ties-to-russia/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrXivDENEF4
I'm sure our credentialed, very professional journalists at the MSM will be all over this!
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http://nypost.com/2017/04/10/turns-out-obama-was-the-real-russian-stooge/
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U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson held marathon meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on April 12. The length of the meetings and the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin granted Tillerson an audience is notable in and of itself, given the preceding back and forth between the White House and the Kremlin on whether Tillerson would in fact meet the Russian head of state.
In their comments following the meeting, both Lavrov and Tillerson said that substantive progress had been made in the U.S.-Russia dialogue. Following the April 4 attack on a Syrian airbase in response to a Syrian chemical weapons attack, Russia suspended a critical deconfliction agreement with the United States, designed to prevent collisions on the battlefield. Going into today's talks, Russia wielded the power of being able to act as a spoiler in Syria at a time when the United States is trying to focus on the fight against the Islamic State, and on the impending offensive against the militant bastion of Raqqa. Lavrov said in the post-meeting press conference that he and Tillerson discussed putting the deconfliction agreement "back on track." Meanwhile, the United States has backed off its allegations that Russia had advance warning — and covered up its knowledge — of a Syrian plan to launch a chemical weapons attack. Washington is also toning down threats of expanded sanctions on Russia.
Ultimately, the United States still wants to avoid expanding the scope of its mission in Syria, though Russia made clear ahead of the meeting with Tillerson that events on the ground could make that difficult. Putin said April 11 that he had knowledge that another chemical weapons attack is being planned in the southern suburbs of Damascus, maintaining that the chemical attacks are rebel actions meant to undermine the legitimacy of the Syrian government.
The United States will not tolerate certain activities by the Russia-backed Syrian government, including the use of nerve agents against civilians. (Notably, the Syrian government has regularly carried out attacks with chemicals that don't target the central nervous system, but the United States is not including those attacks in the current definition of its "red line".) Ultimately, the United States wants a final settlement of the Syrian civil war, and that means deciding whether to tolerate Bashar al-Assad as a leader or not.
The two countries are at least making the crucial first step of clarifying their priorities. For now, it seems that a temporary de-escalation in Syria has been agreed upon, which will enable the United States to better manage its risks on the battlefield. Russia will meanwhile attempt to use this temporary and partial agreement to further the dialogue with the United States on other issues, including NATO, the situation in Ukraine, and sanctions. On the latter, Tillerson said that sanctions could even be added if evidence emerges of Russian interference in the U.S. election. It is still uncertain whether the United States would even entertain the idea of broader negotiations with Russia. There is certainly enough playing out on the global stage to continue to drive tensions between the two sides, but this conciliatory meeting provided the opportunity for much-needed de-escalation, even if such a respite is temporary in nature.
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"The length of the meetings and the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin granted Tillerson an audience is notable in and of itself."
- That was my thought too. I'm guessing some pretty frank discussions are going on behind the scenes and I'm guessing Tillerson is very good at this, diplomatic but not afraid to make his point.
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Helluva coincidence that "Putin's poodle" has Mattis, McMaster, and Tillerson as his team. It is almost as if he knew that the hand he was extending to Putin might be rejected.
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http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/329930-treasury-wont-give-exxon-waiver-for-oil-drilling-in-russia
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even THIS denial of the waiver is twisted by the God Damn left to be some sort of cover up to deflect away from some Trump Russia election connection
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http://conservativetribune.com/trump-plans-russia-special-event/?utm_source=Email&utm_medium=THENewVoiceEmail&utm_campaign=can&utm_content=2017-04-28
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http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/15/russia-iran-sanctions-senate-vote-239594
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http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the-trump-putin-bromance-is-back-on?mbid=nl_170708_Daily&CNDID=50142053&spMailingID=11432571&spUserID=MjAxODUyNTc2OTUwS0&spJobID=1200684804&spReportId=MTIwMDY4NDgwNAS2
I must confess I share the assessment here on the election issue.
The Russian trolling begins , , ,
http://thehill.com/policy/international/341094-putin-thinks-trump-believed-denial-russia-meddled-in-election?rnd=1499526521
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https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/22/us/politics/congress-sanctions-russia.html?emc=edit_na_20170722&nl=breaking-news&nlid=49641193&ref=cta&_r=0
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http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jul/16/russia-fights-us-fracking-using-shell-company-to-f/?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWVdSalpUQTNNMll3WVdZeCIsInQiOiJINlVCRmZJSHVPOVN2VW5TVGczYXluOHQ2UmZJeE9HcjBhQWNNK1p4TWI0NHk2dXhvZmRrajA2blBtZ0t3ZGVRd2M2TEtqcVZUa3Uyc21sUGZraWhQcnZGUG1KY09ibk1wQXVXTDFBQmxhUzlxZm00dmxQb2xaSW1QOUdTRHhBTCJ9
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https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/world/europe/us-russia-sanctions.html?emc=edit_na_20170728&nl=breaking-news&nlid=49641193&ref=cta
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I can't say that this is something I would have opposed at the time , , ,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/oct/18/vladimir-putins-rage-triggered-by-president-obamas/?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiT0RVM01HVm1ObVE0TldKaiIsInQiOiJwY2ExcEdjaW9VTWlVYkJXdXFhZUN3aW1TNW1XWGljTjNDdHFBQmtRaFh6QkdJY21BMGpJU3dGZnJHd2VYYW5VUkNDakRUc3lTdFwvaDFOdXR6eUhjSHQwS29tMjZnVGNwQVkwS0lER253aGpFXC9FNU5CQUpycGM4b0IrdkJUcXFUIn0%3D
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quote author=Crafty_Dog
I can't say that this is something I would have opposed at the time , , ,
[Sticking it to Putin in 2012]
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I agree. It begs the question of how to deal with these complex relationships (China, Russia, Saudi, etc.). Not kowtow to them but not poke them in the eye at every opportunity.
The instincts of Trump (his call with Taiwan for example) may be just as good (or bad) as the judgment of the experts and careerists. Let them know they will get some cooperation and some aggravation out of us, carrot and stick. Make them want to influence us positively, from their point of view.
Condi Rice was quite the Russian expert. What did she accomplish? I don't know, mixed results, mostly bad.
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Regarding the Bush 43 Russian-US era, FWIW my take on it is this:
President Clinton split the difference on possible responses in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Empire, arguably coming up with the worse outcomes of each-- he didn't put the Russians away while they were weak, but instead did enough to piss them off (e.g. Yugoslavia) and persuade them to take advantage of his failure to put them away.
When Bush 43 came in they Russians were already hard at work rebuilding their military and re-imposing on their near abroad. With bandwidth consumed by the Iraq War, and Bush's polls at catastrophic levels, the Russians knew we would do jacksh*t when they invaded the Ossetia region of Georgia-- thus laying the groundwork for Crimea and east Ukraine.
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Regarding the Bush 43 Russian-US era, FWIW my take on it is this:
President Clinton split the difference on possible responses in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Empire, arguably coming up with the worse outcomes of each-- he didn't put the Russians away while they were weak, but instead did enough to piss them off (e.g. Yugoslavia) and persuade them to take advantage of his failure to put them away.
When Bush 43 came in they Russians were already hard at work rebuilding their military and re-imposing on their near abroad. With bandwidth consumed by the Iraq War, and Bush's polls at catastrophic levels, the Russians knew we would do jacksh*t when they invaded the Ossetia region of Georgia-- thus laying the groundwork for Crimea and east Ukraine.
Discussion on US-China thread reminded me that I wanted to add to this excellent description of what happened and didn't happen when the Soviet Union folded. I wrote a counterpoint that ran alongside the Mple red star-tribune's endorsement of Bill Clinton, Nov 1992, and they omitted from my argument against the left turn to Clinton what was the most important point to me. The continuation of growth economics (which unfortunately was not a choice on the ballot in 1992 anyway) was a most crucial component of a successful foreign policy. Economic growth in a free economy is our answer to Nikita Krushchev's false promise of theirs, 'we will bury you'. We needed to grow past these dangerous crony government tycoons in order to move them toward setting up a free market economy of their own to keep pace. Instead we elected an agenda of other priorities, larger government, higher taxes, social democracy, etc. slow growth at best. That agenda shifted later in the 90s and fast growth returned, but the new Russia was already off and running in a screwed up, central government fashion.
The same lessons apply today vis a vis China.
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It's easy to look at a string of recent indictments against members of U.S. President Donald Trump's former campaign staff and get sidetracked by the partisan rhetoric flying back and forth. But calls for impeachment from the left and claims of a state-sponsored set-up from the right ignore the deeper intrigue beneath the surface.
At the heart of the political turmoil is Russia, which believes itself to be a great power by right but has been held back by an international system designed and dominated by the West, with the United States at its helm. From its seat in Moscow, the Kremlin is determined to see this system undone and has worked tirelessly toward that end using every means it can except military force. Its inherent weakness, however, has determined the tools at its disposal.
Characterizing Russia as a weak nation might seem counterintuitive, but that doesn't make the description any less accurate. The country's options are limited and will likely only narrow in the years ahead. Over the past few years, cracks have begun to emerge in the political structure that Russian President Vladimir Putin built around himself. The government's tight grip on power is slowly starting to slip in the face of growing opposition groups, mounting regional resistance, enduring economic stagnation, increasing financial burdens, substantial international pressure and the rise of a new generation of citizens more willing than ever to challenge the establishment over corruption and hardship. All of these issues signal greater internal instability on the horizon, and as the Russian state grows more fragile, it will act decisively to mitigate any additional threats from beyond its borders.
Over the past few years, cracks have begun to emerge in the political structure that Russian President Vladimir Putin built around himself.
Moscow has thus turned to a grand strategy born of weakness, using asymmetric abilities to intertwine statecraft with unconventional military force. This approach offers a low-cost opportunity for confrontation that is just indirect enough to avoid eliciting a coordinated response from more powerful adversaries. Russia's activities in Ukraine are a case in point. Moscow was well aware that no Western nation would risk nuclear war — a possible outcome of any military conflict with Russia — to yank back the Ukrainian territory it had seized. Russia's reliance on a nuclear arsenal, particularly its tactical nuclear weapons, is therefore a key component of its asymmetric strategy.
Another is its use of information, including propaganda and disinformation campaigns. Russia has wielded such programs to great success in the past, gaining impressive advantages at the operational and strategic level, often at very little cost. The Kremlin's approach to the information realm is twofold: One part is geared toward influencing its audience at home, while the other is directed against states abroad. The second category, aimed at countries, includes sowing discontent, exacerbating political and social divisions, and wreaking havoc in strategic parts of the globe to keep the attention of other powers fixed elsewhere instead of on Russia.
Information operations are neither new nor exclusively Russian. They also aren't a tactic solely for the weak. Rather, they have long been part of international cooperation and competition, particularly for countries with complex interests that stretch far and wide. But what makes their use today different is technology. Recent advances, especially the birth of the internet, have dramatically expanded the scope of "information confrontation," creating a new and virtual battlefield where Russia has excelled. The Kremlin's information operations are highly nuanced and, by disseminating data that is partially true, they are often far more effective than those that rely on falsified news. In this way, Moscow's messaging appears more plausible to its audience and gradually builds support for Russian interests.
Until it is stopped, Russia will not abandon the tactics that have already proved so effective in the subtle war it is waging against the international system and the states that lead it.
Recent testimonies before Congress on election meddling, coupled with revelations of Russia's sophisticated "fake" news and targeted propaganda efforts, play perfectly into the Kremlin's strategy. Because at the end of the day, its activities have little to do with picking an election's winners and losers, and everything to do with sowing discord throughout the West.
The real question, then, is how will the United States and its European allies respond? So far they have not found a comprehensive and coordinated solution to the threat they face. It will take time for the piecemeal fixes that have emerged to coalesce into a cohesive policy that prevents, punishes or deters Russia — especially since some of their most potent tools, such as the control of information, run counter to the fundamental rights that their democracies hold dear. Until it is stopped, Russia will not abandon the tactics that have already proved so effective in the subtle war it is waging against the international system and the states that lead it.
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I like this analysis. We look at strengths of Russia and forget to look at them from their points of weakness.
Interesting point from the article about their disinformation tactics: "The Kremlin's information operations are highly nuanced and, by disseminating data that is partially true, they are often far more effective than those that rely on falsified news." - Right out of the DNC / Rules for Radicals playbook.
Unmentioned are low oil prices, maybe implied in stagnant economy. Note that Trump is opening large new areas for drilling. Second is that if we aggressively produce and export LNG that squeezes them further. Maybe they will have to grow a real economy.
Another idea is to quit telling them how special and important they are. G8? They aren't G10.
US, China, Japan, Germany, UK, France, India, Italy, Brazil, Canada and South Korea all have bigger economies.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)
UN Security Council, permanent member, why? Because of their moral authority??
Walter Russell Mead had an article this week about 5 countries that use informal and voluntary cooperation, US, UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/five-eyes-are-better-than-one-1509402670
Why not expand on that idea and keep out countries that work to sabotage out interests at every turn?
P.S. They didn't affect our election any more than a whole lot of other subversive forces.
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"UN Security Council, permanent member, why? Because of their moral authority??"
Because of their nukes and their willingness to act (Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, etc etc etc)
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"UN Security Council, permanent member, why? Because of their moral authority??"
Because of their nukes and their willingness to act (Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, etc etc etc)
Right. But they should be the topic of the Security Council meetings, not a voting member IMHO, if this was a serious organization designed to prevent and react to things like what happened in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, etc.
I understand why they are there but there is a downside to it. We elevate Putin's standing with the Russian people and with the world. What was the consequence for those invasions and annexations?
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Another good Stratfor point I meant to highlight:
"... its activities have little to do with picking an election's winners and losers, and everything to do with sowing discord throughout the West."
Facebook Admits That Russia Ads Are Actually Against Donald Trump
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0s4cLDwt7o
That doesn't fit any narrative, except it makes more sense that they supported Hillary than Trump.
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To be precise, that would be the post election ads, yes?
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Note From the Interviewer:
These days Vygaudas Usackas, the European Union's former envoy to Moscow, is touring Lithuania presenting a documentary about the assassinated Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov and offering audiences his insight into the world of Russian politics. One idea recurs throughout the question-and-answer sessions that precede the screenings: Even though Russia has violated international law, the West must try to improve its relationship with the country. I sat down with Usackas during a showing to ask him some questions about Nemtsov, Moscow and what to do if you find yourself stuck in an elevator with the Russian president.
As the movie about the slain Russian opposition leader plays in the theater next to us, let me start off by asking you whether you believe Boris Nemtsov had the potential to effect change in Russia?
I think he clearly had views and a vision for the country that corresponded to the initial expectations of the Russian people, i.e. a move toward embracing democracy, the rule of law and a free market. As the documentary, "The Man Who Was Too Free," suggests, Nemtsov was initially picked as the most likely successor to President Boris Yeltsin. However, later, under a different set of circumstances, the decision-making process was redefined and Vladimir Putin was promoted as Yeltsin's successor.
Before the movie you said that the West made a mistake in the early 1990s, after the Soviet empire's collapse, by treating Russia as it had treated Japan and war-ravaged Germany after World War II, i.e. by assisting them. Do you believe that the West had any other option then?
I think we can't speak about a mistake (in the treatment), but there was definitely a noble approach to Russia, trying to support it and promote profound democratic changes in the country. It was carried out with the intention to transform Russia later into a state like post-war Germany or Japan, a country that embraced democracy and the free market. At some point, however, Western leaders misinterpreted the real changes taking place in Russia, when the new president, Putin, embarked on a different path Western leaders hadn't promoted and hoped for.
I think this is where the question arises: Why did it happen, who made a mistake and at what stage? From my perspective, different kinds of developments were unlikely to have been expected because hypocrisy and complacency had overtaken relations between Russia and the West for a considerable time. Let's admit that there was too much wishful thinking and too little honest accounting between the two sides after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The West did not find it convenient to acknowledge that President Putin's Russia has been departing from the initial path of democratization and gradually tightening the screws over fundamental freedoms at home, while aggressively asserting its interests abroad. It all looked like a temporary fluke, but not a fundamental shift.
Russians are hugely disappointed in their authorities, yet Putin enjoys high support ratings across the country. How do you explain this?
Well, I believe there's one important factor that the West and Russia's immediate neighbors don't appreciate enough, i.e. the natural desire of the Russian people to recover the respect and pride of the nation. The transition from a Soviet planning system to a free market economy, from a one-party dictatorship to the multiparty system, is well-understood and highly appreciated from the perspective of a Lithuanian or anyone familiar with the Soviet system and anyone who had to go through this kind of transformation.
Unlike Lithuania, which managed to make the transition to the new system smoothly and fulfilled its aspirations of European Union and NATO membership, the reforms in Russia didn't yield satisfactory results for most people. In their view, they experienced too much suffering and too little positive change. As we in the Baltics enjoyed the fruits of reforms, the Russians continued to feel neglected and harmed by perceived American hegemony and the trans-Atlantic dictatorship. Once in power, Putin injected a sense of greater pride and self-confidence into the nation, albeit one that was accomplished through illegal means, such as the annexation of Crimea or the continuing conflict in eastern Ukraine. Yet Putin demonstrated a stamina and political will as well as a capacity to use the Russian military to achieve the ultimate goal of putting Russia back on the world stage. This was shown not only through the illegal actions in Ukraine but also through military and political engagement in Syria. The latter helped Putin get out of isolation (following the Ukraine crisis) and reinstate himself as an indispensable negotiating partner for the Americans over Syria and the greater Middle East.
Russia hinges on its military might. Do you believe this will change anytime soon? With Putin still in power or with him out the Kremlin?
I think Russia will face a dilemma at some point. As a country, it has resources but very low productivity; its financial reserves have started to deplete, and the economy is underperforming due to a decline in the price of oil and because of economic sanctions. I believe the Russian economy will reach a point where Russia will have to make the choice whether to continue wasting much needed money in places like Syria or Ukraine or attempt to balance the books by embarking on internal structural reforms and restoring relations with the West, which can only come with a return to respecting the international rule-based system.
Do you believe relations between the United States and Russia have hit their lowest point?
I do think that West-Russia relations are indeed at the lowest point. On the other hand, any conflict, however unpleasant it might be, has its own timespan. We see that new urgent issues and priorities are appearing and Russia has a say as a U.N. Security Council member or a major regional actor.
There's a growing understanding that we have to live with Russia in a complex way. On some issues, like Syria and North Korea, we may find more commonalities. On the other ones, like regional and internal political freedoms, we will remain in an adversarial relationship for a considerable time. Western societies and leaders have to acknowledge that Russia has taken a different path of development, one marked by self-isolation from the West and an emphasis on military might. This will not change soon. We face a clash of worldviews that concerns core European values, such as freedom of speech or political pluralism. We also differ with respect to honoring World Trade Organization provisions. At the heart of this clash is Russia's continued rejection of the outcome of the Cold War and its insistence on a new security order based on its spheres of influence rather than on the free choice of nations such as Ukraine and Georgia to forge alliances and associations with the West.
But the most important thing is that we don't clash in a direct military conflict, which would have enormous multidimensional consequences. To me, it's obvious that Putin will stick to his worldviews until his last day in power. Yet I believe that we, as neighbors, have to be open to a certain kind of relationship with a view to better understand (Russia's) intentions and to seek to avoid worsening the security environment in Europe. At the same time, we have to stick to our principles, avoid the perception that the West is demanding, ensure unity within the EU and trans-Atlantic unity, and increase political and financial support for Ukraine.
Since annexing Crimea and making an incursion into eastern Ukraine, Russia hasn't proceeded with any new acts of aggression for the last three years. Does this mean that it doesn't want new conflicts and would rather mend fences with the West?
I think President Putin has shown his unique capacity to surprise by making robust strategic and tactical decisions. In no way should we in the West become complacent and give up our vigilance or underestimate our strategic calculations. What NATO is doing in deterring Russia and reinforcing the bloc's military position in the Baltics is of paramount importance. It's also very important that we address the loopholes of cybersecurity and confront hybrid meddling into the democratic processes of the West. Yet, as I said, it's important, being on the front line with Russia, that we maintain a certain kind of dialogue to avoid unintentional consequences as a result of a lack of basic information between the two sides.
We're speaking a day after U.S. President Donald Trump and Putin shook hands and spoke briefly in Vietnam. Do you think it's a sign that the two adversaries are willing to speak?
We still have yet to learn what they were talking about. Initially, the Russian media reported that the main topic of conversation was the Syria conflict, but I would be surprised if the presidents didn't touch on the topic of North Korea. The United States' resolute approach to the reclusive country may spur Russian and Chinese leaders to employ a set of political and economic levers to address the situation. I believe the two heads of state spoke in this manner: "Help me on this and I will help you on that." Who knows, but it's very possible that they also raised the issue of Ukraine against the backdrop of the unfulfilled Minsk agreement.
Russia insists that it defends a multipolar world in which Russia counterbalances American hegemony in the world. Do you buy this?
A unipolar approach to me is based on the principle that all nations, including Russia, abide by international law. In reality, however, we see that Russia vigorously attempts to challenge what it perceives to be a Western dictate on political and economic developments. Russia does outreach to China and also to the (other) BRICS countries — Brazil, India and South Africa. We see that Russia is promoting alternative institutions through it, such as the BRICS (New Development) Bank etc.
It remains to be seen where it takes us, but we may be witnessing a shift in global powers. Within 15 to 20 years the Pacific nations will be producing more than 50 percent of the world's gross domestic product. The shift of economic might is already moving toward China, but India and other growing economies in the region also have potential. I believe that what matters at the end of the day is not whether we live in a unipolar, bipolar or multipolar world, but that we all live under a unified international system of rules and that nations comply with these rules.
President Trump is staving off accusations stemming from alleged contact between some of the leading men in his presidential campaign and high-ranking Russian officials. Do you believe the congressional probe into Russia's meddling in the U.S. presidential campaign is politicized to some extent?
I don't think it's politicized. We have plenty of evidence, including revelations by the U.S. investigators and even by French President Emmanuel Macron, who, in a press conference with Putin, said bluntly that pro-Kremlin news channel Sputnik was biased and that Moscow was supporting the Brexit.
As independent Russia media reported, last year the Anti-Globalist Movement of Russia, which is funded by a presidential grant, hosted a congress of separatists from around the world. It brought together populist and separatist movements from Europe and America.
Russian disinformation and meddling in the internal affairs of democratic countries continues as illustrated by a recent statement from British Prime Minister Theresa May.
As Russia gets ready for a presidential election next year, do you believe the outcome of the election is already clear? Do you believe Putin has any vulnerabilities?
Everyone has vulnerabilities, including Putin. But the vulnerabilities he faces don't provide sufficient room for him to lose, simply because the others will not enjoy a level playing field: The other candidates won't have the Kremlin-controlled media's support, access to resources and so on. And, yes, Putin's popularity remains very high. Unfortunately, the Russian people do not have a fair choice.
You're one of few top-level EU politicians who's met Putin in person, and you even talked to him during an awkward situation when you were stuck with him and former European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso in an elevator in Brussels. You spoke about the encounter to the Nemtsov moviegoers earlier this evening and to the Lithuanian media, too. Can you recall the meeting for our international readers?
(Grins) I wouldn't call it an awkward situation, at least not for me. Everything happens. Especially after a tough meeting when two leaders cannot speak without a translator. While in the elevator and kind of ignoring President Barroso, President Putin started to complain to me about Dalia Grybauskaite, the Lithuanian president, asking why she always speaks so harshly to him on the world stage. My response was simple: "How can you expect her to talk friendly to you if you threaten Ukraine and introduce an embargo on Lithuanian agricultural products?" He commented tersely, "It's not me, it's the Russian business lobbyists who are trying to promote their particular interests and meddle in the work of the government."
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Tensions between Russia and the West will remain high in 2018, with the United States and European Union likely to maintain — if not expand — their economic sanctions.
Negotiations between Moscow and the West over contested hot spots like Ukraine and Syria will take place throughout the year, though talks ultimately will not lead to any breakthrough agreements.
The importance of Russia's relationship with the West to Moscow will gradually ebb as the Kremlin increasingly turns its foreign policy focus to other regions of the world.
At the beginning of 2017, it appeared as if the strained relationship between Russia and the West was about to undergo a substantial shift. U.S. President Donald Trump, who had campaigned on a platform of improving relations with Russia, was about to be inaugurated. Upcoming elections in the core European Union states of France and Germany offered the possibility that Euroskeptic parties would rise to power, leading to a major change in those countries' positions, including on maintaining sanctions against Russia. Furthermore, it appeared as if solidarity within NATO, as well as support for Western-leaning states like Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, was in danger of weakening substantially.
But as 2018 approaches, it's clear that instead of waning, Western pressure against Russia has intensified. In the United States, lawmakers wrested the power to withdraw U.S. sanctions against Russia away from the president, partially as a result of the numerous investigations launched into the extent of Russian interference in U.S. elections. Trump essentially was forced to cede his power to unilaterally lift the penalties in July, and Congress subsequently enacted a stronger sanctions regime against Moscow.
In France, the National Front, a Euroskeptic party, and its pro-Russian presidential candidate Marine Le Pen reached the second round of the country's presidential election, but Le Pen lost to centrist Emmanuel Macron in the decisive vote. Russia certainly had tried to influence the result in favor of Le Pen, but the exposure of the cyberwarfare and information campaigns it had used to try to influence the outcome of U.S. elections and the revelation that the Kremlin was employing the same techniques in Europe, blunted their effectiveness. The same held true during the German general elections in September, where despite Russian efforts, the anti-establishment Alternative for Germany party did not gain substantial traction, even though it did outperform expectations. After the dust of the European elections settled, the European Union maintained its cohesiveness, and its members voted unanimously to extend sanctions against Russia through the end of 2017.
