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Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities => Politics & Religion => Topic started by: Crafty_Dog on November 18, 2008, 09:06:12 AM

Title: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 18, 2008, 09:06:12 AM
Ukjraine would not be on my radar screen but for the analyses of Stratfor in the past few years.  Beginning today Stratfor is starting an extended analysis of the situation in Ukraine, its pivotal role in US-Russia and Euro- Russian relations and so I begin this thread.

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Part 1: Instability in a Crucial Country
Stratfor Today » November 18, 2008 | 1205 GMT
Summary
Ukraine is a country at a crossroads. Not only is it among those being hit hardest by the current global financial crisis, but it is now flirting with actual dissolution. The country’s economy is fundamentally weak, and ongoing political strife has made economic reforms necessary but impossible. Furthermore, the country is the cornerstone of the geopolitical battle between the West and Russia. Its weakness makes Ukraine dependent on outside powers, but outside powers appear to be working to pull the country apart.

Analysis
Editor’s Note: This is the first part of a series on Ukraine.

Of all the countries being hit by the global financial crisis, Ukraine is one of the most profoundly affected because it is already coping with failing financial institutions, a collapsing economy and a domestic political scene too shattered to handle much of anything. On top of that, it is unfortunate enough to be the centerpiece of the geopolitical turf war between Russia and the West. In short, Ukraine is so deeply troubled that it cannot exist or remain united as a state unless an outside power enables it. And right now, outside powers are doing just the opposite.

The Current Financial Crisis
Ukraine is fundamentally unprepared to weather the global financial crisis. The country’s budget deficit is 2.8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and is likely to increase before it decreases, as declining industrial output triggered by the global recession will inevitably reduce expected tax receipts. Confounding the budget deficit is the parliament’s promise to increase minimum wages in 2009 — a promise that no party will want to back out of publicly when parliamentary and presidential elections could be held soon.

Related Link
Countries in Crisis
Ukrainian currency problems are also quite severe. Foreign investment has been leaving Ukraine’s equity markets (it declined almost 80 percent so far in 2008; only Iceland experienced a larger drop) and speculators have been attacking the currency, the hryvnia. The hryvnia has lost 20 percent of its value in the last month alone, and there are fears that a devaluation is on the way. As confidence inside Ukraine slides, bank runs are taking place; Ukraine’s Central Bank President Vladimir Stelmakh estimated that customers withdrew almost $3 billion — approximately 4 percent of the country’s total deposits — from accounts within a week.

As the hryvnia’s decline continues, all loans — both business and private — taken out in foreign currencies (whether Swiss franc, euro or dollar) will begin appreciating, creating a very real possibility of defaults that domestic banks will not be able to cover.

This brings up the issue of total public and private sector debt. Ukraine’s debt is not exorbitant (private sector debt is at $80 billion and public is $20 billion; combined, it is a moderately high 66 percent of GDP), but it is the speed with which it has accumulated over the past two years that is worrying. With the decline in the hryvnia and upcoming debt service payments (around $46 billion due next year for private sector and $1.6 billion for public), Ukrainian total foreign currency reserves — totaling $37 billion — could begin drying up fast, particularly if the government continues to try to use the reserves to prop up the hryvnia.

Ukraine’s public sector debt, currently only 10 percent of GDP, could also begin to rise as the domestic banks face liquidity pressures and the government is forced to intervene as well as it can, though it cannot afford bailouts like those in the United States, Europe and Russia. The country’s sixth largest bank, Prominvestbank — which holds 4 percent of the market share in Ukraine’s banking sector — was already bailed out by the government on Oct. 8 to the tune of $1 billion, and the Ukrainian economy’s overall weakness indicates that more domestic lenders could follow suit.

However, much as in Central Europe, it could be the foreign banks that create havoc for Ukraine’s economy. Foreign banks already own roughly 50 percent of the country’s banking system: Austria’s Raiffeisen owns Bank Aval, Italy’s UniCredit owns Ukrsotsbank and the French BNP Paribas owns UkrSibbank. These banks — both foreign and domestic — were particularly active in bringing about the Ukrainian explosion of mortgages and retail loans, most of which were made in foreign currencies (euro and Swiss francs) so as to take advantage of a lower interest rate.

Ukraine is right behind the troubled Hungary, Croatia and Romania in terms of the percentage of total loans made in foreign currencies (roughly 50 percent of all loans in Ukraine). As the hryvnia depreciates, consumers and businesses will be less able to service these foreign-currency-denominated loans. This will lead to a potential mountain of unserviceable debt that could collapse domestic banks and spread the contagion to the rest of emerging markets and potentially to foreign bank headquarters.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has offered Ukraine a $16.5 billion loan. However, Ukraine’s internal political chaos has suspended the country’s ability to meet the IMF’s conditions or even make a decision on the IMF’s terms.

Fundamentally Weak
Beyond the current financial crisis, Ukraine’s economy is volatile at best — leaving little hope for the country to pull itself out of any difficulty. One problem is that each region in Ukraine is highly dependent on a specific industry for money; so when that industry fails, the entire region tends to fail. Furthermore, most of Ukraine’s lucrative business is based in the eastern half of the country, which typically gives that half (and Russia) a bit more political and economic power. Although Ukraine mainly depends on its metallurgical industry, it also gains much revenue from grain, military exports and energy transit. However, each of these sectors is suffering from deep problems that could not be easily fixed even if the country had the proper tools.





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Metals
Ukraine is one of the world’s top 10 steel-producing and iron-ore-producing nations and is the third-largest exporter of steel. The metallurgical industry accounts for 40 percent of Ukraine’s exports, nearly 30 percent of its GDP and 12 percent of its tax revenues — and it employs more than half a million people.

However, the metallurgical industry is exceedingly inefficient and outdated. It is also highly dependent on expensive natural gas from its neighbor, Russia, making the cost of Ukrainian steel already 25 percent higher than its Russian and Chinese competitors. To make matters worse, demand and prices for many metals, especially steel, are collapsing globally. Prices for steel soared for the past year, prompting many steel-producing countries such as Brazil, India, Russia, China and Australia to overproduce, creating a global surplus. This leaves Ukraine horribly exposed since anyone who would have previously agreed to pay for the more-expensive Ukrainian steel now has several other options.

Ukraine’s Industry Ministry has officially declared the metallurgical sector to be in crisis, with 17 of the 36 steelmaking furnaces closed. Moreover, many of the metals heavyweights in Ukraine are foreign-owned — by firms such as ArcelorMittal and Rusal — and are already discussing massive layoffs. This will also greatly increase Ukraine’s account deficit. The bottom line is that Ukraine simply cannot compete on a global level in metallurgy, though much of its economy is dependent on it.

Grain
Ukraine saw an increase in revenues from an abundant grain harvest and exporting; in the third quarter of 2008, Ukraine’s exports outpaced imports. Grains account for approximately 6 percent of the country’s exports and brought in more than $2 billion the summer of 2008. The problem with grain is that the revenue it generates is cyclical, and thus Ukraine will not see any more cash from it until mid-2009. That, combined with severe credit constriction — which will stress farmers in the upcoming planting season — makes any dependency on the grain sector shaky.

Military Exports
Ukraine also depends on military exports to bring in cash. During and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, military units (including nuclear forces) were moved from Ukraine back inside Russia proper, but Kiev retained and commanded a great deal of Soviet military hardware and production facilities. Since around the mid-1990s, Kiev has sold that used equipment to countries as diverse as China, Sierra Leone, Kenya and even the United States. Though Ukraine retains significant stocks of such equipment, those stocks continue aging and slipping further toward obsolescence, and there is a (rapidly approaching) limit to how far the Soviet military legacy can carry Ukraine. There are a few discrepancies in estimates of how much money military exports bring in for Kiev. The official estimate by the Ukrainian Defense Ministry is around $1 billion a year; however, there are many within the government who claim it generates three times that amount but some equipment is sold under the table to other parties (such as Georgia) that Kiev does not want to be formally connected with.

Energy Transit
The only other really substantial moneymaker for the country is energy transit. Eighty percent of Russia’s energy exports of oil and natural gas to Europe transit through Ukraine. Currently, Ukraine receives approximately $1.9 billion a year simply for transiting Russian and Central Asian natural gas to Europe, along with some compensation on its own domestic purchases — be that a small bartered amount in payment or discounted natural gas. Ukraine announced Nov. 5 that it is planning on raising the amount it transports in 2009 in hopes of raising its revenues. However, the energy game is tricky for Ukraine because it also has to import 90 percent of its own domestic supplies of natural gas — something that typically gets the government into a $2 billion debt to Moscow every quarter — and Russia is considering raising its prices to Ukraine in the new year.

Tell Stratfor What You Think


Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 19, 2008, 08:39:04 AM
November 19, 2008 | 1204 GMT
Summary
Within Ukraine there are several forces that, in theory, could steer the country in one direction or another. However, the political forces have been locked in a battle for control for the past four years. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s oligarchs and other forces with both economic and political clout are too distracted by the current global financial crisis to take action. Thus, Ukraine has been left with no ability to handle its own crisis or determine its own future.

Analysis
Editor’s Note: This is the second part of a series on Ukraine.

Ukraine’s government is simply far too shattered and chaotic to handle the country’s current financial and economic problems or make any of the reforms needed in its defunct financial, economic, military and energy sectors. Kiev has been a confused and chaotic mass of shifting coalitions and governments since the 2004 Orange Revolution, which was supposed to herald a new era in which Ukraine would be part of the West rather than a Russian satellite.

From the Orange Revolution through today, Ukraine’s political scene has been dominated by three main parties (though there are myriad smaller parties):

Our Ukraine: The vehemently pro-Western party under current Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko

Bloc Yulia Timoshenko: A coalition of parties under current Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko that can flip to either the pro-Western or pro-Russian side; and

Party of Regions: The vehemently pro-Russian party led by former Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich.
Our Ukraine and Timoshenko’s bloc were the parties behind the Orange Revolution, though all three major parties have flip-flopped into different coalitions half a dozen times in the past four years. Most of the breaks and alliances among the three groups have not necessarily come about because of changes in ideology; rather, they are driven by the personalities and egos of Yushchenko, Timoshenko and Yanukovich. Typically, with each turnover in the government and coalitions, the laws and reforms passed by the former ruling group are either undone or ignored. This has seriously retarded any restructuring or improvement in almost any sector or institution in the country.


Furthermore, each political group generally controls a certain region of the country, so the parties look out for those industries, oligarchs and regional economics that pertain to their regions. This means that if a political party is booted from power, any restructuring or deals in place for its favorite region, industry or business can be overturned. The result is a business environment as chaotic and confusing as the political environment.

Ukraine is still suffering from political chaos. There has been one small internal shift: So many political figures outside of the big three personalities are so worn down from the constant bickering that they have started a wave of new political parties and groups. Parliamentary elections could be held in December of January, with a presidential election in late 2009 or early 2010. And with 72 percent of Ukrainians saying they are tired of the political infighting, these new smaller parties could end up changing the political landscape and making Ukraine’s political future even more unpredictable.

The Oligarchs

As in neighboring Russia, Ukraine also has the political and economic force of the oligarchs — those who swooped in after the Soviet era to snatch up certain enterprises and businesses, making themselves incredibly wealthy and powerful very quickly. The oligarchs are very politically active. Some started out in politics and then seized wealth and position to become oligarchs; others began by securing wealth and position to use as leverage in politics. Just as in Russia, Ukraine’s oligarchs either back certain political forces — paying for campaigns and receiving kickbacks once their chosen players are in power (such as the oligarchs backing Yushchenko and Yanukovich) — or they establish their own political parties as a means to influence distribution of resources and advantageous business deals (as with Timoshenko). This has helped fuel the constant government chaos and sustained a level of distrust in Ukrainian businesses and those who run them.

But at the moment, the oligarchs are unable to shape the political or economic landscape in Ukraine because they are being crushed by the economic crisis. According to some records, Ukrainian oligarchs’ assets have lost some 90 percent of their value in the past few months. For example, Viktor Pinchuk (a Timoshenko backer), who controls Ukraine’s leading steel company Interpipe, has lost $2 billion. Sergei Taruta (a Yanukovich backer), who controls another metallurgical giant ISD, has lost $4.8 billion.

While Ukraine’s oligarchs are scrambling to keep their businesses and wealth intact, they are too preoccupied to be as politically active as usual. With two critical elections looming, there could be a shift in that the oligarchs will not be able to dole out cash as easily as in the past. For example, Timoshenko has already heard from one of her financial backers — Konstantin Zhevago, who owns Financial and Credit Group and iron producer Poltavsky — that he will not be dishing out his usual funding because he recently lost most of his wealth. The crisis among the oligarchs has led both Timoshenko and Yanukovich to try to postpone elections, knowing they do not heave enough cash to run full campaigns.

Rinat Akhmetov

The one Ukrainian oligarch who is not absent from the political scene is the wealthiest in the country — Rinat Akhmetov, who owns assets in energy, steel, coal, banking, hotels, telecommunications, media and soccer. Most Ukrainian oligarchs are worth only a fraction of what Akhmetov is worth. Much of his wealth was not in the hard-hit equity markets, and so he has only lost a reported $7 billion of his $36 billion in the economic slowdowns; thus, he still has quite a bit of influence to wield in politics and economics.

Akhmetov is looking to take advantage of others’ economic misfortune and wants to expand his reach over more assets (especially in coal and electricity) not only in Ukraine, but also in Russia, Poland, Romania and Hungary. He has long been the puppet master behind the Party of Regions and Yanukovich; Stratfor has learned from sources that he also holds a great deal of leverage over Yushchenko and Timoshenko. Long kept in the shadows, Akhmetov is considering running for the presidency, knowing he has the financial capabilities, political backing from his leash holder (Russia) and enough clout against the big three political leaders to possibly really shake things up.

Other Forces

The only other forces in Ukraine that can affect the political or economic landscapes are the military, intelligence services and organized crime. As stated earlier, Ukraine’s military — much like its stockpile of Soviet weaponry — is seriously deteriorating without the political or economic backing needed to push for and coordinate modernization and reforms.

Ukraine’s intelligence and security apparatus — mainly the Security Service of Ukraine — is currently tangled in an identity crisis stemming from its break with its former master, the Soviet KGB, and the constant restructuring and leadership changes. Ukraine’s intelligence and security services consist of seven agencies and institutes that are responsible for identifying threats to Ukraine both at home and abroad, collecting intelligence and analyzing data. All agency heads are appointed by and report to the president, but the parliament must approve the appointments — which means the intelligence and security services are another casualty of the political chaos as the president and prime minister fight for control.

Organized crime is another major political and economic force in Ukraine, having proliferated since the country gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Ukrainian organized crime started off as a function of physical security for the oligarchs who controlled Ukraine’s resources and backed favored politicians, but expanded because the country’s weak central government was unable to effectively police criminals. Organized crime became a pillar of the state through the political-criminal nexus in which politicians, businessmen and criminals provided each other with services and favors. It has branched out considerably, with Ukrainian organized crime groups forming partnerships or acting alone in countries throughout Eastern and Central Europe — and because Ukraine remains essentially a weak state dependent on outside patronage, foreign organized criminal elements have found a market there for illicit goods and human trafficking. But organized crime, just like other businesses, is suffering during the economic and financial crisis as criminal groups lose funds in foreign banks and customers have less cash to spend on services and goods.

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 20, 2008, 08:27:46 AM
Part 3: Outside Intervention
Stratfor Today » November 20, 2008 | 1201 GMT
Summary
Because Ukraine is vital to Russia’s defense and survival as any kind of world power, it has become the cornerstone of the geopolitical battle between Russia and the West. Russia has many levers it could use to influence the course of Ukraine’s future, though the West is not without its tools. The eventual outcome of the battle for Ukraine is uncertain.

Analysis
Editor’s Note: This is the third part of a series on Ukraine.

Since Ukraine is essentially too internally shattered to make sweeping changes or reforms, its future is at the whim of foreign powers. Because of this — and because of Ukraine’s geographic location — the country is now the chief arena for the struggle between Russia and the West.

Related Links
Countries in Crisis
Part 1: Instability in a Crucial Country
Part 2: Domestic Forces and Capabilities
The Cornerstone
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West (particularly under the guises of the European Union and NATO) has pushed eastward, making its way toward Russia’s doorstep. As the West tries to continue its advance and as Russia tries to stave it off, Ukraine has become paramount to both sides — not just as a potentially lucrative territory, but because Ukraine is the key to Russia’s defense and survival as any sort of power.





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Although Ukraine hosts the largest Russian community in the world outside of Russia, the battle for Ukraine is about far more than ethnic kin. Even before the Soviet era, Ukraine was integrated into Russia’s industrial and agricultural heartland, and eastern Ukraine remains integral to the Russian heartland to this day. Furthermore, Ukraine is the transit point for Russian natural gas to Europe and a connecting point for nearly all meaningful infrastructures running between Russia and the West — whether pipeline, road, power or rail.

Without Ukraine, Russia could not project political or military power into the Northern Caucasus, the Black Sea or Eastern Europe, and Russia would be nearly entirely cut off from the rest of Europe. Ukraine also goes deep into former Soviet territory, with borders a mere 300 miles from either Volgograd or Moscow, and the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol on the Black Sea has long been the Russian military’s only deep, warm-water port.

To put it simply, as long as Ukraine is in its orbit, Russia can maintain strategic coherence and continue on its path of resurging in an attempt to resume its superpower status. Without Ukraine, Russia would face a much smaller set of possibilities.

This is why the 2004 Orange Revolution that brought in Ukraine’s first pro-Western government was Russia’s deepest nightmare. Russia knows that the Orange Revolution was a U.S.-backed project, supported by U.S. allies such as Poland. Since that color revolution, Moscow has been content with simply destabilizing Ukraine in order to ensure it does not fully fall into the West’s sphere.

Russia’s Levers
Russia has a slew of levers inside Ukraine to keep the country unstable. It also has quite a few tools it could use to either pull the country back into Moscow’s fold or break the country apart.

Politics: Russia is the very public sponsor of Viktor Yanukovich and his Party of Regions; though in the past three months, Moscow has also started granting its favor to Yulia Timoshenko — breaking the Orange Coalition and isolating President Viktor Yushchenko and his party. The topic of how to respond to a strengthening Russia has been a constant point of contention in Ukraine’s different coalitions and governments.

Energy: Since Russia supplies 80 percent of Ukraine’s natural gas, energy is one of Moscow’s favorite levers to use against Kiev. Moscow has proven in the past that it is not afraid of turning off the heat at the height of winter in Ukraine to not only hurt the country but also to push Kiev into the heart of a firestorm as European countries’ supplies get cut off when Russia cuts supplies to Ukraine. The price Russia charges Ukraine for natural gas is also constantly being renegotiated, with Kiev racking up billions of dollars in debt to Moscow every few months.

Economics: Russia controls a large portion of Ukraine’s metals industry, owning factories across the eastern part of the country, where most of Ukraine’s wealth is held. Russia also controls much of Ukraine’s ports in the south.

Oligarchs: Quite a few of Ukraine’s oligarchs pledge allegiance to Russia because of relationships from the Soviet era, because of assets held in Russia or because Moscow bought or supported certain oligarchs during their rise. Rinat Akhmetov is the most notable pro-Russian oligarch; not only does he do the Kremlin’s bidding inside Ukraine, but he is also rumored to have recently helped the Kremlin during Russia’s financial crisis. Moscow controls many other notable Ukrainian oligarchs, such as Viktor Pinchuk, Igor Kolomoisky, Sergei Taruta and Dmitri Firtash. This has allowed the Kremlin to shape much in these oligarchs’ business ventures and have a say in how these oligarchs support certain politicians.

Ships from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet during the celebration of the fleet’s 225th anniversaryMilitary: Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is headquartered and based in Ukraine’s Crimea region, in Sevastopol. Compared to Kiev’s small fleet, Russian naval power in the Black Sea is overwhelming. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet also contributes to the majority of the Crimea region’s economy. Though imposing a military reality on Ukraine would be another thing entirely from imposing a military reality on South Ossetia and Georgia, there is little doubt that Russia — and the ethnic Russian majority in the Crimea — is committed to retaining the decisive hand in the fate of the Crimea, even if the Russian Fleet withdraws in 2017, when its lease expires.

Intelligence: Ukraine’s intelligence services were essentially born from Russia’s heavy KGB presence in the country before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Security Service of Ukraine originated in Moscow’s KGB presence in Ukraine, and the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine sprung forth from Russia’s SVR foreign intelligence agency. Many of the senior officials in both agencies were actually KGB trained and worked for them during the early days of their careers. Russia’s current spy agency, the Federal Security Service (a descendant of the KGB), has a heavy presence within Ukraine’s intelligence agencies. This gives the Russians a big opening they can use to serve their own interests in Ukraine.

Organized crime: Russian organized crime is the parent of Ukrainian organized crime and is still deeply entrenched in the current system (even among the oligarchs). Russia has been especially successful in setting up shop in the Ukraine involving shady natural gas deals, the arms trade, the drug trade and other illicit business arrangements. Population: Ukraine is dramatically split between a population that identifies with Russia and a population that identifies with the West. It has a complex and multifaceted demography: A large Russian minority comprises 17.3 percent of the total population, more than 30 percent of all Ukrainians speak Russian as their native language and more than half of the country belongs to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarch. Geographically speaking, Ukrainians living east of the Dnieper River tend to identify more with Russia than with the West, and those in Crimea consider themselves much more Russian than Ukrainian. This divide is something Russia can use not only to keep the country in chaos, but to split the country in half should the need arise.

The West’s Levers and Concerns

The West, on the other hand, is split over what exactly to do with Ukraine. In 2004, during the Orange Revolution, it was the United States’ time to push up against Russia; but other Western heavyweights such as Germany have never really liked or trusted any government in Kiev. Berlin would love to see a pro-Western government in Kiev to work with, but the Germans know that meddling in Ukraine costs them something, unlike the Americans. This was seen in 2006, when Russia cut off natural gas supplies to Ukraine, which led to the lights going out in quite a few European countries as well. So the Europeans see the upheaval of Ukraine as yet another mess the Americans have gotten them into.

Since the Orange Revolution, the West has used two main levers — cash and protection — to try to keep Kiev on a pro-Western path. It has thrown cash at Ukraine, but there are two problems with this move. First, whoever has been in charge in Kiev has squandered and mismanaged any cash given to Ukraine rather than working to alleviate the economic, financial, institutional and systematic problems the country is facing. For example, the West is offering Ukraine an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan of $16.5 billion with only a few strings — banking reform and an end to government squabbling — attached, but Kiev cannot manage these changes, and now the IMF is considering withdrawing its offer. Second, as the West faces its own financial crisis, it is not in any position currently to offer Kiev any more help.

The West’s other move — again championed by Washington — is to pull Ukraine into NATO. Ukraine is ill-qualified as a potential member of the Atlantic alliance, but the move would permanently break Russia’s hold over Ukraine.

Years of concerted, focused and well-funded military reform could move Kiev meaningfully toward eligibility, but there appears to be no firm consensus — especially with Germany and France against it — on pushing for Ukrainian admittance into the membership action plan. Also, NATO’s members have neither troops available to be stationed in the country nor the defense dollars to support such an expensive modernization and reform program.

The battle for the soul of Ukraine is on. The country is shattered internally in nearly every possible way: politically, financially, institutionally, economically, militarily and socially. The global financial crisis is simply showing the problems that have long existed in the country. In the near future, there is no conceivable or apparent way for any force within the country to stabilize it and begin the reforms needed. It will take an outside power to step in — which leads to the larger tussle between the West and Russia over control of one of the most geopolitically critical regions between the two. Russia has far more tools to use to keep Ukraine under its control, but the West has laid a lot of groundwork in order to undermine Moscow, leaving the future of Ukraine completely uncertain.

Title: Pay up or else!
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 20, 2008, 08:52:19 AM
PS:  Russian President Dmitri Medvedev told energy company Gazprom to collect Ukraine’s $2.4 billion natural gas debt “either voluntarily or compulsory in line with current laws and within the framework of bilateral relations,” Interfax reported Nov. 20.

Title: Russian Gas Trap
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 14, 2009, 06:26:04 AM




By Peter Zeihan

At the time of this writing, the natural gas crisis in Europe is entering its 13th day.

While the topic has only penetrated the Western mind as an issue in recent years, Russia and Ukraine have been spatting about the details of natural gas deliveries, volumes, prices and transit terms since the Soviet breakup in 1992. In the end, a deal is always struck, because Russia needs the hard currency that exports to Europe (via Ukraine) bring, and Ukraine needs natural gas to fuel its economy. But in recent years, two things have changed.

First, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution of 2004 brought to power a government hostile to Russian goals. Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko would like to see his country integrated into the European Union and NATO; for Russia, such an evolution would be the kiss of death.

Ukraine is home to most of the infrastructure that links Russia to Europe, including everything from pipelines to roads and railways to power lines. The Ukrainian and Russian heartlands are deeply intertwined; the two states’ industrial and agricultural belts fold into each other almost seamlessly. Eastern Ukraine is home to the largest concentration of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers anywhere in the world outside Russia. The home port of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is at Sevastopol on Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula, a reminder that the Soviet Union’s port options were awful — and that Russia’s remaining port options are even more so.

Ukraine hems in the south of European Russia so thoroughly that any hostile power controlling Kiev could easily threaten a variety of core Russian interests, including Moscow itself. Ukraine also pushes far enough east that a hostile Kiev would sever most existing infrastructure connections to the Caucasus. Simply put, a Ukraine outside the Russian sphere of influence transforms Russia into a purely defensive power, one with little hope of resisting pressure from anywhere. But a Russified Ukraine makes it possible for Russia to project power outward, and to become a major regional — and potentially global — player.

Related Links
Part 1: Instability in a Crucial Country
Part 2: Domestic Forces and Capabilities
Part 3: Outside Intervention
The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power
Russia and Rotating the U.S. Focus
Europe: Feeling the Cold Blast of Another Russo-Ukrainian Dispute
Global Market Brief: Europe’s Long-Term Energy Proposal
Related Special Topic Page
Russian Energy and Foreign Policy
The second change in recent years is that Russia now has an economic buffer, meaning it can tolerate a temporary loss in natural gas income. Since Vladimir Putin first came to power as prime minister in 1999, every government under his command has run a hefty surplus. By mid-2008, Russian officials were regularly boasting of their $750 billion in excess funds, and of how Moscow inevitably would soon become a global financial hub. Not surprisingly, the 2008-2009 recession has deflated this optimism to some extent. The contents of Moscow’s piggy bank already have dropped by approximately $200 billion. Efforts to insulate Russian firms and protect the ruble have taken their financial toll, Russia’s 2009 budget is firmly in deficit, and all talk of a Russian New York is on ice.

But Russia’s financial troubles pale in comparison to its neighbors’ problems — not in severity, but in impact. Russia is not a developed country, or even one that, like the states of Central Europe, is seriously trying to develop. A capital shortage simply does not damage Russia as it does, say, Slovakia. And while Russia has not yet returned to central planning, rising government control over all sources of capital means the Russia of today has far more in common economically with the Soviet Union than with even the Russia of the 1990s, much less the free-market West. In relative terms, the recession actually has increased relative Russian economic power — and that says nothing about other tools of Russian power. Moscow’s energy, political and military levers are as powerful now as they were during the August 2008 war with Georgia.

This is a very long-winded way of saying that before 2004, the Russian-Ukrainian natural gas spat was simply part of business as usual. But now, Russia feels that its life is on the line, and that it has the financial room to maneuver to push hard — and so, the annual ritual of natural gas renegotiations has become a key Russian tool in bringing Kiev to heel.

And a powerful tool it is. Fully two-thirds of Ukraine’s natural gas demand is sourced from Russia, and the income from Russian natural gas transiting to Europe forms the backbone of the Ukrainian budget. Ukraine is a bit of an economic basket case in the best of times, but the global recession has essentially shut down the country’s steel industry, Ukraine’s largest sector. Russian allies in Ukraine, which for the time being include Yushchenko’s one-time Orange ally Yulia Timoshenko, have done a thorough job of ensuring that the blame for the mass power cuts falls to Yushchenko. Facing enervated income, an economy in the doldrums and a hostile Russia, along with all blame being directed at him, Yushchenko’s days appear to be numbered. The most recent poll taken to gauge public sentiment ahead of presidential elections, which are anticipated later this year, put Yushchenko’s support level below the survey’s margin of error.

Even if Yushchenko’s future were bright, Russia has no problem maintaining or even upping the pressure. The Kremlin would much rather see Ukraine destroyed than see it as a member of the Western clubs, and Moscow is willing to inflict a great deal of collateral damage on a variety of players to preserve what it sees as an interest central to Russian survival.

Europe has been prominent among these casualties. As a whole, Europe imports one-quarter of the natural gas it uses from Russia, and approximately 80 percent of that transits Ukraine. All of those deliveries now have been suspended, resulting in cutoffs of various degrees to France, Turkey, Poland, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Romania, Austria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Serbia and Bulgaria — in rough order of increasing severity. Reports of both mass power outages and mass heating failures have been noted in the countries at the bottom half of this list.

A variety of diversification programs have put Europe well on its way to removing its need for Russian natural gas entirely, but these programs are still years from completion. Until then, not much can be done for states that use natural gas for a substantial portion of their energy needs.

Unlike coal, nuclear energy or oil, natural gas can be easily shipped only via pipeline to previously designated points of use. This means the decision to link to a supplier lasts for decades and is not easily adjusted should something go wrong. Importing natural gas in liquid form requires significant skill in cryogenics as well as specialized facilities that take a couple of years to build (not to mention a solid port). Alternate pipe supply networks, much less power facilities that use different fuels, are still more expensive and require even more time. All European countries can do in the immediate term is literally rely upon the kindness of strangers until the imbroglio is past or a particularly creative solution comes to mind. (Poland has offered several states some of its share of Russian natural gas that comes to it via a Belarusian line.) Some Central European states are taking the unorthodox step of recommissioning mothballed nuclear power plants.

Because Russia’s goal in all this is to crack Kiev, there is not much any European country can do. But one nation, Germany, is certainly trying. Of the major European states, Germany is the most dependent upon Russian resources in general, and energy in particular.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Putin spent three nights this past week on the phone with each other discussing the topic, and the pair has a two-day summit set for later this week. The Germans have three primary reasons for cozying up to the Russians at a time when it seems they should be as angry as anyone else in Europe.

First, because most of the natural gas Germany gets from Russia passes not through Ukraine, but through Belarus — and because the Russians have not interrupted these secondary flows — the Germans desperately want to avoid rocking the boat and politicizing the dispute any more than necessary. The Germans need to engage the Russians in discussion, but unlike most other players, they can afford not to be accusatory, because they have not been too deeply affected so far. (Like all the other Europeans, the Germans are working feverishly to diversify their energy supplies away from Russia, but while Berlin can keep the lights on, it doesn’t want to ruffle any more feathers than it needs to.)

Second, as any leader of Germany would, Merkel recognizes that if current Russian-Western tensions devolve into a more direct confrontation, the struggle would be fought disproportionately with German resources — and perhaps even on German soil. Germany is the closest major power to Russia and would therefore be the focus of any major action, Russian or Western, offensive or defensive. France, the United Kingdom and the United States enjoy the buffer of distance — and in the case of the last two, a water buffer to boot.

German national interest, therefore, is not to find a way to fight the Russians, but to find a way to live with them. Germany traditionally has been Russia’s largest trading partner. Every time the two have clashed, it has been ugly, to say the least. In the German mind, if Ukraine (or perhaps even adjusting the attitude of Poland) is what is necessary to make the Russians feel secure, so be it.

Third, Germany has a European angle to think about. To put it bluntly, Merkel is always on the lookout for any means of easing Germany back into the international community with a foreign policy somewhat more sophisticated than the “I’m sorry” that has reigned since the end of World War II. After the war, France successfully hijacked German submission and used German economic strength to achieve French political desires. Since the Cold War’s end, Germany has slowly wormed its way out of that policy straitjacket, and the natural gas crisis raises an interesting possibility. If Merkel’s discussions with Putin result in restored natural gas flows, then not only will Russia see Germany as a partner, but Germany might win goodwill from European states that no longer have to endure a winter without heat.

Still, it will be a tough sell: the European states between Germany and Russia have always lived in dread that one power or the other — or, God forbid, both — will take them over. But Germany is clearly at the center of Europe, and all of the states affected by the natural gas crisis count Germany as their largest trading partner. If Merkel can muster sufficient political muscle to complement Germany’s economic muscle, the resulting image of strength and capability would go a long way toward cementing Berlin’s re-emergence.
Title: Strat: Ukraine for sale
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 09, 2009, 10:27:41 PM
Summary
The Russian Finance Ministry announced Feb. 9 that its Ukrainian counterpart requested a $5 billion loan from Moscow to cover Kiev’s budget deficit. Coupled with the International Monetary Fund’s wariness of disbursing a second tranche ($1.9 billion) of a $16.5 billion loan agreed upon in November 2008, this move indicates the seriousness of Ukraine’s financial state. It also highlights Ukraine’s more fundamental economic problems, showing that Kiev ultimately will fall into the orbit of whichever country can come to its aid financially.

Analysis
Ukraine made an official request to Russia on Feb. 9 for a $5 billion loan to make up for a decrease in budget revenues, the Russian Finance Ministry announced. Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko has also asked the leaders of the world’s richest countries for emergency loans, citing the difficulties her country faces as a result of the global financial crisis.

Kiev began its frantic search for loans from “powerful and financially stable countries” after a visit by an International Monetary Fund (IMF) delegation the week of Feb. 1 that did not go well at all. The IMF typically works by doling out loans to troubled countries in tranches, usually attached with strict conditions designed for macroeconomic stabilization. Ukraine received its first such tranche of $4.5 billion (out of a total loan of $16.5 billion) in November. But Kiev has failed to live up to the loan’s requirements, which include a deficit-free budget for 2009 — the budget has a 3 percent deficit — and a curtailing of social spending. The latter is an especially dangerous task politically, with Ukrainian unemployment figures soaring above the 1 million mark (out of a population of 46 million) and presidential elections slated for early 2010. Because of Ukraine’s shortcomings, the IMF delegation made no promises that a second tranche would be coming in the near future.

But Ukraine as a country is fundamentally broken, and its economy — which was far from stable even before the global economic crisis — will not be fixed easily with loans from the IMF, Russia or the West. The Ukrainian government is essentially at odds with itself, split between the pro-Russian and pro-Western movements. The country’s political and economic institutions need more than small tweaks, and until they are radically reformed — which would be tremendously difficult to pull off socially — Kiev cannot do without outside assistance. And whoever provides this assistance will hold the most influence over Ukraine.

This reality is only intensified by the financial crisis. Kiev depends heavily on manufacturing and industry for its government revenues, and as of December 2008, industrial production had dropped more than 26 percent year on year. Ukraine’s currency has fallen dramatically since last summer, losing nearly a third of its value, and the country’s gross domestic product for 2009 is expected to contract 5 percent.

Financial assistance does not necessarily need to come from the Russians; Kiev simply needs to find whoever will help its economy survive. Previously, Russia’s influence in Ukraine was underwritten by natural gas prices that were well below what the Europeans were charged. However, Russia raised those prices significantly, causing a monthlong standoff that affected much of Europe and created more economic problems for Kiev. Though Kiev paid its natural gas bill for January, a representative of Ukrainian energy giant Naftogaz said the renegotiated prices will cause Ukraine to go bankrupt. Currently, the Europeans are in no financial position to bail out Ukraine, so Kiev is calling on Moscow to alleviate Ukraine’s financial pains.

To be able to proceed, with the IMF’s assistance, in trying to tackle its myriad economic problems, Ukraine must first take care of its budget deficit — hence the request to Russia for a $5 billion loan, which would roughly cover the deficit. Any Russian assistance, however, will come with strings attached. While the natural gas situation remains shaky and tense, a $5 billion loan would effectively draw Kiev further into Russia’s orbit. And with political infighting and instability the norm in Ukraine, Russia will be sure to take advantage of Kiev’s financial weaknesses in any way that it can. This essentially means that Ukraine will be divorced from its Western leanings and will move firmly into Russia’s sphere of influence, both economically and politically.

Title: Stratfor: Upcoming elections, part 1
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 13, 2010, 07:31:15 AM
Summary
Ukraine’s next presidential election is scheduled for Jan. 17. All of the leading candidates are pro-Russian. This means that the last vestiges of pro-Western government brought on by the 2004 Orange Revolution will be swept away and Russia’s ongoing consolidation of power will become evident in Kiev.

Editor’s Note: This is the first part of a three-part series on Ukraine’s upcoming presidential election.

Analysis
Related Link
Ukraine: More than a Religious Schism
STRATFOR’s 2010 Annual Forecast said, “For Russia, 2010 will be a year of consolidation — the culmination of years of careful efforts.” Moscow will purge Western influence from several countries in its near abroad while laying the foundation of a political union enveloping most of the former Soviet Union. Although that union will not be completed in 2010, according to our forecast, “by year’s end it will be obvious that the former Soviet Union is Russia’s sphere of influence and that any effort to change that must be monumental if it is to succeed.”

Ukraine is one country where Russia’s consolidation will be obvious, mainly because the most important part of reversing the 2004 pro-Western Orange Revolution will occur: the return of a pro-Russian president in Kiev. Ukraine’s presidential election is slated for Jan. 17, and all the top candidates in the race are pro-Russian in some way.

Russia considers Ukraine to be vital to its national interests; indeed, of all the countries where Moscow intends to tighten its grip in 2010, Ukraine is the most important. Because of its value to Moscow, Ukraine has been caught for years in a tug-of-war between Russia and the West. Since the Orange Revolution, Russia has used social, media, energy, economic and military levers — not to mention Federal Security Service assets — to break the Orange Coalition’s hold on Ukraine and the coherence of the coalition itself. Russia even managed to get a pro-Russian prime minister placed in Kiev for more than a year. However, the presidency remained in the hands of pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko. And in Ukraine, it is the president who controls the military (including the military-industrial sector and its exports), the secret services (which, while littered with Russian influence, are still controlled by a pro-Western leader) and Ukraine’s foreign policy.

Typically, STRATFOR does not focus on personalities because long-term trends in geopolitics act as constraints on human agency, limiting the value of individual-level analysis in forecasting. However, the Ukrainian election is a critical part of Russia’s resurgence, and STRATFOR will shed light on the colorful and complicated world of Ukrainian politics and offer clarity on the personalities that will lead Ukraine back into the Russian fold — and explain how Moscow has ensured their loyalty.

The candidates STRATFOR will examine are not all front-runners, necessarily, but they are the most important candidates in the race. Yushchenko is running for re-election but, according to polls from the past year, has support from only 3.8 percent of Ukrainian voters, which is little more than the margin of error. Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich — who won Ukraine’s initial 2004 presidential election but was swept from power in the re-vote sparked by the Orange Revolution — has always been staunchly pro-Russian and stands a good chance of victory on Jan. 17. Current Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko is also in the running. She was Yushchenko’s partner in the Orange Revolution, but Russia’s growing influence in Ukraine persuaded her to make a deal with Moscow, and she is now running on a relatively pro-Russian platform. The last candidate we will examine is Arseny Yatsenyuk, a young politician once thought to be free of both pro-Western and pro-Russian ties. However, STRATFOR sources have said that Yatsenyuk is not exactly what he seems, and that much more powerful forces — with Russian ties — are behind this Ukrainian wild card.
Title: Ukraine- part 2
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 14, 2010, 09:18:42 AM
Summary
On Jan. 17, Ukraine is scheduled to hold a presidential election that will sweep the last remnant of the pro-Western Orange Revolution — Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko — from power in Kiev. Yushchenko’s presidency has been marked by pro-Western moves on many levels, including attempts to join the European Union and NATO. However, the next government in Kiev — pro-Russian though it may be — could still have a place for Yushchenko.

Editor’s Note: This is the second part of a three-part series on Ukraine’s upcoming presidential election.

Analysis
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko is the last remnant of the pro-Western Orange Revolution. Now that his popularity has plummeted and his coalition partner, Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko, has turned pro-Russian, he is set to be swept aside by Ukraine’s Jan. 17 presidential election.

Yushchenko led the Orange Revolution, and his presidency kept Russia from completely enveloping Ukraine. Although the upcoming presidential election will deliver Ukraine into Russia’s hands, Yushchenko might not be ejected from Kiev altogether.

Yushchenko entered the government in 1999 when he was nominated as prime minister by then-President Leonid Kuchma after a round of infighting over the premiership. As prime minister, Yushchenko — a former central bank chief — helped Ukraine economically and helped keep relative internal stability for two years. Yet even while he served in the government, Yushchenko partnered with Timoshenko — his deputy prime minister — and started a movement against Kuchma. When a vote of no confidence ended Yushchenko’s premiership in 2001, he and his coalition partners accelerated their anti-Kuchma movement, aiming to make Yushchenko president in 2004 with Timoshenko as his prime minister. In the 2004 election, Yushchenko faced another of Kuchma’s prime ministers, Viktor Yanukovich.

Yushchenko became the West’s great hope during the 2004 presidential campaign, as he vowed to integrate Ukraine with the West and seek membership in NATO and the European Union. Although the West fully supported Yushchenko, other parties were not as thrilled with his candidacy. During the campaign, he was poisoned with dioxin, a carcinogenic substance whose outward effects include facial disfigurement. Yushchenko’s camp charged that Russian security services were behind the poisoning.





When the presidential election was held, Yanukovich was declared the winner. However, voter fraud reportedly was rampant, and mass protests erupted across the country in what would become known as the Orange Revolution. Ukraine’s top court nullified the results of the first election, and when a second election was held, Yushchenko emerged victorious.

Yushchenko has acted against Russia on many levels during his presidency — from calling the Great Famine of the 1930s an act of genocide engineered by Josef Stalin to threatening to oust the Russian navy from Crimea and even trying to break the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and Russian Orthodox Church apart. He also tried to fulfill his promises that Ukraine would join NATO and the European Union (but these ideas proved too bold for some Western states, particularly Germany, since accepting Ukraine into either organization would enrage Russia). Most importantly, Yushchenko and his Orange Revolution were able to keep Ukraine from falling completely into Russia’s hands for at least five years. Yushchenko used the president’s control over foreign policy and Ukraine’s secret service and military to stave off Russia’s attempts to assert control over the country.

But all was not well in Kiev during Yushchenko’s presidency. His coalition with Timoshenko collapsed barely nine months after Timoshenko was named prime minister. Furthermore, Yushchenko was feeling the pressure of being a pro-Western leader in a country where much of the population remained pro-Russian or at least ambivalent enough that mere promises of pro-Western reform would not sway their vote. Yushchenko tried to find a balance in his government by naming Yanukovich prime minister in 2006, but this led to a series of shifting coalitions and overall instability in Kiev. It also stripped Yushchenko of much of his credibility as a strong pro-Western leader. His popularity has been in decline ever since.

Even though his polling numbers are currently at 3.8 percent, which places him behind five other candidates at the time of this writing, Yushchenko is trying for re-election. Unless he cancels the election — which would cause a massive uprising — this is the end of his presidency and of the Orange Revolution.

However, it might not be the end of his work inside the government. STRATFOR sources in Kiev have said that Yushchenko, Yanukovich and Russian officials are in talks that could lead Yushchenko to a relatively powerless premiership in Ukraine — a move to block Timoshenko and appease the Western-leaning parts of the country. There are regions in Western Ukraine that feel no allegiance to Russia. The Orange Revolution was strongest in the area around Lviv, a part of Ukraine that feels much more oriented toward neighboring Poland and the West. This region could very well become restive with the reversal of the Orange Revolution. A pro-Russian president, therefore, might have to include Yushchenko in the government to prevent fissures within the country. Though such a decision could create the same kind of political drama Kiev has seen in the past few years, Moscow will want to ensure that if such political chaos does occur Yushchenko will know his — and Ukraine’s — place under Russia.
Title: Stratfor: The Election and Russian Resurgence
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 26, 2010, 06:48:42 AM
   
Ukraine's Election and the Russian Resurgence
January 26, 2010




By Peter Zeihan

Ukrainians go to the polls Feb. 7 to choose their next president. The last time they did this, in November 2004, the result was the prolonged international incident that became known as the Orange Revolution. That event saw Ukraine cleaved off from the Russian sphere of influence, triggering a chain of events that rekindled the Russian-Western Cold War. Next week’s runoff election seals the Orange Revolution’s reversal. Russia owns the first candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, outright and has a workable agreement with the other, Yulia Timoshenko. The next few months will therefore see the de facto folding of Ukraine back into the Russian sphere of influence; discussion in Ukraine now consists of debate over the speed and depth of that reintegration.

The Centrality of Ukraine
Russia has been working to arrest its slide for several years. Next week’s election in Ukraine marks not so much the end of the post-Cold War period of Russian retreat as the beginning of a new era of Russian aggressiveness. To understand why, one must first absorb the Russian view of Ukraine.

Related Special Topic Page
The Russian Resurgence
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, most of the former Soviet republics and satellites found themselves cast adrift, not part of the Russian orbit and not really part of any other grouping. Moscow still held links to all of them, but it exercised few of its levers of control over them during Russia’s internal meltdown during the 1990s. During that period, a number of these states — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the former Czechoslovakia to be exact — managed to spin themselves out of the Russian orbit and attach themselves to the European Union and NATO. Others — Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine — attempted to follow the path Westward, but have not succeeded at this point. Of these six, Ukraine is by far the most critical. It is not simply the most populous of Russia’s former possessions or the birthplace of the Russian ethnicity, it is the most important province of the former Russian Empire and holds the key to the future of Eurasia.

First, the incidental reasons. Ukraine is the Russian Empire’s breadbasket. It is also the location of nearly all of Russia’s infrastructure links not only to Europe, but also to the Caucasus, making it critical for both trade and internal coherence; it is central to the existence of a state as multiethnic and chronically poor as Russia. The Ukrainian port of Sevastopol is home to Russia’s Black Sea fleet, and Ukrainian ports are the only well-developed warm-water ports Russia has ever had. Belarus’ only waterborne exports traverse the Dnieper River, which empties into the Black Sea via Ukraine. Therefore, as goes Ukraine, so goes Belarus. Not only is Ukraine home to some 15 million ethnic Russians — the largest concentration of Russians outside Russia proper — they reside in a zone geographically identical and contiguous to Russia itself. That zone is also the Ukrainian agricultural and industrial heartland, which again is integrated tightly into the Russian core.

These are all important factors for Moscow, but ultimately they pale before the only rationale that really matters: Ukraine is the only former Russian imperial territory that is both useful and has a natural barrier protecting it. Belarus is on the Northern European Plain, aka the invasion highway of Europe. The Baltics are all easily accessible by sea. The Caucasian states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are on the wrong side of the Caucasus Mountains (and Russia’s northern Caucasus republics — remember Chechnya? — aren’t exactly the cream of the crop of Russian possessions). It is true that Central Asia is anchored in mountains to the south, but the region is so large and boasts so few Slavs that it cannot be controlled reliably or cheaply. And Siberia is too huge to be useful.

Without Ukraine, Russia is a desperately defensive power, lacking any natural defenses aside from sheer distance. Moscow and Volgograd, two of Russia’s critically strategic cities, are within 300 miles of Ukraine’s eastern border. Russia lacks any natural internal transport options — its rivers neither interconnect nor flow anywhere useful, and are frozen much of the year — so it must preposition defensive forces everywhere, a burden that has been beyond Russia’s capacity to sustain even in the best of times. The (quite realistic) Russian fear is that without Ukraine, the Europeans will pressure Russia along its entire western periphery, the Islamic world will pressure Russia along its entire southern periphery, the Chinese will pressure Russia along its southeastern periphery, and the Americans will pressure Russia wherever opportunity presents itself.

Ukraine by contrast has the Carpathians to its west, a handy little barrier that has deflected invaders of all stripes for millennia. These mountains defend Ukraine against tanks coming from the west as effectively as they protected the Balkans against Mongols attacking from the east. Having the Carpathians as a western border reduces Russia’s massive defensive burden. Most important, if Russia can redirect the resources it would have used for defensive purposes on the Ukrainian frontier — whether those resources be economic, intelligence, industrial, diplomatic or military — then Russia retains at least a modicum of offensive capability. And that modicum of offensive ability is more than enough to overmatch any of Russia’s neighbors (with the exception of China).

When Retreat Ends, the Neighbors Get Nervous
This view of Ukraine is not alien to countries in Russia’s neighborhood. They fully understand the difference between a Russia with Ukraine and a Russia without Ukraine, and understand that so long as Ukraine remains independent they have a great deal of maneuvering room. Now that all that remains is the result of an election with no strategic choice at stake, the former Soviet states and satellites realize that their world has just changed.

Georgia traditionally has been the most resistant to Russian influence regardless of its leadership, so defiant that Moscow felt it necessary to trounce Georgia in a brief war in August 2008. Georgia’s poor strategic position is nothing new, but a Russia that can redirect efforts from Ukraine is one that can crush Georgia as an afterthought. That is turning the normally rambunctious Georgians pensive, and nudging them toward pragmatism. An opposition group, the Conservative Party, is launching a movement to moderate policy toward Russia, which among other things would mean abandoning Georgia’s bid for NATO membership and re-establishing formal political ties with Moscow.

A recent Lithuanian power struggle has resulted in the forced resignation of Foreign Minister Minister Vygaudas. The main public point of contention was the foreign minister’s previous participation in facilitating U.S. renditions. Vygaudas, like most in the Lithuanian leadership, saw such participation as critical to maintaining the tiny country’s alliance with the United States. President Dalia Grybauskaite, however, saw the writing on the wall in Ukraine, and feels the need to foster a more conciliatory view of Russia. Part of that meant offering up a sacrificial lamb in the form of the foreign minister.

Poland is in a unique position. It knows that should the Russians turn seriously aggressive, its position on the Northern European Plain makes it the focal point of Russian attention. Its location and vulnerability makes Warsaw very sensitive to Russian moves, so it has been watching Ukraine with alarm for several months.

As a result, the Poles have come up with some (admittedly small) olive branches, including an offer for Putin to visit Gdansk last September in an attempt to foster warmer (read: slightly less overtly hostile) relations. Putin not only seized upon the offer, but issued a public letter denouncing the World War II-era Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty, long considered by Poles as the most outrageous Russian offense to Poland. Warsaw has since replied with invitations for future visits. As with Georgia, Poland will never be pro-Russian — Poland is not only a NATO member but also hopes to host an American Patriot battery and participate in Washington’s developing ballistic missile defense program. But if Warsaw cannot hold Washington’s attention — and it has pulled out all the stops in trying to — it fears the writing might already be on the wall, and it must plan accordingly.

Azerbaijan has always attempted to walk a fine line between Russia and the West, knowing that any serious bid for membership in something like the European Union or NATO was contingent upon Georgia’s first succeeding in joining up. Baku would prefer a more independent arrangement, but it knows that it is too far from Russia’s western frontier to achieve such unless the stars are somewhat aligned. As Georgia’s plans have met with what can best be described as abject failure, and with Ukraine now appearing headed toward Russian suzerainty, Azerbaijan has in essence resigned itself to the inevitable. Baku is well into negotiations that would redirect much of its natural gas output north to Russia rather than west to Turkey and Europe. And Azerbaijan simply has little else to bargain with.

Other states that have long been closer to Russia, but have attempted to balance Russia against other powers in hopes of preserving some measure of sovereignty, are giving up. Of the remaining former Soviet republics Belarus has the most educated workforce and even a functioning information technology industry, while Kazakhstan has a booming energy industry; both are reasonable candidates for integration into Western systems. But both have this month agreed instead to throw their lots in with Russia. The specific method is an economic agreement that is more akin to shackles than a customs union. The deal effectively will gut both countries’ industries in favor of Russian producers. Moscow hopes the union in time will form the foundation of a true successor to the Soviet Union.

Other places continue to show resistance. The new Moldovan prime minister, Vlad Filat, is speaking with the Americans about energy security and is even flirting with the Romanians about reunification. The Latvians are as defiant as ever. The Estonians, too, are holding fast, although they are quietly polling regional powers to at least assess where the next Russian hammer might fall. But for every state that decides it had best accede to Russia’s wishes, Russia has that much more bandwidth to dedicate to the poorly positioned holdouts.

Russia also has the opportunity. The United States is bogged down in its economic and health care debates, two wars and the Iran question — all of which mean Washington’s attention is occupied well away from the former Soviet sphere. With the United States distracted, Russia has a freer hand in re-establishing control over states that would like to be under the American security umbrella.

There is one final factor that is pushing Russia to resurge: It feels the pressure of time. The post-Cold War collapse may well have mortally wounded the Russian nation. The collapse in Russian births has halved the size of the 0-20 age group in comparison to their predecessors born in the 1970s and 1980s. Consequently, Russian demographics are among the worst in the world.

Even if Russia manages an economic renaissance, in a decade its population will have aged and shrunk to the point that the Russians will find holding together Russia proper a huge challenge. Moscow’s plan, therefore, is simple: entrench its influence while it is in a position of relative strength in preparation for when it must trade that influence for additional time. Ultimately, Russia is indeed going into that good night. But not gently. And not today.

 
Title: Re: Ukraine Riots/Resistance
Post by: DougMacG on February 20, 2014, 08:43:23 AM
A good read in the New Republic, and a George Will column:

http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116655/kiev-ukraine-protests-are-vladimir-putins-worst-nightmare
What's Happening in Kiev Right Now Is Vladimir Putin's Worst Nightmare
"If it can happen in Kiev, in other words, it can happen in Moscow."
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/george-will-is-ukraine-the-cold-wars-final-episode/2014/02/19/382f6844-99a9-11e3-80ac-63a8ba7f7942_story.html
Is Ukraine the Cold War’s final episode?
By George F. Will, Published: February 19

"... President George W. Bush peered into Putin’s eyes and got “a sense of his soul” as someone “very straightforward and trustworthy”?...Ukrainians, whose hard history has immunized them against the folly of wishful thinking, see in Putin’s ferret face the cold eyes of a prison warden."

"Obama participated in waging seven months of war against Libya, a nation not threatening or otherwise important to the United States." 
"Yet Obama seems so fixated on [the "reset"] that he will not risk annoying Putin by voicing full-throated support for the Ukrainian protesters."

"...this is perhaps the final episode of the Cold War. Does America’s unusually loquacious 44th president remember how the words of the 40th — “Tear down this wall!” — helped to win it?"
Title: Spengler calls for partition, and deal w Russkis
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 21, 2014, 08:18:13 AM
The ever thoughtful Spengler

http://pjmedia.com/spengler/2014/02/20/ukraine-should-vote-on-partition/?singlepage=true

Ukraine Should Vote on Partition

I’ve argued for years that partition is the best solution for Ukraine, which never was a country but an almalgam of provinces left over from failed empires–Russian, Austrian, Lithuanian, Ottoman–cobbled together into a Soviet “republic” and cast adrift after the collapse of Communism. Lviv (Lemberg) was a German-speaking city, part of Silesia; before World War II a quarter of its people were Jews. Jews were two-fifths of the population of Odessa.

A fifth of the population, mainly in the East, are ethnic Russians; a tenth, mainly in the West, are Uniate Catholics, who have a special place in Catholic policy since the papacy of John Paul II. Ukrainian nationality is as dubious as Byelorussian nationality: neither of them had a dictionary of their language until 1918.

The country also is a basket case. At its present fertility rate (1.3 children per female), its 47 million people will shrink to only 15 million by the end of the century. There are presently 11 million Ukrainian women aged 15 to 49 (although a very large number are working abroad); by the end of the century this will fall to just 2.8 million. There were 52 million Ukrainian citizens when Communism fell in 1989. Its GDP at about $157 billion is a fifth of Turkey’s and half of Switzerland’s.  Ukrainians want to join the European Union rather than Russia so they can emigrate.  It is of no strategic, economic, or demographic importance to the West.

Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, whose “F*** the Europeans” remark earned her 15 minutes of fame recently, ought to be fired for being plain dumb. I am no admirer of European diplomacy, but Europe will have to pay a good part of the bill for Ukraine’s problems one way or the other. I don’t see Congress offering $15 billion to support Ukraine’s foreign debt as Russia did last month. The Russians won’t abandon Ukraine, which they consider part of their territory, and they certainly won’t abandon Russian-speakers “orphaned” by the collapse of the Soviet Union. What does Ms. Nuland propose: land paratroopers? Just what are we offering to the Ukrainian opposition? American policy has alternated between indifference and impotent posturing. The Nuland tape was painful to hear for its sheer stupidity.

We cannot ignore a humanitarian disaster in a European country. But the idea that we can influence matters by promoting one or another opposition leader, as in the Nuland tape, is ridiculous. There is something we can do, however: Propose a referendum in which the people of Ukraine can choose constitutional alternatives–partition, confederation, or status quo. And the person who should act for the West is German Chancellor Angela Merkel, for several reasons. First, she has credibility; second, she has guts (she came into politics through the democracy movement in East Germany); third, she speaks Russian and understands Vladimir Putin; fourth, she has more brains than anyone in Washington (a doctorate in quantum chemistry).

Russia never will permit the integration of Ukraine into NATO; were it to come to that, Russia would use force, and the West would stand by cursing. But Russia will settle for half a loaf, namely a Russian-allied Eastern Ukraine. Whatever we do, Ukraine will continue its slow, sad slide into oblivion. The diplomats have the dour duty of managing this decline with the minimum of friction.

I have been making this argument for years. From my 2008 essay, “Americans Play Monopoly, Russians Chess“:

On the night of November 22, 2004, then-Russian president – now premier – Vladimir Putin watched the television news in his dacha near Moscow. People who were with Putin that night report his anger and disbelief at the unfolding “Orange” revolution in Ukraine. “They lied to me,” Putin said bitterly of the United States. “I’ll never trust them again.” The Russians still can’t fathom why the West threw over a potential strategic alliance for Ukraine. They underestimate the stupidity of the West….

I will offer the assertion that partition is the destiny of Ukraine….

Russia’s survival depends not so much on its birth rate, nor on immigration, nor even on prospective annexation, but on the survival of the principle by which Russia was built in the first place. That is why Putin could not abandon the pockets of Russian passport holders in the Caucusus. That Russia history has been tragic, and its nation-building principle brutal and sometimes inhuman, is a different matter. Russia is sufficiently important that its tragedy will be our tragedy, unless averted.

The place to avert tragedy is in Ukraine. Russia will not permit Ukraine to drift to the West. Whether a country that never had an independent national existence prior to the collapse of communism should become the poster-child for national self-determination is a different question. The West has two choices: draw a line in the sand around Ukraine, or trade it to the Russians for something more important.

My proposal is simple: Russia’s help in containing nuclear proliferation and terrorism in the Middle East is of infinitely greater import to the West than the dubious self-determination of Ukraine. The West should do its best to pretend that the “Orange” revolution of 2004 and 2005 never happened, and secure Russia’s assistance in the Iranian nuclear issue as well as energy security in return for an understanding of Russia’s existential requirements in the near abroad. Anyone who thinks this sounds cynical should spend a week in Kiev.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 21, 2014, 08:32:04 AM

Analysis

Negotiations in Ukraine are evolving quickly, and Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich's position appears increasingly precarious. Yanukovich has agreed to hold early presidential and parliamentary elections, according to a Western-mediated plan, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said Feb. 20. The announcement comes after Yanukovich held talks with the Polish, German and French foreign ministers following three days of increased violence in Kiev.

The foreign ministers have also spoken with the moderate opposition leaders. However, the French and Polish foreign ministers have said that there is still no agreement between the sides and that they are returning to talk to Yanukovich.

In addition to elections, the Western-mediated plan includes an interim government and constitutional reform. The agreement to hold new presidential elections would be a large concession by Yanukovich, who has flirted with the idea of parliamentary elections but has staunchly resisted resigning from his own post.
Anti-Government Activity In Ukraine As Of Feb. 20
Click to Enlarge

Yanukovich is likely to set conditions for the elections -- such as holding them later in the year -- which is why the moderate opposition leaders are rejecting the offer. Moreover, Yanukovich may believe that the radical opposition, which is still amassed in Independence Square, could wreck any truce or agreement. (On Feb. 19, when the moderate opposition and Yanukovich reached a potential agreement, the radical opposition struck up violence in the streets again, quickly breaking the truce.) In the meantime, Yanukovich can claim he gave negotiations an honest chance. Stratfor will be watching for what terms the foreign ministers are taking back to Yanukovich from the moderate opposition leaders and whether the radical opposition leaders will sign on to any deal they did not negotiate.

Even more important is what Russia's reaction to a Western-mediated agreement will be. Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev was clear earlier Feb. 20 that Moscow was reconsidering its loyalty to the Yanukovich presidency. Apparently the Kremlin is uncertain about the Ukrainian president's ability to control the country. In the past few hours, there has been a flurry of calls between Russian President Vladimir Putin and German Chancellor Angela Merkel and between Putin and Yanukovich. The most pressing issue is whether Russia has signed on to a plan to help remove Yanukovich and bring about new elections.

Read more: Ukraine: Dwindling Russian Support Could Unseat Yanukovich | Stratfor
Title: Timoshenko's release
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 21, 2014, 08:52:11 PM
 Timoshenko's Release Could Redefine Ukrainian Politics
Analysis
February 21, 2014 | 1213 Print Text Size
A poster of Yulia Timoshenko displayed by her supporters in front of Pechersk district court in Kiev. (GENYA SAVILOV/AFP/Getty Images)

Analysis

Ukraine's parliament voted Feb. 21 to release former Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko from prison. The move will be controversial for President Viktor Yanukovich and will add another layer of political maneuvering to the ongoing crisis that outside groups, such as Russia, could exploit.

Timoshenko has long been a controversial and popular figure in Ukraine. She was part of the coalition that led the Orange Revolution in 2004 and was prime minister in 2005 and 2007-2010. She was considered one of the three major political leaders alongside former President Viktor Yushchenko and Yanukovich. It was the divisions between these three leaders that paralyzed Ukraine for years -- the West and Russia played the political leadership off of each other to influence Ukraine.

In 2011, Timoshenko was charged with abuse of office, stemming from her energy negotiations with Russia that resulted in Moscow winning contracts and pricing preferable to Russia. Yanukovich testified against Timoshenko in criminal court, accusing her of corruption from Russian influence. With her sentencing, Yanukovich eliminated a political competitor, though the West rallied behind Timoshenko during the trial, accusing Yanukovich of political persecution. This became a critical sticking point in the negotiations on trade and association agreements between the European Union and Ukraine, with the European Union demanding the release of Timoshenko in order for the agreements to move forward.

Timoshenko represents the largest threat to Yanukovich should she be released and allowed to run in the upcoming elections. Timoshenko not only has deep ties within Yanukovich's own bloc and Party of Regions, but also appeals to many of the opposition groups, especially those loyal to Arseniy Yatsenyuk. Yatsenyuk is not loyal to Timoshenko -- though the two seem to have a love-hate relationship -- but many in his following could turn to the previous prime minister if she is released. This also complicates any political plans for the rest of the moderate opposition, such as current media favorite Vitali Klitschko, who could see his supporters split to join Timoshenko. Ultimately, Timoshenko appeals to many voters on both sides of the country and is already championed by the outside players in Europe who fought for her release.

Russia has an interest in seeing Timoshenko freed at this stage. Though Timoshenko was part of the Orange movement, she has deep and personal ties to the Kremlin, especially with Russian President Vladimir Putin. It was the personal negotiations between Timoshenko and Putin that shifted Russia's influence in Ukraine's energy sector. On Feb. 20, Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev said that Yanukovich may no longer be the Ukrainian leader the Kremlin prefers to work with because he has shown he cannot control the country. The political scene is shifting rapidly, but Timoshenko's potential political comeback raises the question of whether Moscow sees her as a possible replacement for Yanukovich.

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 22, 2014, 06:51:55 AM
When Obama told Medvedev he would have more flexibility after the election, who knew it meant getting bent over by Putin over and over again?

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on February 22, 2014, 12:40:38 PM
When Obama told Medvedev he would have more flexibility after the election, who knew it meant getting bent over by Putin over and over again?

He should have checked with George Bush before speaking about the power of an unpopular, lame duck.
Title: Tough days for Lenin Statues in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 23, 2014, 05:40:18 PM
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/02/21/this-montage-of-ukrainians-tearing-down-lenin-monuments-will-raise-the-hair-on-your-neck/
Title: Re: Tough days for Lenin Statues in Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 23, 2014, 06:16:00 PM
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/02/21/this-montage-of-ukrainians-tearing-down-lenin-monuments-will-raise-the-hair-on-your-neck/

Anyone who tears down communist icons is probably someone worthy of support.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 24, 2014, 03:23:39 AM
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/23/us-warns-russia-to-keep-its-military-out-of-ukrain/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 24, 2014, 03:36:18 AM
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/23/us-warns-russia-to-keep-its-military-out-of-ukrain/

I'm sure Vladimir is very concerned about president mom jeans.
Title: A tale of two countries
Post by: bigdog on February 25, 2014, 07:39:32 AM
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/02/ukraines-crisis

From the article:

One of the most important European trading and university cities since the 14th century, modern Lviv has been Soviet Lvov, Polish Lwów and Austro-Hungarian Lemberg in the past 100 years. It was seized by the Soviet Union in 1939 but guerilla resistance was intense, and broken only in the 1950s. Lviv’s sense of its own belonging in Europe was supported by its architecture and its history of resistance to the Soviet rule. It jubilantly supported the Orange revolution in 2004 and was bitterly disillusioned by the failure of that revolution’s leaders, notably Viktor Yushchenko to modernise and reform the country in the years that followed.
Title: WSJ: Crimean Muslims oppose ethnic Russian separatists
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 26, 2014, 05:21:29 PM


SIMFEROPOL, Ukraine—Thousands of Crimean Tatars descended Wednesday on Crimea's parliament to shout down local Russian nationalists, emerging as a bulwark for Kiev's new pro-Europe powers as separatist sentiment in the region grows.

Crimea—a Black Sea peninsula that belonged to Russia until 1954 and remains dominated by ethnic Russians—has swiftly become the epicenter of a backlash against the Kiev protesters who toppled President Viktor Yanukovych . As his opponents build a new government, some of the more radical Russian locals in Crimea are demanding the autonomous region secede or once again become part of Russia.

But Crimean Tatars—indigenous Muslims who account for about 12% of Crimea's population of two million people—are the exception. Their strained relations with Russia go back centuries, and many bristle at the idea of their homeland moving farther into Moscow's orbit. Hundreds traveled to Kiev during the demonstrations to support the pro-Europe camp. In Crimea, they have become the most powerful local advocates for recognizing the new powers and remaining part of Ukraine.

"The Crimean Tatars are the key problem for the Russian nationalists," said Ihor Semyvolos, executive director of the Association of Middle East Studies in Kiev and an expert on the region.

On Wednesday, Ukraine's acting interior minister, Arsen Avakov, said his main task was to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict in Crimea. He said his instructions to all police and security personnel in the region were clear: "Don't provoke any sort of conflict or armed standoff with civilians at any cost."

The tension was palpable Wednesday on the square in Simferopol. "Crimea is Ukraine!" thousands of Tatars shouted while waving Tatar and Ukrainian flags outside the regional legislature, where officials held talks on Crimea's tumult. The Tatars raised their voices and whistled to drown out an opposing crowd of Russians waving Crimean and Russian flags and chanting "Russia!"

"Our biggest demand is to not allow a split of Ukraine," said Elmira Baranova, a 40-year-old Crimean Tatar from Fedosiya, who arrived at the Simferopol rally wrapped in a Ukrainian flag. Ms. Baranova said the Tatars wouldn't "allow Russia to break up Ukraine and take away Crimea." She said her ethnic Russian husband felt the same way, adding that sympathies don't always cleave clearly along ethnic lines.

Refat Chubarov, the Crimean Tatar leader, has called for people promoting separatism to be prosecuted and has said Crimean Tatars won't tolerate a breakup of the country.

Still, pro-Russian sentiment in Crimea runs strong, and the rise of a more nationalist Ukrainian leadership after the collapse of Mr. Yanukovych's government last weekend has alienated some local Russians and fueled talk of separatism.

At one point, the rally Wednesday devolved into shoving and pushing outside the parliament. One person died of a heart attack during the protests, and 30 people were injured in clashes outside the legislative building, Crimea's Ministry of Health said. Six were hospitalized, three in critical condition, the ministry said.

The atmosphere in the region is tense. A Russian businessman has taken control as de facto mayor of Sevastopol, home to the Russian fleet, and called the new powers in Kiev illegitimate. The speaker of the Crimean parliament has floated the idea of secession, though he has since toned down his rhetoric and vowed to fight for more autonomy. Some ethnic Russians have signed up to militias in recent days, saying they must protect their cities from what they call bandits who have taken power in Kiev.

A man holds a single Russian flag while Crimean Tatar activists wave their flags and shout slogans during a rally in Simferopol, Ukraine, on Feb. 26. European Pressphoto Agency

Many local Russians express concern about the role Ukrainian nationalists from the country's west played in toppling Mr. Yanukovych. They worry that under the nationalists' influence, the new government will pursue policies that drive Ukraine away from Russia and crack down on the use of the Russian language. A large swath get their news from Russian outlets, some of which have focused on such fears.

"I don't want to unite with bandits and fascists who will tell me what language to speak or where my place is," said Elena Sokolova, a 36-year-old computer programmer from Simferopol, who was chanting "Russia!" from atop a planter at the rally on Wednesday.

She said Crimea is oriented toward Russia and should be allowed to decide its own fate. "They aren't letting us have a referendum," Ms. Sokolova complained. "They haven't let us have one for 10 years."

The opposition forces that have emerged victorious in Kiev have tried to quell the panic among such ethnic Russians in Crimea. Oleh Tyahnibok, the leader of Ukraine's ultranationalist Svoboda party, played a leading role in the Kiev uprising but has said he won't take a formal position in the new government. He has urged Crimeans to disregard what he called fear-mongering about a ban on the Russian language, as well as false rumors about the supposed arrival of far-right nationalist hoodlums in Crimea.

Still, some decisions by the new provisional powers in Kiev already have stoked anger in the southern region, including the disbanding on Wednesday of the Berkut, a special national antiriot unit that Mr. Yanukovych's government ordered onto Kiev's main square to quell the protests. Berkut officers—many imported to the capital from Mr. Yanukovych's regional strongholds, including Crimea—have become targets of public wrath across much of Ukraine after their clashes with protesters left dozens dead last week.

The decision rattled many in Crimea who have greeted the injured Berkut returning from Kiev as heroes. Russian activists here say Mr. Yanukovych sent the forces to Kiev without proper defenses and subjected them to abuse from protesters before abandoning and embarrassing them. Thousands turned out to a funeral last weekend in Simferopol for some of the local riot police who died in the Kiev clashes. The new Sevastopol mayor, Alexei Chaly vowed Wednesday to retain the Berkut in the Crimean city.

The presence of the Tatars in Crimea, though, suggests the region wouldn't break off without a struggle. For centuries, Tatars controlled the Black Sea peninsula under the Crimean Khanate, a protectorate of the Ottoman Empire before Catherine the Great annexed the region for Russia in 1783. The Russian Empire later fought against the Ottomans, France and Britain over the territory in the 1850s. Crimean War, a conflict famous in part for the role played by British nurse Florence Nightingale.

In 1954, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev transferred Crimea from Russia to Ukraine, then both Soviet republics. The peninsula stayed part of independent Ukraine after the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, despite its majority-Russian population. Crimea still carries the status of an autonomous region, a designation inherited from the Soviet era. That affords the peninsula more powers of self governance than other Ukrainian regions but has stoked separatist sentiment.

Today, many Crimean Tatars still harbor deep resentment against the Kremlin, because of they were deported en masse to Central Asia on the orders of Joseph Stalin. The dictator exiled many of the Soviet Union's ethnic minorities during World War II out of paranoia that they would join with the Nazis and create a fifth column.

Mr. Semyvolos of the Association of Middle East Studies in Kiev says long-term peace in Crimea depends on negotiations among local leaders that take into account the welfare of the Tatars. He said they were largely ignored by Mr. Yanukovych's government, which helped push them into the arms of the protest movement.

"The situation is very complicated," Mr. Semyvolos said. "In this situation you have to be very careful."

Write to Paul Sonne at paul.sonne@wsj.com
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 28, 2014, 12:58:08 PM
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/23/us-warns-russia-to-keep-its-military-out-of-ukrain/

I'm sure Vladimir is very concerned about president mom jeans.

Another red line gets crossed. Who could have seen that coming?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 01, 2014, 07:39:56 AM
Right about now, Lurch is tearing the sec. of state office apart desperately looking for the reset button...
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 01, 2014, 02:26:03 PM
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/obama-skips-national-security-team-meeting-russia-ukraine_783659.html

https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=T1409sXBleg

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2570335/Former-British-Ambassador-Moscow-warns-Russia-invaded-Ukraine-difficult-avoid-going-war.html

http://nation.foxnews.com/2014/03/01/palin-mocked-2008-warning-putin-may-invade-ukraine-if-obama-elected

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/02/28/exclusive-russian-blackwater-takes-over-ukraine-airport.html

hat tip to our Big Dog for this one  http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/01/nato_needs_to_move_now_on_crimea

Title: Ukraine says invasion means war
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 01, 2014, 11:23:36 PM
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-01/ukraine-tells-russia-troop-entry-means-war-after-putin-approval.html
Title: Background context
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 01, 2014, 11:51:13 PM
http://m.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/02/the-crimean-crisis-we-should-have-seen-coming/284153/
Title: Re: Background context
Post by: G M on March 02, 2014, 06:38:14 AM
http://m.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/02/the-crimean-crisis-we-should-have-seen-coming/284153/

To be followed by the Iranian crisis and the Asian crisis we should have seen coming...
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 02, 2014, 08:13:32 AM
Note that both Sarah Palin and Mitt Romney saw this coming years ago and were attacked by the left for it back then.
Title: Follow the money
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 02, 2014, 08:44:58 AM
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/russia-vladimir-putin-the-west-104134.html#.UxM8n4WuFZI

http://www.politico.com/blogs/politico-live/2014/03/graham-to-obama-stop-going-on-television-184283.html?hp=l1_b5

http://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-militia-commander-fights-to-protect-kiev/



Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 02, 2014, 12:55:23 PM
http://www.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2014/02/28/red-lines-in-crimea/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 02, 2014, 07:29:45 PM
http://streetwiseprofessor.com/?p=8214

http://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/03/02/putins-pyrrhic-crimea-campaign/

Even WaPo turns on Baraq http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obamas-foreign-policy-is-based-on-fantasy/2014/03/02/c7854436-a238-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html

Hat tip to Rob Crowley.  I am going to try to get him to post here.  He is particularly sharp on things Russian.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 02, 2014, 10:49:01 PM
Some interesting data in here

http://sofrep.com/33526/soviet-reunion-the-power-play-behind-putins-invasion-of-crimea/#.UxPP28ZV7xY.facebook
Title: Obama's Cold War Denial...
Post by: objectivist1 on March 03, 2014, 06:08:35 AM
Obama’s Cold War Denial

Posted By Joseph Klein On March 3, 2014

President Obama was AWOL on Saturday when his national security team met to discuss the rapidly unfolding events in Ukraine, including Russia’s expanded military presence in the Crimea portion of Ukraine. Only a day before, President Obama had warned Russia that there would be “costs” if it violated Ukraine’s sovereignty. Saturday morning, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave his answer. He thumbed his nose at Obama. Once again, the Obama administration’s vaunted button to “re-set” relations with Russia in a more positive direction has blown up in its face, as Putin continues to play by the rules of realpolitik while Obama flounders. This detached president did not even attend a key national security meeting called to figure out how to best deal with Putin’s latest maneuvers.

Ironically, during the 2012 presidential campaign, President Obama mocked the Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney for warning about Russia’s “geopolitical” threat. During one of the presidential debates Obama remarked condescendingly about Romney’s warning, “You said Russia. Not Al Qaida. You said Russia. The 1980s are now calling to ask for their foreign policy back because…the cold war’s been over for 20 years.”

In words that Obama should repeat to himself every night before he goes to sleep, Romney responded: “Russia, I indicated, is a geopolitical foe…and I said in the same paragraph I said and Iran is the greatest national security threat we face. Russia does continue to battle us in the U.N. time and time again. I have clear eyes on this. I’m not going to wear rose-colored glasses when it comes to Russia or Mr. Putin…”

Romney was right on both counts. Iran, as it pursues its nuclear arms ambitions, is the greatest national security threat that we face. And, as Russia’s willingness to run interference for the Syrian regime at the UN and its present provocative actions in Ukraine prove, Russia under Putin represents a significant geopolitical threat. Obama unfortunately continues to wear rose-colored glasses when it comes to Iran, as he pursues fruitless negotiations that the Iranian regime is exploiting. And he is now just maybe beginning to take off his rose-colored glasses with respect to Putin’s Russia, as it increasingly flexes its muscles.

Former President George Bush also mistakenly had given Putin the benefit of the doubt back in 2001 when he said, after meeting with Putin, that he thought he could trust the Russian leader. But that was nearly thirteen years ago. Obama has had all the intervening years to observe Putin in action. It became obvious to anyone with his or her eyes wide open that the Russian president operated solely on the basis of realpolitik and was very expert in doing so, as Putin has shown in taking advantage of Obama’s perceived weakness and indecision time and time again.

With respect to the Ukraine crisis, at Putin’s request, the upper house of the Russian Parliament formally granted him the authority to use military force, not just in Crimea but throughout Ukraine. The Russian parliamentary approval for Putin’s use of military force merely ratified the facts on the ground that had already been occurring, as thousands of armed Russian soldiers, often wearing masks and uniforms without any national insignia, reportedly surrounded the regional parliament building and other government facilities in the Crimean capital city of Simferopol. They also effectively closed the region’s two main airports and took control over key communications hubs.

President Obama’s response to Putin’s maneuvers was to call the Russian leader on Saturday and urge him to pull back his military forces or risk isolation in the international community if he refused. Obama also laid out the initial “cost” of Russia’s provocative actions – the U.S. is suspending its participation in preparations for the upcoming Group of 8 economic summit in Sochi, Russia.

“President Obama expressed his deep concern over Russia’s clear violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, which is a breach of international law,” the White House said in its readout of the call. “The United States condemns Russia’s military intervention into Ukrainian territory. The United States calls on Russia to de-escalate tensions by withdrawing its forces back to bases in Crimea and to refrain from any interference elsewhere in Ukraine.”

The Kremlin provided its own readout of the call. It said that Putin pointed out to Obama the “real threat to the lives and health of Russian citizens” currently in Ukraine, and referred to “the provocative and criminal actions on the part of ultranationalists who are in fact being supported by the current authorities in Kiev.”

Meanwhile, at United Nations headquarters in New York, an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council was held on Saturday afternoon to discuss the Ukrainian crisis – the second such meeting in two days. For the first two hours, the Security Council members wrangled behind closed doors on whether they should hold their discussions in public or in private consultations. They reached a compromise of sorts – a brief public meeting followed by much lengthier closed door consultations.

During the open meeting, UN Deputy Secretary General Jan Eliasson called for restoration of calm and dialogue among all concerned parties. “Now is the time for cool heads to prevail,” he advised. His advice was promptly ignored. The verbal sparks were flying, reminiscent of Cold War sparring in the Security Council that had often paralyzed the UN body from taking any effective action.

The Ukrainian ambassador to the UN, Yuriy Sergeyev, who was invited to attend the open meeting on Saturday, accused Russia of “an act of aggression” in “severe violation of international law.”  He added that the “Russian Federation brutally violated the basic principles of Charter of the United Nations obliging all member states to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” He called for the members of the Security Council to take a stand against Russian aggression that interfered with Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. He repeated these themes in remarks to the press after his Security Council statement. He also defended the legality of the Ukrainian parliament’s removal of the ousted Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, who has sought refuge in Russia.

Russian UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin told the Security Council that Russia had acted at the request of the regional authorities in Crimea, making a dubious distinction in claiming that Russian troops could be deployed “on the territory of Ukraine,” but not “against Ukraine.” In response to calls for Russia to refrain from intervention to protect its interests, he said that “[W]e can’t agree with this at all.” Churkin lashed out at the “radicals” in the “illegal” government in Kiev who were allegedly threatening peace and security in Crimea. He questioned the legality of the manner in which Yanukovych was removed from office, noting that Yanukovych had been democratically elected.

Churkin did not speak to reporters on Saturday, but the previous day he had told reporters that the new government in Kiev was not representative of all political factions of Ukraine and was trying to impose its political will on the rest of the country. He accused the European Union of treating Ukraine as its “province” and charged that it was the West’s interference that had helped cause the Ukrainian crisis in the first place.

U.S. Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power expressed the strong support of the U.S. for the new government of Ukraine in her remarks to the Security Council on Saturday. Russia’s “intervention is without legal basis – indeed it violates Russia’s commitment to protect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Ukraine,” she said. “It is time for the Russian intervention in Ukraine to end.” Ambassador Power also accused the Russians of double standards with regard to its position on national sovereignty. “It is ironic that the Russian Federation regularly goes out of its way in this Chamber to emphasize the sanctity of national borders and of sovereignty,” she said, “but Russian actions in Ukraine are violating the sovereignty of Ukraine and pose a threat to peace and security.”

Ambassador Power proposed that international monitors and observers – including from the UN and OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, in which Russia and Ukraine are members] be sent to Ukraine. “That’s the best way to get the facts, monitor conduct, and prevent any abuses,” she said.  Russia so far has shown little inclination to accept this proposal.

In remarks to the press after the completion of the Security Council’s closed door consultations, Ambassador Power said that Russia’s “military presence in Crimea is a violation of international law.”

While the situation on the ground in Ukraine continues to deteriorate, including the Ukrainian naval chief’s pledge of allegiance to the Crimean pro-Russia authorities who are defying the authority of the new central government in Kiev, the war of words from the Obama administration continued to escalate on Sunday. Secretary of State John Kerry warned on “Meet the Press” that Russia was facing isolation and opprobrium from the international community, which could result in trade and investment penalties, asset freezes, denial of visas, and even possible expulsion from the G-8. He accused Putin of “possibly trying to annex Crimea” and said that Russia was displaying 19th century behavior in the 21st century by committing “aggression” on a “phony pretext.” That said, any military option by the U.S. in response to Russia’s actions appears to be off the table at least for now.

What is evident from this serious crisis is that President Obama’s attempt to reset relations with Russia at the outset of his first term has been a dismal failure. He demonstrated weakness when he dropped plans to locate missile interceptors and a radar station in Poland and the Czech Republic without getting anything in return. In March 2012, Obama was overheard on an open mike telling outgoing Russian President Dmitry Medvedev that, since he would not be running again for president after the 2012 election, he would have “more flexibility” in dealing with Russia on such matters as missile defense. Medvedev replied: “I understand. I will transmit this information to Vladimir,” a reference to the real power in Russia, Vladimir Putin, who would soon re-assume the presidency. Putin has taken Obama’s measure and is out-maneuvering him at every turn.

In a prior article I theorized that perhaps Obama had decided to support the protests against the Russian-allied ousted president Yanukovych in order to put Russia on defense and “divert Putin’s attention away from the Middle East by causing him to redirect money and resources closer to home.”  If so, the strategy appears to be backfiring since Putin is proving that he is perfectly capable of deploying a few thousand troops in Crimea while still continuing to provide active support to the Assad regime. He is simply allowing the presence of Russian troops, without any full-scale Russian occupation, to catalyze a popular movement in Crimea by its Russian speaking majority to push for breaking away completely from Ukraine.

More likely, there was no real Obama offensive strategy playing out in Ukraine and no clear-eyed thinking on what real national security and geopolitical threats we face, much less on how to handle them. Instead, President Obama is reverting to his lead-from-behind, reactive approach to most major foreign policy crises he has faced. Obama owes Mitt Romney an immediate apology.
Title: How could the Russians not be afraid of Kerry?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 03, 2014, 10:26:44 AM
This from Feb 28  http://news.yahoo.com/russia-ready-help-ukraines-economy-kerry-183428623.html

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Contrast this:

http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/02/28/stephen-harper-ukraine-moscow_n_4875091.html

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Crimea Synagogue Vandalized Amid Ukraine
Unrest](http://www.israelvideonetwork.com/crimea-synagogue-vandalized-amid-ukraine-unrest)
==========

[](http://www.israelvideonetwork.com/crimea-synagogue-vandalized-amid-ukraine-unrest)

Click here to watch: [Crimea Synagogue Vandalized Amid Ukraine
Unrest](http://www.israelvideonetwork.com/crimea-synagogue-vandalized-amid-ukraine-unrest)

In the latest anti-Semitic attack in the Ukraine, vandals on Friday sprayed
swastikas and graffiti reading "Death to the Jews" on a synagogue in Simferopol in
the Crimea region, reported the Israel Hayom daily newspaper. "There is no doubt
that it was important to anti-Semites to commit this crime," Anatoly Gendin, head of
the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Crimea, told the
newspaper. "Since the crisis started, prices have risen by 30 percent and people
aren't receiving their pensions. As always, the Jews are being blamed, and I'm
scared to think where it could progress," he added. The anti-Semitic incident  in
Crimea took place the same day that the Russians began to take over the peninsula.

According to the Jewish community leader, to get to the building the vandals had to
climb the 2-meter wall that surrounds the synagogue compound. Rabbi Misha Kapustin,
a leader in the Crimean Jewish community, told Israel Hayom that he had asked
worshippers to stay away from the site. "This was the first time in my life that a
synagogue was closed," he said. "I realized that the situation wouldn't get better.
We don't need to wait for them to riot against us." Rabbi Kapustin added that
intends to write a letter to a number of heads of state, appealing to them to do
"whatever is in their power to prevent a Russian invasion. To [ask them to] not
abandon Ukrainian Jews."

[WATCH
HERE](http://www.israelvideonetwork.com/crimea-synagogue-vandalized-amid-ukraine-unrest)

Anti-Semitic incidents have been recorded in Ukraine for many years, but have been
on the rise recently, in the wake of the unrest there that toppled Viktor
Yanukovych. In January, unknown assailants stabbed a hareidi man in Kiev as he was
making his way home from synagogue on a Friday night. As the political situation in
the country worsened, reports indicated that extremists have been targeting the
Jewish community in Ukraine, including a member of the opposition. A synagogue
southeast of Kiev was firebombed last week by unknown assailants. At the same time,
reported Israel Hayom, other voices are also making themselves heard in Crimea. A
representative of the pro-Russian party that controls the Sevastopol city council
said that "there are no soldiers or armed people in the streets. There aren't a lot
of Jews here, but those who are left can relax." The Rabbi of the city of Kharkov,
Rabbi Moshe Moskowitz, told Arutz Sheva last week that a number of local Jews have
already expressed a desire to leave Ukraine and emigrate to Israel. The unrest of
recent month is what has brought this desire to the fore, he said.  MK Rina Frankel
(Yesh Atid) has called on Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to launch an emergency
aliyah operation to bring Ukrainian Jewry to safety as a result of the unrest.
Title: Re: Ukraine gave up its weapons in exchange for US protection
Post by: DougMacG on March 04, 2014, 03:09:10 PM
1994, Ukraine was a nuclear pwer.  Does ANYONE remember this?

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10667111/Ukraine-pleads-for-Britain-and-US-to-come-to-its-rescue-as-Russia-accused-of-invasion.html

(http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/02837/Budapest_Memorandu_2837141b.jpg)
http://unterm.un.org/DGAACS/unterm.nsf/8fa942046ff7601c85256983007ca4d8/fa03e45d114224af85257b64007687e0?OpenDocument

The two Western powers signed an agreement with Ukraine in 1994, which Kiev's parliament wants enforcing now. The Budapest Memorandum, signed by Bill Clinton, John Major, Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kuchma – the then-rulers of the USA, UK, Russia and Ukraine – promises to uphold the territorial integrity of Ukraine, in return for Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons.

Article one reads: "The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine ... to respect the Independence and Sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine."

And Kiev is now claiming that their country's borders are not being respected. 
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 04, 2014, 05:36:16 PM
Dems love to fcuk over our allies. Ask the South Vietnamese.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: bigdog on March 07, 2014, 09:42:12 AM
Read in tandem, these seem interesting to me:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-krauthammer-obamas-inaction-enables-putins-grab-for-ukraine/2014/03/06/c4222690-a55f-11e3-84d4-e59b1709222c_print.html

http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/obama-s-leverage-over-putin-20140306
Title: Re: Ukraine - 5 myths?
Post by: DougMacG on March 09, 2014, 10:16:48 AM
CNN author makes a bunch of straw arguments in the '5 myths' format, IMHO.
http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/08/opinion/miller-five-myths-about-ukraine-crisis/index.html?hpt=hp_t4
Myth 1. We're back in the Cold War - No, we are in a new one. 
2. Putin is Hitler - No one is Hitler, but the similarities are worth noting. 
"Russia believed its vital interests in Ukraine were threatened and it had the means, will, and proximity to act on them. And it's about time we faced up to it."  - Hitler I suppose had his apologists in the west as well.
3. It's all Obama's fault - No, not the motives or the exact events, but the timing is certainly tied to perceived American weakness.
4. Bombing Syria would have saved Ukraine - Bombing Syria wasn't anyone's proposal in total, but actually it probably would have slowed Putin and saved Ukraine as we knew it.
5. Ukraine can have a 'Hollywood' ending - The goal of peace through strength and deterrence is not to have a happy ending to a brutal, hard fought, nuclear confrontation.  The author is either too deep in his cocoon to know that or is intentionally obfuscating.   Perfect example of what we mean by mainstream or lamestream media coverage, where the more you read the less you know.
Title: Re: Ukraine, "Russia has already lost", NY Times
Post by: DougMacG on March 09, 2014, 10:28:31 AM
Anther take on Ukraine, optimistic and maybe similar in view to the National Journal article BD posted:
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/09/opinion/sunday/how-russia-has-already-lost-the-war.html?_r=0
(Author Chrystia Freeland is a Liberal member of the Canadian Parliament.)
I hope she has this right; we will see.

KIEV, Ukraine — OVER the past two weeks, residents of Kiev have lived through its bloodiest conflict since the Second World War, watched their reviled president flee and a new, provisional team take charge, seen Russian troops take control of part of the country, and heard Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin, assert his right to take further military action. Yet the Ukrainian capital is calm.

Revolutions often falter on Day 2, as Ukraine has already bitterly learned twice — once after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and then again in 2005 after the Orange Revolution. That could happen again, but the new revolution is enjoying a prolonged honeymoon, thanks to Mr. Putin, whose intervention in Ukrainian foreign and trade policy provoked the uprising in the first place, and whose invasion has, paradoxically, increased its chance of long-term success.

Kiev smells like a smoky summer camp, from the bonfires burning to keep the demonstrators still out on Independence Square warm, but every day it is tidier. Sidewalks in the city center are checkerboarded with neat piles of bricks that had been dug up to serve as missiles and are now being put back.

The police, despised for their corruption and repression, are returning to work. Their squad cars often sport Ukrainian flags and many have a “self-defense” activist from the protests with them. A Western ambassador told me that the activists were there to protect the cops from angry citizens. My uncle, who lives here, said they were also there to stop the police from slipping back into their old ways and demanding bribes.

This revolution may yet be eaten by its own incompetence or by infighting. A presidential election is scheduled for May, and the race, negative campaigning and all, has quietly begun. The oligarchs, some of whom have cannily been appointed governors of the potentially restive eastern regions, are jockeying for power. But for now, Ukrainians, who were brought together by shared hatred of the former president, Viktor F. Yanukovych, are being brought closer still by the Kremlin-backed invasion.

“Yanukovych freed Ukraine and Putin is uniting it,” said Iegor Soboliev, a 37-year-old ethnic Russian who heads a government commission to vet officials of the former regime. “Ukraine is functioning not through its government but through the self-organization of its people and their sense of human decency.”

Mr. Soboliev is a former investigative journalist who grew frustrated that carefully documented revelations of government misbehavior — which he says “wasn’t merely corruption, it was marauding” — were having no impact. He and a few friends formed Volya, a movement dedicated to creating a country of “responsible citizens” and a “state worthy of their trust.”

“People in Odessa, Mykolaiv, Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk are coming out to defend their country,” Mr. Soboliev said. “They have never liked the western Ukrainian, Galician point of view. But they are showing themselves to be equally patriotic. They are defending their country from foreign aggression. Fantastical things are happening.”

This conflict could flare into Europe’s first major war of the 21st century, and Crimea may never again be part of Ukraine. But no matter what happens over the next few months, or even years, Mr. Putin and his vision of an authoritarian, Russian-dominated former Soviet space have already lost. Democratic, independent Ukraine, and the messy, querulous (but also free and law-abiding) European idea have won.

So far, the only certain victory is the ideological one. Many outsiders have interpreted the past three months as a Yugoslav-style ethno-cultural fight. It is nothing of the kind. This is a political struggle. Notwithstanding the bloodshed, the best parallel is with Prague’s Velvet Revolution of 1989. The emphasis there on changing society’s moral tone, and each person’s behavior, was likewise central to the protests that overthrew Mr. Yanukovych.

For Ukraine, as well as for Russia and much of the former U.S.S.R., the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was only a partial revolution. The U.S.S.R. vanished, but the old nomenklatura, and its venal, authoritarian style of governance remained. Mr. Putin is explicitly drawing on that heritage and fitfully trying to reshape it into a new state capitalist system that can compete and flourish globally. An alliance with Mr. Yanukovych’s Ukraine was an essential part of that plan.

That effort has now failed. Whatever Mr. Putin achieves in Ukraine, it will not be partnership with a Slavic younger brother enthusiastically joining in his neo-imperialist, neo-Soviet project.

The unanswered question is whether Ukraine can be a practical success. The economy needs a total structural overhaul — and that huge shift needs to be accomplished while either radically transforming, or creating from scratch, effective government institutions.

This is the work Central Europe and the Baltic states did in the 1990s. Their example shows that it can be done, but it takes a long time, requires a patient and united populace, and probably also the promise of European partnership.

The good news is that Ukraine may finally have achieved the necessary social unity. The bad news is that it isn’t clear if Europe, struggling with its economic malaise and ambivalence toward its newish eastern members, has the stomach to tutor and support Ukraine as it did the Visegrad countries — Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland — and the Baltic states.

THIS should be Ukraine’s biggest problem. But with Russian forces in Crimea, the more urgent question Kiev faces is whether it will find itself at war.

The answer depends in large part on Russia. Sergei Kovalev, a former dissident who became a member of the Russian Parliament in the 1990s, once told me that a good rule for understanding Russian strongmen was that “eating increases the appetite.” Mr. Putin has thus far lived up to that aphorism.

Thanks to his agility in Syria, his successful hosting of the Sochi Olympics and even, at first, his masterful manipulation of Mr. Yanukovych, Mr. Putin has won himself something of a reputation as a master strategist. But he has made a grave miscalculation in Ukraine.

For one thing, Mr. Putin misunderstands the complexities of language and ethnicity in Ukraine. Certainly, Ukraine is diverse, and language, history and culture play a role in some of its internal differences — just as they do in blue- and red-state America, in northern and southern Italy, or in the north and the south of England.

The error is to believe there is a fratricidal separation between Russian and Ukrainian speakers and to assume that everyone who speaks Russian at home or voted for Mr. Yanukovych would prefer to be a citizen of Mr. Putin’s Russia. The reality of Ukraine is that everyone in the country speaks and understands Russian and everyone at least understands Ukrainian. On television, in Parliament, and in the streets, bilingual discussions are commonplace.

Mr. Putin seems to have genuinely believed that Ukraine was Yugoslavia, and that his forces would be warmly welcomed by at least half of the country. As Leonid D. Kuchma, a former president of Ukraine and once a senior member of the Soviet military-industrial complex, told me: “His advisers must have thought they would be met in eastern Ukraine with flowers as liberators. The reality is 180 degrees opposite.”

Many foreign policy realists wish the Ukrainian revolution hadn’t happened. They would rather Ukraine had more fully entered the corrupt, authoritarian zone the Kremlin is seeking to consolidate. But we don’t get to choose for Ukraine — Ukrainians do, and they have. Now we have to choose for ourselves.


Title: US State Dept: President Putin's Fiction, 10 False Claims About Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on March 10, 2014, 09:54:44 AM
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/222988.htm

President Putin's Fiction: 10 False Claims About Ukraine
Washington, DC
March 5, 2014

    1. Mr. Putin says:  Russian forces in Crimea are only acting to protect Russian military assets. It is “citizens’ defense groups,” not Russian forces, who have seized infrastructure and military facilities in Crimea.

    The Facts:  Strong evidence suggests that members of Russian security services are at the heart of the highly organized anti-Ukraine forces in Crimea. While these units wear uniforms without insignia, they drive vehicles with Russian military license plates and freely identify themselves as Russian security forces when asked by the international media and the Ukrainian military. Moreover, these individuals are armed with weapons not generally available to civilians.

    2. Mr. Putin says:  Russia’s actions fall within the scope of the 1997 Friendship Treaty between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

    The Facts:  The 1997 agreement requires Russia to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, which have given them operational control of Crimea, are in clear violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

    3. Mr. Putin says:  The opposition failed to implement the February 21 agreement with former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych.

    The Facts:  The February 21 agreement laid out a plan in which the Rada, or Parliament, would pass a bill to return Ukraine to its 2004 Constitution, thus returning the country to a constitutional system centered around its parliament. Under the terms of the agreement, Yanukovych was to sign the enacting legislation within 24 hours and bring the crisis to a peaceful conclusion. Yanukovych refused to keep his end of the bargain. Instead, he packed up his home and fled, leaving behind evidence of wide-scale corruption.

    4. Mr. Putin says:  Ukraine’s government is illegitimate. Yanukovych is still the legitimate leader of Ukraine.

    The Facts:  On March 4, President Putin himself acknowledged the reality that Yanukovych “has no political future.” After Yanukovych fled Ukraine, even his own Party of Regions turned against him, voting to confirm his withdrawal from office and to support the new government. Ukraine’s new government was approved by the democratically elected Ukrainian Parliament, with 371 votes – more than an 82% majority. The interim government of Ukraine is a government of the people, which will shepherd the country toward democratic elections on May 25th – elections that will allow all Ukrainians to have a voice in the future of their country.

    5. Mr. Putin says:  There is a humanitarian crisis and hundreds of thousands are fleeing Ukraine to Russia and seeking asylum.

    The Facts:  To date, there is absolutely no evidence of a humanitarian crisis. Nor is there evidence of a flood of asylum-seekers fleeing Ukraine for Russia. International organizations on the ground have investigated by talking with Ukrainian border guards, who also refuted these claims. Independent journalists observing the border have also reported no such flood of refugees.

    6. Mr. Putin says:  Ethnic Russians are under threat.

    The Facts:  Outside of Russian press and Russian state television, there are no credible reports of any ethnic Russians being under threat. The new Ukrainian government placed a priority on peace and reconciliation from the outset. President Oleksandr Turchynov refused to sign legislation limiting the use of the Russian language at regional level. Ethnic Russians and Russian speakers have filed petitions attesting that their communities have not experienced threats. Furthermore, since the new government was established, calm has returned to Kyiv. There has been no surge in crime, no looting, and no retribution against political opponents.

    7. Mr. Putin says:  Russian bases are under threat.

    The Facts:  Russian military facilities were and remain secure, and the new Ukrainian government has pledged to abide by all existing international agreements, including those covering Russian bases. It is Ukrainian bases in Crimea that are under threat from Russian military action.

    8. Mr. Putin says:  There have been mass attacks on churches and synagogues in southern and eastern Ukraine.

    The Facts:  Religious leaders in the country and international religious freedom advocates active in Ukraine have said there have been no incidents of attacks on churches. All of Ukraine’s church leaders, including representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, have expressed support for the new political leadership, calling for national unity and a period of healing. Jewish groups in southern and eastern Ukraine report that they have not seen an increase in anti-Semitic incidents.

    9. Mr. Putin says:  Kyiv is trying to destabilize Crimea.

    The Facts:  Ukraine’s interim government has acted with restraint and sought dialogue. Russian troops, on the other hand, have moved beyond their bases to seize political objectives and infrastructure in Crimea. The government in Kyiv immediately sent the former Chief of Defense to defuse the situation. Petro Poroshenko, the latest government emissary to pursue dialogue in Crimea, was prevented from entering the Crimean Rada.

    10. Mr. Putin says:  The Rada is under the influence of extremists or terrorists.

    The Facts:  The Rada is the most representative institution in Ukraine. Recent legislation has passed with large majorities, including from representatives of eastern Ukraine. Far-right wing ultranationalist groups, some of which were involved in open clashes with security forces during the EuroMaidan protests, are not represented in the Rada. There is no indication that the Ukrainian government would pursue discriminatory policies; on the contrary, they have publicly stated exactly the opposite.
Title: Kissisnger on the Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 11, 2014, 10:00:42 AM
Henry Kissinger on the Ukranian crisis

March 5, 2014, WaPo
-------

How the Ukraine crisis ends

Henry A. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977.

Public discussion on Ukraine is all about confrontation. But do we know where we are going? In my life, I have seen four wars begun with great enthusiasm and public support, all of which we did not know how to end and from three of which we withdrew unilaterally. The test of policy is how it ends, not how it begins.

Far too often the Ukrainian issue is posed as a showdown: whether Ukraine joins the East or the West. But if Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must not be either side’s outpost against the other — it should function as a bridge between them.

Russia must accept that to try to force Ukraine into a satellite status, and thereby move Russia’s borders again, would doom Moscow to repeat its history of self-fulfilling cycles of reciprocal pressures with Europe and the United States.

The West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country. Russian history began in what was called Kievan-Rus. The Russian religion spread from there. Ukraine has been part of Russia for centuries, and their histories were intertwined before then. Some of the most important battles for Russian freedom, starting with the Battle of Poltava in 1709, were fought on Ukrainian soil. The Black Sea Fleet — Russia’s means of projecting power in the Mediterranean — is based by long-term lease in Sevastopol, in Crimea. Even such famed dissidents as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Joseph Brodsky insisted that Ukraine was an integral part of Russian history and, indeed, of Russia.

The European Union must recognize that its bureaucratic dilatoriness and subordination of the strategic element to domestic politics in negotiating Ukraine’s relationship to Europe contributed to turning a negotiation into a crisis. Foreign policy is the art of establishing priorities.

The Ukrainians are the decisive element. They live in a country with a complex history and a polyglot composition. The Western part was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939 , when Stalin and Hitler divided up the spoils. Crimea, 60 percent of whose population is Russian , became part of Ukraine only in 1954 , when Nikita Khrushchev, a Ukrainian by birth, awarded it as part of the 300th-year celebration of a Russian agreement with the Cossacks. The west is largely Catholic; the east largely Russian Orthodox. The west speaks Ukrainian; the east speaks mostly Russian. Any attempt by one wing of Ukraine to dominate the other — as has been the pattern — would lead eventually to civil war or break up. To treat Ukraine as part of an East-West confrontation would scuttle for decades any prospect to bring Russia and the West — especially Russia and Europe — into a cooperative international system.

Ukraine has been independent for only 23 years; it had previously been under some kind of foreign rule since the 14th century. Not surprisingly, its leaders have not learned the art of compromise, even less of historical perspective. The politics of post-independence Ukraine clearly demonstrates that the root of the problem lies in efforts by Ukrainian politicians to impose their will on recalcitrant parts of the country, first by one faction, then by the other. That is the essence of the conflict between Viktor YanuВ¬kovych and his principal political rival, Yulia TymoВ-shenko. They represent the two wings of Ukraine and have not been willing to share power. A wise U.S. policy toward Ukraine would seek a way for the two parts of the country to cooperate with each other. We should seek reconciliation, not the domination of a faction.

Russia and the West, and least of all the various factions in Ukraine, have not acted on this principle. Each has made the situation worse. Russia would not be able to impose a military solution without isolating itself at a time when many of its borders are already precarious. For the West, the demonization of Vladimir Putin is not a policy; it is an alibi for the absence of one.

Putin should come to realize that, whatever his grievances, a policy of military impositions would produce another Cold War. For its part, the United States needs to avoid treating Russia as an aberrant to be patiently taught rules of conduct established by Washington. Putin is a serious strategist — on the premises of Russian history. Understanding U.S. values and psychology are not his strong suits. Nor has understanding Russian history and psychology been a strong point of U.S. policymakers.

Leaders of all sides should return to examining outcomes, not compete in posturing. Here is my notion of an outcome compatible with the values and security interests of all sides:

1. Ukraine should have the right to choose freely its economic and political associations, including with Europe.

2. Ukraine should not join NATO, a position I took seven years ago, when it last came up.

3. Ukraine should be free to create any government compatible with the expressed will of its people. Wise Ukrainian leaders would then opt for a policy of reconciliation between the various parts of their country. Internationally, they should pursue a posture comparable to that of Finland. That nation leaves no doubt about its fierce independence and cooperates with the West in most fields but carefully avoids institutional hostility toward Russia.

4. It is incompatible with the rules of the existing world order for Russia to annex Crimea. But it should be possible to put Crimea’s relationship to Ukraine on a less fraught basis. To that end, Russia would recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea. Ukraine should reinforce Crimea’s autonomy in elections held in the presence of international observers. The process would include removing any ambiguities about the status of the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol.

These are principles, not prescriptions. People familiar with the region will know that not all of them will be palatable to all parties. The test is not absolute satisfaction but balanced dissatisfaction. If some solution based on these or comparable elements is not achieved, the drift toward confrontation will accelerate. The time for that will come soon enough.
Title: Stratfor: The Oligarchs
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 12, 2014, 05:27:31 PM

Summary

Ukraine's independence from the Soviet Union was followed by the privatization of state-owned assets, giving birth to a powerful class of business leaders known as oligarchs. Since the country's founding, they have played a crucial role in the political system -- there are close ties between Ukraine's oligarchs and the evolution of the country's political crisis. This was most recently illustrated in Donetsk on March 9, when Ukrainian presidential hopeful Vitali Klitschko met with Rinat Akhmetov, the country's richest man, to discuss the ongoing situation.
 
The oligarchs function as a bridge between the Western-leaning interim government and Russia's interests in the country, especially in the Ukrainian east. They will play a key role in negotiations over Ukraine's political future and will prove pivotal in shaping any Ukrainian administration's relationship with Russia.
 
Analysis

Similar to Russia, the rapid transition to capitalism in Ukraine allowed politically connected individuals to amass tremendous wealth as they acquired and monopolized assets spanning the country's metals, chemicals and energy distribution industries, among others. But Russia has a long tradition of centralized power, and as the Kremlin regained its strength, Moscow subsumed or eliminated these wealthy individuals. Kiev wields no such political might. Ukraine's oligarchs were never fully subordinated by the government; their power only grew.
 
The result is a political system in Ukraine that continues to depend highly on the patronage and support of oligarchs. All major political parties and candidates for powerful posts in parliament and the executive office have their respective oligarch backers. For instance, figures such as Akhmetov, who holds a dominant position in the country's steel and coal production, and Dmytro Firtash, a major player in the power and chemicals industry, have been leading financiers of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich's Party of Regions. Other oligarchs, such as Igor Kolomoisky, a banking and industrial magnate, have kept out of direct politics, forging short-term situational alliances with various politicians.

The Oligarchs' Main Allegiance

The fidelity of the oligarchs has proved to be fluid. They are most concerned about preserving their lucrative business interests rather than pursuing an ideological or political line. Oligarchs have shifted their support of specific candidates. In some cases, such as Akhmetov, they have backed rival parties to make sure they would not be targeted in the event of a political upheaval. Any trend that compromises oligarch interests -- for example the emergence of a rival oligarch clan from within Yanukovich's family -- can be politically dangerous.
 
The latest crisis in Ukraine has produced just such a shift, and the reaction of the oligarchs has once again revealed their important role in the country. The oligarchs have quickly distanced themselves from Yanukovich and now support the new government in Kiev. Though this government has gone after Yanukovich and his inner circle, authorities have been extremely careful not to target the oligarchs who previously supported his party. They know such a move could create backlash among key political power brokers, and their legitimacy depends on maintaining at least a pragmatic relationship with the oligarchs. Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and other members of the interim government have reached out to figures including Akhmetov and Firtash, assuring them that their businesses will not be targeted. Kiev has even appointed key oligarchs such as Kolomoisky and industrialist Sergei Taruta as governors in the eastern regions of Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk, respectively.

The Key to National Cohesion

With presidential elections set for May 25 and parliamentary elections likely to be held later in the year, Ukraine's current administration will need the continued support of the oligarchs. More immediately, with Crimea on the verge of leaving Ukraine, the new government's urgent challenge is to keep mainland Ukraine together. Eastern Ukraine is crucial to this -- the region is a stronghold for pro-Russia sentiment and the main site of opposition, after Crimea, to the Western-backed and Western-leaning government.
 
The oligarchs are key to keeping control over eastern Ukraine, not only because Ukraine's industrial production is concentrated in the east -- thus anchoring a shaky economy -- but also because many of the oligarchs have a stronger and more manageable relationship with Russia than the current government, which Moscow sees as illegitimate. Many of these business leaders hail from the industrial east. They have business ties to Russia and decades of experience dealing with Russian authorities -- experience that figures such as Klitschko and Yatsenyuk lack.
 
So far, the new government has been able to maintain the support of the country's most important oligarchs. In general, the oligarchs want Ukraine to stay united. They do not support partition or federalization, because this would compromise their business interests across the country. But this support is not guaranteed over the long term. There have been recent complaints about the new government, for example over the arrest of former Kharkiv Gov. Mikhail Dobkin. Akhmetov came out in Dobkin's defense, saying the government should not be going after internal rivals right now, but rather focusing on concerns over Russia. This can be seen as a warning to the new administration: The oligarchs' loyalty to the current regime is conditional and should not be taken for granted.
 
Ultimately, the biggest threat to the oligarchs is not the current government, over which they have substantial leverage, but Russia. The oligarchs stand to lose a great deal if Russia intervenes in eastern Ukraine. If Russia takes over eastern territories, it could threaten the oligarchs' very control over their assets. Therefore they have an interest in bridging the gap between Russia and Kiev, but it is Moscow they fear more. The oligarchs have substantial power to shape the Ukrainian government's decision-making as it moves forward. Their business interests and the territorial integrity of the country are at stake.

Read more: Ukraine's Oligarchs Will Play a Decisive Role | Stratfor

Title: Stratfor: Ukraine's increasing polarization and the western challenge
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 13, 2014, 09:11:00 AM
 Ukraine's Increasing Polarization and the Western Challenge
Geopolitical Weekly
Tuesday, March 11, 2014 - 03:02
Stratfor

By Eugene Chausovsky

Just days before the Ukrainian crisis broke out, I took an overnight train to Kiev from Sevastopol in Crimea. Three mechanics in their 30s on their way to jobs in Estonia shared my compartment. All ethnic Russians born and raised in Sevastopol, they have made the trip to the Baltic states for the past eight years for seasonal work at Baltic Sea shipyards. Our ride together, accompanied by obligatory rounds of vodka, presented the opportunity for an in-depth discussion of Ukraine's political crisis. The ensuing conversation was perhaps more enlightening than talks of similar length with Ukrainian political, economic or security officials.

My fellow passengers viewed the events at Independence Square in an overwhelmingly negative light. They considered the protesters camped out in Kiev's central square terrorists, completely organized and financed by the United States and the European Union. They did not see the protesters as their fellow countrymen, and they supported then-President Viktor Yanukovich's use of the Berkut security forces to crack down on them. In fact, they were shocked by the Berkut's restraint, saying if it had been up to them, the protests would have been "cleaned up" from the outset. They added that while they usually looked forward to stopping over in Kiev during the long journey to the Baltics, this time they were ashamed of what was happening there and didn't even want to set foot in the city. They also predicted that the situation in Ukraine would worsen before it improved.

A few days later, the protests in Independence Square in fact reached a crescendo of violence. The Berkut closed in on the demonstrators, and subsequent clashes between protesters and security forces throughout the week left dozens dead and hundreds injured. This spawned a sequence of events that led to the overthrow of Yanukovich, the formation of a new Ukrainian government not recognized by Moscow and the subsequent Russian military intervention in Crimea. While the speed of these events astonished many foreign (especially Western) observers, to the men I met on the train, it was all but expected.

After all, the crisis didn't emerge from a vacuum. Ukraine was a polarized country well before the Euromaidan movement took shape. I have always been struck by how traveling to different parts of Ukraine feels like visiting different countries. Every country has its regional differences, to be sure. But Ukraine stands apart in this regard.
Ukraine's East-West Divide

Traveling in Lviv in the west, for example, is a starkly different experience than traveling in Donetsk in the east. The language spoken is different, with Ukrainian used in Lviv and Russian in Donetsk. The architecture is different, too, with classical European architecture lining narrow cobblestoned streets in Lviv and Soviet apartment blocs alongside sprawling boulevards predominating in Donetsk. Each region has different heroes: A large bust of Lenin surveys the main square in Donetsk, while Stepan Bandera, a World War II-era Ukrainian nationalist revolutionary, is honored in Lviv. Citizens of Lviv commonly view people from Donetsk as pro-Russian rubes while people in Donetsk constantly speak of nationalists/fascists in Lviv.

Lviv and Donetsk lie on the extreme ends of the spectrum, but they are hardly alone. Views are even more polarized on the Crimean Peninsula, where ethnic Russians make up the majority and which soon could cease to be part of Ukraine.

The east-west Ukrainian cultural divide is deep, and unsurprisingly it is reflected in the country's politics. Election results from the past 10 years show a clear dividing line between voting patterns in western and central Ukraine and those in the southern and eastern parts of the country. In the 2005 and 2010 presidential elections, Yanukovich received overwhelming support in the east and Crimea but only marginal support in the west. Ukraine does not have "swing states."

Such internal political and cultural divisions would be difficult to overcome under normal circumstances, but Ukraine's geographic and geopolitical position magnifies them exponentially. Ukraine is the quintessential borderland country, eternally trapped between Europe to the west and Russia to the east. Given its strategic location in the middle of the Eurasian heartland, the country has constantly been -- and will constantly be -- an arena in which the West and Russia duel for influence.

Competition over Ukraine has had two primary effects on the country. The first is to further polarize Ukraine, splitting foreign policy preferences alongside existing cultural divisions. While many in western Ukraine seek closer ties with Europe, many in eastern Ukraine seek closer ties with Russia. While there are those who would avoid foreign entanglements altogether, both the European Union and Russia have made clear that neutrality is not an option. Outside competition in Ukraine has created wild and often destabilizing political swings, especially during the country's post-Soviet independence.

Therefore, the current crisis in Ukraine is only the latest manifestation of competition between the West and Russia. The European Union and the United States greatly influenced the 2004 Orange Revolution in terms of financing and political organization. Russia meanwhile greatly influenced the discrediting of the Orange Regime and the subsequent election of Yanukovich, who lost in the Orange Revolution, in 2010. The West pushed back once more by supporting the Euromaidan movement after Yanukovich abandoned key EU integration deals, and then Russia countered in Crimea, leading to the current impasse.

The tug of war between Russia and the West over Ukraine has gradually intensified over the past decade. This has hardened positions in Ukraine, culminating in the formation of armed groups representing rival political interests and leading to the violent standoff in Independence Square that quickly spread to other parts of the country.

The current government enjoys Western support, but Moscow and many in eastern and southern Ukraine deny its legitimacy, citing the manner in which it took power. This sets a dangerous precedent because it challenges the sitting government's and any future government's ability to claim any semblance of nationwide legitimacy.

It is clear that Ukraine cannot continue to function for long in its current form. A strong leader in such a polarized society will face major unrest, as Yanukovich's ouster shows. The lack of a national consensus will paralyze the government and prevent officials from forming coherent foreign policy, since any government that strikes a major deal with either Russia or the European Union will find it difficult to rightfully claim it speaks for the majority of the country. Now that Russia has used military moves in Crimea to show it will not let Ukraine go without a fight, the stage has been set for very difficult political negotiations over Ukraine's future.
Russian-Western Conflict Beyond Ukraine

A second, more worrying effect of the competition between the West and Russia over Ukraine extends beyond Ukrainian borders. As competition over the fate of Ukraine has escalated, it has also intensified Western-Russian competition elsewhere in the region.

Georgia and Moldova, two former Soviet countries that have sought stronger ties with the West, have accelerated their attempts to further integrate with the European Union -- and in Georgia's case, with NATO. On the other hand, countries such as Belarus and Armenia have sought to strengthen their economic and security ties with Russia. Countries already strongly integrated with the West like the Baltics are glad to see Western powers stand up to Russia, but meanwhile they know that they could be the next in line in the struggle between Russia and the West. Russia could hit them economically, and Moscow could also offer what it calls protection to their sizable Russian minorities as it did in Crimea. Russia already has hinted at this in discussions to extend Russian citizenship to ethnic Russians and Russian speakers throughout the former Soviet Union.

The major question moving forward is how committed Russia and the West are to backing and reinforcing their positions in these rival blocs. Russia has made clear that it is willing to act militarily to defend its interests in Ukraine. Russia showed the same level of dedication to preventing Georgia from turning to NATO in 2008. Moscow has made no secret that it is willing to use a mixture of economic pressure, energy manipulation and, if need be, military force to prevent the countries on its periphery from leaving the Russian orbit. In the meantime, Russia will seek to intensify integration efforts in its own blocs, including the Customs Union on the economic side and the Collective Security Treaty Organization on the military side.

So the big question is what the West intends. On several occasions, the European Union and United States have proved that they can play a major role in shaping events on the ground in Ukraine. Obtaining EU membership is a stated goal of the governments in Moldova and Georgia, and a significant number of people in Ukraine also support EU membership. But since it has yet to offer sufficient aid or actual membership, the European Union has not demonstrated as serious a commitment to the borderland countries as Russia has. It has refrained from doing so for several reasons, including its own financial troubles and political divisions and its dependence on energy and trade with Russia. While the European Union may yet show stronger resolve as a result of the current Ukrainian crisis, a major shift in the bloc's approach is unlikely -- at least not on its own.

On the Western side, then, U.S. intentions are key. In recent years, the United States has largely stayed on the sidelines in the competition over the Russian periphery. The United States was just as quiet as the European Union was in its reaction to the Russian invasion of Georgia, and calls leading up to the invasion for swiftly integrating Ukraine and Georgia into NATO went largely unanswered. Statements were made, but little was done.

But the global geopolitical climate has changed significantly since 2008. The United States is out of Iraq and is swiftly drawing down its forces in Afghanistan. Washington is now acting more indirectly in the Middle East, using a balance-of-power approach to pursue its interests in the region. This frees up its foreign policy attention, which is significant, given that the United States is the only party with the ability and resources to make a serious push in the Russian periphery.

As the Ukraine crisis moves into the diplomatic realm, a major test of U.S. willingness and ability to truly stand up to Russia is emerging. Certainly, Washington has been quite vocal during the current Ukrainian crisis and has shown signs of getting further involved elsewhere in the region, such as in Poland and the Baltic states. But concrete action from the United States with sufficient backing from the Europeans will be the true test of how committed the West is to standing up to Moscow. Maneuvering around Ukraine's deep divisions and Russian countermoves will be no easy task. But nothing short of concerted efforts by a united Western front will suffice to pull Ukraine and the rest of the borderlands toward the West.

Editor's Note: Writing in George Friedman's stead this week is Stratfor Eurasia analyst Eugene Chausovsky.

Read more: Ukraine's Increasing Polarization and the Western Challenge | Stratfor

Title: Excrement approaching fan
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 13, 2014, 03:22:42 PM
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/world/europe/ukraine.html?_r=3
Title: Re: Excrement approaching fan
Post by: G M on March 13, 2014, 03:35:31 PM
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/world/europe/ukraine.html?_r=3

For the Ukrainians. Obama is working on a humdinger of a letter telling Putin just how unhappy he is with this behavior. I'm expecting a very bold font and perhaps some underlining.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 14, 2014, 09:24:36 AM
A friend who grew up in that part of the world writes:
===============================================
Russia will not try to annex Ukraine.  Why?  Because it would probably lose the civil war.  Fighting a guerrilla war against fighters who enjoy the support of the population is very hard.

Right after WWII, Stalin's regime was all powerful, in every respect.  And yet, for many years they were unable to eliminate the "partisans" fighting against them in the tiny Lithuania.  Those people were a rather mixed group, ranging from Nazi collaborators to serious patriots, who were ready to give their lives fighting against Stalinist Russia.  Eventually, already well into the 50's, the Soviets offered them an amnesty - those who would lay down their arms and stop fighting would not be prosecuted.  The "partisans" complied.  Surprisingly, the Soviets kept their word, and those people were left to live their lives unmolested.  Growing up, we all knew individuals who used to belong to the "forest brothers".

Ukraine would be incomparably harder.  A recent poll showed that only 15% of Russians would be in favor of military action against Ukraine.

IMHO, Putin may well lose his job over the worsening of relations with Ukraine.  If Ukraine becomes militantly anti-Russian -- grabbing a couple of warm sea resorts on the Black Sea will be a poor consolation.  Strategically, that would not make any real difference, since Russia has military and naval bases in that region anyway.

My best guess is that Putin will try to make a deal - Russia would refrain from "annexing" Crimea -- on condition that Ukraine would be encouraged to remain neutral.  I think that at this point that would be the best outcome for most of those concerned.  To save face, Putin would probably ask for the Russian military bases in Crimea to become permanent - as well as for more autonomy for the region.
Title: US transport planes headed to Poland
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 15, 2014, 10:57:58 AM
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/14/ukraine-crisis-simmers-us-transport-planes-heading/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 15, 2014, 05:40:41 PM
See panels 3-6:

http://www.daybydaycartoon.com/2014/03/16/
Title: Even POTH says Russia stifles dissent in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 16, 2014, 10:54:05 AM
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/15/world/europe/pressure-and-intimidation-sweep-crimea-ahead-of-secession-vote.html?emc=edit_th_20140316&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193
Title: Speznatz provoking in East Ukraine?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 16, 2014, 03:26:30 PM


http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/03/15/russian-commandos-invade-ukraine.html
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 17, 2014, 08:28:47 AM
One of the key themes in the Ukraine is natural gas and the Russian's control of supplies of it to Europe.  As long as that remains the case, Europe will do nothing and Russia remains in the driver's seat.  Period.

I would note that I have been making this point here for several years.  I would note the strategy I advocated (helped mightily by the insights shared by YA in the Afpakia thread) about developing alternate routes for central Asian gas (e.g. through Afpakia to the Indian Ocean, though Georgia, etc) so that Russia was not its only buyer; for without importing this gas, Russia cannot export to Europe.

Instead we have a president who finds it necessary to rely upon Russia as a supply route to Afpakia (which does support mightily Obama's determination to exit Afpakia) and Russia as a "partner" in Syria, and in dealing with Iran and who suppresses the US as a supplier of natural gas to the world-- leaving Europe subject to Putin's whims.
Title: Close the Dardenelles to Russian navy?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 18, 2014, 01:53:44 PM
Here is an interesting idea: Have NATO member Turkey close the Dardenelles to Russian naval movements-- thus denying Russia its only warm water port for military purposes http://www.theblaze.com/.../new-sanctions-may-not-be.../
Title: Russia examines its options
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 20, 2014, 09:16:40 PM
By George Friedman

The fall of the Ukrainian government and its replacement with one that appears to be oriented toward the West represents a major defeat for the Russian Federation. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia accepted the reality that the former Eastern European satellite states would be absorbed into the Western economic and political systems. Moscow claims to have been assured that former Soviet republics would be left as a neutral buffer zone and not absorbed. Washington and others have disputed that this was promised. In any case, it was rendered meaningless when the Baltic states were admitted to NATO and the European Union. The result was that NATO, which had been almost 1,600 kilometers (1,000 miles) from St. Petersburg, was now less than approximately 160 kilometers away. 

This left Belarus and Ukraine as buffers. Ukraine is about 480 kilometers from Moscow at its closest point. Were Belarus and Ukraine both admitted to NATO, the city of Smolensk, which had been deep inside the Soviet Union, would have become a border town. Russia has historically protected itself with its depth. It moved its borders as far west as possible, and that depth deterred adventurers -- or, as it did with Hitler and Napoleon, destroyed them. The loss of Ukraine as a buffer to the West leaves Russia without that depth and hostage to the intentions and capabilities of Europe and the United States.
 
There are those in the West who dismiss Russia's fears as archaic. No one wishes to invade Russia, and no one can invade Russia. Such views appear sophisticated but are in fact simplistic. Intent means relatively little in terms of assessing threats. They can change very fast. So too can capabilities. The American performance in World War I and the German performance in the 1930s show how quickly threats and capabilities shift. In 1932, Germany was a shambles economically and militarily. By 1938, it was the dominant economic and military power on the European Peninsula. In 1941, it was at the gates of Moscow. In 1916, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson ran a sincere anti-war campaign in a country with hardly any army. In 1917, he deployed more than a million American soldiers to Europe.
 
Russia's viewpoint is appropriately pessimistic. If Russia loses Belarus or Ukraine, it loses its strategic depth, which accounts for much of its ability to defend the Russian heartland. If the intention of the West is not hostile, then why is it so eager to see the regime in Ukraine transformed? It may be a profound love of liberal democracy, but from Moscow's perspective, Russia must assume more sinister motives.
 
Quite apart from the question of invasion, which is obviously a distant one, Russia is concerned about the consequences of Ukraine's joining the West and the potential for contagion in parts of Russia itself. During the 1990s, there were several secessionist movements in Russia. The Chechens became violent, and the rest of their secession story is well known. But there also was talk of secession in Karelia, in Russia's northwest, and in the Pacific Maritime region.
 
What was conceivable under Boris Yeltsin was made inconceivable under Vladimir Putin. The strategy Putin adopted was to increase Russia's strength moderately but systematically, to make that modest increase appear disproportionately large. Russia could not afford to remain on the defensive; the forces around it were too powerful. Putin had to magnify Russia's strength, and he did. Using energy exports, the weakness of Europe and the United States' distraction in the Middle East, he created a sense of growing Russian power. Putin ended talk of secession in the Russian Federation. He worked to create regimes in Belarus and Ukraine that retained a great deal of domestic autonomy but operated within a foreign policy framework acceptable to Russia. Moscow went further, projecting its power into the Middle East and, in the Syrian civil war, appearing to force the United States to back out of its strategy.
 
It is not clear what happened in Kiev. There were of course many organizations funded by American and European money that were committed to a reform government. It is irrelevant whether, as the Russians charge, these organizations planned and fomented the uprising against former President Viktor Yanukovich's regime or whether that uprising was part of a more powerful indigenous movement that drew these groups along. The fact was that Yanukovich refused to sign an agreement moving Ukraine closer to the European Union, the demonstrations took place, there was violence, and an openly pro-Western Ukrainian government was put in place.
 
The Russians cannot simply allow this to stand. Not only does it create a new geopolitical reality, but in the longer term it also gives the appearance inside Russia that Putin is weaker than he seems and opens the door to instability and even fragmentation. Therefore, the Russians must respond. The issue is how.
Russia's Potential Responses

The first step was simply making official what has been a reality. Crimea is within the Russian sphere of influence, and the military force Moscow has based in Crimea under treaties could assert control whenever it wished. That Sevastopol is a critical Russian naval base for operations in the Black and Mediterranean seas was not the key. A treaty protected that. But intervention in Crimea was a low-risk, low-cost action that would halt the appearance that Russia was hemorrhaging power. It made Russia appear as a bully in the West and a victor at home. That was precisely the image it wanted to project to compensate for its defeat.
 
Several options are now available to Russia.

First, it can do nothing. The government in Kiev is highly fractious, and given the pro-Russian factions' hostility toward moving closer to the West, the probability of paralysis is high. In due course, Russian influence, money and covert activities can recreate the prior neutrality in Ukraine in the form of a stalemate. This was the game Russia played after the 2004 Orange Revolution. The problem with this strategy is that it requires patience at a time when the Russian government must demonstrate its power to its citizens and the world. Moreover, if Crimea does leave Ukraine, it will weaken the pro-Russian bloc in Kiev and remove a large number of ethnic Tartars from Ukraine's political morass. It could be enough of a loss to allow the pro-Russian bloc to lose what electoral power it previously had (Yanukovich beat Yulia Timoshenko by fewer than a million votes in 2010). Thus, by supporting Crimea's independence -- and raising the specter of an aggressive Russia that could bind the other anti-Russian factions together -- Putin could be helping to ensure that a pro-Western Ukraine persists.

Second, it can invade mainland Ukraine. There are three problems with this. First, Ukraine is a large area to seize and pacify. Russia does not need an insurgency on its border, and it cannot guarantee that it wouldn't get one, especially since a significant portion of the population in western Ukraine is pro-West. Second, in order for an invasion of Ukraine to be geopolitically significant, all of Ukraine east of the Dnieper River must be taken. Otherwise, the frontier with Russia remains open, and there would be no anchor to the Russian position. However, this would bring Russian forces to the bank opposite Kiev and create a direct border with NATO and EU members. Finally, if the Russians wish to pursue the first option, pulling eastern Ukrainian voters out of the Ukrainian electoral process would increase the likelihood of an effective anti-Russian government.

Third, it can act along its periphery. In 2008, Russia announced its power with authority by invading Georgia. This changed calculations in Kiev and other capitals in the region by reminding them of two realities. First, Russian power is near. Second, the Europeans have no power, and the Americans are far away. There are three major points where the Russians could apply pressure: the Caucasus countries, Moldova and the Baltics. By using large Russian minority populations within NATO countries, the Russians might be able to create unrest there, driving home the limits of NATO's power.

Fourth, it can offer incentives in Eastern and Central Europe. Eastern and Central European countries, from Poland to Bulgaria, are increasingly aware that they may have to hedge their bets on Europe and the West. The European economic crisis now affects politico-military relations. The sheer fragmentation of European nations makes a coherent response beyond proclamations impossible. Massive cuts in military spending remove most military options. The Central Europeans feel economically and strategically uneasy, particularly as the European crisis is making the European Union's largest political powers focus on the problems of the eurozone, of which most of these countries are not members. The Russians have been conducting what we call commercial imperialism, particularly south of Poland, entering into business dealings that have increased their influence and solved some economic problems. The Russians have sufficient financial reserves to neutralize Central European countries.

Last, it can bring pressure to bear on the United States by creating problems in critical areas. An obvious place is Iran. In recent weeks, the Russians have offered to build two new, non-military reactors for the Iranians. Quietly providing technological support for military nuclear programs could cause the Iranians to end negotiations with the United States and would certainly be detected by U.S. intelligence. The United States has invested a great deal of effort and political capital in its relations with the Iranians. The Russians are in a position to damage them, especially as the Iranians are looking for leverage in their talks with Washington. In more extreme and unlikely examples, the Russians might offer help to Venezuela's weakening regime. There are places that Russia can hurt the United States, and it is now in a position where it will take risks -- as with Iran's nuclear program -- that it would not have taken before.

The European and American strategy to control the Russians has been to threaten sanctions. The problem is that Russia is the world's eighth-largest economy, and its finances are entangled with the West's, as is its economy. For any sanctions the West would impose, the Russians have a counter. There are many Western firms that have made large investments in Russia and have large Russian bank accounts and massive amounts of equipment in the country. The Russians can also cut off natural gas and oil shipments. This would of course hurt Russia financially, but the impact on Europe -- and global oil markets -- would be more sudden and difficult to manage. Some have argued that U.S. energy or European shale could solve the problem. The Russian advantage is that any such solution is years away, and Europe would not have years to wait for the cavalry to arrive. Some symbolic sanctions coupled with symbolic counter-sanctions are possible, but bringing the Russian economy to its knees without massive collateral damage would be hard.

The most likely strategy Russia will follow is a combination of all of the above: pressure on mainland Ukraine with some limited incursions; working to create unrest in the Baltics, where large Russian-speaking minorities live, and in the Caucasus and Moldova; and pursuing a strategy to prevent Eastern Europe from coalescing into a single entity. Simultaneously, Russia is likely to intervene in areas that are sensitive to the United States while allowing the Ukrainian government to be undermined by its natural divisions.
Considering the West's Countermoves

In all of these things there are two questions. The first is what German foreign policy is going to be. Berlin supported the uprising in Ukraine and has on occasion opposed the Russian response, but it is not in a position to do anything more concrete. So far, it has tried to straddle the divides, particularly between Russia and the European Union, wanting to be at one with all. The West has now posed a problem to the Russians that Moscow must respond to visibly. If Germany effectively ignores Russia, Berlin will face two problems. The first will be that the Eastern Europeans, particularly the Poles, will lose massive confidence in Germany as a NATO ally, particularly if there are problems in the Baltics. Second, it will have to face the extraordinary foreign policy divide in Europe. Those countries close to the buffers are extremely uneasy. Those farther away -- Spain, for instance -- are far calmer. Europe is not united, and Germany needs a united Europe. The shape of Europe will be determined in part by Germany's response.
 
The second question is that of the United States. I have spoken of the strategy of balance of power. A balance of power strategy calls for calibration of involvement, not disengagement. Having chosen to support the creation of an anti-Russian regime in Ukraine, the United States now faces consequences and decisions. The issue is not deployments of major forces but providing the Central Europeans from Poland to Romania with the technology and materiel to discourage Russia from dangerous adventures -- and to convince their publics that they are not alone.

The paradox is this: As the sphere of Western influence has moved to the east along Russia's southern frontier, the actual line of demarcation has moved westward. Whatever happens within the buffer states, this line is critical for U.S. strategy because it maintains the European balance of power. We might call this soft containment.
 
It is far-fetched to think that the Russians would move beyond commercial activity in this region. It is equally far-fetched that EU or NATO expansion into Ukraine would threaten Russian national security. Yet history is filled with far-fetched occurrences that in retrospect are obvious. The Russians have less room to maneuver but everything at stake. They might therefore take risks that others, not feeling the pressure the Russians feel, would avoid. Again, it is a question of planning for the worst and hoping for the best.
 
For the United States, creating a regional balance of power is critical. Ideally, the Germans would join the project, but Germany is closer to Russia, and the plan involves risks Berlin will likely want to avoid. There is a grouping in the region called the Visegrad battlegroup. It is within the framework of NATO and consists of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. It is now more a concept than a military. However, with U.S. commitment and the inclusion of Romania, it could become a low-cost (to the United States) balance to a Russia suddenly feeling insecure and therefore unpredictable. This, and countering Russian commercial imperialism with a U.S. alternative at a time when Europe is hardly in a position to sustain the economies in these countries, would be logical.

This has been the U.S. strategy since 1939: maximum military and economic aid with minimal military involvement. The Cold War ended far better than the wars the Americans became directly involved in. The Cold War in Europe never turned hot. Logic has it that at some point the United States will adopt this strategy. But of course, in the meantime, we wait for Russia's next move, or should none come, a very different Russia.

Editor's Note: An earlier version of this analysis misstated which part of Ukraine that Moscow would have to seize for any Russian invasion to be geopolitically significant.

Read more: Russia Examines Its Options for Responding to Ukraine | Stratfor
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Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 24, 2014, 04:59:46 PM
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March 24, 2014 7:19 p.m. ET

Russia is a big country. In case you didn't know.

A flight from New York to St. Petersburg will cover the same distance as one from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok. There are 22 Russians for every Russian square mile, a population density only slightly exceeded by Mali. Exclude all of Russia east of the Urals, and the European portion of the country is still about the size of India and Turkey put together.

This is not exactly a state needing greater Lebensraum.

The point needs making in the face of an undercurrent of Western apology for Vladimir Putin's seizure of Crimea. It's an argument that goes roughly as follows:

• Yes, Russia's seizure of the peninsula was provocative and illegal. But look at it from Moscow's point of view. "To Russia," writes Henry Kissinger in the Washington Post, GHC -1.04% "Ukraine can never be just a foreign country." Defining events in Russian history—Mr. Kissinger cites the 1709 battle of Poltava—took place on (current) Ukrainian soil, and Ukraine has been independent for just 23 years. Crimea itself is ethnically Russian and only passed into Ukrainian hands through a Soviet bureaucratic maneuver in the mid-1950s.

• As for provocation, how could any Russian leader be indifferent to a Ukraine that sought to join NATO or the European Union, much less sit still as demonstrators in Kiev paralyzed the country and brought about the downfall of its democratically elected leader?
Enlarge Image

Russia's president is trigger happy. Getty Images

In this reading, the West's post-Cold War policies toward Russia have been a complex of patronizing lectures about democracy and good governance alongside a string of geopolitical humiliations, above all the expansion of NATO to former Warsaw Pact countries.

• Also, isn't it hypocrisy for Washington to protest Russia's occupation of foreign soil? "As ambassador, I found it difficult to defend our commitment to sovereignty and international law when asked by Russians, 'What about Iraq?' " writes Mike McFaul, until recently the administration's envoy to Moscow, in Monday's New York Times. NYT -1.71%

• Finally, isn't Mr. Putin merely duplicating the tough-guy tactics conservatives favor when it comes to the pursuit of American interests? "For Putin, an anti-Russian government in Kiev is illegitimate regardless of how it takes power," writes Peter Beinart. "For many American hawks, the same is now true for a pro-Chávez government in Latin America or an Islamist government in the Middle East." Mr. Beinart calls Mr. Putin a "Russian Neocon."

Thus does cold-blooded foreign policy "realism" blend with the embarrassed apologetics of postmodern liberalism to become the enabler of Russian revanchism.

Let's get a few things straight.

(1) NATO is a defensive alliance. As the Kremlin well knows, despite its propaganda and paranoia. The notion that the West provoked Russia by expanding NATO ignores why Poland, the Baltic states and other new members wanted to join NATO in the first place. Russia, threatened only by its internal discontents, does not need Ukraine as a territorial buffer against the Wehrmacht.

(2) A historic claim is not a valid claim. Much of modern-day Ukraine was Polish until September 1939. Yet Poland does treat Ukraine as "just a foreign country." To invoke history as a way of rationalizing Mr. Putin's moves in Crimea allows him to manipulate history. It strengthens his interests at the expense of the interests, and history, of others.

(3) Ethnic claims aren't valid claims, either. Especially when there is no evidence of ethnically motivated harms. Especially, too, when the non-Russian minority amounts to a non-trivial 40%. Especially, three, when the referendum used ex post facto to justify the seizure of Crimea yielded the kind of lopsided vote—a Stalinist 97%—that can only be achieved by fraud and intimidation, further undermining the validity of the ethnic claim. Especially, four, when Russia's ethnic claim to Crimea opens a global Pandora's box.

(4) Russia was not humiliated by the end of the Cold War. Even if Mr. Putin and his colleagues in the KGB were. Humiliation is what Germany imposed on Russia at Brest-Litovsk, and what France imposed on Germany at Versailles. In reality, Russia was saved by the end of the Cold War and a postwar settlement that provided lavish foreign aid and went out of its way to integrate Russia into the global economy, the G-8 and even NATO itself.

(5) Crimea is not Iraq. And Amb. McFaul's suggestion that the two are even remotely comparable is both insipid and outrageous. In Iraq, the U.S. deposed a tyrant who had spent the previous decade defying international law. We then did our imperfect best to stand up a representative government while fighting an insurgency consisting of al Qaeda, Baathist holdouts, and proxies of Iran. Then we got out. How, again, is this like Crimea?

(6) Neocons typically want to promote liberal democracy. And stand up to the enemies of liberal democracy. That's why this column has been calling for Russia to be kicked out of the G-8 since 2006, two years before liberals started clinking glasses to the "reset" and nearly eight years before Mr. Obama finally took my good advice.

Our new Kremlinogists now tell us that Mr. Putin's gambits need to be understood in the context of Russia's historic foreign policy objectives. True up to a point. But Mr. Putin is also pursuing his own interests as ringleader in a corrupt oligarchy sitting on the economic time bomb that is a commodities-based economy. The best U.S. policy will seek to light the shortest fuse on that bomb, strengthen our allies, and contain the fallout.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 25, 2014, 07:15:38 PM
 Crimea Joins the East While Ukraine Looks West
Geopolitical Diary
Thursday, March 20, 2014 - 17:58 Text Size Print

Two major events in the unfolding Ukraine crisis will occur Friday. First, Russia's Federation Council will ratify a treaty with Crimea concluding Russia's formal annexation of the territory. Second, Ukraine will sign the political chapters of an association agreement with the European Union.

Both events show just how much the standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine has escalated, leading the country to split in two. They also make the future uncertain for what is left of Ukraine. The government in Kiev is sure to face greater pressure from Russia while not being clear on exactly what to expect from the West.

In practical terms, Ukraine's inking of the political parts of the association agreement changes little, with the complete signing of the EU agreements not scheduled until sometime later in the year. But the symbolism of the act is huge. After all, the Ukrainian crisis began when former President Viktor Yanukovich rejected the association and free trade agreements in the lead-up to the Nov. 29-30 Eastern Partnership summit over the issue. This led to protests against the decision from pro-EU demonstrators that eventually expanded to general anti-government rallies, culminating in Yanukovich's ouster on Feb. 22.

An interim government under former opposition leader Arseniy Yatsenyuk replaced the Yanukovich regime. One of the main priorities of the new government has been to reverse the decision to suspend the agreements with the European Union. Now, less than a month after Yanukovich's ouster, the first formal step toward concluding these deals is being taken.

What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman explains.

While this is a cause for celebration in Kiev and among the government's pro-Western supporters, Russia sees it as a major affront. Moscow adamantly opposed the Western-backed uprising against Yanukovich and has firmly expressed its view that the new government in Kiev is illegitimate. Russian actions in Crimea came in response to the events in Kiev, with Moscow framing its steps as completely legitimate given how the new government in Ukraine took power and allegedly threatened the rights of ethnic Russians.

Still, Russian opposition has not persuaded the Ukrainian government to stop its integration efforts with the West, as the expected signing Friday shows. But Russia's intervention in Crimea is not the only response to be expected from Moscow. Just as it worked to dissuade Yanukovich from following through with the EU deals by enacting painful trade restrictions on Ukrainian goods, Russia is again showing that a blockade of Ukrainian exports to Russia could be forthcoming. Russia briefly barred Ukrainian trucks from entering Russian territory at certain border crossings overnight on Thursday, though by the afternoon it had started letting them in again. This move was likely meant as a warning of things to come.

The new government in Kiev probably will not reverse its pursuit of EU integration, something it has specifically cited it has a mandate to continue. But while Kiev's commitment to integration may not be in question, the West's commitment to Ukraine is.

So far, Western willingness to back the new government in Ukraine has not been convincing. Russia's military incursions into Crimea have gone without a significant response, but that can be expected given that Ukraine is not a member of NATO. U.S. and EU sanctions have been levied against Russia but so far have not deterred Putin. And while the West has pledged to offer concrete financial assistance to economically beleaguered Ukraine, very little has actually been transferred -- and the larger sums pledged have come with painful austerity conditions attached.

Kiev has in principle accepted even these conditions, given that Ukraine needs the West more than ever. As the government proceeds with its EU integration efforts, this will necessarily incur greater economic costs from Russia. Moscow will also seek to destabilize the country via other methods, including by raising natural gas prices and stirring up ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine.

Weathering such moves will require tremendous Western support, both economic and political. While the European Union and the United States have demonstrated their ability to help a pro-Western government rise to power in Ukraine, they have yet to demonstrate an ability or willingness to sustain such a government and bring it firmly into the Western fold. The question of the West's commitment may therefore be just as worrisome to the new Ukrainian government as the certainty of Russian retaliation.

Read more: Crimea Joins the East While Ukraine Looks West | Stratfor
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 27, 2014, 12:17:36 PM
Russia Likely Isn't Done
This just in: Russia may not stop with annexing Crimea. A new U.S. intelligence report indicates that Russia may seek to takeover a corridor in Ukraine connecting Russia with Crimea. As one official put it, the assessment is "that the likelihood of a further Russian incursion is more probable than it was previously thought to be." There are tens of thousands of Russian troops amassing at the border with Ukraine, and, while Moscow insists that's for "training exercises," it's clearly meant at the very least to rattle Ukraine and the West. The whole thing even provoked Barack Obama to say something very un-Obama-like. He chastised fellow NATO members for cutting defense spending, saying, "The situation in Ukraine reminds us that our freedom isn't free, and we've got to be willing to pay for the assets, the personnel, the training to make sure we have a credible NATO force and an effective deterrent force." Surely he was reading from the wrong teleprompter.


Patriot Post
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 27, 2014, 12:29:53 PM
Meanwhile Obama guts our military...
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on March 27, 2014, 12:32:00 PM
Meanwhile Obama guts our military...

I wonder if they see the incongruity.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 27, 2014, 12:39:55 PM
It's all about feeding soundbites to the short attention span, low information voters. To them, saying something is just like solving the problem.
Title: WSJ: Border Build Up stokes worry
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 28, 2014, 08:17:33 AM
By Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes
Updated March 28, 2014 7:34 a.m. ET

Russian soldiers stand near a tank outside a former Ukrainian military base near the Crimean capital of Simferopol. Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

WASHINGTON—Russian troops massing near Ukraine are actively concealing their positions and establishing supply lines that could be used in a prolonged deployment, ratcheting up concerns that Moscow is preparing for another major incursion and not conducting exercises as it claims, U.S. officials said.  Such an incursion could take place without warning because Russia has already deployed the array of military forces needed for such an operation, say officials briefed on the latest U.S. intelligence. (Follow the latest developments on the crisis in Ukraine.)

As Russia began its invasion of Crimea last month, Ukraine's fledgling government turned to its armed forces to bolster security. What they found was a badly degraded military, stripped bare by years of neglect and corruption. Photo: EPA


The rapid speed of the Russian military buildup and efforts to camouflage the forces and equipment have stoked U.S. fears, in part because American intelligence agencies have struggled to assess Russian President Vladimir Putin's specific intentions.  The troop movements and the concealment—involving covering up equipment along the border—suggest Mr. Putin is positioning forces in the event he decides to quickly expand his takeover of the Crimea peninsula by seizing more Ukrainian territory, despite Western threats of tighter sanctions.

Still unknown, however, is Mr. Putin's plan, or whether he has one.  The Kremlin has defended the deployments as a legitimate military exercise on Russian soil.

"It's really a question of leadership intentions. Who does Putin tell, if anyone, what his plans are?" a senior Obama administration official said. "He's obviously putting things in place in case he wants to go in. The question is whether a political decision has been made to do so."

A spokesman for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence said U.S. officials are working at understanding the Russian force movements.

"We're actively monitoring the situation in eastern Ukraine, including the massing of Russian troops and materiel at the border," said the spokesman, Shawn Turner.
"Our immediate focus is on providing policy makers with regular intelligence updates and forward-looking analysis of the situation in order to help inform decisions," he added.

The U.S. believes Russia now has nearly 50,000 troops in position for possible operations, including those participating in the declared exercises along the Ukrainian border and those already inside Russian-controlled Crimea, officials said.  U.S. and Western officials previously have said there were 20,000 Russian forces along Ukraine's border, in addition to those inside Crimea, estimated at as many as 25,000.

A senior Ukrainian official said Thursday that the number of Russian troops in the area was closer to 100,000.  A senior U.S. official said that 100,000 figure was "way too high."

"It's not the number that matters most. They have enough to move in now, regardless, and in the right composition to be dangerous," the senior U.S. official said. "What matters is the intent. And we don't have a clear sense of that."

Another senior military official said the Pentagon was increasingly worried that the Russians have moved into place additional supplies including food and spare parts that could both support an exercise or a military incursion into Ukraine. Putting in place the logistics support could allow Russian forces to sustain themselves if they were to cross into eastern Ukraine.

"They are positioning logistics. That is necessary for the exercise but could also be used for further aggression if they choose to go," the senior military official said. "They have in place the capability, capacity and readiness they would need should they choose to conduct further aggression."

Rear Adm. John Kirby, the Pentagon spokesman, said Thursday that Russia has continued to send more troops to its border with Ukraine.  While Russia has said the troops were sent to the border to conduct military exercises, Adm. Kirby said the U.S. has "seen no specific indications that exercises are taking place."

U.S. spy agencies have struggled to intercept telltale communications in which Russian leaders, military commanders or front-line troops have indicated their military plans, said U.S. officials.  Intelligence officials are using an array of intelligence tools, including imagery and human sources to discern Russia's next moves.  Russia is often very good at operational security and may be working actively to not voice intentions because they know they might be overheard, U.S. officials say. 

A U.S. official said the U.S. is tracking the Russian efforts closely and has "visibility into the Russian troop buildup along the Ukrainian border."  The senior Obama administration official acknowledged the difficulty of collecting intelligence about Russian intentions, calling the country a "hard target."  Military officials said the camouflaging has further complicated U.S. efforts to assess the size and scope of the military forces being put in place.

"They have moved into concealed positions," said a senior military official.  The official said concealment could be aimed at obscuring images taken by American spy satellites.
The concealment effort may also be designed to obscure location and size of their force from the Ukrainian military.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu has told U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel that Russia has no designs to invade Ukraine but the Pentagon is concerned that the Russian minister isn't the final word on Russia's intentions in the region.  On Tuesday, U.K. Defense Minister Philip Hammond expressed concerns that Mr. Putin is directly controlling strategy and that the views of ministers like Mr. Shoigu may be "moot."

Adm. Kirby said Wednesday that the Pentagon shares that concern.
Title: How could we go to war with ourselves?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 29, 2014, 03:13:21 PM
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/29/world/europe/russianborder.html?emc=edit_th_20140329&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193
Title: Nice country ya got there; it would be a shame if anything happened to it , , ,
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 31, 2014, 08:11:25 AM
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/31/russia-ukraine-deal-troops-lavrov-kerry
Title: Re: Nice country ya got there; it would be a shame if anything happened to it , , ,
Post by: G M on March 31, 2014, 08:37:18 AM
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/31/russia-ukraine-deal-troops-lavrov-kerry

Has Lurch promised us peace in our time yet?
Title: More pressure for referendums in eastern Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 09, 2014, 08:21:41 AM
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303873604579490860377829796?mod=WSJ_hppMIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsSecond&mg=reno64-wsj
Title: Ukraine, Russian Military Takeover Of police headquarters In Kramatorsk
Post by: DougMacG on April 14, 2014, 06:12:59 AM
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ivO9nSRrfuY[/youtube]

pro-Russian forces taking control of the police headquarters in Kramatorsk

Takeover Of A Local Government Building In Kramatorsk, In The Donetsk Oblast of Ukraine, April 12, 2014

A video that clearly shows the ontology of the takeover of a local government building in Kramatorsk, in the Donetsk region. First, organized spetsnaz teams enter--guns blazing. They are followed by organized bands of less well armed "titushky" ( paid $ 500 if they participate in a takeover) and these are followed by local protestors--mainly poor, some ideological-- (many of whom are reportedly encouraged with payments of $50 for participation in protests). Phase one and two of such a takeover is chillingly recorded in this video. This is a planned, military and paramilitary operation.
Title: Berlin Wall (year?) Hungary 1956; Czechslovakia 1968, Ukraine 2014
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 14, 2014, 11:29:16 AM
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304117904579499762012132306?mod=trending_now_4


By
Matthew Kaminski
Updated April 14, 2014 5:39 a.m. ET

Kiev, Ukraine

'We're the chosen generation," says Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Ukraine's interim prime minister. He's referring to all those who made this winter's European revolution. For the first time since 1654, when Ukrainian Cossacks formed a fateful alliance with Moscow against Polish rulers, Ukrainians are heading back West.

Their timing is terrible. Two decades ago, when the Berlin Wall fell, the West embraced another generation of Eastern Europeans. Ukraine has gotten a different welcoming committee. An economically feeble European Union gorges on Russian energy and dirty money while lecturing Ukraine on Western values but refusing to defend it. Asking for Washington's help against Russian attack, Kiev finds a man "chosen" in the past two presidential elections to get America out of the world's trouble spots.

Vladimir Putin sees a West made soft by money, led by weak men and women, unwilling to make sacrifices to defend their so-called ideals. In the Ukrainian crisis, the image fits. Russia's president is many things, but most of all he is resolute. He took the EU and America's measure and annexed Crimea last month at minimal cost. Ignoring Western pleas for "de-escalation," Russia this weekend invaded eastern Ukraine. Just don't look for video of T-72 tanks rolling across the borders, not yet at least.

Russian intelligence and special forces on Saturday directed local crime bosses and thugs in coordinated attacks on police stations and other government buildings in towns across eastern Ukraine. These men were dressed and equipped like the elite Russian special forces ("little green men," as Ukrainians called them) who took Crimea. Ukrainian participants got the equivalent of $500 to storm and $40 to occupy buildings, according to journalists who spoke to them. Fighting broke out on Sunday in Slovyansk, a sleepy town in the working-class Donbas region that hadn't seen any "pro-Russia" protests. A Ukrainian security officer was killed.

Kiev is on a war footing. Radio commercials ask for donations to the defense budget by mobile-telephone texts. The government's decision to cede Crimea without firing a shot cost the defense minister his job and wasn't popular. Western praise for Ukrainians' "restraint" got them nothing. The fight for Ukraine's east will be different.

This invasion was stealthy enough to let Brussels and Washington not use the i-word in their toothless statements. The EU's high representative, Catherine Ashton, called herself "gravely concerned" and commended Ukraine's "measured response." There was no mention of sanctions or blame. The U.S. State Department on Saturday said that John Kerry warned his diplomatic counterpart, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, that "if Russia did not take steps to de-escalate in eastern Ukraine and move its troops back from Ukraine's border, there would be additional consequences."

By now, the Ukrainians ought to have seen enough to know that they're on their own. Moscow has reached the same conclusion. These perceptions of the West are shaping events.

A month ago, the EU sanctioned 21 marginal Russian officials and quickly tried to get back to business as usual. On Friday, the U.S. added to its sanctions list seven Russian citizens and one company, all in Crimea. What a relief for Moscow's elites, who were speculating in recent days about who might end up on the list. Slovyansk fell the next day.


Any revolution brings a hangover. Ukrainians expected problems: an economic downturn, some of the old politics-as-usual in Kiev, including fisticuffs last week in parliament, and trouble from Russia. Abandonment by the West is the unexpected blow. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians fought, and 100 died, for their chance to join the world's democracies.

As an institution, the EU always found excuses to deny Ukraine the prospect of membership in the bloc one day. But Bill Clinton and George W. Bush never recognized Russian domination over Ukraine. Billions were spent—Kiev was the third-largest recipient of U.S. aid in the 1990s—and American promises were made to protect Ukraine's sovereignty. In return, Ukraine took active part in NATO discussions and missions, sending thousands of troops to the Balkans and Iraq.

When Russia invaded Crimea and massed 40,000 or more troops in the east, Ukraine turned to an old friend, the United States, and asked for light arms, antitank weapons, intelligence help and nonlethal aid. The Obama administration agreed to deliver 300,000 meals-ready-to-eat. As this newspaper reported Friday, military transport planes were deemed too provocative for Russia, so the food was shipped by commercial trucks. The administration refused Kiev's requests for intelligence-sharing and other supplies, lethal or not.

Boris Tarasiuk, Ukraine's former foreign minister, barely disguises his anger. He says: "We've not seen the same reaction from the U.S." as during Russia's 2008 attack on Georgia. U.S. Navy warships were deployed off the Georgian Black Sea coast. Large Air Force transport planes flew into Tbilisi with emergency humanitarian supplies. But who really knew for sure what was on board the planes? That was the point. Russian troops on the road to the Georgian capital saw them above and soon after turned back. The Bush administration dropped the ball on follow-up sanctions but may have saved Georgia.

By contrast, the Obama administration seems to think that pre-emptive concessions will pacify Mr. Putin. So the president in March ruled out U.S. military intervention in Ukraine. Maybe, but why say so? Late last month at a news conference in Brussels, Mr. Obama also openly discouraged the idea of Georgia or Ukraine joining NATO.

The next diplomatic "off ramp" touted by the Obama administration will be the negotiations involving Russia, Ukraine, the EU and the U.S. scheduled for later this week. Petro Poroshenko, the leading Ukrainian presidential candidate, tells me that these "talks for the sake of talks" send "a very wrong signal" about the West's commitment to sanctions. It's a case of the blind faith in "diplomacy" undermining diplomacy. See the Obama record on Syria for the past three years.

The West looks scared of Russia, which encourages Mr. Putin's bullying. But on the Ukrainian side, the sense of abandonment brings unappreciated consequences. Ukraine's political elites have taken into account that Russia could reimpose its will—perhaps that anticorruption law demanded by the EU isn't so necessary after all?

While millions of Ukrainians have united against Russia, out in the east of the country many people are fence-sitters. The fight there, as in Crimea, won't be over any genuine desire to rejoin Russia. Before last month, polls in Crimea and eastern Ukraine put support for separatists in single digits. But the locals' historical memory teaches them to respect force and side with winners. Left to fend for itself by the West, Ukraine looks like a loser to them, notes Kiev academic Andreas Umland.

The U.S. Army won't save Slovyansk. But Ukraine expects and deserves America's support by every other means that Washington has refused so far. Betrayal is an ugly word and an uglier deed. Europe and the U.S. will pay dearly for it in Ukraine.

Mr. Kaminski is a member of the Journal's editorial board.
Title: WSJ: Russia's second invasion
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 14, 2014, 02:38:43 PM
second post

President Obama is dispatching Vice President Joe Biden to Kiev next week in a show of Western support against Russian intimidation, but the Veep may want to speed up his deployment. By then Vladimir Putin may already have annexed another chunk of Ukraine.

As our Matt Kaminski reports nearby from Kiev, the Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine may already be underway. Masked and armed Russian speakers with the distinct look of special forces, but no military insignias, took over police stations and other locations in much of Ukraine's east over the weekend. This was the Russian president's stealth mode of invasion in Crimea. By the time the West figured out what was going on, the deed was done.
Opinion Video

Editorial page editor Paul Gigot on Kiev's reaction to Russia's invasion of eastern Ukraine. Photo credit: Getty Images.

The difference this time is that Ukraine is responding with at least some force of its own. The Kiev government is mobilizing its military for what it called a "large-scale antiterrorist operation" in the east. "We won't allow Russia to repeat the Crimean scenario in the eastern regions of the country," said acting President Oleksandr Turchynov.

Gun battles in Slovyansk and elsewhere have already produced casualties, and the violence may be exactly what Mr. Putin wants as a pretext to send in larger forces in the name of protecting Russian-speaking minorities. This too was part of the Crimea playbook. So much for the diplomatic "off-ramp" that Mr. Obama keeps beseeching Mr. Putin to take. The only off-ramp the Russian wants is inside Ukraine and points west.

Mr. Kaminski also reports on how the Obama Administration rejected Kiev's pleas for military aid that could be useful now and might have even given the Kremlin cause to slow its revanchism. Instead Mr. Putin has seen the flimsy Western response to Crimea, following Mr. Obama's climbdown on Syria, and he has calculated he can move without fear of serious economic sanctions or a military buildup inside front-line NATO countries.

Mr. Putin may also calculate that raising the military pressure on Ukraine will help achieve what he wants without a full-scale invasion. This week envoys from the EU, U.S., Ukraine and Russia are set to meet to discuss a diplomatic solution. Mr. Putin's solution is to impose conditions on Kiev that include Russian as a second national language, a pledge not to join NATO or the EU, and a "federalist" reform that would make eastern parts of Ukraine essentially self-governing. Eventually the autonomous regions might choose to join Russia.

Mr. Putin would like nothing better than to get the EU and U.S. to tell Kiev that it has little choice but to accept these terms or risk a full-fledged invasion. If Kiev still resists, the West would have given Mr. Putin another pretext to invade his neighbor to defend his fellow Russian-speakers. With this second military action in weeks, the U.S. ought to drop its illusion that Mr. Putin is interested in diplomacy. His real goal is to redraw the postwar map of Europe to Russia's advantage, with faux diplomacy if he can, by force if necessary.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on April 14, 2014, 03:16:03 PM
Well, Putin was promised more flexibility in Obama's second term.
Title: Re: Ukraine, US pays Russia $1 Billion, invasion pays handsomely
Post by: DougMacG on April 14, 2014, 09:50:22 PM
We not only prevented Ukraine from fighting back by disarming them, we are paying Russia for their trouble.
It seems wrong to me.

US Pays Half Of Gazprom's Overdue Invoice With $1 Billion Ukraine Loan Guarantee
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-04-14/us-treasury-pays-half-gazproms-overdue-bill-1-billion-ukraine-loan-guarantee
Title: Uke govt fires on Russki rowdies
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 15, 2014, 04:43:02 PM


http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303887804579502892789915218?mod=WSJ_hp_RightTopStories&mg=reno64-wsj
Title: WSJ: Shocking development-- deal breaks down
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 18, 2014, 02:10:50 PM
Eastern Ukraine's Pro-Russian Activists Stand Fast
Rebels Say They Have No Intention of Leaving, Despite Geneva Agreement
By Paul Sonne in Donetsk, Ukraine and Gregory L. White in Moscow
Updated April 18, 2014 4:52 p.m. ET

Pro-Russian activists in eastern Ukraine said Friday they had no plans to vacate the government buildings they have occupied, despite the compromise agreement calling for that. Paul Sonne reports. Photo: Getty.

Pro-Russian activists in eastern Ukraine refused to vacate the government facilities they have occupied, defying a compromise agreement struck a day earlier by international powers, including Russia, that called on them to leave.

Denis Pushilin, the leader of the uprising that calls itself the People's Republic of Donetsk, said at a news conference in the southeast Ukrainian city's seized administration building that the activists wouldn't exit until the new leaders in Kiev leave the government, which he said they have been occupying unlawfully since late February.

"After that, we'll also agree to do it," Mr. Pushilin said. Instead, he said he and other activists in the building were continuing to prepare for a referendum on the southeast Ukraine region's future, which they intend to hold by May 11. We will defend our interests "until the last drop of blood if necessary" against the "Kiev junta," he said. (Follow the latest updates on the crisis in Ukraine.)

The activists' refusal seemed to undermine a deal reached Thursday in Geneva by Ukraine, Russia, the U.S. and the European Union, aimed at neutralizing a crisis that has plunged Ukraine into political and civil disarray and thrown Russia and the West into their deepest conflict since the end of the Soviet Union.

Pro-Russian protesters tie a banner on barricades placed in front of the seized office of the SBU state security service in Luhansk, eastern Ukraine, on Friday. Reuters

It also appeared to confirm dwindling hope by the new powers in Kiev that the joint statement released at the close of the Geneva negotiations would translate into substantive results. "We don't have any excessive expectations from this statement," Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk told the country's parliament in Kiev on Friday, referring to the statement.