In the meantime, neither the European Union nor NATO has backed away from the countries on the European/Russian borderland. The United States and the European bloc have been steadfast in their support for Ukraine, and NATO has followed through with the deployment of semipermanent battalions to Poland and the Baltic states. On its side of the border, Russia has built up its forces as well, and while there has been no major confrontation between Russia and NATO, their military standoff has maintained the intensity of past years.
What's Ahead in 2018?
Several key issues will shape the direction of ties between Russia and the West in 2018. One is the conflict between Russian-backed separatist forces and the Ukrainian government in Ukraine's east, which is entering its fourth year. Following an escalation of violence along the frontlines in the separatist Donbas region shortly after Trump's inauguration, military activity has decreased in intensity in recent months. The conflict has now taken on the "semi-frozen" nature typical of those in other Russian-backed breakaway territories in the former Soviet space. In the meantime, diplomatic activity between Russia and the West over the Ukrainian separatist conflict picked up after a suggestion by Russian President Vladimir Putin in September that a U.N. peacekeeping force be deployed to Eastern Ukraine.
Putin's proposal and associated diplomatic efforts have raised the question of whether the end of the Ukrainian conflict could be in sight in 2018. But given the gap between Russia and the West over the nature and parameters of a potential U.N. mission in Donbas, prolonged negotiations are likely before any agreement could be struck. Russia, on one hand, has suggested the deployment of a limited force purely to protect observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe on the line of contact between Ukrainian security forces and the separatists. But Ukraine and the United States have both called for a deployment to span all of Donbas, including along the border between the separatist territory and Russia. That option essentially would represent a complete abandonment of Russia's strategic position in Donbas, given that Moscow is thought to funnel troops and weapons to support the rebels over the border. While Russia can use the peacekeeping proposal to show its willingness to negotiate over the conflict in an effort to stave off additional Western pressure, it does not mean that Russia will capitulate to the Ukrainian-U.S. position. What's more, Russia could drive an escalation of fighting if it suited its needs.
Depending on what ongoing U.S. investigations over Russian election meddling reveal, the United States could escalate its sanctions regime against Russia. And although Trump does not support it, key members of his administration are openly considering sending lethal weaponry to Ukraine. If the United States decides to take either of those actions, Moscow could choose to respond by escalating the conflict in Eastern Ukraine — or responding elsewhere in an asymmetric fashion.
A longtime driver of tensions between Russia and the West has been the ongoing military buildup by both sides along the European borderlands, which shows no signs of slowing. Russia is expected to permanently deploy Iskander short-range ballistic missile systems to its Kaliningrad enclave on a permanent basis at the beginning of 2018, while NATO will set up new Atlantic and logistics commands, as well as increase coordination efforts on Black Sea patrols and cyberdefense capabilities. The continued buildups could add pressure that would interfere with the resumption of already stalled arms control talks between the United States and Russia.
Moscow's continued use of hybrid warfare techniques in Europe, the United States and Western-aligned nations represents another front in the standoff.
Moscow's continued use of hybrid warfare techniques in Europe, the United States and Western-aligned nations represents another front in the standoff. As Italy prepares to hold general elections by May, Moscow is likely to ramp up its information campaign in support of parties like the Five Star Movement and Forza Italia that oppose Russian sanctions. But as in Germany, the Italian parties that Russia would prefer will likely struggle to access power. Russian efforts are more likely to be successful in Moldova, where there is a good chance the pro-Russian Socialist Party will unseat the ruling EU-oriented coalition and subsequently reverse some of the moves the country has taken in recent years toward Western integration in favor of closer ties with Moscow.
Russia's Foreign Policy Focus Shifts
One important emerging trend related to the Russia-West standoff is Moscow's rising influence in regions other than Europe and Eurasia. As its isolation from the West has become more pronounced, Russia has expanded its economic relationships with China and the Arab states. At the same time, Russia has increased its economic and security involvement in areas of substantial strategic interest to the United States and Europe, most notably Syria and North Korea.
Those efforts have substantially boosted Russian influence in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific, and it has followed by deepening its ties in other strategic theaters such as Afghanistan, Venezuela and Libya. Initially, Russia appeared to be conducting the interventions in areas outside its traditional interests in the European and Eurasian theaters as a strategy to increase its leverage in negotiations with the United States over issues closer to home. But Russia's relationships in those regions has evolved beyond a negotiation strategy. Indeed, Moscow has developed significant political, economic and security interests in many of those areas.
Managing its relationship with the West is no longer the defining feature of Russia's foreign policy efforts. Instead, Moscow has created a much more complex and intertwined series of relationships spanning the globe. While its confrontation with Europe and the United States is expected to continue and perhaps even intensify in 2018, that competition will be only one facet among many emerging interests and priorities for Russia.
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The United States is gearing up to increase pressure on Russia over what it claims are Moscow's flagrant violations of an important Cold War-era arms treaty. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is a cornerstone arms control pact between the United States and Russia that halted a destabilizing buildup of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe during the 1980s. The United States has accused Russia of developing, testing and deploying a cruise missile that violates the limits set by the INF, and Moscow in turn has accused Washington of deploying drones and missile launchers that violate the terms of the treaty. Last week, the U.S. State Department released a report in which it vehemently refuted Russia's claims. To pressure Moscow back into compliance with the treaty, the U.S. State Department also announced Dec. 8 that Washington was preparing to take military, diplomatic and economic measures over alleged infractions of the pivotal arms treaty.
To ensure conformity with the treaty, the United States will seek to work with its NATO partners to present a united front against Russia. Last month during the North Atlantic Council meeting, U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis reportedly presented NATO allies with an ultimatum: Either NATO acts jointly on punitive measures on Russia related to the INF violations by summer 2018 or Washington will move ahead unilaterally. Furthermore, U.S. Commerce Department is preparing new sanctions that will target Russian companies believed to be involved with developing weapons that violate the terms of the treaty. On the diplomatic front, the United States and Russia will meet this week as part of the Special Verification Commission to potentially address the U.S. accusations. However, past meetings on the same issue have failed to produce any breakthroughs.
Finally, the United States could pressure Russia militarily. For instance, the U.S. Congress has moved toward authorizing funds for the development of a U.S. missile that if fielded would violate the INF treaty. (Though, for now, the United States would develop the missile but not deploy it.) In addition, Washington is also looking into increasing its force deployments in Europe as well as expanding its missile defenses as a response. If the United States elects to ratchet up the pressure even further, it could then test and deploy its own missiles that violate the treaty.
The fragility of the INF highlights the fraying legacy of an arms control framework left over from the Cold War. Complicating matters, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) will expire in 2021, and the dispute around the INF could impair negotiations over New START's renewal. If the dispute over INF ends up undermining New START, that would further exacerbate an already unstable arms control regime and lead to a significant new arms race between the United States and Russia that could even extend to other nations.
STRATFOR
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http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/365168-gop-chairman-worried-by-trumps-stance-on-russian-interference
In addition to the Trump related commentary, note this:
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Last week, the House passed legislation sponsored by McCaul that would elevate Homeland Security’s cybersecurity mission by replacing the little-recognized headquarters office called the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) with an operational, stand-alone agency to handle cyber and infrastructure protection.
Part of the NPPD’s mission is providing penetration testing and other services to state and local officials worried about the security of their voter databases and other systems. Homeland Security opened up election infrastructure to voluntary federal protections after Russia tried to infiltrate election infrastructure in 21 states ahead of last year’s election.
Broadly, NPPD is responsible for protecting critical infrastructure — the majority of which is owned privately — from cyber and physical threats.
McCaul’s legislation has received strong backing from Kirstjen Nielsen, Trump’s new Homeland Security secretary. She has urged the Senate to pass similar legislation.
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Washington will increase pressure on Moscow in 2018 through a series of expanded sanctions aimed at Russia’s financial stability, elites, reputation and defense industry.
Russia will weather the increased pressure by further insulating its economy, oligarchs and companies, placing additional responsibility for the country’s stability on the Kremlin.
The Russian government can maintain its position next year, though its resources are growing slim and the Kremlin faces a pivotal series of elections.
Heading into the new year, tensions between Moscow and Washington show no sign of abating. The United States is continuing its investigations of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election; both sides have accused each other of arms treaty violations; and both countries are continuing to build up their positions across the globe as they prepare for a long-term struggle. In addition, the United States has specified four areas — each with varying effects and degrees of political fallout — for further sanctions against Russia. The added pressure on the Kremlin comes as President Vladimir Putin faces re-election and Russia grows increasingly fragile.
Sanctions in Place
Since the Soviet period, the United States has targeted Russia with numerous sanctions. The primary ones currently in effect were instituted over human rights violations and the conflict in Ukraine. In late 2012, the United States expanded its Soviet-era sanctions over human rights and approved the Magnitsky Act to punish those deemed responsible for the death of Russian tax accountant Sergei Magnitsky, a whistleblower who investigated Kremlin abuses and a tax-fraud scheme. The act penalizes dozens of people believed to be involved in the case, but the measure has evolved into a platform for the United States and its allies to punish Russia for a much wider scope of human rights abuses.
The Ukraine sanctions imposed by the United States (and, to a lesser extent, by the European Union, Canada, Australia and Japan) stem from Russian involvement in the conflict there and includes the conflict in eastern Ukraine, Russian support of the previous government, the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 and the annexation of Crimea. Those penalties include:
Limits on debt issuance to Russia's six largest banks, four primary state oil firms and four state defense firms.
Sanctions on Russia's energy industry, prohibiting U.S. firms from providing, exporting or re-exporting goods and technology related to deep-water, Arctic offshore and shale oil and natural gas projects in Russia.
Bans on subjects receiving dual-use goods by Russia's primary state defense companies.
Sanctions (travel and asset freezes) against hundreds of Russian entities and individuals.
But the effects of these sanctions on Russia are open to debate, because low oil prices plunged the country into a recession in the same year that some of the penalties were implemented. And Russia insulated much of its economy as ties soured with the West. It has curbed Western imports by building up its domestic capabilities (including in food, credit services and online infrastructure) and by looking to the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East for investment partners and some level of trade. The sanctions did bite into some key energy projects, such as the giant oil deal with Exxon Mobil Corp., and they will have a long-term effect on Russia's oil production. But much to Washington's chagrin, Moscow has, for the most part, weathered the penalties.
During the past year, Washington has drafted a string of sanction options; some were extreme, such as cutting off Russia from Western-based financial and credit systems. But four key subjects — sovereign debt, oligarchs, human rights and defense — are moving into range as targets of expanded sanctions. In July, the U.S. Congress wrested the power to directly withdraw the Russian sanctions away from the presidency, and lawmakers now require that changes to the sanctions regime go through them first. President Donald Trump signed the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act in August, and it included provisions for expanding penalties in the coming years.
Beginning in February, the U.S. Treasury Department will submit the details on possible expanded sanctions, though their general targets — sovereign debt and oligarchs — are already known. These penalties are connected mostly to the U.S. investigation into Russian interference during the 2016 presidential election, which has sent U.S. perceptions of Russia plummeting — particularly in Congress.
The Sovereign Debt Squeeze
In its February report, the Treasury Department will detail the effects on Russia and the global market of possible sanctions on U.S. citizens who buy new Russian domestic government debt. Current sanctions prevent certain Russian companies (such as its largest bank, Sberbank, and oil giant Rosneft) from issuing bonds to Western investors, but they don't prevent the government from issuing the debt. So the Kremlin has been taking on sovereign debt and reportedly transferring it to its sanctioned firms. In 2017, foreign investment in Russian government debt rose from 5 percent to 30 percent of the total $25 billion in bonds issued. Among many Western financial firms, Russian government bonds have been considered some of the best performing in emerging markets this year.
In 2018, the Russian government expects to borrow an additional $18 billion to supplement its federal budget, which is already slim for the year. While the country is pulling out of a recession, it is also settling into a prolonged period of economic stagnation. Moreover, the Russian people and many of the country's strategic firms and banks are facing even more difficulties, forcing the Kremlin to take on increased financial burdens to ensure the economic system doesn't destabilize and to mitigate popular backlash. The Kremlin will likely draw on much of its reserve funds to stay afloat, while borrowing more heavily internationally.
If the United States implements sanctions on Russian sovereign debt, Western investors (beyond American) could be spooked away from buying it. The Russian Finance Ministry said in mid-December that the government would not try to issue bonds ahead of the February report; it was confident Moscow had enough non-Western connections to purchase its future debt. Russia has spent much of its energy in recent years strengthening its relationships in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East to mitigate pressure from the West. So expanded sanctions on Russian sovereign debt would be a hindrance, but not a burden heavy enough to change Russian behavior.
Pinching the Oligarchs
Another sanctions option that has caught the Kremlin's attention will be part of a second U.S. Treasury Department report to be released in February. It will outline the most significant Kremlin-tied oligarchs, the silovarchs, their net worth, evidence of corruption, their business ties abroad, their assets abroad and their sources of income. Their families (wives, children, parents and siblings) and associates will be subject to sanctions, as will their assets. In addition, their children could even be prevented from studying abroad. The scope of this option is starkly different from the current sanctions on Russian personalities. Those Kremlin-tied oligarchs mostly keep their assets and lives inside Russia, and they are also directly tied to Russian foreign policy — mostly to the conflict in Ukraine. Expanding the list to the oligarchs and silovarchs who are Putin's personal cronies comes closer to directly targeting the president.
And among members of the general oligarchy, concern has spread that they may get roped into sanctions under this investigation. These elites are holdovers from the chaotic 1990s and are not necessarily loyal to Putin. They typically hold vast sums of money, assets and business interests abroad, and most of them are tied to the Kremlin because they need Putin's support. Names floated among the media are mostly the surviving oligarchs of the metals and energy industries: Oleg Deripaska, Roman Abramovich, Mikhail Fridman, Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Prokhorov. According to The Moscow Times and RBC media group, Russian oligarchs have flooded Washington with lobbyists and lawyers, who have reportedly suggested that the oligarchs divorce their wives and put their assets in the names of their now ex-wives to protect them. On a side note, the oligarchs have also reportedly threatened Forbes Russia to not publish its annual list of Russian billionaires. In early December, Russian media reported that Forbes would pull back on the list, though it didn't confirm or deny that it was acquiescing to the oligarchs.
After Putin's crackdown on the oligarchs during his first decade in power, the remaining handful of businessmen running major non-state firms are powerful. The Kremlin relies on these oligarchs to maintain non-state businesses, to shore up the country's financial sector and to supply the livelihoods for the many regions and cities dependent on a single industry. Should they come under U.S. attack for a foreign policy they are not responsible for, then they may turn on Putin and his administration, destabilizing the already tense system of elites.
Unnamed sources in Washington told the newspaper Izvestia that the list of oligarchs and businessmen drawn up by the U.S. Treasury Department won't be released publicly. The move is probably intended to prevent those people from moving their funds and shifting their business ties to duck sanctions. In addition, the Izvestia report claimed that the list would be shared with the United States' European partners to attempt to persuade them to not do business with those on the list. That move is likely just a recommendation, because most Europeans are not fully behind expanded sanctions, which could harm their economies and businesses. And concern about the U.S. use of this sanction option sparked increased capital flight from Russia by foreign investors during November and December.
On Dec. 21 Putin called a large bunch of the oligarchs to the Kremlin; such a call typically means the government is going to demand that the billionaires flush cash into the Russian system to keep it stable. Such a demand was issued last month, but the most recent sit-down was starkly different. The Kremlin offered to help the oligarchs move their money safely from abroad by using Eurobonds to protect it from U.S. targeting. The Russian Central Bank and Finance Ministry assured the businessmen that the infrastructure to move foreign currency investments in bulk back to Russia had been put in place. Unofficial reports claim the Russian government will float $3 billion in Eurobonds, but not through the typical security accounts, such as Euroclear or Clearstream — which are required to notify the U.S. Treasury Department. Instead, the float would be available to anonymous Russian investors directly, though it is unclear what system Moscow will use instead.
Magnitsky and Human Rights
Though the Europeans are not necessarily on board with either of the aforementioned measures, they could agree to sanctions over human rights. The United States has expanded the Magnitsky Act over the years, turning it from a vehicle for sanctions on people responsible for the Russian accountant's death to one targeting global human right offenses. The original act was adopted by a handful of Western allies, including Canada, the United Kingdom, Estonia and Lithuania. The only high-ranking individual on the sanctions list until recently was Alexander Bastrykin, head of Russia's Investigative Committee.
However, on Dec. 20, the Treasury Department expanded the list to include one of Russia's most powerful and controversial figures: Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. He is accused of being involved in a purge of homosexual men in his region this year. Dozens of gay or bisexual men have fled Chechnya, though Kadyrov denies the accusations. He responded in his usual way: with a rant on Instagram. He blasted the sanctions, then mocked their impact because he says he has no assets in the United States and doesn't want to travel there.
This fall, Canada introduced its own version of the Magnitsky Act and sanctioned 52 people tied to the case. Ottawa is also using the act as blanket legislation to target global human rights offenses, though it is primarily aimed at Russia. The United Kingdom, as well, is considering expanding its Magnitsky-style bill in February. And France, South Africa and Ukraine are all considering introducing similar measures against Russia next year.
The Magnitsky Act and related bills do not directly hit the Kremlin or Russia. However, Putin has repeatedly noted that he takes personal offense to the measures. For an autocratic leader who has aggressively consolidated power and has not shied away from conflicts abroad, this sentiment may seem peculiar. But this issue is reportedly one of the primary demands Russia has repeatedly raised in larger negotiations. Putin seems to believe that the act undermines his reputation at home and abroad. Now that the act is expanding to his closest loyalists, the issue is likely rising in the Russian leader's priorities.
Targeting the Defense Industry
Next year the United States is likely to impose sanctions on Russian defense companies that provide technology or development that violates the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). The United States and Russia have repeatedly accused each other of violating the 1987 arms-control pact, which bans a buildup of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. In November, U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis presented NATO allies with an ultimatum to join U.S. punitive measures on Russia over the INF Treaty. The U.S. Commerce Department is preparing a list of companies believed to be involved in developing weapons that violate the treaty.
The Cold War arms treaties have long been a bone of contention between Moscow and Washington, and they have grown obsolete as both sides have been developing missiles that could violate the treaty and as arms programs have proliferated to many other powers who are not bound by the pact's restrictions. Putin said in his recent televised news conference that the treaty was all but dead. The United States is already planning to increase force deployments in Europe and expand missile defense programs — both against Russia's wishes.
Despite the INF Treaty technically still being in place, Russia is already responding to U.S. sanctions over the agreement. Putin ordered 77 defense firms to ensure that they can develop equipment and parts currently imported from the West. The Russian government has also decreed that all purchases made by its Defense Ministry and various security services should be made in secret. All documentation of contracts, registrations, purchases and permits by these agencies and their contractors will be issued in closed tenders and classified as state secrets. Banks and financial institutions will also mark such transactions as classified.
With increased financial allocations for the defense industry, Russia is also preparing for the eventuality of a break in the treaties. However, Putin has said Russia will challenge the United States if there is a renewed arms race, but he would not bankrupt the country to do so, reflecting a lesson the longtime Russian leader learned from the mistakes of the Soviet Union.
So for the United States and Russia, 2018 is shaping up to be another contentious year. While Washington is laying out the tools it can use against Moscow, Russia is getting ready for even tougher relations by insulating its economy and building bridges to the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East.
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The United States is mulling its options to increase pressure on Russia over its reported election meddling and disinformation campaigns. Moscow is preparing for expanded sanctions by attempting to insulate its government, companies and elites.
While Russia has mostly shielded itself from sanctions affecting its ability to issue sovereign debt, the possible targeting of its most powerful and wealthy citizens, even if not implemented, will ripple deep into Russia’s core.
As the poverty rate in Russia expands, the population's dissatisfaction with widespread corruption and the exorbitant wealth held by the elites is growing. A list detailing that wealth could spark pushback on the Kremlin during this pivotal election year.
The United States has for years used economic sanctions as a cudgel against Russia for various perceived transgressions, including its actions in Crimea and Ukraine. They not only have targeted sectors vital to the Russian economy, contributing to its recession, but they also hit individuals in the upper echelons of Kremlin leadership. Now, Russian leaders are bracing for the possibility of even more sanctions, these stemming from allegations that Moscow interfered in the 2016 U.S. elections.
On Jan. 29, the U.S. Treasury Department will begin releasing a series of reports detailing options to increase pressure on Russia through expanded sanctions. The U.S. Congress ordered the reports in August as part of its Countering America’s Adversaries Sanctions Act. The Treasury Department reports are not an automatic expansion of sanctions, but rather are an exploration of the various pressure points the United States could use against Russia and the ramifications that doing so could have on the wider international economic and financial systems. Even as the reports were being readied, Moscow has taken steps to blunt the impact of any new sanctions that might be levied. In anticipation that its ability to fund sovereign debt could be restricted, Russia has worked to line up alternate sources of financing.
But it's the other possible targets of U.S. penalties that have drawn the most attention: Congress ordered the Treasury Department to draw up a list of oligarchs with strong Kremlin ties, and to include any evidence of corruption against them, plus details of their net worth, assets, foreign business ties, sources of income and families (wives, children, parents and siblings). The scope of this option marks a stark contrast from any other sanctions the United States has undertaken. Even though a string of Russian personalities already has landed on U.S. sanctions lists, they have been people directly tied to Russian military interventions, or personally to President Vladimir Putin and his grip on power.
Those who land on the highly anticipated "oligarch list" will likely be a who's who of Russia's most powerful and wealthy elite, many without clear ties to Russian foreign policy or activities abroad. The new sanctions option is intended to go after the less obvious Russian power bases, closing supposed loopholes that allow Russia to skirt current sanctions, and to apply direct pressure to Putin's administration. Leaks emanating from Washington indicate that the oligarch list initially will remain separate from the Treasury Department’s specially designated nationals list of people targeted by individual sanctions. The exploratory report naming Russia's wealthy power brokers, portions of which may remain classified, will give Congress another option.
The Guessing Game
The question of who will land on the list has been somewhat of a parlor game among international news media outlets. Russian media giant Kommersant reported that it had identified some 50 elites, plus their families and associates — about 300 people in total — who will be named by the Treasury Department. Forbes has compiled a list of 96 Russian citizens, mostly oligarchs, who hold some $386 billion in assets. In addition, there's a group of Kremlin elites thought to hold vast sums of secret money, estimated in one new study performed by academics in Paris and London to approach the trillion-dollar range.
In the past, the United States has not compiled and publicized a comparable list without implementing sanctions. But the atypical nature of the oligarch list has raised questions whether this is a "shame list," meaning that no sanctions are intended on the individuals named, but rather it will be used for its optics. The Kremlin and many Russian elites have reportedly bolstered their lobbying efforts to persuade the Treasury Department to keep certain names off the list.
Possible Targets of the Oligarch List
(NOT PRINTING HERE)
The intense interest in who will be named in the oligarch list has been matched by speculation over what its publication might mean for Putin's administration and Russia as a whole. The elites expected to be named on the list fall into four broad categories:
1. Senior Kremlin officials who are directly tied to the administration and its mechanisms for creating and implementing foreign policy. Most of these Kremlin elites serve on boards of some of the largest and most lucrative companies in Russia, own shares anonymously, and store much of their wealth in safe havens abroad.
2. Russian elites who are part of Putin’s loyalist circle and who help him maintain a hold on power. Like the senior figures in the Kremlin, these elites also hold shares in large Russian firms or occupy critical seats of power and are willing to carry out Putin's bidding.
3. Other government officials who either plan, implement or finance Russian activities abroad.
4. Russian oligarchs, who are mostly holdovers from the 1990s holding vast amounts of wealth and assets. While mostly on friendly terms with the Kremlin and Putin, these oligarchs are not particularly loyal to the current government but understand that they have to work with it to survive.
Preparing for Action
As the Treasury Department reports were being formulated, the Russian government held a series of meetings to develop strategies to shield elites and oligarchs from U.S. sanctions. The Kremlin exempted large state firms from disclosing their contractors, thus offering fewer possible targets for U.S. actions. Putin called on the elites and oligarchs to repatriate their assets held abroad. The Finance Ministry and Central Bank offered methods for anonymous money transfers that would fly under the sanctions radar. The government is also allowing a $3 billion eurobond float to Russian business elites that offers them anonymity. Multiple reports indicate that many elites have either liquidated their assets abroad or run them through a series of stress tests to gauge risk. Many large Russian companies have tapped international capital markets and issued hundreds of millions of dollars worth of bonds in recent months. Many oligarchs, cautious of the state's monitoring and its propensity to nationalize assets, don’t want to keep their cash in Russia.
The Russian government has characterized the upcoming oligarch list as an attempt to destabilize the country financially and politically in a pivotal election year. The Kremlin already has laid the groundwork for reciprocal sanctions against the United States, but it is waiting to see how far Washington will take the issue.
Even if the list does not lead to sanctions, it will have two powerful effects in Russia and among Putin’s administration. The elites and oligarchs remain loyal to Putin as long as they have the freedom to run their fiefdoms. Even the thought that the United States might move to seize or limit their wealth and power will have a strong psychological effect on their perception of Putin’s ability to protect them, and thus affect their continued loyalty to his administration. In recent years, many elites have already dissented from Putin’s direct orders on a slew of issues, as the Russian economy and financial sector fell back into recession. Putin reacted by surrounding himself with a group of ultraloyalists, shifting his presidency to an even further autocratic extreme. The longtime Russian leader understands that struggles in the Kremlin and among the country's elites have led to the downfall of other powerful Russian leaders in the past.
But even more dangerous to Putin could be the Russian people's reaction to a list of wealthy elites at a time when the country's poverty rate is growing at its fastest pace in 20 years. The primary cadre of elites and oligarchs hold as much wealth abroad as the combined wealth of all Russians back home, the academic study found. Calls for an anticorruption campaign in Russia have grown louder in recent years, and two-thirds of the more than 1,100 protests in 2017 were focused on corruption and economic woes. Most of the ire of those protests was not directed at the oligarchs, but at the government officials, such as Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev, who live lavishly while claiming meager salaries. Seeing a list of the elites with the details of their wealth could reignite those sentiments during this election year, and force the Kremlin to respond with a campaign against corruption — even at the cost of sacrificing some of its own.
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Strange that we don't hear about this in the Russia debate.
Russia military spending was cut almost in half from 2015 peak, Russia in near financial collapse
(https://www.nextbigfuture.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/eba0e43b422ab1658aec78c570acf74a.png)
https://www.nextbigfuture.com
On January 4, 2018, Russia’s finance ministry said it had fully spent its reserve fund, as planned, in late 2017 to cover budget shortfalls.
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Second source, Russia GDP Drop:
https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp
Russia GDP 2013: US$ 2.2 trillion.
Dropped to 2016: 1.3 trillion
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Russia was worth 1283.20 billion US dollars in 2016. The GDP value of Russia represents 2.07 percent of the world economy. GDP in Russia averaged 893.96 USD Billion from 1989 until 2016, reaching an all time high of 2230.60 USD Billion in 2013
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Fracking, not mentioned in the article, is our best, contain-Russia policy, same for several other rogue states. Fracking caused the price drop in oil. Now Republicans are opening up ANWR, Keystone and off shore drilling.
What are the implications of this? Can Russia still prop up Venezuela and other new conquests or are they now out of that business? https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-15/russia-venezuela-sign-deal-on-3-15-billion-debt-restructuring
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Hard to say how this squares with my previous post that Russian military spending is tanking with their economy, but on the other side of it they seem to be flying by us in the area of electronic warfare.
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-steadily-cultivating-electronic-warfare-u-s-nato-lag-behind/
Maybe Facebook raising their advertising rates will squeeze Russia and their ability to accelerate chaos in the US.
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https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-02-16/russia-attacked-u-s-troops-in-syria
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Presidents (according to liberal historian).
Not this conservative historian (VDH):
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/02/russia-spreading-chaos-fooling-media-exposing-fbi/
we will NEVER read this in left msm never .
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https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/02/russia-spreading-chaos-fooling-media-exposing-fbi/
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Russia: Russia’s ambassador to the U.S. said that in light of recent U.S. moves against Russia, it would be impossible for Moscow and Washington to hold strategic consultations in Vienna, which had been scheduled for March 6-7. This could be significant if it is a sign that relations are taking a turn for the worse.
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This could explain quite a bit , , ,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/us/politics/russia-cyberattacks.html?emc=edit_ta_20180315&nl=top-stories&nlid=49641193&ref=cta
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on security highlights
Tensions between the West and Russia are ratcheting up in the wake of the nerve agent attack on Sergei Skripal.
The heightened hostilities will make day-to-day operations more challenging for foreign companies, nongovernmental organizations and journalists working in Russia.
In addition to the threat of government surveillance and harassment, foreigners will likely be the targets of increased violence from nationalists and nationalist gangs.
Just when it looks like relations between Russia and the West have hit rock bottom, they manage to reach a new low. It's a pattern we've been tracking for the last decade as Russia's security services have grown more aggressive in their tactics. And sure enough, tensions have flared once again following the attack on Col. Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military intelligence officer who, along with his daughter, was poisoned with a rare nerve agent in London on March 4. The British government has since announced that the nerve agent used in the attack was a novichok, Russian for "newcomer" — a substance Russia's chemical weapons program reportedly developed to bypass the restrictions of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which Moscow signed in 1993. The compound's use was likely meant as a calling card, a warning from the Russian government to current intelligence officers not to turn against the homeland as Skripal had.
The Big Picture
Russia has long been a challenging environment for Western companies and nongovernmental organizations. As relations between Moscow and the West continue to sour in the wake of the attack against former Russian military intelligence Col. Sergei Skripal, the environment will be even more challenging.
After the novichok revelation, British Prime Minister Theresa May announced the expulsion from London of 23 Russian diplomats believed to be intelligence officers. The British government is also discussing the possibility of imposing new sanctions on Moscow, with the support of the United States and other NATO allies. But the Kremlin won't take these punishments lightly. Moscow already has kicked 23 British intelligence officers out of Russia and will doubtless snap back at new sanctions with measures of its own, as it did in response to sanctions over the invasion of Crimea in 2014. The escalating hostilities stand to make working and traveling in Russia even more difficult for Western companies and their employees.
Hostile Hosts
Relations between Russia and the West have chilled considerably since President Vladimir Putin's election in 2000, and the enmity is becoming palpable. A friend who has traveled all across Russia in his frequent trips to the country recently recounted how on a visit earlier this month, he sensed unusual hostility from ordinary Russians on the street. When he asked a security officer why the locals were treating him this way, the officer replied that it was because the Americans had killed more Russians in Syria than they did during the entire Cold War. He was referring, among other things, to reports that U.S. airstrikes in Deir el-Zour province killed dozens, if not hundreds, of Russian military contractors Feb. 7 when forces aligned with the Syrian government attempted to seize an oil field.
Though the accuracy of the security officer's statement is questionable — especially if one accounts for U.S. support to the mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan war — the conflict in Syria does seem to explain some of the hostility. Russian state media seized on the bloody fight, and the U.S. contribution to the body count, to stir up nationalism and galvanize support for Putin in the runup to his re-election. The sanctions Washington slapped on Moscow in response to the death of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, to Russia's invasion of Crimea and to its interventions in the 2016 U.S. presidential election have only fueled the Russian public's rancor. And it's not just directed at the U.S. government or military, as my friend's anecdotal account illustrates.
Business as Usual?
For a variety of reasons, including corruption, confusing and sometimes conflicting laws and regulations, and organized crime, Russia has long been a challenging environment for foreign businesses. The blowback over Western sanctions and battlefield deaths in Syria will add yet another wrinkle for overseas companies and nongovernmental organizations active there. Beyond the repercussions for day-to-day operations, the mounting strain between Moscow and the West could have unpleasant consequences for the estimated 1 million spectators, corporate sponsors and athletes who will flock to Russia this summer for the World Cup. Many of these visitors, after all, will hail from the West.
Well before the attack on Skripal, and the subsequent death of a Russian businessman and government critic in London, we warned of the threat industrial espionage will pose to Western companies and executives during the World Cup. But these incidents and their fallout will no doubt make Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) and Foreign Intelligence Service even more aggressive toward Westerners living or traveling in Russia.
Throughout its history, and increasingly over the last several years, Russia often has been a difficult place for companies from abroad to do business.
In 2016, Russian lawmakers passed the Yarovaya Law, requiring tech companies operating in the country, such as Twitter and LinkedIn, to store user data, limit encryption and help the FSB decipher encrypted messages. Regulators in Russia have since used the law to clamp down on virtual private networks, or VPNs, which foreign companies often use to protect proprietary data. In light of these restrictions, visitors to the country need to be careful about what data they bring in with them. They can assume that whatever they do bring in will be compromised. Tourists or business travelers may also consider using burner phones or computers — prepaid, disposable devices that will never be connected to a corporate or home network — for the duration of their stay. In addition, visitors should be aware that most high-end hotel rooms in Russia are wired for sound and video.
A Dangerous Fervor
Beyond increased intelligence attention, Western companies and travelers will probably face a greater threat of violence from Russian nationalists and nationalist gangs. Minorities and obvious foreigners in Russia have long been the targets of attacks from nationalist groups and individuals. The surging hostility toward the West will only encourage these kinds of incidents. One of the reasons Putin acts so aggressively on the global stage is that his demonstrations of bravado — like the annexation of Crimea — meet with overwhelming support from the public. In fact, the more brazenly he behaves, the higher his approval rating seems to climb. The international backlash over his actions, moreover, helps reinforce the narrative that other countries want to hold Russia back, which, in turn, perpetuates suspicion and antipathy toward foreigners.
Throughout its history, and increasingly over the last several years, Russia often has been a difficult place for companies from abroad to do business. But the latest developments between Moscow and the West are only going to make things worse — especially for British and U.S. companies, NGOs and journalists.
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https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/asia/time-rethink-deterring-russia
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IMHO this article forgets and badly understates what a grievous problem Communist Russia was for its neighbors and for the world and what Russia is today. Also, the brief description of what happened with Georgia is well wide of the mark-- the Russians were giving Russian passports to ethnically Russian Georgians in preparation for skullduggery.
Nonetheless, this is a thoughtful article.
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/03/russia-american-foreign-policy-realism-difficult/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202018-03-28&utm_term=NR5PM%20Actives
Can the American intelligentsia and American policymakers ever discuss Russia intelligently, realistically, and honestly? I doubt it.
Consider two sets of facts.
Here’s the first: Recently, on British soil, agents of the Russian state probably assassinated an ex spy of theirs using a chemical weapon. Russia may have worked with WikiLeaks to release information embarrassing to Hillary Clinton, either with the goal of weakening her as president, or helping to elect Donald Trump. In 2014, Russia annexed a portion of Crimea; it was the first time the Russian state had expanded its territory of rule since the end of the Cold War. Russian-supplied militants in Ukraine used anti-aircraft weaponry to down a passenger airliner. Russia makes special deals with American enemies, such as Iran. Russia made itself a player again in the Middle East, by intervening in Syria, when America couldn’t commit itself to removing Bashar al-Assad. It provides safe refuge for Edward Snowden, who is wanted for stealing American secrets. Russian banks lend to disruptive political parties in the Western world, such as Marine Le Pen’s National Front. Russia suppresses political dissent within Russia through both legal and extra-legal measures, from preventing ballot access to killing journalists. Its military conducts provocative exercises along the borders of NATO countries.
Here’s the second: Russia withdrew peacefully from 700,000 square miles of Europe and Eurasia at the end of the Cold War. Boris Yeltsin’s government, claiming to act on the advice of Western policymakers who counseled “shock therapy,” sold the assets of the Russian economy to a series of Communist apparatchiks and gangsters. This was deeply unpopular in Russia but his reelection was secured by direct American meddling, including “emergency infusions” of billions of dollars of Western money, a phalanx of American political consultants, and a play-scripted “confrontation” with Bill Clinton. Under Yeltsin’s rule, economic and social trends culminated in a major decrease in Russian life expectancy. George W. Bush empowered revolutions in the former Soviet sphere. His administration empowered men, such as Mikhail Saakashvili in Georgia, who proceeded to make war on Russia. During just President Obama’s second term, the United States backed a putsch in Ukraine and a series of Islamist-tinged rebels in Syria, two countries that happen to host major Russian naval installations. In both these cases, Russia intervened militarily.
What story do you tell from the above facts? Is Russia weak or is it gathering confidence and strength? Is it contained by strong Western policymaking? Or is it encircled by hysterical and easily terrified Western powers? Is Putin playing a bad geopolitical hand brilliantly? Or is he desperately maneuvering to cover over faults and mistakes?
America’s political actors seem to shift their views easily. When Mitt Romney said in 2012 that Russia was America’s “top geopolitical foe,” President Obama snapped back, “The 1980s are now calling to ask for their foreign policy back.” Liberals cheered.
But two years later, Russia passed a law proscribing homosexual propaganda aimed at youth. The state arrested the punk-rock band Pussy Riot for protesting on the altar of a cathedral. Suddenly, for American liberals, Russia began to become a foreign proxy for their own domestic culture wars. Obama sent gay athletes in the American delegation to the Sochi Olympics. Pussy Riot was feted as heroic.
What troubles us? It can’t be that we are upset at Russian violations of human rights at home; that doesn’t trouble anyone who approves America’s special relationship with Saudi Arabia. It can’t be that we really fear it as a long-term rival for power. Russia shrinks, China grows. So what is it?
In elite policymaking circles, in the well-lit rooms lined with free bottles of spring water, where people grandly refer to themselves as “Atlanticists,” Russia isn’t spoken about as if it were a nation with its own history, impelling national interests, and problems. Instead, both privately and publicly, it is spoken of like a ghost written into the Western storyline. It haunts the West. It is the motor behind every unwelcome political development. It is blamed for the rise of Viktor Orbán in Hungary, even if he was the product of Atlanticist institutions. People blame Russia for the rise of a populist nationalist party in Poland, even if that party is led by a man who believes Putin killed his brother.
Some day we might learn again that Russia is simply a nation-state with its own enduring interests.
Russia functions as symbol of Western self-doubt, in all its varieties. Western populists doubt that their leadership class has their interests at heart, and they imagine that Putin stands up for his country. Some in the Western political class doubt that their post–Cold War program of ever-freer movement of goods, capital, and people could ever come to ruin. And so they believe its apparent rejection in the votes for Brexit and Donald Trump must be the product of Russian machinations.
For others the doubts are darker. The post-war program lately produces more economic dislocation than they expected and more political turmoil than they can stomach. It also produces hypocrisy. Russians are expected to swallow the corruption of Yeltsin being foisted on them. But Western elites can’t even handle a few Facebook memes.
In some of those rooms of Atlanticists, there is a little guilt, too. Don’t the financial institutions in the city of London depend on the fortunes of Russian oligarchs? So too the personal wealth of our elites is partly reflected in the inflated real-estate prices of London, New York, and Paris, which depend on those Russians who buy it up and visit once every few months, if ever. Some of the children of America’s elite go to private school with these young Russian resource-heirs, the ones whose families were enriched by shock therapy.
Comments
Some day we might learn again that Russia is simply a nation-state with its own enduring interests. We may one day accept, or at least understand, that its ugly political culture is informed by an unhappy history and unlucky geography. We may even recognize our own blunders in our relationship. Right now we are too wrapped up in our own factional domestic disputes, and too haunted by our own feeling that we lack leadership and policy wisdom, our own fear that we lack the will to maintain our way of life or the ability to change it.
But I’m not sure I long for that day. Self-knowledge of this type is usually only given to us through unspeakable tragedy. The day Russian conspiracy theories no longer amuse or soothe us will be a day when nothing can or will.
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Russia: Russia canceled a contract for four Borei B-class strategic nuclear submarines, citing cost concerns. It will instead purchase six more Borei A-class submarines. Has Russia canceled any other defense contracts recently?
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• Middling powers in Europe, Asia and the Middle East will face increasing pressure from Washington on their ties with Russia because of the United States' new sanctions legislation.
• Germany, Vietnam and Turkey are some of the major states most likely to defy U.S. pressure on their Russia relations.
• In Asia, India may struggle to cope with the U.S. sanctions, while Indonesia could go either way.
• Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates will find it easier to comply thanks to their limited links to Russia and deep defense relationships with Washington.
• Measures such as the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act will encourage U.S. partners to adopt a more multilateral strategy in an emerging world of great power competition.
Yesterday was Tehran and today it's Moscow. As the United States, Russia and China engage in a great power competition, growing tensions between Washington and Moscow could soon have a major effect on U.S. relations with other countries. Upset by the Kremlin's actions around the world, U.S. lawmakers are hoping to hit Russia where it hurts most, its defense and energy business, through the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which applies secondary sanctions to countries engaging in business with Moscow in these fields. CAATSA has faced some resistance — not least from the commander in chief himself — but its gradual implementation promises to have far-reaching effects on all concerned.
The Big Picture
In its second-quarter forecast for 2018, Stratfor noted that the United States would turn its attention toward its competition with Russia and China. Washington already has targeted Beijing with trade tariffs, and now it is finally starting to implement measures that could change Russia's strategic ties around the world under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.
See 2018 Second-Quarter Forecast
A Potent New Process
Secondary sanctions are hardly new to U.S. foreign policy. Washington used them extensively against Tehran in an effort to force the Islamic republic to modify its behavior before the Iranian nuclear deal's signing in 2015. But Russia occupies a different position from Iran in the international system as a great power that boasts robust energy relationships with Europe and China, as well as diverse defense ties with many states, particularly in Asia and the Middle East. CAATSA also targets Iran, along with North Korea, yet it is the secondary sanctions against Russia — especially those stipulated in sections 231 and 232 of the act — that could affect the United States' partnerships the most.
Under Section 231 of CAATSA, any third-country firm or individual that engages in a "significant transaction" with Russia's defense or intelligence sectors will face a penalty. Companies and individuals can apply for an exemption from the sanctions. Getting one, however, would require U.S. authorities to certify not only that the exemption would not harm the United States' national security interests but also that Russia had made "significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions."
Given that the Kremlin is unlikely to meet the second condition anytime soon, countries wishing to continue trade with Russia's defense or intelligence sectors could opt for a waiver under Section 231. The waiver, which has a maximum length of 180 days, requires U.S. officials to certify that the applicant is "substantially reducing the number of significant transactions" with targeted Russian interests. (The U.S. Congress is also currently considering the 2019 National Defense Authorization Bill, legislation that would replace the waiver process with an upfront certification that determines whether the entity in question is taking "significant and verifiable steps" or "has agreed to reduce reliance" on Russia over a "specified period.") But the waiver could draw unwanted attention to countries engaged in trade with Russia and give Washington leverage to try to exact concessions from them.
Section 232, meanwhile, focuses on energy, targeting investments of $1 million or more in Russian pipelines or support for building or operating pipelines — in goods, services, technology and information — worth an annual total of at least $5 million. Unlike those prescribed under Section 231, Section 232 sanctions are discretionary rather than mandatory.
The waiver could draw unwanted attention to countries engaged in trade with Russia and give Washington leverage to try to exact concessions from them.
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Off to a Slow Start
U.S. President Donald Trump opposed CAATSA (the act largely stems from a unilateral initiative by Congress, which took action out of concern that the U.S. leader could become too conciliatory toward Russia). Nevertheless, it passed by veto-proof majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives alike. The president then delayed its implementation beyond the Jan. 29 congressional deadline, arguing that the date signified the start, rather than the end, of the process.
Facing growing pressure from Congress, Trump has signaled that he will begin applying the law. The State Department has tried to define "significant transaction" and is already engaged in conversations with many countries on their relationships with Russia. At the same time, U.S. diplomats also tried to entice countries to expand their defense ties with Washington to compensate for the loss of Russian supplies. The overtures suggest that CAATSA's aim is not simply to penalize Russia for its perceived bad behavior but also to expand U.S. arms sales wherever possible. Still, some prominent members of the U.S. Congress are dissatisfied with the progress toward implementing the act. Key Democrats, such as Sen. Robert Menendez, and some Republicans, in fact, recently requested a rare multiagency investigation into the delays in the law's application. But regardless of the snags in its implementation, CAATSA demonstrates that the United States is more strident than ever in pushing other countries to reduce their defense and energy ties with Russia.
Addressing Russia's Worldwide Influence
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia is the world's second-largest arms exporter. From 2013 to 2017, the country accounted for 22 percent of the globe's weapons exports, lagging behind only the United States at 34 percent. (All other exporters' contributions, by contrast, are in the single digits.) Russia also has numerous clients in diverse fields that purchase its air defense systems, aircraft, missiles, ships, armored vehicles and aircraft engines. Nearly two-thirds of Russia's exports go to Asia, though the Middle East and Africa also receive a significant portion of the country's arms.
Regardless of the snags in its implementation, CAATSA demonstrates that the United States is more strident than ever in pushing other countries to reduce their defense and energy ties with Russia.
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Russia's deepest defense relationships are with China, India and Vietnam, which together account for 58 percent of Russian exports. China has received top-of-the-line Russian equipment of late, including the S-400 air defense system and Su-35 aircraft, while India and Vietnam have been purchasing and using Russian equipment since Soviet times. Farther afield, Russia has signed major arms deals with Indonesia and Turkey, and it's in talks with Saudi Arabia and Qatar over the sale of the S-400 system. The United Arab Emirates, too, is considering the purchase of Su-35 aircraft. Although these countries are some of Russia's biggest customers — or prospective customers — they aren't the only ones that could run afoul of CAATSA. States such as Algeria, Myanmar, Malaysia, Kazakhstan and Ethiopia also could soon find themselves in hot water with the United States because of their "significant" defense relationships with Russia.
Mulling a Response
China
As one of the biggest purchasers of Russian arms, China will likely have the most difficulty scaling down its ties with Russia — all the more so since Washington has already targeted Beijing in separate trade disputes. Its connections with Russia are so deep and strategic that China will be unlikely to make more than token concessions on its core defense purchases from Moscow. (But even without the threat of U.S. sanctions, China is destined to purchase less Russian military hardware as it develops technology that would allow it to manufacture its own arms.) Similarly, major energy projects such as the Power of Siberia gas pipeline from Russia to the Far East are more or less irreversible.
As one of the biggest purchasers of Russian arms, China will likely have the most difficulty scaling down its ties with Russia — all the more so since Washington has already targeted Beijing in separate trade disputes.
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India
Russia also has deep relations with China's rival over the Himalayas, India. Moscow supplies most of the arms for the Indian military, including combat aircraft, naval destroyers, battle tanks and a lone nuclear submarine. The BrahMos missile — the product of Russian-Indian cooperation — is a signature success for New Delhi's defense establishment that also has great export potential. Furthermore, Russian arms deals offer generous terms, such as technology transfers and opportunities for joint production, that are important to India's strategic autonomy doctrine.
If push comes to shove, India will not sacrifice its relationship with Russia. Instead, it will try to compromise with the United States by purchasing more U.S. arms or by signing the two outstanding foundational defense agreements with the country. Despite its historical links with Moscow, New Delhi has expanded its security and economic relationship with the United States over the past two decades to try to increase its clout in the global system. Their ties are now strong, and India increasingly relies on the United States to balance China's rise in Asia. As a result, Washington has greater leverage over New Delhi, which, in turn, is more vulnerable to CAATSA's stipulations than Beijing is. In the longer run, however, the CAATSA process could rekindle anti-American sentiment in the Indian defense bureaucracy and the political class, two decades after a reset in U.S.-Indian relations consigned such nationalism to the margins.
Vietnam
In Southeast Asia, Vietnam — whose military gets nearly all its equipment from Russia — also has been more open to U.S. defense ties since the United States lifted an embargo on lethal arms sales to Hanoi in 2016. The United States has sold patrol boats to Vietnam, and a U.S. aircraft carrier even docked at the country's Cam Ranh naval base. Even so, Vietnam's connections to the United States remain limited at this nascent stage of their rapprochement. That means Vietnam will be in a stronger position than India in negotiations with Washington over CAATSA — even though it has deeper ties with Russia. In fact, the CAATSA process could discourage Vietnam from further building its defense relationship with the United States, if only to avoid future compromises to its strategic autonomy.
Indonesia
Indonesia could go either way in its ties with Russia. Its military has long relied on suppliers from multiple countries, including Russia, with which it is drafting a strategic partnership agreement. Indonesia reportedly defied U.S. pressure in February when it proceeded with a new order for 11 Su-35 jets in a deal with Moscow. At the same time, though, the Southeast Asian country counts the United States as a major export destination and tends to be less assertive than Vietnam.
Turkey
Toward the other end of Eurasia, Turkey would seem to be an unexpected target for CAATSA as a member of NATO, the gold standard for U.S. alliances. But Ankara has been moving to engage in more transactional relationships with all powers, including putative ally the United States. In a symbolic departure from the practices of alliance behavior, Turkey inked an agreement to acquire the S-400 air defense system from Russia, a NATO adversary.
The Trump administration has demanded that Ankara scuttle the deal, only to trigger a hostile response from the Turkish government. Now the U.S. Congress appears to
be upping the ante with a draft defense bill that would include provisions to suspend the sale of 100 F-35s to Turkey until U.S. authorities provide a report assessing the effects of Washington and Ankara's strained relations on U.S. operations in Turkey. And as in military matters, so in energy: Ankara is expected to defy Washington on the Turk Stream natural gas pipeline between Russia and Turkey, which could become a target of sanctions. If the United States becomes insistent in its demands, Ankara could use its cooperation in Syria as further leverage against Washington.
The Gulf States
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, meanwhile, have far fewer defense ties with Russia than with the United States, meaning they will find it easier to demonstrate a reduction in defense transactions with Moscow.
Germany
In terms of energy, another of the United States' most enduring allies, Germany, will find itself in the CAATSA crosshairs. Large European energy firms such as Royal Dutch/Shell, Uniper, OMV and Engie could all suffer U.S. sanctions because of their financial involvement in Nord Stream 2, a controversial pipeline that will bring natural gas directly to Germany from Russia. Germany, which has publicly condemned CAATSA's provision regarding Nord Stream 2, is well-placed to resist U.S. demands, thanks to its position as a major global player. Yet its strong economic ties with the United States will also make it vulnerable to punitive U.S. action.
Risks and Rewards
Secondary sanctions are part of the United States' broader strategy to achieve a set of objectives with regard to an adversary by imposing its laws on other countries. Washington has applied extraterritoriality in this way several times in the post-Cold War era, to Cuba, Iran and Libya in the 1990s, and once again to Iran in the 2000s.
If CATSAA succeeds, the rewards for Washington will be nothing less than altering Russia's behavior or curtailing its influence in the international system.
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Most countries view energy and defense as delicate areas in which market dynamics compete with strategic considerations. Defense relations, however, naturally involve sensitivities that exceed those of energy ties. Price negotiations are often protracted, and it might take years to complete an order. Any major weapons system, moreover, requires contracts for maintenance, spare parts and potential upgrades. Supplier reliability is a huge concern — as are technology transfers and joint production, which importers value. Consequently, reorienting core defense relationships can be quite disruptive for the importer.
The CAATSA process is full of lofty ambitions. If it succeeds, the rewards for Washington will be nothing less than altering Russia's behavior or curtailing its influence in the international system. But it also carries risks. In today's world, middle powers are increasingly assertive and refuse to tie themselves to any single great power. The United States' reliance on the blunt tool of extraterritoriality could eventually backfire if it's not careful.
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As the United States pressures Russia with sanctions, Moscow will use a mix of options to counter the penalties in the short term, including diplomatic negotiations and financial support for threatened businesses.