Late Friday, Mr. Yatsenyuk and acting President Oleksandr Turchynov announced what they said was a sweeping constitutional-reform plan aimed at addressing many of the concerns of their opponents in Ukraine's east, where many residents speak Russian and are wary of Kiev's new pro-Western leadership.

The plan calls for replacing appointed mayors and regional governors with officials elected locally and giving regional governments more power to determine how budget funds are spent. The plan would also allow towns, cities and regions to independently determine whether to make Russian an official language alongside Ukrainian. Language rights have been a central issue for protesters.

But hopes the reform plan would win parliamentary approval Friday fell short as Communist legislators, as well as those from the Party of Regions, which is particularly strong in the east and the party of deposed President Viktor Yanukovych, refused to back it. Messrs. Yatsenyuk and Turchynov said they hoped for passage soon.

Mr. Yatsenyuk said Ukraine's new government has prepared a draft law granting amnesty to any protesters on either side who give up their weapons and leave occupied buildings. In Kiev, pro-Western protesters who helped usher Mr. Yanukovych's ouster have continued to occupy the city's main Independence Square and some nearby buildings.

Kiev and its Western allies say Moscow has incited the separatist uprising in eastern Ukraine, a charge the Kremlin has denied. Western diplomats say they aren't optimistic that Russia will follow through and help force the militants to disarm and vacate the occupied buildings across eastern Ukraine. Russian officials say they have no influence over those protesters.

Russia's Foreign Ministry issued a statement Friday evening saying it was disappointed with U.S. official responses to the Geneva deal and accused Washington of stubbornly supporting the Kiev government in what Moscow called its determination to use force against pro-Russian protesters in the east. The Foreign Ministry said the Geneva deal's call on protesters to give up weapons and occupied buildings should apply first to those in Kiev, "who participated in the February coup."

Donetsk activist leader Mr. Pushilin began his news conference earlier Friday with a nearly identical comment. But he said Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who signed off on the statement in Geneva, "didn't sign anything for us, he signed on behalf of the Russian Federation." Mr. Pushilin said he isn't receiving any money from Russia.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has been tasked with assisting the effort to disarm the activists. But diplomats said the organization doesn't have the personnel on the ground in Ukraine to implement the disarmament effectively.

Mr. Pushilin denounced the new authorities in Kiev for sending in the Ukrainian military to try to control the situation in the country's east—an "antiterrorist" operation launched earlier this week that so far has yielded few results.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Deshchytsia said whether military action continues will depend on whether the activists respond to the demands articulated in Geneva.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said Thursday he hoped not to send Russian troops into Ukraine but didn't rule it out, accusing the Kiev government of committing "a serious crime" by using the military to quell unrest. Paul Sonne reports. Photo: AP.

"As far as the antiterrorist operation goes, it is continuing and its intensity will depend on whether there is any real fulfillment of the [Geneva] agreement," Mr. Deshchytsia told the Interfax news agency. Ukrainian authorities have said they put the operation on hold for the duration of the Easter holidays.

The Kiev government and Western officials have said some of the armed men in unmarked uniforms aren't local residents but Russian special-forces troops who are leading the uprising, as they did in Crimea. Moscow and the protesters in eastern Ukraine deny that, describing the events as an independent uprising.

Anti-Kiev activists who continue to hold municipal and security buildings across cities in southeast Ukraine have shown no sign of retreat.

Gun-wielding men traveling in an armed personnel carrier with protest flags rolled into the village of Seversk on Friday and took down the Ukrainian flag on the city administration building before speeding away, according to photos, an official at the local information site and the police department spokeswoman.

When the Ukrainian military arrived in such armed personnel carriers during the "antiterrorist operation" earlier this week, a number of the vehicles ended up being seized by angry activists. Ukrainian authorities said Friday that they had recovered two of the six vehicles.

In the city of Slovyansk, a hotbed of anti-Kiev sentiment in Ukraine's east, protesters who have taken control of the city administration building announced Friday that the city's mayor, Nelya Shtepa, was in their custody. "She is currently with us," an activist announced outside the building, saying the activists had decided to protect her after she had given up power. It wasn't immediately clear whether she had been taken hostage or was, in fact, in the building.

Outside the city, unidentified masked men with automatic weapons took control of the main television transmission tower for the area on Thursday and turned off Ukrainian channels, leaving only state-controlled Russian news that was broadcasting snippets from an annual televised phone-in session by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Ukraine's central state broadcasting operation in Kiev responded by shutting off electricity to the facility early Friday, causing the armed men to leave, according to a top official from the state transmission operator, who said the tower services about a million people. The official said the men showed up again hours later with more than double the force and managed to hook up electricity from another source.

Two masked men in green camouflage outfits, who stood outside the facility with automatic weapons on Friday, declined to discuss the situation or allow entrance to the television tower.

The news conference Friday in Donetsk, held by rebels who took control of the central regional administration building there on April 6 and proclaimed an independent "people's republic" the following day, showed the challenge Kiev faces in holding together Ukraine.

"To call us criminals and terrorists for occupying buildings, while calling the people in Kiev who have done the exact same thing heroes, is at the very least not right," Mr. Pushilin said. He echoed Mr. Putin's long-standing criticism that the West operates on a system of double standards when it comes to Russia.

Both Russian officials and activists in Ukraine's east have sought to present the recent seizure of buildings in the region as an equivalent response to the actions pro-Europe protesters took in Kiev in late 2013 and earlier this year.

The activists in Donetsk are demanding a referendum on the future of the largely Russian-speaking region, the home of the deposed Mr. Yanukovych, which has long had closer relations with Russia than much of the rest of Ukraine.

But when pressed on Friday, neither Mr. Pushilin nor other leaders of the uprising could say what exact question they hope to pose on any referendum on the region's "self determination." Mr. Pushilin said it would be the question of the Donetsk region's "sovereignty." Asked if that meant the region would stay part of Ukraine, he said he wouldn't rule it out.

Alexander Khryakov, another leader in the uprising, said the question was being formulated by experts and leaders and couldn't be described yet. Mr. Khryakov said his personal preference is a return to the Soviet Union, which would make the region part of the same country as Russia.

Mr. Khryakov said that authorities in Brussels and Washington, with their support of Kiev, have wakened the "Russian bear." He said: "The Russian bear is us, who stand for the all the hopes of our people here."

—Olga Padorina contributed to this article.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 20, 2014, 01:50:28 PM
An Independent Ukraine Hangs Between Life and Death
The Geneva agreement on Thursday was a diplomatic masterpiece—for Putin.
By Charles Fairbanks
April 18, 2014 6:55 p.m. ET

Le Monde reported a few days ago that the eastern Ukrainian town of Slovyansk, "where no one stops in normal times," was the "epicenter of an historical drama that goes beyond it: the Ukrainian state finds itself between life and death." Vladimir Putin has been chewing off pieces of eastern Ukraine in professional special-forces operations.

What most news coverage isn't reporting is the failure of several major Ukrainian military efforts to retake the public centers seized by the Russians. As Piotr Smolar writes in Le Monde, the new Ukrainian government has revealed itself to be "without a real army, unable to lean on Western military support, incapable of insuring itself by the loyalty of the [security] services (SBU) or of the police."


This Ukrainian government—which has to assure the legitimacy of an election that will take place nationwide in little more than a month—is now under assault by foreign troops. It cannot survive without the forces that Max Weber defined as the very essence of the modern state.

What is happening now in these dreary provincial towns really is a matter of life or death for Ukraine. The country didn't exist as an independent state until 1991, and it may not survive as one into next year.

There was a heady sense of liberation this winter when the Maidan protesters in Kiev won, but the new government cannot survive the revelation that it is making empty threats against aggressors it can never fulfill. Beyond what the Russian attacks can gobble up in eastern Ukraine, Moscow can expose the new government as unable to cope with a crisis of national survival.

It is easy to deride Kiev's responses, but its new leaders are in the same situation as the Russian provisional government of 1917 after the fall of the czar. They are a disparate collection of politicians and activists, floated to the top of the govenrment by waves of still surging change, who must improvise the means of self-defense in a government rusted away by corruption, with an empty treasury, a foreign army penetrating deeper into the country, and friends from abroad who offer plenty of free advice but never act.

President Obama, David Ignatius wrote on April 17 in the Washington Post, GHC +1.81% "appears, for now, to have averted war. Each side can reasonably claim success." Is that so? The agreement reached on Thursday in Geneva does say occupied buildings and squares "must" be vacated, in return for an amnesty and all sides' promise to refrain from "violence, intimidation or provocative actions." In other words, Ukraine's attempt to assert its sovereignty on its own soil must stop.

And so Ukraine will come under the tutelage of the other powers that met in Geneva. Which ones specifically—the United States, the European Union, or Russia? The answer becomes clear not in the text of the Geneva agreement but in events on the ground.

Leaders of Mr. Putin's puppet "People's Republic of Donetsk" immediately announced that they had no intention of fulfilling the agreement. And why should they? They didn't participate in the negotiations. And who will persuade them? Only Russia possibly could, because Russia put them there, arms them, pays them and gives them instructions.

Under the Geneva agreement, we give Russia concessions in the hope that Moscow will be able to influence the puppet government it imposed. Geneva will in practice give Russia an international benediction for interfering in eastern Ukraine. Henceforth Russia has one more lever. The first, in use since the invasion of Crimea, is covert action with military special forces. The second will now be the international effort to negotiate a "solution."

It is a diplomatic masterpiece—for Mr. Putin. With the Geneva agreement, Russia has advanced considerably toward its goal of federalizing Ukraine and creating puppet domains carved into its eastern border, like South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made this clear in his revealing news conference.

The agreement specifies that "the announced constitutional process"—of drafting a new Ukrainian constitution—"will be inclusive, transparent and accountable. It will include the immediate establishment of a broad national dialogue, with outreach to all of Ukraine's regions and political constituencies, and allow for the consideration of public comments and proposed amendments."

Mr. Lavrov explains: "That is the essence of our agreement of today. . . . It is important that those who took over power in Kiev as a result of the coup . . . listen to [the regions'] worries, sit with them and begin negotiations on settling concrete problems of security in this or that settlement." So, for Russia, Geneva implies Ukrainian government recognition of the secessionist "governments" put "in power" by mobs of a couple of hundred people, in provinces of millions, and sometimes controlling only the buildings they sit in.

Russia wants the "federalization" of Ukraine. Federalization is newspeak for partition. Until Geneva, we kept this demand at bay. Russia hopes to reach it by what the U.S. has now agreed to. Russia's foreign ministry said of the Geneva agreement's disarmament provision that it includes "the militias of the right sector and other fascist groups, who participated in the February coup in Kiev."

The Geneva agreement will break down, probably soon, amid more Russian military moves and threats. Then, with our endless appetite for negotiation, we will go back to the table, no doubt to make more concessions.

So far all the American and European countermeasures, including Thursday's agreement, belong to a virtual reality native to politics: things you do to seem to be doing something, not to achieve any aim. They don't deflect Mr. Putin but further discredit the public space indispensable to a republican government.

The saving grace, if there is one, is that in the past week some in Europe are beginning to wake up to what is really happening. For the first time there is a note of real urgency in European journalism close to some governments. The question is finally being asked: What if an independent Ukraine does not survive?

With Ukraine's partition, occupation or dissolution into chaos, the order America helped to establish in the region after 1991 will also come tumbling down. And the crash will reverberate world-wide. If President Obama will not defend the arrangements achieved by three earlier presidents over 20 years, everything our efforts and sacrifices achieved since the end of the Cold War will be eroded as quickly as sand castles with the tide.

Mr. Fairbanks is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. He served as deputy assistant secretary of state in the Ronald Reagan administration.
Title: 12 Tribes
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 21, 2014, 10:50:07 AM
‘Grotesque’ fliers warn Jews in Ukraine

 


Click here to watch: ‘Grotesque’ fliers warn Jews in Ukraine
U.S. officials Thursday denounced what one called a "grotesque" leaflet ordering Jews in one eastern Ukrainian city to register with a government office, but the Jewish community there dismissed it as a "provocation. The fliers were handed out by masked men in front the main synagogue in Donetsk, where pro-Russian protesters have declared a "People's Republic," Jewish leaders there said. The document warned the city's Jews to register and document their property or face deportation, according to a CNN translation of one of the leaflets. Geoffrey Pyatt, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, told CNN's "The Lead with Jake Tapper" that a respected Jewish leader in Ukraine showed him a photograph of one of the leaflets. He called the document "chilling." And in Geneva, where diplomats held emergency talks on the Ukrainian crisis, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry called the leaflets "grotesque" and "beyond unacceptable."
Watch Here
But the Jewish community statement said relations between the Jews of Donetsk and their neighbors were amicable, and the self-proclaimed head of the "People's Republic," Denis Pushilin, denied any connection to the fliers. Pushilin told CNN the handwriting on the flier wasn't his, and the title attached to his name was not one he uses. It wasn't clear who had distributed the leaflets, but the chief rabbi of nearby Dnipropetrovsk said, "Everything must be done to catch them." "It's important for everyone to know its not true," said the rabbi, Shmuel Kaminezki. "The Jews of Donetsk will not do what the letter says. The reports come as Ukraine's Western-backed interim government has been struggling to contain uprisings by pro-Russian political movements in several eastern cities, with both sides invoking the historical horror of Nazism in their disputes. Pyatt told CNN that radical groups may be trying to stir up historic fears or create a provocation to justify further violence. "It's chilling. I was disgusted by these leaflets," Pyatt said. "Especially in Ukraine, a country that suffered so terribly under the Nazis, that was one of the sites of the worst violence of the Holocaust. To drag up this kind of rhetoric is almost beyond belief." The leaflets were handed out on Tuesday, during the Jewish holiday of Passover, the Jewish community statement said. They stated that registration was required because Jewish leaders had supported the "nationalists and bandits" in Kiev, where a popular revolt ousted pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych in February.
Source: CNN


Title: Ukraine sold its best weapons for cash
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 27, 2014, 08:02:11 PM
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/apr/23/sold-out-ukraines-leadership-swapped-best-military/
Title: Russian market up again on Obama's sanctions
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 29, 2014, 03:46:33 AM
Russia's Obama Rally
The latest weak sanctions cheer investors in Moscow.
April 28, 2014 7:23 p.m. ET

The U.S. and European Union imposed more sanctions on Russia Monday, and both the ruble and Moscow stock index rallied, the latter up 1.5%. The markets didn't take this response to the Kremlin's war on Ukraine seriously, and neither will Vladimir Putin.


Secretary of State John Kerry last week used blistering language to describe Moscow's actions in eastern Ukraine. He was right. Russian special forces and local separatists have stormed government offices and threatened journalists and opponents. Some were tortured, a couple killed. The independent mayor of Kharkiv, Ukraine's second-largest city, was shot Monday in an assassination attempt.

On Friday, the Russian-sponsored warlords who hold the provincial city of Slovyansk took hostage monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. These are the monitors the U.S. insisted be allowed to oversee the truce Mr. Kerry negotiated only two weeks ago.

Yet President Obama delayed the announcement of new sanctions and then watered them down. The White House targeted seven more Russian officials, barring them from travelling or banking in the U.S., and it added 17 companies linked to Putin cronies who were already sanctioned. The EU followed on Monday by sanctioning 15 Russian and Ukrainian officials, but its list includes fewer top officials and no companies.

The one notable name on the U.S. list is Igor Sechin, a close Putin friend and a Kremlin hard-liner. Mr. Sechin runs the state-owned oil company Rosneft, whose best assets were plundered from Yukos, a private company destroyed by the Kremlin a decade ago. He joins a few other close Putin friends whom the Administration—in the one notably bold American move of the whole Ukrainian crisis—sanctioned five weeks ago, soon after the annexation of Crimea. His absence was an oversight corrected on Monday.

This round of sanctions is once again more notable for what wasn't done. Gazprom OGZPY -2.51% boss Alexei Miller, who carried Mr. Putin's bags during his days atop the KGB in the late 1990s, was considered. President Obama took him off, according to several news reports.
Enlarge Image

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Rosneft's President Igor Sechin Getty Images

None of the Russian outrages in eastern Ukraine, with many to choose from, were sufficient for the Administration to go after prominent energy or financial companies. The Kremlin and the markets feared the U.S. would target Gazprom, an important instrument of Russian foreign policy and crony enrichment. Vneshtorgbank VTBR.MZ +2.41% and Sberbank, SBER.MZ +0.89% the savings bank, are other arms of the Russian state that might have been included.

Sanctions on entire sectors of the economy would be more effective and potentially damaging. In the end the Administration didn't even sanction Rosneft, taking away the bite of including Mr. Sechin. Rosneft's shares still fell 1.7% on investor concerns about the future of the company's ventures with BP BP.LN +0.85% and ExxonMobil. XOM +0.76% But Gazprom was up over 2%, Sberbank 5%. Call it Moscow's Obama rally.

The White House defends this "calibrated" approach as necessary to make sure Europe comes along. But Europe is always going to resist unless the U.S. is willing to go it alone, and then it may come along. That's what happened on Iran.

Sanctions only make sense if they cause enough economic pain to make Russians begin to question the wisdom of Kremlin imperialism. Otherwise they make the West look weak and disunited. This is exactly what Mr. Putin is counting on, and so far he's been right.
Title: Obama's spam vs. Putin's SF
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 03, 2014, 09:00:06 AM
Ukraine Needs U.S. Military Aid
Obama offers Spam while Putin sends in special forces.


May 2, 2014 6:51 p.m. ET

The battle for Ukraine is entering a dangerous new phase, as the Kiev government is finally making an attempt to regain control over its eastern cities from local thugs and Russian special forces. Is it too much to ask the U.S. to offer the military means to help Ukraine keeps its own territory?

Vladimir Putin's campaign to destabilize and disrupt his neighbor is escalating as the May 25 date to elect a new Ukrainian government nears. The Russian strongman wants to block the vote, or disrupt it enough so he can call it illegitimate. His Russian-sponsored fighters moved this week from smaller towns in eastern Ukraine to the regional centers of Donetsk and Luhansk, taking key government installations.


The interim authorities in Kiev, which came into office after Moscow crony and President Viktor Yanukovych fled this winter, has dithered. Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov on Wednesday said the Ukrainian state had no authority in the east, a demoralizing and questionable admission. Seizing an opening, Mr. Putin the next day told Kiev to withdraw from the east and sue for peace. The Ukrainians might as well send him the keys to the capital.

We're told the assault launched on Friday reflects a change in approach and a commitment to push back. The "restraint" shown by Kiev in Crimea and in the east—which President Obama praised again on Friday—has frustrated most Ukrainians and failed to stop the Russian advance. The interim government might have faced an uprising in Kiev over its defeatist approach.

Russian gains in the east will nonetheless be hard to reverse given the weakness of Kiev's government and military. Ukrainian forces moved Friday against the Russian-held town of Slovyansk, strategically located on the road between Donetsk and Kharkiv, the country's second-largest city. Two Ukrainian helicopters were shot down, showing how well-armed and trained the Russian-backed forces are.

A Kremlin spokesman claimed the operation "effectively destroys all hope for" the peace deal reached last month in Geneva. Cue the laughter in Moscow. Russia all along merely used Geneva as cover for its destabilization strategy, and its boys in Slovyansk are still holding as hostages seven foreign monitors who were sent to implement Geneva.

Yet eastern Ukrainians are hardly rushing to secede and join Russia. Though skeptical of the new authorities in Kiev, easterners are even more opposed to Russian intervention. No leading politician among remaining Yanukovych allies has gone over to Moscow's side. Pro-Ukraine demonstrations in the southeast are large, and the Russians have tried to beat them into silence. Some three dozen people died on Friday during clashes in Odessa.

Ukraine is desperately seeking Western military help, but so far the U.S. has refused. Earlier this week in Manila, President Obama tetchily addressed his Ukraine policy, saying, "Well, what else should we be doing?" He offered another rhetorical question: "Do people actually think that somehow us sending some additional arms into Ukraine could potentially deter the Russian army?"

Well, who knows? Mr. Putin could crush Ukraine if he wants to send in the tanks, but he also knows the political cost of an invasion would be high. That's why he prefers destabilization with special forces, hostage-taking, murder and thuggery. Defensive but lethal weapons for Ukraine—anti-tank mines or artillery, modern guns—would raise the cost and risk of this intervention.

But Mr. Obama is so worried about upsetting Mr. Putin that he refused to send even night-vision goggles, offering 300,000 meals-ready-to-eat instead. The Ukrainians are battling to free themselves of Russian domination and build a European democracy. They deserve more than Spam in a can from America.
Title: Stratfor: Poland and Lithuania seeking closer military ties with Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 03, 2014, 09:11:31 AM
second post of the day


Summary

Poland and Lithuania are working with Ukraine to establish stronger trilateral military ties after the recent political transition in Kiev. Knowing that NATO membership for Ukraine is unlikely because of resistance from other European countries and Russia, Warsaw and Vilnius -- two of Europe's strongest advocates for closer relations with Kiev -- hope to use the trilateral partnership to strengthen the Ukrainian military's Western orientation and build a closer alliance with Kiev. The Ukrainian political crisis and tensions with Russia mean Kiev is more willing than it has been in the past to forge such ties, but persistent political instability and Kiev's constant balancing act between the West and Russia call into question the potential strengthening of military ties between Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine.
Analysis

In recent months, Polish, Lithuanian and Ukrainian officials have met several times to discuss forging stronger trilateral military relations. These plans for deeper military ties are not new, but they have been postponed over the years largely because of a lack of political will in Kiev. The political transition in Kiev has given Vilnius and Warsaw an opportunity to assist Ukraine and finally strengthen ties.

During an April 22 meeting with his Ukrainian counterpart, Mikhail Koval, Lithuanian Defense Minister Juozas Olekas said Lithuania was willing to offer Ukraine assistance in restructuring its defense forces. Since Poland and Lithuania went through drastic military reforms to join NATO after the fall of the Soviet Union and are still making reforms, their assistance and experience likely would help Kiev improve ties with Western military forces on a technical level and could aid potential reforms within the Ukrainian military.

Beyond assisting Ukraine with reforms, Poland and Lithuania are pushing for more long-term institutional ties through a three-country joint brigade. Warsaw, Vilnius and Kiev agreed to set up this force in 2009, but tensions between Poland and Lithuania as well as Kiev's lack of political will to strengthen defense ties kept the brigade from materializing. The agreement to form the joint brigade was made while the Western-oriented Viktor Yushchenko was the president of Ukraine, but its implementation was delayed after Viktor Yanukovich's victory in the presidential election of 2010.
Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine
Click to Enlarge

The aim of the joint brigade would be to have a small permanent staff with representation from all three countries headquartered in Poland to plan joint training and eventually joint missions under NATO, EU or U.N. mandates. Setting up the joint brigade likely would not encounter many technical hurdles, especially since operational ties between Poland and Ukraine were quite strong from 1998 to 2010. Ukrainian forces were engaged in the Iraq War under Polish leadership, and Poland and Ukraine jointly participated in the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, at times with Lithuanian forces. The past collaboration between Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine was tied into NATO operations, several of which Ukraine has been a part of as a partner country. Warsaw and Vilnius likely hope that their efforts to strengthen trilateral ties will also help Ukraine integrate further with NATO.

As a result of the confrontation between the West and Russia, calls from the West and within Ukraine to give Kiev clearer prospects for joining the European Union and NATO have grown louder. However, Ukraine's membership in these institutions remains unlikely. The new government in Kiev has noted that it is not seeking NATO membership at this time. Moreover, important Western European countries such as Germany and France are willing to support the new Ukrainian government but -- as in the past -- are hesitant to fully integrate Ukraine with Western institutions, fearing the high cost of integration and the possibility of souring relations with Russia.

However, Poland and Lithuania are more interested in Ukraine's Western orientation than other European countries are, and thus want stronger military ties with Ukraine in anticipation of the difficulties associated with formally integrating it with NATO. Whether Warsaw and Vilnius succeed greatly depends on the future political stability of Ukraine and the nature of the Ukrainian government. The current leadership in Kiev is interested in strengthening military ties with Western countries as tensions with Russia persist, so more formal ties with Poland and Lithuania are likely. However, because domestic instability has created numerous new challenges for the Ukrainian military -- ranging from defending the country's territorial integrity to dealing with leadership changes and the emergence of armed groups -- foreign partnerships that do not directly help Kiev deal with these challenges will be a low priority.

Ukraine's Western orientation is by no means cemented. Thus, Warsaw and Vilnius are likely to see Kiev's enthusiasm for military collaboration fade again depending on the evolution of the relationship between Kiev and Moscow in the coming years.

Read more: Lithuania and Poland Seek Closer Military Ties With Ukraine | Stratfor

Title: Putin’s “Greater Novorossiya” - The Dismemberment of Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on May 05, 2014, 05:38:44 PM
This looks about right to me, "Unless and until the West takes a seriously strong stand against Putin’s undeclared war against Kiev and commits to keeping Ukraine united and independent, Putin will continue on his present path of stealth conquest."

Foreign Policy Research Institute

http://www.fpri.org/articles/2014/05/putins-greater-novorossiya-dismemberment-ukraine

Putin’s “Greater Novorossiya” - The Dismemberment of Ukraine
Adrian A. Basora, Aleksandr Fisher 
About the Author:  http://www.fpri.org/contributors/adrian-basora 
(more at the link, sources, footnotes)  May 2014

On April 17, Vladimir Putin introduced a dangerously expansive new concept into the Ukraine crisis. During his four-hour question and answer session on Russian TV that day he pointedly mentioned “Novorossiya” – a large swath of territory conquered by Imperial Russia during the 18th century from a declining Ottoman Empire. This historic Novorossiya covered roughly a third of what is now Ukraine (including Crimea).

Subsequent comments and actions by Putin and his surrogates have made it clear that the Kremlin’s goal is once again to establish its dominance over the lands once called Novorossiya. Furthermore, it is clear that Putin hopes to push his control well beyond this region’s historic boundaries to include other contiguous provinces with large Russian-speaking populations.

Most commentators and media are still focusing on Putin’s annexation of Crimea and on the threatened Russian takeover of the eastern Ukraine provinces (oblasts) of Donetsk and Luhansk. But the far more ominous reality, both in Moscow’ rhetoric and on the ground, is that Putin has already begun laying the groundwork for removing not only these, but several additional provincesfrom Kiev’s control and bringing them under Russian domination, either by annexation or by creating a nominally independent Federation of Novorossiya.

Unless the U.S. and its European allies take far more decisive countermeasures than they have to date, Putin’s plan[1] will continue to unfold slowly but steadily and, within a matter of months, Ukraine will either be dismembered or brought back into the Russian sphere of influence.

Putin’s convenient and expansive (though historically inaccurate) ‘rediscovery’ of Novorossiya now appears to include the following provinces in addition to Crimea: Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mikolaiv and Odessa. If he can turn this vision into a reality, Moscow would dominate the entire northern littoral of the Black Sea and control a wide band of contiguous territory stretching all the way from Russia’s current western boundaries to the borders of Romania and Moldova (conveniently including the latter’s already self-declared breakaway province of Transdnistria).

(http://www.fpri.org/docs/resize/image_1-400x275.png)

If all of these provinces are either annexed by Russia or form a nominally independent federation of ‘Greater Novorossiya’, the population of Ukraine would drop from 46 million to 25 million. This would not only subtract nearly 45% of Ukraine’s 2013 population but also roughly two thirds of its GDP, given that the country’s eastern and southern provinces are far more industrialized than those of the center and west.[2]

So far, neither financial sanctions nor international condemnation of Russia’s aggressions against Ukraine have had the slightest deterrent effect against Putin’s strategy. Instead, he is now steadily undermining Kiev’s control of the country’s eastern oblasts in small slices – currently at the rate of two or three strategic centers per day – the same pace and playbook that enabled Russia to establish total control of Crimea within a matter of weeks.

Given its track record so far, the weak government in Kiev and its even weaker military and security forces are obviously powerless to put a stop to Putin’s Novorossiya strategy. Meanwhile, the western powers continue to talk but take actions that are patently having no deterrent value. Unless the U.S. and its European allies can manage a quantum leap in their sanctions and counter-measures, Putin’s strategy seems likely to continue to unfold, slowly but steadily, likely without need for any overt large-scale Russian military intervention other than menacing moves on Ukraine’s borders.

If this happens, not only will the map of Ukraine be dramatically redrawn, but the entire geopolitical balance of Europe will be decisively altered. And, needless to say, the fate of democracy in the region, which has already suffered worrisome erosion in several post-communist countries over the past few years, will be severely compromised.

And, beyond Europe, Putin will have taken a giant step towards creating his new Moscow-dominated Eurasian Union. This is a potentially massive geopolitical and economic bloc stretching through the Caucasus into post-Soviet Central Asia – with obvious negative global repercussions.

Putin’s Vision of “Greater Novorossiya”

Novorossiya (literally, New Russia) refers historically to a very large section of present-day Ukraine lying north of the Black Sea and stretching from Luhansk and Donetsk in the east to Odessa in the west. Russia, and subsequently the USSR, controlled this region from the 18th century until the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. But in the Soviet period it was part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic rather than directly part of Russia.

Ominously, however, on April 17, when Putin evoked the memory of historic Novorossiya, he also exclaimed that only “God knows” why Russia surrendered this region in 1922 to Ukraine.

Just a few weeks earlier, Putin had described Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to incorporate Crimea into Ukraine in 1954 in a remarkably similar vein. The analogy seems all too obvious.

Furthermore, as if Putin’s concept of correcting historic anomalies were not sufficiently threatening, he quickly expanded his description of Novorossiya to include territories that lie well beyond its actual historical boundaries, most notably by explicitly including Kharkiv – a major city and important oblast that was never part of that historic region.

Furthermore, Putin and his hard-line Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, along with the Kremlin’s prolific propaganda machine, also regularly attempt to legitimize Russian intervention by focusing on the high number of “Russians” in Ukraine overall. Lavrov has also repeatedly claimed that Moscow has a right to protect Russian “citizens” in Ukraine – thus adding a further argument in favor of defining the new version of Novorossiya quite expansively.

http://www.fpri.org/docs/resize/image_2-400x307.png

Putin’s Motives and Russian Grand Strategy

Vladimir Putin’s Ukraine strategy is driven by three goals: survival, empire and legacy.

First and foremost, Putin sees the fate of Ukraine as an existential issue both for himself and for the authoritarian regime that he and his inner circle have gradually rebuilt over the past fifteen years. The Orange Revolution of 2004 was a deep shock to Putin because of the echoes it created in Russia and because Ukraine seemed to be on the brink of becoming a major source of longer-term “democratic diffusion” right on Russia’s long southwestern border. Fortunately for Putin, however, the luster of this revolution quickly wore off once its leaders gained office and failed to live up to their reformist promises. From the start there was infighting between Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko; reforms were postponed; the Ukrainian economy spiraled downward and corruption remained rampant.

By the time Yushchenko’s presidency ended in 2010, many voters had come to see Viktor Yanukovych as a preferable alternative. Yanukovich also reportedly benefited from substantial financial and “political technology” support from Moscow. For Putin, Yanukovych was a promising alternative to the western-oriented “Orange” leaders, since he seemed likely to maintain strong trade and financial ties with Russia, show proper deference towards Moscow and, above all, keep Ukraine out of NATO. But it turned out that too many Ukrainians were unwilling to follow the Putin/Yanukovich script.

When Yanukovich fled Kiev on February 21, it must have seemed to the Kremlin that a second wave of the Orange Revolution had taken control of Ukraine. Putin no doubt trembled with fury – but also with fear.

Putin’s second driving motive for going all out to reassert as much dominance as possible in Ukraine combines his goals of restoring a Russian empire and of burnishing his personal legacy. It is abundantly clear that Putin seeks to restore Russia to its former imperial glory, and in so doing to secure for himself a place in history as one of the greatest Russian leaders of all time. In a 2005 speech, Putin famously stated that “the breakup of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century.”[3]

Putin’s comments on the Soviet Union, taken together with his current vision of Novorossiya, should make it crystal clear to the West that the crisis in Ukraine is not a small-scale conflict, nor simply an internal political problem between eastern and western Ukraine. Rather, a de facto war for control of Ukraine has begun – and Ukraine, in turn, is only a part (though a very important one) of Putin’s strategic plan to re-establish Russian hegemony over as much as possible of the former Soviet Union, and thus to reassert Russia’s role as a major global power.

Repeating the Crimea Playbook, Province by Province

Although his strategy in Ukraine is highly ambitious, Putin is clearly convinced that the most effective tactic is to proceed one stealthy step at a time. He will avoid overt military intervention if at all possible so as not to shock the western powers into genuinely painful countermeasures. Putin is clearly repeating the Crimea pattern in eastern Ukraine, having already established de facto control of over a dozen key locations in its most important eastern province, Donetsk. This is Ukraine’s most industrialized oblast[4], with a population of 74.9 percent Russian speakers and very strong industrial ties to Russia.

(http://www.fpri.org/docs/resize/image_3-400x234.png)

The next three oblasts most immediately threatened by Russian stealth takeovers are Luhansk with 68.6 percent Russian speakers, Zaporizhia with 48.2 percent. Kherson with 24.9 percent also belongs on the immediately endangered list, despite its lower percentage of Russian-speakers, because Russia needs to control it along with Donetsk in order to create a “land bridge” between Russia and Crimea. A further “favorable” factor from Moscow’s viewpoint is that Kherson – along with Donetsk, Zaporizhia and part of Luhansk – falls largely within the boundaries of historic Novorossiya.

Beyond these four provinces, there have already been major Russian incursions into the two contiguous provinces of Luhansk and Kharkiv (which has a 44.3 percent Russian speaking population). And, as mentioned earlier, Putin has also proclaimed publically, even though inaccurately, that Kharkiv is part of Novorossiya.

To the west of the six oblasts mentioned above are Mykolaiv and Odessa, which have 29.4 percent and 41.9 percent Russian speakers, respectively. The strategic port city of Odessa has already seen the same type anti-Kiev agitation and organization of a secessionist movement that are the hallmarks of the Crimea playbook. Christian Caryl, an American journalist and editor of Foreign Policy’s Democracy Lab, has recently interviewed Odessans who are excited about the prospect of an autonomous Novorossiya state. He quotes one citizen as exclaiming, "A population of 20 million, with industry, resources. With advantages like that, who needs to become a part of Russia? By European standards that's already a good-sized country.”[5]

Language, Ethnicity and Attitudes

(http://www.fpri.org/docs/resize/image_4-400x240.png)

In claiming a Russian right to intervene in these eastern and southern provinces, it is clear that Moscow will use a maximalist definition of “Russians”. This means counting the number of Russian speakers rather than the number of ethnic Russians.[6] This is to Putin’s advantage, since the number of ethnic Russians in these provinces is much lower than the number of Russian speakers. Furthermore, not only do many Ukrainians living in the east and south acknowledge Russian as their native tongue, but an additional significant percentage speak the language fluently, which Moscow could well use as a further rationale either for the annexation of these provinces or to create an enlarged version of Novorossiya that would in fact be subservient to Moscow.

Beyond fueling ethnic and linguistic differences to justify Russia’s incursions into Ukraine, Putin is working systematically to create a permanent rift between eastern and western Ukrainians based on pre-existing differences of perspective and attitude, and by building upon manufactured confrontations and grievances.

Recent public opinion polls conducted by the Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization show that the linguistic and ethnic divisions between western and eastern Ukraine also correlate with the two regions’ viewpoints on a variety of issues including: Russia’s military excursion in Crimea, the EuroMaidan protests that ousted Yanukovich, and the upcoming presidential election on May 25.[7] According to the poll, over 94 percent of western Ukrainians believed Putin’s actions in Crimea constituted an invasion, while only 44 percent of eastern Ukrainians believed the same. In fact, 45 percent of eastern Ukrainians believed that the referendum in Crimea on joining Russia is a legitimate right of the residents of Crimea to express their opinion about the future of Crimea.

Sixty-six percent of citizens in western Ukraine said they viewed the Euromaidan events positively while only 7 percent of citizens in eastern Ukraine said the same. While 34 percent of citizens in western Ukraine said they would vote for Petro Poroshenko, the “chocolate oligarch”, in the upcoming presidential election, only 7 percent of eastern Ukrainians agreed, and 11 percent said they would vote for Serhiy Tihipko, a former member of Yanukovich’s Party of Regions who has taken a pro-federalization stance.

Perhaps most importantly, 59 percent of citizens in eastern Ukraine are already in favor of joining Russia’s Customs Union as opposed to 20 percent who are in favor of joining the European Union.

The total population of Putin’s ideal Greater Novorossiya (Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Dnepropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Odessa, and Crimea), would be approximately 21 million. This would be a sizable potential addition to the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, Armenia and Kazakhstan, which would give Putin’s Russia even stronger economic leverage against the European Union.

Russian journalist Yulia Latynina views Putin’s tactics in Crimea and eastern Ukraine as a new military strategy, in which the government controls and distorts information to cast Russia and the pro-Russian separatists as the victims. She argues that this “is far more important than achieving a military victory. To come out the winner in this scenario, you don't have to shoot your enemy. All you have to do is either kill your own men — or provoke others into killing them — and then portray it as an act of aggression by the enemy with all of the attendant media spin.”[8] Due to this media spin, all of the Ukrainian government’s attempts at diffusing the situation in the eastern provinces have horribly backfired.

Implications for Moldova and Beyond

Even assuming that Putin achieves his ambitious vision of a Greater Novorossiya, there is no guarantee that Putin will stop at Odessa. In fact, the contrary seems likely. Moldova would also be directly threatened. In March, the separatist de facto government in Transdniestria asked to be incorporated into the Russian federation.[9] Putin could thus easily repeat the same tactics that were successful in Crimea and are working in eastern Ukraine, in Transdniestria. This breakaway region would become independent from Moldova and possibly join the Novorossiya federation.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss the potential impact of this scenario on the weak remainder state of Moldova or, for that matter of the putative rump state of central and western Ukraine. Suffice it to say that, if Ukraine and the West do not act decisively against Russian “irredentism” in eastern Ukraine, any state in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, or Central Asia with a Russian speaking minority could well be at risk of either dismemberment or of de facto Russian domination as the price of avoiding it.

Can Putin be Stopped?

It is hard to envision any realistic scenario whereby the current Ukrainian government in Kiev might stop this slow and steady dismemberment of the country. Given pro-Russian separatists’ success in seizing government buildings all across eastern Ukraine with impunity, what options does the current Ukrainian government have?

If Ukraine can manage to make serious military efforts to counteract the gradual slicing off of its provinces, Moscow will blame the resultant bloodshed on Western-instigated “fascists” in Kiev and would likely intervene militarily to assure the victory of the pro-Russian separatists whom they are currently instigating and assisting with semi-covert military support. Putin has already expressed indignation towards Ukraine’s miniscule “anti-terrorist operations” in the east and has called these actions a “grave crime.”[10]

Given Ukraine’s likely ineffectiveness in dealing with Russia’s incursions into its territory, what options does the West have in dealing with Russia’s increased aggression and imperialistic ambitions?

The U.S., its NATO allies and the European Union are left with two basic options. The first is to continue the current pattern of de facto acquiescence. The West can continue its current course of public condemnation and minor punitive economic and financial sanctions that stop short of really serious pain on either side. If so, Putin will almost certainly ignore the West’s sanctions, despite their toll on the Russian economy. He will thus move steadily ahead with his plan to either separate and federalize eastern and southern Ukraine, or incorporate it into Russia.

The alternative is for the West to undertake truly deep and thus mutually painful economic sanctions that would sharply reduce Russia’s oil and gas exports and revenues, decimate foreign investment and wreak havoc with that country’s economy. This would require going very far beyond the half-hearted European support for intensified sanctions against Russia that we have seen so far, especially among European countries with strong trade ties to Russia.[11]

And, given the insulation of Putin and his ruling elite from economic pain, there would also need to be a strong show of military resolve. The U.S. would need to at least double the number of its forces stationed in Europe (currently only 66,000 vs. 400,000 during the Cold War) and NATO would have to move several thousand European, Canadian and American troops to the eastern borders of Poland and the Baltic republics, and to northeastern Romania.

As of now, the West has not committed a substantial number of troops to the defense of Eastern Europe, despite its treaty obligations to defend these NATO members. On April 23rd, the U.S. sent 150 American troops, with 450 more expected to join them, to Poland as part of a military exercise.[12] However, these 150 troops are dwarfed by Russia’s 40,000 men stationed at the Ukrainian border.[13] From Putin’s expansive perspective, these micro-exercises are derisory at a time when he has held military exercises near Ukraine involving troops in the tens of thousands.

Putin will not be deterred by anything short of a commensurate show of resolve by the Western powers.

Unless and until the West takes a seriously strong stand against Putin’s undeclared war against Kiev and commits to keeping Ukraine united and independent, Putin will continue on his present path of stealth conquest. He will implement his own vision of Novorossiya as a step towards re-establishing a “Greater Russia” – one that continues its aggressive expansionism well beyond Ukraine and in which he plays a major role on the world stage dedicated to undercutting the West and its democratic values.

 
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 05, 2014, 06:37:25 PM
Excellent Doug-- would you please post it here http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=1179.0 as well?  TIA.
Title: WSJ: THe Battle for Eastern Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 13, 2014, 11:01:46 AM
The Battle for Eastern Ukraine
Putin presses his annexation by stages while the West watches.
May 12, 2014 7:00 p.m. ET

Vladimir Putin may have lost this winter's pro-European uprising in Ukraine, but he's winning the counterrevolution. On the weekend he took a big step toward disrupting Ukraine's May 25 presidential election and grabbing another chunk of his neighbor's territory.

Separatist leaders in Eastern Ukraine followed through Sunday with their sham referendum on local autonomy. As in Crimea, the separatists had taken control of cities and towns in the east with the help of Russian special forces. Then on Monday a separatist leader who was unknown a month ago demanded that Ukraine withdraw security forces from his "sovereign territory" and asked Russia to absorb the Donbas region.

The Kremlin didn't respond directly to the absorption request but replied that it "respects the will of the population" and "all mediation efforts will be welcome." It's an old Putin habit to offer to solve a problem he's created, and Germany and the Obama Administration have fallen for it before. Witness last month's so-called peace deal for eastern Ukraine, which Russia flouted from the first. Now Mr. Putin is once again inviting Secretary of State John Kerry and the EU to negotiate the terms of Kiev's surrender.

The government in Kiev denounced the referendum, but its military writ doesn't extend to the east. Most pro-Ukrainian voters didn't bother to vote in the referendum, which was supervised by the separatists, who counted ballots dropped in clear cannisters that supervisors could see. Independent monitors were barred from the region.

But the battle for eastern Ukraine isn't over. Unlike in Crimea, the Ukrainians haven't given up and the territory is majority ethnic Ukrainian and voted by a large majority for Ukraine's independence in 1991. After presidential elections later this month, Ukraine will have a leader whose chief task will be to hold the country together. But the government in Kiev needs outside military help. The Ukrainians have presented the U.S. with a long list of requests for military aid, but the Obama Administration has so far agreed to send only prepackaged meals. Literally.

The U.S. and EU joined Kiev in denouncing the referendum, but it isn't clear they will do anything about it. On Monday the EU added 13 more Russians to its sanctions list, but it continues to resist more far reaching punishment against companies or industries that would raise the costs for Mr. Putin. The U.S. has done better, though not by much.

A judo black belt, Mr. Putin can sense that Western leaders want to do as little as possible. So he is trying to achieve his goals in Ukraine without the full-fledged invasion that would leave President Obama and Chancellor Angela Merkel with little choice but to impose broader sanctions. The White House strategy of threatening more sanctions only after Mr. Putin takes the next step has played into the Russian's plan of disruption in stages and via separatist proxies.

Mr. Putin hasn't begun to feel enough economic pain to make him back off his strategy of gobbling eastern Ukraine and destabilizing the rest. Until he does, expect him to keep moving westward.
Title: POTH: Ruskis give tanks to separatists
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 13, 2014, 06:47:12 PM


Russia Has Sent Tanks to Ukraine Rebels, U.S. Says
The State Department confirmed on Friday that Russia has sent tanks and other heavy weapons to separatists in Ukraine.
A convoy of three T-64 tanks, several BM-21 “Grad” multiple rocket launchers and other military vehicles crossed the border near the Ukrainian town of Snizhne, State Department officials said. Reports and images of the weapons’ presence circulated on Thursday, but there were conflicting claims about where they had come from.
“This is unacceptable,” said Marie Harf, the deputy State Department spokeswoman. “A failure by Russia to de-escalate this situation will lead to additional costs.”
A Western official said that intelligence about the movement of the tanks and other weapons into Ukraine was shared on Friday with NATO allies. Secretary of State John Kerry complained earlier this week about the flow of Russian arms to separatists in Ukraine in a phone call to Sergey V. Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister.
The T-64 is an obsolescent tank no longer in active use by Russian forces, but still kept in storage in southwest Russia.
READ MORE »
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/14/world/europe/russia-has-sent-tanks-to-ukraine-rebels-us-says.html?emc=edit_na_20140613

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 13, 2014, 08:05:56 PM
Careful Putin, Obama has a phone and a pen.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 14, 2014, 09:37:16 AM
Ukrainian jet shot down.

It would appear that the annexation of Ukraine by Putin continues.  Nary a peep from Baraq, nor any word I am aware of concerning the French selling navy assault ships to the Russians.    :cry:

Life is tough and it is tougher when we are stupid.

==================================================

Meanwhile, Back in Ukraine
Tanks mysteriously roll in from Russia.
WSJ
June 13, 2014 6:56 p.m. ET

After Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian military to pull back from Ukraine's borders this month, the West sighed in relief. "Putin blinked," goes the meme du jour. We'd welcome it, but the facts on the ground tell a different story.

Waves of Russian tanks and divisions of infantrymen are one way to undermine the budding democracy in Kiev. But an overt invasion would force a reluctant America and EU to sanction Russia, and the Kremlin figures it can get to the same place by a less costly route.

For two months Russian and Chechen mercenaries, money and weapons have flowed over the border, fueling a separatist uprising in eastern Ukraine. Late this week, three T-64 or T-72 tanks, B-21 "Grad" multiple rocket launchers and other military vehicles arrived from Russia, according to the Ukrainian government and U.S. State Department. On Friday Moscow also threatened to cut exports of natural gas to Ukraine after talks on a new contract failed.

The pro-Russian rebels showed off the tanks without revealing their provenance. If they came from Russia, said NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in a statement Friday, "this would mark a serious escalation of the crisis in eastern Ukraine." It's safe to presume the separatists, who include a high proportion of Russian citizens, didn't pick up the tanks at a used car lot.

Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko, who took office a week ago, has launched a counteroffensive in the east. The separatists control territory around Donetsk and Luhansk, the two largest cities in the industrial Donbas region. The Ukrainian military on Friday said it had ousted the rebels from the port city of Mariupol and destroyed two of the three tanks. After the past few months of military setbacks, the Ukrainians need the morale boost.

But Russia has tanks to spare, and President Putin has little reason to fear a Western backlash. The Iraqi crisis is a useful diversion for him. President Obama and the Europeans rarely mention Crimea, implicitly accepting Russia's illegal annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula in March. Mr. Putin was welcomed to last week's D-Day commemoration in France despite his Ukraine revanchism.

New sanctions on Russia are off the table, and the Moscow stock exchange index has returned to pre-Crimea levels. The markets are saying who really blinked on Ukraine.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 18, 2014, 05:25:26 PM
Ummm , , , has anyone noticed what is happening in the Ukraine?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 19, 2014, 07:46:46 AM
Ummm , , , has anyone noticed what is happening in the Ukraine?


It's hard to keep track of all the scandals and foreign policy trainwrecks right now.
Title: Defying Russia, Ukraine signs trade agreement with EU
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 28, 2014, 06:15:40 AM

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/28/world/europe/ukraine-signs-trade-agreement-with-european-union.html?emc=edit_th_20140628&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193
Title: Ukraine army getting traction
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 07, 2014, 10:39:03 AM


http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/07/world/europe/ukraine-military-finds-its-footing-against-pro-russian-rebels.html?emc=edit_th_20140707&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 17, 2014, 05:23:55 PM
Maybe if our Commander in Chief can break away from brie and crackers in the Hamptions while fundraising, he can announce giving something a tad more effective for fighting to the Ukrainians than MREs , , , :-P :x :x
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on July 17, 2014, 05:29:04 PM
Maybe if our Commander in Chief can break away from brie and crackers in the Hamptions while fundraising, he can announce giving something a tad more effective for fighting to the Ukrainians than MREs , , , :-P :x :x


He did stop for a hamburger in Delaware as well !

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DDF on July 17, 2014, 05:36:00 PM
I've said it before, I'll say it again, and damn the consequences. You go electing a Detroit style politician, you're going to get Detroit style results.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on July 17, 2014, 05:40:10 PM
Give him a break, this is his first real job. He's still trying to get oriented.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DDF on July 17, 2014, 05:41:36 PM
Give him a break, this is his first real job. He's still trying to get oriented.

There are some things however, where you and I are on exactly the same page. My daughter is still in Russia. I'm less than thrilled with his "handling" of this. Another cold war is the last thing any of us need.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on July 17, 2014, 05:46:03 PM
It's only a war if someone fights back. Putin will continue to run the table while Obama pretends nothing is happening because he has no idea what to do.

Short of a nuclear launch, I expect some meetings with Lurch and at most a few more token sanctions that will in reality serve to harm American interests more than Russian.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 17, 2014, 09:23:58 PM
Someone on our side is trying to pay attention.  The new, slightly expanded sanctions announced just before today's jetliner shoot down included the company that made the missile that did it. 

BTW, this missile reaches up to 72,000 feet altitude; this is not amateur stuff.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on July 17, 2014, 09:32:14 PM
I'm pretty sure that was luck. Competence is not a hallmark of this administration.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 18, 2014, 08:04:52 AM
My intended point was that there are people who were there before this administration and who will be there after this administration , , ,
Title: Maybe Obama can send Ukraine some more MREs
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 23, 2014, 06:22:13 AM
Putin Makes His Move
His forces intervene to grab another chunk of Ukraine.
Updated Aug. 22, 2014 7:10 p.m. ET

The use of Russian-manned artillery inside Ukraine is being portrayed as a "significant escalation" in Vladimir Putin's effort to seize his neighbor's territory. That's putting it mildly. So far in this crisis the Russian strongman has practiced a form of ambiguous aggression—the insignia-less "little green men" in Crimea; the quasi-covert military aid to the separatists in eastern Ukraine—that provided the Kremlin with at least a fig leaf of deniability. What's happening now looks like an outright invasion.

The insertion of artillery, which was confirmed Friday by NATO officials, comes as a convoy of some 200 Russian trucks illegally entered the separatist-controlled territory in and around the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk. The trucks, ostensibly delivering humanitarian aid, were supposed to be escorted by the International Red Cross. Red Cross officials refused to join the convoy for fear of being caught in a crossfire, but the convoy entered anyway.
Opinion Video

Global View Columnist Bret Stephens on news that Russia artillery units are inside Ukraine, firing on Ukrainian forces. Photo: Associated Press

Exactly what Mr. Putin hopes to achieve remains to be seen. At a minimum, the convoy serves the Kremlin's domestic propaganda purposes by offering visual evidence that Mother Russia will come to the aid of fellow Russians stranded in the country's "near abroad" and under dire threat from allegedly nefarious forces.

U.S. Gen. Philip Breedlove, NATO's Supreme Commander, has noted that Russia has "previously sent 'humanitarian' and 'peacekeeping' efforts to Georgia, Moldova and Crimea, and we have seen how they proved to be deceptions that freeze conflicts rather than resolve them." The Kremlin formula is to insert the convoy, demand a ceasefire, then insist that Kiev honor the ceasefire, in turn allowing the rebel enclaves to become self-governing territories.

But the convoy also creates the possibility of an incident—accidental or premeditated—that can spark a wider war. Mr. Putin has a history of using such incidents to start wars against his enemies. That includes the mysterious apartment building explosions—blamed on Chechen terrorists but widely suspected of being the work of Russian intelligence services—that sparked the Second Chechen War in 1999 and first brought Mr. Putin to power. The 2008 invasion of Georgia was sparked by another ambiguous border incident.

As for the Ukraine crisis, there is little doubt the Kremlin is ready and perhaps eager for another incident. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu has "guaranteed" to the Obama Administration that the convoy would not be used to start an invasion. Yet his ministry has also stationed some 18,000 troops on the border with Ukraine, and now the deployment of Russian artillery shows how little that guarantee was worth.
Enlarge Image

Russia's President Vladimir Putin in Yalta, Crimea, in August. Reuters

All the more so since Kiev has surprised much of the world, perhaps including itself, by prosecuting a successful military offensive that seemed to be on the cusp of cutting off the rebels from their supply routes to Russia. Among the reasons the Obama Administration has refused to supply Ukraine with arms is the fear that its military was incompetent, undisciplined and possibly disloyal. Having proven the Administration skeptics wrong, Ukraine's military deserves immediate U.S. support.

We noted last week ("Some Realism on Russia," Aug. 16) what some of that support might be: body armor, night-vision goggles, small UAVs, antitank weapons, shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles and radio jammers. This equipment can be rapidly loaded on C-17 cargo planes and flown directly to Kiev, much like the crucial aid that was delivered to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Merely the sight of those planes might give Mr. Putin reason to think twice about sending in the main body of his forces. It would also give Ukrainians—not to mention nervous NATO allies in the Baltics and Central Europe—confidence that Mr. Obama's assurances are more than talk. The President has boasted about the efficacy of his post-Crimea sanctions, but so far they've had little impact on the Russian economy and even less on the Kremlin's behavior, save perhaps to underscore how reluctant the West is to punish the Kremlin.

Eastern Ukraine is now the place where Western resolve is being acutely tested against the usual temptations of timidity and indifference. This is an old story, and Mr. Obama is fond of saying that this kind of aggression has no place "in the 21st century." But Russia's revanchism is a reminder that human nature remains the same no matter what century we're living in. Dictators do not do off-ramps. Their aggression doesn't stop until it is checked.

The White House on Friday called Mr. Putin's actions a "flagrant violation" of Ukraine's sovereignty. But the question now in Ukraine, as also regarding ISIS in Iraq, is not the sincerity of Mr. Obama's indignation. It's whether this President has the will to do anything to stop it.
Title: Russian invades on new front!
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 27, 2014, 01:53:52 PM


Russia Opens 3rd Front With a New Offensive, Ukrainian and Western Officials Say

Tanks, artillery and infantry have crossed from Russia into an unbreached part of eastern Ukraine in recent days, attacking Ukrainian forces and causing panic and wholesale retreat not only in the small border town of Novoazovsk but a wide swath of territory, in what Ukrainian and Western military officials are calling a stealth invasion.

The attacks outside Novoazovsk and in an area to the north essentially have opened a new, third front in the war in eastern Ukraine between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian separatists, along with the fighting outside the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk.

READ MORE »
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/europe/ukraine-russia-novoazovsk-crimea.html?emc=edit_na_20140827

Title: Re: Russian invades on new front!
Post by: G M on August 27, 2014, 02:39:01 PM


Russia Opens 3rd Front With a New Offensive, Ukrainian and Western Officials Say

Tanks, artillery and infantry have crossed from Russia into an unbreached part of eastern Ukraine in recent days, attacking Ukrainian forces and causing panic and wholesale retreat not only in the small border town of Novoazovsk but a wide swath of territory, in what Ukrainian and Western military officials are calling a stealth invasion.

The attacks outside Novoazovsk and in an area to the north essentially have opened a new, third front in the war in eastern Ukraine between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian separatists, along with the fighting outside the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk.

READ MORE »
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/europe/ukraine-russia-novoazovsk-crimea.html?emc=edit_na_20140827



Quick, somebody find that reset button!
Title: Z-big gets one right , , , in 1994
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 04, 2014, 08:45:26 AM

Sept. 3, 2014 7:17 p.m. ET

Zbigniew Brzezinski writing in Foreign Affairs, March/April 1994:

Insurance is needed against the possibility, one might even argue the probability, that the weight of history will not soon permit Russia to stabilize as a democracy, and that the single-minded cultivation of a partnership with Russia, while downgrading other interests, will simply accelerate the reemergence of an ominously familiar imperial challenge to Europe's security. . . .

The crucial issue here, one that might well come to a dramatic head in the course of 1994, is the future stability and independence of Ukraine. It cannot be stressed strongly enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire. American policymakers must face the fact that Ukraine is on the brink of disaster: the economy is in a free-fall, while Crimea is on the verge of a Russia-abetted ethnic explosion. Either crisis might be exploited to promote the breakup or the reintegration of Ukraine in a larger Moscow-dominated framework. It is urgent and essential that the United States convince the Ukranian government, through the promise of substantial economic assistance, to adopt long-delayed and badly needed economic reforms. At the same time, American political assurances for Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity should be forthcoming.
Title: Charles Krauthammer: Obama Writes Off Ukraine, use "Tripwires" not red lines
Post by: DougMacG on September 05, 2014, 09:30:19 AM
Yes, Zbig got that right in 1994.  Who knew Russia would still have an eye on re-taking Ukraine and any/all of its old empire that it could!

Here is Krauthammer writing on the same mess today.  These 3 opinion pieces, VDH on deterrence, George Will on Putin acting like Hitler and Charles Krauthammer on the surrender of Ukraine should be read together IMO.  Quoting Krauthammer,

"...what NATO did not do. It did not create the only serious deterrent to Russia: permanent bases in the Baltics and eastern Poland that would act as a tripwire. Tripwires produce automaticity. A Russian leader would know that any invading force would immediately encounter NATO troops, guaranteeing war with the West.  Which is how we kept the peace in Europe through a half-century of Cold War. U.S. troops in West Germany could never have stopped a Russian invasion. But a Russian attack would have instantly brought America into a war — a war Russia could not countenance."

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/387151/obama-writes-ukraine-charles-krauthammer

SEPTEMBER 4, 2014 8:00 PM
Obama Writes Off Ukraine
Putin’s invasion may be nothing new to Obama. For Ukraine, it changed everything.
By Charles Krauthammer

At his first press briefing after the beheading of American James Foley, President Obama stunned the assembled when he admitted that he had no strategy in Syria for confronting the Islamic State. Yet it was not nearly the most egregious, or consequential, thing he said.

Idiotic, yes. You’re the leader of the free world. Even if you don’t have a strategy — indeed, especially if you don’t — you never admit it publicly.

However, if Obama is indeed building a larger strategy, an air campaign coordinated with allies on the ground, this does take time. George W. Bush wisely took a month to respond to 9/11, preparing an unusual special ops–Northern Alliance battle plan that brought down Taliban rule in a hundred days.

We’ll see whether Obama comes up with an Islamic State strategy. But he already has one for Ukraine: Write it off. Hence the more shocking statement in that August 28 briefing: Obama declaring Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — columns of tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery and a thousand troops brazenly crossing the border — to be nothing new, just “a continuation of what’s been taking place for months now.”
And just to reaffirm his indifference and inaction, Obama mindlessly repeated his refrain that the Ukraine problem has no military solution. Yes, but does he not understand that diplomatic solutions are largely dictated by the military balance on the ground?

Vladimir Putin’s invasion may be nothing new to Obama. For Ukraine, it changed everything. Russia was on the verge of defeat. Now Ukraine is. That’s why Ukraine is welcoming a cease-fire that amounts to capitulation.

A month ago, Putin’s separatist proxies were besieged and desperate. His invasion to the southeast saved them. It diverted the Ukrainian military from Luhansk and Donetsk, allowing the rebels to recover, while Russian armor rolled over Ukrainian forces, jeopardizing their control of the entire southeast. Putin even boasted that he could take Kiev in two weeks.

Why bother? He’s already fracturing and subjugating Ukraine, re-creating Novorossiya (“New Russia”), statehood for which is one of the issues that will be up for, yes, diplomacy.

Which makes incomprehensible Obama’s denial to Ukraine of even defensive weapons — small arms, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. Indeed, his stunning passivity in the face of a dictionary-definition invasion has not just confounded the Ukrainians. It has unnerved the East Europeans. Hence Obama’s reassurances on his trip to the NATO summit in Wales.

First up, Estonia. It seems to be Obama’s new red line. I’m sure they sleep well tonight in Tallinn now that Obama has promised to stand with them. (Remember the State Department hashtag #UnitedforUkraine?)

To back up Obama’s words, NATO is touting a promised rapid-reaction force of about 4,000 to be dispatched to pre-provisioned bases in the Baltics and Poland within 48 hours of an emergency. (Read: Russian invasion.)

First, we’ve been hearing about European rapid-reaction forces for decades. They’ve amounted to nothing.

Second, even if this one comes into being, it is a feeble half-measure. Not only will troops have to be assembled, dispatched, transported and armed as the fire bell is ringing. The very sending will require some affirmative and immediate decision by NATO. Try getting that done. The alliance is famous for its reluctant, slow, and fractured decision-making. (See: Ukraine.) By the time the Rapid Reactors arrive, Russia will have long overrun their yet-to-be-manned bases.

The real news from Wales is what NATO did not do. It did not create the only serious deterrent to Russia: permanent bases in the Baltics and eastern Poland that would act as a tripwire. Tripwires produce automaticity. A Russian leader would know that any invading force would immediately encounter NATO troops, guaranteeing war with the West.

Which is how we kept the peace in Europe through a half-century of Cold War. U.S. troops in West Germany could never have stopped a Russian invasion. But a Russian attack would have instantly brought America into a war — a war Russia could not countenance.

It’s what keeps the peace in Korea today. Even the reckless North Korean leadership dares not cross the Demilitarized Zone, because it would encounter U.S. troops and trigger war with America.

That’s what deterrence means. And what any rapid reaction force cannot provide. In Wales, it will nonetheless be proclaimed a triumph. In Estonia, in Poland, as today in Ukraine, it will be seen for what it is — a loud declaration of reluctance by an alliance led by a man who is the very embodiment of ambivalence.
Title: Russia still fg w Ukraine, US still not doing diddly
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 15, 2014, 07:19:17 AM
Summary

Following the separatist elections in Donetsk and Luhansk on Nov. 2, the political entities representing both regions -- the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic, respectively -- have established what is likely to be yet another long-term frozen conflict in the former Soviet periphery. Ukraine's inability to retake these regions by force, combined with continued weapons and personnel support from Russia, mean they are here to stay.

Russia will have difficulty propping up these new breakaway territories at a time when Moscow is under growing economic and political strain. Still, Russia has strategic interests in supporting these territories as a check against Ukraine's Western integration efforts. Along with its history of subsidizing other breakaway territories in the region, Moscow has shown with its efforts in Ukraine that it will be willing to incur the financial and political costs of backing the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics.
Analysis

The breakaway territories in eastern Ukraine trace their origins to the Western-backed uprising in Kiev and the subsequent Russian response to this uprising. From pro-Russian demonstrations in Donetsk and Luhansk, Moscow-backed rebel militias and the political entities representing them simultaneously emerged. In Donetsk, activists who occupied administration buildings declared the establishment of the Donetsk People's Republic on April 7, while in Luhansk a similar declaration was made for the establishment of the Luhansk People's Republic on April 27. Both groups subsequently held referendums on May 12 on the issue of declaring independence from Ukraine, and according to the local referendum organizers (international observers were not allowed), both received over 95 percent of votes in favor of secession.

Russia Maintains Supply Flow to Ukrainian Separatists
Click to Enlarge

Following the military gains made by the rebels at the expense of Ukrainian security forces in the ensuing months, the territories controlled by the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics did not take part in Ukraine's political process, including the presidential election in May and parliamentary elections in October. Instead, the separatists held their own parliamentary elections Nov. 2, which essentially solidified the existing leadership of Alexander Zakharchenko in the Donetsk People's Republic and Igor Plotnitsky in the Luhansk People's Republic. While most of the international community did not recognize the elections, the polls further cemented the reality that Ukraine was no longer in control of these territories.
From Rebellion to Administration

With the separatists having achieved territorial control, the question now is how the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics will manage the administration of their territories. Together, the people's republics control nearly 16,000 square kilometers (a little less than 6,200 square miles) of territory -- roughly 30 percent of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts combined. Donetsk and Luhansk are two of the most densely populated regions of Ukraine, and Kiev estimates that nearly 65 percent of the Donetsk oblast's population and 50 percent of the Luhansk oblast's population (or around 1.5 million and 2 million people respectively) are under separatist rule. The separatists also control both regional centers, the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk.

Administering these territories therefore represents quite the undertaking for the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics. This is especially the case since both regions have experienced significant dislocations from the conflict, both in terms of outflows of population and economic disruption. An estimated 800,000 people have been displaced as a result of the conflict, with nearly 400,000 seeking refuge across the border in Russia. While some of the population has started returning to the area, anecdotal evidence suggests that many of those returning are middle-aged or elderly, while the younger and more productive members of the population have so far chosen to stay away. Adding to these problems, the Ukrainian government recently decided to stop paying social benefits -- including pensions in certain cases -- to residents in these areas.

Donetsk and Luhansk historically have been two of the most economically productive regions of Ukraine, jointly making up the Donbas industrial belt, but much of their industrial production has been hurt by the military conflict. Coal mining is a major part of the economy in the rebel-controlled territories, and over 50 percent of the coal plants and steel mills there have halted production or are producing under capacity. Those that are still producing, such as the coal mines controlled by oligarch Rinat Akhmetov, have refused to pay taxes to the separatist governments (though according to sources, there may be kickbacks being paid to the rebels under the table). Without an effective mechanism for tax collection, much of the local revenue the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics have collected has come from soliciting local businesses.

Furthermore, if and when industrial production in these regions does pick back up, the separatist governments will find it difficult to legally export products abroad -- or at least to Europe, which has placed sanctions on the breakaway territories. Additionally, the banking systems in these territories have been frozen, and most workers reportedly have been receiving their salaries in cash.
Russia Continues Its Support

The economic prospects for these breakaway regions -- at least for the short to medium term -- are not particularly bright. The territories have only one viable option for sustaining themselves -- Russia. Indeed, Moscow is already playing a significant role in propping up the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics. First and foremost, Russian aid has come in the form of military supplies -- including tanks and heavy weaponry -- and flows of personnel to assist in the battle against Ukrainian security forces. Russia has also sent humanitarian convoys with food and other supplies to the parts of the rebel territories that have been most damaged in the conflict zone, such as areas around the city of Luhansk.

Moscow's direct financial and economic assistance to these territories, however, is more opaque. Though the rebels have admitted that they have not yet been able to set up a reliable tax collection system, sources have said they are still getting paid, which reportedly comes in part from cash transfers from Russia. The self-declared republics also reportedly receive aid from businessmen close to the Kremlin, such as Konstantin Malofeev.

Additionally, there are other important economic activities in the separatist-controlled territories. There have been reports of coal supplies from the breakaway regions being smuggled into Russia, with Moscow then selling these supplies back to Ukraine and channeling revenues to the rebels. There also have been reports of the continuing production of machines that service the coal and steel sector as well as the agricultural production of wheat, corn and sunflower seeds, which could allow Russia to increase its imports of these goods from the rebel territories. Finally, Moscow could choose to subsidize energy exports, given that pipeline infrastructure is directly integrated across the border.
Costs and Benefits to Russia

Still, Russia's ability to directly finance the breakaway territories or absorb their products is not infinite. Moscow is already experiencing significant economic problems as a result of the Ukraine crisis, including capital flight, a depreciating ruble and financial restrictions caused by Western sanctions. Russia has had its own internal debate over budgetary expenditures for social and defense spending, which declining oil prices have only exacerbated. Projections of stagnant growth or even mild recession for 2015 do not suggest a dramatic improvement in Russia's economic position.

Nevertheless, the total amount of financing needed to sustain these regions is unlikely to cost Russia more than a few billion dollars per year, especially since much of the economy will be operating in the grey zone. Furthermore, Russia's ability to project power into its periphery has traditionally outstripped the country's economic weaknesses. Indeed, even in the chaos of the 1990s, Russia militarily and financially supported a number of breakaway territories throughout the former Soviet space, including Transdniestria in Moldova and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. Moscow continues to support these territories to this day, both in terms of subsidizing local economic production and providing direct budgetary assistance to the breakaway governments. Russia has only increased such support, given that Moldova and Georgia have attempted to get closer to the West as a result of the crisis in Ukraine.

Ultimately, the benefits of backing the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics will outweigh the financial and political costs for Moscow. The uprising in Ukraine and the subsequent pro-Western government it has produced in Kiev is a fundamental threat to Russia's national security interests. Supporting the breakaway territories in Donetsk and Luhansk not only gives Russia direct military and political influence in these regions but also serves as a check against Ukraine's Western integration efforts. This explains why, despite sanctions from the West and its own economic difficulties, Moscow has not stopped supporting the breakaway territories and continues to be the main power player in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Russia has redrawn the borders, and the new breakaway territories are here to stay.

Read more: Russian Interests Reshape Ukraine's Borders | Stratfor
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Title: Why Russia would intervene in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 11, 2014, 05:39:07 PM
Note date

Analytic Guidance: Why Russia Would Intervene in Ukraine
Analysis
August 6, 2014 | 22:04 GMT Print Text Size
Analytic Guidance: Why Russia Would Intervene in Ukraine
Ukrainian soldiers patrol Debaltseve, a city in the eastern region of Donetsk, on Aug. 3. (ANATOLII STEPANOV/AFP/Getty Images)
Analysis

Editor's Note: The following is an internal Stratfor document produced to provide high-level guidance regarding the conflict in Ukraine. This document is not a forecast but rather a series of guidelines for understanding and evaluating events, as well as suggestions for areas of focus.

With 20,000 troops positioned on its border with Ukraine, Russia has all the pieces in place to launch a direct, limited ground intervention in eastern Ukraine without having to make any additional preparations. Of course, that kind of military invasion would cost Moscow a lot of political capital, but Russian policymakers may believe the high price of intervention is justified in certain scenarios. Those scenarios are as follows:
The Humanitarian Crisis Worsens

On Aug. 5, Russia officially requested to lead a humanitarian mission in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross to provide aid for civilians in eastern Ukraine. Parts of Donetsk and Luhansk are experiencing food, water and electricity shortages, but so far Kiev has rejected Russia's offers of assistance, arguing there is no humanitarian crisis to end. The civilian death toll has increased steadily as fighting moved from the countryside into the cities. If more civilians die, Russia may decide to intervene.
The Ukrainian Military Threatens Rebel Strongholds

Over the past few weeks, the Ukrainian military has tallied several notable victories in its fight against the rebels, one of many factors that guided Russia's decision to amass troops along the border. However, Ukrainian forces have not been able to move into the urban areas surrounding the cities of Luhansk and Donetsk; in addition to general difficulties associated with urban warfare, some rebels have already started a counteroffensive. If the Ukrainian military seriously threatens to take these important rebel strongholds, Russia may intervene.
Analytic Guidance: Why Russia Would Intervene In Ukraine
Click to Enlarge
NATO Deploys More Assets

After Russia's annexation of Crimea, NATO initiated new rotational exercises in Poland and the Baltics; however, no additional measures have been taken since then to increase the security of the alliance's members in the region. Any serious push to build up combat power in areas adjacent to Ukraine — including Poland, Romania, the Baltics and Turkey — may indicate that NATO and the United States believe a Russian intervention is imminent. (Meanwhile, Russia could see the congregation of NATO and U.S. forces as a sign that the West plans to intervene.) U.S. naval movement in the Mediterranean or Black seas is also important to watch.
The United States Arms the Ukrainian Military

U.S. aid to Ukraine has been limited to nonlethal equipment and rations, but many in Russia attribute the Ukrainian military's recent gains to advising from the U.S. military. If Washington supplies the Ukrainian military with weapons or trains or assists soldiers more overtly, Russia may respond by intervening.
More Sanctions Are Imposed

The Kremlin has reacted to the latest round of Western sanctions by restricting some food and agricultural imports from the United States and the European Union. But the application of additional, more severe sanctions, especially those targeting Russia's financial and energy sectors, could provoke Russia to invade Ukraine, especially if Moscow believes it has nothing else to lose.
Russian Public Opinion Changes

The majority of Russians oppose direct military intervention into Ukraine. The factions within the Kremlin, including the typically hawkish security circle, are divided on the issue, too. This opposition has constrained the actions of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who wants to maintain his popularity levels among his constituents and retain the loyalty of his supporters within the government. If Putin can disguise the intervention as a peacekeeping or humanitarian mission, he may be able to sell it to the Russian public more effectively, giving him more freedom to act.
The Ukrainian Government Collapses

The Kremlin's goal is for Ukraine, an important buffer state, to become at least a neutral territory between Russia and the West. After the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich and Ukraine's decision to sign the EU association and free trade agreements, the Kremlin hoped that the new government in Kiev would be unable to remain stable and united and fail to implement the International Monetary Fund-mandated austerity and reform measures. So far, internal divisions have not affected the government's ability to implement reforms and make military decisions. But the emergence of more significant internal divisions over policy, especially security policy, is key to watch. If the government in Kiev fails on its own, Russia will have no need to intervene. 

Read more: Analytic Guidance: Why Russia Would Intervene in Ukraine | Stratfor
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Title: Ukraine's NATO vote
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 24, 2014, 09:44:30 AM
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/24/world/europe/ukraine-parliament-nato-vote.html?emc=edit_th_20141224&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193&_r=0
Title: Arms at last?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 02, 2015, 08:31:05 PM


Several developments over the weekend related to the Ukraine crisis indicated that the standoff between Russia and the West could soon reach a turning point. Fighting continued between Ukrainian security forces and Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine while the latest round of peace talks in Minsk collapsed in a matter of hours. Shortly after the talks failed, the leader of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic announced that a general mobilization of up to 100,000 fighters would occur within two weeks. Meanwhile, a report from The New York Times published on Sunday suggested that the United States is seriously considering providing the Ukrainian military with lethal weapons. The United States is characterizing this as a defensive move, but the pro-Russian rebels and Russian government are not likely to agree.

All of these events point to an acute risk of escalation in the conflict over Ukraine. The main question is where this escalation will lead. During the crisis, which has dragged on for more than a year now, there have been several ebbs and flows, as demonstrated by numerous declarations and breaches of cease-fires that occurred while political dialogue between various representatives continued. One thing that is clear is that all options remain on the table in this evolving standoff, including the potential for a larger military conflict.

There are two broader perspectives from which to view the crisis in Ukraine. One is that of the West, which sees the origins of the conflict in Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for a separatist insurgency in eastern Ukraine — illegal and illegitimate responses to what was considered a democratic revolution in Kiev in February 2014. The West regards Russia's actions as a violation of Ukraine's territorial sovereignty and believes that the appropriate response are sanctions against Russia and the backing of a pro-Western government in Kiev. The other view is that of Russia, which sees the February 2014 uprising as an illegal coup d'etat orchestrated by the West. The annexation of Crimea and the eastern Ukrainian insurgency are viewed as legitimate reactions that had substantial support from the local population and were an appropriate response to a conflict the West started as a means of containing and weakening Russia.

What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman Explains.

Russia's view of the West's intentions existed long before the uprising in Kiev. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has witnessed what it perceived as deliberate efforts at containment by the West. One was the expansion of NATO into the former Soviet bloc in the late 1990s and early 2000s; with the inclusion of the Baltic states, the Western military alliance expanded to within 161 kilometers (100 miles) of St. Petersburg. Another was the wave of "color revolutions" that swept the former Soviet space in the mid-2000s, most notably the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, which brought Western influence even closer to the Russian heartland. The 2014 uprising in Ukraine was, from Moscow's perspective, merely the latest chapter in the same story of the West's attempts to contain Russia in the former Soviet borderlands.

This thinking has framed Russia's actions in Ukraine. If Ukraine is aligned with the West it poses an existential threat to Russia, so Moscow feels that it must do whatever is necessary to prevent this alignment. Following the Orange Revolution, Russia used several tools, including energy cutoffs and political connections in Ukraine, to undermine the pro-Western government in Kiev and eventually got a Russian ally in power in 2010. However, the current iteration of Moscow's standoff with the West has left the Russian economy isolated by Western sanctions just as it is reeling from a dramatic drop in oil prices. Meanwhile, the United States and NATO have increased their military presence and commitment to countries in Central Europe, with plans to pre-position equipment and forces in the Baltic states, Poland and Romania. Now the West is signaling its intentions to increase military assistance to Ukraine significantly.

This leaves Russia in a difficult position. A weakening economy puts Russian President Vladimir Putin under pressure at home, and although most Russians oppose a direct, overt military intervention in Ukraine, being seen as capitulating to the West on an issue as strategic as Ukraine could have dire consequences. The issue is particularly delicate given Putin's limitations within the Kremlin as he juggles different power circles' interests.

These circumstances lend greater importance to the intensification of fighting in key areas such as the Donetsk airport and Mariupol. These moves could be meant to demonstrate Russia's capabilities in degrading Ukraine's forces on the battlefield while steering the negotiations over Ukraine's future toward a diplomatic settlement. But the United States and Russia's neighbors cannot discount the possibility that these actions are precursors to a wider Russian military offensive. The West has increased its support to Kiev since the crisis started, and the Times report about possible U.S. weapons sales to Ukraine shows that Russia cannot assume that the West's commitment will not grow. Therefore, Putin could be calculating that if any major military action is to be launched, it would be best to do it before the West increases its presence and assistance in Ukraine and nearby states.

This is not to say that a broader war is looming or inevitable. There are a number of possible outcomes in the range between a negotiated settlement and a full-scale military conflict over Ukraine. The conflict could continue for a long time. But the fact remains that Putin must survey his options, and continuing with the current tactics might not be one of them.
Title: WSJ: On the road to Putinlandia
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 16, 2015, 07:58:54 AM
by Bernard-Henri Lévy
Feb. 13, 2015 6:59 p.m. ET
372 COMMENTS

The meeting was scheduled for that very evening—the evening before the Minsk summit this week—in Petro Poroshenko’s office at the presidential palace in Kiev. But the moment my colleague Gilles Hertzog and I arrive at the Kiev airport and step on the tarmac, my phone rings.  It is Valeriy Chaly, the Ukrainian president’s deputy chief of staff, who is already in Belarus for the summit.

“Stay where you are. Whatever you do, don’t go into town. I can’t tell you anything on the phone. Protocol is coming to pick you up.”

We sit in a deserted waiting room where a converted duty free is selling bad coffee and bars of the Rohsen chocolate, ubiquitous in Ukraine, on which Petro Poroshenko made his fortune.  After two hours, the security ballet begins—men in black, headsets in the ear, long, ultra-slim briefcase in hand, a routine that several decades in the planet’s hot spots have taught me signifies the imminent arrival of the Boss.

From there, everything moves quickly. The men in black assume battle stations as we charge back onto the tarmac, where a jet sits with its twin engines running. We scramble up the ramp at the rear. A security man leads us to the forward cabin, where Petro Poroshenko is waiting. The Ukrainian president is barely recognizable in his khaki T-shirt, camouflage pants and military boots—but mostly because of an almost worrisome pallor, something that I have not seen on him before.

“Sorry about all the mystery, but except for him”—Mr. Poroshenko gestures to Gen. Viktor Muzhenko, the Ukrainian army’s commander in chief, who is also in uniform—“nobody knows where we’re going. Security reasons. But you’ll see. It’s awful. And I want you as witnesses.”

The flight, headed southeast, lasts an hour.

We are headed to the Donetsk region, where, the president tells me, vicious shelling of a civilian area has just claimed several dozen victims.

The conversation turns to the summit in Minsk, Belarus, where the leaders of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine will meet.

“Tomorrow at this time you’ll be face to face with Putin. What are you going to say to him?”

“That I will yield on nothing,” Mr. Poroshenko replies. “That neither Ukraine’s territorial integrity nor its right to Europe are negotiable.”

“And if he persists? If he won’t abandon his idea of federalizing the areas now in the hands of the separatists?”

“Then I’ll walk out and submit the question to public opinion and to the United Nations. We are not Ethiopia in 1935 or Czechoslovakia in 1938 or one of the little nations sacrificed by the great powers at Yalta. We’re not even your friend [Alija] Izetbegovic, who accepted the partition of Bosnia in Dayton.”

I tell him that the difference this time is that France, under François Hollande, is with him. He says he knows that.

I remind him that Germany contracted an ineradicable debt with respect to Ukraine (seven million dead in World War II alone) and that Chancellor Merkel cannot fail to honor it. He nods as if to say that he knows that, too, but is a little less sure of it.

In any event, he feels strongly that his country has paid too dearly for its freedom and independence to accept any form of diktat. “I am hoping with all my heart for a peace agreement, but we are not afraid of war. Didn’t your General de Gaulle say that great people, in dark times, have no better friends than themselves?”

We spend the rest of the flight discussing the formal statement that he will make at the opening of the summit, where the fate of his country will be hanging in the balance. It is a little after 10 p.m. when we land in Kharkov.

About 30 armored vehicles are waiting for us near the plane.

And off we go in convoy across the deserted plains of the Dnieper to Kramatorsk. After three hours of fairly easy going, the last 30 miles are a frozen track rutted by military convoys.

No lights to be seen.

Not a soul stirring.

The chilling atmosphere of a dead city.

And then, suddenly, a clutch of poor people warming themselves around a fire.

Here, the middle of the city had been the target of a Smerch rocket fired from a distance of more than 30 miles in the early afternoon.

Here, and within a radius of about 900 yards, the giant antipersonnel weapon released its rain of minirockets, killing 16 people and wounding 65.

And here I discover another Petro Poroshenko: no longer the military leader from the plane; still less the billionaire president that I accompanied to the Élysée Palace a year ago; but a ravaged man, livid in the floodlights illuminating the scene. He listens as survivors recount the hellish whistle of the rocket, the women returning from the market who were mowed down by the deluge of pellets, the panic in the streets as people rushed for shelter, tripping over bodies, the brave mother who covered her child with her body and was killed, the arrival of rescuers, the anguish that another rocket could follow.

“What a disaster,” he groans.

He repeats it several times: “What a disaster . . . We are kilometers from the front. There’s no one here but civilians. This isn’t war—it’s slaughter. This isn’t a war crime; it’s a crime against humanity.”

And then, standing at the edge of the crater formed by a rocket that had failed to explode, Mr. Poroshenko—suddenly immense and strangely colossal because of the bulletproof vest that his aides had him don under his jacket—points at the engine of death as if it were his personal enemy and adds: “A monster of that size, outlawed by the Geneva Convention, the separatists don’t have those. That could only be the Russians.”

He repeats, a grim smile freezing his features. “The Russians. When I think that the Russians will be there in Minsk tomorrow and will have the audacity to talk about peace . . .”

A doctor, his arms bare even though the temperature is well below zero, approaches to escort us to the nearby hospital emergency room.

The president lingers at the bed of each of the injured, sometimes asking questions, sometimes offering sympathy, sometimes, with the hardiest, trying to joke. I think I even see him give a quiet blessing to an old woman as she hands him the fragments that had been removed from her legs, saying, “Here, Petro, you give these to Putin. Tell him they’re from Zoya in Kramatorsk.”

We make a last stop, far from the city, at the military headquarters of the general staff of the Donetsk region. In a vast building entirely covered with camouflage net are dozens of officers, helmeted Herculeses, their faces furrowed and exhausted, some asleep on their feet with their backs to the wall, still clutching their weapons. And there Mr. Poroshenko resumes the role of war leader. He disappears into the map room with his top officers, where he gives orders for the counteroffensive that will have to be launched if the Minsk summit fails.

It is 3 a.m.

Military intelligence fears the launch of another rocket attack. In any event it is time to go. We take the same route back, though it seems even more desolate.

Once we return to the plane, I tell President Poroshenko that I had dinner the night before in Paris with a former ambassador to Ukraine who is advocating deliveries of weapons—and who believes that the Ukrainian armed forces are in a tough spot, especially in the Debaltsevo pocket, where thousands of troops are menaced on three sides.

“He’s not wrong there,” Mr. Poroshenko responds with a smile, digging into the cold cuts that the flight attendant has just brought to him. “But make no mistake: The time is long past when the navy at Sebastopol and the barracks at Belbek and Novofedorivka gave up without firing a shot. That’s the only advantage of war: You learn how to wage it.”

I also tell him that many in the U.S. and Europe doubt the capacity of his soldiers to make good use of the sophisticated weapons that eventually may be delivered to them. At this, he guffaws and, after exchanging a few words in Ukrainian with his chief of staff, says:

“Well, tell them, please, that they’ve got it wrong. We would need a week, no more, to take full possession of the equipment. Know that, because we had no choice, our army is about to become the best, the bravest, and the most hardened force in the region.”

From that point on, he darkens again only when I mention the uphill battle that his American friends will have to fight before any equipment can be delivered: Congress will have to reapprove the Ukrainian Freedom Support Act that it first passed on Dec. 11. It is an appropriation bill to release the $350 million in military aid that was approved. Final approval will be needed from President Obama, whose tendency to procrastinate in such matters is well known. And a decision will need to be made about whether the equipment can be taken from existing stocks or will have to be manufactured, which would take even more time.

“I know all that,” Mr. Poroshenko mutters, closing his eyes. “I know. But maybe we’ll get a miracle. Yes, a miracle.”

That reminds me that Petro Poroshenko is a practicing Christian, a deacon in civilian life. On the presidential campaign trail last year, in Dnepropetrovsk and elsewhere, before every meeting, I watched him find the nearest church and take a moment to kneel and pray.
***

The idea also crosses my mind that the skilled strategist that he has become—the civilized man whom circumstances have obliged to join the admirable club of reluctant heroes who make war without wanting to—is possibly thinking that what he most needs now is to gain time. Perhaps gaining a few weeks would be the chief advantage of the accords that, without for an instant trusting Vladimir Putin’s word, he is going to sign.

Minsk. Is it a fool’s bargain?

Will the agreement he signs be a false one that, like last September’s, stops the war for just a month or two?

Of course. Deep down, he knows it. His statement after the signing of the accord was simple: “The main thing which has been achieved is that from Saturday into Sunday there should be declared without any conditions at all a general cease-fire.”

For the time being, the nightmare will recede a bit.

It is nearly dawn when we finally land in Kiev. And President Poroshenko has only a few hours to make it to that summit where, one way or another, he has a rendezvous with history.

Mr. Lévy’s books include “Left in Dark Times: A Stand Against the New Barbarism” (Random House, 2008). This article was translated from the French by Steven B. Kennedy.
Title: Russia and Ukraine economically intertwined
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 18, 2015, 05:46:48 AM
Summary

Despite Russia's annexation of Crimea and fighting in Ukraine's east, Ukraine and Russia remain economically intertwined. Kiev has lobbied Western governments to impose sanctions on Russian companies and advocated reducing dependence on Russia natural gas imports. However, Ukraine's banking and energy sectors are tied to Russia, giving the Kremlin several options with which to influence Kiev.
Analysis

Russia and Ukraine have substantial trade ties in addition to closely integrated industrial sectors. Before the crisis began, Russia provided 6.8 percent of foreign direct investment in Ukraine, though the real figure may be higher. Formally, 33.4 percent of FDI to Ukraine in 2013 came from Cyprus, raising the possibility that Russian investment has passed through Cypriot banks and corporations. In 2014, with the onset of the crisis, the share of both Russian and Cypriot FDI flows to Ukraine decreased to 5.9 percent and 29.9 percent, respectively. At the same time, German FDI flows to Ukraine increased to 12.5 percent from only 10.9 percent a year earlier.

Moreover, Russian firms such as Rosneft and Lukoil were active in Ukraine before hostilities broke out. Fighting in the east and pressure from the new, pro-Western authorities, however, has led some Russian firms to cut back on their operations. In July 2014, Lukoil sold one of its subsidiaries, Lukoil-Ukraine CFI, which controlled 240 filling stations in Ukraine, to Austrian company AMIC Energy Management.

Ukraine's banking sector is still closely connected to Russia without these investments. Ukraine's fifth-largest bank in terms of total assets is Prominvestbank, a subsidiary of Russia's Vnesheconombank. Moreover, subsidiaries of Russia's Sberbank, Alfa-Bank and VTB Bank constitute Ukraine's eighth-, ninth-, and 10th-largest banks, respectively. Together these Ukrainian subsidiaries hold over $6 billion in assets. Because the Russian state owns Vnesheconombank and is a majority shareholder in Sberbank and VTB, the Kremlin indirectly controls a significant portion of Ukraine's banking sector. According to Ukraine's Finance Ministry, in the beginning of 2015, Ukraine's total direct and guaranteed debt to the Russian state and Russian banks totaled over $4 billion, the equivalent of about 12 percent of the country's external debt.

However, Russia's own banking sector has experienced difficulties over the past month. Some banks, including VTB, are even seeking state aid, motivating the Kremlin to avoid using its banks to destabilize Ukraine's banking sector. Still, Russia's strong presence does give the Kremlin another opportunity to influence the country's financial markets and pressure Kiev.

In addition to banking, Ukraine's energy sector is also closely tied to Russia. VS Energy International, a Russian firm, owns stakes in eight of Ukraine's 27 regional energy supplier companies, including power distributors in the Odessa and Kiev regions. Electricity shortages resulting from the loss of some of Ukraine's coal resources have led the country to begin importing electricity from Russia as well to fill the projected 10 percent shortfall. Indeed, in late December, Ukrainian energy company Ukrinterenergo signed a one-year contract to purchase up to 1,500 megawatts from Russia (Ukraine currently uses the total 26,000 megawatts it generates). With Russian firms controlling about 30 percent of Ukraine's regional power distribution companies and beginning to export electricity to the country, the Kremlin is positioned to continue playing a role in Ukraine's energy sector.

Kiev knows how dependent it is and has made moving away from relying on Russian natural gas a top priority. Ukraine is buying natural gas reverse flows from Slovakia and has purchased supplies from Poland and Hungary in the past. Also, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk announced Feb. 14 that his country would borrow $1 billion in order to build up new natural gas and oil reserves.

But Ukraine will have to continue relying on Russia because Slovakia, Poland and Hungary are unable to provide sufficient natural gas supplies to meet demand during winter. Furthermore, the temporary deal between Ukraine's Naftogaz and Russia's Gazprom is set to expire at the end of March. Kiev will have to come to at least another temporary agreement with Gazprom before the summer months when Ukraine must begin filling up its storage facilities in preparation for winter.

On the surface, it appears the crisis has lessened Ukraine's economic and financial ties to Russia. The truth, however, is that Russia is still a significant player in the country's banking and energy sectors. In addition, it is maintaining its long-standing trade and industry ties. Moscow will continue using the subsidiaries of Russian firms, as well as Russian exporters, to apply pressure to Kiev and maintain influence within Ukraine's struggling economy. Nevertheless, Russia's own economic vulnerabilities to the West persist and will impact how the Kremlin wields its leverage over Ukraine.
Title: WSJ Ukraine to buy arms from UAE
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 24, 2015, 11:45:06 AM

By Robert Wall in Abu Dhabi and James Marson in Moscow
Updated Feb. 24, 2015 2:06 p.m. ET


Ukraine said it would buy what it called defensive weapons from the United Arab Emirates, bypassing the West’s reluctance to provide arms to help Kiev’s forces against Russia-backed rebels.

President Petro Poroshenko, speaking Tuesday at the International Defence Exhibition and Conference in Abu Dhabi, didn’t specify what type of equipment Ukraine would buy or in what quantities, but said they would help Ukraine protect its territory from the separatists.

The U.A.E. Defense Ministry couldn’t immediately be reached for comment. It didn’t include any Ukraine-related arms deals in its daily contract update for the exposition.

Ukraine has for months requested lethal weapons from its backers in the West, but run into stiff resistance especially from Germany, France and Britain, which fear an escalation in the nearly yearlong conflict.

The Obama administration recently began reconsidering supplying Javelin antitank missiles, small arms and ammunition to Ukraine, but delayed a decision during the latest European peace efforts, which brought a cease-fire agreement on Feb. 12.  Like a similar agreement in September, the truce has failed to fully take hold, as militants overran the strategic, Ukrainian-held town of Debaltseve last week.

In Washington on Tuesday, Secretary of State John Kerry said Russia has repeatedly lied about the presence of Russian troops and weapons in Ukraine, and it is still “a question mark” on whether the U.S. will step up sanctions or provide lethal aid. The U.S. still wants to see the cease-fire agreements implemented, he told the Senate Appropriations subcommittee.

“Russia is engaged in a rather remarkable period of the most overt and extensive propaganda exercise that I’ve seen since the very height of the Cold War,” Mr. Kerry said. “And they have been persisting in their misrepresentations, lies, whatever you want to call them about their activities there, to my face, to the face of others on many different occasions.”

Col. Andriy Lysenko, a government security spokesman, said militants continued to shell Ukrainian positions on Tuesday, with one serviceman killed and seven injured in the last 24 hours.

He said that although the frequency of shelling had decreased, a full cease-fire needed to hold for two days before Kiev would pull its heavy weapons from the front lines—the next stage of the peace agreement.

Eduard Basurin, a rebel army commander, said his fighters had withdrawn heavy weapons from some towns on the front lines, but Col. Lysenko said the militants were regrouping elsewhere.

Russian President Vladimir Putin , who helped broker the Feb. 12 truce, said in a television interview in Moscow that “the situation will gradually normalize” if the full cease-fire deal is implemented. That includes a decentralization of power that would hand rebel-held areas greater powers, including the right to create their own police force and appoint prosecutors and judges.

Foreign ministers from Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France reaffirmed their commitment to the accord hashed out by their leaders, calling for “strict implementation” of all provisions.

Meeting in Paris, the envoys discussed the violence around Debaltseve and Mariupol—a Ukrainian port that has also been targeted by separatists—demanding that international monitors receive full access to the disputed areas.

“We call on all parties to cooperate,” the ministers said afterward, without saying which side was preventing the monitoring.

Meanwhile, Ukraine is looking to bolster its armed forces, which mostly use aging equipment from the Soviet era, after losing its Crimea region to Russia in March 2014, and then large swaths of its Donetsk and Luhansk regions to pro-Moscow separatists.

But the fighting has caused havoc in the local weapons industry, which has suffered the loss of some facilities as it tries to maintain production of items such as armored combat vehicles.

Mr. Poroshenko said a “practical dialogue” remained under way with the U.S. to provide defensive weapons, including communications gear and the ability to counter artillery fire that has been heavily used by rebels in eastern Ukraine.

“We hope that in the very near future we have the decision,” the Ukrainian president said. EU leaders have urged the U.S. not to provide lethal weapons, apparently fearing it would lead to more bloodshed.

The U.S. has provided Ukraine with nonlethal military aid, such as protective vests, night-vision goggles and counter-mortar radar systems.

U.K. Defense Secretary Michael Fallon on Tuesday announced additional nonlethal support “in light of continued Russian-backed aggression,” including medical, logistics, infantry and intelligence capacity-building. He said up to 75 British troops would conduct the training from mid-March in Ukraine, but “well away” from the conflict area.

Prime Minister David Cameron told a parliamentary committee that Britain was “not at the stage of supplying lethal equipment” to Ukraine.

After a meeting with senior U.A.E. officials, Mr. Poroshenko said military technical-cooperation agreements were signed to bolster Ukraine’s arms industry, which he said also managed to secure several export orders. He called the deals “extremely important so we have the money to modernize our armed forces.”

Ukraine has been forced to scrap some foreign orders as it diverts items intended for export to fighting at home, said Lukyan Selsky, spokesman for UkrOboronProm, which represents most of Ukraine’s defense industry. “We had to put all the vehicles in the fight in eastern Ukraine,” he said.

Some production facilities in Crimea and eastern Ukraine also are no longer under government control, he said. Ukrainian officials believe some of the equipment has been relocated to Russia, though they lack proof.

Some personnel who worked in eastern Ukraine have been relocated to other plants. The ability to manufacture explosive powder, for instance, is being rebuilt after a key production site fell into rebel hands, Mr. Selsky said.

Ukraine also is trying to balance military needs with its limited financial resources. The country, for instance, can’t afford its own Oplot main battle tank, Mr. Selsky said. It has decided to continue their export and instead take older tanks that were in storage and upgrade them.

Write to Robert Wall at robert.wall@wsj.com and James Marson at james.marson@wsj.com
Title: Ukraine's arms deal with UAE
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 26, 2015, 10:28:03 AM
 An Arms Deal for Ukraine Serves to Warn Russia
Geopolitical Diary
February 25, 2015 | 21:58 GMT
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A day after Tuesday's announcement of an arms deal between Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates, the dust is beginning to settle and the details are starting to become clear. Much attention has been given to the potential for U.S. involvement in this deal and the possibility that the agreement is a way to indirectly transfer U.S. weapons Ukraine, a move that would cross a red line for Russia. However, UAE weapons cooperation with Ukraine is not likely to be that incendiary. For now, the deal serves the political purpose of signaling to Moscow that there are consequences for its actions — not only in Ukraine, but also in Iran and the rest of the world.

Stratfor sources have indicated that UAE military supplies to Ukraine are likely restricted to lower-profile items such as armored vehicles rather than "game-changing" technology. Using the United Arab Emirates simply as a conduit for U.S.-produced arms makes little sense because of the permission required from Washington to transfer critical U.S.-produced systems to a third party. Such a move would not give the United States any more political cover than a direct delivery to Ukraine would.

What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman Explains.

Defense deals between Abu Dhabi and Kiev are not new. Even during the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates delivered armored vehicles to the Ukrainian military that have been used in active operations. The United Arab Emirates has developed a modest defense industry, and securing export deals for these armored vehicles is a normal practice.

But the timing of Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko's claim that the countries signed a contract worth tens of millions of dollars on Tuesday is critical. In recent weeks, the United States has issued a deluge of statements about retaining the option to provide lethal weapons to Ukraine, and Russia has responded with a deluge of warnings. Abu Dhabi is not seeking to antagonize Moscow, but right now, defense-related cooperation with Ukraine at any level inadvertently affects relations with Russia. Poroshenko's invitation to the IDEX 2015 defense industry convention in the United Arab Emirates is certain to have caught Russia's eye. The invitation follows a recent visit to Iran by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu that put the delivery of Russian air defense systems to Iran back on the table. The delivery of the S-300 air defense system has been a source of diplomatic controversy for some time and would exacerbate Abu Dhabi's concerns about Iran's military capabilities and nuclear program. In this context, displaying some degree of defense cooperation with Ukraine would serve as a reminder to Moscow that the United Arab Emirates can deliver weapon systems to places sensitive to Russian interests.

However, any weapon in and of itself will not reverse Ukraine's fortunes in the war. A weapon system has a capability, but that capability can only be used for a certain set of specific tasks on any given battlefield, whether they be offensive or defensive — a distinction the Russians will not make about any weapons sold or transferred to Ukraine. A weapon can have a massive impact on the battlefield if its capabilities neutralize or destroy the enemy's strength or exploit a weakness, if it is present in enough numbers and if the troops wielding it have been properly trained. All of this requires money — something the Ukrainians do not have much of, leaving them largely dependent on third-party largesse and a geopolitical context that rises above just fighting separatists in eastern Ukraine.

This explains the level of noise surrounding any potential weapons transfers to Ukraine. The separatists, with heavy Russian support, have had much success on the battlefield against a fairly weak Ukrainian military, predominantly by using armor and artillery. But the United States and its allies possess some weapons systems that could impose painful costs if they are fielded in large enough numbers and the Ukrainian military is trained in their use. The Javelin anti-tank guided missile is an oft-cited example of such a system. It may not win the war, but it could result in a higher attrition rate for Russian tanks, and that is why Russia has warned it would respond if significant weapons deliveries occur.

There is a context and timing to all of this noise as well. It grew louder when the separatists and their Russian backers looked like they could seriously expand their territorial holdings in eastern Ukraine. The threat of weapons deliveries from the United States was meant to deter such thinking. In other words, the United States has been telling Russia that the conflict in eastern Ukraine will get much more painful if Moscow continues using the combat situation as leverage in negotiations with Kiev. This strategy seems to have worked, to a point; a cease-fire has been implemented, albeit slowly and painfully.

A deterrent like the threat of arms deliveries does not go away. The combination of U.S. threats and the secretive UAE deal with Ukraine has opened up all levels of speculation. This deal seems to be more about low-level transfers and subtle messaging for now, but many options remain open as the conflict continues. All sides are likely to continue discussing and speculating about negotiations as well as any future arms deals with Ukraine as long as the status of eastern Ukraine remains in doubt.
Title: Ukraine's gold in US hands?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 02, 2015, 03:45:40 PM
I have no idea whether this is true or not.

http://21stcenturywire.com/2014/03/21/the-latest-heist-us-quietly-snatches-the-ukraines-gold-reserves/
Title: US troops in Ukraine, Russia pist off, confrontation in the air
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 06, 2015, 05:40:47 AM
 The U.S. and Russia: Exercises and Venom
Geopolitical Diary
March 6, 2015 | 02:14 GMT
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Three hundred U.S. paratroopers could soon be arriving in Lviv, western Ukraine, for training exercises with the Ukrainian army. The arrival of the troops, which was signaled several weeks ago and alluded to as recently as Monday by the commander of the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade — the unit that would supply the troops — would represent a significant event in the Ukraine crisis. No matter how few or what their mission, these are U.S. combat forces. The United States would at that point have taken the step of openly deploying combat forces in Ukraine, something that had not happened in some time, taking the U.S. relationship with Ukraine to a new level. It signals to the Russians that Ukraine, however informally, is now in a special relationship with the United States. At the same time, military exercises are taking place in the Black Sea involving a U.S. warship and cruiser and Romanian, Bulgarian and Turkish assets. It is a fairly routine exercise, but under these circumstances, what had been routine now takes on special meaning.

Russian forces are conducting exercises as well in southern Russia and the North Caucasus, including Armenia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As significant, the exercises extend to Crimea. They focus on air defense. Significantly, both NATO and the Russians are conducting exercises around the Baltics.

Armies exercise all the time, but context is everything. Before the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, the United States was exercising with Georgian forces while the Russians were conducting exercises just north of Georgia. The Americans went home when the exercise ended. The Russians stayed put: The exercise was the preface for the Russian move into Georgia. Similarly, what has been routine before now is not necessarily routine right now.

What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman Explains.

The United States has indicated it may introduce a small force into Ukraine. The Russians may easily view that as a preface to a larger force. According to Nikolai Patrushev, the head of the Russian Security Council: "The U.S. is funding political groups under the guise of promoting civil society, just as in the color revolutions in the former Soviet Union and the Arab world. At the same time, the U.S. is using the sanctions imposed over the conflict in Ukraine as a pretext to inflict economic pain and stoke discontent. It's clear that the White House has been counting on a sharp deterioration in Russians' standard of living, mass protests." Others in Russia are charging that the United States is trying to overthrow President Vladimir Putin, and some that the CIA murdered Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov to generate protests. Meanwhile, the assumption on the U.S. side is that Putin had Nemtsov murdered.

The atmosphere has become increasingly toxic. Under the circumstances, every military exercise must be taken seriously for its implications. U.S. exercises in Ukraine and the Black Sea can be viewed as the dress rehearsal for naval action and larger forces. On the American side, the emphasis on air defenses raises the possibility of a Russian move to the west. If the Russians were to attack Ukraine, and the Americans chose to resist, the primary means available would be air power designed to strike at armor concentrations. The Russian counter is not its own air force, which is limited, but rather its mobile and strategic surface-to-air missiles to deny aircraft access to the skies over the attackers. Therefore, of all the exercises to cause potential concern in the United States concerning Russian intentions, exercising this capability would raise the specter of a potential Russian invasion of Ukraine.

There is, of course, a certain hollowness to all this rhetoric and maneuvering. This is not 1980, with massive forces carefully trained and deployed on both sides. The United States is planning to send a battalion of paratroopers. That really isn't much. The Russian army is a shadow of the Soviet army, and its ability to move even with minimal resistance is limited.

At the same time, the rhetoric and the charges disproportionate to the forces available are still noteworthy. The head of the Russian Security Council has essentially accused the United States of trying to cripple the Russian Federation. The Americans are saying that the Russians have violated the territory of a sovereign state and must be repelled. And the death of Nemtsov has triggered charges against both the FSB and the CIA.

It is difficult to see how either side backs off its position; this has become an American-Russian confrontation. Both are increasingly locking themselves into a hostile posture. Neither is in a position to launch a war, but both are ultimately capable of waging one. We expected a new Cold War between the United States and Russia, but we are surprised at the speed and venom that is framing this confrontation. The force is not there to match the venom, but given the intensity, no one should be confident that the force will not be generated.
Title: Russia's military options in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 09, 2015, 07:43:38 PM
Summary

Editor's Note: As part of our analytical methodology, Stratfor periodically conducts internal military simulations. This series, examining the scenarios under which Russian and Western forces might come into direct conflict in Ukraine, reflects such an exercise. It thus differs from our regular analyses in several ways and is not intended as a forecast. This series reflects the results of meticulous examination of the military capabilities of both Russia and NATO and the constraints on those forces. It is intended as a means to measure the intersection of political intent and political will as constrained by actual military capability. This study is not a definitive exercise; instead it is a review of potential decision-making by military planners. We hope readers will gain from this series a better understanding of military options in the Ukraine crisis and how the realities surrounding use of force could evolve if efforts to implement a cease-fire fail and the crisis escalates.

Russia's current military position in Ukraine is very exposed and has come at a great cost relative to its limited political gains. The strategic bastion of Crimea is defensible as an island but is subject to potential isolation. The position of Ukrainian separatists and their Russian backers in eastern Ukraine is essentially a large bulge that will require heavy military investment to secure, and it has not necessarily helped Moscow achieve its larger imperative of creating defensible borders. This raises the question of whether Russia will take further military action to secure its interests in Ukraine.

To answer this question, Stratfor examined six basic military options that Russia might consider in addressing its security concerns in Ukraine, ranging from small harassment operations to an all-out invasion of eastern Ukraine up to the Dnieper River. We then assessed the likely time and forces required to conduct these operations in order to determine the overall effort and costs required, and the Russian military's ability to execute each operation. In order to get a baseline assessment for operations under current conditions, we initially assumed in looking at these scenarios that the only opponent would be Ukrainian forces already involved in the conflict.
Analysis

One of the most discussed options is a Russian drive along Ukraine's southern coast in order to link up Crimea with separatist positions in eastern Ukraine. For this scenario, we assumed that planners would make the front broad enough to secure Crimea's primary water supply, sourced from the Dnieper, and that the defensive lines would be anchored as much as possible on the river, the only defensible terrain feature in the region. This would in effect create a land bridge to secure supply lines into Crimea and prevent any future isolation of the peninsula. Russia would have to drive more than 400 kilometers (250 miles) into an area encompassing 46,620 square kilometers, establish more than 450 kilometers of new defensive lines, and subdue a population of 2 million.

Taking this territory against the current opposition in Ukraine would require a force of around 24,000-36,000 personnel over six to 14 days. For defensive purposes, Russian planners would have to recognize the risk of NATO coming to Kiev's assistance. Were that to happen, Russia would have to expand the defensive force to 40,000-55,000 troops to hold the territory.

Planners must also consider the force needed to deal with a potential insurgency from the population, which becomes decidedly less pro-Russia outside of the Donbas territories. Counterinsurgency force structure size is generally based on the size of the population and level of resistance expected. This naturally leads to a much wider variance in estimates. In this scenario, a compliant populace would require a force of only around 4,200 troops, while an extreme insurgency could spike that number to 42,000. In this particular case, no extreme insurgency is expected, as it would be in cities such as Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkiv or Kiev. The defensive force could overlap with the counterinsurgency force to some degree if there were no external threat, but if such a threat existed the forces would have to be separate, potentially doubling the manpower required to secure the territory.
Wargaming Russia's Military Options in Ukraine

A similar scenario that has been considered is the seizing of the entire southern coast of Ukraine in order to connect Russia and its security forces in the Moldovan breakaway region of Transdniestria to Crimea. The logic goes that this would cripple Kiev by cutting off access to the Black Sea and would secure all of Russia's interests in the region in a continual arc. In terms of effort required, Russia essentially would be doubling the land bridge option. It would require an attacking force of 40,000-60,000 troops driving almost 645 kilometers to seize territory encompassing 103,600 square kilometers over 23-28 days. The required defensive force would number 80,000-112,000. This would also add a complicated and dangerous bridging operation over a large river. Moreover, the population in this region is approximately 6 million, necessitating 13,200-120,000 counterinsurgency troops.

These first two scenarios have a serious flaw in that they involve extremely exposed positions. Extended positions over relatively flat terrain — bisected by a river in one scenario — are costly to hold, if they can be defended at all against a concerted attack by a modern military force. Supply lines would also be very long throughout the area and, in the scenario that extends beyond the Dnieper River, rely on bridging operations across a major river.

A third scenario would involve Russia taking all of eastern Ukraine up to the Dnieper and using the river as a defensive front line. When it comes to defending the captured territory, this scenario makes the most sense. The Dnieper is very wide in most places, with few crossings and few sites suitable for tactical bridging operations, meaning defending forces can focus on certain chokepoints. This is the most sensible option for Russia if it wants to take military action and prepare a defensive position anchored on solid terrain.

However, this operation would be a massive military undertaking. The force required to seize this area — approximately 222,740 square kilometers — and defeat the opposition there would need to number 91,000-135,000 troops and advance as much as 402 kilometers. Since the river could bolster defensive capabilities, the defensive force could remain roughly the same size as the attacking force. However, with a population of 13 million in the area, the additional troops that might be required for the counterinsurgency force could range from 28,000-260,000. Russia has approximately 280,000 ground troops, meaning that the initial drive would tie down a substantial part of the Russian military and that an intense insurgency could threaten Russia's ability to occupy the area even if it deployed all of its ground forces within Ukraine.

One positive aspect would be that this operation would take only 11-14 days to execute, even though it involves seizing a large area, because Russia could advance along multiple routes. On the other hand, the operation would require such a vast mobilization effort and retasking of Russian security forces that Moscow's intent would be detectable and would alarm Europe and the United States early on.

Two remaining options that we examined were variations on previous themes in an effort to see if Russia could launch more limited operations, using fewer resources, to address similar security imperatives. For example, we considered Russia taking only the southern half of eastern Ukraine in an effort to use decidedly less combat power, but this left the Russians with an exposed flank and removed the security of the Dnieper. Similarly, a small expansion of current separatist lines to the north to incorporate the remainder of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions to make the territory more self-sustaining was considered. Both operations are quite executable but gain little in the grand scheme.

The final scenario we considered was the most limited. It involved Russia conducting small temporary incursions along the entirety of its border with Ukraine in an effort to threaten various key objectives in the region and thus spread Ukraine's combat power as thin as possible. This would be efficient and effective for the Russian military in terms of the effort required. It could accomplish some small political and security objectives, such as drawing Ukrainian forces away from the current line of contact, generally distracting Kiev, or increasing the sense of emergency there, making the Ukrainians believe Russia would launch a full invasion if Kiev did not comply.

For all of the scenarios considered, the findings were consistent: All are technically possible for the Russian military, but all have serious drawbacks. Not one of these options can meet security or political objectives through limited or reasonable means. This conclusion does not preclude these scenarios for Russian decision makers, but it does illuminate the broader cost-benefit analysis leaders undertake when weighing future actions. No theoretical modeling can accurately predict the outcome of a war, but it can give leaders an idea of what action to take or whether to take action at all.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 11, 2015, 07:30:26 AM
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/10/ukraines-courageous-energy-reforms-meant-to-erode-russias-leverage/
Title: WSJ: Sanctions
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 18, 2015, 04:54:13 AM
BRUSSELS—A political deal is emerging within the European Union that could help the bloc navigate its divisions on policy toward Russia, by delaying an immediate decision on extending economic sanctions against Moscow, according to people involved in discussions.

The arrangement would also clearly link an easing of sanctions explicitly to the full and final implementation of the Ukraine cease-fire accord signed in Minsk, Belarus, last month, the people said.

The understanding, crafted in talks in Brussels, Paris and Berlin in recent days, aims to create a broad consensus at an EU leaders summit this week that when heads of government meet again in June or July, they would likely extend the economic sanctions on Russia through at least the rest of 2015.

EU governments are still working on the exact language leaders will use in a statement they will issue after this week’s summit.

After European affairs ministers met in Brussels on Tuesday, Edgars Rinkevics, foreign minister of Latvia said he doesn’t believe “there is going to be...any decisions” on sanctions this week. Latvia holds the rotating EU presidency,

According to several people involved in the talks, there is now what one diplomat called a clear “political understanding” that there will be no decision to renew sanctions this week. However, the leaders’ statement is expected to say sanctions will be tied to Russia fully implementing its Minsk obligations, which include the crucial step of handing back control of the Ukrainian border at the end of 2015.

Extending the sanctions would be “more or less a formality” at the next EU leaders summit, said a second senior official involved in discussions. The emerging political deal would “get the issue out of the way for now.”

The EU has imposed a series of sanctions on Russia since March 2014, when Moscow annexed the Ukrainian region of Crimea. Russia denies western accusations that it has supplied and supported separatist forces in eastern Ukraine that battled Ukraine’s army for most of the past year.

The EU already has extended until September 15 targeted sanctions on Russian and separatist individuals and entities whose actions were deemed to have undermined Ukraine’s sovereignty. EU leaders have said sanctions would be stepped up if the situation in eastern Ukraine deteriorates.

With the cease-fire largely holding, however, divisions have been emerging within the EU about when and whether to roll over the bloc’s toughest response to the crisis: major economic restrictions on energy, banking and defense ties with Russia imposed last summer and which expire in July.

Speaking on Monday after meeting in Berlin with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said pressure on Russia shouldn’t be lifted until Moscow has fully implemented the Minsk agreement. “The sanctions and the implementation of the Minsk plan must be connected,” she said.

However at a meeting in Brussels that same afternoon, EU foreign ministers again exposed their rifts on what is best to do. The Austrian and Spanish foreign ministers were among those warning the bloc should take no step at this point to ratchet up pressure, saying that would send the wrong signal at a critical moment in the cease-fire.

“There is no need to decide now on Russia sanctions--they are still ongoing until summer,” said Austrian Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz. “Sanctions are a means of pressure, not a goal as such. Extension of sanctions depends on the situation on the ground in eastern Ukraine.”

Others pressed the bloc to give a clear signal that economic sanctions would stay in effect well past July. “I hope we can have a clear political commitment to maintaining sanctions until Minsk is implemented in its entirety,” said British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond. “It’s important to send a signal to the Russians that we are united, we are determined and that they have to deliver on their commitment.”

The U.S. has signaled it will keep its sanctions in place for the foreseeable future.

Since the start of the crisis in Ukraine, the EU has struggled to maintain unity and divisions have become increasingly transparent in recent months.

Governments in Hungary, Slovakia and Greece have criticized the effectiveness of the restrictions to secure a political solution in Ukraine while others, like Italy, Spain and Cyprus have been tentative about the measures. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Budapest last month. Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi visited Mr. Putin in Moscow in early March, and Greece’s new Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras is due to see the Russian president in Moscow early April.

Other countries such as Poland, those in the Baltic and the U.K. have frequently vented frustration that the EU hasn’t reacted more resolutely to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. European Council President Donald Tusk, a former Polish premier, said in January that what he termed as the West’s “appeasement” of Moscow “encouraged the aggressor to greater acts of violence.”

The economic sanctions issue still has the potential to crack open the unity that the bloc has managed to sustain so far. To renew the measures beyond July, the bloc needs the approval of all 28 member states. Greece’s government, which is entangled in a conflict with its fellow eurozone members over its economic plans, has said it won’t give up its right to veto any EU decision that threatens its national interests.

However, the EU has time and again swung behind a consensus led by France and Germany—the two countries that helped broker the Minsk agreement along with Ukraine and Russia. Diplomats say that while Paris was wary of German talk about extending the sanctions in recent weeks, the two are now agreed that delaying any immediate decision on sanctions in exchange for an understanding that the pressure will remain beyond July is a policy that can keep the bloc united.

Write to Laurence Norman at laurence.norman@wsj.com
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Title: Stratfor: Backtracking from the Brink in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 02, 2015, 05:19:33 AM
 Backtracking From the Brink in Ukraine
Global Affairs
April 1, 2015 | 08:04 GMT
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By Jay Ogilvy

If ever there were a flashpoint — to invoke the title of George Friedman's new book — Ukraine is it. The fragile cease-fire now in place in eastern Ukraine is the pilot light to a new Cold War between the United States and Russia as their proxies poise to reload.

At this critical moment, American media have been fanning the flames of this flashpoint. While Russia has hardly been innocent of violating international law in its annexation of Crimea, it is worth taking stock of some history, near and distant, to temper the narratives that could escalate into a shooting war that should be entirely avoidable.

Ever since the lead-up to the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, the American media have been filled with Vladimir Putin bashing. For Americans, Putin is an easy target with his KGB background, bare-chested bravado and anti-gay policies. But this obsessive focus on Putin's personality obscures much more important geopolitical realities.

False Parallels

The dominant U.S. narrative for Ukraine is that Ukraine is simply one more Eastern European country trying to pry itself out from under seven decades of Soviet oppression. This narrative is profoundly misleading. Ukraine is not Poland and it is not Latvia or Romania. These countries are each largely united by a shared language and culture. They are also further fused through suffering from prior Russian incursions.

Ukraine is different from most of its neighbors in Eastern Europe. It is both deeply divided, culturally and politically, and its eastern half is strongly bound to Russia.

Just look at the maps of the presidential elections of 2004, 2010 and 2014.

Note the similarity between these electoral maps and the distribution of Russian speakers:

Eastern Ukraine is not equivalent to the former East Germany artificially divided from the whole. "Rus," the identity that is the root of the Russian identity, was born in Ukraine's capital, Kiev, centuries before Moscow's more recent accession to the central role. During the civil war that followed the Russian Revolution of 1917, some of the fiercest fighting over the founding of post-revolutionary Russia took place in Ukraine. Crimea, which was part of Russia until it was ceded to Ukraine after World War II, has long served as Russia's equivalent to Florida — a vacation destination for the elite to escape winter's cold or enjoy summer at the seashore.

In addition to these historical and cultural realities that go back centuries, the U.S. media also ignore more recent history. The Soviet Union gifted Crimea to Ukraine in 1954, shortly after the death of Josef Stalin in 1953. The new leader, Nikita Khrushchev, felt a strong attachment to his favorite province of the Soviet Union. He had worked in a Ukrainian mine as a young man and took a Ukrainian woman as his wife. Shifting Crimea's attachment from Russia to Ukraine was like moving money from his right pocket to his left. Khrushchev could hardly have imagined that his beloved Ukraine would cease to be part of the Soviet Union in less than 40 years.

Moving still closer to the present, an amnesiac American media forgets that, after the fall of the Soviet Union, in the words of the last U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union in a Feb. 20 address at the National Press Club, "first President [George H.W.] Bush, at a Malta meeting in 1989, and then later, in 1990, almost all the Western leaders, told Gorbachev: If you remove your troops from Eastern Europe, if you let Eastern Europe go free, then we will not take advantage of it."

Despite that admittedly controversial "promise" — controversial because it was only verbal and never put in the form of a written treaty — the United States and NATO have moved steadily eastward toward the Russian border. Never mind juicy details like U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt getting caught on tape discussing the imminent coup of elected Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich. Never mind the dark shadow of anti-Semitism in groups like western Ukraine's nationalist Svoboda party, or the out of control militias responsible for some of the worst of the fighting. There is plenty of blame to go around on both sides of a very messy reality. The important thing is to appreciate that this mess has many hues other than black and white before righteously arming those poor Ukrainians against the vicious Putin.
A Warmer Cold War

Today it is almost hard to recall the warmer relationship between the United States and Russia before and immediately after the fall of the Iron Curtain. As part of a decadeslong effort at citizen diplomacy, I traveled to Russia in 1983, 1985 and 1991. Those were heady days with talk of a "peace dividend" and "a new world order." Our tiny group — Track Two: An Institute for Citizen Diplomacy — numbered fewer than 50 individuals. Nevertheless, we managed to sponsor then-President Boris Yeltsin's first trip to the United States, during which he experienced an epiphany. Faced with dozens of different brands of mustard in a Houston, Texas, supermarket (he loved mustard), he broke down in tears at what 70 years of communism had denied his people. He returned to Russia, quit the Communist Party, and the rest, as they say, is history.

I tell this story to heighten the contradictions between what could have been, what is now and what might yet be. When I returned to Russia again in 2005, feelings were much cooler. I had the opportunity to conduct 28 high-level interviews over a period of 10 days and, time and again, what I heard was a message that said, in effect, "No, we are never going to go back to the old centrally planned economy; we renounce Marx; we embrace the market; but we want to do it our way. You Americans are overbearing and arrogant. Back off!"

What had happened in the intervening years? In retrospect, I would say the United States simply got distracted around the time of the first Gulf War. We took our eye off the Russian ball. Various advisers and consultants confused Russia with Poland and advocated a sudden transition to a market economy. Lacking the requisite institutional infrastructure for managing a fair marketplace, many of Russia's treasures fell prey to asset grabs by the now infamous oligarchs.

When runaway inflation led to the devaluation of the ruble in 1998, millions saw their precious pensions evaporate overnight. Many Russians were not at all happy with their transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. Perhaps the jokes had been true — "All Russians are equal: equally poor" and "We pretend to work; they pretend to pay us." Nonetheless, those pensions had provided something of a safety net, however meager. The new world order was considerably more brutal — economically speaking — than the old regime.

Further, as former President Mikhail Gorbachev has remarked, Americans indulged in what he calls "triumphalism," which was all the easier to do when the Russian economy fell so far down. But as former U.S. Ambassador Jack Matlock argues vigorously in his book Superpower Illusions, the United States did not "win" the Cold War. Matlock was there with President Ronald Reagan and Gorbachev when they achieved what both sides regarded as a negotiated settlement that was to the advantage of both nations — at least at first. Only later, when the promise of Russian wealth did not materialize, did that negotiated settlement come to appear to the Russians to be every bit as punitive as the Treaty of Versailles had been to the Germans in the wake of World War I.

The American media, with a few exceptions like Stephen F. Cohen, neglects these geopolitical realities. Instead it repeats over and over its cartoons of a demon Putin, its tales of unwarranted Russian aggression across Ukraine's eastern border, its sympathy for a nation mistakenly believed to be united in its fear of Russia. But Ukraine is not united. It is riven by wounds that run deep. No winner-take-all solution to its problems is likely to succeed.

What chance is there that Russia will use military force to achieve a winner-take-part solution? An earlier Stratfor three-part series began by gaming Russia's options via several scenarios; then, in part two, considered possible responses by the West. Part three, Russia Weighs the Cost, wrapped up with the following paragraph:

    "The conclusion reached from matching up these scenarios with Moscow's strategic imperatives is that no obvious options stand out. All of the scenarios are logistically feasible, though some would come at an incredible cost, few of them actually meet Russia's needs, and none of them can be guaranteed to succeed as long as the possibility of a U.S. or NATO military response remains. If the prospect of such a military engagement deters the West from taking direct action against a Russian offensive, the West's option to subsume the remaining parts of Ukraine significantly minimizes the benefits of any military operation Russia might consider. As Joshua, the computer in the 1983 movie WarGames, observed, 'The only winning move is not to play.'"

This scenario-based analysis reflects a disciplined effort to weigh the options from the perspective of Russian strategists: what is to be gained or lost for Russia, not for a cartoonish Putin.

The point of this column is to overcome the simplistic narrative of Ukraine that has been painted in the U.S. media. If we fail to appreciate Russia's real interests, if we obscure geopolitical realities with glossy dramas about Putin's bare chest, then we are in danger of fanning the flames of old enmities at this critical flashpoint.

Crimea was, is and will be part of Russia. Get used to it. For Donetsk and Luhansk this will also very likely be the case. But Russia (not Putin) has no real interest in advancing more deeply into eastern Ukraine: "The only winning move is not to play." Unless, of course, the West — NATO urged on by the United States — presses needlessly for a winner-take-all solution. In that case many Russians, if not the strategists in the Kremlin, would almost surely be motivated to engage in a "humanitarian intervention" to protect their Russian friends suffering under "oppression" just over the border in eastern Ukraine. In this Western-pressured scenario, there will be blood.

Pressure for a winner-take-all solution by the West would be unreasonable and totally in violation of those verbal assurances made when Reagan and Gorbachev negotiated the conclusion of the Cold War. Such pressure could build upon media-fed delusions about an undivided Ukraine. But a deeper understanding of the geopolitical realities, seen in the context of history, near and far, should give us pause before foolishly giving in to calls to arm the Ukrainians against an unlikely Russian offensive.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 10, 2015, 08:14:17 AM
Analysis

By Eugene Chausovsky

The Ukrainian city of Lviv is located in the far west of the country, less than 60 kilometers (37 miles) from the Polish border. Lviv was once part of the kingdom of Galicia, which included parts of modern Ukraine and Poland. The city has long been known as the center of Ukrainian culture, overshadowing Kiev as the driving force behind the development of a distinct national identity. Lviv played a particularly important role in the period between World War I and World War II, when Ukraine first attained independence, and again in the lead-up to the collapse of the Soviet Union. During Ukraine's unrest in 2014, the city was once again at the vanguard of history. Demonstrators stormed local government buildings and declared the city independent on Feb 20, a full two days before Kiev's EuroMaidan protesters forced then-President Viktor Yanukovich to give up his hold on power and flee abroad.

Of Ukraine's major cities, Lviv is the most European — in terms of both history and culture. The city was ruled by Poland from the 14th to the 18th century and, as rival powers gradually partitioned Poland, was then controlled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire until World War I. After the war, nationalists in Lviv attempted to form an independent state, only to ultimately fail, and Poland reclaimed the city in 1919. It was not until the end of World War II that Lviv fell under Moscow's control as part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Kiev, by contrast, had been under Russia's sway for three centuries already.

A view of buildings at Lviv University, established in 1661 by Poland's King John II Casimir. (Wikimedia Commons)

Modern Lviv bears the marks of this European history and has a distinctly different character than eastern Ukraine or even Kiev—it is the city in which Western influence is at its maximum and Russian influence is at its weakest. The Ukrainian language predominates on the streets of Lviv, which are lined with classical and Gothic European architecture. Catholic cathedrals such as the Church of the Holy Communion and the Latin Cathedral stand in the city's old town. On the main thoroughfare, Svobody Avenue, a monument to Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz is erected in front of an Austrian-built Baroque opera house and a statue of Taras Shevchenko, the icon who made Ukrainian into a literary language.

A tent stands on Svobody Avenue in central Lviv as a memorial to government troops killed in the fighting in eastern Ukraine. (EUGENE CHAUSOVSKY/Stratfor)

Today on Svobody, there stands a more immediate symbol of Lviv's Western-orientation and solid Ukrainian credentials: a memorial tent to the "freedom fighters" battling pro-Russia separatists in the east. Nearby is a small booth set up by the nationalist Svoboda party, whose leader, Oleh Tyahnybok, is from Lviv and played an important role during the EuroMaidan demonstrations. Ukrainian flags can be spotted on every street, along with a few EU and Council of Europe flags. Troops occasionally walk by, chatting casually with locals. Many shops and cafes are decorated in the Ukrainian national colors of yellow and blue as well as posters supporting Kiev's efforts against eastern separatists. Most have buckets soliciting donations for the war effort.

A truck soliciting donations to support the Ukrainian military's efforts in eastern Ukraine. (EUGENE CHAUSOVSKY/Stratfor)

It was here, in the center of the city, amid the nationalist decorations, that I met up with some Ukrainian friends — two couples in their mid-thirties from Kiev. Normally the May holidays would find them abroad, but Ukraine's current economic circumstances have made that difficult. The hryvnia, which once exchanged at eight to the dollar, depreciated over the past year and now sits at 22 to the dollar. A road trip to Lviv was much more affordable for them.

My first question was what they thought of Ukraine's national crisis. Right away, one of them responded that it didn't matter what they thought — they couldn't change anything. Before the ouster of Yanukovich, this sort of apathy was the norm among young people. It surprised me, however, to hear it at such a critical and tumultuous time. But this knee-jerk cynicism belied the fact that my previously apolitical friends had, over a short period, become intensely aware and involved in domestic politics. While fatalism was still the norm, even after Kiev's pro-European Union protests broke out in November 2013 and police began to beat student demonstrators, many otherwise apolitical people rallied to the anti-government cause. They provided food and supplies to protestors on the Maidan. When the rallies succeeded in toppling Yanukovich, my friends were thrilled.

When Russia reacted by annexing Crimea and providing support to militants in eastern Ukraine, my friends transformed into full-fledged Ukrainian patriots. Before 2014, none of them had voted in elections. In recent parliamentary elections, however, they all voted — two chose Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko's party and two voted for the radical Right Sector party. The latter choice shocked me. When I asked why, they said they chose Right Sector because it was the only party fully committed to defending the nation; in their minds, the other parties seemed self-interested and willing to sell out to the highest bidder. None of my friends cared whether Ukraine pursued EU membership, but they all said Russia was clearly a threat and that Ukraine needed help meeting that threat.

All of my friends have been affected by last year's conflict and instability, either emotionally, physically or economically. Utility prices, for example, have risen substantially. They will continue to do so under the new government's reform and austerity program, which is key to obtaining funds from Western financial institutions. My friends said that these costs were difficult for them to bear, but that they would endure them. To them, that was the price of progress. They preferred higher bills to the humiliating corruption under Yanukovich. They acknowledged that the reform process would take time, but were willing to wait and see it out if it would lead to a more well-run and just state. Ultimately, however, they wanted at least some demonstrable improvements soon, saying that Poroshenko could suffer Yanukovich's fate if he did not deliver.

Elsewhere in Lviv, I found others who shared my friends' cautious optimism. A Lviv-born taxi driver told me that his life had worsened since 2014. Most of his complaints were about the economy — high gas prices, food costs and heating rates did not balance with stagnating wages. He noted, however, that Ukraine had suffered worse hardships before and that at least now the West was acknowledging Russian President Vladimir Putin's designs on Ukraine. In addition, he was relieved that Yanukovich was gone. In Lviv, life was calm and plenty of tourists still came to the city, while the fighting was "way out there in the east."

A Ukrainian flag flies in a rural village near Rivne, about 180 kilometers (112 miles) northeast of Lviv. (EUGENE CHAUSOVSKY/Stratfor)

Leaving the city, however, it became clear that even nearby towns were suffering the crisis more acutely than Lviv. This became quickly apparent as the charming old city gave way to Soviet-style concrete apartment blocks and small, rusting factories. Along the E-40 highway heading east, these concrete buildings eventually faded out, leaving only flat, green fields and small, derelict villages. I spotted people on horse-drawn carts working the land as they and their families had done for centuries. Many of these people likely camped out in the EuroMaidan and were essential in championing the demands for reform that ultimately led to Yanukovich's ouster. Passing through them made it easy to see why — there really wasn't much else to do.

All the signs along the road to Kiev were printed in both Ukrainian and English – none were in Russian. A few Soviet-era monuments stood alongside the road — a tank, a MiG-29 fighter. All of these, however, were draped with Ukrainian flags. The welcome sign outside the town of Tarakanov bore not only the Ukrainian flag, but also the red and black Ukrainian nationalist flag now used by Right Sector.

Driving into central Kiev, we crossed the over the Dnieper River on the yellow and blue illuminated Peshechodny Bridge. Seeing Ukraine's national colors, my friend said "Isn't it beautiful?" Hearing this middle class, Russian speaker who had once been so politically apathetic swell with Ukrainian pride underlined the drastic evolution they and other Ukrainians had undergone over the past year. Alongside the political, economic and security changes Ukraine had undergone, many of its people had experienced an emotional transformation. Their identity had changed. They knew the war with Russia would be difficult and long. They knew that the economy was weak and that the government was still corrupt and influenced by oligarchs. In spite of all this, they now felt more Ukrainian than they had before.

This, however, does not mean they support the new government unconditionally. Instead, it means they hold Kiev to higher standards than ever before. This was a shift in public sentiment on a deeper, more personal level. The government could just as easily be voted or removed from office as the previous one. This new identity, however, could not be removed as easily. Granted, Ukraine still has a number of cultural divides and were I to speak to Ukrainians in Kharkiv or Odessa, not to mention separatist-dominated Donetsk and Crimea, the answers would be quite different. Regardless of its scope, the new and politically engaged attitudes that I witnessed in Lviv will play an important role, both domestically and abroad, in Russia and the West, in charting Ukraine's new future.
Title: US changes tactics
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 19, 2015, 06:53:18 PM
 The U.S. Changes Its Tactics With Russia
Geopolitical Diary
May 19, 2015 | 00:31 GMT
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On Monday, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Victoria Nuland met with Russian deputy foreign ministers Sergei Ryabkov and Grigory Karasin in Moscow. The Russian reaction to Nuland's visit has been mixed. Karasin called his discussions with the assistant secretary "fruitful" but also said he is not in favor of the United States' joining the Normandy talks on Ukraine, which include representatives from Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France. Ryabkov noted that the current state of the U.S.-Russia relationship is not conducive to moving forward. Nevertheless, Nuland's visit is the latest indicator that the U.S. role in the negotiations over Ukraine's future and the U.S. administration's position on Ukraine may be shifting.

During the past week, U.S. officials have been shuttling between meetings with Russian and Ukrainian leaders, inserting the United States directly into the complex negotiations. Last week, Nuland met with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk after accompanying Secretary of State John Kerry on his trip to Sochi, Russia, on May 12. Kerry's meetings in Sochi with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov were inconclusive but elicited positive public feedback from the Kremlin.

What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman Explains.

For the past year and a half, Germany and France have been at the forefront of Western negotiations with Russia. However, differences between the German and U.S. views of events in eastern Ukraine and interpretations of the Minsk agreement have come to the fore. Germany has taken a more favorable view of progress in implementing the Minsk agreement, while the United States has maintained a hard line, emphasizing continued active Russian military support for the separatist forces.

Moreover, members of the European Union are divided over how to approach Russia, especially regarding sanctions. Poland and some Baltic states have sought to increase pressure on Russia, while countries such as Greece, Italy, Hungary and Spain are seeking to protect their trade ties and have indicated that they would consider voting to ease sanctions down the line. As a result, Germany is having an increasingly difficult time maintaining a hard line in dealing with Russia.

Nonetheless, Germany would rather remain at the forefront of the negotiations with Russia and avoid a scenario in which the United States forces Russia into a confrontation that Berlin does not want. Although U.S. officials have been involved in discussions with their Russian and Ukrainian counterparts throughout the conflict, the recent direct high-level negotiations — without the participation of European leaders — signal that Washington wants a larger and more direct role in discussions regarding Ukraine.

At the same time, Russia's negotiating position has changed since the beginning of the conflict. Low energy prices and sanctions have contributed to economic troubles in Russia. Simultaneously, Putin's temporary disappearance from public view in March, as well as the Federal Security Service's efforts to boost its influence relative to competing Kremlin factions, could have affected the U.S. strategy for negotiating with the Kremlin.

There are indications that U.S. demands for Russia in the Ukraine crisis are evolving as well, possibly as a part of negotiations. In contrast to previous statements from U.S. officials, both Kerry and Nuland refrained from publicly discussing the status of Russian-annexed Crimea over the past week. Though the Minsk agreements envision Ukraine retaking control of its border with Russia, in both Kiev and Moscow Nuland merely spoke about the necessity for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to have a presence on the border and the ability to inspect cargo moving into Ukraine. Nevertheless, while in Moscow, Nuland did note Russian support for the separatists and, in a symbolic move, met with Lyudmila Alexeyeva, the head of the Moscow Helsinki Group and a human rights activist critical of the Kremlin.

Russian negotiators would like to elicit several key concessions from the United States. The first concerns U.S. military support for Ukraine. U.S. trainers are in western Ukraine on a six-month mission, but Russia wants to ensure that U.S. forces do not extend or expand this mission. Thus far, the United States has refrained from providing significant military support to Kiev. The Kremlin is likely pushing its U.S. counterparts not to provide weapons to Ukraine and to end training activities there and in other countries in Russia's periphery such as Georgia.

Another key Kremlin demand is curbing U.S. and NATO activity along the alliance's eastern edge, in countries such as the Baltics, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. Further, Russian negotiators are pressing for the United States and the European Union to lift sanctions imposed on Russian firms and citizens.

The United States probably is unwilling to compromise on its military training mission to Ukraine, but the U.S. administration could, as it has thus far, avoid providing Ukraine with weapons that add to the country's military capabilities. Creating an alliance along NATO's eastern edge is likewise a part of the U.S. strategy in the region for countering Russia.

But when it comes to sanctions, Washington may be open to compromising. U.S. sanctions were imposed in spring and summer 2014 using executive orders and can be lifted should the U.S. administration decide to do so, unlike EU sanctions, whose fate depends on decisions by all the bloc's members. If it occurs, the lifting of U.S. sanctions would take place piecemeal, beginning with lighter sanctions such as travel bans on individuals, since the administration would likely work to ensure that it still has some means of pressuring Russia as negotiations continue. In order to begin lifting some sanctions, the United States will likely demand a full cease-fire along the line of contact in eastern Ukraine, as well as greater access for international observers.

The United States and Russia have been in close contact regarding the situation in Ukraine since the beginning of the crisis. But Nuland's visit, as well as Kerry's trip to Sochi and meeting with Putin, could signal a shift in U.S. strategy in talks with the Kremlin. The latest flurry of meetings likely does not herald an end to the crisis. For Russia, rendering Ukraine at least neutral is still a strategic goal. However, greater direct U.S. involvement in the negotiations could change the dynamics of the talks. The United States does not necessarily want a neutral Ukraine, but it appears more open to directly negotiating with Russia and keeping potential compromises on the table
Title: Re: Ukraine, Putin winning or losing
Post by: DougMacG on September 21, 2015, 06:10:17 AM
The American Interest

HOW TO READ UKRAINE
Is Putin Winning or Losing?
WALTER RUSSELL MEAD
Pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine don’t think they’re getting enough support from the Kremlin, and are openly wondering if Putin still wants to help them win.

Ukrainian separatist leaders say their hopes of full integration with Russia or greater independence are fading as the Kremlin tightens the reins on their rebellion.

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears unwilling to risk broadening his conflict with the U.S. and European Union over Ukraine, senior separatist officials said in interviews this month, meaning the rebel regions’ future is more likely to resemble Transnistria, the Russian-backed breakaway area of Moldova, whose fate is still unresolved more than two decades after fighting subsided.
Russian nationalists want to bring Ukraine back into the fold; there should not, some Russians feel, be an international border between Moscow and Kiev. Yet there’s little sign that Putin has ever made this his goal. For one thing, Ukraine’s economy is in such bad shape that Russia would have to subsidize it heavily. That’s not something Putin is eager to do. Even the nationalists’ fallback position—a Ukraine so committed to Russia’s version of the European Union (the “Eurasian Union”) that further EU integration is impossible—would require heavy Russian support.

On the other hand, Putin cannot tolerate a Ukraine that is fully integrated into the West. A democratic Ukraine that was traveling the road taken by Poland and the Baltic States to become increasingly economically successful, ultimately to join the Western institutions of the EU and NATO, would be a crippling defeat for Putin for two reasons: First, because the Russian nationalists who are an important part of Putin’s coalition would turn against him in anger and disappointment if Russia were seen to have ‘lost’ Ukraine in this way. Second, because the core arguments that Putin uses to defend his methods and regime would be gravely weakened.

Putin’s argument to the Russian people is that Orthodox Slavs are part of a different civilization from the West: Russia isn’t like France or Germany, England, or even Poland. Western democracy, Western economic organization, and Western ideas about personal autonomy and freedom are foreign to Russia and don’t work. Look what happened in the 1990s when Yeltsin tried to move the country Westward, the argument goes. Russia almost fell apart! Then, when the kind of strong government that Russia needs was restored (by Putin) things got better. Western pressure to democratize is part of a plan to defeat, dismember and humiliate Russia. The West’s true hope, Putin contends, is for Russia to fall apart the way the Soviet Union did.

The trouble for Putin is that a successful Ukraine, democratizing and Westernizing, undercuts this argument. If Ukraine were to start looking more like Denmark, or even Poland, that would be an important sign that an Orthodox Slavic culture (and remember, Russian nationalists consider Ukraine and Russia to be deeply similar) really can succeed on the basis of liberal economic and political ideas. Russia doesn’t have to be isolated, undemocratic and poor. If the Russians get rid of Putin and his cronies, they too could have a better life.
Putin’s core concern with Ukraine, then, is defensive. He considers its Westward aspirations to be a serious danger to his power. His goal isn’t to conquer all Ukraine or even part of it; his goal is to spoil Ukraine—to prevent it from taking the Westward road with success. Conquest or integration of Ukraine into the Eurasian Union is something he can’t afford and doesn’t particularly want. But keeping Ukraine from assimilating into the West: that’s vital.
Long term Russian control over Crimea and a poor, corrupt, Ukraine run by greedy and unpopular oligarchs is pretty much Putin’s dream scenario. And it’s better still if this crippled entity is subsidized by the West—if the EU and the U.S., for example, end up helping Ukraine pay its oil bill to Gazprom and otherwise have to prop up its staggering economy.

That’s not a perfect situation for him; there are, for example, important defense plants in eastern Ukraine that Russia would like to have back under his control. But given that Russia is a weaker power, and that the oil price collapse has exacerbated Russia’s weakness, what we see now is pretty much a status quo that Putin can live with—as long as Ukrainian reforms fail and its economy flounders.

So the important battle line in Ukraine isn’t actually in the east. The important battle in Ukraine is political and economic. Can the West and pro-Western Ukrainians reform the economy and build a competent, honest and modernizing state, or will the oligarchs and the legacy of Soviet corruption drag Ukraine down?
Putin hopes (not without reason) that time and inertia are on his side. Ukraine has never been able to build a Western style state, and its oligarchs remain in charge. The West’s goals for Ukraine are harder to achieve than Putin’s goals; this is why Russia, a fundamentally weaker power than the West it opposes, has a chance at getting its way in Ukraine.

Therefore, the purpose of the badly organized and poorly-led mafias and militias in the Russian dominated chunks of eastern Ukraine is to keep Ukrainian politics on the boil. By controlling when and whether Donetsk militias fight, Putin can create a political crisis in Ukraine at any moment. This frozen conflict (which Putin always has the option of unfreezing) helps deter foreign investors who fear the risk of renewed unrest. It pushes Ukrainian nationalists toward more radical politics in ways that Putin hopes will further unbalance Ukraine’s precarious political order. It forces Ukraine to borrow money for military defense. It confirms the impression of people inside Russia that their country is surrounded by implacable enemies and needs a strong leader to defend it.

Meanwhile, Putin has other tools he can use to make the task of reform inside Ukraine harder. There are oligarchs whose loyalties are divided, and who want to keep on good terms with the Kremlin while keeping the EU and the reformers from changing the way they do business. Some members of parliament and of Ukraine’s government and security forces are susceptible to Russian bribes or blackmail. Some groups in Ukraine fear that reform will undercut their power and privilege (like the masses of corrupt civil servants and judges who will ultimately be sidelined and marginalized if the New Ukraine really takes shape). And there are others who, for reasons of sentiment or interest, want Ukraine to look East rather than West.

For all these reasons, Putin doesn’t need military success in eastern Ukraine or further advances into Ukrainian territory to get his way. This is a political struggle for Putin more than a military one, and from his point of view, the situation in Ukraine looks reasonably good. Success isn’t guaranteed, of course, but the odds against a successful state building effort in Kiev remain long.

Posted: Sep 20, 2015 - 3:49 pm
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/09/20/is-putin-winning-or-losing/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 21, 2015, 08:55:49 AM
That seems a pretty good analysis to me.
Title: Stratfor
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 29, 2015, 07:28:38 AM
Summary

Editor's Note: This is the second installment of a five-part series that explores the past, present and future of the confrontation between Russia and the West on the Eurasian landmass.

Russia's desire for influence in Ukraine is as old as the Russian state itself. It has fought for centuries to protect its stake in the Eastern European nation from the encroachment of the West, often turning to natural gas cutoffs or outright military intervention to do so.

Since the end of the Cold War, Ukraine has vacillated between East and West, split between the country's pro-Russia and pro-Europe factions. Now, as Ukraine swings once more toward the West, Russia stands to lose much of its power over one of its most important satellites.
Analysis

There was once no distinction between the Russian and Ukrainian nations in their earliest forms; both peoples belonged to the loose federation of eastern Slavic tribes known as Kievan Rus that emerged in Eastern Europe toward the end of the ninth century. Over time, the medieval state grew to become one of the largest on the Continent, spanning between the Baltic and the Black seas. But it was different from its neighbors to the west: Orthodox Christianity was the dominant religion in Kievan Rus, setting it apart from the mostly Catholic Western Europe.

In the 13th century, Kievan Rus began to destabilize in the face of internal discord, only to be swept away completely by invading Mongol hordes from the east. The state's capital, Kiev, as well as the rest of the land that is now Ukraine, languished until the Western Catholic powers of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and then the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth conquered it at the start of the 14th century. Meanwhile, the principality of Muscovy, which lay northeast of Kiev, grew to become the new center of the Slavic Orthodox civilization to the east.

Emergence of the Ukrainian Front

The two major powers — the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the west and the burgeoning Russian Empire to the east — competed for control of Ukraine over the next 300 years, giving rise to the East-West divide that exists in the country to this day. But a third force — the Cossacks — began to gain influence in Ukraine as well, complicating loyalties even further. A frontier people, the Cossacks had a fierce warrior mentality and were constantly feuding with their Asian and Muslim neighbors to the south. They were also staunch observers and defenders of their Orthodox faith.

The Cossacks were the precursors of Ukraine's modern independence movement, belonging to neither the Catholic Poles nor the distant Orthodox Russians. In 1648, Bohdan Khmelnytsky — perhaps the most famous Cossack — led an uprising against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and established an independent Cossack state centered on the banks of the Dnieper River, which bisects the city of Kiev. However, much like the kingdom of Kievan Rus, the Cossack state did not last. Six years after launching his rebellion, Khmelnytsky allied with Muscovy in its war against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, ultimately leading to the integration of Kiev and modern-day eastern Ukraine with Muscovite Russia. Western Ukraine remained under Polish control.

As the Russian Empire expanded throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, its influence in Ukraine grew. The Partitions of Poland gradually chipped away at the commonwealth's territory, granting the Austro-Hungarian Empire control of the far western Galicia region while giving the rest of the country to Russia.

In the early 20th century, after the fall of the Russian Empire, a Ukrainian nationalist movement emerged in the western province of Lviv. When the Soviet Union was founded in 1922, Lviv was the only Ukrainian territory that was not incorporated into the new Soviet state. Instead, it became the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and Kiev was its capital.

Josef Stalin's forced collectivization of the Soviet Union's agricultural sector brought starvation to the Ukrainian countryside in the 1930s, and soon after World War II began the Nazis invaded. When the Allies defeated Nazi Germany, all of Ukraine, including the province of Galicia, was brought under the Soviets' domain for the first time in centuries. The next 40 years were relatively calm for Ukraine, though they were marked by Soviet rule. When the Soviet Union finally collapsed in 1991, Ukraine became an independent state.
The Past 25 Years: Tug-of-War Between Russia and the West

The end of the Cold War brought an unprecedented degree of independence to Ukraine. Nevertheless, the legacy of suzerainty lingered, making the country's political scene more volatile. Russia continued to influence Ukraine from the east, while the newly formed European Union began to exert its power over the country from the west. Within Ukraine, competing political factions emerged that were loyal to one foreign patron or the other.

At first, the weak Ukrainian government attempted to rebuild the country while maintaining a precarious balance between Russia and the West in its foreign policy. But when the pro-Russia Viktor Yanukovich won a narrow and contested victory over his pro-West opponent, Viktor Yushchenko, in Ukraine's 2004 presidential election, mass protests erupted. After what became known as the Orange Revolution, the election results were deemed illegitimate, and Yushchenko assumed the presidency instead.

During the decade of political polarization that followed, Ukraine began to politically reorient itself toward the West, and it formally pursued membership in the European Union and NATO. This aggravated tensions with Russia. Moscow responded by cutting its natural gas flows to Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 and by expressing explicit discomfort with Kiev's new pro-West policies.

Still, the defining feature of this period was the infighting taking place within Ukraine's own government, especially between Yushchenko and his running mate, Yulia Timoshenko. Their dispute, which divided the government, prevented the country from meaningfully integrating with the West and led to a steep decline of the government's popularity among Ukrainian voters. By the next presidential election in 2010, the political tides had turned: Yushchenko garnered a mere 5 percent of the vote and ceded the presidency to Yanukovich accordingly.

However, Yanukovich's victory was hardly sweeping, and the bulk of his support came from constituencies concentrated in the country's pro-Russia east and south; he registered very little support in Ukraine's pro-Europe center and west. Upon assuming office, Yanukovich wasted no time in reversing his predecessor's efforts to integrate Ukraine with the West. He made NATO membership illegal and extended the Russian Black Sea fleet's port lease in Crimea by 25 years in exchange for lower natural gas prices. These decisions alienated and angered pro-West Ukrainians, who complained that Yanukovich abused his power.

The final straw came when Yanukovich pulled out of an EU free trade agreement just before an Eastern Partnership summit, again in return for financial aid and lower prices on energy imports from Russia. Protests erupted, eventually becoming the large-scale demonstrations known as the Euromaidan movement that culminated in Yanukovich's ouster in February 2014. The scale and intensity of the protests were unmatched by any in Ukraine's post-Soviet history.

When a new pro-West government led by President Petro Poroshenko rose in Yanukovich's place, Ukraine swung away from Russia yet again. Unsurprisingly, ties between Ukraine and Russia have deteriorated again, but this time Russia has responded more aggressively. To counter what it considered to be a dangerous level of Western influence near its borders, Russia annexed Crimea and instigated a pro-Russia rebellion in eastern Ukraine. The situation there has come to a tense standstill as Russia faces off against the West.
The Next 25 Years: Moving Away From Russia

A look at Ukraine's long history shows that major shifts in the country's foreign policy and political orientation are not unique to the Euromaidan uprising. The country has frequently pivoted between Russia and the West as the pro-Russia east and the pro-Europe west vie for power.

However, the latest conflict in eastern Ukraine has polarized the country more than any other in its post-Soviet history. In fact, it resembles how divided Ukraine was before it was incorporated into the Soviet Union. This polarization is likely to continue in some form for several years, if not decades, as the military engagement with Russia becomes ingrained in Ukrainian society and weakens the historical bonds between the two countries. Animosity will probably only intensify as younger generations with no memory of Ukraine's Soviet period grow up in a country where Russia poses the greatest threat to national security.

In the meantime, the high level of economic integration that has defined the relationship between Ukraine and Russia for centuries is also likely to weaken in the coming decades. Because of the crisis in eastern Ukraine, the two have already significantly reduced trade ties: Ukraine has slashed its imports of Russian natural gas, while Russia is preparing to embargo Ukrainian agricultural products. Such retaliatory measures will probably intensify over time, and the two countries will come to rely less on each other economically. Similarly, political and military ties will remain neutral at best. Each of these factors makes a reorientation toward Russia highly unlikely in the next 25 years.

As Ukraine's ties with Russia erode, Kiev will meanwhile try to strengthen its connection with the West. This does not necessarily mean that Ukraine will become an EU and NATO member, since those institutions will undergo changes of their own over the next 25 years. However, Ukraine will probably integrate further with the two countries that played a major role in shaping its pre-Soviet history: Poland and Lithuania. Poland and the Baltic states are currently in the throes of a long-term effort to merge their energy and economic infrastructure to create a regional bloc. Joining the bloc will become increasingly attractive to Ukraine in the coming decades, especially if membership comes with the political and security backing of the West's most powerful member, the United States.

This potential grouping, which harken back to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, will be made more feasible by the sweeping demographic changes taking place in Ukraine. The country is set to experience one of the steepest population declines in the world: It will lose 21.7 percent of its population by 2050, dropping from 45 million people to 35 million. As it does, Ukraine will need to secure partnerships with larger countries or multinational alliance groups to maintain its economic viability and gain security patrons to protect itself from Russia — something that also interests Poland and the Baltic states, as well as Moldova, Romania and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

However, Ukraine and Russia will not sever all ties over the next 25 years. The deep cultural, linguistic and religious bonds that exist between them are not likely to be broken entirely over the course of a generation. Still, the bonds will weaken, as will the two countries' broader bilateral ties when Ukraine moves out of Russia's shadow.
Title: Russian invasion planned
Post by: ccp on August 20, 2016, 05:27:59 PM
It appears :

http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russian-military-forces-staging-near-ukraine/
Title: Ukraine supported Hillary
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 16, 2017, 12:00:32 AM
http://observer.com/2017/01/ukraine-hillary-clinton-donald-trump-election/
Title: Ukraine helped Clinton campaign
Post by: ccp on January 16, 2017, 03:43:43 AM

How about this CNN and the rest of the pompous phonies:

http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2017/01/12/politico-ukrainian-officials-election/
Title: The Holocaust in the Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 25, 2017, 08:18:03 AM
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3205754/Blood-oozed-soil-grave-sites-pits-alive-secrets-Ukraine-s-shameful-Holocaust-Bullets-killing-centre-1-6million-Jews-executed.html
Title: Re: The Holocaust in the Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on April 25, 2017, 08:59:06 AM
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3205754/Blood-oozed-soil-grave-sites-pits-alive-secrets-Ukraine-s-shameful-Holocaust-Bullets-killing-centre-1-6million-Jews-executed.html

Amazingly powerful photos.  I wonder what the Holocaust deniers think of this.

I can't help but think of my father who never told me they were the first medical unit at the liberation of the Nazi concentration camp in Buchenwald, Germany.  His buddy told me that everyone who was anywhere near it knew what was going on there based on the smell.
Title: Geopolitical Futures: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 26, 2017, 01:13:34 PM
•   Ukraine: On July 25, the U.S. special representative to Ukraine said the United States was considering providing defensive weapons to Ukraine. On July 26, the CEO of Ukrainian state energy distributor Ukrenergo announced that the company had suspended electricity to Donetsk region; it had threatened to take this action in April. On the same day, a district court in Kiev ordered Ukraine’s State Security Service to open a case against Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko on the charge of treason, claiming that he had helped finance fighters in Donbass. These are all potential signs of a more assertive Ukraine. It may be coincidence that these developments happened after the U.S. House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly to extend sanctions against Russia, but coincidences are rare in our line of work. The bill passed with such a strong majority that it can’t be vetoed by the president. Russia is threatening retaliation of some type and has to respond to provocations in Ukraine. All of this points toward a potential destabilization in Ukraine. In the immediate term, we need to look at each of these moves and figure out whether they are a result of the sanctions or whether they were long in the making.
Title: GeoFut
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 01, 2017, 12:14:57 PM
•   Ukraine: The U.S. State Department and Defense Department agreed to supply Ukraine with anti-tank missiles and weapons, pending U.S. executive approval. The weaponry is described as defensive and will reportedly help Kiev fight pro-Russia rebels. We need to track the progression of this proposal, when the delivery of weapons would occur and troop movement in contested areas such as Crimea.
Title: Stratfor: Russians about to adjiust strategy in Ukraine?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 16, 2017, 06:34:30 AM
Russia may soon change its strategy on the conflict in Ukraine. According to a report from independent Russian news publication RBC on Sep 15, Russia will cut humanitarian aid to the breakaway territories of Donbas in Eastern Ukraine beginning in 2019-2020. These plans were reportedly outlined in the minutes of a meeting, which allegedly came into the possession of RBC. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak chaired the meeting Sept. 1.

Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov refuted the reports, saying that Russia, the primary military and financial supporter of separatists in the region, had not and would not consider refusing humanitarian aid to Donbas residents. However, Peskov also said that a restructuring of the Russian Finance Ministry's funding process was underway. The comments are notable because they suggest Russia is contemplating a shift in how — if not how much — it finances the breakaway territories in Donbas.

The timing of the report is also notable. Russia and Ukraine are expected to hold discussions next week over Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposal for a U.N. peacekeeping force in Donbas. The proposal, made on Sept. 5, called for a peacekeeping force to protect monitors from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the line of contact between Ukrainian security forces and Russia-backed separatists in Donbas.

Ukraine and the West have criticized the proposal for being too limited in scope. Kiev has instead called for a U.N. peacekeeping force with access to all of Donbas, including along the border with Russia. Nevertheless, the proposal has breathed new life into the long-running negotiation process over the Ukrainian conflict. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko is slated to present Kiev's plan for a U.N. peacekeeping mission in Donbas before the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) in New York on Sep. 20. Putin has even indicated openness to expanding his initial proposal to include more locations where OCSE monitors already carry out inspections in accordance with the Minsk agreements.

The upcoming UNGA will be important to watch for diplomatic movement in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, as well as for the involvement in these talks of key Western players such as Germany, France, and the United States. Given the conflicting positions and divergent demands of the various sides, it's unlikely that a U.N. peacekeeping force will actually be deployed in the near future. However, the UNGA will offer an opportunity to de-escalate growing animosity between Moscow and the West. At the very least, these recent developments suggest Russia is looking at ways to ease Western pressure against its involvement in Ukraine. Russia will continue to support of Donbas because of the region's position on the country's borderlands. But Moscow is demonstrating a willingness to be more flexible in how it approaches — and how much it supports — Donbas.
Title: GPF: Ukraine: End in Sight?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 28, 2017, 03:53:29 AM
An End in Sight for Ukraine … Maybe
Sep 28, 2017
By Jacob L. Shapiro

The conflict in Ukraine has developed an interminable quality. We are now over three years into the war in Donbass, and every day brings new updates on cease-fire violations or steps forward and backward on implementing the Minsk accord. This can make it hard to determine when conditions have actually changed. There have been a few key developments lately, however, that suggest real change is in the offing. The likeliest shape of this change is an acceptance of the stalemate and formalization of the status quo so that the fighting can finally stop. It’s a little too soon to say that this is what’s happening, but the early indicators are there.

Positive Indicators

The first indicator was a meeting between the newly appointed U.S. special envoy to Ukraine, Kurt Volker, and one of Russian President Vladimir’s Putin’s top aides, Vladislav Surkov. The two met in Minsk on Aug. 21, and although no major developments arose out of the meeting, both sides characterized it as cordial and honest. It was a startling characterization given that the meeting occurred amid a firestorm related to new U.S. sanctions against Russia and the possibility that the U.S. would provide Ukraine with new weaponry.

The second indicator came Sept. 5, when Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a draft resolution to the U.N. Security Council that raised the possibility of sending U.N. peacekeepers to eastern Ukraine to provide security in Donbass for monitors from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Putin endorsed the plan himself, describing the deployment of the peacekeepers as “absolutely appropriate” at a BRICS press conference in Xiamen, China. This was an about-face for Russia, which had consistently blocked the idea of U.N. peacekeepers in the region. Germany’s foreign minister said the move could be a “first major step towards lifting anti-Russian sanctions,” which meant it could also be a first step toward removing a stumbling block in Russian-German relations.

Neither the U.S. nor Ukraine, however, reacted favorably to the Russian proposal. This is because the initial proposal said that the U.N. peacekeepers could be deployed only along the line of contact between separatists in the Donbass region and Ukraine. Ukraine wants the peacekeepers stationed not at the line of contact but at what it views as the border between Ukraine and Russia.
 
(click to enlarge)

The third indicator came in the Russian response to these concerns on Sept. 11. In a phone conversation with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Putin reportedly said the U.N. peacekeepers “could guard OSCE observers not only on the line of contact … but in other locations as well.” Putin’s statement was broad enough as to be practically meaningless, but even so, it was a gesture of compromise, and these agreements do not sprout from the ground fully formed overnight.

The gesture was not initially reciprocated. Russia’s ambassador to the U.N. lamented on Sept. 18 that the U.S. and Ukraine had told Russia that they would not work with Russia on the U.N. peacekeepers plan. A week later, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized that point, claiming that Russia had made a good-faith proposal but had received no response and wasn’t going to force the U.S. and Ukraine to sit down at the table.

That changed Sept. 25 when Volker, the U.S. special envoy, was interviewed by Voice of America’s Ukrainian service chief. This serves as our fourth indicator. Volker was blunt about the fact that the U.S. does not view the Russian proposal as viable – according to Volker, it “will even more divide Ukraine, and not solve the problem.” But Volker also made a point of saying that he did not believe Russia would have proposed a solution if Moscow weren’t prepared to talk seriously about a resolution, and that Volker took this as a sign that serious negotiations were possible. Notably, last week, Interfax reported that Volker and Surkov may meet again in the first week of October in an undisclosed country in the Balkans.

Not So Fast

Of course, these are just preliminary indicators. Just because both sides are willing to talk to each other does not mean they are willing to put aside their differences and reach a compromise. The EU’s ambassador to Russia said Sept. 27 that the EU would not link deployment of U.N. peacekeepers to the removal of anti-Russia sanctions, cutting against the optimism that Germany’s reaction to Russia’s proposal engendered. And no doubt Russia did not miss the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the U.S. saying in his testimony in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Sept. 26 that he was of a mind that the U.S. should provide Ukraine with weapons to help it defend its sovereignty.

Ukrainian soldiers take part in the “Rapid Trident-2017” international military exercises at the Yavoriv shooting range not far from the western Ukrainian city of Lviv on Sept. 15, 2017. YURI DYACHYSHYN/AFP/Getty Images

What makes the indicators more compelling, however, are the interests that suggest that a resolution makes a good deal of sense. Russia’s interest in Ukraine is as a buffer to potential threats emanating from its West. Donbass is a shabby excuse for that buffer – what Russia really wants is for all of Ukraine, not just two small separatist statelets, to side with it. The longer the war in the east drags out, the more hostile western Ukraine grows toward Russia, and the more precarious Russia’s position becomes – especially if the U.S. ends up supplying Ukraine with new weapons.

Consider also that Russia is spending a lot of money to keep those separatist areas, Donetsk and Luhansk, afloat. The exact amount is impossible to know. A study by the German newspaper BILD concluded that Russia was spending 1 billion euros ($1.17 billion) a year on public service salaries and pensions alone in separatist Ukraine. The National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, meanwhile, estimated Russian expenditures in Donbass at $6 billion per year. No doubt those figures are too high; Ukraine has an interest in making it appear that Russia’s position in Donbass is untenable. But even though it’s hard to quantify the precise cost, it’s not hard to deduce its significance. The Russian economy is not in a state that it can afford to throw money at a problem with no end in sight.

Russia’s options are the status quo or some kind of settlement. Neither is particularly savory, but Russia may be at the point where the latter is preferable to the former.
Donetsk and Luhansk are not going to march on Kiev and bring Ukraine back into Russia’s sphere of influence, and a policy of supporting them against a larger and better-equipped enemy is unsustainable. The choice for Russia right now looks to be either a hostile government in Kiev, backed and armed to the teeth by the U.S., or a pro-West government that the U.S. will not arm and that Russia can slowly try to bring back into its orbit. Russia would settle for neutrality in Kiev right now, and that is something the U.S. may be open to.

That’s because the U.S. has been trying to improve relations with Russia through multiple presidential administrations. The U.S. does not want Russia to be able to dominate Eastern Europe and therefore will oppose any solution that could put Kiev at risk. But the U.S. also isn’t spoiling for a fight. It has concerns throughout the world, most notably on the Korean Peninsula, and it would not be opposed to de-escalation. This doesn’t mean the U.S. is going to turn away from Ukraine, but it does mean the U.S. may be willing to promise not to provide Ukraine with weapons or to consider other Russian requests if they are accompanied by Russian compromises. As for the rest of Europe, and especially the EU, the situation in Ukraine is an inconvenience but nothing more. Germany in particular wants to get past this problem so it can get back to selling its exports to Russia.

There’s a long way to go yet, and it’s possible that this is another false start. There have been periods of de-escalation before in the past three years, and it could be that Russia is dangling a proposal it knows is a non-starter for the U.S. to appear willing to make accommodations without doing anything. Still, the four indicators are more likely to represent a trend than a series of anomalies. And considering that both the U.S. and Russia have geopolitical interests in bringing the conflict to an end, and that our 2017 forecast expected exactly these types of developments, the indicators are even more notable. The thing to watch for next is whether Volker and Surkov do indeed meet again, and if they do, what comes out of their meeting. If it’s positive, then the situation in Ukraine may be on its way toward formalization. If it’s more of the same, then the stand-off continues.
Title: POTH: Ukraine- intrigue and corruption
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 08, 2017, 04:46:03 AM
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/07/world/europe/ukraine-russia-manafort-corruption.html?emc=edit_th_20171008&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193&_r=0


POLTAVA, Ukraine — After four years of investigation by the German police, the F.B.I. and other crime-fighting agencies around the world, heavily armed security officers stormed an apartment in the central Ukrainian town of Poltava. After a brief exchange of gunfire, they captured their prey: the man suspected of leading a cybercrime gang accused of stealing more than $100 million.

The arrest of Gennadi Kapkanov, 33, a Russian-born Ukrainian hacker, and the takedown of Avalanche, a vast network of computers he and his confederates were accused of hijacking through malware and turning into a global criminal enterprise, won a rare round of applause for Ukraine from its frequently dispirited Western backers.
By the following day, however, Mr. Kapkanov had disappeared.

A judge in a district court in Poltava turned down a prosecution request that he be held in preventive custody for 40 days, and ordered him set free. Mr. Kapkanov has not been seen since.

Whether Mr. Kapkanov’s flight was the result of corruption, incompetence or a mix of the two has not been clearly established. The prosecutor general in Kiev, Ukraine’s capital, threatened to fire the local prosecutor but backed off when it became clear that the case had been handled by one of his own deputies.
The Poltava debacle helps explain why Ukraine, a land of so much promise thanks to its educated population, fertile farmland and vibrant civil society, has a tendency instead to generate so many headline-grabbing scandals.

Over the past year, Ukraine has been battered by revelations: off-the-books payments to President Trump’s former campaign manager, Paul Manafort; the creation in Ukraine of malware used in hacking attacks by Russia during the 2016 American presidential election; and speculation that its Soviet-era missile technology may have been smuggled to North Korea.

The sagas are unrelated in their substance and timing. Mr. Manafort’s activities in Ukraine predate Ukraine’s 2014 revolution, while the others follow it. But they all flow in part from the same dysfunctions of a weak state gnawed by corruption and thrown off balance by constant Russian pressure, and the open vistas of opportunity for skulduggery that these have offered.

“Why is there so much noise around Ukraine? Because Ukraine is the epicenter of the confrontation between the Western democratic world and authoritarian, totalitarian states,” Oleksandr Turchynov, the head of Ukraine’s national security and defense council, said in an interview. He denounced reports of Ukraine providing missiles to North Korea as Russian disinformation aimed at undermining Western support.

But while Russia has worked steadily since the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union to weaken Ukraine and keep it within Moscow’s orbit of influence — first through economic pressure and political meddling and then military aggression — Ukraine has also enfeebled itself.

“The thread that ties strange things together in Ukraine is nearly always corruption,” said Serhiy A. Leshchenko, an opposition member of the Ukrainian Parliament and vociferous critic of President Petro O. Poroshenko.

Mr. Poroshenko, he conceded, is better than his predecessor, the kleptocratic, pro-Russian leader — and former Manafort client — Viktor F. Yanukovych, who fled to Russia in February 2014 after months of street protests in Kiev. “But that is only because he is weaker, and society is much stronger,” Mr. Leshchenko said.

President Petro O. Poroshenko in 2014. He is better than his predecessor, a critic says, “only because he is weaker and society is much stronger.” Credit Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times

Mr. Poroshenko, unlike his Russian counterpart, President Vladimir V. Putin, also has to contend with a lively free press that delights in probing and exposing government stumbles and the maneuvers of self-dealing insiders.

“Ukraine, with the exception of the Baltic States, is the only post-Soviet republic which is not authoritarian,” said Serhii Plokhii, a Harvard professor and the author of a history of Ukraine. And unlike the three Baltic States, which enjoyed brief periods of independence between the First and Second World Wars, Ukraine has only an acute awareness of centuries of subjugation by outside powers, among them Poland, Austria and Russia, that left its people inherently wary of authority.

“What is Ukraine’s national idea? It is resistance to authority,” said Taras Chornovil, a former adviser to Mr. Yanukovych.

Ukraine’s painful history as a put-upon appendage has left it ill-equipped to curb unruly habits at odds with the rule-based, scandal-shy order of the European Union, which it aspires to join.

“Its attempts to stay democratic while building a nation are often messy, its oligarchs all powerful and, given the virtual absence of state control over media and oligarchic competition, post-Soviet corruption is out in the open,” Mr. Plokhii said.

Ukraine’s domestic intelligence service, or S.B.U., its powers of surveillance greatly enhanced by monitoring equipment provided by the United States after Mr. Yanukovych
decamped to Russia, has added its own highly selective and distorted form of transparency by leaking information about alleged wrongdoing, often for political or financial gain.

Controlled by Mr. Poroshenko, the S.B.U. has become a tool in domestic political and business battles, with anti-corruption activists accusing it of working to undermine, not help, their cause.

While still politically influenced, Ukrainian law enforcement is no longer the swamp of incompetence and corruption it once was. It has been able to monitor Mr. Manafort’s former business associates and turn up evidence of Russian hacking in the 2016 United States election, in part owing to American technical support.

The Central Intelligence Agency tore out a Russian-provided cellphone surveillance system, and put in American-supplied computers, said Viktoria Gorbuz, a former head of a liaison office at the S.B.U. that worked with foreign governments.

Ms. Gorbuz’s department translated telephone intercepts from the new system and forwarded them to the Americans. “This team would translate and immediately, 24 hours a day, be in full cooperation with our American colleagues,” she said.

It is unclear whether any phone intercepts relevant to the election meddling investigation have gone to the American authorities. But a Ukrainian law enforcement official has given journalists partial phone records of former associates of Mr. Manafort.

Dismantling Russian spy gear, however, proved far easier than purging Russian power, which has shadowed Ukraine constantly since it declared independence in 1991 but became far more aggressive in recent years.

Since March 2014 Ukraine has lost Crimea to Russian annexation and large chunks of its industrial heartland in the east to rebels backed by fighters and weapons from Russia. It has also been used as a testing ground by Moscow for disinformation and hacking techniques later deployed during presidential election campaigns in the United States and France.

A pro-Russian rally in Feodosia, Crimea, in 2014. Russia annexed Crimea and aided separatists in eastern Ukraine, contributing to the chaos that keeps Ukraine unstable. Credit Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times

Ukrainian officials invariably cite Russian meddling to explain why anti-corruption and other steps demanded by the West have often faltered. While Russia is a convenient excuse, it is also a very real menace.

In Poltava, the center of town is dominated by a czarist-era monument to Russia’s victory over Sweden in a 1709 battle that sealed Russia’s rise as the region’s pre-eminent power and ended Ukrainians’ early aspirations for their own state.

Now draped in Ukrainian flags, the monument nonetheless stands as a powerful reminder of Russia’s looming presence in a country that has struggled to create a functioning independent state on the fragile foundations left by more than 70 years of communism and centuries of subjugation by Russian czars.

Igor Gavrilenko, a lecturer in Ukrainian history at the Poltava National Technical University, said the release of Mr. Kapkanov, the man accused of being a cybercrime kingpin, was typical of the dysfunction that has plagued Ukraine.

“The whole situation is absurd, but nothing in my country really surprises me anymore,” he said, sitting in a park near the Poltava battle monument. “Ukraine is a country where anything is possible if you have money.”

It was to Ukraine that Mr. Manafort looked for new business horizons after doing work for despots in Africa and Asia. Setting up shop in Kiev, he became entangled in a murky constellation of Russian and Ukrainian business tycoons and politicians, notably Mr. Yanukovych, the president ousted in 2014.

Mr. Chornovil, who worked as Mr. Yanukovych’s campaign manager in 2004, remembers Mr. Manafort as “arrogant and full of self-confidence,” a showman who liked to organize big, splashy events that required lavish spending.

A secret ledger recording payments to Mr. Manafort and others, he said, was part of a crude effort to keep track of all the money sloshing through Mr. Yanukovych’s administration.

“Everyone was stealing, and the party wanted a record of who got what,” Mr. Chornovil. “They never imagined that they might lose power one day and the accounts would come to light.”

Mr. Manafort, he said, often clashed with members of the president’s entourage but “had a colossal influence on Yanukovych for some reason.”
He added: “He was not here out of any ideology but to make money. He was here exclusively for the money.”

A rally in Independence Square in Kiev in 2013. Ukraine has been too fragmented to impose either Russian-style authoritarianism or a modern democratic order. Credit Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times

The end of Mr. Yanukovych’s rule in 2014 upended Mr. Manafort’s business in Kiev and brought in Mr. Poroshenko on a wave of reformist fervor.

Left in place, however, was what has for years been Ukraine’s strength as a pluralistic society and also its fundamental flaw: a fragile state that is too fragmented by competing economic and regional interests to impose either Russian-style authoritarianism or European-style rule of law.

“There was never a strong state on this land. Medieval feudal mosaics, fragile kingdoms and early-modern Cossack republics had nothing in common with European absolutism or Russian authoritarianism,” said Valerii Pekar, a lecturer at the Kiev-Mohyla Business School, in a recent article. “This is a country of balance, not of leadership. Nobody can rule Ukraine like a king.”

The West, fed up with the dysfunction, has been pushing Mr. Poroshenko with only partial success to tip the balance away from the corruption-tainted oligarchs and Russian proxies who often held sway under Mr. Yanukovych.

He did establish an independent anti-corruption agency and introduce a mandatory declaration of assets for officials and members of Parliament. But he has so far stalled on setting up a tribunal outside the existing court system to try corruption cases.

Larissa Kulishova, the judge in Poltava who let the hacker go, denied that she had erred. In a brief interview, the judge said she had made her ruling “in full accordance with Ukrainian and European law.” She disputed an appeals court judgment issued after the hacker had fled that overturned her decision and said she had been wrong: “I don’t think I made a mistake.”

Larissa Golnyk, a judge in the same courthouse, said she could not speculate on what prompted her fellow judge to free Mr. Kapkanov but expressed dismay at the decision.  Ms. Golnyk has bitter experience of the pressures put on judges. Equipped with a secret camera by anti-corruption investigators, she filmed a representative of Poltava’s mayor offering her a $5,000 bribe to close a case. Posted online, the video produced a public uproar but no action against the mayor or his emissary.

“Every time something clearly wrong happens I ask, ‘How can this be happening?’” Ms. Golnyk said. “I am always told, ‘Come on, you must be used to such things by now.’”

Title: Stratfor: US-Ukraine arms deal
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 11, 2018, 05:46:23 AM


Highlights

    Considering its long-standing opposition to the move, Moscow will probably respond in one way or another to the United States' recent decision to send lethal weapons to Ukraine.
    Beefing up the separatist forces' arsenal to ensure their capabilities match those of Ukrainian fighters may be Russia's best bet for retaliating without damaging relations with the United States too much.
    Russia could also opt to defer a response for now in favor of diplomacy, but it will fire back as it sees fit if the United States or the European Union increases sanctions against it or makes a move it considers aggressive.

Since the war in Ukraine began in 2014, the United States has considered sending arms to the country. Now Washington is ready to follow through with the idea. U.S. President Donald Trump approved the sale of lethal weapons to Ukraine on Dec. 22, signing a $47 million deal that includes 35 FGM-148 Javelin command launch units and 210 anti-tank missiles, along with smaller arms. Wary of provoking Russia, the United States has been careful to frame the recent decision as a purely defensive measure, and not a means to encourage military action against separatist forces in eastern Ukraine. But Moscow, viewing the move as an act of escalation, will doubtless respond in one way or another.

A Cautious Move

Though the previous administration also entertained sending arms to Ukraine, it chose not to take that route to avoid stoking the conflict, which had become less intense in 2015. Trump signaled on taking office that he would take a similar approach. He preferred to work with Russia on issues such as the war in Ukraine, rather than ratchet up tension. Over the first year of Trump's presidency, however, relations between Washington and Moscow have only declined. Congress passed stricter sanctions against Russia in 2017 and may impose more punitive measures on the country this year. At the same time, officials in the Trump administration, including Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster and U.S. Special Envoy to Ukraine Kurt Volker, advocated more firmly for supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine.

Even so, the administration has tread lightly on the issue. An unnamed U.S. official told The Wall Street Journal that the Javelin missiles promised in the arms deal would be used only for training purposes in western Ukraine — far from the front lines — under the close watch of U.S. military personnel. That way, Washington hopes not only to avoid a flare-up in the fighting but also to make sure its weapons don't wind up in the hands of the separatists and their Russian patrons.
Firing Back

Moscow isn't convinced, though. Following the arms deal's announcement, the Russian deputy foreign minister called the United States "an accomplice in fueling a war" because of the decision. And that accusation may not be the extent of Russia's reaction. Moscow, for example, could respond to the move in kind by ramping up its support for the separatists in Donbas to ensure they have capabilities on par with those of the Ukrainian military. On Jan. 10, a member of the Ukrainian parliament said the Russian military was working on technology to shield vehicles from Javelin missiles. Beefing up the separatists' arsenal may be the best option for Russia to respond to the U.S.-Ukraine lethal weapons deal without making relations with the United States much worse.

In addition, Moscow could opt for an asymmetric response. Russia could use the hybrid tactics it routinely employs against Ukraine — including targeted assassinations of security forces and officials, cyberattacks, economic restrictions, and political manipulation — to put more pressure on the country and its Western backers. It could even apply these methods outside Ukraine, for instance in Syria or in the European borderlands, to retaliate against the United States for increasing support to the Ukrainian government. Russia, after all, has followed a similar strategy many times in the past.

Still a third option for Moscow is to defer a response for now in favor of diplomacy. With only two months to go before the next presidential election, the current Russian administration has an interest in preventing the conflict in Ukraine from escalating, lest the United States compound Russia's economic troubles with more sanctions. Staying engaged with U.N. peacekeeping negotiations, likewise, offers Moscow a potential solution to keep heavier sanctions at bay.

So far, at least, the arms deal has yet to aggravate hostilities along the front lines in eastern Ukraine. The two sides of the conflict, in fact, went through with a major prisoner swap just days after the United States announced the decision. But should the United States or European Union take further punitive action against Russia, or make more moves in the security sphere that it considers aggressive, then the Kremlin will fire back as it sees fit.
Title: Re: Stratfor: US-Ukraine arms deal
Post by: DougMacG on January 11, 2018, 11:01:38 AM
Maybe we could use some of our leverage in Ukraine to stop the hacking.  I learned yesterday from a call from a federal agent that my ebay account was hacked, most likely out of Ukraine where we don't have enforcement cooperation.
Title: Stratfor: A US-Russian deal in the making?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 31, 2018, 06:57:54 AM
n Stratfor's 2018 Annual Forecast, we wrote that a resolution for Ukraine would remain out of reach, despite potential progress in negotiations between the United States and Russia over a U.N. peacekeeping force. Even as the two major powers cautiously signal a willingness to find common ground over such a force, that analysis still holds.
See 2018 Annual Forecast

Even as the animosity continues to build between the United States and Russia, the two countries may be moving toward compromise in a hotly disputed theater: Ukraine. Following Jan. 26 talks in Dubai between Russian presidential aide Vladislav Surkov and U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations Kurt Volker, Surkov said that Russia would carefully study U.S. proposals for a U.N. peacekeeping force in Ukraine. More specifically, Surkov spoke favorably of a U.S. plan to deploy U.N. peacekeepers in phases.

A phased approach, if carried out, would be a significant departure from the United States' and Russia's respective positions up until now. Ever since Russian President Vladimir Putin first signaled his openness to a U.N. peacekeeping mission last September, the Kremlin has been adamant that such a mission must be limited to guarding independent observers on the line of contact between Ukrainian troops and separatist forces. The United States and its allies in Ukraine, on the other hand, have insisted that a U.N. peacekeeping mission should be deployed throughout Donbas, including at the border between the separatist territories and Russia where the Russians regularly provide weapons and troops to sustain the rebels. A phased approach would, ostensibly, provide a compromise between the two plans.

Few specifics are currently available about Washington's proposal. U.S. officials have yet to comment, and Surkov approached the topic cautiously, stating only that Russia would provide a prompt answer after careful study and that a follow-up meeting would be arranged. It's unlikely that Russia will implement the plan until after its March presidential vote, given that doing so would represent a concession to the United States — something it wants to avoid during election season.

Russia's post-election landscape could offer more room for negotiation, however, especially since Moscow is also facing the possibility that Washington will expand sanctions against it. For the Kremlin, a more constructive approach to the Ukraine conflict might go a long way toward avoiding a major expansion of sanctions. Russia is not about to abandon its position in eastern Ukraine, but allowing U.N. peacekeepers to the frontlines could show cooperation with the West, while still leaving open the possibility for Russia to subsequently freeze the process if and when it sees fit. For now, the phased approach is still just at the proposal stage. But if the United States and Russia do eventually agree on a plan, it could bring about a real, if limited, deployment of U.N. forces.
Title: GPF: Russia not supplying gas to Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 01, 2018, 12:06:36 PM

Russia, Ukraine: Russia has stopped supplying gas to Ukraine. In fact, Russia returned a Ukrainian payment, saying there was no existing agreement between Russia’s Gazprom and Ukraine’s Naftogaz for March supplies of gas. Why is Russia making this an issue? Is it a tactical move or does it portend a shift in Russia’s policy on Ukraine? We will try to find out what prompted Russia’s action.
Title: GPF: In Eastern Ukraine, no good options remain
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 01, 2018, 02:36:40 PM
second post

In Eastern Ukraine, No Good Options Remain
Mar 1, 2018

 
Summary
In November 2013, protests erupted in Kiev over the pro-Russian government’s refusal to sign a trade deal with the European Union. The protests led to the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovych and the establishment of a new, pro-Western government, which promptly announced that the country would continue its move toward integration into the European Union. And so it became evident that there was a deep divide in Ukraine between two camps: one that wanted to increase integration with Europe and another that preferred to maintain strong ties with Russia.
 
The second camp is represented strongest in eastern Ukraine, which has been simmering in conflict since 2014, when the Russian-backed Luhansk People’s Republic and Donetsk People’s Republic declared independence. Both republics are just part of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, which are part of the wider region of Donbass. Separatism is ubiquitous here because of the region’s cultural and economic ties to Russia and its industrial roots. 

Of the two republics, the LPR is less stable and weaker economically. It has been plagued by infighting, occasional violence and even allegations of an attempted coup in November, when armed men appeared on the streets of the city of Luhansk, the self-proclaimed republic’s capital. The incident was apparently the result of a power struggle between the leader of the LPR, Igor Plotnitsky, and the ousted interior minister. Days later, security minister Leonid Pasechnik announced that Plotnitsky had resigned for health reasons and that he would be taking over as interim leader. This Deep Dive will focus on Luhansk, a region that stands on the frontline of the conflict between East and West. It will look at how this conflict spread to the self-proclaimed republic, why the LPR has remained unstable and what its future might look like.

Origins of the Conflict

Luhansk is a highly urbanized region on the eastern edge of Ukraine that spans roughly 10,000 square miles (26,000 square kilometers). It borders two other Ukrainian regions, Kharkov and Donetsk, but the border it shares with Russia is longer than the one it shares with the rest of Ukraine. It once had a population of more than 2 million, but this number has been declining for years as people fled the fighting for cities like Kiev or Moscow. As of December 2017, the population of the LPR was 1.4 million, with 435,000 of those living in the city of Luhansk.
 
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The population of the LPR can be divided into four categories: Russian speakers (the largest category), Ukrainian speakers, speakers of both languages, and Russian speakers who call themselves ethnic Russians. According to the 2001 census – the most recent census in Ukraine – 52 percent of the population in the LPR is Ukrainian and 44 percent is ethnic Russian. But 77 percent of people said their native language was Russian, and there are areas within the LPR – including the Krasnodonsky district and the Stanichno-Luhansky district – where the Russian population is dominant.
 
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When the new, pro-Western government in Kiev took office in February 2014, it had the support of the population in the capital and in the northern and western parts of the country, but it failed to sway people in the southern and eastern parts, where Yanukovych and his political party, the Party of Regions, enjoyed greater support. By late April 2014, a confrontation was brewing between Russian-backed separatist rebels and Ukrainian security forces. Occasional clashes soon turned into a full-fledged armed conflict. Kiev’s drift into the Western sphere of influence concerned Moscow, which sees Ukraine as a critical buffer between itself and Europe. But Russia also viewed the unrest in eastern Ukraine as an opportunity to increase its influence over the region by supporting the separatists and even annexing Crimea.
 
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Today, there is a divide not just between Ukraine and the separatist parts of Luhansk but also within Luhansk itself. The government in the LPR is a hybrid between the prewar civilian-controlled structures and the structures that emerged after the war broke out – a somewhat chaotic arrangement. When the LPR declared independence, its leaders were little known, and many believe that the Kremlin chooses its government officials. During his time as head of the republic, Igor Plotnitsky attempted to subdue all areas of the republic but ultimately failed. Plotnitsky fled to Russia and left behind a population that has yet to decide how to define its relationship with its eastern neighbor or to what degree it wants to be administered by Moscow.

Economic Development

The part of the Luhansk region where the LPR is located is known for its vast deposits of high-quality coal. Sitting in the Seversky Donets River basin, the area accounts for roughly a third of Ukraine’s total coal reserves and two-thirds of its reserves of anthracite, a type of coal with a high carbon content that produces more energy than other types of coal. These resources, as well as the area’s natural gas deposits, offered Ukraine domestic sources of energy and commodities for export. The driver of the LPR’s economy, therefore, has been industry, coal and metal production, and engineering.

Significant coal extraction in eastern Ukraine began in the late 18th century. The minerals concentrated there transformed the area into an industrial hub, and during the rule of Catherine II (1762-96), its first factory was built. Coal from the east not only fueled local industrial activity but also served as a cornerstone of Russia’s industrialization.
At the beginning of the 20th century, the first attempt was made to separate this region from other industrial regions. In 1918, the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Soviet Republic – which included present-day Kharkov, Donetsk and Luhansk – was established as an autonomous republic, uniting the coal-producing regions. Despite the territory’s autonomous status, however, the Soviet Union maintained control over it, since the Soviets wanted to create an industrial zone that would service and depend on Moscow. The importance of this history is that this region, unlike other autonomous regions in the Soviet Union, was united not by a common sense of identity or nationality but by its economic utility.

The Donetsk region had two advantages that enabled it to outperform Luhansk economically: a higher population, and direct sea access through the Mariupol port. But in the 1960s and early 1970s, Luhansk prospered. Its economy began to grow, coal and pig iron production increased, and electricity supplies expanded. Progress diminished over time, however. The industrial facilities built in Luhansk could not sustain long-term growth, and the region’s development was placed on the back burner as oil began to play a larger role in the energy market. Moscow dedicated less time and fewer resources to the upkeep of infrastructure and industry unrelated to the oil sector, and the Luhansk region suffered.

The poor economic conditions of the 1980s were the springboard for separatism, which really took off in the 1990s. Before the 1991 referendum that gave Ukraine its independence from the Soviet Union, representatives of the Soviet Union’s Constitutional Democratic Party proposed separating the southern and eastern portions of Ukraine to form a new state called Novorossiya. In 1993, local miners went on strike over their belief that Donbass was subsidizing the poorer regions of Ukraine while receiving little investment in return. Miners demanded autonomy for Donbass over its economic affairs. In addition, a 1994 survey showed that 90 percent of the residents of Donbass supported implementing a federal system and imposing Russian as the second official language in Ukraine.

The region saw its second growth spurt in the 1990s, but it too would prove unsustainable. During this time, two activities became important contributors to the economy – and both were illegal. The first was surface mining for coal. The Soviet Union had prohibited the practice, but it was a cheap and quick way to extract coal. When Ukraine became independent, surface mining remained illegal, but those who participated in it weren’t punished and it therefore became widespread. The second profitable business was smuggling goods, especially fuel. The drawback of both these activities, however, is that they never created the conditions for further growth in Luhansk.

At the same time, legal coal production enterprises were going bankrupt. Their employees weren’t paid for years, and the riots that resulted were often suppressed by militias throughout the 1990s. As a result, in the 2000s, legal coal production declined. The post-industrialization era had taken root, and the service sector was becoming a critical part of the global economy. Luhansk, however, was left behind.
 
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Moreover, industry and coal mining proved to be a double-edged sword for Luhansk. For a long time, they served as the source of the region’s economic development; but they also strengthened its dependence on Russia. Russia was the main buyer of the region’s industrial products, and illegal supplies coming in from Russia only increased this dependency. The economy of the region was built to be a component of the Soviet economy, so after the collapse of the Soviet Union, factories in Luhansk had no choice but to continue to work closely with Russian businesses.

This explains, at least in part, why Luhansk and its neighbors were reluctant to support a pro-Western government that could put their relationship with Russia at risk. The coal, metals and machine-building industries that had survived were less competitive than those in the rest of Europe. Given that Russia is Luhansk’s biggest market, there is concern in the manufacturing sector that if this territory does not maintain a pro-Russian outlook, thousands of jobs could be lost.

The Rise of Separatism

There were three sources for the discontent in Luhansk that explain its embrace of separatism. First, people were dissatisfied with the government in Kiev, particularly the way it distributed the country’s resources. As in previous decades, many believed that the region’s wealth and resources were being unfairly redistributed to the impoverished and less productive parts of the country, which contributed to a growing sense of alienation from the rest of Ukraine. But this was a misconception. Luhansk region accounted for 4 percent of Ukraine’s gross domestic product in 2013, 13 percent of its imports and 5 percent of its exports. It also accounted for 8 percent of state subsidies in 2010 and 11 percent in 2011 – more than double its GDP contribution. Nevertheless, the perception of economic inequality and unfair conditions was still there, and it was a major driver of the separatist movement.

Second, the Euromaidan revolution bolstered right-wing Ukrainian nationalists who, among other things, tried to repeal the law that allowed regions to give special status to minority languages. The separatists argued that Kiev was trying to diminish the importance of the Russian language in Russian-speaking regions, although ordinary people in these regions were less concerned about the language law than they were about potentially declining economic opportunities.

Last, these regions believed there were negative consequences to joining the European Union – specifically reduced trade with Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union and the possibility that Ukraine could be forced to adopt austerity measures similar to those imposed on countries like Greece that have struggled with high debt and other economic problems.

But despite the rising desire to form an entity that was free from Kiev’s oversight, there was a lack of national identity that could draw the regions of eastern Ukraine together. Here, separatism was not motivated by nationalism, since no single nation has ever formed in Luhansk. Rather, Luhansk’s industrial surge attracted migrants from a wide variety of places, such as Siberia, the Volga region and western Ukraine. What emerged in Luhansk during its age of industrialization was what the Soviet Union dreamed of: a proletariat. The population of Donbass was therefore mainly composed of the working class, which served the interests of the state and large industries.
The population has always been fragmented. It is essentially dominated by the workers, who desire stability – as an autonomous republic. Whether this autonomous republic was part of Ukraine or Russia was not nearly as important for the population as autonomy itself was.

The Future

For the LPR, there are few options remaining. It can be absorbed into the Russian Federation, become an autonomous region within Ukraine, unite with Donetsk or continue the frozen conflict as it stands today. None of these are good options.

It is unlikely that the territory will become part of Russia because Moscow, by agreeing to the Minsk agreement, has indicated it doesn’t want to absorb the LPR. Taking over the LPR would require dedicating more funds – already in short supply – to the region. Russia is more interested in having the LPR as a loyal buffer zone and strengthening its dependence on Moscow by providing it more supplies and military assistance. The LPR’s reliance on Russia is already growing as it is, with Moscow delivering much-needed aid, food and energy supplies.

In 2017, Ukraine imposed a cargo blockade on the LPR, following unofficial blockades imposed by Ukrainian activists – although deliveries of some humanitarian aid are still allowed. This only deepened the area’s dependence on Russian supplies. Before the war, 70 percent of the products available in stores were from Ukraine; this number has fallen to 20-30 percent. Many products sold in the region now are made in Russia or in other countries such as Finland, Germany, Turkey and Greece and imported through Russia. Luhansk’s main factories supply a narrow market, without the possibility of export outside Russia due to the lack of recognized quality. In addition, Russia – through the energy giant Gazprom – is the main supplier of electricity to the LPR.

It is also unlikely that the LPR would rejoin Ukraine as an autonomous region – the solution offered by the Minsk agreement. Ukraine has been unwilling to accept this arrangement. It believes the country should be unified and won’t accept autonomous status for the breakaway republics.

The third option – forming one state with the Donetsk People’s Republic – is also probably a nonstarter. The DPR – the economically stronger and politically more stable region – would be interested in uniting with the LPR, since it could then take control over the LPR’s coal and metal production and other industrial activities. But the LPR wouldn’t accept this option because the two regions have been engaged in an unofficial struggle for leadership over Donbass for years, and joining the DPR would mean ceding control. Both sides claim that they support the idea of integration – the heads of both republics agreed in 2016 to create a single economic zone, though it has been fraught with problems, and they recently signed an agreement to form a customs union – but the reality is much different. For its part, Russia opposes unification of the republics because it could diminish Moscow’s influence over the region and increase Donetsk’s. Russia prefers to have Luhansk and Donetsk as two separate buffers rather than one large territory with its center in the city of Donetsk, which is far from the Russian border.

For now – and as long as the parties involved are unwilling to make the concessions necessary to find a solution – the LPR seems destined to remain in this frozen conflict. Moscow, meanwhile, will continue to strive to expand westward and claim lands historically connected to Russia, and Ukraine will seek to limit the spread of Russian influence.

The post In Eastern Ukraine, No Good Options Remain appeared first on Geopolitical Futures.
Title: Advanced US missile arrives in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 02, 2018, 08:26:59 AM
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/may/1/advanced-us-missile-system-arrives-ukraine/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=manual&utm_campaign=20171227&utm_term=newsletter&utm_content=morning

Title: GPF: Ukraine;; US-Russia beyond Helsinki
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 25, 2018, 12:11:40 AM
By Jacob L. Shapiro
US-Russia Relations Beyond Helsinki


For the U.S., Ukraine is important. For Russia, Ukraine is everything.


In 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at a summit in Slovenia. After the summit, Bush said he had “looked the man in the eye” and gotten a “sense of his soul.” By the end of Bush’s presidency, Russia had invaded Georgia, and the U.S. was installing missile defense batteries in Poland. In 2009, early in President Barack Obama’s first term, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov a reset button to usher in a new era of U.S.-Russia relations. By the end of Obama’s presidency, Russia had invaded Crimea and was propping up Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria. Last week, U.S. President Donald Trump met with Putin in Helsinki in an attempt to improve relations that the Russian president said were “worse than during the Cold War.” The question no one is asking is: What will U.S.-Russia relations look like by the end of the Trump administration?

A Claustrophobic Russia

For over 100 years, the issue of Russian expansion in Eastern Europe has dominated U.S. strategic thinking. The U.S. entered World War I in part because of the Russian Revolution. Allowing Germany a dominant position on the European continent was untenable – as was leaving a power vacuum the Soviet Union might fill. In World War II, the power vacuum couldn’t be avoided – the U.S. needed Soviet help to defeat the Germans. The cost was ceding Eastern Europe’s fate to Moscow. In effect, the staring contest across the Iron Curtain was the real frontline of the Cold War – not Korea or Vietnam or the Middle East.

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When the Soviet Union collapsed, there was hope that this long-running disagreement between two global heavyweights might finally be put aside. But hope could not change the strategic reality of the U.S.-Russia relationship. The U.S. was eager to welcome former Soviet states in Eastern Europe into the liberal world order – a world order that had triumphed over communism – in part because there was a lot of money to be made in the former Soviet states, and Western businessmen were eager to make it. But the U.S. also saw an opportunity to nip any potential challenge from the new Russian Federation in the bud by creating a strong, pro-Western buffer between Europe and Russia.

Russia immediately began to feel claustrophobic. Without Russian control over Eastern Europe, Napoleon and Hitler might have succeeded in conquering Russia. Taking this region away from Russia would be like taking away the oceans from the United States.

It was that loss of control that in part led to the rise of Vladimir Putin as Russia’s newest czar. The corruption and economic privation of the late 1990s played a significant role as well. Putin represented (and still represents) a need for order at home and power abroad. U.S. presidents have come and gone, but Putin has remained, and that is not a coincidence. The Russian Federation was not structured to profit from the world order the U.S. had created, and Russia’s brief experiment with behaving like a liberal democracy made that abundantly clear. There is opposition to Putin inside Russia, but there is far more fear about a return to the instability that preceded Putin than there is discontent with the way his regime has behaved.

Successive U.S. administrations have sought to make amends with Russia – and have failed spectacularly. The Obama administration failed not so much because of what it did, but because of how it reacted to an unpredictable event – the Maidan revolution, which ousted Ukraine’s pro-Russia president. In Maidan, the seeds of a more serious U.S.-Russia confrontation were sown. Losing Eastern European states like Poland or Hungary as a buffer was one thing, but losing Ukraine, which borders Russia and is so culturally linked to Russia, was a bridge too far. For all of Russia’s efforts to prevent Ukraine from turning to the West, Putin was left with Crimea (a financial black hole for a government that isn’t awash in expendable cash) and two separatist uprisings in eastern Ukraine. In effect, Putin failed to do what should be any Russian president’s top duty: to defend Russia’s interests in Europe. He has not forgotten this, primarily because no Russian leader can last long in office if key buffer territory is suddenly populated with NATO troops and advanced U.S. weaponry.

This is not a problem Russia can solve by force, at least for now. From a military perspective, Russia could probably defeat Ukrainian forces, but it would be an extremely costly endeavor. And occupying the territory after conquest would be another risky affair: The farther west Russian forces extended, the more difficult holding the territory would be. Not to mention the crippling economic sanctions that would inevitably follow. Even if the U.S. and its allies didn’t intervene, it’s unclear that Russia would be able to repeat the success it had in Georgia – Ukraine is a much larger country with more concerned neighbors.

Russia, therefore, can’t afford to be the instigator. Any Russian aggression is bound to unite Russia’s enemies, which Moscow can’t afford right now. Instead, Russia must bide its time. It must rebuild and modernize its military forces. It must ease the financial burden – even if that means touching the third rail of Russian politics, pension reform. And to keep its rivals at bay, it must sow divisions in the Western world.

Ukraine Is Everything

But this strategy can work only if the threats on Russia’s borders appear to be under control and Moscow appears to have a handle on Russian security interests. And there is no place where that hold is more tenuous or more important right now than in Ukraine. It’s impossible to know what Trump and Putin talked about in their one-on-one meeting in Helsinki, but one doesn’t need to know what they were talking about to know what’s on Putin’s mind – because it’s what would be on the mind of any Russian leader in his situation. Ukraine is tilting toward the West, and a Ukrainian presidential election is coming up in March 2019.

According to polls, Yulia Tymoshenko, a former prime minister and fierce rival of Russia-backed former President Viktor Yanukovych, is the frontrunner (although the election is still eight months away and Ukrainian polls are hardly the most reliable). No matter who emerges as the winner, Russia can’t allow a staunchly pro-West candidate to hold office in Kiev. What political persuasion such a candidate might come from is impossible to predict. It may be a Ukrainian populist candidate who supports joining the EU and NATO to protect Ukraine from Russian revanchism – essentially willing to give up sovereignty in one aspect to preserve it in another. Whatever the case may be, if something like this happens, Russia will face a very difficult choice, and judging from the disposition of Russia’s military forces right now, it is a contingency Russia is preparing for.

Or perhaps a candidate acceptable to Russia will be elected, and Moscow will continue to bide its time. In this scenario, Russia will slowly repair the damage done in 2014 by offering money, political support or resources to pro-Russia voices in Ukraine, which remain a significant faction in the country. Even having a pro-West candidate win office in Kiev would be tolerable for Moscow as long as Ukraine maintains a pragmatic relationship with Russia and does not engage in outright hostility toward Moscow and its interests.

After getting back from Helsinki, Trump attempted to justify his comments at the press conference to his domestic audience. Putin, however, warned of a serious risk of escalation in southeastern Ukraine at a meeting of Russian ambassadors. He also leaked an alleged proposal he made to Trump in Helsinki about a referendum in eastern Ukraine to resolve the frozen conflict. (The leak also included details about Putin’s agreement not to discuss the plan publicly so Trump could consider it privately first.) For the U.S., Ukraine is important. For Russia, Ukraine is everything. Russia can accept the status quo of the current frozen conflict, but this cannot be a permanent state of affairs, nor can Russia tolerate any further displays of weakness on this issue. This will be the center of gravity of U.S.-Russia relations for the rest of the Trump presidency.
As long as the U.S. and Russia are competitors in Eastern Europe – and there’s little to suggest that over a century of history is about to reverse – no summit, reset button or deep look into Putin’s eyes will change the nature of U.S.-Russia relations.
Title: Russia seizes Uke ships
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 25, 2018, 05:19:27 PM
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46338671?fbclid=IwAR2WcYHPQTOwdtVDx-oI6wrF8an9jybTQoYeNqS_T-Eba0gQ7FOp0OCPOvU
Title: Sea of Azov
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 26, 2018, 02:21:11 PM
The Big Picture
________________________________________
Stratfor has noted that Ukraine-Russia skirmishes like the recent clash at the Kerch Strait would become more likely and that the Sea of Azov remains a flashpoint between the two countries. In addition, Ukraine is emerging as a key battleground between the United States and Russia as part of the wider great power competition.
________________________________________
The Fight for Russia’s BorderlandsThe Ukraine Conflict

What Happened

The Russian-Ukrainian dispute over maritime access through the Kerch Strait escalated on Nov. 25 when paramilitary forces from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) disabled, boarded and captured two small Ukrainian naval vessels and a tugboat attempting to pass through the strait. Six of the 24 Ukrainian crew members detained by Russia were injured in the forced boarding. The strait, positioned at the eastern end of Crimea, connects the Sea of Azov with the Black Sea. The Ukrainian government in Kiev immediately denounced the Russian actions and accused Moscow of military aggression. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko also declared that a state of martial law would begin Nov. 28 and last for 30 days (but could be subsequently extended). Ukraine and Russia requested an urgent meeting of the U.N. Security Council.

A Treaty, Crimea and Trade

According to Russia, its annexation of Crimea in 2014 invalidated the 2003 agreement with Ukraine over the use of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait. With control of the Crimea, Russia argues that the waters around the Kerch Strait are effectively its territorial waters. However, Kiev and most of the rest of the world does not recognize the Russian takeover of Crimea, and Ukraine insists on its right to pass through the strait and the sea without interference. A few months ago, Ukraine announced that it would build a naval base on the Sea of Azov by the end of the year, raising tensions. Recently, Russia has intensified its interference with Ukrainian maritime traffic in the area. For Ukraine, access to the Sea of Azov is critical for economic and security reasons. Without unhindered traffic through the strait, it would effectively lose maritime access to key ports such as Mariupol.

Why It Matters

The biggest current risk is the escalation of this skirmish into a broader military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. Both countries are already embroiled in a semifrozen conflict in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, so escalation there is already a distinct possibility. Given Ukraine's limited naval capabilities, however, Kiev can do little in response to Russia at sea — any attempt by Ukraine to force its claim on the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait would fail. And the threat of wider escalation appears relatively contained because the Ukrainians haven't shown any signs of preparing a military riposte.

But other motives — both global and domestic — could lie behind Ukraine's latest naval foray into the disputed waters. Given its military weakness in comparison to Russia, especially on the seas, it is in Kiev's interest to highlight Russian aggression to the rest of the world — and particularly to the European Union and the United States. A U.S. rapprochement with Russia that leaves it in control of Crimea and leaves Russian-aligned forces in control of much of the Donbas in eastern Ukraine would be a disaster for Kiev. And mere days before U.S. President Donald Trump is expected to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the G-20 summit in Argentina, Ukraine is pressing its maritime claims and highlighting Russia's belligerence. However, it might not have expected Russia to go so far as to board its vessels and capture its sailors. Declaring martial law also serves to intensify the spotlight on Russia's actions and Ukraine's position.
 
For Ukraine, the payoff from this maritime move could lead either to additional EU and U.S. pressure on Russia through new sanctions or to new direct assistance, especially in the form of military equipment or increased NATO forays into the Black Sea. NATO could also step up efforts to build up the Ukrainian navy, but given the force's current state, that would entail providing support, training and equipment for years. And the degree to which Russia enforces its claims also matters in the Western response — the more belligerent it appears in denying Ukrainian access and the firmer it responds to Ukraine's attempts to press its claims, the risk of drawing more EU and U.S. pressure rises.

In addition, domestic motivations could be playing a part in the Ukrainian gambit and the subsequent declaration of martial law. Presidential elections are set for March 2019, and Poroshenko, who doesn't appear to be doing too well in the polls, is at serious risk of losing. Some in the opposition have decried the declaration of martial law as a ploy by the president to either delay or manipulate the election. The extent of martial law restrictions is unclear so far, and not every measure possible under the law will necessarily be enacted. Some provisions allow the government to limit and regulate media, including telecommunications, radio and the press. They also permit a postponement of presidential elections, creating the possibility that martial law could be used for political advantage. The measures the government enforces, therefore, will indicate whether a domestic political agenda, as well as national security interests, are motivating it to magnify a skirmish with Russia.

Whatever Kiev's reasoning, the weekend's events are taking their toll on the fragile Ukrainian economy. Its currency, the hryvnia, dropped as much as 1.6 percent against the U.S. dollar on Nov. 26, and the country's borrowing costs rose to their highest level since a bond sale last year. Yakiv Smoliy, governor of Ukraine's central bank, reportedly met with representatives from the country's major banks on Nov. 26 to reassure them about Ukraine's financial stability. The country has been under an International Monetary Fund reform program since 2015. So far, the IMF has not indicated that martial law would put the program in jeopardy. However, it will probably keep a close eye on the economic policy decisions that Kiev makes while under martial law to see whether they deviate from the IMF program.

===================================================

GPF:

Tensions in the Sea of Azov. On Sunday, the Russian navy opened fire on three Ukrainian ships before seizing them in the Kerch Strait, the narrow passageway connecting the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. Moscow claims the Ukrainian ships – two small armored artillery vessels and a tugboat – had entered Russian territorial waters near Crimea illegally. Russian warplanes and combat helicopters were deployed in the area. Six Ukrainian sailors were injured. Russia accused Kiev of orchestrating the entire incident; making Moscow the villain would create the conditions for new Western sanctions, and the imposition of martial law in Ukraine would allow Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko to delay upcoming elections, in which he is trailing. (The parliament will vote on the issue of martial law later today.) Russia has been slowly solidifying its position in Crimea since seizing the peninsula in 2014. It’s bided its time, preparing for a potential military conflict, and if statements made by Poroshenko are to be believed, that conflict is in the offing: He claims to have intelligence that Russia is readying itself for a ground invasion. But those statements are hard to believe. Russia is wary of new sanctions, and it doesn’t need to fight a war with Ukraine to secure its interests there. Still, the coming days will be unpredictable, as is often the case when domestic politics muddies the waters.
Title: GPF: Fallout from the Sea of Azov
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 27, 2018, 08:46:47 AM
Fallout from the Sea of Azov. In response to the dust-up in the Kerch Strait this weekend, Ukraine has imposed martial law in the areas that border Russia. It will last for 30 days. The government in Kiev has put troops in eastern Donbass on high alert, and it has stopped Russian citizens from crossing the border with Crimea. Russia has yet to officially announce its position, noting only that it wanted to restore contacts with NATO. European governments, meanwhile, have reacted with their customary rhetoric. German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced today that Europe may need to impose more sanctions on Russia. Austrian Foreign Minister Karin Kneissl said further sanctions would depend partly on how Russia and Ukraine move forward. France, however, may have issued the most honest response: It acknowledged that it’s impossible to discuss major international problems without Russia.
Title: GPF: Quelle surprise; Germany rules out action
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 29, 2018, 10:55:05 AM


•   Germany has ruled out military action in Ukraine, adding that the crisis must be separated from the issue of implementing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
Title: WSJ: Ukraine is Moscow's Guinea Pig
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 29, 2018, 12:15:16 PM
second post

Ukraine Is Moscow’s Guinea Pig
Russia uses its neighbor to hone its aggressive tactics and test whether rivals are willing to fight back.
141 Comments
By Adrian Karatnycky
Nov. 28, 2018 6:22 p.m. ET
On a Ukrainian military ship moored at Mariupol on the Sea of Azov, Nov. 27.
On a Ukrainian military ship moored at Mariupol on the Sea of Azov, Nov. 27. Photo: SEGA VOLSKII/AFP/Getty Images

Russia’s attack Sunday on Ukrainian naval vessels in the Azov Sea shows the Kremlin is ready to take the veil off the conflict. After nearly five years of clandestine war using private armies, proxies and unmarked federal forces, the Russians announced themselves loudly with an open strike on Ukrainian forces.

The aggression specifically underscores Russia’s willingness to use naval power to block commerce and restrict trade routes. The attack violated a 2003 treaty that designated the Azov Sea as shared territory between Russia and Ukraine.

The Kremlin dared to act in such a brazen way because the West’s response to its campaign in Ukraine so far has been largely feckless. The U.S. and its European allies answered the annexation of Crimea and occupation of the Donbas region with halfhearted rhetoric and meager material aid to the Ukrainian resistance. The Russians this week had little reason to expect that their overt attack would prompt a reaction they couldn’t withstand.

Westerners unmoved by the conflict should acknowledge that Russia has long used Ukraine as a testing ground for its hybrid-war techniques. What happens in Ukraine does not stay there; it is a preview of what Russia will bring to its fight with the West.

In 2004 Russian agents disrupted Ukraine’s presidential election with financial assistance for Moscow’s favored candidate, along with technical advice, fake news and other tricks—inadvertently triggering the Orange Revolution that followed once Ukrainians uncovered the manipulation. The Russians refined their election-meddling tactics over the following decade and have attempted to interfere with campaigns in the U.S. as well as Spain, Sweden and other European countries. Early in the conflict Russia also launched cyberattacks on Ukraine’s government communications, commercial institutions and power grid, and it has since attempted similar strikes in the U.S.

Cyberwar is one dimension of Russia’s hybrid-war testing process. The Russian military-intelligence operatives identified as the attackers of ex-spy Sergei Skripal in the U.K. were found to have deployed in Kiev during the 2014 Ukrainian revolution. The Wagner group, a Russian paramilitary contractor, was active in Crimea and the Donbas from 2015-16, and its forces were used again this year to attack the U.S. military in Syria.

Days before the latest escalation, Britain’s army chief, Gen. Mark Carleton-Smith, argued that Russia is now a bigger threat to Britain than ISIS and other Islamic terrorist groups. “Russia has demonstrated that it is prepared to use military force to secure and expand its own national interests.” Gen. Carleton-Smith told the Daily Telegraph on Nov. 23.

Increasingly aware of the danger Russia poses, the West must more thoroughly support Ukraine’s effort to rebuke the aggression on the eastern front. The Ukrainian government has shown its commitment, spending 5% of gross domestic product on national security and upgrading its military and advanced-weapons arsenal. But it needs significant additional help to raise the cost to Russia of Vladimir Putin’s aggressive war.

The Trump administration already provides lethal military aid to Kiev in the form of Javelin antitank missiles, and it should expand assistance to include land-based antiaircraft and antiship missiles. The U.S. should take the lead in supporting the modernization of Ukraine’s advanced-weapons systems. This defensive aid would enable Ukraine to deter or respond to Russian attacks on every front.

The U.S. and its allies should also bolster their naval presence in the Black Sea. British Defense Secretary Gavin Williamson announced in September that the Royal Navy would send more troops and take a more aggressive posture in the region. The calendar for such a deployment should be sped up after Sunday’s events.

If Russia moves to shut off Ukrainian trade through the Azov Sea, Western nations should consider bypassing the blockade by expanding Ukraine’s major ports in Odessa and Mykolaiv and enhancing rail links to eastern Ukraine.

The U.S. and U.K. should lead the charge to ratchet up sanctions on Russia dramatically. They should pressure Europe to cancel Moscow’s planned Nord Stream 2 and South Stream pipeline projects, which would foster European dependence on Russian oil and help shore up Russia’s finances. The West should also consider further economic sanctions on an array of Russian companies, such as those involved in shipbuilding and infrastructure.

Finally, Russia must be told that further military adventurism will lead to its expulsion from the Swift banking system. Western leaders should announce the possibility of such a penalty and lay out the actions that would trigger it—a deterrent against future Russian escalation.

During this conflict Russia has used Ukraine not only as a testing ground for techniques of hybrid war and political disruption, but as a test of the West’s resolve. The Kremlin’s latest escalation is the right moment to show the West’s commitment to back Ukraine and deter Mr. Putin from his dangerous path.

Mr. Karatnycky is a co-director of the Ukraine in Europe program at the Atlantic Council.
Title: Stratfor: Russian Military Movements in Crimea
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 22, 2018, 09:54:04 AM
Russian military movements in Crimea. According to local media, a convoy consisting of armored personnel carriers, artillery cannons and a field kitchen was spotted near the town of Pervomaiske in northern Crimea. Increased Russian military hardware near a manufacturing plant owned by Crimean Titan was also reported. This comes as Russian submarines conducted a series of drills in the Black Sea near the Crimean coast and more than a dozen SU-27 and SU-30 fighter jets reportedly landed at Russia’s Belbek air base in Crimea. In response, the U.S. pledged an additional $10 million to help defend Ukraine, and the U.K. said it will send a naval training delegation there in January. At this point, the Russian moves appear to be more posturing than anything else, since Moscow doesn’t want a direct military confrontation with the U.S. over Ukraine, but they are nonetheless notable, especially when compared to Moscow’s actions before the 2008 war in Georgia.
Title: GPF: The Second Partition of the Ukraine?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 02, 2019, 08:24:36 AM

The Second Partition of Ukraine?

The country lost part of its territory nearly five years ago. Was that just the beginning?

Jacob L. Shapiro |December 31, 2018


In the 18th century, the once-mighty Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth collapsed, ending an empire that, just a century prior, had been the most populous entity in Europe. After 100 years of war, corruption and sclerotic rule, it was dismembered over 23 years by three of its neighboring rivals – the Russian Empire, Prussia and Habsburg Austria. Present-day Poland still bears the scars of those partitions. For another 200 years after its division, Poles were deprived of their autonomy, which was only regained following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Those years of subjugation remain the driving force behind Polish national strategy today. While Austria no longer poses a risk, Russia and Germany are the biggest threats to Poland’s independence and prosperity.

(click to enlarge)

You may be wondering what any of this has to do with Ukraine. The answer is, Ukraine is in danger of experiencing disintegration similar to what Poland endured in the 18th century. In fact, Poland is one of a number of regional rivals that have claims to Ukrainian territory and may be waiting for an opportunity to take back what they see as rightfully theirs. Poland’s own dismemberment hasn’t prevented the emergence of a nascent Polish revanchism, and the same can be said to varying degrees of Hungary, Romania and, most notably, Russia. Caught between these stronger powers, beset with acute internal political fractiousness, bereft of significant military force and governed by a corrupt and well-entrenched oligarchic class, Ukraine is a ticking time-bomb, and it’s becoming increasingly uncertain whether anyone is willing or able to defuse it.

Underlying Problems

Ukraine’s fragility has been widely overlooked. The narrative in the Western media narrative around Ukraine has been shaped mainly by a combination of understandable, if hysterical, fears in Ukraine about Russian domination and an intense anti-Russia bias. Just last week, the Institute for the Study of War, a resource we’ve occasionally cited in our own work, published a report predicting possible imminent Russian “offensive operations against Ukraine from the Crimean Peninsula and the east.” The evidence for a Russian offensive includes the movement of a few military convoys, a few Foreign Ministry statements, a planned naval drill in the Black Sea and the transfer of “more than a dozen” fighter jets to a base near Sevastopol. Taken together, these moves might well give the impression that Russia is preparing for an operation in eastern Ukraine. But the reality is more complicated. And the underlying problems in Ukraine are more serious than the threat of a limited Russian incursion.

Internally, Ukraine is facing a number of challenges. Its gross domestic product dropped by 17 percent in the two years following the 2014 revolution, Russia’s subsequent seizure of Crimea and insurgencies in Luhansk and Donetsk. Sensing an opportunity to pull Ukraine further into the Western camp, the International Monetary Fund in 2015 approved a $17.5 billion loan over four years to help boost Ukraine’s economy. It took roughly two years and a dispersal of about half the total amount for the IMF and its Western backers to become dissatisfied with how Ukraine was spending the money and suspend the loan. (The IMF agreed to a new $3.9 billion program with Ukraine just last week.) Then-U.S. Vice President Joe Biden even said the U.S. might have to abandon sanctions against Russia if Ukraine couldn’t overcome its corruption problems. He might as well have asked the sky to stop being blue.

Ukraine has taken some small steps in recent months to satisfy its creditors. Fearful of what the IMF might do if Kiev didn’t at least appear to be meeting the obligations of its loan program, it followed through on a promise to raise gas prices by almost 25 percent in October. Ukraine was in danger of a serious liquidity crisis – in July, it had to delay pension and public sector salary payments – and without more IMF funding, it might have been unable to meet its debt payments and finance its budget. This is the cost of keeping Ukraine in the pro-West camp and why Russia feels less urgency than most think it does to reverse the outcome of the 2014 revolution. It’s happy enough to wait for Ukraine to revert to a more neutral position while the West grows tired of footing the bill for its recovery.

The situation will only get worse in the year ahead. In 2019, Russia will complete work on the TurkStream and Nordstream 2 pipelines, which will enable Russian natural gas exports destined for Europe to bypass Ukraine and slash Ukrainian revenue from delivery of these exports through its territory. (Last year, Ukraine earned roughly $3 billion in transit fees from Russian gas exports to Europe – no chump change for a country on the edge of a liquidity crisis.) In March, Ukraine will hold its first presidential election since the 2014 Maidan Revolution. Due to its struggling economy, social divisions and competition between political factions with conflicting business interests and personal allegiances, no single candidate has even 25 percent of the vote so far. Russia’s main concern, therefore, is not a pro-Western government in Kiev but that chaos following the election could cause volatility on the Russian border.

External Issues

Ukraine also has several external problems, chief among them being Russia. Russia doesn’t want instability in Ukraine any more than the United States or any other Western country does – but it’s more affected by economic uncertainty and political competition in Ukraine than the other outside powers involved in the frozen conflict there. And while Russia isn’t exactly a 21st-century incarnation of the Soviet Union – Moscow isn’t peddling a global ideology and has no delusions that it can compete as an equal with Washington on the world stage – the Russian government has relied heavily on Russian nationalism to legitimize its rule. And its brand of nationalism requires Moscow to protect Russians wherever they live – including in eastern Ukraine. Vladimir Putin’s government can’t abandon the ethnic Russian population there without looking weak.

There’s no doubt Russia has beefed up its military presence on its western border and is increasingly active in the Black Sea, but these are more signs of Moscow preparing for a meltdown in Ukraine than precursors to an invasion. Russia has wanted relief from U.S. and EU sanctions for years, and it behooves Russia not to antagonize the West but to find some kind of accommodation (especially with a potential global recession and possibly lower oil prices approaching). But to do so, it can’t be seen as the aggressor in a conflict with Ukraine – and Ukraine knows it, which is why Kiev made such a big deal out of the Kerch Strait incident, a relatively minor affair, all things considered. There are some in the Russian establishment who want to make up for the embarrassment of losing Kiev in 2014, and perhaps even some who think a show of force in eastern Ukraine might distract Russians from their own financial woes. But it’s more likely that Russia is preparing for any eventuality, including a possible internal collapse in Ukraine – and, meanwhile, is biding its time.

(click to enlarge)

Russia, however, isn’t the only country eyeing Ukrainian territory. Hungary has long wanted to reabsorb parts of western Ukraine that still have a majority ethnic Hungarian population. Similarly, Moldova and Romania both have claims to Ukrainian territory along their borders, though they have been less vocal about their grievances than the Hungarians. (For its part, Romania doesn’t want to jeopardize its close relationship with the United States by compounding Ukraine’s problems. Washington barely pretends to care about Ukraine and certainly doesn’t want to get involved in squabbling over post-World War II territorial claims, especially if such squabbling could make blocking Russian ambitions in the region even costlier.)

Poland, too, has had political disputes with Ukraine. The ethnic Polish population in Ukraine was less concentrated after World War II than the ethnic Hungarians and Romanians, so it’s harder to point to a specific area that Poland wants back. But Poland once held much of the territory now in western Ukraine. Present-day Lviv was once a powerful Polish city called Lwow – almost 60 percent of the city’s population in 1944 was Polish. But just six years later, Ukrainians had become the largest ethnic group in Lviv and today represent more than 90 percent of the population. Poland is an emerging power in Eastern Europe, but its power has limits. Its curse is that it’s located on the North European Plain, but in times of strength, that curse becomes a temptation. Indeed, Polish influence and economic ties in western Ukraine have been growing. And although most Poles don’t think in these terms, the stronger Poland is, the more its influence is felt in the region, especially in Ukraine.

Ukraine is facing a number of serious internal and external challenges. Internally, a corrupt, oligarchic ruling class is presiding over a crisis-prone economy dependent on outside aid to remain afloat. Elections are upcoming, and if the polls and previous elections are any indication, they could once again stir up discontent in the country. Russia, meanwhile, is preparing for a time when it may need to intervene in Ukraine to secure its interests and protect ethnic Russians living beyond its border. Others are waiting in the wings for an opportunity to settle old scores and redraw borders while keeping Russia sufficiently at bay. None of this is yet inevitable, but the forces threatening to tear Ukraine apart are very real. Considering the history of the region – including the loss of Crimea nearly five years ago – it’s reasonable to ask whether Ukraine stands on the precipice of a second partition.
Title: Stratfor: Ukraine, Sea of Azov, Russia, NATO
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 03, 2019, 07:11:36 AM
The Big Picture
________________________________________
In our 2019 Annual Forecast, Stratfor noted that the Sea of Azov will be the site of heightened conflict between Ukraine and Russia this year. A standoff toward the end of 2018 and recent naval movements by Russia, Ukraine, and NATO countries point to the potential for a more serious confrontation in the coming months.
________________________________________
Eurasia
What Happened
On Jan. 1, the commander of Ukraine's navy, Adm. Ihor Voronchenko, issued a statement saying his force had made deployments to the Sea of Azov and increased the combat capabilities of its maritime, air and coastal units in response to Russian aggression in the area. This came after Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova warned on Dec. 26, 2018, that the West should refrain from supporting any new "provocations" by Ukraine in the sea after a confrontation between Ukrainian and Russian naval ships in the last months of 2018.

Background

As of Jan. 2, Russia was still holding the three ships and 24 sailors from Ukraine that it had seized during the Nov. 25, 2018, standoff over the Sea of Azov. The sea has been the site of growing tensions between the two countries; Russia had restricted and interfered with Ukrainian commercial vessels throughout 2018. Before the November 2018 standoff, the Ukrainian government had announced that it would build a naval base in the Azov port city of Berdyansk by the end of 2018. Since the standoff, Ukrainian officials have stated that they intend to send warships to Ukraine's ports in the sea through the Kerch Strait. The chief of Ukraine's naval staff, Vice Adm. Andriy Tarasov, has also warned that Ukraine could use weapons in the event of another confrontation between Ukrainian and Russian naval vessels in the sea, though he did not specify which type of weaponry.

Why It Matters

These latest developments point to the potential for a more serious confrontation between Ukraine and Russia on the sea. In particular, the West has boosted its political and security support for Kiev in the standoff. The United Kingdom sent the HMS Echo, a Royal Navy survey ship, to the Ukrainian port city of Odessa on Dec. 19, 2018; it was the first NATO vessel to enter the Black Sea in explicit support of Ukraine over its Azov tensions with Russia. British Defense Minister Gavin Williamson then met his Ukrainian counterpart and said the United Kingdom would help organize joint exercises with the Ukrainian navy in early 2019. That same week, the U.S. special envoy to Ukraine, Kurt Volker, met Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko in Kiev and said the United States would send Ukraine a new batch of weapons in the coming months.
 
However, it bears remembering that Ukraine's naval fleet is much weaker than that of Russia; Kiev, accordingly, understands that it cannot simply force its navy into the Sea of Azov in the face of Russian resistance. Furthermore, NATO is extremely unlikely to risk its forces by intervening directly in the area, not least because they would be at a military disadvantage so close to Russia. Nevertheless, access to the Sea of Azov remains a critical priority for Ukraine for economic, security and sovereignty reasons, and Ukrainians feel compelled to risk further clashes with Russia in pressing their claims. Even if Ukraine understands it is unlikely to come out on top in an armed skirmish with Russia at sea, Kiev hopes that any such incident would maintain and increase Western pressure (in the form of sanctions and military buildups) on Russia and drum up even more support for its own armed forces and position.

What to Watch For

•   Ukrainian activity in and around the Sea of Azov: The movement of naval vessels into the Sea of Azov and the buildup of forces, especially at the new naval base in Berdyansk, will be important to track. And Ukraine's warning about using weapons in another naval confrontation will be crucial, because that could range from warning shots across the bow to the launching of torpedoes or anti-ship missiles, though the latter would represent a serious escalation.
•   Russia's response to Ukraine's moves: As Ukraine bolsters its forces in the area, Russia could pursue its own military buildups in the Sea of Azov, as well as in Crimea. The Kremlin could also increase its support for separatists in eastern Ukraine and amass ground troops on its borders with the territory.
•   NATO's presence in the Black Sea: The alliance is likely to become more active in the region. A survey vessel isn't an overt threat, but a warship would send a different signal. It will also be important to track how close any NATO naval vessels come to the Kerch Strait.
•   A Western boost in training exercises and weapons support for Ukraine: Additional joint drills could occur between Ukraine and NATO. However, such exercises need to be organized in advance and coordinated with current training and maintenance schedules. And, the larger the platforms involved — and the number of nations participating — the bigger the training bill, which could deter a full commitment by NATO, politically or militarily. The specific types of U.S. weapons delivered to Ukraine will also be key to watch.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 16, 2019, 08:15:19 AM
From a friend born in Ukraine:

Ukraine already had an economy downturn before the Russian annexation. When I last visited there were these million dollar homes in the center of the Kiev. They were beautiful but had no electricity, or running water. Very few people in Ukrainian would be able to afford it. It seems its worse now.

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2423723/amp/Kievs-millionaires-ghost-town-left-Ukrainian-economy-crashed.html&ved=2ahUKEwjyqZ7kjvHfAhXzoYMKHQeuDT8QFjAKegQIBhAB&usg=AOvVaw02N1VGIP6lAWK-iSdFpnOJ&ampcf=1


Title: Stratfor: Ukraine,
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 25, 2019, 01:04:55 PM
Russia, Ukraine: NATO Hits Its Limits in the Black Sea

The Big Picture

After a November 2018 escalation in the conflict between the Ukrainian navy and the Russian coast guard at the Kerch Strait, the maritime situation in this area has remained tense. Russia contests Ukraine's freedom of movement into the Sea of Azov, which is separated from the Black Sea by the strait. That channel came under de facto Russian control after the Kremlin annexed Crimea in 2014.
See The Ukraine Conflict
What Happened

Since the confrontation last year between Russia and Ukraine at Kerch Strait, NATO warships have been traveling into the Black Sea to demonstrate support for Ukraine. In the latest visit, the destroyer USS Donald Cook entered the Black Sea on Jan. 19 and visited Batumi in Georgia, while being closely tracked by Russian navy vessels. The British HMS Echo, a hydrographic survey ship, had visited the area in December. At the time, the British presence was openly tied to the Kerch Strait incident, and British Defense Minister Gavin Williamson even boarded a Ukrainian frigate on the Black Sea. NATO has consistently conducted maritime operations in the sea, but its visits have taken on added significance since the breakdown in relations between Ukraine and Russia in 2014. And the recent heightened tensions mean Russia is watching the transits even more closely.
Why It Matters

The situation in the Black Sea resembles the dispute in the South China Sea, where U.S. and British vessels both conduct freedom of navigation operations. In the Black Sea, the visits have evolved from a conceptual show of support for Kiev to a more practical backing of Ukraine's freedom of navigation. However, unlike the operations in the South China Sea, these NATO vessels are unlikely to directly challenge Russian limits to freedom of navigation by traveling through the Kerch Strait and into the Sea of Azov. While the Montreux Convention, which governs the presence of foreign navies in the Black Sea, technically doesn't prevent them from doing so, a great degree of tactical risk would be associated with such an operation deep in an area where the Russian navy is dominant.
A map shows the Black Sea, Russia, Ukraine, Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov.

The Montreux Convention also severely limits the NATO presence, restricting the number of non-Black Sea state naval vessels and their time in the sea. Even when the sizable fleet of Turkey, a NATO member, is taken into account, Russia's ability to project significant force over the Black Sea through its land-based missile systems, as well as its air assets, gives it a sizable advantage. And the limited strength of the Ukrainian navy means that the Russian Black Sea fleet — despite its own challenges — is able to maintain supremacy there and particularly in the Sea of Azov.
What Happens Next

Though NATO has made it clear that it wants to support Ukraine when it comes to freedom of navigation in the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov, the reality is that this area is still very much at the mercy of Russian power. The Kremlin has been growing assertive and harassing both civilian and Ukrainian navy vessels traveling in the area, but short of a military engagement, there isn't a lot standing in Russia's way. Such an armed engagement would be conducted from a position of inferiority for Ukraine and the West in this particular area, and it would come with a great risk of escalating beyond. Therefore, NATO navies will find themselves limited to a largely symbolic presence in the wider Black Sea.
Title: Stratfor: more Sea of Azov
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 15, 2019, 02:07:50 PM
Ukraine, Russia: Pressure on Moscow Builds Over Its Seafaring Standoff With Kiev
The Big Picture

In its 2019 Annual Forecast, Stratfor noted that the Sea of Azov would emerge as a key front in the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia — writing that both countries would bolster naval assets in the area, with the United States weighing in through additional security support for Ukraine. A recent meeting between Ukrainian and NATO defense officials, along with upcoming sanction decisions against Russia related to the Sea of Azov, point to the growing importance of this front.


Ukrainian Defense Minister Stepan Poltorak met with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg and other NATO officials Feb. 14 in Brussels to discuss security issues related to the Black Sea. Following the meeting, Poltorak announced that NATO would significantly increase its presence in the Black Sea this year to help Ukraine improve its defense capabilities in the area, including "troops training, modern weapons and development of military infrastructure." He also added that "special attention will be paid to naval and air force capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces."

Why It Matters

The Sea of Azov and broader Black Sea area have been the site of escalating tensions between Ukraine and Russia since a confrontation between the two countries in November 2018. The standoff has enabled Ukraine to elicit greater political support from the West in recent months, particularly when it comes to increasing sanctions pressure on Russia. There are growing signs that both the European Union and the United States will pass greater sanctions against Russia over the Sea of Azov standoff with Ukraine, including individual sanctions on Russian security officials involved in the impasse, as well as restrictions on Russia's shipbuilding sector. The EU Foreign Affairs Council is scheduled to discuss increasing such sanctions on Feb. 18, while the United States has floated its own sanctions package partially related to the matter as well.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin recently warned that U.S. plans to hold naval drills with Ukraine in the Black Sea represent "a dangerous idea," which suggests tensions in the region will heat up in the coming months.

The Sea of Azov standoff has also driven greater security support from NATO countries to Ukraine, as evidenced by visits from NATO vessels to country's ports on the Black Sea. The Ukrainian defense minister's recent meeting with NATO officials indicates that this support will now include more active involvement in joint NATO-Ukrainian naval exercises in the Black Sea, as well as increased deployments in, and weapons deliveries to, Ukraine.

These expanded actions will increase the likelihood of additional confrontations between Ukraine and Russia in the Sea of Azov and greater Black Sea area, which could, in turn, escalate the broader conflict in eastern Ukraine. Indeed, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin recently warned that the United States' plans to hold naval drills with Ukraine in the Black Sea represent "a dangerous idea," which suggests tensions in the region will heat up in the coming months.
Background

On Nov. 25, Russia seized three Ukrainian ships and detained 24 Ukrainian sailors in a standoff on the Sea of Azov. Leading up to the confrontation, Moscow had been intercepting Ukrainian ships in the area following Ukraine's announcement in September 2018 that it would build a naval base in Berdyansk by the end of the year. The Ukrainian sailors remain detained in Russia.
Title: A history of Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 01, 2019, 07:58:51 AM
 
The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine
By Serhii Plokhy

The edge of Western civilization. The breadbasket of Europe. Of the many roles Ukraine has played throughout its history, perhaps the most important has been as Europe’s borderland. The world was reminded of as much in 2014, when protests erupted in the capital of Kiev, unleashing a chain of events that would lead to the ouster of the Ukrainian president, the introduction Russian patrols in eastern Ukraine, and the annexation of Crimea by Russia. Russia called the uprising a Western-backed coup, while the West welcomed the developments. Many feared the country would splinter along pro-Russia and pro-Europe lines. And so, Ukraine’s status as Europe’s first frontier was once again secured.

But in “The Gates of Europe,” Serhii Plokhy’s meticulous telling of Ukrainian history shows that these events weren’t as unique or unexpected as one might think. Ukraine’s history is littered with uprisings and ethnic, cultural and linguistic divides. Plokhy begins his account in the fifth century B.C. with Herodotus, the ancient Greek historian whom Plokhy refers to as “the first historian of Ukraine.” He goes on to describe the pivotal moments that shaped the country’s history, from the Great Revolt to the collapse of empires following World War I, allowing Ukraine to form its own not-yet-independent state.

Perhaps the most intriguing part of the book is the epilogue, where Plokhy writes about the issue of nation-building and Ukrainian identity. Russia was able to take control over Russian-speaking Crimea with relatively little military force in part because of the linguistic and cultural connections between the population there and Russia. Many Russian leaders and “volunteers” who joined the fight in eastern Ukraine have made direct connections between the Russian language and Russian nationality. From this perspective, anyone who speaks Russian is part of the Russian nation and deserves Moscow’s protection, even if they live beyond the country’s official borders. This was part of the justification for the annexation of Crimea and it’s part of Ukraine’s ongoing weakness – a large chunk of its population speaks something other than the official language of Ukraine. The country has thus struggled to form an identity of its own. Indeed, Vladimir Putin has repeatedly claimed that Russians and Ukrainians are the same people and downplayed ethnic distinctions between them.

It’s important to remember, however, that the New Russia project – the attempt to merge parts of eastern Ukraine with the Russian state – wasn’t as successful as its architects had hoped. Plokhy points out that most Russian-speaking Ukrainians in Donbass refused to identify themselves as Russian, and after five years of war, Russian-backed rebels haven’t managed to secure full independence from Ukraine. It’s hard to see where the conflict will end, but the broader struggle in which Ukraine has repeatedly found itself may never be resolved.

Valentina Jovanovski, editor

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 28, 2019, 11:12:42 AM
Ukraine Provides a Test Case of Russia's Hybrid Warfare Strategy
By Eugene Chausovsky
Senior Eurasia Analyst, Stratfor

Passersby walk past a giant electoral poster of Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko displayed on a building in central Kiev on March 22, 2019.
(SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP/Getty Images)


    Ukraine will provide a laboratory for the evolution of Russia's hybrid warfare strategy as Moscow adjusts its tactics and expands the scope of such actions around the world.
    The competition over Ukraine will factor heavily into the broader Russia-West standoff, which is only likely to intensify in the coming years.
    But regardless of who wins Ukraine's presidential elections on March 31, the country will maintain its orientation to the West, thereby highlighting the limitations of Russia's hybrid strategy.

 

On March 31, Ukrainians will head to the polls for one of the most pivotal and unusual elections in the country's post-Soviet history. This will be the first presidential election since the immediate aftermath of the country's Western-backed Euromaidan uprising in 2014, in which large-scale protests overthrew pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich, clearing a path for the pro-Western Petro Poroshenko to capture the post in May 2014. But five years after Euromaidan, Ukraine has yet to find its political footing, as evidenced by the fact that Poroshenko and former Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko — two familiar faces in Ukraine's political scene — are trailing Volodymyr Zelenskiy, a 41-year-old TV star and comedian with no previous political experience, by a wide margin. But regardless of who wins the election, one thing is clear: Ukraine's pro-Western orientation is here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future. Following Euromaidan, Ukraine became ground zero for Moscow's expansion of its hybrid warfare strategy, but the country's decisive break from its powerful eastern neighbor has laid bare some of the limitations of such Russian activity.

The Big Picture

Ukraine has long been a battleground between Russia and the West. The consequences of its 2014 Euromaidan uprising have rippled far and wide over the past half-decade. As Ukraine prepares for a presidential election — and the future beyond — it will be a vital test case for the evolution of Russia's hybrid warfare strategy, since it showcases both the impact of the strategy and its ultimate limitations.

The Comedian Who Could be President

The latest opinion polls released by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology on March 25 show Zelenskiy with 32.1 percent of support, far ahead of Poroshenko's 17.1 percent and Timoshenko's 12.5 percent. It is worth noting that pre-election polls in Ukraine can prove unreliable, but Zelenskiy's substantial lead over his two main opponents (as well as a field of nearly 40 other presidential candidates) shows that the star of the popular TV comedy series "Servant of the People," in which he plays the president, has a good chance of joining the ranks of U.S. President Donald Trump and Brazil's Jair Bolsonaro as anti-establishment candidates who unexpectedly upended the political status quo in their countries.

Zelenskiy's rapid rise is contextualized by Ukraine's post-Euromaidan political climate, in which lofty expectations of significant change remain largely unfulfilled. In terms of foreign policy, Ukraine has made important strides in its bid to integrate with the West under Poroshenko, as Kiev has concluded a free trade and visa-free agreement with Brussels, while the United States and NATO have increased security support for the country. Still, membership in either the European Union or NATO remains a distant dream despite Poroshenko's initiative to enshrine Ukraine's desire to join these blocs in the country's constitution. Such aspirations have come at a high cost, including a prolonged conflict with Russia that has led to the loss of Crimea and Donbas — as well as over 10,000 lives.

A map showing Ukraine and the disputed areas of Donbas and Crimea.

On the domestic front, there has also been a mix of progress and setbacks over the past five years. Reforms in the energy sector, while lessening Ukraine's dependence on Russia, have raised utility costs substantially. In the meantime, wages have not kept pace with inflation, while efforts to tackle corruption through judicial and legal reform have largely stalled. Against this backdrop, Zelenskiy is a protest candidate against the powers that be; in such a situation, his fresh face and dearth of political experience is not a weakness for many voters, but rather a positive sign that he can shake things up.

Ukraine and the Russia-West Standoff

The impact of Euromaidan has also traveled well beyond Ukraine's borders, sending ripple effects throughout Eurasia and the West. While the revolution was not the first Western-supported uprising to occur in Russia's backyard (a wave of color revolutions, including one in Ukraine, preceded it earlier in the century), it was by far the most violent and most enduring in terms of its implications. For Russia, Euromaidan posed a major threat to its strategic interests and represented the biggest breach between Moscow and the West since the Cold War, fundamentally altering the way Russia interacts with the West.

Russia's initial reaction to the uprising serves as a case in point. Rather than pursue a formal military invasion of Ukraine, Russia sent in "little green men," or unmarked military personnel, to Crimea and, later, eastern Ukraine in a bid to spawn counter-Euromaidan political movements and forces to oppose the new government in Kiev. At the time, Russia's actions seemed like a thinly veiled effort to cover its tracks and avoid blame for a direct military intervention. In retrospect, however, these were the baby steps in a profound shift in Russian strategy to something different: hybrid warfare.

To be sure, hybrid warfare is not a new concept to either Russia or other states all the way back to antiquity. However, the manner in which Moscow waged hybrid warfare underwent a significant evolution and expansion after Euromaidan. While Russia had previously used hybrid tactics in a restricted manner to achieve limited objectives, such as during the Russia-Georgia War in 2008, Moscow expanded the tactics tremendously in both scope and breadth after Euromaidan in 2014. Russia's techniques grew to encompass everything from targeted assassinations and other covert security operations to cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns. All of these were designed — with varying degrees of intensity and effectiveness — to weaken the Ukrainian state and undermine its efforts to align and integrate with the West.

Using Ukraine as a test case, Russia applied some or all of these expanded hybrid warfare techniques to other pro-Western countries in the former Soviet periphery, such as Moldova and Georgia, so as to undermine their efforts to integrate with the West. Russia expanded its political and economic backing for pro-Moscow parties like the Socialists in Moldova and boosted security support for contested territories like Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia also looked further afield to wield its enhanced tools, supporting Euroskeptic parties in Germany and Italy or establishing entire bot armies on social media platforms with the ultimate aim of fomenting divisions and sowing chaos in the West. Naturally, the scope of Russia's tools varied based on the country it was targeting: Moscow was not willing to challenge countries like the United States or France in a direct military sense, but it was willing to conduct cyberattacks and meddle in their political systems during critical elections.
Euromaidan's Global Reverberations

Russia's prolonged standoff with the West has also had a significant impact on the manner in which Moscow interacts with the rest of the world. Just a year after the Euromaidan uprising, Russia intervened in the Syrian conflict, deploying military forces to back the government of Bashar al Assad against U.S.- and Western-backed rebels. As in Ukraine, Russia's military involvement in Syria began with a small and unofficial presence to test the waters before growing to include a much larger and more powerful force. Russia's intervention also demonstrated that the country was ready and willing to challenge the West not only in the post-Soviet space but also in areas further afield like the Middle East.

Today, signs are emerging that Moscow could go even more global in its use of hybrid warfare. Russia's use of covert or mercenary forces has spread to regions like Africa, including in Libya and the Central Asian Republic, and even as far as Venezuela. What's more, Russia could bolster its military presence in Venezuela, especially after Russian military planes recently landed in Caracas with more than 100 troops and advisers. If so, Russia's forays into Venezuela would share important similarities with previous hybrid interventions in Ukraine or Syria, both in terms of tactics and its goals of enhancing its standing and leverage in its broader negotiations with the United States.

Euromaidan not only reoriented Ukraine's foreign policy toward the West, the decisiveness with which it occurred means the shift will likely endure long beyond this election.

Russia's Hybrid Strategy Hits a Wall

The West, however, has not been completely silent in the face of Russia's hybrid warfare activities. The United States and the European Union have ramped up sanctions against Russia, while NATO has bolstered its military presence in European border areas to protect front-line countries and reinforce defenses against Russia. In addition to conventional buildups, NATO members and countries like Ukraine have redoubled their efforts to enhance and integrate cybersecurity defenses and defend against online propaganda and disinformation tactics. Such efforts have led to diminishing returns for Russia, as the West has worked to both increase the cost of Russia's hybrid tactics and reduce their effectiveness.

Which brings us back to Ukraine. Despite public frustration over the uneven progress of reforms and the persistence of day-to-day difficulties for many citizens, the country has nevertheless undergone a major transformation over the past five years that is hard to ignore from a strategic perspective. Euromaidan not only reoriented Ukraine's foreign policy away from Russia and toward the West, the decisiveness with which it occurred means the shift will likely endure long beyond this election. Regardless of who wins on March 31, all leading candidates support the continuation of Ukraine's Western integration efforts; in fact, not a single pro-Russian candidate has a realistic chance of qualifying for the second round. That, in the end, is a major departure from Ukraine's polarized politics before Euromaidan, when the country was split roughly evenly between pro-Russian and pro-Western factions. More than that, it is also a testament to the limitations of Russia's hybrid tactics.

Ultimately, the motivation for Russia's hybrid warfare strategy goes deeper than the Euromaidan uprising to reflect Moscow's difficulties in competing with the United States and the West in a direct manner. Even as Russia's standoff with the West has been intensifying for half a decade, Moscow suffers from a number of inherent weaknesses, including a resource-dependent economy that can't keep up with the likes of the United States or China, as well as increasingly pressing demographic challenges at home. As a result, Russia has resorted ever more to a continuously evolving and spreading hybrid strategy to attain its strategic ends. Perhaps more than any other country, Ukraine has showcased both the effectiveness and limitations of this strategy for Russia — and that is unlikely to change, even as Moscow refines its strategy and deploys it much further afield.
Title: Landslide win for the comedian
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 22, 2019, 10:56:57 AM

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-presidential-gamble-11555875881

also see

What Happened

With over 98 percent of the votes counted from the second round of the Ukrainian presidential election, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, best known as a TV comedian, has overwhelmingly won the post by capturing over 73 percent of the vote. Incumbent Petro Poroshenko has conceded defeat.
Why It Matters

Zelenskiy’s landslide victory can be seen as an expression of public frustration over business as usual in Ukraine. The 2014 Euromaidan revolution elevated public expectations of seeing significant changes in the country, but reform efforts under Poroshenko produced mixed results. Reforms in the energy sector, for instance, have led to higher utility costs, while wages have not kept up with inflation, and efforts to tackle corruption through judicial and legal reforms have largely stalled. Zelenskiy — who had no previous political experience and offered no clear policy prescriptions during his campaign — thus served as a protest candidate.

The Ukrainian parliament, currently led by the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, presents a significant limiter on the power of the presidency.

With Zelenskiy’s victory now all but official, the question becomes how he will reshape Ukrainian policy after he takes office. In the short term, the likely answer is not much. The Ukrainian parliament, currently led by the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, presents a significant limiter on the power of the presidency. Therefore, Zelenskiy — whose party currently has no parliamentary representation — will find it difficult to push through any significant policy changes at least until parliamentary elections in October, when he will have a chance to build his party’s numbers and will factor more heavily into coalition-building. Any changes Zelenskiy wants to make will also face external influence, including a push by the West for policy continuity on economic reforms tied to the country’s financial assistance program through the International Monetary Fund.

Beyond the immediate term, Zelenskiy could shift Ukraine’s approach to key issues like the conflict with Russian-backed separatists in Donbas. Indeed, he has called for a reset of the negotiation process over ending the war in Eastern Ukraine, but he also faces obstacles to that ambition. Ukraine’s Western backers have pushed for a continuation of the Minsk process and Normandy format of negotiations, a step that Zelenskiy’s representatives have confirmed a commitment to keeping, meaning the bid to find a resolution to the conflict will face the all same constraints. Russia, which has taken a cautious approach to Zelenskiy’s victory, will also serve as a major roadblock to ending the conflict, considering Moscow's interest in undermining Ukraine’s Western integration process regardless of who is president. Given that Zelenskiy supports broader integration with Western blocs such as the European Union and NATO (he has called for a referendum on Ukraine’s NATO membership as a means to clarify public consensus on the issue), any difference in foreign policy between Zelenskiy and Poroshenko is likely to be tactical, rather than strategic, in nature.

There could, however, be more potential for domestic change, as the Ukrainian public will hold Zelenskiy accountable to his pledge to do more to tackle corruption. But this, too, will be complicated by his alleged ties to influential oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky, as well as efforts by vested interests within the political and economic establishment to resist anti-corruption reforms. The extent of the resistance that Zelenskiy will face in changing Ukrainian policy will become clearer in the weeks ahead as he makes key Cabinet and personnel appointments and pushes to increase his party's representation in parliament.
What's Next?

Ukraine is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections on Oct. 27. The Petro Poroshenko Bloc and the Popular Front currently make up the ruling coalition, while Zelenskiy’s Servant of the People party will be trying to seat its first members.

 
Title: Army Times: Russian Military gains in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 14, 2019, 05:57:39 PM
https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/05/14/russian-military-gains-in-ukraine-could-spell-trouble-for-the-us-army-even-in-a-conventional-fight/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Army%20DNR%2005-14-19&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup
Title: Ukraine--Black Sea
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 02, 2019, 04:25:24 PM
https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/07/02/sea-breeze-exercise-underway-in-the-black-sea-with-ukraine-nato-allies/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Army%20DNR%2007-02-19&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup
Title: Stratfor: Watching for signs of progress
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 28, 2019, 02:00:24 PM
 

Watching for Signs of Progress in Eastern Ukraine

The Big Picture
________________________________________
As the conflict in Ukraine enters its sixth year, recent signs point to a revival of the stalled negotiation process between Ukraine, Russia and the West. While various political and security challenges still stand in the way of a comprehensive truce between Kyiv and Moscow, the successful implementation of more tactical measures, such as prisoner swaps and troop withdrawals, could help break the diplomatic deadlock over the war.
________________________________________
The Fight for Russia’s BorderlandsThe Ukraine Conflict
Editor's Note: This assessment is part of a series of analyses supporting Stratfor's 2019 Fourth-Quarter Forecast. These assessments are designed to provide more context and in-depth analysis of key developments over the next quarter.
On Sept. 18, Ukraine announced it was preparing to pull back its military presence 1 kilometer (0.62 miles) from the roughly 450-km front line in eastern Ukraine on the basis that Russian-backed separatist forces do the same. Specifically, Kyiv stressed that the successful completion of this plan would depend on concurring "reciprocal actions from the opposite side." This announcement follows a high-profile prisoner exchange between Ukraine and Russia on Sept. 7. Combined, these two recent developments suggest that the door to further de-escalation may be opening wider — and with it, the potential for diplomatic progress toward addressing the nearly six-year conflict in the region.
Closer to Diplomacy?
There have been discussions of a resumption of talks between heads of state in the Normandy Four format (Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France). The last time such a meeting took place regarding the conflict in eastern Ukraine was in 2016. A successful, mutual pullback of military personnel and equipment along the front line in Donbas would create positive momentum going into the Normandy summit, as well as boost parallel natural gas transit negotiations between Ukraine, Russia and the European Union (which are part of broader talks among Ukrainian officials). This could, in turn, increase the chances for Kyiv and Moscow to start implementing some of the political aspects of the 2014 Minsk Protocol, and lay the groundwork for further political concessions as well, including the potential lifting of EU sanctions against Russia.
 
What Stands in the Way
However, there are still significant hurdles for a comprehensive breakthrough (or even piecemeal agreement) to take place as a result of the potential upcoming Normandy Four talks. These include:
•   The Minsk impasse: Russia and Ukraine have divergent positions on implementing the Minsk protocols, particularly its sequencing. Before granting any concessions, Ukraine has demanded a complete removal of Russian military personnel from the region and the restoration of Ukrainian control over the Russian border with Donbas. Russia, however, has pushed against these demands, insisting that Ukraine must first recognize Donbas' political autonomy.
•   Domestic political pressures: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy — who took office earlier this year after securing a landslide victory — has made ending the conflict in eastern Ukraine one of his top priorities. However, domestic political pressures will make Zelenskiy (and, to a lesser extent, Russian President Vladimir Putin) hesitant to pursue more meaningful concessions for fear of appearing politically weak.
•   Past failures: Finally, previous troop pullbacks have proven to be unsuccessful. A previous agreement in 2016 to push back both Ukrainian and separatist forces from three specific areas (Stanitsa Luganskaya, Zolotye and Petrovskoye) has had little success. Over the past three years, the pullback has been successfully completed in only Stanitsa Luganskaysa — and even then, only recently.
A step back from the front line in eastern Ukraine could at least allow Kyiv and Moscow to reopen the conversation around ending the conflict.
What to Watch for
Despite these challenges, the fact that there is movement on the ground in terms of both prisoner exchanges and a limited version of troop pullbacks nonetheless suggests that more diplomatic progress could soon be reached. In gauging the likelihood of such traction, it will be important to monitor the following developments in the coming weeks and months:
•   A sustained cease-fire: Persistent crossfire in eastern Ukraine risks delaying or thwarting any troop pullbacks. A sustained cease-fire in the region would first have to take place for either side to feel comfortable enough to move their military troops and equipment.
•   A strong start to the pullback: Any successful troop pullback would have to occur sequentially across the front line in eastern Ukraine, likely beginning first in the Luhansk regions of Zolotye and Petrovskoye (the sites of the previously failed 2016 plans). If both Russian and Ukrainian forces are successfully removed in these two regions, then pullbacks in other parts of Luhansk and the more contentious Donetsk region would likely take place next.
•   The U.S.'s diplomatic position: The United States — while not a part of the Normandy Four — will nevertheless play a key role in peace negotiations. Given its own rivalry with Russia, along with its political and security support for Ukraine, Washington can be expected to side with Kyiv and insist on more concessions from Moscow. Zelenskiy is scheduled to have his first sit-down with U.S. President Donald Trump on Sept. 25 on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly. The White House also recently signed off on the release of a $250 million military assistance package for Ukraine.
•   The Normandy Four summit: Concrete movement toward a cease-fire and troop pullback would likely set the stage for additional meetings among Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany that are needed to reach any more meaningful truce. There is also a chance that the potential meeting will yield some limited concessions from Ukraine and Russia, such as additional prisoner swaps, or granting greater access for forces with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to monitor separatist territories in eastern Ukraine.
Read on Worldview



Title: Glenn Beck on the Ukraine scandal
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 06, 2019, 10:34:24 AM

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5nUZekJ3pfM&fbclid=IwAR35WinJVyG9GIeVrLzZj0k4OriHMm52kXrCvQ1af_16zPg97S3pHGn9XYk
Title: The mess that Victoria Nuland made
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 06, 2019, 10:46:07 AM
I'm not going to Monday morning quarterback this , , , yet, but I post this to give an idea of the complexity of the situation.

https://truthout.org/articles/the-ukraine-mess-that-nuland-made/
Title: Ted Carpenter: America's hypocrisy in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 06, 2019, 11:25:14 AM
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/americas-ukraine-hypocrisy-21803?fbclid=IwAR2ksT-oM1cjaLBF6g3wJEx2ht1K7SwrCTuCZGDfGWU24iweNVjaPyP3bk0
Title: Ukrainian politician tossed in trash
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 07, 2019, 02:14:10 PM
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/angry-mob-tosses-ukrainian-politician-trash-n204456?fbclid=IwAR0Xwtc2WyG8CHb9EebgfCk39-Zz6wkpxXUFy3JfDYJTEffgZUnd5x9dV9E
Title: How President helped Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 08, 2019, 07:52:01 AM
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columnists/testimony-how-trump-helped-ukraine
Title: Nation: Why are we in Ukraine?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 15, 2019, 11:54:22 AM
https://www.thenation.com/article/why-are-we-in-ukraine/
Title: Re: Nation: Why are we in Ukraine?
Post by: DougMacG on November 15, 2019, 05:42:10 PM
https://www.thenation.com/article/why-are-we-in-ukraine/

"Ukraine is not “a vital US national interest, ...
Ukraine is a vital Russian interest."

I realize this is The Nation, but isn't containing Russia to Russian borders, when and where we can, to not become Soviet Union 2.0, isn't that a "vital US national interest"?

What was the lesson of WWII? In my view it is to stop regimes like Hitler sooner, before they capture more territory, resources, confidence, momentum, before we have to take a half million casualties or more to stop them.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 15, 2019, 07:02:58 PM
Yes, understood! 

I should have clarified with an accompanying explanation, that I posted because it articulates well a particular, and rational, POV.

It most certainly fair to point out that if the shoe were on the other foot, we would NOT be happy with the Russians militarily present in Mexico, contrast our NATO presence on Russian borders and our vague declarations of adding Ukraine and Georgia to the list.

My current thinking is this:  The problem is that in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Empire there were two basic ways to play it with the Russians.  Extend the hand or step on the neck while they were weak.  President Clinton did it half-assed instead.
Title: Ukraine: The Maidan's Tale
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 17, 2019, 03:45:46 PM
https://kaus.substack.com/p/the-maidans-tale?token=eyJ1c2VyX2lkIjoyOTIzODI2LCJwb3N0X2lkIjoxNzE1MjYsIl8iOiJjMXNldSIsImlhdCI6MTU3Mzg3MTQ4MCwiZXhwIjoxNTczODc1MDgwLCJpc3MiOiJwdWItMTA5NDIiLCJzdWIiOiJwb3N0LXJlYWN0aW9uIn0.bPoZNTcqWtErW1H-M8grc8Zjd-3zqbqoC5WQJMhRtOA
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on November 17, 2019, 10:00:26 PM
Yes, understood! 

I should have clarified with an accompanying explanation, that I posted because it articulates well a particular, and rational, POV.

It most certainly fair to point out that if the shoe were on the other foot, we would NOT be happy with the Russians militarily present in Mexico, contrast our NATO presence on Russian borders and our vague declarations of adding Ukraine and Georgia to the list.

My current thinking is this:  The problem is that in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Empire there were two basic ways to play it with the Russians.  Extend the hand or step on the neck while they were weak.  President Clinton did it half-assed instead.

Thank you Crafty. 

"we would NOT be happy with the Russians militarily present in Mexico, contrast our NATO presence on Russian borders and our vague declarations of adding Ukraine and Georgia to the list."

   - Our Denny S also makes a persuasive 'backyard' argument.  Cuban missile crisis might be an example.  I would add clarification..  I would add a distinction, the US has no designs on Mexico or Cuba, except for them to be sovereign, independent and free, unlike the way Russia looks at Crimea/Ukraine.  If our goal was annexation, we might find ourselves facing reaction of a world community alliance in resistance to that, whether we like it or not.

"...in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Empire there were two basic ways to play it with the Russians.  Extend the hand or step on the neck while they were weak.  President Clinton did it half-assed instead."

    - Yes.  Just the voters' choice of Clinton was a significant left turn away from what should have been a 'third Reagan term' and then a fourth term (Bush Sr.) emphasizing freedom instead of statism.  That election took away our credibility to tell other nations to choose individual rights and freedoms and steer away from statism.  Russia was lost.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 18, 2019, 03:54:15 AM
"I would add clarification..  I would add a distinction, the US has no designs on Mexico or Cuba, except for them to be sovereign, independent and free, unlike the way Russia looks at Crimea/Ukraine.  If our goal was annexation, we might find ourselves facing reaction of a world community alliance in resistance to that, whether we like it or not."

Well articulated and I agree entirely. 

That said, the Russians do not see themselves as we see them.  The Russian sense of history comes through the very distorted lens of Marxist-Leninist Pravda propaganda while shutting off Truth from the outside, which with the fall of the Soviet Empire simply put on a new cloak over the same old rationalizations.
Title: Yovanovitch demanded firing of Uke prosecutor during election
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 18, 2019, 05:59:41 AM
second post

It would appear she has a point!

https://www.theepochtimes.com/yovanovitch-demanded-firing-of-top-ukrainian-prosecutor-amid-nations-presidential-election_3147700.html?ref=brief_News&utm_source=Epoch+Times+Newsletters&utm_campaign=5b65476f19-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_11_15_05_49&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4fba358ecf-5b65476f19-239065853
Title: Interesting reminders of reality in Ukraine with regard to Russia
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 20, 2019, 01:31:27 PM
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/impeaching-trump-and-demonizing-russia-birds-of-a-feather/?fbclid=IwAR0GlURRpJ6YZcfzplG4SXHw10oiBw7EYAoaPPhCuj_r9lxRAn6kj2Qa004

A friend with unusually deep expertise in Russo-American strategic issues comments:

"The author is a bit more willing to take the Russian perspective than I think is wise, but this is still a good and interesting piece. The bits about NATO’s expansion and our support for factions in Ukraine are particularly useful reminders. The moves may have been in our interest, and largely I agree that they were, but the notion that Russia wouldn’t react was naive."
Title: What if Trump was right about Ukraine?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 20, 2019, 01:42:31 PM
second post

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/analysis-what-if-trump-was-right-about-ukraine?fbclid=IwAR3YnBe5nZuxMH-VvlQ0FV8PqkhnS0Y-eHrYTlQSZG-6j0XiTvvHp41HPYc
Title: But wait! There's more , , , corruption in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 20, 2019, 01:48:00 PM
third post

https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/press-conference/625831.html

Title: Andrew McCarthy: The foreign policy establishment's Uke fantasy
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 20, 2019, 05:36:55 PM
fourth post

https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/11/the-progressive-policy-community-ukraine-fantasy/
Title: Obama State Dept: Do not investigate Soros group
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 25, 2019, 03:07:33 PM
https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/435906-us-embassy-pressed-ukraine-to-drop-probe-of-george-soros-group-during-2016
Title: The Budapest Memorandum
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 19, 2019, 01:59:19 PM
from 2014, source unknown,

https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-explainer-budapest-memorandum/25280502.html
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 30, 2019, 05:40:07 AM
Stratfor Worldview

ASSESSMENTS

A New Gas Transit Deal Won't Keep Ukraine and Russia Together for Long
6 MINS READ
Dec 30, 2019 | 10:00 GMT

A natural gas line runs outside Donetsk, Ukraine, on March 11, 2015. In the future, gas transit deals between Ukraine and Russia could have less ability to keep the countries' tensions in check.

(ANDREW BURTON/Getty Images)
HIGHLIGHTS
Their new agreement notwithstanding, Moscow and Kyiv are ultimately set to go their separate ways on energy....

For the short term at least, Ukrainians and Europeans won't have to worry about shelling out more to heat their homes this winter. An eleventh-hour extension to an energy transit agreement will guarantee the continued flow of natural gas from Russia to Europe through Ukraine over the next five years, but there is little indication that the current deal will presage longer-term cooperation between Moscow and Kyiv. Indeed, lingering distrust between the two capitals will lead Ukraine down the path of producing its own natural gas to achieve self-sufficiency in the longer term, while Russia will strive to shift shipments to pipelines in the Baltic and Black seas that don't present as much of a political nuisance. Ultimately, the emergence of other transit routes will reduce the calming effect that natural gas transit deals have had on the two countries' larger political disputes over hot-button issues like Crimea, eastern Ukraine and more.

The Big Picture

Russia supplies nearly half of Europe's natural gas, and Ukraine's pipeline infrastructure plays a key role. But the construction of new pipeline infrastructure in the Baltic and Black seas will allow Russia to reduce its dependence on Ukrainian infrastructure.

See The Politics of Pipelines

The Road to an Agreement

At the outset of the most recent talks, Russia proposed a one-year deal. At the same time, Russia also demanded that Ukraine's Naftogaz drop all litigation it had filed against Gazprom for allegedly pumping less than the 110 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year it was required to ship during the previous contract from 2009 to 2019. Ukraine, by contrast, wanted a 10-year agreement that would have provided Kyiv with a guaranteed income from transit fees over a long period in which it hoped to further develop its own natural gas production or alternative import sources. At the same time, Ukraine, as well as the European Union, had proposed a minimum transit of 60 bcm per year, with an additional capacity for 30 bcm.

After exhaustive negotiations, representatives of Russia's Gazprom and Ukraine's Naftogaz finally reached a preliminary agreement for a five-year extension to their new gas transit contract on Dec. 19, just 12 days before the present deal was set to expire.

Gazprom also committed to paying $2.9 billion that a Stockholm court earlier ordered it to pay Naftogaz as compensation after volumes dropped to less than 90 bcm per year, particularly as a result of the Euromaidan uprising. Naftogaz, in exchange, agreed to stop pursuing additional lawsuits related to transit in which it had demanded a total of $13 billion.

Both Ukraine and Russia ended up making concessions relative to their initial demands in order to pragmatically sustain gas flows.

And in terms of yearly volumes, the new agreement envisions a progressive reduction in Russia's use of Ukrainian infrastructure from the current volume of 90 bcm to 65 bcm next year and just 40 bcm in 2021. As a result, Ukraine would normally collect less revenue, just as the costs of maintaining the aging infrastructure will rise. But under the new deal, Naftogaz and Gazprom have reportedly fixed the transit fees over the next five years at a higher level to allow Ukraine to sustain its roughly $3 billion in revenue even though volumes could drop by more than half.

The extension is of great economic importance to both Russia and Ukraine, as the lack of a deal would have physically prevented Russia from pumping enough natural gas to European markets to meet demand, while Kyiv would not have been able to reap transit fees. Both countries ended up making concessions relative to their initial demands in order to pragmatically sustain gas flows. From Ukraine's perspective, the new agreement will give Kyiv some level of reliability and generate revenue of at least $15 billion — $2 billion more than it would have gained if Naftogaz had won the lawsuits it originally filed against Gazprom. While the country might not have achieved as much as it could if it had stood its ground in negotiations, it evidently chose to sacrifice revenue for more certainty.

This map shows various pipeline routes from Russia to Europe.

Toward New Routes

The agreement, however, does not herald a long future of Russian-Ukrainian energy ties. The importance of Ukraine as a transit country lies within the broader context of the natural gas pipelines that connect Russia and European markets. Next year, Russia hopes to bring both TurkStream and Nord Stream 2 online to increase its total export capacity to Europe and develop more alternatives to Ukraine. Since the breakdown of relations between Kyiv and Moscow in 2014, Russia has considered Ukraine an unreliable transit route, and numerous legal and political conflicts between the two have complicated their relationship.

For one, Gazprom has chosen to honor the $2.9 billion compensation verdict, but Naftogaz is still exposing itself by dropping litigation in the name of a new deal, as it has accepted the risk that Russia may choose not to abide by their new agreement in years ahead — something that could cost the Ukrainian company revenues down the road. (Naftogaz, nonetheless, will continue its efforts to recover over $5 billion from Russia it says it incurred when Moscow annexed Crimea in 2014.)

While the latest agreement may succeed in averting the disruption of natural gas flows to Europe, the devil in the details does portend a radical shift in the infrastructure that brings Russian gas to Europe.

As it is, Ukraine ceased to directly consume Russian natural gas in 2015 (it still depends on Russia for about 10 bcm a year, or a third of its consumption, through so-called reverse flows of Russian natural gas that Moscow sells to other European countries, which then sell it on to Ukraine) and intends to develop its own resources to the extent that it would no longer be import-dependent. While Ukraine is unable to do this for now — and has failed to meet several targets in developing such abilities — the country's long-term goals of self-sufficiency would make its transit infrastructure a viable political tool that Kyiv could use to disrupt Moscow's access to European markets without risking its own supply.

While the latest agreement may succeed in averting the disruption of natural gas flows to Europe, the devil in the details does portend a radical shift in the infrastructure that brings Russian gas to Europe. Despite U.S. attempts to sanction the construction of Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream, Russia will bring both of these pipeline projects online in 2020, allowing it to begin shipping natural gas to Europe through routes it considers more reliable. How quickly that happens will depend on Gazprom's delivery contracts with customers in Europe, as such contracts often specify the point of delivery. Whatever the case, the writing is on the wall for Ukraine's status as a major transit corridor between Russia and Europe, as cost and geopolitical risk are likely to drive Moscow to ship more natural gas to its European customers through alternate routes in the year to come. And that reality could have profound effects on their political problems; with the need to cooperate to ship natural gas to Europe diminishing, there will be one fewer factor inhibiting their geopolitical quarrel
Title: Ukraine Pogrom?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 12, 2020, 06:27:50 PM
Not familiar with this site:

http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/274433
Title: GPF: Ukraine clashes
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 18, 2020, 01:10:06 PM


Clashes in Ukraine. Ukraine’s military and the armed forces of the self-proclaimed Luhansk People’s Republic accused each other of shelling in Donbass and of using heavy weapons, which are prohibited under the Minsk agreements. Kyiv said armed groups attacked its military using 120mm caliber mortars, machine guns and grenade launchers near the settlements of Novotoshkovskoye, Orekhovo, Krimskoye and Khutor Volny on the demarcation line in Donbass. One Ukrainian soldier and one LPR fighter died. Kyiv also said armed groups tried to break through the demarcation line. Meanwhile, the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics said Ukrainian security forces attacked settlements using heavy weapons (large-caliber artillery and mortars) and caused damage to civilian infrastructure in Kirovsk and Donetsk. Moscow has not commented on the clashes.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called the attacks a “cynical provocation” and “an attempt to disrupt the peace process in the Donbass.” Zelensky convened a meeting of the National Security and Defense Council to discuss Ukraine’s next steps. It’s clear that neither Ukraine nor Russia is interested in a full-fledged war. But Zelensky is likely considering future negotiations with the Normandy Four leaders over not just Donbass but Crimea as well. He is planning to create a working group focused on returning to Kyiv control over the Ukraine-Russia border.
Title: Stratfor: Crimea's future grows dimmer
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 28, 2020, 03:30:21 PM
Stratfor Worldview
ASSESSMENTS
Under Russia, Crimea’s Future Grows Dimmer -- and Drier
9 MINS READ
Feb 24, 2020 | 09:00 GMT
This photo shows a dry irrigation canal in Crimea.
An irrigation canal in Crimea runs dry without access to the North Crimean Canal. Russia’s annexation in 2014 has since severed the peninsula’s access to crucial Ukrainian water flows.

(A_Lesik/Shutterstock)
HIGHLIGHTS
Without access to Ukranian water, replenishing Crimea's near-dry resources will force Russia to either front costly infrastructure projects -- or abandon its economic hopes for the region....

Water scarcity is quickly dimming Russia's hopes for economic growth on the Crimean Peninsula. Reservoirs throughout the region are at record lows for this time of year, with only a few months of reserves left to cover the Crimean population's daily consumption. But while an unusually dry winter is partially to blame, Russia's annexation has been at the core of Crimean water woes by prompting Ukraine to close off the North Crimean Canal in 2014.

Without external access to fresh water, permanent relief for the peninsula can only be obtained by either desalinating water from the Black Sea, or by building new pipelines to feed water from Russia's Kuban River directly into Crimea. But unless Moscow coughs up the capital needed to fund such costly infrastructure projects, Crimea risks becoming a mostly barren military bastion as its industries, agricultural lands and population shrivel up alongside its water reserves.

The Big Picture

Crimea lacks the natural water reserves to meet the needs of its population while also serving its agricultural and industrial sectors. For decades, water supplies from Ukraine helped keep Crimea afloat. But ever since Russia’s annexation in 2014 severed this key artery, Crimea has struggled to meet water demands to sustain its economic activity.

Crimea's Water Woes

Crimea’s inherent vulnerability to water shortages has always been a part of its geopolitical reality, with recurrent dry spells limiting local water accumulation every five to seven years. The dry seasons from 2018 until now, however, effectively constitute the first of these cyclical droughts since Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea, which has denied access to the Ukranian water reserves that have historically carried the peninsula through the droughts. In the 1960s, the Soviet Union built the North Crimean Canal connecting the Dnieper River in Ukraine to Crimean reservoirs and irrigation installations. For decades, the more than 400-kilometer-long (roughly 250 miles) canal provided up to 85 percent of the peninsula’s water needs. But as part of its standoff with Russia in 2014, Ukraine blocked the canal to complicate Moscow's control over the region. And the canal has remained closed, cutting Crimea off from its key water lifeline.

This, along with the effects of climate change and prolonged droughts, has exacerbated Crimea's water woes in recent years. Shortages have started to affect its population centers, reducing their ability to sustain normal consumption patterns. Without access to North Crimean Canal water, the Crimean capital, Simferopol, depends entirely on rainfall and snowmelt to replenish its three main reservoirs. But having endured dry years in 2018 and 2019, and without snowfall this winter, these reservoirs have continued to decline. Currently, they hold the equivalent of no more than five months' worth of daily consumption.


These low levels recently prompted Simferopol to announce it was restricting water flow to only eight hours per day. While a limited refill of the reservoirs has since temporarily delayed those restrictions, the levels of the reservoirs continue to remain low. And depending on weather conditions, they'll eventually drop even lower as summer approaches. Unless consumption is restricted at some point, or the reservoirs are refilled by other means, serious water shortages in Simferopol are all but guaranteed in the latter half of this year.

Water scarcity, however, is not limited to urban Simferopol. Across the peninsula, a large number of reservoirs capable of holding 188 million cubic meters of water (about 500 million gallons)  are now down to just 75 million cubic meters. This is at a time when melting snow typically brings the reservoirs to near full capacity. The rivers feeding these reservoirs — such as the Alma River that runs into the Partizansky reservoir at Simferopol — are now nearly dried up. A repeat of this phenomenon across the peninsula has caused a significant decline in vegetation as well. The southernmost area of the peninsula, an epicenter of Crimea’s tourism sector and the home to the city of Yalta, has been somewhat spared from these effects. But it's apparent that if the current situation holds, the overall water supply in the country has become unsustainable in the long term.

Underwater Investments

These water shortages have thrown a significant wrench into Russia's broader plans to boost economic development in Crimea, currently one of the poorest areas under its territorial control. Moscow set aside $13.3 billion to invest in road, rail and tourism infrastructure in the peninsula between 2015 and 2022, making it Russia's fastest-growing economic region in 2019. Throughout the region, construction and manufacturing levels have grown by 20 percent. And in some areas, such as the major port city of Sevastopol, those levels have spiked by 71 percent. Crimea's diminishing water supplies, however, are now weighing heavily on the potential for Russia to see a return on its infrastructure investments in the peninsula, given that water is an essential resource in many industrial activities — particularly in construction and chemical production.

Perhaps no sector that relies more on the water than agriculture, posing a significant challenge to Russia's desire to increase the output of Crimean farmers. Moscow has been especially keen on leveraging its forceful acquisition of the region to boost its own agricultural potential. Even though Crimea makes up less than a fifth of a percent of Russia’s entire surface area, it accounts for over 2 percent of its total grain exports. In recent years, Moscow has sought to expand this production via investments to increase the efficiency of the region's agricultural sector. But drought conditions have caused Crimea's grain production levels to fall significantly short of Moscow’s ambitions for growth.

Crimea churned out 1.7 million tons of grain in 2017, near-record production. But a dry spell reduced production to just 1 million tons in 2018. Local officials managed to bring production back in line with annual averages at 1.4 million tons in 2019, although as water use increases and soil quality declines, the low production levels of 2018 risk soon becoming the new normal. And indeed, Crimea's near-empty reservoirs at this point already suggest another meager harvest for 2020. In addition to insufficient precipitation, the overuse of groundwater resources is also threatening the quality of Crimean soil. To mediate the current water scarcity, Russia has so far relied on withdrawing from Crimea's underground aquifers. But overtaxing these aquifers has progressively deteriorated their mineral composition, increasing soil salinity. This unsustainable practice thus adds to the effects of water shortages by damaging the fertility of agricultural land in Crimea.

No Quick Fix in Sight

Without significant relief in water access, Crimea's agricultural production (and overall economic activity) will only become harder to sustain. But Russia will be hard-pressed to easily or cheaply remedy this reality. In addition to overusing the peninsula's underground aquifers, Moscow has developed several, localized pipeline networks to transport water within Crimea. Such networks, however, offer only a reprieve and won't provide a sustainable fix without access to external water sources. Indeed, scientific studies have shown that even with extensive infrastructure developments allowing optimal use of runoff and groundwater, the peninsula's water supply would still not be enough to sustain both Crimea's agricultural lands and its population's consumption needs.

Unless Russia coughs up the capital needed to fund costly infrastructure projects, Crimea's economic prospects risk shriveling up alongside its water reserves.

Reopening the North Crimean Canal would, of course, be the most immediate fix in rectifying the region's water access. But Ukraine has made it clear that it will not consider such an option unless Russia ends its occupation of the peninsula. Moscow has even offered to pay for water supplies, but for Kyiv, any economic interaction with a Russian-occupied Crimea is unacceptable, as it would imply a de-facto recognition of Russian sovereignty over the region. Moscow, however, will be just as unwilling to relinquish control over its newly attained military foothold on the Black Sea.

This leaves Russia with more radical — and costly — options to resolve Crimea's water issues: finding alternative access to external water sources, or desalinating seawater. While Moscow has been experimenting with limited desalination of seawater, making this a fully sustainable solution would require drawing in large amounts of water from the Black Sea, along with overall improvements to efficiencies in Crimea’s water distribution infrastructure including extensive wastewater treatment. Moscow has also considered building a pipeline to transport fresh water from Russia's Kuban River across the Kerch Strait into Crimea’s reservoirs, though this too would entail extensive (and expensive) infrastructure investments.

Hung Out to Dry?

While such major development projects to sustain the peninsula's economic potential are not impossible, it will come at a significant cost for Moscow. The question then becomes just how high Crimea ranks among Russia's already constrained economic priorities — and how that financial opportunity stacks up to Moscow's more immediate military priorities in the region. Even without any efforts to mediate the longer-term water emergency in Crimea, Russia would still be able to comfortably sustain its military presence in the peninsula. The water requirements for such an effort would not be nearly as extensive as broader economic development of the peninsula. With Crimea's tourist sector geographically concentrated in the country's southern region, it could more easily persist with current water access or only limited desalination in place.

Even if Crimea can’t be an agriculturally or industrially significant contributor within the Russian Federation, Moscow will still prioritize the region's sustainable military utility over any calls to relinquish control. For these reasons, Russia is unlikely to consider water scarcity in Crimea as an existential threat to its control over the peninsula. It's thus not guaranteed that Moscow will shell out the capital needed to permanently fix the problem. In such a case, Crimea’s agricultural sector may slowly peter out and its industrial potential never reached, as Moscow retains its hold on the geopolitically advantageous region. With no solution in sight, the region's population, meanwhile, would likely start to relocate in the hopes of finding better economic opportunities and more sustainable living conditions elsewhere in Russia.
Title: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 03, 2020, 05:39:00 AM
https://www.judicialwatch.org/corruption-chronicles/u-s-soros-funded-ukrainian-hiv-charity-under-criminal-probe-for-embezzlement/?utm_source=deployer&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=tipsheet&utm_term=members&utm_content=20200303051703
Title: Stratfor: Kyiv's push to end Eastern Ukraine's conflict risks prolonging it
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 04, 2020, 09:02:56 PM
Stratfor Worldview


Kyiv's Push to End Eastern Ukraine's Conflict Risks Prolonging It

Global Analyst , Stratfor
7 MINS READ
Mar 4, 2020 | 19:21 GMT
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy speaks following an outbreak of violence with pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine on Feb. 18, 2020. Ruslan Khomchak, the commander of Ukraine's armed forces, stands behind Zelenskiy.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy speaks following an outbreak of violence in eastern Ukraine on Feb. 18, 2020. Because of severe challenges in implementing the Minsk protocols, the Ukrainian government is planning to propose an alternative framework to end the ongoing conflict with Russian-backed separatists.

HIGHLIGHTS

The continued lack of progress toward achieving permanent peace in eastern Ukraine has prompted Kyiv to officially pursue a replacement to the Minsk protocols.

Ukraine, however, lacks the leverage to coerce Russia and the region's separatist republics into complying with its plans to negotiate an entirely new diplomatic roadmap.

Kyiv's strategy could instead leave the opposing parties in Donbas without any mutually agreed-upon framework, which would increase the possibility of military escalation in the region.

With no end in sight to the conflict in eastern Ukraine, Kyiv's desire to forge a new path to peace risks setting it back to square one. In late February, Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it was actively working on a proposal to replace the 2014 Minsk Protocol. But while the chances of permanently ending the conflict under the current Minsk agreements remain slim at best, the chances that Ukraine can successfully negotiate an entirely new framework with Russia-backed separatists in Donbas are even slimmer. Instead, Kyiv's strategy is most likely to collapse existing diplomatic efforts — and could potentially even lead to an escalation in fighting along the region's still-active front lines — by highlighting the very constraints that have prevented progress over the past six years.

The Big Picture

Since the initial Minsk Protocol was signed in September 2014, little progress has been made toward settling the ongoing conflict in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Growing frustration with the deadlock could see Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy abandon or unravel his government's initial efforts to find common ground with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Out of Options

Kyiv's push for an alternative to the Minsk agreement indicates its intent to abandon the existing framework due to its failure to achieve permanent peace in eastern Ukraine. Convinced that certain aspects of the Minsk Protocol are impossible to implement as-is, the Ukrainian government has concluded its potential to secure peace in eastern Ukraine has now been exhausted. Kyiv's primary hangups with the current agreement include the organization of elections in Donbas, the special political status of the breakaway territories, and returning Ukraine's border with Russia back to Minsk's control. Ukraine has also argued that the timeline of these events, which currently requires the implementation of the special political status within Ukrainian law and the organization of elections before Ukraine can reassume control over its border, is particularly troubling. Ukraine's current government under President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has even said that it would have never agreed to an agreement under these terms in the first place.

This push, however, risks jeopardizing the Ukrainian government's apparent progress in normalizing ties with Russia over the past year. After Zelenskiy's election in May 2019, he appeared on track toward reaching a permanent resolution with Moscow to the conflict in eastern Ukraine. By initially tackling the easier aspects of implementing the agreement, through prisoner exchanges and tactical withdrawals from the front line in eastern Ukraine, this perception was drawn out even though greater challenges still continued to cast a shadow over the potential for full implementation.

A map explaining the requirements to implement the Minsk agreements.

These efforts culminated in a Normandy Format summit in Paris in December, where the heads of state of Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France — the guarantors of the Minsk agreement — met to negotiate the further implementation of the deal. But despite the optimism around the summit, it failed to provide any breakthroughs beyond the continuation of prisoner exchanges and tactical withdrawals. And since then, there's been little progress on even these elements, and Ukrainian voices calling for the abandonment of the Minsk agreement altogether have grown louder.

The Specter of War

Ukrainian officials have floated the idea of an entirely new Minsk agreement since the second iteration was signed in 2015, and its implementation was questioned. This, however, is the first time the government has officially committed to the "Plan B" concept, which brings with it a great degree of uncertainty. Despite the failure to fully implement the Minsk agreement, both the initial 2014 agreement and the 2015 final version (as well as the 2016 Steinmeier Formula) have so far effectively kept Kyiv and Moscow working within the diplomatic framework. An attempt at renegotiation risks unraveling the achievements to this point, primarily consisting of the delineation of the contact line in eastern Ukraine and efforts to impose a cease-fire. Without a valid diplomatic framework, the parties to the conflict could once again be seen reaching for military means to strengthen their position in negotiations.

If this were to be the case, neither side of the conflict would be in a position to overpower the other. Ukraine has not yet managed to rebuild its military strength following the loss of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, though it has worked steadily toward a potential NATO membership. Russia, on the other hand, continues to provide support to the Donetsk and Luhansk republics, which would allow these separatist forces to extend the conflict indefinitely. Kyiv likely wants to avoid such a return to military operations, as it would complicate its own efforts at economic stabilization, and could potentially even jeopardize its bid for NATO membership (which rules out enrolling new member states with active armed conflicts within their borders). But Ukraine's push to reshape the diplomatic process may very well lead there.

Russia Refuses a Redo

Russia has downright refused to entertain the idea of straying from the current Minsk agreement. In response to the Ukrainian request for a new Normandy summit, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov clearly stated that Russia saw no need for a future summit before decisions made during the previous meeting (implementing elements of the Minsk agreement) had taken place. Even if this were the case, Russia has argued a draft agreement preceding such a summit would have to rule out any attempts at undermining the Minsk agreement. The next steps in this implementation mostly relate to providing the breakaway republics in eastern Ukraine with a permanent political status under Ukrainian law. Kyiv is hesitant to move forward with this step, as it would effectively lock it into the existing diplomatic roadmap that grants Moscow leverage over Ukrainian politics and presents a roadblock to Kyiv's NATO membership. But for that very reason, Russia prefers sticking with the current Minsk framework over exploring a new one.

While the chances of implementing the Minsk protocols in eastern Ukraine remain slim at best, the chances of Kyiv negotiating an entirely new peace deal with Russia are even slimmer.

Currently, this leaves Russia and Ukraine going head-to-head over the future direction of the peace process with no clear outcome. But the one thing that appears certain is the inability for the implementation of the Minsk agreement to progress. Overall, Ukraine's ability to force Russia (and, by proxy, the two breakaway republics in eastern Ukraine) to comply with its demands is weak, which was recently made clear in the renegotiation of a key gas transit agreement between the two countries. And unlike Kyiv, Moscow would be perfectly capable of accepting a long-term extension of the current reality in eastern Ukraine, or even an escalation of the conflict.

Kyiv will likely also draw on France, Germany and the United States to exert pressure on Russia to comply with its plans for renegotiation, though the appetite for this will be low. Kyiv's allies (and particularly those in Europe) are not looking to take on additional economic risks by re-escalating tensions with Russia. In the longer term, Ukraine — with help of those Western allies — could hope to rebuild its military strength to force Russia and the region's separatists into accepting Kyiv's conditions. But without any shifts to Kyiv's political or physical leverage, the fighting in eastern Ukraine will likely continue at the hands of separatist forces seeking to force a return to the principles outlined within the Minsk agreement.
Title: Yovanavitch lied under oath
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 17, 2020, 09:57:49 AM
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/state-dept-emails-yovanovitch-met-with-burisma-despite-testifying
Title: Re: Yovanavitch lied under oath
Post by: DougMacG on May 17, 2020, 06:24:25 PM
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/state-dept-emails-yovanovitch-met-with-burisma-despite-testifying

Calculated lying under oath means she is hiding a larger, higher crime, something to do with Biden and Burisma and likely her own complicity?
Title: Ukraine, Those who gave up Crimea without a fight must be held responsible
Post by: DougMacG on October 25, 2020, 02:32:43 PM
This week in the Kyiv post:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky says those who allowed Russia to illegally annex Crimea in early 2014 must be held responsible.

https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/rfe-rl-zelensky-says-those-who-gave-up-crimea-without-a-fight-must-be-held-responsible.html

I wonder if he means Biden Obama...
Title: GPF: Signs of War in Ukraine?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 06, 2021, 07:12:30 AM
By: Geopolitical Futures
Signs of war? There are increasing signs of a possible outbreak of fighting in eastern Ukraine. In an interview with a Russian broadcaster, the head of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic said a military conflict in Donbass was nearly unavoidable at this point. He said he anticipated a full-scale offensive launched by the Ukrainian army in the near future as Kyiv redeploys military equipment to the east. Military cargo is also being transported by plane from NATO’s Ramstein Air Base to Kyiv, though this may be connected to NATO’s Defender Europe 2021 drills. Meanwhile, the European Union’s chief diplomat, Josep Borrell, said he was following developments in the region closely, amid concerns about a Russian military buildup across the border.
Title: GPF: Ukraine: Black Sea deployments
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 09, 2021, 01:45:18 PM
Black Sea deployments. Amid rising concerns about a military buildup along the Ukrainian-Russian border, regional powers are deploying assets to the Black Sea. On Thursday, Ukraine carried out unexpected naval drills that limited traffic at Ukraine’s largest ports in the Black Sea. Meanwhile, Turkey said it received official notification that two U.S. warships would enter the Black Sea through the Bosporus next week and stay until May 4. Russia is also deploying ships from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 10, 2021, 06:32:49 PM
https://www.patreon.com/posts/49857165
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 12, 2021, 08:41:59 PM
Whatcha gonna do President Magoo?  Co-President Kommiela?
Putin and ‘Consequences’
Putin masses troops near Ukraine in an early test for Biden and the G-7 allies.
By The Editorial Board
April 12, 2021 6:35 pm ET

Most Americans haven’t noticed, but the world is becoming a more dangerous place by the day. The hottest current spot is Russia’s border with Ukraine and the Black Sea, where the Kremlin has amassed more forces than any time since its invasion of the Donbass region when Joe Biden was Vice President.

Vladimir Putin’s ambitions aren’t clear, though some think he wants to control the entire Black Sea coast, further squeezing Ukraine. An invasion to grab more Ukrainian territory is also possible. The U.S. Navy has dispatched two ships to the region.

On Monday the U.S. also joined the other G-7 foreign ministers asking Mr. Putin to cease and desist: “These large-scale troop movements, without prior notification, represent threatening and destabilizing activities. We call on Russia to cease its provocations and to immediately de-escalate tensions in line with its international obligations.”

Mr. Putin has never been one for “international obligations,” so don’t expect the G-7 to scare him—even when the foreign ministers also demand, as they did, that he follow “the procedure established under Chapter III of the Vienna Document.” International law: Such a lovely fiction.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken was somewhat more forceful Sunday on NBC’s “Meet the Press”: “So the question is: Is Russia going to continue to act aggressively and recklessly? If it does, the President has been clear there’ll be costs, there’ll be consequences.”

This sounds like a line in sand, and we’ll see how seriously Mr. Putin takes it. He might assume that a G-7 that can’t even agree to stop the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia to Germany might merely huff and puff and do nothing. China and Iran will also be watching to see how Mr. Biden, now in the Oval Office, defines “consequences” if Mr. Putin calls the G-7’s bluff.
Title: Fortunately the US Navy won't be in the way
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 16, 2021, 04:45:16 PM
Non-commercial vessels will be blocked from crossing the waterway, according to Kyiv.
By: Geopolitical Futures

Russia's blockade. Russia is planning to block access to the waters around the Kerch Strait, which connects the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov, for non-commercial ships, according to Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry. The closure will begin next week and last until October, while the Russian military carries out drills in the area. On Thursday, Ukraine also accused boats from Russia’s Federal Security Service of harassing Ukrainian naval vessels in the Sea of Azov. Meanwhile, the leaders of France and Germany held talks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy on Friday over the recent rise in tensions between Moscow and Kyiv.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on April 16, 2021, 05:21:57 PM
Secretary of State Antony Blinken was somewhat more forceful Sunday on NBC’s “Meet the Press”: “So the question is: Is Russia going to continue to act aggressively and recklessly? If it does, the President has been clear there’ll be costs, there’ll be consequences.”

This the same Blinken that was just publicly bitch slapped by the Chinese?
Title: Russian passports in Donbass
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 23, 2021, 07:15:38 AM
https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=ffe4febfc27d45ceb74c06c499fd9138_60d33248_6d25b5f&selDate=20210623
Title: The feckless stupidity of President Magoo continues
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 28, 2021, 05:42:39 PM
https://www.breitbart.com/asia/2021/06/28/ukraine-pulls-out-anti-china-un-statement-after-report-biden-freezing-aid/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 21, 2021, 12:05:52 AM
Why Putin Still Covets Ukraine
A 5,000-word essay by the strongman explains his thinking. It pays to listen.

By Walter Russell Mead
July 19, 2021 6:30 pm ET



Writing long, historically focused opinion pieces is an activity more characteristic of think tankers than heads of state, but Russian President Vladimir Putin is anything but conventional. Last week he published a 5,000-plus-word article that reviews the last millennium to conclude that Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians share a common history, faith and destiny.

In Mr. Putin’s view, Western powers have tried for centuries to separate them, but those efforts are doomed to fail. He argues that “the anti-Russia project has been rejected by millions of Ukrainians” in Crimea, the Donbas and elsewhere. The Russian president believes that after centuries of common development and trade, the Ukrainian economy simply cannot flourish without close integration with Russia. Without his country, Ukraine will flounder, despite the occasional aid it receives from its Western paymasters, Mr. Putin writes. Even before the pandemic, Ukraine’s gross domestic product per capita was below $4,000. “This is less than in the Republic of Albania, the Republic of Moldova, or unrecognized Kosovo.” (Moscow doesn’t recognize Kosovo’s independence from Serbia.) “Nowadays,” Mr. Putin writes, “Ukraine is Europe’s poorest country.”

Some observers dismissed the essay as an empty propaganda ploy aimed at distracting Russian public opinion in the face of a surging pandemic. Others saw it as an announcement that Russia will escalate its support for the pro-Moscow forces in the smoldering conflict in eastern Ukraine. Since deception and surprise are fundamental tools of Mr. Putin’s statecraft, anything is possible, but Western powers would be well advised to take the essay seriously. The Russian president’s policies will always and inevitably reflect his calculations about the opportunities and risks he faces at any given moment, but his strategic objectives are unmistakable. Mr. Putin’s quest to rebuild Russian power requires the reassertion of Moscow’s hegemony over Belarus and Ukraine.


In Belarus, where the Kremlin enabled the embattled government to survive months of pro-democracy protests and Western sanctions, Mr. Putin has crushed any hopes President Lukashenko had of escaping Moscow’s embrace. Ukraine is a tougher nut to crack. But the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is moving inexorably toward completion, weakening Ukraine’s influence over European policy making. Infighting and disorganization also continue to prevent the European Union from becoming a significant geopolitical actor. Amid all this, Mr. Putin has served notice that he will patiently but relentlessly pursue his strategic goals at Kyiv’s expense.


The best way to think of Russia these days is as being constrained but not contained. That is, the West has failed abysmally to develop a coherent policy to stop the Kremlin’s attacks on its neighbors or its opposition to the EU and the American-based world order. Sanctions don’t deter Mr. Putin; the West is hopelessly disunited on Russia policy, and the resulting incoherent policies offer Moscow opportunities from the Middle East to Myanmar to advance its foreign-policy agenda and bolster its commercial interests. Under these circumstances Russia will continue to test the West, and Mr. Putin will look to victories abroad to bolster his standing at home.

Yet the Kremlin operates within limits. Even as the recent surge in oil and gas prices pumps more money into Moscow’s coffers, Russia’s failure to develop a dynamic 21st-century economy prevents Mr. Putin from exploiting the tempting opportunities he sees on every side. Worse, the Russian president has been unable to replace the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with a political organization strong enough to give him the sort of control in Russia that the Chinese Communist Party affords Xi Jinping. His frustration must be enormous; as a foreign-policy strategist Mr. Putin, not without justification, likely feels a giant among dwarfs, but Ukraine is still out of his reach. Without it, not even his string of high-profile foreign policy wins since 2008 can make Russia great again.

What keeps Russian troops out of Kyiv is neither the Ukrainian army nor the faltering prestige of the West. It is Mr. Putin’s grudging realization that Russian public opinion wouldn’t countenance the accompanying sacrifices and the staggering Russian economy couldn’t bear the costs. Since an Anschluss-style solution is, for now, beyond him, the Russian president must cajole where he seeks to command. In this spirit, Mr. Putin’s essay suggests that if Ukraine adopts a friendly attitude toward Moscow and de-aligns from the West, Russia will welcome the prodigal home without demanding a formal reunion.

Mr. Putin can reasonably hope that time is on Russia’s side. Ukraine shows few real signs of overcoming the corruption and stagnation that keep it weak and poor. The EU continues to dither, the Western world order continues to erode, and Washington’s intensifying rivalry with Beijing both distracts U.S. attention and weakens its hand when it comes to Russia policy. If these trends persist, many things about our world will change, and the political balance between pro- and anti-Russian forces in Ukraine might be one of them.
Title: Stratfor: US-Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 03, 2021, 01:25:51 AM
The Obstacles to the U.S. and Ukraine’s Strategic Partnership
7 MIN READSep 2, 2021 | 21:42 GMT





U.S. President Joe Biden (right) meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office of the White House on Sept. 1, 2021.
U.S. President Joe Biden (right) meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office of the White House on Sept. 1, 2021.

(BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/AFP via Getty Images)

Despite new support measures and statements that the strategic partnership between the United States and Ukraine has never been stronger, a clash of short- and long-term interests will significantly challenge the future of the bilateral relationship, first becoming apparent in the Donbas conflict. On Sept. 1, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with his U.S. counterpart Joe Biden at the White House, making Zelensky only the second European leader to do so following German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s farewell visit in July. Immediately prior to Zelensky’s meeting with Biden, the United States announced measures and initiatives aimed at supporting Ukraine’s security, Euro-Atlantic aspirations and reform agenda. 

The Biden administration announced the reinvigoration of the Strategic Partnership Commission (SPC) to codify the newly elevated status of U.S.-Ukraine cooperation. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Ukraine’s foreign minister intend to approve a new charter at the SPC’s meeting in Washington this fall.
In support of Ukraine’s domestic reform efforts, the U.S. government plans to allocate over $463 million in assistance this year, including for programs focused on democracy, human rights, local governance and decentralization, privatization and judicial reform.

The United States also authorized a new $60 million security assistance package for Ukraine, including critical Javelin anti-tank systems and other defensive lethal capabilities.

Ukraine and the United States agreed to finalize a memorandum of understanding on commercial cooperation authorizing the U.S. Export-Import Bank to provide initial support of $3 billion for projects in agribusiness, infrastructure, climate and energy.

In addition, the U.S. government agreed to provide an additional $45 million in humanitarian assistance to Ukrainians affected by the Donbas conflict in need of life-saving assistance such as food, shelter and safe drinking water.

The United States wants to ensure Ukraine’s long-term stability and ties to the West through major reforms and fighting corruption, including within Zelensky’s inner circle. The newly established dialogue channels and support measures will enable the United States to more effectively pressure the Ukrainian government via selective engagement. In doing so, the White House will likely make it clear that the additional political or material support is conditioned on the Zelensky administration’s willingness to follow through on reforms, which it has so far largely failed to do.

The sluggish pace of Ukraine’s economic reforms and lack of sufficient judicial and anti-corruption reforms have resulted in ongoing delays in the disbursement of tranches from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as part of the country’s Stand-By Agreement with the international financial institution. The ongoing limbo regarding IMF support is detrimental to Ukraine’s development prospects. 

The United States wants to see the Ukrainian government move forward with legislation to reform the country’s entire judicial sector in line with international best practices. Washington also wants Ukraine to establish an independent anti-corruption infrastructure to implement several initiatives, including those aimed at safeguarding the authority of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and selecting a new Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor.

As part of the U.S. push against corruption, the Biden administration on March 5 sanctioned the Ukrainian oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky, Zelensky’s long-time business partner who bankrolled his successful presidential bid in 2019. Observers widely understood the U.S. sanctions as an indication that Kolomoisky should be investigated by Ukrainian law enforcement. Ukrainian officials, however, still have yet to move against Kolomoisky, which the Biden administration sees as a sign that Zelesnky is not serious about fighting corruption or the influence of oligarchs and powerful business clans in his country.

Amid the immediate threats posed by Russian aggression and the economic fallout from COVID-19, Zelensky will continue embracing reforms rhetorically while avoiding or delaying some key reforms he believes could undermine Ukraine’s stability in the short term and/or be politically damaging to him. Ukraine’s near-term security concern remains the frozen Donbas conflict along the country’s eastern border with Russia. A flare-up in Donbas would not only be politically unpopular but could provoke the remote possibility of another Russian military intervention. Mitigating this risk thus remains one of Ukraine’s primary priorities, given that ensuring the country’s long-term security with NATO membership is still many years away. Zelensky also fears that heeding U.S. calls for more reforms and anti-graft initiatives could further disrupt Ukraine’s already pandemic-rattled economy, where corruption is rampant — threatening his prospects for re-election in the spring of 2024.

Corruption is endemic to many parts of the Ukrainian society and economy, including government institutions like the police, judiciary and customs service, as well as the country’s still largely state-owned energy and utility sector.

Zelensky has for several months been forced to temper expectations that the United States would provide Ukraine with rapid or unconditional assistance. Now that substantial U.S. assistance has come in via the initiatives announced on Sept. 1, Zelensky will find himself increasingly boxed in, facing domestic pressure from both pro- and anti-reform factions while international partners reiterate that they will only help Ukraine as much as Ukraine is willing to help itself.

Zelensky is concerned that a fight against corruption could lead to higher prices or endanger the country’s growth due to short-term capital flight. Zelesnky has likely not taken action against Kolomoisky specifically due to these same concerns, as well as the threat that deputies within Zelensky’s own Servant of the People party loyal to Kolomoisky could oppose key reforms — increasing domestic strife that Russia would be keen to amplify and exploit. Deputies loyal to Kolomoisky within Zelensky’s party have already quietly worked with pro-Russian politicians under the leadership of Viktor Medvedchuk to block anti-corruption efforts.

Medvedchuk, whose pro-Russian TV channels Zelensky forced off-air in February, was indicted for treason in May.

The Donbas conflict is one of the first places where the United States and Ukraine’s clash of interests will arise, threatening their newly reaffirmed partnership. Ukraine is looking for the United States to play a larger role in the conflict to ensure its short-term stability against Russian aggression in case of an escalation. Zelensky’s administration has repeatedly spoken in favor of either involving the United States in the Normandy-format talks on the Donbas conflict, or establishing an alternative format with Washington’s participation. Indeed, Zelensky claimed that he personally asked Biden to do so during their recent meeting. But disagreement within the Biden administration means the United States will most likely continue to defer to France and Germany on the Donbas conflict. The conflict is thus likely to remain frozen in its current state, with neither Ukraine nor Russia prepared to follow through with the Minsk agreements.

France and Germany continue to push for the so-called Steinmeier Formula, an interpretation of the Minsk agreements that would grant the Donbas constitutionally-enshrined autonomy and the ability to hold local elections prior to Ukraine receiving control of its border with Russia. Proposed by Germany in 2016, the Steinmeier Formula sparked protests in Ukraine for being a capitulation and a dangerous trap unfavorable to Ukraine’s interests.

Zelensky’s administration believes the United States would stick up for the Ukrainian position against the Steinmeier Formula. Ukraine also hopes that Washington would perhaps even show a willingness to help negotiate a replacement to the Minsk 2 agreement more favorable to Kyiv, which France and Germany have resisted. But the United States has instead declined to confirm its support for this idea. The U.S.-Ukraine joint resolution released Sept. 1 also reaffirmed Washington’s full support for the Normandy Format, marking a subtle swipe at the possibility of greater U.S. involvement.

Reports indicate that there is significant disagreement within the Biden administration on the Donbas conflict. Some White House officials believe the United States should join the French and Germans in insisting on the Steinmeier Formula, arguing it would open the door for a de-escalation of the Donbas conflict and enable the United States and Europe to more effectively refocus on their true strategic priority in the coming years of rallying against China. Other members of the Biden administration, however, believe the United States should support Ukrainian efforts to scrap the Minsk agreement and start over, even if it risks escalating the conflict — arguing that the enactment of the Steinmeier Formula would be catastrophic for Ukraine.
Title: MY: Sec Def Austin is dumb
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 21, 2021, 04:20:06 PM
https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/1197828/ukraine-secdef-austin-is-just-dumb
Title: Re: MY: Sec Def Austin is dumb
Post by: G M on October 21, 2021, 04:58:46 PM
https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/1197828/ukraine-secdef-austin-is-just-dumb

Yon is correct.

Austin isn’t where he is because he is smart.
Title: GPF: Ukraine-Crimea-Russia-Turkey
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 03, 2021, 06:09:02 AM
   
The Geopolitics of Crimea
Russian control has never been uncontested.
By: Ridvan Bari Urcosta
Cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey is intensifying. Just a few days ago, the Ukrainian military used Turkish-made drones to strike fighters in Donbass, a disputed region in the eastern part of Ukraine that is supported by Russia. Meanwhile, Turkey and Ukraine announced they would create a facility near Kyiv to maintain, repair and modernize combat drones. Caught literally in the middle is the Crimean Peninsula.

Russia has long claimed Crimea as being in its sphere of influence, using the peninsula to increase its strategic depth, improve its position in the Black Sea and provide a strategic location for sophisticated military bases. In 2014, it dispensed with appearances and straight up annexed the region. Yet, despite Moscow’s influence there, history shows that maintaining permanent control is difficult because doing so brings it directly against Turkish interests.

Expanding to the Sea

To understand Russia’s options in Crimea, we need to examine the geopolitics of the peninsula. Extending off a thin isthmus from mainland Ukraine, Crimea sits in the middle of the Black Sea. It covers approximately 10,000 square miles (26,000 square kilometers) and is home to roughly 2.5 million people, many of whom recently migrated to the area from other parts of Russia. Its subtropical climate produces mild winters compared to the rest of Eastern Europe, its harbors secure against major storms, and its mountains have shielded it from invaders (and are now a great location of air defense installations).


(click to enlarge)

Over the years, Crimea’s natural defenses attracted just about every Eurasian and European power, which would leverage their positions to create favorable maritime security and commercial environments. The Greeks occupied the peninsula as early as the 7th century B.C., creating a hub for cultural and economic exchanges between Eastern Europe, the Eurasian nomadic world and the ancient Greco-Roman world. Centuries later, the eastern part of Crimea and the Kerch Peninsula would be home to a strong Greco-Scythian state known as the Bosporan Kingdom, which controlled one of the most important chokepoints in the region. Along with the southern portion of Crimea, this kingdom became part of the Roman Empire and, later, the Byzantium Empire. But only the Crimean south was controlled by the Roman Empire, and the geographic division of the region would influence power struggles there for centuries to come – between the Romans, the Byzantines, the Goths, the Huns, the Khazarians, the Vikings, and so on. Naturally, this dramatically affected the cultural and religious composition of the peninsula, though Catholics and Orthodox Christians would eventually emerge as the two most significant practitioners. (Islam would come a little later.)

By the 1400s, the Mongolian Empire had taken control of much of Eurasia. One of its constituent parts, the Crimean Khanate, ruled the lands from Moldova to the North Caucasus, Crimea and the entire modern Ukrainian coastline. Its rulers repeatedly laid siege to Moscow, even destroying it in 1571. Russia fought back, expanding to the south and southeast with mixed results. By the 18th century, the Russian Empire was eager as ever to destroy the khanate and gain access to the Sea of Azov and eventually to the Black Sea. The khanate, however, was the main source of the Ottomans’ military presence in Eastern and Central Europe. This laid the groundwork for the ensuing Russia-Turkey rivalry over the coming centuries.

As the Russian Empire grew more powerful, it came to understand more intimately the geostrategic importance of Crimea and its role as the main obstacle in its expansion into the Balkans, Caucasus and what we now call Ukraine. Similarly, the Ottomans came to realize their entire strategy in the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Balkans rested on Crimea. The last chance Turkey and its Crimean allies had to stop Russia’s advance came with the Swedish invasion of Russia. Russia defeated Sweden in the Battle of Poltava in 1709, so Crimea and Istanbul, worried that they would be the next targets of Russian expansionism, preemptively declared war on Russia in 1710. Crimean Khan Devlet II Giray constructed an alliance with Sweden, a small fraction of pro-Turkish Cossacks and the anti-Russian faction of Poles. They defeated Russia at the Battle of Pruth in 1711, and as punishment, the Ottoman Empire, already in control of the Kerch Strait, deprived Russia of access to the Sea of Azov.

Turkey and Russia went to war again over this area in 1768. This time, Crimea, the Ottoman Empire and Poland lost and were immediately absorbed into the Russian Empire. The Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca in 1774 gave Russia full access to the Black Sea and rights to Russian merchant fleet to pass through the Turkish Straits. Russia annexed Crimea in 1783. The gateways to the Caucasus and the Balkans were opened.


(click to enlarge)

What Russia Can’t Afford

But Russia’s domination of the Black Sea was never uncontested. By the middle of the 19th century, Russia had penetrated deeply into the Balkans and Caucasus, thanks to its possession of former Ottoman territories and the Crimean Khanate (now southern Ukraine). Moreover, the Russian navy became much stronger than Turkey’s in Sevastopol. European powers found this imbalance in power concerning, so they partnered with the Ottoman Empire to successfully defeat Russia in the Crimean War of 1853-56.

World War I gave the Ottoman Empire another opportunity to retake control of Crimea and Sevastopol from Russia. The peninsula was an important stop for the Germans who were invading Russian territory. Germany needed an ally, a state that could prevent Russia from dominating the Black Sea. The presence in the Black Sea could have allowed Germany to control Russian merchant ships because the main flow of Russian exports went through the straits. On the eve of World War I, more than 60 percent of Russian grain exports went through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. In other words, Germany needed Turkey. Russia declared war on Turkey, and Moscow ended up controlling Crimea after the Entente lost.

The peninsula was similarly important in World War II, situated as it was on the route to the oil-rich Caucasus. It was also a valuable aviation base. Losing Crimea would mean that the Soviet Union would lose the ability to raid the Romanian oil fields, and the Germans would have been able to strike at targets in the Caucasus. Russia thus bogged down German troops throughout the war and secured the land after its conclusion.

One of the most pivotal decisions on Crimea came in 1954, after Josef Stalin died, when new Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev transferred Crimea to Ukraine. But the region still retained importance to the Soviet regime. In the Soviet era, the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol was responsible for the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. Migration escalated the ethnic tensions, which were often based on a particular group’s attitude toward Russia’s role in Crimea. The future of Sevastopol became a highly contentious issue, too. (Pro-Russian officers threatened to use weapons if the Black Sea Fleet transferred to Ukraine.) Only in 1997 did Ukraine and Russia reach an agreement regarding Sevastopol. Kyiv made multiple concessions, the last of which occurred in 2010, when Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych extended the Russian presence till 2042. In 2014, after the Ukrainian revolution, Russia annexed Crimea and attained full control over the peninsula and Sevastopol. Unfettered control over Sevastopol allowed Russia to establish uninterrupted communication lanes between Russia and Syria during the active phase of the Syrian campaign. Moreover, the Black Sea became the main base of the 5th Operational Squadron, which is operating in the Mediterranean near Syrian shores.

Crimea’s geostrategic position gives Moscow both defensive and offensive advantages. Defensively, it would be next to impossible for an enemy to carry out an assault on Russia's southern borders without destroying its military assets in Crimea. It has one of the strongest concentrations of military forces in Eurasia along with Kaliningrad. Both regions are key to Russia's defenses in the west, one in the south and the other in the north.

Russian Military Presence in Crimea, 2014 & 2018
(click to enlarge)

Offensively, Crimea is an important source of power projection in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. Possession of Crimea and Abkhazia gave Russia the biggest share of the Black Sea coastline of any power in the region. Before this, its coastline was more or less equal to that of Georgia or Romania. More, the fleet in Sevastopol is the main source of Russian defense against NATO warships. In case of military conflict with Ukraine and NATO, Russia could initiate offensive operations using its Crimean assets along the more than 500-kilometer Ukrainian shore on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov to cut western supply lines to Odessa or even to Romania. It could also block NATO warships at the entrance to the Black Sea (i.e., the Bosporus Strait) using Russian warships and air defense systems stationed in Crimea. Moscow could also impose a blockade of Ukraine and even penetrate into its southern regions and support military formations in the Moldovan breakaway region of Trans-Dniester.

For Russia, another benefit of controlling Crimea is that, with a population of more than 2 million ethnic Slavs, the peninsula helped improve Russia's demographic situation. Its annexation ensured that the population balance in the country, especially relating to non-Slavic groups in the North Caucasus, stayed in Moscow's favor.

Nearly eight years since Crimea's annexation, there is still a possibility of further escalation of conflict. Turkey supports the Crimean Tatars on the peninsula, with whom it shares ethnic and religious ties. It also provides military and economic support to Kyiv, acting as a counterweight to Russia. For Ankara, the entire northern Black Sea region with Crimea at the center is key to its security. If Russia were to occupy Odessa, it would amount to a return to the 18th century when Turkey lost key parts of its foothold in the region and a path was opened for Russian expansion into the Caucasus and the Balkans.

Russian influence in Crimea has strengthened, but Russia continues to fight for Crimea in other ways. Crimea remains unrecognized by many states of the world, which creates additional pressure on the introduction of Russia's foreign trade. Social and economic issues, such as water supply and the development of the region in general, require immediate solutions, large financial investments and effective projects – none of which Russia can really afford right now. But it can’t afford to ignore Crimea either.
Title: GPF: Russians planning invasion of Ukraine?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 17, 2021, 02:50:07 AM
November 17, 2021
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Is Russia Planning Another Assault in Ukraine?
Many are warning of a potential escalation, but the reality is much different.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova

The war in eastern Ukraine began more than seven years ago. The conflict has grown more complicated each year as rumors swirl that both Moscow and Kyiv plan to move on the embattled region of Donbass. Both sides are increasing their military presence at the border, training exercises are becoming more frequent, and new surveillance technologies are being employed. Just this week, This week, there are once again warnings that Russia may be planning a military operation this winter as it reportedly masses military forces on its western border.

On the surface, these moves seem to support speculation of renewed fighting. But escalating the frozen conflict into a hot war would be risky for both sides considering it could significantly change the balance of power in the region and complicate Russia’s relationship with the West even further. Russia would thus use other means to achieve its goals there, especially now that other key players in the region are distracted by more pressing issues.

Destabilizing Ukraine

Ukraine is a critical part of Russia’s western buffer zone, which separates the Russian border from NATO forces. Moscow therefore has an interest in keeping Ukraine weak and destabilized so that it can more easily expand its own influence there while curbing the West’s. It can achieve this in several ways. One is that it can destabilize Ukraine by launching a surprise attack in the east using Russian-backed rebels. Considering that the balance of forces and capabilities here favor Russia, Ukraine would likely lose more land to the separatists, weakening the position of the government in Kyiv.

Conflict in Eastern Ukraine
(click to enlarge)

Another way is that Russia can destabilize Ukraine through economic means. Kyiv depends on revenue it generates as a transit zone for Russian energy exports destined for other parts of Europe. Earlier this year, Ukraine said it expected to generate $7 billion to $15 billion (depending on the volume of deliveries) over the next five years through energy transit fees. But if Russia were to reroute these deliveries through territory outside of Ukraine, it would strain Ukraine’s budget, which is already weighed down by debt and a pandemic-induced economic slowdown. For this reason, Kyiv views the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which will circumvent Ukraine as it transports Russian natural gas to European markets, as a threat. The lack of reliable gas and coal supplies for Ukraine from Russia is another vulnerability. All this could then lead to social discontent, which could result in rising pro-Russian sentiments in the country. Believing that closer ties with Europe has brought few financial benefits and endangered their access to affordable fuel, Ukrainians may end up siding with Moscow, especially as the cold winter season approaches.

A third way Russia could destabilize Ukraine is by undermining its politics. Indeed, Ukrainian politics are already on shaky ground. According to a recent poll, only 33 percent of Ukrainians are satisfied with the job Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is doing. Zelensky is also in the middle of a battle against Ukraine’s oligarchs that could threaten his political position. Earlier this month, he signed a bill into law that is meant to limit their political and economic influence in the country. It restricts oligarchs’ contributions to political parties and prohibits them from participating in the privatization of certain assets. It’s believed that the law will impact the operations of the richest man in Ukraine, businessman Rinat Akhmetov, who owns three coal mining enterprises in Russia’s Rostov region.

Thus, Western fears of a Russian assault are not unfounded. With the president’s approval ratings falling, energy prices soaring and average Ukrainians wondering if they’ll be able to heat their homes this winter, Moscow may view this as a perfect opportunity to strengthen its position in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the European Union is focused on the migrant crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border, and the United States is distracted with myriad other issues, both domestic and international.

Talk of a Winter Assault

But Russia understands its capabilities, limits and goals better than anyone, and those goals do not include a chaotic destabilization of Ukraine. Moscow prefers a controlled destabilization that leads to implementation of the Minsk agreements, the 2015 deal intended to resolve the conflict in the east. The Kremlin believes it can get what it wants – for Ukraine’s eastern separatist republics to function as a pro-Russian, independent buffer zone between pro-Western Kyiv and Russia – with only the threat of greater destabilization and even war.

Direct military action is probably not even on the Kremlin’s radar. It would be very risky and would endanger the Minsk agreements. From Moscow’s perspective, it’s Kyiv that is behaving provocatively, using Turkish-made Bayraktar drones in the east and talking up Russian troop deployments in Crimea, a key base of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. A Russian attack would invite new sanctions, would damage economic recovery efforts, and would anger many Russians, some of whom have familial ties with Ukraine and most of whom want the Kremlin to focus on the post-COVID-19 recovery. Moreover, Russia and the U.S. have reached something of an understanding: The U.S. won’t deploy weapons in Ukraine or Georgia that could threaten Russia, and Russia will not move deeper into those countries’ territory. Moscow does not want to risk the status quo.

Even its destabilization efforts demand caution; Russia has no interest in seeing another Euromaidan situation next door, so it is proceeding cautiously. Russian energy giant Gazprom is in no hurry to book more pipeline capacity to Europe via Ukraine, and recently Russia banned the supply of thermal coal to Ukraine. As temperatures fall, this could create panic among Ukrainians who don't want to left without heat during the long winter. Russia provides about 60 percent of Ukraine’s imports of coal and about 20 percent of its gas. But in all likelihood this is for show: During all the years of the frozen conflict, Russia remained Ukraine’s main supplier of coal. Supplies were redirected through Belarus and other countries.

Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin responded to Ukraine’s use of Bayraktar drones in the east by flaunting the economic opportunities Russia can offer the Luhansk and Donetsk republics. Moscow fully opened its markets to the republics’ manufactured goods, which may help businesses in the Donbass region boost sales and create jobs. Putin also signed a decree on the provision of humanitarian support to the two republics. According to the document, Russia will take steps to reduce the barriers that Donbass businesses face selling goods to Russia – for example, giving them the same access as Russian firms to public procurement deals. Moscow also recognized certificates of origin issued by firms in the region and scrapped import quotas. In other words, the pro-Russian eastern territories get economic support and access to a large market, while the rest of the Ukrainian economy struggles to cope with COVID-19 restrictions.

Every spring or fall since the second Minsk agreement, Kyiv goes to the media and its allies at some point with warnings that Russia is preparing for the next war. The same happened last March. Usually it occurs before a round of Normandy format negotiations. But while Kyiv probes how Moscow will react to its deployment of Bayraktar drones, the Kremlin is using a more relaxed and deliberate approach, not trying to throw Kyiv into disarray. Having shown Kyiv that it can make its life harder or easier, Moscow is trying to push Ukrainian authorities to implement the Minsk agreements or to strengthen its own hand in the negotiations to come.
Title: Gatestone: Ukraine facing Russian invasion
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 06, 2021, 02:47:42 AM
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18000/russia-ukraine

President Trump had great geopolitical insight in wanting to find a way to better relations with Russia/Putin.
Unfortunately the seditious RussiaRussiaRussia conspiracy of Hillary/FBI/CIA/Pelosi/Schiff/Schumer/and the Pravdas tied his hands and made that impossible.

Our corrupt and compromised President Biden made things even worse by empowering Russia by approving the Nord Stream pipeline that both increases Russian revenues and its leverage over Europe.

So now we face the entirety of Asia (contrast Nixon-Kissinger cutting a deal with China so as to separate it from working with the Soviets against us)  working as a tag team against us in Taiwan and Ukraine.     

In the immortal words of John Wayne "Life is tough.  It is tougher when you are stupid." 

Washington has been revealed as a corrupt and incompetent Rome .

Led as we are by senile Manchurian Joe, Cackling Kommiela Harris, Sec Def Austin, Blinkin' Binken at State, and Thoroughly Modern Millie at the Joint Chief of Staff things look to end very, very badly.
Title: George Friedman: War or Bluff?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 07, 2021, 05:12:19 AM
December 7, 2021
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Russia and Ukraine: War or Bluff?
By: George Friedman

Two weeks ago, I wrote an analysis of Russian strategy titled “Russia’s Move.” Here’s a brief recap: When the Soviet Union collapsed, it lost control of the western borderlands that had been the bedrock of its security for hundreds of years. Those borderlands created a strategic depth that forced invaders into an extended and exhausting campaign that Russia could resist. Russia had been attacked in the 18th century by the Swedes, in the 19th century by France, and twice in the 20th century by Germany. There had also been wars with Turkey in the 18th and 19th centuries. In 1991, these borderland regions became independent, and from the Russian point of view, the West generally and the United States specifically sought to control the newly formed states. This constituted nothing less than an existential threat to Russia.

A few days after “Russia’s Move,” I wrote a piece called “Intelligence and Love,” in which I argued that to defeat an enemy you must objectively understand how they see themselves. And for its part, Russia sees itself as vulnerable, particularly from the west, where the most dangerous threats have historically originated. Belarus and Ukraine are the heart of Russian fears. The Ukrainian border is only a few hundred miles from Moscow and is therefore a major threat when in the hands of enemies. Distance will not wear down an enemy attacking from there. From the Russian point of view, the unwillingness of the United States to recognize these deep-seated fears suggests the United States has aggressive and dangerous designs. The only imaginable value Belarus and Ukraine hold for the Americans is to put Russia in a position where it must capitulate to the United States on all critical matters – or risk an outright invasion. Where the United States has no overriding interests, Russia has existential ones.

Russia must therefore act. In Belarus, it already has. Last year, President Alexander Lukashenko won a dubious and heavily criticized election. The Russians intervened to save Lukashenko and are now in effective control of Belarus, thereby securing the North European Plain, the primary invasion route from Europe to Moscow. This leaves Ukraine, a much larger and more important state, in Russia’s crosshairs.

Russia appears to have amassed forces along the Ukrainian border. It is believed to be a substantial contingent. If the purpose is to occupy Ukraine, it is not enough to defeat the Ukrainian army, but it could physically occupy key areas of the country. In invading a country, the need to continually detach forces to occupy and pacify various areas can rapidly overstretch your forces. So if the reports are true, this is a risky play.

Russia’s war plan is obviously secret, but the government of Ukraine has released its view of how a Russian invasion would be executed. It consists of three thrusts intended to isolate and occupy Kyiv: northward from the Crimean Peninsula, southward from Belarus and westward from Volgograd. Together, they would surround Kyiv and pass through a substantial part of Ukraine, giving them maximum opportunity for low-cost pacification.

National Security Threats to Ukraine
(click to enlarge)

There are three problems with the strategy. The first problem is logistical. These multi-division forces would be engaged in high-intensity maneuver and combat. All three would have to be supplied, and as they approached Kyiv they would take on a circular formation. Since it must be assumed that combat increases as movement declines, one phase would require massive amounts of "POL" – petroleum, oil and lubricants. The second phase would demand large amounts of munitions of all varieties. The possibility is high of uncoordinated pauses in advancing, leaving Russian flanks open.

The second issue is that it would create a complicated, multi-front war waged by untested troops. The Russians have not fought a multi-divisional battle like this since World War II. Their military is competent, but none of their commanders have commanded this type of battle. War games and maneuvers are valuable, but an untested force under fire for the first time needs a very sophisticated command structure. The Russians won’t know if they have one until they try it.

The third issue is the Americans, who will probably not attempt to block the advance with their own troops. Time is of the essence, but imposing friction on an enemy is valuable in itself. The U.S. is in a position to transport Polish forces, for example, to create that friction. (Assuming the Poles are willing.) But if it chose to send its own troops, it would force Russia into full-scale combat on a schedule it was not prepared for. The most important threat from the Americans, however, would be air and missile power. Their targets would be logistic nodes. In armored warfare, which seems to be the plan, the destruction of POL and munitions is the same as destroying tanks. The Russians would need to preempt this by taking out U.S. air and missile installations, very likely on a global scale. Doing this would escalate the war to world war status, and in that situation, the risk for Russia would skyrocket.

The United States recognizes the Russian threat, or at least wants Russia to believe it has recognized it. President Joe Biden’s statements on the matter imply a level of concern that suggests there would be a U.S. intervention if Russia struck. At the very least, the Russians have to factor this possibility into their war planning. The military and political implications of American intervention reduce the urgency of claiming Ukraine as a buffer zone.

Of course, the threat of invasion isn’t exclusive to this strategy. If Russia intends to occupy Ukraine, some variation will be necessary. But an invasion might simply entail taking a piece of Ukraine in the east or the north. The U.S., eager to avoid a war in the middle of Eurasia when the threat is trivial, will likely respond only with sanctions. Russia can stomach that as it threatens further penetration without taking it. This changes the political dynamic if Europe, incapable of mounting a defense, chooses to accommodate Russia.

To be sure, the entire threat might simply be an attempt to test Biden. During the Cold War, testing a new president was a Soviet routine. Doing so now could be seen as a low-risk, high-reward proposition. In fact, there are many counterarguments to my view that a full invasion of Ukraine is too complex and risky to undertake. The Russians cannot afford a defeat in their bid to secure Ukraine in the present geopolitical reality. They have time to move – that is, unless Putin, who hungers to restore the former Soviet border, sees the hand of time moving and is prepared to take a risk for the sake of glory. Perhaps so, but KGB men are trained to be careful. My bet is this is a bluff. But I wouldn’t bet the house on it.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 07, 2021, 09:13:56 AM
Cutting off SWIFT would be a huge fg deal.

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/biden-mulls-cutting-russia-swift-ahead-putin-call-nuclear-option-response-ukraine?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=330
Title: Ukraine prepares
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 07, 2021, 07:36:01 PM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7xCuDYRTSyk&t=1s
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 08, 2021, 02:09:56 PM
Actually this sounds quite reasonable to me:

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/putin-biden-finlandize-ukraine-or-we-will?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=331

That said, worth remembering is that in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Empire, Ukraine became the 4th largest nuke power in the world (working from memory here). In return for giving Russia its nukes
back Ukraine received formal written promise from the Russians to respect Ukrainian territorial integrity.

(cf Chinese promise to respect Hong Kong integrity for 50 years after the Brits returned it, but I digress)

The US was not a signatory to the deal.  Perhaps a written promise to us that there will be no more territorial encroachments would be a good part of coming to understanding here?
Title: Biden: No thoughts of US troops , , , yet?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 08, 2021, 02:36:20 PM
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2021/12/biden-rules-out-sending-troops-ukraine-least-now/187386/
Title: Patriot Post: Biden vs. Putin over Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 08, 2021, 02:47:57 PM
second

https://patriotpost.us/alexander/84770?mailing_id=6331&utm_medium=email&utm_source=pp.email.6331&utm_campaign=alexander&utm_content=body
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on December 08, 2021, 05:53:28 PM
"Ukraine received formal written promise from the Russians to respect Ukrainian territorial integrity."