In the long term, Russia will continue deploying a strategy to insulate its people and businesses, leading Moscow to increasingly move away from the West and toward the East.
While Moscow may make tactical concessions to protect its economic interests, U.S. sanctions ultimately will be ineffective in compelling Russia to strategically shift its foreign policy, meaning the Russia-West standoff is here to stay.
U.S. sanctions against Russia aren't really working the way Washington had hoped. As the pressure builds, Moscow continues to duck, bob and weave to avoid the harshest blows. The Kremlin remains defiant and is even punching back at U.S. interests. What's more, Russia is working on short-term and long-term strategies to insulate its people, businesses and economy from Western penalties. U.S. attempts to alter Russia's behavior are leading Moscow to turn away from the West more and more and are also forcing some Russian companies, including the aluminum giant Rusal, to remake themselves.
The Big Picture
In preparation for Stratfor's upcoming 2018 Third-Quarter Forecast, we are releasing a series of supporting analyses, focusing on critical topics, regions and sectors. These assessments have been designed to contextualize and augment the quarterly global forecast.
In the 2018 Annual Forecast, Stratfor wrote that "Russia — the linchpin of Eurasia — is undergoing a shift in its foreign policy. Years of deteriorating ties with the United States and Europe have led Moscow to recalibrate its priorities and strategy heading into the new year." The United States has intensified its sanctions campaign, and this move will lead to a greater divergence in relations between Russia and the West, as Moscow increasingly looks eastward.
See 2018 Annual Forecast
See Echoes of the Cold WarSee Moscow Looks to the East
Penalties and Aluminum
In early April, the U.S. Treasury Department instituted the harshest sanctions to date against Russia. The U.S. Congress had placed heavy pressure on President Donald Trump's administration to act after it passed the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act in July 2017. That legislation sprang from Moscow's role in the Ukrainian conflict and allegations of Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. It targeted seven oligarchs, 12 oligarch-owned companies, 17 senior government officials, one state-owned defense firm and one Russian bank.
The sanctions were particularly damaging to Rusal, the world's second-largest aluminum company, and its owner, oligarch Oleg Deripaska, who was also punished. They restrict access to U.S. markets and threaten companies outside the United States with penalties for "knowingly facilitating significant transactions" for sanctioned people and businesses. Rusal, which produces about 6 percent of the world's aluminum, was the only sanctioned company that has substantial dealings with U.S. firms, totaling over 14 percent of its revenues, or $1.4 billion. About 80 percent of Rusal's business is outside of Russia.
This timeline shows how U.S. sanctions on Russia affected the global price of aluminum
The sanctions have effectively shut off Rusal's access to the international financial system, prohibiting the company from borrowing in dollars and keeping many other non-U.S. companies from doing business with it out of fear that they also will face penalties. The sanctions have also shaken the global aluminum industry; they pushed prices up by more than 30 percent in their first two weeks and sent companies, including Australian-British multinational Rio Tinto and some U.S. firms, frantically seeking alternative suppliers. Given Rusal's size and global operations, the sanctions have pushed up costs to producers and prices to consumers worldwide.
Even after this global collateral damage, one thing remains unclear. Why did the United States specifically target Rusal and Deripaska in this round of sanctions? Whatever the reason, Russia has received a clear message: Any high-level figure or company is vulnerable to U.S. economic restrictions.
Building Short-Term Buffers
To fend off restrictions for now and in the near future, Russia has several options. The first is to negotiate with the United States. Indeed, Russia has indicated that it is open to the U.S. demand that Deripaska sell his 48 percent stake in Rusal. On April 23, the U.S. Treasury Department extended the deadline for U.S. companies and individuals to halt their business dealings with Rusal from June 5 to Oct. 23. On April 27, Rusal reported that it would appoint a fully independent board, along with a new management team, in hopes of getting off the sanctions list. Sources said that Deripaska and Rusal were in close communication with U.S. authorities as it took these steps. On May 25, Rusal confirmed that Deripaska had quit the boards of both it and his holding company, EN+ Group.
However, it remains unclear whether Deripaska's resignation is enough to get the Rusal sanctions lifted. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov echoed this uncertainty, saying, "The signals coming from Washington now are very contradictory, so it's hard to make any kind of conclusions." Nevertheless, negotiating may sometimes prove effective because Washington has extended one deadline for cutting business connections to Rusal and offered a path to easing or ending the sanctions. This may indicate that Washington is serious about reversing some sanctions.
Another option for Russia in lieu of Deripaska's divestment from Rusal is to provide financial support to vulnerable businesses. The country's overall macroeconomic position is relatively strong, giving the Kremlin financial tools to work with. Immediately after the U.S. sanctions were passed, the Russian government announced that it was willing to step in to assist Rusal. Finance Minister Anton Siluanov pledged short-term liquidity assistance to the company if it were needed. He also said that funds from Promsvyazbank, a lender that the country's central bank took over last year, could be used to support Rusal.
This chart show Russia's macroeconomic indicators
Moscow has also floated the idea of a temporary nationalization of the company. Industry and Trade Minister Denis Manturov said the government could purchase at least part of Deripaska's stake in Rusal. He also said that if the divestment strategy does not work, Rusal could be converted into an exclusively domestic company. One source said that part of Russia's excess aluminum could go to the state metals and precious stone repository Gokhran, while the rest could meet the needs of the military-industrial complex. However, outright nationalization would likely come with significant economic losses for Rusal, when compared to ensuring that the company regains access to the global market.
The Kremlin is also working on another alternative: setting up legal mechanisms to offer some protection to oligarchs affected by sanctions. One of the options on the table is to set up "onshore offshore" firms in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad or in Primorsky Krai in the Far East. These businesses would be granted special tax status. Such zones would allow owners to transfer ownership of their companies back to Russia, but those businesses would still be considered to be domiciled "abroad" and could bypass the complex Russian bureaucracy involved in bringing companies onshore.
A draft bill reportedly has been circulated by the Ministry of Economic Development and is now being discussed at the ministerial level. Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev confirmed the Kremlin's plans to set up such domestic offshore districts "very soon." However, the U.S. sanctions are intensively focused on capital repatriation, making it questionable that such a scheme could work. At the same time, President Vladimir Putin has been campaigning to "de-offshorize" Russian business, but the oligarchs have been reluctant to bring their holdings and money back to Russia because of their concerns about a Kremlin takeover, making this another problematic option.
Thinking of Long-Term Insulation
Even if the United States pulls back on Rusal, Moscow cannot be sure that other firms or oligarchs won't be hit with sanctions down the line as the Russia-West standoff plays out. So, in recent years, Russia has been pursuing a long-term strategy to insulate itself from U.S., as well as European Union, sanctions.
As trade and investment ties with the West have declined since 2014, Russia has focused on expanding economic and broader political linkages — including energy exports and the sale of agricultural products and weapons — to the East. This is particularly the case with China, which has become Russia's largest trade partner, but Russia has also looked to expand economic ties with other countries in the Asia-Pacific, such as Japan and South Korea. These two countries were important participants in the most recent St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.
But Russia isn't looking just to the east; it is also looking to the south, to the Middle East. It has been expanding trade ties with countries such as Turkey and Egypt, building out its economic relationship with Iran, and seeking greater investment and energy ties with Gulf Cooperation Council countries such as Saudi Arabia. It is looking to use the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union as a vehicle for expanding ties and signed trade agreements with both China and Iran on May 17.
Despite everything, Russia is unlikely to replace all of its Western economic ties with Eastern ones.
However, Russia is unlikely to replace all of its economic ties with the West with ties to the East. Europe, for example, will long continue to be its main market for energy exports, and the country's exposure to the U.S.-dominated global financial system can never be fully cut off. Nevertheless, the overall trade balance and economic structure that Russia is pursuing will gradually shift it away from the West. Moscow hopes this move will give it more insulation from U.S. sanctions in the long term.
Ultimately, the purpose of U.S. sanctions has been to shape Russia's behavior and force Moscow to become more compliant on key issues such as the Ukrainian conflict. However, the sanctions have so far have had the opposite effect. Russia has retained and increased its support for the separatist conflict in Ukraine, while pursuing a military buildup in areas such as Crimea and Kaliningrad. It has also boosted its involvement in areas of strategic interest to the United States, including Syria, Iran and North Korea.
During the later years of the Cold War and early years after the frozen conflict had thawed, Moscow learned that trading geopolitical concessions for economic benefits can have a net negative impact on its national security and global standing. Unless the United States takes drastic action to cut off Russia from the global financial system, Moscow is unlikely to change its foreign policy to be more compliant with the United States. As the era of great power competition intensifies, Moscow will look instead to other powers such as China and Iran to challenge the U.S. position globally. Thus, Russia may make certain tactical concessions to the United States to protect its economic interests, but the U.S. sanctions are unlikely to result in the broader strategic shifts that Washington is seeking.
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Sent to me by someone of background for whom I have high regard:
PS: Note the references to "uni-polar" and "multi-polar".
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https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/raiding-and-international-brigandry-russias-strategy-for-great-power-competition/
Raiding and International Brigandry: Russia’s Strategy for Great Power Competition
No one knows if the next six years of Vladimir Putin’s reign will be his last, but signs suggest they will be the most difficult for Washington to navigate in what is now widely acknowledged on both sides as a long-term confrontation between Russia and the West. Moscow has weathered an economic crisis brought on by low oil prices and Western sanctions, domestic political scandals, and international setbacks. More importantly, just as America’s own national security documents begin to frame great power competition as the defining challenge to U.S. power, Russia is yet again adapting its approach based on the experience of the past three years. Russian leaders may not have something that would satisfy the Western academic strategy community as a deliberate “grand strategy,” but they nonetheless possess a strategic outlook and a theory of victory for this competition. That theory is based less on direct competition and more on raiding, a stratagem that holds promise for revisionist ambitions and the weaker side in the conflict.
Raiding is the way by which Russia seeks to coerce the United States through a series of operations or campaigns that integrate indirect and direct approaches. Modern great power competition will thus return to forms of coercion and imposition reminiscent of the Middle Ages, but enacted with the technologies of today. Although raiding will be Moscow’s principal approach to competition, international brigandry may be the best term to describe elements of Russian behavior that the West considers to be “bad” or “malign.” These are acts of indirect warfare, both centrally planned and enacted on initiative by entities within the Russian state empowered to shape policy – often in competition with each other. Brigandry may come with negative legalistic connotations, a byword for outlaw, but here the term is meant to define a form of irregular or skirmish warfare in the international system conducted by a partisan.
Russia is, at times, miscast as a global spoiler or retrograde delinquent. Delinquents commit minor offenses and have no plan. Spoilers react to plans, but have little strategy of their own. Raiders, by contrast, launch operations with a strategic outlook and objectives in mind. And while often weaker than their opponents, raiders can be successful. The structure of the international system and the nature of the confrontation lends itself to the use of raiding, which increasingly appears to be the chosen Russian strategy. By focusing on deterring the high-end conventional fight and restoring nuclear coercive credibility, both important in and of themselves, the United States national security establishment may be fundamentally overlooking what will prove the defining Russian approach to competition.
Raiding as a tactic is not a new experience for the United States, but considered in a strategic context, the concept may lend itself more useful than the hodgepodge of gray zone, and other neologisms the community is often stuck referencing to explain the modern character of war. More importantly, raiding is a long established concept at the operational and strategic level of warfare, unlike “Russian hybrid warfare,” which has devolved into a kitchen sink discussion about Russian bad behavior. Indeed, raiding was once the principal form of warfare throughout Europe. Raiding is new in the sense that it is actually quite old as a strategy for competition between powers before the prominence of industrial scale warfare. Today, in our manuals, a raid is viewed as an operational tool rather than strategic concept, as can be seen in Joint Operations (JP 3-0), which describes a raid as “an operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability culminating in a planned withdrawal.”
Raids are often conducted over phases, including infiltration, denying the enemy the opportunity to reinforce, followed by surprise attack and withdrawal. Raiding plays much more to Russian strengths, leveraging agility and a simplified chain of command ( i.e. deinstitutionalized decision making, and a strong desire to achieve political ends, but not to get stuck with the costs of holding terrain). This is a strategy of limited means and it is also lucrative. Thus, raiding is not about territorial expansion or global domination. We should consider this term when seeking to understand how classical great powers like Russia use their toolkits in strategic competition.
Great Power Spoiler or Great Power Raider?
Once the Cold War ended, Washington became accustomed to seeing Russia as a largely irrelevant power, unable to contest American foreign policy and too weak to effectively pursue its own interests. However, the 1990s and early 2000s were an anomalous period of time, with Russia missing as an actor in European politics, and taciturn on the international stage. In truth, it was not simply Russia’s absence from international politics, but the dearth of other powers in general that made this a period of unipolarity and the primacy of one state in international affairs well above and beyond the power of others. Denizens of Washington tended to forget or ignore the second word in the term Charles Krauthammer coined in 1990 to describe American primacy in the post-Cold War period: the “unipolar moment.”
He wrote:
The most striking feature of the post-Cold War world is its unipolarity. No doubt, multipolarity will come in time. In perhaps another generation or so there will be great powers coequal with the United States, and the world will, in structure, resemble the pre-World War I era. But we are not there yet, nor will we be for decades. Now is the unipolar moment.
That moment lasted longer than many had expected, but the decades did pass, and great power competition has reemerged.
The Russo-Georgian War in 2008 led to a turning point in bilateral relations. There was a sense in Washington that somewhere things had gone awry in Russia policy, and a desire emerged to reset relations with Moscow, in the hope that successful cooperation on areas of mutual interest would demonstrate the benefits of integration with the West, and into a U.S.-led international order. Suffice it to say that dream did not come to fruition.
Around 2015, after its intervention in Syria, Russia became increasingly seen as a global spoiler. Still the view prevailed that Moscow was resurgent, but brittle in terms of the foundations of power. This is a hubristic and overly optimistic interpretation. Such a vision is borne of the consistent mythos in America’s outlook that Russia is dangerous, but no more than a paper tiger that will eventually fade from the global stage. The endless trope that Russia doesn’t have a long game is a self-serving delusion. As Russia seeks to navigate through mounting international challenges posed by its confrontation with the United States it is increasingly forcing Washington and its allies to respond to a series of operations, campaigns, and calculated and not so calculated gambits.
Effective nuclear and conventional deterrence has long resulted in what Glenn Snyder described as a stability-instability paradox. This holds that the more stable the nuclear balance, the more likely powers will engage in conflicts below the threshold of war. If war is not an option and direct competition is foolish in light of U.S. advantages, raiding is a viable alternative that could succeed over time. Therefore, Russia has become the guerrilla in the international system, not seeking territorial dominion but raiding to achieve its political objectives. And these raids are having an effect. If Moscow can remain a strategic thorn in Washington’s side long enough for Beijing to become a global challenge to American leadership, Washington may have no choice but to negotiate a new great power condominium that ends the confrontation , or so Moscow hopes.
At the heart of a raid is the desire to achieve a coercive effect on the enemy. Even if unsuccessful, a raid can positively shape the environment for the raider by the damage and chaos it can inflict. At the tactical level, it is about military gains, but large raiding campaigns in the past sought political and economic impact on the adversary, typically ending with a withdrawal. The French word for this form of warfare was chevauchee, or mounted raid, describing an approach to conflict that eschewed siege warfare. The chevauchee was prominent in the 14th century, and the quintessential raider of that time was the English Black Prince, Edward III’s son. The Black Prince led two extensive raiding campaigns in 1355 and 1356 during the Hundred Years War, looting, burning and pillaging the French countryside. He was forced to adopt this form of warfare in part because the English lacked the means to siege French cities. Thus, the goal became to destabilize France to convince its feudal sovereigns that they were on their own. He did this with raids that targeted economic resources and thereby destroyed the political credibility of the French monarchy.
In Spain, the term for this form of warfare was cabalgadas, prolonged raiding operations conducted by infantry, a common feature of the War of the Two Pedros (1356 to 1379). In North Africa, raids were called razzia. America’s martial traditions are also rooted in raiding, from Roger’s Rangers during the French and Indian War, to the Revolutionary War, or the famous cavalry raids of the Civil War.
Russia has extensive experience in raiding as a form of warfare. The Russian term for raiding is nabeg. Long before the Mongol invasion in 1237 to 1240 and the formation of the Russian Empire, the first raids by the Rus began in 860 against the Byzantine Empire. These raids went on until 1043. Peter the Great was also no stranger to raiding operations in wartime. Hundreds of years later, during the latter years of the Great Northern War, Russian galley fleets with thousands of raiders successfully attacked Sweden, including Gotland, Uppland, and the Stockholm archipelago. The Red Army had its armored raids of World War II, like the 24th Tank Corps raid on Tatsinskaya during the last stages of the Battle of Stalingrad in December 1942.
Raiding is an effective riposte to a strong but distracted opponent, and becomes popular when the technologies of the time create a rift between the political objectives sought and the means available to attain them. This makes traditional forms of warfare too costly, too risky, or unsuitable to the goals desired. Raiding proved prevalent before the modern nation-state system was formed in 1648 and subsequently exported by Europeans to the rest of the world. However, today the modern nation-state construct is weak. Do states truly have economic, information, or cyber borders? How do you demark these borders, defend them, and deter adversaries from crossing them? Much of the infrastructure for this digital age lives in exposed global domains, lies under the sea in international waters, in space, and cyberspace. All of it is vulnerable and ripe for exploitation.
The Modern Chevauchee
Russia will continue to use other instruments of national power to raid the West as part of a coercive campaign intended to at minimum weaken and distract Washington and, at maximum, coerce it into concessions on Russian interests. This is not a short-term strategy for victory, and it would be wrong to assume that these raids are centrally directed given the diverging security factions, clans, and personalities seeking to shape Russian foreign policy. Mark Galeotti cleverly coined “adhocracy” to describe this system. The image of Putin sitting in the Kremlin pulling knobs and levers, or the mythical Gerasimov Doctrine (a linguistic invention that its author has forsworn), have become tragic caricatures in the current zeitgeist. On the contrary, raiding has historically been conducted by detachments with a simplified chain of command, pre-delegated authority, and substantial leeway in how to prosecute their campaign. Raiding is not for deliberate strategists, but for those able to capitalize on leaner, fail fast, and fail cheap approaches.
Russia is not raiding to erode the liberal international order, at least not intentionally. That is the inevitable consequence of Russian behavior from a Western perspective, but not its objective. Such evaluations are frankly expressions of Anglo-Saxon political ideology more so than astute analysis of how Moscow actually tries to influence the international system. Russia does not believe there is any such thing as a liberal international order, nor does it see NATO as anything other than America’s Warsaw Pact, an organization structured around the projection of U.S. military power. As such, what the Kremlin understands the current international order to be is simply a system built around American unipolarity, and the best way to change this construct is to accelerate a transition from unipolarity to multipolarity (or what their policy establishment now calls a “polycentric” world).
Suffice it to say this transition will take a long time because, as William Wohlforth argued in 1999, unipolarity is more stable than it seems. Before 2014, many in Moscow thought they could just wait for this shift in power to happen. It’s important to understand that Russian elites too believe time is on their side. Many misread the 2007-2008 financial crisis as the beginning of rapid decline in the West. The confrontation has now forced Russian leadership to become active in pursuing the long-stated objectives of its own foreign policy, and they won’t stop until a settlement is made.
The center of gravity, in Russian military thought, is the adversary’s will to fight and a country’s ability to engage in war or confrontation as a system. Therefore, the purpose of operations, particularly at a time of nominal peace, is to shape adversary decision-making by targeting their economic, information, and political infrastructure. Senior Russian officers see the modern character of war (correlation of forms and methods) as placing greater emphasis on non-kinetic means, particularly when compared to warfare in the 20th century. Russia’s chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, famously had this posited as a 4:1 non-military to military ratio in one article. Another important trend in Russian military thought identifies the decisive period of conflict as the confrontation or crisis preceding the outbreak of force-on-force violence and the initial period of war. Much of this Russian discourse focuses on non-contact warfare, the ability of long range precision weapons, paired with non-kinetic capabilities in global domains to inflict damage throughout the enemy’s system.
This vision seeks to reconcile the natural proclivities of a General Staff (i.e. planning for high-end warfare, buying expensive capabilities, and seeking larger conventional formations) with an understanding that modern conflicts will play out without set battle lines and meeting engagements. Russia seeks to shape the environment prior to the onset of conflict, and immediately thereafter, imposing costs and inflicting damage to coerce the adversary, in the hope that an inherent asymmetry of interests at stake will force the other side to yield. Russian officers are certainly not partisans, nor do they vocally advocate for raiding, but it is hard to escape the fact that the central tenets of current Russian military thought resemble more the coercive theory of victory of a chevauchee than they do of industrial scale warfare.
Raiding should not be confused with hybrid warfare. Raiding is an established historical approach to warfare, with discernible phasing, objectives, ways, and an overall strategy. The application of hybrid warfare to describe Russian operations has usually been confusing and disjointed in practice. Today, the term is increasingly relegated to European conversations about Russian information warfare and political chicanery.
The Strategic Terrain of Great Power Competition
Moscow is constrained by the structural realities of its competition with Washington. There is no way for Russia to fundamentally alter a balance of power that dramatically favors the United States. America’s GDP is more than five times that of Russia’s adjusted for purchasing power parity and ten times greater in raw terms. Washington sits at the head of the world’s most powerful network of allies in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific. And U.S. conventional military superiority is underwritten by a defense budget that is many times the size of Russia’s.
This is why Stephen Walt was right when he argued in March that the current competition is dissimilar to the Cold War (China, however, might prove a different story). It is not borne of a bipolar system, has no universalist ideological conflict behind it, and will not shape international politics as that period of confrontation did. Despite shrill cries by Max Boot, this is also no war, and the United States should do its best to keep it that way. We are still in what can broadly be described as a great power peace. Ever since the great powers built nuclear weapons, large-scale warfare has proven too risky and costly, thereby displacing competition into a host of proxy conflicts or actions short of warfare. Occasional conflicts do occur, such as the Sino-Soviet border conflict 1969, or Kargil War in 1999, but these have tended to be among young, and relatively minor nuclear powers, during the early stages of their nuclear arsenal development. Major nuclear powers, with established nuclear deterrents, eschew conventional wars because they understand that no one wins a nuclear war.
International orders historically have been created from the ashes of a great power war. As such, powers that want to create a multipolar world order have no quick or easy way of realizing such a vision. Therefore, Russia is stuck playing on a largely fixed strategic board, where the rules and institutions created by the West both favor the United States and constrain revisionism. That’s the end of the good news.
However, not all is well with the U.S.-led liberal international order. One need only to look to Russia’s war with Ukraine, successful projection of power in Syria, and sustained efforts at political subversion. Russia’s strategy is aimed at pursuing a great power condominium, seeking to secure former Soviet space as a de facto sphere of influence and its status as one of the principal players in the international system. The approach is rooted in convincing the United States that Russia is a great power with special rights, including the primacy of its security over the sovereignty of its neighbors and a prominent role in organizations governing world affairs. The Russian dream is to return to a status and recognition the Soviet Union held during a very particular time of its history, the détente of 1969 to 1979, when Washington saw Moscow, albeit reluctantly, as a co-equal superpower. In the face of structural constraints, Russia has found a viable path to getting what it wants from the United States via a strategy of coercion, leveraging raids and a wider campaign of international brigandry to impose outsized costs and retain Western attention.
In the early 2000s, when Russia was weak, Putin hoped to make a deal, trading Russian support for the U.S. so-called War on Terror in exchange for certain prerogatives: being treated as a great power, a free hand in its near abroad, and a U.S. ‘hands off’ approach in the former Soviet space. Back then, Moscow sought to explain why Russia deserves a seat at the table, but it was judged in Washington as too weak and irrelevant. When that approach didn’t work, Russia sought to demonstrate that its power and influence was grossly underestimated. Starting with the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, Moscow began using force to prevent NATO expansion. In Ukraine and Syria, Russia illustrated to what at times seems an overly post-modern Western political establishment that military power is still the trump card in international relations, despite what then-Secretary of State John Kerry had to say about 19th century behavior.
Russia’s successful use of force got the West to rethink Moscow’s capabilities and intentions, but it did not lead to a recognition of Russian interests, or a renegotiation of the post-Cold War order and Russia’s place in it, as the Kremlin had hoped. In place of a great power condominium, Russian leaders earned a lasting confrontation. Russia may have the power to filch Crimea from Ukraine, but it is still judged too weak to force a renegotiation of the security framework in Europe or attain major concessions from the United States. After Congress passed sanctions in the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act in July 2017 and the executive branch closed ranks to prevent any rapprochement, it became clear that no deal was in the offing between the Kremlin and the White House.
Russia still seeks recognition of its great power status in the international system, believing that with it will come privilege, security, and a privileged sphere of influence over its neighbors. The Russian leadership’s strategic outlook has not changed, but demonstrating renewed military strength and resolve has proven insufficient for their country to get a deal with the United States. Washington is still full of policymakers who see Russian power as brittle, believing Moscow doesn’t have a long game. The Russian leadership has no alternative but to settle in for a prolonged geopolitical confrontation, banking on their own resilience, and the ability to impose costs on the basis of an old and familiar strategy of raiding.
Goodbye Nation-State, Hello Raiding
Ironically, as the driver of globalization and the growth of global interdependence, it is the West that has done the most to make raiding against itself so lucrative. Global connectivity, labor flows, migration both legal and illegal, proliferation of information technologies such as social media, together with the creation of supranational entities like the European Union are all enabling factors. Great powers like China and Russia often strive for autarky, seeking to fence off their kingdoms from influences that might create interdependence and allow uncontrolled outside influence. Beijing built the ”great firewall of China,” while Russia has also sought to wall itself off and impose statist control over the invisible ties that connect it to the rest of the international community.