   - Oops:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_Crimea_by_the_Russian_Federation

"cf Chinese promise to respect Hong Kong integrity for 50 years after the Brits returned it, but I digress"

   - Relevant?  Yes.  Russia (also) lacks trustworthiness.  US lacks a competent party needed to enter an agreement. 

Frankly, I don't know who are our friends and allies anymore.  Depends on the enemy and depends on who is in power in the respective countries.  'Finlandization' of Ukraine sounds acceptable but what happens if we give on this now and they keep taking?  US lacks the will to do anything about anything.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 08, 2021, 06:29:26 PM
""Ukraine received formal written promise from the Russians to respect Ukrainian territorial integrity."

"- Oops:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_Crimea_by_the_Russian_Federation"

Can you find citation for the Russian promise in exchange for the return of their nukes?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on December 08, 2021, 06:53:26 PM
See if this helps:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_and_Ukraine  (USe thius to access the other links.)

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine held about one third of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, the third largest in the world at the time, as well as significant means of its design and production.
 Dahlburg, Decemb. "Ukraine Votes to Quit Soviet Union : Independence: More than 90% of Voters Approve Historic Break with Kremlin. The President-elect Calls for Collective Command of the Country's Nuclear Arsenal". LA Times. Retrieved April 15, 2014.

Formally, these weapons were controlled by the Commonwealth of Independent States.[4] In 1994 Ukraine agreed to destroy the weapons, and to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).[5][6]
 Hanley, Jeremy (June 22, 1993). "Nuclear Weapons". Hansard. UK Parliament. Column 154. Retrieved September 9, 2018. The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Jeremy Hanley): ... Some weapons are also possessed by Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, but these are controlled by the Commonwealth of Independent States.
 William C. Martel (1998). "Why Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons : nonproliferation incentives and disincentives". In Barry R. Schneider, William L. Dowdy (ed.). Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink: Reducing and Countering Nuclear Threats. Psychology Press. pp. 88–104. ISBN 9780714648569. Retrieved August 6, 2014. There are some reports that Ukraine had established effective custody, but not operational control, of the cruise missiles and gravity bombs. ... By early 1994 the only barrier to Ukraine's ability to exercise full operational control over the nuclear weapons on missiles and bombers deployed on its soil was its inability to circumvent Russian permissive action links (PALs).
 Alexander A. Pikayev (Spring–Summer 1994). "Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine: Who can push the Button?" (PDF). The Nonproliferation Review. 1 (3): 31–46. doi:10.1080/10736709408436550. Archived from the original (PDF) on August 8, 2014.

In exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons, Ukraine received financial compensation, as well as the security assurances of the Budapest Memorandum.[9]
 Budjeryn, Mariana (September 1, 2016). "Was Ukraine's Nuclear Disarmament a Blunder?". World Affairs. 179 (2): 9–20. doi:10.1177/0043820016673777. ISSN 0043-8200. S2CID 151341589.
---------------------------------------------
https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-explainer-budapest-memorandum/25280502.html

With tensions rising in Crimea and pro-Russian forces controlling the peninsula's main airports, Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk has called on Russia to "not violate the Budapest Memorandum." So what is the "Budapest Memorandum" and what does it have to do with Crimea?

What exactly is the "Budapest Memorandum"?

The "Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances" is a diplomatic memorandum that was signed in December 1994 by Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

It is not a formal treaty, but rather, a diplomatic document under which signatories made promises to each other as part of the denuclearization of former Soviet republics after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Under the memorandum, Ukraine promised to remove all Soviet-era nuclear weapons from its territory, send them to disarmament facilities in Russia, and sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Ukraine kept these promises.

In return, Russia and the Western signatory countries essentially consecrated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine as an independent state. They did so by applying the principles of territorial integrity and nonintervention in 1975 Helsinki Final Act -- a Cold War-era treaty signed by 35 states including the Soviet Union -- to an independent post-Soviet Ukraine.

Which principles in the Helsinki Final Act, reiterated in the "Budapest Memorandum," are relevant to the current situation in the Crimea?

In the "Budapest Memorandum," Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States promised that none of them would ever threaten or use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine. They also pledged that none of them would ever use economic coercion to subordinate Ukraine to their own interest.

They specifically pledged they would refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation or engage in other uses of force in violation of international law.

All sides agreed that no such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legal and that the signatories would "consult in the event a situation arises which raises a question concerning these commitments."

Is there anything legally binding about the "Budapest Memorandum" regarding Russia's obligations to respect Ukraine's territorial integrity?

"That's actually a much more complex question than it may sound. It is binding in international law, but that doesn't mean it has any means of enforcement," says Barry Kellman is a professor of law and director of the International Weapons Control Center at DePaul University's College of Law.

"The 'Budapest Memorandum' follows the Helsinki Final Act and essentially reiterates its provisions. There are confidence building measures and then a host of other broader obligations – primarily negative obligations. Don't interfere."

Kellman concludes that there are a host of other sources of international law that oblige Russia to respect Ukraine's territorial integrity -- including the provisions of the CSCE treaty and the UN Charter.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 08, 2021, 07:03:49 PM
YES!!!
Title: The nuclear option?!?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 08, 2021, 10:54:52 PM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xITopRyqyYc
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 09, 2021, 08:48:40 PM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pw0ypSr1SGY&t=1s

https://dailycaller.com/2021/12/09/daniel-just-a-reminder-that-biden-and-merkel-practically-invited-a-russian-invasion-of-ukraine/?utm_source=piano&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2360&tpcc%3D=newsletter&pnespid=r7V1Fi1XKbMFy.iQqyqqFMuV5w2zBJ9pIezlxLs2.kFm_dxd98t7ZHjz1zwp39tOSj4nMwor

https://dailycaller.com/2021/12/08/joe-biden-nord-stream-2-russia-ukraine-energy-policy/?utm_source=piano&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2360&tpcc%3D=newsletter&pnespid=t75iGiZOP.gRyOucpC.uAc2P4U70V5F6MPLhzvpxtxJmW3wrzXlJ3mMpH4cpEUEz3tYmcKqW
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 10, 2021, 08:28:33 PM
December 10, 2021
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Ukraine, War and American Doctrine
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman
During the Vietnam War, an American doctrine emerged whereby wars were primarily political and waging wars signaled to other powers that the U.S. was ready to fight wherever challenged. I call it “political war” because the intent was focused not on destroying the enemy but on establishing American credibility. It was characterized by an irrational confidence in America’s ability to rapidly defeat an enemy with minimal effort and loss. The United States failed to understand the will of the enemy, frequently because its leaders focused on warfighting technology as the measure of power, and in any case the war did not begin with a clear definition of victory.

From Vietnam to Afghanistan, the United States engaged an enemy far more willing than Washington to absorb casualties. Since the wars were not existential matters for the United States, its commitment was limited. For the North Vietnamese and the Taliban, the war was a moral absolute. It would be fought whatever the cost and with whatever weapons were available. Some wars ended in outright defeat, some (the exception being Desert Storm) ended in U.S. retreat and withdrawal. Few of these engagements convinced potential enemies of American power. Instead, they caused adversaries to misread American power and increased the risk that the U.S. would choose another elective war.

All nations go to war at some point in history, but the United States has spent most of the 21st century at war. The desire to use war as a signal of power, coupled with not understanding the amount of power needed to wage a successful war, raises the question of whether the U.S. has an interest in intervening in Ukraine if the Russians invade. I doubt a full-fledged invasion of Ukraine intended to occupy the entire country is in the offing, but thinking of such an invasion helps us to define current warfighting doctrine.

The United States has two strategic imperatives. First, it must maintain relations with Canada and Mexico, the two nations that could provide a base for a ground attack on the United States. Second, since the first is reasonably secure, it must make certain that it maintains control over the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the only places that would facilitate offensive action against the United States.

Obviously this requires the U.S. to control the seas via naval, air and space power. But the challenge is subtler than that. World War II was for the United States a struggle to secure the seas. This is obvious in the Pacific but was also the case in the Atlantic. The American concern after the fall of France was that Britain might be forced to capitulate to Germany, and that capitulation would mean that the Royal Navy was to become a German navy. The Royal Navy was a challenge to the U.S. Navy, so this meant either a naval war in the Atlantic or even German control of the Atlantic.

That would have been catastrophic for the U.S., which responded by maintaining open sea lanes to Britain and supplying Britain with needed equipment. Even the land aspects of the war were partly designed to shift German resources away from the navy; the invasion of France was part of the strategy. U.S. strategy was ultimately to fight in Europe to prevent German threats to the United States.

During the Cold War, the United States feared a Soviet invasion of Western Europe and seizure of German and French ports – i.e., the Soviets forcing their way into the Atlantic. For the U.S., defending Europe was essential to securing the Atlantic, and so Washington spent a great deal of time during the Cold War securing the Atlantic for eastern-moving convoys. The GIUK gap around Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom was a prime focus of the United States. If the Soviets broke through, they could block reinforcements to NATO and likely win the war. The fate of Europe was of interest to the United States, but the fate of the Atlantic was existential. The battle would be fought in Europe, but the ultimate objective would be the Atlantic.

Any U.S. military doctrine must therefore exclude hostile powers from the Atlantic and Pacific. (That’s precisely what the United States is doing in the South China Sea.) Because Washington has no challenger in the Atlantic right now, and since a new doctrine must focus on existential needs and focus on achieving military ends, it would seem that at the moment Russia cannot challenge U.S. control of the Atlantic.

The Soviet Union cracked in 1991. The buffer zones surrounding Russia spun out of Russian control. Moscow’s own imperatives and doctrines require that it demonstrate a return to power in Ukraine. Here again, the U.S. is concerned less about the territory involved than about losing credibility if it doesn’t act. Credibility is not trivial, nor has it proved a successful basis for initiating conflict. But for Russia, the Ukrainian border is about 300 miles from Moscow and while no threat exists at this moment, the speed with which a third power such as the United States could appear in Ukraine and threaten the heartland should not be discounted. The Russians cannot discount it, and therefore want to preclude the possibility by controlling Ukraine.

U.S. strategy hasn’t really changed, but the geography has. The Cold War doctrine was to maintain sea lanes to Europe by blocking Soviet naval and air power and defeat Russia with overwhelming and replaceable force. But that was when the Soviet border was well west of Ukraine. There are two avenues of advance by Russia if it decides to take Ukraine. One is the North European Plain through Belarus and Poland. The other is through the Carpathian Mountains in the south. So long as Poland is well defended and the Russians remain east of the Carpathians, the probability of Russia posing a threat to Europe, and by extension the Atlantic, is low.

Russia cannot leave Ukraine in the position it is. Doing so is potentially too dangerous. The United States cannot fight a land war on the doorstep of Russia. With the amount of force Russia can quickly bring to bear, the U.S. mission would, at best, fail. At worst, it would be defeated. This is dictated by geography. If the U.S. intervenes, it must do so on the western reaches of the Carpathians and the plains of Poland. It cannot go farther west.

This is a rather ruthless application of a doctrine. Ukraine has a right to self-determination. But the maturity of American foreign policy rests not on testing the justice of the cause but on the price and probability of victory. No matter what the politics or morality might be, the recognition of geography, capability and interest must take priority over indulging in military action likely to fail. What we have learned is that the U.S. is powerful but not omnipotent. The idea that the U.S. must fight for political right on the assumption of omnipotence is juvenile. The great comfort is that Russia is as afraid of losing as I am, so it likely is an academic exercise
Title: WSJ: Invading Ukraine is a trap for Putin
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 11, 2021, 04:56:32 AM
Invading Ukraine Is a Trap for Vladimir Putin
Russia can’t be an empire without it, but it can’t even be a great power if it overreaches.
By Christopher A. Hartwell
Dec. 10, 2021 5:49 pm ET


Russia has stepped up its belligerence toward Ukraine, with troop movements, frequent attacks through state propaganda channels and direct threats from Russian leadership. The likelihood of a major European war is at its highest since the end of the Cold War.

If Russian aggression toward Ukraine does expand militarily, however, it could spell the end of the authoritarian experiment that Vladimir Putin has fostered for the past two decades. In any scenario, it will also result in a much-diminished Russia.

Historically, Ukraine has suffered under Russian domination since it broke free from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 17th century. It was eventually absorbed into the Russian empire, then the Soviet Union. The Holodomor, the deliberate starving of millions of Ukrainians under Stalin’s orders, weighs heavily in modern Ukrainian narratives—and made Ukrainians highly suspicious of Russian attempts to portray the two as “brother Slavs.”

More-recent events have further diminished any idea of Slavic solidarity, as Russia has waged war on Ukraine since the latter broke away from the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union in 2014. The aggression has been both overt (illegally annexing Crimea and invading the Donbas region) and covert (including sabotage, propaganda and cyberattacks). Unseen in much of the West, and erroneously referred to as a civil war or an effort by separatists, the conflict has been directed and sustained by Russia.

But the origin of Russia’s current saber-rattling is different from that of the events of 2014-15. Mr. Putin’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 was done from a position of weakness, as an opportunistic move that proceeded as the West, especially the U.S., pulled back from Central and Eastern Europe. Today Russia is in a better position economically and strategically than it has been since 2016, aided by U.S. policy. President Biden’s refusal to impose sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 pipeline handed Mr. Putin a geostrategic win that, coupled with the restrictions placed on America’s own energy producers, has also created a cudgel with which to strike Western Europe. Simply put, Mr. Putin has many more diplomatic and military levers for pressure that didn’t exist even two years ago.


So why Ukraine, and why now? Most analyses focus on the prospect of Ukraine’s joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But another key issue can be found in Russian domestic politics. An unpopular Mr. Putin is a dangerous Mr. Putin.

His 2000 war with Chechnya, 2008 invasion of Georgia, and 2014 seizure of Crimea were all popular, raising the president’s approval ratings from low levels. In 2021 Mr. Putin’s popularity has been declining precipitously, first and foremost because of Moscow’s egregious mishandling of the Covid pandemic. With an estimate of excess mortality close to 800,000 since the start of the pandemic (the official report of Covid deaths is 278,000), Russia has been hit badly by the virus. At the same time, Russian disposable income declined more than 10% from 2014 to 2020. With his popularity waning, Mr. Putin has been anxious to rally Russians around the flag.

Unfortunately for him, Ukraine is also a much stronger actor, both economically and militarily, than it was in 2014. Unlike Russian actions before seizing Crimea and Donbas, the current Russian military buildup is out in the open, giving Ukraine time to respond. Any direct military strike would inflict massive harm on Russia in a manner similar to what the U.S.S.R. suffered in Afghanistan, but with the added complication of being on Europe’s doorstep, with clear supply lines from NATO countries. While there is little hope of direct NATO intervention, the threat of guerrilla war and bloody, protracted insurrection for years may serve as a deterrent to any rash moves.

Russia can’t be an empire without Ukraine. But Russia will cease to be a great power if it tries to acquire the rest of Ukraine. Moscow is simply far too dependent on primary commodities, and Covid has weakened popular support for a regime that can deliver “international prestige” but little else. Any armed incursion into Ukraine will push the still-fragile Russian economy to the brink and likely over the edge.

It is thus imperative that the West present a united front against Russia and continue to ratchet up the costs of any aggression. This means, against the instincts of Mr. Biden and likely the German Foreign Ministry, not handing Mr. Putin an easy win for his belligerence. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, sacrificing Ukraine to keep Europe’s unstable equilibrium would be to choose dishonor without necessarily preventing war.

Mr. Hartwell is a professor of international business policy and head of the International Management Institute at the ZHAW School of Management and Law in Zurich and a professor at Kozminski University in Poland.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 11, 2021, 09:25:08 AM
Not that I agree with his support of Ukraine into NATO, but respect for the man and his articulation of his POV.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jDoqsWsML8g&t=43s
Title: George Friedman: The Russian Treaty Proposal
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 20, 2021, 07:58:01 AM
December 20, 2021
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The Russian Treaty Proposal
By: George Friedman

We have been operating with a model of Russia. Having lost its non-Russian territories with the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia is missing the buffers that protected it. Its national imperative is to recover those border states, either formally or informally. They could be either occupied by Russian forces or, at the very least, governed by native governments that exclude the presence of Western powers and coordinate with Moscow. The Russians achieved this in the South Caucasus through diplomacy and the stationing of Russian peacekeepers in the region. They have been increasing their power in Central Asia. But the critical region for Russia is in the west, facing Western Europe, the United States and NATO. There, the loss of Belarus and Ukraine posed a critical problem. The eastern border of Ukraine is only about 300 miles (480 kilometers) from Moscow, and Ukraine is allied with the United States and European powers, informally if not as part of NATO.

Russia’s strategy to this point had been to avoid direct military intervention against hostile forces and use hybrid measures to build influence and gain control. This is what happened in the Caucasus. This is also what happened in Belarus, where a contested election left President Alexander Lukashenko in a weak position, and Moscow used its power to assure Lukashenko’s position and control events in Minsk. The surge of refugees toward the Polish border put Poland on the defensive and created a sense of crisis in Poland. As for Belarus, it was simply the arena chosen by Russia, a satellite taken softly.

As Russia was reclaiming its buffers, we turned our attention to Ukraine, which, as I said, is the key buffer. It is vast, it threatens Russia directly, and from Ukraine, Russia could threaten the West as well. Indeed, between Belarus on the North European Plain and Ukraine’s control of the Carpathian Mountains, Russia could not only defend itself but also threaten an attack on Europe from the Baltic to the Black seas.

The Russians mobilized forces along Ukraine’s borders – from the east, north and south – and, without making overt threats, created a situation in which an invasion of Ukraine seemed possible. I wrote last week doubting that the Russians would try a complex occupation of a hostile country because the possibilities of failure, even against minimal resistance, were real and because the Russians could not predict American actions. If it intervened, the U.S. would likely intervene on land, but it also possesses arsenals of anti-tank missiles launched from air or ships in the Baltic and Black seas. How this conflict would evolve is unknown, and the United States might not choose a military counter. But Russia could not know this, nor could it risk acting on intelligence, which is frequently mistaken.

For the Russians to complete rebuilding the Soviet Union, they have to first neutralize the United States without military action. The best strategy for this is to neutralize NATO, whose military forces are limited but still significant. More important, an American response to Russia without the availability of NATO territory, and without the political backing of NATO allies, would complicate the military and political dynamic of U.S. action. The U.S. had already indicated its caution by threatening the Russian banking system if there were a war in Ukraine, rather than threatening military action.

Therefore, before Russia even considered military action in Ukraine, it had to neutralize the (already cautious) U.S. politically, and the key to that was to paralyze NATO and particularly Germany. Germany sees Russia as a crucial source of energy, a trading partner that might grow in significance, and a problem to be avoided. Even more important to it is Europe, of which NATO is a crucial element – not so much as a military force, but as another force holding Europe together. As the dominant power in Europe (outside of Britain), Germany has a national imperative to maintain its dominant economic position, which gives it major influence on the behavior of the Europeans on military matters.

For Germany, a war would therefore not suit its needs. It would risk a conflict that could severely weaken Europe’s economy at a delicate moment. Germany sees Poland as a difficult problem since it is in NATO, but Poland’s posture toward Russia does not suit Germany’s interests. Germany would of course like a buffer against Russia in Belarus and Ukraine, but not if it means massive economic cost and increasing American power in Europe. The U.S. dominates NATO, and an extended conflict would maximize American military considerations and minimize German economic concerns. In short, while there may be an array of positions on Russia’s moves in Europe, Germany, the leading power, needs to avoid war and will pay a price for this. Russia’s neutralization of the United States leads through NATO, Europe and particularly Germany. If they have divergent views, a unilateral American defense against Russia becomes very risky.

Thus, we get to the extraordinary document that Russia delivered last week. The document is targeted at NATO. The key clause is Article 5: “The Parties shall refrain from deploying their armed forces and armaments, including in the framework of international organizations, military alliances or coalitions, in the areas where such deployment could be perceived by the other Party as a threat to its national security, with the exception of such deployment within the national territories of the Parties.”

In other words, Russia is demanding the right to limit the deployment of U.S. troops in NATO countries if the Russians feel threatened by that deployment. The immediate effect would be that, while Poland could build its strength, the U.S. would have to withdraw from Poland if Russia felt threatened, which it says it does. Of course, if the Russian Federation reintegrated former Soviet territories within its political system, which I think is a possibility, then Russia would be freed from Article 5.

There are other clauses that guarantee the United States will reject the document. It is therefore an interesting question why the Russians crafted it. It may be designed as a negotiating platform, but it is too skewed to the Russian interest to be a workable platform for Washington. Another possibility is that it is for domestic Russian consumption, showing that Russia speaks to the U.S. as a powerful equal to be respected. Or it might be that after the Americans’ initial response to Russian threats – that their banking system would be hurt – the Russians read the U.S. as unwilling to respond in Ukraine.

The key from my point of view is that no one wants a war in Ukraine because it would be long and bloody, and the geographic advantage would go to Russia. A proposal on the table, regardless of how preposterous, can give cautious nations an opportunity to capitulate while appearing to prefer a diplomatic course to irrational military responses. Much of Europe is unwilling to fight for Ukrainian independence. The United States, concerned with the free spread of Russian power through military force, might choose an intervention. This proposal might well be seen in Europe as a “basis of discussion,” limiting American options.

An invasion of Ukraine would be filled with risks for Russia. Failure or prolonged resistance would turn Russia from a reemerging power into a nation to be discounted. Russian President Vladimir Putin obviously knows this document will be rejected, but within its context, rejection will get back to counteroffers, and it is possible that NATO and the U.S. will give some ground in exchange for scrapping some of the egregious Russian demands. Or Putin wants everyone to see this in terms that are not mentioned – as an ultimatum – and to panic.

In any case, the key piece of Russian reconstruction – Ukraine – is on the table, and the document so completely confuses the issues, by demanding fundamental shifts in how the U.S. operates, that something may be conceded under European pressure. Putin has nothing to lose from this document and something to gain. I would assume the American response will be to refuse talks based on the document.
Title: Poroshenko now a treason suspect
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 21, 2021, 07:19:16 AM
Ukraine: Former President Petro Poroshenko Named Treason Suspect
2 MIN READDec 20, 2021 | 18:18 GMT





What Happened: Ukraine’s deputy prosecutor general notified former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko that he is officially suspected of treason and of financing terrorist activities related to coal purchases from Ukraine’s separatist-controlled Donbas region from 2014-2015, Bloomberg reported Dec. 20. Poroshenko is scheduled to speak with investigators about the charges on Dec. 23.

Why It Matters: Poroshenko’s domestic backers and Ukraine’s Western partners will widely deride the charges as politically motivated, which risks jeopardizing Western support for Ukraine. Ukraine's current Zelensky administration is aware of this risk, so it is unlikely that the charges will result in Poroshenko’s conviction or in major repercussions. But the investigation will help Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky fortify his political base by allowing him to claim that he fulfilled his 2019 campaign promise to prosecute former administration officials, including Poroshenko. The case also enables Zelensky to tie Poroshenko to pro-Russian Opposition Platform — For Life party leader Viktor Medvedchuk, who is a suspect in the same case.

Background: The charges coincide with Moscow's military build-up near the Russia-Ukraine border amid Moscow's diplomatic push for "security guarantees" from the United States and NATO. Zelensky repeatedly suggested during the 2019 presidential campaign that he would prosecute former administration officials for corruption. Despite defeating Poroshenko in Ukraine's 2019 presidential election by nearly 50 percentage points, Zelensky backers still see Poroshenko as the president's biggest political rival.
Title: WSJ: The Case for War
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 22, 2021, 04:42:56 PM
The Strategic Case for Risking War in Ukraine
An invasion would be a diplomatic, economic and military mistake for Putin. Let him make it if he must.
By John R. Deni
Dec. 22, 2021 12:31 pm ET
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Ukrainian reservists participate in a military exercise near Kyiv, Ukraine, Dec. 18.
PHOTO: SERGEY DOLZHENKO/SHUTTERSTOCK

As Russia continues its destabilizing military buildup around Ukraine, the U.S. and its allies have made clear they prefer to resolve the crisis through diplomacy. This reflects not simply the preference of the Biden administration when it comes to national-security matters but also the West’s desire to avoid inflaming and escalating the situation through military action.

This makes good sense. Any Russo-Ukrainian war is likely to be bloody for the combatants, result in a wave of refugees heading west, and further destabilize an already precarious regional security situation. Nonetheless, as diplomatic efforts unfold, there are good strategic reasons for the West to stake out a hard-line approach, giving little ground to Moscow over its demand to forsake Ukrainian membership in Western institutions and halt military activity in Central and Eastern Europe. Rather than helping Russian President Vladimir Putin back down from the position he’s taken, the West ought to stand firm, even if it means another Russian invasion of Ukraine.

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Russia’s efforts to destabilize and undermine the Ukrainian government by keeping alive the smoldering war in the Donbas region haven’t returned Kyiv to Moscow’s orbit. Instead, Ukraine has used the past several years to boost its military capabilities gradually, strengthen its ties to the West, and improve its economy. It’s unclear why Mr. Putin has chosen this moment to demand assurances that Ukraine won’t become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union. Perhaps the Kremlin believes time isn’t on its side as Ukraine continues to slide closer to the West. Or Mr. Putin might assume Washington is more willing to accommodate Russia’s demands, given the intensifying American rivalry with China. Or it could even be that Mr. Putin hopes to bolster his declining public support with a jingoistic foreign adventure.

Regardless, Mr. Putin’s tactics have placed the West in a reactive mode, hoping to avoid a war in Europe that could result in tens of thousands of casualties. The death and destruction could far outpace that of the relatively more limited war in Donbas, where as many as 14,000 have died since 2014. But Mr. Putin’s price for turning down the heat is anathema to Western values of national self-determination and sovereignty. Moreover, a NATO-Russia agreement preventing Ukraine from seeking membership would violate a 1975 Helsinki agreement on security and cooperation in Europe—signed by Moscow—which said European states have the right to belong to any international alliance they choose.

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Mr. Putin therefore appears to have taken quite a risk—and the West ought to exploit his gamble by maintaining a hard-line stance in diplomatic discussions. In the best case, Mr. Putin is forced to back down, losing face domestically and internationally, even if his state media spins it as a victory or claims the buildup was merely part of an exercise.


In the worst case, if Mr. Putin’s forces invade, Russia is likely to suffer long-term, serious and even debilitating strategic costs in three ways. First, another Russian invasion of Ukraine would forge an even stronger anti-Russian consensus across Europe. Although the EU has shown a remarkable degree of solidarity in maintaining its limited sanctions on Russia since the 2014 invasion of Ukraine, there are cracks in the edifice. Germany’s new left-leaning government hasn’t yet found its footing on Russia. Italy, Austria, Hungary and even France have shown a willingness to consider opening up to the Kremlin, despite the Russian forces in Crimea and Donbas. And NATO’s attention and resources remain split between Russia on the one hand, and instability and insecurity emanating from across the Mediterranean Sea on the other. Russian tanks crossing into Ukraine would focus minds and effort.

Second, a Russian reinvasion of Ukraine would likely result in another round of more debilitating economic sanctions that would further weaken Russia’s economy. Disconnecting Russia from the tools of global finance and investment—such as the Swift banking-payment system—would make it difficult for Moscow to earn money from its oil exports. Similarly, a ban on Western institutions’ trading of existing Russian debt in secondary markets would limit Moscow’s ability to finance development. Over time, a stronger, more effective round of sanctions would hasten Russia’s economic decline relative to the West, reduce its power overall, and make it far more expensive for Mr. Putin to intimidate and destabilize his neighbors.

Third, another Russian invasion of Ukraine, even if militarily successful in the short run, is likely to spawn a guerrilla war in those areas of Ukraine occupied by Russian forces. This will sap the strength and morale of Russia’s military while undercutting Mr. Putin’s domestic popularity and reducing Russia’s soft power globally.

If Russian forces enter Ukraine yet again, Kyiv is likely to lose the war and the human toll will be extensive. The long-term damage suffered by Moscow, however, is likely to be substantial as well. The seemingly impetuous Mr. Putin has maneuvered his way into a strategically risky position, and the West ought to leverage the Kremlin’s mistake and drive a hard bargain in any diplomacy.

Mr. Deni is a research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of “Coalition of the Unwilling and Unable: European Realignment and the Future of American Geopolitics.
Title: Putin threatens war
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 23, 2021, 02:13:48 AM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dhTPnpWz9iY&t=16s
Title: Stratfor: Four Scenarios for Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 23, 2021, 10:09:12 AM
Four Scenarios of Rising Russia-Ukraine Tensions

Russia’s buildup of troops along the Ukrainian border has reignited speculation regarding the future of the Donbas conflict and Moscow’s intentions in eastern Ukraine more broadly. For now, the Kremlin’s primary motivation is to increase its leverage in impending European security talks with the United States and NATO amid Moscow’s push for “security guarantees.” These concerns have been particularly acute amid Moscow’s months-long expressions of dissatisfaction with the situation in Ukraine. But Moscow’s opening position, which Russia’s foreign ministry unveiled on Dec. 17, contains demands against NATO expansion to the former Soviet Union or even to develop bilateral military cooperation with these countries, both of which have already taken place and are non-starters for the alliance. The documents’ unacceptable content and rapid disclosure by Russia are indicative of their use as an ultimatum, after which Moscow will likely conduct long-planned steps continuing its military buildup or possibly threatening a hotter Donbas conflict.
 
Against this backdrop, there are four main scenarios for the future of the conflict in Ukraine, starting from the most likely to the least likely:
 
Scenario #1 (Very Likely): Russia maintains tensions but refrains from a military intervention amid negotiations. 
 
In our baseline scenario, Russia’s demands for security guarantees and disputes over the Minsk agreements will keep tensions in eastern Ukraine elevated. Moscow will also keep troops and equipment at the border, but a Russian invasion will not materialize. Seeing a credible military threat against Ukraine as leverage against the United and a critical lever to slow its declining influence over Kyiv, Russia will maintain its buildup of forces, infrastructure and equipment near Ukraine’s borders to pressure the West to make concessions. While the U.S. and European leaders will hold talks with Russia, NATO will not formally disavow the prospect of Ukraine’s membership in the alliance. Discussions on limiting the eastern deployment of certain NATO weapons systems and incident avoidance and management measures with the alliance will dissuade Russia from conducting a military incursion in 2022. Informal acknowledgment by the West that Ukraine is far from NATO membership (even if the alliance does not formally rule it out) could provide a sufficient “out” for Moscow to save face on the international stage. However, Moscow will continue to insist on Kyiv enacting the Minsk Protocol on its terms as a necessary precondition for avoiding a return to hot conflict in the Donbas. While Western leaders will reassure Russia that the Minsk agreement should be enforced, Kyiv's opposition and the separatists’ intransigence will make a real change on the ground unlikely. Ukrainian President ​​Volodymyr Zelensky’s administration, however, may engage in cosmetic initiatives toward enacting the agreements (including, for example, new laws regarding the Donbas’ special/autonomous constitutional status) that will have no effect on the situation on the contact line. The failure of any real progress will encourage Moscow to authorize the separatists to frequently violate the cease-fire as they have in previous months, while Russia will continue to keep many of its troops and military equipment near the Ukrainian border to keep the threat of a short-notice intervention credible and to deter the Ukrainians from responding forcefully to separatist cease-fire violations.
 
Scenario #2 (Likely): Russia raises the stakes by escalating the Donbas conflict, short of an overt military incursion.
 
In this scenario, the Kremlin will determine that it is not receiving sufficient concessions on security guarantees and its interpretation of the Minsk agreements, and will seek tangible ways (short of a new military incursion) to push Kyiv and Washington to make concessions. This will most likely take the form of more cease-fire violations by the Donbas separatists, possibly "offensive" ones with heavy weapons or drones, intended to provoke Ukraine. While monitors from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) report high levels of daily violations, most of these are not characterized as escalatory, but instead designed for deterrence and to project readiness. Increased reports of combative probing maneuvers — particularly those which approach, let alone cross, the Line of Contact separating separatist and government troops — could signal that combat forces are making preparations to return to war. Authorizing the separatists to further increase provocative cease-fire violations would seek to further put Kyiv in a bind. If the Ukrainian military responds forcefully to separatist shelling, Moscow can portray Kyiv as the aggressor and justify Russian intervention, such as a long-planned incursion or invasion. But if Ukraine does not step up its counter-shelling, the Ukrainian military will suffer disproportionate casualties and face accusations of failing to establish deterrence, which will be politically damaging for the Zelensky administration.
 
There are several additional potential signposts for this scenario. The most obvious would be restrictions on the movement and activities of OSCE monitors. OSCE monitors have access to most areas of eastern Ukraine, and the imposition of significant or prolonged limits on their movement would signal that separatist/Russian forces may be moving personnel and equipment as part of preparations for a return to war, or at least signal this possibility. Another would be increased public statements by high-ranking Russian officials such as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and others calling for the protection of the hundreds of thousands of people in eastern Ukraine who have received Russian passports since 2019. Such statements could signal that Russia is diplomatically preparing to justify an impending military escalation. The risk would particularly increase if President Vladimir Putin repeatedly makes such statements, as it would suggest that Russia is providing legal grounds to justify its right to intervene. Finally, an increase in sensationalist anti-Ukrainian messaging in Russian media stressing alleged crimes against humanity by the Ukrainian government like genocide could indicate that Russian authorities are using propaganda to morally justify a resumption of the conflict by the separatists.
 
The constant “offensive” cease-fire violations, along with the signposts described above, would serve the Kremlin’s goal of suggesting that the status quo (of Ukraine not enacting the Minsk agreements on Moscow’s terms and lack of a European security accord) is insufficient for containing the conflict, justifying a theoretical intervention by Moscow with military force to adjust it. With these and other steps, Moscow would be raising the stakes as part of a bid to get more concessions from the West without actually having to resort to higher-cost options like an incursion or invasion, as Moscow can signal it is on the verge of resorting to those steps through a worsening of the Donbas conflict.
 
Scenario #3 (Unlikely): Russia conducts a new military intervention in Ukraine.
 
In this low probability, high impact scenario, Moscow would use the failure to secure legal guarantees in security talks with the West and the stagnation of the Minsk agreements to justify an incursion or invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s buildup could prompt additional Western military and other support for Kyiv while security talks fail to give the Kremlin even rhetorical or symbolic concessions on its biggest demands. Moscow could conclude that the best time for a military incursion against Ukraine is now rather than in 10 or 20 years, calculating the Ukrainian defense capabilities, national identity and democratic values, as well as the country’s relative stability and prosperity, are likely to continue trending upward. As a Slavic nation with deep cultural and historic ties to Russia, this trajectory would create a dangerous precedent for Putin’s governance model in Russia itself, as many younger Russians will point to Ukraine as evidence that democracy is possible in Russia, and could argue that the standoff with Ukraine contradicts Russia’s national interests. The Kremlin's original goal was to use the Minsk agreements as a tool to get influence over the whole of Ukraine and the occupation of the Donbas as an instrument to destabilize the country by empowering regionalist movements and pro-Russian political forces. But Russian leadership likely believes that a political or diplomatic resolution is slipping away, and that Ukraine will slide permanently into the United States’ security orbit.
 
An important constraining factor on Moscow’s willingness to conduct a military escalation is economic, in particular its desire to avoid new sanctions and preserve economic ties with the West, including Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline with Germany. But years of domestic propaganda and a thoroughly sterilized political environment following a renewed wave of repressions mean that domestic opposition to an escalation would be insignificant, and while more sanctions would certainly pummel the Russian economy’s already weak growth prospects, it is doubtful economic measures alone would deter Russia due to the national security implications and ideological significance the Kremlin has ascribed to Ukraine.
 
The most likely version of this scenario would be an attempt to seize and occupy large pieces of Ukraine. This, in turn, contains multiple sub-variants, as Russia could seek to establish a land corridor to Crimea or significantly expand the size of the separatist republics. Western response measures would include sanctions on Russian sovereign debt, dollar transactions, and energy projects and other measures that would severely cripple the Russian economy. Given the harsh nature of the West’s response to any such invasion, arguably the most likely scenario could be a massive seizure of all of Ukraine east of the Dnieper river, and possibly even the port city of Odessa to secure the entire Black Sea coast. This large territory would most likely be used to create a loyal Ukrainian puppet state (that Moscow would insist is the “real” Ukraine) loosely modeled off Alexander Lukashenko’s Belarus, and joining it as the third nation to the Union State with Russia.
 
Alternative versions of this scenario could involve more limited use of force with an attempt at significant political interplay. One could be preemptive missile strikes on key Ukrainian military installations and infrastructure, such as airfields and arms depots. These strikes would demonstrate that the Ukrainian military will not be able to effectively oppose a Russian invasion, after which Moscow would issue Kyiv an ultimatum to back down to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. Another variant could involve limited incursions into Ukraine by Russian troops meant to destroy large formations of the Ukrainian army to force a political settlement or possible regime change in Kyiv without having to immediately occupy large pieces of Ukraine for an extended period. The advantage of these variants is that they allow Russia to achieve its geopolitical goals at a potentially lower human, economic and political cost than an invasion and occupation. Additionally, a further swelling of Russian troops on the border, possibly followed by a mobilization of reservists, could give Ukraine precious time to conduct its own emergency mobilization that would increase Russian casualties, but Ukraine cannot afford – politically or economically – to mobilize unless an impending Russian invasion is all but certain.
 
For Russia to resort to this option, Moscow would likely need to bring significantly more equipment and troops to the border. Russia would likely also opt to pass through some of the escalation signals described above in the second scenario.
 
Scenario #4 (Very Unlikely): Russia significantly lowers tensions and pulls back large amounts of troops and equipment from the Ukrainian border.
 
In this highly improbable scenario, Russia would be satisfied with concessions from Western leaders and Kyiv’s recommitment to the Minsk agreements, and would draw down its troops and remove equipment from the Ukrainian border to demonstrate that appeasement works and should continue. The West would probably not cave to all of Moscow’s demands, but confronted with the continuation of Russia’s military buildup, Western leaders could make commitments that Ukraine (and Georgia) will not be admitted to the NATO alliance for several more decades. Pro-Kremlin outlets could spin such a concession as a political win and a step toward regional security and stability. Moscow would cast the statement as a war-averting concession while reiterating that Russia reserves the right to return the troops or take preemptive steps against Ukraine at any point, thereby threatening to simply start the crisis anew should Western leaders appear to backtrack on the declaration in the coming years. This scenario would cause an upheaval in Ukrainian politics and major domestic instability, as the country has sought to join NATO since 2014. Many Ukrainians would likely interpret the sudden blockage of this path to Euro-Atlantic integration as a betrayal, empowering pro-Russian forces capitalizing on disenchantment to argue for improving ties with Moscow, further enraging nationalists and supporters of Ukraine’s European cours
Title: WSJ: Ukrainians prepare to resist
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 27, 2021, 03:07:58 AM
Where Russia Once Triumphed, Ukrainians Prepare to Resist Putin
Poltava is among the areas that Putin says were wrongly cleaved from Moscow’s control
Tourists pose in front of a mosaic that honors Peter the Great’s victory in Poltava.
By James Marson


POLTAVA, Ukraine—A decisive Russian military victory here in 1709 allowed Moscow to dominate much of this country for nearly three centuries.

If Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to pull it off again with the tens of thousands of troops he has amassed around Ukraine, he will have to reckon with people like 39-year-old archaeologist Anatoliy Khanko.

Mr. Khanko is a veteran of the war that Russia whipped up in Ukraine’s east in 2014 to hinder its neighbor from integrating with the West. While the U.S. and its allies have been fretting that Mr. Putin will order a forceful military thrust to rein in Ukraine again, Mr. Khanko has been laying plans to send his wife and small child westward so he can wage a partisan war from the woods around Poltava.

“Even if they get to Poltava, they won’t be here for long,” said Mr. Khanko, who sports a buzzcut and long black beard.


Anatoliy Khanko is a veteran of the war that Russia whipped up in Ukraine’s east in 2014.
Mr. Putin has described Ukraine as an artificial country glued together by Soviet leaders and named Poltava, some 100 miles from the modern border, among historical Russian lands that he says were wrongly cleaved from Moscow’s control. The city lies on the main highway westward from Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, to Kyiv, the capital.

But there are thousands of veterans in this region alone, and while the powerful Russian army would likely overrun Ukrainian forces, holding the territory would come at a huge cost, Mr. Khanko said. A recent national survey by a Kyiv pollster showed that one-third of Ukrainians are willing to take up arms if Russia launches an all-out war.

“I know what I am fighting for, but how will Putin sell it to Russians when tens of thousands of graves appear across the country?” Mr. Khanko said. “For what?”


A statue of the 18th-century Russian Gen. Alexander Suvorov, which was moved to the Poltava aviation museum from outside a Kyiv military school in 2019.

Souvenirs and battlefield images for sale near the Poltava Battle Museum.
Western and Ukrainian officials say there is little clarity whether Mr. Putin is planning a major military offensive to secure Ukraine in his sphere of influence or seeking to use the threat of war to pry concessions from the West.

Russia has denied it has any plans to invade, but it wants the U.S. and its allies to abandon its support for Ukraine’s military and withdraw a pledge to make Ukraine a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On Thursday, in his annual end-of-year media session, Mr. Putin said Russia wanted to avoid conflict but it required immediate security guarantees from the U.S. and its allies.



A military buildup along the Ukrainian border is further straining ties between Russia and the U.S., after clashes over cybercrime, expulsions of diplomats and a migrant crisis in Belarus. WSJ explains what is deepening the rift between Washington and Moscow. Photo Composite/Video: Michelle Inez Simon
One thing Mr. Putin has been clear about is his broad ambitions for Ukraine, a former Soviet republic that declared independence in 1991. Ukrainians and Russians, he has said repeatedly, are one people torn apart by the Soviet collapse.

In a recent 7,000-word essay on Ukrainian history, Mr. Putin wrote about the Battle of Poltava in 1709, saying that most locals sided with Moscow against Swedish forces and Cossacks under a Ukrainian leader named Ivan Mazepa.

Yevheniya Shcherbyna, a 33-year-old tour guide at the museum of the battle, sees things differently.


The Holy Dormition cathedral in Poltava housed food and clothing to be sent to Ukraine’s army at the start of the conflict with Russia in 2014.

A children's choir singing carols at the cathedral during this month’s St. Nicholas Day celebrations.
“The information war started 300 years ago,” she said, citing the production of paintings, engravings and statues glorifying the Russian victory.

The battle was a defeat for Ukraine, she said, but later generations continued the fight to this today.

The museum last year opened an exhibit detailing what it calls Russian myths about the battle.

“For Putin, the mythology of the Battle of Poltava is the foundation of the idea that we are one nation,” said Oleh Pustovgar, a Poltava historian. “It is important for Russia not to let Poltava out of the brotherly embrace.”

After Swedish Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist last month said his country could send troops on a training mission to Ukraine, Russia’s embassy recalled the battle.

“We would like to remind Mr. Hultqvist that he is not the first military leader in Sweden who is trying to intimidate Russia with the power of his heroic army by planning to send his military to Ukraine,” the embassy wrote on Facebook.


Poltava, a quiet provincial capital of around 280,000 inhabitants, saw a surge of patriotic activism after 2014 that was sparked by a revolution that toppled a pro-Russian president and the subsequent war.

Mr. Khanko led a unit of protesters from this town during the revolution in Kyiv that ended in dozens of deaths, including one from his group.

Protesters took to the streets here as well, using a crane to pull down the city’s statue of Lenin.

Russia fomented separatist protests in cities across Ukraine’s south and east in 2014, but patriotic groups here quickly quashed efforts of instigators they said weren’t locals.


Ivan Petrenko is a retired army colonel who served in the Soviet army in Afghanistan.
As supplies of fighters, commanders and weapons from Russia transformed demonstrations in the east into an armed conflict, Poltava residents sent aid to Ukraine’s threadbare army. Food and clothes piled up in an Orthodox cathedral here, soon filling an office, spilling down a staircase and taking up around one-third of the building, recalls Archbishop Fedir, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine’s leader in the region.

“Ukraine has weak state institutions, but we can organize ourselves quickly,” he said.

Others like Mr. Khanko, the archaeologist, went to fight, many as part of volunteer units.

“I used to know how to dig up,” he said. “But I learned how to dig in.”

Activists raised Ukrainian and nationalist flags atop a monument to the Russian victory in the center of town. A statue to Mr. Mazepa, the defeated Cossack leader, was erected after years of delays. At the aviation museum, new displays were added to commemorate locals killed in the current war alongside exhibits to Soviet heroes.

There is some support here for ties with Russia, mainly among older residents with ties to the ex-Soviet air force base.

The city’s mayor, Oleksandr Mamai, who draws support mainly from elderly voters, caused a storm when he echoed the Kremlin’s narrative in a recent television interview, saying the U.S. was fighting Russia in Ukraine, setting “brother against brother.” Political opponents want him removed.



Oleksandr Koba, who helped topple the Lenin statue, said elderly ladies cursed him in the days afterward. “You pulled down our Lenin,” he recalls them saying. Mr. Koba has organized pop-up street museums and performances to showcase Ukraine’s history and Soviet villainy, including the Holodomor, a forced famine that killed millions in the 1930s.

The conflict has brought some economic pain. Exports to Russia collapsed, a process that began even before the war when Moscow banned milk imports from the region.

At the souvenir shop near the museum, a seller complained that some of the craftspeople who make trinkets and traditional embroidered shirts have left to look for work in European Union countries.

Russia has justified its interventions in Ukraine by claiming, with scant evidence, that Russian speakers face repression there.


A military buildup along the Ukrainian border is further straining ties between Russia and the U.S., after clashes over cybercrime, expulsions of diplomats and a migrant crisis in Belarus. WSJ explains what is deepening the rift between Washington and Moscow. Photo Composite/Video: Michelle Inez Simon
Ihor Petrichenko, a deputy of Mr. Mamai’s from an opposition party, said many in the town switched from speaking Russian to Ukrainian after 2014, but he largely stuck with Russian to make a point.

“I don’t need Putin to protect me,” he said.

After returning from the front, Mr. Khanko and other veterans launched camps to teach teenagers basic military tactics and survival skills, as well as patriotic history.

He acknowledges the West wouldn’t send troops to help if Russia invades, but hopes for weapons deliveries.

Ivan Petrenko, who helped set up a motorized infantry battalion from scratch in 2014, said Mr. Putin had underestimated Ukrainians then. A retired colonel who served in the Soviet army in Afghanistan, he said Russia has been buoyed by the U.S.’s recent flight from Kabul—but that Ukrainians would stand firm.

“We won’t be a second Afghanistan,” said Mr. Petrenko. “This is our land, and we’ll fight for it.”
Title: George Friedman: Russi, US, and Ukraine: The State of Play
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 28, 2021, 06:24:26 AM
December 28, 2021
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Russia, US and Ukraine: The State of Play
By: George Friedman

When nations negotiate, a quiet settles in before the threats begin. Such is the case now between the U.S. and Russia, which will soon hold talks over the status of Ukraine and any number of other issues. Moscow has published its list of demands – more of a wish list, really – to try to set the agenda. But in the end, agendas are set by reality. A quick recap of Russia’s year is a good place to begin establishing that reality.

Russia has been trying to reclaim the buffers it lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union. These buffers, the most important of which are in Eastern Europe, insulate Russia from potential attack. In the past, these attacks have tended to emerge unexpectedly, so Russia wants to have them before a threat emerges. It doesn’t necessarily need the buffers to be part of the Russian Federation; it just needs to make sure they are not hostile (or occupied by hostile powers).

Thus, Russian activities in the past year were predictable. When war broke out in the South Caucasus between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Russia dispatched a peacekeeping force and, with its enormous influence in the region, constructed a system of relationships dominated by Russia. In Central Asia, Moscow built a network of airfields, a process that only accelerated as the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan. In Belarus, Russia completely dominates Alexander Lukashenko’s government.

These were important steps for Russia’s reclamation of its buffers, but none of them are as important as Ukraine. Its sheer size allows an enemy force to maneuver, and that maneuverability forces a defender to disperse forces. In war, Ukraine gives Russia time. It spent the year – and really years before it – focused on this moment.

Moscow understood from the beginning that it had to reach an accommodation with Washington. It also understood that the United States, like all countries, comes to the table only when it has to. Washington has been content with the structure of the former Soviet Union. Russia has not. So Russia had to put American interests in the region, particularly in Ukraine, at risk.

The very obvious massing of Russian forces around the Ukrainian border was the logical next step. Deployed as they were, the massed armored forces appeared to be in a position to rapidly overrun Ukraine. The problem, of course, was that though a country as large as Ukraine could be overrun, it could not be overrun rapidly.

Militarily, the United States is in a militarily difficult position. It has no significant force in Ukraine, and any infusion of forces could lead to a long and potentially indecisive war. NATO has no stomach for this kind of confrontation on its doorstep. Apart from limited militaries, the NATO model has morphed into the EU model, and the EU model has morphed into a model whose motto is peace and prosperity. A rapid deployment with few casualties is possible, but the kind of battle Russia offered is of no interest to the EU model, save for a few countries, most notably Poland. The Russian calculation was that the U.S. would not act, and if it did, it would split the Europeans. NATO would exercise and plan in Brussels, but ultra-caution would limit collective action.

From the American point of view, there is no short-term interest in intervening in Ukraine, let alone fighting another potentially losing war at long distance with questionable allies. But there is a long-term danger. The American strategy in the Cold War was to prevent Russia from imposing hegemony over Europe. Such a hegemony would wed Russian resources and manpower to European technology and manufacturing, creating a massive superpower that could challenge the U.S. in the Atlantic. This was a long-range threat, but long-range threats had to be dealt with early and cheaply. The Soviet threat was always there, but it was blocked at relatively low cost and was therefore politically acceptable in the West, especially when they were draped in anti-Soviet ideology and the principles of liberal democracy.

European Division, 1990
(click to enlarge)

The current situation in Ukraine recreates this long-range threat. The Russians view the United States as unpredictably ruthless – it never knows when the U.S. will take action, and its experience in the Cold War showed a U.S. willing to deploy massive force. Russia had to force the United States to limit its presence in Ukraine without risking a dramatic response. It had to demonstrate its power with a not fully credible force to compel a negotiation but not a massive response. And Washington could not go into talks without demonstrating a credible response to the Russian threat. It’s delicate on both sides.

Ultimately, both sides understood the weakness of the Russian strategy relative to the United States. Armored fighting vehicles such as those Russia sent to the Ukrainian border eat an enormous amount of fuel. An armored division in the U.S. military uses about 600,000 gallons of fuel per day when on the move, and Russia is deploying multiple divisions, which would have to be followed by an endless line of refueling vehicles, coming from vast fuel storages. At best, this is complicated. At worst, it’s a prime candidate for a war of attrition as the U.S., weary of Russia’s anti-aircraft capability, fires cruise missiles from afar. (Russia can, of course, shoot some down, but the losses would be huge.)

The Russian decision to carry out multidivisional armored warfare will depend on how confident it is that the U.S. would get involved, how confident Moscow is that the U.S. would choose a winning strategy, how confident it is in its own defensive systems, and how confident it is that it can politically withstand even a temporary defeat. The Russians have not engaged in multidivisional offensives since 1945. They cannot live with the loss of buffers. They cannot live with defeat.

War is filled with vulnerabilities, many of which are discovered at inconvenient times. The price Russia would pay in the event of a failed invasion is significant in terms of domestic politics and international credibility. The price the U.S. would face by a defeat would be less. Its credibility would be hurt, but a geopolitical imperative would not be lost.

The Russians know this far better than I do. So the coming negotiations will break down here and there; Russian forces will be on full alert, but Russia can’t afford a defeat and can’t be certain of victory. In the end, the thing that the Russians will have gained is that they sat down across from the Americans as equals, and the rest of the world will have seen it. There will be consequences to America for conceding the point, and the Europeans will proclaim the end of American power for the hundredth time. And history will go on.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 29, 2021, 01:14:19 AM
https://abc6onyourside.com/news/nation-world/us-warships-stay-in-mediterranean-amid-ukraine-russia-fears?fbclid=IwAR1eJ5H8nmzQKjeAErpk31uUiY0Gt-y6QFtIfMKbU9HSEgoET30baKbumIk
Title: GPF's 2019 prediction: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 07, 2022, 09:40:28 AM
Editor’s Note: Last month, major news outlets were reporting that Russia was amassing troops at its border with Ukraine; an important buffer country, in an effort to reclaim former Soviet Union territory. When you understand how the pieces are lining up, you can predict these kinds of developments, as we did back in December, 2018.
 
Today, we are sharing an excerpt of that original forecast with you (see below). We are proud to provide you with the accurate and in-depth analysis you’ve come to expect from Geopolitical Futures, keeping you ahead of the mainstream and better informed on what’s to come.

From our 2019 Forecast,
The World in 2019: A Year on the Edge

 


Ukraine and Belarus are the two places with the potential for a U.S.-Russia confrontation. Ukraine is at risk of falling apart. Russian influence in Belarus will threaten Poland.
Ukraine is caught in the crossfire of the U.S., the EU and Russia. Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream are expected to be completed in 2019. These pipelines, which connect Russia’s supply of natural gas to the EU and Turkey, circumvent traditional and lucrative natural gas transit routes through Ukraine, giving Moscow further leverage over the government in Kiev. The conflict in eastern Ukraine is frozen but still volatile, and it’s unclear whether Ukraine can govern what’s left of its territory. Russia is better prepared for intervention there than the West is, but Moscow is betting that Ukraine’s internal dysfunctions will eventually bring much of the country, if not the government itself, back into its orbit. At the same time, Ukraine is preparing for a presidential election, slated for March. Polls show no clear frontrunner, so there’s a real chance the political conflict that follows will entangle outside powers, just as it did after the 2014 elections.




Belarus is also concerning. For years, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has juggled relations with the West and Russia, leaning further east or west as necessity dictates. Right now, he is engaging more with the West, much to the chagrin of Russia, which is concerned about increased U.S. military presence in Poland and Romania. Lukashenko has intimated that if a permanent U.S. military base is installed in Poland, Minsk and Moscow may have to respond together. (He has insisted, however, that Russian troops will not be stationed in Belarus.)

In Belarus, as in Ukraine, we do not expect the situation to come apart at the seams – but the competitive forces on both sides are creating tremendous pressure, which, in the shorter term, makes precise developments unpredictable.

-------------------------------------------------
===========================

Also:



Is Russia Planning Another Assault on Ukraine?
By Ekaterina Zolotova
November 17, 2021
Ukraine is a critical part of Russia’s western buffer zone, which separates the Russian border from NATO forces. Moscow therefore has an interest in keeping Ukraine weak and destabilized so that it can more easily expand its own influence there while curbing the West’s.
 
China, Russia and the Strategy of Indirection
By George Friedman
June 29, 2021
The Russians are struggling to regain borders that they had more or less held since the 18th and 19th centuries. Threatening new territories is one thing. Trying to recover lost territory is another, especially when the territory is vast, as it is from Ukraine to Central Asia. What was lost in a year will take generations to recover. It’s more vulnerable than it appears. It has lost so much that regaining Eastern Europe is a dream, and it must resist American attempts to contain it on its current line.
 
Ukraine, War, and the American Doctrine
By George Friedman
December 10, 2021
The Ukrainian border is about 300 miles from Moscow and while no threat exists at this moment, the speed with which a third power such as the United States could appear in Ukraine and threaten the heartland should not be discounted. The Russians cannot discount it, and therefore want to preclude the possibility by controlling Ukraine.
Title: What if the roles were reversed?
Post by: G M on January 07, 2022, 12:20:19 PM
https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/promises-made-promises-broken-what-yeltsin-was-told-about-nato-in-1993-and-why-it-matters-2/

JFK almost had WWIII over missiles in Cuber.

Our “elites” want us to protect Ukrainian borders while dismantling ours.
Title: This is John Bolton's operation, yes?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 07, 2022, 02:27:33 PM
I am sympathetic to GM's point immediately above, but I post this in the interest of a well-rounded discussion:

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18096/russia-putin-nato

Also, note Russian behavior in the recent posts in this thread:

https://firehydrantoffreedom.com/index.php?topic=1673.new#new
Title: Re: What if the roles were reversed?
Post by: DougMacG on January 07, 2022, 03:50:39 PM
These don't equate for me.

"Our “elites” want us to protect Ukrainian borders while dismantling ours."
[/quote]

What we are allowing to happen at our southern border is treasonous, but not related to the questions of whether and how to assist Ukraine against Russia.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on January 07, 2022, 04:03:45 PM
Doug,

We can put our troops on the Uke/Russian border to protect Ukraine, but we can’t protect our own nation from invasion?

It used to be that NATO was a joke, dependents of America’s military might. Now our military is just a bloated version of the pathetic Western European militaries. President Dementia and our fake and gay military have no business in Ukraine. If Putin is a threat to Europe, Europe better step up.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on January 07, 2022, 04:07:20 PM
I bet the Ukrainian military would have loved to have all the weapons and equipment we left for the Taliban.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on January 07, 2022, 09:30:51 PM
Doug,

We can put our troops on the Uke/Russian border to protect Ukraine, but we can’t protect our own nation from invasion?

It used to be that NATO was a joke, dependents of America’s military might. Now our military is just a bloated version of the pathetic Western European militaries. President Dementia and our fake and gay military have no business in Ukraine. If Putin is a threat to Europe, Europe better step up.

http://ace.mu.nu/archives/be%20all%20that%20you%20can%20be.jpg

(http://ace.mu.nu/archives/be%20all%20that%20you%20can%20be.jpg)
Title: Ukraine prepares for the fight
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 08, 2022, 04:45:13 AM
Playing GM's URL of Reply 220 forward.

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https://coffeeordie.com/ukraine-national-resistance-law/?fbclid=IwAR06u2jPBefJUTfjgf0GifIblMRA0YLX5CQOuaKcJPOFJ7qH0h5N2Mw3_A4

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WSJ

A Dangerous Moment for Europe
What will Biden give Putin to avoid an invasion of Ukraine?
By The Editorial Board
Follow
Jan. 7, 2022 6:45 pm ET


Ukrainian border guards watch as a special vehicle digs a trench on the Ukraine-Russia border close to Sumy, Ukraine, Dec. 21, 2021.
PHOTO: UKRAINIAN BOARD GUARD PRESS OFFICE/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The crisis created by Russia at Ukraine’s border is the most dangerous moment for Eastern Europe in decades, and not merely for the chances of a Russian invasion. Another, perhaps greater, risk is what President Biden might concede to Vladimir Putin to prevent an invasion.

On Friday NBC News reported that “U.S. officials are ready to propose discussions on scaling back U.S. and Russian troop deployments and military exercises in Eastern Europe.”

Citing current and former officials, the report said talks “could potentially address the scope of military drills held by both powers, the number of U.S. troops stationed in the Baltic states and Poland, advance notice about the movement of forces, and Russia’s nuclear-capable Iskander missiles in the Russian territory of Kaliningrad between Poland and Lithuania.”

Wow. The report quickly stirred consternation, and pushback from the White House. “Reports that the administration is developing options for pulling back U.S. forces in Eastern Europe in preparation for discussions with Russia next week are not accurate,” a National Security Council spokesperson said.


She added: “We’ve been clear that should Russia further invade Ukraine we would reinforce our eastern flank NATO Allies, to whom we have a sacred obligation. We are tightly lashed up with our NATO Allies as we address this crisis, on the principle of ‘nothing about you without you.’”


We’re glad to hear it, and NBC may have hyped its story. But Mr. Putin has put demands like these on the table as the price of standing down from invasion. Moscow has publicly called on NATO to rule out further expansion eastward—that is, to block Ukraine’s potential membership. The Kremlin also seeks to limit Western military activities such as the ones that NBC says the White House is considering rolling back.

Merely by threatening invasion, Mr. Putin has already gained an advantage. He’s the one making demands of the West, and he’s already won two virtual head-to-head meetings with Mr. Biden. The President has conceded to next week’s security talks, which will address Russia’s concerns about NATO. But Russia’s troops are massed on a neighbor’s borders. NATO has only token forces in Poland and the Baltics.

Mr. Biden offered “two paths” to Mr. Putin during a recent phone call. “One is a path of diplomacy leading toward a de-escalation of the situation, and the other is a path that’s more focused on deterrence, including serious costs,” a senior Administration official said afterward. “Those costs include economic costs, include adjustments and augmentations of NATO force posture in Allied countries, and include additional assistance to Ukraine to enable it to further defend itself.”

Yet Mr. Biden has held off significant deliveries of additional military aid to Kyiv. Assistance sent after Russian tanks begin rolling across the border may arrive too late. The White House apparently fears that making an invasion more costly would provoke the Russians before bilateral negotiations begin in Geneva. But Mr. Putin may interpret that reluctance as a sign of U.S. weakness.

Mr. Putin has long desired to rebuild a Greater Russia sphere of influence, and he clearly thinks the first year of the Biden Presidency is a moment of opportunity. It’s hard to know if this is partly a personal calculation about Mr. Biden and his will and capacities. But Mr. Biden’s willy-nilly flight from Afghanistan can’t have given Mr. Putin any greater fear about U.S. resolve.

***

No one wants a Russian invasion, but worse than a new war in Ukraine would be to let Mr. Putin intimidate NATO into a retreat from Eastern Europe in order to avoid an invasion in the short term. Mr. Putin would pocket that concession, use it to shore up his standing at home, and wait for the next opening to look for more. Would the Baltic states be next?

An invasion of Ukraine would be a tragedy for that country, but letting Mr. Putin dictate Western security terms would be worse for everyone
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on January 08, 2022, 05:34:21 PM
https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/095/050/519/original/b8987712dfdb95bc.jpg

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So, if Putin pushes into Ukraine, we should do what exactly ?
Title: WaPo
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 08, 2022, 06:49:50 PM
Exactly so:

=========================


Negotiators for the United States are planning to show up to talks with their Russian counterparts Monday with proposals to discuss the placement of missiles and scope of military exercises in Europe, according to a senior administration official and others familiar with the plans.

The White House is looking to test whether Moscow is serious about ending the Ukraine crisis through diplomacy or is making unworkable demands as a delay tactic or pretext for a new invasion.

The bilateral talks in Geneva — with Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman leading the U.S. delegation and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov serving as lead representative for the Russians — come as Moscow continues to mass forces and materiel on the border with Ukraine, threatening to take military measures if Washington and its allies fail to address the Kremlin’s security concerns.

A timeline: Why the rifts between Russia and the West keep on growing

The Geneva talks will be followed by a special meeting of the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels on Wednesday and a session of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Vienna on Thursday — chances for the United States to engage Russia together with its allies and partners.

What’s happening in Ukraine, and will Russia really invade?
In early December, U.S. intelligence agencies warned that Russia was planning a massive military invasion of Ukraine. Here’s why Moscow would do that. (Jason Aldag/The Washington Post)

“Our intention is to have an open, sincere and serious dialogue about European security with the Russians at the table. We want to be inclusive. We don’t want to go over anybody’s head,” U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE Michael Carpenter said in an interview.

The multicountry engagements at NATO and the OSCE are a priority for the White House, which has regularly reassured European allies and partners, including Ukraine, that it won’t negotiate “about them, without them.” But the Geneva talks are likely to be the most substantive and closely watched indicator of whether there is a diplomatic deal to be struck that will avert a renewed war in Europe.

“The way the Russians think, there’s only one venue that matters to them and it’s the bilateral one,” said a U.S. government official specializing in Russian affairs who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the issue’s sensitivity. “The rest, from their point of view, is decoration.”


U.S. officials don’t know whether Russian President Vladimir Putin believes the time is right to invade Ukraine once again and attempt to pull the country back into Russia’s strategic orbit by force, or if he is undertaking a more nebulous gambit to extract security concessions from the United States and its allies by threatening Ukraine.

Six ways Russia views Ukraine — and why each should worry the West

In Geneva, U.S. officials will be looking to see whether their Russian counterparts emphasize demands the Kremlin knows are nonstarters — such as providing a legally binding guarantee that NATO will not expand eastward to include Ukraine — or instead focus on areas where there is room for negotiation.

“If the Russians come on Monday and they only want to talk about NATO expansion, then we are going to be at an impasse. I think the administration is prepared to push back — that this is not up for discussion,” said Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a Russia expert at the Center for a New American Security. “But if the Russians want to talk about conventional arms control issues, then there is a discussion to be had — and it would raise the prospect that there could be a diplomatic solution to the crisis.”


Ahead of the talks, top U.S. officials have stepped up their rhetoric about Russian threats.

On Friday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken listed grievances Washington has with Moscow, including Russia’s invasions of two neighboring states, election interference and attempted assassinations with chemical weapons, accusing the Kremlin of driving “the false narrative that NATO is threatening Russia.”

“That’s like the fox saying it had to attack the hen house because its occupants somehow pose a threat,” Blinken said. “We’ve seen this gaslighting before.”

Last month, the Russian Foreign Ministry published draft treaties laying out what Russia wants the United States and NATO to accede to. Parts of the texts were so unrealistic that many Western lawmakers dismissed the Russian approach as unserious. Among other things, Russia demanded the United States and its Western European military allies agree not to put weapons or forces in any of the former Warsaw Pact countries that are now members of NATO.


The drafts raised worries that Putin was looking to create a pretext for a new invasion of Ukraine once the proposals were inevitably spurned. What the Russians are willing to accept short of those demands remains unclear to American negotiators.

The U.S. government official who specializes in Russian affairs believes the Russians are still interested in a real dialogue and want to see whether Washington is willing to discuss any sort of commitment that constrains U.S. power, which for example could include placing limits on U.S. missile deployments in parts of Europe that could threaten Moscow.

“The Russians are waiting to see what we’re going to offer, and they’re going to take it back and decide is this serious?” the official said. “Is this something we can sell as a major victory for security, or is it just, from their point of view, another attempt to fob us off and not give us anything?”

Russia planning massive military offensive against Ukraine involving 175,000 troops, U.S. intelligence warns

U.S. officials have also said they are proceeding on the “principle of reciprocity” and won’t cut deals unless the Russians address U.S. concerns.
Title: Ukraine thought experiment
Post by: G M on January 08, 2022, 07:55:16 PM
What would President Reagan have done if Mexico joined the Warsaw Pact?
Title: Re: Ukraine thought experiment
Post by: DougMacG on January 09, 2022, 07:08:57 AM
What would President Reagan have done if Mexico joined the Warsaw Pact?

What would Reagan have done if the Soviet Union had pushed forward into Finland, Sweden, Norway, Austria, Switzerland?

Thwart them every step of the way, I hope.
Title: Re: Ukraine thought experiment
Post by: G M on January 09, 2022, 09:47:42 AM
What would President Reagan have done if Mexico joined the Warsaw Pact?

What would Reagan have done if the Soviet Union had pushed forward into Finland, Sweden, Norway, Austria, Switzerland?

Thwart them every step of the way, I hope.

Thwart? Interesting way to spell war.

The Mexican government repressed and “disappeared” a lot of communistas between the 60s and the 80s. What if a Marxist government came to power in Mexico during the Cold War? Would the USG see it as an existential threat? Would every option be on the table to address it?

Of course.

Now we a screwing around on Vladi’s front porch and at a time where we are holding a very weak hand.
Everyone knows it.

How much kompromat does Putin have on president kid sniffer and his crackhead son?


Title: Re: Ukraine thought experiment
Post by: DougMacG on January 09, 2022, 10:56:07 AM
What would President Reagan have done if Mexico joined the Warsaw Pact?

What would Reagan have done if the Soviet Union had pushed forward into Finland, Sweden, Norway, Austria, Switzerland?

Thwart them every step of the way, I hope.

Thwart? Interesting way to spell war.

The Mexican government repressed and “disappeared” a lot of communistas between the 60s and the 80s. What if a Marxist government came to power in Mexico during the Cold War? Would the USG see it as an existential threat? Would every option be on the table to address it?

Of course.

Now we a screwing around on Vladi’s front porch and at a time where we are holding a very weak hand.
Everyone knows it.

How much kompromat does Putin have on president kid sniffer and his crackhead son?

You noticed I didn't answer your question.    :wink:

Since Biden Klain or whoever is charge doesn't care what we think, the question to me is what should we do if we or President Pompeo for example was in charge, (and if our own border was secure, a different matter).

The backyard philosophy is fine but Putin isn't analogous to Reagan to me.  NATO isn't an offensive organization, they're barely a defensive one, and not analogous to the Soviets or Putin Russia today.

Yes, thwart.  Some things fall short of sending troops or launching warheads, like offering to supply LNG they may need in a conflict or break with Russia, for example.

Something has kept them from doing this to date.

My analogy is the French and Dutch helping the colonists against foreign rule.

What is THE lesson from WWII?  Intervene earlier against evil, don't let it grow and spread.  Is Putin-Russia a real threat?  Is Xi-China?  If so, sit back, stay home, let evil regimes grow larger and stronger?  Ideally no.
Title: Re: Ukraine thought experiment
Post by: G M on January 09, 2022, 11:34:20 AM
What would President Reagan have done if Mexico joined the Warsaw Pact?

What would Reagan have done if the Soviet Union had pushed forward into Finland, Sweden, Norway, Austria, Switzerland?

Thwart them every step of the way, I hope.

Thwart? Interesting way to spell war.

The Mexican government repressed and “disappeared” a lot of communistas between the 60s and the 80s. What if a Marxist government came to power in Mexico during the Cold War? Would the USG see it as an existential threat? Would every option be on the table to address it?

Of course.

Now we a screwing around on Vladi’s front porch and at a time where we are holding a very weak hand.
Everyone knows it.

How much kompromat does Putin have on president kid sniffer and his crackhead son?

You noticed I didn't answer your question.    :wink:

Since Biden Klain or whoever is charge doesn't care what we think, the question to me is what should we do if we or President Pompeo for example was in charge, (and if our own border was secure, a different matter).

The backyard philosophy is fine but Putin isn't analogous to Reagan to me.  NATO isn't an offensive organization, they're barely a defensive one, and not analogous to the Soviets or Putin Russia today.

Yes, thwart.  Some things fall short of sending troops or launching warheads, like offering to supply LNG they may need in a conflict or break with Russia, for example.

Something has kept them from doing this to date.

My analogy is the French and Dutch helping the colonists against foreign rule.

What is THE lesson from WWII?  Intervene earlier against evil, don't let it grow and spread.  Is Putin-Russia a real threat?  Is Xi-China?  If so, sit back, stay home, let evil regimes grow larger and stronger?  Ideally no.

We just gave the global jihad Afghanistan and billions of dollars of weapons and equipment. The global jihad is expansionist and has taken root most places around the globe. Including Western Europe and the Attorney General’s Office of the State of Minnesota.

Russia? Not so much. Unlike our leadership, Putin actually seeks to preserve and protect Russia. He takes his National Security seriously. At this point, the American Military-Industrial Complex has long abandoned the concept of winning wars, replacing it with ensuring that defense contractors have steady revenue streams.

Losing Taiwan would have serious consequences globally, but especially profound ones to the US. The Ukraine? Not so much. Pick your fights carefully, especially when the other side has ICBMs.

Title: Re: Ukraine thought experiment
Post by: DougMacG on January 09, 2022, 01:32:23 PM
"Pick your fights carefully".   - Yes.

I would add, pick your sit-this-one-out choices wisely too.

Iraq and Afghan:  There was a point where Baghdad had fallen, Saddam was pulled out his cowering hole and hanged.  We could have left.  Osama, in the end, was actually pulled out of Pakistan.  Very costly wars but easy to imagine how those two accomplishments might have happened with 1/10th the cost in lives and dollars and no gear or people left behind.

"Losing Taiwan would have serious consequences globally, but especially profound ones to the US. The Ukraine? Not so much."

Two different situations with some similarities, plus they might easily be linked if two US enemies join forces:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pacific_Fleet_(Russia)

Crucial question:  Which emboldens Xi more, if the US rolls over when Putin takes Ukraine, or if Russia does not take Ukraine because US and NATO flex a little muscle and influence?

Maybe Ukraine assistance 2022 is one for impotent Europe without us.  Someone should persuade Russia to leave its neighbors alone.

Title: Re: Ukraine thought experiment
Post by: G M on January 09, 2022, 02:36:43 PM
"Pick your fights carefully".   - Yes.

I would add, pick your sit-this-one-out choices wisely too.

Iraq and Afghan:  There was a point where Baghdad had fallen, Saddam was pulled out his cowering hole and hanged.  We could have left.  Osama, in the end, was actually pulled out of Pakistan.  Very costly wars but easy to imagine how those two accomplishments might have happened with 1/10th the cost in lives and dollars and no gear or people left behind.

"Losing Taiwan would have serious consequences globally, but especially profound ones to the US. The Ukraine? Not so much."

Two different situations with some similarities, plus they might easily be linked if two US enemies join forces:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pacific_Fleet_(Russia)

Crucial question:  Which emboldens Xi more, if the US rolls over when Putin takes Ukraine, or if Russia does not take Ukraine because US and NATO flex a little muscle and influence?

Maybe Ukraine assistance 2022 is one for impotent Europe without us.  Someone should persuade Russia to leave its neighbors alone.

What emboldens Xi is the same thing that emboldens all
Of our enemies globall, our cut and run from A-stan and Grandpa Felonyfingers as Commander in Chief.

We lost to illiterate goat fcukers (I know a retired cop that trained the Afghan National Army, the Afghans really do that and think nothing of it). Let’s not rush into a fight with a nuclear armed “need peer”.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 09, 2022, 05:07:13 PM
What pushed the Soviet Empire over the cliff was our arming the mujahadeen with shoulder mounted rockets that took down Russian helicopters.

As best as I can tell the Ukes have the balls and the will to fight.  Let's enable them to do so-- as President Trump started to do.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on January 09, 2022, 05:16:04 PM
What pushed the Soviet Empire over the cliff was our arming the mujahadeen with shoulder mounted rockets that took down Russian helicopters.

As best as I can tell the Ukes have the balls and the will to fight.  Let's enable them to do so-- as President Trump started to do.
Or we could just agree to not bring NATO to Russia’s border…
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/guerrilla-tactics-offer-ukraines-best-chance-against-putins-invasion-force/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 09, 2022, 05:20:38 PM
In return for , , , what?

Or, as a freebie?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on January 09, 2022, 05:22:05 PM
In return for , , , what?

Or, as a freebie?

For him agreeing to leave the Ukes alone.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 09, 2022, 05:34:51 PM
The Russians already did that with the Budapest Accord (think I am remembering the name correctly-- in 1993?) and then invaded Crimea and the Donbass.

Ask the Kazakhis about Russia as a neighbor-- check out the recent entries on the Central Asia thread for a memory freshener , , ,
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on January 09, 2022, 05:50:22 PM
The Russians already did that with the Budapest Accord (think I am remembering the name correctly-- in 1993?) and then invaded Crimea and the Donbass.

Ask the Kazakhis about Russia as a neighbor-- check out the recent entries on the Central Asia thread for a memory freshener , , ,

If Ukraine became a NATO member, then Article 5 applies to them, yes?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 09, 2022, 06:28:38 PM
Your point being?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on January 09, 2022, 07:10:48 PM
Your point being?

An attack on Ukraine is supposed to be treated as an attack on the US. So if Putin decides to move into the Ukraine then, either we got to war with Russia or NATO is shown to be worthless.

Does that strike you as going to a stupid place to do stupid things with stupid people?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 10, 2022, 01:29:58 AM
My reference to the Budapest Accord was a reminder to your comment that in return for not bringing Ukraine into NATO Putin would promise to leave Ukraine alone that Russian promises mean little.

It was not a call for bringing Ukraine into NATO.

We are in agreement that that would be a very poor idea-- quite The Three Ss. 

OTOH arming and supporting Uke resistance, hard sanctions, etc. seem to me a good and necessary response.
Title: Good thing we’d never stoop to doing this!
Post by: G M on January 16, 2022, 04:09:01 PM
https://www.theburningplatform.com/2022/01/16/false-flags-suddenly-no-longer-a-crazy-conspiracy-theory/#more-256935
Title: WRM's analysis
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 18, 2022, 03:38:33 AM
How to Halt Putin’s Ukraine Push
The U.S. needs unity and tough diplomacy. Economic sanctions won’t be enough.

By Walter Russell Mead
Follow
Jan. 17, 2022 5:20 pm ET


As the Ukrainian crisis deepens, there is only one option that would stop a Russian invasion—and that is the one that all the serious players in Washington say is off the table: dispatching an American and coalition force to defend Ukraine. Vladimir Putin is not ready for war with the U.S.; informing his gamble is a well-grounded conviction that America is not committed enough to Ukraine to defend it by force.

History may look back on this as a failure of nerve equal to the appeasement of the 1930s. Britain and France thought war was unthinkable until it became unavoidable. With troops off the table, the Biden administration hopes to whip up a mass of economic sanctions and political repercussions (up to arming Ukrainian insurgents) grave enough to warn Mr. Putin away from his intended prey.

“Hopes” is the operative word. In Washington, where trying to guess Mr. Putin’s intentions has become a bigger indoor sport than Wordle, even administration insiders doubt this approach will work. A worst-case scenario, in which Russia seizes much of Ukraine and the West invokes sanctions that fail to reverse the invasion, seems likely.

America’s Indo-Pacific allies in particular are watching with horror. A Russian occupation would expose the fragile underpinnings of world order and encourage China and North Korea to probe for weakness. And if America responds to Russian aggression by building up North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces and entering a prolonged confrontation with Moscow, what becomes of the U.S. focus on the Pacific?


Caught in this ugly predicament, Team Biden must improve the odds of deterring a Russian invasion and plan for the possibility—some think it’s a probability—that deterrence fails and Mr. Putin attacks. To do that, it must plan consequences that Mr. Putin will find serious, challenge his calculations about American weakness, and, without appeasement, make the peaceful option look more attractive.


When it comes to threats, Democrats and Republicans alike tend to overvalue the effect of economic sanctions and underestimate their cost. Europe depends so heavily on Russian oil and gas that sanctions are necessarily limited in their scope. Even very small, poor countries like Cuba and North Korea have been undeterred by sanctions more severe than any Russia is likely to face. Formal defense ties uniting Sweden, Finland and the U.S. with a commitment to defending the Baltic states, or the restoration of close defense relations between the U.S. and Turkey (which has sold Ukraine drones and has much to fear from a resurgent Russia), would impress Mr. Putin more.


Beyond that, President Biden must do more to restore U.S. credibility than saying “America is back.” Mr. Putin believes the American polarization he has helped promote is so bitter that our foreign policy is doomed to be erratic, changing with every presidential election, and ineffective, because our domestic disputes leave little energy or political capital for foreign affairs. As tensions with Russia mounted, Mr. Biden flew to Atlanta to make the most divisive speech of his presidency, confirming Mr. Putin’s dismissive ideas about American paralysis at the worst possible time.

To defend peace abroad, President Biden needs to make some peace at home. Resistance to Russia unites both progressive and conservative senators. A bipartisan Senate delegation arrived in Kyiv over the weekend. The administration can and should develop a Russia policy with bipartisan support and put that unity prominently on display.

Mr. Biden then needs to use all the considerable tools at his disposal to educate the American people about the new and dangerous world we inhabit. The holiday from history is over. Between China and Russia, America faces adversaries as powerful and relentless as any we faced in the Cold War. It is President Biden’s mission to get this message across.

Finally, he needs to open an effective back channel to explore a way forward. Mr. Putin isn’t wrong that Washington and Moscow need a relationship that acknowledges Russia’s new power. Quiet conversations between senior people on both sides are likely to be more effective than official exchanges.

These steps can improve the odds of a better outcome in Ukraine, and position the U.S. better should deterrence fail, but the final decision is out of our hands. American policy makers should reread their George Kennan. His 1946 Long Telegram provides an analytical framework that explains why the U.S.-Russia relationship is so volatile, why attempted resets with Mr. Putin have failed, and how best to manage an important relationship that will never be easy
Title: WSJ: Don't Bail Out Putin
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 18, 2022, 09:58:59 AM
second post


OPINION  BUSINESS WORLD
Don’t Bail Out Putin
His Ukraine gambit is ultimately about enlisting the West in a scheme to prop up his rule.

By Holman W. Jenkins, Jr.
Follow
Jan. 14, 2022 6:23 pm ET


Good things come to strong, successful nations. Neighbors crave closer ties. Allies don’t object to being part of a “sphere of influence.” Vladimir Putin has given his neighboring peoples only reasons to run away from him. They wouldn’t clamor for NATO membership if not for the kind of regime Mr. Putin operates.

All nations have geographical vulnerabilities on paper, including the U.S. with its long land border with Mexico and Canada. But they worry about these vulnerabilities only when they need to. If it were in Mr. Putin’s interest, he would be first to emphasize that Ukraine is incapable of posing a military threat to Russia, that no aggressive enemy—and certainly not NATO—has the means or will to use Ukraine to attack Russia. Ukraine has no desire to put itself in such a position.


Mr. Putin is playing a weak hand not cleverly but noisily. Strong leaders don’t make continual spectacles out of themselves. Mr. Putin is forcing the Biden administration to play his game over Ukraine because he needs the U.S. to deliver him something of importance to his regime—bluntly, to prop it up. He wants the U.S. to acquiesce in a Russian “sphere of influence” not for Russia’s military security, but to make Mr. Putin seem powerful and inevitable to Russians at home.


He has created an awkward situation for himself in Ukraine twice over. Ukraine’s rapidly consolidating military power could roll up the Russian separatists in the country’s east, administering a defeat Mr. Putin might find it hard to survive. But even dragged down by the sterile wasteland of a separatist enclave, Ukraine still is muddling toward liberalization and integration with the West, with living standards looking up, a development that also threatens Mr. Putin’s survival.


To this self-created crisis in the west, now add instability in Kazakhstan. Mr. Putin will continue to face such challenges along the ex-Soviet periphery, from citizens who tire of repression and stagnation, which Mr. Putin will try to control with cyber threats, energy threats, corruption of foreign elites (such as former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder ) and by recurrently threatening to embroil NATO in his problems.

And so a moment of realism arrives. As economist and Russian oppositionist Vladimir Milov told a Hudson Institute podcast, “This idea that we can somehow make a deal with Putin and avoid costs, no. Costs will be only greater if you [in the outside world] miss the action right now”—i.e., fail to understand the game Mr. Putin is playing

It would be better if Mr. Putin had not heard messages that the West always prefers Putinesque stability to short-term risk. For once the Munich lesson holds: There’s no stable solution to Mr. Putin’s problems that Western appeasement can provide. His regime is on course only for deeper repression and more military adverturism. Yes, with enough ceremonial atmospherics, the U.S. might reach a token agreement that Mr. Putin could use to claim victory for now, but he will need more such victories. He will need Ukraine to remain a failing state. He will ratchet up tensions with the U.S. superpower to keep his people accepting of a society run for oligarch billionaires while the population shrinks and drinks itself to one of the shortest life expectancies in the developed world.

Though appeasement might seem preferable to the Biden administration, not to mention the Germans, the U.S. needs to think about its long-term health in a world where despots see brandishing nuclear weapons and cyber threats as a way to extort forms of payola from outsiders to sustain themselves in power against their own people. Mr. Putin is not different from Kim Jong Un in this regard or the mullahs in Iran. Mr. Putin is right about one thing only: Russia has natural attributes that should make it an influential power, a magnet in its region. These pieces would quickly fall into place if not for the nature of Mr. Putin’s rule.


Nothing here guarantees that, without some U.S.-bestowed victory, Mr. Putin won’t launch a fresh invasion of Ukraine. This would be a tragedy for Ukrainians and also the least good option for Mr. Putin. The benefits would be short-lived, possibly nonexistent. It suits Mr. Putin to pretend that he’s living in the 1940s, that globalization is optional, military geography isn’t. But his regime is nothing without its considerable degree of integration with the global economy, which he knows he puts in danger every time he tries to solve his domestic problems at the expense of straining relations with the U.S.-led global community.

The U.S. and its allies have always had the strong hand, in the unlikely event they were willing to play it. If Russian tanks in Ukrainian streets are seen on Western TV screens, there’s no telling what the mood shift might allow.
Title: Re: WSJ: Don't Bail Out Putin
Post by: G M on January 18, 2022, 10:01:06 AM
Now do the Monroe Doctrine.

second post


OPINION  BUSINESS WORLD
Don’t Bail Out Putin
His Ukraine gambit is ultimately about enlisting the West in a scheme to prop up his rule.

By Holman W. Jenkins, Jr.
Follow
Jan. 14, 2022 6:23 pm ET


Good things come to strong, successful nations. Neighbors crave closer ties. Allies don’t object to being part of a “sphere of influence.” Vladimir Putin has given his neighboring peoples only reasons to run away from him. They wouldn’t clamor for NATO membership if not for the kind of regime Mr. Putin operates.

All nations have geographical vulnerabilities on paper, including the U.S. with its long land border with Mexico and Canada. But they worry about these vulnerabilities only when they need to. If it were in Mr. Putin’s interest, he would be first to emphasize that Ukraine is incapable of posing a military threat to Russia, that no aggressive enemy—and certainly not NATO—has the means or will to use Ukraine to attack Russia. Ukraine has no desire to put itself in such a position.


Mr. Putin is playing a weak hand not cleverly but noisily. Strong leaders don’t make continual spectacles out of themselves. Mr. Putin is forcing the Biden administration to play his game over Ukraine because he needs the U.S. to deliver him something of importance to his regime—bluntly, to prop it up. He wants the U.S. to acquiesce in a Russian “sphere of influence” not for Russia’s military security, but to make Mr. Putin seem powerful and inevitable to Russians at home.


He has created an awkward situation for himself in Ukraine twice over. Ukraine’s rapidly consolidating military power could roll up the Russian separatists in the country’s east, administering a defeat Mr. Putin might find it hard to survive. But even dragged down by the sterile wasteland of a separatist enclave, Ukraine still is muddling toward liberalization and integration with the West, with living standards looking up, a development that also threatens Mr. Putin’s survival.


To this self-created crisis in the west, now add instability in Kazakhstan. Mr. Putin will continue to face such challenges along the ex-Soviet periphery, from citizens who tire of repression and stagnation, which Mr. Putin will try to control with cyber threats, energy threats, corruption of foreign elites (such as former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder ) and by recurrently threatening to embroil NATO in his problems.

And so a moment of realism arrives. As economist and Russian oppositionist Vladimir Milov told a Hudson Institute podcast, “This idea that we can somehow make a deal with Putin and avoid costs, no. Costs will be only greater if you [in the outside world] miss the action right now”—i.e., fail to understand the game Mr. Putin is playing

It would be better if Mr. Putin had not heard messages that the West always prefers Putinesque stability to short-term risk. For once the Munich lesson holds: There’s no stable solution to Mr. Putin’s problems that Western appeasement can provide. His regime is on course only for deeper repression and more military adverturism. Yes, with enough ceremonial atmospherics, the U.S. might reach a token agreement that Mr. Putin could use to claim victory for now, but he will need more such victories. He will need Ukraine to remain a failing state. He will ratchet up tensions with the U.S. superpower to keep his people accepting of a society run for oligarch billionaires while the population shrinks and drinks itself to one of the shortest life expectancies in the developed world.

Though appeasement might seem preferable to the Biden administration, not to mention the Germans, the U.S. needs to think about its long-term health in a world where despots see brandishing nuclear weapons and cyber threats as a way to extort forms of payola from outsiders to sustain themselves in power against their own people. Mr. Putin is not different from Kim Jong Un in this regard or the mullahs in Iran. Mr. Putin is right about one thing only: Russia has natural attributes that should make it an influential power, a magnet in its region. These pieces would quickly fall into place if not for the nature of Mr. Putin’s rule.


Nothing here guarantees that, without some U.S.-bestowed victory, Mr. Putin won’t launch a fresh invasion of Ukraine. This would be a tragedy for Ukrainians and also the least good option for Mr. Putin. The benefits would be short-lived, possibly nonexistent. It suits Mr. Putin to pretend that he’s living in the 1940s, that globalization is optional, military geography isn’t. But his regime is nothing without its considerable degree of integration with the global economy, which he knows he puts in danger every time he tries to solve his domestic problems at the expense of straining relations with the U.S.-led global community.

The U.S. and its allies have always had the strong hand, in the unlikely event they were willing to play it. If Russian tanks in Ukrainian streets are seen on Western TV screens, there’s no telling what the mood shift might allow.
Title: A very sophisticated analysis of the Ukraine issue
Post by: G M on January 18, 2022, 11:11:30 AM
https://jrnyquist.blog/2022/01/18/will-russia-invade-ukraine/
Title: D1
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 18, 2022, 11:21:58 AM
January 18, 2022   
         
It's another busy week of diplomacy for Europe as America's top diplomat travels to Ukraine today, followed by a stop in Berlin on Thursday to speak with German, French, and British officials.

For the record, United States State Secretary Antony Blinken's travel this week is "part of the diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the tension caused by Russia's military build-up and continued aggression against Ukraine," State Department spokesman Ned Price said in a statement Tuesday morning.

Blinken also rang up his Russian counterpart Tuesday morning. In that call, the secretary "reiterated the unshakable U.S. commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and underscored that any discussion of European security must include NATO Allies and European partners, including Ukraine," Foggy Bottom announced in a separate statement Tuesday.

Germany's foreign minister traveled to Moscow today, where she met with the same man Blinken spoke to by phone, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Reuters has a tiny bit more from that one, here.

And NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg is dropping by Berlin today to meet with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Defence Minister Christine Lambrecht.

More than a half dozen U.S. lawmakers visited Ukraine's president and defense minister on Monday. And that bipartisan delegation included Sens. Rob Portman, R-Ohio; Jeanne Shaheen, D-N.H.; Chris Murphy, D-Conn.; Kevin Cramer, R-N.D.; Amy Klobuchar, D-Minn.; Roger Wicker, R-Miss.; and Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn.

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One of the CODEL's messages to Ukraine: "The United States Congress will give President Biden the authority he needs to build a set of massive deterrent sanctions to dissuade Russia from further invading Ukraine," Sen. Murphy tweeted Monday.

"Ukraine is a vital U.S. partner who is standing resolute in the face of Vladimir Putin's shameful and illegal aggression," Wicker said in his own statement Monday, and emphasized, "It is imperative that the United States stay strong in the face of Russian aggression and stand by our friends who are fighting for freedom."

The British military is rushing "anti-armor" weapons to Ukraine, Defence Secretary Ben Wallace told the House of Commons on Monday. "Let me be clear: this support is for short-range, and clearly defensive weapons capabilities; they are not strategic weapons and pose no threat to Russia," Wallace said. "They are to use in self-defence and the UK personnel providing the early-stage training will return to the United Kingdom after completing it."

The reason why: "As of today, tens of thousands of Russian troops are positioned close to the Ukrainian border," the secretary told lawmakers Monday. "Their deployment is not routine, and they are equipped with tanks, armoured fighting vehicles, rocket artillery, and short-range ballistic missiles."

And regarding Russia's big gripe (NATO is getting too close), "Countries choose NATO; NATO does not choose them," Wallace said. "If Russia has concerns about the enlargement, it should perhaps ask itself why, when people were free to choose, they chose NATO." Read over his full remarks, including several overtures to Moscow, here.

ICYMI: "Russia denies looking for pretext to invade Ukraine," the Associated Press reported Monday from Moscow.
Title: GPF: Ukraine update
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 18, 2022, 11:33:58 AM
second

Nations have begun deploying assets to support the government in Kyiv.
By: Geopolitical Futures

Support for Ukraine. Western states have begun sending support to Kyiv amid the ongoing speculation about a possible Russian invasion. British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace said on Monday that the U.K. has started supplying Ukraine with anti-tank weapons – noting that they will be used only for self-defense. Wallace also said a small number of British troops would go to Ukraine to train forces on using the weapons. Meanwhile, Canada has reportedly deployed special operations forces to Ukraine. The troops will be there to support the Ukrainian government and deter a possible Russian incursion, as well as to help evacuate Canadian diplomats if a conflict erupts, according to Canadian media. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is also planning to visit Ukraine later this week as part of Washington’s deescalation efforts.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with U.S. senators to discuss the situation at the border. Zelensky thanked the United States for its assistance and called for a preventive package of sanctions against Russia to be drawn up. This comes as Russia has launched more exercises in its Western Military District involving more than 2,000 military personnel.
Title: "no option is off the table"
Post by: ccp on January 18, 2022, 01:54:33 PM
LOL
that means military action is out  :wink:

Psaki said Secretary of State Tony Blinken would meet with his Russian counterpart in Switzerland this week to urge Putin not to invade Ukraine and warn of “severe” consequences if they chose to do so.

“No option is off the table,” she said.
Title: Re: "no option is off the table"
Post by: G M on January 18, 2022, 02:08:04 PM
Get ready for Putin to run the table on them.


LOL
that means military action is out  :wink:

Psaki said Secretary of State Tony Blinken would meet with his Russian counterpart in Switzerland this week to urge Putin not to invade Ukraine and warn of “severe” consequences if they chose to do so.

“No option is off the table,” she said.
Title: Russia thins out its Uke embassy
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 18, 2022, 03:06:57 PM
https://dnyuz.com/2022/01/17/russia-thins-out-its-embassy-in-ukraine-a-possible-clue-to-putins-next-move/?fbclid=IwAR3MS7MQPga2cfJqHYYMnsrg9-zQ-oknnd4l6Qti1FwsRR6hmYATMcWHyLE
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 18, 2022, 03:08:08 PM
I thought we were all of the opinion that US troops would be profoundly unwise?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on January 18, 2022, 03:31:53 PM
I thought we were all of the opinion that US troops would be profoundly unwise?

I am. But the sooper geniuses that brought us disaster in Afghanistan are ready for a whole other disaster with a nuclear armed near peer.
Title: GPF: What the failure of the talks means
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 19, 2022, 02:35:10 PM
January 19, 2022
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
What the Failure of the US-NATO-Russia Talks Means
Putin can’t enter the Ukraine crisis and leave with nothing.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova

Negotiations last week between the United States and Russia say a lot without saying much at all. Talks first took place on Jan. 9 ahead of more official discussions in Geneva the next day. A few days later, Russia and NATO spoke in Brussels about Ukraine and, related, the non-expansion of NATO to the east.

There was never much hope for the negotiations, the top agenda for which was Russia’s proposals for security guarantees, especially vis-a-vis NATO. The three parties ended their talks agreeing only that disagreements remain. After the meetings, the media naturally began to talk about escalation and preparations for an invasion of Ukraine. But this “escalation” looks like a tactic rather than a true position, an attempt by Russia to pressure its adversaries to participate in additional meetings and thus ensure the safety of its precious buffer zones.

Buffer Between Russia and NATO
(click to enlarge)

Showtime

Even during the negotiations, Russia began to up its psychological pressure on the U.S. and NATO. For example, it initiated military exercises in the western regions of Voronezh, Belgorod, Bryansk and Smolensk – all of them close to the Ukrainian border. (Roughly 3,000 troops participated.) The purpose of the drills was clear: to demonstrate its capabilities and a desire to protect its interests. Psychological operations such as these are particularly important to Moscow, which believes it needs to stand its ground without resorting to war or incurring additional sanctions.

Conflict in Eastern Ukraine
(click to enlarge)

The purpose of Moscow’s demands is also pretty clear. It wanted a guarantee from NATO and Washington that they would not use neighboring countries to prepare for or carry out an armed attack on Russia. It wanted Washington to halt the eastward expansion of NATO, refusing the admission of all former Soviet satellite states. And it wanted assurances that the U.S. would not create military bases in those states, and that NATO would cease military activities in Ukraine as well as other parts of Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Without these guarantees, Russia will inevitably feel vulnerable in its western borderlands. Indeed, one of its most important geopolitical imperatives is to maintain a buffer zone between its heartland and external threats from Europe.

Of course, the Kremlin never expected the U.S. to capitulate to its demands last week. But it had hoped that the West would at least soften some of its stances on these issues. And since the negotiations didn’t go anywhere, we can all expect Russia to act a little more aggressively, if only rhetorically, in the near term. After all, the borderlands remain unsecured: There is a frozen conflict in Donbass, the Caucasus region is constantly challenged by Turkey, and Central Asia is still unstable. In a recent interview with CNN, for example, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov made several statements that Russia’s relations with NATO are approaching a redline thanks to the alliance’s military support for Ukraine. He went on to say that NATO is a tool of confrontation, that Russia is seeing a gradual NATO invasion of Ukraine, and that proposed U.S. sanctions against Russian leaders could lead to the termination of bilateral relations. Moreover, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, a direct participant in negotiations, said in an interview with RTVI that he cannot rule out the possibility of deploying military assets to Cuba and Venezuela if negotiations with the West fail. Again, this may all be rhetorical, but it nonetheless puts the U.S. on the defensive – and publicly at that.

Aside from heightened rhetoric, Russia has openly stepped up military movements. Over the past week, several dozen videos on TikTok and Instagram have shown the transfer of military personnel and equipment from Siberia and the Far East to Russia’s western regions. Soon thereafter, the Tank Army of the Western Military District began exercises in five regions, in which more than 800 servicemen and more than 300 weapons were involved. Elsewhere, Russian troops began to arrive in southern and western Belarus for exercises. With these moves, Russia intends to send the message that its forces are ready.

Limits

Despite this performative maneuvering, and despite reports of possible strikes, there’s plenty of evidence to suggest neither Russia nor the United States is interested in a serious military confrontation.

First, if Russia wanted a confrontation, it would have done it quietly. Well-advertised military movements, particularly ones involving soldiers from the polar opposite end of the country, surrender any element of surprise Russia could have hoped to have. And though the numbers of troops and tanks in western Russia seem large, they are not nearly enough to wage a winnable war in the vast lands of Ukraine. (Notably, the repositioning of Russian materiel has been underway for nearly a year; it didn’t just start last week.)

Second, deploying weapons or troops to Cuba and Venezuela is no easy task. It would be difficult in the best of times, but these are not the best of times. Bilateral cooperation between them and Russia, for example, is far weaker than it has been in recent years. And in any case, operating in such a remote region requires active movement and reliable logistics to ensure the safety of military installations. The projects will require serious capital investment, which Russia's unstable economy is not ready for.

Last, the Kremlin can achieve its imperative of securing a buffer zone without resorting to war. For Moscow, a peaceful stabilization in Donbass is a suboptimal but entirely acceptable outcome. Any truce thereto would paint Russian President Vladimir Putin as a peace negotiator who put an end to the frozen conflict, likely raising his approval ratings and world standing. In short, Putin can’t enter a crisis and leave with nothing. The U.S. has even less reason to intervene in a conflict far from its borders with no exit strategy.

Russia wants to appear ready to wage war without losing any leverage at the negotiating table. For its part, the U.S. suspects Russia is probably bluffing. It understands Russia’s limits, and it’s seen this movie before. Russia will continue to conduct operations to try to achieve control over the buffer zone, and the U.S. will be unhappy with those actions, but both sides understand that to ease tensions, they will have to have a dialogue not with the EU, NATO or Ukraine but with each other.
Title: Budapest memorandum
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 19, 2022, 03:59:27 PM
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/12/04/the-budapest-memorandum-and-u-s-obligations/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on January 19, 2022, 04:07:48 PM
"I thought we were all of the opinion that US troops would be profoundly unwise?"

well isn't that what "all options are on the table" means

it is the most stupid bluff our idiotic leaders use

it is something Hillary would be saying, or Obamster , as they always did

just so empty is is laughable

(except for Trump who did not bluff)

the honest thing to say would be:  we are going to have a chat (or since it is now vogue - a 'conversation ') with "our friends and allies"

while Russian tanks and troops are rolling onto the streets of Kyiv.

unless Putin himself is bluffing which I still think he is .................

Title: Sleepwalking into WWIII
Post by: G M on January 20, 2022, 05:29:12 PM
https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2022/01/video-guest-tucker-carlson-sounds-alarm-biden-sleepwalking-us-war-russia-not-just-nuts-dangerous-precipice-conflict-unseen-since-w/
Title: Re: Sleepwalking into WWIII
Post by: G M on January 20, 2022, 07:59:38 PM
https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2022/01/video-guest-tucker-carlson-sounds-alarm-biden-sleepwalking-us-war-russia-not-just-nuts-dangerous-precipice-conflict-unseen-since-w/


Matthew Bracken
@Matt_Bracken

5h
·
·

Edited
In 1990 James Baker promised Gorbachev an "Austrian solution" in return for Soviet armed forces leaving Eastern Europe. Specially, we would not expand NATO eastward. The Russians feel totally lied to and betrayed, that our promises were worthless.

You can say, "Tough shit, Russia, that's the way the ball bounces," as we expanded NATO from Estonia to Romania, including missile bases in Poland etc.

But if you want to instigate a land war in Europe, there is no better way than to tell Russian we have the right to include Ukraine in NATO at our pleasure.

Ukraine and Belorussia have been "STRONGLY" part of Russia for many centuries. Their status as "independent nations" has mainly been a fiction. Because of the flat terrain and difficulty in defending Mother Russia from invasion, these 2 countries have been kept rigidly under Russia's control as buffer states. So in the Russian psyche, the chance of Ukraine joining NATO is a chance worth going to war over.

If our diplomats are too stupid or mendacious to understand that, please don't be surprised if the Russians move to secure eastern Ukraine by force of arms.

To Russia, this is EXACTLY like Communist China, during a period of extreme U.S. economic weakness, suborning, bribing and buying influence from Panama to finally Mexico, with a Mexican CCP puppet president "requesting" CCP armed forces to "guarantee their security against Yankee aggression."

You can say, "that is not a good analogy," but what you or I think means nothing. It's what the Russians believe about Ukraine that counts.

We are stumbling stupidly into a land war in Europe, by refusing the simple promise of a neutral Ukraine, aka, "The Austrian Solution" that James Baker promised Gorbachev, even now at the last moment, in the last country.

Russia WILL go to war over Ukraine, and it's because we are too proud and stupid to say, "Let Ukraine remain neutral, like Austria."

We are "holding onto the right to invite any damn country into NATO," and over this prideful blunder, we are going to blunder into war.

And unless we go nuclear, Russia will kick our asses and humiliate the West in Ukraine. Their theater-level military forces makes our ability to project regional power a trivial joke. They hold us in special disregard now after our humiliating and disgraceful exist from Afghanistan.

And the current POTUS is such a senile fool that he said on a world stage yesterday what he was not supposed to say out loud, that the U.S. position is that a small incursion would invite a small response. His cabinet and media sycophants have been cleaning up that mess all day.

God help us.

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on January 21, 2022, 10:38:32 AM
I thought we were all of the opinion that US troops would be profoundly unwise?

I am. But the sooper geniuses that brought us disaster in Afghanistan are ready for a whole other disaster with a nuclear armed near peer.

http://ace.mu.nu/archives/397498.php

Here is our disaster.
Title: Let’s start WWIII to distract from all our other failures!
Post by: G M on January 21, 2022, 03:55:46 PM
https://thepostmillennial.com/biden-administration-seeking-conflict-with-russia-to-restore-credibility

This should turn out well.
Title: Macron calls for EU talks with Kremlin; Germany flips off Biden invite
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 21, 2022, 04:09:24 PM
https://www.voanews.com/a/macron-s-call-for-eu-talks-with-kremlin-unnerves-european-allies-/6405475.html

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-chancellor-turned-down-biden-invite-discuss-ukraine-crisis-der-spiegel-2022-01-21/?fbclid=IwAR0QAEoycx41Wm1UNUFK5vcTRd0t2KJpYL6L4tB0feJto37gHbNMK6IT7is
Title: Re: Macron calls for EU talks with Kremlin; Germany flips off Biden invite
Post by: G M on January 21, 2022, 04:25:26 PM
Working out terms of surrender?

https://www.voanews.com/a/macron-s-call-for-eu-talks-with-kremlin-unnerves-european-allies-/6405475.html

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-chancellor-turned-down-biden-invite-discuss-ukraine-crisis-der-spiegel-2022-01-21/?fbclid=IwAR0QAEoycx41Wm1UNUFK5vcTRd0t2KJpYL6L4tB0feJto37gHbNMK6IT7is
Title: Re: Macron calls for EU talks with Kremlin; Germany flips off Biden invite
Post by: G M on January 21, 2022, 06:44:27 PM
https://www.theburningplatform.com/2022/01/21/putin-could-take-all-of-europe-in-the-blink-of-an-eye-its-time-to-be-awake-not-woke/#more-257392

Working out terms of surrender?

https://www.voanews.com/a/macron-s-call-for-eu-talks-with-kremlin-unnerves-european-allies-/6405475.html

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-chancellor-turned-down-biden-invite-discuss-ukraine-crisis-der-spiegel-2022-01-21/?fbclid=IwAR0QAEoycx41Wm1UNUFK5vcTRd0t2KJpYL6L4tB0feJto37gHbNMK6IT7is
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 21, 2022, 07:35:18 PM
Some interesting thoughts in there.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 21, 2022, 07:44:49 PM
Well, I'm not against Europe looking to itself.  The idea of the US carrying the load while Germany e.g. gets to free rider is not a persuasive one for me.

Daily Memo: Johnson and Scholz Talk Ukraine
European leaders are urging for a coordinated response to Russia.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Concerns over Ukraine. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson discussed the situation in Ukraine with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on Thursday. Both expressed concerns over Russia’s actions, and Johnson called for a coordinated response from NATO members. Also on Thursday, the president of the European Commission reiterated the threat of new sanctions against Russia if Moscow attacks Ukraine. Meanwhile, Spain’s defense minister said on Thursday that Madrid sent warships to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. She added that Spain was considering sending fighter jets to Bulgaria to contribute to the deterrence efforts against Russia.

MARC:  But all this is but the appetizer.  Ultimately all this must be assessed in terms of China going after Taiwan.
Title: Dick Morris vs Tucker Carlson
Post by: ccp on January 22, 2022, 06:25:46 AM
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/dick-morris-tucker-carlson-pro-putin-ukraine/2022/01/21/id/1053466/
Title: Re: Dick Morris vs Tucker Carlson
Post by: G M on January 22, 2022, 08:03:46 AM
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/dick-morris-tucker-carlson-pro-putin-ukraine/2022/01/21/id/1053466/

 :roll: :roll: :roll:

Not wanting WWIII over a conflict we don’t have a strategic interest in doesn’t mean that one loves Putin.

Unless/until we unfcuk this country, we have no business mucking around in Europe. If Russian tanks roll into Paris, it’s a better scenario than the current path of islamicization they are currently on.
Title: Fred Fleitz to Newsmax: Blinken too Inexperienced
Post by: ccp on January 22, 2022, 10:34:20 AM
https://www.newsmax.com/newsmax-tv/fred-fleitz-blinken-lavrov-russia/2022/01/22/id/1053526/
Title: Threat inflation
Post by: G M on January 22, 2022, 11:15:08 AM
http://ace.mu.nu/archives/397348.php
Title: Russians planning puppet?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 22, 2022, 03:51:21 PM
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-60095459
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on January 23, 2022, 03:51:46 AM
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FJyM13xXMAAcEuT?format=jpg&name=900x900)
Title: How to Retreat from Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 23, 2022, 08:58:46 AM
By Ross Douthat
Opinion Columnist

One of the hardest challenges in geopolitics is figuring out how to conduct a successful retreat. We witnessed that reality last summer in Afghanistan, when the Biden administration made the correct strategic choice — cutting our losses instead of escalating to preserve a morally bankrupt status quo — but then staggered through a disastrous withdrawal that wounded his presidency and laid bare American incompetence to a watching world.

Now we face the same problem with Ukraine. The United States in its days as a hyperpower made a series of moves to extend our perimeter of influence deep into Russia’s near-abroad. Some of those moves appear to be sustainable: The expansion of NATO to include countries of the former Warsaw Pact was itself a risk, but at the moment those commitments seem secure. But the attempt to draw Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit, the partway-open door to Ukrainians who preferred westward-focused alliances, was a foolish overcommitment even when American power was at its height.

Note that this is not a question of what Ukrainians deserve. Russia is an authoritarian aggressor in the current crisis; Ukraine is a flawed democracy but a more decent regime than Vladimir Putin’s oligarchy. When we gave Ukraine security assurances under Bill Clinton, opened the door to NATO membership under George W. Bush and supported the Maidan protests under Barack Obama, we were in each case acting with better intentions than Moscow in its own machinations.

But in geopolitics good intentions are always downstream from the realities of power. Whatever its desires or ours, the government in Ukraine has simply never been in a position to fully join the West — it’s too economically weak, too internally divided and simply in the wrong place. And the actions of the Bush and Obama administrations — and for all of Trump’s personal sympathies for Putin, some Trump administration acts as well — have left us overstretched, our soft-power embrace of Kyiv ill-equipped to handle hard-power countermoves from Moscow.

Given those realities, and the pressing need to concentrate American power in East Asia to counter China, it’s clear enough where an ideal retreat would end up: with NATO expansion permanently tabled, with Ukraine subject to inevitable Russian pressure but neither invaded nor annexed, and with our NATO allies shouldering more of the burden of maintaining a security perimeter in Eastern Europe.

But as with Afghanistan, the actual execution is harder than the theory. Coming to a stable understanding with Putin is challenging, because he’s clearly invested in being a permanent disrupter, taking any opportunity to humiliate the West. Extricating ourselves from our Ukrainian entanglements will inevitably instill doubts about our more important commitments elsewhere, doubts that will be greater the more Kyiv suffers from our retreat. And handing off more security responsibility to the Europeans has been an unmet goal of every recent U.S. president, with the particular problem that a key European power, Germany, often acts like a de facto ally of the Russians.

Given those difficulties, the Biden administration’s wavering course has been understandable, even if the president’s recent news conference was too honest by several orders of magnitude. The United States cannot do nothing if Russia invades Ukraine; we also would be insane to join the war on Ukraine’s side. So the White House’s quest for the right in-between response, some balance of sanctions and arms shipments, looks groping and uncertain for good reason: There’s simply no perfect answer here, only a least-bad balancing of options.

But my sense is that we are still placing too much weight on the idea that only NATO gets to say who is in NATO, that simply ruling out Ukrainian membership is somehow an impossible concession. This conceit is an anachronism, an artifact of the post-Cold War moment when it briefly seemed possible that, as the historian Adam Tooze puts it, the world’s crucial boundaries “would be drawn by the Western powers, the United States and the E.U., on their own terms and to suit their own strengths and preferences.”

That’s not how the world works now, and precisely because it’s not how the world works, I would be somewhat relieved — as an American citizen, not just an observer of international politics — to see our leaders acknowledge as much, rather than holding out the idea that someday we might be obliged by treaty to risk a nuclear war over the Donbas.
Title: Re: How to Retreat from Ukraine
Post by: G M on January 23, 2022, 09:54:50 AM
Exactly!

By Ross Douthat
Opinion Columnist

One of the hardest challenges in geopolitics is figuring out how to conduct a successful retreat. We witnessed that reality last summer in Afghanistan, when the Biden administration made the correct strategic choice — cutting our losses instead of escalating to preserve a morally bankrupt status quo — but then staggered through a disastrous withdrawal that wounded his presidency and laid bare American incompetence to a watching world.

Now we face the same problem with Ukraine. The United States in its days as a hyperpower made a series of moves to extend our perimeter of influence deep into Russia’s near-abroad. Some of those moves appear to be sustainable: The expansion of NATO to include countries of the former Warsaw Pact was itself a risk, but at the moment those commitments seem secure. But the attempt to draw Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit, the partway-open door to Ukrainians who preferred westward-focused alliances, was a foolish overcommitment even when American power was at its height.

Note that this is not a question of what Ukrainians deserve. Russia is an authoritarian aggressor in the current crisis; Ukraine is a flawed democracy but a more decent regime than Vladimir Putin’s oligarchy. When we gave Ukraine security assurances under Bill Clinton, opened the door to NATO membership under George W. Bush and supported the Maidan protests under Barack Obama, we were in each case acting with better intentions than Moscow in its own machinations.

But in geopolitics good intentions are always downstream from the realities of power. Whatever its desires or ours, the government in Ukraine has simply never been in a position to fully join the West — it’s too economically weak, too internally divided and simply in the wrong place. And the actions of the Bush and Obama administrations — and for all of Trump’s personal sympathies for Putin, some Trump administration acts as well — have left us overstretched, our soft-power embrace of Kyiv ill-equipped to handle hard-power countermoves from Moscow.

Given those realities, and the pressing need to concentrate American power in East Asia to counter China, it’s clear enough where an ideal retreat would end up: with NATO expansion permanently tabled, with Ukraine subject to inevitable Russian pressure but neither invaded nor annexed, and with our NATO allies shouldering more of the burden of maintaining a security perimeter in Eastern Europe.

But as with Afghanistan, the actual execution is harder than the theory. Coming to a stable understanding with Putin is challenging, because he’s clearly invested in being a permanent disrupter, taking any opportunity to humiliate the West. Extricating ourselves from our Ukrainian entanglements will inevitably instill doubts about our more important commitments elsewhere, doubts that will be greater the more Kyiv suffers from our retreat. And handing off more security responsibility to the Europeans has been an unmet goal of every recent U.S. president, with the particular problem that a key European power, Germany, often acts like a de facto ally of the Russians.

Given those difficulties, the Biden administration’s wavering course has been understandable, even if the president’s recent news conference was too honest by several orders of magnitude. The United States cannot do nothing if Russia invades Ukraine; we also would be insane to join the war on Ukraine’s side. So the White House’s quest for the right in-between response, some balance of sanctions and arms shipments, looks groping and uncertain for good reason: There’s simply no perfect answer here, only a least-bad balancing of options.

But my sense is that we are still placing too much weight on the idea that only NATO gets to say who is in NATO, that simply ruling out Ukrainian membership is somehow an impossible concession. This conceit is an anachronism, an artifact of the post-Cold War moment when it briefly seemed possible that, as the historian Adam Tooze puts it, the world’s crucial boundaries “would be drawn by the Western powers, the United States and the E.U., on their own terms and to suit their own strengths and preferences.”

That’s not how the world works now, and precisely because it’s not how the world works, I would be somewhat relieved — as an American citizen, not just an observer of international politics — to see our leaders acknowledge as much, rather than holding out the idea that someday we might be obliged by treaty to risk a nuclear war over the Donbas.
Title: overcompensation now after Afghanistan?
Post by: ccp on January 23, 2022, 09:55:51 AM
https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2022/01/23/u-s-aircraft-carrier-strike-group-heads-for-mediterranean-amid-russia-threats/

one just has to wonder
is blinks flex his huge biceps here to

try to make up for making fools out of us in Afghanistan?

trying to get their "mojo back " ?
Title: Re: overcompensation now after Afghanistan?
Post by: G M on January 23, 2022, 10:25:01 AM
https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2022/01/23/u-s-aircraft-carrier-strike-group-heads-for-mediterranean-amid-russia-threats/

one just has to wonder
is blinks flex his huge biceps here to

try to make up for making fools out of us in Afghanistan?

trying to get their "mojo back " ?

That's part of it. The other part is an attempt to "wag the dog" to distract from the utter disaster the Biden administration has been since they stole the election.
Title: If Putin decides to sink our carrier group?
Post by: G M on January 23, 2022, 10:54:56 AM
https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2022/01/23/u-s-aircraft-carrier-strike-group-heads-for-mediterranean-amid-russia-threats/

one just has to wonder
is blinks flex his huge biceps here to

try to make up for making fools out of us in Afghanistan?

trying to get their "mojo back " ?

That's part of it. The other part is an attempt to "wag the dog" to distract from the utter disaster the Biden administration has been since they stole the election.

https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2019/3/22/incoming-can-aircraft-carriers-survive-hypersonic-weapons

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/why-russia-isn%E2%80%99t-worried-about-us-hypersonic-missiles-184696

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4424320/Russia-able-neutralise-warships-report-claims.html

Title: the hypersonic missiles really THAT fast?
Post by: ccp on January 23, 2022, 11:12:11 AM
hypersonic

I read the hypersonic missiles being developed ~ Mach 5
that is ~ 3500 mph

but

the typical intercontinental ballistic missile is
7 km/sec = ~ 15,000 mph

based on a google search

I guess if they can travel 3,500 mph within the low atmosphere
that is faster than almost all jets that is really fast


Title: Re: the hypersonic missiles really THAT fast?
Post by: G M on January 23, 2022, 11:15:57 AM
hypersonic

I read the hypersonic missiles being developed ~ Mach 5
that is ~ 3500 mph

but

the typical intercontinental ballistic missile is
7 km/sec = ~ 15,000 mph

based on a google search

I guess if they can travel 3,500 mph within the low atmosphere
that is faster than almost all jets that is really fast

This isn’t playing “whack-a-mole” with haji. Russia and China can inflict serious casualties upon us without going nuclear.

Title: Re: the hypersonic missiles really THAT fast?
Post by: G M on January 23, 2022, 01:58:09 PM
hypersonic

I read the hypersonic missiles being developed ~ Mach 5
that is ~ 3500 mph

but

the typical intercontinental ballistic missile is
7 km/sec = ~ 15,000 mph

based on a google search

I guess if they can travel 3,500 mph within the low atmosphere
that is faster than almost all jets that is really fast

This isn’t playing “whack-a-mole” with haji. Russia and China can inflict serious casualties upon us without going nuclear.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/32087/admiral-warns-americas-east-coast-is-no-longer-a-safe-haven-thanks-to-russian-subs

As far as nuclear...
Title: Decrepit, doddering memorycare patient contemplating startingWWIII
Post by: G M on January 23, 2022, 06:05:46 PM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/us-orders-families-diplomats-immediately-leave-ukraine-biden-weighs-deploying
Title: Germany stabs in back some more
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 23, 2022, 09:05:01 PM
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-will-not-supply-weapons-kyiv-now-defence-minister-says-2022-01-22/?fbclid=IwAR2Jj6MTty1MseOoOWwfIycpM8AwKq3l5QdBuuHeKS1MgI-OOsBuAXahyzY
Title: NY Post: Ukrainians fight; US supplies
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 24, 2022, 03:23:59 AM
https://nypost.com/2022/01/21/a-view-from-inside-ukraine-tense-but-people-are-ready-to-resist/?fbclid=IwAR2ST4GClsCEEVgADwHQI8s3r65-Pe50tlo4yz8dC0LEN1rx4xI3KcH5rFI

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/01/us-sends-more-military-equipment-ukraine/361042/
Title: Re: Decrepit, doddering memorycare patient contemplating startingWWIII
Post by: G M on January 24, 2022, 07:42:25 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/us-orders-families-diplomats-immediately-leave-ukraine-biden-weighs-deploying

https://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2022/01/eerie_echoes_of_world_war_one_in_bidens_seeming_rush_to_war.html
Title: POTP
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 24, 2022, 07:47:49 AM
NATO sends more ships, fighter jets to Eastern Europe as Russia masses troops on Ukraine border

Civilian participants in a Kyiv Territorial Defense unit train on Jan. 22 in Kyiv, Ukraine. (Sean Gallup/Getty Images)
By Robyn Dixon and David L. Stern
Today at 5:42 a.m. EST|Updated today at 9:43 a.m. EST



MOSCOW — NATO said Monday it would send additional ships and fighter jets to Eastern Europe as Britain ordered some diplomats and their families to leave Ukraine, amid growing alarm that Russia may invade as it masses tens of thousands of troops near the border.

The moves came after the United States on Sunday ordered families of diplomats to leave Kyiv and authorized nonessential diplomatic staff to leave. The State Department also cautioned American citizens to consider leaving Ukraine, with U.S. officials warning that an attack could happen “at any time.”

NATO said Monday its members are “putting forces on standby and sending additional ships and fighter jets to NATO deployments in eastern Europe, reinforcing Allied deterrence and defence as Russia continues its military build-up in and around Ukraine.”

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Russia was watching NATO’s moves and President Vladimir Putin was “taking measures to ensure that our security and our interests are properly protected.”

“Unfortunately, we live in such an aggressive environment. Unfortunately, we are all reading reports that NATO is making certain decisions,” Peskov said. “This is the reality in which we exist.”

State Department orders U.S. Embassy staff families to leave Ukraine
On Jan. 23, the State Department ordered diplomats' families to depart its embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine, due to the "continued threat of Russian military actions." (Reuters)
State Department orders diplomats' families to leave U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, citing ‘threat of Russian military action’

Russia has continued to rapidly scale up its military presence near Ukraine and in Belarus to unprecedented levels in recent days, according to military analysts. As Russia massed forces near Ukraine, it made a series of sweeping demands to the United States and NATO last month, including that Ukraine be barred from joining the alliance, a condition that NATO officials ruled out. Diplomatic talks have failed to resolve the crisis.


Russian officials have repeatedly denied any plan to invade Ukraine and asserted that Russia has a right to move troops and hold military exercises on its own territory. Russian and Belarusian officials have announced joint military exercises in Belarus next month, raising Western fears of a possible ground attack on northern Ukraine from Belarus, and Russian military officials announced a naval exercise involving 20 vessels from the Baltic Fleet.

“I welcome Allies contributing additional forces to NATO,” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said in a statement. “NATO will continue to take all necessary measures to protect and defend all Allies, including by reinforcing the eastern part of the Alliance.”

Peskov blamed the United States and NATO for the escalation of tensions over Ukraine, accusing them of stoking “informational hysteria” against Russia. He complained of “lies and fakes” coming from Western officials.


“I want to draw your attention to the fact that all of this is not happening because of what we, Russia, are doing. It is all happening because of what the United States [and] NATO are doing and because of the information they are spreading,” Peskov told journalists.

He said the West’s “provocative hysterical actions” have also caused uncertainty and pessimism in global markets.

Peskov also accused Ukraine of boosting its forces along the line of contact that divides Kyiv-controlled Ukraine from two unrecognized separatist republics, the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic. The regions, backed by Russia, split from Ukraine in 2014 after Moscow annexed Crimea. The resulting conflict in eastern Ukraine, which has killed more than 13,000 people, continues.

The threat of a Ukraine attack against the regions was “now very high,” Peskov claimed.


Ukraine’s foreign ministry spokesman Oleg Nikolenko said that Kyiv had repeated many times that “Ukraine is committed to peace and diplomacy, and does not plan any military attacks.”

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko accused Ukraine of moving forces to its northern border with Belarus and threatened to further bolster the Belarusian side of the border.

“We just want to protect our southern border,” he said, speaking at a meeting with the head of the Belarusian border guards, Anatoly Lappo, BelTA state news agency reported.

Australia also ordered family members of diplomats in Ukraine to leave because of the security situation and warned Australian citizens to depart, the Sydney Morning Herald reported. Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne told Australian officials to send assistance, including support to help Kyiv protect against cyberattacks to help Ukraine defend itself, according to the report.


European Union president Ursula von der Leyen on Monday announced 1.2 billion euros ($1.35 billion) in emergency aid to help Kyiv meet financing needs “due to the conflict.”

Despite the escalation, the bloc’s top diplomat, Josep Borrell, said Monday that E.U. countries would not scale back staffing at embassies or send diplomatic families home.

“We are not going to do the same thing because we don’t know any specific reasons,” Borrell told journalists before a meeting of E.U. foreign ministers that U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken was due to join online, Reuters reported. “Negotiations are going on,” Borrell added.

Members of the 27-member bloc have been split on what sanctions should be on the table and whether to send defense weapons to Ukraine.

German officials Monday ruled out any change to Berlin’s decision not to supply Kyiv with defensive weapons but Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said Berlin was working with Washington and E.U. members on potential joint sanctions should Russia invade.


The German Foreign Ministry said Monday that families of German diplomats were given the option of leaving Ukraine, but diplomats would stay. “This is the appropriate measure in the current situation,” said spokesman Christofer Burger.

Nikolenko, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, said Monday the U.S. move to send home some diplomats was premature and overly cautious, given that there has been no material change to Ukraine’s security situation.

“While we respect the right of foreign states to ensure the security of their diplomatic missions, we consider such step by the American side to be premature and sign of excess caution,” he said in a statement. “In fact, there have been no cardinal changes in the security situation recently,” he added, noting that the concentration of Russian forces on Ukraine’s borders began last April.

Putin has many options short of a multi-front invasion of Ukraine

Andy Hunder, president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine, said the decisions by the United States and Britain to scale back embassy staff were “worrying” but added that American business executives in Ukraine were doing “business as usual,” while making contingency plans.


“But I think, you know, it still is hoping for the best but preparing for what may come,” Hunder said.

The U.S. Embassy has announced a virtual town hall to update American citizens on the situation Tuesday.

Putin has kept U.S. and NATO officials on edge, claiming Russia is the victim of Western aggression and threatening a “military-technical” response.

A whirlwind of diplomatic efforts among United States and NATO officials and Russian officials in recent weeks has not resolved the impasse.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova on Monday described the U.S. decision to authorize nonessential staff to leave as “strange.”

“Their information policy agenda is strange and unwise,” Zakharova told independent Echo of Moscow radio. “They’ve been shooting off their reports one after another, but all of them have missed.” She said Russia’s embassy in Kyiv is operating normally, disputing Western media reports that staffing had been reduced.


Earlier, Zakharova accused Washington, not Moscow, of preparing possible “military provocations” in Ukraine in a Telegram post.

U.S. threatens use of novel export control to damage Russia’s strategic industries if Moscow invades Ukraine

She speculated that Washington and its allies were aiming to “prepare” Western public opinion for military action.

Explaining the decision to order diplomatic families to leave, the State Department said that Russia was “conducting disinformation operations and fomenting unrest” in Ukraine. It said it was unclear whether Putin has decidedto invade, “but he is building the military capacity along Ukraine’s borders to have that option ready at any time.”

In recent days, the United States and Britain have aired allegations of two separate Russian plans to destabilize the Ukrainian government and install a pro-Moscow government. Russian officials have denied the allegations.

Britain’s Foreign Office accused Russian intelligence Sunday of plotting to install a pro-Moscow government in Kyiv and name former Ukrainian lawmaker Yevhen Murayev as a possible puppet leader. Murayev denied the report. Russia’s embassy in London called on Britain to “stop foolish rhetorical provocations.”

Stern reported from Kyiv, Ukraine. Loveday Morris, reporting from Berlin, contributed.
Title: Re: Decrepit, doddering memorycare patient contemplating startingWWIII
Post by: G M on January 24, 2022, 08:31:36 AM
https://theconservativetreehouse.com/blog/2022/01/23/obama-biden-state-dept-orders-diplomats-and-families-to-leave-ukraine-ahead-of-u-s-conflict-with-russia/

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/us-orders-families-diplomats-immediately-leave-ukraine-biden-weighs-deploying

https://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2022/01/eerie_echoes_of_world_war_one_in_bidens_seeming_rush_to_war.html
Title: NRO
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 24, 2022, 03:34:07 PM
President Biden rounded out his first year in office inadvertently encouraging a Russian invasion of Ukraine.

His now-infamous comment that the Western response to an invasion would depend on whether “it’s a minor incursion” was remarkably, disturbingly candid, demonstrating that Washington and the West could well tolerate a limited Russian attack. Biden also said another unstated assumption out loud: that there’s no transatlantic unity on how to respond to the Russian military buildup. Effectively, he telegraphed to the Kremlin that the U.S. response to an invasion will only be as strong as what its most reticent ally will permit.

The president’s comments laid bare the fundamental problems with this administration’s handling of the situation in Eastern Europe so far. Washington is hesitant to do anything that might be interpreted in Moscow as an escalation. The White House is yielding to German economic interests over Ukraine’s interest in maintaining its independence. It’s taken a Model U.N., kid-glove approach to dealing with a kleptocratic thug who has shown a penchant for invading the democracies bordering Russia. And it has actively lobbied against measures — such as a Nord Stream 2 sanctions bill proposed by Senator Ted Cruz — that would bolster U.S. deterrence.

Biden ascended to the presidency pledging to support U.S. allies and partners. And, to his credit, the administration’s strongest performance throughout this crisis has been the marathon of meetings and calls U.S. officials have conducted with foreign counterparts. But even then, Biden’s “minor incursion” comment prompted an embarrassing, public backlash from Ukrainian officials, with President Volodymyr Zelensky criticizing it on Twitter. Beyond the social-media foibles rests a more important diplomatic fact: For everything Biden and others have said about supporting Ukraine, the president has yet to even nominate an ambassador to the country.

And the consequences of that lackluster approach were on full display last week. Even as U.S. diplomats met their Russian counterparts across a number of different forums in Geneva, Brussels, and Vienna, Moscow was surging forces to Russia’s border with Ukraine. As of now, Russia has the capability to quickly send forces into Ukraine from the north, east, and south of the country; there’s no doubting that Moscow would win any fight it picks decisively. Which is to say nothing of the possibility of a “minor incursion,” to which there’s likely not to be one unified Western response.

Antony Blinken and Sergei Lavrov concluded a round of talks on Friday, with the secretary of state saying he would reply in writing to Russia’s demands that NATO not permit any new members to join the alliance. They’re likely to hold another round in the near future. If Blinken deputy Wendy Sherman’s talks with Russian officials the previous week are any indication, any diplomatic compromise could result in new curbs on military exercises and missile placements. 

As well as abandoning its belief that negotiations on Europe’s security architecture will lead Vladimir Putin to an off-ramp, the White House needs to dispense with the fiction that threatening tough U.S. sanctions in the event of an attack serves any sort of deterrent effect. That’s the approach that the administration and congressional Democrats are rallying behind, with a bill advancing such a policy on the way.

Meanwhile, the administration has been sending badly needed weaponry to the Ukrainians at a glacial pace. The White House just announced that it would deliver Mi-17 helicopters, marking the end of a months-long delay.

But the Ukrainians need more equipment, including Javelin anti-tank missiles and air-defense systems. And the administration should be complementing arms shipments with biting sanctions, starting immediately, not after Russia attacks.

The GUARD Act proposal put forward by congressional Republicans is a good alternative. That bill would immediately boost funding for transferring lethal weaponry to Ukraine, increase annual U.S. funding of Ukraine’s military forces, and impose sanctions to kill the Kremlin-backed Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Lawmakers should also revive another sanctions proposal that the administration successfully blocked from the annual defense bill — legislation targeting 35 oligarchs named by Putin antagonist Alexei Navalny.

Congress, however, can only get the president to do so much, and he’s shown no sign so far of rising to the challenge.

In more ways than one, Ukraine is already under attack. Russian forces occupy the East of the country, and Moscow recently demonstrated its ability to knock Ukrainian government websites offline. The worst may be yet to come.
Title: GPF: What the failure of the US/NATO-Russia talks means
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 25, 2022, 03:26:31 AM
From Jan 19

What the Failure of the US-NATO-Russia Talks Means
Putin can’t enter the Ukraine crisis and leave with nothing.

By Ekaterina Zolotova -January 19, 2022Open as PDF
Negotiations last week between the United States and Russia say a lot without saying much at all. Talks first took place on Jan. 9 ahead of more official discussions in Geneva the next day. A few days later, Russia and NATO spoke in Brussels about Ukraine and, related, the non-expansion of NATO to the east.

There was never much hope for the negotiations, the top agenda for which was Russia’s proposals for security guarantees, especially vis-a-vis NATO. The three parties ended their talks agreeing only that disagreements remain. After the meetings, the media naturally began to talk about escalation and preparations for an invasion of Ukraine. But this “escalation” looks like a tactic rather than a true position, an attempt by Russia to pressure its adversaries to participate in additional meetings and thus ensure the safety of its precious buffer zones.

Buffer Between Russia and NATO
(click to enlarge)

Showtime

Even during the negotiations, Russia began to up its psychological pressure on the U.S. and NATO. For example, it initiated military exercises in the western regions of Voronezh, Belgorod, Bryansk and Smolensk – all of them close to the Ukrainian border. (Roughly 3,000 troops participated.) The purpose of the drills was clear: to demonstrate its capabilities and a desire to protect its interests. Psychological operations such as these are particularly important to Moscow, which believes it needs to stand its ground without resorting to war or incurring additional sanctions.

Conflict in Eastern Ukraine
(click to enlarge)

The purpose of Moscow’s demands is also pretty clear. It wanted a guarantee from NATO and Washington that they would not use neighboring countries to prepare for or carry out an armed attack on Russia. It wanted Washington to halt the eastward expansion of NATO, refusing the admission of all former Soviet satellite states. And it wanted assurances that the U.S. would not create military bases in those states, and that NATO would cease military activities in Ukraine as well as other parts of Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Without these guarantees, Russia will inevitably feel vulnerable in its western borderlands. Indeed, one of its most important geopolitical imperatives is to maintain a buffer zone between its heartland and external threats from Europe.

Of course, the Kremlin never expected the U.S. to capitulate to its demands last week. But it had hoped that the West would at least soften some of its stances on these issues. And since the negotiations didn’t go anywhere, we can all expect Russia to act a little more aggressively, if only rhetorically, in the near term. After all, the borderlands remain unsecured: There is a frozen conflict in Donbass, the Caucasus region is constantly challenged by Turkey, and Central Asia is still unstable. In a recent interview with CNN, for example, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov made several statements that Russia’s relations with NATO are approaching a redline thanks to the alliance’s military support for Ukraine. He went on to say that NATO is a tool of confrontation, that Russia is seeing a gradual NATO invasion of Ukraine, and that proposed U.S. sanctions against Russian leaders could lead to the termination of bilateral relations. Moreover, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, a direct participant in negotiations, said in an interview with RTVI that he cannot rule out the possibility of deploying military assets to Cuba and Venezuela if negotiations with the West fail. Again, this may all be rhetorical, but it nonetheless puts the U.S. on the defensive – and publicly at that.

Aside from heightened rhetoric, Russia has openly stepped up military movements. Over the past week, several dozen videos on TikTok and Instagram have shown the transfer of military personnel and equipment from Siberia and the Far East to Russia’s western regions. Soon thereafter, the Tank Army of the Western Military District began exercises in five regions, in which more than 800 servicemen and more than 300 weapons were involved. Elsewhere, Russian troops began to arrive in southern and western Belarus for exercises. With these moves, Russia intends to send the message that its forces are ready.

Limits

Despite this performative maneuvering, and despite reports of possible strikes, there’s plenty of evidence to suggest neither Russia nor the United States is interested in a serious military confrontation.

First, if Russia wanted a confrontation, it would have done it quietly. Well-advertised military movements, particularly ones involving soldiers from the polar opposite end of the country, surrender any element of surprise Russia could have hoped to have. And though the numbers of troops and tanks in western Russia seem large, they are not nearly enough to wage a winnable war in the vast lands of Ukraine. (Notably, the repositioning of Russian materiel has been underway for nearly a year; it didn’t just start last week.)

Second, deploying weapons or troops to Cuba and Venezuela is no easy task. It would be difficult in the best of times, but these are not the best of times. Bilateral cooperation between them and Russia, for example, is far weaker than it has been in recent years. And in any case, operating in such a remote region requires active movement and reliable logistics to ensure the safety of military installations. The projects will require serious capital investment, which Russia’s unstable economy is not ready for.

Last, the Kremlin can achieve its imperative of securing a buffer zone without resorting to war. For Moscow, a peaceful stabilization in Donbass is a suboptimal but entirely acceptable outcome. Any truce thereto would paint Russian President Vladimir Putin as a peace negotiator who put an end to the frozen conflict, likely raising his approval ratings and world standing. In short, Putin can’t enter a crisis and leave with nothing. The U.S. has even less reason to intervene in a conflict far from its borders with no exit strategy.

Russia wants to appear ready to wage war without losing any leverage at the negotiating table. For its part, the U.S. suspects Russia is probably bluffing. It understands Russia’s limits, and it’s seen this movie before. Russia will continue to conduct operations to try to achieve control over the buffer zone, and the U.S. will be unhappy with those actions, but both sides understand that to ease tensions, they will have to have a dialogue not with the EU, NATO or Ukraine but with each other.
Title: What to expect if things go hot in Ukraine
Post by: G M on January 25, 2022, 04:03:56 PM
https://areaocho.com/just-in-case/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on January 26, 2022, 09:09:36 AM
https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/095/050/519/original/b8987712dfdb95bc.jpg

(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/095/050/519/original/b8987712dfdb95bc.jpg)

So, if Putin pushes into Ukraine, we should do what exactly ?

https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2022/01/bidens-deputy-national-security-adviser-says-americans-care-ukraine-borders-inviolate-record-518360-illegals-invade-us-border-first-fiscal-quarter/

Some borders are more equal than others.
Title: General Keane a few days ago
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 26, 2022, 07:33:12 PM


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2gvv-xi7l64
Title: In case you wondered why...
Post by: G M on January 26, 2022, 08:42:46 PM
https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/096/889/269/original/053f1fe8c6642d13.png

(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/096/889/269/original/053f1fe8c6642d13.png)
Title: Don't make it worse
Post by: G M on January 27, 2022, 03:32:01 PM
https://www.theburningplatform.com/2022/01/27/a-biden-intervention-in-ukraine-will-expose-american-weakness/#more-258006
Title: blinks ask China to help with Ukraine
Post by: ccp on January 28, 2022, 08:36:13 AM
https://www.newsmax.com/world/globaltalk/urges-china/2022/01/27/id/1054357/

 :roll:
Title: Re: blinks ask China to help with Ukraine
Post by: G M on January 28, 2022, 09:00:21 AM
https://www.newsmax.com/world/globaltalk/urges-china/2022/01/27/id/1054357/

 :roll:

(https://encrypted-tbn0.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcTbuOOSvQKM3fa1bwYIKUfMHQd6Ly91ABJ7e5MPia8fupFdqnY&s)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 28, 2022, 06:54:25 PM
How embarrassing for America  :-P :-P :oops:
Title: Western Europe needs MOAR green energy!
Post by: G M on January 29, 2022, 09:39:26 AM
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/28/what-if-russia-turns-off-the-gas-europe-assesses-its-options-amid-ukraine-crisis.html

Enjoy your global warming virtue signaling as you freeze in the dark, eurotards!
Title: WSJ: Ukraine's will to fight
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 29, 2022, 11:53:08 AM
KYIV, Ukraine—In a forest one frigid recent morning, this country’s last line of defense was training for the nightmare scenario of a Russian invasion reaching deep into the interior.

An architect dove in the snow to practice taking cover. A 51-year-old mother of three toted an assault rifle as she pivoted to engage an enemy.

Ukraine is fleshing out a territorial-defense force to take on the might of Russia’s military if it breaches front-line defenses. The aim is to have a brigade of reservists in each of the country’s regions, able to react quickly if the enemy blasts or sneaks its way through.

“We are the weekend army,” said Yuriy Bredak, a 33-year-old architect and father of two young children.


Denis Semyrog-Orlyk, a 46-year-old architect, instructs his unit during training in a Kyiv park last week.
The units aim to address a core problem Ukraine had when Russia sent an invasion force in 2014: Citizens were willing to fight, but weren’t prepared or organized. One-third of respondents in a survey late last year said they were ready to take up arms if Russia invades.

Eight years ago, thousands of poorly trained volunteers headed to the front to fight equally chaotic separatists and Russian fighters. Their derring-do helped liberate some towns, but when they faced covert Russian army units, they were crushed.

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The Ukraine government is seeking to avoid that scenario this time by offering training and a structure for those who don’t want to make a full-time commitment to the army. These reservists are valuable partly because Russia has a strategic advantage: It can attack from the north, south or east, or even stage armed attacks inside the country. Starting from last spring, the citizen-soldiers are activated if martial law is declared.

Territorial battalions were established in 2014, then were rolled into the army. They have now been re-established with a clear structure. Officials say they are adding large numbers of new recruits, aiming for a total reserve force of some 130,000.

“They will defend cities, villages, critical infrastructure, bridges, tunnels, roads, et cetera,” Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov said.

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Joining requires a conversation with the local unit commander, medical checks, proof of no criminal record and signing a contract. Then training begins, including practical and theoretical classes.

Some participants of the recent training session were a little skeptical that the authorities have managed to rally as many volunteer fighters as the government projects.

Some of the 420,000 veterans of the eight-year war in Ukraine’s east said they were waiting for more clarity about whether a conflict will break out before they commit, and prefer to band together with former comrades-in-arms over joining new groups.

Most have jobs and families that they are hoping not to abandon for the front line unless absolutely necessary.

Satellite Images Show Russia’s Military Buildup Near Ukraine
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Satellite Images Show Russia’s Military Buildup Near Ukraine
Satellite Images Show Russia’s Military Buildup Near Ukraine
The U.S. said about 100,000 Russian troops have been deployed near the Ukrainian border. Satellite images show the growing presence of military equipment at several locations. Photo: Maxar Technologies
Ukraine has been under threat so often, for so long, that many people have grown complacent about the need for urgent preparedness, particularly in recent years when the pandemic added to their daily struggles.

“Our military preparation is a problem—a lot of Ukrainians don’t want to fight,” said Yuri Boyko, who at age 68 is considered too old to fight, but attends the training as an adviser. “Life is busy and Ukrainians lost a lot of energy due to the long war, now Covid, [and] other issues.”

“Much more needs to be done to be ready in case Russia attacks,” he added.

Participants are a mix of veterans and ordinary folk energized by the desire to resist.


Reservist Marta Yuzkiv at home outside Kyiv on Tuesday. Speaking of Russia, she said, ‘They have been trying to destroy Ukraine for a long time.’
Marta Yuzkiv, 51 years old, said she is fired up by memories of Soviet rule of Ukraine, part of a long history of Moscow’s domination of her country.

“I know what will happen if Russia comes here,” she said, expressing particular concern that Russian forces will be holding military exercises at the start of February in Belarus, which has a border with Ukraine 75 miles from Kyiv.

“They have been trying to destroy Ukraine for a long time,” she said. “They destroyed our churches, they stole our history…. It is something I don’t want to repeat.”

Ukraine is training younger reservists as well. About 180 male and female students from a local university stood at attention, side-by-side in snow some 3 inches thick, watching Ms. Yuzkiv and her fellow fighters conduct training exercises. Some grew fidgety as training dragged on in the cold, but they acknowledged that they recognize the threat to their country is real and they could be called to battle.


Students at a local university watched the Territorial Defense Battalion training in a Kyiv park last week.
PHOTO: \
Military customs are difficult for civilians to get used to, especially the need to give and follow precise orders, said Denis Semyrog-Orlyk, a 46-year-old architect and reservist.

He said he was alarmed by the news of the Russian military buildup, mostly because he recalled the destruction wrought by Russian forces in Syria.

Mr. Semyrog-Orlyk also worried about how his family would cope if he has to go fight. He had kept a reserve of savings in case of war, but with the long conflict and economic troubles, he has already spent it. “It is like that for most people,” he said.

Still, he said, Ukraine had become a different country in recent years, and people would be motivated by defending their homes against an invader.

“In war the main thing is will to win,” said Mr. Semyrog-Orlyk. “The Russians don’t have the same motivation as we do.”
Title: WSJ: Ukraine's growing sense of national identify
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 29, 2022, 12:19:37 PM
Ukraine’s Growing Sense of National Identity Puts It in Putin’s Crosshairs
Russian leader has long argued that the two countries are inseparable, but Ukrainians have other ideas, increasingly speaking their own language and celebrating their independence from Moscow
Kyiv residents celebrate Ukrainian Unity Day on Jan. 22.
By James Marson
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 | Photographs by Anastasia Vlasova for The Wall Street Journal
Jan. 28, 2022 10:53 am ET


KYIV, Ukraine—In December, the local edition of lifestyle magazine Elle announced a new fashion on its cover: It would publish only in Ukrainian, not Russian.

The switch in languages for a publication that is hardly a hotbed of nationalist ferment goes some way toward explaining why Russian President Vladimir Putin is forcing the issue of Ukraine now. Since Russia first invaded portions of the country in 2014, Ukraine has been severing cultural ties with its old imperial ruler and developing a keener sense of what it means to be Ukrainian. That undermines the argument Mr. Putin routinely cites as justification for his interventions here—that Ukrainians are essentially Russians.

In the subsequent eight years, Ukrainians have torn down hundreds of Lenin statues and changed the names of cities and streets connected with the country’s Soviet past. The language of conversation in Kyiv, which a decade ago was usually Russian, is now more frequently Ukrainian. In 2019 the country won its own Orthodox Church after centuries in which believers were part of Moscow’s flock.

Mr. Putin has fought back with pen and sword. Last year he wrote a 7,000-word essay describing Ukraine as an artificial creation of Soviet leaders made up largely of historically Russian lands. He has railed against the changes, suggesting they were driven by radical nationalists and part of a plot by foreign intelligence agencies to divide the two countries. Now he is massing more than 100,000 troops around Ukraine as a possible prelude to another invasion.

“The clock is running against Putin,” said Pavlo Klimkin, a former Ukrainian foreign minister. “The country is changing.”


The Kyiv offices of Elle Ukraine.

Editor Sonya Zabouga transitioned the magazine away from Russian.

The cultural changes have been mirrored by political and economic shifts. Before 2014, polls showed a roughly even split in support among the population for joining the European Union or a Moscow-led economic bloc. In a November survey, however, 58% favored the EU, with 21% for Russia’s group. Polling data show that even people in the south and east, where there are many ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, are now in favor of the EU.

Ukraine’s exports, once almost evenly led by trade to Russia and to EU members, now predominantly flow westward. In 2020, sales to Poland, Ukraine’s smaller western neighbor, overtook exports to Russia.

It has been a long road for Ukraine, which struggled for centuries to assert its own identity under the rule of Russia and other empires. Several attempts at establishing a Ukrainian state were snuffed out, and Ukrainian culture was repressed. In Soviet times, promoting Ukrainian as a distinct identity was a dangerous undertaking that frequently ended in Siberian labor camps, while official propaganda often portrayed Ukrainian culture as a folksy curiosity.

After declaring independence in 1991, when the Soviet Union dissolved, Ukraine remained strongly under Russian influence, owing to economic, cultural and political ties. The Orange Revolution in 2004, where hundreds of thousands hit the streets to overturn the disputed election of a Russia-backed leader, was a turning point. Ukrainians showed that, unlike in Russia, street protests could effect change, even against the will of Moscow.


People sing the Ukrainian anthem in Kyiv’s Sophia Square this month.

The new president, Viktor Yushchenko, his face scarred by an unsolved poisoning during the campaign, promoted recognition of the Holodomor, the starvation by famine of millions in Ukraine under Stalin. He threw open KGB archives to facilitate research. He sent weapons to a fellow pro-Western leader in Georgia who fought a brief war against Russia. Moscow pushed back, calling Mr. Yushchenko anti-Russian.

He was voted out in 2010, dogged by an economic crisis and failure to fulfill pledges to uproot corruption. The winner of the election was Viktor Yanukovych, the very candidate the Orange Revolution had blocked in 2004. Mr. Yanukovych vacillated between Russia and the West, but he squeezed some of those who promoted an independent Ukrainian identity. He enacted a language law that gave Russian official status in some regions. Mr. Putin gave the Ukrainian lawmakers who penned the legislation a Russian state award.

Mr. Yanukovych denounced Ukrainian nationalist insurgents who fought Soviet rule. Security services detained a historian who ran a museum in Lviv, a city in western Ukraine, which documented the killings of hundreds of Ukrainians by Soviet secret police.

“They wanted to shut the mouths of historians,” said the detained researcher, Ruslan Zabiliy, in an interview in 2016. “They wanted to spread the understanding of one historical space of Ukraine and Russia.”

At the same time, Moscow pressured Mr. Yanukovych to abandon plans for a trade-and-political pact with the EU by restricting trade and threatening more serious measures.

After dozens of protesters were gunned down in February 2014, Mr. Yanukovych fled to Russia, which seized Crimea and fomented a conflict in eastern Ukraine that has cost some 14,000 lives. That sparked an outpouring of patriotism. Volunteer fighters rushed to fight at the front, while others stashed food and clothes in cars to supply them. People painted bridges and fences in blue and yellow, the colors of the national flag. Many adopted a nationalist greeting: “Glory to Ukraine!” and the response: “Glory to the heroes!”

At Elle magazine, the sands were shifting, too. Like most magazines, it had always published in Russian. Ukrainian was long scorned as the language of uneducated villagers while Russian was seen as the language of the urban elite.

Sonya Zabouga, Elle’s chief editor since 2008, said she made a decision to allow authors to choose which language they would prefer to write in.

Ukrainian has much in common with Russian, including its use of Cyrillic script, but most linguists say it is a separate language with many other regional influences, including Polish.

Events of 2014 were “a strong booster,” said Ms. Zabouga. “A lot of people changed their attitude and understanding of what a Ukrainian is.”

The magazine soon mixed Ukrainian and Russian, she said. That reflected Ms. Zabouga’s own life, having grown up speaking Russian with her father and Ukrainian with her mother. She switches seamlessly between the two.

Horizons broadened after the EU allowed visa-free travel with Ukraine in 2017 and low-cost airlines expanded flights to European cities. Hundreds of thousands now study and work in Poland and other EU countries.

The foreign ministry led a campaign against Russian spellings of Ukrainian names, which led many foreign media and airports to switch to calling the Ukrainian capital Kyiv instead of Kiev.


Rita Burkovska, a Ukrainian actress, used to speak Russian with her friends.

Rita Burkovska, a 32-year-old actress who spoke Russian with her friends until 2014 now uses Ukrainian. She had studied in a Russian-language high school but remembered visits as a child to her grandparents’ house in the countryside where she would be surrounded by Ukrainian. She even thought in Russian, she says, but considered Ukrainian her mother tongue.

“There was an attitude that it was shameful to speak Ukrainian, that it was not cool,” she said.

A law came into force in January 2021 obligating stores, cafes and other businesses to provide services in Ukrainian. This January, legislation ordered newspapers and magazines to print at least as many copies in Ukrainian as any other language.

Change has also swept places far from the swanky offices of Elle.

After 2014, villagers in dozens of parishes revolted against priests from the local arm of the Russian Orthodox Church, which has dominated Ukraine for centuries. The church, which claims Ukraine as part of its canonical territory, is closely aligned with the Kremlin. Critics said the church was promoting Russia’s view of the conflict in Ukraine as a “fratricidal war” and not condemning Mr. Putin.

Ukrainians began switching to the Kyiv Patriarchate, a locally run church that supported the 2014 revolution and war effort. The church began displaying photos of the military dead on the walls of St. Michael’s Cathedral in Kyiv, which now number thousands.


In the western Ukrainian village of Soloniv, locals jimmied the lock on their wooden church and held a vote to switch allegiance after the priest refused to pray for those killed in the war.

“People have grown up,” said retiree Kateryna Polyova, a villager, in 2015. “People understood that no one should tell us what to do, but that we are masters in our own home.”

The Kyiv Patriarchate wasn’t recognized by the global Orthodox community, so its leaders and Ukraine’s pro-Western President Petro Poroshenko launched a campaign for Kyiv to have its own church.

Mr. Putin opposed the move, and the Russian Orthodox Church lobbied against it. The Russian president stepped up efforts to emphasize religious and cultural ties with Ukraine, unveiling a statue close to the Kremlin to Vladimir the Great (or Volodymyr in Ukrainian), the Kyiv leader who adopted Christianity more than a millennium ago.

In 2019, the leader of global Orthodoxy in Istanbul, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, granted Ukraine its own church. “It’s a slow process that broke the chains which united Ukrainian society with the Soviet and Russian imperial past,” said Archbishop Yevstratiy, a leader of the independent church. “It’s a slow process, but not reversible or stoppable.”

Write to James Marson at james.marson@wsj.com
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on January 30, 2022, 06:01:27 PM
Some snippets from Martin Armstrong...He and his Socrates computer is right more often than not, having followed him for over 2 decades, he tends to get the macro trends correct.

As background he is suggesting that US and European govts cannot pay back their debts. This is what govts have done historically in the French revolution as well as the American revolution, debts of previous govts are not paid back. COVID via Klaus Schwab was an attempt to engineer world collapse and wipe out debts, but that did not work out. So war is another way out.

"Now, these tyrants NEED war as the next great distraction. The refusing to yield to any demands of Russia and then refusing to defend Ukraine is an invitation for Putin to invade. The new strategy is that a war will present the UN as the great peacemaker and validate its claim to rule the world. Russia could also move to establish bases in Cuba and Venezuela to increase the tensions now while they have a senile leader of the claimed free world whose administration is obsessed with climate change as self-evident by the collapse in the supply chain and the soaring inflation that they wanted to terminate fossil fuels without comprehending how much the economy relies upon that energy source.

Washington and the EU have abandoned Ukraine and they will never become part of NATO. Meanwhile, US/NATO missile bases in Poland and Romania will be quietly removed or Russia will establish such bases in Cuba and Venezuela. There is no Kennedy in the White House this time. The Biden Administration will continue to make empty threats for a show, but Putin realizes as does China, that the Biden Administration is so incompetent, they could not lead the world to cross the street no less to stand up to both China and Russia.

While some think that Putin will allow Washington to save face in some meaningless way, all the real people behind the curtain know that Putin has won. There is no possible way that the US and NATO can prevail against China and Russia combined. Now is the time for both China and Russia to make their move. The West is impotent and this is the demise of Western power our computer has been forcasting.

NATO was created on April 4th, 1949. Cyclically, this is 72 years and this is the danger point. That is even the timing for Taiwan. But this 72-Year Revolution Cycle has appeared throughout history and this presents a serious crisis as we now head into March 14th. February is showing up around the world as an important turning point and it is a Panic Cycle in the Russian share index."
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on January 31, 2022, 05:27:33 AM
"Meanwhile, US/NATO missile bases in Poland and Romania will be quietly removed or Russia will establish such bases in Cuba and Venezuela. There is no Kennedy in the White House this time."

Kennedy did give up missile site in Turkey and 
revealed, as far as I know,  many decades later:

"During the Cuban Missile Crisis, leaders of the U.S. and the Soviet Union engaged in a tense, 13-day political and military standoff in October 1962 over the installation of nuclear-armed Soviet missiles on Cuba, just 90 miles from U.S. shores. ... Kennedy also secretly agreed to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey.Oct 22, 2021"

How was this kept out of the papers?

I guess. the same way we never knew about his affairs and his Addison's disease.......
Title: WSJ: Ukrainian civilians train up to fight
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 31, 2022, 06:46:27 AM
Civilians Prepare to Defend Ukraine
‘We will never surrender,’ says a Kyiv architect at a training session. ‘Putin should be afraid of us.’
Ukrainian civilians train on the outskirts of Kyiv on Jan. 22. JILLIAN KAY MELCHIOR
By Jillian Kay Melchior
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Jan. 30, 2022 4:18 pm ET
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Kyiv, Ukraine

Denys Semyroh-Orlyk, a 46-year-old architect, has a message for Russia: “We will never surrender. We are using every opportunity to train. So I think Putin should be afraid of us.”

He speaks from the woods on the outskirts of the Ukrainian capital on a frigid Saturday in January, alongside a large group of camouflaged civilians. They’re training to defend their city and resist a Russian occupation. Their weapons are decoys, at least at the session I attended, but their ferocity is genuine and aimed straight at the enemy. They practice an attack and counterattack, making a stark contrast with Kyiv residents taking their dogs out for a morning walk.

The training session reveals much about the strength of Ukraine’s civil society and the citizenry’s determination to remain independent from Russia. Meanwhile, the government’s approach to this civilian defense and resistance movement says something about Ukraine’s current anxieties.

Mr. Semyroh-Orlyk says that before 2014 he was a “cosmopolite.” Bearded, burly and at ease in command, he looks far from one now. Everything changed when Russian fighters—“green pieces of s—,” in his words—seized Crimea. He would like “to thank Mr. Putin for helping us wake up.”

Mr. Semyroh-Orlyk began attending weekly training sessions taught by retired military men, organized in coordination with the Territorial Defense Forces, a part of Ukraine’s military. He’s now a platoon sergeant of the 130th Territorial Defense Battalion, as well as the head of a nongovernmental organization, Territorial Defense of the Capital.


PHOTO: JILLIAN KAY MELCHIOR
The NGO’s training sessions bring together reservists with combat experience and civilian volunteers—several dozen Kyiv residents, men and a few women, mostly in their 30s. Some train with the goal of joining the active-duty ranks, while others belong to a pool from which the army can draw if hostilities flare up. Some were experienced hunters, while others had never used a firearm before they showed up here.

Together they learn and drill to handle a weapon, defend buildings and infrastructure, patrol, ambush adversaries, stanch a battlefield wound, lead and communicate, and other valuable wartime skills. Training entails a major commitment of time, but Mr. Semyroh-Orlyk says he believes Russia will invade eventually, and “we have to do what we can to help Ukraine.”

A December survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology found that “every third respondent” of some 2,000 it polled “is ready to put up armed resistance” against the Russians. The Warsaw Institute, a Polish think tank, estimated in 2018 that Ukrainians have “almost four and a half million weapons at their homes,” most of them unregistered. That’s in line with estimates from Ukrainian defense experts.






Kyiv residents gather on a frigid day in January to train for how to defend their city and infrastructure and resist Russian invasion.

Photo: Jillian Kay Melchior
Kyiv residents practice attack and counterattack in the woods on the outskirts of the city. On this day, they're practicing with artificial weapons. Not far away, residents walk their dogs and take morning strolls.

Photo: Jillian Kay Melchior
Denys Semyroh-Orlyk, center, says that before 2014 he was a “cosmopolite.” He's now training to be ready to defend Ukraine from Russian aggression.

Photo: Jillian Kay Melchior
A recent poll by the by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology found that one in three Ukrainians are "ready to put up armed resistance” against the Russians. Other Ukrainians told The Wall Street Journal they are prepared to support Ukraine's defense by donating blood, money and time.

Photo: Jillian Kay Melchior
A cluster of journalists gathered to watch as a young Ukrainian drilled with an artificial weapon.

Photo: Jillian Kay Melchior
There are risks to a bunch of gun-toting Ukrainian civilians willing to lace up their boots and fight—especially when a bellicose Russia is run by a KGB alum like Vladimir Putin. Discipline matters as Ukraine faces an adversary looking for a plausible excuse to launch an attack. Ukrainians also worry that Mr. Putin will try to destabilize their country. Chaos, panic and violence could provide an opening for him to promote one of his puppets here as a “peacemaker,” who would then invite Russian intervention to restore stability. So it’s important to guard against Russian infiltration of these civilian defense and resistance groups.

A new law took effect on Jan. 1 that seeks to impose structure, military control and a chain of command on would-be civilian fighters. The NGOs that train them must register with the government, participants undergo background checks, and the training itself is prescribed by the military, says Gen. Victor Muzhenko, a former top commander of Ukraine’s Armed Forces.

Civilians wouldn’t decide when they fight. Instead, Ukraine’s president would declare war with the approval of Parliament, and the military would decide how to mobilize civilians and give the orders. “The trigger would not be their trigger,” Mr. Muzhenko says. “It would be the military trigger to say, ‘Now pick up your arms and go to this place.’ ”


Sannikov Oleksii
PHOTO: JILLIAN KAY MELCHIOR
That all looks neat on paper. “How it will work now that we have this law—I don’t know, nobody knows,” says Valeriy Kravchenko, a senior research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies, a governmental think tank. “We have manpower capacity. We are not sure about the capability of that capacity.” Sannikov Oleksii of the Ukrainian Legion, another NGO involved in training civilians, expressed uncertainty how groups like his would be funded, among other areas of legal ambiguity.

But “at a minimum, Putin has to know that nobody will welcome him here,” Mr. Oleksii says. At maximum? “Ukrainians will cut the throats of the Russians.”

Ms. Melchior is a Journal editorial page writer.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 01, 2022, 01:40:16 PM
https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/095/050/519/original/b8987712dfdb95bc.jpg

(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/095/050/519/original/b8987712dfdb95bc.jpg)

So, if Putin pushes into Ukraine, we should do what exactly ?

https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2022/01/bidens-deputy-national-security-adviser-says-americans-care-ukraine-borders-inviolate-record-518360-illegals-invade-us-border-first-fiscal-quarter/


https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/097/431/548/original/d0816bd6140fdd4f.png

(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/097/431/548/original/d0816bd6140fdd4f.png)

Some borders are more equal than others.
Title: WSJ: Luhansk and Donetsk are fuct
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 04, 2022, 09:10:40 AM
STANYTSIA LUHANSKA, Ukraine—The Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donetsk regions were once the engines of the country’s economy and dominated its politics.

They produced its richest man, billionaire industrialist Rinat Akhmetov, as well as former President Viktor Yanukovych, ousted by the street protests that triggered the Russian invasion in 2014.

Since then, however, the two areas—now nominally independent “people’s republics” inside the larger regions of Luhansk and Donetsk—have turned into impoverished, depopulated enclaves that increasingly rely on Russian subsidies to survive. As much as half the prewar population of 3.8 million has left, for the rest of Ukraine, more prosperous Russia or Europe. Those who remain are disproportionately retirees, members of the security services and people simply too poor to move. Current economic output has shrunk to roughly 30% of the level before the Russian invasion, economists estimate.

As Russian President Vladimir Putin is massing more than 100,000 troops for a possible broader invasion of Ukraine, the developments in Donetsk and Luhansk show what many fear could happen to the rest of the country if he were to carry that out. The dismal record of Russian rule is one reason so many Ukrainian citizens, including Russian-speakers, are ready to take up arms so that their hometowns won’t meet the same fate.


Russia-controlled territory

RUSSIA

Kharkiv

KHARKIV

Severodonetsk

Stanytsia Luhanska

LUHANSK

POLTAVA

Slovyansk

Luhansk

DONBAS

DONETSK

DNIPROPETROVSK

Donetsk

Area of detail

Kyiv

DONBAS

UKRAINE

ZAPORIZHIA

50 mi

CRIMEA

Sea of Azov

50 km

Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Emma Brown/The Wall Street Journal
“The nightmare that started in 2014 in Donetsk has transformed the popular attitudes in mostly Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine,” said Oleksiy Goncharenko, a lawmaker from Odessa, one of the cities in southern and eastern Ukraine rocked by large-scale pro-Russian protests at the time.

“Back in 2014, the majority here were undecided—their main priority was to keep living normally, working in their businesses, sending their kids to school,” Mr. Goncharenko said. “Since then, they’ve seen very clearly that life is quiet only in the areas where the Ukrainian flag remains. They said: We don’t want to live in such a zombie zone, in some kind of Somalia.”

Borys Korolyov, a native of Luhansk city, is now studying at a university in the northeastern Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, some 220 miles away. On a recent day, he lingered for a few minutes while his cellphone still worked in Stanytsia Luhanska, a crossing point from Ukrainian-controlled to Russian-held areas. Then he picked up his suitcase and headed across a bridge into Luhansk, to visit his parents.