Moscow’s latest battle that sparked protests was its attempt to censor Telegram, a popular messaging app, a contest which has escalated into millions of IPs blocked. These countries seek to create advantage in the great power competition by securing themselves from those technological trends which make modern states borderless. They are building forts. At the same time, they have come to recognize that liberal democracies are open plains ripe for raiding. The 21st century, with all its technological advancements and global interconnectedness, is naturally reviving forms of warfare that shaped Europe in 13th and 14th centuries.
Cyber operations are perhaps the most obvious instrument for modern day raiding. Both Russia and China have made good use of it to raid the U.S. politically and economically, pillaging and looting like in the days of yore. Those Russian attacks not intended to damage are perhaps even more worrisome intrusions designed to gain access and lay the groundwork for future strikes against critical infrastructure such as “energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation and manufacturing.” Russia’s recently closed San Francisco consulate was reportedly an intelligence hub for physically mapping fiber optic networks, and a host of activities described as “extraordinarily aggressive intelligence-collection efforts” considered to be “at the very forefront of innovation.”
However, military raiding is back as well. The Russian campaign in Ukraine’s Donbass region is only posing as a form of industrialized warfare. In reality, this was meant to be a raid. It began with infiltration, and its strategic centerpiece is a low-cost effort to coerce Ukraine into federalization in a bid to retain control over Kyiv’s strategic orientation. Moscow never wanted to hold on to the Donbass and still does not. If anything, it long sought to return it to Ukraine in exchange for federalization, though, at minimum, Russia is happy at the destabilizing effect that this conflict has on Ukraine’s policy and economy. Put aside cyber and political warfare campaigns, the four-year conflict in Ukraine is at face value a sustained raid that Moscow had hoped to close out with the Minsk I and Minsk II agreements. Russia empirically lacks the manpower to take over Ukraine, nor did it want to own and pay for parts of the country either. At its core the war in the Donbass is the modern equivalent of the Black Prince’s great chevauchee campaigns in France.
Raiding is not a direct imposition by conquest, nor is it a fait accompli. Behind a raid lies neither the desire for domination nor for limited territorial gains. From the outset, the adversary seeks to withdraw. This is why Crimea does not fit this model, although there is much evidence to suggest that Russia initially seized Crimea without the intent to annex it ( i.e. it was first meant as part of a game of coercive diplomacy). That said, Ukraine illustrates the fundamental problems with raiding: Raids are easier to launch than they are to manage. The fitful and messy escalation in Ukraine is a hallmark of raiding, when the character of war is not defined by two armies meeting in the field, or a militarily superior power seeking to simply impose its will on a weaker adversary via large-scale industrial warfare. If Russia wanted to crush the Ukrainian military, it could do it, but instead it wants to raid. Since 2015, the conflict has evolved to unconventional warfare throughout Ukraine’s territory, with state-sponsored assassinations, acts of terror, and industrial sabotage becoming the norm.
As Russia grows more confident, and the confrontation intensifies, raiding may become more military in nature. Moscow’s position in Syria is ideal for campaigns elsewhere in the Middle East where it can establish itself as a power broker on the cheap, with countries in the region already choosing to hedge and deleverage from their dependency on relations with the United States. This is ultimately an iterative experience: Some raids or acts of brigandage have clearly backfired. The best recent example of blowback was the failed Russian mercenary attack on February 7 east of Deir Ezzor. That night in the desert was the brainchild of one of Russia’s “mini-garchs” and infamous backers of the Wagner mercenary group, together with the internet troll factory, Yevgeny Prigozhin. While not exactly the brightest horseman, he has been closely linked to Russian efforts in information, political, and other forms of indirect warfare.
The Middle East is a flanking theater in the competition, one where the United States is visibly weak, and its allies are interested in any alternative external power to reduce their own dependency on Washington. Russia will look for ways to raid America’s influence there without taking ownership, security responsibilities, or otherwise over extending itself. The military campaign in Syria came cheaply, taught Russia that it can indeed project power outside its region, and challengeds America’s monopoly on use of force in the international system.
The Black Prince’s Strategy
Forget the decisive Mahanian battle. The typical conventional wars, which the United States frequently wargames, but probably will never get to fight (thanks to nuclear deterrence), are poorly aligned with how adversaries intend to pursue their objectives. Avoiding disadvantages in direct competition is undoubtedly important, as Russia and China have equally invested in conventional and nuclear capabilities, but it is precisely because of our investments in these realms that we have made raiding lucrative. The surest way to spot a raid is when the initiating power doesn’t actually want to possess the object in contest but is instead seeking to inflict economic and political pain to coerce a more important strategic concession out of their opponent. This is not to say that limited land grabs or conventional warfare will disappear from the international arena, but raiding poses a more probable challenge to the United States and its extended network of allies.
Great power raiding is not meant to represent a unified field theory of adversary behavior in the current competition. Not everything aligns neatly with this concept, nor can the actions of a country with numerous instruments of national power be reduced so simply. Nonetheless, raiding for cost imposition and outright pillage, together with other behaviors by intelligence services and elites that may be summed up as in international brigandry, do encapsulate much of the problem. The Russian long game is to raid and impose painful costs on the United States, and its allies, until such time as China becomes a stronger and more active contender in the international system. This theory of victory stems from the Russian assumption that the structural balance of power will eventually shift away from the United States towards China and other powers in the international system, resulting in a steady transition to multipolarity. This strategy is emergent, but the hope is that a successful campaign of raiding, together with the greater threat from China, will force Washington to compromise and renegotiate the post-Cold War settlement.
Can Russia win? If winning is defined as Moscow attaining influence and securing interests in the international system not commensurate with the relative balance of power, but rather based the amount of damage they have inflicted by raiding – quite possibly. If the raider has staying power, and makes a prolonged strategic burden of itself, it can get a favorable settlement even though it is weaker, especially if its opponent has bigger enemies to deal with. Throughout history, leading empires, the superpowers of their time, have had to deal and negotiate settlements with raiders.
Here, conventional military might and alliances count for a lot less than you might hope. Today, you don’t need mounted riders for a raiding campaign or for acts of international brigandry. Moscow successfully rode past NATO, all of America’s carrier strike groups, and struck Washington with a campaign of political subversion. The technology involved may be innovative or new, but this form of warfare is decidedly old. To deal with it, Washington will not require panel discussions, new acronyms, and the construction of a center of excellence, but instead to revisit the history of conflict, international politics, and strategy.
Michael Kofman is a Senior Research Scientist at CNA Corporation and a Fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute. Previously he served as program manager at National Defense University. The views expressed here are his own.
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Two friends of mine just got back from Russia. Our view of thing is so slanted it is becoming amusing. No culture or society is perfect or without problems but Russia seems to be going up while we continue to slide. Young people on public transportation routinely give up seats for older passengers, people show respect for religious ideas, unnatural feminism and homosexuality are culturally discouraged.
We play nasty games (i.e. try to influence the election of the prime minister of Israel) with other counties and then act surprised that others do the same. In the cyber world:
The Five Eyes. Flashpoint report author Jon Condra, director of East Asian Research and Analysis, also examined cyber threat capabilities of the U.S., U.K., Australia, New Zealand and Canada, collectively referred to as “The Five Eyes,” and determined that they “together represent the pinnacle of cyber capabilities of all actors in cyberspace.” He concluded, “Their broad reach, unparalleled levels of technical sophistication and high levels of coordination make them formidable adversaries for those who are targeted for either the purposes of intelligence collection, disruption or destruction during wartime.” While Flashpoint indicated that the Five Eyes do not carry out highly disruptive or destructive attacks against allied or Western systems, especially during peacetime, it should be noted that the U.S. has recently been targeted by a mysterious online group dubbed the “Shadow Brokers.” The group has repeatedly released alleged U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) hacking “data,” such as the EquationDrug files and the Lost in Translation dump that details SWIFT and Windows OS-based exploits and payloads. According to Flashpoint, the Shadow Brokers also released “evidence pointing to an ostensible NSA-backed campaign targeting financial institutions, particularly those located in the Middle East.” Also, the EternalBlue exploit, discovered by the NSA and subsequently leaked, was discovered in the global ransomware worm WannaCry. “Then there’s really ham-fisted stuff like the U.S. government trying to pin WannaCry on North Korea, in order to get everyone to forget that the exploit WannaCry was built on was a CIA exploit that was leaked, probably, by the Russians,” says Ranum. “It’s totally North Korea’s fault that we built a weapon and someone used it, right?”
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Manchurian president.
Pretty sloppy tradecraft, KGB recruited assets are not supposed to openly meet with their handlers to avoid this very thing.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304177104577305182847032866.html?mod=WSJ_hp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsSecond
By CAROL E. LEE
SEOUL—U.S. President Barack Obama told Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on Monday that his re-election campaign has tied his hands in resolving differences with Russia over U.S. plans for a missile-defense system in Europe, and suggested an agreement would be more likely after November
"This is my last election, and after my election I'll have more flexibility," Mr. Obama said to Mr. Medvedev after a meeting in Seoul, according to audio picked up by television cameras that apparently wasn't intended to be heard by reporters. (!!!)
"I understand," Mr. Medvedev replied.
"I transmit this information to Vladimir," he added, referring to incoming Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The White House confirmed that the exchange came after a discussion about the missile-defense shield, saying in a statement that the issue, which has strained U.S.-Russia relations, won't be resolved before Americans vote in November.
Mr. Medvedev said on Friday that Russia was unconvinced that a planned U.S.-led missile defense shield in Europe is meant to deter an attack by countries such as Iran.
continued
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jul/1/us-really-did-have-manchurian-candidate-white-hous/
America really did have a Manchurian Candidate in the White House
With the presidential seal on the wall behind him, President Barack Obama gestures as he speaks in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, on the White House campus in Washington, Wednesday, Nov. 28, 2012, about how middle class Americans would see their taxes go up if Congress fails to act to extend the middle class tax cuts. The president said he believes that members of both parties can reach a framework on a debt-cutting deal before Christmas. (AP Photo/Pablo Martinez Monsivais)
With the presidential seal on the wall behind him, President Barack Obama gestures as he speaks in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, on the White House campus in Washington, Wednesday, Nov. 28, 2012, about how middle class Americans would see ... more >
By L. Todd Wood - - Sunday, July 1, 2018
ANALYSIS/OPINION:
After returning from a tour of some of the war zones in the Middle East — which ended with the Free Iran Gathering 2018 in Paris — I am struck by the realization that America really did have a Manchurian Candidate in The White House for eight years. If you look at the evidence, there really is no other conclusion. The calamitous consequences of the Obama presidency will be felt for the foreseeable future.
In the short year and a half that President Trump has been in office, he has put in place policy that has mitigated the damage that President Obama inflicted on our national security and on our allies. The speed with which Trump has been able to turn things around points to the diabolical depths the Obama administration went to in order to undermine our national strength and way of life. All Trump had to do was stop doing things that hurt America; America could then take care of itself. The results are plain as day. However, it will take decades for the Obama damage to be completely undone. The deviousness of the Obama sedition runs deep.
Think about it for a moment. If you wanted peace in the Middle East, why would you throw away the trillions of dollars spent, as well as the lives of thousands of American souls, by irresponsibly pulling out ALL American troops from Iraq? No matter your thoughts on starting the war, pulling out was an irresponsible thing to do. We still have troops in Germany, Korea and Japan, for God’s sake. Why? For stability, that’s why. As Colin Powell said, we broke it, now we own it. It was a given that instability would follow the force withdrawal. When you combine this act with the reality that Obama never really did try to defeat the Islamic State, what conclusion can you come up with? Trump defeated them in a few months. The conclusion is obvious: Obama really didn’t want to destroy them.
Why did Obama and Hillary take down Moammar Gadhafi, who had already given up his nuclear weapons? Was it to destabilize Libya, where ISIS could gain another foothold? Why did Obama help install the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt? What was the agenda behind the so-called Arab Spring?
However, the coup-de-grace of anti-American activity was the JCPOA, or, to say it another way, the agreement to give Iran everything it wanted, including nuclear weapons and money — lots of money — which it immediately used to further destabilize the region, and existentially threaten the only democracy in the Middle East, Israel. To take it a step further, why didn’t Obama support the opposition against the Mullahs in 2009 when there was an obvious chance for regime change in Iran? Why didn’t Obama confront Bashar Assad’s chemical weapons use? One of the main unanswered questions is what ties did Valerie Jarrett really have to the Iranian regime?
I won’t go into why Obama ran up more debt for the United States than all previous presidents combined. I won’t ask why he weakened our armed forces. I won’t ask why he used tyrannical policies, like using the agencies of the federal government to go after his political opposition. I won’t ask why he politicized our security apparatus in an attempt to frame President Trump.
What I will say is that there was a big fox in the hen house for eight long years. Eight long years for people like Brennan, Hillary, Kerry, Clapper, Comey and Jarrett to really hurt us regarding our safety and security.
Trump has a lot of house cleaning to do. Thank goodness he’s being quick about it.
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What Putin Wants From Trump
The U.S. President wants better relations. The price will be high.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, July 12, 2018.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, July 12, 2018. Photo: Alexei Druzhinin/Associated Press
By The Editorial Board
July 12, 2018 7:32 p.m. ET
283 COMMENTS
Donald Trump meets Vladimir Putin Monday in Helsinki, and if the U.S. President has an agenda beyond dominating the headlines and taunting his domestic opponents, it isn’t apparent. That won’t be the case with Mr. Putin, who has spent 18 months sizing up the American President and will be looking to get the most out of a weak Russian hand.
Foreign Edition Podcast
Liu Xia's Freedom; Pompeo's Pyongyang Flop
In 18 years running Russia, Mr. Putin has outfoxed two previous U.S. Presidents who sought better relations. The Russian makes promises to win concessions but then typically reneges or moves to exploit what he perceives as U.S. weakness. George W. Bush at least negotiated the end of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that stifled missile defenses, but Mr. Putin rolled over Barack Obama like T-14 tanks in a Ukrainian corn field.
So let’s assess the summit in advance by what Mr. Putin wants now from Mr. Trump. The U.S. President considers himself a shrewd negotiator, so we can measure the results by how much of the Putin agenda the former KGB operative gets Mr. Trump to concede.
• Prestige. Mr. Putin’s top priority at all times is shoring up his political standing at home, where he lacks democratic legitimacy. This means striding the world stage as if Russia is again a global power, and Mr. Trump is helping Mr. Putin on this score merely by meeting him on equal terms. The Russian will also want Mr. Trump to endorse Mr. Putin’s denials about meddling in the 2016 election—which he will advertise as official absolution.
Mr. Putin has been persona non grata in Europe since he invaded Crimea in 2014, and he wants Mr. Trump’s help with rehabilitation. Expect Mr. Putin to flatter Mr. Trump for his willingness to disrupt global norms. He’ll also want Mr. Trump to repeat his recent comments that Mr. Putin should rejoin the G-7.
• Syria. Mr. Putin has accomplished what he sought when he barged into Syria in 2015. He’s saved Bashar Assad, fortified long-term military bases, and replaced the U.S. as chief power broker in the region. He wants Mr. Trump to validate these gains and withdraw U.S. troops from eastern Syria.
In return Mr. Putin may promise to help the U.S. contain Iran’s presence in Syria, though there’s no guarantee he can do so, given Iran’s investment in Mr. Assad. The Russian knows Mr. Trump is eager to bring U.S. troops home and might rely on assurances on Iran the way he did on the “de-escalation” zone in southwestern Syria. Mr. Putin has helped Mr. Assad bomb the opposition in that part of Syria despite the Russian’s assurances.
• Ukraine. Mr. Putin wants Mr. Trump to accept his Crimea annexation, perhaps in return for recommitting to the Minsk negotiation process for eastern Ukraine, where Russian forces started another illegal war. Mr. Trump has already blamed Barack Obama for losing Crimea, essentially a unilateral concession that Mr. Putin will pocket. The Russian will also try to get Mr. Trump to stop providing Kiev with lethal weapons.
• Lifting sanctions. This is Mr. Putin’s top near-term priority. He needs to be able to enrich his cronies, and U.S. and European sanctions have become a major problem. The Russian will play to Mr. Trump’s dislike for the European Union by suggesting Mr. Trump can come to an independent deal over Ukraine, Syria and sanctions. Mr. Putin knows that the Italian, Hungarian and Greek governments are wobbly on sanctions, and he’d like Mr. Trump to stir more dissension in the EU.
• The trans-Atlantic alliance. Mr. Putin knows that the stronger NATO is as a military force, the riskier it is for him to engage in foreign adventurism. The Russian’s long-term goal is to erode the West’s political will to add to its capabilities as the memories of Crimea fade. Mr. Putin will do whatever he can in Helsinki to underscore Mr. Trump’s frustration with Europe that was on display this week at the NATO summit, planting the seeds of future discord.
• Arms control. Mr. Trump has been floating the idea of new arms talks with Russia, though over what isn’t clear. No doubt Mr. Putin’s spies have told him that Mr. Trump wants to be known as a nuclear peacemaker. And Mr. Putin may try to exploit that desire by offering a new round of talks to reduce the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals.
The problem here is that the Pentagon believes Mr. Putin is violating his current arms treaties with the U.S. This includes deploying intermediate-range cruise missiles in Europe that are banned under the 1987 INF Treaty. But that might not stop Mr. Trump from thinking he can change Mr. Putin’s behavior.
***
Mr. Trump clearly believes that Mr. Putin’s Russia is not the security threat that the Pentagon does, and he’s intent on showing that the two countries can get along. The wily Russian knows that too, which is why we should watch what he gains for smiling across the table
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WTF just happened?
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WTF just happened?
I've only heard the critics; none of us heard the actual talks. Suffice it to say that when Rand Paul compliments your foreign policy you've had a bad day.
The relationship with Russia is strategic and complicated. The election interference part is an annoyance and distraction to Trump, and no, he doesn't trust Clapper, Brennan, Comey, McCabe, Ohr, Smirk et al. There are real things Trump wants from Putin, Syria, Iran, North Korea and China issues come to mind. There are things Putin wants from Trump, sanctions relief and backing off of certain moves like moving bases and bases into Poland perhaps and energy price issues. Most likely they made no real progress on those except to get their most private thoughts and threats said and heard.
Then they head out into the cameras and the questions and Trump apparently had a goal of not salting potential wounds while he sets out to achieve this or that with this (other) egomaniac, and Trump knows quite well how thin skinned, narcissistic egomaniacs think.
When you win real concessions peacefully from geopolitical partners and foes, there is a something you need to give the leader of the other side called saving face. Nothing I'm sure was accomplished so far but Trump for some reason decided that in this press conference he will prove to Putin that he can stroke his ego in public and show respect - as a tactic toward specific ends.
Clear to all but half unspoken is that Trump has both been extremely tough on Russia on policies crucial to our interests and nice to him in person in front of cameras. All media and establishment see this and make comment on one aspect and not the other.
The media and experts were wrong before, every time with Trump and often with others:
Reagan Flubs Reykjavik Summit
At his big meeting, the President’s obsession with Star Wars allowed Gorbachev to outmaneuver him on arms control
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/reagan-flubs-reykjavik-summit-118796/
Then of course there is the elephant in the room, the Left-Russia schizophrenia. It was about a minute ago the Left laughed when Romney thought Russia was a larg geopolitical threat. What an idiot! The eighties called and want their foreign policy back, ha ha ha.
https://www.mediaite.com/tv/rothman-msnbcs-most-embarrassing-mockery-of-romneys-russia-warnings/
http://thefederalist.com/2016/07/25/5-times-liberals-mocked-mitt-romney-for-warning-about-russia/
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/22/obama-romney-russia_n_2003927.html
Time will tell where this leads.
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Pasting RickN's posts here on this thread:
rickn
Insert Quote
Trump now says that he meant to say, "Why wouldn't it be Russia?" instead of "Why would it be Russia?"
OK. You must be careful with the double negatives.
Posted on: Today at 01:50:02 PM
Posted by: rickn
Insert Quote
A lot of people are criticizing Trump for not saying that he believes the intelligence assessment of Russian interference over Putin's denials.
I think that Trump handled the issue properly, but not artfully.
Mueller's Friday the 13th indictment of those 12 Russian operatives turned a counterintelligence issue into a matter of US criminal procedure. As Andy McCarthy noted correctly, because the indictment asserts US jurisdiction over their actions, the Mueller indictment granted those 12 Russian defendants the full protection of the US Constitution. For federal court defendants, this involves especially Amendments 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. And this also includes the presumption of their innocence.
If Trump answers that question by saying that he believes the US intelligence assessment over Putin's denials, then he has prejudged the case and Mueller's ability to prosecute those 12 defendants successfully would have been reduced significantly.
Whether or not Trump had thought the matter through this far is unimportant. Whatever the motivation for his answer, the answer was the correct one. Trump cannot have an official opinion about the evidence against these 12 defendants now that Mueller made the matter one of criminal justice instead of counterintelligence.
================
Rick:
Nice!
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https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/07/trump-putin-meetings-unnecessary/
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From Professor Emeritus Stephen Cohen who actually applauds Trump and points out we certainly are in a dangerous new Cold War and puts much Blame on Bush the second and Obama:
http://podbay.fm/show/popout.php?id=589864479&e=1531887290
Trump was loathed by those who could not understand how he, the weakest Republican candidate in decades (though I am not sure that McCain or Bob Dole could be considered any better)
that they will never accept him . He went from being loathed to now being a heretic from those who made lots of money , careers out of blaming the big bad Russia to saying America also shares some blame.
Cohen feels that US blame is in area of "80%"
I would like to hear more of what he thinks about Putin's kleptocratic reign but hat is another story.
If you see two Cohen podcasts go to the second one which is from last night .
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Thinking About the Trump-Putin Meeting
By and large, high-level summits don’t matter. Agendas are set weeks in advance. A series of agreements – mostly symbolic – are negotiated ahead of time, with documents ready to be signed. Private meetings usually involve several aides to help the leaders and to ensure that they stick to the script.
President Donald Trump approaches summits differently from his predecessors. Rather than months of preparation at lower levels, he enters meetings prepared to improvise. He has been deeply criticized for this approach, particularly by those officials who would normally be called upon to prepare for meetings, but it isn’t clear that the old method worked. It tended to minimize gaffes, but it also homogenized the meetings, tying the hands of the president – who was elected, after all, whereas the minions were appointed. Trump’s desire to be free to interact and deal is not inherently a bad idea, as it would turn summits into authentic meetings, but the complexities of domestic and foreign politics require discipline.
Only a handful of people know exactly what was said during the private meeting on Monday in Helsinki between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, but the world bore witness to the post-summit Q&A with the media. The American president was not restrained by his advisers, nor was he bound by his prepared remarks. He was, however, constrained by domestic politics. World leaders are politicians, and politicians have publics – whether in democracies or dictatorships – that they must answer to.
The weaker the political positions of leaders are – or the weaker they perceive their positions to be – the more they will speak to their public. Their statements will shift away from the matter at hand to try to buttress their political position at home. They can do this in several ways, including by using the occasion as a platform to attack domestic opponents. This is what happened at the Trump-Putin meeting. Putin is politically strong, and for him, simply appearing confident was enough. But Trump is embattled, and he chose to focus on domestic issues. A major one is the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election. Since the summit was with Putin, and Trump’s focus was on domestic politics involving Russia, the confluence led him into difficult places.
Trump’s most interesting comment came as a tweet before the press conference, though he reaffirmed the comment’s sentiments during the conference. He said that U.S.-Russian relations had reached their lowest point ever and that it was the United States’ fault. The first part is suspect given events like the Cuban Missile Crisis, but the startling part was the assertion that the U.S. was to blame. What I think Trump was trying to do was to attack the Obama administration for trying to isolate Russia rather than engage it. There is an argument to be made for that position, but it wasn’t clearly expressed in the tweet.
The decision by Robert Mueller, the special counsel leading the investigation into Russian meddling, to indict 12 Russians the Friday afternoon before the summit clearly threw Trump off balance. It isn’t clear that Mueller had to do this when he did, given that there was no chance whatsoever that the Kremlin would extradite them. Putin hinted that if Mueller wanted to question them, the Russian government would then want to question Americans accused of committing crimes in Russia, citing one case in particular. Since U.S. foreign intelligence must break laws daily in Russia to do its job, an agreement on this would open a can of worms no one wants.
One explanation for the timing of the indictments is that Mueller was oblivious or indifferent to the fact that there was a summit meeting the following week. Another explanation is that in performing his job as special counsel, Mueller saw an opportunity to fluster Trump and he used it, prioritizing his role in the investigation over U.S. foreign policy. In any event, the indictments dominated the press conference, with American reporters hammering on whether Trump endorsed them. Trump could have answered that they were only indictments and not convictions and that he would let the judicial system decide this, but instead, he essentially took Putin’s line, dismissing U.S. intelligence findings. (Trump walked back those remarks on Tuesday.)
This brings us to the subtext of the investigation, which is that Trump is in some way under the control of Russian intelligence. The press conference should put those concerns to rest. If he were, the Russians never would have permitted Trump to reject U.S. intelligence findings or side with Putin. Indeed, it would have been unwise to hold a private meeting between the presidents in the first place. The Russians would be doing everything in their power to enhance Trump’s political standing in the United States and to make him appear anti-Russian. They would never allow anyone to imagine he was working for them. They would use him in different ways. Trump would have attacked Putin directly at the press conference.
The pressures on Trump are mounting, whether he is concerned about something he did or simply under the normal pressure that comes with being under constant investigation. His desire to challenge what he sees as tormentors on all fronts has become powerful, and it broke out around the meeting in Helsinki. Putin undoubtedly was pleased, and the world media declared it a major setback for the United States.
In actuality, at most it hurt the career of a single politician, and more likely it didn’t do even that. The American public is fully aware of Trump’s personality quirks and public statements. His approval rating has ticked up in recent months, reaching as high as 47 percent according to Rasmussen for the month of June. This is one of the higher results, but it’s pretty strong for a president at this point in his presidency. There are voters who will despise him regardless of what he does, and others who will admire him regardless of what he does. Trump’s popularity won’t surge or plummet simply because he behaved like himself.
As to American standing on the world stage, that too is consistent. Most dislike the United States, but none can dismiss it. In my travels, I found many countries that held President Barack Obama in withering contempt. President George W. Bush was regarded as incompetent. Dislike of the president for being unsophisticated, or the U.S. for being naive or ruthless (sometimes both, somehow), is not new, although there is no question that Trump has created vast new opportunities for critics.
But the United States is the world’s largest economy, the engine of global technological innovation and the only global military force in the world. It is also the largest importer, and Germany’s largest customer, for example. German Chancellor Angela Merkel may be offended by Trump, but in the end, her country needs the American market. The objective realities of U.S. power trump the behavior of the president. Similarly, summits must be put into context. They are meetings between people, some of whom have enough political support to do what they say they will, others who do not. But both will pass the scene long before the deep power of either country passes away. The balance of power shifts, but, except in time of war, ever so slowly. A sense of proportion is needed, but that has never been abundant in the world.
The post Thinking About the Trump-Putin Meeting appeared first on Geopolitical Futures.
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uly 19, 2018 7:31 p.m. ET
303 COMMENTS
Vladimir Putin knows what he wants from Donald Trump, and one priority is help in silencing businessman and human-rights advocate Bill Browder. Someone should tell Mr. Trump that he and Mr. Browder were both targeted by Fusion GPS, the political gun-for-hire that midwifed the Steele dossier in 2016.
Mr. Browder has been on Moscow’s enemies list since he lobbied Congress to pass the Magnitsky Act in 2012. The law is named for Mr. Browder’s late lawyer and auditor Sergei Magnitsky, who exposed a $230 million fraud embarrassing to the Kremlin, was arrested on trumped-up charges, and died from torture and neglect in a Moscow detention center at age 37.
The Magnitsky Act, versions of which have also passed in Britain, Canada and the Baltic states, allows for sanctions and travel restrictions on human-rights violators. The U.S. has sanctioned 51 Russians under the law. The Kremlin has been hounding Mr. Browder for years, lodging “red notice” requests with Interpol for his arrest and filing frivolous lawsuits in U.S. and British courts.
The news this week is that Mr. Putin complained about Mr. Browder in Helsinki at his news conference with Mr. Trump. The Russian accused Mr. Browder of tax fraud and “a contribution to the campaign of Hillary Clinton, ” the latter of which looks like an unsubtle attempt to seduce Mr. Trump to help him.
The next day Russia’s prosecutor general said Moscow wants to question several U.S. officials allegedly involved with Mr. Browder, including former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul. Asked about that Wednesday, White House press secretary Sarah Sanders said “the President’s going to meet with his team and we’ll let you know when we have an announcement on that.” What?
It seems Mr. Putin also sought Mr. Trump’s intervention against Mr. Browder during their private meeting in Helsinki. The State Department rightly rejected Mr. Putin’s interrogation request as “absurd” on Wednesday, but allow us to connect some dots for Mr. Trump.
Mr. Putin wants relief from Magnitsky Act sanctions and tried to lure Donald Trump Jr. to support relief in the 2016 campaign. Recall that Kremlin-linked lawyer Natalia Veselnitskaya met Don Jr. and son-in-law Jared Kushner in June 2016 at Trump Tower on the pretext of having dirt on Hillary Clinton. It turned out she had nothing on Mrs. Clinton but wanted to lobby the two to support repeal of the Magnitsky Act.
Mrs. Veselnitskaya also worked alongside Fusion GPS to undermine the Magnitsky Act, which means Fusion was working both for the Russians to smear Mr. Browder and the Clinton campaign to smear Mr. Trump via the Steele dossier.
Mr. Browder has told Congress that Fusion spread false information to news outlets that Magnitsky wasn’t murdered. And Fusion co-founder Glenn Simpson told Congress that he had planted information with U.S. media about Mr. Browder’s “activities in Russia” and his supposed “history of tax avoidance.” We doubt Mr. Putin told Mr. Trump about the Kremlin link to Fusion in their private conversation about Mr. Browder.
All of this is another way of saying to Mr. Trump that Vladimir Putin is trying to con you, sir. And on that point, the U.S. Senate did Mr. Trump a favor Thursday by voting 98-0 for a resolution warning the President not to let the Russian government question diplomats or other officials.
On Thursday afternoon the White House seemed to see where the politics of this was going when it released a statement saying that the request to interview U.S. officials “was made in sincerity by President Putin, but President Trump disagrees with it.” The White House then announced that Mr. Trump will invite Mr. Putin to meet in Washington.
Mr. Trump should know that critics of the Kremlin often end up dead, and Mr. Browder is undoubtedly a target. Before he cuddles with the bear again, Mr. Trump ought to say publicly that Mr. Putin will get no help from the U.S. against Mr. Browder. And that if anything happens to Mr. Browder—if he should fall from a bridge, or be shot as he gets out of a car—the world is going to blame Vladimir Putin.
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http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/safadi-lavrov-discuss-return-refugees
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http://www.thediplomad.com/2018/07/president-putin-how-to-get-progs-to.html
President Putin: How to Get the Progs to Love You
Dear President Putin:
I know you are very busy these days trying to maintain Russia as a major power on the world stage. You had it pretty easy for most of the past decade, as your biggest "rival"--we're not really in the same league, but never mind--the USA, was governed by "pajama boys," at best, and maybe even active enemies of the USA. I wrote some time back (here, for example) about you,
Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, the Shining Shooting Tsar of Eurasia-- [is] arguably the smartest national leader in the world. Let me back up. "Smartest" might be the wrong word. Yes, it definitely is the wrong one. That word is too loosely defined and too easily pinned on too many. What makes Putin successful and such a formidable geopolitical foe (thank you, Mitt Romney) is not that he is just "smart," but that he is a throw-back to a different era. He hunts and fishes, and doesn't care about the political fashion and sensitivities of the day; pajama boy has no place in Putin's cage fighter universe. Despite his upbringing as a Communist, he is now devoutly religious and wants to see religion restored to Russian life. As the jihadis have discovered, they have in Putin a rival as ruthless and religiously committed as they, and not bound by the conventions of political correctness.
So you see, I have a lot of respect for you as an actor on the world stage, and am full of genuine admiration at how you could play a pretty weak hand so very well against opponents much stronger than you, well, on paper. I also wrote that, sorry, I was glad not to be in a world where Russia was the dominant power (here) and even gave advice to my leaders on how to deal with Russia's big power ambitions (here). I have written a lot more which I am sure your world class hackers can retrieve with no difficulty, or they can just Google the stuff. As you can see, I am not a big fan of what you're trying to do, but . . . well, the situation in my country has gotten so absurd I turn to you.
In November 2016, we elected a President who has been the toughest on Russia since, since . . . well, at least since the USSR became Russia. You know all the things that Trump has done better than I, and am quite certain this man was not whom you wanted in the White House. Your folks poured a lot of money into the Bill and Hillary Clinton Crime Family, and I am sure you feel a bit burned by that pointless investment. The losers of that election have tried to play political jiu-jitsu by claiming that their opponent was actually in your pocket and that we should ignore all the collusion between your people and Hillary. Our media and "Deep State," which respond to DNC dictates much as did the old Pravda to the Kremlin's, have gone full Orwell. Well, you know all about that. No need for me to spell it out for you.
You are not getting good press here. Good press is important in the USA and West. You're not getting it. The Progs who control the bulk of the media, old and new, don't like you for a variety of reasons having more to do with Prog delusions than anything real. Let me give you some advice which is inspired by Francisco Franco and Josip Broz Tito. There you had two authoritarian European dictators who did not hesitate to sentence enemies to prison and to death. They were very similar in many ways, but Tito knew how to handle the international Progs and Franco did not. Franco talked about the Church, fighting Communism, and crushing the Masons. Tito, as much if not more dictatorial than Franco, talked about the Non-Aligned Movement (he helped found it, in fact), being anti-imperialist, belonging to no side in the great battle of the Cold War, just in favor of peace, anti-colonialism, etc. All themes from Progdam. Tito knew, as I wrote here, for example, that Progs love the FAKE. They adore the FAKE. You can go to my piece, and you will see what I mean.
So President Putin, my advice for you is to go Full Fake!
Tito and Franco, for example, both wore colorful military uniforms with lots of Goering-style medals, but Tito had a snazzy Red Star on his cap. He would wear the uniform of a bloody military dictator but talk about peace, non-alignment, freeing the poor, etc. Not Franco, no, the fool was too honest for that. He just wanted to talk about crushing the Communists and the Masons. In the end, of course, Spain turned out to be a much better place to live than did Yugoslavia (RIP), but Franco (and Pinochet in Chile vs Castro in Cuba) would get no credit for that.
If you go Full Fake, then it will be OK for our President to meet you. Nobody will object. Get on MSNBC and decry the evils of imperialism in Africa and Latin America; quote Marx; talk about Frantz Fanon. You can do it. The Progs in the West will eat it up!
Regards to Sergei Lavrov and tell him I think of him often and of our days at the UN. Ask him if he remembers being trapped in a car with me in a Swiss park . . . a funny story that . . . please don't have him shot because of it . . .
Go Fake!
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A Trump accomplishment that he got the Left to admit the threat of Russia. George Orwell would be shocked to see these real-world players turn on a dime and deny history in any way that suits them.
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From the Ukraine article,
"Claustrophobic Russia"?
Russia spans 11 time zones!
My modest proposal to shake up the geopolitical balance is that while Russia turns to Europe, steals Crimea, fights for the Ukraine, threatens the Baltics, partners with Germany, and gets bogged down in a quagmire in the Middle East while plummeting oil and gas prices decimate their domestic economy, Trump should buy Siberia from Putin.
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https://bigthink.com/paul-ratner/34-years-ago-a-kgb-defector-described-america-today
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Interesting perspective.
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2018/08/07/post-communist_russia_is_not_the_soviet_union_137730.html
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Certainly there are several counter points to be made, but an interesting article nonetheless. Nice find.
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Certainly there are several counter points to be made, but an interesting article nonetheless. Nice find.
Agreed. I wondered if this was written by some pro-putin source. It challenges some conventional thinking and offers some perspective.
They missed the part about Putin killing all his rivals. Still we want to know how he thinks, what he faces and how their economy works. Other than the big cronies and oligarchs, I really don't know how much their economy is market versus state.
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http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/406369-secretive-russian-gru-tests-trump-with-brazen-tactics?userid=188403
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https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-cyber-politics/espionage-scandals-show-russian-armys-growing-clout-idUSKCN1MJ1MP
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U.S. and Russian defense. U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton has arrived in Russia for defense talks. The trip will be tense, to say the least. It comes on the heels of accusations that Russia has been trying to interfere in upcoming U.S. elections – a charge Moscow believes is merely pretext for more sanctions. Yet the countries have much they want to discuss, namely the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. START will expire in 2021 if they don’t agree to extend it, and rumors circulated that Bolton may threaten to withdraw entirely from the INF treaty. (As the talks progress, keep an eye on Ukraine. The U.S. envoy to the country said the talks will go nowhere until after the Ukrainian elections next spring.) This is all a timely reminder that for all the kind words between leaders, the fundamental differences between the U.S. and Russia tend to generate conflict, not cooperation.
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https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/oct/23/donald-trump-scores-wins-over-russia-economy-natio/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=manual&utm_campaign=20171227&utm_term=newsletter&utm_content=morning&bt_ee=10t9PAtYk3xeXQ2BOyc4%2FScJZM33Y9JbV%2FiiB44h0ByPPZgTBTE5gKkbcdYeX22o&bt_ts=1540377577186
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second post
ditor's Note: The views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the participants only.
Can you please give us a glimpse into your life under constant surveillance by Russian intelligence?
I'm trying not to think about this; otherwise I'd be too paranoid. As for the surveillance, it's pretty amusing, as at the end of a day there's nothing that I say in private that can be kept private. ...
I remember I was having a meeting in a cafe in central Moscow with Dmitry Gudkov, a member of the opposition in the Duma until 2016. The waiter came in and brought us coffee and put sugar on the table. I saw Dmitry's face turn pale and his voice grew insistent: "Please take it away," he ordered. The waiter seemed befuddled: "What's wrong with the sugar?" But Gudkov kept demanding that the waiter remove it from the table. "They usually put a tiny microphone in powdery sugar like this," he explained to me later.
In another case, I was in Nizhny Novgorod where I was making my documentary about Boris Nemtsov. I sat down with my cameraman to have lunch. A few minutes later, three masked men ran in and started throwing eggs at us. Surprisingly to some but not to us, they knew where we were and exactly what we were doing. The same day, in the same evening, when I was waiting for a train back to Moscow, I was met by picketing members of a pro-Kremlin group. When I got back to Moscow a crew from the pro-Kremlin NTV television channel was right there and got in my face. They knew which carriage I was in.
Are you afraid for your life?
You're asking this to somebody who's nearly been killed twice in the last three years. [Sighs]. I'm a normal human being, and fear is normal. My family, my wife and children are not in Russia. They live in the United States. ...
So far, I've been lucky. … Alas, so many of my colleagues and independent journalists weren't so fortunate — they lost their lives.
In March, I interviewed Boris Vishnevsky, one of your colleagues in the Russian opposition and a member of the parliament in St. Petersburg. When asked about Alexei Navalny, the presumed leader of the Russian opposition, he said Navalny is viewed as such only in the large Russian cities, not in the provinces. Do you agree? Is not having a single leader a good thing or a bad thing?
The most prominent and effective voice, and the strongest leader in the Russian opposition to Vladimir Putin's authoritarian regime, was the former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov. There are still strong and prominent leaders in the Russian opposition today. In fact, there are many of them.
One of the wildly promulgated myths of the Kremlin propaganda machine is that, apart from Putin, there are no other (potential) leaders in Russia. How insulting it is to say so in a country with a population of 140 million, in a country which has so many talented and intelligent people.
Even today, when we live under oppression, there are many prominent and intrepid figures within the Russian opposition, such as Alexei Navalny, as well as Mikhail Khodorkovsky (after serving a six-year prison sentence, the former oil tycoon now lives in Switzerland) and Yevgeny Roizman, who was elected as the mayor of Yekaterinburg, the fourth-largest city in Russia. Because the Kremlin couldn't defeat him, the election results were annulled. He just recently vacated the office. Another bright name (in the opposition) is Lev Shlosberg, a very active and prominent political figure in the parliament of the Pskov region. He was the first to provide definite proof of the presence of regular Russian troops in the Donbas region in Ukraine in 2014. His newspaper Pskovskaya Gubernia published photographs of unmarked and anonymous graves of paratroopers from Pskov who'd been sent to Eastern Ukraine and killed. He discovered that the bodies were secretly brought back in unmarked body bags and buried like street dogs in unmarked graves with only identification numbers instead of their names. The Russian Defense Ministry has denied the fact. The newspaper paid a heavy price for the revelation, and Shlosberg was savagely beaten and stripped of his parliamentary seat. However, the people of Pskov have entrusted him again with a mandate in the regional parliament.
And then we have Dmitry Gudkov, a member of the Duma, who was planning to vie for the Moscow mayor's office but was impeded by the Kremlin because they knew he was going to collect many local votes. Another bright name in the opposition is Galina Shirshina, who was elected mayor of Petrozavodsk, a city in western Russia. There are many more names on the list.
Russian opposition to Putin seems uncoordinated and very "colorful." Both are signs of weakness. Do you agree? What needs to be done to bring the opposition together as a single powerful voice and force?
I don't think it would be right if the democratic opposition was to copy the kind of a single authoritarian leader (as we have now in the) regime in the Kremlin. Our goal is not to replace Putin with Navalny or Khodorkovsky or with anybody else. To say it illustratively, we don't strive to replace a bad czar with a good czar. We don't want any czar in Russia in our vision — that is, a modern and democratic country. As Khodorkovsky pointed out via Skype at the night session of the Riga Conference 2018 that we attended, as the opposition, we want an efficient parliamentary system functioning in the country. Russian history has proved that if there's even such a good-hearted person such as the late Boris Yeltsin, the first democratically elected president of Russia, things don't necessarily end up well for Russia and its people, because the system itself is wrong. What we need is a pluralistic government, a strong parliamentary system and many strong leaders throughout the country.
We don't strive to replace a bad czar with a good czar. We don't want any czar in Russia in our vision.
Note that most members of the opposition aren't from Moscow. They come from St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Pskov and Karelia. We've opened 30 regional branches of political opposition across the country. Our key principle is to be visible everywhere. For too long, everything has been focused on Moscow and St. Petersburg, the two largest cities.
Your chances in the provinces are slim as no business leader will support an opposition party for the simple reason that their business would be shut down by the authorities ...
That is absolutely true. Yet despite this, and despite the prevailing censorship, and despite the fact that elections in Russia are manipulated and controlled by the authorities, there have been a very few genuine cases where the opposition was allowed on the ballot and received significant support. The example of the aforementioned Yevgeny Roizman, who was directly elected as the mayor of Yekaterinburg in 2013, beating a candidate from United Russia, and Galina Shirshina, a member of Yabloko (an opposition party chaired by the Yeltsin-era economist Grigory Yavlinsky that's usually allowed to participate in Russian elections) who won the mayor's office in Petrozavodsk, prove my claim. And then we have the example of Nemtsov, who in 2013 ran successfully for a seat in the regional parliament in Yaroslavl, doing so despite the avalanche of blackmail and smear against him by the state propaganda machine. If he hadn't been killed in 2015, he would very likely have been elected to the Duma.
The Kremlin is able to maintain the image of Putin's ostensible popularity of 85 percent or so only through preventing his opponents from running in elections. It's easy to win when your opponents aren't even in the race.
Russia holds more regional elections next year. Do you believe it will be an easy grab for Putin's United Russia? Particularly in the wake of the unpopular pension reform that dragged Putin's support ratings to record lows?
Let's look at what happened during the last two weeks in Russia's gubernatorial elections in Primorsky Krai in the Far East, the Vladimir region, Khakassia and the Khabarovsk region. In each of them, the candidates put on the ballot by Putin's United Russia lost in the second round. In Primorsky Krai we saw a massive vote rigging that was so obvious that the electoral authority was forced to rerun the primary.
What is pretty amusing to me is that, for many years now, the Kremlin has learned to completely control the election process, from top to bottom. Yet with every tool in its hands to win, the Kremlin-supported candidates are starting to lose. We see a completely new situation in which, even with carefully chosen names on the ballots, United Russia fails to win. Furthermore, people are ready to vote for anybody, even a clown on the ballot, just not for the Putin party candidates. Vishnevsky, whom you mentioned earlier, recently wrote an article in which he found the trend similar to what was happening in the elections in the early 1990s. The people voted for anybody except the Communists, and now they feel the same way about the Putin candidates. It's a bad omen for Putin and his party, and let's see how it plays out in the regional elections next year.
Can you tell me something about relations between Open Russia and the other opposition parties? Do you have many branches in the regions?
Open Russia isn't a political party but a broad movement encompassing a spectrum of people representing different political views. At this point we don't plan to participate in the elections as a party. For now, we seek to cooperate with the other democratic parties out there preaching the tenets of democracy, human rights and freedom.
As of today, we have branches in over 30 regions of the Russian Federation, from Kaliningrad in the west to Vladivostok in the east.
Although we're often unable to participate in the elections, we see every election for our people and especially the youth as a training ground. Since 2015, we've put together lists of our candidates for every tier election across Russia while building a political campaign infrastructure — that is, hiring campaign managers, volunteers and so on. The bottom line is that even if you can't participate and/or win, you can still learn. Young people will need this experience when the Putin regime is gone.
Do you have a timeline for this?
I'm a historian by education, and one thing that Russian history definitely shows is that major political changes in our country can start quickly, suddenly and unexpectedly. As a historian, I don't think that Vladimir Lenin knew what was to unravel in Russia in the coming weeks after he gave his famous speech in Zurich in January 1917 to the young Social Democrats of Switzerland. He admitted to the audience then: "My generation won't live long enough to see the decisive battles of this coming revolution." Yet the revolution swept everything aside in just six weeks! Isn't it amazing? Like you, I'm old enough to remember August 1991 when one of the most oppressive regimes of the 20th century collapsed in just three days. If anybody had said in early August that year that the Soviet regime would be gone by the end of the month, nobody would have believed it.
The task of Open Russia is to prepare for a change that will happen sooner or later.
One thing that Russian history definitely shows is that major political changes in our country can start quickly, suddenly and unexpectedly.
Yet you have to agree that the arrival of ultranationalists, anti-globalists and the political novices in Europe and the United States plays into the hands of Putin who, pointing to them, can justly say: "Hey guys, either we enjoy the stability that Russia has or subject ourselves to shake-ups and the unpredictability that the West is going through?" What would be your response to this?
I don't see these as very relevant. The task of political change in Russia is in the interest of Russian citizens and can't be achieved by any international actors.
The only thing we're asking the West to do is to stay firm on the principles it preaches. We ask them not to make any cynical deals with the corrupt and authoritarian regime in the Kremlin, which so many Western leaders have embraced, alas.
It's heartening to know that some countries, such as Lithuania for example, have got even tougher on the regime over the last couple of years. Your country was the second in the European Union to pass the so-called Magnitsky Act (introducing targeted individual sanctions against the people in Putin's close-knit circle), and it was the first to implement the act in practice.
The Magnitsky legislation is the best example of a principled approach to politics.
In your speech at the recent Riga Conference 2018 you debunked quite a few of what you call "myths" about Russia. Specifically, you said that the Russians, contrary to popular belief, "don't crave the strong hand of a ruler" and that Russia doesn't want "to subjugate nations" to its will. This has to be music to Putin's ears! What makes you think so?
As I said, Russia is a country of 140 million people and has a spectrum of different views reflected by the many layers within its society.
It's very insulting for us Russians to hear people in the West equate us as a whole nation with the small clique of crooks, kleptocrats and criminals in the Kremlin, all of them coalesced around Putin.
Russia is much bigger and better than the current regime. Of course, there are people here who crave for a "strong hand" and who want to subjugate other countries. But note, there are many people in the West who vote for pro-fascist, right-wing parties today. Does it mean that those countries, and those societies, too, are not democratic already? No, it doesn't. So again, please don't equate the Russians and Russia with the Kremlin. Given a chance, the Russian people opt for democracy. In illustrating that, I can go as far back in our history as the elections to the State Duma in 1906, when the Constitutional Democrats won, or the election to the Constituent Assembly in November 1917, which was held a couple of weeks after the Bolsheviks seized power when they lost it to a party that advocated for democratic parliamentary rule. And then there's June 1991, when the democratic opposition candidate Boris Yeltsin defeated Nikolai Ryzhkov, the candidate of the ruling Communist Party, with 57 percent supporting Yeltsin and a mere 17 percent voting for his opponent.
Let everyone remember that, each time, when the Kremlin sends troops or tanks to foreign soil, there are always Russians who are prepared to stand up and say: "I don't support it!" Sometimes there are just seven people, such as in Red Square in Moscow in August 1968, when a few came to protest against the invasion in Czechoslovakia. And sometimes it's half a million people, such as in January 1991 in Manezhnaya Square where the crowd turned up to protest against the bloody events in Vilnius, Lithuania. And recently, in September 2014, tens of thousands led by Boris Nemtsov hit the streets of Moscow to protest against Russia's aggression in Ukraine.
Nevertheless, you have to agree that the annexation of Crimea has skyrocketed Putin's ratings. Do you believe that with his support declining, a result partly of the unpopular pension reform, the Kremlin could resort to a new military action to ratchet them up?
I really don't pay attention to any polls or their results. We don't know what the majority of the Russian people think about Putin and his policies, as in a country under authoritarian regime no one is willing to speak his or her mind. Can you imagine an ordinary Russian family speaking openly to a pollster about Putin, his party or his ruling? I can't. The Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu boasted 99.9 percent support just two weeks before he was overthrown. So public opinion in an authoritarian regime is absolutely meaningless. The real picture can be — and is — stunningly different from the one the Kremlin wants us to believe.
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Glad to see the WSJ's breakdown of this, otherwise I would not have known how to respond:
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Schumer’s Russia Sanctions Gambit
There’s no evidence to doubt the Treasury’s negotiation with Rusal.
248 Comments
By The Editorial Board
Jan. 14, 2019 7:23 p.m. ET
The goal of U.S. sanctions is to change behavior. But tell that to Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer, who is trying to score political points by killing an agreement between the Treasury Department and owners of Rusal, Russia’s aluminum giant. Mr. Schumer is talking tough on Moscow, without even trying to explain what a better final outcome would be.
In April the Treasury announced sanctions on Oleg Deripaska, one of Vladimir Putin’s oligarch cronies. Since Mr. Deripaska controls EN+ Group, which controls Rusal, both companies were implicated. But the U.S. penalty seems to have worked. In a Dec. 19 letter, Treasury told Congress it would lift sanctions on the companies—though not on Mr. Deripaska—under an agreement with the Russian parties.
The law gives Congress 30 days to overturn this action by passing a resolution of disapproval. Since it’s procedurally privileged, Mr. Schumer can force a vote—and he has suggested he intends to, possibly Tuesday. He wants to put Republicans on the spot so he can portray them as soft on Russia.
“The Treasury Department’s proposal is flawed,” the Minority Leader said, “and fails to sufficiently limit Oleg Deripaska’s control and influence of these companies.”
Did he read the same Treasury letter that we did? Under its terms Mr. Deripaska’s stake in EN+ will drop from about 70% to 45%, where it will be frozen. He will get no cash from the restructuring. Shares will be taken by VTB Bank , the Swiss mining company Glencore , and a charitable foundation.