“In Kharkiv, there are new, unexpected things, opportunities at every corner,” said Mr. Korolyov. “In Luhansk, there is nothing to do except stay at home. Boring. No prospects for the future.”


A market stall near the Stanytsia Luhanska crossing point.

Buildings of a psychiatric hospital in the Slovyansk area last week that were damaged in the fighting in 2014. The area is in the Ukrainian-controlled part of the Donetsk region.
The Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics are among a number of breakaway statelets Russia has fostered on its periphery as it seeks to undermine pro-Western neighbors. Russian troops also occupy the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and the Transnistria republic in Moldova. These territorial conflicts hamper the moves by Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova toward possible membership in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

When unrest began in eastern Ukraine following Mr. Yanukovych’s ouster and the Russian takeover of Crimea in February 2014, it was led by local pro-Russian militants with the tacit support of local law enforcement and some oligarchs. In April 2014, heavily armed Russian military veterans led by former Russian intelligence officer Igor Girkin seized the city of Slovyansk in the Donetsk region, heralding the start of more open Russian military involvement.

Hastily formed Ukrainian volunteer battalions and the country’s then-dilapidated military responded with a bloody counteroffensive, retaking Slovyansk and a string of other rebel-held towns in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, an area collectively known as Donbas.

When Ukrainian forces reached the outskirts of Donetsk and Luhansk cities in August 2014, Russia amped up its involvement, sending tanks, anti-aircraft batteries and long-range artillery across the border and imposing a cease-fire agreement on Kyiv.

Front lines have remained largely static since the latest Russian tank offensive in February 2015, even though sniper fire and artillery exchanges continue almost daily, with casualties on both sides.

Serhiy Shakun, known in Luhansk for his openly pro-Ukrainian opinions, operated one of the city’s largest taxi companies, with a fleet of 200 vehicles before the Russian takeover. In 2014, pro-Russian gunmen came to his office looking to detain him. Warned by a phone call, he took his family and escaped, eventually settling in Severodonetsk, the government seat of the Kyiv-held part of the Luhansk region. “They have taken everything. Nothing is left,” he said.


Serhiy Shakun in Severodonetsk.
Many other businesses and institutions were similarly expropriated. Isolyatsiya used to be a popular contemporary art space in Donetsk, hosting exhibitions and performances at a Soviet-era insulation materials factory. When Russian-backed militants took it over in 2014, saying the space was needed to store Russian humanitarian aid, they allowed staff to rescue a collection of Soviet-period social-realist paintings but smashed the contemporary art pieces, melting some of the statues and installations for scrap metal.

The Russian-installed official in charge of the facility, Leonid Baranov, went on television at the time to say that degenerate art had to be destroyed because it ran counter to the values of the new state, prevented young families from procreating and promoted hatred of the Russian idea.

Weeks later, Isolyatsiya’s compound turned into a detention facility operated by the Donetsk republic’s ministry of state security. One of the hundreds of prisoners there was Ukrainian novelist and journalist Stanislav Aseev, who was detained in 2017 after local security officials discovered he was contributing under a pen name to Ukrainian news outlets. Mr. Aseev, who says he was repeatedly tortured with electric shock, was freed in December 2019 as part of a prisoner exchange and now lives near Kyiv.

“They’ve managed to rebuild a Soviet system in the occupied territories—and not the Soviet system of the 1960s and 1970s, but a Soviet system of the 1930s and 1940s, with dungeons, with torture chambers, a system where lives are ruined if you dare to write or say something negative about these republics and their authorities,” Mr. Aseev said.

Russia still doesn’t formally recognize the self-proclaimed independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics, something it has already granted to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A bill to do so is making its way through the Russian parliament. Meanwhile, Russia has increasingly absorbed the two enclaves into its own economy.

The breakaway areas have switched from the Ukrainian currency to the Russian ruble; their citizens have been issued Russian passports; their students receive Russian diplomas; and the leaders of both republics last year publicly joined Mr. Putin’s political party, United Russia. Mr. Putin recently ordered the extension of Russia’s welfare benefits to the residents of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics.

“We see what Ukraine does to us: It shells and blockades Donbas, incites hatred of its residents. In this context, Russia’s actions clearly demonstrate who really cares about the people and their legitimate rights, and who is only interested in gaining territory,” the speaker of the Donetsk people’s republic parliament, Vladimir Bidyovka, said as he thanked Mr. Putin for the move.


An ATM in Stanytsia Luhanska.
PHOTO: ANASTASIA VLASOVA FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

A family crossed at the Stanytsia Luhanska entry point.
PHOTO: ANASTASIA VLASOVA FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Donetsk, once one of Ukraine’s wealthiest cities, hosted the 2012 European soccer championship with a new international airport, stadium and swanky hotels built for the event. Its buildings now are covered with billboards praising unity with Russia and honoring several separatist commanders who were mysteriously assassinated after 2014, such as Givi, the leader of a battalion called Somalia.

With the Russian-occupied territories cut off from the international financial system and trade, Western brands’ stores and chain restaurants have shut down. McDonald’s outlets have rebranded as DonMac, offering fries and burgers in similar red packaging. Because of a curfew, most shops and restaurants close early. Property prices have plunged and transactions are difficult because of the legal limbo.

Little remains of the airport, the site of some of the war’s most intense combat in 2014. Mobile network service is patchy and reliable connections with the rest of Ukraine are usually only possible via internet messaging services.

With the bulk of prominent Donbas businesspeople—including Mr. Akhmetov—escaping to Ukraine-controlled territory, the republics have seized most of the region’s biggest mines and industrial enterprises. The most valuable ones now are controlled by Russian investor Yevgeni Yurchenko. In a recent interview with Donetsk TV channels, Mr. Yurchenko said he plans to raise salaries threefold by 2024, bringing them on par with the nearby Russian regions to stem the exodus of skilled workers.

Ukraine recognizes the residents of the occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk as its own citizens, and allows them to enter to renew their documents, obtain medical, mail and banking services unavailable in the breakaway republics—or resettle permanently if they so choose. Even residents who opt for Russian citizenship usually keep their Ukrainian passports, which allow visa-free entry to the European Union.

The crossings into Russian-occupied areas were relatively easy before the Covid-19 pandemic. Currently only the checkpoint at Stanytsia Luhanska, just across the river from Luhansk city, operates daily.

The crossing is usually open only to Luhansk residents, so Donetsk residents wishing to travel to and from the rest of Ukraine have to drive for over 24 hours, making a giant loop via Russia proper.

Only people registered as the occupied areas’ permanent residents are allowed to enter without special permission. The Wall Street Journal was denied accreditation processing by the Luhansk people’s republic, which required proof of residence in Russia to consider requests. The Donetsk people’s republic didn’t reply to an accreditation request.


A bus departed from Stanytsia Luhanska.

Larysa Kandakova waited to cross the border at Stanytsia Luhanska.
On a recent afternoon, Larysa Kandakova, a native of Luhansk currently living in Kyiv, was spending her second day in a small service center at the Stanytsia Luhanska crossing point, waiting for permission from the Luhansk republic to enter to bury her mother, Livia. Aged 72, Ms. Kandakova’s mother died of a heart attack earlier that week. “I am so afraid, I really want to be able to get across,” she said, her eyes swollen. She was last able to see her mother two years ago.

Outside, coarse-voiced taxi and bus drivers touted rides to Kharkiv, Odessa and Severodonetsk to Luhansk residents who had just walked across the bridge separating Stanytsia Luhanska from Russian-held areas. The new bridge, running parallel to one destroyed in 2014, was built by Ukraine to be too narrow for tanks and heavy vehicles. A nurse in a booth just by the gate dispensed Pfizer -BioNTech Covid-19 vaccines, which are unauthorized in Russia and the breakaway republics. Some 3,000 people cross here daily.

Many were reluctant to discuss life in the Russian-controlled territory, casting a wary eye at potential informers in the crowd. “You have to keep your tongue between your teeth all the time because, otherwise, there will be trouble,” said Oleksandr, a gold-toothed retired worker from the town of Stakhanov who crossed to visit his children and declined to provide his surname.

Andrey, who owns an ice-cream wholesaler in Luhansk and was crossing with his wife and child to visit relatives, said it was pointless for ordinary people like him to discuss politics. “Nothing depends on us. Let other people decide for us—the only thing we want is for the war to end,” he said as his wife urged him to ignore “provocative” questions. “For many people, there’s no reason to be nostalgic about Ukrainian rule,” he said. “They had nothing back then, and they have nothing now. For them, nothing has changed.”

While Ukraine has pumped money into jobs and infrastructure across the parts of Donbas it controls, Stanytsia Luhanska is hardly a showcase of prosperity. Frequent shelling by pro-Russian forces has created streetscapes of collapsed roofs and pockmarked walls. Outside the cluster of outlets by the border checkpoints—a grocery, a kebab restaurant, a pharmacy and a Covid testing clinic—few businesses operate.

Development is much more visible in Slovyansk, which is well outside artillery range. New espresso bars, restaurants and hotels have opened throughout the city, as have retail outlets. Many of them are owned by newcomers from Russian-controlled parts of Donbas. Anastasia Monda, a 26-year-old from the town of Shakhtarsk near Donetsk, has worked as a barista in one such coffee shop for the past three years and travels to the occupied areas to visit her mother twice a year.


Anastasia Monda at the coffee shop where she works in Slovyansk.
“My hometown is gloomy. But in Donetsk city, everything looks fine, except that few people remain,” she said. Like many people in Ukrainian-controlled Donbas, Ms. Monda wouldn’t be drawn into talking about a possible Russian invasion. “I am not a political person,” she said. “The less you know, the sounder you sleep.”

Unlike in the wars of the former Yugoslavia, where religion and ethnicity created a permanent identity marker, here whether to consider oneself Ukrainian or Russian is a matter of choice and ideology rather than blood.

“There are so many families here that have broken up because one part supported Ukraine and another backed the Russian aggression,” said Maryna Oliynyk, head of the culture department at the Slovyansk civil-military administration. She no longer speaks to her uncle and cousin, who live in a nearby Ukrainian-controlled town, binge on Russian TV and adore Mr. Putin. “I am a patriot,” she said.

At the Slovyansk local museum, a room is dedicated to the 84 days when the town remained under the control of Russian militias in 2014. Exhibits include rocket-propelled grenades, artillery fragments and ballots of the referendum on independence from Ukraine that pro-Russian forces carried out at the time. Some 100 local residents died in Slovyansk, and more than 2,000 buildings were destroyed or damaged in the fighting. A suburb along the main highway still stands in ruins.



Maryna Oliynyk is the head of the culture department at the Slovyansk civil-military administration. Oleksandr Gayevoy is a curator at the Slovyansk history museum.
“It’s a big stress. Everyone is afraid, God forbid, that it will happen again,” said one of the museum’s curators, Oleksandr Gayevoy, who lived through the fighting in 2014. “People now prefer not to talk too much, because who knows who will come here next.”

Mr. Gayevoy added that one of his brothers, who remained in the Russian-controlled town of Yenakiyevo, former President Yanukovych’s hometown, was an ardent supporter of the Russian-installed regime there but has since changed his views.

“There used to be a lot of enthusiasm for the Donetsk people’s republic in the beginning, everyone chanted DPR, DPR, DPR! Now, there’s just a lot of disappointment,” said Mr. Gayevoy, who last visited the Russian-held areas in 2019. “My brother now tells me that they are ruled by cretins. The economy there has crumbled, the jobs are gone. There’s nothing good over there.”
Title: Whether to invade depends in part on the weather?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 04, 2022, 10:24:16 AM
second

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/ukraine-russia-invasion-geography-weather/?utm_campaign=wp_post_most&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_most&carta-url=https%3A%2F%2Fs2.washingtonpost.com%2Fcar-ln-tr%2F35f2959%2F61fd5d679d2fda51803059cf%2F61cdf026ae7e8a4ac205b2b3%2F9%2F72%2F61fd5d679d2fda51803059cf
Title: NYT: Ukes displaying American supplied weaponry
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 05, 2022, 02:58:19 AM
With a missile shot, Ukraine sends a public warning to Russia.

By Maria Varenikova
Feb. 4, 2022
YAVORIV, Ukraine — With television cameras rolling, a Ukrainian soldier heaved an America-made missile launcher onto his shoulder and pressed a red button. The missile streaked out and blew a target — a pile of tires — to smithereens.

For the more than two months after Russia began its military buildup near Ukraine last fall, the United States was quiet about its military aid to Kyiv, merely acknowledging sending arms that had been scheduled for delivery long ago.

That has changed now. American cargo planes bringing weaponry and ammunition are arriving openly at Kyiv’s Borispol airport. And the Ukrainian army is making a point of showing media these newly delivered weapons at a military training area.

In the last two weeks, seven U.S. cargo planes carrying a total of about 585 tons of military assistance have landed in Kyiv. After the latest plane arrived, on Thursday, Ukraine’s defense minister, Oleksiy Reznikov, posted on Twitter, “this is not the end! To be continued!”

Along with ammunition for small arms, the planes also delivered a significant number of missiles to Ukraine. These include Javelin anti-tank missiles, which the United States has been providing to Ukraine since 2018.

It also included a type of American-made, shoulder-launched missile that can blow up sandbagged fortifications and destroy partially buried bunkers. On Friday, Ukrainian soldiers fired 10 of the so-called “bunker busters” for international media, including a Japanese television crew.

To critics of the policy of arming Ukraine, this weapon seems provocative. Within Ukraine, nearly half the respondents to an opinion poll published on Wednesday said they believed Western weaponry will deter Russia, but a third said they thought it would do the opposite — provoke an attack. The Russian government has objected to the weapons transfers, and Germany is staunchly opposed to them.

“I do not think it’s realistic to believe such weapons exports could turn around the military imbalance,” Annalena Baerbock, Germany’s foreign minister, said on a visit to Kyiv on Monday.

Ukraine’s policy of publicly displaying the new weaponry adds to their value as a deterrent, said Maria Zolkina, a political analyst at Democratic Initiatives Foundation. The media events, she said, will help “destroy the myth that an unprotected Ukraine as an easy catch for Russia.”

Ukraine’s foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, has said the weapons airlifts strengthen Ukraine’s hand in dealing with Russia.

“The stronger Ukraine is the lower are the risks of further Russian aggression,” he said in a video conference with journalists this week. “The more defensive weapons we get today the less likely we will need to use them.”

The United States is not the only country that has been arming Ukraine in the airlifts that began last month. The United Kingdom sent about 2,000 light anti-tank missiles. With approval from the United States, the Baltic countries of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia said they would transfer Stinger antiaircraft missiles, filling gaps in Ukraine’s weak air defenses. Poland has also said it will send antiaircraft missiles.

At the demonstration firing of the American bunker busters, only Ukrainian soldiers handled the weapon. They had been through a three-day course taught by instructors from the 53d Infantry Brigade of the Florida National Guard. The Americans stood aside, declining to appear on camera.

The launching tube and missile weigh about 15 pounds and look like a small, green log. When a missile was fired, the whooshing noise rattled dishes on a picnic table set up to provide snacks for the visiting journalists. Ukrainian soldiers cheered when missiles hit the targets of tires and exploded in a red flash.

“It’s very simple, just a gadget,” said Ivan, a 25-year-old Ukrainian senior sergeant, now trained in firing the new missile, who declined to give his last name for security reasons. The soldiers also covered their faces with balaclavas to protect their identities.

But the training itself was simple, Ivan said. “A boy or a girl of any age can fire it. It’s like an iPhone.”
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on February 05, 2022, 06:36:38 AM
sending arms and threatening sanctions

seems like the best option
apart from sending US soldiers

which no one wants beside the Lincoln project crowd

and if he was still here - John McCain
Title: GPF: What Russian people think about conflict with Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 07, 2022, 03:48:21 AM
February 7, 2022
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What Russians Think About the Conflict With Ukraine
They are more worried about their day-to-day lives than the palace intrigue of Kyiv.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova

By now, tensions between Russia and Ukraine, and therefore Russia and the West, are well documented. Russia amassed troops at the border, the U.S. objected, and the negotiations to resolve the issue have gone nowhere, raising the possibility that a military operation is in the offing. One question ignored in the headlines is whether the Russian people actually want to go to war. So far, the answer appears to be a resounding no.

Russian polling agencies have confirmed as much. Less than 5 percent of Russians are ready to participate in a war, according to one poll. In fact, only 20 percent of Russians are closely following the current standoff. Many public figures argue that Russia does not need a war since there is no real threat, and that there is simply no appetite among the people to fight.

The explanations are many for why this is so. One is geography. Though most of the Russian people live on the “European” side of the country, most of the territory lies on the “Asian” side. Unsurprisingly, the threat of war in Ukraine is perceived as a minor security threat for the Asian part of Russia. For the east, the issue is out of sight, out of mind.

Another is culture. Russia is a multinational state with more than 190 ethnicities and nationalities represented in the predominately Russian population. Put simply, this means many Russians identify with the Ukrainians living among them instead of seeing them as enemies. Other nationalities that don’t have a historical and cultural connection with Ukraine don’t really care about the reclamation of Russian borderlands, however important it may be to the government.

Then there is an economic aspect. War is a resource-intensive business, one seen as far less pressing as the Russian economy is stalling, inflation is rising and more than half the population earn incomes below the national average and wait for state-directed projects to improve their living standards. It’s hard for them to care much about geopolitics when they are trying to make ends meet.

Even so, there is a geopolitical explanation for why Russians don’t care so much about the conflict. For them, it’s one issue of many, not an existential issue itself. They see it through the prism of Western-Russian tensions, one that for them is all too similar to the Cold War. Though many Russians blame the U.S. and NATO for the current escalation, those old enough to remember also understand that the fall of the Soviet Union and the associated loss of territory contributed to many of the problems Russia has today. They understand that all these recent events – Moscow setting its red lines, reengaging in the former Soviet space, the arguments about Nord Stream 2, the Belarusian border crisis, NATO exercises in eastern Europe, the constant threat of new sanctions, attention to Cuba and Venezuela from Russia, the demonstrative movement of troops from one part of Russia to another, as well as the reduction of gas supplies through the Yamal gas pipeline – are attempts by both sides to test the possibilities and limits of their opponent.

Poll: Who is the initiator of the aggravation of the situation in the east of Ukraine
(click to enlarge)

In that sense, the Ukraine conflict is just one aspect of a larger confrontation between the interests of Russia and the West. For most Americans, it’s a relatively new issue. For most Russians, it’s an issue that has been unfolding since 2014, from the beginning of hostilities in Donetsk and Luhansk and the annexation of Crimea by Russia, over which the talk of war has loomed large for a year. So to the average Russian citizen, this is just informational noise.

Fear of Sanctions

What Russians care about is how this whole confrontation will affect their living standards. They are concerned about the West’s response and thus Russia’s future in international trade and finance because fluctuations in the ruble, inflation and the stability of the financial system will affect their well-being.

Poll: Russian Economic Crisis
(click to enlarge)

Indeed, whipping up military and sanctions hysteria usually costs Russia dearly. The economy is already suffering from accelerating inflation, currency depreciation, stock market crashes and foreign exits from government securities. Conflict-related uncertainty causes an outflow of capital as foreign investments freeze in anticipation of possible sanctions. In January 2022, the share of foreign investment in Russian government bonds decreased to 18.8 percent compared to 34.9 percent in March 2020.

Moreover, the Russian ruble is especially sensitive to events like this. Just the announcement that sanctions were possible caused the ruble to fall. It likewise fell at the end of January when the U.S. Embassy recommended that American citizens leave Ukraine. A weak ruble is worse for Russian citizens than it is for the state, which can still find ways to patch up holes in the budget. People buy foreign products like cars, smartphones and household appliances, so a weak ruble drives up the costs of their consumption.

Russian Ruble Exchange Rate
(click to enlarge)

There are also more general fears that a military engagement would disrupt Russian gas supplies to Europe and food supplies to Asia, Africa and the Middle East, leading to higher prices at home. These fears are not unfounded: The International Monetary Fund recently noted that a possible escalation of the conflict would lead to an increase in energy prices and further acceleration of inflation in the world.

For all these reasons, most Russians aren’t interested in the Ukraine conflict. To the extent that they are, it’s part of a bigger problem in which further deterioration in ties between Russia and the West could harm their quality of life. They live their lives worried about the pandemic, their bottom lines, difficulties in the economy and future sanctions regimes. But not Kyiv itself.
Title: Another POV: Putin has already lost
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 07, 2022, 03:26:43 PM
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-putin-has-already-lost-ukraine-200400?fbclid=IwAR20aw5k7BSIAsTAVc7xWr0SsjW_wUKm37TEQctEQMJO0cpenvTOwNyS_yQ
Title: George Friedman: Is invasion of Ukraine imminent?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 08, 2022, 04:08:49 AM
February 8, 2022
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Is an Invasion of Ukraine Imminent?
By: George Friedman
Over the past few days, the United States has warned that a Russian invasion of Ukraine may be imminent. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said Russia could take Kyiv in as few as three days. Moscow, for its part, has insisted that it has no intention of invading Ukraine. But Moscow has every reason to lie. The truth behind Washington’s statements is harder to parse.

Obviously, U.S. intelligence might have information indicating that the Russian military will invade this week. If so, publicly saying as much might be meant to deter Russia. The problem is that it won’t. The U.S. has made clear that it would respond to an invasion with extreme economic sanctions rather than with military force. So if Moscow has made up its mind to invade in spite of the consequences, acknowledging the imminence of the attack isn’t much of a deterrent.

That changes if an invasion triggered an American military response. If that were the case, Russia would have to be deeply concerned that U.S. intelligence knows exactly what it can do and what it plans to do. So by advertising the imminence of an attack, the U.S. could be assuming that Russia doesn’t want Ukraine badly enough to risk war, which always has an uncertain and messy outcome. If Moscow believed a fight was at stake with the U.S., it might reconsider its options.

It makes sense that Washington would want to deter Russia. The United States is not eager for a war with Russia, to say the least, and the best way to avoid a war is to threaten a counterstrike. Equally valuable is a public demonstration that American intelligence had penetrated Russian war plans. The Russians would have to assume that their war plans had been more broadly penetrated. If the U.S. knows the timing of the invasion, perhaps it also knows the formations to be used and movements and timing of movements. A three-pronged armored assault, each moving hundreds of miles and being refueled along the way, has to be choreographed like a ballet. If it’s disrupted by air and missile attacks, the entire movement could collapse for want of logistical support and loss of communication.

Under these circumstances, the U.S. – not wanting a war in Ukraine but feeling compelled to engage anyway – would be sending a very clear message: “We know your plans, and will strike at you.” The problem with this theory is that if the U.S. intended to counter a Russian attack by means other than sanctions, it would have made its intentions clear far in advance of the eve of an invasion. More important, the Russians would have seen American preparations. Russia was clearly capable of reconsidering its plans if it was genuinely concerned about the U.S. response.

And yet, the U.S. has refrained from saying outright that war is coming and that it will respond with all the power at its disposal. It has announced only Russia’s “intentions,” without any public hint that the U.S. intends to do something about it. It’s as if the U.S. wants the world to know it knows Russia will soon attack without doing anything other than raising an alarm. This is a strange way to build credibility. If you do not intend to act, it would be better to feign surprise. Having knowledge and still being beaten is a poor option.

If the U.S. is planning to counter the Russian attack, then advertising the fact that it has penetrated Russian war plans is perhaps the clumsiest move of all because Moscow will cancel the attack, create a new plan, and look for and shut down the leak. It is therefore difficult to assume Washington is planning a surprise counterattack, even if it is trying to convince Moscow that it is. It could be that Russia will call off the attack because it has no idea what America’s intentions are. Considering how good Russian intelligence generally is, that’s not very likely.

At this point, it’s all smoke and mirrors. The U.S. says Russia will attack, Russia says it won’t. One of them is either lying or wrong. Either way, the U.S. is drumming up war fever. It may be designed to keep allies like Germany in line, but it’s hard to see how shouting fire but not gathering fire engines will instill enough confidence to rally allies to the United States' side. They may lose all confidence in Russia, but it is amazing how a victory rebuilds confidence.
Title: GPF: Competing drills on the same days
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 08, 2022, 09:49:18 AM
Competing exercises. Ukraine said it would hold military drills on Feb. 10-20 in several regions of the country. Russia and Belarus also plan to conduct joint exercises on the same days. Russia's Southern Military District, meanwhile, has already begun tactical drills.
Title: Putin makes it clear: Fcuk with me and it's mushroom clouds
Post by: G M on February 10, 2022, 07:10:08 AM
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10488413/Vladimir-Putin-warns-nuclear-war-break-Ukraine-joins-NATO.html#v-5984255003370174117
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 10, 2022, 07:15:53 AM
I noted the logic of Ukraine in NATO means it can invoke Article 5 to recover Crimea.
Title: Gen. Keene three days ago
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 10, 2022, 02:45:18 PM


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q9aUs7ctzUQ
Title: George Friedman: The Phases of War
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 11, 2022, 05:43:14 AM
As always GF is thoughtful, but I'm not seeing here any consideration of the little green men in the Donbass variations.
================================================================================

February 11, 2022
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The Phases of War
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman
As we consider the American claim that Russia intends to attack Ukraine – which the Kremlin denies – it is useful to consider in skeletal form the phases of warfare in order to understand not only the sequence but also the difficulty and risks of war.

There are four phases in attacking and occupying a country:

Phase 1: Intelligence. Understand who you are fighting, his intentions and capabilities, and what war is meant to achieve.

Phase 2: War. Initiate movement and firepower intended to break the enemy’s will and ability to resist.

Phase 3: Occupation. Occupy the country, or that portion that is necessary to achieve the political end desired.

Phase 4: Pacification. Pacify the occupied terrain and break the will of the people to resist.

This is an orderly summary of what is likely the most disorderly thing humans experience. Each stage is more complex and disorderly than might seem possible, and the number of stages can boggle the mind. Nonetheless, simplifying and ordering the chaos of war will help us pose the proper questions and perhaps glimpse the answers.

Intelligence is the first phase, and it precedes the decision to fight. Understanding the intentions of a potential enemy tells you whether what he intends is compatible with your interests. Understanding his capabilities tells you whether you should take the enormous risk of going to war. Intentions and capabilities are things that all countries seek to understand about even the least likely adversary. They tell you who you have to fight and who might fight with you. Intelligence can also guide you on who the enemy might be. When Japan invaded China, it did not anticipate that in due course it might be facing the United States. If there is a Russian invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. has a fairly clear idea of who it might be fighting if it intervenes. (China is unlikely to have the capability to project decisive force during the timeframe of any U.S.-Russian conflict.) Russia does not know the order of battle facing it, although it might be clear on what kind of force a potential adversary could bring to bear. The political uncertainty creates military uncertainty.

The second phase is the initiation and prosecution of war. The aggressor decides for the defender. When Germany, allied with the Soviet Union, invaded Poland, Berlin’s intelligence did not tell it about the array of nations and long-run capabilities it would be facing. A decision to go to war is meant to anticipate the shape of the war in the end. Political intelligence is far more difficult to gather than military intelligence. The engines of war can be hidden only imperfectly. The intentions of countries are difficult to fathom, as even those countries are unaware of what they might do. Nevertheless, it is essential to evaluate what they will do when confronted with the war you are launching, either now or in the long run. You must know this in order to know the order of battle you will have to defeat. Hitler understood his potential enemies. He did not appreciate the order of battle the United States would bring to bear or the resilience of the Soviet defense. Whatever Russia’s objective in Ukraine, its uncertainty about who its enemy might be is a deterrent. This is true unless Russian intelligence has deeply penetrated American decision-making.

The third phase is the occupation of the territory or country targeted. Occupation is an end. The means to this end must be the destruction of the enemy’s military, physically or as a matter of morale. France had the material ability to continue resisting Nazi Germany but lacked the morale. The occupation of a country is a difficult and time-consuming process even when there is no resistance. There is first the sheer physical size of the country and the caution that must accompany imperfect intelligence about the enemy force. Then there is the matter of logistics. Soldiers must eat, and in modern warfare, gasoline must be delivered to vehicles, along with ammunition to replace what was consumed. In an armored assault, such as would be the case in Ukraine, armored vehicles, even when well maintained, have a tendency to break down. When 50 tons of moving parts encounter the road, parts may fail. And we should not underestimate the anti-tank weapons given to Ukraine. Any assault would have to be methodical and aware of possible threats, and the logistic movement itself is more vulnerable than the main thrust and just as essential. If the occupation faces resistance, movement will be slowed dramatically. If not, concern about the possibility of resistance will slow the movement. This has political ramifications, as a rapid defeat of a force precludes reinforcement by foreign powers – they would have to invade anew. An extended process of occupation increases the likelihood of foreign powers feeling pressure to intervene on behalf of the defenders – or at least the offensive force has to consider the possibility.

The fourth phase may be the most time-consuming and politically vexing. Some occupied populations accept defeat. Others do not. The best example of the military effectiveness of post-occupation resistance is Russia itself, where military and civilian forces continued resisting behind the advancing Germans, forcing the Germans to divert forces to pacification, which further alienated the population and increased resistance behind the front line. Britain in India faced this problem in the 19th century. Pacification is a political issue pivoting on the population’s loyalty to its government and the hostility of the occupiers. From the occupiers’ point of view, pacification is a double-edged sword, both limiting resistance and encouraging it through its brutal nature. It is, of course, not clear how loyal the Ukrainian people are to the government or the principle of an independent Ukraine, nor is it clear how much they dislike the Russians and how much a Russian pacification might encourage resistance.

In the case of Russia and Ukraine, the Russians cannot be certain whether the U.S. would become involved or what weapons they would use. In modern warfare it is not necessary to come within a kilometer of a tank to destroy it. Long-range missiles can attack the force and, more profitably, the logistical system that supports that force. A U.S. intervention would be the most dangerous for Russia, and Moscow can’t trust whatever Washington says, particularly if Ukrainian resistance is stiff, casualties are high and the U.S. finds itself under pressure to intervene. It is a case where the Americans themselves don’t know what they will do. In that case, what the Russians intended to be a short war could drag out, with the likelihood of successful pacification uncertain.

Military operations require the minimization of uncertainty. It is, however, in the nature of war that uncertainties multiply. The U.S. dismissed the idea of a German counteroffensive late in World War II. The Battle of the Bulge resulted. The U.S. expected North Vietnam to abandon its desire to unite Vietnam. It miscalculated. And Stalin did not expect a German invasion in 1941.

Intelligence frequently fails. Military operations suffer failures of command, communication and morale. The resistance to the invader unexpectedly surges. Allies of the defender emerge as a surprise, with military and non-military attacks. Superb sources of information from the enemy’s capital turn out to be working for the enemy. To go to war, there must be an overriding interest for which no other solution or mitigation is possible.

When we use the stages of war as a skeleton on which to drape the various phases, war becomes an unattractive idea. For the Russians, who have not conducted an extended multidivisional war in nearly 75 years, the option might seem attractive. Time hides truths. But in the case of Russia, the truth of war will take centuries to forget. The Russians remember World War II in their bones. They also remember how many things Hitler miscalculated, from Russian resistance to the nations that supported Russia. And in remembering that war, considering the model I tinkered with here and the vast unknowns, the Russians, I don’t think, will initiate another. It would make little sense
Title: Harris - assigned Ukraine
Post by: ccp on February 11, 2022, 05:53:41 AM
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/kamala-harris-joe-biden-biden-administration-ukraine/2022/02/09/id/1056241/

 :-o

what we really need is the most qualified Dem for this ->

Hillary !    :wink:
Title: Re: Harris - assigned Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on February 11, 2022, 06:31:34 AM
How's Kamala doing on that border issue?

She's going to Europe because Joe can't, not because she can solve anything, obviously.
Title: Re: Harris - assigned Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 11, 2022, 06:44:48 AM
How's Kamala doing on that border issue?

She's going to Europe because Joe can't, not because she can solve anything, obviously.

Perhaps she can "Willie Brown" Putin into an agreement?
Title: Re: Harris - assigned Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on February 11, 2022, 06:53:11 AM
Her mind might be valuable than her body at this point.
Title: Re: Harris - assigned Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 11, 2022, 07:04:50 AM
Her mind might be valuable than her body at this point.

Oooof!


Well, at least she fixed the border!
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 11, 2022, 09:05:55 AM
The Cackling Kommiela?

Truly we are fuct , , ,
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 12, 2022, 04:34:48 AM
https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/europe/2022/02/12/russia-evacuating-diplomatic-staff-from-ukraine/
Title: Gen Keane on Maria's show
Post by: ccp on February 12, 2022, 09:04:04 AM
https://video.foxbusiness.com/v/6296309579001#sp=show-clips
Title: Re: Gen Keane on Maria's show
Post by: DougMacG on February 12, 2022, 06:44:02 PM
https://video.foxbusiness.com/v/6296309579001#sp=show-clips

Good interview, thanks.

Putin does not want to own Ukraine, just wants to accomplish certain objectives, keep NATO out.

The new Iran deal will be worse than the first, negotiated by China, Russia, Arabs and Israel don't want it.  We will again be giving them planeloads of cash to buy weapons to blow up us and allies.

At my age I hate to be wishing 4 years, this jackass's term, go by faster.
Title: Ukraine and the end of the Gay American Empire
Post by: G M on February 14, 2022, 09:24:32 AM
https://thezman.com/wordpress/?p=26699

The End Of Empire
Posted on February 14, 2022
Note: The Monday Taki post is up. The subject of it and today’s post is the rather bizarre crisis in Europe. Of course, Sunday Thoughts is up behind the green door for those needing audio stimulation. Much of it is about the situation in Europe.

The question that has not been given much consideration over the last few decades is how exactly will the Global American Empire end? All empires come to an end, but not all of them end the same. Usually, they dissolve into their constituent parts like we saw with the Soviet Union. This may or may not bring with it a spasm of violence, but the unnatural combination eventually returns to its nature. What makes each empire unique is its birth and its death.

Like every empire before it, the Global American Empire will end. This may be what we are seeing with the current crisis in Europe over Ukraine. Russia is well past the dissolution of the Soviet Empire. Europe has also evolved past the old arrangements made necessary by the Cold War. The only player stuck in the past is the Global American Empire, which is carrying on like it is 1960. We are now seeing the hints of the end for the American empire in Europe.

The starting place is the fact that the stuff coming from Washington is so bizarre that not even the Ukrainians understand it. The rhetoric has gone well beyond the normal sort of moralizing that has distinguished the American empire. Washington and now London have conjured a reality in which the Russians are ready to launch into Ukraine while the Russians and Ukrainians are happy to find a peaceful solution. The whole thing is making Washington look a bit nuts.

All of this happening against the reality that if the Russians want to invade Ukraine there is nothing NATO can do about it. If the Russians wanted to move onto Berlin there is not much NATO could do to stop them. Over time, the West would be able to rally and cripple the Russians economically, then roll them back militarily, but in the short term everyone gets that NATO is a paper tiger. It is also a pointless vestige from a bygone era that should have been scrapped a generation ago.

This is one entry point into the crisis. The Germans want to finish Nord Stream 2 and build closer economic ties with Russia. The Russians want to restore their ancient relationship with Western Europe. They will not accept the American conditions that they must embrace the religion of the West. There will be no rainbows and transsexuals in the Russian culture. There will be no scenes of Russian soldiers walking around in pumps claiming to be sorry for their ancestors.

The Germans and the French seem to be ready to make the deal with the Russians and begin a new era for both sides. The Russians can maintain their traditional model for organizing themselves and Europe will begin to normalize economic relations with the rest of Eurasia. This leaves little room for the Global American Empire, which is based on an assertion that there is only one moral way to organize a society. This potential new arrangement is a rebuke of the very idea of empire.

Another entry point into viewing the current crisis as a stage in the dissolution of the Global American Empire is in the reaction itself. Even the American media has lost track of how many times the Biden people have claimed an invasion is imminent. It feels like it is a weekly thing now. The State Department swears the tanks are revving their engines and then nothing happens. European leaders have to be wondering if the empire is losing its grip on reality.

The hysteria could very well be the only thing left. Again, if Russian draws the line on NATO expansion and takes over Ukraine, there is very little Washington can do about it other than make a lot of noise. The promise of crippling economic sanctions is as ridiculous as the rest of the bellowing. Europe needs to buy important stuff from Russia in order to exist. Germany and France will go along with superficial stuff to please Washington, but they are not committing suicide over Ukraine.

What we may be entering is a final phase of the Global American Empire in which conflicting realities create a lot of friction. One reality is that America’s dominion over Europe was always unnatural for both sides. In the Cold War it was seen as a necessity, so it was a tolerable contradiction. Those conditions have not existed for over a generation now and reality is reasserting itself. Western Europe will be dominated by France and Germany and Eastern Europe by Russia.

Another set of conflicting realities is that the heritage stock of America never wanted to be a major player in world affairs. The sales pitch by the imperial leaders was always based on this assumed reluctance. The Global American Empire was a necessity born out of war and tragedy. That necessity is long over and yet the managerial elite of the empire insists on maintaining the empire. Meanwhile the public is dealing with cultural and economic collapse.

There has never been a time when the average American has felt more divorced from his government than now. The guy the empire counts on to wave the flag and respond to war drums is not sure which side to support. This is one of those unspoken truths about this Ukraine affair. The reservoir of patriotism is now dry among the cohort of Americans who have always been the most patriotic. The response from these people over Ukraine is a shrug or maybe a wry smile.

This may be what the end empire is like from the inside. We will have spasms of bellowing and shouting from Washington, but the world will slowly crawl out from under the shadow of Washington. Meanwhile, domestic politics will grow increasingly untenable, with populist revolt replacing electoral organizing. The system simply stops working as the reason for it to keep working no longer makes sense. The end of empire is a million small breakdowns in the system.
Title: Re: Ukraine and the end of the Gay American Empire
Post by: G M on February 14, 2022, 10:00:28 AM
https://www.theburningplatform.com/2022/02/14/speed-wobble/#more-260178


https://thezman.com/wordpress/?p=26699

The End Of Empire
Posted on February 14, 2022
Note: The Monday Taki post is up. The subject of it and today’s post is the rather bizarre crisis in Europe. Of course, Sunday Thoughts is up behind the green door for those needing audio stimulation. Much of it is about the situation in Europe.

The question that has not been given much consideration over the last few decades is how exactly will the Global American Empire end? All empires come to an end, but not all of them end the same. Usually, they dissolve into their constituent parts like we saw with the Soviet Union. This may or may not bring with it a spasm of violence, but the unnatural combination eventually returns to its nature. What makes each empire unique is its birth and its death.

Like every empire before it, the Global American Empire will end. This may be what we are seeing with the current crisis in Europe over Ukraine. Russia is well past the dissolution of the Soviet Empire. Europe has also evolved past the old arrangements made necessary by the Cold War. The only player stuck in the past is the Global American Empire, which is carrying on like it is 1960. We are now seeing the hints of the end for the American empire in Europe.

The starting place is the fact that the stuff coming from Washington is so bizarre that not even the Ukrainians understand it. The rhetoric has gone well beyond the normal sort of moralizing that has distinguished the American empire. Washington and now London have conjured a reality in which the Russians are ready to launch into Ukraine while the Russians and Ukrainians are happy to find a peaceful solution. The whole thing is making Washington look a bit nuts.

All of this happening against the reality that if the Russians want to invade Ukraine there is nothing NATO can do about it. If the Russians wanted to move onto Berlin there is not much NATO could do to stop them. Over time, the West would be able to rally and cripple the Russians economically, then roll them back militarily, but in the short term everyone gets that NATO is a paper tiger. It is also a pointless vestige from a bygone era that should have been scrapped a generation ago.

This is one entry point into the crisis. The Germans want to finish Nord Stream 2 and build closer economic ties with Russia. The Russians want to restore their ancient relationship with Western Europe. They will not accept the American conditions that they must embrace the religion of the West. There will be no rainbows and transsexuals in the Russian culture. There will be no scenes of Russian soldiers walking around in pumps claiming to be sorry for their ancestors.

The Germans and the French seem to be ready to make the deal with the Russians and begin a new era for both sides. The Russians can maintain their traditional model for organizing themselves and Europe will begin to normalize economic relations with the rest of Eurasia. This leaves little room for the Global American Empire, which is based on an assertion that there is only one moral way to organize a society. This potential new arrangement is a rebuke of the very idea of empire.

Another entry point into viewing the current crisis as a stage in the dissolution of the Global American Empire is in the reaction itself. Even the American media has lost track of how many times the Biden people have claimed an invasion is imminent. It feels like it is a weekly thing now. The State Department swears the tanks are revving their engines and then nothing happens. European leaders have to be wondering if the empire is losing its grip on reality.

The hysteria could very well be the only thing left. Again, if Russian draws the line on NATO expansion and takes over Ukraine, there is very little Washington can do about it other than make a lot of noise. The promise of crippling economic sanctions is as ridiculous as the rest of the bellowing. Europe needs to buy important stuff from Russia in order to exist. Germany and France will go along with superficial stuff to please Washington, but they are not committing suicide over Ukraine.

What we may be entering is a final phase of the Global American Empire in which conflicting realities create a lot of friction. One reality is that America’s dominion over Europe was always unnatural for both sides. In the Cold War it was seen as a necessity, so it was a tolerable contradiction. Those conditions have not existed for over a generation now and reality is reasserting itself. Western Europe will be dominated by France and Germany and Eastern Europe by Russia.

Another set of conflicting realities is that the heritage stock of America never wanted to be a major player in world affairs. The sales pitch by the imperial leaders was always based on this assumed reluctance. The Global American Empire was a necessity born out of war and tragedy. That necessity is long over and yet the managerial elite of the empire insists on maintaining the empire. Meanwhile the public is dealing with cultural and economic collapse.

There has never been a time when the average American has felt more divorced from his government than now. The guy the empire counts on to wave the flag and respond to war drums is not sure which side to support. This is one of those unspoken truths about this Ukraine affair. The reservoir of patriotism is now dry among the cohort of Americans who have always been the most patriotic. The response from these people over Ukraine is a shrug or maybe a wry smile.

This may be what the end empire is like from the inside. We will have spasms of bellowing and shouting from Washington, but the world will slowly crawl out from under the shadow of Washington. Meanwhile, domestic politics will grow increasingly untenable, with populist revolt replacing electoral organizing. The system simply stops working as the reason for it to keep working no longer makes sense. The end of empire is a million small breakdowns in the system.
Title: Joe Biden policies paid for the Ukraine crisis
Post by: DougMacG on February 16, 2022, 07:50:41 AM
Gas at the pump here is now double what I paid under Trump.  Natural gas to heat our homes already doubled and has gone up more with the 'surprisingly' harsh winter.  World oil prices have more than doubled.  Not from the Covid lockdown lows but from the pre-covid times of rapid economic growth.  D

More than anything, this is the result of Joe Biden being president.

Guess who is empowered by that and by American weakness in general?  Vladimir Putin, whose otherwise tenuous economy depends on the world price and scarcity of oil and gas.  Biden closed a pipeline in his first minute in office, shutdown drilling on federal lands and is basically cancelling the industry to the best of his ability with all the levers of government.  The world's biggest producer (US) has stopped much of its production, stopped exporting, and can barely supply its own pumps and consumers.

The whole Ukraine thing, centered around words and troop movements, is likely a head fake by Putin designed to get whatever he wants from Ukraine and from the West.  It costs money to move those troops around and to fire up those old tanks.  Guess what?  They have plenty of money now after being starved by the Trump policies, and they have plenty of oil and gas.  Thanks to Joe Biden and those with TDS who supported him, Putin is back in power, like a kid in an unattended candy store.

$100 Billion in military arms and equipment were left in Afghanistan, given to the Taliban.  We won't be using those to stop him.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 16, 2022, 06:50:54 PM
February 16, 2022
View On Website
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Daily Memo: Ukraine Cyberattack, EU Funding Dispute
Kyiv experienced one of the largest cyberattacks in its history.
By: Geopolitical Futures

Cyberattack. Ukrainian authorities said state-owned banks and websites were targeted on Tuesday in one of the largest cyberattacks in the country’s history. Ukraine’s Center for Information Security suggested that Russia may have been behind the attack. Meanwhile, Ukrainian law enforcement conducted several exercises over the weekend to plan a response to the possible seizure of administrative buildings and police departments within 30 kilometers (19 miles) of Crimea, the country’s internal affairs minister said on Wednesday
Title: Everyone here should try to have this level of training
Post by: G M on February 16, 2022, 11:03:29 PM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GkSsC6aCFbU

Plan accordingly.
Title: Ukraine, Biden Administration Accuses Putin of Lying
Post by: DougMacG on February 17, 2022, 08:10:33 AM
Biden Administration Accuses Putin of Lying about troop withdrawals.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60407010

I find this disheartening. 

Biden Administration also doubled Russia's national income by retreating from the global oil and gas markets.  Thank you Joe Biden, buffoon.  Why would you do that if they are warmongering liars?  Makes no sense, or did it save the planet - only to have it ruled by China or Russia?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on February 17, 2022, 09:40:08 AM
so far the US has called Putin's bluff.

ball in Putin's court...........


Title: Russia would kick our fake and gay military’s ass
Post by: G M on February 18, 2022, 10:13:06 AM
https://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/us-not-ready-peer-peer-fight-europe
Title: 2/18 update
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 18, 2022, 11:41:18 AM
Unfamiliar with this source

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bPGZFSFCZsM&t=4s

Title: Stratfor on Donbass
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 18, 2022, 01:50:15 PM
GRAPHICS
The Donbas Conflict in Context
2 MIN READFeb 18, 2022 | 21:06 GMT





A Ukrainian soldier stands guard near debris after the reported shelling of a kindergarten in the settlement of Stanytsia Luhanska in eastern Ukraine on Feb. 17, 2022.
A soldier stands guard near debris after the reported shelling of a kindergarten in eastern Ukraine on Feb. 17, 2022.

(ARIS MESSINIS/AFP via Getty Images)

In recent days, Russia has clearly signaled its willingness to escalate the eight-year conflict in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. On Feb. 18, a day after Russian-backed separatists shelled a nursery in the government-controlled territory, authorities in the two self-proclaimed republics in Donbas ordered a mass evacuation of civilians. The evacuations will make it easier for Russia — which now has an estimated 169,000-190,000 troops stationed near Ukraine — to move equipment and personnel into the war-torn region. This raises the probability of additional cease-fire violations and false-flag attacks as Moscow tries to use the threat of an invasion to gain significant concessions from Kyiv and the West.


Since 2014, Ukrainian forces have been battling Russian-backed separatists in an area in southeastern Ukraine known as the Donbas. On Feb. 15, Russia's parliament approved a non-binding resolution to formally recognize the region’s self-proclaimed Luhansk and Donetsk republics as independent countries. The vote has spurred controversy, as such a designation would free Russia to openly send troops and weapons to war-torn Donbas. It would also end the Minsk agreements, which see Ukraine regaining control of its eastern border in exchange for giving the separatist regions more autonomy.

The separatists in charge of eastern Ukraine’s two breakaway republics claim sovereignty over the entire Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (which effectively span the Donbas region), but they actually control a smaller section between the Russian border and the region’s two major cities. These two separatist-controlled areas are de facto Russian-occupied, as Russians make up the majority of soldiers in both republics. But Moscow denies it has troops in Donbas, claiming these soldiers are instead volunteers and mercenaries.
Title: GPF: Update
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 20, 2022, 12:31:32 AM
February 19, 2022
View On Website
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An Update on Eastern Ukraine
The following is a roundup of events over the past few days.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Editor’s note: The following is a roundup of events over the past few days.

Earlier this week, Russia took steps to de-escalate the situation on its border with Ukraine, announcing the end of the “active phase” of military exercises and posting a video showing their return of troops from the border to their normal locations. Moscow also said that negotiations with the West would continue. For its part, Ukraine made sure to say that the likelihood of military clashes was, but only a few days later, things started heating up in Donbas.

What Happened

The Donetsk People’s Republic said about 600 shells were fired over the past 24 hours.
The head of the Luhansk People’s Republic signed a decree on a general mobilization . DPR leaders followed suit. The head of the LPR signed a decree on the transfer of state bodies, enterprises and organizations to wartime conditions
On Feb. 19, the DPR  was evacuated.
 A group of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia flies to the Rostov region to organize the reception of citizens of the DPR and LPR. A state of emergency is imposed in Rostov.
About the Evacuation

Some 700,000 people are ready to leave the area, according to a statement from the DPR, The evacuation is conducted by the Ministry of Emergency Situations in coordination with local cities and regions.
Russia has not confirmed the evacuation. According to a source at TASS news agency, there are temporary accommodation centers for only 10,000 places and they will be deployed in the Rostov region in the near future.
The largest companies in Yakutia are ready to accept only 1,500 refugees. Alrosa, Elgaugol and Kolmar are ready to help the evacuees, including with employment.
The deputy head of the Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations osaidefugees from Donbass can be sent to seven regions of Russia
Bottom Line: Either the DPR is providing incorrect information about the number of refugees to raise noise, or the Kremlin provide incorrect information because it doesn’t want to show that DPR residents are leaving en masse.
On Military Operations

Still, it seems that Russia still doesn’t want to start on outright war. The number of troops on the border with Ukraine are less than the number of troops in the Ukrainian army, and Russia has not prepared any additional reserves. The West is ill prepared too, judging by a still modest troop presence, and military supplies from the United States and NATO have dropped sharply since Feb. 16.
Russia wants to convey a sense that its moves are a symmetrical response to the evacuation of Western embassies and citizens from Kiev.
Ukraine notes that the situation in the east of Ukraine is under control. The president went  to the Munich conference today.
Donbass is ready for a constructive dialogue in the contact group on specific issues and with specific proposals
Area behind the front lines are not panicked. Stores are full of goods and products, and managers say vendors will carry groceries without interruption.
The situation in the front-line settlements from where the evacuation is taking place (given by the telegrams of the Donbass channel) is also not very similar to martial law
Stray Notes

In the village of Luganskoye, the night passed quietly.

Kalinovka, Molochny, Sanzharovka were  under fire. The Ukrainian army fired 120-mm mortars, grenade launchers and small arms. Though this is somewhat commonplace, the villagers are worried. The first bus left for evacuation yesterday.
In Yasinovataya, Things were relatively quiet. Residents are trying to send out children and the elderly as much as possible.In Panteleymonovka, damage was sustained by shelling from the Ukrainian army.Heavy artillery was heard in Makiivka.
Dokuchaevsk. “It was noisy at night.but  Everything works in the city: shops, market. Communications are working. There is no panic."

Three residential buildings were damaged in Zaitsevo

U.S. President Joe Biden, citing intelligence, said that Vladimir Putin had decided on a new invasion of Ukraine and it would begin in the coming days under the pretext of genocide in Donbass.
Title: This is why the world laughs at what we have become
Post by: G M on February 20, 2022, 04:04:49 PM
https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/099/263/753/original/55f648f29c236fa6.jpg

(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/099/263/753/original/55f648f29c236fa6.jpg)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on February 21, 2022, 08:32:05 AM
- Ukraine legalizes BTC,
- Bulgarian exchange for crypto starts functioning
- Huge BTC buys happening in Poland, which borders Ukraine
- Russian parliament is debating legalizing crypto...alternative to SWIFT
- Putin has indicated decision will be made today..

It seems to me that 2 new Republics may be coming up ....
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on February 21, 2022, 09:41:53 AM
Like I said putin is bluffing:
https://populistpress.com/the-biggest-war-in-europe-since-1945/

 :-o

would it not have simply been easier if NATO pledged not to include Ukraine?

Is not that what Putin wanted?

So now many people may die because we had to make a stand for something that was superfluous

Biden the terrible.........
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 21, 2022, 09:52:22 AM
Finland has said it may well apply to NATO if Russia invades Ukraine.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 21, 2022, 10:19:34 AM
Got to wag the dog to distract from the implosion of the US.


Like I said putin is bluffing:
https://populistpress.com/the-biggest-war-in-europe-since-1945/

 :-o

would it not have simply been easier if NATO pledged not to include Ukraine?

Is not that what Putin wanted?

So now many people may die because we had to make a stand for something that was superfluous

Biden the terrible.........
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on February 21, 2022, 11:11:42 AM
Got to wag the dog to distract from the implosion of the US.

“What’s the point of having this superb military you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?”
    - Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Colin Powell
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 21, 2022, 11:56:38 AM
Got to wag the dog to distract from the implosion of the US.

“What’s the point of having this superb military you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?”
    - Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Colin Powell

Back before the US military was fake and gay...
Title: You fcuked up, you trusted us!
Post by: G M on February 21, 2022, 11:58:21 AM
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early
Title: Who could have seen this coming?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 21, 2022, 12:07:13 PM
https://www.nationalreview.com/news/putin-to-recognize-two-ukrainian-separatist-regions-as-independent-nations/?utm_source=email&utm_medium=breaking&utm_campaign=newstrack&utm_term=26783603
Title: Re: Ukraine, [Finland]
Post by: DougMacG on February 21, 2022, 12:24:43 PM
Finland has said it may well apply to NATO if Russia invades Ukraine.

Good luck breaking ties with Russia:

% of gas supply from Russia
north macedonia: 100%
finland: 94%
bulgaria: 77%
slovakia: 70%
germany: 49%
italy: 46%
poland: 40%
france: 24%
Title: Re: Ukraine, NATO
Post by: DougMacG on February 21, 2022, 12:32:50 PM
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FMCb6qrWUAEYaQX?format=png&name=medium

(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FMCb6qrWUAEYaQX?format=png&name=medium)

1.  I have the feeling that Putin's no NATO requirement for Ukraine also means no other defense association with them, in terms of successor organizations for NATO.

2.  The expanding 'backyard' argument:  If Russia takes control of it's first tier neighbors like Ukraine, guess what happens next?  Another layer of countries become Russia's first tier neighbors, under an even more credible threat.  For that layer, we ARE committed to coming to their defense?

A complicated web we weave ...
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on February 21, 2022, 05:00:52 PM
- Ukraine legalizes BTC,
- Bulgarian exchange for crypto starts functioning
- Huge BTC buys happening in Poland, which borders Ukraine
- Russian parliament is debating legalizing crypto...alternative to SWIFT
- Putin has indicated decision will be made today..

It seems to me that 2 new Republics may be coming up ....

Its a done deal, Congrats Putin, well played. Fitting that he did this on US President's day. Hopefully, Biden has finished his ice cream by now.
Russia will take care of the defense of the 2 republiks and later when things calm down, annex them.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 21, 2022, 07:08:26 PM
- Ukraine legalizes BTC,
- Bulgarian exchange for crypto starts functioning
- Huge BTC buys happening in Poland, which borders Ukraine
- Russian parliament is debating legalizing crypto...alternative to SWIFT
- Putin has indicated decision will be made today..

It seems to me that 2 new Republics may be coming up ....

Its a done deal, Congrats Putin, well played. Fitting that he did this on US President's day. Hopefully, Biden has finished his ice cream by now.
Russia will take care of the defense of the 2 republiks and later when things calm down, annex them.

https://newsthud.com/wow-putin-chooses-to-invade-ukraine-on-the-anniversary-of-one-of-joe-bidens-tweets-about-him/

Not coincidental.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 21, 2022, 08:12:02 PM
- Ukraine legalizes BTC,
- Bulgarian exchange for crypto starts functioning
- Huge BTC buys happening in Poland, which borders Ukraine
- Russian parliament is debating legalizing crypto...alternative to SWIFT
- Putin has indicated decision will be made today..

It seems to me that 2 new Republics may be coming up ....

Its a done deal, Congrats Putin, well played. Fitting that he did this on US President's day. Hopefully, Biden has finished his ice cream by now.
Russia will take care of the defense of the 2 republiks and later when things calm down, annex them.

https://newsthud.com/wow-putin-chooses-to-invade-ukraine-on-the-anniversary-of-one-of-joe-bidens-tweets-about-him/

Not coincidental.

https://instapundit.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/erick_erickson_russia_and_democrats_02-21-2022-2.jpg

(https://instapundit.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/erick_erickson_russia_and_democrats_02-21-2022-2.jpg)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 21, 2022, 09:29:26 PM
Ummm, there is also Bush43 and Ossetia.
Title: Ukraine, Gordon Chang, Budapest memorandum
Post by: DougMacG on February 22, 2022, 07:35:08 AM
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18260/ukraine-budapest-memorandum
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 22, 2022, 09:37:27 AM
February 22, 2022
View On Website
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The Not Quite Invasion
Little has changed on the ground, but everything has changed politically.
By: George Friedman
Russia has officially ordered soldiers into Donetsk and Luhansk, and though this certainly increases the sense of crisis, it must also be put in context. The region has effectively been under Russian control since the aftermath of the 2014 Maidan revolution. It is heavily ethnically Russian and is hostile to Ukraine. Various militias and paramilitary forces here have been fighting for years, with Russia providing support for the separatists. The east is formally part of Ukraine, but it has created its own administrative structures and militaries, which are heavily under the influence of Russia. In other words, Russia invaded an area in which it already had near-total control. In the eyes of international law, it was clearly an invasion. In practice, however, it isn’t so cut and dry.

Russia has been amassing troops and hardware near the border for some time now, but it couldn’t maintain a constant threat of war indefinitely, especially if Washington kept claiming that war was imminent. Moscow also understood that though the military buildup made for a frightening picture, an actual invasion of a country the size of Ukraine was fraught with difficulties – even if it were sure the U.S. wouldn’t respond with force. Russia therefore had to make its threat real without triggering a theoretical military response or a much more likely financial response. It needed to gauge American commitment and, in turn, Europe’s commitment to its alliance with America. Invading a region that was practically if not nominally part of Russia was a good way to achieve this. It has shown its aggression without taking an aggressive move.

The danger, of course, is that it could be seen as a prelude to a full-scale invasion. Indeed, that is how most are portraying it. But the truth is that this makes Ukraine no less difficult to take by force, makes the justification no less difficult to sell, and completely takes away the element of surprise.

Even so, it has left the United States with a problem. There’s no question that Russia wants to take control of Ukraine. But before it tries, it must test Western solidarity. It has forced the U.S. to act, even though it doesn’t really want to incur the cost of action. If Washington does nothing – because there is nothing that needs to be done – then that by itself can undermine the Western alliance.
Title: Re: Ukraine, "peacekeeping" forces
Post by: DougMacG on February 22, 2022, 09:45:15 AM
US and European Left have met their match with word distortions, probably because KGB was their mentor in the first place.

 Obama never sought Congressional authorization to conduct war in Libya. Instead they called it "kinetic action".

With domestic policy it is far worse.  Affordable means subsidized.  Infrastructure means social engineering. Abortion is reproductive rights and choice means death to unwanted young.

But they met their match, the grand Master, a card carrying Soviet, invades his neighbor with "peacekeeping forces".

To the Left, you got played, right out of your play book, by the people you stole the play from.

Could we please call an end to butchering and reinventing the language., at least at home, and call things what they are?
Title: "Could we please call an end to butchering and reinventing the language."
Post by: ccp on February 22, 2022, 10:10:11 AM

like substituting

progressive
for socialist
and democrat socialist for

communist

and using Stalin tactics to put down all opposition from the Right as protecting "democracy"

suppose I wake up today feeling like a building
is it ok to call myself a building?

Title: Stratfor: What to Watch For
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 22, 2022, 06:49:09 PM


What to Watch for as the Russia-Ukraine Conflict Escalates
The Russia-Ukraine conflict entered a new stage on Feb. 21 after Russia moved to end the Minsk peace deal by formally recognizing eastern Ukraine’s two separatist republics as independent states. In response, the West has announced the first round of economic sanctions against Moscow over the crisis. With the prospect of Russian troops crossing into Ukrainian-controlled territory now a distinct possibility, the potential escalation or de-escalation of the conflict will hinge on the evolution of the following developments in the coming days:

1) The Donbas conflict
On Feb. 22, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Moscow’s recognition of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region goes beyond the territories that the rebels currently control and includes their claims over the rest of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, which are currently controlled by Ukraine. This position is meant to preserve the threat of a further invasion of Ukraine in the near future, as Moscow could use claims of defending the territorial integrity of its proxy states to launch an invasion of more Ukrainian territory inside Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, or even beyond them. In gauging whether the conflict will escalate, it will thus be key to monitor the current situation on the frontline in Donbas, as signs of renewed fighting or reported deaths of Russian citizens and/or service members there could serve as the grounds for a Russian “peace enforcement” operation to destroy Ukrainian military units and secure the Donbas or large pieces of Ukraine.

In a televised speech on Ukraine delivered on Feb. 21, Putin appeared to suggest the Ukrainian government hold talks with separatists regarding the border claims, noting “that all the difficult questions will be solved during negotiations between the current Kyiv government and the leadership of this government.” This suggestion inflamed concerns of an imminent Russian military operation deep into Ukraine, as such talks would likely only take place after Moscow attempts to restore the republics’ claimed borders. This ambiguity is meant to keep the door open to further incursions into Russian territory while also preventing the implementation of particularly tough sanctions against Russia. Moreover, Russia’s authorization for the deployment of forces to the separatist regions does not explicitly confine them to the areas currently controlled by the Donbas governments.

2) Russia’s military buildup near Ukraine
Russia’s military buildup around Ukraine has only increased in recent days and, despite statements by Russian and Belarusian officials, shows few signs of winding down. Russian troops continue to move into areas nearest to the Ukrainian border, with Russian national guard troops spotted in Belarus for the first time on Feb. 22. Similar to Russia’s presence in the Donbas, this is meant to keep the threat of an invasion alive.

In another potential precursor of an imminent Russian attack on Ukraine, Russia's foreign ministry announced on Feb. 22 it will evacuate its embassy staff from Ukraine as soon as possible, citing "repeated attacks" by Ukrainians since 2014. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensk also recently called up military reservists, signaling the Ukrainian government is beginning to become aware of the distinct possibility of an imminent Russian military action. A significant signpost for a Russian incursion would be a notification from the U.S. or Ukrainian defense officials that Russian units have reorganized into concentrated strike groups, which would come only hours before military action.


3) Western-Russian diplomatic contacts
On Feb. 21, the same day it recognized the two rebel republics in Donbas, Russia insisted on holding meetings with European and U.S. officials. In the coming days, the European Union is likely to defend the need to continue diplomatic talks, even if the bloc has imposed sanctions on Russia. Brussels believes diplomacy can prevent an escalation of the conflict, even if it leads to a frozen conflict and not to a permanent solution.

An outcome similar to that of Russia’s conflict with Georgia in 2008 — where political negotiations brought the armed battle to an end without fully solving the territorial disputes that caused it — is something that Moscow can probably accept because a frozen conflict would effectively end any chances of Ukraine ever joining NATO or the European Union. Such an outcome would also enable the European Union to reduce the probability of war in Ukraine, even if some of the sanctions against Russia stay in place for potentially years. The United States, which has taken a more hawkish stance on Russia’s demands for security guarantees, is probably the main obstacle to this scenario. There is for now little sign that the West, and the United States in particular, is prepared for an immediate return to dialogue as Russia continues to push unacceptable demands while continuing to engage in escalation. A meeting between the two countries’ foreign affairs chiefs scheduled for Feb. 24 was canceled, with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken saying that “now that we see the invasion is beginning and Russia has made clear its wholesale rejection of diplomacy, it does not make sense to go forward with that meeting at this time.” This suggests another summit between Putin and U.S. President Joe Biden is unlikely at this time. U.S. and European leaders, however, will keep the option for de-escalation talks open.

4) The West’s response
So far, the West’s reaction to events in eastern Ukraine has been relatively mild. On Feb. 22, the European Union announced that it will limit the Russian government's access to the bloc’s capital and financial services markets. In addition, the bloc agreed to sanction all the legislators in the Russian State Duma who supported the recognition of the rebel republics, as well as 27 individuals and entities accused of destabilizing Ukraine. Following weeks of internal and external pressure, the German government also announced the suspension of the certification process of the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline between Germany and Russia (Berlin, however, could reverse this decision in the future).

Separately, the United Kingdom froze the assets of five Russian banks and several Russian individuals involved in the recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics in eastern Ukraine. Both the European Union and the United Kingdom also banned trade with the two separatist regions. Finally, the United States announced sanctions against two Russian financial institutions and on Russia's sovereign debt, in addition to personal sanctions targeting representatives of the Russian elite and their families.

These announcements show that the United States and its allies in Europe are not displaying their full firepower, as tougher sanctions have been avoided in an understanding they will be needed in response to Russia's further plans for escalation. In an effort to keep negotiation channels open with Moscow, Western leaders will likely only consider resorting to more drastic measures (such as banning exports of strategic technology to Russia, targeting larger Russian banks, or even cutting Russia off from the SWIFT messaging system for electronic payments) in the case of a substantial escalation of the conflict, which could come in a matter of days.
Title: Trump on Putin
Post by: ccp on February 23, 2022, 06:56:06 AM
"genius"

"keep the peace"

sorry, but this is wrong headed to be saying this:

https://www.yahoo.com/news/trump-praises-putins-genius-incursion-into-ukraine-234001858.html
Title: Re: Trump on Putin
Post by: DougMacG on February 23, 2022, 07:11:38 AM
"genius"

"keep the peace"

sorry, but this is wrong headed to be saying this:

https://www.yahoo.com/news/trump-praises-putins-genius-incursion-into-ukraine-234001858.html

Yes, leaves him vulnerable to Yahoo and Psaki saying Trump praised Putin, but it is kind of obvious, Putin, pursuing evil, is far smarter than his German and American counterparts trying to stop him.

Trump, within the same article, same interview:  "By the way, this never would have happened with us. Had I been in office, not even thinkable. This would never have happened."  Meaning this is terrible what Putin did, and it was invited (caused) by Biden's weakness.  All true.

For context, look at what he said in 2018 about Germany and the pipeline, closing coal and nuclear and becoming dependent on adversary Russia.  Also unthinkable but they did it.  This was all warned by Trump and happened under Biden.

Same reporting, Psaki noted how Trump had sided with Russia when it annexed the Crimean Peninsula.

Umm, that happened under Obama-Biden, American weakness, shortly after the America apology tour.  Russia, China, NK, Iran etc annexed nothing under Trump.  Wonder why.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on February 23, 2022, 07:28:13 AM
but messaging is his problem

he always has to say something controversial
that is then taken and placed into the headlines

and the rest of it is all lost
in the details
that no one reads but his followers who get
 backed into a corner and then having to put his bluster into context
with the details

never fails

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on February 23, 2022, 07:30:51 AM
Right.  But this isn't about Trump.
Title: This could have been a good idea a month or two ago.
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 23, 2022, 12:05:00 PM
This could have been a good idea a month or two ago:

https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/biden-ukraine-speech-pushes-sanctions-russian-banks-s-not-going-ncna1289540?fbclid=IwAR0UlN_xT6RrJVXpQqwZD2QIFdB9J5B3LX37BOw62aQe9MgQsoD1uyIBXhc
Title: NRO
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 23, 2022, 04:58:11 PM
https://www.nationalreview.com/2022/02/the-ukraine-catastrophe/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202022-02-23&utm_term=NRDaily-Smart
Title: Vox: Putin speech transcript
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 24, 2022, 03:21:05 AM
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2022/2/23/22945781/russia-ukraine-putin-speech-transcript-february-22?fbclid=IwAR3J6WxdOZWSu0cfjTp3pmhjIAYU2LdBuEMnrGXg1Po_IL8S0RbDWREoTwI
Title: Ukrainian guerilla warriors
Post by: ccp on February 24, 2022, 08:17:24 AM
https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2022/02/24/a-well-regulated-militia-ukraine-gives-guns-to-citizens-to-defend-our-country/

or Ukrainian cheerleaders

lets pray there are not mass rapes ........
not being sarcastic

I still am not clear
if we just declared that Ukraine would not be in Nato would this still have happened?

Maybe Putin was simply waiting for corona to die down prior to invasion ?

Title: Ukraine, Russia launches "full-scale" military invasion
Post by: DougMacG on February 24, 2022, 08:35:42 AM
Vladimir Putin has launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine and demanded Kyiv’s army lay down its weapons, launching what could be the largest conflict in Europe since the second world war. In an address broadcast on state television shortly before 6am on Thursday, Russia’s president claimed that he was not planning to occupy Ukraine but vowed Moscow would punish all those who stood in its way. “The goal is to defend people who have been victims of abuse and genocide from the Kyiv regime. And we will strive to demilitarise and de-Nazify Ukraine,” Putin said. “All responsibility for the possible bloodshed will be fully and completely on the conscience of the ruling regime.”
   - Source: Financial Times (paywall) ft.com

Within minutes of Putin’s short televised address, explosions were heard near major Ukrainian cities, including the capital Kyiv. The scope of the Russian attack appears to be massive. Ukraine’s interior ministry reported that the country was under attack from cruise and ballistic missiles, with Russia appearing to target infrastructure near major cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, Mariupol and Dnipro.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/24/russia-attacks-ukraine-news-vladimir-putin-zelenskiy-russian-invasion

Ukrainian officials say Russian troops have landed in Odessa while others are crossing the border into Kharkiv. The Ukrainian interior ministry made the announcement on Telegram, adding that rocket attacks are targeting Ukrainian fighter jets at an airport outside Kyiv. Ukraine’s state emergency service says attacks have been launched against 10 Ukrainian regions, primarily in the east and south of the country. The Guardian’s live coverage is constantly updating.

Kyiv urges EU to provide air-defences as Russia invades on multiple fronts
https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2022/feb/24/russia-invades-ukraine-declares-war-latest-news-live-updates-russian-invasion-vladimir-putin-explosions-bombing-kyiv-kharkiv
Title: Chernobyl dust?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 24, 2022, 11:51:19 AM
https://www.nationalreview.com/news/ukrainian-officials-warn-of-fighting-in-chernobyl-exclusion-zone/?utm_source=email&utm_medium=breaking&utm_campaign=newstrack&utm_term=26818344
Title: 'want us to' Protect Ukraine borders while dismantling ours
Post by: DougMacG on February 24, 2022, 02:21:02 PM
A lose, lose proposition.  It turns out that doing nothing to help Ukraine did not make our southern border more secure.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
« Reply #222 on: January 07, 2022, 03:50:39 PM »
[Doug] These don't equate for me.

"Our “elites” want us to protect Ukrainian borders while dismantling ours."

What we are allowing to happen at our southern border is treasonous, but not related to the questions of whether and how to assist Ukraine against Russia.


January 8:
(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/095/050/519/original/b8987712dfdb95bc.jpg)
Title: Re: 'want us to' Protect Ukraine borders while dismantling ours
Post by: G M on February 24, 2022, 03:30:16 PM
Russia didn’t burn down any American cities in 2020. Ukraine isn’t a friend or ally, no matter how much cocaine they supplied to Hunter.


A lose, lose proposition.  It turns out that doing nothing to help Ukraine did not make our southern border more secure.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
« Reply #222 on: January 07, 2022, 03:50:39 PM »
[Doug] These don't equate for me.

"Our “elites” want us to protect Ukrainian borders while dismantling ours."

What we are allowing to happen at our southern border is treasonous, but not related to the questions of whether and how to assist Ukraine against Russia.


January 8:
(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/095/050/519/original/b8987712dfdb95bc.jpg)
Title: Re: 'want us to' Protect Ukraine borders while dismantling ours
Post by: G M on February 24, 2022, 04:43:41 PM
https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/099/724/258/original/d11d08b8d3ecff75.jpg


(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/099/724/258/original/d11d08b8d3ecff75.jpg)
Russia didn’t burn down any American cities in 2020. Ukraine isn’t a friend or ally, no matter how much cocaine they supplied to Hunter.


A lose, lose proposition.  It turns out that doing nothing to help Ukraine did not make our southern border more secure.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
« Reply #222 on: January 07, 2022, 03:50:39 PM »
[Doug] These don't equate for me.

"Our “elites” want us to protect Ukrainian borders while dismantling ours."

What we are allowing to happen at our southern border is treasonous, but not related to the questions of whether and how to assist Ukraine against Russia.


January 8:
(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/095/050/519/original/b8987712dfdb95bc.jpg)
Title: NYT: Ukes ask Turkey to close the Bosporus and Dardanelles to war ships
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 24, 2022, 08:23:51 PM
Ukraine asks Turkey to close the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits to warships.
Title: Quality post from another forum I frequent
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 24, 2022, 08:30:25 PM
second

now I may well be proven wrong but I doubt it. The answer to the question of Crafty's article is Europe and the US have already made a deal with Putin on which parts of Ukraine he gets to keep. Maybe all of it.

1. Ukraine is the poorest country in Europe so is nothing but an economic drag.
2. Germany needs the gas and is effectively a vassal of the Tsar already. Germany runs Europe.
3. Just like the CCP does, the Tsar has the goods on the Biden crime family, which is the reason (in addition to 4.) for the half assed sanctions.
4. The banksters need the money flow to continue. This is also part of 3.
5. Unless I'm mistaken, gas/oil is still flowing in the pipelines all across Ukraine.
6. $100 per barrel oil will send the world into a recession, giving Biden, et al something to blame for their tottering economies. Klaus Schwab and the Great Reset gang will be very happy.

Historically, there is nothing at all unusual about powers allowing weak countries to be divided up and banks making bank off of it. This is just business as usual in Europe.

The only real questions are:

1. does Zelenskyy know? I suspect he does because today he announced full mobilization that will take 90 days. Why not start months, weeks, or even days ago?
2. do the lower echelons of the Ukraine military - the ones actually fighting - know? I have no clue but it sure seems strange to me that the frigging border crossing stations weren't mined and filled with IEDs
Title: Re: Quality post from another forum I frequent
Post by: G M on February 25, 2022, 12:37:18 AM
second

now I may well be proven wrong but I doubt it. The answer to the question of Crafty's article is Europe and the US have already made a deal with Putin on which parts of Ukraine he gets to keep. Maybe all of it.

1. Ukraine is the poorest country in Europe so is nothing but an economic drag.
2. Germany needs the gas and is effectively a vassal of the Tsar already. Germany runs Europe.
3. Just like the CCP does, the Tsar has the goods on the Biden crime family, which is the reason (in addition to 4.) for the half assed sanctions.
4. The banksters need the money flow to continue. This is also part of 3.
5. Unless I'm mistaken, gas/oil is still flowing in the pipelines all across Ukraine.
6. $100 per barrel oil will send the world into a recession, giving Biden, et al something to blame for their tottering economies. Klaus Schwab and the Great Reset gang will be very happy.

Historically, there is nothing at all unusual about powers allowing weak countries to be divided up and banks making bank off of it. This is just business as usual in Europe.

The only real questions are:

1. does Zelenskyy know? I suspect he does because today he announced full mobilization that will take 90 days. Why not start months, weeks, or even days ago?
2. do the lower echelons of the Ukraine military - the ones actually fighting - know? I have no clue but it sure seems strange to me that the frigging border crossing stations weren't mined and filled with IEDs

This makes a lot of sense to me.

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on February 25, 2022, 06:44:22 AM
From further up:
"Ukraine isn’t a friend or ally,"

It isn't the loss of Ukraine that hurts us most, it is the gain of ground, of resources, if power, and emboldening of Putin/Russia/new USSR that is the biggest loss here, sure to cost us more in the not so long run than doing more to dissuade him sooner, IMHO.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 25, 2022, 07:24:09 AM
From further up:
"Ukraine isn’t a friend or ally,"

It isn't the loss of Ukraine that hurts us most, it is the gain of ground, of resources, if power, and emboldening of Putin/Russia/new USSR that is the biggest loss here, sure to cost us more in the not so long run than doing more to dissuade him sooner, IMHO.

https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/099/839/016/original/e797ff6fcfd30e86.png

(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/099/839/016/original/e797ff6fcfd30e86.png)
Title: Klitschko the warrior
Post by: ccp on February 25, 2022, 09:01:01 AM
https://www.yahoo.com/sports/vitali-klitschko-an-outspoken-putin-critic-may-have-signed-his-own-death-warrant-145626700.html
Title: A Uke "Nuts!" to the Russkis!
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 25, 2022, 09:05:11 AM
https://youtu.be/6Y2iVHUMZhg

https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/25/europe/ukraine-russia-snake-island-attack-intl-hnk-ml/index.html
Title: George Friedman discusses getting it wrong.
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 25, 2022, 09:58:48 AM
second post

February 25, 2022
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
My Mistake on Ukraine
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman

Since the beginning of the Russian armored buildup, and even after the entry into Donbas, I argued that the Russians would not invade Ukraine proper. It’s true that Russia must recover Ukraine in some fashion to gain the strategic depth it lost when the Soviet Union collapsed, but that didn’t seem to require a full-scale invasion. I was wrong. Even so, I would like to take a moment to explain my thinking.

My mistake came from a couple of false assumptions. The first concerns the recent history of Russian “intervention” in its borderlands. In Belarus, protests erupted after Alexander Lukashenko won what was widely held as a fraudulent election. It’s possible his government would have buckled under popular pressure, just as Ukraine's had years earlier, if not for Russian support. Moscow turned Belarus into a vassal state without the threat of war, a soft but substantial increase in its power.

Elsewhere, after the Nagorno-Karabakh war last year, Russia mediated a cease-fire between Azerbaijan and Armenia, a key provision of which was to allow Russia to keep several thousand peacekeepers nearby. It was yet another soft coup that gave Russia a military presence in the vital South Caucasus.

Much more recently, there was an outbreak of political violence in Kazakhstan, perhaps the most important country in Central Asia. The government was destabilized, so Moscow sent peacekeepers to stabilize it.

Having watched Russia recover strategic depth through soft coups, taking advantage of internal tensions and local wars to stabilize the situation and recover strategic depth, I believed it would do likewise in Ukraine. The problem was that there were no divisions within Ukraine proper to exploit, nor any conflicts in which to intervene. More, I failed to appreciate that for Russia, Ukraine was too urgent a matter to be treated like the others.

My second assumption was that an armored invasion was simply too risky. The risks are real, of course. Supporting three armored divisions is expensive and logistically difficult in the best of circumstances, and vulnerable to missile attacks to boot. The U.S. said it would not go to war in Ukraine, but I assumed Vladimir Putin couldn’t take Washington at its word. Add to this the fact that the U.K. sent a very large amount of Javelin anti-tank missiles. Clearly, Ukrainians were training rapidly for the exact kind of invasion that is now transpiring.

I concluded that the buildup and “invasion” of Donbas was a bluff meant to create the opportunity for another soft coup. Russia already de facto controlled Donbas, so making it official seemed like a less risky way for Russia to flex without actually going to war. I rejected the idea that this would be the foundation of Russia’s military planning.

Trapped as I was by these two false assumptions, I then committed the worst error one can make in intelligence. After reaching my conclusions, and knowing that Russia was going to take Ukraine somehow, I either ignored data contrary to my position or took it as evidence that supported my position. I believed what I believed until I no longer could.

Ultimately, I didn’t attack my own theory. I failed to see its weaknesses. I should always be my own worst enemy. I failed to do so, and for that, I am sorry.
Title: No NATO ships in Black Sea
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 25, 2022, 04:03:54 PM
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-leaves-black-sea-exposed-russia-invades-ukraine-2022-02-24/?fbclid=IwAR0ghCFuvLWAQ8o0mIUlyZtK9wLqhC5dJtuc1yF_WGqKvnWCwlW_wcUDm3Q
Title: July 2021: Deal with China
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 25, 2022, 05:06:45 PM
third post

https://www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2021/07/05/china-ukraine-sign-deal-to-strengthen-infrastructure-cooperation?fbclid=IwAR2FozcCv48FVu8Kqx8fxtYnAGiPJXFHwKu6_-nAK3YZVb188n5AIO2XbN8
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 25, 2022, 05:50:21 PM
https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-cannot-stop-russian-warships-accessing-black-sea-says-foreign-minister-2022-02-25/?fbclid=IwAR2DcAkPEE08LIysBKpuk1haa4tTTiPuauyG4lBwPyoeNaMy_5o8qx-GDts
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 25, 2022, 08:17:18 PM
I could be completely wide of the mark here, but it is not clear to me that Putin is necessarily going to win in the medium to long term.
Title: China hedges its bets
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 26, 2022, 07:15:19 AM
https://www.foxbusiness.com/economy/china-restrict-financing-russia-ukraina-invasion?fbclid=IwAR3b7a2PTAl1I7HjEOagccc33pxYYEBc3g7pI-QsHMv9ZVGuZUGWaFE2Yqo
Title: Thomas Friedman actually writes something intelligent:
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 26, 2022, 07:46:09 AM
We Have Never Been Here Before
Feb. 25, 2022
Image
A Soviet-era statue in Oleksandriya, Ukraine, titled “Knowledge Is Strength” was transformed a few weeks ago to include a Ukrainian flag.
A Soviet-era statue in Oleksandriya, Ukraine, titled “Knowledge Is Strength” was transformed a few weeks ago to include a Ukrainian flag.Credit...Brendan Hoffman for The New York Times
Thomas L. Friedman
By Thomas L. Friedman

Opinion Columnist

Sign up for the Russia-Ukraine War Briefing.  Every evening, we'll send you a summary of the day's biggest news. Get it sent to your inbox.

The seven most dangerous words in journalism are: “The world will never be the same.” In over four decades of reporting, I have rarely dared use that phrase. But I’m going there now in the wake of Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.

Our world is not going to be the same again because this war has no historical parallel. It is a raw, 18th-century-style land grab by a superpower — but in a 21st-century globalized world. This is the first war that will be covered on TikTok by super-empowered individuals armed only with smartphones, so acts of brutality will be documented and broadcast worldwide without any editors or filters. On the first day of the war, we saw invading Russian tank units unexpectedly being exposed by Google maps, because Google wanted to alert drivers that the Russian armor was causing traffic jams.

You have never seen this play before.

Yes, the Russian attempt to seize Ukraine is a throwback to earlier centuries — before the democracy revolutions in America and France — when a European monarch or Russian czar could simply decide that he wanted more territory, that the time was ripe to grab it, and so he did. And everyone in the region knew he would devour as much as he could and there was no global community to stop him.

In acting this way today, though, Putin is not only aiming to unilaterally rewrite the rules of the international system that have been in place since World War II — that no nation can just devour the nation next door — he is also out to alter that balance of power that he feels was imposed on Russia after the Cold War.

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That balance — or imbalance in Putin’s view — was the humiliating equivalent of the Versailles Treaty’s impositions on Germany after World War I. In Russia’s case, it meant Moscow having to swallow NATO’s expansion not only to include the old Eastern European countries that had been part of the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, like Poland, but even, in principle, states that were part of the Soviet Union itself, like Ukraine.

I see many people citing Robert Kagan’s fine book “The Jungle Grows Back” as a kind of shorthand for the return of this nasty and brutish style of geopolitics that Putin’s invasion manifests. But that picture is incomplete. Because this is not 1945 or 1989. We may be back in the jungle — but today the jungle is wired. It is wired together more intimately than ever before by telecommunications; satellites; trade; the internet; road, rail and air networks; financial markets; and supply chains. So while the drama of war is playing out within the borders of Ukraine, the risks and repercussions of Putin’s invasion are being felt across the globe — even in China, which has good cause to worry about its friend in the Kremlin.

Welcome to World War Wired — the first war in a totally interconnected world. This will be the Cossacks meet the World Wide Web. Like I said, you haven’t been here before.

“It’s been less than 24 hours since Russia invaded Ukraine, yet we already have more information about what’s going on there than we would have in a week during the Iraq war,” wrote Daniel Johnson, who served as an infantry officer and journalist with the U.S. Army in Iraq, in Slate on Thursday afternoon. “What is coming out of Ukraine is simply impossible to produce on such a scale without citizens and soldiers throughout the country having easy access to cellphones, the internet and, by extension, social media apps. A large-scale modern war will be livestreamed, minute by minute, battle by battle, death by death, to the world. What is occurring is already horrific, based on the information released just on the first day.”

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A Ukrainian volunteer paramedic at a base in Pavlograd on Thursday sharing a video of the Ukrainian military using anti-aircraft weapons.
A Ukrainian volunteer paramedic at a base in Pavlograd on Thursday sharing a video of the Ukrainian military using anti-aircraft weapons.Credit...Lynsey Addario for The New York Times
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A woman recording fragments of a downed aircraft in Kyiv on Friday.
A woman recording fragments of a downed aircraft in Kyiv on Friday.Credit...Lynsey Addario for The New York Times
The outcome of this war will depend in large part on the will of the rest of the world to deter and roll back Putin’s blitzkrieg by primarily using economic sanctions and by arming the Ukrainians with antiaircraft and anti-tank weaponry to try to slow his advance. Putin may also be forced to consider the death toll of his own comrades.

Will Putin be brought down by imperial overstretch? It is way too soon to say. But I am reminded these days of what a different warped leader who decided to devour his neighbors in Europe observed. His name was Adolf Hitler, and he said: “The beginning of every war is like opening the door into a dark room. One never knows what is hidden in the darkness.”

In Putin’s case, I find myself asking: Does he know what is hiding in plain sight and not just in the dark? Does he know not only Russia’s strengths in today’s new world but also its weaknesses? Let me enumerate them.

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Russia is in the process of forcibly taking over a free country with a population of 44 million people, which is a little less than one-third the size of Russia’s population. And the majority of these Ukrainians have been struggling to be part of the democratic, free-market West for 30 years and have already forged myriad trade, cultural and internet ties to European Union companies, institutions and media.

We know that Putin has vastly improved Russia’s armed forces, adding everything from hypersonic missile capabilities to advanced cyberwarfare tools. He has the firepower to bring Ukraine to heel. But in this modern era we have never seen an unfree country, Russia, try to rewrite the rules of the international system and take over a free country that is as big as Ukraine — especially when the unfree country, Russia, has an economy that is smaller than that of Texas.

Then think about this: Thanks to rapid globalization, the E.U. is already Ukraine’s biggest trading partner — not Russia. In 2012, Russia was the destination for 25.7 percent of Ukrainian exports, compared with 24.9 percent going to the E.U. Just six years later, after Russia’s brutal seizure of Crimea and support of separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine and Ukraine’s forging of closer ties with the E.U. economically and politically, “Russia’s share of Ukrainian exports had fallen to only 7.7 percent, while the E.U.’s share shot up to 42.6 percent,” according to a recent analysis published by Bruegel.org.

If Putin doesn’t untangle those ties, Ukraine will continue drifting into the arms of the West — and if he does untangle them, he will strangle Ukraine’s economy. And if the E.U. boycotts a Russia-controlled Ukraine, Putin will have to use Russia’s money to keep Ukraine’s economy afloat.

Was that factored into his war plans? It doesn’t seem like it. Or as a retired Russian diplomat in Moscow emailed me: “Tell me how this war ends? Unfortunately, there is no one and nowhere to ask.”

But everyone in Russia will be able to watch. As this war unfolds on TikTok, Facebook, YouTube and Twitter, Putin cannot closet his Russian population — let alone the rest of the world — from the horrific images that will come out of this war as it enters its urban phase. On just the first day of the war, more than 1,300 protesters across Russia, many of them chanting “No to war,” were detained, The Times reported, quoting a rights group. That’s no small number in a country where Putin brooks little dissent.

And who knows how those images will affect Poland, particularly as it gets overrun by Ukrainian refugees. I particularly mention Poland because it is Russia’s key land bridge to Germany and the rest of Western Europe. As strategist Edward Luttwak pointed out on Twitter, if Poland just halts truck and rail traffic from Russia to Germany, “as it should,” it would create immediate havoc for Russia’s economy, because the alternative routes are complicated and need to go through a now very dangerous Ukraine.

Anyone up for an anti-Putin trucker strike to prevent Russian goods going to and through Western Europe by way of Poland? Watch that space. Some super-empowered Polish citizens with a few roadblocks, pickups and smartphones could choke Russia’s whole economy in this wired world.

*
This war with no historical parallel won’t be a stress test just for America and its European allies. It’ll also be one for China. Putin has basically thrown down the gauntlet to Beijing: “Are you going to stand with those who want to overturn the American-led order or join the U.S. sheriff’s posse?”

That should not be — but is — a wrenching question for Beijing. “The interests of China and Russia today are not identical,” Nader Mousavizadeh, founder and C.E.O. of the global consulting firm Macro Advisory Partners, told me. “China wants to compete with America in the Super Bowl of economics, innovation and technology — and thinks it can win. Putin is ready to burn down the stadium and kill everyone in it to satisfy his grievances.”

The dilemma for the Chinese, added Mousavizadeh, “is that their preference for the kind of order, stability and globalization that has enabled their economic miracle is in stark tension with their resurgent authoritarianism at home and their ambition to supplant America — either by China’s strength or America’s weakness — as the world’s dominant superpower and rules setter.”

I have little doubt that in his heart China’s president, Xi Jinping, is hoping that Putin gets away with abducting Ukraine and humiliating the U.S. — all the better to soften up the world for his desire to seize Taiwan and fuse it back to the Chinese motherland.

But Xi is nobody’s fool. Here are a couple of other interesting facts from the wired world: First, China’s economy is more dependent on Ukraine than Russia’s. According to Reuters,“China leapfrogged Russia to become Ukraine’s biggest single trading partner in 2019, with overall trade totaling $18.98 billion last year, a nearly 80 percent jump from 2013. … China became the largest importer of Ukrainian barley in the 2020-21 marketing year,” and about 30 percent of all of China’s corn imports last year came from farms in Ukraine.

Second, China overtook the United States as the European Union’s biggest trading partner in 2020, and Beijing cannot afford for the E.U. to be embroiled in conflict with an increasingly aggressive Russia and unstable Putin. China’s stability depends — and the legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party rests — on Xi’s ability to sustain and grow his already massive middle class. And that depends on a stable and growing world economy.

I don’t expect China to impose sanctions on Russia, let alone arm the Ukrainians, like the U.S. and the E.U. All that Beijing has done so far is mumble that Putin’s invasion was “not what we would hope to see” — while quickly implying that Washington was a “culprit” for “fanning up flames” with NATO expansion and its recent warnings of an imminent Russian invasion.

So China is obviously torn, but of the three key superpowers with nuclear weapons — the U.S., China and Russia — China, by what it says or doesn’t say, holds a very big swing vote on whether Putin gets away with his rampage of Ukraine or not.

To lead is to choose, and if China has any pretense of supplanting the U.S. as the world leader, it will have to do more than mumble.

Finally, there is something else Putin will find hiding in plain sight. In today’s interconnected world, a leader’s “sphere of influence” is no longer some entitlement from history and geography, but rather it is something that has to be earned and re-earned every day by inspiring and not compelling others to follow you.

The musician and actress Selena Gomez has twice as many followers on Instagram — over 298 million — as Russia has citizens. Yes, Vladimir, I can hear you laughing from here and echoing Stalin’s quip about the pope: “How many divisions does Selena Gomez have?”

She has none. But she is an influencer with followers, and there are thousands and thousands of Selenas out there on the World Wide Web, including Russian celebrities who are posting on Instagram about their opposition to the war. And while they cannot roll back your tanks, they can make every leader in the West roll up the red carpet to you, so you, and your cronies, can never travel to their countries. You are now officially a global pariah. I hope you like Chinese and North Korean food.

For all these reasons, at this early stage, I will venture only one prediction about Putin: Vladimir, the first day of this war was the best day of the rest of your life. I have no doubt that in the near term, your military will prevail, but in the long run leaders who try to bury the future with the past don’t do well. In the long run, your name will live in infamy.

I know, I know, Vladimir, you don’t care — no more than you care that you started this war in the middle of a raging pandemic. And I have to admit that that is what is most scary about this World War Wired. The long run can be a long way away and the rest of us are not insulated from your madness. That is, I wish that I could blithely predict that Ukraine will be Putin’s Waterloo — and his alone. But I can’t, because in our wired world, what happens in Waterloo doesn’t stay in Waterloo.

Indeed, if you ask me what is the most dangerous aspect of today’s world, I’d say it is the fact that Putin has more unchecked power than any other Russian leader since Stalin. And Xi has more unchecked power than any other Chinese leader since Mao. But in Stalin’s day, his excesses were largely confined to Russia and the borderlands he controlled. And in Mao’s day, China was so isolated, his excesses touched only the Chinese people.

Not anymore — today’s world is resting on two simultaneous extremes: Never have the leaders of two of the three most powerful nuclear nations — Putin and Xi — had more unchecked power and never have more people from one end of the world to the other been wired together with fewer and fewer buffers. So, what those two leaders decide to do with their unchecked power will touch virtually all of us directly or indirectly.

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is our first real taste of how crazy and unstable this kind of wired world can get. It will not be our last
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 26, 2022, 08:32:19 AM
The Ukraine War Exposes Russia and China’s Competing Visions for Eurasia
undefined and Senior VP of Strategic Analysis
Rodger Baker
Senior VP of Strategic Analysis, Stratfor
7 MIN READFeb 25, 2022 | 18:47 GMT



Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying discusses the Russia-Ukraine crisis during a press conference in Beijing on Feb. 24, 2022.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying discusses Russia-Ukraine tensions during a press conference in Beijing on Feb. 24, 2022.
(NOEL CELIS/AFP via Getty Images)

China continues to publicly back Russia despite the Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine. But the conflict is exposing Beijing and Moscow’s competing visions for the future of Eurasia, which will continue to stress their relationship. China sees the continental area as a broad corridor of trade routes linking the Pacific and the Atlantic. But Russia’s assertion of its sphere of influence along its western frontier challenges this view by risking a more permanent rift between Moscow and Europe. Talk of new Cold War dynamics undercut China’s ability to create economic and political links across Eurasia through its Belt and Road infrastructure investments.

Cracks in the Foundation

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has refrained from directly criticizing Russia for invading Ukraine. Chinese media coverage has even used some of Russia’s own arguments in downplaying the military intervention. Beijing is also offering Moscow a partial buffer against sanctions through new deals for increased energy trade, expanded agriculture trade, and the likely use of alternatives to the SWIFT international payment system. But while not openly critical, China has refrained from providing active diplomatic support for Russia’s military actions and its recognition of the breakaway republics in eastern Ukraine. Beijing has longstanding ties with Ukraine (including in the defense sector). And Chinese leaders are concerned with the precedent set by Russia of foreign support for breakaway provinces (which, in China’s case, could include places like Xinjiang, Tibet, or even Taiwan).

The mixed reaction from Beijing reflects a deeper unease in its broader relationship with Moscow. While there are several areas of strategic alignment between the two neighbors, including their mutual concern with the United States, there remains an underlying mistrust between them. China is a rising Eurasian power, Russia is declining. That alone creates unevenness in their relationship — one that Moscow resents and Beijing eyes with caution. In the past, China’s economic power complemented Russia’s military and historical power across Central Asia, leaving more room for cooperation than competition. But China’s growing military prowess, and its increasing political influence, challenge Russia’s traditional influence in its near abroad. Moscow may not be able to match China’s economic largess, but it continues to use historical and cultural ties, the Eurasian Economic Union, and its security relationships to try and temper Chinese influence. While Beijing tolerates this, it perpetuates a sense of mistrust.

China’s Focus on Economic Power

At its core, the fundamental difference between the two large neighbors is their differing visions of the future of Eurasia. Russia continues to see itself in light of an embattled Eurasian heartland power, one that needs to build a shell around itself to ensure its strategic security. This is about distinct spheres of influence and a division between Russia and Europe. China, on the other hand, sees the future of Eurasia as a vast corridor of trade — a crisscross of land routes that ease Beijing’s current vulnerability at sea, reorient its underdeveloped interior provinces away from their wealthier coastal neighbors, and enable China to use economic heft as a tool of influence and security across Asia, Europe and even into Africa.


In many ways, China’s vision better matches British geographer Sir Halford J. Mackinder’s concern of the potential power of what he called the World Island. In the early 20th Century, Mackinder saw the potential for modern technology (the railroad) to crisscross and connect Europe, Asia and Africa into a vast supercontinent. A single Eurasian power could then harness the resources and manpower of the three continents, and then turn that combined power out to the seas. Neither Russia, Germany nor the Soviet Union — all prospective Heartland powers — ever linked Eurasia, much less the World Island. This was in part due to cost. But mostly it was because, in the 19th and much of the 20th Century, the expansion of political power was often tied to territorial aggrandizement, and no country or coalition was able to conquer and control Europe and Asia.

In the 21st century, China seeks political power through economic rather than military tools. Beijing does not have to conquer its neighbors or the more distant reaches of Eurasia; it can instead expand its influence through trade, technology, investment and infrastructure development. China, then, is a modern imperial power — one that grows its reach for the most part without needing to grow its physical territory. In the South China Sea, Beijing has used its military as a tool of coercion to back its vast territorial claims and occupy several unoccupied islets. But China has avoided direct military confrontations or the use of military force to seize territory from others in the strategic waterway.


Only in the past 20 years or so has Beijing begun revising its military for the expected future need of operations abroad. Even then, China remains rather conservative in its use of military force as a tool of foreign policy — particularly when compared with its peer great powers Russia and the United States, or even Western European countries like France. Beijing has a grand vision of power and influence, but it seeks to attain it through means shy of war for as long as possible.

Russia’s Focus on Military Power

By comparison, Russia is a holdout of the past, a country that has regularly used its military as a tool of coercion and influence in its near abroad. Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia in support of Moscow-inspired secessionist movements was repeated and expanded upon in its 2014 intervention in Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea. And it has been taken to the extreme with Russia’s current invasion of Ukraine, one aimed not at the minimal goals of establishing buffers along the Russian southern front, but of either the “Finlandization” or reassertion of Russian influence and control of Ukraine.

Modern Russia’s use of its military to reshape its near abroad mirrors the actions of the Soviet Union. Russia uses the military as a tool of coercion, to enact a fait accompli (as with its annexation of Crimea) and as a tool of brute force (as with the current invasion of Ukraine) to actively change regimes along its periphery. While China may appreciate Russian actions keeping the United States focused on Europe instead of the Indo-Pacific, Beijing is concerned that Moscow’s actions may re-strengthen Euro-Atlantic ties and fracture China’s ability to keep trade flowing through former Soviet territories into Europe. China’s economic interests across Eurasia will increasingly be put at risk by Russia’s military and political actions that fragment rather than unite the supercontinent.

A Closed vs. Open Eurasia

Chinese rail and road connections to Europe rely on transit through Russia, or key countries in Russia’s near abroad. If Russian actions and Western sanctions and security dynamics lead to even a light version of the old Iron Curtain, China’s economic and political leverage falters, and Beijing will once again be dependent upon the maritime routes that remain vulnerable to U.S. maritime power. Russia may be satisfied as a continental power, but China sees its continental connections as a path toward global power, secure first on land, and then expanding into the seas. The tension between these two visions will strain Beijing’s ties with Moscow as their actions run counter to their interests. China wants to open the space, Russia wants it closed. In short, China’s attempt to bridge Eurasia may be undermined by Russia’s attempt to dig a moat. And at some point, that challenge may prompt Beijing to deem the costs of its continued close cooperation with Moscow outweigh the benefits.
Title: Ukrainian tank man
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 26, 2022, 08:45:38 AM
fourth

https://www.theepochtimes.com/video-shows-ukrainian-tank-man-trying-to-block-russian-military-convoy_4303927.html?utm_source=newsnoe&utm_campaign=breaking-2022-02-261&utm_medium=email&est=%2FYLuXdWfczYr2HDQAUOSJJ%2BbY6uJMcJ9iO%2FWCiul46EZXk8EHFrT%2BxKAVVlSSSvJA5NQ
Title: Zelensky: We need ammo, not a ride!
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 26, 2022, 09:38:21 AM
Fifth

https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/need-ammo-not-a-ride-ukraine-president-rejects-us-evacuation-offer-2790734

and lo and behold!

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/02/us-racing-350-million-immediate-arms-ukraine-includes-javelins-ammo-armor/362488/
Title: WSJ: Ukes repel attack on Kyiv
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 26, 2022, 10:03:57 AM
sixth

Ukrainian Forces Repel Russian Attack on Kyiv, Prepare for Next Assault
Thousands of civilians take up arms to help defend the capital, while Russian forces face fierce resistance throughout Ukraine
Ukrainian soldiers and volunteer fighters held off Russian forces to take control of a highway connecting Ukraine’s capital Kyiv to Lviv in the country’s west on Saturday. CHRISTOPHER OCCHICONE FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
By Yaroslav Trofimov
Updated Feb. 26, 2022 12:57 pm ET


KYIV, Ukraine—Ukrainian forces and thousands of freshly recruited volunteers regained control of Kyiv’s streets after Russian troops and undercover units in civilian clothes tried to enter the city in the early hours of Saturday, while Russian airstrikes, airborne landings and armored advances continued throughout the country.

On the third day of the war that Russian President Vladimir Putin unleashed with the aim of overthrowing Ukraine’s elected government and ending its alignment with the West, Ukrainian forces fought fiercely on all fronts, with each side asserting it had inflicted heavy losses on the other.


President Volodymyr Zelensky recorded a video address from the street outside the presidential headquarters in Kyiv, urging Ukrainians to keep fighting and denying Russian reports that he had called on his forces to lay down arms.

“Truth is on our side. This is our land, our country, our children, and we will keep defending them all,” he said. “Glory to Ukraine.”

A rapid Russian victory in the biggest war in Europe for decades would drastically change the geopolitical balance on the continent, giving Mr. Putin control of strategically vital swaths of the former Soviet Union’s territory and placing Russia’s armies on the doorstep of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

European and U.S. officials are increasingly concerned that Mr. Putin’s broader goal of revising the ending of the Cold War, restoring Moscow’s former sphere of influence in Europe’s east, won’t stop at Ukraine, a fear that could force a rethink of NATO’s military stance and Europe’s energy supplies, which depend in large part on Russia. Mr. Zelensky has constantly reinforced that message, saying that Ukrainians are fighting and dying not just for their own country but for all of Europe.


Traffic jams have choked roads in Kyiv as people try to flee Russia's pressing assault. WSJ's Brett Forrest documented his long car journey out of the Ukrainian capital while traveling to cover the war. Photo: Ethan Swope/Bloomberg News
If fierce Ukrainian resistance leads to a long and bloody war—or forces Mr. Putin to seek to end the fighting without achieving his goals—the setback could threaten both his hold on power in Moscow and his drive to restore Russia as a global power.

Mr. Zelensky, in an address on Saturday, said that Russia has failed in its quest to quickly replace him with a puppet regime and that Ukrainian soldiers were holding the line throughout the country. He called on Ukrainians abroad and foreign volunteers to join the fight. “Everyone who can, come back to defend Ukraine,” Mr. Zelensky said. “All the friends of Ukraine who want to come join us, come here too—we will give you weapons.”


On Friday, the biggest thrust of Russian forces, pouring in from the north, targeted Kyiv, an ancient city that was home to around three million people before Russian bombardments triggered a mass exodus of people toward western Ukraine, which is safer. Many who remained in the city spent the night in bomb shelters and underground subway stations.

Ukrainian civilians fleeing westward have been stuck in long lines of cars near the border with Poland. Many people have abandoned their cars and walked to the border for many hours in chilly weather, carrying children and a few belongings.

Ukraine’s Health Ministry said Saturday that 198 Ukrainian civilians, including three children, had been killed since the Russian invasion began, and 1,115 injured.

“We knew that the night would be difficult because the Russian Federation would use all its resources and reserves to inflict on us maximum damage in the maximum number of locations,” Mr. Zelensky’s adviser, Mykhailo Podolyak, said early Saturday. “Kyiv is their priority number one because the main declared goal of the Russian operation is the annihilation of Ukraine’s political and military leadership. That is why they are pouring the maximum number of Russian troops toward Kyiv.”


Explosions and gunfire rocked Kyiv as Russian troops intensified attacks on Ukraine’s capital. Residential areas were hit and people sought refuge, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called for help from Western leaders. Photo: Oleksandr Ratushniak/AP
A Russian column that attempted to advance from the West, on the highway linking Kyiv to Lviv, was destroyed in nighttime fighting inside Kyiv, witnesses said. Bodies lay on the ground, amid the smoldering remains of armored vehicles and trucks. Presumed Russian infiltrators, traveling in civilian vehicles, were also gunned down by Ukrainian troops as they tried to approach the Ukrainian Parliament building, the witnesses said. Intense firefights were reported in other locations throughout the capital.

After daybreak on Saturday, Ukrainian regular troops and volunteers of the newly formed Territorial Defense force regained the upper hand, erecting roadblocks, firing positions and other fortifications around the city, particularly in the government district and near bridges spanning the Dnipro river. Trucks accompanied by police ferried ammunition as civilians lined up patiently in grocery stores, at pharmacies and teller machines.

A large supermarket on Kyiv’s Antonovycha street was well stocked, with fresh bread, pineapples and Italian cheese, and some of the checkout lanes still accepted Apple Pay. A handful of basement bars reopened as makeshift shelters, serving espressos before the 5 p.m. curfew kicked in. At one bar, customers were asked to show their passports to prove that they weren’t Russian citizens.

The biggest lines in the Ukrainian capital were at the recruitment centers for the Territorial Defense. At one sports facility converted for this purpose, several hundred volunteers, commanded by career military officers, loaded crates of ammunition into civilian vehicles and sped off to their positions.



Outside, hundreds more aspiring recruits, including women, patiently waited their turn in a line that snaked around the building. “I never expected so many would turn up. The whole city has risen up now,” one of the officers at the site said. “A bit too late, but better late than never.”

Concerned about Russian infiltrators and spies, members of the Territorial Defense didn’t allow photography and didn’t provide their names. The volunteers said they had no choice but to fight now that Russian forces were on Kyiv’s doorstep.

“A Russian rocket hit a building near my home this morning. This was the last straw for me, and now it’s time to take up arms. Everyone in this city who wanted to escape has already fled,” said one of the new recruits, a 35-year-old IT specialist.

“There is nowhere to run and no point in hiding. We just have to repel the invaders and send them back where they came from,” said another, a human-resources specialist.



South of Kyiv, Russian airborne troops attempted a landing in the strategic town of Vasylkiv, the location of a Ukrainian military airfield. Firefights broke out during the night but by morning hundreds of Ukrainian troops and irregular volunteers armed with assault rifles patrolled Vasylkiv’s main road. Along the highway running between Kyiv and Odessa near Vasylkiv, security forces and local volunteers wearing armbands were looking for stray Russian troops who might be hiding in the woods.

Ukrainian soldiers said they had driven off most of the Russian landing force in Vasylkiv. Kyiv also said Ukrainian forces had downed a Russian Il-76 transport plane full of airborne troops near Vasylkiv. That claim couldn’t be independently confirmed. In the late morning, contrails of two jet fighters engaging in a dogfight could be seen in the blue skies above the town.

Intense fighting also went on through the night near the southern cities of Odessa, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Mariupol, Mr. Podolyak said.

On Friday, Moscow signaled an openness to talks with Kyiv. But shortly after, Mr. Putin excoriated Mr. Zelensky, calling him a terrorist and urging Ukraine’s military to oust him, dimming prospects for diplomacy.


Russia’s continued bombardment of Ukraine has forced many to make the difficult choice between fleeing the country or staying put. WSJ’s Brett Forrest in Kyiv, which was increasingly targeted, explains how people are weighing their options. Photo: Vadim Ghirda/AP
Mr. Zelensky is expected to speak to several world leaders later on Saturday, Mr. Podolyak said. On Friday, Mr. Zelensky spoke by phone with President Biden. A White House official said the call lasted about 40 minutes.

Mr. Zelensky wrote on Twitter, “Strengthening sanctions, concrete defense assistance and an antiwar coalition have just been discussed with @POTUS.”

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in a statement Saturday that Washington would provide up to $350 million in additional military aid to Ukraine, including “lethal defensive assistance” to help Kyiv resist Russian armored and airborne forces.

Mr. Blinken didn’t say which weapons Washington intended to provide. The U.S. has previously sent Javelin antitank weapons and ammunition, among other battlefield systems. In January, the U.S. also gave approval for Latvia and Lithuania to deliver American-made Stinger antiaircraft missiles to Kyiv.

Mr. Biden authorized the fresh delivery of military aid Friday night and approved up to $250 million for overall assistance to Ukraine. A person familiar with the matter said the administration has asked Congress for $6.4 billion in additional funding for Ukraine aid and defense needs.
Title: POTP vs. Tucker on Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 26, 2022, 10:13:12 AM
Tucker Carlson says Ukraine is not a democracy. Here are the facts.

Listen to article
7 min
Is Ukraine a democracy? Here are the facts.
In late February, Fox News host Tucker Carlson openly questioned the legitimacy of Ukraine’s political system, openly dismissing its status as a democracy. (Adriana Usero/The Washington Post)
Image without a caption
By Glenn Kessler
Staff writer
February 24, 2022 at 1:34 p.m. EST



“You can’t say it enough, Ukraine is not a democracy. … In American terms, you would call Ukraine a tyranny.”

— Fox News host Tucker Carlson, on his show, Feb. 22

Carlson has been channeling many of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s arguments for invading Ukraine, including that Ukraine is not a democracy. Putin has asserted that the 2014 ouster of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych — what Putin labels a coup d’etat — “did not bring Ukraine any closer to democracy and progress.” He stressed the role of oligarchs and attacks on political opponents and media outlets.

On Wednesday’s show, Carlson expanded on these themes, tossing in another Putin nostrum — that Ukraine is a “client state” of the United States.

“Ukraine, to be technical, is not a democracy,” Carlson said. “Democracies don’t arrest political opponents, and they don’t shut down opposition media, both of which Ukraine has done. And by the way, Ukraine is a pure client state of the United States State Department — again, that’s fine. We are not mad about that, go ahead and run Ukraine if you want, if you think you can do a better job than Ukrainians. Just don’t tell us it’s a democracy.”

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To some extent, whether Ukraine is a democracy is a matter of opinion, so we will not offer a Pinocchio rating. But Carlson — who has expressed admiration for Hungarian President Viktor Orbán and his crackdown on civil liberties — is stacking the deck against Ukraine. It is a fledgling democracy, with significant growing pains, largely the result of Russian pressure and interference in its affairs. It is certainly not “a tyranny.”

The Facts
Ukraine has many aspects of a democracy. The president, who is head of state and commander in chief, is chosen by a popular election. The legislature has a mix of single-seat and proportional representation. The prime minister is chosen through a legislative majority and is head of government. The Supreme Court is appointed by the president upon nomination by the Supreme Council of Justice.


“In April 2019 Volodymyr Zelensky was elected president in an election considered free and fair by international and domestic observers,” the State Department said in its 2021 Human Rights report. “In July 2019 the country held early parliamentary elections that observers also considered free and fair.”

But what’s on paper is not necessarily the same as what happens in practice. Ukraine’s constitution, for instance, guarantees the right to peaceful assembly, but there is no law that specifically provides for freedom of assembly.

The country has struggled to build up a lasting democratic infrastructure as it has veered between leaders who lean toward Russia or toward the West. Corruption remains a serious problem that government officials have only halfheartedly addressed.

Zelensky has been engaged in a bitter political feud with the man he defeated in a landslide 2019 election, Petro Poroshenko. Prosecutors have sought to arrest Poroshenko on charges of treason and supporting terrorism, but a court in January said he could await trial while released on his own recognizance. Poroshenko had been accused of facilitating coal purchases for government enterprises from mines under the control of Moscow-backed insurgents in eastern Ukraine, helping finance the militants. He says the charges are politically motivated.


Freedom House, a nonpartisan think tank that ranks democracies, has labeled Ukraine “a transitional or hybrid regime” in one recent report and “partly free” in a second report.

Hungary, Carlson’s fave, is also listed as a “transitional or hybrid regime” and does not rank much higher than Ukraine. Ukraine’s overall Freedom House score, moreover, is higher than that of Mexico and Indonesia, two countries often labeled democracies.

The Economist Intelligence Unit, which in its 2021 Democracy Index listed the United States as a “flawed democracy,” also pegged Ukraine as a “hybrid regime.” Other Eastern European countries in that category included Armenia, Georgia and Bosnia.

Essentially, Ukraine is in the middle of the pack of former Soviet republics. It ranks much higher on the Democracy Index than Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan — all considered authoritarian regimes. But it is much lower than Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — now members of the European Union that are considered full democracies.


“Ukraine has enacted a number of positive reforms since the protest-driven ouster of President Viktor Yanukovych in 2014,” said Freedom House in its 2021 report on worldwide freedoms. “However, corruption remains endemic, and initiatives to combat it are only partially implemented. Attacks against journalists, civil society activists, and members of minority groups are frequent, and police responses are often inadequate.”

Ukraine earned a score of 60 out of 100, down from 62 the year before. “Corruption remains a serious problem, and even the little remaining political will to fight it is eroding, despite strong pressure from civil society,” the report said. (According to Transparency International, Ukraine is the third-most-corrupt country in Europe, after Russia and Azerbaijan.)

In Freedom House’s 2021 report on Nations in Transit, Ukraine’s score was also reduced because of backsliding on the judiciary in the previous year.


“Judicial Framework and Independence rating declined from 2.50 to 2.25 due to court rulings that suspended laws necessary for reforms, discredited progressive public officials, and overturned corruption verdicts; additionally, a constitutional crisis was caused by the judges of the constitutional Court, who abolished asset declarations of public officials while acting with conflicts of interest,” the report said. “As a result, Ukraine’s Democracy Score declined from 3.39 to 3.36” out of a possible score of 7.

“Media in Ukraine remained pluralistic and free from state pressure in 2020. Media outlets are, however, significantly influenced by the financial support and political agendas of their owners,” the report added. “There are positive tendencies in Ukraine’s fight against grand corruption, but also increasing resistance from the judicial branch.”

The State Department human rights report especially faulted unlawful or arbitrary killing by internal security forces. “The government generally failed to take adequate steps to prosecute or punish most officials who committed abuses, resulting in a climate of impunity,” the report said. “Human rights groups and the United Nations noted significant deficiencies in investigations into alleged human rights abuses committed by government security forces.”


The report noted the problem of extrajudicial killings was even worse “in the Russia-instigated and -fueled conflict in the Donbas region” and in Russia-occupied Crimea.

It often takes time for a country to build up democratic institutions, especially if there has not been a long history of rule of law. A key aspect of U.S. foreign policy has been to assist Ukraine in its transition toward a more Western-oriented democracy. In 2020, according to ForeignAssistance.gov, the U.S. government gave Ukraine $160 million to improve governance, including $47 million for judicial development, $25 million for civil society, $18 million for media freedom and $16 million to anti-corruption organizations.

The Bottom Line
Carlson is too quick to dismiss Ukraine as not a democracy, especially given his embrace of Hungary. It is especially rich of Carlson to mimic Putin’s complaints about the state of Ukraine’s democracy, given that Putin runs an authoritarian regime. Putin does not care about democracy; his main complaint is that the current Ukrainian government refuses to be a Russian puppet.

Ukraine is a flawed democracy — though one with aspirations to improve its standing if it is allowed to break free of Russian meddling in its affairs.
Title: Warlord potential
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 26, 2022, 05:01:38 PM
https://www.vox.com/platform/amp/2015/2/20/8072643/ukraine-volunteer-battalion-danger?fbclid=IwAR2beg_2V5hSIqxz_DaC6QUTVByfL1ld8hE2uMxtVU2NtVH4IkvITGDomiE
Title: Uh oh. Chechyans getting involved?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 26, 2022, 05:36:49 PM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_RlBkxyqFOI
Title: The arrogant and foolish west
Post by: G M on February 26, 2022, 07:28:13 PM
https://www.theburningplatform.com/2022/02/25/why-i-blame-the-arrogant-foolish-west/#more-261325
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on February 27, 2022, 01:03:20 PM
I could be completely wide of the mark here, but it is not clear to me that Putin is necessarily going to win in the medium to long term.

Interesting.  Hope you're right. 
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 27, 2022, 03:07:00 PM
It smells to me like has overplayed his hand and begins to sense it.  Because he cannot go home without success, his emotional dynamic will be very susceptible to hard core escalation.

Things could get eyeball to eyeball real quickly , , ,
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 27, 2022, 03:08:12 PM
May I suggest rereading the first three posts in this thread?  (Yes, from 2008)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 27, 2022, 03:49:56 PM
It smells to me like has overplayed his hand and begins to sense it.  Because he cannot go home without success, his emotional dynamic will be very susceptible to hard core escalation.

Things could get eyeball to eyeball real quickly , , ,

Like this:
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/belarus-lukashenko-says-west-pushing-russia-third-world-war
Title: Ukraine: Don’t believe the hype!
Post by: G M on February 27, 2022, 05:16:52 PM
https://gatesofvienna.net/2022/02/the-bad-war/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 28, 2022, 03:14:16 AM
https://www.foxnews.com/world/footage-appears-to-show-ukrainian-drone-destroying-russian-missile-system?fbclid=IwAR3OyMmsUwiBSFn0oPvW9Al0OAiZuTB2A61RRLAcwLYlCyWd7bg9CYbdOY0
Title: Lomachenko
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 28, 2022, 03:48:48 AM
https://www.espn.com/boxing/story/_/id/33388013/top-boxer-vasiliy-lomachenko-joins-terror-defense-battalion-ukraine
Title: Soviet-Ukraine history
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 28, 2022, 03:55:22 AM
third

Unfamiliar with source:
==================================
The outcome of the Soviet rule in Ukraine

Soviet Ukraine was born in late 1917, existed briefly in 1918, and re-emerged in 1919. On 30 December 1922, it joined the USSR as the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, but before that, the communists had clashed for power and territory with, among others, Ukrainian People’s Republic, General Denikin, German-sponsored Second Hetmanate, and again UPR, allied with Poland. Only after the 1921 Treaty of Riga did they consolidate their rule over the bulk of Ukraine – and this part, compared to the regions that ended up within Polish, Czech or Romanian borders, drew the shorter straw.

Ukraine joined the Soviet Union just as its war communism – extreme centralization of power and total control of production by the state – was making way for Lenin’s New Economic Policy. Seeing how the previous doctrine had ruined the state and, combined with drought, brought about the 1921-1922 famine that killed milions (including hundreds of thousands Ukrainians), the Bolsheviks decided to introduce a temporary measure of free market, at least in agriculture. From 1922, the Soviet republics, Ukraine included, began slow recovery.

In early and mid-1920s, the communists, trying to strengthen their power, also allowed national aspirations of the Union’s peoples to surface, and even fostered local cultures. At the same time, they were preparing to transform the agricultural economy into an industrialized one. In 1928, Stalin ended NEP with his first five-year plan and speeded up industrialization. Shortly thereafter, in 1929, the countryside was hit with collectivization, which aimed at turning peasants, land owners, into forced laborers of the state, slaving away on their nationalized land.

The whole of USSR saw revolts against the new policy, slaughtering of farm animals and destruction of machines, but the Ukrainian dissent was the most pronounced. Stalin, who remembered the UPR, decided to break this "Ukrainian nationalism" with dekulakization – mass murder and deportation campaign – plus the increase in food quotas to be delivered and confiscation of any surplus. The result was one of the worst famines in the history of mankind, engineered starvation of four to seven milion people on fertile Ukrainian soil, a Soviet plan that crippled Ukrainian peasantry.

The peasantry were historically the base of culture and traditions, both closely linked to religion and the local Orthodox Church – which from early 1930s was hit by severe repressions as well. There was more: parallel to the famine, Ukrainian party leaders, ten years before encouraged by Lenin to promote Ukrainization, were purged, and to sideline the remnants, the capital was moved from Kharkiv to Kiyv. Sovietization replaced Ukrainization: Ukrainian cultural institutions and newspapers were shut down, the language marginalized, the people harassed.
The famine was a major blow aimed to cut Ukrainian national identity at the knees through the decimation of the peasant class, and another one was an attack on intelligentsia, which, in Stalin’s opinion, was leaning too much toward the West: in late 1920s, only 20% of books in Ukraine were translations of Russian writers, while the rest were penned by local authors or translated from western languages. From 1933, places like the Slovo Building in Kharkiv, a haven of Ukrainian intellectual activity, would not be permitted to last and its members to live.

And in this organized assault on the very idea of Ukraine, thousands of leading Ukrainian authors, journalists, artists and educators found themselves persecuted, imprisoned and usually executed. A great number ended up in the Solovki camp, but not for long: on 3 November 1937 in Sandarmokh, NKVD officer Matveyev, his only education being two years of elementary school, made poet and translator of Horace Mykola Zerov lie facedown in a shallow grave and shot him in the back of the head, and with him, hundreds of other members of the "Executed Renaissance."

Then, the 1937-1938 Great Terror purged the CP(B)U, the communist party, and NKVD members in Ukraine, while famous Order no. 00447 ("Concerning the punishment of former kulaks, criminals and other anti-Soviet elements") gave the security services quotas of people to persecute and execute, and the NKVD troikas a carte blanche to persecute and execute anyone they wanted. Such policy removed yet more thousands of Ukrainians – either from the face of the earth or into Siberian labor camps, and the vast majority were victims of blanket terror, not purges.

After WWII, the reign of Soviet terror returned, first under Khruschev, since 1938 the First Secretary of the CP(B)U, then under Melnikov. Post-war repression campaign was mostly of anticosmopolitan nature because it targeted people suspected of disloyalty or infecting the Soviet society with western influences: real or alleged Nazi collaborators, as well as former POWs and forced laborers returning home. This period also saw a renewed attack on intelligentsia; survivors of the 1930s slaughter, allowed to foster patriotic sentiments in WWII, were in late 1940s accused of "Ukrainian nationalism" and persecuted.

By the time Stalin died in 1953 and Khruschev delivered his "On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences" speech in 1956, Ukraine lost yet more hundreds of thousands people – deported, imprisoned and executed. The Khruschev thaw began the last three and a half decades of Ukraine in the Soviet Union – slow revival of culture and returning Russification, as well as the birth of dissident movements and resulting repressions from Moscow-controlled security apparatus, all this against the background of gradually deteriorating economy.
After the first three and a half decades, which cut the population of Ukraine by almost a third and its elites by four-fifths – the other three and a half were, at best, only lesser evil. The history of Soviet Ukraine is seven decades or repressions, planned genocide and countless human tragedies.

Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych Polish Foreign Ministry
Title: China's nuke umbrella for Ukraine?!?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 28, 2022, 08:27:14 AM
fourth

I did not see this one coming!

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/feb/27/putin-threat-tests-chinas-nuclear-umbrella-pact-uk/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=uC8HFdICPOzIZpoVd77%2FoMk5X8aXylo10SLAbTMDlHuXQgHJ98Q3Fd33EeL%2FbSOT&bt_ts=1646014530911
Title: Re: China's nuke umbrella for Ukraine?!?
Post by: G M on February 28, 2022, 09:55:03 AM
Totally off my radar screen.

fourth

I did not see this one coming!

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/feb/27/putin-threat-tests-chinas-nuclear-umbrella-pact-uk/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=uC8HFdICPOzIZpoVd77%2FoMk5X8aXylo10SLAbTMDlHuXQgHJ98Q3Fd33EeL%2FbSOT&bt_ts=1646014530911
Title: Warning Mocked, Putin might invade Ukraine if Obama Biden win, 2008
Post by: DougMacG on February 28, 2022, 11:23:00 AM
https://foreignpolicy.com/2008/10/22/russia-might-invade-ukraine-if-obama-wins-palin-warns/

"After the Russian Army invaded the nation of Georgia, Senator Obama’s reaction was one of indecision and moral equivalence, the kind of response that would only encourage Russia’s Putin to invade Ukraine next."

Foreign Policy magazine:  "This is a very far-fetched scenario."
Title: Ukraine 1941
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 01, 2022, 03:56:23 AM
https://imgur.com/gallery/x9952?fbclid=IwAR2hZccHR0tdq_PzwKmvMUZDiL6hSyROWG6s4-_M_BIrJY42buCK3vXWyCE
Title: Ukraine isn't what the propaganda is telling you it is
Post by: G M on March 01, 2022, 09:12:59 AM
https://ocindex.net/country/ukraine
Title: From 2016
Post by: G M on March 01, 2022, 09:39:35 AM
https://ocindex.net/country/ukraine

https://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/04/18/fighting-culture-of-corruption-in-ukraine-pub-63364
Title: With accelerating speed , , ,
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 01, 2022, 12:51:07 PM
https://twitter.com/GresselGustav/status/1498749829874335755?fbclid=IwAR2AgviX0mHuPTBusLIF_PeUKHhGr61A9JSJOKO5Mid1PamDIyPxihgTMQ8
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 01, 2022, 01:35:52 PM
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/mar/1/lack-fuel-and-food-hinders-russian-advance-kyiv-pe/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=evening&utm_term=evening&utm_content=evening&bt_ee=o1nE5ty%2FBRxxlHV5Pxq6MSEQbZ5wAwIyBZz9EMHLfva%2BdwByQbErvSTwEoOl1hQY&bt_ts=1646169948851
Title: Ukrainian anti-semitism history
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 01, 2022, 02:13:27 PM
https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/122778?fbclid=IwAR35vH_vBMcncNrHjjTxCx57gO9VWKPYia15UTIpX4HB3ed_-jAvQaBWs7c
Title: some good thoughts
Post by: ccp on March 01, 2022, 04:22:53 PM
to keep in mind as we had into tonights propaganda speech

I never thought I would have so little trust in my own government as I do
the past 30 yrs

far more BS always with Dems in power
https://www.nationalreview.com/2022/03/beware-wishful-thinking-in-evaluating-the-ukraine-crisis/
Title: Re: some good thoughts, SOTU
Post by: DougMacG on March 01, 2022, 05:36:17 PM
I'm glad we're discussing it here, but I don't see or hear anyone here in my real world aware or admitting they care what the President of the United State* has to say tonight.

Frankly I doubt Putin will watch.
----------------------
PBS Commentator:  This speech is supposed to be a victory lap for a President completing his firt year in office.
Title: Ukes take out a shitload of Russki tanks
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 02, 2022, 06:45:41 AM
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10569027/Charred-remains-Putins-tanks-lie-smouldering-street-Russian-death-toll-climbs.html
Title: MY: Why Russians not taking out Uke comms?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 02, 2022, 07:41:53 AM
https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/1783899/ukraine-phones-electricity
Title: GPF
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 02, 2022, 07:51:19 AM
third

March 2, 2022
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
Daily Memo: Western Firms Exit Russia, More EU Sanctions on Belarus
Several global businesses have decided to pull out of their operations in Russia
By: Geopolitical Futures
State of the Russian economy. The ruble exchange rate reached record lows – 122 rubles to the euro and 109 rubles to the dollar – on Wednesday. This comes as a number of international companies have decided to halt operations in Russia. The Ford Sollers auto plant in Tatarstan suspended its operations, and Honda and Mazda stopped deliveries of cars and components to Russia. German carmaker BMW announced on Tuesday that it stopped exporting vehicles to Russia and that it would halt production at an assembly plant in Kaliningrad. ExxonMobil said it will not invest in new developments with Russia. (Relatedly, oil prices reached a seven-year high on Wednesday, trading at roughly $110 per barrel.) Apple, meanwhile, suspended sales at its Russian stores.

No access. Several countries have started blocking port access to Russian vessels. The U.K. government passed a law banning Russian-linked ships, which include Russian-flagged vessels as well as those owned and operated by firms with Russian interests, from British ports. The Canadian government also announced it would close access to Russian-owned ships. And Malaysia’s Transport Ministry denied port entry for a Russian-flagged oil tanker included on a U.S. sanctions list that was set to arrive at Kuala Linggi International Port on March 5.

Sanctions on Belarus. The French presidency of the EU said the bloc’s diplomats approved new sanctions against Belarus for its involvement in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The package will target Belarusian officials, the military and the economic sector, particularly the wood, steel and potash industries. The decision comes after Britain imposed similar sanctions against Belarus targeting Belarus’ chief of the General Staff and two military enterprises.

More drones for Ukraine. Ukraine’s Defense Ministry announced on Wednesday that it received more Bayraktat TB2s, the Turkish-made combat unmanned aerial vehicle. Its defense minister said the drones were already in combat position.

Support for Taiwan. A delegation of former U.S. defense and security officials arrived in Taiwan on Wednesday and met with the island’s president, Tsai Ing-wen. China condemned the visit.

Turkish-Kyrgyz relations. The defense ministers of Turkey and Kyrgyzstan met in Ankara to discuss regional issues and bilateral relations. They signed a roadmap for cooperation on military and military-technical matters. Meanwhile, Turkey’s Foreign Ministry marked the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan by saying it would continue to support the stability and prosperity of the country.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on March 03, 2022, 05:11:34 AM
Nice read on ZH...thought provoking

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/luongo-opening-salvos-thrown-what-are-putins-next-steps-ukraine (https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/luongo-opening-salvos-thrown-what-are-putins-next-steps-ukraine)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 03, 2022, 05:44:30 AM
Nice read on ZH...thought provoking

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/luongo-opening-salvos-thrown-what-are-putins-next-steps-ukraine (https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/luongo-opening-salvos-thrown-what-are-putins-next-steps-ukraine)

Good article. As I posted elsewhere, the western idiots in charge haven't anticipated the second and third order effects of what they are doing.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on March 03, 2022, 06:24:37 AM
I like how he uses "Davos " to describe the globalists elites

NATO is supposed to be a deterrent but it also keeps increasing our risk of getting into war
 with every new nation entry

I don't care about Europe : let the Western Europeans deal with it.  We keep having to bale them out.

The real problem  is China IMHO
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 03, 2022, 06:42:10 AM
I like how he uses "Davos " to describe the globalists elites

NATO is supposed to be a deterrent but it also keeps increasing our risk of getting into war
 with every new nation entry

I don't care about Europe : let the Western Europeans deal with it.  We keep having to bale them out.

The real problem  is China IMHO

Exactly.

All the virtue-signaling idiots posting Ukrainian flags on their social media accounts and pouring out Russian vodka will drive to most any retail store and mindlessly buy PRC products.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on March 03, 2022, 07:59:21 AM
"NATO is supposed to be a deterrent but it also keeps increasing our risk of getting into war
 with every new nation entry."

   -I don't agree with the moral equivalence of threatening your neighbors versus wanting to protect them, or the idea Putin is the victim.

"I don't care about Europe : let the Western Europeans deal with it.  We keep having to bale them out."

   - See excerpt below* of similar sentiment in a previous time.

"The real problem is China IMHO"

   - The biggest problem is China, but we don't have just one problem or threat, and coincidentally, China is siding with Russia.


  *  Wikipedia, opposition to WWII:  " ... the Mothers' movement led by Elizabeth Dilling, also opposed World War II on the basis that it would be preferable for Nazism rather than Communism to dominate Europe.[13] These women also wished to keep their own sons out of the combat US involvement in the war would necessitate, and believed the war would destroy Christianity and further spread atheistic Communism across Europe.

Henry Ford also opposed US participation in the war until the attack on Pearl Harbor and refused to manufacture airplanes and other war equipment for the British.[14] Father Charles Coughlin urged the US to keep out of the war and permit Germany to conquer Great Britain and the Soviet Union.[15] Asked Coughlin, "Must the entire world go to war for 600,000 Jews in Germany?"[16]

Isolationism was strongest in the United States, where oceans separated it on both sides from the war fronts. The German-American Bund even marched down the avenues of New York City demanding isolationism. The isolationists, led by the America First Committee, were a large, vocal, and powerful challenge to President Roosevelt's efforts to enter the war. Charles Lindbergh was perhaps the most famous isolationist. Isolationism was strongest in the Midwest with its strong German-American population.

In the US, organizations like the American Peace Mobilization and veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade protested in opposition to the war, conscription, and the Lend-Lease Act. They said of Lend-Lease, "Roosevelt needs its dictatorial powers to further his aim of carving out of a warring world, the American Empire so long desired by the Wall Street money lords."[17] Students at UC Berkeley in 1940 led a large protest in opposition to the war.[18] "     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opposition_to_World_War_II


[Doug]  Our support for NATO and Europe is partly out of the good of our heat but mostly IMHO about stopping enemy attacks before they pick up unstoppable momentum and attack us here.

From the above:  "Father Charles Coughlin urged the US to keep out of the war and permit Germany to conquer Great Britain and the Soviet Union.[15] Asked Coughlin, "Must the entire world go to war for 600,000 Jews in Germany?"[16]

   - It's not okay to let them conquer Great Britain or even the Soviet Union.  It wasn't 600,000 Jews; it was more like 6 million killed even with victory for the allies, and they weren't stopping there.  They were coming to the US next from both sides IMHO. 

As with now, the threat isn't just in Ukraine or just Europe, all here acknowledge China is watching closely and plans to take Taiwan when the time is right for them.  Will letting Taiwan go also make us safer?  Ukraine is Russia's last conquest.  Taiwan is China's last conquest.  [Czechoslovakia was Hitler's last conquest?]  Then they will all be satisfied and live in tyranny um peace?  If so, then why is china militarizing islands all the way up and down the South China Sea, expanding their control in Africa, Asia, South America and in the US?

The lesson I take from WWII is stop evil sooner, before it gains territory, resources, momentum and confidence.  Also the treatment (genocide) of the Jews was symptom of the evil, not the entire problem.  This time it's only Ukraine?  Oops, only Ukraine and the Baltics?  Only Ukraine, the Baltics and central Asia?  Denying or ignoring the scope of the evil for as long as we could was not the best course (in WWII) IMHO.  Does that apply here?
Title: Chinese tires to blame?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 03, 2022, 08:04:20 AM
https://theweek.com/russo-ukrainian-war/1010857/how-cheap-chinese-tires-might-explain-russias-stalled-40-mile-long
Title: Re: Ukraine, energy
Post by: DougMacG on March 03, 2022, 08:36:33 AM
The news from the US Putin was reading before ordering the invasion:

Biden pauses new oil and gas leases amid legal battle over cost of climate change
PUBLISHED THU, FEB 24 2022
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/24/biden-administration-pausing-new-oil-and-gas-leases-amid-legal-battle-.html

You don't have to think Putin is  genius to think he is smarter than our leadership.
Title: Re: Ukraine, energy
Post by: G M on March 03, 2022, 09:38:21 AM
The news from the US Putin was reading before ordering the invasion:

Biden pauses new oil and gas leases amid legal battle over cost of climate change
PUBLISHED THU, FEB 24 2022
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/24/biden-administration-pausing-new-oil-and-gas-leases-amid-legal-battle-.html

You don't have to think Putin is  genius to think he is smarter than our leadership.

It’s a low bar.

Here is our historic VP explaining current events:

https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2022/03/kamala-harris-explains-ukraine-russia-conflict-black-radio-host-ukraine-country-europe-exists-next-another-country-called-russia-russia-bigger-country-audio/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on March 03, 2022, 09:57:16 AM
"I don't care about Europe : let the Western Europeans deal with it.  We keep having to bale them out."

   - See excerpt below* of similar sentiment in a previous time.

https://www.google.com/search?q=gdp+russia&oq=gdp+russia&aqs=chrome..69i57.3473j0j15&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

VERSUS

https://www.google.com/search?q=gdp+eu&oq=gdp+eu&aqs=chrome..69i57.1928j0j15&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

+

https://www.google.com/search?q=GDP+GB&oq=GDP+GB&aqs=chrome..69i57.3861j0j15&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

This is why they should be handling on their own
maybe weapons support
from us

we spoiled them too much

Title: Ukraine, Podcast, Col Austin Bay with Steve Hayward Powerline
Post by: DougMacG on March 03, 2022, 11:07:19 AM
I think we need a podcast page, (with ours first).

https://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2022/03/podcast-a-sit-rep-on-ukraine-with-col-austin-bay.php

Worth your time, 40 minutes.  Nothing particularly new, just solid perspective.  I think I will listen a second time to pull facts and quotes out of it.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on March 03, 2022, 02:27:32 PM
"Worth your time, 40 minutes.  Nothing particularly new, just solid perspective"

I will listen
that said I keep turning on TV or internet

and I hear how

"we must do more to help Ukraine"

besides drill drill drill for oil here ( which ain't going to happen till hopefully '24)

what the hell are we supposed to do
I don't want Americans going there
if some US fools want to fly over and risk their lives
 as though a few hundred or thousand of them is going to make a damn bit of difference
on the other side of the world - be my guest

the news is endless pundits screaming and pounding tables
we must do more!!!!

it is over

it is done

we can escalate with more force

only

endless calls for "sanctions".

everyone of these arm chair experts sounds so silly to me

I guess I am the only one not jumping on the bandwagon chorus in the world

Europe needs to step up more load up forces in NATO countries and *sit tight*
and hold the line
Ukraine is NOT NATO

suddenly this is the most ground shaking event in the last 70 yrs....


then only advantage to me by doing "more" whatever that means is to set an example for the CCP who are of course studying this .

otherwise , while very sad , I don't care about Ukraines
my ancestors came here well over 100 yrs ago......

 



Title: Ukraine Russia talks: create safe corridors
Post by: DougMacG on March 03, 2022, 04:09:10 PM
Ukraine Russia talks: create safe corridors

(https://instapundit.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Screen-Shot-2022-03-03-at-17.16.07.png)

44 million people free to leave.  What could go wrong.
Title: Turkey sends drones
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 03, 2022, 08:50:29 PM
https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/ukraine-conflict-turkey-airlifts-additional-tb2-ucavs-to-ukraine?fbclid=IwAR0tR4PWi1q7n4knF40Kxu4TaKbYGuBMA2b4kxZwZJD2c6Bk_iJtMXN9bEo
Title: Serious discussion from 2014
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 03, 2022, 09:11:31 PM


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JrMiSQAGOS4
Title: Re: Serious discussion from 2014
Post by: G M on March 03, 2022, 09:29:00 PM


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JrMiSQAGOS4

We were warned.
Title: Thermobaric deployed, used?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 04, 2022, 04:24:08 AM
https://www.nationalreview.com/the-morning-jolt/russia-deploys-thermobaric-weapons-in-ukraine/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=MJ_20220303&utm_term=Jolt-Smart
Title: Assassination attempts on Zelensky thwarted
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 04, 2022, 04:25:50 AM
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/zelensky-survives-three-assassination-attempts-in-days-xnstdfdfc?fbclid=IwAR2Lwp8VULN9ZD3shcOw7VriYpginlPUGJK0y39P2wj2FSDzW1k1p3G1u2o
Title: Where's my money?
Post by: G M on March 04, 2022, 07:13:29 AM
https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/100/563/134/original/18fb9c2ba1496902.png

(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/100/563/134/original/18fb9c2ba1496902.png)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 04, 2022, 07:48:34 AM
You forgot other historic Americans that warned us against getting caught up in conflicts in other parts of the world:

https://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/democrac/49.htm

The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.

Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?

It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it, for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But in my opinion it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.

Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.

Harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand, neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences; consulting the natural course of things; diffusing and diversifying by gentle means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing; establishing with powers so disposed, in order to give trade a stable course, to define the rights of our merchants, and to enable the Government to support them, conventional rules of intercourse, the best that present circumstances and mutual opinion will permit, but temporary and liable to be from time to time abandoned or varied as experience and circumstances shall dictate; constantly keeping in view that it is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay with a portion of its independence for whatever it may accept under that character; that by such acceptance it may place itself in the condition of having given equivalents for nominal favors, and yet of being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. It is an illusion which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard....

(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/100/196/702/original/b41927553f4f0fac.jpg)

"NATO is supposed to be a deterrent but it also keeps increasing our risk of getting into war
 with every new nation entry."

   -I don't agree with the moral equivalence of threatening your neighbors versus wanting to protect them, or the idea Putin is the victim.

"I don't care about Europe : let the Western Europeans deal with it.  We keep having to bale them out."

   - See excerpt below* of similar sentiment in a previous time.

"The real problem is China IMHO"

   - The biggest problem is China, but we don't have just one problem or threat, and coincidentally, China is siding with Russia.


  *  Wikipedia, opposition to WWII:  " ... the Mothers' movement led by Elizabeth Dilling, also opposed World War II on the basis that it would be preferable for Nazism rather than Communism to dominate Europe.[13] These women also wished to keep their own sons out of the combat US involvement in the war would necessitate, and believed the war would destroy Christianity and further spread atheistic Communism across Europe.

Henry Ford also opposed US participation in the war until the attack on Pearl Harbor and refused to manufacture airplanes and other war equipment for the British.[14] Father Charles Coughlin urged the US to keep out of the war and permit Germany to conquer Great Britain and the Soviet Union.[15] Asked Coughlin, "Must the entire world go to war for 600,000 Jews in Germany?"[16]

Isolationism was strongest in the United States, where oceans separated it on both sides from the war fronts. The German-American Bund even marched down the avenues of New York City demanding isolationism. The isolationists, led by the America First Committee, were a large, vocal, and powerful challenge to President Roosevelt's efforts to enter the war. Charles Lindbergh was perhaps the most famous isolationist. Isolationism was strongest in the Midwest with its strong German-American population.

In the US, organizations like the American Peace Mobilization and veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade protested in opposition to the war, conscription, and the Lend-Lease Act. They said of Lend-Lease, "Roosevelt needs its dictatorial powers to further his aim of carving out of a warring world, the American Empire so long desired by the Wall Street money lords."[17] Students at UC Berkeley in 1940 led a large protest in opposition to the war.[18] "     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opposition_to_World_War_II


[Doug]  Our support for NATO and Europe is partly out of the good of our heat but mostly IMHO about stopping enemy attacks before they pick up unstoppable momentum and attack us here.

From the above:  "Father Charles Coughlin urged the US to keep out of the war and permit Germany to conquer Great Britain and the Soviet Union.[15] Asked Coughlin, "Must the entire world go to war for 600,000 Jews in Germany?"[16]

   - It's not okay to let them conquer Great Britain or even the Soviet Union.  It wasn't 600,000 Jews; it was more like 6 million killed even with victory for the allies, and they weren't stopping there.  They were coming to the US next from both sides IMHO. 

As with now, the threat isn't just in Ukraine or just Europe, all here acknowledge China is watching closely and plans to take Taiwan when the time is right for them.  Will letting Taiwan go also make us safer?  Ukraine is Russia's last conquest.  Taiwan is China's last conquest.  [Czechoslovakia was Hitler's last conquest?]  Then they will all be satisfied and live in tyranny um peace?  If so, then why is china militarizing islands all the way up and down the South China Sea, expanding their control in Africa, Asia, South America and in the US?

The lesson I take from WWII is stop evil sooner, before it gains territory, resources, momentum and confidence.  Also the treatment (genocide) of the Jews was symptom of the evil, not the entire problem.  This time it's only Ukraine?  Oops, only Ukraine and the Baltics?  Only Ukraine, the Baltics and central Asia?  Denying or ignoring the scope of the evil for as long as we could was not the best course (in WWII) IMHO.  Does that apply here?
Title: JQ Adams
Post by: ccp on March 04, 2022, 08:22:54 AM
https://www.rd.com/list/presidents-with-the-highest-iq-scores/

I think this is good. Blinks took my advice from my post yesterday:


https://nypost.com/2022/03/04/us-embassy-gets-ahead-of-biden-calls-russia-nuke-plant-attack-war-crime/

defend NATO as signed up to do
but otherwise stay the hell out.
if Marc Levin wants to send more missiles and machine guns
go ahead
I agree more with Tucker here - I think - unless he changed his position
Title: Defect!
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 04, 2022, 03:14:25 PM
How to Entice Russian Soldiers Out of Ukraine
Offer them refuge, at least until Putin is gone, if they surrender and defect.
By Peter H. Schuck
March 3, 2022 6:49 pm ET


Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine is already a humanitarian disaster. Although Vladimir Putin’s endgame is not yet clear, the West’s expressed refusal to place boots on the ground in Ukraine invites Russia to expand its long-shrunken empire. Mr. Putin views the whole of Ukraine as ripe for reconquest, while he must see Poland, the Baltics and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization enemies as vulnerable to nonmilitary subversion.

Short of committing troops, what can NATO do to weaken Mr. Putin’s hand? The coalition is already supplying Ukraine with war-fighting materiel and logistical and tactical assistance, denying airspace to Russia, and offering immediate refuge for displaced families. President Biden’s skillful orchestration of severe trade, currency, banking and other economic sanctions against Moscow and Russian oligarchs have created viselike pressures that will grow steadily more effective as economic panic takes hold in Russia. Even dictators like Mr. Putin must attend to domestic opposition to war, already evidenced by public protests and outrage over the number of Russian soldiers coming home in body bags. The key question is one of timing: Can these factors take full effect before Russia subjugates Ukraine?

Reports of low Russian military morale—bodies left on the battlefield, soldiers looting for food and other necessaries—suggest a tactic worth considering. NATO should announce that any Russian troops who defect will be granted temporary refuge in the West. A soldier could surrender to a Ukrainian military unit or government office or at a NATO country’s border crossing. He would be permitted to stay until Mr. Putin’s regime is overthrown, at which point he would have to return to Russia. In selected cases—perhaps when a defecting soldier can prove he would be persecuted by a post-Putin regime—he might apply for formal protection under the 1953 Refugee Convention, which usually leads to permanent residency. Human-rights violators and serious criminals would not qualify.

Such a scheme is likely to be effective because even a few initial defections can have a cascading effect, especially if other troops fear that the offer may be time-limited. The scheme would entail no risk to NATO forces (quite the contrary) and cost the NATO countries essentially nothing, particularly if the defectors are spread among them. In the U.S., the idea should have bipartisan political support; it both exploits the “soft power” that liberals claim America has forfeited and advances U.S. foreign-policy interests.

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Some might argue that such a policy would subordinate the U.S. refugee program to realpolitik, but that horse left the barn long ago. The Refugee Act of 1980 already incorporates geopolitical considerations, not only humanitarian ones. The president may exceed the statutory refugee quota if he determines that it is “in the national interest.” The quota is determined after annual consultation between the president and Congress and must analyze, among other factors, how refugee admissions will affect U.S. foreign-policy interests.

This need not be a slippery slope, increasing pressures to offer defectors refugee visas in other turbulent situations. The strategy should be used only on a case-by-case basis. In the area of foreign policy the force of precedent is at its weakest. Each foreign-policy crisis is unique and can readily be distinguished from others when there are good reasons to do so.

Using the relative attractiveness of life in the NATO states to weaken Mr. Putin’s ability to wage war would create a propaganda coup and a battlefield advantage.

Mr. Schuck is an emeritus professor at Yale Law School and a distinguished scholar in residence at New York University Law School.
Title: UN led NFZ?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 04, 2022, 06:18:00 PM
https://video.foxnews.com/v/6299652274001?fbclid=IwAR0-aAkJh3tlRZHdFpY3uPGqfK4J7JcoMeV0OXwTViGY6hjGVJxALkj2wyU#sp=show-clips
Title: the only way to stop this is military
Post by: ccp on March 05, 2022, 09:56:44 AM
which is truly NUTS!

if Trump was President - we can argue if this would happen - but we would certainly be in nuclear war by now.

is my recipe for controlling escalation
send some guns  and food.
otherwise stay the hell out
 

protect the NATO nation and stop there

the other Balkan countries are on their own

(and screen which party the refugees favor - if they sign on dotted line to vote for R - bring em in  :-D

the world is dividing up between the US EU vs China Russia

India it seems would be more natural to be with us
but they sit right next to China Russia

if I am mistaken they abstained from voting in the UN

It would be good to have 1.5 billion Indians on our side

Africa will go to the highest bidder
and I don[t know S America would do.

Title: if Trump was Pres now
Post by: ccp on March 05, 2022, 10:04:14 AM
I have to admit a hot head like Trump
as President now

would have the top people shitting in their shorts
this would be their worst fear

I am not saying he would not do well
like keep us out
but I could see him ordering things and the military ignoring him......
Title: Re: if Trump was Pres now
Post by: G M on March 05, 2022, 10:13:42 AM
There would not a be Ukraine invasion, gas would be under three dollars but there would be the unspeakable horror of MEAN TWEETS!


I have to admit a hot head like Trump
as President now

would have the top people shitting in their shorts
this would be their worst fear

I am not saying he would not do well
like keep us out
but I could see him ordering things and the military ignoring him......
Title: Re: UN led NFZ?
Post by: G M on March 05, 2022, 10:27:00 AM
https://video.foxnews.com/v/6299652274001?fbclid=IwAR0-aAkJh3tlRZHdFpY3uPGqfK4J7JcoMeV0OXwTViGY6hjGVJxALkj2wyU#sp=show-clips

This is how you get WWIII.


https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/evacuation-ceasefires-break-down-russian-shelling-resumes-key-port-cities
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on March 05, 2022, 10:41:19 AM
"There would not a be Ukraine invasion, gas would be under three dollars but there would be the unspeakable horror of MEAN TWEETS!"

maybe on the first part maybe not
agree on second part

and I am not talking about "tweets" on the third
I am speaking of two gigantic egos duking it out with us as cannon fodder.

as for no fly zone of course it is an act of war
but. so are sanctions and
cyberattacks
so we are already in a "limited" war
but the brass seems go be doing a good job now not escalating
   




Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on March 05, 2022, 11:45:36 AM
Interesting that 4 mostly like-minded people here (seem to) have 4 different views on this.
Title: Israel's Bennet mediating?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 05, 2022, 04:08:10 PM
Israel’s Bennett Speaks With Putin, Zelensky Separately in Effort to Mediate Ukraine Crisis
Conversation with the Russian leader in Moscow touched on the safety of Ukraine’s Jewish population and international talks over Iran’s nuclear program

Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has faced pressure domestically to boost support to Ukraine.
PHOTO: ABIR SULTAN/ASSOCIATED PRESS
By Thomas Grove
March 5, 2022 3:48 pm ET


TEL AVIV—Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett held talks with President Vladimir Putin Saturday in the Kremlin over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and then spoke with Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky, an attempt to mediate a conflict that has caused growing civilian casualties and refugees.

Before Mr. Bennett’s visit, diplomacy by President Biden and European leaders failed to stop Mr. Putin from invading Ukraine or rolling back his tanks. In the face of massive Western sanctions, Mr. Putin has found himself increasingly cut off from the world, with few avenues for diplomacy and with his country’s economy unplugged from much of global commerce.

Mr. Bennett’s meeting with Mr. Putin took place “with the blessing of the U.S. administration,” said Mr. Bennett’s office, which also noted that it coordinated with Germany and France. After seeing Mr. Putin, Mr. Bennett left Moscow for Berlin, where he will meet with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, the prime minister’s office said. Mr. Bennett was joined by Housing Minister Zeev Elkin, who was born in the now Ukrainian city of Kharkiv and assisted with the translation.

The nearly three-hour conversation with Mr. Putin touched on the safety of Ukraine’s Jewish population and international talks over Iran’s nuclear program, Mr. Bennett’s office said. On Saturday, new demands from Russia—a party to the nuclear talks—threatened to derail efforts to restore the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, a pact that Israel opposes.


Mr. Bennett flew to Moscow as Russian troops continued to meet fierce resistance from Ukrainian forces, and an agreement to evacuate civilians from two besieged cities fell apart. Russia’s invasion of its smaller neighbor last week has caused civilian casualties and sparked the largest movement of people in Europe since World War II as Ukrainians flee the bloodshed.


The meeting comes about a week after Mr. Bennett, in a call with Mr. Putin, offered to mediate between Russia and Ukraine. Mr. Putin said during that call that he was “ready for negotiation,” a senior Israeli official said.

Throughout the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Israel has found itself caught between powerful opposing forces. Israel’s most important ally, the U.S., and pro-Western Ukraine, with a large Jewish population, have pushed Israel to side strongly with the Ukrainians. At the same time, Mr. Bennett’s government has worried that taking sides would jeopardize its relationship with Russia, which allows Israel the freedom to bomb Iranian positions in Syria.

Mr. Bennett has faced pressure domestically to boost support to Ukraine. Israel has so far refused a Ukrainian request for weapons and other military equipment, such as helmets and protective vests, Ukraine’s ambassador, Yevgen Korniychuk, said earlier this week. But Israel has condemned Russia’s invasion and voted for a United Nations resolution demanding an end to the offensive.

Mr. Bennett, an observant Jew, flew to Moscow during the Sabbath, underlining the urgent nature of his mission.

Israel has worked to maintain good relations with the Kremlin and has been keen not to anger Moscow during the conflict. Russia’s launch of a military intervention in Syria in 2015 turned it into an important player in the Middle East. Israel sees Russia’s presence there as a moderating influence among Islamist militant organizations such as Hezbollah and Iran’s increasingly aggressive stance.

Mr. Putin’s stated aim of his invasion and decapitation of the Ukrainian government is denazification of the country, despite Mr. Zelensky’s Jewish origins. Since Russia struck a television tower earlier this week in Kyiv’s Babyn Yar area, the site of one of the worst massacres during the Holocaust, international Jewish condemnation of Russia’s invasion has grown.

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on March 06, 2022, 08:38:46 AM
India gets a lot of hate, for staying Neutral. Here's the other side, that India see's but the west forgets.

https://twitter.com/i/status/1500485014705770499 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1500485014705770499)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on March 06, 2022, 09:20:16 AM
From ZH (https://capexinsider.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/insider-weekly-232-03.jpg)

For full story https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2022-03-04/what-isnt-being-talked-about
Title: Blinken: Green light for Migs to the Ukes
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 06, 2022, 09:22:22 AM
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-russia-war-fighter-jets-antony-blinken-face-the-nation/?fbclid=IwAR036h7ZLXCbo9hds7ncWZRpZmFf0ioMzlMSL2sgo1ca4G3I7BFE1WYLnm0
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 06, 2022, 09:28:34 AM
Responding to the map near the beginning in the Indian clip shared by YA:

It takes as the STARTING POINT of NATO expansion east the Soviet CONQUEST of East Europe-- AS ORIGINALLY ENVISIONED BY STALIN WHEN HE SIGNED THE RIBBENTROP AGREEMENT, and overall the simple profound fact is that NATO existed to defend against the Warsaw Pact conquering ALL of Europe.

I'm completely down for respecting a reasonable Monroe space for Russia (though this may not be possible at this point) but , , , 
Title: some thoughtful points by Pat Buchanan
Post by: ccp on March 06, 2022, 10:17:37 AM
yes he still lives:


https://buchanan.org/blog/did-we-provoke-putins-war-in-ukraine-159120
Title: Re: some thoughtful points by Pat Buchanan
Post by: DougMacG on March 06, 2022, 12:38:57 PM
yes he still lives:
https://buchanan.org/blog/did-we-provoke-putins-war-in-ukraine-159120

From the article:
"Putin is a Russian nationalist, patriot, traditionalist and a cold and ruthless realist looking out to preserve Russia as the great and respected power it once was and he believes it can be again."

No.  It's not that he's trying to preserve Russia which no one is threatening, he's trying to reconstitute the Soviet Union by threatening and invading sovereign neighbors.

NATO is a defensive alliance.  Putin, Russia [Soviet] operation is the aggressor that places like Ukraine are trying to protect against.  Putin can spin that some other way, of course, he's the guy who sent in "peacekeeping" forces to carpet bomb the place.

We've gone from you can't say Putin is an (evil) genius to calling Putin the victim here.  Putin isn't murdering millions like Stalin, no he's oppressing greater than a hundred million - who would be murdered if they, for example, spoke truth aloud.

Interestingly, he crossed the border into a sovereign country and is murdering people indiscriminately now.  Our bad?

Why is there still a NATO everyone over there wants to join?  Because Russia is still a threat.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on March 06, 2022, 12:59:01 PM
Some good points Doug

It was Trump who complemented him as a "genius"

not me

as for him not being a "victim"

yes , but knowing him, we certainly did keep encircling him
that could have been predicted we would sooner or later provoke him to turn to  the war option

Perhaps he would have done this anyway , I don't know.

I don't want this to spiral out of control

How many wars unfold as planned?




Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 06, 2022, 01:37:20 PM
THIS is why the CIA propaganda is omnipresent in the MSM (Including the allegedly conservative media) and social media while the oppression and real threat from China is ignored as the DC Uniparty "elites" are being paid off by the PRC.



From ZH (https://capexinsider.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/insider-weekly-232-03.jpg)

For full story https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2022-03-04/what-isnt-being-talked-about
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on March 06, 2022, 01:41:35 PM
Some good points Doug

It was Trump who complemented him as a "genius"

not me

as for him not being a "victim"

yes , but knowing him, we certainly did keep encircling him
that could have been predicted we would sooner or later provoke him to turn to  the war option

Perhaps he would have done this anyway , I don't know.

I don't want this to spiral out of control

How many wars unfold as planned?

Right, you ripped Trump for calling Putin a genius, but I took what he said in the context that Trump clearly believes what Putin is doing is terrible, "wouldn't have happened under him".  Putin is a genius in small world  tactics within his wrong-headed worldview that you only improve your lot by taking from others.  Genius compared to Biden Harris and genius in the sense that we should stop underestimating our adversaries.



Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 06, 2022, 01:44:16 PM
Some good points Doug

It was Trump who complemented him as a "genius"

not me

as for him not being a "victim"

yes , but knowing him, we certainly did keep encircling him
that could have been predicted we would sooner or later provoke him to turn to  the war option

Perhaps he would have done this anyway , I don't know.

I don't want this to spiral out of control

How many wars unfold as planned?

Right, you ripped Trump for calling Putin a genius, but I took what he said in the context that Trump clearly believes what Putin is doing is terrible, "wouldn't have happened under him".  Putin is a genius in small world  tactics within his wrong-headed worldview that you only improve your lot by taking from others.  Genius compared to Biden Harris and genius in the sense that we should stop underestimating our adversaries.

Putin has taken a weak hand (Aside from nukes) and played it quite well. Of course, our lame and feckless western leaders have been his biggest asset.
Title: Nazi symbols on Uke helmets?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 06, 2022, 01:57:28 PM
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/german-tv-shows-nazi-symbols-helmets-ukraine-soldiers-n198961?fbclid=IwAR1b78T_wx_Fe1Glmj6lZp0WBQajsF33x5lwCMtBG_1Eg4XJcg3A-79Fz-8
Title: Re: Nazi symbols on Uke helmets?
Post by: G M on March 06, 2022, 01:59:27 PM
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/german-tv-shows-nazi-symbols-helmets-ukraine-soldiers-n198961?fbclid=IwAR1b78T_wx_Fe1Glmj6lZp0WBQajsF33x5lwCMtBG_1Eg4XJcg3A-79Fz-8

 :roll:
Title: The map tells the story
Post by: G M on March 06, 2022, 02:01:31 PM
https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/the-map-tells-the-story?s=r

(https://cdn.substack.com/image/fetch/f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fa411b788-f488-4534-aff2-0b2e8fffb9f9_640x360.png)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 06, 2022, 02:10:15 PM
GM:

Why the eye roll on the Nazi symbols on the helmets?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 06, 2022, 02:15:20 PM
GM:

Why the eye roll on the Nazi symbols on the helmets?

Ever see a gathering of outlaw bikers?
Title: Do we want small wars or world wars?
Post by: G M on March 06, 2022, 02:30:53 PM
https://amgreatness.com/2022/03/05/do-we-want-small-wars-or-world-wars/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 06, 2022, 02:42:19 PM
Ummm, given the history of Ukraine, I'm going to reject that argument as unresponsive.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 06, 2022, 02:46:56 PM
Ummm, given the history of Ukraine, I'm going to reject that argument as unresponsive.

If someone wears a symbol, you have to know what the symbol means to them, NOT what it means to you.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 06, 2022, 02:48:56 PM
Duh.

And given Ukraine's deep and extensive history of anti-semitism, I'm saying they know EXACTLY what it means.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 06, 2022, 02:53:01 PM
Duh.

And given Ukraine's deep and extensive history of anti-semitism, I'm saying they know EXACTLY what it means.

Yes, those pogroms took place long before the formation of the German Socialist Worker's Party and their adoption of the swastika, yes?

A snippet of data without context is useless for analytical purposes, but it is useful for those trying to manipulate an audience emotionally.

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 06, 2022, 03:08:47 PM
Ummm, given the history of Ukraine, I'm going to reject that argument as unresponsive.

If someone wears a symbol, you have to know what the symbol means to them, NOT what it means to you.

https://lp.post.ca.gov/post/resources/resources/LASD/Inmate-Tattoos-LES-FOUO.pdf

See page 195 from the above document.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 06, 2022, 03:16:27 PM
I've been having extensive FB sidebar conversation with the wife of one of my top students- they are observant Jews and raising their children as such.

Her parents were Uke Jews who fled to Russia where she was born and raised.  Russian is her first language and she now teaches history at the high school level in a private NYC school.

I don't have the time and energy to collate everything she has shared with me, but there is A LOT and plenty of it is NOT ancient history.

That said, this just happened to cross my radar screen.

https://www.theepochtimes.com/the-risks-of-arming-ukraines-azov-battalion_4311731.html?utm_source=News&utm_campaign=breaking-2022-03-06-2&utm_medium=email&est=xVKLce9yNWWMwz4EyXhptvLxAI4OP2Rwykww0XyLeG%2B%2FqEtR0v3Bet7JvOsnJUhTcBgA
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 06, 2022, 03:33:09 PM
I've been having extensive FB sidebar conversation with the wife of one of my top students- they are observant Jews and raising their children as such.

Her parents were Uke Jews who fled to Russia where she was born and raised.  Russian is her first language and she now teaches history at the high school level in a private NYC school.

I don't have the time and energy to collate everything she has shared with me, but there is A LOT and plenty of it is NOT ancient history.

That said, this just happened to cross my radar screen.

https://www.theepochtimes.com/the-risks-of-arming-ukraines-azov-battalion_4311731.html?utm_source=News&utm_campaign=breaking-2022-03-06-2&utm_medium=email&est=xVKLce9yNWWMwz4EyXhptvLxAI4OP2Rwykww0XyLeG%2B%2FqEtR0v3Bet7JvOsnJUhTcBgA

Good article.