To further dilute control, Mr. Deripaska will vote only 35% of his shares. The rest will be voted by a trust, which will be required to side with the majority of non-Deripaska shares. Shares held by VTB Bank will be voted by a third party. So will shares whose owners have “professional or family ties” to Mr. Deripaska.
EN+ will get a new board. Two-thirds of its directors will be independent of Mr. Deripaska, and half will be American or British. Rusal’s chairman will step down, and the majority of its board will be independent. The companies have agreed to auditing and reporting requirements, such as providing the Treasury with quarterly reports and board minutes.
Keep in mind, EN+ and Rusal are not accused of anything other than entanglement with Mr. Deripaska. Consider, too, the implications if Mr. Schumer succeeds in blocking the Treasury deal. Other entities under U.S. sanction will take the lesson that negotiating is fruitless and changing ownership or business practice is no guarantee of relief.
The eventual outcome with Rusal may end up worse. Russia could nationalize the aluminum producer or broker a deal for the Chinese to buy it. That would disentangle the company from Mr. Deripaska, but not in a way that advances America’s interests.
Mr. Schumer adds that the sanctions should stay because Robert Mueller hasn’t concluded his special counsel investigation. The insinuation is that President Trump could be intervening here as a favor to the Russians. There’s zero evidence for that—and the Trump Administration has been far tougher on Russia than the Obama Administration was even after the Kremlin’s 2016 election interference.
When a party under sanctions shapes up, the penalty ought to be lifted. There’s no reason Rusal should be an exception.
Appeared in the January 15, 2019, print edition.
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One of those war game scenarios is described here:
https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a19087437/what-putin-would-nuke/
I don't buy it that Russia has these perfectly designed and maintained missiles and weapons, but has a failing economy and is capable of manufacturing absolutely nothing else. Something is wrong with this picture.
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https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/03/russia-turning-its-nuclear-rhetoric-s-problem/155669/?oref=defenseone_today_nl
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https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/world/europe/unit-29155-russia-gru.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur&fbclid=IwAR2B2I5dutDy9INcDQWekkt2ebtz9rJQKic91lxnVgZfdePdVkkZkVyI8iA
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https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/when-russia-and-america-cooperated-to-avert-a-y2k-apocalypse?source=EDT_NYR_EDIT_NEWSLETTER_0_imagenewsletter_Daily_ZZ&utm_campaign=aud-dev&utm_source=nl&utm_brand=tny&utm_mailing=TNY_Daily_010120&utm_medium=email&bxid=5be9d3fa3f92a40469e2d85c&cndid=50142053&esrc=&mbid=&utm_term=TNY_Daily
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https://www.businessinsider.com/former-troll-russia-disinformation-campaign-trump-2017-10
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second post
Russia Takes a Hard Approach to Soft Power
Kseniya Kirillova
Kseniya Kirillova
Board of Contributors
9 MINS READ
Jan 22, 2020 | 11:00 GMT
Russia's Maria Butina arrives at Moscow's Sheremetyevo International Airport on Oct. 26, 2019, after her deportation from the United States for failing to register as a foreign agent.
Maria Butina arrives home at Moscow's Sheremetyevo airport on Oct. 26, 2019, after her deportation from the United States for failing to register as a foreign agent. Butina's engagement with U.S. conservative groups is just one example of how Russia tries to exploit societal fissures overseas.
(MIKHAIL JAPARIZDE/TASS via Getty Images)
HIGHLIGHTS
In exerting its soft power, Russia is not only trying to portray itself in a good light but also spread illusory fears, phobias and hatred in countries it sees as a threat.
Moscow, however, cannot sow discord out of thin air; instead, it seeks to exploit existing divisions in Western countries.
If Western nations are going to try and popularize their values in Russia, they would do well to consider whether their efforts will be immediately discredited by Kremlin propaganda.
For all its prodigious hard power, Russia's soft power is no trifling matter. In recent years, the Kremlin has resorted to plenty of channels to undermine Western democracies by spreading propaganda — including false-flag operations and other "information operations" — bribing officials and politicians, cultivating corrupt ties through business lobbies and immigrant organizations, targeting specific (often radical) segments of the population with carefully tailored ideologies and making special attempts to sow friction, disagreement and conflict.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and his propaganda machine have successfully convinced the population that any intimidation and crimes by authorities are justified by the unprecedented "external threat" facing Russia. They claim that the United States is to blame for all that Russia does today because they have organized color revolutions along the Russian border, developed fifth columns and so on. Russia, accordingly, is merely trying to prove that its actions are a "mirror image" of Western foreign policy. But how does Russia go about projecting its soft power, and how might Western states respond — all while avoiding taking the same path as Moscow?
A Different Type of 'Soft Power'
To one degree or another, all major states naturally use "soft power" to cultivate a positive image abroad. But if Joseph S. Nye Jr., a professor at Harvard University who introduced the term, implied soft power to mean the popularization of a certain value system and lifestyle, Moscow's actions abroad typically have little to do with positive advertising.
First, the difference lies in the goals of "soft power." Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States did not make any effort to destroy either Russia or the countries that emerged in Eastern Europe. On the contrary, the United States attempted to introduce democratic institutions — including anti-corruption bodies, a transparent and independent judiciary, fair elections and more — into the post-Soviet space. Had they taken root, these countries would have enjoyed notable improvements in their development and standard of living.
Today, it's a very different story with Moscow. Russia does not conceal its view of the United States as its primary and irreconcilable enemy, the instigator of international terrorism and the primary threat to its very existence. The Kremlin, accordingly, is seeking to weaken the United States and Europe to the greatest possible extent, undermine faith in Western democracy, destroy existing institutions and, above all, render these countries dependent, one way or another, on Moscow, making them incapable of resisting Russian aggression in Eastern Europe.
Russia does not cultivate values for those it takes under its wing but rather instills illusory fears, phobias and hatred toward the things Moscow's propaganda identifies as a threat.
But while Russia, as well as its opponents, are good at inconspicuously supporting movements in other countries, the United States typically refrains from distorting the facts, spreading outright disinformation and engaging in slander. Such an approach makes the West more vulnerable to Russia's actions while simultaneously giving Moscow reason to claim that Washington "organizes" coups in other countries.
The way the United States uses "soft power" is generally more transparent and consistent with its stated goals. This means openly transmitting American values via the mass media, nongovernmental organization activities (including grants for foreign organizations), offering foreign internships, organizing educational programs and the like. Russian political scientists use almost the same channels to spread their influence in Western societies, albeit with one major difference: Russia does not cultivate values for those it takes under its wing but rather instills illusory fears, phobias and hatred toward the things Moscow's propaganda identifies as a threat.
To achieve its desired effect, the Kremlin largely uses lies, slander, mishmashed facts, conspiracy theories and a multitude of contradictory versions of reality to destroy the notion of truth and exploit the slightest contradictions within Western societies. To work with certain groups of people abroad, the Kremlin creates special "ideologies for export" — individual worldview systems aimed at specific social groups.
But along with this activity, "information operations" of a destructive nature are also inevitable. As the results of U.S. special prosecutor Robert Mueller's investigation about Russian influence in the 2016 U.S. presidential election have shown, such operations are often conducted under a false flag; in the U.S. case, this included fake accounts on social networks established on behalf of American citizens.
The crux of the matter is that it's often very difficult to determine the line between "positive propaganda" — in Russia's case, some of the more benign educational and cultural activities that Moscow sponsors abroad — and the beginning of "information operations." These two forms of Russian soft power coexist at the same time, sometimes merging and flowing into one another, which gives the Kremlin an opportunity to occasionally transform even innocuous cultural events into a platform for "information operations."
Moscow's 'Interceptions'
Since Russia's information operations clearly don't engage in "fair play," it's extremely difficult to oppose such activity. Aggravating the situation is Russia's recent success in both discrediting Western forms of soft power at home and "intercepting" them using the channels the West created to spread its own influence.
The recent case of Maria Butina, a Russian who was convicted of failing to register herself as foreign agent in the United States, vividly demonstrates such "interceptions" by way of evangelical churches and student exchange programs — even though Russian media and officials formerly termed the influx of American missionaries into Russia in the 1990s and the development of educational exchange programs as an American "attempt at the creeping occupation" of Russia. Ultimately, it was the National Prayer Breakfast, an event organized by evangelical churches, where Butina sought to invite Russian officials so as to create informal channels of communication between them and American politicians.
The Butina case also showed U.S. law enforcement and the media how the Russian government works with foreign universities and organizes work with young people abroad. In particular, the American historian and publicist Yuri Felshtinsky noted that in October 2013, the FBI accused a Russian diplomat and head of the Washington-based Russian Cultural Center, Yury Zaytsev, of recruiting Americans as potential intelligence assets.
Revolutions will occur where there are societal sentiments conducive to their success; without them, it would be impossible to organize a revolution from outside without widespread support inside.
The FBI alleged that part of Zaytsev's mission was "sending young professionals from the United States to Russia as part of a cultural program wherein participants are evaluated and/or assessed for Russian counterintelligence purposes." In 2014, Zaytsev left the United States, but his successor in the same post, Oleg Zhiganov, was deported from the United States for the same reason in March 2018 as part of a group of 60 Russian diplomats who were accused of espionage.
Money laundering is another channel of influence that Moscow has successfully used. A few years ago, many believed that Russian oligarchs' propensity for keeping money in European and U.S. bank accounts and retaining real estate abroad made the Russian elite dependent on the West. On the contrary, it turned out that Moscow was using "dirty money" to spread corruption in the West and bribe European politicians.
Moreover, the Kremlin successfully "intercepts" projects and initiatives created by the Russians themselves, both domestically and abroad. The Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots (KSORS), which represents branches of the World Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots Living Abroad, were formally established to foster "the interaction of compatriots with Russian Federation government bodies." According to members of these organizations, the diaspora directly determined the leaders of these councils until 2014. Then, however, Russian authorities placed KSORS under the Foreign Ministry's control.
A former head of the Russian American Coordination Council from New York, Igor Baboshkin, claimed in the media that his organization "had been seized by the Russian embassy, which today appoints leaders who are exceptionally favored by the Kremlin." Likewise, Russian authorities are trying to exert control over independent Russian-language media and any overseas cultural organizations through the distribution of grants and, where possible, direct administrative pressure.
Lessons to Learn
For most of this century, Moscow has accused Washington of organizing color revolutions along its borders — and not without a kernel of truth. The global reality, however, is that there are no saints: Every country supports movements in other countries that are close to them. In the end, revolutions will occur where there are societal sentiments conducive to their success; without them, it would be impossible to organize a revolution from outside without widespread support inside, as evidenced by the failure of Western-backed opposition rallies in Belarus in 2011 or pro-Kosovo rallies in Serbia in 2013.
Based on all of the above, Western governments would be wise to take note. First, before Western states make any attempts to popularize their values in Russia, they might determine whether Russian propaganda has discredited the method of delivery — to say nothing of asking what, exactly, Russians want. Equally important is recognizing the "counterintelligence" aspect of certain events, as that could help the West minimize Moscow's use of bilateral communication channels for its subversive operations.
No matter how effective Russia's 'soft power' tactics may be, the Kremlin can't create problems in Western countries out of thin air. Moscow, instead, simply takes advantage of the contradictions and conflicts that are already present in Western societies.
Second, the creation of cultural and educational initiatives independent of the Kremlin among the Russian diaspora is critical. The emergence of an "alternative culture" created in Russian, but free from the influence of Kremlin propaganda, is one of Putin's greatest fears. That's why it's important to pay special attention to the Russian-language media existing in the diaspora. After all, the Russian-speaking community in places like the United States is often starved for information in Russian, allowing structures affiliated with the Russian embassy to make inroads among such people.
Meanwhile, independent Russian-language media in the United States, or the creation of such media, could help convey American values to the diaspora and, potentially, refute Moscow's official propaganda. What's more, it could contribute to the effective assimilation of Russian-speaking immigrants and create an alternative culture that preserves the best in Russian cultural heritage and language — all while avoiding becoming another cog in Moscow's unceasing "information operations."
In the end, no matter how effective Russia's "soft power" tactics may be, the Kremlin can't create problems in Western countries out of thin air. Moscow, instead, simply takes advantage of the contradictions and conflicts that are already present in Western societies. That leaves the West having to prepare itself to repel foreign interference at the same time it works to solve the real problems that Russia is exploiting. If not, Western democracies might come to resemble Moscow, sharply reducing the prospect for self-criticism as the powers that be dismiss internal problems as mere "intrigues of an external enemy."
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third post
January 22, 2020 Open as PDF
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet Ventures Into the Mediterranean
By: Jacek Bartosiak
In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, which compelled the U.S. Navy and other NATO countries to demonstrate their overwhelming land-attack capabilities in the Black Sea. Their combined resources and capabilities frightened Russian decision-makers to the point that military officials informed President Vladimir Putin that the Black Sea Fleet would not be able to stop Western forces from destroying Sochi – southern Russia’s unofficial capital, where Putin (like Stalin before him) stays for up to six months each year – and striking any Russian targets throughout the Black Sea Basin.
The Russian leadership then set out to strengthen the Black Sea Fleet, including by restoring submarine-deployed cruise missiles and introducing a Bastion coastal defense missile system. But the modernization efforts failed to alter the overall balance of power in the Black Sea that had been in place since the collapse of the Soviet empire, in part because Russia did not yet have full control of Crimea and in part because the Black Sea Fleet’s operations have expanded widely over the past several years.
The Soviets’ Foray Into the Mediterranean
To change the balance of power in the Black Sea region, the Russians would need to be able to block the passage of NATO ships through the Bosporus. To achieve this goal, they need a forward sea presence at the southern European perimeter beyond the Bosporus in the Mediterranean. If this could be achieved, the Turkish Straits could be defended from Western navies, which could then be blocked from entering the Black Sea. The Bosporus would then become the first bolted position on the outskirts of the Mediterranean, turning the Black Sea Basin essentially into an additional buffer against the West and shielding Crimea, the Don and Volga areas – the soft underbelly of Russia – and of course the southern capital, Sochi.
(click to enlarge)
The Soviet Union tried to create such a buffer by establishing a Mediterranean squadron that would operate separately from the Black Sea Fleet. At its peak, the squadron numbered 30-50 ships. Its primary task was to block the freedom of action of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea as well as to support Arab client countries. Essentially, its goal was to keep the Turks below the 43rd parallel (in the southern Black Sea) and the Americans behind the 23rd meridian (west of the British Isles).
When the Soviet Union, which was never a real naval power, collapsed, the Black Sea squadron’s escapades into the Mediterranean also ended. The Black Sea, like the Baltic, was no longer dominated by the continental empire. That opened these waters to U.S. influence and began the process of Western expansion into Eastern Europe that brought with it the establishment of democratic systems.
A Grand Return
The Russians used the civil war in Syria as a convenient excuse to make a grand return to the Levant and the Eastern Mediterranean. The focus was on securing the port of Tartus and providing air cover for land operations and sea communication to the air base in Hmeimim, Syria. Generally speaking, the Russian fleet coped poorly with the task set for it in Moscow. This is evidenced by the fact that within the Russian armed forces, which are undergoing major organizational shifts, the navy does not wield sufficient influence among the top brass.
In Syria, the Russian navy has produced mixed results. Frigates, corvettes and submarines have been deployed and have launched Kalibr missiles at a number of enemy targets. Perhaps the navy’s most impressive strike early in the campaign came on Oct. 7, 2015, Putin’s birthday, when four flotilla corvettes in the Caspian fired 26 Kalibr NK 3M14 missiles with a range of 1,500 kilometers (930 miles) over Iranian and Iraqi airspace at targets in Syria. A total of about 25 volleys and 140 missiles were fired, some by Black Sea Fleet frigates located in the Mediterranean approximately 160 kilometers from the Syrian coast. On average, one salvo consisted of 4-8 missiles.
Kilo-class submarines also fired cruise missiles – a total of about 40 pieces at an average distance of 400-900 kilometers deep into Syria. Though Kalibr missiles have proved to be a good weapon system, the Russians do not have enough of them in stock, a problem the French have also had to deal with in their operations in Libya and Syria. It’s noteworthy, however, that the Syrian factions on which the Kalibr missiles were tested do not have anti-aircraft defense or modern radars, so the weapon has not been properly tested against a professional, sophisticated opponent. They are also rather expensive, costing up to $6.5 million per piece. And although they are theoretically difficult to detect, their overall effectiveness, beyond demonstrating to the U.S. and other Western countries Russia’s capability to strike from a distance, is difficult to gauge.
The Fleet’s Shortcomings
The other traditional capabilities of the Russian fleet fared much worse. In 2016, the Kuznetsov aircraft carrier, accompanied by the Pyotr Velikiy nuclear cruiser, two rocket frigates and logistics ships, was sent to the Mediterranean Sea. The squadron left from Severomorsk and while sailing along Europe’s northern rim, the Kuznetsov cruised at less than 10 nautical miles per hour and released plumes of smoke that indicated serious engine failure and poor propulsion. The ship has been waiting for repairs since returning to its home port in February 2017.
The Kuznetsov is able to carry up to 50 planes and helicopters, but when it passed Gibraltar, it had only 10 Su-33, four new MiG-29K and a few helicopters. The reason was the lack of pilots trained to fly aircraft stationed on a carrier and the lack of operational equipment.
Since the Kuznetsov has no catapult, the planes take off from the ramp with the help of afterburners, but in this case the low speed of the ship (it needs to sail at a minimum of 20 nautical miles per hour) prevented combat launch. In total, on-board aircraft made only 420 combat flights over Syria, of which as many as two-thirds were from land bases in Syria. In addition, two planes crashed from the sea due to a chassis failure and poor pilot training. Meanwhile, the Pyotr Velikiy battlecruiser participated in very few operations because it did not have the capacity to strike at land from the sea; with ongoing renovations, this is expected to change.
Russian maritime logistics performed better than the fighting fleet. Russian vessels sailed constantly from Russian ports across the Bosporus to Syria, mainly along the Novorossiysk-Bosporus-Tartus route, transporting up to 100,000 metric tons of cargo per month. This was done thanks to the mobilization of a landing fleet that included ships made in the PRL – the Toad 775 project, which can carry a Russian marine battalion and 12 tanks with supplies. In addition, civilian ships carrying civilian crews were purchased in Turkey, Greece and even Ukraine and painted in the Black Sea Fleet colors so that they would not be stopped by the Turks on the Bosporus.
Russia’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, Syria and Libya could be a step toward achieving Moscow’s goal of shielding the Black Sea from Western influence. But a number of other pivotal changes would need to be made before it can really alter the balance of power in its favor, especially as other powers grow increasingly interested in establishing a foothold in the region.
To learn more, please visit strategyandfuture.org.
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https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/end-open-skies-treaty-further-weakens-us-russian-arms-control?id=743c2bc617&e=b6fb3e5216&uuid=9c94b7cb-5435-4ec8-b7e8-d35a71d0cf95&utm_source=Topics%2C+Themes+and+Regions&utm_campaign=d66d79f4dc-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_05_21_07_16&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_743c2bc617-d66d79f4dc-53682369&mc_cid=d66d79f4dc
The End of the Open Skies Treaty Further Weakens U.S.-Russian Arms Control
3 MINS READ
May 21, 2020 | 19:06 GMT
HIGHLIGHTS
The U.S. government on May 21 informed its allies of intention to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies. The continued abandonment of arms control treaties is both an indicator and a driver of reduced trust and cooperation between the United States and Russia. ...
The U.S. government on May 21 informed its allies of intention to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies. The administration of President Donald Trump has long contemplated this move, citing Russian infractions and abuse of the treaty. The announcement came as separate leaks suggested that the Trump administration is considering a limited extension of New START, the treaty that governs the number of nuclear weapons Russia and the United States maintain. These actions add to the broader dismantling of the global arms control framework.
The Treaty on Open Skies provides the United States and Russia, as well as its European signatories, with the ability to conduct observation flights over each other's territory as a means to achieve stability and trust by allowing mutual visibility of military facilities and deployments. Russia's refusal to allow these flights over certain Russian territories, as well as its increasing focus on the observation of civilian infrastructure during overflights of the United States, fueled opposition to the treaty.
New START governs the number of nuclear weapons that both Russia and the United States field, but is set to expire in February 2021. While the treaty allows for a five-year extension upon both parties' agreement, the Trump administration has been reluctant to agree to this without expanding the scope of the treaty to include China.
The continued abandonment of arms control treaties is both an indicator and a driver of reduced trust and cooperation between the United States and Russia. Similar negative trends occurred during the Cold War, and were eventually followed by a revival of arms control efforts within that same bilateral context. One core problem that has plagued the viability of bilateral arms control treaties is the nonparticipation of China. Despite China's much smaller nuclear arsenal, its rise as a military power and technological advances in both strategic and conventional weapons have seen the reality of arms control evolve beyond the former Cold War bipolarity. In this more complex environment, sustaining legacy arms control measures becomes difficult, and establishing new ones is even further out of reach.
The Trump administration didn't initiate this trend; it only happens to be occupying the White House as long-term questions on the sustainability of particular arms control treaties are coming to a head.
Under the Trump presidency and amid the context of increasing multipolar competition, the arms control framework that established limitations and guarantees between the United States and Russia during and following the Cold War has become progressively weakened. Last year, Trump withdrew from the INF Treaty, banning intermediate-range missiles from U.S. and Russian arsenals. The Trump administration didn't initiate this trend — former presidents George W. Bush withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 and Barack Obama considered abandoning the INF Treaty — it only happens to be occupying the White House as long-term questions on the sustainability of particular arms control treaties are coming to a head.
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second
A bright spot in President Trump’s foreign policy has been his recognition that treaties are only valuable when every party adheres to them. His decision this week to abandon the 1992 Open Skies accord will cost the U.S. little, but it sends the right message to American adversaries.
The Trump Administration began informing allies Thursday that the U.S. would withdraw from the treaty in six months. The agreement, which also includes dozens of European nations, lets countries conduct intelligence-gathering flights over each other’s territory. In theory Open Skies is one of the more useful arms-control deals because it contributes to transparency and confidence about an adversary’s military.
But Russia used the flights to catalog critical American facilities and even fly over Mr. Trump’s New Jersey estate. It regularly blocked U.S. flights considered legitimate under the treaty. Moscow restricted surveillance missions over Kaliningrad, where Russian forces are massed miles from the Polish border. It also stopped flights in Georgia and over a Russian military exercise.
One problem with arms control is that its supporters have never seen a violation large or frequent enough to justify pulling the plug. “Another shortsighted Trump move to abandon a treaty that includes many close allies,” former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power tweeted. “This decision further chips away at decades of arms control progress.”
Vladimir Putin knows that Obama officials like Ms. Power support treaties for the sake of supporting treaties, whatever their real usefulness. Open Skies is a product of the post-Cold War era of good international feeling. But these days Russia, China and Iran are seeking regional dominance and often unite to work against the interests of the U.S. and its allies. There’s no reason to grant them the advantage of abiding by arms agreements they violate.
Advances in surveillance technology mean the U.S. doesn’t need the flights to see inside Russia, while the flights do help the Russians. Withdrawing will also save about $250 million. The most serious risk is that pulling out will annoy some of America’s NATO allies that plan to remain in the agreement. But Open Skies is far from the most serious issue in the trans-Atlantic relationship.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said Thursday that Washington may “reconsider our withdrawal should Russia return to full compliance with the Treaty.” And Mr. Trump has said he’d like to renegotiate the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and expand it to include China. That sounds like a mistake given how neither China nor Russia abide by other promises (see nearby).
But leaving the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty last year and Open Skies by the end of 2020 at least sends an important message about what this Administration expects when negotiating arms-control deals.
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ON GEOPOLITICS
Putting the SolarWinds Hack in Geopolitical Context
Rodger Baker
Rodger Baker
Senior VP of Strategic Analysis, Stratfor
6 MINS READ
Dec 22, 2020 | 21:22 GMT
The Austin, Texas, headquarters of SolarWinds.
The Austin, Texas, headquarters of SolarWinds.
(Travel_with_me/SHUTTERSTOCK)
HIGHLIGHTS
The latest cyberattack against U.S. government computer systems reflects Russia's strategic position on the world stage, its perceived vulnerabilities and its continued use of gray area operations to maintain a strategic edge against the United States. Russia is unlikely to back down from continued operations in the future, even in the face of U.S. sanctions or counteroperations....
The latest cyberattack against U.S. government computer systems reflects Russia's strategic position on the world stage, its perceived vulnerabilities and its continued use of gray area operations to maintain a strategic edge against the United States.
The SolarWinds attack appears to have provided Russian operatives with lengthy access to internal U.S. government computer systems and email accounts, a veritable goldmine of intelligence collection. Initial assessments suggest the suspected Russian operatives limited the systems they accessed, reducing the chance of detection and thus lengthening their access. As such, this currently appears to be primarily an intelligence collection operation, not an offensive operation designed to damage or destroy U.S. systems.
Russia's continued use of cyberspace for intelligence collection and detection of vulnerabilities for potential offensive operations demonstrate a key component of Russian international strategy. Moscow sees itself still locked in competition with the United States and its European allies, and engages in gray-area operations and hybrid warfare, using proxies and nonmilitary means in order to maintain a tactical edge and broaden its options should relations deteriorate further. Gray area operations, from cyberespionage to the use of "little green men" along the Russian periphery, are lower cost and lower risk operations for Russia. Their use reflects Moscow's seizing of an opportunity and its perceptions of its own weakness.
Russia's government, and Russian President Vladimir Putin in particular, has assessed Russia's opening to the West at the end of the Cold War as having been an economic and political disaster at home, and as clear proof that the United States and Europe have little intention of ever considering Russia an equal within the Western liberal order. For Russia, reasserting its influence along the former Soviet periphery and protecting its domestic political system represents an imperative. Russia sees the West constantly seeking to further eat away at its periphery, from promises of, or actual, NATO and EU expansion to economic and political sanctions.
This perception is made more immediate by Russia's future vulnerabilities. Like most of the developed nations of the global north, Russia faces a future of continued demographic decline, with an aging and shrinking population pool from which to draw labor, innovation and defense personnel. Russia has also found it difficult to transition away from a commodity-based economy, one heavily dependent on oil and gas, and sees the potential for peak oil in the early 2030s as a massive economic obstacle. In short, Russia faces an economic and budget crisis and a population crisis sometime in the next 20 years. It fears those vulnerabilities will leave it exposed to faster Western encroachment and to an unequal relationship with China.
Over the past 20 years, Moscow has sought to address these future crises. It has steadily pushed back along its periphery, from Georgia to Moldova, from Ukraine to Armenia. Moscow inserted itself in the Middle East crisis, and is expanding its maritime operations along the Red Sea. And it sought new investments into alternative industries. But its strategic push along the Soviet frontiers, particularly the annexation of Crimea and the downing of MH17, imposed additional sanctions that left Moscow doubling down on resource extraction in the Arctic and its Far East.
The government has also sought to reinstall a strong sense of Russian nationalism, and strengthened ties with the orthodox Church to reinforce a sense of Russian identity and try to spur its birth rate. At the same time, Russia has stepped up its defense ties with China, securing its rear, dividing U.S. attention and drawing on Chinese financial resources.
But these efforts only serve to build a protective shell for the future Russia. They do not eliminate the threats from the West (or the East). The cyber domain provides Russia with several important strategic levers to mitigate its vulnerabilities. It is a source of intelligence collection, against governments and industries. It is a tool for information operations and disruption. And it can be a vector for attacks against U.S. communications and infrastructure. Moscow is regularly engaged in the first two, and in exposing vulnerabilities toward the latter. These provide Russia with asymmetric response capabilities to U.S. economic and political tools, both now and in any future confrontation.
Over the last several decades, Moscow has seen the limits of U.S. and Western responses to cyberattacks, to territorial violations and even to extraterritorial assassinations.
And the United States remains particularly vulnerable in the cyber domain. The long-standing preference for freedom of information, personal privacy and free market activity leaves the U.S. system fragmented, with limits on government involvement and control. This is not a critique, but a recognition of the choice, one in contrast to the cyberspace policies of China and Russia — or even the shifting policies of the European Union, which bend even more strongly toward individual protections over corporate. Despite the increase in U.S. attention to the cyber domain, this patchwork quilt structure is likely to remain, reinforcing U.S. values at the risk of vulnerabilities.
Russia, then, is unlikely to back down from continued operations in the future, even in the face of U.S. sanctions or counteroperations. Over the last several decades, Moscow has seen the limits of U.S. and Western responses to cyberattacks, to territorial violations and even to extraterritorial assassinations. The United States and European nations have largely responded to Russian actions with limited steps, from targeted sanctions to public critiques. This is similar to U.S. responses to Chinese activities over the past several decades. The strategic consideration has been that no single action justifies such a strong response that it either cripples the adversary (Russia or China) or triggers an escalation that could lead to physical conflict. And the semiambiguity possible in cyberspace adds another layer of assurance that the responses will be kept within a set of Western norms that Moscow can generally manage.
The risk for Russia is that, as with the shifting U.S. perception of China, Russia's actions may reach a point where the status quo response is no longer politically feasible inside the United States. Washington has refrained from its potentially most devastating economic tools, and limited the expansion of its military partnerships along the Russian frontier. While this is likely to remain the reality for some time, were Russian actions to move from intelligence collection, information operations and disruptive activities to cyberattacks with strong physical impacts inside the United States, the U.S. calculus would change dramatically.
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Much could go wrong when President Biden sits down with Vladimir Putin in Geneva on June 16. But at least one bad policy has been ruled out: The U.S. won’t try to revive the Open Skies Treaty.
“In concluding its review of the treaty, the United States therefore does not intend to seek to rejoin it, given Russia’s failure to take any actions to return to compliance,” a State Department statement said last week. “Further, Russia’s behavior, including its recent actions with respect to Ukraine, is not that of a partner committed to confidence-building.”
The 1992 accord—which allowed the U.S., Russia and European states to conduct surveillance flights over each other—is a relic of the optimism that accompanied the downfall of the Soviet Union. The treaty was theoretically useful in creating military transparency. But these kinds of agreements only work when the parties operate in good faith.
Despite some post-Cold War hope, Russia never transformed into a responsible international player. It blocked legitimate Western flights over its territory while using the treaty to gain intelligence about American sites. Even if Mr. Putin fully complied, the treaty still tilted in his favor: American surveillance technology outpaces Russian abilities, making the flights more useful to Moscow than Washington.
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When Donald Trump announced he would leave the treaty in May 2020, Mr. Biden called the decision a “short-sighted policy of going it alone and abandoning American leadership.” He warned this would “increase the risks of miscalculation and conflict” while alienating Europeans who wanted the U.S. to stay.
“Russian violations should be addressed not by withdrawing from the Treaty,” Mr. Biden said, “but by seeking to resolve them through the Treaty’s implementation and dispute mechanism.” Apparently the Biden Administration now has seen the light on the pointlessness of bureaucratic wrangling with Russia.
“The United States made another political mistake, struck a new blow to the European security system,” said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov. “We gave them a good chance, which they did not take advantage of.” He promised “uncomfortable” signals would soon be coming from Moscow. If anyone in the White House is doubting the President’s withdrawal, the Kremlin’s response should confirm Mr. Biden’s decision.
All of which raises a question: If Mr. Biden doesn’t have confidence on a relatively minor issue like Open Skies, what does he expect to accomplish in Geneva?
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Putin Tests Biden’s Cyber Vow
When a U.S. President draws a clear red line, he has to enforce it.
By The Editorial Board
July 7, 2021 12:51 pm ET
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Russian President Vladimir Putin chairs a meeting with members of the government via teleconference at the Kremlin in Moscow on July 7.
PHOTO: ALEXEY NIKOLSKY/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Barack Obama’s misadventures in Syria showed that a President shouldn’t draw red lines he isn’t willing to enforce. President Biden hasn’t been afraid to talk tough and set expectations with Vladimir Putin, but will Mr. Biden enforce his own red lines?
Media reports suggest that the SVR, Russia’s foreign intelligence service, was behind a recent cyber attack on a Republican National Committee contractor. The same outfit hit the Democratic National Committee six years ago and was behind the more recent SolarWinds attack on U.S. government agencies and corporations. The RNC attack took place last week, around the same time as a Russian-linked gang struck hundreds of American businesses with ransomware.
Mr. Putin has spent his time in power invading neighbors, meddling in Western elections, cheating on arms-control agreements—and allowing cyber attacks against the U.S. This despite the best efforts to improve relations from George W. Bush, Mr. Obama and Donald Trump. Mr. Biden’s team argued that last month’s summit wouldn’t solve a problem like Mr. Putin but could limit the damage. The new cyberattacks suggest this was wrong.
Mr. Biden has said he gave Mr. Putin a list of 16 critical infrastructure areas that should be “off-limits” from cyber attacks. He warned after the meeting that “if, in fact, they violate these basic norms, we will respond with cyber.” The President suggested over the weekend that the U.S. would respond if it found the Kremlin at fault over the recent attacks.
Mr. Putin is not omniscient and his grip on Russia isn’t as firm as it sometimes seems. But he was—or should have been—aware of an attack on a major political target in the U.S. If Russian hackers are independent of the government, Moscow should be willing to cooperate with Washington and bring them to justice. Note that these cyber-criminals in Russia never seem to attack targets in Russia.
If the U.S. doesn’t respond, it will be open season on America’s digital infrastructure. Proportionate retaliation runs the risk of escalation. But after publicly drawing a red line, Mr. Biden has no choice lest he show Mr. Putin and other thugs around the world that the U.S. President’s words are empty.
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https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=d3e30e3cb8be94f07729369c9bced6c7_60e84d9c_6d25b5f&selDate=20210709
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https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/oct/7/biden-painted-corner-get-tough-policy-russia-falls/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=Go1hPJ%2BoWXpRr%2B7lgjT3zTV1Cm5i4q6GnBjLD8FHtNtJhBfXUfF%2BAtNPL%2BZlBZbf&bt_ts=1633688016761
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Russia has defaulted on its foreign debt for the first time since the Bolshevik Revolution after a 30-day grace period for the country to disburse two Eurobond interest payments expired on Sunday night. It's a largely symbolic move given that the Kremlin has enough money to pay off the debt, but is barred from doing so because of the heavy Western sanctions leveled on the government. Last month, the U.S. Treasury Department effectively blocked Moscow from making the payments by letting a sanctions loophole expire that had previously allowed it to transfer cash to debtholders via American banks.
Quote: "Anyone who understands this situation knows that this in no way a default," Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov declared. "There is money and there is also the readiness to pay. This situation, artificially created by an unfriendly country, will not have any effect on Russians' quality of life."
While a formal default (by a ratings agency or court) would be another sign of isolation, in this case it doesn't mean much, as Russia currently cannot borrow internationally. In fact, it doesn't need to, thanks to surging energy export revenues that have grown even more plentiful since the invasion of Ukraine. The grim status could influence its standing as an economic and financial pariah, however, as more multinationals flee the country or discourage foreign direct investment in the future.
Next steps: Bondholders are likely to take a wait-and-see approach. Claims only become void three years from now and much could change before then in terms of the scope of the war or sanctions. Debtholders may also have a difficult time repatriating the cash since the Kremlin hasn't waived its sovereign immunity and no foreign court would have jurisdiction there. Note that Russia under Boris Yeltsin also defaulted on its domestic debts in 1998, which led to a wave of inflation and a devalued ruble, but the economy was able to recover quickly due to rising oil prices and international aid. (23 comments)
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A good friend of mine was part of the team that arrested him. He is seriously pist off about the prospects of this guy getting released.
https://www.foxnews.com/world/who-viktor-bout-russias-merchant-death-who-could-be-freed-prisoner-swap-brittney-griner?fbclid=IwAR0yoYYLTpHJLqvVUxVRNLZGaInNTNeJVBcDdoTdEq1ZJsTT4rLjxdcwJjU
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https://twitter.com/TeresaF79957054/status/1602344875055276032?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1602344875055276032%7Ctwgr%5Eb02a086902cadf18fa94dd36f585d8cc03cf967f%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fredstate.com%2Fnick-arama%2F2022%2F12%2F12%2Felon-musk-wrecks-john-brennan-with-just-four-words-n672659
I think we should trade John Brennan for Paul Whelan :-D
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https://townhall.com/tipsheet/leahbarkoukis/2023/04/11/merchant-of-death-viktor-bout-sends-trump-a-message-n2621796
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https://townhall.com/tipsheet/leahbarkoukis/2023/04/11/merchant-of-death-viktor-bout-sends-trump-a-message-n2621796
Victor Bout isn't wrong. The deep state will kill him, given the opportunity.
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https://news.postimees.ee/2787688/edward-lucas-putin-s-defenders-in-the-west-ignore-those-who-know-russia-best?fbclid=IwAR3JO7bxxvzjns5TizSxYCfzWL-TBhEOFTS_XuAfXocx2HQxAEU5zyahV2g
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https://dailycaller.com/2023/05/26/bill-gates-anna-chapman-mila-antonova-jeffrey-epstein/?utm_source=piano&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=29912&pnespid=ueFqUT5BNqUFh_KZum_7EY2Cuw_2SMZlKPWx3LNl8BJmfqQAHXuUgERHCrhyL_wOBI9xzndE
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And here we have the picture of her with the Russian spy (Ana Chapman?)
https://i.dailymail.co.uk/1s/2023/05/26/16/71452453-0-image-m-154_1685113439486.jpg
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And here we have the picture of her with the Russian spy (Ana Chapman?)
https://i.dailymail.co.uk/1s/2023/05/26/16/71452453-0-image-m-154_1685113439486.jpg
Brace yourself for collective indifference from the same leftist hysterics frothing “Russia, Russia, Russia “! Regarding the BadOrangeMan.
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Refresher on Anna Chapman:
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/anna-chapman-how-did-the-fbi-nab-alleged-russian-spy/
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The First Six Months of Clinton-Russian Relations:
Summits with Yeltsin at Vancouver and Tokyo, 1993
Declassified transcripts of US-Russia summits show wide range of cooperation and Clinton’s early personal support: “We’re in this with you for the long haul”
Russian president asks for US aid, housing for demobilized officers, G-7 financing; Americans press for budget austerity, ruble stabilization, and privatization
Clinton rallies to Yeltsin’s side in confrontation with parliament over shock therapy
Washington, D.C., June 5, 2023 – Declassified highest-level records from the first six months of the Clinton administration’s relations with the Russian Federation in 1993 reveal a remarkable array of cooperative diplomatic initiatives and Bill Clinton’s direct personal support for Boris Yeltsin in the latter’s growing conflict with his own elected parliament over radical economic reforms known as “shock therapy.”
The documents include verbatim transcripts of the first two face-to-face presidential meetings, in Vancouver, Canada, in April 1993, and at the G-7 meeting in Tokyo in July 1993, together with records of telephone conversations between the two leaders in February, April and June. The April conversation came just after the Russian leader prevailed in a snap referendum endorsing his leadership and his call for new parliamentary elections. Clinton called to tell the Russian leader, “I want you to know that we’re in this with you for the long haul.”
The documents also include key policy memos prepared for Clinton ahead of the Vancouver summit meeting by national security adviser Tony Lake, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. The latter argued for a “real partnership between our two defense establishments at all levels,” including “intense personal engagement” and even “bonding.” If the U.S. failed, Aspin wrote, the Russian military “will go over to the other side in the ongoing Russian revolution.”
These records are early highlights from the forthcoming document collection: US-Russian Relations from the End of the Soviet Union to the Rise of Vladimir Putin, the latest installment in the award-winning Digital National Security Archive series published by ProQuest.
Together, these documents provide historical context to the statement last week in Helsinki by Secretary of State Antony Blinken in his speech about Russia’s strategic failure in Ukraine: “At the peaceful end of the Cold War, we shared the hope that Russia would emerge to a brighter future, free and open, fully integrated with the world. For more than 30 years, we worked to pursue stable and cooperative relations with Moscow, because we believed that a peaceful, secure, and prosperous Russia is in America’s interests—indeed, in the interests of the world. We still believe that today.”
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https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2023-06-05/first-six-months-clinton-russian-relations-summits-yeltsin?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=75ae4773-a13e-4146-896c-43bf80267fec
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WTF?!?
How much does Hillary's Uranium One shenanigans have to do with this?
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Russian uranium. The United States purchased a record amount of Russian uranium in 2023, Russia’s RIA Novosti reported. Exports increased by 43 percent to $1.2 billion. U.S. lawmakers passed a bill in December banning imports of low-enriched uranium from Russia.
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Paywall blocked for me. Do we already have this here on the forum?
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/us/cash-flowed-to-clinton-foundation-as-russians-pressed-for-control-of-uranium-company.html
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yup she has the uranium
https://images.search.yahoo.com/search/images?p=image+clinton+hair+standing+up&fr=mcafee&type=E210US1494G0&imgurl=https%3A%2F%2Fstatic2.amica.it%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2015%2F05%2Fclintonqd.jpg%3Fv%3D99390#id=6&iurl=https%3A%2F%2Fstatic2.amica.it%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2015%2F05%2Fclintonqd.jpg%3Fv%3D99390&action=click
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When I click on that I am seeing a page of her hairdos.
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The one with the big hairdo was enlarged
Her her looks radioactive.
She monster :evil:
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Very odd.
Especially now.
Tail wagging the dog? Change the topic.
Since when is a security threat so sudden like this?
No I at least will not forget , Joe's senility.
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/rcna138848
We already know about major threats from Russia, CCP Iran, Venezuela etc.
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looks like this came out of House Intelligence so not clearly wag the tail.
very strange leak....
market quiet
and now other news instead.....
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Neither do I:
https://www.independent.org/news/article.asp?id=14847
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hard to believe Russia has the terrorists alive!
escaping to Ukraine ? now we won't know what the investigation will show or even how truthful it will be.
what does our intelligence know?
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UKr will get blamed.. ISIS bombing Russia does not make sense. Russia is a major supporter of the muslim world at the moment. From Hamas to Saudis to Iran.
Obama was visiting London a few days ago..probably carrying a message.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1769821700198105301
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OTOH there is Chechnya, and supporting Assad in Syria , , , and the history of the Central Asia border lands and the treatment of the 10% of Russian population that is Muslim.
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ISIS-K, probably operating out of Afghanistan or Turkmenistan. Makes sense they were the ones responsible given proximity and activity.
ISIS sleepers in Syria are inactive because YPG/SDF are suppressing them, but they've picked up a bit since operation Olive Branch, when the Turks got their proxies to push into Kurdish territory. They also have African affiliates but ISIS-K is most active right now.
These are the kind of people that don't deserve to exist on this planet, I'd kill them for free, and wouldn't feel guilty about it.
To be honest, I know a lot more about the Syrian IS affiliates, but their ideology is the same everywhere. Some people are way past redemption and need to be put down.
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Somebody on Twitter.
"One of the questions people are asking is why the IS attacked in Moscow and why now. First, it is not since yesterday. In the case of the Russian Federation, its years of repression in the Caucasus, its intervention in Syria, and its role in Central Asia are among the reasons Russia has been targeted. This news rarely makes the Western web pages, but there are frequent reports in the Russian media of "anti-terrorist" operations by Russian security forces in the Caucasus regions, Chechnya and Ingushetia. Most recently, the FSB conducted 13-hour-long gun battles with armed men in a town in Ingushetia who have no connection to the IS but are anti-government and attacked police posts.
Interestingly, unlike the attack in Moscow, in that case in Ingushetia, Russian authorities announced that they had eliminated IS fighters. Now that the heart of the empire has been struck by IS, things look different. The Kremlin will not admit that security has been compromised, that the group that the Russian army claimed to have destroyed in the ruins of Palmyra is not at the gates of Moscow but has already broken through.
There is hardly a message from the IS as ignored as the one on the Moscow attack. The Russian government has launched a narrative that Ukraine was behind the attack, and the narrative has been building over the past twenty-four hours. Although the organization released footage of the attack itself - very brutal footage showing the brutality of the attack - the Russian Federation is sticking to its Ukrainian thesis and will use it repeatedly. In the meantime, Russia remains exposed to more terrorist attacks due to its inability to deter them."
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My understanding is that they were Tajiks.
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BrpzRGWahSk
"Russia is a multi-ethnic empire."
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My understanding is that they were Tajiks.
Yeah, you're right, looks like that's what current information appears to suggest. Makes sense, Tajikistan has access to the region.
https://www.livemint.com/news/world/moscow-terror-attack-suspects-four-tajikistan-nationals-ukraine-kyiv-russia-putin-islamic-state-isis-k-khorasan-province-11711266949825.html
https://menafn.com/1108015398/Moscow-Terror-Attack-Gunmen-Were-Recruited-Via-Messaging-App-From-Tajikistan
https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/moscow-terror-attack-who-killed-133-in-russia-details-on-4-tajikistan-suspects/ar-BB1kqFMS
https://www.rferl.org/a/moscow-attack-islamic-state-russia-terror-crocus/32874123.html
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For months now, Martin Armstrong has been beating the war drums. May 7 2024 is a critical and long forecasted date, based on his proprietary Socrates arrays. A lot of things are lining up, together with some other currency data. It takes some experience to read these arrays. the rouble is also getting stronger.
(https://standard.socratesplatform.com/Blog/GetImage/6600605fa91d6a3ccf2d7f94)
(https://standard.socratesplatform.com/Blog/GetImage/660056b3a91d6a3ccf2d7dee)
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Flesh that out a bit please.
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Kasparov misses the role of US border security in Republican actions, but his hypothesis intrigues
Moscow Attack: Don’t Believe the Kremlin
In a heavily surveilled city, how could ISIS terrorists have killed for nearly an hour and driven away?
By Garry Kasparov
March 24, 2024 2:41 pm ET
Friday’s terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall concert venue near Moscow killed more than 100 people in a brutal crime against humanity. Many key facts are still unclear, and rest assured they will become only less clear as the Kremlin works to exploit the crisis domestically and abroad.
Coming shortly after his latest sham election, the attack gave dictator Vladimir Putin a rallying cry one day after the Kremlin declared for the first time that Russia is in a “state of war” in Ukraine.
Paranoia is my birthright, as it is for anyone born in the Soviet Union. But the official Kremlin story line is already a shambles. In one of the most surveilled cities on earth, where you can be arrested in 30 seconds for whispering “no war,” the terrorists continued their attack for more than an hour and then simply drove away.
The FSB, Russia’s state security service, claims to have arrested four suspects near Ukraine, at one of the most fortified borders in the world. Or did the suspects actually drive to Russian ally Belarus, as that nation’s ambassador to Russia said? Considering the amount of materiel and preparation required to do so much damage to a venue the size of a small village, it’s odd that the terrorists would suddenly turn into bungling amateurs by carrying their Tajik passports and heading to a militarized border.
Every official statement from the Kremlin and its propagandists will be a lie, with a few half-truths tossed in. It’s a control reflex of the security state of which Mr. Putin is a product. As I often say, I believe in coincidences, but I also believe in the KGB.
Mr. Putin angrily dismissed warnings from the U.S. Embassy on March 7 and March 18 about a potential terror attack at a concert venue in Moscow. (How did the U.S. know? Was it sources in ISIS-K or, as I suspect, moles in the FSB?) Then, on March 22, Mr. Putin issued orders to conscript hundreds of thousands more Russians for his war of conquest against Ukraine.
Twenty-five years ago, when then-Prime Minister Putin needed a platform for his presidential campaign, a series of terrorist apartment bombings in Russia launched the Second Chechen War. I laid out the copious evidence that these were false-flag attacks, staged by the FSB, in my 2015 book, “Winter Is Coming.” It’s a deed so shocking that it is difficult to believe—until you realize what sort of man Mr. Putin is. He has no allergy to blood, Russian or any other kind, if spilling it furthers his goals.
Twenty-five years ago, Mr. Putin grabbed power by committing mass murder in Chechnya. Today, in hope of staying in power, Mr. Putin is committing mass murder in Ukraine.
The West’s weakness encourages Russian escalation. White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan was just in Kyiv, but instead of helping Ukraine fight off the daily Russian attacks on its energy infrastructure by delivering weapons, he was apparently there to discourage Ukraine from doing the same to Russia. On Friday the Financial Times reported that the U.S. has pressured Ukraine not to attack Russian oil infrastructure for fear of raising global gas prices—which might harm President Biden’s re-election chances. Russian air power devastates Ukraine because America promised Ukraine F-16s but says it takes too long to train the pilots. Last week Mr. Biden’s administration even vetoed a Group of Seven statement condemning Russia’s fake elections.
All this suggests Mr. Biden fears Russian defeat more than Russian victory. As I documented in August, this is the continuation of a betrayal of a democratic ally and of American security interests.
It’s a cowardly new world order. The White House is busy telling Ukraine where it can’t shoot and telling Israel where it can’t hunt terrorists. Instead of providing leadership to unite democratic allies against dictators, Mr. Biden’s administration puts limits on America’s allies to protect America’s enemies. You don’t have to wonder what Taiwan and China make of America’s descent into passivity.
Republican obstruction of aid to Ukraine is despicable, but Mr. Biden can’t use it to excuse his own politicking and inaction. America has the largest military arsenal known to man, but it rusts in warehouses while Ukrainians die. Harry Truman had to face down Stalin and said the buck stopped with him. Mr. Biden says the buck stops with Speaker Mike Johnson. Donald Trump threatens isolationism in speeches and social-media posts; Mr. Biden is making isolationism a reality by refusing to stand up to dictators or to his own domestic opposition.
Mr. Biden retreated from Afghanistan, and Russia invaded Ukraine. He retreated from Ukraine, and Hamas launched a war against Israel. Weakness invites aggression.
Mr. Putin believes he needs perpetual war to hold on to power. He is creating the conditions to radicalize the Russian population further and to fulfill his new mobilization orders. By summer, the new conscripts will be at Ukraine’s front lines. Ukraine can’t survive this year unless America’s leaders do what is right instead of what they think is politically expedient.
Like all dictators, Mr. Putin excels at creating distractions from his crimes. The Moscow attack will draw global attention away from his war on Ukraine, but it won’t distract him at all. Mourn for every innocent life lost in Moscow, but also act to save the next one in Ukraine.
If a suspected serial killer is at large, the first thing to do when there’s a murder is to check his alibi. Mr. Putin is under indictment for war crimes, and his bloody track record makes him suspect No. 1. There can be no common cause against terror with Russia when the world’s most accomplished terrorist rules the Kremlin.
Mr. Kasparov is a co-founder of the World Liberty Congress and chairman of the Renew Democracy Initiative.
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Very interesting. I had not thought of that.
Is Putin THAT evil? - yes
One thing is certain . The shooters didn't risk having armed citizens shooting back.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gun_control_in_Russia#:~:text=Originally%2C%20handguns%20were%20only%20used,be%20concealed%20carry%20in%20public.
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https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2024-04-04/short-lived-nato-russia-honeymoon?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=fb45344d-f07f-4bb7-885d-f6047bddf80a
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Interesting times of lost opportunity.
In my view, the US leftward turn during Bush's last two years and then in Clinton's first two years blurred the lines of what a new Russia needed to do to compete in the western world. Why would they turn to freedom while we were turning away from it?
To follow Reagan, America chose Bush over Dukakis in 1988 when the right answer in my view was Jack Kemp to take economic freedom in the west to the next level using what we learned in Reagan's 8 years.
So we had 4 years of undoing Reagan in the US while potential freedom in Russia was in it's infancy. By the end of the decade Russia had KGB for a leader and their chance at free elections, free economy and a free people was squandered.
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And to highlight Doug's point :
https://georank.org/economy/russia/united-states