From 2014

https://www.algemeiner.com/2014/06/24/ukraine-jewish-billionaires-batallion-sent-to-fight-pro-russian-militias/

Title: Heading into the vortex
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 06, 2022, 03:42:38 PM
https://www.theepochtimes.com/russia-warns-countries-allowing-ukraine-to-use-airfields-would-enter-conflict_4319867.html?utm_source=News&utm_campaign=breaking-2022-03-06-3&utm_medium=email&est=aUTcqq9t62OvNa5ZCdnv5PXECeZzY7JxQ0jqkM4chQqZUhrBkpcy8korsBgmr1sxHioC
Title: Do you want WWIII? Because this is how we get WWIII.
Post by: G M on March 07, 2022, 09:17:51 AM
https://www.theepochtimes.com/russia-warns-countries-allowing-ukraine-to-use-airfields-would-enter-conflict_4319867.html?utm_source=News&utm_campaign=breaking-2022-03-06-3&utm_medium=email&est=aUTcqq9t62OvNa5ZCdnv5PXECeZzY7JxQ0jqkM4chQqZUhrBkpcy8korsBgmr1sxHioC

https://www.breitbart.com/clips/2022/03/06/blinken-nato-countries-have-green-light-to-send-fighter-jets-to-ukraine/
Title: Sent by a Uke-Russian Jew friend
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 08, 2022, 08:56:38 PM


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fy910FG46C4
Title: Re: Sent by a Uke-Russian Jew friend
Post by: G M on March 09, 2022, 02:18:56 AM


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fy910FG46C4

https://www.algemeiner.com/2014/06/24/ukraine-jewish-billionaires-batallion-sent-to-fight-pro-russian-militias/

Ukraine: Batallion Backed by Jewish Billionaire Sent to Fight Pro-Russian Militias
avatarby Dave Bender

Ukrainian international businessman, Igor Kolomoisky. Photo: eajc.org.

Despite cease-fire declarations, pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian militias are still reportedly clashing at several locations in south-eastern Ukraine.

Among those going into battle from the Ukrainian side are some 500 trained fighters in the self-declared Azov battalion, backed by Jewish energy magnate and Dnipropetrovsk region governor, Igor Kolomoisky, according to Israel’s Ma’ariv daily.

I see. A neo-nazi group funded by *checks notes* a Jewish billionaire who became a Israeli citizen and now lives in Israel.

Seems legit.



Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 09, 2022, 04:00:49 AM
Noted that the article is from 2014.  Have things changed in the eight years since?

Will report back what my Uke-Russian Jew friend has to say about this.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 09, 2022, 07:07:02 AM
My friend responds:

I didn't realize Kolomoisky is Jewish. He is the one who sponsored Zelensky's campaign..part of the reason Zelensky was losing popularity before the war started was bc he was backed by a Russian oligarch. Interesting...

Russian speaking I should say. Not Russian..

But he has a reputation for being very corrupt. He owns the media company where Zelensky had his show where he played a teacher who suddenly became a president of Ukraine.

He and Timoshenko were allies at one point. These people made money ny basically robbing everyone blind when privatization happened in the early 90s. She was jailed for some type of corruption but made is seem like it was a political thing bc she fought for democracy. I honestly don't think any of these people care about Ukraine. They are just as bad as Russia's oligarchs and just want a government that will close its eyes to their corruption. It's a game of thrones there, not a nascent democracy. Neither Russia nor Ukraine are ready for that bc while the cuties are very developed, the rural population still lives in the 18 century. I really wish US would have stayed out of there bc now everyone will suffer,  Ukraine most of all.

I really wish he wasn't Jewish lol. Not a good look for us.
===============================
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 09, 2022, 07:34:11 AM
Ukraine is a Eastern European mafiya-ocracy. Makes Mexico look like Belgium.

My friend responds:

I didn't realize Kolomoisky is Jewish. He is the one who sponsored Zelensky's campaign..part of the reason Zelensky was losing popularity before the war started was bc he was backed by a Russian oligarch. Interesting...

Russian speaking I should say. Not Russian..

But he has a reputation for being very corrupt. He owns the media company where Zelensky had his show where he played a teacher who suddenly became a president of Ukraine.

He and Timoshenko were allies at one point. These people made money ny basically robbing everyone blind when privatization happened in the early 90s. She was jailed for some type of corruption but made is seem like it was a political thing bc she fought for democracy. I honestly don't think any of these people care about Ukraine. They are just as bad as Russia's oligarchs and just want a government that will close its eyes to their corruption. It's a game of thrones there, not a nascent democracy. Neither Russia nor Ukraine are ready for that bc while the cuties are very developed, the rural population still lives in the 18 century. I really wish US would have stayed out of there bc now everyone will suffer,  Ukraine most of all.

I really wish he wasn't Jewish lol. Not a good look for us.
===============================
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on March 09, 2022, 07:38:41 AM
".I really wish US would have stayed out of there bc now everyone will suffer,  Ukraine most of all."

interesting

could he be more specific

stay out how?


Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 09, 2022, 08:26:48 AM
She starts from a point of view that Putin/Russia were misunderstood.  Strongly disapproves of what Putin has done.
Title: ET: Ten years of American fukkery in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 10, 2022, 03:06:52 AM
https://www.theepochtimes.com/before-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-a-decade-of-destabilization_4316990.html?utm_source=Opinion&utm_campaign=opinion-2022-03-09&utm_medium=email&est=%2Bqxu%2BDUNGu8eCZYSGT69Ns14oYtieKUe9gCtosFWn%2FziyTM7KIK9%2FovkGBjAa3KF6H%2B4

Before Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, a Decade of Destabilization
How top US officials played key roles in destabilizing Ukraine, damaging US–Russia relations
By Jeff Carlson and Hans Mahncke March 4, 2022 Updated: March 8, 2022biggersmaller Print
News Analysis

As war rages in Ukraine following the invasion by Russia, the realities on the ground are difficult to assess—it’s estimated that thousands have been killed, including hundreds of civilians, and 2 million have been forced to flee their homes.

Although Russian President Vladimir Putin is rightly deserving of blame, top U.S. officials over the past decade have played important roles in critical events that undermined U.S. relations with Russia and resulted in the destabilization of Ukraine.

The deterioration in our relations with Russia, in many ways, started with President George W. Bush in 2008, when he dangled before Ukraine the promise of NATO membership during the Bucharest declaration, boldly claiming, “We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.”

The promise of NATO membership for Ukraine is something that has never been taken lightly by Russia, which has remained resolutely opposed to any NATO expansion along its borders.

In 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher had promised the Kremlin not to expand NATO eastward in return for German unification. However, in the decades that followed that promise, NATO incorporated 14 additional Eastern European countries.

In his 2020 memoir, Joe Biden’s current CIA director, Bill Burns, explicitly warned about the dangers posed by Ukraine gaining NATO membership, citing his own words in 2008 to then-Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice: “Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all redlines for the Russian elite (not just Putin).​”

“In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle-draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putin’s sharpest liberal critics, I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests,” he wrote.

Ukraine’s Longstanding Political Troubles
In addition to its geographic importance as a centuries-old buffer territory between the East and West, Ukraine is a resource-rich country with an abundance of agriculture exports and large supplies of minerals, iron ore, and coal.

Yet Ukraine’s political upheavals and influence from powerful oligarchs have meant that it’s also one of the poorest countries in Europe. Ukraine’s per-capita nominal gross domestic product stands at around $3,500 compared to the European average of $31,000. Rampant governmental corruption has only served to make a difficult situation worse.

Ukraine has been through two significant revolutions since it gained independence in 1991. The first revolution occurred in 2004, when the apparent winner of the presidential election, Viktor Yanukovych, a candidate favored by Russia, was unseated. Yanukovych made a political comeback in 2010 when he again won the presidential election.

However, Yanukovych was deposed yet again in February 2014, when a U.S.-supported coup installed a new government in Ukraine. Arseniy Yatsenyuk, the candidate pushed by the United States, was installed as prime minister, but would resign two years later amid corruption accusations.

While the 2014 Maidan Revolution has been portrayed as a triumph of democracy over oppression, such a characterization ignores the fact that the resulting coup culminated in the removal of a democratically elected leader of Ukraine.

Ukraine, which became a focal point of a new cold war with Russia, led many U.S. officials to willfully ignore a dangerous rise in fascist sentiments and neo-Nazi movements within the country.

Andriy Parubiy, co-founder of the fascist Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU), served as the chairman of the Ukrainian parliament from April 2016 until August 2019. The ideology of Parubiy’s SNPU, which he co-founded in 1991 with Oleh Tyahnybok, now the current leader of the ultranationalist Svoboda party, was radical nationalism and neo-Nazism.

Parubiy was the “commander” of the Maidan Revolution, which led the various Maidan paramilitary units, and his forces played a material role in the U.S.-backed coup that led to the overthrow of Yanukovych.

The growth of a fascist movement in a country that was serving as the battleground for a new cold war between the U.S. and Russia should have raised many alarms. But rather than distancing themselves from these elements, Western leaders appeared to embrace them.

Indeed, then-U.S. Sen. John McCain met with ultranationalist leader Tyahnybok in the lead-up to the 2014 coup, and Vice President Joe Biden met with Tyahnybok shortly thereafter in April 2014. In June 2017, Parubiy was inexplicably invited to Washington, where he met with a number of American politicians, including McCain and House Speaker Paul Ryan.

Vice President Biden Becomes Ukraine Point Man
It was during events surrounding the February 2014 coup that Biden, then-vice president to Barack Obama, made his first appearance as a Ukraine power broker. Biden had been appointed as the Obama administration’s point man on Ukraine in early 2014.

An intercepted phone conversation between Victoria Nuland, who at the time was assistant secretary for European and Eurasian affairs in the Obama State Department, and then-U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt revealed that the State Department was actively pursuing the ouster of Yanukovych and the installation of opposition leader Yatsenyuk as prime minister. It isn’t known exactly when their discussion took place, only that it transpired prior to Feb. 7, 2014, when the conversation was leaked.

During that leaked discussion, Nuland noted that Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser to Vice President Biden, had informed her that “you need Biden” for the successful installation of Yatsenyuk, and Nuland concluded by telling Pyatt that “Biden’s willing.” Sullivan now serves as the national security adviser to President Biden.

Just two weeks later, on Feb. 22, 2014, Yanukovych was removed as president of Ukraine; within days, Yatsenyuk, Nuland’s preferred candidate, was installed as prime minister of Ukraine.

The U.S. government had effectively assisted in the removal of a democratically elected leader that was friendly to Russia with the installation of a leader who was selected by the United States.

The Kremlin, watching these events unfold, didn’t wait long to react, annexing Crimea a few days later.

Prosecutor Investigating Ukrainian Oligarch Is Fired
One of the members of Yanukovych’s government who lost his position in government as a result of the coup was Mykola Zlochevsky, the owner of Burisma Energy.

He had first served as minister of ecology and natural resources and later as deputy secretary for economic and social security. While he held power in government, Zlochevsky’s companies reportedly received an unusually large number of permits to extract oil and gas.

In April 2014, UK prosecutors seized $23.5 million in assets owned by Zlochevsky that were held at a London bank, alleging that Zlochevsky had engaged in criminal conduct in Ukraine.

Following the sudden loss of Zlochevsky’s government position, Burisma appointed Biden’s son, Hunter, to its board of directors. In addition to Hunter, Burisma also appointed Devon Archer, a Hunter Biden associate who was jailed in February 2022 in New York for his role in a scheme to defraud a Native American tribe of $60 million.

Both Hunter Biden and Archer were hired in April 2014 around the time Zlochevsky’s funds were seized in London. Although Hunter’s appointment wasn’t announced until May 12, 2014, Burisma posted a picture of Archer and Joe Biden on its website on April 17, 2014. The picture had been taken a day earlier at the White House.

During Hunter’s first year at Burisma, the company allegedly paid a $7 million bribe to Ukraine’s chief prosecutors’ office to help shut the UK investigation into Zlochevsky, according to a State Department email. The Ukrainian prosecutor’s office subsequently sent a letter to its UK counterparts stating there was no longer an active case against Zlochevsky. UK prosecutors were then forced to release Zlochevsky’s previously seized funds.

Notably, at the time the alleged bribe was paid in late 2014, Hunter Biden was listed by Burisma as the head of the company’s legal unit. The chief prosecutor, Vitaly Yarema, had previously served as the first vice prime minister of Ukraine following the 2014 U.S.-led coup. Yarema suddenly resigned in February 2015, barely two months later. Yarema’s replacement, Viktor Shokin, was brought out of retirement to become prosecutor general of Ukraine.

Initially, Shokin’s appointment was welcomed by U.S. officials, although he suddenly fell out of U.S. favor in late 2015—around the same time the head of Burisma’s board, Vadym Pozharskyi, emailed Hunter Biden on Nov. 2, 2015. In the email, Pozharskyi pressed Hunter Biden to produce “deliverables,” stating that the “ultimate purpose” was to “close down any cases or pursuits” against Burisma owner Zlochevsky in Ukraine.

Less than three weeks later, Joe Biden began demanding the removal of Shokin, who by this time had restarted the investigation into Zlochevsky and had also successfully sought an order from Ukrainian courts to seize Zlochevsky’s assets. Less than seven weeks after the seizure of Zlochevsky’s assets, on March 29, 2016, Shokin was fired.

Biden later famously bragged that he had leveraged $1 billion in U.S. government loan guarantees to force Shokin’s removal. To this day, Shokin has never been charged with any wrongdoing.

Joe Biden was privately warned by Amos Hochstein, a U.S. special envoy, about Hunter’s association with a corrupt oligarch. Biden is said to have ignored the warnings.

Clinton Campaign’s RussiaGate Hoax Further Impaired Relations
It was against this political backdrop, with Ukraine destabilized and Russia angered by a U.S.-backed coup, that Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign made the fateful decision to accuse Russia of interfering in the 2016 presidential election for the purposes of helping then-candidate Donald Trump. Clinton and her campaign’s politically driven accusations further impaired already-strained U.S.–Russia relations, and the effects of her actions are being felt to this day.

The use of Russia for the attack on Trump was two-pronged. First, the Clinton campaign hired British ex-spy Christopher Steele to write a fabricated dossier that portrayed Trump as a compromised puppet of the Kremlin. In order to provide backing for the dossier’s claims, operatives created a false data trail that purported to show communications between Trump and the Kremlin. In doing so, the Clinton campaign’s operatives fabricated false evidence of collusion between a candidate for president and the Kremlin.

These actions would continue after Trump became president, as evidenced by a Clinton campaign lawyer’s visit to the CIA to hand over more data from these same operatives in February 2017, as revealed in a court filing by special counsel John Durham.

But it wasn’t only the political campaign of Clinton that was making these accusations. The Intelligence Community, acting in a dangerous geopolitical game, assisted the Clinton campaign by backing her claims that Russia was interfering in our elections in order to help Trump.

The Clinton campaign’s creation of the false Trump–Russia collusion narrative, which culminated in the inclusion of Steele’s fictitious dossier in an official intelligence community assessment, effectively tied Trump’s hands with respect to dealings with Russia—raising serious national security implications.

The resulting myopic focus on Russia also shifted our nation’s attention away from a far more dangerous adversary, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

False Claims of Russia Laptop Plot
Four years later, during the 2020 presidential election, the Biden campaign introduced its own claims that Russia was meddling in the election, again in order to assist Trump.

When Hunter Biden’s abandoned hard drive emerged in the months preceding the election, it contained a litany of damaging emails and other incriminating information on the Biden family, including the Nov. 2, 2015, email from the head of Burisma’s board demanding that Hunter Biden shut down the investigations into Burisma’s owner. The laptop also contained other damaging information, including the younger Biden’s entanglements with the CCP.

Although the corporate media and major social media platforms immediately restricted—or in some cases, outright banned—sharing of articles regarding the laptop story, Trump publicly raised the issue during the second presidential debate on Oct. 22, 2020. In response, Biden chose to blame Russia for the emergence of his son’s hard drive.

Biden’s assertion traced back to similar claims from the highest levels of our intelligence community, including former CIA Director John Brennan, who claimed in a joint statement that Hunter Biden’s laptop “has all the classic earmarks of a Russian information operation.”

As it turned out later, the Hunter emails were authentic and not a Russian plot.

Adding to an already tense geopolitical situation, Biden held out NATO membership to Ukraine as recently as December, as did his secretary of state, Antony Blinken. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin went even further, saying the door was open to Ukraine for NATO membership during an October 2021 trip to Ukraine.

These promises, which were sure to provoke Russia, lay in stark contrast to the warnings from Biden’s own CIA director, who had previously stated that NATO membership for Ukraine was the “brightest of all red lines” for Russia.

The overarching national security goal of the United States should have centered around preventing Russia and China from forming further alliances. The vilification of Russia, driven in part by the self-serving actions of top U.S. officials such as Clinton and Biden, seriously undermined that goal.

With the outbreak of war in Ukraine and consequent total isolation of Russia from the West, that goal is no longer attainable.

The likely outcome is that Russia and China will grow even closer.
Title: Ukes fukk up Russki tank column
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 10, 2022, 07:09:18 AM
https://nypost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2022/03/russian-armored-convoy-ambush-feat-image.jpg?quality=90&strip=all
Title: Re: Ukes fukk up Russki tank column
Post by: G M on March 10, 2022, 07:13:07 AM
https://nypost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2022/03/russian-armored-convoy-ambush-feat-image.jpg?quality=90&strip=all

This is why armor is supposed to work in conjunction with infantry. Tanks are big and scary and lethal, but they need lots of fuel and the tank crew has to take a piss every so often...
Title: Zelensky ready to negotiate with Israel as mediator
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 12, 2022, 02:33:22 PM
https://www.theepochtimes.com/zelensky-ready-to-negotiate-open-to-high-level-peace-talks-in-jerusalem_4333384.html?utm_source=News&utm_campaign=breaking-2022-03-12-3&utm_medium=email&est=qxCkmROSe0gya2lwf9xrMmiVKbcxkDfzTMq8aWyIlefHKM4mzJ%2BOLQv6oBaufJqtzGIx
Title: Ukes conspired against Trump in 2016
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 12, 2022, 02:34:21 PM
https://www.realclearinvestigations.com/articles/2022/03/10/how_ukraine_conspired_with_dems_against_trump_to_prevent_the_kind_of_war_happening_now_under_biden_820873.html?fbclid=IwAR3UdfAaNYvgAnQP_fZ2IV5ybrYDmT4LqSkXJoUbwT5lDue90h_AjckktUg
Title: Re: Ukraine, VDH
Post by: DougMacG on March 17, 2022, 04:57:36 AM
VDH made a point regarding China, Russia and Ukraine that I tried to paraphrase earlier. 

4.  China is now pro-Russian. Beijing wants Russian natural resources at a discount. Russia will pay for overpriced access to Chinese finance, commerce, and markets. Yet if Russia loses the Ukraine war, goes broke, and as an international pariah is ostracized, then China will likely cut the smelly Russian albatross from its neck — in fear of new Western financial, cultural, and commercial clout.

https://jewishworldreview.com/0322/hanson031722.php

(Read his 10 pts on Ukraine at link.  I hesitate to excerpt when all of it is full of wisdom.)

2.  No-fly zones don't work in a big-power, symmetrical standoff. In a cost-benefit analysis, they are not worth the risk of shooting down the planes of a nuclear power. They usually do little to stop planes outside of such zones shooting missiles into them. Sending long-range, high-altitude anti-aircraft batteries to Ukraine to deny Russian air superiority is a far better way of regaining air parity.

8. It is not "escalation" to send arms to Ukraine. The Russians far more aggressively supplied the North Koreans and North Vietnamese in their wars against America, without spreading the war globally. Pakistan, Syria, and Iran sent deadly weapons — many in turn supplied to them by Russia, North Korea, and China — to kill thousands of Americans during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.

10.   It is not "un-American" to point out that prior American appeasement under the Obama and the Biden Administrations explains not why Putin wished to go into Ukraine, but why he felt he could. It is not "treasonous" to say Ukraine and the United States previously should have stayed out of each other's domestic affairs and politics — but still do not excuse Putin's savage aggression. It is not traitorous to admit that Russia for centuries relied on buffer states between Europe — lost when its Warsaw Pact satellite members joined NATO after its defeat in the Cold War. But that reality also does not justify Putin's savage attack.

We should not rehash the past but learn from it — and thereby ensure Putin is defeated now and deterred in the future
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on March 17, 2022, 05:58:33 AM
Our fear of provoking and escalating is provoking and escalating.
Title: Ann Coulter on Ukraine media blitz
Post by: ccp on March 17, 2022, 06:15:22 AM
https://anncoulter.com/2022/03/16/dem-nightmare-what-if-the-war-ends-before-november/

Rudy Guliani had it right in my view on radio last afternoon

yes it is terrible what is happening to Ukrainian people
but instituting a no fly zone
while not likely to lead to nukes
is a risk not worth taking

lets see roll the dice - if we lose - nuclear bombs going off.

seem like a good idea
not to him
and not to me

we need to stay the hell out of it.

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on March 17, 2022, 06:58:19 AM
BREAKING: Biden says Putin is a "war criminal."

This rhetoric is a mistake by the United States.

We should be trying to create offramps in Ukraine - not boxing Putin into a corner by flirting with regime change in Russia.

   - A tweet captured at Instapundit
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on March 17, 2022, 07:07:49 AM
Doug writes:

"BREAKING: Biden says Putin is a "war criminal."

This rhetoric is a mistake by the United States."

Calling despots names .....  the strategy
 of the Dems and their lawyers

Just think of all the lawsuits and business that could be generated with by suing Russia, Putin , and throw in a few rich "oligarchs"

In a similar line of thinking

lets state China is on the wrong side of history (whatever the BS line means)
from the most powerful SOS in US history:

https://www.breitbart.com/clips/2022/03/17/blinken-on-ability-to-isolate-china-chinas-already-on-the-wrong-side-of-history-and-is-hurting-its-reputation/
Title: Historical background on Crimea
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 17, 2022, 12:35:06 PM
https://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/ap_news/conversation/why-crimean-tatars-are-fearful-as-russia-invades-ukraine/article_75ed00e6-2300-54ee-bbe5-70586fba07e6.html?presentid=webnews&ocid=msedgntp
Title: CIA in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 17, 2022, 09:32:01 PM
https://www.yahoo.com/news/exclusive-secret-cia-training-program-in-ukraine-helped-kyiv-prepare-for-russian-invasion-090052743.html
Title: Ukes kick Russki as in Voznesensk
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 17, 2022, 09:52:36 PM
A Ukrainian Town Deals Russia One of the War’s Most Decisive Routs
In the two-day battle of Voznesensk, local volunteers and the military repelled the invaders, who fled leaving behind armor and dead soldiers
Ukrainian troops in Voznesensk on Tuesday.
By Yaroslav Trofimov
Follow
 / Photographs by Manu Brabo for The Wall Street Journal
March 16, 2022 11:37 am ET


VOZNESENSK, Ukraine—A Kalashnikov rifle slung over his shoulder, Voznesensk’s funeral director, Mykhailo Sokurenko, spent this Tuesday driving through fields and forests, picking up dead Russian soldiers and taking them to a freezer railway car piled with Russian bodies—the casualties of one of the most comprehensive routs President Vladimir Putin’s forces have suffered since he ordered the invasion of Ukraine.

A rapid Russian advance into the strategic southern town of 35,000 people, a gateway to a Ukrainian nuclear power station and pathway to attack Odessa from the back, would have showcased the Russian military’s abilities and severed Ukraine’s key communications lines.

Instead, the two-day battle of Voznesensk, details of which are only now emerging, turned decisively against the Russians. Judging from the destroyed and abandoned armor, Ukrainian forces, which comprised local volunteers and the professional military, eliminated most of a Russian battalion tactical group on March 2 and 3.

The Ukrainian defenders’ performance against a much-better-armed enemy in an overwhelmingly Russian-speaking region was successful in part because of widespread popular support for the Ukrainian cause—one reason the Russian invasion across the country has failed to achieve its principal goals so far. Ukraine on Wednesday said it was launching a counteroffensive on several fronts.

“Everyone is united against the common enemy,” said Voznesensk’s 32-year-old mayor, Yevheni Velichko, a former real-estate developer turned wartime commander, who, like other local officials, moves around with a gun. “We are defending our own land. We are at home.”


Voznesensk Mayor Yevheni Velichko, left, atop a bridge Ukrainian military engineers blew up.
The Russian military says its Ukraine offensive is developing successfully and according to plan. Moscow hasn’t released updated casualty figures since acknowledging on March 2 the death of 498 troops, before the Voznesensk battle.

Russian survivors of the Voznesensk battle left behind nearly 30 of their 43 vehicles—tanks, armored personnel carriers, multiple-rocket launchers, trucks—as well as a downed Mi-24 attack helicopter, according to Ukrainian officials in the city. The helicopter’s remnants and some pieces of burned-out Russian armor were still scattered around Voznesensk on Tuesday.

Russian forces retreated more than 40 miles to the southeast, where other Ukrainian units have continued pounding them. Some dispersed in nearby forests, where local officials said 10 soldiers have been captured.

“We didn’t have a single tank against them, just rocket-propelled grenades, Javelin missiles and the help of artillery,” said Vadym Dombrovsky, commander of the Ukrainian special-forces reconnaissance group in the area and a Voznesensk resident. “The Russians didn’t expect us to be so strong. It was a surprise for them. If they had taken Voznesensk, they would have cut off the whole south of Ukraine.”

Ukrainian officers estimated that some 100 Russian troops died in Voznesensk, including those whose bodies were taken by retreating Russian troops or burned inside carbonized vehicles. As of Tuesday, 11 dead Russian soldiers were in the railway car turned morgue, with search parties looking for other bodies in nearby forests. Villagers buried some others.



A Russian soldier’s body before transfer to the Voznesensk morgue.

Bodies of Russian soldiers in the freezer train car turned morgue.
“Sometimes, I wish I could put these bodies on a plane and drop them all onto Moscow, so they realize what is happening here,” said Mr. Sokurenko, the funeral director, as he put Tuesday’s fifth Russian cadaver on blue-plastic sheeting inside his van marked “Cargo 200”—Soviet military slang for killed in action. A Ukrainian military explosives specialist accompanied him, because some bodies had been booby trapped.

About 10 Ukrainian civilians died in Voznesensk during the combat and two more after hitting a land mine afterward, local officials said. Ukraine doesn’t disclose its military losses. There were fatalities, mostly among the Territorial Defense volunteer forces, local residents said.

The Russian operation to seize Voznesensk, 20 miles from the South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant, was ambitious and well-equipped. It began after Russian forces fanned out of the Crimean Peninsula, which Moscow severed from Ukraine and annexed in 2014, and thrust northward to seize the regional capital of Kherson on March 1. They pushed to the edge of Mykolaiv, the last major city before Odessa, Ukraine’s main port.

About 55 miles north of Mykolaiv, Voznesensk offered an alternative bridge over the Southern Bug river and access to the main highway linking Odessa with the rest of Ukraine. Russian forces raced toward the town at the same time as they made a successful push northeast to seize the city of Enerhodar, where another major Ukrainian nuclear power plant is located. Voznesensk’s fall would have made defending the nuclear plant to the north of here nearly impossible, military officials said.


The Battle of Voznesensk

South Ukraine

nuclear facility

UKRAINE

Area of detail

Controlled by or

allied to Russia

3

Detail below

Voznesensk

MYKOLAIV OBLAST

P06

2

P55

Connects

Voznesensk

and Odessa

ODESSA OBLAST

Mykolaiv

1

M14

Kherson

Controlled

by Russia

Odessa

Black Sea

On March 1, the Russian military column departs Kherson headed north and northeast.

To reach Odessa, the column must cross the Southern Bug in Mykolaiv or Voznesensk. The river runs in a deep canyon and can only be crossed via bridge.

1

2

VOZNESENSK

4

Bridge

destroyed

AREA OF BATTLE

Mertvovod R.

RAKOVE

3

The column reaches Voznesensk, where the bridge over the Mertvovod tributary of the Southern Bug has been destroyed by local forces, stopping the northward progression.

After two days of fighting, most of the column is destroyed. Survivors escape east toward Bashtanka.

3

4

Source: staff reports
Mayor Velichko worked with local businessmen to dig up the shores of the Mertvovod river that cuts through town so armored personnel vehicles couldn’t ford it. He got other businessmen who owned a quarry and a construction company to block off most streets to channel the Russian column into areas that would be easier to hit with artillery.

Ahead of the Russian advance, military engineers blew up the bridge over the Mertvovod and a railroad bridge on the town’s edge. Waiting for the Russians in and around Voznesensk were Ukrainian regular army troops and members of the Territorial Defense force, which Ukraine established in January, recruiting and arming volunteers to help protect local communities. Local witnesses, officials and Ukrainian combat participants recounted what happened next.

Missile strikes
The Russian assault began with missile strikes and shelling that hit central Voznesensk, destroying the municipal swimming pool and damaging high-rises. Helicopters dropped Russian air-assault troops in a forested ridge southwest of Voznesensk, as an armored column drove from the southeast. Mr. Velichko said a local collaborator with the Russians, a woman driving a Hyundai SUV, showed the Russian column a way through back roads.

Ukrainian officers estimate that some 400 Russian troops took part in the attack. The number would have been bigger if these forces—mostly from the 126th naval infantry brigade based in Perevalnoye, Crimea, according to seized documents—hadn’t come under heavy shelling along the way.

Natalia Horchuk, a 25-year-old mother of three, said Russian soldiers appeared in her garden in the village of Rakove in the Voznesensk municipality early March 2. They told her and neighbors to leave for their safety, and parked four tanks and infantry fighting vehicles between the houses. “Do you have anywhere to go?” she recalled them asking. “This place will be hit.”

“We can hide in the cellar,” she replied.


“The cellar won’t help you,” they told her. Hiding valuables, she and her family fled, as did most neighbors.


Children play near the shelled clinic in Rakove.

One of the Ukrainian troops inspecting ruined houses where Russian soldiers rested.
Outside Rakove, Volodymyr Kichuk, a guard at a walnut plantation, woke to find five Russian airborne troops in his hut. They took his phone and forced him to lie on the ground, said his wife, Hanna. “Once they realized there was nothing to steal, they told him: You can get up after we leave,” she said. By day’s end, the couple were gone from the village.

Russian soldiers took over villagers’ homes in Rakove and created a sniper position on a roof. They looked for sacks to fill with soil for fortifications, burned hay to create a smoke screen and demanded food.

A local woman who agreed to cook for the Russians is now under investigation, said Mr. Dombrovsky. “A traitor—she did it for money,” he said. “I don’t think the village will forgive her and let her live here.”

Downhill from Rakove, Russian forces set up base at a gas station at Voznesensk’s entrance. A Russian BTR infantry fighting vehicle drove up to the blown-up bridge over the Mertvovod, opening fire on the Territorial Defense base to the left. Five tanks, supported by a BTR, drove to a wheat field overlooking Voznesensk.

A group of Territorial Defense volunteers armed with Kalashnikovs was hiding in a building at that field’s edge. They didn’t have much of a chance against the BTR’s large-caliber machine gun, said Mykola Rudenko, one of the city’s Territorial Defense officers; some were killed, others escaped. Russian troops in two Ural trucks were preparing to assemble and set up 120mm mortars on the wheat field, but they got only as far as unloading the ammunition before Ukrainian shelling began.



Russian soldiers took over villagers’ homes during their advance on Voznesensk; above and below, Ukrainian troops inspect such houses in Rakove.

Phoning in coordinates
As darkness fell March 2, Mr. Rudenko, who owns a company transporting gravel and sand, took cover in a grove on the wheat field’s edge under pouring rain. The Russian tanks there would fire into Voznesensk and immediately drive a few hundred yards away to escape return fire, he said.

Mr. Rudenko was on the phone with a Ukrainian artillery unit. Sending coordinates via the Viber social-messaging app, he directed artillery fire at the Russians. So did other local Territorial Defense volunteers around the city. “Everyone helped,” he said. “Everyone shared the information.”

Ukrainian shelling blew craters in the field, and some Russian vehicles sustained direct hits. Other Ukrainian regular troops and Territorial Defense forces moved toward Russian positions on foot, hitting vehicles with U.S.-supplied Javelin missiles. As Russian armor caught fire—including three of the five tanks in the wheat field—soldiers abandoned functioning vehicles and escaped on foot or sped off in the BTRs that still had fuel. They left crates of ammunition.

Mr. Rudenko picked up a Russian conscript days later, he said, who served as an assistant artillery specialist at a Grad multiple-rocket launcher that attacked Voznesensk from a forest. The 18-year-old conscript, originally from eastern Ukraine and a Crimea resident since 2014, suffered a concussion after a Ukrainian shell hit near him. He woke the next morning, left his weapon and wandered into a village, Mr. Rudenko said. There, a woman took him into her home and called the village head, who informed Territorial Defense. “He’s still in shock about what happened to him,” Mr. Rudenko said.

Mr. Dombrovsky, the reconnaissance-unit commander, said he captured several soldiers in their early 20s and a 31-year-old senior lieutenant from the Russian military intelligence. The lieutenant, he said, had forced a private to swap uniforms but was discovered because of the age discrepancy—and because Ukrainian forces found Russian personnel files in the column’s command vehicle.

“The Russians had orders to come in, seize, and await further instructions,” Mr. Dombrovsky said. “But they had no orders for what to do if they are defeated. That, they didn’t plan for.”


Ukrainian troops in a village where the Russian forces camped in their advance toward Voznesensk.

Russian military gear from the Voznesensk battle.
Russian troops had detained a local man on March 2 after they found him to have binoculars, villagers said. “They had put him in a cellar and told him they will execute him in the morning, for correcting artillery fire,” Mr. Dombrovsky said, adding that the detainee wasn’t a spotter. “But in the morning they didn’t have time to execute him. They were too busy fleeing.”

The Russians retreat
As the Russian forces retreated on March 3, they shelled the downhill part of Rakove. A direct hit pierced the roof of the local clinic, where Mr. Dombrovsky’s mother, Raisa, worked as a nurse. “We’ve just built a new roof,” she sighed, showing the gaping hole. “But it doesn’t matter. The main thing is that we have kicked them out, and survived.”

When villagers returned to Rakove on March 4, they found their homes ransacked. “Blankets, cutlery, all gone. Lard, milk, cheese, also gone,” said Ms. Horchuk. “They didn’t take the potatoes because they didn’t have time to cook.”

This week, village homes still bore traces of Russian soldiers. Cupboards and closets were still flung open from looting, and Russian military rations and half-eaten jars of pickles and preserves littered floors.

The Ukrainian army’s 80th brigade was towing away the last remaining Russian BTRs with “Z” painted on their sides, the identification markers that in Russia have become the symbol of the invasion. About 15 Russian tanks and other vehicles were in working or salvageable condition, said Mr. Dombrovsky. “We are ready to hit the Russians with their own weapons,” he said. Others, mostly burned-out wrecks, were removed from streets because they scared civilians and contained ordnance, the mayor said.


A Ukrainian army truck tows a Russian armored vehicle in Voznesensk on Tuesday.

Ukrainian troops build a defensive position on Voznesensk’s outskirts.
Electricity, disrupted during combat, has returned in Voznesensk, as have internet, gas and water services. ATMs have been restocked with cash, supermarkets with food.

The only explosions are from bomb squads occasionally disposing ordnance. Mr. Velichko, the mayor, fielded citizen phone calls Tuesday, telling one he would take care of a possibly rabid dog and assuring another that her utilities wouldn’t be cut in wartime even if she was late in paying. He argued with an army commander because Ukrainian soldiers had siphoned fuel from the gas station.

Spartak Hukasian, head of the Voznesensk district council, said the city—no longer near front lines—was starting to get used to relatively peaceful life again. “He who laughs last laughs best,” he said. “We haven’t had a chance to laugh until now.”

Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com

Copyright ©2022 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the March 17, 2022, print edition as 'A Ukrainian Town Deals Putin One of His Most Decisive Routs.'
Title: Re: Ukes kick Russki as in Voznesensk
Post by: G M on March 17, 2022, 09:55:11 PM
When Putin has the city bombed/shelled flat, it won't seem like such a victory.


A Ukrainian Town Deals Russia One of the War’s Most Decisive Routs
In the two-day battle of Voznesensk, local volunteers and the military repelled the invaders, who fled leaving behind armor and dead soldiers
Ukrainian troops in Voznesensk on Tuesday.
By Yaroslav Trofimov
Follow
 / Photographs by Manu Brabo for The Wall Street Journal
March 16, 2022 11:37 am ET


VOZNESENSK, Ukraine—A Kalashnikov rifle slung over his shoulder, Voznesensk’s funeral director, Mykhailo Sokurenko, spent this Tuesday driving through fields and forests, picking up dead Russian soldiers and taking them to a freezer railway car piled with Russian bodies—the casualties of one of the most comprehensive routs President Vladimir Putin’s forces have suffered since he ordered the invasion of Ukraine.

A rapid Russian advance into the strategic southern town of 35,000 people, a gateway to a Ukrainian nuclear power station and pathway to attack Odessa from the back, would have showcased the Russian military’s abilities and severed Ukraine’s key communications lines.

Instead, the two-day battle of Voznesensk, details of which are only now emerging, turned decisively against the Russians. Judging from the destroyed and abandoned armor, Ukrainian forces, which comprised local volunteers and the professional military, eliminated most of a Russian battalion tactical group on March 2 and 3.

The Ukrainian defenders’ performance against a much-better-armed enemy in an overwhelmingly Russian-speaking region was successful in part because of widespread popular support for the Ukrainian cause—one reason the Russian invasion across the country has failed to achieve its principal goals so far. Ukraine on Wednesday said it was launching a counteroffensive on several fronts.

“Everyone is united against the common enemy,” said Voznesensk’s 32-year-old mayor, Yevheni Velichko, a former real-estate developer turned wartime commander, who, like other local officials, moves around with a gun. “We are defending our own land. We are at home.”


Voznesensk Mayor Yevheni Velichko, left, atop a bridge Ukrainian military engineers blew up.
The Russian military says its Ukraine offensive is developing successfully and according to plan. Moscow hasn’t released updated casualty figures since acknowledging on March 2 the death of 498 troops, before the Voznesensk battle.

Russian survivors of the Voznesensk battle left behind nearly 30 of their 43 vehicles—tanks, armored personnel carriers, multiple-rocket launchers, trucks—as well as a downed Mi-24 attack helicopter, according to Ukrainian officials in the city. The helicopter’s remnants and some pieces of burned-out Russian armor were still scattered around Voznesensk on Tuesday.

Russian forces retreated more than 40 miles to the southeast, where other Ukrainian units have continued pounding them. Some dispersed in nearby forests, where local officials said 10 soldiers have been captured.

“We didn’t have a single tank against them, just rocket-propelled grenades, Javelin missiles and the help of artillery,” said Vadym Dombrovsky, commander of the Ukrainian special-forces reconnaissance group in the area and a Voznesensk resident. “The Russians didn’t expect us to be so strong. It was a surprise for them. If they had taken Voznesensk, they would have cut off the whole south of Ukraine.”

Ukrainian officers estimated that some 100 Russian troops died in Voznesensk, including those whose bodies were taken by retreating Russian troops or burned inside carbonized vehicles. As of Tuesday, 11 dead Russian soldiers were in the railway car turned morgue, with search parties looking for other bodies in nearby forests. Villagers buried some others.



A Russian soldier’s body before transfer to the Voznesensk morgue.

Bodies of Russian soldiers in the freezer train car turned morgue.
“Sometimes, I wish I could put these bodies on a plane and drop them all onto Moscow, so they realize what is happening here,” said Mr. Sokurenko, the funeral director, as he put Tuesday’s fifth Russian cadaver on blue-plastic sheeting inside his van marked “Cargo 200”—Soviet military slang for killed in action. A Ukrainian military explosives specialist accompanied him, because some bodies had been booby trapped.

About 10 Ukrainian civilians died in Voznesensk during the combat and two more after hitting a land mine afterward, local officials said. Ukraine doesn’t disclose its military losses. There were fatalities, mostly among the Territorial Defense volunteer forces, local residents said.

The Russian operation to seize Voznesensk, 20 miles from the South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant, was ambitious and well-equipped. It began after Russian forces fanned out of the Crimean Peninsula, which Moscow severed from Ukraine and annexed in 2014, and thrust northward to seize the regional capital of Kherson on March 1. They pushed to the edge of Mykolaiv, the last major city before Odessa, Ukraine’s main port.

About 55 miles north of Mykolaiv, Voznesensk offered an alternative bridge over the Southern Bug river and access to the main highway linking Odessa with the rest of Ukraine. Russian forces raced toward the town at the same time as they made a successful push northeast to seize the city of Enerhodar, where another major Ukrainian nuclear power plant is located. Voznesensk’s fall would have made defending the nuclear plant to the north of here nearly impossible, military officials said.


The Battle of Voznesensk

South Ukraine

nuclear facility

UKRAINE

Area of detail

Controlled by or

allied to Russia

3

Detail below

Voznesensk

MYKOLAIV OBLAST

P06

2

P55

Connects

Voznesensk

and Odessa

ODESSA OBLAST

Mykolaiv

1

M14

Kherson

Controlled

by Russia

Odessa

Black Sea

On March 1, the Russian military column departs Kherson headed north and northeast.

To reach Odessa, the column must cross the Southern Bug in Mykolaiv or Voznesensk. The river runs in a deep canyon and can only be crossed via bridge.

1

2

VOZNESENSK

4

Bridge

destroyed

AREA OF BATTLE

Mertvovod R.

RAKOVE

3

The column reaches Voznesensk, where the bridge over the Mertvovod tributary of the Southern Bug has been destroyed by local forces, stopping the northward progression.

After two days of fighting, most of the column is destroyed. Survivors escape east toward Bashtanka.

3

4

Source: staff reports
Mayor Velichko worked with local businessmen to dig up the shores of the Mertvovod river that cuts through town so armored personnel vehicles couldn’t ford it. He got other businessmen who owned a quarry and a construction company to block off most streets to channel the Russian column into areas that would be easier to hit with artillery.

Ahead of the Russian advance, military engineers blew up the bridge over the Mertvovod and a railroad bridge on the town’s edge. Waiting for the Russians in and around Voznesensk were Ukrainian regular army troops and members of the Territorial Defense force, which Ukraine established in January, recruiting and arming volunteers to help protect local communities. Local witnesses, officials and Ukrainian combat participants recounted what happened next.

Missile strikes
The Russian assault began with missile strikes and shelling that hit central Voznesensk, destroying the municipal swimming pool and damaging high-rises. Helicopters dropped Russian air-assault troops in a forested ridge southwest of Voznesensk, as an armored column drove from the southeast. Mr. Velichko said a local collaborator with the Russians, a woman driving a Hyundai SUV, showed the Russian column a way through back roads.

Ukrainian officers estimate that some 400 Russian troops took part in the attack. The number would have been bigger if these forces—mostly from the 126th naval infantry brigade based in Perevalnoye, Crimea, according to seized documents—hadn’t come under heavy shelling along the way.

Natalia Horchuk, a 25-year-old mother of three, said Russian soldiers appeared in her garden in the village of Rakove in the Voznesensk municipality early March 2. They told her and neighbors to leave for their safety, and parked four tanks and infantry fighting vehicles between the houses. “Do you have anywhere to go?” she recalled them asking. “This place will be hit.”

“We can hide in the cellar,” she replied.


“The cellar won’t help you,” they told her. Hiding valuables, she and her family fled, as did most neighbors.


Children play near the shelled clinic in Rakove.

One of the Ukrainian troops inspecting ruined houses where Russian soldiers rested.
Outside Rakove, Volodymyr Kichuk, a guard at a walnut plantation, woke to find five Russian airborne troops in his hut. They took his phone and forced him to lie on the ground, said his wife, Hanna. “Once they realized there was nothing to steal, they told him: You can get up after we leave,” she said. By day’s end, the couple were gone from the village.

Russian soldiers took over villagers’ homes in Rakove and created a sniper position on a roof. They looked for sacks to fill with soil for fortifications, burned hay to create a smoke screen and demanded food.

A local woman who agreed to cook for the Russians is now under investigation, said Mr. Dombrovsky. “A traitor—she did it for money,” he said. “I don’t think the village will forgive her and let her live here.”

Downhill from Rakove, Russian forces set up base at a gas station at Voznesensk’s entrance. A Russian BTR infantry fighting vehicle drove up to the blown-up bridge over the Mertvovod, opening fire on the Territorial Defense base to the left. Five tanks, supported by a BTR, drove to a wheat field overlooking Voznesensk.

A group of Territorial Defense volunteers armed with Kalashnikovs was hiding in a building at that field’s edge. They didn’t have much of a chance against the BTR’s large-caliber machine gun, said Mykola Rudenko, one of the city’s Territorial Defense officers; some were killed, others escaped. Russian troops in two Ural trucks were preparing to assemble and set up 120mm mortars on the wheat field, but they got only as far as unloading the ammunition before Ukrainian shelling began.



Russian soldiers took over villagers’ homes during their advance on Voznesensk; above and below, Ukrainian troops inspect such houses in Rakove.

Phoning in coordinates
As darkness fell March 2, Mr. Rudenko, who owns a company transporting gravel and sand, took cover in a grove on the wheat field’s edge under pouring rain. The Russian tanks there would fire into Voznesensk and immediately drive a few hundred yards away to escape return fire, he said.

Mr. Rudenko was on the phone with a Ukrainian artillery unit. Sending coordinates via the Viber social-messaging app, he directed artillery fire at the Russians. So did other local Territorial Defense volunteers around the city. “Everyone helped,” he said. “Everyone shared the information.”

Ukrainian shelling blew craters in the field, and some Russian vehicles sustained direct hits. Other Ukrainian regular troops and Territorial Defense forces moved toward Russian positions on foot, hitting vehicles with U.S.-supplied Javelin missiles. As Russian armor caught fire—including three of the five tanks in the wheat field—soldiers abandoned functioning vehicles and escaped on foot or sped off in the BTRs that still had fuel. They left crates of ammunition.

Mr. Rudenko picked up a Russian conscript days later, he said, who served as an assistant artillery specialist at a Grad multiple-rocket launcher that attacked Voznesensk from a forest. The 18-year-old conscript, originally from eastern Ukraine and a Crimea resident since 2014, suffered a concussion after a Ukrainian shell hit near him. He woke the next morning, left his weapon and wandered into a village, Mr. Rudenko said. There, a woman took him into her home and called the village head, who informed Territorial Defense. “He’s still in shock about what happened to him,” Mr. Rudenko said.

Mr. Dombrovsky, the reconnaissance-unit commander, said he captured several soldiers in their early 20s and a 31-year-old senior lieutenant from the Russian military intelligence. The lieutenant, he said, had forced a private to swap uniforms but was discovered because of the age discrepancy—and because Ukrainian forces found Russian personnel files in the column’s command vehicle.

“The Russians had orders to come in, seize, and await further instructions,” Mr. Dombrovsky said. “But they had no orders for what to do if they are defeated. That, they didn’t plan for.”


Ukrainian troops in a village where the Russian forces camped in their advance toward Voznesensk.

Russian military gear from the Voznesensk battle.
Russian troops had detained a local man on March 2 after they found him to have binoculars, villagers said. “They had put him in a cellar and told him they will execute him in the morning, for correcting artillery fire,” Mr. Dombrovsky said, adding that the detainee wasn’t a spotter. “But in the morning they didn’t have time to execute him. They were too busy fleeing.”

The Russians retreat
As the Russian forces retreated on March 3, they shelled the downhill part of Rakove. A direct hit pierced the roof of the local clinic, where Mr. Dombrovsky’s mother, Raisa, worked as a nurse. “We’ve just built a new roof,” she sighed, showing the gaping hole. “But it doesn’t matter. The main thing is that we have kicked them out, and survived.”

When villagers returned to Rakove on March 4, they found their homes ransacked. “Blankets, cutlery, all gone. Lard, milk, cheese, also gone,” said Ms. Horchuk. “They didn’t take the potatoes because they didn’t have time to cook.”

This week, village homes still bore traces of Russian soldiers. Cupboards and closets were still flung open from looting, and Russian military rations and half-eaten jars of pickles and preserves littered floors.

The Ukrainian army’s 80th brigade was towing away the last remaining Russian BTRs with “Z” painted on their sides, the identification markers that in Russia have become the symbol of the invasion. About 15 Russian tanks and other vehicles were in working or salvageable condition, said Mr. Dombrovsky. “We are ready to hit the Russians with their own weapons,” he said. Others, mostly burned-out wrecks, were removed from streets because they scared civilians and contained ordnance, the mayor said.


A Ukrainian army truck tows a Russian armored vehicle in Voznesensk on Tuesday.

Ukrainian troops build a defensive position on Voznesensk’s outskirts.
Electricity, disrupted during combat, has returned in Voznesensk, as have internet, gas and water services. ATMs have been restocked with cash, supermarkets with food.

The only explosions are from bomb squads occasionally disposing ordnance. Mr. Velichko, the mayor, fielded citizen phone calls Tuesday, telling one he would take care of a possibly rabid dog and assuring another that her utilities wouldn’t be cut in wartime even if she was late in paying. He argued with an army commander because Ukrainian soldiers had siphoned fuel from the gas station.

Spartak Hukasian, head of the Voznesensk district council, said the city—no longer near front lines—was starting to get used to relatively peaceful life again. “He who laughs last laughs best,” he said. “We haven’t had a chance to laugh until now.”

Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com

Copyright ©2022 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the March 17, 2022, print edition as 'A Ukrainian Town Deals Putin One of His Most Decisive Routs.'
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on March 18, 2022, 05:14:23 AM
"When Putin has the city bombed/shelled flat, it won't seem like such a victory."

and first thing is first after that happens. -

build a megayacht factory on the coast of the Black Sea
in Odessa

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 18, 2022, 06:51:37 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/kremlin-reports-major-progress-ukraine-talks-wrong-bidens-putin-remark-unforgiveable?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=547
Title: VDH: 10 Realities
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 18, 2022, 07:22:24 AM
second

https://dailycaller.com/2022/03/17/victor-davis-hanson-10-realities-ukraine-russia-biden/?utm_medium=email&pnespid=6_R9UytVbqhExfWc.T7qTciQsAL3CYVvMPK_kbd4pR1mPAsmWEoxuiNpMM6JNY.yjxRt4F0a
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 18, 2022, 07:44:48 AM
third

https://nypost.com/2022/03/18/russian-troops-reportedly-shooting-themselves-in-the-legs-to-avoid-fighting/?fbclid=IwAR0Vjq_6X7K90fjz7NHyrdm4eVPIKPP2cxNNyGDxRssrVBmWXJom8lYH480
Title: VDH s 10 points
Post by: ccp on March 18, 2022, 07:54:28 AM
Agree with all but this :

"Yet if Russia loses the Ukraine war, goes broke and is ostracized as an international pariah, then China will likely cut the smelly Russian albatross from its neck — in fear of new Western financial, cultural and commercial clout."

I don't agree.
I think China will still be glad to get oil gas from Russia.

Title: Uke Ballad of Green Berets
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 18, 2022, 08:37:43 PM
https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/1868468/ukrainian-version-of-balad-of-green-berets
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 18, 2022, 08:40:34 PM
second

Despite Progress on 'Neutrality,' Larger Constraints to a Russia-Ukraine Peace Deal Remain
6 MIN READMar 18, 2022 | 20:05 GMT


Despite reports of progress in Russia-Ukraine talks regarding the latter's ''neutrality,'' Moscow's insistence that Kyiv also surrender significant territory means the two sides are unlikely to reach a peace deal soon. In the meantime, Russia will seek to increase its negotiating leverage by seizing more Ukrainian cities and regions, which will risk prolonging the conflict and further limiting room for a comprehensive deal. On March 16, reports emerged that Ukraine and Russia had made progress on the wording of a 15-point peace plan for a cease-fire and Russian withdrawal of troops, as well as a mutually acceptable vision of neutrality including limits on its armed forces. But this does not represent a major change in Ukraine's position nor a major step toward ending the war. The topic of Ukraine's neutrality is the least controversial for Kyiv among Russia's demands because the Ukrainian government has accepted that its NATO aspirations have failed to protect Ukraine, and that Russia's invasion did not progress its bid to gain membership in the Western security alliance. Therefore, larger constraints to a peace deal remain, including Kyiv's reluctance to formally recognize the loss of its territories and Kyiv's insistence that in exchange for renouncing its NATO ambitions, Ukraine must receive security guarantees of protection from the likes of the United States, United Kingdom or Turkey. These demands will hardly satisfy Russia, which is unlikely to withdraw from the Ukrainian territories it has occupied until Kyiv relents. Ukraine's Western partners may be reluctant to guarantee Ukraine's security for fear that it would put their own national security at risk.

On March 7, Ukrainian delegation member Davyd Arakhamia said that while movement on Ukrainian neutrality was possible, it would be almost impossible for Ukraine to bow to Russia's demands that Kyiv recognizes Russia's 2014 seizure of Crimea, as well as the independence of the Russian-occupied breakaway republics in eastern Ukraine's Donbas region.

On March 15, Russia's lead negotiator Vladimir Medinsky said that discussions included the Swedish or Austrian version of a demilitarized state that has its own armed forces. But Ukraine's top negotiator Mikhailo Podolyak rejected over-focusing on these models, saying talks with Moscow to end fighting should focus on ''security guarantees.''

Russian officials maintain maximalist goals, which Moscow will seek to achieve through either negotiations or the mere imitation of negotiations amid continued conquest. Statements from Russian officials implying that a deal is close could be part of an attempt to cast Russian demands as reasonable and the only obstacle to peace as Kyiv's obstinance, while in reality, Moscow will continue to regroup its forces, consolidate seized areas, and return to the offensive to further improve its negotiating position. Medinsky also said that Russia's goal for the talks is for Ukraine to become ''a friend and neighbor, with whom we will be developing relations and building a common future'' and that Moscow is seeking an agreement to last ''for the lifetime of many generations.'' This suggests that Moscow retains goals for the talks that are almost impossible for the current Ukrainian government to achieve, and for most of the Ukrainian population to accept, if Ukraine wants to remain sovereign.

On March 16, Russian President Vladimir Putin told regional governors that Russian negotiators were ready to discuss ''the neutral status of Ukraine, its demilitarization and denazification,'' which he identified as ''precisely the principal issues for Russia [and] for our future.''
On March 17, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said he has ''not seen any meaningful efforts by Russia to bring this war that it is perpetrating to a conclusion through diplomacy.'' Blinken also noted that he ''didn't see signs right now that Putin is prepared to stop,'' adding ''on the contrary, if you listen to, just for example, his most recent remarks yesterday, that suggests that he is moving in the opposite direction.''

As the invasion continues, Russia will face its own internal constraints against allowing the Ukrainian government to regain control over the territories it has lost, which could severely reduce the room for a peace deal. Putin is unlikely to give up his long-term strategic goals, which include bringing Ukraine into Russia's sphere of influence via political control and the country's demilitarization. A peace deal could merely serve as a strategic pause for these goals to be completed in later months or years after Moscow accuses Kyiv of violating the agreement. As Russian casualties continue to mount in the war against Ukraine, Putin will also feel intense pressure to show that the continued loss of Russian soldiers has brought concrete gains for Russia. On the ground, developments suggest that Russia is moving forward with attempts to establish pro-Russian regional regimes in places like the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions, creating a land bridge from the Donbas to Crimea, that will oppose the Ukrainian government. In addition, Russia is reportedly increasing the number of troops in Ukraine following three weeks of heavy fighting that resulted in significant Russian casualties. Social media reports showed Russian forces from Russia's eastern, central and southern military districts heading toward Ukraine. Russia is deploying reserves from as far as Armenia and South Ossetia in Georgia to create new units from the remnants of units lost early on in the invasion. These troop movements suggest that Russia could be using negotiations to appear reasonable and assemble reinforcements before escalating its attempts to control Ukrainian territory. Russian forces are unlikely to depart Ukraine before Moscow secures a deal that addresses all of its security demands, including Ukrainian neutrality and recognition of Crimea as Russian and the Donbas region as independent, as this would be an embarrassment for Putin not perceived to be worth the large human and economic price Russia has already paid for the war. Therefore, Putin is likely to continue investing resources until he achieves these goals one way or another.

On the evening of March 16, for the first time, the U.S. Pentagon assessed that Russia is sending ''replacement troops'' to backfill for combat losses. These fresh forces will likely be pushed into frontline battle roles, while depleted units that have taken greater manpower and equipment losses will move to roles such as logistics protection and occupation.
Title: Lara Logan explains Ukraine-MUST WATCH!
Post by: G M on March 20, 2022, 11:16:54 AM
https://theconservativetreehouse.com/blog/2022/03/20/lara-logan-gives-a-brutally-honest-assessment-of-ukraine-and-u-s-politics/
Title: Putin lays out demands
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 20, 2022, 01:57:16 PM
Putin Lays Out Two ‘Most Difficult’ Demands of Ukraine Amid Ceasefire Talks: Report
By Allen Zhong March 19, 2022 Updated: March 20, 2022biggersmaller Print
Russian President Vladimir Putin laid out several demands for Ukraine including two “most difficult issues” during a phone call with Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan.

The demands can be divided into two parts, Turkish presidential spokesperson Ibrahim Kalin told several media outlets.

The first four articles appear to be possible common ground for both sides.

“Basically, there are six topics discussed. The first is Ukraine’s neutrality, that is, its withdrawal from NATO membership. Second, disarmament and mutual security guarantees in the context of the Austrian model. Third, [is] the process that the Russian side refers to as ‘de-Nazification.’ Fourth, removing obstacles to the widespread use of Russian in Ukraine,” he told Turkish newspaper Hurriyet in an interview published on Saturday.

Epoch Times Photo
Ukrainian and Russian officials pose prior to talks in Belarus’s Brest region on March 7, 2022. (Maxim Guchek/BELTA/AFP via Getty Images)
Some progress has been made in the above four topics; however, it’s too early to say there is potentially a full agreement that could be reached because there are two other “most difficult issues.”

Putin put forward two territory-related demands.

Putin would require Ukraine to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and admit the independence of the Donbas, a disputed region in southeastern Ukraine.

Putin recognized the independence of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic, two separatist territories in the Donbas, days before he ordered a full invasion of Ukraine.

Putin reportedly told Erdogan he would hold talks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky personally about the territory-related issues if the two sides reached common ground on the first four areas.

The Epoch Times reached out to the Ukrainian government and the Russian government for comments.

zelensky
In this image from video provided by the Ukrainian Presidential Press Office and posted on Facebook, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky speaks from Kyiv, Ukraine, on March 16, 2022. (Ukrainian Presidential Press Office via AP)
Zelensky has been asking Putin to talk with him directly after the war broke out. He proposed again on Saturday that the disputes between Russia and Ukraine be solved through “meaningful” talks.

“Negotiations on peace, on security for us, for Ukraine—meaningful, fair, and without delay—are the only chance for Russia to reduce the damage from its own mistakes,” he said in a statement.

He also warned that the war would cause huge losses to Russia if the two sides don’t reach a timely end to the war.

“Otherwise, Russia’s losses will be so huge that several generations will not be enough to rebound,” he said.

Epoch Times Photo
Ukrainian refugees prepare to board a train to Poland at the train station in Lviv, Ukraine, on March 18, 2022. (Charlotte Cuthbertson/The Epoch Times)
Putin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24 after the efforts to deter war failed.

The United Nations said that, as of March 19, they had recorded 847 deaths and 1,399 injuries of civilians in Ukraine because of Russia’s military action against Ukraine, mostly caused by shelling and airstrikes.

However, the U.N. believes that the actual figures are “considerably higher.”

Over 3.3 million people have fled Ukraine since the war began, United Nations data show.
Title: Russians "deport" thousands
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 20, 2022, 02:18:30 PM
Second:

Will they ever be seen again?


https://www.theepochtimes.com/live-updates-zelensky-says-it-is-time-for-meaningful-talks-with-moscow_4347981.html?utm_source=News&utm_campaign=breaking-2022-03-19-3&utm_medium=email&est=4d7oKq9EFUz3GpxXLRL%2FC3tybNaI384ljDkhhcLo%2FEDicMz6aqwvFEBqLyWMnSA8mpP1

The latest on the Russia–Ukraine crisis, March 19. Click here for updates from March 18.

Mariupol Says Russia Forcefully Deported Thousands of Its People
The city council of Ukraine’s Mariupol said Russian forces forcefully deported several thousand people from the besieged city last week, after Russia had spoken of “refugees” arriving from the strategic port.

“Over the past week, several thousand Mariupol residents were deported onto the Russian territory,” the council said in a statement on its Telegram channel late on Saturday.

“The occupiers illegally took people from the Livoberezhniy district and from the shelter in the sports club building, where more than a thousand people (mostly women and children) were hiding from the constant bombing.”

The Epoch Times could not independently verify the claims.

Title: Really well done multi-media article
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 21, 2022, 01:11:27 AM
https://ig.ft.com/russias-war-in-ukraine-mapped/
Title: Death toll > 900
Post by: ccp on March 21, 2022, 06:29:44 AM
https://www.npr.org/2022/03/20/1087781833/ukraine-deaths-casualties

but when we watch the news one would think it tens of thousands..........

they also only image us on buildings destroyed making one think entire cities are reduced to rubble

it needs context to get a better picture of the extant

typical of the media we don't see it all in context .

Title: Re: Death toll > 900
Post by: G M on March 21, 2022, 07:00:13 AM
If Putin wanted to pound Ukraine flat, he could have done it in less than 72 hours. He isn’t looking to destroy the country or inflict mass casualties, obviously.


https://www.npr.org/2022/03/20/1087781833/ukraine-deaths-casualties

but when we watch the news one would think it tens of thousands..........

they also only image us on buildings destroyed making one think entire cities are reduced to rubble

it needs context to get a better picture of the extant

typical of the media we don't see it all in context .
Title: Petraeus on current battlefield
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 21, 2022, 08:26:51 AM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dt2L14RcWP0

05:20 on taking out the five Russki generals
Title: Sure hope one of the many Stingers we sent to the Ukes didn’t…
Post by: G M on March 21, 2022, 09:28:42 AM
https://mobile.twitter.com/mtracey/status/1504682636538789894

Take down the Chinese airliner.
Title: Article attacking Zelensky's creds on democracy
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 21, 2022, 12:09:03 PM
https://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2022/03/zelenskys_record_on_democracy_is_looking_very_dubious.html?fbclid=IwAR2FyBY0if3jvo4VnLjQswJjEdx-J9VbiQT7HXk_6OWdYkKlvR70oqzTlCk
Title: I'm being called part of the "Putin wing" of the Republican party
Post by: ccp on March 21, 2022, 05:49:54 PM
on the way home tonight
by Mark Levin on his show tonight

he called me a "Putinoid"

just because I don't think it wise to keep upping the ante for Ukraine

for Taiwan yes
for Ukraine no

First time I listened to him for the past 12 yrs or more I truly felt insulted
He invokes memory of holocaust and WW2
states Jews do understand this - funny he left out the fact Israel has to my knowledge NOT condemned Putin

sometimes it is smarter to stand back
in my view





Title: Re: Article attacking Zelensky's creds on democracy
Post by: DougMacG on March 21, 2022, 06:04:35 PM
https://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2022/03/zelenskys_record_on_democracy_is_looking_very_dubious.html?fbclid=IwAR2FyBY0if3jvo4VnLjQswJjEdx-J9VbiQT7HXk_6OWdYkKlvR70oqzTlCk

From the article:  "They reiterate that the U.S. is duty-bound to defend Ukraine because Ukraine is a democracy, while Russia is a totalitarian state."

   - A tad of straw or overreach there IMHO.  I think the argument is that Ukraine is (an imperfect) sovereign state and Russia is an invading force.

"The media are attempting to make the case for war, painting Zelensky and the Ukrainian regime as spotless white and Putin and Russia as pure black."

   - Again straw, who calls Zelensky "spotless"?  Even if you accept those labels (black and white)and that Zelensky is overstepping his power (in a time of war), they are right on the Putin side.  He is pure evil and needs to be stopped - by someone, IMHO.

If not Zelensky, who do they propose lead the fight to keep Ukraine independent and sovereign?  No one?

Another country with a not so spotless record of not so spotless leaders is - look in the mirror...

I still don't get the connection of finding flaws in Ukraine to letting the Putin evil empire of Putin expand one inch in our time; they already have 11 time zones and 17 million square kilometers of control spread over two key continents.

The central question is not asked or answered.  Under which outcome would the people of Ukraine have a better shot at achieving freedom, consensual government and less corruption, under Zelensky and those who follow him via Ukrainian elections, or under Putin's permanent tyranny?  I would take the former.  Even if it's flawed.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 21, 2022, 08:15:09 PM
Agree.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 22, 2022, 12:22:17 AM
"He is pure evil and needs to be stopped - by someone, IMHO."

Pure evil? Let's be real. Did he shower with his young daughter? What was Russia's connection to Jeffery Epstein? Oh, that was the US Intel community and Israel's OP, not his.

Funny all the outrage being ginned up over the invasion of the top 3rd child exploitation material producing country in the world that just happens to have so many lucrative no-show jobs for the children of the DC Uniparty elites.

https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/101/754/173/original/4561f694b920737f.jpg

(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/101/754/173/original/4561f694b920737f.jpg)

Quick, send them MORE MONEY!
Title: The Ukraine shiny object
Post by: G M on March 22, 2022, 12:46:46 AM
https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2022/02/ukraine_wont_fix_inflation_or_an_addled_president.html
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 22, 2022, 03:12:48 AM
Regarding the photo in Reply 509:

For those of us who don't read Arabic, who took the photo?

I'm not saying that the point being made is implausible, but as we all know a lot of lying propaganda is flying around.
Title: What if we do this, and what if we don't?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 22, 2022, 03:23:56 AM
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/03/its-time-protected-humanitarian-airlift-lviv/363414/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 22, 2022, 09:41:43 AM
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-smuggle-diplomats/ukraine-diplomats-arrested-trying-to-smuggle-gold-cigarettes-into-poland-idUSKCN2AT2L1

Regarding the photo in Reply 509:

For those of us who don't read Arabic, who took the photo?

I'm not saying that the point being made is implausible, but as we all know a lot of lying propaganda is flying around.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 22, 2022, 09:46:26 AM
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-corruption/ukraine-police-find-42-kg-of-gold-in-home-of-ex-energy-minister-idUSBREA2L0F120140322

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-smuggle-diplomats/ukraine-diplomats-arrested-trying-to-smuggle-gold-cigarettes-into-poland-idUSKCN2AT2L1

Regarding the photo in Reply 509:

For those of us who don't read Arabic, who took the photo?

I'm not saying that the point being made is implausible, but as we all know a lot of lying propaganda is flying around.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on March 22, 2022, 09:49:53 AM
@ $1,900 per oz
this comes to $175,560,000
that's nearly as much as Nancy Pelosi......

more than Hunter Biden though.......
Title: Re: What if we do this, and what if we don't?
Post by: G M on March 22, 2022, 09:55:29 AM
Dick1 wants WWIII.


https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/03/its-time-protected-humanitarian-airlift-lviv/363414/
Title: The narrative has changed
Post by: G M on March 22, 2022, 10:06:41 AM
https://summit.news/2022/03/22/video-rogan-exposes-how-west-has-done-a-complete-180-on-corrupt-ukraine/

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-corruption/ukraine-police-find-42-kg-of-gold-in-home-of-ex-energy-minister-idUSBREA2L0F120140322

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-smuggle-diplomats/ukraine-diplomats-arrested-trying-to-smuggle-gold-cigarettes-into-poland-idUSKCN2AT2L1

Regarding the photo in Reply 509:

For those of us who don't read Arabic, who took the photo?

I'm not saying that the point being made is implausible, but as we all know a lot of lying propaganda is flying around.
Title: Re: The narrative has changed
Post by: G M on March 22, 2022, 10:11:12 AM
https://twitchy.com/dougp-3137/2022/03/21/priceless-ny-times-asked-candace-owens-where-she-got-her-ideas-about-ukraine-then-it-got-awkward-for-the-nyt/

https://summit.news/2022/03/22/video-rogan-exposes-how-west-has-done-a-complete-180-on-corrupt-ukraine/

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-corruption/ukraine-police-find-42-kg-of-gold-in-home-of-ex-energy-minister-idUSBREA2L0F120140322

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-smuggle-diplomats/ukraine-diplomats-arrested-trying-to-smuggle-gold-cigarettes-into-poland-idUSKCN2AT2L1

Regarding the photo in Reply 509:

For those of us who don't read Arabic, who took the photo?

I'm not saying that the point being made is implausible, but as we all know a lot of lying propaganda is flying around.
Title: Ukrainian women get to enjoy the diversity of western europe
Post by: G M on March 22, 2022, 02:56:00 PM
https://summit.news/2022/03/22/female-ukrainian-refugees-encounter-swedish-diversity/

So intolerant! Gang-rape is just how our islamic friends like to say "Howdy! Welcome to the neighborhood!".

Title: Uke air force kicking ass
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 22, 2022, 07:58:26 PM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/how-ukraine-s-outgunned-air-force-is-fighting-back-against-russian-jets/ar-AAVmcbe?ocid=msedgntp
Title: Re: The narrative has changed
Post by: G M on March 23, 2022, 03:45:27 AM
https://archive.ph/m7dn0

Totally not corrupt! She was just going to buy some Hunter Biden artwork in LA!


https://twitchy.com/dougp-3137/2022/03/21/priceless-ny-times-asked-candace-owens-where-she-got-her-ideas-about-ukraine-then-it-got-awkward-for-the-nyt/

https://summit.news/2022/03/22/video-rogan-exposes-how-west-has-done-a-complete-180-on-corrupt-ukraine/

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-corruption/ukraine-police-find-42-kg-of-gold-in-home-of-ex-energy-minister-idUSBREA2L0F120140322

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-smuggle-diplomats/ukraine-diplomats-arrested-trying-to-smuggle-gold-cigarettes-into-poland-idUSKCN2AT2L1

Regarding the photo in Reply 509:

For those of us who don't read Arabic, who took the photo?

I'm not saying that the point being made is implausible, but as we all know a lot of lying propaganda is flying around.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 23, 2022, 03:49:01 AM
Well, to be precise, if one is going to flee a country taking one's money along is rather plausible idea.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on March 23, 2022, 06:50:28 PM
Ukraine movie
https://youtu.be/LHH10jIRJmQ (https://youtu.be/LHH10jIRJmQ)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 24, 2022, 02:54:43 AM
Love Tucker, and still do, but very much disagree with what he said last night-- that Biden should pick up the phone and tell Zelensky to cut a deal.

======================

Ukraine Can Win With Enough Help
Biden and NATO are still too cautious in opposing Putin’s war.
By The Editorial Board
Follow
March 23, 2022 7:04 pm ET


The public message out of Thursday’s meeting of NATO leaders in Brussels is sure to be heavy on unity and resolve in support of Ukraine. But the unfortunate reality is that the democratic alliance confronting Vladimir Putin still isn’t doing enough to ensure the Russian’s defeat. And behind the scenes, some leaders would prefer if Volodymyr Zelensky agreed to a peace settlement sooner rather than later.


The stunning fact of this war is that the Ukrainians have rescued Europe and the U.S. as much as NATO is assisting Ukraine. Kyiv’s stalwart resistance, at great human cost, has given the West a chance to stop the advance of Russian imperialism before it imperils NATO. The war has exposed the Russian military as weaker than our intelligence services and the Pentagon thought. Against all expectations, Ukraine may be winning.

Most surprising, the Ukrainian resistance has renewed a sense among the people of the West that their countries stand for something more than welfare-state ease and individual indulgence. Ukrainians are showing that freedom has a price, often a fearsome one.

***
Yet Western leaders still seem worried of what would happen if Ukraine won. That’s especially true in the Biden Administration, which has taken many good steps—but typically under pressure from Congress or Europe, and typically late. President Biden is rightly outraged by Mr. Putin’s brutality, and he calls him a war criminal, but he still seems afraid of doing what it takes to defeat him.


At the White House on Tuesday, national security adviser Jake Sullivan was asked twice if he and the President thought Ukraine could win. The best he could offer was the assurance that Russia is “never going to be able to subjugate the Ukrainian people” and a boilerplate commitment to Kyiv’s sovereignty.

This cautious commitment extends to the slow pace of weapons delivery. Slovakia has offered its S-300 missile-defense system, which Ukraine says it needs, but it isn’t clear when it will be delivered. News leaked on March 16 that the U.S. would finally deliver Switchblade loitering drones to counter an invasion that began on Feb. 24. But on Monday the Pentagon conceded the Switchblades still weren’t on the ground in Ukraine. The U.S. should be emptying and restocking its weapons stockpiles on an emergency basis.

The same goes for assisting Western Europe as it copes with 3.5 million refugees and tries to wean itself from Russian oil and gas. The U.S. can accept many more Ukrainians for temporary protected status.

Europeans now understand the mistake they made on energy and are changing their policies. But Mr. Biden refuses to set aside his climate-change obsessions to address this world-changing crisis. His regulators are still targeting U.S. oil and gas production for slow extinction. He will have little credibility in persuading Germans and Italians to make sacrifices if he won’t help them meet their energy needs now and next winter.

It’s hard to resist the conclusion that Mr. Putin has succeeded in intimidating Mr. Biden and other leaders with his threats of nuclear escalation. This concern may justify the decision not to assist Ukraine with a NATO no-fly zone, which could require U.S. planes to attack Russian radars and missile defenses inside Russian territory.

But it shouldn’t be an excuse for caution in doing everything short of that to help Ukrainians defeat Mr. Putin. If the nuclear threat works to stop NATO support now, the Russian will use it in the future against NATO proper. The essence of deterrence is credibility, which means persuading Mr. Putin that his resort to nuclear weapons in Ukraine will be met with a requisite response. The same goes for chemical or biological weapons.

***
Our fear is that Mr. Biden, and perhaps other NATO leaders, will lean on Mr. Zelensky to agree to let Ukraine become one more “frozen conflict” like Georgia. Russia would be able to keep the Ukrainian territory it occupies in return for no more bombing. Mr. Putin would be able to consolidate control over those areas and rearm to threaten Ukraine again in the future. The NATO leaders could put that fear to rest if they said publicly that sanctions against Russia won’t be lifted until its troops leave Ukraine.

We’ve said before that a country goes to war, hot or cold, with the President it has. We want Mr. Biden to lead and succeed in Ukraine. But he needs to lead more decisively—and with a goal not merely of military stalemate but of Ukrainian victory.

    
Title: A rare realistic view
Post by: G M on March 24, 2022, 07:53:37 AM
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-03-22/niall-ferguson-putin-and-biden-misunderstand-history-in-ukraine-war
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 24, 2022, 12:26:38 PM
Thoughtful piece. I appreciated his respect for other points of view.
================

One month into the Ukraine war, a defiant nation is forever changed but adapting
By Isabelle Khurshudyan, Max Bearak, Siobhán O'Grady, Sudarsan Raghavan and Robyn Dixon
Today at 6:00 a.m. EDT


ODESSA, Ukraine — A month has passed since blasts woke Ukrainians at 5:07 a.m. on Feb. 24. The sounds of explosions still scare but don’t surprise. Each day since has brought the wail of air-raid sirens, the screech of breaking glass and numbingly frequent moments of silence for the dead.

A month of war with Russia has forced every fourth Ukrainian out of their home. It has shown that Moscow’s forces fire indiscriminately on civilians in their apartments, businesses, hospitals and schools. It has exposed weaknesses in Vladimir Putin’s military, which seems stunned and disoriented by the month-long fight. And it has focused the world’s attention on the unexpected ferocity and power of ordinary people uniting to defend their homes and nation.

To escape the war above, Ukrainian families have gone underground

Four weeks of explosions, fire and death have devastated Ukrainians and empowered them. Their “new normal” is always knowing where the nearest bomb shelter is while indulging in a cappuccino at a local coffee shop, or a visit to the barber. It’s martial law-imposed sobriety with a ban on alcohol sales. It’s asking the United States and NATO for a no-fly zone that could significantly damage Russia’s ability to attack from the sky — even as allies refuse, citing fears of touching off the world war that Moscow and the West have for so long managed to avoid.


It’s the population’s — and the world’s — growing belief that Ukraine’s military could actually win. It has already kept Russia’s massive and feared armed forces from the easy victory Putin seemed to expect.

“The aggressors planned three weeks ago to be in the capital, to be here because it is the heart of the country,” Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko told journalists on Wednesday, as the now all-too-familiar sound of artillery shelling echoed in the background.

“Everybody is surprised,” he said.


Russia’s forces for weeks have made only marginal gains and even lost ground in some parts of the country, revealing a flawed military strategy. The Kremlin’s plan, according to analysts, assumed a swift decapitation of the government and installation of a puppet regime, apparently based on Moscow’s view of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as likely to flee the same way Afghan President Ashraf Ghani did last summer when the Taliban closed in on Kabul. The logical first step — shock-and-awe attacks to knock out Ukraine’s air defenses, drones and air force — never happened.

Zelensky’s defiant unshaven face in daily video addresses from Kyiv has instead inspired and rallied ordinary Ukrainians. A month ago, Volodymyr Marusiak was an attorney. Now his corporate law office in the western Ukrainian city of Lviv serves as his headquarters as a commander in the Territorial Defense Forces, which is made up of civilian volunteers. Doctors, construction workers, start-up founders — men and women — are now some of his fighters.


“A month ago, I was busy wearing a suit and tie,” he said, sitting in a dim conference room. “Now I command 140 people.”

How Kyiv’s outgunned defenders have kept Russian forces from capturing the capital

Putin, casting himself as a liberator, underestimated the Ukrainian resistance. Viral videos show farmers in tractors towing abandoned Russian military equipment down country lanes. Even in places now under the control of Russian troops, such as the southern port of Kherson, Ukrainians have stared down enemy soldiers while chanting pro-Ukrainian slogans during protests.

Moscow’s military missteps this past month, echoing its errors in Chechnya in December 1994, may foreshadow a similar trajectory: a long, punishing war with massive civilian casualties. The repeated bombardment of some eastern and northern Ukrainian cities has displaced millions of people and destroyed thousands of buildings — apartments, shopping malls and hospitals.


But in other cities, Ukrainians have adjusted to the daily grind of war. Yaroslav Rudakov, 27, reopened his sleek hair salon, Sprut, last week, one of two or three that are now open to customers in the capital. He did it to send a defiant message to the Russians — and to help Ukraine.

“This is my mission,” Rudakov said. “It’s not really big, but it helps. The message it sends is that people here are brave. They know the real history. The Russians want to destroy everything here and show that they are very powerful. … But now we see how it’s going.”



Three hairdressers work from 11 a.m. to 5 p.m. and see six or seven customers a day. Rudakov said all the money he earns is sent to a fund to help the Ukrainian armed forces. After each haircut, Rudakov asks customers how much they are willing to pay — full price, 20 percent less or half of the cost. He doesn’t charge the elderly. At least half pay full price, he said.


Those kinds of contributions have become commonplace. Dodo Socks — a popular designer sock brand — is donating all its profits to the Ukrainian military. CEO Marta Turetska said that has totaled more than $50,000 this month already. She said the company is switching a third of its production over to padded socks for soldiers and the rest to new designs with patriotic slogans, Molotov cocktails or symbols of Ukrainian pride, including the Antonov An-225 Mriya, a Soviet-era cargo plane that was the world’s largest aircraft until it was destroyed by Russian bombs.

Dodo’s bright, high-ceilinged studio is one of the many makeshift shelters for Ukraine’s more than 10 million displaced people.


Dodo Socks restarted its production on a smaller scale after the war forced it to close. (Kasia Strek/Panos Pictures for The Washington Post)

CEO Marta Turetska said the company is switching a third of its production over to padded socks for soldiers. (Kasia Strek/Panos Pictures for The Washington Post)

The rest of its output will be devoted to new designs. (Kasia Strek/Panos Pictures for The Washington Post)
The company’s production facility in Ukraine’s eastern Luhansk region, now largely occupied by Russian forces, had to shut down, and the new one on the outskirts of Lviv employs displaced people. But at least half of the employees from the city of Rubizhne, back in Luhansk, haven’t been able to escape.

“We don’t even know if they are alive,” Turetska said. “So what we are doing may be crazy, giving our company totally over to the war effort. But we are devastated. We wish every company in Ukraine would do it.”


The wait to hear news from loved ones in areas besieged by Russian forces has become a daily routine, too. Kirill Lisovoy, 32, is sheltering in Dodo’s studio with his two dogs and his wife. Her family is in Mariupol — the southeastern Ukrainian port city that has been the site of some of the most brutal bombing in this month of war. They haven’t been able to make contact with them in three weeks.

“It is impossible to think about anything else,” Lisovoy said, talking more freely when his wife left to do laundry. “And how not to feel guilty — we are safe, we have a kitchen to use, good people to help us. That is so much more than many, even here in Lviv, have. And then Mariupol, a destroyed city. Maybe everyone we know there is dead — we just don’t know.”

Amid war and brutality, Ukrainians are transformed and united

In Kyiv, repeated attacks on civilian infrastructure over the past month have made residents more defiant. On Sunday, shortly after artillery fire struck an apartment building in Kyiv, firefighters climbed into the charred remains of the building to search for survivors. Outside, two children played on a swing set.


Yuriy Gulevich, 45, whose apartment windows blew out early Wednesday morning when a barrage of rockets struck his neighborhood in Kyiv, said the attack only left him more angry with Russian forces — and more determined that Ukrainians will win. He and his elderly mother sheltered in the hallway and bathroom to avoid injuries.

“I’m angry they’re targeting civilians,” he said while waiting in line to report the damage to a police officer. “This war was created by one person only and millions of people are now suffering.”

Next to him, in a plastic bag on the ground, sat the remains of what the officer said was a rocket that came from a Grad multiple-rocket launcher. The attack Wednesday marked the first time such a system has been deployed in the capital since the war began, several police officers at the scene told The Washington Post.


But at a trendy coffee shop downtown, Artem Khomych, 28, and Sergii Dietkov, 29, sat across from each other playing chess. This was one of their favorite spots from before the war. Even after a month of brutal fighting, it remains so now.

“It’s home,” Dietkov said. “I feel safe here.”

Ian Panitov, 19, was born in Russia but moved to Ukraine when he was 5. On a recent afternoon, he sat outside the same coffee shop writing in his journal.

“I’m sure Kyiv will not be occupied,” he said. “We have a lot of weapons in the city, a lot of Territorial Defense, a lot of army, a lot of people who make Molotov cocktails. And everybody is ready to just choke occupiers with their hands if they do not have weapons.”

The past month has felt like a lifetime — filled with cursing the Russians, asking “why” out loud and mourning all that’s already been lost in such a short time. Life’s new rhythms feel heavy — with sorrow, with responsibility, and with uncertainty.


Andriy Spirin is just 18, but he is the dzvonar — the bellringer — at one of Lviv’s oldest Orthodox churches. His duties used to be simple: ring the church’s century-old bells on Saturday evening, Sunday morning and holidays. At the request of Lviv’s city council, however, every dzvonar must now ring their bells at 6 p.m. each day until the war is over.

For the new evening ritual, Spirin composed his own three-minute melody, a somber tune he has titled “The Bell of Peace.”

“We ring these bells to call upon God,” he said as the winter sun dipped past Lviv’s skyline of cupolas and clocktowers. “If the West won’t close our skies, God will. Only He knows how long I will ring these bells. Only He knows how long it will take for us to be victorious.”

Bearak reported from Lviv, Ukraine. O’Grady and Raghavan reported from Kyiv. Dixon reported from Riga, Latvia. Kostiantyn Tatarchuk in Kyiv contributed to this report.
Title: A Uke analysis
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 24, 2022, 07:23:56 PM
https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/bidens-defective-ukraine-strategy.html?fbclid=IwAR0ey-dyy10g6F2nHmtrWnK
Title: Green Berets trained the Ukes
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 24, 2022, 07:33:47 PM
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/us-armys-green-berets-have-lasting-impact-on-fight-in-ukraine?fbclid=IwAR2CP2cGW8EIEp3abs6ZWN3vdtb2Wqe4fydRiNz6BwYp61oRup8RjAGoaZc
Title: Zelensky asks Biden
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 24, 2022, 08:29:24 PM
https://www.yahoo.com/news/zelenskyy-reportedly-asked-biden-drop-131941918.html
Title: George Friedman: Ukraine and the Long War
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 25, 2022, 04:44:08 AM
March 25, 2022
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
Ukraine and the Long War
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman

For as often as it happens, nations typically don’t elect to enter wars if they know they will be long, drawn-out, uncertain and expensive affairs. They enter wars when they think the benefits of winning outweigh the risks, or when they think they have the means to strike decisively enough to bring the war to a quick resolution. Long wars result from consistent and fundamental errors: underestimating the will and ability of an enemy to resist, overestimating one’s own capabilities, going to war for incorrect or insufficient reasons, or underestimating the degree to which a powerful third party might intervene and shift the balance of power.

If a nation survives the first blow, then the probability of a victory increases. This is particularly the case in the long war. The nation initiating the war tends to have committed available force at the beginning, maximizing the possibility of an early victory. The defending power has not yet utilized its domestic forces or those of allies prior to the attack. Therefore, the defender increases its military power much more rapidly than the attacker. The Japanese could not match American manpower or technology over time. The United States underestimated the resilience of the North Vietnamese, even in the face of an intense bombardment of their capital. There are exceptions. The Germans in 1914 failed to take Paris, and in the long war were strangled by the British navy and ground down on the battlefield.

This is not a universal truth, but long wars originate in the attacker's miscalculation, and with some frequency with the attacker moving with the most available force, while the defender, surviving the initial attack, has unused resources to draw upon. It is possible for the long war to grind down the defender's resources and will, but having survived the initial attack, the defender likely has both will and resources to draw on, while the attacker must overcome the fact that it is fighting the enemy’s war, and not the one it planned.

The war in Ukraine is far from over and its outcome is not assured. But it began with a Russian attack that was based on the assumption that Ukrainian resistance would be ineffective, and would melt away once Russia came to town because the Ukrainians were indifferent or hostile to an independent Ukraine. This faulty assumption is evidenced by the relatively casual deployment of Russian armor. It also explains the Russian strategy of both bombing and entering cities. It’s difficult to subdue cities by bombing alone (think London, Hamburg and Hanoi). They are resilient, and the tonnage needed to cripple them is exorbitant. And they are notoriously advantageous for their defenders, who are more familiar with alleyways, roads, dead ends, and so on. The fact that the Russians operated this way indicates that they had low expectations of their enemy. This is to say nothing of Russia’s massive intelligence failure, which misread the enemy. (There are reports that the chief of the FSB intelligence agency's Ukraine unit has been placed under house arrest.) The most important failure was the failure to see that Ukraine would counter with a large, relatively decentralized infantry force.

The protraction of the war allowed the West and its allies to initiate economic warfare against Russia on an unprecedented scale. It takes time to implement economic warfare, and the Russians gave away precious time. Similarly, Moscow didn’t anticipate the substantial military aid that would flow into Ukraine, particularly the kinds that were ideally suited for a light infantry force.

None of this has defeated the Russians, of course, but it has created a crisis. A military force shocked by the inaccuracy of intelligence must determine without confidence in its intelligence what to do next. Russia thus seems to have abandoned the goal to occupy all of Ukraine or even Kyiv, shifting instead to a strategy of creating a land bridge from Russia to Crimea. If there is no military dimension to the future, this is a reasonable retreat for the Russians. But a long, relatively narrow salient – military-speak for a bulge or vector – is vulnerable to many forms of interdiction. This leaves the Russian salient at the mercy of Ukrainian action at the time and place of Kyiv’s choosing.

The question of the long war depends on Russian resources, without which there is nothing to discuss. Russia is apparently short on infantry, or it would not be recruiting and trying to integrate Syrian and other soldiers. The possibility of having forces that don’t speak Russian and haven’t experienced Russian training would only be considered by a force short of manpower. And such a force, depending on how it is integrated and what the mission would be, would be taking a large risk in maintaining large-scale operations.

The problem has thus become political. The initial war plan failed. The Russians are certainly able to continue the war, but they apparently need more people and an overall better logistics system, which is hard to improve in the face of constant combat. The United States, facing the same essential problem, chose to continue the wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. The cost was substantial but did not threaten core national security because of the vast oceans between the war and the homeland. The Ukraine war is on Russia’s doorstep, and an extended war, with intensifying distrust of the government, can result in a trained Ukrainian special forces group expanding the fighting into Russia. Russians cannot assume immunity.

It is painful, from a political point of view, for presidents and chiefs of staff to admit failure and cut their losses. The desire to keep trying, coupled with a reluctance to admit failure, carries with it myriad problems. Russian President Vladimir Putin needs an honest intelligence review, but he had one before invading. It was not a lie; it was just wrong. In a long war, the defender has the opportunity to grow strong, and the attacker is likely maxed out in anticipation of victory and the intent to throw everything into it. If Russia has resources not deployed and held in reserve for another possible threat, and doesn’t ruthlessly cut its losses, it will be joining a long line of defeats, from Algiers to Khartoum to Hue.
Title: Azov Battalion
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 25, 2022, 05:25:19 AM
second

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-azov-battalion-mariupol-neo-nazis-b2043022.html?amp&fbclid=IwAR3x-HW87AleztZhUq-YvbAIhtYH59qjmEs6GLL4HzgRasrhGVuyfp6GlCY
Title: What to make of this?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 27, 2022, 02:22:02 PM
Is there anything of value to extract from this?
===================================
Authored by Pepe Escobar,

The supreme target is regime change in Russia, Ukraine is just a pawn in the game – or worse, mere cannon fodder...



All eyes are on Mariupol. As of Wednesday night, over 70% of residential areas were under control of Donetsk and Russian forces, while Russian Marines, Donetsk’s 107th batallion and Chechen Spetsnaz, led by the charismatic Adam Delimkhanov, had entered the Azov-Stal plant – the HQ of the neo-Nazi Azov batallion.

Azov was sent a last ultimatum: surrender until midnight – or else, as in a take no prisoners highway to hell.

That implies a major game-changer in the Ukrainian battlefield; Mariupol is finally about to be thoroughly denazified – as the Azov contingent long entrenched in the city and using civilians as human shields were their most hardened fighting force.

Meanwhile, echoes from the Empire of Lies all but gave the whole game away. There’s no intention whatsoever in Washington to facilitate a peace plan in Ukraine – and that explains Comedian Zelensky’s non-stop stalling tactics. The supreme target is regime change in Russia, and for that Totalen Krieg against Russia and all things Russian is warranted. Ukraine is just a pawn in the game – or worse, mere cannon fodder.

This also means that the 14,000 deaths in Donbass for the past 8 years should be directly attributed to the Exceptionalists. As for Ukrainian neo-Nazis of all stripes, they are as expendable as “moderate rebels” in Syria, be they al-Qaeda or Daesh-linked. Those that may eventually survive can always join the budding CIA-sponsored Neo-Nazi Inc. – the tawdry remix of the 1980s Jihad Inc. in Afghanistan. They will be properly “Kalibrated”.

A quick neo-Nazi recap

By now only the brain dead across NATOstan – and there are hordes – are not aware of Maidan in 2014. Yet few know that it was then Ukrainian Minister of Interior Arsen Avakov, a former governor of Kharkov, who gave the green light for a 12,000 paramilitary outfit to materialize out of Sect 82 soccer hooligans who supported Dynamo Kiev. That was the birth of the Azov batallion, in May 2014, led by Andriy Biletsky, a.k.a. the White Fuhrer, and former leader of the neo-nazi gang Patriots of Ukraine.

Together with NATO stay-behind agent Dmitro Yarosh, Biletsky founded Pravy Sektor, financed by Ukrainian mafia godfather and Jewish billionaire Ihor Kolomoysky (later the benefactor of the meta-conversion of Zelensky from mediocre comedian to mediocre President.)

Pravy Sektor happened to be rabidly anti-EU – tell that to Ursula von der Lugen – and politically obsessed with linking Central Europe and the Baltics in a new, tawdry Intermarium. Crucially, Pravy Sektor and other nazi gangs were duly trained by NATO instructors.

Biletsky and Yarosh are of course disciples of notorious WWII-era Nazi collaborator Stepan Bandera, for whom pure Ukrainians are proto-Germanic or Scandinavian, and Slavs are untermenschen.

Azov ended up absorbing nearly all neo-Nazi groups in Ukraine and were dispatched to fight against Donbass – with their acolytes making more money than regular soldiers. Biletsky and another neo-Nazi leader, Oleh Petrenko, were elected to the Rada. The White Führer stood on his own. Petrenko decided to support then President Poroshenko. Soon the Azov battalion was incorporated as the Azov Regiment to the Ukrainian National Guard.

They went on a foreign mercenary recruiting drive – with people coming from Western Europe, Scandinavia and even South America.

That was strictly forbidden by the Minsk Agreements guaranteed by France and Germany (and now de facto defunct). Azov set up training camps for teenagers and soon reached 10,000 members. Erik “Blackwater” Prince, in 2020, struck a deal with the Ukrainian military that would enable his renamed outfit, Academi, to supervise Azov.

It was none other than sinister Maidan cookie distributor Vicky “F**k the EU” Nuland who suggested to Zelensky – both of them, by the way, Ukrainian Jews – to appoint avowed Nazi Yarosh as an adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Gen Valerii Zaluzhnyi. The target: organize a blitzkrieg on Donbass and Crimea – the same blitzkrieg that SVR, Russian foreign intel, concluded would be launched on February 22, thus propelling the launch of Operation Z.

All of the above, in fact just a quick recap, shows that in Ukraine there’s no difference whatsoever between white neo-Nazis and brown-colored al-Qaeda/ISIS/Daesh, as much as neo-Nazis are just as “Christian” as takfiri Salafi-jihadis are “Muslim”.

When Putin denounced a “bunch of neo-Nazis” in power in Kiev, the Comedian replied that it was impossible because he was Jewish. Nonsense. Zelensky and his patron Kolomoysky, for all practical purposes, are Zio-Nazis.

Even as branches of the United States government admitted to neo-Nazis entrenched in the Kiev apparatus, the Exceptionalist machine made the daily shelling of Donbass for 8 years simply disappear. These thousands of civilian victims never existed.

U.S. mainstream media even ventured the odd piece or report on Azov and Aidar neo-Nazis. But then a neo-Orwellian narrative was set in stone: there are no Nazis in Ukraine. CIA offshoot NED even started deleting records about training members of Aidar. Recently a crappy news network duly promoted a video of a NATO-trained and weaponized Azov commander – complete with Nazi iconography.

Why “denazification” makes sense
The Banderastan ideology harks back to when this part of Ukraine was in fact controlled by the Austro-Hungarian empire, the Russian empire and Poland. Stepan Bandera was born in Austro-Hungary in 1909, near Ivano-Frankovsk, in the – then autonomous – Kingdom of Galicia.

WWI dismembered European empires into frequently non-viable small entities. In western Ukraine – an imperial intersection – that inevitably led to the proliferation of extremely intolerant ideologies.

Banderastan ideologues profited from the Nazi arrival in 1941 to try to proclaim an independent territory. But Berlin not only blocked it but sent them to concentration camps. In 1944 though the Nazis changed tactics: they liberated the Banderanistas and manipulated them into anti-Russian hate, thus creating a destabilization force in the Ukrainian USSR.

So Nazism is not exactly the same as Banderastan fanatics: they are in fact competing ideologies. What happened since Maidan is that the CIA kept a laser focus on inciting Russian hatred by whatever fringe groups it could instrumentalize. So Ukraine is not a case of “white nationalism” – to put it mildly – but of anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalism, for all practical purposes manifested via Nazi-style salutes and Nazi-style symbols.

So when Putin and the Russian leadership refer to Ukrainian Nazism, that may not be 100% correct, conceptually, but it strikes a chord with every Russian.

Russians viscerally reject Nazism – considering that virtually every Russian family has at least one ancestor killed during the Great Patriotic War. From the perspective of wartime psychology, it makes total sense to talk of “Ukro-nazism” or, straight to the point, a “denazification” campaign.

How the Anglos loved the Nazis
The United States government openly cheerleading neo-Nazis in Ukraine is hardly a novelty, considering how it supported Hitler alongside England in 1933 for balance of power reasons.

In 1933, Roosevelt lent Hitler one billion gold dollars while England lent him two billion gold dollars. That should be multiplied 200 times to arrive at today’s fiat dollars. The Anglo-Americans wanted to build up Germany as a bulwark against Russia. In 1941 Roosevelt wrote to Hitler that if he invaded Russia the U.S. would side with Russia, and wrote Stalin that if Stalin invaded Germany the U.S. would back Germany. Talk about a graphic illustration of Mackinderesque balance of power.

The Brits had become very concerned with the rise of Russian power under Stalin while observing that Germany was on its knees with 50% unemployment in 1933, if one counted unregistered itinerant Germans.

Even Lloyd George had misgivings about the Versailles Treaty, unbearably weakening Germany after its surrender in WWI. The purpose of WWI, in Lloyd George’s worldview, was to destroy Russia and Germany together. Germany was threatening England with the Kaiser building a fleet to take over the oceans, while the Tsar was too close to India for comfort. For a while Britannia won – and continued to rule the waves.

Then building up Germany to fight Russia became the number one priority – complete with rewriting of History. The uniting of Austrian Germans and Sudetenland Germans with Germany, for instance, was totally approved by the Brits.

But then came the Polish problem. When Germany invaded Poland, France and Britain stood on the sidelines. That placed Germany on the border of Russia, and Germany and Russia divided up Poland. That’s exactly what Britain and France wanted. Britain and France had promised Poland that they would invade Germany from the west while Poland fought Germany from the east.

In the end, the Poles were double-crossed. Churchill even praised Russia for invading Poland. Hitler was advised by MI6 that England and France would not invade Poland – as part of their plan for a German-Russian war. Hitler had been supported financially since the 1920s by MI6 for his favorable words about England in Mein Kampf. MI6 de facto encouraged Hitler to invade Russia.

Fast forward to 2022, and here we go again – as farce, with the Anglo-Americans “encouraging” Germany under feeble Scholz to put itself back together militarily, with 100 billion euros (that the Germans don’t have), and setting up in thesis a revamped European force to later go to war against Russia.

Cue to the Russophobic hysteria in Anglo-American media about the Russia-China strategic partnership. The mortal Anglo-American fear is Mackinder/Mahan/Spykman/Kissinger/Brzezinski all rolled into one: Russia-China as peer competitor twins take over the Eurasian land mass – the Belt and Road Initiative meets the Greater Eurasia Partnership – and thus rule the planet, with the U.S. relegated to inconsequential island status, as much as the previous “Rule Britannia”.

England, France and later the Americans had prevented it when Germany aspired to do the same, controlling Eurasia side by side with Japan, from the English Channel to the Pacific. Now it’s a completely different ball game.

So Ukraine, with its pathetic neo-Nazi gangs, is just an – expendable – pawn in the desperate drive to stop something that is beyond anathema, from Washington’s perspective: a totally peaceful German-Russian-Chinese New Silk Road.

Russophobia, massively imprinted in the West’s DNA, never really went away. Cultivated by the Brits since Catherine the Great – and then with The Great Game. By the French since Napoleon. By the Germans because the Red Army liberated Berlin. By the Americans because Stalin forced to them the mapping of Europe – and then it went on and on and on throughout the Cold War.

We are at just the early stages of the final push by the dying Empire to attempt arresting the flow of History. They are being outsmarted, they are already outgunned by the top military power in the world, and they will be checkmated. Existentially, they are not equipped to kill the Bear – and that hurts. Cosmically.

================

Not sure what to make of this, I asked my friend of whom I have previously spoken what she thought of it.  Herewith her comments:

================

Yes! I think it explains very well both the Nazi presence, the difference between Nazis and followers of Bandera as the " enemy of my enemy is mu friend". Not the first time they had a common goal. Killing Jews was also something that united them for a short time.

Also like his explanation of the war in Donbas. Ignoring what was done there by Ukranian nationalists just bc the people there were Russian supporters fit in very well with the Russophobia. And also, with Putin's obsession of incorporating the Russians who were stuck in New and hostile countries after the fall of Soviet Union.

I believed from the beginning that Ukrain was just a pawn and a sacrifice to isolate Russia. Bating Putin to attack knowing that he is someone who would not shy away from total destruction. 

Zelensky is definitely someone who is playing a part. At first I just thought it was him embracing the dramatic to do whats best for Ukraine..but now he is starting to annoy me. If he talks to the Oscars today, I'm going to lose it lol

And btw Biden just senile talking about overthrowing Putin? I don't think so. I think that was planned to piss Putin off further

Title: Re: What to make of this?
Post by: G M on March 27, 2022, 04:04:18 PM
https://www.adl.org/blog/why-is-putin-calling-the-ukrainian-government-a-bunch-of-nazis

The ADL only calls American conservatives nazis.


Is there anything of value to extract from this?
===================================
Authored by Pepe Escobar,

The supreme target is regime change in Russia, Ukraine is just a pawn in the game – or worse, mere cannon fodder...



All eyes are on Mariupol. As of Wednesday night, over 70% of residential areas were under control of Donetsk and Russian forces, while Russian Marines, Donetsk’s 107th batallion and Chechen Spetsnaz, led by the charismatic Adam Delimkhanov, had entered the Azov-Stal plant – the HQ of the neo-Nazi Azov batallion.

Azov was sent a last ultimatum: surrender until midnight – or else, as in a take no prisoners highway to hell.

That implies a major game-changer in the Ukrainian battlefield; Mariupol is finally about to be thoroughly denazified – as the Azov contingent long entrenched in the city and using civilians as human shields were their most hardened fighting force.

Meanwhile, echoes from the Empire of Lies all but gave the whole game away. There’s no intention whatsoever in Washington to facilitate a peace plan in Ukraine – and that explains Comedian Zelensky’s non-stop stalling tactics. The supreme target is regime change in Russia, and for that Totalen Krieg against Russia and all things Russian is warranted. Ukraine is just a pawn in the game – or worse, mere cannon fodder.

This also means that the 14,000 deaths in Donbass for the past 8 years should be directly attributed to the Exceptionalists. As for Ukrainian neo-Nazis of all stripes, they are as expendable as “moderate rebels” in Syria, be they al-Qaeda or Daesh-linked. Those that may eventually survive can always join the budding CIA-sponsored Neo-Nazi Inc. – the tawdry remix of the 1980s Jihad Inc. in Afghanistan. They will be properly “Kalibrated”.

A quick neo-Nazi recap

By now only the brain dead across NATOstan – and there are hordes – are not aware of Maidan in 2014. Yet few know that it was then Ukrainian Minister of Interior Arsen Avakov, a former governor of Kharkov, who gave the green light for a 12,000 paramilitary outfit to materialize out of Sect 82 soccer hooligans who supported Dynamo Kiev. That was the birth of the Azov batallion, in May 2014, led by Andriy Biletsky, a.k.a. the White Fuhrer, and former leader of the neo-nazi gang Patriots of Ukraine.

Together with NATO stay-behind agent Dmitro Yarosh, Biletsky founded Pravy Sektor, financed by Ukrainian mafia godfather and Jewish billionaire Ihor Kolomoysky (later the benefactor of the meta-conversion of Zelensky from mediocre comedian to mediocre President.)

Pravy Sektor happened to be rabidly anti-EU – tell that to Ursula von der Lugen – and politically obsessed with linking Central Europe and the Baltics in a new, tawdry Intermarium. Crucially, Pravy Sektor and other nazi gangs were duly trained by NATO instructors.

Biletsky and Yarosh are of course disciples of notorious WWII-era Nazi collaborator Stepan Bandera, for whom pure Ukrainians are proto-Germanic or Scandinavian, and Slavs are untermenschen.

Azov ended up absorbing nearly all neo-Nazi groups in Ukraine and were dispatched to fight against Donbass – with their acolytes making more money than regular soldiers. Biletsky and another neo-Nazi leader, Oleh Petrenko, were elected to the Rada. The White Führer stood on his own. Petrenko decided to support then President Poroshenko. Soon the Azov battalion was incorporated as the Azov Regiment to the Ukrainian National Guard.

They went on a foreign mercenary recruiting drive – with people coming from Western Europe, Scandinavia and even South America.

That was strictly forbidden by the Minsk Agreements guaranteed by France and Germany (and now de facto defunct). Azov set up training camps for teenagers and soon reached 10,000 members. Erik “Blackwater” Prince, in 2020, struck a deal with the Ukrainian military that would enable his renamed outfit, Academi, to supervise Azov.

It was none other than sinister Maidan cookie distributor Vicky “F**k the EU” Nuland who suggested to Zelensky – both of them, by the way, Ukrainian Jews – to appoint avowed Nazi Yarosh as an adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Gen Valerii Zaluzhnyi. The target: organize a blitzkrieg on Donbass and Crimea – the same blitzkrieg that SVR, Russian foreign intel, concluded would be launched on February 22, thus propelling the launch of Operation Z.

All of the above, in fact just a quick recap, shows that in Ukraine there’s no difference whatsoever between white neo-Nazis and brown-colored al-Qaeda/ISIS/Daesh, as much as neo-Nazis are just as “Christian” as takfiri Salafi-jihadis are “Muslim”.

When Putin denounced a “bunch of neo-Nazis” in power in Kiev, the Comedian replied that it was impossible because he was Jewish. Nonsense. Zelensky and his patron Kolomoysky, for all practical purposes, are Zio-Nazis.

Even as branches of the United States government admitted to neo-Nazis entrenched in the Kiev apparatus, the Exceptionalist machine made the daily shelling of Donbass for 8 years simply disappear. These thousands of civilian victims never existed.

U.S. mainstream media even ventured the odd piece or report on Azov and Aidar neo-Nazis. But then a neo-Orwellian narrative was set in stone: there are no Nazis in Ukraine. CIA offshoot NED even started deleting records about training members of Aidar. Recently a crappy news network duly promoted a video of a NATO-trained and weaponized Azov commander – complete with Nazi iconography.

Why “denazification” makes sense
The Banderastan ideology harks back to when this part of Ukraine was in fact controlled by the Austro-Hungarian empire, the Russian empire and Poland. Stepan Bandera was born in Austro-Hungary in 1909, near Ivano-Frankovsk, in the – then autonomous – Kingdom of Galicia.

WWI dismembered European empires into frequently non-viable small entities. In western Ukraine – an imperial intersection – that inevitably led to the proliferation of extremely intolerant ideologies.

Banderastan ideologues profited from the Nazi arrival in 1941 to try to proclaim an independent territory. But Berlin not only blocked it but sent them to concentration camps. In 1944 though the Nazis changed tactics: they liberated the Banderanistas and manipulated them into anti-Russian hate, thus creating a destabilization force in the Ukrainian USSR.

So Nazism is not exactly the same as Banderastan fanatics: they are in fact competing ideologies. What happened since Maidan is that the CIA kept a laser focus on inciting Russian hatred by whatever fringe groups it could instrumentalize. So Ukraine is not a case of “white nationalism” – to put it mildly – but of anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalism, for all practical purposes manifested via Nazi-style salutes and Nazi-style symbols.

So when Putin and the Russian leadership refer to Ukrainian Nazism, that may not be 100% correct, conceptually, but it strikes a chord with every Russian.

Russians viscerally reject Nazism – considering that virtually every Russian family has at least one ancestor killed during the Great Patriotic War. From the perspective of wartime psychology, it makes total sense to talk of “Ukro-nazism” or, straight to the point, a “denazification” campaign.

How the Anglos loved the Nazis
The United States government openly cheerleading neo-Nazis in Ukraine is hardly a novelty, considering how it supported Hitler alongside England in 1933 for balance of power reasons.

In 1933, Roosevelt lent Hitler one billion gold dollars while England lent him two billion gold dollars. That should be multiplied 200 times to arrive at today’s fiat dollars. The Anglo-Americans wanted to build up Germany as a bulwark against Russia. In 1941 Roosevelt wrote to Hitler that if he invaded Russia the U.S. would side with Russia, and wrote Stalin that if Stalin invaded Germany the U.S. would back Germany. Talk about a graphic illustration of Mackinderesque balance of power.

The Brits had become very concerned with the rise of Russian power under Stalin while observing that Germany was on its knees with 50% unemployment in 1933, if one counted unregistered itinerant Germans.

Even Lloyd George had misgivings about the Versailles Treaty, unbearably weakening Germany after its surrender in WWI. The purpose of WWI, in Lloyd George’s worldview, was to destroy Russia and Germany together. Germany was threatening England with the Kaiser building a fleet to take over the oceans, while the Tsar was too close to India for comfort. For a while Britannia won – and continued to rule the waves.

Then building up Germany to fight Russia became the number one priority – complete with rewriting of History. The uniting of Austrian Germans and Sudetenland Germans with Germany, for instance, was totally approved by the Brits.

But then came the Polish problem. When Germany invaded Poland, France and Britain stood on the sidelines. That placed Germany on the border of Russia, and Germany and Russia divided up Poland. That’s exactly what Britain and France wanted. Britain and France had promised Poland that they would invade Germany from the west while Poland fought Germany from the east.

In the end, the Poles were double-crossed. Churchill even praised Russia for invading Poland. Hitler was advised by MI6 that England and France would not invade Poland – as part of their plan for a German-Russian war. Hitler had been supported financially since the 1920s by MI6 for his favorable words about England in Mein Kampf. MI6 de facto encouraged Hitler to invade Russia.

Fast forward to 2022, and here we go again – as farce, with the Anglo-Americans “encouraging” Germany under feeble Scholz to put itself back together militarily, with 100 billion euros (that the Germans don’t have), and setting up in thesis a revamped European force to later go to war against Russia.

Cue to the Russophobic hysteria in Anglo-American media about the Russia-China strategic partnership. The mortal Anglo-American fear is Mackinder/Mahan/Spykman/Kissinger/Brzezinski all rolled into one: Russia-China as peer competitor twins take over the Eurasian land mass – the Belt and Road Initiative meets the Greater Eurasia Partnership – and thus rule the planet, with the U.S. relegated to inconsequential island status, as much as the previous “Rule Britannia”.

England, France and later the Americans had prevented it when Germany aspired to do the same, controlling Eurasia side by side with Japan, from the English Channel to the Pacific. Now it’s a completely different ball game.

So Ukraine, with its pathetic neo-Nazi gangs, is just an – expendable – pawn in the desperate drive to stop something that is beyond anathema, from Washington’s perspective: a totally peaceful German-Russian-Chinese New Silk Road.

Russophobia, massively imprinted in the West’s DNA, never really went away. Cultivated by the Brits since Catherine the Great – and then with The Great Game. By the French since Napoleon. By the Germans because the Red Army liberated Berlin. By the Americans because Stalin forced to them the mapping of Europe – and then it went on and on and on throughout the Cold War.

We are at just the early stages of the final push by the dying Empire to attempt arresting the flow of History. They are being outsmarted, they are already outgunned by the top military power in the world, and they will be checkmated. Existentially, they are not equipped to kill the Bear – and that hurts. Cosmically.

================

Not sure what to make of this, I asked my friend of whom I have previously spoken what she thought of it.  Herewith her comments:

================

Yes! I think it explains very well both the Nazi presence, the difference between Nazis and followers of Bandera as the " enemy of my enemy is mu friend". Not the first time they had a common goal. Killing Jews was also something that united them for a short time.

Also like his explanation of the war in Donbas. Ignoring what was done there by Ukranian nationalists just bc the people there were Russian supporters fit in very well with the Russophobia. And also, with Putin's obsession of incorporating the Russians who were stuck in New and hostile countries after the fall of Soviet Union.

I believed from the beginning that Ukrain was just a pawn and a sacrifice to isolate Russia. Bating Putin to attack knowing that he is someone who would not shy away from total destruction. 

Zelensky is definitely someone who is playing a part. At first I just thought it was him embracing the dramatic to do whats best for Ukraine..but now he is starting to annoy me. If he talks to the Oscars today, I'm going to lose it lol

And btw Biden just senile talking about overthrowing Putin? I don't think so. I think that was planned to piss Putin off further
Title: US ready to fight Russia down to the last Ukrainian
Post by: G M on March 27, 2022, 08:55:00 PM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/manufactured-world-crisis
Title: Re: What to make of this?
Post by: G M on March 27, 2022, 10:49:52 PM
https://www.arkhaven.com/comics/comedy/stonetoss/fast-friends

(https://media.arkhaven.com/comics/series/7910983d-242e-4bc7-ad05-615c7a4c8218/episode/f4fd72fb-9ab7-4589-a7fa-ab9414db4ae3/images/bbaba525-19cc-4487-88bb-229d6d5ee6d0-ukraine-azov-stonetoss-comic-1080w.webp)

https://www.adl.org/blog/why-is-putin-calling-the-ukrainian-government-a-bunch-of-nazis

The ADL only calls American conservatives nazis.


Is there anything of value to extract from this?
===================================
Authored by Pepe Escobar,

The supreme target is regime change in Russia, Ukraine is just a pawn in the game – or worse, mere cannon fodder...



All eyes are on Mariupol. As of Wednesday night, over 70% of residential areas were under control of Donetsk and Russian forces, while Russian Marines, Donetsk’s 107th batallion and Chechen Spetsnaz, led by the charismatic Adam Delimkhanov, had entered the Azov-Stal plant – the HQ of the neo-Nazi Azov batallion.

Azov was sent a last ultimatum: surrender until midnight – or else, as in a take no prisoners highway to hell.

That implies a major game-changer in the Ukrainian battlefield; Mariupol is finally about to be thoroughly denazified – as the Azov contingent long entrenched in the city and using civilians as human shields were their most hardened fighting force.

Meanwhile, echoes from the Empire of Lies all but gave the whole game away. There’s no intention whatsoever in Washington to facilitate a peace plan in Ukraine – and that explains Comedian Zelensky’s non-stop stalling tactics. The supreme target is regime change in Russia, and for that Totalen Krieg against Russia and all things Russian is warranted. Ukraine is just a pawn in the game – or worse, mere cannon fodder.

This also means that the 14,000 deaths in Donbass for the past 8 years should be directly attributed to the Exceptionalists. As for Ukrainian neo-Nazis of all stripes, they are as expendable as “moderate rebels” in Syria, be they al-Qaeda or Daesh-linked. Those that may eventually survive can always join the budding CIA-sponsored Neo-Nazi Inc. – the tawdry remix of the 1980s Jihad Inc. in Afghanistan. They will be properly “Kalibrated”.

A quick neo-Nazi recap

By now only the brain dead across NATOstan – and there are hordes – are not aware of Maidan in 2014. Yet few know that it was then Ukrainian Minister of Interior Arsen Avakov, a former governor of Kharkov, who gave the green light for a 12,000 paramilitary outfit to materialize out of Sect 82 soccer hooligans who supported Dynamo Kiev. That was the birth of the Azov batallion, in May 2014, led by Andriy Biletsky, a.k.a. the White Fuhrer, and former leader of the neo-nazi gang Patriots of Ukraine.

Together with NATO stay-behind agent Dmitro Yarosh, Biletsky founded Pravy Sektor, financed by Ukrainian mafia godfather and Jewish billionaire Ihor Kolomoysky (later the benefactor of the meta-conversion of Zelensky from mediocre comedian to mediocre President.)

Pravy Sektor happened to be rabidly anti-EU – tell that to Ursula von der Lugen – and politically obsessed with linking Central Europe and the Baltics in a new, tawdry Intermarium. Crucially, Pravy Sektor and other nazi gangs were duly trained by NATO instructors.

Biletsky and Yarosh are of course disciples of notorious WWII-era Nazi collaborator Stepan Bandera, for whom pure Ukrainians are proto-Germanic or Scandinavian, and Slavs are untermenschen.

Azov ended up absorbing nearly all neo-Nazi groups in Ukraine and were dispatched to fight against Donbass – with their acolytes making more money than regular soldiers. Biletsky and another neo-Nazi leader, Oleh Petrenko, were elected to the Rada. The White Führer stood on his own. Petrenko decided to support then President Poroshenko. Soon the Azov battalion was incorporated as the Azov Regiment to the Ukrainian National Guard.

They went on a foreign mercenary recruiting drive – with people coming from Western Europe, Scandinavia and even South America.

That was strictly forbidden by the Minsk Agreements guaranteed by France and Germany (and now de facto defunct). Azov set up training camps for teenagers and soon reached 10,000 members. Erik “Blackwater” Prince, in 2020, struck a deal with the Ukrainian military that would enable his renamed outfit, Academi, to supervise Azov.

It was none other than sinister Maidan cookie distributor Vicky “F**k the EU” Nuland who suggested to Zelensky – both of them, by the way, Ukrainian Jews – to appoint avowed Nazi Yarosh as an adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Gen Valerii Zaluzhnyi. The target: organize a blitzkrieg on Donbass and Crimea – the same blitzkrieg that SVR, Russian foreign intel, concluded would be launched on February 22, thus propelling the launch of Operation Z.

All of the above, in fact just a quick recap, shows that in Ukraine there’s no difference whatsoever between white neo-Nazis and brown-colored al-Qaeda/ISIS/Daesh, as much as neo-Nazis are just as “Christian” as takfiri Salafi-jihadis are “Muslim”.

When Putin denounced a “bunch of neo-Nazis” in power in Kiev, the Comedian replied that it was impossible because he was Jewish. Nonsense. Zelensky and his patron Kolomoysky, for all practical purposes, are Zio-Nazis.

Even as branches of the United States government admitted to neo-Nazis entrenched in the Kiev apparatus, the Exceptionalist machine made the daily shelling of Donbass for 8 years simply disappear. These thousands of civilian victims never existed.

U.S. mainstream media even ventured the odd piece or report on Azov and Aidar neo-Nazis. But then a neo-Orwellian narrative was set in stone: there are no Nazis in Ukraine. CIA offshoot NED even started deleting records about training members of Aidar. Recently a crappy news network duly promoted a video of a NATO-trained and weaponized Azov commander – complete with Nazi iconography.

Why “denazification” makes sense
The Banderastan ideology harks back to when this part of Ukraine was in fact controlled by the Austro-Hungarian empire, the Russian empire and Poland. Stepan Bandera was born in Austro-Hungary in 1909, near Ivano-Frankovsk, in the – then autonomous – Kingdom of Galicia.

WWI dismembered European empires into frequently non-viable small entities. In western Ukraine – an imperial intersection – that inevitably led to the proliferation of extremely intolerant ideologies.

Banderastan ideologues profited from the Nazi arrival in 1941 to try to proclaim an independent territory. But Berlin not only blocked it but sent them to concentration camps. In 1944 though the Nazis changed tactics: they liberated the Banderanistas and manipulated them into anti-Russian hate, thus creating a destabilization force in the Ukrainian USSR.

So Nazism is not exactly the same as Banderastan fanatics: they are in fact competing ideologies. What happened since Maidan is that the CIA kept a laser focus on inciting Russian hatred by whatever fringe groups it could instrumentalize. So Ukraine is not a case of “white nationalism” – to put it mildly – but of anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalism, for all practical purposes manifested via Nazi-style salutes and Nazi-style symbols.

So when Putin and the Russian leadership refer to Ukrainian Nazism, that may not be 100% correct, conceptually, but it strikes a chord with every Russian.

Russians viscerally reject Nazism – considering that virtually every Russian family has at least one ancestor killed during the Great Patriotic War. From the perspective of wartime psychology, it makes total sense to talk of “Ukro-nazism” or, straight to the point, a “denazification” campaign.

How the Anglos loved the Nazis
The United States government openly cheerleading neo-Nazis in Ukraine is hardly a novelty, considering how it supported Hitler alongside England in 1933 for balance of power reasons.

In 1933, Roosevelt lent Hitler one billion gold dollars while England lent him two billion gold dollars. That should be multiplied 200 times to arrive at today’s fiat dollars. The Anglo-Americans wanted to build up Germany as a bulwark against Russia. In 1941 Roosevelt wrote to Hitler that if he invaded Russia the U.S. would side with Russia, and wrote Stalin that if Stalin invaded Germany the U.S. would back Germany. Talk about a graphic illustration of Mackinderesque balance of power.

The Brits had become very concerned with the rise of Russian power under Stalin while observing that Germany was on its knees with 50% unemployment in 1933, if one counted unregistered itinerant Germans.

Even Lloyd George had misgivings about the Versailles Treaty, unbearably weakening Germany after its surrender in WWI. The purpose of WWI, in Lloyd George’s worldview, was to destroy Russia and Germany together. Germany was threatening England with the Kaiser building a fleet to take over the oceans, while the Tsar was too close to India for comfort. For a while Britannia won – and continued to rule the waves.

Then building up Germany to fight Russia became the number one priority – complete with rewriting of History. The uniting of Austrian Germans and Sudetenland Germans with Germany, for instance, was totally approved by the Brits.

But then came the Polish problem. When Germany invaded Poland, France and Britain stood on the sidelines. That placed Germany on the border of Russia, and Germany and Russia divided up Poland. That’s exactly what Britain and France wanted. Britain and France had promised Poland that they would invade Germany from the west while Poland fought Germany from the east.

In the end, the Poles were double-crossed. Churchill even praised Russia for invading Poland. Hitler was advised by MI6 that England and France would not invade Poland – as part of their plan for a German-Russian war. Hitler had been supported financially since the 1920s by MI6 for his favorable words about England in Mein Kampf. MI6 de facto encouraged Hitler to invade Russia.

Fast forward to 2022, and here we go again – as farce, with the Anglo-Americans “encouraging” Germany under feeble Scholz to put itself back together militarily, with 100 billion euros (that the Germans don’t have), and setting up in thesis a revamped European force to later go to war against Russia.

Cue to the Russophobic hysteria in Anglo-American media about the Russia-China strategic partnership. The mortal Anglo-American fear is Mackinder/Mahan/Spykman/Kissinger/Brzezinski all rolled into one: Russia-China as peer competitor twins take over the Eurasian land mass – the Belt and Road Initiative meets the Greater Eurasia Partnership – and thus rule the planet, with the U.S. relegated to inconsequential island status, as much as the previous “Rule Britannia”.

England, France and later the Americans had prevented it when Germany aspired to do the same, controlling Eurasia side by side with Japan, from the English Channel to the Pacific. Now it’s a completely different ball game.

So Ukraine, with its pathetic neo-Nazi gangs, is just an – expendable – pawn in the desperate drive to stop something that is beyond anathema, from Washington’s perspective: a totally peaceful German-Russian-Chinese New Silk Road.

Russophobia, massively imprinted in the West’s DNA, never really went away. Cultivated by the Brits since Catherine the Great – and then with The Great Game. By the French since Napoleon. By the Germans because the Red Army liberated Berlin. By the Americans because Stalin forced to them the mapping of Europe – and then it went on and on and on throughout the Cold War.

We are at just the early stages of the final push by the dying Empire to attempt arresting the flow of History. They are being outsmarted, they are already outgunned by the top military power in the world, and they will be checkmated. Existentially, they are not equipped to kill the Bear – and that hurts. Cosmically.

================

Not sure what to make of this, I asked my friend of whom I have previously spoken what she thought of it.  Herewith her comments:

================

Yes! I think it explains very well both the Nazi presence, the difference between Nazis and followers of Bandera as the " enemy of my enemy is mu friend". Not the first time they had a common goal. Killing Jews was also something that united them for a short time.

Also like his explanation of the war in Donbas. Ignoring what was done there by Ukranian nationalists just bc the people there were Russian supporters fit in very well with the Russophobia. And also, with Putin's obsession of incorporating the Russians who were stuck in New and hostile countries after the fall of Soviet Union.

I believed from the beginning that Ukrain was just a pawn and a sacrifice to isolate Russia. Bating Putin to attack knowing that he is someone who would not shy away from total destruction. 

Zelensky is definitely someone who is playing a part. At first I just thought it was him embracing the dramatic to do whats best for Ukraine..but now he is starting to annoy me. If he talks to the Oscars today, I'm going to lose it lol

And btw Biden just senile talking about overthrowing Putin? I don't think so. I think that was planned to piss Putin off further
Title: Uke pilot interview
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 29, 2022, 02:02:13 AM
https://coffeeordie.com/ukrainian-mig-29-pilot-interview/
Title: Ukes smash Russian 4th Guard Tank Division
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 29, 2022, 02:06:56 AM
https://sofrep.com/news/ukrainians-obliterate-the-elite-russian-4th-guards-tank-division-15-miles-from-russian-border/?fbclid=IwAR0BmQAzVo9vC54UwiVQOXF64VyzvJ2zP7MsHDEY1qLFbmLkKec2mh2tuO4
Title: Is Putin is winning?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 30, 2022, 06:18:56 AM
What if Putin Didn’t Miscalculate?
March 29, 2022





By Bret Stephens



He thought Russian-speaking Ukrainians would welcome his troops. They didn’t. He thought he’d swiftly depose Volodymyr Zelensky’s government. He hasn’t. He thought he’d divide NATO. He’s united it. He thought he had sanction-proofed his economy. He’s wrecked it. He thought the Chinese would help him out. They’re hedging their bets. He thought his modernized military would make mincemeat of Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainians are making mincemeat of his, at least on some fronts.



Putin’s miscalculations raise questions about his strategic judgment and mental state. Who, if anyone, is advising him? Has he lost contact with reality? Is he physically unwell? Mentally? Condoleezza Rice warns: “He’s not in control of his emotions. Something is wrong.” Russia’s sieges of Mariupol and Kharkiv — two heavily Russian-speaking cities that Putin claims to be “liberating” from Ukrainian oppression — resemble what the Nazis did to Warsaw, and what Putin himself did to Grozny.



Several analysts have compared Putin to a cornered rat, more dangerous now that he’s no longer in control of events. They want to give him a safe way out of the predicament he allegedly created for himself. Hence the almost universal scorn poured on Joe Biden for saying in Poland, “For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power.”



The conventional wisdom is entirely plausible. It has the benefit of vindicating the West’s strategy of supporting Ukraine defensively. And it tends toward the conclusion that the best outcome is one in which Putin finds some face-saving exit: additional Ukrainian territory, a Ukrainian pledge of neutrality, a lifting of some of the sanctions.











But what if the conventional wisdom is wrong? What if the West is only playing into Putin’s hands once again?



The possibility is suggested in a powerful reminiscence from The Times’s Carlotta Gall of her experience covering Russia’s siege of Grozny, during the first Chechen war in the mid-1990s. In the early phases of the war, motivated Chechen fighters wiped out a Russian armored brigade, stunning Moscow. The Russians regrouped and wiped out Grozny from afar, using artillery and air power.



Russia’s operating from the same playbook today. When Western military analysts argue that Putin can’t win militarily in Ukraine, what they really mean is that he can’t win clean. Since when has Putin ever played clean?



“There is a whole next stage to the Putin playbook, which is well known to the Chechens,” Gall writes. “As Russian troops gained control on the ground in Chechnya, they crushed any further dissent with arrests and filtration camps and by turning and empowering local protégés and collaborators.”



Suppose for a moment that Putin never intended to conquer all of Ukraine: that, from the beginning, his real targets were the energy riches of Ukraine’s east, which contain Europe’s second-largest known reserves of natural gas (after Norway’s).






Combine that with Russia’s previous territorial seizures in Crimea (which has huge offshore energy fields) and the eastern provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk (which contain part of an enormous shale-gas field), as well as Putin’s bid to control most or all of Ukraine’s coastline, and the shape of Putin’s ambitions become clear. He’s less interested in reuniting the Russian-speaking world than he is in securing Russia’s energy dominance.



“Under the guise of an invasion, Putin is executing an enormous heist,” said Canadian energy expert David Knight Legg. As for what’s left of a mostly landlocked Ukraine, it will likely become a welfare case for the West, which will help pick up the tab for resettling Ukraine’s refugees to new homes outside of Russian control. In time, a Viktor Orban-like figure could take Ukraine’s presidency, imitating the strongman-style of politics that Putin prefers in his neighbors.



If this analysis is right, then Putin doesn’t seem like the miscalculating loser his critics make him out to be.

It also makes sense of his strategy of targeting civilians. More than simply a way of compensating for the incompetence of Russian troops, the mass killing of civilians puts immense pressure on Zelensky to agree to the very things Putin has demanded all along: territorial concessions and Ukrainian neutrality. The West will also look for any opportunity to de-escalate, especially as we convince ourselves that a mentally unstable Putin is prepared to use nuclear weapons.



Within Russia, the war has already served Putin’s political purposes. Many in the professional middle class — the people most sympathetic to dissidents like Aleksei Navalny — have gone into self-imposed exile. The remnants of a free press have been shuttered, probably for good. To the extent that Russia’s military has embarrassed itself, it is more likely to lead to a well-aimed purge from above than a broad revolution from below. Russia’s new energy riches could eventually help it shake loose the grip of sanctions.



This alternative analysis of Putin’s performance could be wrong. Then again, in war, politics and life, it’s always wiser to treat your adversary as a canny fox, not a crazy fool.

Title: Re: Is Putin is winning?
Post by: G M on March 30, 2022, 06:27:01 AM
From what I have read, this is the Russian way of war. We lead with Tier 1 ops and the best we have at the start. The Russians throw the worst conscripts in as bullet sponges. After slogging things out, then the Spetnaz and better units go in after a tired and depleted enemy.


What if Putin Didn’t Miscalculate?
March 29, 2022





By Bret Stephens



He thought Russian-speaking Ukrainians would welcome his troops. They didn’t. He thought he’d swiftly depose Volodymyr Zelensky’s government. He hasn’t. He thought he’d divide NATO. He’s united it. He thought he had sanction-proofed his economy. He’s wrecked it. He thought the Chinese would help him out. They’re hedging their bets. He thought his modernized military would make mincemeat of Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainians are making mincemeat of his, at least on some fronts.



Putin’s miscalculations raise questions about his strategic judgment and mental state. Who, if anyone, is advising him? Has he lost contact with reality? Is he physically unwell? Mentally? Condoleezza Rice warns: “He’s not in control of his emotions. Something is wrong.” Russia’s sieges of Mariupol and Kharkiv — two heavily Russian-speaking cities that Putin claims to be “liberating” from Ukrainian oppression — resemble what the Nazis did to Warsaw, and what Putin himself did to Grozny.



Several analysts have compared Putin to a cornered rat, more dangerous now that he’s no longer in control of events. They want to give him a safe way out of the predicament he allegedly created for himself. Hence the almost universal scorn poured on Joe Biden for saying in Poland, “For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power.”



The conventional wisdom is entirely plausible. It has the benefit of vindicating the West’s strategy of supporting Ukraine defensively. And it tends toward the conclusion that the best outcome is one in which Putin finds some face-saving exit: additional Ukrainian territory, a Ukrainian pledge of neutrality, a lifting of some of the sanctions.











But what if the conventional wisdom is wrong? What if the West is only playing into Putin’s hands once again?



The possibility is suggested in a powerful reminiscence from The Times’s Carlotta Gall of her experience covering Russia’s siege of Grozny, during the first Chechen war in the mid-1990s. In the early phases of the war, motivated Chechen fighters wiped out a Russian armored brigade, stunning Moscow. The Russians regrouped and wiped out Grozny from afar, using artillery and air power.



Russia’s operating from the same playbook today. When Western military analysts argue that Putin can’t win militarily in Ukraine, what they really mean is that he can’t win clean. Since when has Putin ever played clean?



“There is a whole next stage to the Putin playbook, which is well known to the Chechens,” Gall writes. “As Russian troops gained control on the ground in Chechnya, they crushed any further dissent with arrests and filtration camps and by turning and empowering local protégés and collaborators.”



Suppose for a moment that Putin never intended to conquer all of Ukraine: that, from the beginning, his real targets were the energy riches of Ukraine’s east, which contain Europe’s second-largest known reserves of natural gas (after Norway’s).






Combine that with Russia’s previous territorial seizures in Crimea (which has huge offshore energy fields) and the eastern provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk (which contain part of an enormous shale-gas field), as well as Putin’s bid to control most or all of Ukraine’s coastline, and the shape of Putin’s ambitions become clear. He’s less interested in reuniting the Russian-speaking world than he is in securing Russia’s energy dominance.



“Under the guise of an invasion, Putin is executing an enormous heist,” said Canadian energy expert David Knight Legg. As for what’s left of a mostly landlocked Ukraine, it will likely become a welfare case for the West, which will help pick up the tab for resettling Ukraine’s refugees to new homes outside of Russian control. In time, a Viktor Orban-like figure could take Ukraine’s presidency, imitating the strongman-style of politics that Putin prefers in his neighbors.



If this analysis is right, then Putin doesn’t seem like the miscalculating loser his critics make him out to be.

It also makes sense of his strategy of targeting civilians. More than simply a way of compensating for the incompetence of Russian troops, the mass killing of civilians puts immense pressure on Zelensky to agree to the very things Putin has demanded all along: territorial concessions and Ukrainian neutrality. The West will also look for any opportunity to de-escalate, especially as we convince ourselves that a mentally unstable Putin is prepared to use nuclear weapons.



Within Russia, the war has already served Putin’s political purposes. Many in the professional middle class — the people most sympathetic to dissidents like Aleksei Navalny — have gone into self-imposed exile. The remnants of a free press have been shuttered, probably for good. To the extent that Russia’s military has embarrassed itself, it is more likely to lead to a well-aimed purge from above than a broad revolution from below. Russia’s new energy riches could eventually help it shake loose the grip of sanctions.



This alternative analysis of Putin’s performance could be wrong. Then again, in war, politics and life, it’s always wiser to treat your adversary as a canny fox, not a crazy fool.
Title: Re: Is Putin is winning?
Post by: DougMacG on March 30, 2022, 02:36:55 PM
From what I have read, this is the Russian way of war. We lead with Tier 1 ops and the best we have at the start. The Russians throw the worst conscripts in as bullet sponges. After slogging things out, then the Spetnaz and better units go in after a tired and depleted enemy.

When you see your troops as expendable and your support at home as irrelevant, that's a pretty good strategy.

But I don't believe their failure and global humiliation so far is intentional.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on March 30, 2022, 03:47:37 PM
Putin is ex KGB, I would not underestimate him. Remember he is competing with Biden!

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/29/opinion/ukraine-war-putin.html?smid=tw-share (https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/29/opinion/ukraine-war-putin.html?smid=tw-share)
Title: Re: Is Putin is winning?
Post by: G M on March 30, 2022, 05:31:48 PM
From what I have read, this is the Russian way of war. We lead with Tier 1 ops and the best we have at the start. The Russians throw the worst conscripts in as bullet sponges. After slogging things out, then the Spetnaz and better units go in after a tired and depleted enemy.

When you see your troops as expendable and your support at home as irrelevant, that's a pretty good strategy.

But I don't believe their failure and global humiliation so far is intentional.

I don't think they are failing. As far as global humiliation, that's us, not them.

The People's Liberation Army Air Force says thanks for the new base in Afghanistan.
Title: Starstreek missile
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 30, 2022, 06:39:54 PM
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44950/starstreek-missile-now-in-ukraine-what-you-need-to-know?fbclid=IwAR09SxWuolp9Mlc_6xCBKi0UmCuNH3eHaAdvroKzydCoJ-WknVmm949t0i4
Title: First rate propaganda from the Ukes
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 31, 2022, 12:28:49 PM
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10671779/Ukraine-holds-military-Oscars-seven-best-video-moments-war.html
Title: unconfirmed Uke attack on Russia
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 01, 2022, 01:43:25 AM
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10675075/Ukrainian-attack-helicopters-strike-oil-facility-INSIDE-Russia.html

https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/1932566/report-ukraine-conducts-successful-attack-inside-russia
Title: Random mines in the northwestern Black Sea
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 01, 2022, 04:39:05 PM
https://shipping.nato.int/nsc/operations/news/-2022/risk-of-collateral-damage-in-the-north-western-black-sea-2
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on April 02, 2022, 05:01:36 AM
Nice interview

https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/ukraine/2022/04/russia-cannot-afford-to-lose-so-we-need-a-kind-of-a-victory-sergey-karaganov-on-what-putin-wants (https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/ukraine/2022/04/russia-cannot-afford-to-lose-so-we-need-a-kind-of-a-victory-sergey-karaganov-on-what-putin-wants)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on April 02, 2022, 05:46:37 AM
Not sure, who's winning. Looks like Russia might have an edge.

(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FPVPkNoXEAQDPOa?format=jpg&name=medium)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 02, 2022, 05:48:05 PM
https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-troops-dead-getting-treated-201328360.html
Title: GPF: The role of nuclear power in the Ukraine War
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 04, 2022, 06:30:56 AM
April 4, 2022
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The Role of Nuclear Power in the Ukraine War
It’s an important source of Russian leverage.
By: Ridvan Bari Urcosta

Russia’s ultimate goal in invading Ukraine is to bring as much of the country as possible under Moscow’s influence, or, absent that, to pry it away from the West. One of the more overlooked strategies to that end is to deprive Ukraine of traditional energy sources in the central and eastern parts of the country. Moscow is particularly keen to take control of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants and uranium deposits.

Put simply, Russia wants to beat the West to the punch of monopolizing Ukraine’s nuclear industry. Doing so, it hopes, will prevent Ukraine from ever being a nuclear power and, as important, keep Ukraine dependent on Russia for energy needs, creating new options for power sourcing in areas of Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine’s east.

Nuclear Inheritance

It wasn’t that long ago that Ukraine's nuclear weapons potential was greater than Britain’s and France’s. It housed the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal, designed specifically to target the United States. In the 1990 Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, Kyiv pledged to become a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs and adheres to three nuclear-free principles. In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, it pledged to give up its weapons in exchange for security guarantees from the U.S., the U.K. and Russia. This was no small thing: At the time, the government in Kyiv possessed nearly 2,000 nuclear warheads and some 2,500 tactical warheads – all holdovers from the Soviet era.

Indeed, Ukraine possesses, at least theoretically, all the requisite institutions to restore its nuclear power status. It inherited massive scientific and technological research and development from the Soviet Union. Ukraine can potentially produce rocket launcher systems, solid propellant engines, rockets, and fuel and necessary software for them. The R&D center of nuclear studies in Kharkiv has an experimental nuclear facility. (Russia accused Ukraine of creating enriched uranium there.) Until recently, Ukraine has been operating four other plants: the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant, the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and Chernobyl.

Unsurprisingly, Ukraine relied heavily on nuclear power for its energy consumption. Before the war, the share of nuclear power was between 40 percent and 51 percent, and 27 percent came from thermal power stations located mostly in central and eastern Ukraine. Until the invasion, Ukraine still received nuclear fuel for its power plants from Russia. (Spent fuel is also problematic; Kyiv sent its waste to various Russian facilities.) Ukraine has reserves of nuclear fuel that will last until at least the beginning of next year.

It’s little wonder, then, that Ukraine has started to reconsider its stance on nuclear weaponry. Discussions to that ended started when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, but they never got far. The invasion of the rest of Ukraine has revitalized the issue. At a recent conference in Munich, for example, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said that if the Budapest Memorandum guarantor states won’t convene and guarantee Ukraine's security and territorial integrity, then Kyiv will become a nuclear power again.

Access to uranium isn’t a problem. Ukraine has some of the largest reserves in the world – about 1.8 percent of global deposits. Ironically, only a few months before the invasion, Kyiv announced plans to produce enough uranium to meet its nuclear energy needs. It was as much a political decision as an economic one: Kyiv needed to wean itself off its fuel dependence on Russia, and it had a hard time affording oil and gas for its thermal power plants. More, after the war in Donbas in 2014-15, Kyiv lost access to its primary coal mines. To offset these losses, Ukraine diversified its energy resources, eventually including nuclear. In 2021, Ukraine planned to start the process of domestically producing zirconium dioxide – an important component of nuclear fuel.

Ukraine’s decision is in keeping with global trends. Nuclear energy is having somewhat of a renaissance as many countries consider it the ideal response to the global energy crisis. Countries with large uranium mines may be able to provide their own energy. Russia wants in on the party and is thus trying to enhance its footprint in nuclear-generated electricity at Ukraine’s expense. Russia is already a leader in enriched uranium production, and if it were to wrest control of Ukraine, it would certainly restore uranium mining and production.

Leverage

Of Ukraine’s five nuclear plants, Russia gained control of Zaporozhe and Chernobyl (though Russian troops recently abandoned the one at Chernobyl) and is approaching the South Ukraine plant. So far, this has not changed the energy balance in the country. All produced electricity from these two plants continues to be a part of the Ukrainian energy system.

Even so, it became clear at the outset of the war that because the shortest route for Russian forces to Kyiv went through Chernobyl, Russia would occupy the region and would, according to Ukraine, initiate different types of provocations and blackmail the West with the threat of nuclear disaster. The International Atomic Energy Agency has reported that though it is concerned about Chernobyl and Zaporozhe, both are still “operating safely and securely.” (The agency recently said it plans to visit Zaporozhe.)

But it’s unclear how long that can last. Russian forces entered the Zaporozhe nuclear power plant on March 4 after clashes with the Ukrainian army. Both stations are now operated by Russian specialists from Rosatom, together with Ukrainian personnel. For Moscow, it would be dangerous for Ukraine’s entire nuclear network to fall into the hands of the West. But, as important, the network is a valuable source of leverage, especially in the face of imminent defeat. After all, what’s to stop Russia from destroying it on its way out?

The future of the rest of Ukraine’s nuclear plants is uncertain, but it is clear that in the upcoming weeks Russia will try to reach and occupy the South Ukraine plant. Anticipating as much, Ukraine has already fortified and reinforced the area. It’s hard to imagine that Russia will try to attack western Ukraine, where two nuclear plants are located, but if worse comes to worst, Russia won’t shy from destroying them or using them against the West to soften the blow of a defeat.
Title: The little Uke tank that could
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 06, 2022, 12:35:00 PM
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10692495/Incredible-moment-single-Ukrainian-tank-takes-entire-Russian-convoy-near-Kyiv.html
Title: D1
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 07, 2022, 08:31:34 AM
The latest Pentagon assessment: Russia's northern tactical retreat appears to be complete. Moscow's forces near Kyiv and Chernihiv "have completed their withdrawal from the area to re-consolidate and refit in Belarus and in Russia," a senior defense official told reporters Wednesday.

And the southern port city of "Mariupol remains isolated, but it has not been secured by the Russians despite some open-source reporting to the contrary of Ukrainians surrendering Mariupol," the official said.

But overall, Russia is still very much committed to this invasion. Of its "nearly 130 [battalion tactical groups] that they applied to this invasion, we still assess that they have, you know, a good many inside, you know, more than 80." As for what's next, the U.S. defense official said, "Our assessment is that they won't want to spend too much time on refit and resupply because they have made a very public show of saying that they're going to, you know, prioritize their efforts on the Donbas region."

Why the intense interest in Donbas? Consider this rail map of Ukraine; it hints at the industrial output stretching out of Donbas. There's also this bit of history from the Crisis Group:

"Under the Soviet Union, Donbas was an industrial powerhouse, producing disproportionate shares of the Union's coal and steel. Its population consisted largely of first- and second-generation migrants sent from other Soviet republics to staff its mines and factories. The region thus earned a reputation as one of the most 'Sovietised' parts of the Union—a place where pre-existing identities, languages and patterns of life had been supplanted by a multicultural society held together by common pride in industry, with Russian as the lingua franca."
On the diplomatic front, Moscow is newly upset by Ukraine's desire to negotiate over Crimea and the eastern Donbas, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in a statement Thursday. During the last round of talks in Turkey, "the Ukrainian delegation proposed a 15-year negotiating process for Crimea, the peninsula that Russia seized in 2014," the New York Times reports. And this week, Belarus's own autocratic leader insisted future peace talks must include someone from his government, declaring, "There can be no separate deals behind Belarus's back."
Title: Rail map
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 07, 2022, 08:32:22 AM
https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1511417223419727891
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 07, 2022, 09:36:11 AM
third

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/07/bucha-german-intelligence-radio-bnd-russia/?utm_campaign=wp_post_most&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_most&carta-url=https%3A%2F%2Fs2.washingtonpost.com%2Fcar-ln-tr%2F3685e66%2F624f086164253a7f342122ac%2F61cdf026ae7e8a4ac205b2b3%2F9%2F72%2F624f086164253a7f342122ac
Title: Re: Ukraine, The war is over
Post by: DougMacG on April 08, 2022, 11:25:17 AM
Small news item, the war is over.

https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-04-08/kremlin-says-russias-operation-in-ukraine-could-end-in-foreseeable-future

Rather than force Ukraine to agree to it terms. Russia will (eventually) fall back to keeping the areas it already controls.

Until the next war...

We taught them almost nothing but have the opportunity to be more prepared next time.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 08, 2022, 12:18:13 PM
Hold in place means that Russia has seized major Uke oil & gas deposits (including in the Black Sea), the mouth of the Dnieper, devastated a goodly % of Uke infrastructure, dispersed millions of Ukes (25% of the population?) and stands ready to continue when convenient.  If they seize Odessa before signing off for now, then the Ukes are landlocked. 

Will Ukes fight again down the road after seeing these results from this round?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on April 09, 2022, 07:17:24 AM
Almost like Russia is winning...

Unpossible, per our professional journalists...

Hold in place means that Russia has seized major Uke oil & gas deposits (including in the Black Sea), the mouth of the Dnieper, devastated a goodly % of Uke infrastructure, dispersed millions of Ukes (25% of the population?) and stands ready to continue when convenient.  If they seize Odessa before signing off for now, then the Ukes are landlocked. 

Will Ukes fight again down the road after seeing these results from this round?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on April 10, 2022, 04:51:40 PM
May 9 is Russia's Victory Day parade...they need to show a clear victory.
Title: Ukraine and the Biden Crime Family
Post by: G M on April 11, 2022, 03:20:56 PM
https://kunstler.com/clusterfuck-nation/the-riptide/

The Riptide
These dangerous currents amount to a huge riptide in global events that will carry many people and whole societies out to sea….


Have you stopped to ask yourself: what exactly are the USA’s interests in Ukraine? The answer: just about none whatsoever if you discount all the effort and capital expended there the past decade to make it a problem for our designated hobgoblin, Russia. During these eight years, since the Maidan “revolution,” Ukraine was an ATM for “Joe Biden’s” family, an inconvenient embarrassment for the US State Department, which has not been able to cover it up.

In fact, their first attempt to do so — the seditious maneuvers leading to Trump impeachment no. 1 — only shined a light onto the dishonest activities of US Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch and her State Department colleagues, in collusion with George Soros’s Atlantic Council, to conceal their involvement in Ukraine’s corrupt political affairs. This gang included agent provocateurs rotating in-and-out of government such as Jake Sullivan and Antony Blinken, now the two top foreign policy officers in “Joe Biden’s” government (National Security Advisor and Secretary of State).

Donald Trump enabled more mischief by sending what he proudly called “lethal aid” in the form of Stinger missiles and other arms to Ukraine in a foolish attempt to out-hawk his predecessor, Mr. Obama, whose main weapon against Ukraine was Vice-president Biden and his grifting family. Poor Mr. Trump apparently had to do something to prove that he was not “Putin’s puppet,” and that something was to give Ukraine tacit permission to bombard the breakaway Donbas region on Russia’s border. Was that supposed to not have consequences?

Throughout all this, NATO has acted as a conduit for arming and training a 400,000-troop Ukrainian army, a violation of several formal agreements between Russia and the West. NATO, otherwise, does not have the will, or even the means, to engage militarily with Russia. And America, at the head of NATO, has so far refrained from starting World War Three by way of sending US troops or war-planes into Ukraine. So, Russia has gone about the plodding business of neutralizing Ukraine’s trouble-seeking military and rearranging the map so that Ukraine won’t be able to act as a proxy antagonist in America’s ill-conceived campaign to destroy Mr. Putin and his country.

The operation will probably end this month. My guess is that Mr. Zelensky will be allowed to remain president of what remains on the map, minus Donbas and the region along the Black Sea coast from Mariupol to Odessa. Mr. Zelensky will not have a functioning military to make trouble with. Other patches of Western Ukraine may be distributed among Poland, Moldova, Romania, and Hungary, leaving a large rump of Ukraine between Lvov and the Dnieper River devoted mostly to the growing of wheat. A stable, agricultural Ukraine will be a benefit to a hungry world, while it will no longer be in a position to launch hostilities or be of much use as a money-laundering facility. In short, with some luck, Ukraine will cease to be a threat to world peace.

Ukraine may have been “Joe Biden’s” last opportunity to screw things up on the world scene. As the military conflict resolves, Ukraine can’t be used by the White House as a shield to divert America’s attention from the political cancer of Biden family corruption, and the systemic illness of the nation’s institutions. Merrick Garland may not be able to contain the open case against Hunter Biden to mere rinky-dink tax violations — and if he tries to limit the US Attorneys in charge of the case, he will be setting himself up for an obstruction of justice rap some months from now. The laptop is out now, too many people have copies of the hard drive, and some are working diligently to make the mess of it more easily searchable. So, expect much more to come.

It won’t be easy for the Democratic Party to get rid of “Joe Biden.” Nobody can feature Kamala Harris in the oval office, and were she to somehow gracefully remove herself from the scene, next-in-line would be Nancy Pelosi who, in addition to being long-in-the-tooth, seems to be literally drunk half the time in her public appearances. And behind her: Patrick Leahy, Senate President Pro Tem, who is nearly as senile and incoherent as “Joe Biden.”

Lots of other spooky things are churning meanwhile in the zeitgeist. Overnight, with his blundering sanctions, “Joe Biden” killed the little credibility left in the shreds of Bretton Woods and gave a green light for Russia to start a world-wide move to gold-backed currencies. That could easily turn the current US dollar inflation from an annualized 8 percent to a runaway hyperinflation, where prices double in weeks or days. It’s becoming ever clearer that special counsel John Durham means business and many a swamp creature must be quivering in its burrow awaiting indictment. The controversy over the 2020 election will prove to be not as over as many have hoped and imagined. And we await developments on the after-effects of all those vaxxes and boosters carried out all over Western Civ. These dangerous currents amount to a huge riptide in global events that will carry many people and whole societies out to sea.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 12, 2022, 08:04:29 AM
Impressive piece of advocacy there, and several strong points made, but unfortunately IMHO it blows right by dealing with the notion that fomenting breakaway regions (not for the first time see e.g. Georgia) and invasion of neighboring countries is OK.  On this important point it is entirely too glib.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 13, 2022, 05:40:42 PM
https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/04/us-rushes-weapons-ukraine-russia-coils-new-offensive-donbas/365610/
Title: Russkis abandon flagship of Black Sea fleet
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 14, 2022, 01:20:09 AM
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-flagship-black-sea-fleet-badly-damaged-by-blast-2022-04-14/?fbclid=IwAR29zLlx0_LeV85_EEb_FYTP6iN-Sw2gA_b-t8vuHANrZ8XtM3c4bd24iiE
Title: Ukrainen troops not using situational awareness in combat zone
Post by: G M on April 14, 2022, 07:11:02 AM
https://www.bitchute.com/video/p8BqUyKFIkNJ/

They chose poorly.
Title: Gen Keane on the fight for Donbass
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 20, 2022, 09:53:56 AM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4UWdm10Vcfc
Title: Billions of dollars in cutting edge weapons
Post by: G M on April 21, 2022, 08:00:16 AM
https://twitter.com/all_seeing_pi_/status/1516963449649041408

Now in Russian hands.
Title: Ukraine New Word:рашизм means ruscism or Russian Fascism
Post by: DougMacG on April 23, 2022, 11:17:04 AM
NY Times.com:
Russian Fascism.
The aggressor in this war keeps trying to push back toward a past as it never happened, toward nonsensical and necrophiliac accounts of history. Russia must conquer Ukraine, Vladimir Putin says, because of a baptism a thousand years ago, or because of bloodshed during World War II. But Russian myths of empire cannot contain the imagination of the Ukrainian victims of a new war. National identity is about living people, and the values and the futures they imagine and choose A nation exists insofar as it makes new things, and a national language lives by making new words.

The new word “рашизм” (rough translation: ‘ruscism” or Russian fascism) is a useful conceptualization of Putin’s worldview. Far more than Western analysts, Ukrainians have noticed the Russian tilt toward fascism in the last decade. Undistracted by Putin’s operational deployment of genocide talk, they have seen fascist practices in Russia: the cults of the leader and of the dead, the corporatist state, the mythical past, the censorship, the conspiracy theories, the centralized propaganda and now the war of destruction. Even as we rightly debate how applicable the term is to Western figures and parties, we have tended to overlook the central example of fascism’s revival, which is the Putin regime in the Russian Federation.
Title: Re: Ukraine New Word:рашизм means ruscism or Russian Fascism
Post by: G M on April 23, 2022, 11:31:01 AM
They still miss Stalin. At last the Walter Duranty Times found a Russian strongman they don’t like.


NY Times.com:
Russian Fascism.
The aggressor in this war keeps trying to push back toward a past as it never happened, toward nonsensical and necrophiliac accounts of history. Russia must conquer Ukraine, Vladimir Putin says, because of a baptism a thousand years ago, or because of bloodshed during World War II. But Russian myths of empire cannot contain the imagination of the Ukrainian victims of a new war. National identity is about living people, and the values and the futures they imagine and choose A nation exists insofar as it makes new things, and a national language lives by making new words.

The new word “рашизм” (rough translation: ‘ruscism” or Russian fascism) is a useful conceptualization of Putin’s worldview. Far more than Western analysts, Ukrainians have noticed the Russian tilt toward fascism in the last decade. Undistracted by Putin’s operational deployment of genocide talk, they have seen fascist practices in Russia: the cults of the leader and of the dead, the corporatist state, the mythical past, the censorship, the conspiracy theories, the centralized propaganda and now the war of destruction. Even as we rightly debate how applicable the term is to Western figures and parties, we have tended to overlook the central example of fascism’s revival, which is the Putin regime in the Russian Federation.
Title: Uke-CA Nat Guard connection
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 23, 2022, 01:55:38 PM
Ukraine’s battlefield success no surprise to their National Guard trainers in U.S.
California Guard has long history training, working with Ukrainian troops




|


https://trends.newsmaxwidget.com/cl...vRzr1rcbfci0+6ZVuWWlerA9uQhrgdpvq7yfEE2&s2s=1
Ukraine's battlefield success no surprise to their National Guard trainers in U.S. - Washington Times

l


Ukrainian National Guard, Armed Forces, special operations units exercise as they simulate a crisis situation in an urban settlement, in the abandoned city of Pripyat near the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, Ukraine, Feb. 4, 2022. When fighting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine resulted in power cuts to the critical cooling system at the closed Chernobyl nuclear power plant, some feared that spent nuclear fuel would overheat. But nuclear experts say there’s no imminent danger because time and physics are on safety's side. (AP Photo/Mykola Tymchenko) **FILE**
Ukrainian National Guard, Armed Forces, special operations units exercise as they simulate a crisis situation in an urban settlement, in the abandoned city of Pripyat near the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, Ukraine, Feb. 4, 2022. When fighting from Russia’s invasion ... more >

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By Mike Glenn - The Washington Times - Friday, April 22, 2022
Leaders in Kyiv began reaching out to U.S. military officials for help soon after Russia rolled into Ukraine following a tense build-up along the border that lasted several months. One of the first calls went out to the California National Guard.

For nearly 30 years following the demise of the Soviet Union, California’s soldiers have had a close working relationship with Ukraine as part of the National Guard‘s State Partnership Program. Maj. Gen. Dave Baldwin, the state’s senior officer, known as the adjutant general, has been friends with top Ukrainian military leaders for a decade, officials said.

“When the invasion started, they started receiving phone calls: ‘Hey, we’re getting attacked,’ followed by phone calls shortly later that said, ‘Hey, here’s what we need,’” recalled Army Gen. Daniel Hokanson, the chief of the National Guard Bureau who also serves on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The State Partnership Program links former Warsaw Pact countries with a U.S. state. Ukraine drew the California National Guard in the lottery. The relationship was intended to help their forces operate more easily alongside NATO and provide guidance about the proper role of a military in a democracy.

“We initially worked on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to help them to respond to their communities [and] to help them take care of their countries,” Gen. Hokanson said recently at a session hosted by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank in Washington.



Ukraine and the California Guard have had about 1,000 different opportunities to work with each other over the past 27 years. “Over time, you continue to build on what you’ve learned,” Gen. Hokanson said.

The California Guard soldiers — many of them combat veterans with tours in Iraq and Afghanistan — trained the Ukrainians on a variety of subjects, ranging from the basics of small-unit tactics to conducting larger joint operations. They also helped Ukraine develop a capable corps of non-commissioned officers — the sergeants in any military who are crucial for accomplishing a mission.

“That makes all the difference in the world,” Gen. Hokanson said.

Many military analysts and strategic thinkers predicted the larger and more powerful Russian army would easily defeat the Ukrainians in direct combat, a misconception apparently shared by Russian President Vladimir Putin and his military aides. The California Guard troops who knew the improving quality of Ukrainian forces over the years were more confident, however. For them, the Ukrainian army’s success at blunting Russia‘s attack for nearly two months did not come as a shock.

“They said, ‘Hey, we’re not surprised they’re doing that well. We’ve trained with them and we knew how good they were,’” Gen. Hokanson said. “You’re seeing that every single day right now.”

Maj. Gen. Baldwin, the California adjutant general, told DOD News in a story last month on the California-Ukraine nexus that his long experience with Ukrainian forces led him to believe they were being badly “underestimated” by the West.

“We knew that they had radically improved their ability to do kind of Western-style military decision making,” he said. “I have been impressed, though, with their ability at the national level to work through some of the challenges we thought they still had in terms of logistics and command control.”

Ukraine’s air force, Gen. Baldwin added, was a particular bright spot.

“Our fighter pilots have been telling everyone for years that the Ukrainian Air Force is pretty good,” he said. “… “Well, the proof is in the pudding. Their Air Force is a lot better than everyone thought — except for the California Air National Guard, who knew that these guys were pretty good.”
Ukraine‘s ability to mount a nimble, adroit form of maneuver warfare stands in stark contrast to the rather stolid, heavy-handed tactics of Russia now on display, tactics that rely heavily on overwhelming artillery firepower to level cities and try to cow the opponent into submission.

“By working with [Ukraine] to establish leaders at the lowest level, really at the small-unit action level, they can seize the initiative, see an opportunity and take advantage of it,” Gen. Hokanson said. “We’re seeing that every day over there right now.”

The State Partnership Program was initially intended to guide the armies of satellite countries that had been under the thumb of the Soviet Union for decades. It has expanded dramatically since then with 93 countries linked to state National Guard contingents from all 50 states, three territories and the District of Columbia.

Ukraine‘s success on the battlefield against Russia might convince other countries to sign on with the State Partnership Program. The input from the combatant commanders — such as the heads of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command; the Middle East-focused Central Command, or Southern Command for Latin America — will be crucial, Gen Hokanson said.

“We’ll maintain a very close conversation with them on where they see potential opportunities for future state partners,” he said.
• Mike Glenn can be reached at mglenn@washingtontimes.com.
Title: Whoops! Former Uke ambassador admits Putin would not have invaded under Trump
Post by: G M on April 25, 2022, 07:43:14 PM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/watch-former-ukraine-ambassador-slips-admits-putin-wouldnt-have-invaded-under-trump

We all knew it.
Title: George Friedman: The Uke War, redefined
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 26, 2022, 03:45:40 AM
April 26, 2022
View On Website
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The Ukraine War, Redefined
By: George Friedman

The war in Ukraine began under a faulty assumption shared by many, including the United States, that if Russia invaded, it would defeat Ukraine, and it would do so quickly. The Russians deployed their forces carelessly, without much regard for the Ukrainians. When the Russians encountered resistance against their disorganized armored and infantry forces, operating pretty much without air support, they acknowledged problems but continued to assume that the problems they faced were simply the friction of the battlefield rather than something that risked the outcome they assumed was theirs.

The United States still tended to share that view but sent supplies to Ukraine via Poland, a move meant to show that Washington was committed more to the resistance than to a belief that Russia was at risk. Moscow continued to press on three fronts: from Belarus in the north, through the Donbas in the east, and from Crimea in the south. It was a chaotic advance thanks to a lack of coordination of the fronts and the inability to supply three separate fronts simultaneously. The Russian failure was symbolized by the 40-mile backup of tanks moving south from Belarus toward Kyiv.

The most startling thing, and one likely to be studied by military historians for years to come, is that the Ukrainian resistance did not break and in many instances intensified. This led to a reevaluation by both Americans and Russians that the Ukrainians might successfully resist for an extended period of time, embarrassing the Russians so much that it would cost them badly needed credibility with partners like China. From the American point of view, Ukraine shifted from being a lost cause, in which defeat had to come gracefully, to a strategic opportunity.

The shift was made possible by Russian failures. Washington had already made what it felt was the least dangerous strategic move in waging economic and financial warfare against Moscow, and in uniting NATO to support the mission. But that doesn’t explain Russian problems on the battlefield: logistics, the inability to mount mobile warfare because of logistics, and the shortage of trained infantry. It’s why, even as Russia abandoned its armored thrust toward Kyiv from Belarus, and as it adopted a much more cautious strategy of moving against Donbas, where it already had substantial influence, and a southerly attack toward Odesa, time wasn’t on Moscow’s side.

So Russia brought in a new commander who had operated in Syria using both conventional warfare and counter-population attacks. The same tactics applied to urban areas worked but more slowly and with greater casualties to infantry than Russia could readily sustain. At this point, it became clear that Ukrainian forces were highly motivated and reasonably well trained. They could take casualties, replace them and not have their force collapse. Not so with Russia. Ukraine could very possibly fight the Russians to a stalemate that the Russians couldn’t afford militarily or politically. Given the paucity of Russian reserves, it was possible that Ukraine might force the Russians to retreat or even withdraw.

At this point, U.S. strategy shifted. Over the weekend, the U.S. secretary of state and secretary of defense went openly to Kyiv, showing disregard for Russian interception, and offered the Ukrainians a massive infusion of weapons from unmanned aerial vehicles to artillery, radar and everything else needed to arm a modern army. The fact that the arrival of these weapons via Poland would take some time showed another degree of confidence, which was that the fighting would be going on in the weeks and months that delivery would take. When we look at the full array of weapons, we can glimpse that the U.S. is now arming a force capable of going on the offense.

The war has always involved the U.S. and Russia, but in a sense, it is now an open duel between them. The Russians must provide troops and equipment. The U.S. is providing equipment but not troops. The American bet is that Ukraine can field more and better-trained forces armed with advanced weapons, while Russia will have to struggle to replace its losses. It is far easier for the United States to produce and ship weapons than it is for the Russians to sustain losses.

This puts Russia in a difficult position. Given the weapons flows announced and the other weapons likely to be supplied, it must try to end the war in the next month or so, only against a much better-armed and motivated Ukrainian force. And having failed to break them so far, the direction of the war is going against the Russians.

The visit by two senior cabinet officials, and the very open listing of at least part of the arms shipments, is clearly intended to signal to Moscow that not only will it not defeat the Ukrainians but Ukraine might force Russia from the battlefield altogether. Obviously, a Russian preemptive attack is now a possibility, but an obvious strategy for Ukraine is to hold, retreat and rearm. Perhaps the Americans are also hoping that this will force the Russians to the negotiating table. That would be the lesser risk. Certainly, the Russians, whose intelligence likely knew this was coming, will have to recalibrate a war that was never really calibrated.
Title: To get to Moldova, Russkis must take Odesa
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 26, 2022, 02:06:01 PM
The blasts were reported in Moldova's breakaway region of Trans-Dniester.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Moldova on edge. Moldovan President Maia Sandu is convening a meeting of the country’s Security Council following explosions in the Russian-backed breakaway region of Trans-Dniester over the past two days. According to Trans-Dniester’s Interior Ministry, Tuesday's explosions hit communication towers that were used to broadcast Russian radio. On Monday, Trans-Dniester’s Ministry of State Security headquarters building in central Tiraspol was reportedly hit by a grenade launcher.
Title: Odessa is on the way to Moldova
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 27, 2022, 01:34:07 PM
Explosions in Moldova's Breakaway Region Fuel Fears of a Wider Russian War
5 MIN READApr 27, 2022 | 20:09 GMT





Moldovan President Maia Sandu speaks during a press conference in Chisinau on March 6, 2022.
Moldovan President Maia Sandu speaks during a press conference in Chisinau on March 6, 2022.

(OLIVIER DOULIERY/Pool/AFP via Getty Images)

While Russia is unlikely to invade Moldova in the short-to-medium term, a series of explosions in a Moldovan breakaway region near Ukraine could eventually grant Moscow a justification for doing so, in addition to destabilizing the pro-EU government in Chisinau. The attacks also risk distracting Kyiv from Russia's renewed offensive in the eastern Donbas region by amplifying the threat to southern Ukraine. A spate of suspicious explosions in the pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway region of Transdniestria starting on April 25 has stoked fears that Russia may soon launch an attack toward Transdniestria from the Ukrainian territory it's seized during the ongoing war. The explosions did not result in casualties, but prompted Transdniestria's government to raise the unrecognized republic's terrorist threat level to high and order the erection of checkpoints outside towns and cities and at the borders with the rest of Moldova and Ukraine.

The three incidents took place within 24 hours at Transdniestria's Ministry of State Security in the capital of Tiraspol, a military base near the village of Parkany, and the towers broadcasting Russian radio and television near the village of Mayak. On April 27, Transdniestrian authorities also claimed that shots were fired at housing in the village of Kolbasna after drones from Ukraine flew over a Russian arms depot there.
The explosions are probably an attempt by Russian or pro-Russian Transdniestrian political forces to stoke anti-Ukrainian sentiment and provide Russia justification to eventually intervene in the region by creating an alleged threat to Russian citizens of Transdniestria. After holding an emergency meeting of the country's Supreme Security Council on April 27, Moldovan President Maia Sandu told reporters that the Ukraine crisis had split Transdniestrians into two competing factions — presumably referring to those who seek to fuel tensions or even join Russia's fight against Ukraine, and those seeking to avoid escalation or getting involved in the war for fear of the massive casualties and destruction it could cause to the breakaway region. Sandu added that the recent explosions were indicative of this rift. Such increased tensions could serve to destabilize Moldova's pro-EU government with the threat of a Russian intervention, which the country's woefully understaffed and underfunded military is completely unprepared to resist.

On April 22, shortly before the series of explosions began, the acting commander of Russia's central military district said that if Russian forces were successful in seizing full control of southern Ukraine, Moscow could create a corridor to Transdniestria, where ''there are also facts of oppression of the Russian-speaking population.'' Prior to the Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin accused Kyiv of discriminating against the Russian-speaking population in the country's eastern Donbas region. Many now, in turn, see the commander's use of similar language just days before the explosions as confirmation that Moscow is preparing to justify an imminent military action toward Transdniestria, where Russia already maintains approximately 1,500-2,500 troops, and where around half of the region's 500,000 residents are believed to hold Russian passports.

Transdniestrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky claimed that ''traces of [the recent] terrorist attacks'' came from Ukraine and urged Kyiv to investigate the infiltration of militant groups within its borders that could carry out such attacks in Transdniestria.

Oleksiy Arestovych, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, said on April 26 that Russia was responsible for the terrorist activity in Transdniestria, and noted the explosions indicated Russian leaders saw occupying Moldova as necessary and wanted to open another line of attack against Ukraine to accomplish this. Arestovych later in a separate statement said that Transdenistria ''was not capable of capturing Chisinau,'' but Moldova ''could still be in big trouble and should turn to Romania and Ukraine for help.''

A Russian attack from occupied Ukraine linking up with Transdniestria is not feasible at this time, suggesting the recent explosions are in part aimed at pressuring Ukraine to deploy more troops near its southern border with Moldova, thereby distracting Kyiv from the main fight in Donbas. Russian military forces in southeastern Ukraine are currently not capable of conducting an attack toward Transdniestria, as such a move would involve capturing or bypassing the heavily defended cities of Odessa and Mykolaiv. But such a thrust into the region could be conducted in the future following an expansion of Russia's war efforts and national mobilization efforts, as well as mobilization and training of additional forces in Transdniestria. Additionally, as Ukraine is already de facto under complete naval blockade, there is little strategic urgency for Russia to launch a risky operation to seize all of southern Ukraine and link up with Trandneistria at this time. Therefore, the region playing a significant role in Russian affairs remains unlikely for the foreseeable future, though such discussions could resume following a mobilization in Russia or significant battle successes in the east that free Russian forces to reconsider offensive operations in that direction — a possibility that is likely months away at the earliest.

Media reports suggest many Transdniestrians believe joining the fight against Ukraine is not in the breakaway region's best interest. However, that will not stop local authorities or Russian troops from acting on Moscow's behalf at the needed moment.

Ukraine and Moldova may consider launching a preemptive attack on Transdniestria to ensure the pro-Russian separatists in the region don't have time to mobilize the population or launch an attack from the area at a time of Moscow's choosing. Russia, however, would see this as a major provocation, which will deter Kyiv and especially Chisinau from conducting such a risky operation.
Title: NRO: The Dangers of a Desperate, Hostile Russia
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 28, 2022, 03:27:45 PM
Hmmm , , , which would we rather have?  An intact neutral Ukraine with Russia not dependent upon China, or , , ,

NRO:

The Dangers of a Desperate, Hostile Russia

On the menu today: As the reports of its atrocities against Ukrainian civilians pile up, the Russia before us today is both less frightening and more frightening than the one our diplomats thought they knew as recently as last year. The Russian military is now revealed to be “undisciplined rabble,” and we now know that its fearsome reputation was built on lies and propaganda. But a losing, humiliated Russia is a desperate, hostile entity, now openly talking about “demilitarizing NATO,” and that a nuclear strike is more likely than not.

Meanwhile, back here in the U.S., the risk of recession is very, very real.

The End of One Russia, the Birth of Another

Last spring, when the Russian invasion of Ukraine was still just an unusual buildup of troops at the border, President Biden declared that he wanted a “stable, predictable” relationship with Russia. As recently as October, Putin used similar terms to characterize the U.S.–Russia relationship: “Putin said Russia’s relations with the Biden administration have been ‘quite constructive’ and he personally has developed ‘working, stable relations’ with President Joe Biden.”

And that, in the eyes of many foreign-policy thinkers, was reasonable; Putin’s Russia was difficult but rational, a former great power that still commanded considerable influence around the globe, and a potential ally to the U.S. on arms control, fighting terrorism, and other issues. Last July, John Kerry, Biden’s special envoy on climate change, spoke with Putin for an hour and called the Russian leader “very forthcoming and thoughtful” about ways to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. “We can continue to feel the kind of cooperative possibility that emerged in the course of our conversation,” Kerry said.

Today, that perspective sounds unspeakably naïve. That vision of Russia as ornery but rational was always a polished public-relations illusion, meant to lull conflict-averse Western leaders into a false sense of security.

After the Bucha massacre, the use of cluster munitions near a preschool where civilians were sheltering, airstrikes hitting public squares, the Mariupol-theatre airstrike, the Mariupol-maternity-hospital airstrike, the two mass graves near Mariupol, the airstrikes on civilians lining up for food in Cherniv, the “deliberate killings, unlawful violence, and widespread intimidation against unarmed civilians across the Kyiv region,” the forced deportation of at least 500,000 Ukrainian citizens from Russian-occupied territory in Ukraine to Russia, the rape and impregnation of Ukrainian women as young as eleven, and so many other utterly indefensible horrors, only the most eagerly self-deluded have any illusions about the true Russia anymore.

The Russian army is brutal, dumb, sadistic, disorganized, poorly trained, and often incompetent. Its troops are the nastiest of bullies against the defenseless, but wilt in the face of organized resistance.

In the third month of the invasion of Ukraine, Russia looks both less scary and scarier than before. Russia is less scary because, clearly, its military forces are nowhere near as fearsome and capable as their reputation suggested. The Economist offers an anecdote about how the recent training successes of the Russian military were mostly smoke and mirrors:

Organizing NATO’s biggest military exercise since the Cold War kept Admiral James Foggo, then the commander of American naval forces in Europe and Africa, busy in the summer of 2018. Trident Juncture was to gather 50,000 personnel, 250 aircraft and 65 warships in the European Arctic in October. As logistically taxing as that sounds, it was small fry compared with what Russia was planning in Siberia in September. The Vostok exercises would be the biggest since the Soviet Union’s mammoth Zapad drills of 1981, boasted Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s defense minister: they would involve 300,000 troops, 1,000 aircraft and 80 warships.

This was a huge feat. “It was a big lift for us to get 50,000 people in the field,” recalled Admiral Foggo recently. “How did they do that?” The answer, he eventually realized, was that they did not do it. A company of troops (150 at most) at Vostok was counted as a battalion or even a regiment (closer to 1,000). Single warships were passed off as whole squadrons. This chicanery might have been a warning sign that not everything was as it seemed in the Russian armed forces, even before they got bogged down in the suburbs of Kyiv.

“It’s not a professional army out there,” said Admiral Foggo. “It looks like a bunch of undisciplined rabble.”

Perhaps we should be using the past tense when discussing the Russian military, because that army is a lot smaller than it was when the war started:

Russia has also lost more than 3,000 pieces of large equipment in battle, according to Oryx, an open-source intelligence tracker. The tally includes more than 500 main battle tanks, 300 armored fighting vehicles, 20 jet fighters and 30 helicopters.

Russia in recent years has produced around 250 tanks and 150 aircraft annually, according to Mark Cancian, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington. That means Ukrainian forces in two months have destroyed the equivalent of at least two years of Russian tank production.

The U.S. believes Russia overall has lost roughly one-fourth of the combat force it initially had to invade Ukraine, a senior Pentagon official said last week, without providing details.

Tanks can be replaced, but the dead cannot be resurrected; this week, the U.K. Ministry of Defense estimated that 15,000 Russian soldiers have been killed during the war so far. In a little more than two months, Russia’s military has suffered about half as many combat deaths as the U.S. military did in the three-year Korean War.

Despite the best propaganda efforts of the state, some Russians can see that what was supposed to be a quick and clean “special military operation” to decapitate the current regime in Kyiv and turn Ukraine into an obedient client state has turned into a long, ugly, bloody, and expensive slog that is just trying to grab some territory. And for those Russians most emotionally invested in the reputation of their country’s military, this invasion has brought little beyond epic humiliation:

In a viral rant posted by YouTuber and Spetsnaz special forces veteran Alexander Arutyunov, whose channel Razvedos has almost 18 million views, Arutyunov slammed the pivot to the eastern Donbas region.

He asked Putin directly: ‘Dear Vladimir Vladimirovich, please decide, are we fighting a war or are we masturbating?

But Russia is more frightening because Putin has marched his regime and country into a desperate situation. He thought this invasion would end with him guaranteed to be remembered by Russians as the second “Vladimir the Great.” Now, he’s on course to be remembered as the most spectacularly reckless and self-destructive European leader since Adolf Hitler. Russia will be economically ruined, diplomatically isolated, globally denounced, and militarily neutered . . . all for a few stretches of bombed-out land on the other side of the pre-war border.

The worse the situation gets, the less Vladimir Putin has to lose. The stability of his regime and perhaps even his life are on the line.

Russian state media are now characterizing the invasion of Ukraine as a war with NATO — and considering all the aid that NATO countries are sending, all the intelligence the U.S. is sharing, and how the U.S. is helping Ukraine shoot down Russian planes, it’s not the most unreasonable assessment in the world.

God only knows whether the ranting and raving buffoons on Russian state television should be interpreted as just venting rage and frustration, or whether it is actually a deliberate choice to prepare the Russian public for coming military moves. But the rhetoric is getting bizarre and disturbing, talking about the need for a special military operation to “demilitarize NATO,” that NATO is “a collective Hitler,” that a nuclear strike seems probable, and that “we’re all going to die someday.”
Title: RIP but
Post by: ccp on April 29, 2022, 01:23:41 PM
https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/28/politics/american-killed-ukraine/index.html

you have wife and new young child

and you go to Ukraine to risk your life......

what were they paying him to do this ?

not good judgement if you ask me.

""He was just a really thoughtful person. He always put everybody ahead of himself even when situations were so stressful,"

so thoughtful except to his own family

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on April 30, 2022, 04:36:13 AM
There is a lot of discussion in the western press, that Russia is losing, mostly because it has not yet achieved its goals. It should have won as even Stratfor above says the expectation was "if Russia invaded, it would defeat Ukraine, and it would do so quickly".

The criteria for winning a war is to meet objectives and not necessarily timelines set up by the west. While the west keeps harping that Russia withdrew from Kyiv, could it be that was just a feint to draw Ukrainian troops to Kyiv while it gobbled up the south and east. Ukraine is a large country, its near impossible to maintain supply lines up to Kyiv, what Russia can do is capture and keep all the south and east Russian speaking areas and that is what they are doing. They are still expanding near Kherson with a goal to move towards Odessa and threaten Mykolaiv. I also see that Russians are starting to pull back from the Kharkiv region (North east), which was meant to draw Ukrainian forces and keep them busy. Might even make a land bridge to Moldova (Russian speaking area of Transnystria).

Russia has energy and food security. I dont see Putin backing down. If pushed, he will use more force, which means Ukraine will be destroyed into rubble for decades. The wise thing for Ukr was to have elections in the Russian speaking areas and let them align with Russia. I see no scenario where Russia gives back captured territories. May 9 is victory day in Russia.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on April 30, 2022, 04:59:28 AM
Pl. see this map and tell me how is Russia losing the war. The purple color is Russian speaking area before the invasion and the red pink is after the invasion. The red/pink areas will not be returned. Secondly, Russia has occupied the land mass adjacent to Crimea up to the Dnieper river, such that Ukr can no longer shut down the water supply to Crimea (which they did in the past). Yes, one can argue that its taking time, but Russia does care about public opinion and will not level everything.

(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FRjGJDGXsAAU2ou?format=jpg&name=4096x4096)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on April 30, 2022, 05:20:00 AM
Parity in this war would be if the attacks on Moscow and territory captured inside Russia were equal to the attacks on Kiev and territory captured inside Ukraine.

Assuming the areas not yellow on the map were what Russia wanted in the first place, land bridge to the port, Russia has already won.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on April 30, 2022, 06:39:10 AM
Parity in this war would be if the attacks on Moscow and territory captured inside Russia were equal to the attacks on Kiev and territory captured inside Ukraine.

Assuming the areas not yellow on the map were what Russia wanted in the first place, land bridge to the port, Russia has already won.

Yes.
Title: Buchanan how far to we push? ME-> WW2 analogies do NOT hold anymore
Post by: ccp on April 30, 2022, 12:52:31 PM
https://www.creators.com/read/pat-buchanan/04/22/will-putin-submit-to-us-imposed-weakening

he uses a General McCarthy analogy

but I am coming to the conclusion that WW2 analogies are useless

there were not nuclear weapons till the end of WW2 and we were the only power to have them

that fact is gone forever

it is now more then ever really down to a game of chicken

so what if Putin does use a tactical nuc

do we respond with one , three , try to annihilate them with a first strike?

or what?

Title: Re: Buchanan how far to we push? ME-> WW2 analogies do NOT hold anymore
Post by: G M on April 30, 2022, 01:59:08 PM
https://www.creators.com/read/pat-buchanan/04/22/will-putin-submit-to-us-imposed-weakening

he uses a General McCarthy analogy

but I am coming to the conclusion that WW2 analogies are useless

there were not nuclear weapons till the end of WW2 and we were the only power to have them

that fact is gone forever

it is now more then ever really down to a game of chicken

so what if Putin does use a tactical nuc

do we respond with one , three , try to annihilate them with a first strike?

or what?

https://www.military.com/history/russias-dead-hand-soviet-built-nuclear-doomsday-device.html/amp
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on April 30, 2022, 04:28:03 PM
If we keep sending weapons, a tactical weapon, perhaps an EMP device above Kiev is a distinct possibility. The USA is not likely to do much.
Title: Ukraine: Why we fight
Post by: G M on May 02, 2022, 04:03:24 AM
https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/105/534/835/original/aaf528d8861df879.jpeg

(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/105/534/835/original/aaf528d8861df879.jpeg)
Title: photo op Nanc
Post by: ccp on May 02, 2022, 06:17:07 AM
Nancy's "secret" mission to Ukraine

got to get the 33 billion bill passed

her husband will somehow figure way to get cut

to get the funds to Ukraine  :wink:



Title: Re: photo op Nanc
Post by: G M on May 02, 2022, 06:41:17 AM
Nancy's "secret" mission to Ukraine

got to get the 33 billion bill passed

her husband will somehow figure way to get cut

to get the funds to Ukraine  :wink:

https://nypost.com/2022/01/14/nancy-pelosis-son-linked-to-firms-probed-by-feds/amp/
Title: D1
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 02, 2022, 08:33:52 AM
Ukraine's military claims it sank two more Russian boats in the Black Sea. The vessels were allegedly patrol boats this time around, and Ukraine says it used Turkish TB-2 drones for the early morning strikes. That would be a notable contrast with Kyiv's new Neptune anti-ship missile, which Ukrainian officials said was used to sink Russia's much larger Black Sea flagship, Moskva, about three weeks ago.

That development follows news that Russian forces are seeking "permanent control" over territory seized across southern Ukraine. And the Kremlin is working to steal these lands "either as nominally independent 'People's Republics' or by annexing them to Russia," according to analysts at the Institute for the Study of War, writing Sunday evening.

Scenes from an occupation, week 10: The Russians severed cell phone and internet service across most of occupied southern Ukraine "by cutting fiber-optic cables and turning off power at base stations," the Wall Street Journal's Yaroslav Trofimov reported Sunday from the Zaporizhzhia region. But this phase of Moscow's invasion is stretching well beyond just the information realm; indeed, Trofimov reports, "occupation authorities are swiftly integrating these areas into Russia, appointing collaborationist administrations and introducing Russian documents, education programs and currency." That even includes "issuing newlyweds with Russian Federation wedding certificates" in the port city of Berdyansk.
Title: Re: Ukraine: Why we fight
Post by: G M on May 04, 2022, 09:26:43 AM
https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/105/741/952/original/e64ff03381354470.png

(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/105/741/952/original/e64ff03381354470.png)

https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/105/534/835/original/aaf528d8861df879.jpeg

(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/105/534/835/original/aaf528d8861df879.jpeg)
Title: Re: Ukraine, WRM
Post by: DougMacG on May 04, 2022, 10:07:53 AM
Walter Mead: “The prospect of tactical nuclear strikes on the European mainland would, Mr. Putin undoubtedly hopes, test the cohesion of the NATO alliance. While nobody wants to be quoted on the record, senior Europeans are already whispering to sympathetic journalists about concerns that the Biden administration is escalating too far and too fast. Would France and Germany continue to back American policy if Russia strikes Ukrainian targets with nuclear warheads? Is American public opinion ready for a replay of the Cuban missile crisis? The Ukraine war is not yet 10 weeks old, and it has already revolutionized world politics. The next 10 weeks could be even more dramatic. President Biden could soon face as stern a test as any American president has since World War II. We must hope, and pray, that he is up to the job.” (Source: wsj.com)
Title: Re: Ukraine, WRM
Post by: G M on May 04, 2022, 10:15:12 AM
He's totally fine!



Walter Mead: “The prospect of tactical nuclear strikes on the European mainland would, Mr. Putin undoubtedly hopes, test the cohesion of the NATO alliance. While nobody wants to be quoted on the record, senior Europeans are already whispering to sympathetic journalists about concerns that the Biden administration is escalating too far and too fast. Would France and Germany continue to back American policy if Russia strikes Ukrainian targets with nuclear warheads? Is American public opinion ready for a replay of the Cuban missile crisis? The Ukraine war is not yet 10 weeks old, and it has already revolutionized world politics. The next 10 weeks could be even more dramatic. President Biden could soon face as stern a test as any American president has since World War II. We must hope, and pray, that he is up to the job.” (Source: wsj.com)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on May 06, 2022, 04:10:21 AM
All those Stingers arriving in Ukraine, could also end up elsewhere..say Europe. There are reports, that weapons are disappearing from Ukraine. Something to keep a watch on.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 06, 2022, 06:50:50 AM
Indeed.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on May 07, 2022, 06:27:45 PM
I have been monitoring Ukr/Russia war progress. The only place where Ukr is making progress is around Kharkiv in the North East. This could be real progress, or that Russia has decided taking on Kharkiv the second largest city may be difficult and they are pulling back to defensible positions (from where they still shell Kharkiv). The middle sector, Russia is making small advances. Kherson, near Mykolaiv/Odessa is at a standstill for now. I think they will activate that front, once Mariupol is settled, in the meantime they regroup and replenish supplies etc. My hunch is Russia will make atleast one attempt for Odessa, because that land locks Ukraine, all other major ports are in Russian hands.

Inspite of all the neg news on Russia (poor morale, logistics etc), on the ground situation is still in Russia's favor. My back of the envelope visual math suggests Russia now occupies about 28,000 sq miles, not counting Crimea. Crimea is itself around 10,000 sq miles...so total about 40,000 sq miles in round numbers. Dont think Putin will return anything.

(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FSHMvyQWQAMd4np?format=jpg&name=4096x4096)
Title: Ukrainen Mafiya winning
Post by: G M on May 08, 2022, 07:11:01 AM
https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2022/05/ukraine-update-cia-ineptitude-russian-cauldrons-ukrainian-mafia/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on May 08, 2022, 08:57:16 AM
At some point the world will realize the media is lying...Ukr could lose more territory. We will fight to the last Ukrainian.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on May 08, 2022, 09:40:49 AM
Next week Finland and Sweden decide if they submit their application to join Nato. Interesting times. Finland lost a significant chunk of land (Karjala) the last time they went to war with Russia.
Title: Ukes will win
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 09, 2022, 09:49:37 AM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gOPr96L0wA4
Title: Russia stealing Ukraine's food
Post by: DougMacG on May 10, 2022, 07:06:41 AM
Ukrainian officials say Russian forces have taken vast stores of grain from Ukraine and exported them to Russia, exacerbating the risk of shortages and hunger in areas under Russian control. Farmers in Ukrainian territory occupied by Russian forces reported that the Russians were “stealing their grain en masse,” according to a statement released over the weekend by Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food. (Source: washingtonpost.com)
------------
Isn't that (another) crime against humanity?

Why do you starve the people you capture?  I thought (Russia alleges) these people want to be under Russian. Stealing their food exposes that tripe as bullsh*t. Does it also expose food shortages in Russia?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on May 10, 2022, 07:22:26 AM
Trying to figure out the endgame, it looks like the map ya posted tells the story.

It's all complicated but key phrases, warm water port and land bridge describe the map of Russian gains.

ya wrote:  "My hunch is Russia will make at least one attempt for Odessa, because that land locks Ukraine, all other major ports are in Russian hands."

It looks like that is taking place now. I hope they fail.  Otherwise it will be hard to reverse gains already made without a real war risking world war. The map of the status quo is the likely the end point unless Odessa and the rest of the coastline falls.  Russia got (most of) what they wanted.
Title: Nazis? Really?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 10, 2022, 09:23:19 AM
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61361827?fbclid=IwAR1F68tQksG-zH7FmoRyuIvJM9JJzoFrLS83n1qaVqR04Ue_WODdeLxGFX4
Title: Inside the battle on the eastern front
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 10, 2022, 09:34:28 AM
https://unherd.com/2022/05/inside-the-battle-on-the-eastern-front/?fbclid=IwAR3NKkhnPY_XIOXfSd7oOvSPloR1vz_wVFGuVDDlJYy5l8RyPzRd3E5-69g
Title: Missiles hitting Odesa
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 11, 2022, 08:52:35 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/military/ukraine-says-russia-has-unleashed-hypersonic-missiles-odesa?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=655

IMHO if Odesa falls, Ukraine is finished as a serious country.

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/05/russia-has-fired-between-10-and-12-hypersonics-ukraine-pentagon-says/366748/
Title: The Russians in action up close
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 11, 2022, 02:22:22 PM
second

https://ilyalozovsky.substack.com/p/theyre-armed-to-the-teeth-but-theyre?fbclid=IwAR2i_GqmnnU02ICzVrlsFKFLKmBrgsbzmVze7T-XxwqMDAO_2f1KhXJRIiQ&s=r

https://alexberenson.substack.com/p/ukraine-three-months-in?token=eyJ1c2VyX2lkIjo1ODg4MTI0MCwicG9zdF9pZCI6NTQ0NjczOTgsIl8iOiI5UmZmVCIsImlhdCI6MTY1MjMwNDY5OSwiZXhwIjoxNjUyMzA4Mjk5LCJpc3MiOiJwdWItMzYzMDgwIiwic3ViIjoicG9zdC1yZWFjdGlvbiJ9.zhXVQARmyEC2mDQp95EKHV-i0x-99kBZYliPNOtvGCI&s=r
Title: Re: Missiles hitting Odesa
Post by: DougMacG on May 11, 2022, 03:22:11 PM
quote author=Crafty_Dog

"IMHO if Odesa falls, Ukraine is finished as a serious country.'
_________________________________________________

"If you own Odessa, you actually can go through Ukraine to the north, dividing Ukraine in two halves and there is literally nothing that can stop you,"
https://www.forces.net/ukraine/news/ukraine-where-odessa-and-why-it-important-russia
____________________________________________________________________

[Doug]  What if NATO or an American President stood up and said, enough is enough. 
Title: odessa
Post by: ccp on May 11, 2022, 03:33:09 PM
[Doug]  What if NATO or an American President stood up and said, enough is enough.

Haven't they been *saying* this?

What else can we do?

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 11, 2022, 04:07:37 PM
Not necessary to conquer and hold that much of Ukraine.

Making it landlocked (and perhaps taking a piece of Moldova) will leave Ukraine a hollow shell, with millions of Uke refugees having nothing to which to return while Russia takes over huge amounts of on shore and off shore resources and full naval access to the Black Sea.

At that point they can offer carrot and stick deals with Turkey for assured access through the Bosphorus into the Mediterranean.
Title: Re: odessa
Post by: DougMacG on May 11, 2022, 04:59:12 PM
[Doug]  What if NATO or an American President stood up and said, enough is enough.

Haven't they been *saying* this?

What else can we do?

Just thinking aloud, take over Kaliningrad or Vladivostok, maybe St. Petersburg, one of their port cities.  See how they like it.
Title: Re: odessa
Post by: G M on May 11, 2022, 05:19:07 PM
[Doug]  What if NATO or an American President stood up and said, enough is enough.

Haven't they been *saying* this?

What else can we do?

Just thinking aloud, take over Kaliningrad or Vladivostok, maybe St. Petersburg, one of their port cities.  See how they like it.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=dxJHecyYBno
Title: Re: odessa
Post by: DougMacG on May 11, 2022, 07:18:59 PM
[Doug]  What if NATO or an American President stood up and said, enough is enough.

Haven't they been *saying* this?

What else can we do?

Just thinking aloud, take over Kaliningrad or Vladivostok, maybe St. Petersburg, one of their port cities.  See how they like it.

Maybe launch the attack from Finland.
https://shraibikus.com/1157956-568521157956.html  NATO setting up shop.
Title: Re: odessa
Post by: G M on May 11, 2022, 07:30:55 PM
[Doug]  What if NATO or an American President stood up and said, enough is enough.

Haven't they been *saying* this?

What else can we do?

Just thinking aloud, take over Kaliningrad or Vladivostok, maybe St. Petersburg, one of their port cities.  See how they like it.

Maybe launch the attack from Finland.
https://shraibikus.com/1157956-568521157956.html  NATO setting up shop.

Less time worrying about the Mafiya State known as Ukraine, more time worrying about the destruction of America.
Title: Russia to pull back?
Post by: ccp on May 11, 2022, 09:01:49 PM
https://www.foxnews.com/world/russia-current-phase-invasion-cut-losses-kherson-referendum

the next big market pop?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on May 12, 2022, 04:42:12 AM
So Kherson is about 10,900 sq miles, Donetsk is 3400 sq miles, Luhansk 3200 sq miles, plus a huge ton of other territory...40, 000- sq miles. Good time for Russia to quit, while ahead. Water supply to Crimea has been protected. I am still not understanding how Russia has lost ?., is it western media not reporting the truth, or perhaps I am missing something. Their dreams of taking Odessa and land bridge to Transnystria might have to wait.

If Finland and Sweden apply to join Nato...plans could change.

(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FSg1bVmXsAAbv9r?format=jpg&name=4096x4096)
Title: Re: Russia to pull back?
Post by: DougMacG on May 12, 2022, 04:50:12 AM
https://www.foxnews.com/world/russia-current-phase-invasion-cut-losses-kherson-referendum

the next big market pop?

No word from our disinformation czar on Russia saying they will stop the invasion while pushing west trying to leave the former Ukraine landlocked. Kherson is the region north of Crimea.  They are attacking Odessa while they spread the message of winding down Russian invasion operations.

Mostly they lie when their lips are moving. Otherwise they are too busy bombing and killing.
Title: Foolish
Post by: G M on May 12, 2022, 07:26:59 AM
https://thefederalist.com/2022/05/12/a-reckless-policy-of-bleeding-russia-in-ukraine-risks-getting-the-u-s-into-a-foolish-foreign-war/
Title: Sen. Rand Paul blocks fast track $40B to Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 13, 2022, 06:02:52 AM
WT

Paul blocks Ukrainian aid package

Senator says $40 billion bill lacks sufficient oversight on spending

BY HARIS ALIC AND JOSEPH CLARK THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Sen. Rand Paul on Thursday blocked the Senate’s attempt to fast-track President Biden’s $40 billion military and humanitarian aid package for Ukraine over concerns there is insufficient oversight and transparency into how the money is being spent.

Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer, New York Democrat, and Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, Kentucky Republican, both hoped for a swift final passage of the bill, after the House overwhelmingly approved the aid 368-57 on Tuesday.

But Mr. Paul, Kentucky Republican, blocked Mr. McConnell’s request for unanimous consent on the measure Thursday afternoon without the addition of language into the bill that would create a special inspector general to oversee the disbursal of aid to Ukraine.

The move was met with vitriol from both the Democrat and Republican leaders anxious to get the aid out the door. Mr. Paul’s objection will push the Senate’s final vote on the measure into next week.

“He is simply saying my way or the highway,” Mr. Schumer said. “When you have a proposal to amend a bill, you can’t just come to the floor and demand it by fiat. You have to convince other members to back it first. That is how the Senate works.”

Mr. McConnell reminded his colleagues of the urgency behind the aid.

“Sending lethal assistance to Ukraine is not just some kind of philanthropy,” he said. “This conflict has direct and major consequences for America’s national security and America’s national interest.”

Mr. Paul refused to budge on the added language, and raised further concerns about U.S. spending for the war amid economic uncertainty at home.

“My oath of office is to the U.S. Constitution, not any foreign nation … We cannot save Ukraine by dooming the U.S. economy,” Mr. Paul said. “It isn’t that we always have to be the Uncle Sam, the policeman that saves the world, particularly when it’s on borrowed money.” Mr. McConnell said, “Ukraine is not asking us to fight this war.”

“They’re only asking for the resources they need to defend themselves against this deranged invasion,” he said. “And they need this help right now.”

The bill, which includes $18.7 billion in military assistance, and funds to replenish U.S. stocks of weapons already sent to Ukraine, has overwhelming support in the Senate.

The bill hit an initial snag over Democrats’ calls to couple the aid with a proposal for $10 billion in additional COVID-19 funds.
Title: everyone now going to ukraine for photo ops
Post by: ccp on May 14, 2022, 07:34:10 AM
the in thing
the DC fad lately

did McConnell bring flowers ?:

https://www.newsmax.com/world/globaltalk/mitch-mcconnell-volodymyr-zelenskyy-ukraine-lethal-aid/2022/05/14/id/1069855/
Title: Re: everyone now going to ukraine for photo ops
Post by: G M on May 14, 2022, 07:41:03 AM
They need to check in on their money laundering operations.


the in thing
the DC fad lately

did McConnell bring flowers ?:

https://www.newsmax.com/world/globaltalk/mitch-mcconnell-volodymyr-zelenskyy-ukraine-lethal-aid/2022/05/14/id/1069855/
Title: WSJ: Ukes Winning
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 15, 2022, 02:20:26 AM
Ukraine Launches Counteroffensive to Disrupt Russian Supply Lines
Russian President Vladimir Putin warns Finland against joining NATO as GOP senators visit Kyiv

A multiple-rocket launcher fires near Svyatohirsk, eastern Ukraine. YASUYOSHI CHIBA/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
By Yaroslav TrofimovFollow
 and Mauro OrruFollow
Updated May 15, 2022 12:01 am ET


KYIV, Ukraine—Ukraine began a counteroffensive toward the eastern city of Izyum aimed at disrupting Russian supply lines into the Donbas region, officials said, as Ukrainian forces continued clearing villages north of Kharkiv and Russian President Vladimir Putin warned his Finnish counterpart that joining NATO would risk damaging relations with Moscow.

According to the Kremlin, Mr. Putin told Finland’s President Sauli Niinistö in a phone call Saturday that ending its decadeslong nonaligned defense policy by joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be a mistake for Helsinki. The Finnish leader initiated the call to explain to Mr. Putin how his invasion of Ukraine had altered the security environment, prompting Finland to seek NATO membership in the coming days.

“The conversation was direct and straightforward and was conducted without aggravations. Avoiding tension was considered important,” Mr. Niinistö said.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko, meanwhile, said that Moscow would need to take “adequate precautionary measures” if NATO were to deploy infrastructure for nuclear weapons near Russia’s borders, including in Finland.

On Saturday, Russia’s Ambassador to the U.S., Anatoly Antonov, said the war in Ukraine is increasingly drawing Washington into conflict with Moscow.

“The situation today, is extremely, extremely dangerous. The U.S. is being drawn deeper and deeper into conflict with the most unpredictable consequences for relations between the two nuclear powers,” Mr. Antonov said on Russian television.

As the war entered its 80th day, Russian offensive operations in Donbas remained largely stalled following the failure of Russia’s ambitious attempt to cross the Siverskyi Donets river and encircle the metropolitan area of Severodonetsk, the capital of the Ukrainian-administered Luhansk region.


With Western weapons continuing to flow into Ukraine, Ukrainian officials are beginning to say that a pivot in the war might be near, with Kyiv switching from defense to offense to reclaim large parts of southern and eastern Ukraine that remain under Russian rule.

“A strategic break in Ukraine’s favor is under way. This process will take time. But, in the long term, these trends make Russia’s defeat inevitable,” Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said in an address to Ukrainian citizens.

After Russia’s initial plans to seize the capital, Kyiv, failed amid Ukrainian resistance, Mr. Putin in late March ordered his forces to pull back from northern Ukraine and concentrate on seizing the entirety of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that make up Donbas. Mr. Putin in February recognized the independence of the Moscow-created proxy states in Donbas, the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics, which controlled roughly one-third of these two regions at the time.

Russia has established the forward headquarters of its operations to conquer Donbas in the town of Izyum, which straddles the Siverskyi Donets river in the Kharkiv region. Ukrainian troops have begun to push successfully toward the town, the head of the Kharkiv regional military administration, Oleh Synehubov, said Saturday.

“The Izyum direction remains our hottest point. That’s where our armed forces have begun a counteroffensive,” he said in a video address. “The enemy is retreating in some directions, which is the result of the character of our armed forces.”


With Russia’s monthlong offensive in Donbas showing only limited results, a bold attempt to cross the Siverskyi Donets and encircle Severodonetsk that Russian forces began ahead of Victory Day on May 9 was meant to achieve a breakthrough. Instead, the failed crossing near the village of Bilohorivka has turned into a disaster for Russia, significantly slowing its momentum in Donbas.

The full scale of this Russian setback is emerging only now, with satellite imagery showing more than 70 Russian tanks, armored personnel carriers and other armor destroyed after Ukrainian artillery and airstrikes sank three pontoon bridges and shelled the Russian beachhead in Bilohorivka.

“We have never seen such dumb stubbornness, going with a frontal assault and trying to build pontoons in the same place three times in a row. But they still keep trying,” said Luhansk Gov. Serhiy Haidai. He added that Ukrainian artillery keeps shelling the area and, according to intelligence intercepts, an entire Russian battalion is refusing orders to attempt yet another crossing in Bilohorivka. That claim couldn’t be independently confirmed.


While Moscow hasn’t acknowledged the events in Bilohorivka, accounts from Russian military officers and observers on Telegram have described it as one of the Russian military’s most catastrophic defeats in this war, calling for the dismissal and punishment of generals who devised the failed operation.

Reverse Side of the Medal, a channel close to the Wagner private military contractor that is actively involved in the war in Ukraine, pointed out sardonically that the Russian commanders in the Bilohorivka operation were “guided by the principle that the shell doesn’t fall into the same place twice and that if you don’t see the enemy, he cannot see you.”

Ukrainian artillery managed to destroy at least a battalion’s worth of Russian armor because it is employing drones and sophisticated reconnaissance technology to achieve precision, Wagner’s channel added. “The Armed Forces of Ukraine use the Western system of smart battle management, and we use a ruler on a paper map,” it said.


In Kyiv, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R., Ky.) and GOP Sens. Susan Collins of Maine, John Cornyn of Texas and John Barrasso of Wyoming met Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on Saturday, according to Mr. Zelensky and a U.S. official. The meeting comes after House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D., Calif.) and a delegation of Democratic lawmakers went to the capital city to meet with Mr. Zelensky earlier this month.

In a statement with accompanying video, Mr. Zelensky said the visit was a powerful signal of bipartisan support for Ukraine from Congress and the American people. A $40 billion aid package for Ukraine is stalled in the Senate over objections from GOP Sen. Rand Paul of Kentucky. Mr. McConnell and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D., N.Y.) had pushed for the bill’s passage together Thursday to request unanimous agreement from all 100 senators to allow a vote on the bill immediately.

A U.S. official confirmed the visit and said it wasn’t publicized in advance because of security concerns. Representatives for the senators didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment.

North of Donbas, a string of Ukrainian military victories in recent days pushed Russian forces outside of field artillery range of the city of Kharkiv, where more than 2,000 residential apartment buildings have been destroyed in more than two months of pounding. In a sign of relative normalcy returning to Kharkiv, the municipality said public-transport services would resume Monday. It will initially be free of charge given that so many city residents have lost their jobs because of the war, said Mayor Ihor Terekhov.

Ukraine’s military has confirmed that its forces have reached the town of Ternova, on the border with Russia north of Kharkiv. “The enemy didn’t conduct active combat actions in the Kharkiv direction,” Ukraine’s General Staff said Saturday. “Its main effort was focused on pulling back troops from the city of Kharkiv, maintaining positions and protecting supply lines.”

The retreat of Russian forces from areas north of Kharkiv is covered by poorly armed recruits drafted in the Luhansk People’s Republic. In a video released on Telegram on Friday, these fighters said that their battalion, which fled to the Russian border north of Kharkiv, was stranded at the gate, with Russian authorities refusing to let them cross and threatening to imprison them if they don’t turn around and fight.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on May 15, 2022, 07:50:07 AM
Russia is using some hardcore bombs...might be illegal.

https://twitter.com/i/status/1525850300187258883 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1525850300187258883)
Title: WSJ: Good news, Uke refugees beginning to return
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 16, 2022, 04:00:46 AM
Ukrainian Refugees Are Heading Home in Droves
Many are returning after Russian pullback from parts of the country: ‘We had the feeling that we were in the wrong place.’

Hanna Kopylova traveled through the Krakow International Airport in Poland from Bergamo, Italy, on her way to return to Kyiv.
By Natalia Ojewska and Ian LovettFollow
/Photographs by Sasha Maslov for The Wall Street Journal
May 16, 2022 6:06 am ET

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PRZEMYSL, Poland—When  Russia invaded Ukraine nearly three months ago, Hanna Kopylova fled Kyiv with her two children for northern Italy.

The family was safe in Bergamo, where her parents have owned a home for years. But on a recent weekend, Ms. Kopylova kissed her children goodbye and headed back into Ukraine on her own.

“I am afraid,” said Ms. Kopylova, 34 years old, but added, “When you see all this bravery on the news, you want to be part of it.”

Ukrainian refugees are heading home in droves, following the Russian pullback from the central part of the country.


People lined up to board a train to Kyiv at the station in Przemyśl, Poland, this month.
More people have returned to Ukraine than left the country in recent days, the country’s border service said on Sunday. On Saturday, 37,000 people left Ukraine via crossings to the European Union and Moldova, and 46,000 entered the country. Crossings in and out of Poland—where the majority of those who fled Ukraine have gone—have been roughly even since mid-April.

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Overall, millions of Ukrainians remain in exile across Europe: Almost six million have left the country since the war began, according to United Nations statistics, while roughly 1.5 million people have entered the country over the same period.

Since the Russian pullback, many areas that Ukrainians fled in February and March are now relatively safe, including Kyiv.

“Refugees almost always want to go home,“ said Gillian Triggs, assistant high commissioner for protection with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. ”If there has been a withdrawal of Russian forces and they want to go back to their villages, they will do it, even though they know the shells are still falling and there is danger.”

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Though occasional shells continue to hit the capital and its surroundings, more refugees each day are deciding that it is now time to head home. Some want to see their husbands (who, in most cases, weren’t allowed to leave the country), or take care of elderly parents. Others, like Ms. Kopylova, say they feel a need to help their country however they can.

Even after her ex-husband told her she couldn’t bring the children back with her, Ms. Kopylova said, she remained determined to go. Her partner is in the territorial defense, and she said she hopes to volunteer bringing food and other goods to recently liberated areas: “I have a car, hands and legs. I can help, too.”

Throughout the war, Ukrainians have been heading back home for a variety of reasons. In the early weeks, thousands of young men who had been living abroad returned home to fight. Some people found work ferrying humanitarian or military aid into the country. Older Ukrainians often helped get their loved ones out but then returned home themselves, preferring the risks of war to the prospect of restarting life in a foreign country.


Liubor Piatetska got ready to bring her daughters to Kyiv from the Przemyśl train station in Przemyśl, Poland.

Karina Tomchuk, left, and Alina Kabanets waited for a train in Przemyśl on their way back home to the Kyiv region.
Though there are no statistics on exactly who is crossing the border, the demographics of those heading back to Ukraine appear to have shifted. In the Polish border town of Przemyśl, hundreds of women lined up for trains back to Ukraine on a recent weekend.

Like several others lined up on a recent Sunday, Liubor Piatetska, a 26-year-old mother of two, was bringing her children back into Ukraine with her. During the two months since she fled Kyiv to stay with friends in Sweden, she had hardly been able to speak to her husband. A Ukrainian soldier who has been fighting in Kharkiv, he seldom has an internet connection. He sometimes manages to call his mother, who is also in Ukraine, and she gives Ms. Piatetska updates. Her parents and siblings also remained in Ukraine.

“Everyone in Sweden was telling me, ‘Stay, please stay,’” she said. “It’s love that brings me home. The love for Ukraine and of my husband. Even though we had very comfortable living conditions in Sweden, we had the feeling that we were in the wrong place.”

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Alona Gorkavchuk took a bus home to Ukraine with daughter Liza after two months spent in Warsaw.
Ms. Piatetska said she hopes to return to her job in an electronics shop. The city’s subway has reopened, albeit at a vastly reduced schedule. A ban on the sale of alcohol imposed in the first days of the war has been lifted. And businesses that were closed for months are starting to open their doors again—adding to the allure of home for those who have spent the last few months abroad.

“I have a coffeehouse on my street that has prepared food for soldiers for two months, and now half the day they prepare coffee again,” said Daryna Antoniuk, a 21-year-old student and journalist who spent the first months of the war in Latvia and has gone back to Ukraine “They kept me so motivated.”

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What does the return of refugees indicate about the future of Ukraine? Join the conversation below.

Returnees are aware of the dangers. A Russian missile hit a 21-story apartment building over two weeks ago when the United Nations secretary-general was visiting the city. But as the war has dragged into its third month, getting to go home, they say, means accepting some level of risk. Many acknowledged they might end up having to flee again.

Marina Volynets has already fled conflict with Russia twice. A native of Donetsk, she first left to stay with her sister in Amsterdam in 2014, when Russian-backed forces invaded that region. Unable to find a job, she moved back to Ukraine and settled in Kyiv the following year, where she lived until February. Then, she left for Amsterdam a second time, before continuing to Portugal.

Ms. Volynets has now returned to Kyiv. Her husband is unable to leave the country and is working as a cook for the Ukrainian army. Her parents also stayed in Ukraine.

“I find it more difficult to stay away and just wait” for the war to end without any idea when that will be, she said. “Yes, it will be more difficult and more scary and more dangerous” at home, she said, “but at least it will be our life as a family.”
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on May 21, 2022, 04:19:24 PM
In the last 72 h, the battle has been moving Russia's way. From the Azov battalion surrender (2400 soldiers), to many areas in the Donbass region. Something has changed.
Title: Any way out in Ukraine?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 22, 2022, 07:21:23 AM
Some interesting thoughts in this one:

https://www.golocalprov.com/news/putin-in-ukraine-no-way-out-mackubin-owens?fbclid=IwAR2v5GgwFeVUr1tOVWZvNhVoz_Y_boOrhYEzLL0v_Z5lmil4OQSj9S-l2OI
Title: Ukes vs. Noam Chomsky
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 22, 2022, 11:56:30 AM


https://blogs.berkeley.edu/2022/05/19/open-letter-to-noam-chomsky-and-other-like-minded-intellectuals-on-the-russia-ukraine-war/?fbclid=IwAR3eFudl6QDfWqBS7q6M3i_lAygt9s0f1APG3rc7ME-xJkqLIgr7d5_FTeY
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on May 22, 2022, 02:50:03 PM
Ukraine could have held a referendum in Donbas (Minsk agreement) and agreed to Crimea as Russian territory. Its too late now. Russia is focussed on getting the whole of Donbas, once that is done, Odessa will be challenged and after that a land bridge to Transnystria. Over the longer term, Russia has more resources and potent weapons and will win.

The loss of the nazi Azov battalion was a big psychological victory for Russia and a loss for Ukr. After their surrender, Russia has been gaining territory and Zelensky is starting to talk peace.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on May 22, 2022, 09:11:04 PM
Ukraine could have held a referendum in Donbas (Minsk agreement) and agreed to Crimea as Russian territory. Its too late now. Russia is focussed on getting the whole of Donbas, once that is done, Odessa will be challenged and after that a land bridge to Transnystria. Over the longer term, Russia has more resources and potent weapons and will win.

The loss of the nazi Azov battalion was a big psychological victory for Russia and a loss for Ukr. After their surrender, Russia has been gaining territory and Zelensky is starting to talk peace.

I agree.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on May 26, 2022, 05:32:29 PM
Look like mainstream media has started to show that things may not be going all that well for Ukr. They have lost a lot of territory in the Donbas.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/26/ukraine-frontline-russia-military-severodonetsk/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on May 27, 2022, 04:33:09 AM
Dotted pink/yellow areas are recent Russian advances

(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FTusrE4WAAgH8G-?format=jpg&name=large)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on May 29, 2022, 11:42:38 AM
Some historical perspective on Ukr

https://contra.substack.com/p/the-road-to-the-russo-ukrainian-war?s=w
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 29, 2022, 01:13:06 PM
Very interesting!
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on May 30, 2022, 05:35:36 PM
Even the NYT has given up on Ukr.

https://www.zerohedge.com/political/new-york-times-dramatic-shift-victory-ukraine
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 30, 2022, 05:58:32 PM
Wonder where the $40B is going to go?
Title: Somehow this is not getting much coverage
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 02, 2022, 08:26:07 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/ukraine-fires-human-rights-chief-perpetuating-russian-troop-systematic-rape-stories?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=698
Title: These weapons will find their way to W. Europe and N. America
Post by: G M on June 02, 2022, 09:29:14 PM
https://twitter.com/imetatronink/status/1531639067330215936
Title: Re: These weapons will find their way to W. Europe and N. America
Post by: G M on June 03, 2022, 08:14:06 AM
https://twitter.com/imetatronink/status/1531639067330215936

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/02/ukraine-weapons-end-up-criminal-hands-says-interpol-chief-jurgen-stock
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on June 03, 2022, 08:21:51 AM
Zelensky claims Russia now occupies 125,000 sqkm of territory, which is about 77,000 sq miles, almost twice of my conservative estimate of 40,000 sq miles a months ago. Giving weapons to Ukr will not help. because Russia will use more powerful weapons on Ukr and destroy it completely. The USA is willing to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian...in the process we will end up destroying our own economy and the US dollar. Already reports of US stingers etc finding their way to the Middle east and then will be used in European cities.

Check this very interesting read, by someone who interviewed Putin many times and knows a thing or two.
https://unherd.com/2022/06/putins-war-is-just-beginning/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 03, 2022, 08:29:45 AM
Exactly.


Zelensky claims Russia now occupies 125,000 sqkm of territory, which is about 77,000 sq miles, almost twice of my conservative estimate of 40,000 sq miles a months ago. Giving weapons to Ukr will not help. because Russia will use more powerful weapons on Ukr and destroy it completely. The USA is willing to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian...in the process we will end up destroying our own economy and the US dollar. Already reports of US stingers etc finding their way to the Middle east and then will be used in European cities.

Check this very interesting read, by someone who interviewed Putin many times and knows a thing or two.
https://unherd.com/2022/06/putins-war-is-just-beginning/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 03, 2022, 07:11:38 PM
Very interesting article YA.

What does it imply for the argument that all would be well but for the Ukes wanting to join NATO?
Title: NY Post: Essential to deny Russia's land bridge to Crimea
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 04, 2022, 12:48:35 PM


https://nypost.com/2022/06/03/we-must-stop-russias-land-bridge-to-crimea-now/?fbclid=IwAR3MBIA3qnc9H71ezx92HKOHP5sjH7cLYt9E5yF7UO3wakkzsjLr_w2KGLE
Title: NRO: Sunk Costs and Pot Commitment
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 04, 2022, 01:20:01 PM
By MICHAEL BRENDAN DOUGHERTY
June 3, 2022 10:20 AM
In the great game around Ukraine, Joe Biden seems like a player who is going to have trouble distinguishing between sunk costs and pot commitment.
Sometimes in a game of poker you feel compelled to throw more chips into the middle of the table even when you know you’re likely to lose the hand. Usually, it’s a psychological trick you’ve played on yourself. It’s the sunk-cost fallacy. You’ve already invested so much on the opening bet, then more on the subsequent flop, and more still on the turn, that your pride or your fear moves your hand forward at the end. You’re just hoping to get lucky.

But sometimes, throwing more chips in at that point is the mathematically correct decision. The combination of your own and others’ circumstances conspire to make throwing good money after bad the most rational decision. Perhaps you’re running low on chips altogether, and a number of players acted irrationally at the start of the hand, over-betting at first but folding once they suspected that another player had drawn the top possible hand. You didn’t make your straight and are stuck with something no better than a high pair. But the pot has grown to a size 30 times larger than your remaining stack of chips. Nothing can be undone. You suspect the last remaining player has a full house. All that’s left is your small remaining bet and the potential large prize. This is what’s known as “pot commitment.” You have every reason to believe that you’re going into the final card well behind in the hand, and your chance of “sucking out” at the end is small. But the pot is too large now. Mathematically, your small chance of winning is overwhelmed by the prize itself. You can’t turn away now. You just have to push your chips in and hope it works out.

Many players never quite master the math that allows them to distinguish between falling for a sunk-cost fallacy and recognizing the actual pot odds. Sometimes they coincide — playing like a sucker for sunk costs leads one to be pot-committed. In each situation, the play was likely driven by improbable turns of play and the consequent emotional swings. A hand that was developing well may sink in the end.

In the great game around Ukraine, Joe Biden seems like a player who is going to have trouble distinguishing between sunk costs and pot commitment.

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The ‘Dangerous Inversion’
‘There Are a Lot of People Very Close to the President Who Privately Understand That This Is a Complete Disaster’
He doesn’t seem to know his own redlines. For weeks, he tried to draw them. No MiG aircraft for Ukraine — Biden himself scuttled that in March. By April, with Ukraine doing better than expected and Russia on the back foot, NATO began delivering ready-to-assemble MiGs. More recently, Biden has gone back and forth about sending certain rocket systems to Russia.

In Biden’s March speech in Poland, the drafted remarks were about limiting U.S. commitment to Ukraine and restating the depth of U.S. commitment to existing NATO members. He vowed that the Kremlin was wrong “to portray NATO enlargement as an imperial project aimed at destabilizing Russia.”

But late in the speech, Biden’s emotions got the best of him, and he departed from the text to call for regime change in Russia. Putin “cannot remain in power,” he said, a comment that had to be promptly walked back by the White House. Though later, Defense secretary Lloyd Austin explained that the U.S. wants to “see Russia weakened” in this war. This reflected a lot of loose talk from the administration at the start of the war that the hope was to force Putin’s downfall.

At the flop, Russia’s war against Ukraine looked like an absolute dud. And the U.S. has started investing its chips: our treasure, and our nation’s honor and credibility. In recent weeks, Russia has limited its operations, settling on a devastating form of artillery attack in the Donbas that is yielding results.

This presents the unattractive possibility that Putin may be able to claim some kind of victory out of this war, perhaps a smaller one than he imagined, but one that he can reasonably say was over not just Ukraine but NATO itself. Putin is not just “demilitarizing” Ukraine but depleting America’s stock of Javelin missiles in the bargain. All the current talk of NATO rejuvenated will sour on that turn of the cards. And Joe Biden would face a Republican Party that would unite instantly on his weakness if not his recklessness. When players get emotional in poker they go “on tilt” and start playing hyper-aggressively and irrationally. There’s danger ahead.
Title: Re: These weapons will find their way to W. Europe and N. America
Post by: G M on June 08, 2022, 10:01:58 AM
https://twitter.com/imetatronink/status/1531639067330215936

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/02/ukraine-weapons-end-up-criminal-hands-says-interpol-chief-jurgen-stock

https://www.rebelnews.com/swedish_police_warn_that_weapons_sent_to_ukraine_could_land_in_the_hands_of_criminal_gangs
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 08, 2022, 10:18:17 AM
Yet another reason to not let the Feds disarm or downgrade us.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 08, 2022, 10:30:38 AM
Yet another reason to not let the Feds disarm or downgrade us.

You better believe Putin will be sure to deliver them to various groups here. I'm not sure how you say "Payback" in Russian, but I know it's a concept they believe in deeply.

Javelin missiles can chew up Police Bearcats quite easily.

Title: MY
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 12, 2022, 07:29:48 AM
https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/2268044/the-middle-east-for-white-people
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on June 15, 2022, 04:40:39 AM
Pope sides with Putin
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/06/14/pope-nato-may-have-provoked-russian-invasion-ukraine-not-pro/?utm_content=telegraph&utm_medium=Social&utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1655216267-1 (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/06/14/pope-nato-may-have-provoked-russian-invasion-ukraine-not-pro/?utm_content=telegraph&utm_medium=Social&utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1655216267-1)
Title: Ukraine goes under the Deep State bus
Post by: G M on June 15, 2022, 10:00:06 AM
https://www.theburningplatform.com/2022/06/15/todays-sitrep-messy-grind-again-and-more-great-walkback/#more-271781
Title: WT: Euro unity cracking
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 16, 2022, 02:11:34 AM
UKRAINE

War-weary Europeans start to crack unity against Russia

Former NATO officials warn of ‘bad peace’

BY BEN WOLFGANG THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Cracks are deepening across Europe over how to handle the Russia-Ukraine endgame, according to data released Wednesday, as a growing number of Europeans favor immediate peace over the continuation of a hard-line anti-Russia stance that has defined Western policy since the start of the war nearly four months ago.

Former NATO Secretary- General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said Europe has hit a “fork in the road” with respect to the war in Ukraine. He acknowledged that rifts have emerged as the fighting drags on, casualties mount, and food and fuel prices skyrocket around the world. Other former NATO officials warned some European leaders — presumably those in Italy and Hungary, the most vocal proponents of an immediate cease-fire — against pushing Ukraine “into a bad peace” and offering any concessions to the aggressor, Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Even as NATO defense

officials gathered in Brussels on Wednesday to map out the next round of assistance to the Ukrainian military and as President Biden announced another $1 billion U.S. military aid package, it became increasingly clear that the European public is rapidly growing weary of war and wants its leaders to push for peace.

Ukrainian officials, led by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, have said they are fighting to oust Russia from every inch of Ukrainian territory, including the Crimean Peninsula, which Mr. Putin annexed eight years ago. Mr. Zenelskyy’s goal was spurred by early victories by Kyiv. U.S. and NATO officials have repeatedly said they would back any peace deal that is acceptable to the Zelenskyy government.

Complicating that message are statements from world leaders. President Biden insisted that Mr. Putin must step down from power, and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said Russia must be “weakened” and incapable of such aggression again.

A study by the European Council on Foreign Relations published Wednesday found that a plurality of Europeans, about 35%, favor “peace now even at the cost of Ukrainian concessions to Russia.” The startling figure strongly suggests that Europe’s appetite to hold Moscow accountable for the war may be crumbling.

The survey was conducted in mid-May and sampled 8,000 Europeans.

About 22% of respondents said “justice” is the most important consideration. They say only Russia’s clear defeat can bring about peace. Another 23% declined to choose between those options, and 20% were classified as swing voters.

The survey showed extreme differences from one country to another. For example, 52% of the Italian public and 49% of the German public favor immediate peace, but just 16% of Polish citizens share that view. Instead, 41% of Poles say defeating Russia is the No. 1 priority and the only path to peace, compared with 19% of Germans and 16% of Italians.

In France, 41% called for peace and just 20% fell into the “justice” category. In Britain, the public was split, with 22% calling for immediate peace and 21% saying Russia must be defeated. The remaining 39% of French citizens and 58% of Britons either declined to choose or were classified as swing voters, according to the report.

“The findings of the poll suggest that European public opinion is shifting, and that the toughest days may lie ahead. The resilience of European democracies will mostly depend on the capacity of governments to sustain public support for policies that will ultimately bring pain to different social groups,” the European Council on Foreign Relations said in a statement accompanying its report. “The survey reveals a growing gap between the stated positions of many European governments and the public mood in their countries. The big looming divide is between those who want to end the war as quickly as possible and those who want to carry on fighting until Russia has been defeated.”

Fueling the divide is the transformation of the conflict into a bloody slog in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region. Russian forces are waging a war of attrition against an outgunned and outmanned Ukrainian military. The fiercest fighting has been in and around Sievierodonetsk, a key strategic city that remains contested despite weeks of an unrelenting Russian assault. The Ukrainian governor of the Luhansk province, Serhiy Haidai, told The Associated Press on Wednesday that the situation inside the city is growing worse.

“But our military is holding back the enemy from three sides at once,” he said. “The enemy is advancing because of significant advantage in artillery and people, but the Ukrainian army is holding on to its positions in the city.”

Russian troops reportedly hit weapons depots in western Ukraine in a bid to stop badly needed guns, ammunition and equipment from reaching the front lines in the Donbas. Mr. Zelenskyy said in a Tuesday evening video address that his troops will keep fighting.

“The losses, unfortunately, are painful, but we have to hold out,” he said. “The more losses the enemy suffers there, the less strength it will have to continue the aggression. Therefore, the Donbas is key to determining who will dominate in the coming weeks.”

Arming Ukraine Mr. Zelenskyy spoke by phone with Mr. Biden on Wednesday. Shortly afterward, the U.S. president announced the latest American aid package.

“I informed President Zelenskyy that the United States is providing another $1 billion in security assistance for Ukraine, including additional artillery and coastal defense weapons, as well as ammunition for the artillery and advanced rocket systems that the Ukrainians need to support their defensive operations in the Donbas,” Mr. Biden said in a statement released by the White House.

The latest U.S. shipment includes artillery rocket munitions, 18 additional M-77 howitzers and the tactical vehicles to tow them, and 36,000 rounds of 155 mm howitzer ammunition.

Mr. Austin announced the details during a press conference at NATO headquarters in Brussels.

“Ukraine is facing a pivotal moment on the battlefield,” Mr. Austin said. “We’re seeing what [Mr. Zelenskyy] warned us about: After failing to take Kyiv and after reassessing its combat aims, Russia has shifted its focus to the Donbas.”

European leaders also have vowed to ramp up weapons shipments to Ukraine, but growing public calls for immediate peace will surely complicate those efforts. Former NATO officials say some European governments are making a grave mistake by appearing to weaken their stance toward Russia.

“Politically, NATO allies could also do much more. First of all, we could strengthen deterrence … by keeping all options on the table,” former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said Wednesday at a virtual forum hosted by the Atlantic Council, a leading Washington think tank.

“To my mind, many NATO leaders have been too eager to exclude this or that action,” he said. “I think we should keep our adversary in uncertainty. That’s the most effi cient deterrent. And NATO allies should not push Ukraine into a bad peace. It’s only for the Ukrainians, it’s for President Zelenskyy and his government to decide the terms of a cease-fire or a peace deal.”

Mr. Rasmussen’s comments seem to have been a direct response to the public positions of Italy and Hungary, which late last month pushed the European Union to call for a cease-fire in Ukraine and direct peace talks with Mr. Putin. That position seemed to break from those of other key EU members, which have publicly insisted that helping Ukraine defeat Russia and push Russian forces out of Ukrainian territory must be the overarching goal.

Mr. Scheffer said those opposing viewpoints are coming to a head.

“I think politically, we might be at a fork in the road,” he said at the Atlantic Council event. “And I see from time to time our leaders in NATO and in the European Union making comments which give me the impression that they’re not always singing from the same hymn sheet.”

He acknowledged the wildly different views of the Russian threat across Europe.

“If you’re living in Poland or living in the Baltic states, the threat is perceived differently than when you live in the Hague or in Madrid or in Rome, for that matter,” he said.
Title: The Ukes make their case for victory
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 17, 2022, 03:06:29 PM
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-06-17/how-ukraine-will-win?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=How%20Ukraine%20Will%20Win&utm_content=20220617&utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017
Title: Re: The Ukes make their case for victory
Post by: G M on June 17, 2022, 08:46:54 PM
 :roll:



https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-06-17/how-ukraine-will-win?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=How%20Ukraine%20Will%20Win&utm_content=20220617&utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 18, 2022, 05:34:12 AM
So, if you were President, what would you do now?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 18, 2022, 06:51:36 AM
So, if you were President, what would you do now?

Do what should have been done at the start, cut a deal while there are still things worth saving.

Or, you know, not provoke a war to begin with.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 18, 2022, 06:54:37 AM
So, pull the rug from under the hard fighting Ukes and accede to Russian conquest so far?  Any concerns about devastating what remains of our credibility as an ally?  Might this affect our efforts to form an alliance to stop China? 
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 18, 2022, 06:58:36 AM
So, pull the rug from under the hard fighting Ukes and accede to Russian conquest so far?  Any concerns about devastating what remains of our credibility as an ally?  Might this affect our efforts to form an alliance to stop China?

Afghanistan ended our credibility. Continuing to feed Ukes into the meat grinder does nothing. Russia is winning.

Anyone paying attention knows the US is a treacherous friend and a weak enemy.

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 18, 2022, 07:04:27 AM
So, we should not fight China becoming #1?

Looks like China is about the expand upon and improve Putin's strategy here:

https://www.theepochtimes.com/china-is-going-to-be-more-aggressive-after-newly-signed-order-analyst_4539866.html?utm_source=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2022-06-18&utm_medium=email&est=WsmDGtvU62xuenv5%2FM2UD0r88balK4uFsSegL5%2BTk6DK4lkZJW%2B2GK%2FTsLV7y2cRy8Az
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 18, 2022, 07:19:43 AM
China owns our "elites". Who is fighting them?


So, we should not fight China becoming #1?

Looks like China is about the expand upon and improve Putin's strategy here:

https://www.theepochtimes.com/china-is-going-to-be-more-aggressive-after-newly-signed-order-analyst_4539866.html?utm_source=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2022-06-18&utm_medium=email&est=WsmDGtvU62xuenv5%2FM2UD0r88balK4uFsSegL5%2BTk6DK4lkZJW%2B2GK%2FTsLV7y2cRy8Az
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 18, 2022, 07:53:25 AM
Well, this forum is, as are patriotic Americans voting in November.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 18, 2022, 07:58:44 AM
Well, this forum is, as are patriotic Americans voting in November.

https://www.axios.com/2020/09/01/bloomberg-group-trump-election-night-scenarios

Brace yourself for another "red mirage".

"Fortified" elections, for your protection!
Title: Interesting read on the Right Sector in Donbas
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 18, 2022, 12:19:58 PM
Ahem , , , returning to the subject of this thread:

https://unherd.com/2022/06/on-the-frontline-with-the-right-sector-militia/?fbclid=IwAR0Er1OVHqMC1RHRa6YYoz0LWHaSK2h8Mmn3M0LRrOtaWBr3Me6UqED6y44
Title: WSJ: Where are the rockets for Ukraine?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 18, 2022, 03:08:16 PM
Where Are the Rockets for Ukraine?
The U.S. has supplied only four advanced rocket-launch system known as Himars in the war with Russia. Kyiv says it needs 60.
By The Editorial BoardFollow
June 17, 2022 7:04 pm ET


The battle for eastern Ukraine has been raging for more than 60 days, and it was foreseeable and foreseen that this long-range artillery duel would favor Russia. The mystery is why U.S. weapons support continues to be halting, and the latest example is the anemic offerings of multiple-launch rocket systems.


The Biden Administration this week announced another $1 billion in security assistance for Ukraine, and included are more munitions for a rocket system known as Himars. These rocket launchers pack a punch with precise munitions, and they can “shoot and scoot” to elude Russian retaliation.

But the U.S. hasn’t provided nearly enough launchers to blunt the Russian equipment advantage. Ohio Republican Rob Portman, who is co-chairman of the Senate Ukraine caucus, on the Senate floor this week offered a blunt assessment of the facts on the ground: Brutal fighting continues in Severodonetsk, where the Russians are making grinding progress, and the Luhansk region could fall within weeks if the Ukrainians can’t get longer-range artillery.

“Because the Russians have more artillery than the Ukrainians and their weapons have longer ranges,” the Senator explained, “the Russian forces concentrate massive firepower on Ukrainian positions at distances, which the Ukrainian forces cannot reach.” Then the Russians “move in. They destroy territory. They occupy it.” The “disparity in the quality and quantity of artillery” has put Ukraine at “a distinct disadvantage.”

How many rocket systems do our friends need? A Ukrainian military adviser told the Guardian earlier this month: “If we get 60” systems “then the Russians will lose all ability to advance anywhere, they will be stopped dead in their tracks. If we get 40 they will advance, albeit very slowly with heavy casualties; with 20 they will continue to advance with higher casualties than now.”

And how many rocket systems has the U.S., the world’s premiere military power, offered so far? Four. And these launchers, which the Biden Administration announced on June 1, won’t reach the battlefield with trained crews until roughly the end of the month, U.S. defense officials have estimated. The Brits and Germans have offered their own rocket systems—but only three apiece.

As Sen. Portman noted, the U.S. is also withholding rockets with the longest range. The ostensible reason is that the Biden Team worries about Ukrainians striking into Russian territory. But the Ukrainians have promised only to defend their sovereign land, and withholding the weapons suggests we don’t trust them.

The stakes are high, and not only for Ukraine. If the Russian military mops up the Donbas, Vladimir Putin will have grabbed more land that he can sell at home as a victory. He can then regroup and push southwest toward Odessa, robbing the Ukrainians of their coast line and building a bridge to Transnistria in Moldova. Europe will be less secure, and Mr. Biden will bear some responsibility.

Skeptics of U.S. aid to Ukraine like to say we can’t support the country forever. But that’s all the more reason to get Kyiv the right weapons sooner and in enough numbers so Ukraine can stop and then roll back Russian advances. That’s the only way to get Mr. Putin to the negotiating table with any hope of a cease-fire on Ukrainian terms favorable to NATO.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on June 18, 2022, 07:40:11 PM
Ukr-Russia war has become a proxy war run by the U.S. Russia is escalating by stopping/reducing gas flows to developed economies like Italy and Germany. Very soon they will cry Uncle. European unity may not last too long come winter. Giving Ukr heavy weapons does not change the result, Russia starts using heavier weapons. More civilians die and Ukr infrastructure gets damaged.

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 18, 2022, 10:34:53 PM
Yes.

Russia will win.

Ukr-Russia war has become a proxy war run by the U.S. Russia is escalating by stopping/reducing gas flows to developed economies like Italy and Germany. Very soon they will cry Uncle. European unity may not last too long come winter. Giving Ukr heavy weapons does not change the result, Russia starts using heavier weapons. More civilians die and Ukr infrastructure gets damaged.
Title: When the lies come home-Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 18, 2022, 10:36:49 PM
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/when-the-lies-come-home/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on June 19, 2022, 06:00:27 AM
Yes.

Russia will win.

Minor correction...has already won. It occupies 20 % or more of territory, not a single sq.mile is likely to be returned. The question now is how much more will Ukr lose. Unless Zelensky. quickly compromises, Odessa and Transnystria will also go in this round. If Europe gives up on Russian energy, their economies go into recession, or at best are severely hampered due to high costs of purchasing oil from elsewhere. Oil is a zero sum game, countries need oil, if they purchase from the Middle East, Russian oil simply gets diverted to the rest of the world. News reports are that Russian oil is purchased cheaply by India,  refined and resold at a higher price back to Europe.

This ZH article offers insights into Russian thinking https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/luongo-russias-new-rules (https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/luongo-russias-new-rules)

With the economy in a tail spin, someone is sure to ask Biden why are we sending billions to Ukr.  Ukr survives as long as the US funds them.
Title: Garry Kasparov: Man the fukk up!
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 19, 2022, 08:44:53 AM
Awakened to Putin’s Threat, Biden and the West Nod Off Again
The president appeared on ‘Jimmy Kimmel Live!’ and didn’t mention Russia’s war against Ukraine in a 23-minute interview.
By Garry Kasparov
June 17, 2022 6:53 pm ET


Earlier this month President Biden addressed the nation. Rather than do so from behind the Resolute Desk, he went on “Jimmy Kimmel Live!” In a 23-minute interview, Russia’s war on Ukraine wasn’t mentioned once. With domestic issues such as inflation, the Jan. 6 hearings, abortion and gun control on the president’s plate, the war in Ukraine may seem less of a priority. But it isn’t. Providing Ukraine with everything it needs to fight the Russians is the right—and popular—thing to do.

Yet Mr. Biden seems as if he’d rather pass the buck than act. During remarks at a Democratic fundraiser two days after the Kimmel interview, he said that President Volodymyr Zelensky “didn’t want to hear it” when warned about Russia’s imminent invasion. The Ukrainians deny this, but even if it were true, what of the U.S. ignoring its own warnings? No sanctions or aid was deployed to deter Mr. Putin’s invasion. Mr. Zelensky was surely skeptical that any U.S. support would be forthcoming after the fighting started.

Now we know the high cost of that failure to act—the slaughter, destruction and war crimes in Ukraine, and the food and fuel crises around the world. Instead of working to contain Mr. Putin in the eight years since he first invaded Ukraine, instead of insulating themselves against blackmail by becoming less dependent on Russian exports, American and European governments kicked the can down the road.

They also kept the door open to Mr. Putin, giving him confidence along with the hundreds of billions of dollars in oil and gas revenues he used to arm his war machine. Mr. Biden had a summit and several calls with Mr. Putin, and for what? Mr. Putin has stayed in power for 22 years by ignoring what weak Western leaders say and watching what they do. He took note as U.S. intelligence correctly predicted his long-planned invasion but did nothing to stop it. He watched as the first U.S. offer of help to Ukraine was to evacuate Mr. Zelensky under the assumption that Kyiv would fall within hours. Ukrainian courage and skill proved that assumption wrong.

Mr. Biden may be besieged politically, but Mr. Zelensky is besieged literally, as Ukraine suffers great loss of life in its defense of the eastern Donbas region. The only way to end the war is by helping Ukraine regain its territory and sovereignty and destroying Mr. Putin’s war machine. Anything less would allow Russia to consolidate and rearm, while Ukrainians under occupation suffer.

Mr. Putin made his intentions clear in a televised appearance on June 9, birthday of Peter the Great. Like Peter, Mr. Putin said he plans to “reclaim” lost lands. Unlike Peter, who modernized Russia and brought it closer to Europe, Mr. Putin is isolating Russia and moving it into a dark age. While dictators usually lie about everything they do, they are often candid about what they would like to do. Mr. Putin has long talked about rebuilding his beloved Soviet Empire. This week’s St. Petersburg International Economic Forum featured the presentation of a map of “former Ukraine,” from Kyiv to Odessa. Colonialism is not a Western European invention, despite what some progressives seem to think.

The escalation Mr. Biden and other Western leaders say they fear if they take stronger action to support Ukraine is guaranteed by their caution. Ukraine is the frontline now, but if Mr. Putin succeeds, he won’t stop there. A direct confrontation with North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces will become inevitable. If the goal is Ukrainian victory, the White House must say so clearly and everything Ukraine needs must be sent now.

During World War II, the American lend-lease program delivered millions of tons of materiel to the Soviet Union. I refuse to believe that it’s harder to get a few hundred howitzers into Ukraine today than it was to ship trucks and tanks past Nazi U-boats. Ukraine is running out of everything, even bullets. The U.S. has the way but not the will.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced another formidable Ukrainian military aid program at the Ramstein Air Base in Germany on Wednesday. The package includes some of the longer-range weapons Ukraine desperately needs. That’s good, but more is needed. Stop talking about negotiated outcomes that will only give Mr. Putin time to prepare his next attack. Helping Ukraine isn’t charity. Democracy can’t be defended on the cheap. The high cost of inflation will be nothing compared with the price Vladimir Putin will exact if he isn’t stopped now.

Mr. Kasparov is chairman of the Renew Democracy Initiative.
Title: Re: Garry Kasparov: Man the fukk up!
Post by: G M on June 19, 2022, 08:48:17 AM
You'd think he'd know checkmate when he saw it.


Awakened to Putin’s Threat, Biden and the West Nod Off Again
The president appeared on ‘Jimmy Kimmel Live!’ and didn’t mention Russia’s war against Ukraine in a 23-minute interview.
By Garry Kasparov
June 17, 2022 6:53 pm ET


Earlier this month President Biden addressed the nation. Rather than do so from behind the Resolute Desk, he went on “Jimmy Kimmel Live!” In a 23-minute interview, Russia’s war on Ukraine wasn’t mentioned once. With domestic issues such as inflation, the Jan. 6 hearings, abortion and gun control on the president’s plate, the war in Ukraine may seem less of a priority. But it isn’t. Providing Ukraine with everything it needs to fight the Russians is the right—and popular—thing to do.

Yet Mr. Biden seems as if he’d rather pass the buck than act. During remarks at a Democratic fundraiser two days after the Kimmel interview, he said that President Volodymyr Zelensky “didn’t want to hear it” when warned about Russia’s imminent invasion. The Ukrainians deny this, but even if it were true, what of the U.S. ignoring its own warnings? No sanctions or aid was deployed to deter Mr. Putin’s invasion. Mr. Zelensky was surely skeptical that any U.S. support would be forthcoming after the fighting started.

Now we know the high cost of that failure to act—the slaughter, destruction and war crimes in Ukraine, and the food and fuel crises around the world. Instead of working to contain Mr. Putin in the eight years since he first invaded Ukraine, instead of insulating themselves against blackmail by becoming less dependent on Russian exports, American and European governments kicked the can down the road.

They also kept the door open to Mr. Putin, giving him confidence along with the hundreds of billions of dollars in oil and gas revenues he used to arm his war machine. Mr. Biden had a summit and several calls with Mr. Putin, and for what? Mr. Putin has stayed in power for 22 years by ignoring what weak Western leaders say and watching what they do. He took note as U.S. intelligence correctly predicted his long-planned invasion but did nothing to stop it. He watched as the first U.S. offer of help to Ukraine was to evacuate Mr. Zelensky under the assumption that Kyiv would fall within hours. Ukrainian courage and skill proved that assumption wrong.

Mr. Biden may be besieged politically, but Mr. Zelensky is besieged literally, as Ukraine suffers great loss of life in its defense of the eastern Donbas region. The only way to end the war is by helping Ukraine regain its territory and sovereignty and destroying Mr. Putin’s war machine. Anything less would allow Russia to consolidate and rearm, while Ukrainians under occupation suffer.

Mr. Putin made his intentions clear in a televised appearance on June 9, birthday of Peter the Great. Like Peter, Mr. Putin said he plans to “reclaim” lost lands. Unlike Peter, who modernized Russia and brought it closer to Europe, Mr. Putin is isolating Russia and moving it into a dark age. While dictators usually lie about everything they do, they are often candid about what they would like to do. Mr. Putin has long talked about rebuilding his beloved Soviet Empire. This week’s St. Petersburg International Economic Forum featured the presentation of a map of “former Ukraine,” from Kyiv to Odessa. Colonialism is not a Western European invention, despite what some progressives seem to think.

The escalation Mr. Biden and other Western leaders say they fear if they take stronger action to support Ukraine is guaranteed by their caution. Ukraine is the frontline now, but if Mr. Putin succeeds, he won’t stop there. A direct confrontation with North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces will become inevitable. If the goal is Ukrainian victory, the White House must say so clearly and everything Ukraine needs must be sent now.

During World War II, the American lend-lease program delivered millions of tons of materiel to the Soviet Union. I refuse to believe that it’s harder to get a few hundred howitzers into Ukraine today than it was to ship trucks and tanks past Nazi U-boats. Ukraine is running out of everything, even bullets. The U.S. has the way but not the will.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced another formidable Ukrainian military aid program at the Ramstein Air Base in Germany on Wednesday. The package includes some of the longer-range weapons Ukraine desperately needs. That’s good, but more is needed. Stop talking about negotiated outcomes that will only give Mr. Putin time to prepare his next attack. Helping Ukraine isn’t charity. Democracy can’t be defended on the cheap. The high cost of inflation will be nothing compared with the price Vladimir Putin will exact if he isn’t stopped now.

Mr. Kasparov is chairman of the Renew Democracy Initiative.
Title: WSJ: Where are the rockets for Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 19, 2022, 01:33:57 PM
Where Are the Rockets for Ukraine?
The U.S. has supplied only four advanced rocket-launch system known as Himars in the war with Russia. Kyiv says it needs 60.
By The Editorial BoardFollow
June 17, 2022 7:04 pm ET


The battle for eastern Ukraine has been raging for more than 60 days, and it was foreseeable and foreseen that this long-range artillery duel would favor Russia. The mystery is why U.S. weapons support continues to be halting, and the latest example is the anemic offerings of multiple-launch rocket systems.


The Biden Administration this week announced another $1 billion in security assistance for Ukraine, and included are more munitions for a rocket system known as Himars. These rocket launchers pack a punch with precise munitions, and they can “shoot and scoot” to elude Russian retaliation.

But the U.S. hasn’t provided nearly enough launchers to blunt the Russian equipment advantage. Ohio Republican Rob Portman, who is co-chairman of the Senate Ukraine caucus, on the Senate floor this week offered a blunt assessment of the facts on the ground: Brutal fighting continues in Severodonetsk, where the Russians are making grinding progress, and the Luhansk region could fall within weeks if the Ukrainians can’t get longer-range artillery.

“Because the Russians have more artillery than the Ukrainians and their weapons have longer ranges,” the Senator explained, “the Russian forces concentrate massive firepower on Ukrainian positions at distances, which the Ukrainian forces cannot reach.” Then the Russians “move in. They destroy territory. They occupy it.” The “disparity in the quality and quantity of artillery” has put Ukraine at “a distinct disadvantage.”


How many rocket systems do our friends need? A Ukrainian military adviser told the Guardian earlier this month: “If we get 60” systems “then the Russians will lose all ability to advance anywhere, they will be stopped dead in their tracks. If we get 40 they will advance, albeit very slowly with heavy casualties; with 20 they will continue to advance with higher casualties than now.”

And how many rocket systems has the U.S., the world’s premiere military power, offered so far? Four. And these launchers, which the Biden Administration announced on June 1, won’t reach the battlefield with trained crews until roughly the end of the month, U.S. defense officials have estimated. The Brits and Germans have offered their own rocket systems—but only three apiece.

As Sen. Portman noted, the U.S. is also withholding rockets with the longest range. The ostensible reason is that the Biden Team worries about Ukrainians striking into Russian territory. But the Ukrainians have promised only to defend their sovereign land, and withholding the weapons suggests we don’t trust them.

The stakes are high, and not only for Ukraine. If the Russian military mops up the Donbas, Vladimir Putin will have grabbed more land that he can sell at home as a victory. He can then regroup and push southwest toward Odessa, robbing the Ukrainians of their coast line and building a bridge to Transnistria in Moldova. Europe will be less secure, and Mr. Biden will bear some responsibility.

Skeptics of U.S. aid to Ukraine like to say we can’t support the country forever. But that’s all the more reason to get Kyiv the right weapons sooner and in enough numbers so Ukraine can stop and then roll back Russian advances. That’s the only way to get Mr. Putin to the negotiating table with any hope of a cease-fire on Ukrainian terms favorable to NATO.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on June 19, 2022, 07:15:32 PM
Yes, the US should push back against China. The problem in Indian and Taiwan govt circles is that no one knows the true committment of the USA. If the US gets a good deal with China, both India and Taiwan will be dumped. Under Trump, the Europeans were threatened with weakening of NATO. Under Biden, the Saudi Alliance is weak. We throw around our weight willy nilly, but the almighty petrodollar is not what it used to be and rivals are coming up. Ukr. will be dumped by the USA and it will further damage our credibility. If tomorrow Putin decides to use a nuke on Ukr, does anyone think anybody is going to do anything about it ?. Ukr has no treaty with the USA. This is the reason, Putin will win in the final escalation. Infact, even if Putin nukes a NATO country like Poland, Estonia etc, the US may not respond with nukes (best guess), even though there would be war. Nukes will only be used, if there is a direct attack on America. Otherwise the complete destruction of the US (and Russia) is assured. I do not see any US president making that decision.

Title: Just hell on earth or a nuclear war because of Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 19, 2022, 09:14:57 PM
https://www.zerohedge.com/commodities/un-food-chief-says-hell-earth-looms-hunger-crisis-triggered-ukraine-war
Title: Garland to Ukraine
Post by: ccp on June 21, 2022, 07:40:32 AM
https://www.yahoo.com/news/ag-merrick-garland-visits-ukraine-130129749.html

seems like an odd thing for him to be doing
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on June 21, 2022, 02:32:22 PM

https://foxmetronews.com/news/eli-rosenbaum-top-us-nazi-hunter-to-lead-justice-department-effort-to-uncover-war-crimes-in-ukraine/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eli_Rosenbaum

still not clear to me why this is in the realm of the DOJ
but maybe it is .
Title: Ukraine: It's over
Post by: G M on June 23, 2022, 07:30:42 AM
https://weltwoche.ch/daily/this-war-has-been-lost-a-long-time-ago/


Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on June 26, 2022, 04:58:53 AM
This is an interesting take on the impact of industrialization capacity between US and Russia

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/biden-better-buy-more-bullets
Title: Re: Ukraine: It's over
Post by: G M on June 26, 2022, 08:41:41 AM
https://weltwoche.ch/daily/this-war-has-been-lost-a-long-time-ago/

https://grahamefuller.com/some-hard-thoughts-about-post-ukraine/

Must read.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 26, 2022, 02:36:28 PM
Some seriously unsound leaps of logic in there, but several passages of penetrating power.  Will post in Geopolitics thread.
Title: Re: Ukraine: It's over
Post by: G M on June 26, 2022, 08:15:47 PM
https://weltwoche.ch/daily/this-war-has-been-lost-a-long-time-ago/

https://grahamefuller.com/some-hard-thoughts-about-post-ukraine/

Must read.

https://www.foxnews.com/media/situation-ukraine-overwhelmingly-favor-russia-daniel-davis
Title: Where are the Russians taking Uke grain?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 27, 2022, 01:05:49 AM
https://www.bbc.com/news/61790625?fbclid=IwAR1iYIvdFm1KTG7hFIt-vjmb-dhVf1G6JcW-k_D6LEiU3v24zKfPYrBl8EI
Title: GPF: A New Phase in the Uke War
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 27, 2022, 11:40:11 AM
June 27, 2022
View On Website
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A New Phase in the Ukraine War
Russia has learned from early setbacks.
By: Ridvan Bari Urcosta and Allison Fedirka
Wars tend to unfold in phases, though it’s never clear how many phases there will be when the war breaks out, and less clear still where one phase ends and another begins until after the fact. It’s all part and parcel of the fog of war. What’s certain is that the first phase of war doesn’t always presage how the rest of the war will go.

If you apply that logic to Ukraine, you can conclude that the first phase is over, that both sides are prepared to continue, and that though Russia “lost” the first phase, it has learned enough lessons to emerge stronger as Ukraine faces a number of new constraints.

Ukraine
(click to enlarge)

Learning From Failure

Russia’s early setbacks owe largely to its failure to accommodate its own vulnerabilities. Moscow opened up the conflict on three fronts: in far eastern Ukraine, in the northeast along Ukraine’s border with Russia, and in the north along the border with Belarus. The two northern thrusts suffered from intelligence failures such as the number and enthusiasm of pro-Russia forces inside Ukraine that led to misinformed or just plain bad political decisions; from overextended supply lines and poor communication capabilities that left Russian forces uncoordinated and poorly protected; and from an ineffective and often times incompatible mishmash of old and new technologies and tactics. Put simply, it was a mess, and it led Moscow to withdraw its forces from its northern thrusts.

Russian Advances into Ukraine, March 7, 2022
(click to enlarge)

The second phase, then, takes place primarily in the south and east, and will occur in three distinct settings: cities, grain fields within the forest belt, and near river systems. Urban warfare will involve a lot of artillery followed by the forward movement of troops. Fighting in the grain fields will be akin to guerilla warfare, accompanied by the deliberate destruction of forests and fields, a practice that dates back to the Soviet era. Riverine warfare will be slower and stodgier, since natural barriers will obstruct offensives and counteroffensives.

Russia’s strategy for the second phase will prioritize military goals and will pursue them methodically. In practice, this means focusing its efforts on the stretch of Ukraine from Luhansk and Donetsk down to Kherson. Russia controls about 95 percent of Luhansk and about 60 percent of Donetsk. Within this conflict zone, Russian forces are creating a number of small battle pockets that allow for massive and concentrated fire on Ukrainian troops from two or three sides. The purpose of this approach is to grind down Ukrainian forces until they reach critically low levels. Unlike in the first phase of the war, in which Russia had a massive concentration of forces, this new tactic instills more flexibility and, in theory, more effectiveness against hard targets. Already, Kyiv has consistently sent reinforcements to these areas to replace the fallen.

Russian Territorial Control of Ukraine, June 23, 2022

(click to enlarge)

The new strategy – a shift from Russian troop advancement to Ukrainian troop attrition – is partly a response to Ukraine’s fortifications in the east. Moscow understands that Ukraine spent nearly a decade creating multilayered defenses in and around Donbas. The result was a sophisticated underground defense system across an estimated 40,000 square kilometers (15,500 square miles) that made any type of blitzkrieg operation impossible. A strategy centered on pockets of kill zones allows Russian forces to slowly but surely deplete Ukrainian forces without necessarily demanding huge Russian advancements. (Hence why Russia has been observably more active in destroying Ukrainian logistical targets.) In theory, the scene will play out like this: Russian advancements will be slow, and when they meet resistance they will stop, launch a series of rocket and artillery strikes against Ukraine’s defensive lines, and advance slowly again once enemy forces are weakened. Importantly, this entire strategy assumes that Western allies will continue to send only aid and military hardware, not soldiers. It’s a safe assumption, but if it’s wrong, Russia has a real problem on its hands.

Zone of Massive Ukrainian Fortifications, June 23, 2022
(click to enlarge)

Until then, Russia will continue to develop what appears to be future offensives from Popasnaya, which it took control of in May, in three directions: toward Lesichansk, the underbelly of Ukrainian defense; toward Zolotoye, which will sever Ukrainian communications; and toward Bakhmut, the fall of which would severely imperil surrounding areas by opening them up to Russian attack from the south. To execute these maneuvers, Russia will heavily rely on artillery complemented by aircraft, radio-electronic warfare, platoons and tanks. The logic of war makes it difficult for the Ukrainians to avoid Russian forces in the zone between Slavyask, Bakhmut and Lesichansk, which is becoming a center of gravity in the conflict. Both sides, therefore, understand the area’s importance.

Donets River Basin, Ukraine

(click to enlarge)

The biggest drawback of this strategy is that it excludes the use of drones, the absence of which reflects Russia’s tactical and material shortcomings. Small drones would enable more night attacks and significantly reduce manpower losses. Indeed, one of the biggest lessons Russia learned in phase one was that small drones can greatly assist artillery bombardment. Russia possesses sophisticated types of drones, but it doesn’t produce them on an industrial level – something a recent government decision will soon change.

Betrayal

Ukraine will have to adapt to changes on the battlefield and Russia’s new strategy accordingly. Kyiv understands that the outcome of the war may well come down to how long Ukrainian forces can keep fighting. In terms of hardware, Ukraine seems relatively well-positioned. It is well-equipped, with several air defense systems that mitigate the damage of Russian aviation assaults. Ukraine also has ample anti-tank weapons and sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles of various classes to provide strong artillery reconnaissance. Western allies have promised Ukraine even more weaponry to support its fighting efforts, but it is unclear how much of the promised goods are ready for immediate delivery and how long training will take.

Relatedly, manpower is a crucial issue. Ukraine got a ton of conscripts and volunteers at the outset of the war, and though they boosted Ukraine’s numbers, many of them lacked training and experience, and they deplete the number of reservists available later. Replacing soldiers always matters in war, but it matters even more as Russia starts to adopt a strategy of attrition.

This question ties into the more pressing constraint of managing both the political and military sides of the war. Public buy-in and nationalism play a huge role in galvanizing and unifying the Ukrainian people toward a single goal. On the military side, there will be instances in which military logic dictates that troops withdraw from one location, regroup and resist in a new location. (Such is the case in Donetsk, where 1,000 troops are stationed in what is effectively a kill zone.) But Kyiv will be under enormous political pressure to sell the war to its people and its allies, and the finer points of warfare aren’t always easy to articulate, let alone sell. The government, meanwhile, is also dealing with controversial legislation that divides political and military efforts. For example, measures to curb the use of the Russian language bolster anti-Russian sentiment but undermine the military’s propaganda warfare efforts, which are primarily in Russian. The government and military need to resolve tensions like these if they are to successfully adapt to this new phase of the war.

And so this summer is likely to witness both sides concentrating their efforts in three main directions: Kharkiv region, Donbas and Kherson. Ukraine will continue to prepare for a counteroffensive in Kherson, currently Russia’s weakest position. Russia is expected to finish its operation in Donbas and integrate the areas it occupies in Kharkiv and Kherson. Until Ukrainian forces are expelled from Donbas, Russia is unlikely to concentrate on other war theaters. That is, the war will not end with the taking of Donbas and Kharkiv. Ukraine will slowly retreat but with great resistance. Any sign of a peace agreement will be seen as a betrayal of national interests.
Title: Ukes take back Snake Island
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 30, 2022, 09:16:40 AM
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61992491
Title: America leading the way!
Post by: G M on July 03, 2022, 08:21:51 AM
https://twitter.com/JackPosobiec/status/1543426648753807360

Now add footage from our wide open border.
Title: Ukraine and the end of NATO
Post by: G M on July 04, 2022, 06:53:29 AM
https://twitter.com/imetatronink/status/1541780685937332224
Title: Re: Ukraine and the end of NATO
Post by: G M on July 04, 2022, 07:22:36 AM
https://twitter.com/imetatronink/status/1541780685937332224

https://www.revolver.news/2022/07/uber-patriot-retired-colonel-ukraine-has-lost-the-war-but-thermonuclear-war-threat-looms/
Title: Re: These weapons will find their way to W. Europe and N. America
Post by: G M on July 04, 2022, 08:23:30 AM
https://twitter.com/imetatronink/status/1531639067330215936

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/02/ukraine-weapons-end-up-criminal-hands-says-interpol-chief-jurgen-stock

https://www.rebelnews.com/swedish_police_warn_that_weapons_sent_to_ukraine_could_land_in_the_hands_of_criminal_gangs

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/us-weapons-supplied-ukraine-end-darknet-marketplaces-rt-investigation-finds
Title: George Friedman: Russian Military Doctrine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 05, 2022, 06:57:58 AM
July 5, 2022
View On Website
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Russian Military Doctrine
By: George Friedman
The city of Lysychansk has fallen to Russia, giving it full control of Ukraine’s breakaway Luhansk region. Russian forces also occupy nearly all of neighboring Donetsk, the other region that the Kremlin recognized as independent two days before launching its invasion. Russia has the choice of accepting this victory as the culmination of the war or seeking total victory by seizing all of Ukraine. Before considering that option, we need to understand the conceptual framework that defined Russia’s initial plan.

All military forces have a doctrine. Doctrine defines how wars are to be fought. In the United States during the late Cold War, the doctrine was called AirLand Battle, which envisioned a combined arms system for offense and defense operating as a single force under unified command. The Chinese had a doctrine called active defense, which envisioned the enemy constantly on the attack while Chinese forces both contained them in most sectors and carried out attacks as opportunities arose. There are many concepts in any military, and most are of little account. The basic combat model defines the type of weapons to be procured, the proper blend of forces, the training they receive and so on. Doctrines exist for an entire theater and for much smaller units. All must be blended in a single battle force in the event of war.

The Russian doctrine defined after the fall of the Soviet Union is called Deep Battle. It anticipates Russian combat at any level of warfare. The goal is to go as deeply and quickly into the enemy as possible. To do this, there must be intense coordination at all levels of the battle and also between levels. So in Ukraine, Deep Battle was to coordinate the general operations in each theater. Theaters were needed to manage the battle at components as small as battalions. The depth of the doctrine is determined not only by how far the enemy can be penetrated but also by how deeply command and control can be carried out.

Deep Battle holds great promise when information flows rapidly to the next highest level of command. The Russian army is a sledgehammer. When that coordination, consultation and command breaks down – and the key is communication, which is notoriously late or wrong in a battle – the hammer hits the army at its knees. Deep Battle turns into a centralized command system, where senior command cannot see realities at the lower level.

The concept for the initial attack on Ukraine followed the Deep Battle concept. It organized the force into three thrusts built around armor and striking from the north toward Kyiv, from the south toward Odesa and a short distance into the Donbas in the east. The initial orders seemed to be in place regardless of events. The northern force got bogged down on a road and remained there for days, with no correction to its orders. That force was likely intended to support the force coming from the east. Tanks burn fuel fast, even when idling, and logistics didn’t have new orders or couldn’t execute them. Out of the single Deep Battle, there emerged three separate theaters of operations with no integrated battle plan. Clearly, the flow of information broke as infantry entered heavily defended cities and failed to understand the force it was facing. Senior command was unaware of battle intelligence on the enemy, logistical reality or battle reports and, instead of devolving more command, kept the reins tight. It was Deep Battle at its worst.

It improved quickly. First, the three zones were treated differently. The northern battle group coming out of Belarus was told to withdraw and possibly send forces to the main battle in the east. The same for the southern thrust. All resources went to the third group, the one that took Luhansk. Deep Battle applied to the single decisive group that defeated the Ukrainians in Luhansk. Rather than fighting the war as a single battle, it took the initial concept and broke it into three theaters taking one area, likely redeploying all but an occupation force and the rest to the southern thrust, which if it succeeds makes the northern thrust irrelevant.

Deep Battle did not fail as a concept but in the execution. The battle now to be fought is simpler. The move toward Odesa will have the orderliness of a successful battle. Senior command is more likely to understand the condition of the battle and give orders as needed, while keeping a careful eye on a single theater, rather than three.

It is far from clear that Russia can win. The concentration on the Donbas has given Ukrainian forces a great deal of badly needed rest, as well as new weapons and training on using those weapons. Soldiers who have experienced the battlefield are far more trainable than the novices who first faced Russia. Russia is now moving toward its next theater of operations, with its troops bloodied and officers who have tasted defeat and victory. They are facing a large, motivated and bloodied Ukrainian army with powerful new weapons. Deep Battle failed the first test, but it gets a second bite against an enemy that fights in small groups with strategic direction but whose tactics reside at far lower levels, a doctrine of diffused authority. Except for the blood that will be shed, it will be interesting to see what happens.
Title: Even D1 admits
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 06, 2022, 03:36:03 PM
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/07/risks-us-military-assistance-ukraine/368896/
Title: Ukes training with US Army in Kansas
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 08, 2022, 10:21:23 PM
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-62001336
Title: Re: Ukes training with US Army in Kansas
Post by: G M on July 08, 2022, 10:57:05 PM
Are they being taught the most important part of US military doctrine?

https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3055525/dod-pays-tribute-to-lgbtq-service-members/

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-62001336
Title: Russia wins
Post by: G M on July 13, 2022, 07:11:25 PM
https://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2022/07/russias_will_to_win_in_ukraine.html
Title: Re: Russia wins
Post by: G M on July 13, 2022, 08:20:11 PM
https://www.zerohedge.com/political/putin-using-western-wokeness-weapon-wsj-op-ed

https://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2022/07/russias_will_to_win_in_ukraine.html
Title: Re: Russia wins
Post by: G M on July 14, 2022, 06:32:54 AM
https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2022/07/western-media-military-analysts-still-dazed-confused-ukraine/

https://www.zerohedge.com/political/putin-using-western-wokeness-weapon-wsj-op-ed

https://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2022/07/russias_will_to_win_in_ukraine.html
Title: Re: These weapons will find their way to W. Europe and N. America
Post by: G M on July 14, 2022, 07:00:51 AM
https://twitter.com/imetatronink/status/1531639067330215936

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/02/ukraine-weapons-end-up-criminal-hands-says-interpol-chief-jurgen-stock

https://www.rebelnews.com/swedish_police_warn_that_weapons_sent_to_ukraine_could_land_in_the_hands_of_criminal_gangs

https://www.revolver.news/2022/07/psst-looking-for-a-javelin/

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 15, 2022, 01:31:38 AM
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-07-08/ukraines-implausible-theories-victory?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=twofa&utm_campaign=Ukraine%E2%80%99s%20Implausible%20Theories%20of%20Victory&utm_content=20220715&utm_term=FA%20This%20Week%20-%20112017
Title: WSJ
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 15, 2022, 05:18:25 AM


Ukraine’s Allies Ask Whether Western Arms Will Let Kyiv Turn Tide Against Russia
U.S. rocket launchers and other supplies help Ukrainians fight invasion, but the prospect of a protracted war remains
Ukrainian troops in the Kharkiv region use U.S.-supplied equipment to battle Russian forces on Thursday.
Ukrainian troops in the Kharkiv region use U.S.-supplied equipment to battle Russian forces on Thursday. EVGENIY MALOLETKA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
By Daniel MichaelsFollow
, Warren P. StrobelFollow
 and Gordon LuboldFollow
July 15, 2022 7:03 am ET



Advanced Western weapons have boosted Ukraine’s fortunes in battling Russia’s invasion recently, but it remains unclear whether those arms will enable Kyiv to turn the tide and avoid a prolonged, grinding stalemate, say Western officials.

U.S. Himars mobile rocket launchers and other systems from France, the U.K., Germany and Poland have begun scoring direct hits on Russian bases far behind front lines, including spectacular detonations of ammunition depots. The strikes are critical because Russian troops have gained ground in eastern Ukraine over recent weeks by firing large amounts of artillery in fairly concentrated areas.

“Ukraine has now been successfully striking Russian locations in Ukraine, deeper behind the front lines, and disrupting Russia’s ability to conduct that artillery operation,” a senior U.S. defense official said this week.

Whether the destruction of Russian munitions and command centers is sufficient to undermine Moscow’s ability to wage war in Ukraine remains a core question for countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that have recently shifted to providing far more precise, long-range and expensive equipment.


“There is a lot of analysis going on in capitals about the most efficacious weapons systems to provide,” said a senior Western intelligence official, who said systems must be readily used without extensive training and easily sustained and repaired during battle.


While Himars, which have a range of almost 50 miles, and other multiple-launch rocket systems that don’t shoot as far have recently drawn attention, other equipment such as ammunition, armored personnel carriers and precision shells for more traditional howitzers is also proving significant.

Ukrainian officials welcome the Western weaponry but want more, including precision long-range artillery systems, armored vehicles, tanks and drones to counter Russia’s jamming systems. “Definitely, we need [drones]—a lot of them,” said Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov in an interview.

The U.S. has committed 12 Himars to Ukraine, and not all are yet in the country in operation. Oleksii Danilov, secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, said in an interview this week that if Ukraine had 50 Himars “it would be a completely different situation.”


If the new systems don’t show demonstrable results in the near future, Western eagerness to supply them may fade, some analysts warn. Western Europe as a result of the war now faces surging energy and food prices that look set to worsen as winter approaches. In the U.S., elections in November will focus attention on inflation and energy prices.

“As time goes on, it’s hard to see how the West is going to sustain the type of support we’ve been providing over the last six months,” said Rachel Rizzo, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington.

Since Russia in the spring shifted its invasion strategy from attacking Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv, and other big cities to targeting the country’s east, Western armaments have allowed Ukraine to continue fighting and slow Russian advances in ways it couldn’t have done independently.

Russia has been forced to limit its ambitions but has gained ground and appears able to continue advancing gradually behind its artillery barrages.

During a news conference at the NATO summit in Madrid on Thursday, President Biden said his administration was preparing to send an additional $800 million to support Ukraine and pledged that Russia’s war will not result in Ukrainian defeat. Photo: Europa Press/Zuma
U.S. intelligence agencies estimate that the war is likely to grind on “for an extended period of time,” Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines said late last month. In that scenario, Russia will continue to make small territorial gains with no breakthrough.

Two other scenarios, she said, would involve a major Russian advance on the ground, or Ukraine stabilizing the front lines and making gains of its own, likely around the southern city of Kherson.

The extent to which advanced Western equipment and precision strikes on high-value Russia targets can change that outlook may get clearer in coming weeks. Some open-source intelligence analysts already see hints of shifts in Russian tactics, potentially as a result of artillery shortages due to Ukrainian attacks.

Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute think tank, said the Himars and similar systems have had an immediate impact on the conflict, significantly eroding a Russian advantage in long-range artillery that helped Moscow’s forces advance in May and June.

Ukrainian forces concur. “Our vehicles hit precisely and painfully, changing the course of the war,” said Lt. Valentyn Koval, a Ukrainian Himars operator.

Russian social media and Ukrainian intelligence indicated that Moscow’s forces have been stunned and demoralized by the range and precision of the new rockets, which are hard to intercept. But the number of advanced Western rocket systems remains limited.

“We can’t be everywhere at the same time, so the work is progressing slowly,” said Lt. Koval.

That pace could result in a protracted war with neither side able to defeat the other, say analysts. Some believe such a situation plays to Russia’s advantage because President Vladimir Putin doesn’t worry about public opinion and has deep supplies of basic Cold-War era munitions that may allow his troops to at least retain Ukrainian territory they have taken.

Still, Ukrainian long-range strikes can have an outsize impact on Moscow’s highly centralized armed forces, Western analysts say. Russia’s inflexible military logistics mean it must rely on large ammunition depots, often near front lines. Hitting these warehouses has a more profound impact on Russian operations than strikes on individual weapons because guns without ammunition are of little use. Strikes on command posts can have a similarly significant impact on Russia’s top-heavy leadership structure.

“When they get hit, it’s a pretty big loss,” said Mr. Lee, a former U.S. Marine infantry officer who has followed the war closely.


Russia has few defenses against the Western systems, he said, because they can be fired quickly and moved out of range of opposing artillery. They can operate at night, making them harder for Russia’s drones to detect.

Mr. Lee said that the arrival of Himars appears to have helped blunt Russia’s advances. But he cautioned that doesn’t necessarily mean that Ukraine will be able to claw back territory. To do that, he said, Ukraine must assemble well-trained military units, artillery and ammunition.

The Biden administration has been criticized by some U.S. lawmakers and policy analysts for not sending more Himars to Ukraine, and more quickly. An even greater limiting factor is Himars munitions, Mr. Lee said. “We don’t have enough to give them,” he said.


So far, he said, Ukraine has been using the guided, long-range rockets judiciously, firing a limited number each night in operations likely supported by U.S. intelligence data giving the precise location of Russian ammunition storage sites and battlefield command centers.

The new systems require much more training than Western artillery and vehicles previously sent, so the pace at which Ukraine can deploy them is slower. A debate is raging over whether Ukraine should take soldiers and officers away from fighting to train on the new systems, depriving front-line troops of vital support.

Western governments have provided only a small number of advanced systems also because they are expensive, limited in supply and often covered by export restrictions. Red tape in Washington and other capitals, as well as the limited supplies of advanced ammunition, have prompted frustration among Ukrainians.

Vivian Salama, Stephen Kalin and Alan Cullison contributed to this article.
Title: Re: WSJ
Post by: G M on July 15, 2022, 07:09:33 AM
Ukraine has lost.




Ukraine’s Allies Ask Whether Western Arms Will Let Kyiv Turn Tide Against Russia
U.S. rocket launchers and other supplies help Ukrainians fight invasion, but the prospect of a protracted war remains
Ukrainian troops in the Kharkiv region use U.S.-supplied equipment to battle Russian forces on Thursday.
Ukrainian troops in the Kharkiv region use U.S.-supplied equipment to battle Russian forces on Thursday. EVGENIY MALOLETKA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
By Daniel MichaelsFollow
, Warren P. StrobelFollow
 and Gordon LuboldFollow
July 15, 2022 7:03 am ET



Advanced Western weapons have boosted Ukraine’s fortunes in battling Russia’s invasion recently, but it remains unclear whether those arms will enable Kyiv to turn the tide and avoid a prolonged, grinding stalemate, say Western officials.

U.S. Himars mobile rocket launchers and other systems from France, the U.K., Germany and Poland have begun scoring direct hits on Russian bases far behind front lines, including spectacular detonations of ammunition depots. The strikes are critical because Russian troops have gained ground in eastern Ukraine over recent weeks by firing large amounts of artillery in fairly concentrated areas.

“Ukraine has now been successfully striking Russian locations in Ukraine, deeper behind the front lines, and disrupting Russia’s ability to conduct that artillery operation,” a senior U.S. defense official said this week.

Whether the destruction of Russian munitions and command centers is sufficient to undermine Moscow’s ability to wage war in Ukraine remains a core question for countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that have recently shifted to providing far more precise, long-range and expensive equipment.


“There is a lot of analysis going on in capitals about the most efficacious weapons systems to provide,” said a senior Western intelligence official, who said systems must be readily used without extensive training and easily sustained and repaired during battle.


While Himars, which have a range of almost 50 miles, and other multiple-launch rocket systems that don’t shoot as far have recently drawn attention, other equipment such as ammunition, armored personnel carriers and precision shells for more traditional howitzers is also proving significant.

Ukrainian officials welcome the Western weaponry but want more, including precision long-range artillery systems, armored vehicles, tanks and drones to counter Russia’s jamming systems. “Definitely, we need [drones]—a lot of them,” said Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov in an interview.

The U.S. has committed 12 Himars to Ukraine, and not all are yet in the country in operation. Oleksii Danilov, secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, said in an interview this week that if Ukraine had 50 Himars “it would be a completely different situation.”


If the new systems don’t show demonstrable results in the near future, Western eagerness to supply them may fade, some analysts warn. Western Europe as a result of the war now faces surging energy and food prices that look set to worsen as winter approaches. In the U.S., elections in November will focus attention on inflation and energy prices.

“As time goes on, it’s hard to see how the West is going to sustain the type of support we’ve been providing over the last six months,” said Rachel Rizzo, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington.

Since Russia in the spring shifted its invasion strategy from attacking Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv, and other big cities to targeting the country’s east, Western armaments have allowed Ukraine to continue fighting and slow Russian advances in ways it couldn’t have done independently.

Russia has been forced to limit its ambitions but has gained ground and appears able to continue advancing gradually behind its artillery barrages.

During a news conference at the NATO summit in Madrid on Thursday, President Biden said his administration was preparing to send an additional $800 million to support Ukraine and pledged that Russia’s war will not result in Ukrainian defeat. Photo: Europa Press/Zuma
U.S. intelligence agencies estimate that the war is likely to grind on “for an extended period of time,” Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines said late last month. In that scenario, Russia will continue to make small territorial gains with no breakthrough.

Two other scenarios, she said, would involve a major Russian advance on the ground, or Ukraine stabilizing the front lines and making gains of its own, likely around the southern city of Kherson.

The extent to which advanced Western equipment and precision strikes on high-value Russia targets can change that outlook may get clearer in coming weeks. Some open-source intelligence analysts already see hints of shifts in Russian tactics, potentially as a result of artillery shortages due to Ukrainian attacks.

Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute think tank, said the Himars and similar systems have had an immediate impact on the conflict, significantly eroding a Russian advantage in long-range artillery that helped Moscow’s forces advance in May and June.

Ukrainian forces concur. “Our vehicles hit precisely and painfully, changing the course of the war,” said Lt. Valentyn Koval, a Ukrainian Himars operator.

Russian social media and Ukrainian intelligence indicated that Moscow’s forces have been stunned and demoralized by the range and precision of the new rockets, which are hard to intercept. But the number of advanced Western rocket systems remains limited.

“We can’t be everywhere at the same time, so the work is progressing slowly,” said Lt. Koval.

That pace could result in a protracted war with neither side able to defeat the other, say analysts. Some believe such a situation plays to Russia’s advantage because President Vladimir Putin doesn’t worry about public opinion and has deep supplies of basic Cold-War era munitions that may allow his troops to at least retain Ukrainian territory they have taken.

Still, Ukrainian long-range strikes can have an outsize impact on Moscow’s highly centralized armed forces, Western analysts say. Russia’s inflexible military logistics mean it must rely on large ammunition depots, often near front lines. Hitting these warehouses has a more profound impact on Russian operations than strikes on individual weapons because guns without ammunition are of little use. Strikes on command posts can have a similarly significant impact on Russia’s top-heavy leadership structure.

“When they get hit, it’s a pretty big loss,” said Mr. Lee, a former U.S. Marine infantry officer who has followed the war closely.


Russia has few defenses against the Western systems, he said, because they can be fired quickly and moved out of range of opposing artillery. They can operate at night, making them harder for Russia’s drones to detect.

Mr. Lee said that the arrival of Himars appears to have helped blunt Russia’s advances. But he cautioned that doesn’t necessarily mean that Ukraine will be able to claw back territory. To do that, he said, Ukraine must assemble well-trained military units, artillery and ammunition.

The Biden administration has been criticized by some U.S. lawmakers and policy analysts for not sending more Himars to Ukraine, and more quickly. An even greater limiting factor is Himars munitions, Mr. Lee said. “We don’t have enough to give them,” he said.


So far, he said, Ukraine has been using the guided, long-range rockets judiciously, firing a limited number each night in operations likely supported by U.S. intelligence data giving the precise location of Russian ammunition storage sites and battlefield command centers.

The new systems require much more training than Western artillery and vehicles previously sent, so the pace at which Ukraine can deploy them is slower. A debate is raging over whether Ukraine should take soldiers and officers away from fighting to train on the new systems, depriving front-line troops of vital support.

Western governments have provided only a small number of advanced systems also because they are expensive, limited in supply and often covered by export restrictions. Red tape in Washington and other capitals, as well as the limited supplies of advanced ammunition, have prompted frustration among Ukrainians.

Vivian Salama, Stephen Kalin and Alan Cullison contributed to this article.
Title: Re: WSJ-Disarming NATO
Post by: G M on July 15, 2022, 07:25:20 AM
https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/111/151/297/original/1e72cb2a175f78c7.jpg

(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/111/151/297/original/1e72cb2a175f78c7.jpg)

Ukraine has lost.




Ukraine’s Allies Ask Whether Western Arms Will Let Kyiv Turn Tide Against Russia
U.S. rocket launchers and other supplies help Ukrainians fight invasion, but the prospect of a protracted war remains
Ukrainian troops in the Kharkiv region use U.S.-supplied equipment to battle Russian forces on Thursday.
Ukrainian troops in the Kharkiv region use U.S.-supplied equipment to battle Russian forces on Thursday. EVGENIY MALOLETKA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
By Daniel MichaelsFollow
, Warren P. StrobelFollow
 and Gordon LuboldFollow
July 15, 2022 7:03 am ET



Advanced Western weapons have boosted Ukraine’s fortunes in battling Russia’s invasion recently, but it remains unclear whether those arms will enable Kyiv to turn the tide and avoid a prolonged, grinding stalemate, say Western officials.

U.S. Himars mobile rocket launchers and other systems from France, the U.K., Germany and Poland have begun scoring direct hits on Russian bases far behind front lines, including spectacular detonations of ammunition depots. The strikes are critical because Russian troops have gained ground in eastern Ukraine over recent weeks by firing large amounts of artillery in fairly concentrated areas.

“Ukraine has now been successfully striking Russian locations in Ukraine, deeper behind the front lines, and disrupting Russia’s ability to conduct that artillery operation,” a senior U.S. defense official said this week.

Whether the destruction of Russian munitions and command centers is sufficient to undermine Moscow’s ability to wage war in Ukraine remains a core question for countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that have recently shifted to providing far more precise, long-range and expensive equipment.


“There is a lot of analysis going on in capitals about the most efficacious weapons systems to provide,” said a senior Western intelligence official, who said systems must be readily used without extensive training and easily sustained and repaired during battle.


While Himars, which have a range of almost 50 miles, and other multiple-launch rocket systems that don’t shoot as far have recently drawn attention, other equipment such as ammunition, armored personnel carriers and precision shells for more traditional howitzers is also proving significant.

Ukrainian officials welcome the Western weaponry but want more, including precision long-range artillery systems, armored vehicles, tanks and drones to counter Russia’s jamming systems. “Definitely, we need [drones]—a lot of them,” said Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov in an interview.

The U.S. has committed 12 Himars to Ukraine, and not all are yet in the country in operation. Oleksii Danilov, secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, said in an interview this week that if Ukraine had 50 Himars “it would be a completely different situation.”


If the new systems don’t show demonstrable results in the near future, Western eagerness to supply them may fade, some analysts warn. Western Europe as a result of the war now faces surging energy and food prices that look set to worsen as winter approaches. In the U.S., elections in November will focus attention on inflation and energy prices.

“As time goes on, it’s hard to see how the West is going to sustain the type of support we’ve been providing over the last six months,” said Rachel Rizzo, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington.

Since Russia in the spring shifted its invasion strategy from attacking Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv, and other big cities to targeting the country’s east, Western armaments have allowed Ukraine to continue fighting and slow Russian advances in ways it couldn’t have done independently.

Russia has been forced to limit its ambitions but has gained ground and appears able to continue advancing gradually behind its artillery barrages.

During a news conference at the NATO summit in Madrid on Thursday, President Biden said his administration was preparing to send an additional $800 million to support Ukraine and pledged that Russia’s war will not result in Ukrainian defeat. Photo: Europa Press/Zuma
U.S. intelligence agencies estimate that the war is likely to grind on “for an extended period of time,” Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines said late last month. In that scenario, Russia will continue to make small territorial gains with no breakthrough.

Two other scenarios, she said, would involve a major Russian advance on the ground, or Ukraine stabilizing the front lines and making gains of its own, likely around the southern city of Kherson.

The extent to which advanced Western equipment and precision strikes on high-value Russia targets can change that outlook may get clearer in coming weeks. Some open-source intelligence analysts already see hints of shifts in Russian tactics, potentially as a result of artillery shortages due to Ukrainian attacks.

Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute think tank, said the Himars and similar systems have had an immediate impact on the conflict, significantly eroding a Russian advantage in long-range artillery that helped Moscow’s forces advance in May and June.

Ukrainian forces concur. “Our vehicles hit precisely and painfully, changing the course of the war,” said Lt. Valentyn Koval, a Ukrainian Himars operator.

Russian social media and Ukrainian intelligence indicated that Moscow’s forces have been stunned and demoralized by the range and precision of the new rockets, which are hard to intercept. But the number of advanced Western rocket systems remains limited.

“We can’t be everywhere at the same time, so the work is progressing slowly,” said Lt. Koval.

That pace could result in a protracted war with neither side able to defeat the other, say analysts. Some believe such a situation plays to Russia’s advantage because President Vladimir Putin doesn’t worry about public opinion and has deep supplies of basic Cold-War era munitions that may allow his troops to at least retain Ukrainian territory they have taken.

Still, Ukrainian long-range strikes can have an outsize impact on Moscow’s highly centralized armed forces, Western analysts say. Russia’s inflexible military logistics mean it must rely on large ammunition depots, often near front lines. Hitting these warehouses has a more profound impact on Russian operations than strikes on individual weapons because guns without ammunition are of little use. Strikes on command posts can have a similarly significant impact on Russia’s top-heavy leadership structure.

“When they get hit, it’s a pretty big loss,” said Mr. Lee, a former U.S. Marine infantry officer who has followed the war closely.


Russia has few defenses against the Western systems, he said, because they can be fired quickly and moved out of range of opposing artillery. They can operate at night, making them harder for Russia’s drones to detect.

Mr. Lee said that the arrival of Himars appears to have helped blunt Russia’s advances. But he cautioned that doesn’t necessarily mean that Ukraine will be able to claw back territory. To do that, he said, Ukraine must assemble well-trained military units, artillery and ammunition.

The Biden administration has been criticized by some U.S. lawmakers and policy analysts for not sending more Himars to Ukraine, and more quickly. An even greater limiting factor is Himars munitions, Mr. Lee said. “We don’t have enough to give them,” he said.


So far, he said, Ukraine has been using the guided, long-range rockets judiciously, firing a limited number each night in operations likely supported by U.S. intelligence data giving the precise location of Russian ammunition storage sites and battlefield command centers.

The new systems require much more training than Western artillery and vehicles previously sent, so the pace at which Ukraine can deploy them is slower. A debate is raging over whether Ukraine should take soldiers and officers away from fighting to train on the new systems, depriving front-line troops of vital support.

Western governments have provided only a small number of advanced systems also because they are expensive, limited in supply and often covered by export restrictions. Red tape in Washington and other capitals, as well as the limited supplies of advanced ammunition, have prompted frustration among Ukrainians.

Vivian Salama, Stephen Kalin and Alan Cullison contributed to this article.
Title: NATO sending its' military equipment to Ukraine
Post by: ccp on July 15, 2022, 07:36:09 AM
and Ukraine is not even IN NATO!

 :-o

I agree with Tucker this war can go on for yrs till all Ukrainians are dead,
and cost us a bundle and for what ?  it ain't worth it .


I agree with a 99 yo
Jewish ex Secretary of State :

Ukraine should try and stop the carnage
hand over the Donbas region (sp?).  End the death and destruction

the rest is not worth it.

though not clear if Putin would accept this......

psssst:

we're broke
let Europe pay for most of this.
Title: Re: NATO sending its' military equipment to Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on July 15, 2022, 08:23:40 AM
No easy answers now.  I like the policy of the previous administration better.  Contain Russia with low, low, low gas and oil prices.

They weren't financing major wars when gas was $1.79 - 2.19, when oil was $60 /barrel:
https://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart

NATO, Europe and US should announce and begin the construction of 1000 new nuclear power facilities and see what happens to the price of oil and Soviet Russian expansionism.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 15, 2022, 09:00:24 AM
"Contain Russia with low, low, low gas and oil prices."

Very pithy!
Title: Re: NATO sending its' military equipment to Ukraine
Post by: G M on July 15, 2022, 09:43:51 AM
THIS!

No easy answers now.  I like the policy of the previous administration better.  Contain Russia with low, low, low gas and oil prices.

They weren't financing major wars when gas was $1.79 - 2.19, when oil was $60 /barrel:
https://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart

NATO, Europe and US should announce and begin the construction of 1000 new nuclear power facilities and see what happens to the price of oil and Soviet Russian expansionism.
Title: As Russia marches on...
Post by: G M on July 18, 2022, 07:56:01 AM
https://sonar21.com/ukraine-pins-hopes-on-u-s-supplied-himars-while-russia-marches-on/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 18, 2022, 11:50:49 AM
The attack on Kiev was a feint?

Seriously?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on July 18, 2022, 01:25:54 PM
The attack on Kiev was a feint?

Seriously?

From the article:  "Ukraine did not force the retreat of the Russian troops in March that surrounded Kiev in March. That was a classic feint and was used successfully to pin Ukraine forces around Kiev so that Russia could concentrate on Mariupol and the Donbas."

   - Not completely a fake, but maybe a real attack designed "to pin Ukraine forces around Kiev so that Russia could concentrate on Mariupol and the Donbas."
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 18, 2022, 04:11:19 PM
Sorry, not taking that seriously.  Russki propaganda to the contrary, they wanted Kiev and failed.  Period.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on July 18, 2022, 09:04:42 PM
Sorry, not taking that seriously.  Russki propaganda to the contrary, they wanted Kiev and failed.  Period.

Either way, the war is decided.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on July 25, 2022, 05:14:24 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/rickards-needless-death-and-misery
Title: Re: Ukraine- A must read!
Post by: G M on July 25, 2022, 06:28:12 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/rickards-needless-death-and-misery

Rickards is right.
Title: Re: Ukraine- A must read!
Post by: DougMacG on July 25, 2022, 08:50:26 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/rickards-needless-death-and-misery

Rickards is right.


Key point from the article:
"A negotiated settlement that cedes Russian control over Crimea and the Russian-speaking parts of eastern Ukraine is probably the most realistic solution available to end the war."


If so, wouldn't it be better (for all parties) to get to that point sooner rather than later.

If this is a worthwhile US war effort, which US General was assigned to win it, what defines a win and how is that going?  When did Congress declare war and when will the President (if we had one) report to the American people on the war effort?

The purpose of American involvement, from my point of view, is to cede no expansion to the evil Putin-Russia.  That failed effort Nov 2020 and was made official on Jan 6, 2021.  Complete conjecture but everyone can see, this would not have happened under Trump or some other strong Republican President.

The turning points against the Soviet Union were the American election of 1980, the standoff in Reykjavik over missile defense, and the words spoken at the gate of the Berlin wall. 

To thwart Russia here, the Biden team and the Euros have used tactics without strategy.  We waste our arsenal, including status of the dollar, without a plan to win.  In doing so we make our enemy look like a genius.  Wait out the Americans, as learned in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

In Iraq, Gen Colin Powell said (wrongly), we break it, we fix it.  (We didn't break it; it was already broken.) Doesn't that mean Russia must rebuild Ukraine?  Maybe the UN Security Council can order that...

How is it that the UN "Security Council" has not condemned this hostile and criminal action by Russia?  The last 'sanction' available to the free world against Russia, remove their status as "permanent member" of the UN Security Council.  If that cannot be done, close down the group and re-form it in a true peace seeking form.  Candidate and President DeSantis can announce it, not one thin dime to this rogue, obsolete organization until it is reformed - with Russia getting the same status as Uganda, if that.
Title: Re: Ukraine- A must read!
Post by: G M on July 25, 2022, 09:52:42 PM
"If this is a worthwhile US war effort, which US General was assigned to win it, what defines a win and how is that going?"

Looking for a winning General in the US would be like looking for a virgin at a Vegas Stripper Convention. The last time the US really won a war, your dad was wearing a uniform.



https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/rickards-needless-death-and-misery

Rickards is right.


Key point from the article:
"A negotiated settlement that cedes Russian control over Crimea and the Russian-speaking parts of eastern Ukraine is probably the most realistic solution available to end the war."


If so, wouldn't it be better (for all parties) to get to that point sooner rather than later.

If this is a worthwhile US war effort, which US General was assigned to win it, what defines a win and how is that going?  When did Congress declare war and when will the President (if we had one) report to the American people on the war effort?

The purpose of American involvement, from my point of view, is to cede no expansion to the evil Putin-Russia.  That failed effort Nov 2020 and was made official on Jan 6, 2021.  Complete conjecture but everyone can see, this would not have happened under Trump or some other strong Republican President.

The turning points against the Soviet Union were the American election of 1980, the standoff in Reykjavik over missile defense, and the words spoken at the gate of the Berlin wall. 

To thwart Russia here, the Biden team and the Euros have used tactics without strategy.  We waste our arsenal, including status of the dollar, without a plan to win.  In doing so we make our enemy look like a genius.  Wait out the Americans, as learned in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

In Iraq, Gen Colin Powell said (wrongly), we break it, we fix it.  (We didn't break it; it was already broken.) Doesn't that mean Russia must rebuild Ukraine?  Maybe the UN Security Council can order that...

How is it that the UN "Security Council" has not condemned this hostile and criminal action by Russia?  The last 'sanction' available to the free world against Russia, remove their status as "permanent member" of the UN Security Council.  If that cannot be done, close down the group and re-form it in a true peace seeking form.  Candidate and President DeSantis can announce it, not one thin dime to this rogue, obsolete organization until it is reformed - with Russia getting the same status as Uganda, if that.
Title: After lying for months, the media are preparing the public for Ukraine’s collaps
Post by: G M on July 27, 2022, 12:47:37 PM
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/when-the-lies-come-home/

Become a Member
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
When the Lies Come Home
After lying for months, the media are preparing the public for Ukraine’s military collapse.

shutterstock_2110835969-scaled-e1655401568466-700x443
(Bumble Dee/Shutterstock)
Douglas Macgregor
Jun 17, 2022
12:00 PM
Diogenes, one of the ancient world’s illustrious philosophers, believed that lies were the currency of politics, and those lies were the ones he sought to expose and debase. To make his point, Diogenes occasionally carried a lit lantern through the streets of Athens in the daylight. If asked why, Diogenes would say he was searching for an honest man.

Finding an honest man today in Washington, D.C., is equally challenging. Diogenes would need a Xenon Searchlight in each hand.

Still, there are brief moments of clarity inside the Washington establishment. Having lied prolifically for months to the American public about the origins and conduct of the war in Ukraine, the media are now preparing the American, British, and other Western publics for Ukraine’s military collapse. It is long overdue.

The Western media did everything in its power to give the Ukrainian defense the appearance of far greater strength than it really possessed. Careful observers noted that the same video clips of Russian tanks under attack were shown repeatedly. Local counterattacks were reported as though they were operational maneuvers.

Russian errors were exaggerated out of all proportion to their significance. Russian losses and the true extent of Ukraine’s own losses were distorted, fabricated, or simply ignored. But conditions on the battlefield changed little over time. Once Ukrainian forces immobilized themselves in static defensive positions inside urban areas and  the central Donbas, the Ukrainian position was hopeless. But this development was portrayed as failure by the Russians to gain “their objectives.”

Ground-combat forces that immobilize soldiers in prepared defenses will be identified, targeted, and destroyed from a distance. When persistent overhead intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, whether manned or unmanned, are linked to precision guided-strike weapons or modern artillery systems informed by accurate targeting data, “holding ground” is fatal to any ground force. This is all the more true in Ukraine, because it was apparent from the first action that Moscow focused on the destruction of Ukrainian forces, not on the occupation of cities or the capture of Ukrainian territory west of the Dnieper River.

The result has been the piecemeal annihilation of Ukrainian forces. Only the episodic infusion of U.S. and allied weapons kept Kiev’s battered legions in the field; legions that are now dying in great numbers thanks to Washington’s proxy war.

Kiev’s war with Moscow is lost. Ukrainian forces are being bled white. Trained replacements do not exist in sufficient numbers to influence the battle, and the situation grows more desperate by the hour. No amount of U.S. and allied military aid or assistance short of direct military intervention by U.S. and NATO ground forces can change this harsh reality.

The problem today is not ceding territory and population to Moscow in Eastern Ukraine that Moscow already controls. The future of the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions along with the Donbas is decided. Moscow is also likely to secure Kharkov and Odessa, two cities that are historically Russian and Russian-speaking, as well as the territory that adjoins them. These operations will extend the conflict through the summer. The problem now is how to stop the fighting.

Whether the fighting stops in the early fall will depend on two key factors. The first involves the leadership in Kiev. Will the Zelensky government consent to the Biden program for perpetual conflict with Russia?

If the Biden administration has its way, Kiev will continue to operate as a base for the buildup of new forces poised to threaten Moscow. In practice, this means Kiev must commit national suicide by exposing the Ukrainian heartland west of the Dnieper River to massive, devastating strikes by Russia’s long-range missile and rocket forces.

Of course, these developments are not inevitable. Berlin, Paris, Rome, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, Vilnius, Riga, Tallin, and, yes, even Warsaw, do not have to blindly follow Washington’s lead. Europeans, like most Americans, are already peering into the abyss of an all-encompassing economic downturn that Biden’s policies are creating at home. Unlike Americans who must cope with the consequences of Biden’s ill-conceived policies, European governments can opt out of Biden’s perpetual-war plan for Ukraine.

The second factor involves Washington itself. Having poured more than $60 billion or a little more than $18 billion a month in direct or indirect transfers into a Ukrainian state that is now crumbling, the important question is, what happens to millions of Ukrainians in the rest of the country that did not flee? And where will the funds come from to rebuild Ukraine’s shattered society in a developing global economic emergency?

When inflation costs the average American household an extra $460 per month to buy the same goods and services this year as they did last year, it is quite possible that Ukraine could sink quietly beneath the waves like the Titanic without evoking much concern in the American electorate. Experienced politicians know that the American span of attention to matters beyond America’s borders is so short that an admission of defeat in Ukraine would probably have little or no immediate consequences.

However, the effects of repeated strategic failures in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria are cumulative. In the 1980s, General Motors wanted to dictate the kind of automobiles Americans would buy, but American consumers had different ideas. That’s why G.M., which dominated the U.S. market for 77 years, lost its top spot to Toyota. Washington cannot dictate all outcomes, nor can Washington escape accountability for its profligate spending and having ruined American prosperity.

In November, Americans will go to the polls. The election itself will do more than test the integrity of the American electoral process. The election is also likely to ensure that Biden is remembered for his intransigence; his refusal to change course, like Herbert Hoover in 1932. Democrats will recall that their predecessors in the Democratic Party effectively ran against Hoover for more than a half century. Republicans may end up running against Joe Biden for the next 50 years.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 27, 2022, 01:45:55 PM
"European governments can opt out of Biden’s perpetual-war plan for Ukraine."

Is this true?  If the Ukes are abandoned/fall, does not Putin have plans to keep going?

"However, the effects of repeated strategic failures in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria are cumulative."

THIS!!! 

I would add our failure to do anything about the Chi-Coms taking Hong Kong and the Chi-Coms militarizing the South China Sea to the list with Taiwan to follow-- unless China's internal problems intervene.

All the preceding said, just as I do not take our Pentagon and our Pravdas at face value, nor do I simply accept assertions of impending collapse by the Ukes at face value.  We are thick in the fog of war.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on July 27, 2022, 01:49:36 PM
"European governments can opt out of Biden’s perpetual-war plan for Ukraine."

Is this true?  If the Ukes are abandoned/fall, does not Putin have plans to keep going?

Going where?

With what?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 27, 2022, 01:53:37 PM
Moldavia - Transnitia for example.

And in that you say "With what?" does that not cut against the argument of this piece?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on July 27, 2022, 01:59:09 PM
Moldavia - Transnitia for example.

And in that you say "With what?" does that not cut against the argument of this piece?

Putin does not have infinite financial or military resources. Just consolidating and holding his gains in Ukraine will require a lot of resources.

Putin will use oil and gas to bring western europe to kneel, not military power.

NATO is done.

Putin is far smarter than the dolts running the west into collapse.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 27, 2022, 04:41:14 PM
He recharged after taking Chechnya, recharged after taking Ossetia, recharged after taking Crimea, recharged after taking Donbas, and will recharge again even with just what he has taken of Ukraine.   

Indeed, from what he has already taken of Ukraine in this bite, he already has A LOT more resources-- including those of the Black Sea of the relevant coastline.

If/when he takes Odesa, Ukraine is done.

Official statements have been made of Moldova/Transnitia next.

Observation:  The center of the justification for aiding Ukraine is the international law principle of territorial integrity of nations.  Given how things are going, Taiwan must be ill at ease.

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on July 27, 2022, 05:13:59 PM
He recharged after taking Chechnya, recharged after taking Ossetia, recharged after taking Crimea, recharged after taking Donbas, and will recharge again even with just what he has taken of Ukraine.   

Indeed, from what he has already taken of Ukraine in this bite, he already has A LOT more resources-- including those of the Black Sea of the relevant coastline.

If/when he takes Odesa, Ukraine is done.

Official statements have been made of Moldova/Transnitia next.

Observation:  The center of the justification for aiding Ukraine is the international law principle of territorial integrity of nations.  Given how things are going, Taiwan must be ill at ease.

Taiwan better be getting ready, as should Australia.
Title: GPF: George Friedman: Strange Events and the Future of the War
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 28, 2022, 09:15:47 PM
July 26, 2022
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
Strange Events and the Future of the Russo-Ukrainian War
By: George Friedman

Russia and Ukraine have signed an agreement to permit the shipping of grain through the Black Sea to world markets. A few hours after the agreement was signed in Turkey, Russia attacked the Black Sea port in Odesa. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has also fired his security chief to investigate allegations of treason and dismissed his chief prosecutor and other officials – all while a U.S. congresswoman asks President Joe Biden to investigate Zelenskyy’s chief of staff for his alleged ties to Russia. The war is becoming complex.

The decision to permit shipments of wheat makes sense for the rest of the world. Ukraine is the fifth-largest exporter of wheat, accounting for a little under 10 percent of global supply, and the Russian blockade drove the price of grain up dramatically. Whatever sense the agreement makes, though, it is unheard of for two nations engaged in war to reach formal agreements on the side. Stranger still is that though Russia benefits from the agreement too, it is far more beneficial for Ukraine, which not only receives more revenue but also gains a sense of security for its Black Sea ports. The attack on Odesa was no doubt meant to remind Ukraine that such agreements can be abandoned quickly, but the fact that it was reached to begin with is odd nonetheless.

Also startling is the firing of senior officials. Zelenskyy claimed that they were guilty of treason. General corruption is one thing, especially in the former Soviet Union. The invocation of treason is quite another. In some quarters of Kyiv, support for Russia is nothing new; Ukraine has more than its fair share of pro-Russia sympathizers. But if, say, the FSB had penetrated Ukrainian security – which is likely – then the weeks of speculation about their job security makes little sense. If senior officials are found to be compromised, their removal would be instant. Instead, Zelenskyy destabilized his government and unnerved his allies. (Of course, it could have been a foreign intelligence service that detected the breach, and Zelenskyy may have been reluctant until forced to act. As in all such matters, those who know don’t talk, and those who talk don’t know. What is clear is that this sort of matter in the course of war is not normal.)

Russians and Ukrainians sitting side by side can’t help but bring to mind the possibilities of a peace treaty. The firings in Kyiv seem to indicate a degree of instability and discord in Ukraine, creating the possibility, however remote, that new considerations are being made that could lead to some kind of larger deal.

The war has been raging for five months – six months if we count the noisy leadup. It has not gone as Russia hoped. Moscow’s initial offensive, a three-pronged attack on Kyiv, Odesa and Donetsk, failed for a variety of reasons: the limits of Russian logistics, the difficulty of coordinating an armored system at distance, and above all Ukrainian tactics and American weapons. The Ukrainians fought an infantry battle with a decentralized command structure and tactical mobility, and they did so with weapons such as Javelin missiles that were ideally suited for combatting the Russian army.

The Russians were forced to retreat to the east as they fought for the Donetsk region, a relatively small area along the Russian border in which Moscow already had a large presence. Moscow has been engaged there for five months, with mercifully short supply lines to Russia proper, and is now almost in control of the area. Even this highly vulnerable region predisposed to Russian victory took months to subdue. The experience there signals a long war in which Russia will struggle to project force over increasingly large areas of a country it does not really occupy.

Ukraine, meanwhile, may have had the luxury of resting and training its infantry to the west and north, but it cannot be sure of how it’ll fare against new Russian tactics. Kyiv has the advantage of American weaponry and intelligence, and in theory it has the capability to at least resist a Russian offensive even if it cannot launch a larger one of its own. This is why instability at the top of the Ukrainian command is a problem. It’s possible that Zelenskyy is simply cleaning house in preparation for a Russian offensive, but that doesn’t explain why he dragged his feet on the dismissals. Russia might strike sooner rather than later, but the unrest at the top is likely going to trickle down to lower levels. Officers linked to offenders may lose focus, or troops might lose confidence in the chain of command. It is one thing to fight a war based on unity of purpose. It is another thing to fight the war with the chain of command uncertain.

Though it’s unclear what exactly is happening in Kyiv, the Americans and the Russians are likely well informed. Assuming they didn’t force the firings for reasons unknown, the Americans will be pressing to contain the purge until a later date. The Russians, who certainly have assets in the Ukrainian government and military, will seek to destabilize.

Of course, there’s a chance that the firings were a minor event amounting to little more than domestic political machination. But that doesn’t seem likely. More likely is that the war has created tension and risk at the highest levels of authority. The immediate challenge for Ukraine is to contain the issue before it affects the army.

Both sides, then, would seem to have an interest in a negotiated settlement. The problem is that neither side can afford one. Russia’s objective was to make Russia, and Moscow in particular, secure against NATO (read: American) actions. So far, the distance to Moscow is where it was when the war started. Russia cannot accept a peace that does not move Russian control far to the west. Ukraine, and by extension the United States, might be interested in a stand-still. Russia can’t accept that without risking confidence in the government.

And it’s not a given that Ukraine would settle for it either. There is clearly dysfunction at the top. If Kyiv were to cede major portions of territory to Russia, things would get only more dysfunctional. For the West, moving the Russian border closer to Eastern Europe would not end the war; it would only create the pretext for the next. The closer Russia is to the western Ukrainian border, the more it must be assumed that Russia would choose to move farther still. True or not, it must be assumed.

As the risks mount for both sides, a settlement seems likely. The agreement on grain was obviously signed with some notion of what it could mean. The concept of a peace agreement is sound, but the geography of such an agreement, and the imperatives on both sides, seems to make this impossible. What is needed here is fear.
Title: Ukraine is done
Post by: G M on July 31, 2022, 10:03:24 PM
https://sonar21.com/while-establishment-media-pushes-delusional-narrative-on-ukraine-us-military-brass-now-recognizes-the-war-is-lost/

Better make a deal, if Russia is even willing to sit down to negotiate.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 01, 2022, 06:04:33 AM
It is war.  Both sides are lying.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on August 01, 2022, 07:21:55 AM
It is war.  Both sides are lying.

True. However, the Ukes are bled white from casualties and the land seized by Russia isn't in doubt.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 01, 2022, 12:16:04 PM
Russia too.
Title: Ukraine goes under the bus
Post by: G M on August 02, 2022, 05:59:06 PM
https://ace.mu.nu/archives/400295.php

Shockingly, there is corruption in Ukraine!
Title: Fighting to the last Ukrainen
Post by: G M on August 03, 2022, 08:41:37 AM
https://www.moonofalabama.org/2022/08/ukraine-sitrep-on-the-ground-report-ukrainian-frontline-collapses.html
Title: Stratfor: Is time on Kyiv's side?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 03, 2022, 12:28:27 PM
Bracing for a Protracted War in Ukraine, Part 1: Is Time on Kyiv's Side?
undefined and Stratfor Eurasia Analyst at RANE
Matthew Orr
Stratfor Eurasia Analyst at RANE, Stratfor
11 MIN READAug 2, 2022 | 21:23 GMT





Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stands in the town of Bucha, northwest of the Ukrainian capital Kyiv, on April 4, 2022.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stands in the town of Bucha, northwest of the Ukrainian capital Kyiv, on April 4, 2022.

(RONALDO SCHEMIDT/AFP via Getty Images)

Editor's Note: This assessment is the first of a two-part series that explores whether Ukraine or Russia is more capable of emerging victorious from a protracted war.

Since the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and particularly in the last several weeks, competing narratives have emerged regarding the future trajectory of the war. These debates are often framed as a question regarding time — namely, on whose side is time in the war?

The Prospect of a Protracted War
This question came to the fore in May as it became clear that the peace talks that began shortly after Russia launched its invasion in February had, unsurprisingly, ground to a halt. Today, a peace deal remains distant due to Russia's insistence that it maintains control over — and likely eventually annexes — the land corridor to Crimea. But Ukraine has refused to even discuss surrendering this territory as it would effectively enshrine Moscow's control of the banks of the Dnieper River, which is the economic and ideological backbone of the Ukrainian state.

Russia controlling even one of the banks at the mouth of the Dnieper River would permanently neuter Ukraine from a strategic standpoint by granting Moscow control over traffic on the river. Russia's presence on the river would, therefore, function similarly to the Russian troops positioned just miles from Georgia's capital of Tbilisi as a result of its 2008 war with Russia, which have contributed to Georgia's struggles to develop its economy and foster closer ties with Europe.

The Ukrainian government will thus resist any cease-fire (let alone a peace accord) that involves Ukraine de facto accepting the loss of this territory. Ukraine will therefore continue to reject Russia's likely unilateral attempts to offer an end of hostilities, instead planning to achieve a stronger negotiating position after building up Western weapons for eventual counteroffensive operations.

In Russia, the popularity of the increasingly costly war largely hinges on the eventual annexation of Ukrainian territories, which will likely also see the Kremlin maintain its strategy of constantly reminding the United States and Europe of the alleged existential nature of the conflict for Moscow. Russia will continue to demonstrate, including through nuclear blackmail, that it will always be ready to pay a higher cost than the West is willing (or, in Ukraine's case, able) to pay for in order to retain the territory Moscow has already seized during the war, while maintaining ambitions on as much of Ukraine as possible.
 
In Ukraine, political leaders continue to insist an end to the ''active phase'' of the war will come some time this winter. However, the inability of either side to achieve sufficiently favorable conditions to do so means the conflict is increasingly likely to extend into 2023 and beyond, as the war becomes a protracted stand-off with the possibility of acute flare-ups. Peace talks will probably eventually resume, but they are unlikely to yield much progress so long as Russia, Ukraine and the United States continue signaling that maintaining the war is sustainable and preferable to the painful concessions at the negotiating table.

The Argument That Time Is on Ukraine's Side
The argument that time favors Ukraine largely rests on its continued access to modern NATO weaponry (specifically artillery systems and ammunition, including precision-guided munitions) — drawing a contrast with Russia's logistical, supply and military equipment production challenges. Statements from Western officials like U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks — who on June 13 said the Pentagon was ''well-equipped'' to support Ukraine ''for five, 10, or 20 years into the future'' — support the notion that Ukraine will receive a steady supply of modern equipment in the long term. Russia, meanwhile, is increasingly economizing its use of precision munitions and certain systems amid doubts over its ability to replace them. A point could thus be made that the growing disparity in the two sides' weaponry will,eventually, enable Ukraine to not just hold the frontline, but conduct its own strategic counteroffensives.

This argument also points to Russia's manpower constraints. The fact that Moscow has repeatedly declined more extensive mobilization measures so far, when doing so would have been more beneficial the earlier they came, is strong evidence that the Kremlin is afraid to do so now or in the future because it could result in a drop in domestic support for the war. Russia is struggling to attract sufficient volunteers, many of whom are older and less fit for combat service. Ukraine, by contrast, is continuing to mobilize highly-motivated personnel who can be trained in the West. This means, over time, Russia will face force quality and availability issues that will put Russian soldiers' lives at risk during a Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Ukraine retaking Crimea or much of the Donbas is off the table for both military and political reasons. But if it retains its manpower and equipment advantage, the Ukrainian military could, so the argument goes, take back sufficient pieces of its territory to stop Russia from annexing or continuing to occupy some territory by making the political and economic costs of doing so unviable from Moscow. Indeed, Ukraine recovering or even just threatening a significant portion of the administrative borders of the Donbas region could throw a monkey wrench in Moscow's plans to annex the region or additional areas of Ukraine. This is because Russia is most likely to annex territory along easily defendable natural borders, such as the Dnieper River, or along administrative boundaries that will contribute to a veneer of legitimacy to Russia's actions. Denying Moscow full control over these administrative regions in a situation where it has not achieved its stated strategic goals could, over time, become politically untenable for Moscow. This, so it is hoped, could force Russia to eventually withdraw from some areas of Ukraine, easing the strain on Russia's military in what Moscow would call a ''goodwill gesture.''
 
Adding to the argument that time is on Ukraine's side are challenges to the Russian economy stemming from sanctions and the departure of Western companies. Despite years of funding ''import replacement'' programs, Russia's civilian and military production remains woefully reliant on imports of foreign (usually Western) equipment, most notably in technologically sensitive components and electronics. Russia may be able to withstand the fallout from Western sanctions through the rest of the year. But if sanctions remain in place in 2023 and beyond, the weakening of Russia's economy could reach a point where Moscow is forced to reduce its war aims due to military and civilian production shortfalls or subsequent political turmoil. Russia's ability to maintain budgetary stability could be severely undermined by an inability to paper over its economic challenges with oil sales. As Russia's breakeven price for oil production has likely gone up, a fall in oil prices could force Moscow to exhaust its foriegn currency reserves to make up the shortfall.

Another factor that could see time favor Ukraine is the Russian public's growing wariness of President Vladimir Putin's ongoing war. Domestic polling shows that, while Putin's popularity and support for his so-called ''special military operation'' in Ukraine spiked following the start of hostilities, both are now trending downward — and will likely continue to do so (albeit slowly) as the war drags on.

Versions of the above argument are of course popular in the West and in Ukraine. It is essential for Kyiv to spread this narrative because it – likely correctly — assesses that maintaining the public's attention and support in the West is contingent on the idea that Ukraine can not just survive the war, but ''win.'' Without this ''vision of victory,'' Western powers may be less inclined to keep providing material and financial support. The fact the Western support partially hinges on notions that Kyiv can ''win'' the war is well understood by Moscow, which will continue pushing the opposite narrative – that weapons deliveries will only lead to additional destruction among the Ukrainian army and people, while never allowing Ukraine to retake sufficient territory to change Moscow's position at the negotiating table.

The Caveats: Ukraine's Weak Position and Western Hesitance
It's true that Ukraine has been remarkably successful at preventing a vastly more powerful foe from taking control of even more of the country (especially given its poor preparations for a full-scale invasion). However, Russia's continued occupation of southeastern Ukraine and attacks on the rest of the country will make it hard for Ukrainians to take solace in this achievement. This is because true strategic Ukrainian victory would involve, at a minimum, Kyiv pushing Moscow's forces entirely out of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhya regions and thereby denying Russian access to the Dnieper River. In addition to Mariupol and the rest of the eastern Donbas region, the current lines would see Ukraine lose control over not only the river but strategic cities like Energodar (the site of Europe's largest nuclear power plant), Melitopol (an industrial center between the Donbas and Crimea) and Berdyansk (a major grain-exporting port on the Sea of Azov).

Western officials' rhetoric stressing that weapons are merely intended to help Ukraine's negotiating position, rather than achieve victory or defeat Russia, are intentionally ambiguous and reflect the grim reality that Ukraine faces a narrow military path for recapturing the territory it's lost since Russian troops began invading on Feb. 24, let alone Ukraine's internationally recognized borders. This strategic ambiguity will continue to dissuade Western officials from clearly defining the pace and limits of their support, as clearer commitments would admit to a definition of Ukrainian ''victory'' that is not one. This would provide information for Moscow to better pursue its own strategy, while severely demoralizing the Ukrainians. Instead, the West's approach involves draining Russian resolve and resources to continue the war over a long period, hoping this will lead to economic and political instability in Russia that will prompt Moscow to de-escalate.

The overall picture suggests that Western politicians are too concerned about the escalation with Russia and the political ramifications of war fatigue — both of which are poised to only grow as market disruptions brought on by the war further destabilize the global economy — to sufficiently supply Ukraine to achieve a victory. But war fatigue in Ukraine and the West was likely bound to increase with time, no matter the pace of support and weapons deliveries in the opening months of the war. Therefore, the West's policy of strategic ambiguity poses dangers for Ukraine because it belies the conditionality of Western support, and has put the onus on the Ukrainians to take risky action without sufficient support before Russian forces have time to fortify their positions. A premature attack would weaken the Ukrainians in a drawn-out conflict, and is therefore something Moscow is likely seeking to provoke.

Knowing that Ukraine's ability to conduct a counteroffensive now and in the future is entirely based on Western weapons supplies, Moscow does not need to break the will of the Ukrainians to keep fighting. Moscow needs only to break the will of the West to continue funding weapons deliveries and supporting Ukraine's civilian economy or eventual reconstruction, and to get the West to stop allowing its weapons to be used to attack its forces in the seized areas of Ukraine.

Reports that Moscow is preparing referendums as soon as September to justify subsequent annexation of the seized areas would align with that strategy. Given the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden's indication that one of its top priorities is preventing World War III, Moscow likely calculates that annexing seized areas and claiming they are under Russia's nuclear shield would help deter Ukrainian attacks on Russia using Western weapons. U.S. officials have said they are opposed to providing weapons that Ukraine ''could use to attack Russia'' — a logic that could be applied to a growing proportion of equipment at Kyiv's disposal. This would, of course, come with a major credibility risk for Moscow. But Russia's ability to blackmail the West (by, for example, raising its nuclear threat level) remains extensive, and would likely see more Europeans and Americans call for de-escalation. Russia's annexation plans serve as a wild card that could potentially most alter the future trajectory of the war, bringing new factors into play regarding each side's strategy.

In the second part of this series, we'll explore the argument that time may be on Russia's side in the war.
Title: GPF: Russia's protracted war strategy
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 03, 2022, 12:39:48 PM
second

August 3, 2022
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Russia’s Protracted War in Ukraine
Moscow's war of attrition is meant simply to exhaust its enemies.
By: Ridvan Bari Urcosta

The war in Ukraine is raging with no end in sight. Neither Russia nor Ukraine is ready to sit at the negotiation table. Both claim that their goals are absolute and non-negotiable. With negotiations not an option, both are determined to exhaust the enemy’s resources, manpower and technological potential, and to finally “throw his adversary, and thus render him incapable of further resistance,” in the words of Clausewitz. In the meantime, Russia’s actions in Ukraine paint a clear picture of Moscow’s doctrinal thinking about warfare, and illustrate that Ukraine is only one part of Russia’s broader economic and geopolitical objectives.

The invasion of Ukraine marks the next stage in the global confrontation between East and West. The East, led by China and Russia, wants to revise the political-economic order, which has the U.S. at the center. The confrontation’s military expression, in Ukraine, could easily spill over into other parts of Eurasia. Neither side wants this, and perhaps a unique feature of this 21st-century confrontation will be its localization. There were many localized military confrontations between East and West during the Cold War, such as Vietnam and Afghanistan. So far, it is unclear who is benefiting more from the prolongation of the war in Ukraine. In fact, one could argue that all involved parties are losing; all are experiencing economic and other hardships that will only grow.

To understand the course of the war, it helps to understand the influences of contemporary Russian military doctrine. Russian doctrine begins with the Marxist theory of war, which teaches that war is a continuation of politics, a premise taken from Clausewitz. The mainstream Russian military school also inherited the dialectical vision of war, where any local war is part of the global geopolitical rivalry with “Western imperialism.” Russian doctrine is also influenced by the Maoist view, which pursues multiple fronts in the event of protracted wars. In practice, this means Russia (and the Soviet Union before it), as well as China, targets the so-called Third World as a means to undermine Western power.

Finally, it is now obvious that when Russia initiated the war, the Kremlin decided on the theory of permanent mobilization. This was developed by the Soviet military theoretician Alexander Svechin, who proposed that the state must avoid “over-mobilization,” which he defined as mobilization of all of society and the economy and which can set off political crisis or even revolution. Svechin suggested that the economic situation must be deeply assessed before and throughout the war. The economic rear should be secure and out of the enemy’s reach.

These perspectives help explain Russia’s economic and military approach to the Ukraine conflict. At the global level, Russia launched ideological, resource, energy and economic-financial wars against the West. The goal is to exhaust the West’s economic and financial potential, particularly the dominance of the U.S. dollar. Ukraine is one of the biggest countries in Europe in terms of population and territory, so it can easily absorb a massive amount of dollars. Russia hopes that the enormous burden of economic and military support for Ukraine will create divisions inside NATO and the European Union. On the battlefield, Russia has not given up its primary goal to occupy the Donbas region and other areas of "Novorossiya" in southern and eastern Ukraine. It continues its hidden mobilization campaign, and continues to threaten Kyiv and the rest of Ukraine.

Russia understood the war to be against the West from the beginning, but since more advanced Western weapons started arriving in Ukraine, particularly HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System), it’s become an inescapable reality. Effective rocket strikes on the Russian army’s rear, bridges and ammunition depots were a wake-up call. The Ukrainians surprised with their ability to grasp and incorporate new technologies into the war. Russia responded with a change of tactics and strategy. It is now avoiding closing the front or concentrations of ammunition depots and hardware. Further, it is seeking new ways to counter the HIMARS, for example by using the Buk-M3 and Pantsir anti-aircraft missile systems to attempt to intercept the rockets.

But the geopolitical and military realities are such that Russian officials must continue to prosecute the war because they have yet to achieve their goals. To stop the assault without taking Donbas would be political suicide, even for Putin. Disruptions to food supplies, migration patterns and energy markets are the only real leverage Russia has left.

Indeed, the situation will escalate in spite of the red lines issued by both sides. Russia wants to keep the conflict an indirect one with the West, and it wants the West to limit military support and weaponry that could, for example, threaten the Russian homeland or undermine Russian control of its own airspace. The West, and especially NATO, wants to keep the conflict from spilling into more sensitive regions such as the Baltics and Poland. So far, no one seems ready to give up the ghost despite heavy losses.

Red lines aren’t inviolable, of course, but they provide a sense of what it would take to kick off a much greater war, or even a nuclear exchange. So far, all sides, including Ukraine, are ready to continue apace. Russia hasn’t yet directly attacked Ukraine’s political and military centers, nor has it carpet bombed Ukrainian cities en masse. But the weaker the Russian army gets, the more tempting it will be for it to take more drastic actions. The West is still an important source of military assistance, but that assistance consists of older aircraft and other air-defense platforms. If it starts to send more sophisticated and cutting-edge technologies, it would alter the balance of power in the conflict and thus potentially draw the West and Russia into an escalated war. The West is not currently prepared to take this risk.

The Putin regime intends to survive, so it is more than willing to play the long game. Moscow sees the war in Ukraine as just the military front in an economic, political and diplomatic conflict with the West. At a recent economic forum in St. Petersburg, Putin even said that actions against Russia will only further aggravate divisions in the West, as evidenced by Russia's retaliation in the energy market.

Military theorist B. H. Liddell Hart said that “Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and manpower of nations in order to sustain the fighting services.” Putin seems to have taken this to heart. Russia’s protracted war of attrition is meant to simply exhaust its enemies; making Ukraine a black hole that absorbs money and resources is central to this goal. For Russia to achieve its geopolitical objectives, it may only have to take its time.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 04, 2022, 07:58:31 AM
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682?fbclid=IwAR3gYf_ys8LoRKs4C54Zx_S85fTPNah3VxllBaanmz4tzycIRp6TIHS51oQ
Title: GPF: Transdniestria
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 04, 2022, 04:31:28 PM
More drills. Russian forces in Transdniestria, a separatist region in Moldova, conducted military exercises.
Title: Re: These weapons will find their way to W. Europe and N. America-
Post by: G M on August 06, 2022, 07:23:51 AM
https://twitter.com/imetatronink/status/1531639067330215936

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/02/ukraine-weapons-end-up-criminal-hands-says-interpol-chief-jurgen-stock

https://www.rebelnews.com/swedish_police_warn_that_weapons_sent_to_ukraine_could_land_in_the_hands_of_criminal_gangs

https://www.revolver.news/2022/07/psst-looking-for-a-javelin/

https://www.revolver.news/2022/08/even-cbs-news-asks-where-all-those-weapons-are-going/
Title: where is all the money and weapons going in Ukraine?
Post by: ccp on August 06, 2022, 08:08:18 AM
"https://www.revolver.news/2022/08/even-cbs-news-asks-where-all-those-weapons-are-going/"

what a surprise

but this endless throwing away billions at problems

allows the next election candidate
to insist they are going to save money by going after Fraud Waste and Abuse

only to spend up the arse
so the next election candidate can scream the same crap

no reason to be disillusioned  :wink:
Title: PS more spending
Post by: ccp on August 06, 2022, 08:55:56 AM
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-us-readies-new-1-billion-ukraine-weapons-package-2022-08-05/

how the hell do we need to spend more multiple times AFTER supplying them with 30 bill ?

is the US military in on the scams and want their cut

or is hunter in on the action ?

 :-o
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on August 06, 2022, 09:14:17 PM
https://citizenfreepress.com/breaking/cbs-news-only-30-percent-of-u-s-weapons-sent-to-ukraine-reach-destination/
Title: "Moscow’s Disastrous Invasion of Ukraine Will Reinforce the Norm Against War"
Post by: DougMacG on August 07, 2022, 06:44:32 AM
An optimistic take from "Foreign Affairs":

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/upside-putins-delusions

Pretty easy to draw the opposite conclusion.  Russia got the land, port and control it wanted.  Xi is poised to do the same, while Russia can regroup and attack another neighbor next.

Same thinking as US Democrats.  Fixed pie, you only gain by taking from others with force, coercion or threat of same.  A magnitude or two of evil beyond covet.
Title: Reuters: New Uke capability?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 11, 2022, 09:49:07 AM
https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-suggests-partisans-behind-blasts-russian-airbase-crimea-2022-08-10/
Title: Re: Reuters: New Uke capability?
Post by: G M on August 11, 2022, 10:43:41 AM
https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-suggests-partisans-behind-blasts-russian-airbase-crimea-2022-08-10/

 :roll: :roll: :roll:

Title: Ukes blow up Wagner HQ in Donbas
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 15, 2022, 09:53:10 AM
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11112131/Ukraine-blows-Wagner-HQ-Donbas.html?fbclid=IwAR31OgeDQNW7kwMPEpawezVuRmiNkzuzfgJHU0SVPIdoD9m5u3R-q4md8qc
Title: Re: Ukes blow up Wagner HQ in Donbas
Post by: G M on August 17, 2022, 10:18:51 AM
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11112131/Ukraine-blows-Wagner-HQ-Donbas.html?fbclid=IwAR31OgeDQNW7kwMPEpawezVuRmiNkzuzfgJHU0SVPIdoD9m5u3R-q4md8qc

More likely "Western Intel and SF blow up Wagner HQ in Donbas".
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 17, 2022, 11:48:16 AM
Could be.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on August 17, 2022, 11:59:36 AM
Could be.

I'd bet 500 bucks it was.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 17, 2022, 12:41:41 PM
Not a bet I would take!
Title: George Friedman: When Russia Prepared for the Inconceivable
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 19, 2022, 06:27:50 AM
ugust 19, 2022
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When Russia Prepared for the Inconceivable
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman

Many of our readers have challenged my idea that Russia invaded Ukraine out fear – fear that, deprived of the strategic depth Ukraine provides, Russia might be invaded and occupied. Rather than debate the moral implications of Russia’s decision to invade, I have argued that having Europe’s easternmost “border” less than 300 miles from Moscow was for Russian leaders unacceptable, and that the invasion was, rightly or wrongly, an act of premeditated self-defense.

The counter to this argument, of course, is that the war is based on a nonexistent threat. Ukraine was not in a position to invade Russia, and no potential enemy had any intention of invading Russia. How, then, could Moscow feel justifiably threatened?

It’s true that at the time of the invasion no one was threatening to attack Russia. But it’s also true that international relations are dynamic. The interests and powers of potential enemies may change over time, and the fact that a country is immune to attack right now doesn’t mean it is immune in perpetuity. As interests evolve, absurd fears can turn into dangerous realities. As balances of power shift, and as the unthinkable emerges, acting preemptively can become a national imperative. For Russia, ignoring the vulnerability of Moscow due to the short distance for a military drive from a now powerful Ukraine, equally afraid not of Russia’s current intent but its intent and power in the future, would have been irresponsible. I am American and I also have fears of a Russian victory that brings them to the border of NATO and forces us to assume the worst case and engage in a new Cold War. Neither fear is frivolous, even if it isn’t currently real. Anyone buying stocks is playing the future. Nations play for higher stakes, with each nation obsessed with its own fears, and both playing the future.

This is compounded by the nature of war. One of the rules of war promulgated by Clausewitz and universally acknowledged is the overriding advantage of surprise, particularly when initiating war with a powerful enemy. Surprise comes in three parts: the political goal of war, the vulnerability of the enemy, and the timing of the attack. The classic case of the surprise attack was Pearl Harbor. Japan had to secure the Western Pacific to import raw material that the U.S. had embargoed or sealed up. The Japanese understood they could not defeat the United States in a full-scale war but hoped to bring the U.S. to a negotiated settlement. That was the political goal. The attack on Pearl Harbor was intended to be psychologically stunning, and Japan had to initiate the war in order to generate American insecurity. U.S. officials assumed that if there was war it would start in the Philippines, astride Japan's trade routes. Therefore, the Japanese attacked a place the U.S. regarded as invulnerable, if only because of its sheer distance from Japan. The attack was a failure. It destroyed the Pacific fleet but did not force the United States to negotiate a settlement. Japanese fear crafted a desperate strategy that failed to understand that the loss for the U.S. of any part of the Pacific would open the door to invasion of the U.S. homeland, which, however it might have appeared, was too dangerous to risk. Japan drove into a war it could not win.

The attack on Pearl Harbor is instructive for a variety of reasons. First, an attack can come at any time and indeed will likely come in unexpected ways. Second, initiating a war without understanding the enemy’s imperatives can lead to disaster. Third, understanding an enemy’s military capabilities is essential.

For Russia, surprise is what they feared and what they achieved. The Russians did not anticipate a national imperative in Ukraine that created unity. And they did not understand the weapons that were being supplied to Ukraine and how those weapons would stymie the Russian advance. Russia fundamentally miscalculated Ukraine’s imperatives and thus failed to appreciate its military capability.

The argument I am making is that the Russian invasion of Ukraine flowed from its vulnerability in an uncertain future, as did the Ukrainian, European and American responses. If Russia isn’t doing this to defend itself, then it has merely done this because it is greedy or evil. Evil certainly exists in the world, but I have found that most people and nations do not on the whole regard themselves as evil. Nations tend to act militarily out of a fear that is not obvious to anyone else.

War yields the unexpected as well as a fear of the future. When there is too much of both, the results can be catastrophic.
Title: who does this guy remind you of?
Post by: ccp on August 21, 2022, 06:59:27 AM
https://nypost.com/2022/08/20/daughter-of-staunch-putin-ally-alexander-dugin-killed-in-car-bombing/
f
I am thinking Rasputin.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 21, 2022, 08:53:32 AM
CCP:

Pasted that here:

https://firehydrantoffreedom.com/index.php?topic=1468.new#new
Title: Ominous if true
Post by: G M on August 24, 2022, 09:16:45 AM
https://www.imetatronink.com/2022/08/no-fly-zone.html

A potential game changer.
Title: BBC maps
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 24, 2022, 12:21:31 PM
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682?fbclid=IwAR3EGy_gGEKATMhddKfDVAMV3bHHyUaL-m_UenA6nLDra3S2BalS5fNvgAs
Title: Return Crimea to Ukraine, Turkish President,
Post by: DougMacG on August 25, 2022, 10:13:50 AM
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/return-of-crimea-to-ukraine-a-requirement-of-international-law-turkish-president/2667680

Return of Crimea to Ukraine a requirement of international law: Turkish president
Ensuring safety, well-being of Crimean Tatars among Türkiye's priorities, Recep Tayyip Erdogan says
---------
(Doug)  Much stronger statement than Biden or NATO has made.
Title: Uke nuke plant cut off from grid. Radiation danger?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 25, 2022, 03:04:21 PM
https://nypost.com/2022/08/25/zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-cut-off-from-ukraines-power-grid/?fbclid=IwAR0q_JF0WshNvAsGyKcJS0_ZBj-BilqB8u5fsYjBzsQsarxbpMHbRIdyINM
Title: Ukes fight to take Kherson
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 30, 2022, 02:06:27 PM
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62730439?fbclid=IwAR3Z4RkPsTV1ayzHVGHGwEbZRDlaexShbDfycBggckrBFacm7cB2Re6XQWY 
Title: WSJ: Ukes giving it a shot to take Kherson
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 30, 2022, 07:04:28 PM
MYKOLAIV, Ukraine—After a crescendo of long-range strikes on Russian military facilities and bridges in the dark of night early Monday, Ukrainian forces launched a southern offensive with attacks along the front lines.

Ukrainian armor crashed over the Inhulets River and established a bridgehead, the main gains that Kyiv has made in two days of fighting.

Whether Ukraine can capitalize on its initial thrust and retake territory in its south that Russia seized at the start of its invasion will go a long way to shape the next phase of the war.


Area controlled by Russia

UKRAINE

Mykolaiv

Inhulets River

Dnipro River

Kherson

UKRAINE

Area of detail

CRIMEA

Source: Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project (areas of control)
After repelling the Russians from the outskirts of Kyiv in the spring, Ukraine had been slowly losing ground in the east in the face of intensive shelling and airstrikes. But after all but halting the Russians there, Ukraine sought to cut off enemy forces on the western bank of the Dnipro River in the south by using precise, long-range rockets provided by the U.S. to strike bridges and military facilities.

Russia has indicated it wants to annex the lands it holds in Ukraine’s south and has sought to play down the Ukrainian assault.

Further Ukrainian gains would boost national morale and show the country’s military and financial backers in the West, who are facing a winter of economic troubles, that Ukraine’s military can halt the Russians and also take back territory.

“Not only would this be their first substantial offensive, it would be a demonstration to the West that they should continue supporting Ukraine to fully push the Russians out of their territory,” said retired Australian Army Maj. Gen. Mick Ryan.


A warning sign marks a minefield that surrounds a skate park in Mykolaiv, Ukraine.
PHOTO: JOSEPH SYWENKYJ FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
A Ukrainian advance would also be crucial for residents of occupied areas holding out hope that Ukraine will liberate their towns.

“I think the political dimensions of this offensive are as important as the military ones,” Gen. Ryan said.

Ukrainian officials have cautioned against excessive optimism. They say the offensive will be slow and grinding.

“This will be a tough fight for the Ukrainians,” said Gen. Ryan. “Offensive operations are hard to coordinate and support, compared to defensive operations.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has said he wants to retake Kherson, the only regional capital Russia captured since launching its invasion on Feb. 24. That would give Ukraine a gateway for attacks on Crimea, which Russia seized in 2014.

‘The political dimensions of this offensive are as important as the military ones’

— Retired Australian Army Maj. Gen. Mick Ryan
The southern offensive is the latest sign that Ukraine is seeking to seize the initiative. Ukrainian sabotage groups this month struck an air base and ammunition depot in Crimea, which acts as a rear base for Russian forces in the south of Ukraine. They were the first major strikes there and sent many Russians fleeing to the mainland while Ukrainians celebrated.

“Ukrainians can sense that momentum is shifting in their favor,” said retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe. “This will make it much more feasible for Ukraine’s supporters, as well as Ukrainians, to envision the recovery of Ukraine. It will continue to remove the idea that Russian victory is inevitable.”

Thousands of Russian troops on the western bank of the Dnipro River are now all but trapped, with Ukraine saying it had damaged bridges across the river sufficiently to prevent any heavy vehicles from crossing.

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“They haven’t been properly resupplied,” said Gen. Hodges. “Their chances of getting out of there are not good.”


Residents collect water on Tuesday in the southern Ukrainian city of Mykolaiv.
PHOTO: JOSEPH SYWENKYJ FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Ukraine is well aware of the importance of the offensive. The military has restricted access for reporters to the front lines and demanded that officials, media and semiofficial propagandists hold their tongues.

Ukrainian officials say little more than that things are going to plan. They have long said they don’t have sufficient armor and troops to mount a broad, overwhelming offensive.

Instead, they wanted to cut off the Russian troops from their supplies and now are seeking to destroy them piece by piece.


Andriy Zagorodnyuk, a former Ukrainian defense minister, played down the significance of Monday’s events, saying it is a continuation of operations that had been taking place for weeks.

“I can’t say that something has dramatically changed,” he said. “They are slowly pushing forward.”

Still, he said, “we’re destroying their capacity to hold territory.”

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A National Guard soldier manning a checkpoint south of Mykolaiv, some 10 miles from the front line, said Ukraine has been wary of launching ground offensives because of the size of Russia’s forces. He said strikes on Mykolaiv, long a target of Russian missiles, had stepped up in the past two days.

“They’re trying to get their revenge, wherever they can and against whomever they can,” he said.

Residents of Mykolaiv on Tuesday also noted a rise in the number of Russian rocket and artillery strikes since Ukraine’s counteroffensive was announced.

Natalia Kirtenko, a 64-year-old retiree, was gathering water at a public well south of the city center on Tuesday evening when explosions rang out in the distance.

She said the increase in attacks on Mykolaiv has given people hope that the battlefield balance will shift. “At least we know this means our guys are moving forward,” she said. “So our mood has improved.”
Title: The cost of supporting Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 01, 2022, 01:54:29 AM
The Ongoing Wealth Transfer to Ukraine
Aid to Ukraine has increased astronomically with no end in sight
Stu Cvrk
Stu Cvrk
 August 31, 2022


The Biden administration and its congressional allies continue to transfer U.S. wealth and treasure to Ukraine with no end in sight. This includes lethal aid in the form of weapon systems and nonlethal aid in generic categories such as refugee assistance, energy security, anti-corruption activities, and logistics support.

Let us examine the topic in greater detail.

As reported by Fox News, these are the Ukrainian aid numbers from 2001 to 2016:

2001-2008 (George W. Bush presidency): $1.1 billion.
2009-2016 (Barack Obama presidency): $2.1 billion.

All of that was nonlethal aid, with the Obama increase coming after the Ukraine election of 2010 and the Russian invasion and annexation of eastern Ukraine and Crimea in 2014. The $320 million in aid provided in 2014 is detailed by an Obama White House fact sheet in the following categories: economic stabilization, reform, and growth; security sector capacity building and reform; national unity, democracy, human rights, and media; anti-corruption initiatives; energy security; humanitarian assistance and early recovery; trade diversification and promotion.

Former President Donald Trump provided the first lethal aid from the United States. According to a report by the Council on Foreign Relations, “In March 2018, the State Department approved the sale of anti-tank weapons [Javelin missiles] to Ukraine, the first sale of lethal weaponry since the conflict began [in 2014].”

This was accomplished under the existing authority as part of the U.S. Department of Defense’s budget that includes funds for “Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO),” which have been funded at up to roughly $65 billion per year. A special part of the OCO funding, called the European Defense Initiative (EDI), focuses on reinforcing allies in Europe and deterring Russian aggression.

Included in the EDI was the $250 million that Congress authorized for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which can be used to replace any “weapons or defensive articles” provided to Ukraine by the United States. (Note: Trump’s deliberations in providing these funds to Ukraine ended up being included in the Democrats’ articles of impeachment during the Ukraine hoax in 2019.)


Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February, the Biden administration has dramatically increased aid to the country—with no strings attached. In May, Congress approved an aid package to Ukraine in the amount of $40 billion. However, the Senate refused to include language proposed by Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) that would have required the appointment of a special inspector general to oversee the distribution of the money to ensure accountability for U.S. taxpayers. This is problematic since Ukrainian corruption is endemic, as summarized by the Borgen Project.

As of Aug. 2, the Ukraine Support Tracker estimated that U.S. aid to Ukraine had reached $44.38 billion (€44.5 billion: €25.0 billion in military aid, €9.2 billion in humanitarian aid, €10.3 billion in financial aid). The second-largest donor listed is “EU institutions,” with €16 billion already committed. Of the countries, the United Kingdom is the second largest donor behind the U.S. government, having committed €6.5 billion.

The total support pledged by Western governments (including “EU institutions”) reached almost €84 billion. Of the military aid, the United States had delivered about $2.06 billion, with $8.63 billion remaining committed. Additional aid was recently approved by Congress, bringing total U.S. aid to Ukraine in 2022 to roughly $54 billion. (The more than $40 billion in additional aid to Ukraine approved by Congress on May 19 brings the total U.S. commitment during the Russian invasion to roughly $54 billion, when combined with the aid package passed in March.)

According to the Defense Department, U.S. military aid so far has come in the form of mortar ammunition, counter-artillery radars, unmanned aerial systems and support equipment, laser-guided rocket systems, as well as funding for training, maintenance, and sustainment. Around 40 percent of the aid is directed to these weapons transfers, medical and intelligence support to European allies, and to support the deployment of additional U.S. troops to Europe.


Assuming an annual interest rate of 3 percent compounded annually over 30 years, the €84 billion commitment will cost Western nations over €200 billion. The U.S. commitment alone ($54 billion) will cost U.S. taxpayers more than $130 billion over the same period.

To put things in perspective, Ukraine spent about $5.9 billion on its military annually before the war. The financial aid commitment from Western nations (€84 billion) to Ukraine is more than 14 times Ukraine’s entire annual military budget. The cost to Western nations (€200 billion) will be more than Ukraine’s entire GDP (€155 billion).

Consider that Europe is facing catastrophic energy problems as Russian gas and oil supplies are being manipulated by Moscow. For example, as reported by Bloomberg News, “Europe’s industrial heartland faces a potential exodus as manufacturers of German car parts, chemicals and steel struggle to absorb power prices that rocket to new highs almost every day.”

Never mind the effect on individual citizens who are facing 20 percent to 30 percent cuts in gas supplies over the coming winter. And yet, Western nations are committing €200 billion to Ukraine aid over the next several years!

For the United States, the $130 billion committed dwarfs the roughly $5 billion needed to complete the construction of the U.S.-Mexico wall in order to stop the ongoing flood of illegals into America (nearly 5 million since January 2021). Never mind the cost to cities and states in providing services to all of the illegals, such as public school education, subsidized housing, healthcare, as well as the security and safety investments needed to combat the increased crime. The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) estimated those annual costs to be $116 billion in 2017, and that was before the 5 million let in by the Biden administration over the past two years!

The bottom line: This is the biggest wealth transfer since COVID-19, which resulted in nearly $4 trillion transferred from the middle class to the ruling class in 2020 alone, as discussed here and here. Let the U.S. political class make personal investments in Ukraine if they so choose, but leave U.S. taxpayers out of it, as we have other priorities–such as covering the staggering costs of inflation.

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Title: Ukraine and the moment of greatest danger
Post by: G M on September 04, 2022, 08:23:58 AM
https://www.imetatronink.com/2022/09/the-moment-of-greatest-danger.html
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 04, 2022, 08:58:55 AM
Frankly, that reads like Russian propaganda.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 04, 2022, 09:02:10 AM
Frankly, that reads like Russian propaganda.

The author has been correct in his assessments from the start of the Uke war.

What of this sounds like propaganda to you?
Title: Winter War and Ethnic/Spiritual divide
Post by: Valerick on September 05, 2022, 07:20:36 AM
https://twitter.com/abcnews/status/1543308190598643712 - Come what may, this winter will be the make it or break it time.

I've maintained since the war began (having followed the last 8 years of war between the Russian Separtist groups and the Ukranian Nationalists) that Russia wants the land they are currently garrisoning and not much else.

Looking at maps of language and religion, we see the currently occupied areas predominantly speak Russian and (more telling) are under spiritual authority by the Russian Church. There was a schism in the church recently which started the Ukranian Orthodox Church.

All that said, I believe highly that the initial attack on Kiev was a distraction while they took the current areas and began to entrench/fortify them. Ukraine has attempted to fire behind the enemy lines/work some assassinations etc to try and provoke an attack from these areas. The longer they're there, the more entrenched they become. After the Kherson offensive, we see how deep these defenses are becoming.

This winter, will be economically unsustainable for most Europeans. They will either not pay, pay and lose everything or the government will have to take on trillions in new debts to float the costs. 22 million refugee/migrants/and Islamic militants will be fighting for resources with the citizens of each country. I've noticed and seen this quite a bit. Once the cost of something becomes "I'm cold, I'm hungry, my kids are hungry" the pool of empathy and care many have is gone. This war will be done by the end of winter imo because of this. Which given everything, I'm glad since it will be the least bloody and save the most civilian lives.

The politics after though are going to be insane. We might heat back up once people recover in a year or two.


- - -

Maps! :

>Language map: https://andthewordsbecamebooks.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/imrs.jpg

>Religious map: https://billtammeus.typepad.com/.a/6a00d834515f9b69e20240a4eb435c200b-popup (this is an interesting one, notice which regions where switched from Moscow/Russian authority to Ukranian)

>Updating Geo Map w/ Videos (this one shows propaganda from various sides at times). That said it does also show some of the tactics being used in modern war including a mix of WW2 era weapons (like the rocket trucks): https://geoworld.space/ukraine/
Title: Re: Winter War and Ethnic/Spiritual divide
Post by: G M on September 05, 2022, 07:30:12 AM
I think there will be a level of suffering and violence experienced this winter that hasn't been possible since WWII.


https://twitter.com/abcnews/status/1543308190598643712 - Come what may, this winter will be the make it or break it time.

I've maintained since the war began (having followed the last 8 years of war between the Russian Separtist groups and the Ukranian Nationalists) that Russia wants the land they are currently garrisoning and not much else.

Looking at maps of language and religion, we see the currently occupied areas predominantly speak Russian and (more telling) are under spiritual authority by the Russian Church. There was a schism in the church recently which started the Ukranian Orthodox Church.

All that said, I believe highly that the initial attack on Kiev was a distraction while they took the current areas and began to entrench/fortify them. Ukraine has attempted to fire behind the enemy lines/work some assassinations etc to try and provoke an attack from these areas. The longer they're there, the more entrenched they become. After the Kherson offensive, we see how deep these defenses are becoming.

This winter, will be economically unsustainable for most Europeans. They will either not pay, pay and lose everything or the government will have to take on trillions in new debts to float the costs. 22 million refugee/migrants/and Islamic militants will be fighting for resources with the citizens of each country. I've noticed and seen this quite a bit. Once the cost of something becomes "I'm cold, I'm hungry, my kids are hungry" the pool of empathy and care many have is gone. This war will be done by the end of winter imo because of this. Which given everything, I'm glad since it will be the least bloody and save the most civilian lives.

The politics after though are going to be insane. We might heat back up once people recover in a year or two.


- - -

Maps! :

>Language map: https://andthewordsbecamebooks.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/imrs.jpg

>Religious map: https://billtammeus.typepad.com/.a/6a00d834515f9b69e20240a4eb435c200b-popup (this is an interesting one, notice which regions where switched from Moscow/Russian authority to Ukranian)

>Updating Geo Map w/ Videos: https://geoworld.space/ukraine/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Valerick on September 05, 2022, 08:22:56 AM
I think it could far surpass even that. The massive population increase combined with people being turned into warring factions. Machiavelli said something akin to "When you have a city with many factions, they always fall. The weak faction always sides with the invader and the other is not strong enough to defeat both."

But that said, so many hungry mouths... people who have NO idea how to farm/survive without government help. Millions of war aged migrants from Islamic nations. Really going to be a time of wolves eating lambs. Might even provoke China who's hungry for an economy growing, nation unifying war of conquest I bet. "Humanitarian aid" where they help select the next leaders of Europe and leave military bases behind.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 05, 2022, 08:26:38 AM
Agreed.


I think it could far surpass even that. The massive population increase combined with people being turned into warring factions. Machiavelli said something akin to "When you have a city with many factions, they always fall. The weak faction always sides with the invader and the other is not strong enough to defeat both."

But that said, so many hungry mouths... people who have NO idea how to farm/survive without government help. Millions of war aged migrants from Islamic nations. Really going to be a time of wolves eating lambs. Might even provoke China who's hungry for an economy growing, nation unifying war of conquest I bet. "Humanitarian aid" where they help select the next leaders of Europe and leave military bases behind.
Title: Russia postpones referendum
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 06, 2022, 01:07:55 AM
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62795976?fbclid=IwAR0iY1UkvBD3dOiDsQjf5Q2V3Gg9h8uro8JWssTS-1DUDY76GWrU-EuekS8
Title: Zeihan on the current state of things
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 06, 2022, 02:07:46 AM
Quite contrary to the sources GM is citing.

Kherson appears to be pivotal and apparently the Ukes have a real shot at it and if they get it, they are in a position to really fukk the Russkis up the ass for reasons explained in the clip.  Fascinating stuff!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tb3U9Ydiw64

BTW, coinciding with what he says here are reports I saw elsewhere that Russia is buying ammo from North Korea
Title: Uke nuke plant knocked off grid
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 06, 2022, 03:10:22 AM
https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=07121b45c28c7a2c5dd56d392d075875_63174dd3_6d25b5f&selDate=20220906
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 06, 2022, 07:02:46 AM
"According to the analysis by The Insider and printed in Pravda, during six months of aggression against Ukraine, Russia had to use at least 7 million shells, not including the losses at frontline storage sites that resulted from Ukrainian strikes. "If the intensity of the war remains at its current level, Moscow will face a tangible shell shortage by the end of 2022 and will have to reduce its use of artillery in order to save munitions," the article says.

"The author also points out the problem of wear and tear of artillery barrels. While the guides on Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems have a long service life when properly maintained, the barrels of rifled artillery guns, as well as tank guns, wear out much faster. As the author of the article writes, by the end of 2022, the wear and tear of the artillery will lead to a drastic reduction in its effectiveness.

"Thus, the expected projectile shortage should coincide with the growing shortage of artillery pieces. At the same time, "things are not going smoothly" with the production of artillery and ammunition.

""Being cut off from supplies of Western equipment, spare parts and materials and simultaneously limited in human capital and labour productivity, Russian artillery and ammunition manufacturers will inevitably face production cuts rather than stagnation in the foreseeable future," the article says. The Russian Federation is also facing a growing shortage of long-range missiles. However, Russia is masking this deficit by shelling Ukrainian cities with long-range rocket artillery and by using S-300/S-400 air defence/anti-missile systems to strike ground targets.

"It is unlikely that Russian industry has the potential to substantially increase rocket production, due not only to the embargo on the supply of equipment and personnel restrictions, but also to relatively low labour productivity."

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/08/31/7365546/
Title: WSJ: Uke attacks look promising
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 07, 2022, 04:11:45 AM
Ukrainian Troops Advance in East, Threatening Russian Supply Route
Ukraine seeks to take the initiative as its forces also press Russia in the south
By James MarsonFollow
Sept. 7, 2022 5:48 am ET

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An unexpected Ukrainian military offensive in the east near the country’s second-largest city of Kharkiv is gaining ground, testing Russian occupation forces that are also under pressure in southern Ukraine.

Ukrainian units are advancing eastward from Kharkiv, according to Ukrainian officials and Russian war bloggers, targeting a critical Russian supply route.

One target of the offensive is the city of Kupyansk, a road hub for Russian supplies heading south from the border into eastern Ukraine. A continued Ukrainian advance could also threaten to isolate Russian forces in the city of Izyum, which Russia has been seeking to use as a staging point for its own offensive in eastern Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces surrounded the city of Balakliya on Tuesday and advanced along a road northeast, seizing villages, according to Russian bloggers who are close to the Russian military. Ukraine’s military didn’t comment, but an adviser to President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed the gains.

“There are surprises along the whole front,” said the adviser, Oleksiy Arestovych.

There was no immediate comment from the Russian government on Ukraine’s offensives.

The advance near Kharkiv comes a week after Ukraine launched an offensive in the south, retaking several villages and expanding a bridgehead across the Inhulets River. Ukraine is trying to cut off thousands of Russian troops in the southern regional capital of Kherson, which Russia seized early in its invasion.

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Damaged windows in Kharkiv, northeastern Ukraine.
PHOTO: ANASTASIA TAYLOR-LIND FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Ukraine also claimed fresh success in the south on Wednesday, seizing a village and striking Russian military facilities, pontoon bridges used to supply troops in Kherson and ammunition depots.

The dual offensives add to indications that Ukraine is increasingly seizing the military initiative in the war, forcing Russia to react to its moves.

After pushing Russian troops back from the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv this spring, Ukrainian forces had been gradually retreating from cities in the east that Russia was leveling with artillery and airstrikes. But Russia’s eastern offensive appears exhausted, with manpower and supply shortages exacerbated by Ukraine’s use of long-range rockets provided by the U.S. to strike command posts and ammunition and fuel depots.


Ukrainian firefighters work at a destroyed residential building in Slovyansk, eastern Ukraine.
PHOTO: AMMAR AWAD/REUTERS
Ukraine spoke openly of its intention to launch a southern offensive, prompting Russia to reinforce its units in the south with thousands of troops from the east. That appears to have opened opportunities for Ukrainian forces in the east to advance.

“Russia’s deployment of forces from Kharkiv and eastern Ukraine to Ukraine’s south is likely enabling Ukrainian counterattacks of opportunity,” the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think tank, wrote in an analysis late Tuesday.

Mr. Arestovych, the Ukrainian presidential adviser, said multiple offensives were keeping the Russians off balance and leaving them unable to shore up all positions with reserves.

“It’s clear who has the initiative at the moment,” he said.

On Tuesday, Ukraine said its forces had also made limited advances in the eastern region of Luhansk, almost all of which was captured by Russia during its now-stalled eastern offensive.
Title: Gazprom Video / Winter wait
Post by: Valerick on September 07, 2022, 05:45:27 AM
Gazprom is the Russian state owned gas company (who turned off the Nordstream) and now trades gas with China. They released this propaganda video recently using the song "And winter will be big." I think this is a pretty big sign they're going to sit, wait and let the economic damage end the war, or at least want to scare people into thinking that.

- - -
https://londonlovesbusiness.com/putins-gazprom-warns-winter-will-be-big-and-threatens-to-freeze-europe-to-death-as-the-ice-age-begins/

Putin’s Gazprom warns ‘winter will be big’ and threatens to freeze Europe to death as ‘the ice age begins’
written by LLB Reporter 7th Sep 22 11:45 am

Russia’s state own gas company Gazprom has released a video threatening to freeze Europe to death and warns the “winter will be big.”
   
Gazprom released an advertisement showing Europe freezing over as they are blaming Western countries for the shortage in gas supplies in response to sanctions and the energy price cap Brussels announced last Friday.

On Tuesday Gazprom’s deputy chief executive Vitaly Markelov warned that they will not resume gas supplies to Europe and Vladimir Putin blames the West for the most severe sanctions which is akin to an economic war. "

 https://youtu.be/n2b_0gfV_4E

Title: Re: Gazprom Video / Winter wait
Post by: G M on September 07, 2022, 09:03:55 AM
Why wouldn't they let europe freeze?


Gazprom is the Russian state owned gas company (who turned off the Nordstream) and now trades gas with China. They released this propaganda video recently using the song "And winter will be big." I think this is a pretty big sign they're going to sit, wait and let the economic damage end the war, or at least want to scare people into thinking that.

- - -
https://londonlovesbusiness.com/putins-gazprom-warns-winter-will-be-big-and-threatens-to-freeze-europe-to-death-as-the-ice-age-begins/

Putin’s Gazprom warns ‘winter will be big’ and threatens to freeze Europe to death as ‘the ice age begins’
written by LLB Reporter 7th Sep 22 11:45 am

Russia’s state own gas company Gazprom has released a video threatening to freeze Europe to death and warns the “winter will be big.”
   
Gazprom released an advertisement showing Europe freezing over as they are blaming Western countries for the shortage in gas supplies in response to sanctions and the energy price cap Brussels announced last Friday.

On Tuesday Gazprom’s deputy chief executive Vitaly Markelov warned that they will not resume gas supplies to Europe and Vladimir Putin blames the West for the most severe sanctions which is akin to an economic war. "

 https://youtu.be/n2b_0gfV_4E
Title: Re: Gazprom Video / Winter wait
Post by: DougMacG on September 07, 2022, 03:11:57 PM
Gazprom is the Russian state owned gas company (who turned off the Nordstream) and now trades gas with China. They released this propaganda video recently using the song "And winter will be big." I think this is a pretty big sign they're going to sit, wait and let the economic damage end the war, or at least want to scare people into thinking that.

- - -
https://londonlovesbusiness.com/putins-gazprom-warns-winter-will-be-big-and-threatens-to-freeze-europe-to-death-as-the-ice-age-begins/

Putin’s Gazprom warns ‘winter will be big’ and threatens to freeze Europe to death as ‘the ice age begins’
written by LLB Reporter 7th Sep 22 11:45 am

Russia’s state own gas company Gazprom has released a video threatening to freeze Europe to death and warns the “winter will be big.”
   
Gazprom released an advertisement showing Europe freezing over as they are blaming Western countries for the shortage in gas supplies in response to sanctions and the energy price cap Brussels announced last Friday.

On Tuesday Gazprom’s deputy chief executive Vitaly Markelov warned that they will not resume gas supplies to Europe and Vladimir Putin blames the West for the most severe sanctions which is akin to an economic war. "

 https://youtu.be/n2b_0gfV_4E

These people are evil.  Good post valerick.

From the article:
"Vladimir Putin blames the West for the most severe sanctions which is akin to an economic war."

  - Mr. Putin, the sanctions were in response to your real war.

This will be an interesting game of chicken.  If he really freezes them to death, they won't come back later to buy Russian oil and gas.
Title: Re: Gazprom Video / Winter wait
Post by: G M on September 07, 2022, 03:36:34 PM
Gazprom is the Russian state owned gas company (who turned off the Nordstream) and now trades gas with China. They released this propaganda video recently using the song "And winter will be big." I think this is a pretty big sign they're going to sit, wait and let the economic damage end the war, or at least want to scare people into thinking that.

- - -
https://londonlovesbusiness.com/putins-gazprom-warns-winter-will-be-big-and-threatens-to-freeze-europe-to-death-as-the-ice-age-begins/

Putin’s Gazprom warns ‘winter will be big’ and threatens to freeze Europe to death as ‘the ice age begins’
written by LLB Reporter 7th Sep 22 11:45 am

Russia’s state own gas company Gazprom has released a video threatening to freeze Europe to death and warns the “winter will be big.”
   
Gazprom released an advertisement showing Europe freezing over as they are blaming Western countries for the shortage in gas supplies in response to sanctions and the energy price cap Brussels announced last Friday.

On Tuesday Gazprom’s deputy chief executive Vitaly Markelov warned that they will not resume gas supplies to Europe and Vladimir Putin blames the West for the most severe sanctions which is akin to an economic war. "

 https://youtu.be/n2b_0gfV_4E

These people are evil.  Good post valerick.

From the article:
"Vladimir Putin blames the West for the most severe sanctions which is akin to an economic war."

  - Mr. Putin, the sanctions were in response to your real war.

This will be an interesting game of chicken.  If he really freezes them to death, they won't come back later to buy Russian oil and gas.

The west violated promises made and pushed deep into Russia's buffer states. The weak and decadent west then decided to wreck Russia's economy after gutting it's energy production capacity.

Natural consequences to bad decisions.

Zero sympathy from me.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 07, 2022, 04:11:49 PM
FWIW my assessment is that Russia will not need to sell to the West from here forward.  I will sell to China, India, and maybe Africa.

Working from memory here, there was a time when I was posting about Russia needing to be a monopsony for Central Asian gas (a major factor in its actions in Chechnya and Georgia and Sryia) so that it could export its western gas to Europe.

If my observation above is correct, then it may be that the dynamic is reversed-- the Central Asian gas will go to China and India and the western gas with meet domestic Russian demand.

Unknown variable:  Russia gas exports through Black Sea-Bosphorus-Suez Canal to India-China?
Title: D1: Things looking up for Ukes
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 07, 2022, 04:14:10 PM
second post

On one of the fronts discussed below, Zeihan's dicsussion of Russian vulnerablity in Kherson is looking good.
=========================================
September 7, 2022   
         
Ukraine's counteroffensive seems to be making surprising progress against Russian invaders sprawled along a roughly 50-kilometer stretch southeast of Kharkiv. That's according to the Wall Street Journal's roving correspondent, Yaroslav Trofimov, who is watching the "Balakliya-Izyum front as Russian military bloggers and analysts remain in doomsday mode," he tweeted Wednesday morning.

"Lots of videos of Russian POWs (including a lieutenant-colonel) and abandoned Russian positions" coming from that region, he writes, and notes, "The speed of the Ukrainian advance seems to have stunned everyone." Russia also appears to be losing trucks and tanks at a familiar rate, almost akin to its failed sprint to Kyiv nearly six months ago.

So, what's the plan for Ukraine? Unclear precisely, of course. But analysts like Rob Lee point to this illustrated summary, which suggests perhaps obvious northeasterly intentions to break through Russian lines. (Lee started a tweet thread with updates related to the apparent offensive, and you can review that here.)

The Brits say three main fronts are receiving the bulk of the action nationwide. That is, "in the north, near Kharkiv; in the east in the Donbas; and in the south in Kherson Oblast." And those three pressure points are very likely posing problems for Russian officers trying to decide where to allay reserves to support an offensive in the Donbas, "or to defend against continued Ukrainian advances in the south." And that suggests Ukraine's recent progress appears to be pinching Russian commanders in a fairly efficient manner.

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Ukraine says it's killed dozens of Russian military contractors around Kharkiv. "Individual units count more than 40 percent seriously wounded and killed," according to the daily report from Ukraine's general staff, which noted that, "The bodies of many of the dead have not been identified and are counted as missing." However, Ukraine officials say they also shot down a Russian Ka-52 helicopter, which is possible; but folks like Lee aren't quite convinced.

The International Atomic Energy Agency released its plan to safeguard Ukraine's most imperiled nuclear facility, which Russian troops have forcibly occupied since the first days of the invasion. To begin, the plan calls for "the immediate establishment of a protection zone," the IAEA's Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi explained in a carefully-worded tweet thread Tuesday, shortly after the report's release (PDF, here).

A second opinion: Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War call the IAEA's report "a coded condemnation of Russian moves that have created and are perpetuating the danger of nuclear disaster in Ukraine.
Title: Re: Gazprom Video / Winter wait
Post by: DougMacG on September 07, 2022, 06:56:42 PM
"The west violated promises made and pushed deep into Russia's buffer states. The weak and decadent west then decided to wreck Russia's economy after gutting it's energy production capacity."

I disagree with this characterization of events.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 08, 2022, 03:16:20 AM
GM:

What do you have in mind here?

" then decided to wreck Russia's economy after gutting it's energy production capacity."
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 08, 2022, 06:02:42 AM
GM:

What do you have in mind here?

" then decided to wreck Russia's economy after gutting it's energy production capacity."

" then decided to wreck Russia's economy after gutting it's (europe's) energy production capacity."
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 08, 2022, 07:56:15 AM
That helps clarify.

What actions do you have in mind as far as wrecking Russia's economy?  Is this pre or post Russian invasion?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 08, 2022, 07:59:18 AM
That helps clarify.

What actions do you have in mind as far as wrecking Russia's economy?  Is this pre or post Russian invasion?

Post. It takes profound stupidity to make yourself dependent on Russian energy and then try to wage economic war on Russia.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 08, 2022, 08:03:16 AM
"Life is tough.  It is tougher when you are stupid."  John Wayne
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 08, 2022, 08:06:36 AM
"Life is tough.  It is tougher when you are stupid."  John Wayne

"You Americans zink evertink iz zee John Wane movie! Mein Gott, I cannot feel mein feet!" -Unnamed German, later this winter
Title: Ukraine claims gains
Post by: DougMacG on September 09, 2022, 09:46:58 AM
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/blinken-visits-ukraine-pivotal-moment-kyiv-claims-gains-2022-09-08/

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11196635/temp.html
----------------------------------------------------------------------

I'm pulling for the Ukrainians in this one.
Title: Re: Ukraine claims gains
Post by: G M on September 09, 2022, 09:51:13 AM
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ :roll:blinken-visits-ukraine-pivotal-moment-kyiv-claims-gains-2022-09-08/

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11196635/temp.html
----------------------------------------------------------------------

I'm pulling for the Ukrainians in this one.

Just 270 trillion dollars away from victory! Please send now!
 :roll: :roll:

Title: Re: Gazprom Video / Winter wait
Post by: DougMacG on September 09, 2022, 10:21:40 AM
"The west violated promises made and pushed deep into Russia's buffer states. The weak and decadent west then decided to wreck Russia's economy after gutting it's energy production capacity."

I disagree with this characterization of events.

Bringing a post of mine forward from the US Russia Europe thread:

https://firehydrantoffreedom.com/index.php?topic=1132.msg143483#msg143483

https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine?fbclid=IwAR18NiLcAsF3mbj2bHCD1bhnygsA-oqqvyE_ULutttu5tqAGVfIpR1A6wtg

Prof. Mearsheimer, from the article:   "I think all the trouble in this case really started in April, 2008, at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, where afterward NATO issued a statement that said Ukraine and Georgia would become part of NATO."

*****************************************************************************************
One person who strongly disagreed with that is Sen Joe Biden in 2007 who said Russia had slipped into "authoritarianism, corruption, and manufactured belligerence" and was "bully[ing] its neighbors".
https://irp.fas.org/congress/2007_hr/russia.pdf
*****************************************************************************************

   - Blame the rape victim for carrying mace or blame Ukraine for wanting defensive weapons and agreements to protect itself against a "belligerent", " bullying" neighbor who happens to be a major nuclear power, I don't buy the idea that the desire to protect your country from an aggressor is justification for the aggressor to come in and crush you.

Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, as I understand it, gave up nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees they did not receive.

Didn't everyone who studied Russia's behavior under Putin know their intent was and is to reconstitute the Soviet Union and the intent of the Soviet empire was to expand outward and threaten the west?  Wasn't there adequate evidence of that at the time?  Unless Sen Biden was lying in Congressional testimony in 2007, this did not start in Bucharest 2008.  NATO and Ukraine were responding to the existential threat posed by Putin / Russia.
Title: Re: Gazprom Video / Winter wait
Post by: G M on September 09, 2022, 10:34:12 AM
"The west violated promises made and pushed deep into Russia's buffer states. The weak and decadent west then decided to wreck Russia's economy after gutting it's energy production capacity."

I disagree with this characterization of events.

Bringing a post of mine forward from the US Russia Europe thread:

https://firehydrantoffreedom.com/index.php?topic=1132.msg143483#msg143483

https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine?fbclid=IwAR18NiLcAsF3mbj2bHCD1bhnygsA-oqqvyE_ULutttu5tqAGVfIpR1A6wtg

Prof. Mearsheimer, from the article:   "I think all the trouble in this case really started in April, 2008, at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, where afterward NATO issued a statement that said Ukraine and Georgia would become part of NATO."

*****************************************************************************************
One person who strongly disagreed with that is Sen Joe Biden in 2007 who said Russia had slipped into "authoritarianism, corruption, and manufactured belligerence" and was "bully[ing] its neighbors".
https://irp.fas.org/congress/2007_hr/russia.pdf
*****************************************************************************************

   - Blame the rape victim for carrying mace or blame Ukraine for wanting defensive weapons and agreements to protect itself against a "belligerent", " bullying" neighbor who happens to be a major nuclear power, I don't buy the idea that the desire to protect your country from an aggressor is justification for the aggressor to come in and crush you.

Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, as I understand it, gave up nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees they did not receive.

Didn't everyone who studied Russia's behavior under Putin know their intent was and is to reconstitute the Soviet Union and the intent of the Soviet empire was to expand outward and threaten the west?  Wasn't there adequate evidence of that at the time?  Unless Sen Biden was lying in Congressional testimony in 2007, this did not start in Bucharest 2008.  NATO and Ukraine were responding to the existential threat posed by Putin / Russia.

“protect itself against a "belligerent", " bullying" neighbor who happens to be a major nuclear power”

Like NATO?

Russia has been invaded many times(anyone know the exact number?). Unlike the leadership of the decadent and rotting west, Putin actually wants to protect his nation.

I have no objection to a well armed but neutral Ukraine. That’s not what Ukraine was, acting as a NATO proxy got them into this situation.

Title: Re: Gazprom Video / Winter wait
Post by: DougMacG on September 09, 2022, 11:22:49 AM
quote author=G M

protect itself against a "belligerent", " bullying" neighbor who happens to be a major nuclear power

"Like NATO?

Russia has been invaded many times(anyone know the exact number?). Unlike the leadership of the decadent and rotting west, Putin actually wants to protect his nation.

I have no objection to a well armed but neutral Ukraine. That’s not what Ukraine was, acting as a NATO proxy got them into this situation."

---------------------------------------------------

I know we already had this discussion, so I won't try to change anyone's mind.  But I don't buy it.

NATO is a threat, not to Russia but to Russian expansion.  Even in this war of Russia's choosing, NATO still hasn't invaded Russia.  Ukraine also hasn't invaded Russia in this war, funny thing.  Ukraine wasn't a threat to Russia and NATO isn't either.  All Russia has to do to stop getting shot is go home.

Ukraine had coastline and resources that Russia wants.  Simple as that. 

Russia was invaded how many times - in our lifetime, in Putin's lifetime?  Zero?  Nyet?  Nada?
https://www.rbth.com/history/330753-which-countries-dared-to-invade-russia

Who has Russia and the Soviets invaded since WWII?
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/magazine-37680610  Soviet tanks crush Hungary.
https://www.indy100.com/news/russia-ussr-invaded-countries-map

Shorten the timeframe and Russia is the one invading neighbors.

If you are Russia's neighbor, you will be controlled or fall.  Is that sovereignty?

Funny we believe in a right of self defense - on all the other threads.

How do you stay "neutral" with an invading bully at the border?  Inside the border?

How come Ukraine didn't feel threatened by NATO?  NATO isn't an invading force.  It's (barely) a force to defend against an invading force.

I'm not saying blank check or how many US billions should go in; just saying I'm pulling for the Ukrainians, and it's a better investment than a lot of things our money goes toward.

After Ukraine and Belarus fall, then anything the next tier does to protect themselves is provocative?

Sorry, I don't buy it.
----------------------------------------------------------------

Drilling for oil and gas here and in Europe, etc. is how you contain Russia.  (Also avoid weak leaders lacking resolve.)

Oil price:
(https://d3fy651gv2fhd3.cloudfront.net/charts/commodity-crude-oil.png?s=cl1&v=202009190701V20200908)
Title: GPF: Ukraine's vulnerable power grid
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 09, 2022, 06:46:57 PM
   
Ukraine's Vulnerable Power Grid
By: Geopolitical Futures
Ukraine's Vulnerable Power Grid
(click to enlarge)

Ukraine’s energy crisis differs dramatically from that of its European counterparts. In Europe, the problem is related to exorbitantly high prices. But in Ukraine, the crisis is shaped primarily by the battlefield, where energy infrastructure has been a major site of the fighting. Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion in February, electricity demand in Ukraine has fallen by about 40 percent. This is largely due to nuclear power plants being taken offline, damage to distribution infrastructure, displacement of people and industry, and the lack of funds for operation and maintenance of facilities.

The physical and financial destruction of Ukraine’s energy sector could also have long-term impacts. The damage caused to energy infrastructure and companies thus far will require billions of dollars and many years to repair. The fighting has also significantly set back Ukraine’s efforts to integrate the sector with the EU and shift to renewables. Disruptions in the energy market will also limit the extent to which industry and other businesses can resume full operations.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on September 09, 2022, 07:21:16 PM
Something odd going on in Ukr. They are capturing lots of territory near kharkiv, with minimal Russian pushback. Almost as if no one is defending those areas.
Title: Ukraine: What must be done
Post by: G M on September 10, 2022, 08:17:38 AM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dbgm8DFsUUw
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 11, 2022, 04:44:36 AM
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/09/russia-keeps-losing-its-best-su-35-fighters-in-ukraine/?fbclid=IwAR0QFwhVxK1cbKVgxd6FNgrgS4_inBXCEq2NuUIL2FDzvldHY7yS3-vKIPA
Title: Was Ukraine peace deal sabotaged?
Post by: G M on September 11, 2022, 08:15:15 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/why-did-us-torpedo-april-ukraine-war-negotiated-settlement
Title: Zeihan
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 11, 2022, 12:13:34 PM
From a few days ago-- I meant to post this but here it is now.  Some very interesting insights relevant to current military developments:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tb3U9Ydiw64
Title: NY Post
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 11, 2022, 05:29:17 PM
second post

It would seem that the Zeihan clip of my previous post accurately predicted this:

https://nypost.com/2022/09/11/total-insanity-ukraine-regains-hundreds-of-miles-as-putin-opens-new-ferris-wheel/?fbclid=IwAR2BI_6ET29TrF6EAe2g5nqtjYnX1-9R0KllfBUZgqI_7PyFQFsm0A5Dlv8
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on September 11, 2022, 06:46:17 PM
Is Russia losing ?
Stoltenberg admitted that there has been “no sign” that Putin or Moscow is giving up its objectives in Ukraine. He keeps insisting that Russia’s ultimate goal in the conflict is “taking control of Ukraine.” He knows that is not true and perhaps is begging Putin to adopt that goal. If that were true, Putin should do as the USA did in Iraq – (1) take down the power grid, (2) take down the communications, (3) attack the water supply, and (4) attack the food supply.


https://www.armstrongeconomics.com/international-news/russia/is-russia-losing/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 11, 2022, 08:07:34 PM
YA:

What did you make of the Zeihan clip above?

===================================



https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/russian-front-line-in-kharkiv-collapses-in-major-victory-for-ukraine/ar-AA11FTVd?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=03b824e7e3cc424892959e9bd56fc246
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 11, 2022, 08:51:40 PM
Are the Uke forces nearing Moscow?

No?

 :roll:
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 12, 2022, 03:24:52 AM
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62869157?fbclid=IwAR0QFwhVxK1cbKVgxd6FNgrgS4_inBXCEq2NuUIL2FDzvldHY7yS3-vKIPA

edited to add:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/situation-more-difficult-by-the-hour-ukrainian-forces-break-through-to-russian-border-live-updates/ar-AA11JlD5?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=ba4285bffa7f43be86dd0a2e39e18286
Title: Walter Russell Mead: What if?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 12, 2022, 03:26:49 PM


We've been following WRM around here for a while now.

========================================


What if Putin Uses a Nuclear Weapon in Ukraine?
If Putin chooses the path of Khrushchev, President Biden needs to stand like JFK.
Walter Russell Mead hedcutBy Walter Russell MeadFollow
Sept. 12, 2022 5:40 pm ET


Ukraine scored a stunning victory in the Kharkiv region over the weekend. Routed Russian forces ditched valuable weapons and tons of badly needed munitions and supplies in a chaotic rush to safety. This signals a new stage in Vladimir Putin’s disastrous war. The Ukrainian army is better armed, better led and more committed to the war than its Russian opponents, and morale among Ukraine’s defenders will now be higher than ever.

Mr. Putin’s choices look bleak. As he struggles to stabilize the military situation while fending off critics at home, he must choose between accepting a humiliating defeat in Ukraine and doubling down in pursuit of a military victory that, as more Western weapons reach Ukraine’s energized defenders, looks very difficult to achieve.

OPINION: POTOMAC WATCH
WSJ Opinion Potomac Watch
A Breakthrough by Ukrainian Forces Against Russia


SUBSCRIBE
Ukraine can take a moment to celebrate, and even gloat, over a hard-fought military success. The Biden administration deserves credit for leading the surge of allied support that made the Ukrainians’ extraordinary achievement possible. And supporters of peace and freedom around the world can rejoice that Mr. Putin’s wanton aggression has brought him to such an unhappy place. Yet Ukraine’s northern victory, however welcome, isn’t the end of the war. As Mr. Putin contemplates his options, we may be approaching a moment of maximum danger.

For Mr. Putin, the war in Ukraine began as what Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass has called a “war of choice.” Mr. Putin could have left Ukraine undisturbed and gone on to rule Russia for many years to come. But having chosen to start the war, he can’t afford to lose it. Radical Russian nationalists are already blaming him for the military failures in Ukraine. The Kremlin is no place for the weak, and the hard men who run Russia could turn on a politically wounded Mr. Putin in a heartbeat. Regardless of public sentiment across Russia, the people closest to Mr. Putin likely still want him to win the war.

The question is what Mr. Putin does next. If he can stabilize the military front until winter sets in, he has several months to prepare for the spring. He might use that time to organize a general mobilization, building a much larger conscript army for another year of conventional combat. But if the front doesn’t stabilize, or if he feels that public resistance to a general mobilization could endanger the stability of the regime, he might look to more drastic options, such as the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

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It is anything but clear how the West would respond. Allowing Mr. Putin to use nuclear blackmail to assert his control over Ukraine would be such a craven act that the moral and political foundations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be shaken to the core—and nuclear-armed aggressors elsewhere would take note. Yet the obvious countermove, placing Ukraine under an American nuclear umbrella, risks the greatest nuclear crisis since John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev squared off over Cuba in October 1962.

So far, American policy has aimed at avoiding the binary choice between abandoning Ukraine and provoking a nuclear confrontation with Russia. For this policy to work, Washington needs a Goldilocks resistance from Ukraine: not so weak and cold that Russia wins a clear-cut victory, but also not so hot and successful that Russia, faced with a shattering defeat, resorts in desperation to its nuclear arsenal.

The Ukrainian advances in the northeast don’t yet force Mr. Putin to choose between nuclear blackmail and abject defeat. The relatively flat and open terrain of eastern Ukraine historically favors wars of movement, in which armies sweep back and forth over large distances without necessarily achieving decisive military results. That both Russia and Ukraine have stretched relatively small armies across a very long military frontier further increases the chance of breakthroughs. This isn’t World War I, in which massive armies were deeply entrenched along a largely static front line. And given shortages of troops and equipment, prudent commanders are unlikely to press Ukraine’s current offensive indefinitely forward.

Even so, the West needs to think about the unthinkable: If Washington’s Goldilocks scenario doesn’t materialize, and continued Ukrainian success turns Mr. Putin into a cornered rat, what then?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on September 13, 2022, 04:53:33 AM
YA:

What did you make of the Zeihan clip above?

===================================



https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/russian-front-line-in-kharkiv-collapses-in-major-victory-for-ukraine/ar-AA11FTVd?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=03b824e7e3cc424892959e9bd56fc246
Occam's razor says that Russian forces are spread thin and they have regrouped to where they have more ethnic Russians in the population. It is difficult to defend a frontline stretching thousands of miles from Kharkiv to Kherson, which are at the extreme ends of the front line. Russia just does not have a large enough army.  My guess is they will focus on acquiring depth as opposed to breadth. It would be the wrong conclusion that Russia is falling apart, or that they cannot manufacture artillery shells and rockets in quantity. Russian weapons are much cheaper than western ones, and while these weapons may not have all the bells and whistles that American weapons have, they kill effectively, especially when used in large quantities.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 13, 2022, 03:08:34 PM
Ummm , , , point taken I suppose, but if so, why are they buying from the Norks?  How is troop morale?  The Chechen general apparently is pist off too.

Apparently as Zeihan predicted, the Ukes have scored a shitload of Russki weaponry.

I'm guessing Uke morale is pretty strong right about now.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 13, 2022, 03:11:10 PM
Ummm , , , point taken I suppose, but if so, why are they buying from the Norks?  How is troop morale?  The Chechen general apparently is pist off too.

Apparently as Zeihan predicted, the Ukes have scored a shitload of Russki weaponry.

I'm guessing Uke morale is pretty strong right about now.

Tell me about the battle of the Bulge.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 13, 2022, 03:16:08 PM
You may be getting pretty far out on a limb there GM , , , 

Anyway, if I am not mistaken, this is General Keene's home base:

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 13, 2022, 03:18:40 PM
We shall see. Gaining ground and holding it are quite different.


You may be getting pretty far out on a limb there GM , , , 

Anyway, if I am not mistaken, this is General Keene's home base:

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 13, 2022, 03:28:31 PM
As the Russians are discovering in this moment  :evil:

More seriously, of course this can go the other way too-- but it would appear that what we are seeing now was outside the range of the plausible for some of the sources you have been citing.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 13, 2022, 03:46:59 PM
Russia plays the long game. I expect this to be a Pyrrhic victory for the Ukes.

We shall see.


As the Russians are discovering in this moment  :evil:

More seriously, of course this can go the other way too-- but it would appear that what we are seeing now was outside the range of the plausible for some of the sources you have been citing.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 13, 2022, 03:53:47 PM
Well, its long game now has Finland and Sweden in NATO, Russia's military rep is in tatters, and Putin seems likely to die in the near-to-medium future , , ,
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 13, 2022, 04:03:55 PM
Well, its long game now has Finland and Sweden in NATO, Russia's military rep is in tatters, and Putin seems likely to die in the near-to-medium future , , ,

Finland and Sweden ? They, like their fellow euro countries are shitting themselves about mass die-offs and currency collapse this winter.

Let's see what exists in europe this spring.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 13, 2022, 04:35:39 PM
Well, its long game now has Finland and Sweden in NATO, Russia's military rep is in tatters, and Putin seems likely to die in the near-to-medium future , , ,

Finland and Sweden ? They, like their fellow euro countries are shitting themselves about mass die-offs and currency collapse this winter.

Let's see what exists in europe this spring.

https://legalinsurrection.com/2022/09/finnish-economist-i-am-telling-you-people-that-the-situation-in-europe-is-much-worse-than-many-understand/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 13, 2022, 04:42:07 PM
On this we agree!

https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/china-russia-new-axis-steer-us-new-cold-war-expert-warns?fbclid=IwAR1JLKh7XLkW-8l8Xv0brhquLj1Fu9vIxN6e8vHNGme2xUky_MvNjdOAOPM
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on September 13, 2022, 05:52:28 PM
Ummm , , , point taken I suppose, but if so, why are they buying from the Norks?  How is troop morale?  The Chechen general apparently is pist off too.

Apparently as Zeihan predicted, the Ukes have scored a shitload of Russki weaponry.

I'm guessing Uke morale is pretty strong right about now.
First, what's wrong with buying from the Norks, is Ukr not getting weapons from multiple EU countries and the USA. Second, I have a hard time believing the mainstream media, their track record is not stellar, for a long time they kept saying that Russia was losing, but it turned out that Russia ended up taking 20 % of Ukr. I would be concerned if Putin is deposed, but apart from that this withdrawal from Kharkiv was a strategic withdrawal, as opposed to a defeat in war. If Putin gives up Donbass/Kherson, that would be a forced withdrawal. Re:Kharkiv, I have been monitoring that area for a while, the Russians initially occupied the border areas, they lost/withdrew, then came back and occupied the whole area and have now withdrawn again. Its possible its a hard area to defend.
Title: George Friedman: What will Russia do?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 13, 2022, 06:23:28 PM
September 13, 2022
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The War
By: George Friedman

During World War II, one needed to say only “the war” for others to know what was being discussed. We have reached the same point with the Russo-Ukrainian war. This is not what the Russians expected to happen. They expected the war to be over quickly because they regarded their military as self-evidently superior to what the Ukrainians would put on the field. Few nations start a war assuming they will lose. They start wars with the same expectation: Hit hard, and be home for Christmas. But the history of the world is filled with the stories of great armies and warriors fighting long and desperate battles. And the history of warfare is filled with examples of confidence meeting reality.

It is far from clear what the final outcome will be. The initial Russian offensive ended in failure, less because of Ukrainians forces, brave though they might have been, than because of a poorly developed Russian strategy, leading to supply shortages and command failures. The Russians regrouped, focused on more modest advances in the expectation that over time they would break the Ukrainian forces and occupy, if not all of Ukraine, then at least a substantial amount of it.

The Ukrainians didn’t break. Wars are fought by soldiers, but they are also fought with weapons and intelligence. Even brave soldiers would fail without these and other material. This is where the Russians experienced their own intelligence failure. They knew that the U.S. had the capacity to deploy world-class weapons but believed the deployment would take time. So it had to be a short war, and when they failed to gain a quick victory, the Ukrainians were armed with an extraordinary array of state-of-the-art weapons, delivered in expanding type and number, with losses replaced.

The United States bought time for the Ukrainian army to evolve from the light infantry force that started the war into an army resembling, in many ways, a great power. Anti-air systems forced the Russians to exercise caution, anti-armor systems caused them to focus on infantry movement, and American artillery meant the Ukrainians could win artillery duels. Russian President Vladimir Putin on several occasions said that the war was not against Ukraine but against the United States. In a real sense he was right, even though he meant it only as propaganda.

All of this is both true and misleading. The war is not over, and Ukraine has not won, although recent advances are significant. No one would have believed that Ukraine could survive the Russian onslaught in the first months. But it did. The Russians reorganized their command structure, introduced superior armor and imposed harsh discipline on their troops. They paid a staggering price, but in time, they redefined the war.

They must now regain their balance. On one hand, they are in far better condition than in 1941. Outright defeat is very unlikely, and they can choose the time and place to attack from a large menu. On the other hand, they are in much worse shape. They are not in a life or death struggle against a monstrous enemy. The troops are not defending their wives and parents from unspeakable fates. The soldiers are not consigned to their own deaths. But it can sometimes destroy an army to fight for ends that are not personal to the soldiers. Throwing away their rifles is not an affront to their families.

The Russians are nevertheless fighting with all of this in mind. They are not simply fighting to postpone the inevitable because the longer a war lasts, the greater the price leaders pay. Putin cannot afford to lose this war, nor can the many others who helped plan it. So before celebrating, the Ukrainians and Americans must calculate their next move, assuming that Russia’s next move is to collapse or capitulate, both of which are unlikely.

One thing the Russians may be counting on is a very cold winter in Europe, which could lead to a European capitulation. But at this stage of the war that doesn’t matter much. Europe’s support is heartening but has minimal military meaning. The U.S. and Ukraine will not stop fighting to keep Europe in the war.

Another strategy the Russians might attempt is to ask China for help. But they are already allied with China, and China has made no move to help. China could support only a small contingent in Ukraine, which they would have to supply because of Russian limits. China is also aware of the economic war the U.S. is waging against Russia, and given its own economic condition, China does not want to face that.

A third strategy might be to negotiate peace. But the Russians cannot return to the Russian border with nothing but dead soldiers to show for it. The Ukrainians will not cede part of their country, viewing any settlement as temporary. A negotiation on either side would now be a capitulation.

The fourth strategy is the only one that seems like a real possibility. One side must defeat the other. Neither side can afford the cost of failing such an attack. The Russian advantage is manpower. There are reports from multiple sources, including American ones, of large numbers of Russian troops training in the Russian Far East. The Russians need more troops, so these reports are believable. Russia is not going to defeat an army armed with American weapons with the number of forces it has deployed thus far. The Russians face a choice of attacking with overwhelming force or losing the war. They will choose the former.

The Russians are protected by a political and military reality. The U.S. is not interested in hitting Russia directly, either with conventional or nuclear weapons. Russia can hit back. Neither side wants a direct Russo-American war. Reinforcements can be hit upon crossing into Ukraine, but the Russians will send a vast number of trainees because heavy casualties at every stage is inevitable.

So long as Putin is president, every effort will be made to win, because he cannot afford anything less than victory. And I don’t see any other possible strategies except the manpower one, which I assume will happen very soon or after the winter. It does not seem to me that the current forces deployed by Russia can do more than hold on to some areas. There needs to be reinforcement. Putin may have other strategies, but they are hard to envision.
Title: More Zeihan
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 14, 2022, 11:12:14 AM


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iAD684eczq8
Title: Small Wars Journal says GM's blogging sources are wrong
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 14, 2022, 11:13:06 AM
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ukraine-writes-textbook-twenty-first-century-warfare-conducts-masterclass?fbclid=IwAR1wIFcFCnQLo2rlRXjaigT-SsRe0WpIVYBIWBLsjFSprOfm3UIBqmCsKdU
Title: Russian TV says GM's bloggers are wrong
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 14, 2022, 11:14:42 AM
Third

https://news.yahoo.com/kremlin-tv-airs-call-russia-164208089.html
Title: Re: Russian TV says GM's bloggers are wrong
Post by: G M on September 14, 2022, 11:20:48 AM
Third

https://news.yahoo.com/kremlin-tv-airs-call-russia-164208089.html

How close are the Uke forces to Moscow?
Title: Re: Russian TV says GM's bloggers are wrong
Post by: DougMacG on September 14, 2022, 11:50:07 AM
How close are the Uke forces to Moscow?

It might be time to define what a Russia loss is.

I think Crimea (they already had it) and some other coastline gains are a win.  The rest starts to look like a quagmire, a loss, a mistake, a miscalculation, an opportunity they found to show weakness to other rivals and at home. 

The loss of Sweden and Finland to NATO is a loss for Russia no matter how energy and winter come out.

(I've said) they should be stripped of their "permanent" stature at the UN.  That would be a loss.

Russia doesn't know how to win, how to lose or how to save face at this point.

Russia has nukes.  So what.  What are they going to do, blow one up in the middle of Ukraine, and that would gain them what??  A surrender?  I doubt it.

We had nuclear capability, plenty of it, during Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan.  That and a quarter, as they say, doesn't buy a cup of coffee.
Title: Re: Russian TV says GM's bloggers are wrong
Post by: G M on September 14, 2022, 11:59:40 AM
If Russia has to kill every last Uke to win, they will.



How close are the Uke forces to Moscow?

It might be time to define what a Russia loss is.

I think Crimea (they already had it) and some other coastline gains are a win.  The rest starts to look like a quagmire, a loss, a mistake, a miscalculation, an opportunity they found to show weakness to other rivals and at home. 

The loss of Sweden and Finland to NATO is a loss for Russia no matter how energy and winter come out.

(I've said) they should be stripped of their "permanent" stature at the UN.  That would be a loss.

Russia doesn't know how to win, how to lose or how to save face at this point.

Russia has nukes.  So what.  What are they going to do, blow one up in the middle of Ukraine, and that would gain them what??  A surrender?  I doubt it.

We had nuclear capability, plenty of it, during Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan.  That and a quarter, as they say, doesn't buy a cup of coffee.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 14, 2022, 01:54:28 PM
Russia?  or Putin?

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11212515/Putins-limousine-hit-loud-bang-possible-attack.html
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 14, 2022, 02:12:28 PM
Anyone who tries and fails to remove Putin is in serious trouble.


Russia?  or Putin?

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11212515/Putins-limousine-hit-loud-bang-possible-attack.html
Title: As GM predicted?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 14, 2022, 04:21:40 PM
https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/2737749/report-russia-attacks-dam-in-ukraine

https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/2737789/russian-attack-in-ukrainian-dam
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on September 15, 2022, 04:57:13 AM
Is Russia losing ?
Stoltenberg admitted that there has been “no sign” that Putin or Moscow is giving up its objectives in Ukraine. He keeps insisting that Russia’s ultimate goal in the conflict is “taking control of Ukraine.” He knows that is not true and perhaps is begging Putin to adopt that goal. If that were true, Putin should do as the USA did in Iraq – (1) take down the power grid, (2) take down the communications, (3) attack the water supply, and (4) attack the food supply.


https://www.armstrongeconomics.com/international-news/russia/is-russia-losing/

The above scenario seems to be playing out ?. Power grid, dams, food supply.....
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on September 15, 2022, 05:09:47 AM
"Putin is certainly aware that the internal front is under some pressure. He refuses even partial mobilization. A perfect indicator of what may happen in winter is the referenda in liberated territories. The limit date is November 4 – the Day of National Unity, a commemoration introduced in 2004 to replace the celebration of the October revolution (it already existed in imperial times).

With the accession of these territories to Russia, any Ukrainian counter-offensive would qualify as an act of war against regions incorporated into the Russian Federation. Everyone knows what that means."

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/escobar-kharkov-game-changer

Title: Wagner group recruiting in prisons
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 15, 2022, 08:42:47 AM
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62911618?fbclid=IwAR3cLT58s7mHdsoe5WfLTnKjXNLOoplau_vSrzLaZ_8nEd5poVgyN5fyNdI
Title: Why bridge to Crimea has not been destroyed
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 16, 2022, 05:45:00 AM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aE5afkEqG08
Title: Re: Why bridge to Crimea has not been destroyed
Post by: DougMacG on September 16, 2022, 09:26:29 AM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aE5afkEqG08

VERY interesting.

I like this one, giving Russian troops an easy escape route when Ukraine retakes the peninsula.   )
Title: D1: 5 Russian installed officials killed?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 16, 2022, 10:54:22 AM
Developing: Five Russian-installed officials have reportedly been killed on occupied Ukrainian territory in the past 24 hours, according to Mathew Luxmoore of the Wall Street Journal, reporting from Kyiv on Friday. That includes "Two in Luhansk, one in Kherson, and two more in Berdyansk," he tweeted. If confirmed, "it would demonstrate the growing reach of its intelligence deep inside Russian-held territory and could further demoralize Russian forces at a time when they have suffered stinging defeats on the battlefield," he added.


Germany's military chief says Russia's reserve troops may be a much smaller force than outsiders had initially believed, Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht told Reuters in an interview on Friday. "Nevertheless," she cautioned, "one should not be mistaken: Russia is far from defeated and still has various military options." Read more from that interview here and (with an eye to China) here.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on September 16, 2022, 05:31:43 PM
Luke Gromen tweeted this.  Something I was not aware off.
Putin's Paradox:

The higher the USD goes against every currency in the world (except the RUB), the greater the incentive every  nation in the world will have to buy oil from Russia in non-USD, just to survive (thereby de-dollarizing their oil imports.)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on September 17, 2022, 08:26:21 AM
https://watson.brown.edu/climatesolutionslab/research/2022/mapping-us-military-dependence-russian-fossil-fuels
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 17, 2022, 08:27:44 AM
https://watson.brown.edu/climatesolutionslab/research/2022/mapping-us-military-dependence-russian-fossil-fuels

Damn! I hadn't even considered this...
Title: Putin: No hurry in Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 17, 2022, 08:29:48 AM
https://summit.news/2022/09/17/putin-tells-allies-no-hurry-in-ukraine-warns-of-more-serious-action-to-come/
Title: WSJL Does this solve Putin's manpower and ammo shortages?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 17, 2022, 01:50:50 PM
Russia’s Use of Iranian Kamikaze Drones Creates New Dangers for Ukrainian Troops
Shahed-136 drones supplied to Russia carried out several devastating strikes in Ukraine’s Kharkiv region over past week, Ukrainian commanders say

By Yaroslav TrofimovFollow
 and Dion NissenbaumFollow


Russia has inflicted serious damage on Ukrainian forces with recently introduced Iranian drones, in its first wide-scale deployment of a foreign weapons system since the war began, Ukrainian commanders say.

Over the past week, Shahed-136 delta-wing drones, repainted in Russian colors and rebranded as Geranium 2, started appearing over Ukrainian armor and artillery positions in the northeastern Kharkiv region, said Col. Rodion Kulagin, commander of artillery of Ukraine’s 92nd Mechanized Brigade.

In his brigade’s operational area alone, the Iranian drones—which usually fly in pairs and then slam into their targets—have destroyed two 152-mm self-propelled howitzers, two 122-mm self-propelled howitzers, as well as two BTR armored infantry vehicles, he said.

Before the current wide-scale use of the Shaheds, Russia carried out a test last month, striking a U.S.-supplied M777 155-mm towed howitzer with the drone, Col. Kulagin said. Another Iranian drone malfunctioned and was recovered, he said.

So far, the Iranian drones seem to have been mostly deployed in the Kharkiv region, where the 92nd Brigade and other Ukrainian forces carried out a major offensive this month, retaking some 8,500 square kilometers, or roughly 3,300 square miles, of land occupied by Russia and seizing or destroying hundreds of Russian tanks, artillery pieces and armored carriers.

“In other areas, the Russians have overwhelming artillery firepower, and they manage with that. Here, they no longer have that artillery advantage, and so they have started to resort to these drones,” Col. Kulagin said.

Independent experts who examined photographs of recent drone wreckage from the Kharkiv region say that it appears to be Shahed-136, the latest evolution of Tehran’s delta-wing design.

Scott Crino, founder and chief executive of Red Six Solutions LLC, a strategic consulting firm, said the Shahed-136 could provide Russia with a “potent counterweight” to the high-tech weapons systems, such as Himars missile launchers, that the U.S. has provided to Ukraine.


“The presence of Shahed-136 in Ukraine war is undoubtedly changing the operational plans of Kyiv,” he said. “The sheer size of Ukraine battlefield makes it hard to defend against the Shahed-136.”

Mr. Crino said the Shahed-136 can be used with great effect with one targeting a radar system and the second one hitting artillery pieces. Iran also has antijamming systems that can make it hard for Ukrainian forces to counter, he said. “Once a Shahed locks onto target, it will be hard to stop,” he said.

Russia’s use of Shahed-136 drones in Ukraine represents the most challenging expansion of Tehran’s arsenal beyond the Middle East, where Iran has successfully used its unmanned aerial vehicles to pressure America and its allies in the region. It also highlights the deficiencies in Russia’s own drone program, which hasn’t been able to match the firepower of armed UAVs deployed by Ukraine.

Israel and the West have accused Iran and its proxies of flying armed drones to attack Saudi Arabia’s oil industry, the capital of the United Arab Emirates, American soldiers in Syria, as well as tankers in the Gulf of Oman in recent years.

The British Ministry of Defense, in its intelligence update on Sept. 14, also said it was highly likely that Russia had deployed Iranian drones in Ukraine for the first time. Noting that the Shahed-136 has a claimed range of 2,500 kilometers, it added that so far, it appears that Moscow is using these drones for tactical strikes near front lines rather than to destroy more strategic targets deep into Ukrainian territory.


The Iranian drones are relatively small and fly at a very low altitude, making it hard for Ukrainian air-defense systems to detect them, Col. Kulagin said. He said he hoped the U.S. and allies could provide Ukraine with more advanced antidrone technologies, or would step in to disrupt Iranian drone shipments to Russia.

In July, U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan warned that Russian defense officials had visited Iran, preparing to purchase up to several hundred Iranian drones, including the weapons-capable ones, on an expedited timeline. At the time, Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian denied the plan in a phone call with his Ukrainian counterpart and said that Tehran opposed the war on Ukraine, according to a statement by the Iranian Foreign Ministry.

Russia hasn’t publicly commented on Iranian drone purchases. Iran’s Foreign Ministry didn’t respond to a recent Wall Street Journal request to comment on the matter. The Kremlin and the Russian Defense Ministry didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment.

On Sept. 8, the U.S. Department of the Treasury said it had sanctioned Iranian company Safiran Airport Services for coordinating Russian military flights that transported Iranian drones and related equipment to Russia, and Iranian drone-manufacturing companies Paravar Pars, DAMA and Baharestan Kish.

Drones of different kinds play an important role in the Ukrainian conflict, in part because neither side has air superiority and is, therefore, reluctant to use manned aircraft over enemy positions. Hundreds of military and commercial reconnaissance drones hover in the air daily along the front lines, spotting targets and guiding artillery fire.

Ukraine, unlike Russia, also operates a fleet of drones armed with missiles. These Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones destroyed several Russian armored columns in the early days of the war and are being used more frequently once again, now that Kyiv has been able to weaken Russian air defenses in many areas, in part thanks to U.S.-supplied AGM-88 HARM antiradar missiles.


The U.S. accused Iran of using delta-wing drones as part of a coordinated 2019 attack on Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities, including in Jeddah.
PHOTO: ANDREJ ISAKOVIC/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Both Russia and Ukraine also use what are known as kamikaze drones, or loitering munitions. Russia’s Kalashnikov Group has developed a homemade drone known as Kub-Bla, while Ukraine is flying Polish-made Warmate and U.S.-supplied Switchblade drones, as well as some locally made UAVs. These munitions have a much shorter range and flying time than the Iranian-developed Shahed drones, and carry a significantly smaller payload.

Iran has emerged as one of the world’s most resourceful developers of combat drones, in part by reverse-engineering American drones that went astray over the past two decades in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Since Iran unveiled its kamikaze drones in 2016, versions of them have been used to carry out attacks across the Middle East. Last year, the British government accused Iran of using Shahed-136 drones to strike an Israeli-affiliated oil tanker off the coast of Oman, in an incident that killed two crew members. A U.S. military investigation recovered drone debris from the MT Mercer Street tanker and concluded that these were parts of Iranian made delta-wing drones.


Washington also accused Iran of using delta-wing drones as part of a coordinated 2019 attack on Saudi Arabia’s oil industry.

The U.S. and Israel have accused Iran of providing militants everywhere from Yemen to Lebanon with the training and the parts they need to develop their own drones.

Iran-backed Houthi forces in Yemen have repeatedly used delta-wing drones to carry out attacks on neighboring Saudi Arabia. In February, Israeli officials said, U.S. jet fighters brought down two Iranian delta-wing drones over northern Iraq. Israeli officials said the drones were heading for Israel.

While the Biden administration has been warning for months that Iran was preparing to provide Russia with hundreds of drones to use in Ukraine, the U.S. initially expected Tehran to have shipped drones capable of carrying missiles, not the kamikaze-style Shaheds.

Michael Knights, a military specialist at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a think tank, predicted that Ukrainian forces would be able to quickly counter the threat posed by Iranian kamikaze drones. “Iran’s drones look snazzy in Yemen and Syria and Gaza, but they’re increasingly blockable,” he said.

Ukraine, he said, is “a serious counter-air environment and electronic warfare environment that Iran hasn’t really experienced before.” These drones, Mr. Knights added, “tend to have effect at first and then the shock effect wears off.”


Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com and Dion Nissenbaum at dion.nissenbaum@wsj.com
Title: Re: Putin: No hurry in Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on September 17, 2022, 05:00:04 PM
https://summit.news/2022/09/17/putin-tells-allies-no-hurry-in-ukraine-warns-of-more-serious-action-to-come/

Of course that's what you say when you have no immediate answer for the humiliating events on the ground.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 17, 2022, 05:55:50 PM
Those Iranian drones might be/become a serious problem , , ,
Title: Zeihan
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 19, 2022, 10:05:29 AM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eH-UtO9clvc
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 19, 2022, 02:15:42 PM
https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2022/09/us-soldiers-provide-telemaintenance-ukrainians-macgyver-their-weapons/377306/?oref=defense_one_breaking_nl
Title: Russia removes subs from Crimea
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 20, 2022, 07:57:41 AM
https://www.foxnews.com/world/russia-removes-submarine-black-sea-fleet-crimea-uk-intel?fbclid=IwAR2nGfuuDr0UCT_-YJO4rwLVFb4Lfv-wlLyxOycnpfQChWRUZ3g_Eg9_vek
Title: George Friedman
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 20, 2022, 08:02:38 AM
September 20, 2022
View On Website
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Russian Options
By: George Friedman
Last week, I discussed the nature of tactical nuclear weapons. They are built for tactical effect, not strategic effect. Strategic nuclear weapons, such as the ones dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, can devastate a large area, with both the blast and the nuclear fallout. The blast area would be devastated, and the fallout would increase the lethality and carry it a significant distance downwind. However, it must be remembered that regardless of casualties, neither city was completely abandoned, and both were populated and functioning at a reasonable level about a year after the bombs were detonated. The power of tactical nuclear weapons (depending on the type) is less than 1 percent of the Hiroshima blast, and as important, they yield little nuclear fallout.

Tactical nuclear weapons can determine the outcome of a battle but not a war, and would not make the land unlivable. Therefore, Russia’s other nuclear option is strategic: to destroy Ukrainian cities with a Hiroshima-type weapon. This option has two weaknesses. The winds in Ukraine are variable and in eastern Ukraine, for example, blow to the northeast. A strategic nuclear detonation would send fallout blowing into Russia and in this example toward Voronezh, a strategic Russian city. Any use of a strategic nuclear weapon would likely affect Russian territory.

A second risk, however unlikely, concerns the Western response. The United States, the United Kingdom and France all possess strategic nuclear weapons. Any of them might take a Russian strike on Ukraine as a potential threat to themselves, triggering an exchange. This may be farfetched and none of the three might imagine it, but in a command center, fears are magnified. Given the limited value of tactical nukes and the potential disaster of strategic nukes, Russian nuclear threats are excellent psychological warfare (unless a Russian enemy takes the threat seriously) but cannot solve Russia’s military problem.

Its problem consists of four parts. The first is that the Russians are deployed in Ukraine as they began the war, on salients vulnerable to flank attacks, which happened. A retreat into more defensible formations would make sense but would also have serious political consequences, as it would indicate another retreat after the one in the north earlier in the war. A second problem appears to be insufficient, poorly trained and unmotivated forces with which to mount a counterattack sufficient to force a major Ukrainian retreat. A third problem is the long-standing Russian/Soviet problem: logistics. In order to mount a counterattack, the Russians must have not only initial supplies but also massive additional supplies arriving reliably where they are needed. This leads to their fourth problem. U.S. satellites are providing constant, accurate intelligence on all forces, including logistical movements. In addition, U.S. artillery of various sorts is capable of cutting the Russian line of supply, leaving an offensive paralyzed. And finally, Ukrainian forces are sufficiently dispersed that a last-ditch tactical nuclear strike would likely impact the Russian offensive.

It would seem that Russia has been forced into a permanent defensive posture. If this were World War II, Russia would be able to rebound. But Russia has not fought a multidivisional war for 77 years. We saw the Russians open the war with three armored thrusts largely unable to cope with logistical problems and anti-tank weapons. In effect, they were forced to retreat from offensive missions, regroup and wind up in the position they are in. They are fighting an enemy in the same position, but one that does not have a logistical problem thanks to the U.S., which has also had its share of failure but whose most robust capability is logistics.

The Russians must obviously change the dynamic of the war if they are not going to be forced into a political settlement. The key is to pose threats to the Ukrainians from multiple directions, both tactically and strategically. Indeed, their primary need is to diffuse U.S. logistics by creating a serious military threat to another American ally or directly attacking one. It is not clear that the U.S. would be unable to supply two fronts, but it might unbalance the U.S. and force it to reduce support for Ukraine, possibly opening opportunities for Russia.

Geography provides few options for this, but the most likely ones are Moldova and Romania, two countries connected to one another. It could not be an overland offensive but would have to take advantage of the Black Sea, landing significant forces in Romania, a NATO member and host to an American naval force. To achieve this, the Russians would have to first use missiles to eliminate Ukrainian anti-ship missiles like those that sank the Moskva. Having done this, they would have to achieve and maintain air or missile superiority over the Black Sea and then land and lodge sufficient force to compel Romanian forces into combat with substantial American forces. Given that there are American naval forces outside the Bosporus, and given that NATO’s mandate or sheer necessity would force the Bosporus shut, this would pose a serious threat to the Russians. Add to this an air attack on Russian forces, and this operation would likely fail.

There are perhaps other viable diversionary actions of sufficient significance to compel the United States to divert its forces, but all of them would be built on land movements at a time when Russia is hard-pressed. An attack on the Baltics would bring a significant Polish attack on Russia’s flank, and mounting an attack on Finland, for example, would be detected and anticipated. The same is true with Romania, but with somewhat lower opportunity.

Of course, the Romanian gambit itself is highly dubious, but here we are assuming that Russia has been forced to the defense and that it is unwilling to abandon the war. Few options are attractive at this point, but the political cost of abandoning the war is enormous. If they must continue and the Russians can’t regain the initiative, then a Hail Mary is the only option.

The final option is one I wrote about before, which is massing forces in the east and then attacking Ukraine with new forces. That remains the most likely solution for Russia, assuming it can mass, train and motivate a large force. If not, Russia might achieve a poor draw, but it cannot impose its will on Ukraine.
Title: A poster on my FB page
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 20, 2022, 12:18:55 PM
"Russia is facing a no win situation. They can use battlefield nukes, or even larger ones which could allow them to win the war but at a terrible cost. Let's assume that because the Ukraine isn't NATO that NATO doesn't attack Russia. That would avert war, but it wouldn't be the end of it. Few nations would back Russia's play, and those that do would be fair weather friends dependent on Russia oil.

"China is not going to back Russia, neither is India. You might get a few African nations but that isn't a majority of nations, or even a respectful near minority. In the case above Russia could claim victory, remain in the area's they seized in 2014, and retreat behind their borders. Of course Russia would be a pariah nation, I expect they would be booted from the UN, no one is going to issue Russia visas. Trade will be reduce from places like Europe, America, and even the far east. Sanctions will remain, and the Russian economy will wither and die.

"So, what is Russia going to do? Well, Putin is going to give a speech tonight and as I understand it he is going to declare war or at least a general mobilization. Start calling up men up to as old as 50, and continue doing what Russia has always done. They will attempt to overwhelm an enemy. First, they bomb and rocket a target, send in men to destroy what remains, declare victory, kill the inhabitants and move on to the next village. It can work given enough men, rockets, artillery shells, and men willing to kill and rape across the Ukraine and Eastern Europe. Will it work in the Ukraine and greater eastern Europe? My answer is short and quick, no. Russia is taking the chance that using nukes will trigger Article 5 of the NATO accords. Then Russia will be fighting not just the Ukraine, but the combined fire power of NATO. In the meantime what will Putin do?

"I think in the end Putin will opt for a full scale mobilization, sending in slightly trained men, using old equipment taken out of Museums, call back units from all over the world, and do what has worked in the past. And when this too doesn't work, and he gets to the point that battlefield nukes are the only way to not lose a war. He will give the orders, and he will be removed. Who cares how, whoever takes over will declare Putin crazy a traitor, or both. This new leader will work out the best deal he can, hope in 5 or 10 years the world will forget, and Russia can rebuild from this drastic mistake....
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on September 20, 2022, 07:48:53 PM
Putin will hold a referendum in Donbass etc, they will become Russian Territory. Any future fight by Ukr will therefore be against the Russian federation. That will allow Putin to use more force and perhaps even partially mobilize.
Title: Re: A poster on my FB page
Post by: G M on September 20, 2022, 09:00:47 PM
Obviously someone who only knows what has been spoonfed by western propaganda.

"Russia is facing a no win situation. They can use battlefield nukes, or even larger ones which could allow them to win the war but at a terrible cost. Let's assume that because the Ukraine isn't NATO that NATO doesn't attack Russia. That would avert war, but it wouldn't be the end of it. Few nations would back Russia's play, and those that do would be fair weather friends dependent on Russia oil.

"China is not going to back Russia, neither is India. You might get a few African nations but that isn't a majority of nations, or even a respectful near minority. In the case above Russia could claim victory, remain in the area's they seized in 2014, and retreat behind their borders. Of course Russia would be a pariah nation, I expect they would be booted from the UN, no one is going to issue Russia visas. Trade will be reduce from places like Europe, America, and even the far east. Sanctions will remain, and the Russian economy will wither and die.

"So, what is Russia going to do? Well, Putin is going to give a speech tonight and as I understand it he is going to declare war or at least a general mobilization. Start calling up men up to as old as 50, and continue doing what Russia has always done. They will attempt to overwhelm an enemy. First, they bomb and rocket a target, send in men to destroy what remains, declare victory, kill the inhabitants and move on to the next village. It can work given enough men, rockets, artillery shells, and men willing to kill and rape across the Ukraine and Eastern Europe. Will it work in the Ukraine and greater eastern Europe? My answer is short and quick, no. Russia is taking the chance that using nukes will trigger Article 5 of the NATO accords. Then Russia will be fighting not just the Ukraine, but the combined fire power of NATO. In the meantime what will Putin do?

"I think in the end Putin will opt for a full scale mobilization, sending in slightly trained men, using old equipment taken out of Museums, call back units from all over the world, and do what has worked in the past. And when this too doesn't work, and he gets to the point that battlefield nukes are the only way to not lose a war. He will give the orders, and he will be removed. Who cares how, whoever takes over will declare Putin crazy a traitor, or both. This new leader will work out the best deal he can, hope in 5 or 10 years the world will forget, and Russia can rebuild from this drastic mistake....
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 21, 2022, 12:40:05 AM
I didn't remember the details, but my FB friend does have resume in the area-- I have messaged him asking him to refresh my memory.

Here it is:

"Sure, in 1965 the US Army sent all the guys from my intel school to Korea or Vietnam, they sent the Jewish kid to Germany. I live in Germany for three years picked up German, and actually lived with a German family. During my time living in Germany, I traveled around Europe. Saw everything from the tip of Spain, to as far north as Bergen Norway. For one year I lived in Berlin, right next to one of the canals that separated East from West Germany. In fact, the Bridge that they exchanged Gary powers was only a short drive away. Which meant I could clearly hear the sounds of machine guns going off when the Vopo's shot at people trying to flee to freedom.

"I was lucky in that I got to actually ask real live former Nazi soldiers what it was like fighting for Hitler. I got some interesting answers. One group of former soldiers told me the holocaust never happened, and if it did happen Hitler never knew about it. And I had a German friend whose father had been a SS Major, who fought so he said on the Eastern Front. He never said anything anti-Semitic, but I asked him about the war and he told me he had fought against the Russian. In fact, he had dozens of photos on his Kitchen walls of him in his black SS uniform. He was the local Graf, so I'm sure everyone in the dorf, (Village) he was Graf in knew what he had done in the war.

"Not to get too wordy, but the Germany of the 1960's is far different today. Which is why I push back against people who try and tie modern Germans with those who were around in the 30's and 40's. A huge amount of change, Germans today by and large have brought German Jewish history back to the forefront of German history. All of the history both good and bad. In the 1960's I couldn't find the remains of a Synagogue that had been destroyed on Kristallnacht. Today those building are memorials.  They have signs on them and only in German telling the reader what they were. The signs are to remind the Germans, they aren't to impress tourists. I've been to Germany three times in the last four years, and I fly on my Israeli passport. I've never had one bit of problem, but then I don't wear my Jewishness on my sleeve. And while my German isn't as good as it was, it's still the dialect of the Heidelberg area. Which means its farmer German not high German.....Anyway, I hope that answered your question....."


Anyway, here is his post of this morning.
======================

"What is interesting is how similar the current situation is with pre-war Europe. The annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany was, to a large degree, prepared by the Sudeten Germans, who—after accepting with great reluctance the Treaty of Saint-Germain, which had placed them under Czechoslovak rule in 1919—responded with increasing approval to the German nationalist. Today Russian's living in the Crimea are talking about a plebiscite to become part of Russia. This will of course mean that Russia can claim aggrieved status if the Ukraine with the help of NATO takes back what Russia will claim as Mother Russia."

"In 1938 Germany was saber rattling because the Sudetenland had so many native German speakers. Today Russia claims that wherever Russian is spoken is Russia. Hitler threatened war if he didn't get his way, today Putin does the same. The onset of the Second World War demonstrated that the League had failed in its primary purpose, the prevention of another world war. There were a variety of reasons for this failure, many connected to general weaknesses within the organisation. Those same weaknesses that plagued the League also plague the UN. Back in the 1930's the League was mostly silent in the face of major events leading to the Second World War, such as Hitler's remilitarisation of the Rhineland, occupation of the Sudetenland and Anschluss of Austria, which had been forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles. Today the Russians are part of the Security Council, but they failed to take their problem with the Ukraine to the UN for arbitration. Proving once again that there are things the UN does well and things they don't. Preventing wars apparently is one of the jobs that they don't do well."
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 21, 2022, 05:26:16 AM
His experiences in Germany applies to Russia?

 :roll:


I didn't remember the details, but my FB friend does have resume in the area-- I have messaged him asking him to refresh my memory.

Here it is:

"Sure, in 1965 the US Army sent all the guys from my intel school to Korea or Vietnam, they sent the Jewish kid to Germany. I live in Germany for three years picked up German, and actually lived with a German family. During my time living in Germany, I traveled around Europe. Saw everything from the tip of Spain, to as far north as Bergen Norway. For one year I lived in Berlin, right next to one of the canals that separated East from West Germany. In fact, the Bridge that they exchanged Gary powers was only a short drive away. Which meant I could clearly hear the sounds of machine guns going off when the Vopo's shot at people trying to flee to freedom.

"I was lucky in that I got to actually ask real live former Nazi soldiers what it was like fighting for Hitler. I got some interesting answers. One group of former soldiers told me the holocaust never happened, and if it did happen Hitler never knew about it. And I had a German friend whose father had been a SS Major, who fought so he said on the Eastern Front. He never said anything anti-Semitic, but I asked him about the war and he told me he had fought against the Russian. In fact, he had dozens of photos on his Kitchen walls of him in his black SS uniform. He was the local Graf, so I'm sure everyone in the dorf, (Village) he was Graf in knew what he had done in the war.

"Not to get too wordy, but the Germany of the 1960's is far different today. Which is why I push back against people who try and tie modern Germans with those who were around in the 30's and 40's. A huge amount of change, Germans today by and large have brought German Jewish history back to the forefront of German history. All of the history both good and bad. In the 1960's I couldn't find the remains of a Synagogue that had been destroyed on Kristallnacht. Today those building are memorials.  They have signs on them and only in German telling the reader what they were. The signs are to remind the Germans, they aren't to impress tourists. I've been to Germany three times in the last four years, and I fly on my Israeli passport. I've never had one bit of problem, but then I don't wear my Jewishness on my sleeve. And while my German isn't as good as it was, it's still the dialect of the Heidelberg area. Which means its farmer German not high German.....Anyway, I hope that answered your question....."


Anyway, here is his post of this morning.
======================

"What is interesting is how similar the current situation is with pre-war Europe. The annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany was, to a large degree, prepared by the Sudeten Germans, who—after accepting with great reluctance the Treaty of Saint-Germain, which had placed them under Czechoslovak rule in 1919—responded with increasing approval to the German nationalist. Today Russian's living in the Crimea are talking about a plebiscite to become part of Russia. This will of course mean that Russia can claim aggrieved status if the Ukraine with the help of NATO takes back what Russia will claim as Mother Russia."

"In 1938 Germany was saber rattling because the Sudetenland had so many native German speakers. Today Russia claims that wherever Russian is spoken is Russia. Hitler threatened war if he didn't get his way, today Putin does the same. The onset of the Second World War demonstrated that the League had failed in its primary purpose, the prevention of another world war. There were a variety of reasons for this failure, many connected to general weaknesses within the organisation. Those same weaknesses that plagued the League also plague the UN. Back in the 1930's the League was mostly silent in the face of major events leading to the Second World War, such as Hitler's remilitarisation of the Rhineland, occupation of the Sudetenland and Anschluss of Austria, which had been forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles. Today the Russians are part of the Security Council, but they failed to take their problem with the Ukraine to the UN for arbitration. Proving once again that there are things the UN does well and things they don't. Preventing wars apparently is one of the jobs that they don't do well."
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 21, 2022, 07:06:10 AM
Well, as part of the US Army he was in Germany precisely to defend against Russia/the Soviet Union/the Warsaw Pact so yes, it would be a big part of his professional interest and would add to his sense of European geopolitics.  Perhaps "spoon fed by Western media" is not applicable?

Anyway, moving on, this seems quite like what one of the Zeihan posts predicted above Russia finding in a real pickle around Kherson:

https://www.foxnews.com/world/russian-troops-boxed-ukrainian-forces-dnieper-river-barge-carrying-supplies-russian-troops-sinks?fbclid=IwAR18Q1B6QTk6cRCbPB4FXOGcZ0CY5skNiN1-lpfyNLoUloPQxlzz9Lk93To
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 21, 2022, 02:04:36 PM
When did the Warsaw Pact end?



Well, as part of the US Army he was in Germany precisely to defend against Russia/the Soviet Union/the Warsaw Pact so yes, it would be a big part of his professional interest and would add to his sense of European geopolitics.  Perhaps "spoon fed by Western media" is not applicable?

Anyway, moving on, this seems quite like what one of the Zeihan posts predicted above Russia finding in a real pickle around Kherson:

https://www.foxnews.com/world/russian-troops-boxed-ukrainian-forces-dnieper-river-barge-carrying-supplies-russian-troops-sinks?fbclid=IwAR18Q1B6QTk6cRCbPB4FXOGcZ0CY5skNiN1-lpfyNLoUloPQxlzz9Lk93To
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 21, 2022, 03:14:47 PM
You are relentless!

 :-D
Title: NY Post: Protests rock Putin's mobilization order
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 21, 2022, 04:58:02 PM
https://nypost.com/2022/09/21/protests-rock-russia-amid-nuclear-threats-mobilization-order/?fbclid=IwAR18Q1B6QTk6cRCbPB4FXOGcZ0CY5skNiN1-lpfyNLoUloPQxlzz9Lk93To
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on September 22, 2022, 04:47:21 AM
Putin will hold a referendum in Donbass etc, they will become Russian Territory. Any future fight by Ukr will therefore be against the Russian federation. That will allow Putin to use more force and perhaps even partially mobilize.

After the referendum, Russia annexes the Donbass + region and declares cease fire, just in time for winter. I dont see any EU support for waging war against Russia, for Russians they are now defending mother Russia, as opposed to being an attacking force in Ukraine. Checkmate.
Title: Ukraine's bottomless corruption
Post by: G M on September 22, 2022, 07:51:54 AM
https://gatesofvienna.net/2022/09/the-bottomless-corruption-of-the-ukrainian-state/
Title: US "aid " always is defrauded
Post by: ccp on September 22, 2022, 08:13:55 AM
wherever US spends "aid"

whether to Americans or overseas countries
 a huge chunk is stolen

leftist cynics would remind us that is "the cost of doing business"

I hate that expression  .......

Title: Re: US "aid " always is defrauded
Post by: G M on September 22, 2022, 08:20:33 AM
https://www.azquotes.com/vangogh-image-quotes/68/2/Quotation-Ron-Paul-Foreign-aid-is-taking-money-from-the-poor-people-of-68-2-0201.jpg

(https://www.azquotes.com/vangogh-image-quotes/68/2/Quotation-Ron-Paul-Foreign-aid-is-taking-money-from-the-poor-people-of-68-2-0201.jpg)

wherever US spends "aid"

whether to Americans or overseas countries
 a huge chunk is stolen

leftist cynics would remind us that is "the cost of doing business"

I hate that expression  .......
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on September 23, 2022, 05:08:46 AM
Does the Kharkiv withdrawal make sense now...Ukrainians were jubilant, that Russia was losing...

(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FdVqtw0XgAEucw5?format=jpg&name=900x900)
Title: POTH: Putin getting involved
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 24, 2022, 11:19:24 AM
I do not have access to this , , ,

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/23/us/politics/putin-ukraine.html?fbclid=IwAR3CcahofRJTcm0j76Gy5yWeaKH5yQYiRbVvQBICjF7AXyk3K1reJh3XktQ
Title: BBC: Logistics general fired
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 24, 2022, 11:20:24 AM
second

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63021117?fbclid=IwAR2I9WJcknTLg8jtXOr3A1za92QUXiIc-zNOCnLKY2nBV-cvjcD3TBdJhkE
Title: Re: POTH: Putin getting involved
Post by: DougMacG on September 25, 2022, 06:22:50 AM
I do not have access to this , , ,

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/23/us/politics/putin-ukraine.html?fbclid=IwAR3CcahofRJTcm0j76Gy5yWeaKH5yQYiRbVvQBICjF7AXyk3K1reJh3XktQ

Russia’s Surveillance State
Costs of the War
As Russian Losses Mount in Ukraine, Putin Gets More Involved in War Strategy
The Russian president has rejected requests from commanders in the field that they be allowed to retreat from Kherson, a vital city in Ukraine’s south.

Ukrainian soldiers operate a drone near Kherson, in southern Ukraine. It was the first major city to fall to the Russians in the initial invasion, and remains the only regional capital under Moscow’s control.
Ukrainian soldiers operate a drone near Kherson, in southern Ukraine. It was the first major city to fall to the Russians in the initial invasion, and remains the only regional capital under Moscow’s control. Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
Julian E. BarnesHelene CooperEric SchmittMichael Schwirtz
By Julian E. Barnes, Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt and Michael Schwirtz
Sept. 23, 2022
WASHINGTON — President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has thrust himself more directly into strategic planning for the war in Ukraine in recent weeks, American officials said, including rejecting requests from his commanders on the ground that they be allowed to retreat from the vital southern city of Kherson.

A withdrawal from Kherson would allow the Russian military to pull back across the Dnipro River in an orderly way, preserving its equipment and saving the lives of soldiers.

But such a retreat would be another humiliating public acknowledgment of Mr. Putin’s failure in the war, and would hand a second major victory to Ukraine in one month. Kherson was the first major city to fall to the Russians in the initial invasion, and remains the only regional capital under Moscow’s control. Retaking it would be a major accomplishment for President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine.

Focused on victory at all costs, Mr. Putin has become a more public face of the war as the Russian military appears increasingly in turmoil, forcing him to announce a call-up this week that could sweep 300,000 Russian civilians into military service. This month, Moscow has demonstrated it has too few troops to continue its offensive, suffers from shortages of high-tech precision weaponry and has been unable to gain dominance of Ukraine’s skies.

But American officials briefed on highly sensitive intelligence said that behind the scenes Mr. Putin is taking on an even deeper role in the war, including telling commanders that strategic decisions in the field are his to make. Although Mr. Putin has accepted some recommendations from military commanders, including the mobilization of civilians, his involvement has created tensions, American officials said.

The officials said that Mr. Putin’s rejection of a military pullback from Kherson has also led to a decrease in morale among Russian troops who have been mostly cut off from their supply lines, and who appear to believe they could be left stranded against Ukrainian forces.

“The situation in Ukraine is clearly dynamic,” Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in an interview on Friday. “It’s too early for a full assessment, but it is clear to me that the strategic initiative has shifted to the Ukrainians.” But he cautioned that there remains a “long road ahead.”

Mr. Putin’s disagreements over battle lines in Kherson illustrate how critical the war in Ukraine’s south is to both sides, American officials said. Despite Ukraine’s recent advances in the northeast, the area around Kherson is a critical theater in the war, with profound strategic implications for Kyiv and Moscow.

Some American officials said they saw trouble ahead for the Russian military in the southern theater. A senior U.S. official said this week that Ukraine was well on its way to repeating in the south the gains its forces had managed during a lightning offensive in the northeast earlier this month. If Ukraine pushes Russian forces back farther, Mr. Putin’s hard-fought-for land bridge to Crimea, the territory it captured from Ukraine and annexed in 2014, could eventually be threatened, American officials said.

The divisions over Kherson are only the latest disagreements between Mr. Putin and his top commanders. Senior Russian officers repeatedly questioned the early plans for the war, American officials said, particularly an initial stage that envisioned a quick strike on Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital. The Russian officers believed Mr. Putin was going to war with insufficient troops and weaponry, American officials said.

Live Updates: Russia-Ukraine War
Updated
Sept. 25, 2022, 7:46 a.m. ET1 hour ago
1 hour ago
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The Russian officers’ concerns proved correct, and after the defeat of the Russian army outside Kyiv, Mr. Putin eased up his control of military planning. He allowed senior generals to create a new strategy focused on massive artillery barrages, American officials said. The new strategy was effectively a grinding war of attrition that played to the Russian military’s strength and succeeded in pushing the army forward in eastern Ukraine.

Since Mr. Putin ordered his commanders to continue fighting in Kherson, the Russian military has tried to halt the Ukrainian advance there. Last week the Russians blew up a dam on the Inhulets River to make the current counteroffensive more difficult.

But Ukrainian strikes have blown up the crossings over the Dnipro River, which has largely cut off Russian troops from their supply lines on the other side. Russians have had to use pontoon bridges to cross the river, only to see them hit by Ukrainian fire, Ukrainian officials said. “They’ve got units in there who, if the Ukrainians break through the lines, will be cut off and surrounded,” said Seth G. Jones, senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “I cannot overstate how dicey the situation is for them.”

Pulling back past the Dnipro River would likely allow Russian commanders to hold the line in the south with fewer troops. That would give them more latitude to redeploy forces from Kherson to other areas, either pushing back against the Kharkiv counteroffensive in the northeast, solidifying defensive lines in the eastern Donbas region or opening up a new front in the south.

But Mr. Putin has told commanders he will set the strategy.

“In this war there has been a consistent mismatch between Putin’s political objectives and the military means to attain them,” said Michael Kofman, director of Russia studies at CNA, a defense research institute in Arlington, Va. “At important decision points Putin has procrastinated, refusing to recognize the reality, until the options turned from bad to worse.”

Pulling Russian forces back past the Dnipro River would also be a stark rebuttal to Mr. Putin’s referendum there on joining the Russian Federation. Holding such sham votes is a key objective of Moscow. Blocking them remains one of Kyiv’s top priorities.

With dissent rising in Russia, and military-age men attempting to flee the country to avoid the call-up, U.S. officials say Mr. Putin believes another Ukrainian victory would further erode the popularity of the war, something he cannot risk. Videos widely shared on Twitter in the days since Mr. Putin announced his call-up show angry draftees being scolded by shouting Russian military officials. “Playtime’s over!” yells one military official in one video. “You’re soldiers now!”

Mr. Putin’s conversations with his regional military commanders in Ukraine may also be part of an effort to get more accurate assessments of the campaign. As the war has gone on, American officials have said that Mr. Putin has not been given accurate information from his top military advisers, Sergei K. Shoigu, the defense minister, and Valery Gerasimov, the Russian military’s chief of the general staff.

In addition to blocking a retreat from Kherson, Mr. Putin has raised doubts about Russian efforts to consolidate their position in the northeast near the Oskil River, which the Ukrainian counteroffensive reached this month. Mr. Putin, an American official said, has opposed pulling back there as well, because he is reluctant to hand anything to Mr. Zelensky that looks like a win.

Even as Mr. Putin demands a strategy of no further retreats, American officials said Russian officers themselves are divided on how to respond to the Ukrainian counteroffensives. Some officers believe they should push back hard on Mr. Putin’s directives before the Ukrainians break through their current lines. Others believe they can follow through on Mr. Putin’s directives.

Russia has continued to focus on the south, despite Ukrainian progress east of Kharkiv. While Moscow has sent some reinforcements to embattled northeastern positions, most of the tens of thousands of troops that Russia sent south to the Kherson area — including some of its best combat forces — remain in place.

© 2022 The New York Times Company
Title: Col. MacG is right!
Post by: G M on September 25, 2022, 11:44:15 AM
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/holding-ground-losing-war/
Title: Gen Keane
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 25, 2022, 02:52:20 PM
https://www.foxnews.com/world/putin-losing-war-ukraine-forcing-annexation-referendum-secure-political-victory-keane-says?fbclid=IwAR3VGK1D8NF4D8wcyDs7xOJXkYb0B8iuYmdnL1ZoCByml2t8Ns95GyB0B0s

What if Putin were to nuke Odessa as response to Ukes going to retake Donbas, which he is now about to assert IS part of Russia?
Title: Re: Gen Keane
Post by: G M on September 25, 2022, 03:37:44 PM
https://www.foxnews.com/world/putin-losing-war-ukraine-forcing-annexation-referendum-secure-political-victory-keane-says?fbclid=IwAR3VGK1D8NF4D8wcyDs7xOJXkYb0B8iuYmdnL1ZoCByml2t8Ns95GyB0B0s

What if Putin were to nuke Odessa as response to Ukes going to retake Donbas, which he is now about to assert IS part of Russia?

What if Putin let the winter settle in and then took down the Uke infrastructure?
Title: Re: Gen Keane
Post by: ya on September 25, 2022, 04:03:08 PM
https://www.foxnews.com/world/putin-losing-war-ukraine-forcing-annexation-referendum-secure-political-victory-keane-says?fbclid=IwAR3VGK1D8NF4D8wcyDs7xOJXkYb0B8iuYmdnL1ZoCByml2t8Ns95GyB0B0s

What if Putin were to nuke Odessa as response to Ukes going to retake Donbas, which he is now about to assert IS part of Russia?

Odessa is mostly Russian speaking...he has designs on it, nuking it would not make sense. Perhaps some part of Ukr with few Russians, or some part of Ukr closer to Europe.
Title: Ukraine, Roger Waters agrees with some here?
Post by: DougMacG on September 25, 2022, 05:19:30 PM
And gets kicked out of Poland.

https://www.startribune.com/pink-floyd-founder-cancels-poland-concerts-after-war-remarks/600209843/
Title: Re: Ukraine, Roger Waters agrees with some here?
Post by: G M on September 25, 2022, 05:50:14 PM
And gets kicked out of Poland.

https://www.startribune.com/pink-floyd-founder-cancels-poland-concerts-after-war-remarks/600209843/

Paywalled
Title: Re: Ukraine, Roger Waters agrees with some here?
Post by: DougMacG on September 25, 2022, 07:11:24 PM
And gets kicked out of Poland.
https://www.startribune.com/pink-floyd-founder-cancels-poland-concerts-after-war-remarks/600209843/
Paywalled

(AP)
WARSAW, Poland — Pink Floyd co-founder Roger Waters has canceled concerts planned in Poland amid outrage over his stance on Russia's war against Ukraine, Polish media reported Saturday.
...
City councilors in Krakow were expected to vote next week on a proposal to name Waters as a persona non grata, expressing "indignation" over the musician's stance on the war in Ukraine.

Waters wrote an open letter to Ukrainian first lady Olena Zelenska early this month in which he blamed "extreme nationalists" in Ukraine for having "set your country on the path to this disastrous war." He also criticized the West for supplying Ukraine with weapons, blaming Washington in particular.

Waters has also criticized NATO, accusing it of provoking Russia.
Title: "Naive"
Post by: G M on September 26, 2022, 06:23:23 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/view-russia-will-lose-war-ukraine-may-be-naive
Title: Jordan Peterson: Naive to think Ukes will win
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 26, 2022, 07:02:37 AM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BnxxELn00gk&t=3s
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 26, 2022, 09:26:31 AM
Here is the completely opposed POV.

This piece comes to me with high praise from someone highly qualified and seriously experienced:

===================

Open in browser
Ukraine Can Win This War
The experts said Ukraine was was ill-prepared, ill-equipped, and Russia’s military was simply too powerful. They were wrong.
Liam Collins and John Spencer
Sep 26
 
▷  LISTEN
SAVE
 
Ukrainian soldiers ride in an armored tank in the town of Izium, recently liberated by Ukrainian Armed Forces, in the Kharkiv region. (Oleksii Chumachenko/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)
When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the conventional wisdom among military experts was that it would all be over for Ukraine in a matter of weeks. Here was Russia, one of the world’s ostensible superpowers, its military five times the size of Ukraine’s, and with nuclear weapons to boot.  At the start of the conflict, Russia maintained an advantage of nearly ten-to-one in defense spending and weapons systems. Ukraine, they said, was ill-prepared, ill-equipped, and Russia’s military was simply too powerful.

It hasn’t turned out that way.

Since Ukraine’s counteroffensive began nearly three weeks ago, the country has reclaimed more than 3,400 square miles. By contrast, Russia’s offensive in the east gained only 2,000 square miles in the past five months. Ukraine continues its advance via a successful offensive in the Kharkiv region (in which they launched a massive surprise counterattack to overwhelm unprepared and unmotivated Russian forces) and through its ongoing success in the Kherson region (where Ukrainian forces have basically encircled and cut off up to 20,000 Russians).

Then there is the panic in Moscow. Days ago, Putin announced the mobilization of 300,000 Russian reservists while also threatening nuclear war. The draft—Russia’s first since World War II—will force thousands of Russians who had previously served to report for duty, receive two weeks of refresher training, and immediately deploy into Ukraine. Russian conscripts' time of service has been extended indefinitely, meaning they will not be able to leave the fighting when their time is up. It’s hard to conceive of how much lower the morale of Russian troops can get.

All of this indicates that Putin is deeply concerned about Ukraine’s ability to win this war. He is right to be.

It has now been seven months since the war began, and signs from Ukraine and Russia indicate quite the opposite outcome that most experts predicted. So, how did all this happen? 

Success in warfighting is a function of much more than the size of a nation’s military. It is also a function of strategy, allyship, doctrine, culture, and the will to fight, among many other factors. And Ukraine—not Russia—holds the advantage in every category except for military size.

Let’s take each in turn.

Strategy

Since Ukraine’s victory in preventing Russia from decapitating the capital city of Kyiv in April 2022, Russia’s strategy in eastern Ukraine can best be described as a war of attrition. Russia massed its combat power and conducted large artillery barrages. These battles were temporarily effective, as Russia was able to make incremental gains in the Donbas. But it came at great cost: Russia expended massive amounts of ammunition and soldiers to make those small gains.

By August, the Pentagon estimated that as many as 80,000 Russian soldiers had been killed or wounded. They lost thousands of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces, and have expended or lost tons of ammunition and supplies. They also lost at least a dozen generals and countless lower-level leaders. It will take Russia decades to train, educate, and ultimately replace these people. For Russia’s officer-centric military, these losses are particularly devastating as it greatly impacts their ability to mobilize a coherent fighting formation on the battlefield today. Military analysts were also surprised at the health and order of Russian equipment and positions—many resembled homeless encampments more than military outposts.

Ukraine had a very different strategy.

Over the past several months, Ukraine—being a much smaller military—wisely decided to surrender some territory in the East, pulling back to more defensible positions so that it could maintain the necessary combat power to fight another day. That day came on August 29, when Ukraine launched its massive counteroffensive. This offensive has been successful because Ukraine has a superior military by every measure other than quantity. As the war has progressed, Ukraine has also been able to replace worn down arms and ammunition, while at the same time acquiring new ones thanks to its relationship with the U.S. and other key allies.

Allyship

Western aid has been critical to Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive. They’ve been able to strike Russian ammunition depots, command and control centers, and supply lines thanks to weapons provided by the U.S., the U.K., Poland, and others. These weapons include HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems), counter artillery and missile radars, HARM (high-speed anti-radiation missiles) air-to-surface missiles, and other superior long-range weapons.

Western aid has not just been about weapons. It has also included battlefieldintelligence, planning assistance, and training for thousands of Ukrainian soldiers outside of the country. The Ukrainians have put that aid and know-how to work to immediate effect on the battlefield.   

NATO Doctrine

Just as critical to Ukraine’s success was the decision nearly eight years ago to have a professional force designed and trained so it could defend itself from Russian aggression. In 2016, Ukraine committed itself to building a modern military capable of meeting NATO standards. With the help of hundreds of Western trainers and advisers, Ukraine built an army that could execute maneuver warfare involving large-scale combined arms operations by the start of the most recent invasion. One of us was among them, and we were deeply impressed by their commitment to make such difficult reforms.

While Ukraine was adopting a NATO force and doctrine, Russia doubled down on their Soviet-era approach—a doctrine that relies on officer-centric orders and rigid, artillery-dependent formations. As Ukraine built a smaller, more nimble military, Russia continued to adhere to the outdated idea of amassing firepower and armor to overwhelm a stationary force.

Culture

In 2014, Ukraine’s military culture was much like Russia’s today: a highly centralized command structure where all decisions flow to the top. Risk-taking and battlefield initiative were not part of its military culture. But Ukraine learned through its experience in the Donbas in 2014—when Russia overwhelmed defending Ukrainian forces to take control of most of eastern Ukraine—that initiative was required when initial battlefield orders no longer fit the changing situation. Now, when the unexpected happens on the battlefield, lieutenants and captains are free to act immediately rather than having to seek permission and receive it after it is too late.

The second important component for Ukraine’s success is a national culture of military volunteerism. Russia’s active military may have been five times that of Ukraine at the start of the conflict, but few anticipated how significant a role volunteers would play in the defense of Kyiv. Tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens who were civilians on February 23—the day before Russia invaded—went to recruiting stations on February 24, or simply used their own arms to support the war effort. The Territorial Defense Force now numbers in the hundreds of thousands, and these volunteers have allowed Ukraine to commit most of its active duty military to the current counteroffensive.   

Will to Fight

When the U.S. offered to evacuate him at the start of the conflict, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is famous for responding, “I need ammunition, not a ride.” The sentiment is common to many Ukrainians. Despite facing what was ranked as the second most powerful military in the world, ordinary Ukrainian men and women have demonstrated a strong will to fight for their country.

There is no greater test of a soldier or a people than war. The story of the Ukrainian people’s heroism is too rich to truncate here, but we are thinking of how thousands of civilians took up arms in February and March 2022, blocked streets, destroyed convoys, blew up bridges, and flooded rivers to prevent the fall of Ukraine’s capital. Or how just a few thousand men and women fought and held down 20,000 Russians for over 80 days in the city of Mariupol, ultimately withdrawing into their own version of an Alamo in the underground tunnels of a steel plant.

The most important difference between a Ukrainian soldier and a Russian one is their determination. Ukrainians prove every day that they are fighting for their freedom, families, and nation. By contrast, Russian soldiers have demonstrated their lack of motivation by refusing to fight, abandoning their positions when in danger, and attacking their leaders.

Despite Ukraine’s recent success, it’s important to remember that wars ebb and flow, and this war has been no different. Ukraine may be able to retake Kherson, but its current counteroffensive is not going to expel Russian forces everywhere. Ukraine’s military will eventually exhaust its capacity to continue this massive counterattack, and the larger Russian military will regroup and establish more effective defensive positions.

Nonetheless, the success of this counteroffensive provides a roadmap for Ukrainian forces: holding where they need to, slowly retreating where they must, and quickly counterattacking when the conditions are right. The ongoing offensive has demonstrated that Ukraine has a superior military that can overwhelm and defeat Russian forces, at scale, when they can achieve more favorable conditions. It has also provided a window into Russia’s military status: Russia cannot sustain their losses in this war.

If the West continues its level of aid and support, while Ukraine continues to build military capability and execute a superior war plan, the path to victory is clear. Under those conditions, it's only a matter of when—not if—Ukraine will win this war.

About the authors:

Liam Collins is the executive director of the Madison Policy Forum. He served as a defense advisor to Ukraine from 2016-2018 and is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel with deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Horn of Africa, and South America. He is co-author of the forthcoming bookUnderstanding Urban Warfare.

John Spencer is the chair of urban warfare studies at the Madison Policy Forum. He served 25 years as a U.S. Army infantryman, which included two combat tours in Iraq. He is the author of the book Connected Soldiers: Life, Leadership, and Social Connection in Modern War and co-author, with Liam Collins, of Understanding Urban Warfare.

If you appreciated this piece and the work that we do every day at Common Sense, please subscribe:

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 26, 2022, 10:32:59 AM
I seriously respect these gentlemen, but since WW II, the US military has demonstrated that despite its ability to win battles, it cannot win wars.

Here is the completely opposed POV.

This piece comes to me with high praise from someone highly qualified and seriously experienced:

===================

Open in browser
Ukraine Can Win This War
The experts said Ukraine was was ill-prepared, ill-equipped, and Russia’s military was simply too powerful. They were wrong.
Liam Collins and John Spencer
Sep 26
 
▷  LISTEN
SAVE
 
Ukrainian soldiers ride in an armored tank in the town of Izium, recently liberated by Ukrainian Armed Forces, in the Kharkiv region. (Oleksii Chumachenko/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)
When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the conventional wisdom among military experts was that it would all be over for Ukraine in a matter of weeks. Here was Russia, one of the world’s ostensible superpowers, its military five times the size of Ukraine’s, and with nuclear weapons to boot.  At the start of the conflict, Russia maintained an advantage of nearly ten-to-one in defense spending and weapons systems. Ukraine, they said, was ill-prepared, ill-equipped, and Russia’s military was simply too powerful.

It hasn’t turned out that way.

Since Ukraine’s counteroffensive began nearly three weeks ago, the country has reclaimed more than 3,400 square miles. By contrast, Russia’s offensive in the east gained only 2,000 square miles in the past five months. Ukraine continues its advance via a successful offensive in the Kharkiv region (in which they launched a massive surprise counterattack to overwhelm unprepared and unmotivated Russian forces) and through its ongoing success in the Kherson region (where Ukrainian forces have basically encircled and cut off up to 20,000 Russians).

Then there is the panic in Moscow. Days ago, Putin announced the mobilization of 300,000 Russian reservists while also threatening nuclear war. The draft—Russia’s first since World War II—will force thousands of Russians who had previously served to report for duty, receive two weeks of refresher training, and immediately deploy into Ukraine. Russian conscripts' time of service has been extended indefinitely, meaning they will not be able to leave the fighting when their time is up. It’s hard to conceive of how much lower the morale of Russian troops can get.

All of this indicates that Putin is deeply concerned about Ukraine’s ability to win this war. He is right to be.

It has now been seven months since the war began, and signs from Ukraine and Russia indicate quite the opposite outcome that most experts predicted. So, how did all this happen? 

Success in warfighting is a function of much more than the size of a nation’s military. It is also a function of strategy, allyship, doctrine, culture, and the will to fight, among many other factors. And Ukraine—not Russia—holds the advantage in every category except for military size.

Let’s take each in turn.

Strategy

Since Ukraine’s victory in preventing Russia from decapitating the capital city of Kyiv in April 2022, Russia’s strategy in eastern Ukraine can best be described as a war of attrition. Russia massed its combat power and conducted large artillery barrages. These battles were temporarily effective, as Russia was able to make incremental gains in the Donbas. But it came at great cost: Russia expended massive amounts of ammunition and soldiers to make those small gains.

By August, the Pentagon estimated that as many as 80,000 Russian soldiers had been killed or wounded. They lost thousands of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces, and have expended or lost tons of ammunition and supplies. They also lost at least a dozen generals and countless lower-level leaders. It will take Russia decades to train, educate, and ultimately replace these people. For Russia’s officer-centric military, these losses are particularly devastating as it greatly impacts their ability to mobilize a coherent fighting formation on the battlefield today. Military analysts were also surprised at the health and order of Russian equipment and positions—many resembled homeless encampments more than military outposts.

Ukraine had a very different strategy.

Over the past several months, Ukraine—being a much smaller military—wisely decided to surrender some territory in the East, pulling back to more defensible positions so that it could maintain the necessary combat power to fight another day. That day came on August 29, when Ukraine launched its massive counteroffensive. This offensive has been successful because Ukraine has a superior military by every measure other than quantity. As the war has progressed, Ukraine has also been able to replace worn down arms and ammunition, while at the same time acquiring new ones thanks to its relationship with the U.S. and other key allies.

Allyship

Western aid has been critical to Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive. They’ve been able to strike Russian ammunition depots, command and control centers, and supply lines thanks to weapons provided by the U.S., the U.K., Poland, and others. These weapons include HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems), counter artillery and missile radars, HARM (high-speed anti-radiation missiles) air-to-surface missiles, and other superior long-range weapons.

Western aid has not just been about weapons. It has also included battlefieldintelligence, planning assistance, and training for thousands of Ukrainian soldiers outside of the country. The Ukrainians have put that aid and know-how to work to immediate effect on the battlefield.   

NATO Doctrine

Just as critical to Ukraine’s success was the decision nearly eight years ago to have a professional force designed and trained so it could defend itself from Russian aggression. In 2016, Ukraine committed itself to building a modern military capable of meeting NATO standards. With the help of hundreds of Western trainers and advisers, Ukraine built an army that could execute maneuver warfare involving large-scale combined arms operations by the start of the most recent invasion. One of us was among them, and we were deeply impressed by their commitment to make such difficult reforms.

While Ukraine was adopting a NATO force and doctrine, Russia doubled down on their Soviet-era approach—a doctrine that relies on officer-centric orders and rigid, artillery-dependent formations. As Ukraine built a smaller, more nimble military, Russia continued to adhere to the outdated idea of amassing firepower and armor to overwhelm a stationary force.

Culture

In 2014, Ukraine’s military culture was much like Russia’s today: a highly centralized command structure where all decisions flow to the top. Risk-taking and battlefield initiative were not part of its military culture. But Ukraine learned through its experience in the Donbas in 2014—when Russia overwhelmed defending Ukrainian forces to take control of most of eastern Ukraine—that initiative was required when initial battlefield orders no longer fit the changing situation. Now, when the unexpected happens on the battlefield, lieutenants and captains are free to act immediately rather than having to seek permission and receive it after it is too late.

The second important component for Ukraine’s success is a national culture of military volunteerism. Russia’s active military may have been five times that of Ukraine at the start of the conflict, but few anticipated how significant a role volunteers would play in the defense of Kyiv. Tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens who were civilians on February 23—the day before Russia invaded—went to recruiting stations on February 24, or simply used their own arms to support the war effort. The Territorial Defense Force now numbers in the hundreds of thousands, and these volunteers have allowed Ukraine to commit most of its active duty military to the current counteroffensive.   

Will to Fight

When the U.S. offered to evacuate him at the start of the conflict, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is famous for responding, “I need ammunition, not a ride.” The sentiment is common to many Ukrainians. Despite facing what was ranked as the second most powerful military in the world, ordinary Ukrainian men and women have demonstrated a strong will to fight for their country.

There is no greater test of a soldier or a people than war. The story of the Ukrainian people’s heroism is too rich to truncate here, but we are thinking of how thousands of civilians took up arms in February and March 2022, blocked streets, destroyed convoys, blew up bridges, and flooded rivers to prevent the fall of Ukraine’s capital. Or how just a few thousand men and women fought and held down 20,000 Russians for over 80 days in the city of Mariupol, ultimately withdrawing into their own version of an Alamo in the underground tunnels of a steel plant.

The most important difference between a Ukrainian soldier and a Russian one is their determination. Ukrainians prove every day that they are fighting for their freedom, families, and nation. By contrast, Russian soldiers have demonstrated their lack of motivation by refusing to fight, abandoning their positions when in danger, and attacking their leaders.

Despite Ukraine’s recent success, it’s important to remember that wars ebb and flow, and this war has been no different. Ukraine may be able to retake Kherson, but its current counteroffensive is not going to expel Russian forces everywhere. Ukraine’s military will eventually exhaust its capacity to continue this massive counterattack, and the larger Russian military will regroup and establish more effective defensive positions.

Nonetheless, the success of this counteroffensive provides a roadmap for Ukrainian forces: holding where they need to, slowly retreating where they must, and quickly counterattacking when the conditions are right. The ongoing offensive has demonstrated that Ukraine has a superior military that can overwhelm and defeat Russian forces, at scale, when they can achieve more favorable conditions. It has also provided a window into Russia’s military status: Russia cannot sustain their losses in this war.

If the West continues its level of aid and support, while Ukraine continues to build military capability and execute a superior war plan, the path to victory is clear. Under those conditions, it's only a matter of when—not if—Ukraine will win this war.

About the authors:

Liam Collins is the executive director of the Madison Policy Forum. He served as a defense advisor to Ukraine from 2016-2018 and is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel with deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Horn of Africa, and South America. He is co-author of the forthcoming bookUnderstanding Urban Warfare.

John Spencer is the chair of urban warfare studies at the Madison Policy Forum. He served 25 years as a U.S. Army infantryman, which included two combat tours in Iraq. He is the author of the book Connected Soldiers: Life, Leadership, and Social Connection in Modern War and co-author, with Liam Collins, of Understanding Urban Warfare.

If you appreciated this piece and the work that we do every day at Common Sense, please subscribe:
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 26, 2022, 11:59:50 AM
1) Were the various absences of victory the fault of the military or the civilian leadership?

2) Here, it aint the US military that is fighting overseas.  It is the Ukes fighting in and for their homeland against an enemy they know well.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 26, 2022, 12:35:50 PM
1) Were the various absences of victory the fault of the military or the civilian leadership?

2) Here, it aint the US military that is fighting overseas.  It is the Ukes fighting in and for their homeland against an enemy they know well.

1. Irrelevant. A loss is a loss. We spent 20 years and how much money training and equipping our Afghan allies and when the money and equipment spigot got turned off, they collapsed faster than a Chinese made lawn chair.

2. Again, our Afghan allies had all the motivation in the world not to lose to the Taliban, but they sure did.

Pets.com wasn’t just a bad business model, it’s a bad way to fight wars. Yet, this is how we do it.

We plan on bleeding Russia, but who is bleeding faster?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 26, 2022, 03:43:00 PM
Your words placed blame squarely on our military.

"(T)he US military has demonstrated that despite its ability to win battles, it cannot win wars."

Fair of me to ask whether the blame was always theirs or sometimes it belonged to the civilian leadership.

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 26, 2022, 04:22:52 PM
Your words placed blame squarely on our military.

"(T)he US military has demonstrated that despite its ability to win battles, it cannot win wars."

Fair of me to ask whether the blame was always theirs or sometimes it belonged to the civilian leadership.

There is serious rot within the U.S. military, especially at the top. It’s the core of the problem. It’s the guys at the tip of the spear that suffer the most because of it.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on September 26, 2022, 04:58:37 PM
"(T)he US military has demonstrated that despite its ability to win battles, it cannot win wars."

we win only open battlefield wars

not wars against guerrillas etc

while we are trying to keep civilian casualties down
etc.

what good is all our might if we can't simply blow up the enemy to smitherenes
for political reasons

why could we not wipe out the Taliban ? did we try ?

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 26, 2022, 06:22:45 PM
"(T)he US military has demonstrated that despite its ability to win battles, it cannot win wars."

we win only open battlefield wars

not wars against guerrillas etc

while we are trying to keep civilian casualties down
etc.

what good is all our might if we can't simply blow up the enemy to smitherenes
for political reasons

why could we not wipe out the Taliban ? did we try ?

Lots of profits for military contractors and lots of jobs for retired generals on the executive boards of those companies if the Afghan war drags on for 20 years. Not so good for the 19 year old marine that loses both legs to an IED because the general had restricted ROEs that prevented the talibs planting the IEDs from being sniped.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on September 26, 2022, 07:08:51 PM
The US loses wars it isn't fully committed to win.
Title: Endless money and weapons for Ukraine?
Post by: G M on September 26, 2022, 09:59:10 PM
"Despite Ukraine’s recent success, it’s important to remember that wars ebb and flow, and this war has been no different. Ukraine may be able to retake Kherson, but its current counteroffensive is not going to expel Russian forces everywhere. Ukraine’s military will eventually exhaust its capacity to continue this massive counterattack, and the larger Russian military will regroup and establish more effective defensive positions.

Nonetheless, the success of this counteroffensive provides a roadmap for Ukrainian forces: holding where they need to, slowly retreating where they must, and quickly counterattacking when the conditions are right. The ongoing offensive has demonstrated that Ukraine has a superior military that can overwhelm and defeat Russian forces, at scale, when they can achieve more favorable conditions. It has also provided a window into Russia’s military status: Russia cannot sustain their losses in this war.

If the West continues its level of aid and support, while Ukraine continues to build military capability and execute a superior war plan, the path to victory is clear. Under those conditions, it's only a matter of when—not if—Ukraine will win this war."

https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2022/08/23/biden-us-ukraine-russia-aid-3-billion-six-months

To date, the U.S. has provided about $10.6 billion in military aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration, including 19 packages of weapons taken directly from Defense Department stocks since August 2021.

Good news for the MIC! How much will it cost, and how long will it take to replace those weapons ?

When General Winter invades europe and euopeans are literally freezing to death, how will that affect the funding and resources sent to Ukraine?

How long can we keep funding Ukraine at the current burn rate?



Title: Re: Endless money and weapons for Ukraine?
Post by: G M on September 26, 2022, 10:16:04 PM
"Despite Ukraine’s recent success, it’s important to remember that wars ebb and flow, and this war has been no different. Ukraine may be able to retake Kherson, but its current counteroffensive is not going to expel Russian forces everywhere. Ukraine’s military will eventually exhaust its capacity to continue this massive counterattack, and the larger Russian military will regroup and establish more effective defensive positions.

Nonetheless, the success of this counteroffensive provides a roadmap for Ukrainian forces: holding where they need to, slowly retreating where they must, and quickly counterattacking when the conditions are right. The ongoing offensive has demonstrated that Ukraine has a superior military that can overwhelm and defeat Russian forces, at scale, when they can achieve more favorable conditions. It has also provided a window into Russia’s military status: Russia cannot sustain their losses in this war.

If the West continues its level of aid and support, while Ukraine continues to build military capability and execute a superior war plan, the path to victory is clear. Under those conditions, it's only a matter of when—not if—Ukraine will win this war."

https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2022/08/23/biden-us-ukraine-russia-aid-3-billion-six-months

To date, the U.S. has provided about $10.6 billion in military aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration, including 19 packages of weapons taken directly from Defense Department stocks since August 2021.

Good news for the MIC! How much will it cost, and how long will it take to replace those weapons ?

When General Winter invades europe and euopeans are literally freezing to death, how will that affect the funding and resources sent to Ukraine?

How long can we keep funding Ukraine at the current burn rate?

https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/116/395/040/original/08431348794c399e.jpeg

(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/116/395/040/original/08431348794c399e.jpeg)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 26, 2022, 10:32:09 PM
"(T)he US military has demonstrated that despite its ability to win battles, it cannot win wars."

we win only open battlefield wars

not wars against guerrillas etc

while we are trying to keep civilian casualties down
etc.

what good is all our might if we can't simply blow up the enemy to smitherenes
for political reasons

why could we not wipe out the Taliban ? did we try ?

Lots of profits for military contractors and lots of jobs for retired generals on the executive boards of those companies if the Afghan war drags on for 20 years. Not so good for the 19 year old marine that loses both legs to an IED because the general had restricted ROEs that prevented the talibs planting the IEDs from being sniped.

https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/116/637/924/original/e789edbc51271190.jpeg

(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/116/637/924/original/e789edbc51271190.jpeg)
Title: Re: Endless money and weapons for Ukraine?
Post by: DougMacG on September 27, 2022, 05:04:51 AM
Bold highlight from G M's post:

"To date, the U.S. has provided about $10.6 billion in military aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration, including 19 packages of weapons taken directly from Defense Department stocks since August 2021."


$10 billion?  [Actual number may be higher]  I hate to say it but wow that's a small amount of money to thwart such a major offensive of evil rival Putin Russia.

The student debt tranference program rounds to a trillion, one hundred  times as much, without even a vote, for no national gain whatsoever.

Oops our national debt just went up another 10 billion while I was writing this, just writing checks to each other.

We've got bigger money problems than helping Ukraine and thwarting Putin.

And no, I don't support endless, limitless amounts, just saying we haven't hit that level yet IF these numbers are accurate.  But, from my secure midwest location, I shamelessly take some solace in seeing Putin's violent trampling on international law and neighbor sovereignty turn into a losing quagmire for him.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on September 27, 2022, 08:03:10 AM
So with NS-1 and NS-2 blown up...qui bono ?. US ? Ukr ?responsible ? Germany definitely in recession. Putin loses a negotiation tool.
Title: WSJ
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 27, 2022, 08:22:29 AM
"And no, I don't support endless, limitless amounts, just saying we haven't hit that level yet IF these numbers are accurate.  But, from my secure midwest location, I shamelessly take some solace in seeing Putin's violent trampling on international law and neighbor sovereignty turn into a losing quagmire for him."

YES.

With variations in how we articulate it, this forum has had consensus that America has considerable responsibility for provoking this war. 

My personal term was "feckless stupidity".

That said, there is more variety among us concerning what to do now.

I continue to think it was feckless stupidity to have provoked all this, and that it was done with astounding incompetence (e.g. green lighting Nord Stream 2, cancelling the missile defense deals with Poland and Czech Republic, cancelling Navy movements in the Black Sea, etc etc etc).  Contrast the way that Trump had SOCEUR train up the Ukes during the entirety of his term-- and witness the results from this in the quality of the Uke military and population!  Contrast MREs and Javelins!

IMHO IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE GRASP THIS AND ARTICULATE IT SHOULD THINGS GO WELL NOW SO THAT BIDEN ET AL'S CLAIMS GREAT WISDOM IN CONTRAST TO PUTIN LOVER TRUMP- which are sure to come- ARE PROPERLY REFUTED

WE ROOT FOR AMERICA, AND IF THINGS GO WELL NOW, IT WILL ACCOMPLISH MANY THINGS-- RE-ESTABLISHING CREDIBILITY FOR AMERICAN ARMS AND RELIABILITY, AND LIKELY PUTTING HESITATION IN CHINESE THINKING FOR TAIWAN AND GREATER CONFIDENCE OF OUR ALLIES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.  Yes, yes, we have driven Russia into China's arms-- and this will have grave consequences that likely will go uncredited, and much of Ukraine has been leveled, and uncounted numbers have died of famines that all this has provoked, but these are no small thing!  As the saying goes, "Better lucky than good!"

Pulling the rug from under the Ukes now would be an even bigger act of feckless stupidity.

I love Tucker, but on this he is utterly wrong.

OTOH if things go bad (the Iranian drones turn things around for Putin, things go nuclear, etc, we can still say-- "We told you so!"

================

Ukraine’s New Offensive Threatens Moscow’s Control of Lands It Seeks to Annex
Wrecked Russian armor and corpses of Russian troops line the roads in northern Donetsk as Ukraine pushes deeper into Donbas
By Yaroslav Trofimov
WSJ
Sept. 27, 2022 9:36 am ET

RUBTSY, Ukraine—The Ukrainian military offensive that ousted Russian troops from the Kharkiv region early this month has now crossed deep into the northern part of the nearby Donetsk region, increasingly threatening Russian control over lands that Moscow seeks to annex as sovereign territory in coming days.

Here in Rubtsy, a village in Donetsk that Russia captured in late April, advancing Ukrainian forces stream east past burned-out carcasses of Russian tanks and the bloated bodies of Russian soldiers that remain on roadsides. Trophy pieces of Russian armor are being towed in the opposite way, to be repaired and reused.

The Ukrainian push here, east of the Oskil River, aims to encircle the strategic town of Lyman, where street battles have begun, and ultimately target the northern parts of the nearby Luhansk region. Russia is wrapping up sham referendums it is staging in Donetsk and Luhansk, collectively known as Donbas, and two occupied regions of southern Ukraine, aiming to formally incorporate them into Russia as soon as this week.

Demoralized by recent defeats in Kharkiv, Russian soldiers on this front line continue to retreat, despite arriving reinforcements. On Sunday, Ukrainian forces took several prisoners in a nearby village because many of the Russian soldiers were drunk, said a Ukrainian soldier. “The ones who were sober ran away, and the ones who were drunk didn’t even realize that the village was being attacked, and got caught,” he said.

The soldier showed off two recently captured Russian T-80 tanks that had been towed to his position, the Russian tactical sign Z on their armor overpainted with the white cross marking Ukrainian armor on this front. One only needed a battery change, he said. The other would require more intensive repairs because the retreating Russian crew had thrown a hand grenade into the barrel. “We’ll fix them and use them against the Russians,” he said.

In addition to the offensive in northern Donetsk, Ukrainian forces in recent days also expanded their foothold east of the Oskil river in the area of Kupyansk, the seat of Russian administration for the roughly 3,500 square miles of the Kharkiv region that Ukrainian forces liberated this month. That defeat forced Russia’s President Vladimir Putin to mobilize hundreds of thousands of reservists, and to call the annexation referendums. A separate Ukrainian push south of Lyman this month reclaimed the town of Svyatohirsk that Russian forces seized as recently as July.

Ukrainian forces remain on the defensive in other parts of the Donetsk region, such as the city of Bakhmut that Russian troops led by the Wagner mercenaries have been trying to storm for over two months, and Avdiivka near the regional capital. Russia currently controls about two-thirds of the region.
Title: Re: WSJ, Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on September 27, 2022, 08:41:49 AM
"With variations in how we articulate it, this forum has had consensus that America has considerable responsibility for provoking this war."


  - By my count, we are all but one (?) in agreement on that.     :wink:

In my book, this is 100% on Vladimir.
Title: Re: Endless money and weapons for Ukraine?
Post by: G M on September 27, 2022, 10:33:45 AM
Bold highlight from G M's post:

"To date, the U.S. has provided about $10.6 billion in military aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration, including 19 packages of weapons taken directly from Defense Department stocks since August 2021."


$10 billion?  [Actual number may be higher]  I hate to say it but wow that's a small amount of money to thwart such a major offensive of evil rival Putin Russia.

The student debt tranference program rounds to a trillion, one hundred  times as much, without even a vote, for no national gain whatsoever.

Oops our national debt just went up another 10 billion while I was writing this, just writing checks to each other.

We've got bigger money problems than helping Ukraine and thwarting Putin.

And no, I don't support endless, limitless amounts, just saying we haven't hit that level yet IF these numbers are accurate.  But, from my secure midwest location, I shamelessly take some solace in seeing Putin's violent trampling on international law and neighbor sovereignty turn into a losing quagmire for him.

What's the line? "A billion here, a billion there and pretty soon you are talking real money".
Title: Re: Endless money and weapons for Ukraine?
Post by: G M on September 27, 2022, 11:04:08 AM
Bold highlight from G M's post:

"To date, the U.S. has provided about $10.6 billion in military aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration, including 19 packages of weapons taken directly from Defense Department stocks since August 2021."


$10 billion?  [Actual number may be higher]  I hate to say it but wow that's a small amount of money to thwart such a major offensive of evil rival Putin Russia.

The student debt tranference program rounds to a trillion, one hundred  times as much, without even a vote, for no national gain whatsoever.

Oops our national debt just went up another 10 billion while I was writing this, just writing checks to each other.

We've got bigger money problems than helping Ukraine and thwarting Putin.

And no, I don't support endless, limitless amounts, just saying we haven't hit that level yet IF these numbers are accurate.  But, from my secure midwest location, I shamelessly take some solace in seeing Putin's violent trampling on international law and neighbor sovereignty turn into a losing quagmire for him.

What's the line? "A billion here, a billion there and pretty soon you are talking real money".

https://www.zerohedge.com/political/zelensky-reveals-how-much-us-taxpayers-give-ukraine-monthly

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on September 27, 2022, 12:31:38 PM
Annexation of 4 Russian speaking Uki states complete. Now, they will be fighting Russia. Assuming that the NS-1/2 pipelines were not blown up by Russia, stronger retaliation is coming.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 27, 2022, 12:42:36 PM
Annexation of 4 Russian speaking Uki states complete. Now, they will be fighting Russia. Assuming that the NS-1/2 pipelines were not blown up by Russia, stronger retaliation is coming.

It wouldn't make sense for Russia to do it.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on September 27, 2022, 12:51:08 PM
I suspect the Ukrainians or the US did it. No one else would have the guts and motivation to do it.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on September 27, 2022, 01:04:08 PM
I suspect the Ukrainians or the US did it. No one else would have the guts and motivation to do it.

Poland.

The US would be my prime suspect.

https://twitter.com/ABC/status/1490792461979078662?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1490792461979078662%7Ctwgr%5Ecb15c2d8e80bafb1a553ad0ab29cf3b1b972c77c%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Face.mu.nu%2F

If someone with dementia sits in on classified planning sessions, they might say things they aren't supposed to say to the press...
Title: Re: Endless money and weapons for Ukraine?
Post by: G M on September 27, 2022, 01:45:36 PM
https://sonar21.com/more-on-the-referendum-game-changer/

"To date, the U.S. has provided about $10.6 billion in military aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration, including 19 packages of weapons taken directly from Defense Department stocks since August 2021.

We can magically create dollars, weapons, ammo, equipment, FOOD and energy, not so much...


Bold highlight from G M's post:

"To date, the U.S. has provided about $10.6 billion in military aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration, including 19 packages of weapons taken directly from Defense Department stocks since August 2021."


$10 billion?  [Actual number may be higher]  I hate to say it but wow that's a small amount of money to thwart such a major offensive of evil rival Putin Russia.

The student debt tranference program rounds to a trillion, one hundred  times as much, without even a vote, for no national gain whatsoever.

Oops our national debt just went up another 10 billion while I was writing this, just writing checks to each other.

We've got bigger money problems than helping Ukraine and thwarting Putin.

And no, I don't support endless, limitless amounts, just saying we haven't hit that level yet IF these numbers are accurate.  But, from my secure midwest location, I shamelessly take some solace in seeing Putin's violent trampling on international law and neighbor sovereignty turn into a losing quagmire for him.
Title: Ukraine provinces 'vote for Russia'
Post by: DougMacG on September 27, 2022, 05:36:41 PM
Where was Jimmy Carter?

https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/lpr-dpr-kherson-and-zaporozhye-vote-for-reunification-with-r
Title: Mobilization and falling oil prices weaken Putin's hand
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 28, 2022, 04:37:29 AM
Russia’s Mobilization, Plunging Oil Prices Weaken Putin’s Economic Hand
Economic storm clouds come as Russian president orders more financial resources directed at war in Ukraine

People bid farewell to reservists drafted during the partial mobilization in the Omsk region, Russia.
PHOTO: ALEXEY MALGAVKO/REUTERS
By Georgi Kantchev
Sept. 28, 2022 5:30 am ET


A costly troop mobilization, plunging energy prices and a new round of Western sanctions threaten to bear down on Russia’s already embattled economy and undermine the financial underpinnings of President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine.

The economic storm clouds come as Mr. Putin orders more financial resources directed at the war in Ukraine. The Kremlin’s decision to call up more than 300,000 soldiers will require new funds to equip, train and pay the new reinforcements, analysts said. It has also spread disruption among Russia’s private businesses, which face a fresh challenge as workers report for duty or flee the country.

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And it is happening as the windfall from soaring energy prices—Russia’s main economic strength—appears to have peaked. Russia’s federal government budget was in deficit last month because of diminished energy revenue. That was before the latest leg down in prices for oil and before Moscow shut down most of its remaining natural-gas flows to Europe.

“Mobilization is another serious hit on the Russian economy, especially because of the increased uncertainty,” said Maxim Mironov, professor of finance at Madrid’s IE Business School. “And it happens when oil and gas revenues are beginning to dry up.”

Wars are often won by the side that has the economic wherewithal to support fighting over the long haul. Ukraine’s economy has been battered, but receives a gusher of aid from the West to stay afloat.

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Western sanctions staggered Russian commerce, but Moscow succeeded in stabilizing the economy thanks to a jump in energy prices. The ruble, which plunged at the start of the war, rose sharply against the dollar and inflation moderated. The Russian government and independent economists now predict a shallower recession this year than previously assumed.

While there is no evidence of an imminent economic collapse, business owners and investors inside the country reacted with dread to the news of the mobilization. Activists and analysts said Mr. Putin’s order opens the door to a much larger draft. Russia’s stock market, limited mostly to domestic investors, tumbled after the draft announcement.

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How do you think Putin will respond to a tightening economic outlook? Join the conversation below.

“It’s really impossible to count,” said Mihail Markin, head of the business development department at Moscow-based logistics company Major Cargo Service. “If it’s five people in a 1,000 person company, that’s one thing, but what if it’s half?”

“And then who knows how businesses will act without the people who are drafted,” he said.

Before the draft, official data showed the government veered into a big budget deficit in August. It reported the budget surplus for the year narrowed to 137 billion rubles, or $2.3 billion, for the first eight months of the year, from about 481 billion rubles in July.

The government has come up with several measures to plug the gap, including raising taxes on the energy industry. It issued government bonds this month for the first time since February and promised to run a deficit next year. The bonds will have to be financed by local savers. Foreign investors, who owned 20% of government bonds before the war, are barred from the market. Moscow is shut out of foreign debt markets.


Russian President Vladimir Putin has mobilized hundreds of thousands of reservists for his war in Ukraine.
PHOTO: GAVRIIL GRIGOROV/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Russia’s economic problems are partly a boomerang effect of the country’s own policies. High energy prices caused by the war in Ukraine initially created huge revenues for Russia. Around 45% of Russia’s total federal budget revenues came from oil and gas in the first seven months of the year, according to the Institute of International Finance.

But high energy prices have put a brake on global growth and led to a widespread slowdown in demand for oil. Benchmark Brent crude has fallen by almost a third from its June high to trade at less than $85 a barrel.

Factoring in the discount of about $20 for Russian crude, Moscow is already selling its oil below the price needed to balance the budget, estimated at $69 a barrel in 2021 by S&P Global Commodity Insights. The strong ruble complicates matters for the Kremlin by reducing the value of oil exports when the proceeds are converted into Russia’s currency.

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Exports of oil have fallen as well as the price in recent weeks, analysts and ship-tracking firms say. The drop has likely been driven by a combination of a slowing world economy and looming European Union sanctions on Russian fuel, which come into effect in December.

Neil Crosby, senior analyst at OilX, said Russian crude exports have fallen to about 4.5 million barrels a day in September, down from over 4.8 million a day in August, because of a drop in flows to Turkey, China and India. Those three countries scooped up much of the Russian crude shunned by the West and its allies in the wake of the invasion.


Before the draft, official data showed the government veered into a big budget deficit in August
PHOTO: MAXIM SHIPENKOV/SHUTTERSTOCK
Capital Economics estimates that Russia’s total oil-and-gas export revenues will halve from around $340 billion this year to $170 billion in 2023, a loss equivalent to more than twice Russia’s defense budget last year.

The West is also preparing to tighten the vise on sanctions, after already hitting Moscow with an unprecedented barrage of measures over the course of the year. A price cap on Russian oil organized by the Group of Seven nations is also in the works.

Just as Russia suffers setbacks on the battlefield, the costs and complications of the draft have rattled confidence.


“Mobilization is the sword of Damocles now hanging over all Russian households,” said Janis Kluge, an expert on Russia at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. “This will hurt the optimism of the average Russian consumer.”

The anxiety has triggered a run for the Russian borders by thousands of fighting-age men, adding to an already sizable brain-drain wave earlier in the year.

“People are escaping where they can,” Mr. Mironov said. “These are mainly highly skilled, educated workers. So this mobilization is going to have a severe economic effect not just for the next year but for decades.”

Russian businesses are trying to figure out which employees are likely to be called up, and how to reduce those numbers.

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The chief executive of a food-production facility in central Russia said he received a blank form from the local town administration on Saturday that he was told to fill out with the information about his employees who might be eligible for military service. The form, reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, asks for information including name, address, military rank, reserve status, family status and work role of the employees.

At Major Cargo Service, the Moscow logistics company, current shipment orders are being fulfilled as planned but fewer clients are contacting the company to discuss new business. The No. 1 priority his clients have now is assessing risks related to staff leaving the workforce due to the draft, Mr. Markin said.

“We are in a pause,” Mr. Markin said. “It’s as if everyone put on an invisibility cloak and quieted down.”


Capital Economics estimates that Russia’s total oil-and-gas export revenues will halve this year, a loss equivalent to more than twice Russia’s defense budget in 2021.
PHOTO: ANATOLY MALTSEV/SHUTTERSTOCK

Write to Georgi Kantchev at georgi.kantchev@wsj.com, Yuliya Chernova at yuliya.chernova@wsj.com and Joe Wallace at joe.wallace@wsj.com
Title: GPF: Russia's mobilization may be a game changer
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 28, 2022, 04:54:01 AM
September 28, 2022
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Russia’s Mobilization May Be a Game-Changer
With the war likely to go deep into 2023, Ukraine needs to disrupt Moscow’s momentum.
By: Ridvan Bari Urcosta

At no small cost, the Russian military managed to stop the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the northeastern Kharkiv region. Kyiv’s rapid success sent Moscow searching for an answer. Officially, it decided on a partial mobilization, though every piece of evidence says the mobilization is overwhelming and widespread. It looks like Moscow is preparing a considerable force to enable it to fully dominate the war’s front line. Russian President Vladimir Putin is signaling to Russians that the regime is ready to increase the tempo of the war and fight to the end, and to the West and NATO that Russia accepts their challenge of a prolonged conflict. Russia’s mobilization will keep its military options open and improve its position in Ukraine, particularly with regard to effective control of the front lines, during any attempts at reaching a settlement over the winter months.

The Logic and Pitfalls of Mobilization

Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced the partial mobilization on Sept. 21. There are four critical aspects to highlight. First, in general Russia is mobilizing against the West. Officially, it sees the war in Ukraine as against the “entire military machine” of NATO. Second, Moscow is anxious not to repeat the errors of previous Russian mobilizations; both in 1905 and 1914, they ended in defeat and revolution. Moscow is trying to meticulously organize the process and avoid economic and political repercussions for the Russian state. Third, the decision called for the immediate mobilization of 300,000 troops, but there are no indications that this will be the limit. Russia is capable of mobilizing several million soldiers, according to Shoigu. Finally, the new troops will need several months of training, which means that in the short term, mobilization is unlikely to significantly shift the balance at the front line.

Russia’s main tasks for now are to create a layered defense along the line of contact, reassert strict control of the occupied territories and control the Russian border. In addition, according to the Kremlin’s estimates, the mobilization will enable Russian combat units to focus on fulfilling the objectives of the war: to gain strategic depth by seizing Ukrainian territory. Russia long since recognized that it needed more troops to defend occupied areas and overcome Ukrainian guerrilla warfare. Integration of the new troops could free up experienced Russian units – currently tied up with patrols and so forth – to launch offensive operations in the late winter and early spring.

But there are downsides as well. First, mobilization takes time. For new troops to pose a serious threat to the enemy, they need to be properly trained, which requires several months at a minimum. Therefore, any mobilized fighters will not be combat-ready until after the winter. In the present circumstances, when Ukraine is conducting offensive operations in Donbas (along the Lyman-Oskil line), Russia is under intense pressure. As a last resort, it could send untrained men to the battlefield. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests this is already happening.

Second, mobilization has provoked a social backlash that challenges Putin’s grip on power. In the days following the mobilization announcement, protests broke out in several cities across Russia, particularly in ethnically non-Russian regions. For example, in the North Caucasus, anti-war protests turned violent in recent days. The turmoil has not disrupted mobilization, but with time it could pose a formidable political threat. There are also many reports of hundreds of thousands of Russians leaving the country to avoid recruitment.

Russia/Ukraine Battle Lines, Sept. 27, 2022
(click to enlarge)

A potential advantage, however, is Russia's ability to mobilize new forces beyond its national borders, as well as hybrid units. From the start of the war, Russia has used proxy forces from the breakaway Ukrainian republics along the front line. Mercenaries and convicts have also helped to plug gaps. This isn’t always a good thing. For example, one explanation given for Russia’s shocking defeat in Kharkiv was its reliance on a concentrated proxy force of Ukrainian separatists. By contrast, the infamous Wagner Group mercenaries employed better supplies and weapons to take ground near Bakhmut in northern Donetsk. Already, the Luhansk and Donetsk separatist forces have announced an increase in their training efforts, and the Wagner Group has launched its own recruitment drives in and around Russia. Moscow also intends to find recruits in soon-to-be annexed parts of Ukraine.

Moreover, anticipating further mobilization efforts later, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov recently called on the heads of all 85 Russian regions to prepare at least 1,000-2,000 soldiers – in addition to those called up by Moscow – over the next several months. Separately, the Kremlin decided to recruit foreign soldiers with Slavic backgrounds, such as Ukrainians, Belarusians and Moldovans. Some non-Slavic men will likely join Russia’s side in the war in hopes of acquiring Russian citizenship.

According to Russian estimates, a total of 500,000 to 600,000 troops should be added to the Russian army as a result of mobilization. This would triple the Russian force already in Ukraine and extend Russia’s numerical advantage.

The Belarus Factor

An additional card that Russia could play concerns Belarus. Given its location, Belarus could pose a major threat to Ukraine were it to enter the war. Belarusian forces could strike Ukraine’s rear and disrupt supplies of Western military aid. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has been vocal about leaving his country’s options open. At the same time, he has repeatedly said Russia has enough men and materiel to defeat Ukraine without Minsk’s direct assistance, and stressed Belarus’ contributions to the war by serving as the first line of defense to prevent NATO from “stabbing Russia in the back.”

Immediately after the Kremlin announced its mobilization, Lukashenko declared that mobilization was not on his government’s agenda and that Belarus was already prepared to respond in the event of a military threat. The secretary of the Belarusian Security Council added that the country was already mobilized and thus had no need to declare additional moves. (Belarus has conducted regular military exercises along its borders with Ukraine and Poland since the start of the war.)

There is also significant disagreement among experts about Belarus’ actual military power. Officially, the country has nearly 48,000 soldiers and officers, with an additional 20,000 people listed as military personnel. Reserves are in the vicinity of 290,000. In June, Ukraine’s General Staff said Belarus was planning to increase its army to 80,000 troops. In other words, Minsk may be conducting a quiet mobilization.

Lukashenko’s first priority is clearly to preserve his room to maneuver. Minsk has not even decided whether it will support Moscow’s annexation of four Ukrainian regions. But Putin is sure to increase pressure on Lukashenko over time, and it may eventually become too much to resist.

Ukraine’s Strategic Conundrum

Russia’s announced mobilization was not a surprise in Ukraine, but it creates two major challenges for the Ukrainian armed forces. First, Kyiv needs to answer Russia’s move by commencing its own next wave of mobilizations. Ukraine’s first mobilization concluded in midsummer and brought in more than 700,000 troops, who now reinforce Ukraine’s defensive lines. How successful an expanded mobilization effort would be is hard to predict. More so than Moscow, Kyiv is limited by the need to leave a large enough population to carry out daily economic activities. On the other hand, new Ukrainian forces are likely to be trained in NATO countries and will likely be better prepared for combat than their Russian counterparts who were rushed to the front lines.

Second, Kyiv urgently needs to demonstrate the ability to strike Russia in the south, in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, and to continue the counteroffensive in Kharkiv. Despite Ukraine’s recent successes, Russia has managed to stem the bleeding. Compared to Russia, Ukraine has fewer reservists to draw upon. Moscow believes it is gaining momentum through sheer numbers, and Kyiv needs to find a way to thwart this momentum. There is a window of opportunity for Ukraine. Russia expects to need the fall and winter to train and coordinate its new personnel, so they are not expected to tip the scales until late winter or early spring. It’s at this point that Russia may outnumber the Ukrainians along the line of contact, which would facilitate further Russian offensive operations.

A related dilemma for Kyiv is whether to press ahead with its counteroffensive to prevent Russia’s annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, or to hunker down for a longer war. While the former calls for urgency, the latter entails the accumulation of manpower and Western weapons through the winter. The onset of winter will complicate offensive operations for both sides. Without foliage, it is difficult to move and also hide from drones and artillery. Winter weather can also blind satellites, hurting the side that relies on them more. These conditions will naturally slow the pace of fighting and give Russia time to train its new recruits, and it may put a time limit on Ukraine’s ability to disrupt Russia’s strategic pivot.

Unwilling to accept the status quo, both sides are preparing to fight well into 2023. Western arms stockpiles are nearing their limits, while Russia is zeroing in on new gains before considering any settlement. But Russia must be careful of two potential pitfalls: the risk that it draws the West deeper into the conflict, and the risk that Putin’s regime becomes Russia’s latest to fall victim to defeat and revolution. Historically, when Russia mobilizes, it has had enormous implications for Europe and Russia. Today, a Russian mobilization once again threatens European peace.
Title: Gatestone: Biden has opened door on Russian nuke strikes
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 28, 2022, 07:15:44 AM
second

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18942/biden-russia-nuclear-strikes
Title: Re: Gatestone: Biden has opened door on Russian nuke strikes
Post by: G M on September 28, 2022, 08:03:51 AM
second

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18942/biden-russia-nuclear-strikes

Keep in mind that the Soviets never stopped doing extensive chem/bio weapons research. Putin probably has multiple nasty options without going nuclear.

The easiest is taking down the Uke infrastructure in midwinter.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on September 28, 2022, 05:27:30 PM
And the west may be running out of ammo
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/28/the-us-and-europe-are-running-out-of-weapons-to-send-to-ukraine.html
Title: So it's not endless?
Post by: G M on September 28, 2022, 05:45:33 PM
And the west may be running out of ammo
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/28/the-us-and-europe-are-running-out-of-weapons-to-send-to-ukraine.html

https://memegenerator.net/img/instances/86478463/you-mean-the-military-industrial-complex-will-be-the-winner-of-the-ukraine-war.jpg

(https://memegenerator.net/img/instances/86478463/you-mean-the-military-industrial-complex-will-be-the-winner-of-the-ukraine-war.jpg)
Title: Re: So it's not endless?
Post by: G M on September 28, 2022, 07:56:05 PM
And the west may be running out of ammo
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/28/the-us-and-europe-are-running-out-of-weapons-to-send-to-ukraine.html

https://memegenerator.net/img/instances/86478463/you-mean-the-military-industrial-complex-will-be-the-winner-of-the-ukraine-war.jpg

(https://memegenerator.net/img/instances/86478463/you-mean-the-military-industrial-complex-will-be-the-winner-of-the-ukraine-war.jpg)

https://i0.wp.com/politicallyincorrecthumor.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/ukraine-zelensky-money-biden-87000-irs-agents-collecting.jpg?w=480&ssl=1

(https://i0.wp.com/politicallyincorrecthumor.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/ukraine-zelensky-money-biden-87000-irs-agents-collecting.jpg?w=480&ssl=1)

Imagine the compromat Zelensky has on the Bidens.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 29, 2022, 01:19:21 PM
I'm playing that one forward haha.

Meanwhile, some pretty good military analysis here IMHO:

https://www.understandingwar.org/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on October 01, 2022, 11:56:17 AM
Putins speech in english
https://telegra.ph/Signing-of-treaties-on-accession-of-Donetsk-and-Lugansk-peoples-republics-and-Zaporozhye-and-Kherson-regions-to-Russia-09-30
Title: Russian retreat
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 01, 2022, 05:29:01 PM
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63102220?fbclid=IwAR1WsqYB3zq4ApBDdh7TRRgwXx9zjil2_seMqA_FKlHpVgtvbg1yhsj7om8
Title: A friend born and raised in that part of the world
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 01, 2022, 05:49:14 PM
"I love how western media portrays the referendums as a sham. Not knowing the history of Lugansk or Donetzk. Did they ever inform people that neither one wanted to be part of Ukraine even in 1917-1918 and they were forced to be part of it? Or that Donesk voted to be independent in 1991 (way before Putin)  and NOT part of Ukraine but it was ignored. And that BOTH regions voted in 1994 90% that they wanted Russian to be their official language but they were ignored by Ukranian government who wanted to hold on to their metallurgy industry. But Yeltsin was too weak and Clinton didn't want Russia to have more territory...  And that they willingly decided to separate in 2014 again When Poroshebko came up with all those anti-Russian speaking laws.  There is 100 years of history of these regions being unwilling to be part of Ukraine OR speak the Ukranian language. Like I said even my grandpa who was born in 1929 didn't speak Ukranian and always wanted to go and live in Russia as did most people in that area which is why so many people who live in Russia now have relatives in Donbas.

"And my friends who live here in US who are from Eastern Ukraine all openly say that those areas should have been returned to Russia when the Soviet Union fell apart bc that is what they always wanted. Either independence or be part of Russia.  Why is that being ignored?

"Of course, if I say that, I will get stoned. Or better yet, I will be "taught" and "informed" about Russian culture and history and about what Russians "really want"
Title: Re: Russian retreat
Post by: G M on October 01, 2022, 06:25:11 PM
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63102220?fbclid=IwAR1WsqYB3zq4ApBDdh7TRRgwXx9zjil2_seMqA_FKlHpVgtvbg1yhsj7om8

Are the Ukes closing in on Moscow?

No?

 :roll:
Title: 2014
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 02, 2022, 03:49:26 AM
https://dailycaller.com/2014/03/13/russia-primed-to-invade-rest-of-ukraine/
Title: The War Has Just Begun
Post by: ya on October 02, 2022, 08:04:27 AM
This is a very interesting read, what Russia may be planning.

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/war-has-just-begun
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 02, 2022, 08:09:16 AM
This is a very interesting read, what Russia may be planning.

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/war-has-just-begun

"Depleting NATO
One of the more fascinating aspects of the war in Ukraine is the extent to which Russia has contrived to attrit NATO military hardware without fighting a direct war with NATO forces. In a previous analysis I referred to Ukraine as a vampiric force which has reversed the logic of the proxy war; it’s a black hole sucking in NATO gear for destruction.

There are now very limited stockpiles to draw from to continue to arm Ukraine. Military Watch Magazine noted that NATO has drained the old Warsaw Pact tank park, leaving them bereft of Soviet tanks to donate to Ukraine. Once these reservoirs are fully tapped, the only option will be giving Ukraine western tank models. This, however, is much harder than it sounds, because it would require not only extensive training of tank crews, but also an entirely different selection of ammunition, spare parts, and repair facilities.

Tanks are not the only problem, however. Ukraine is now staring down the barrel (heh heh) of a serious shortage of conventional tube artillery. Earlier in the summer, the United States donated 155mm howitzers, but with stockpiles of both guns and shells dwindling, they’ve recently been forced to turn to lower caliber towed trash. After the announcement of yet another aid tranche on September 28th, the USA has now put together five consecutive packages which do not contain any conventional 155mm shells. Shells for Ukraine’s Soviet vintage artillery were running low as early as June.

In effect, the effort to keep Ukraine’s artillery arm functioning has gone through a few phases. In the first phase, Warsaw Pact stockpiles of Soviet shells were drained to supply Ukraine’s existing guns. In the second phase, Ukraine was given mid-level western capabilities, especially the 155mm howitzer. Now that 155mm shells are running low, Ukraine has to make do with 105mm guns which are badly outranged by Russian howitzers and will be, in a word, doomed in any kind of counterbattery action.

As a substitute for adequate tube artillery, the latest aid package does include 18 more of the internet’s favorite meme weapon - the HIMARS Multiple Launch Rocket System. What is not explicitly mentioned in the press release is that the HIMARS systems don’t exist in current US inventories and will have to be built, and are thus unlikely to arrive in Ukraine for several years.

The increasing difficulties in arming Ukraine coincide with the rapid closing of Ukraine’s window of operational opportunity. The forces accumulated over the summer are degraded and fought out, and every subsequent rebuild of the Ukrainian first tier forces will become harder as manpower is destroyed and NATO arsenals are depleted. This depletion comes precisely as Russian force generation is surging, foretelling the Winter of Yuri."
Title: Re: So it's not endless?
Post by: G M on October 02, 2022, 09:12:36 AM
And the west may be running out of ammo
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/28/the-us-and-europe-are-running-out-of-weapons-to-send-to-ukraine.html

https://memegenerator.net/img/instances/86478463/you-mean-the-military-industrial-complex-will-be-the-winner-of-the-ukraine-war.jpg

(https://memegenerator.net/img/instances/86478463/you-mean-the-military-industrial-complex-will-be-the-winner-of-the-ukraine-war.jpg)

https://i0.wp.com/politicallyincorrecthumor.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/ukraine-zelensky-money-biden-87000-irs-agents-collecting.jpg?w=480&ssl=1

(https://i0.wp.com/politicallyincorrecthumor.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/ukraine-zelensky-money-biden-87000-irs-agents-collecting.jpg?w=480&ssl=1)

Imagine the compromat Zelensky has on the Bidens.

https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/117/045/323/original/f6bba71d11edd826.jpeg

(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/117/045/323/original/f6bba71d11edd826.jpeg)
Title: My friend continues
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 02, 2022, 09:48:08 AM
"Ok course. He's a cold heated ruthless tyrant. And he had no remorse about killing people. The fact that he is the aggressor is not even a question. My issue is not with demonizing Putin. My issue is with the facts being skewed to make it seem like this is somehow another Hitler who is insane and bloodthirsty and will take over the world unless we get involved.

"And he would not have invaded if after 2014, the Ukranians did not send the Azov to the Eastern areas and kill thousands of ppl over the last 8 years. Somehow that always gets left out.  Did he take advantage of the situation? Yes. Does he really care about the Russian speakers of Donbas? No. But it would also not be a good looking for him in Russia if he didn't do anything about the fact that it was happening for so long and no one in the world seemed to care.  How often in our media did they even talk about all the atrocities that happened there since 2014?"
Title: The NS leaks set precedent for Russian attacks on Euro energy infrastructure
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 02, 2022, 12:11:16 PM
The Nord Stream Leaks Set a Precedent for Russian Attacks on Europe's Energy Infrastructure
7 MIN READSep 29, 2022 | 21:48 GMT


Russia could further undermine Europe's energy security long after it cuts off gas supplies, if Moscow begins to more aggressively target the continent's maritime oil and gas industry. On Sept. 26, the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Administration warned of potential ''deliberate attacks'' after energy companies reported multiple cases of unidentified drones flying near offshore oil and gas installations. Just a few hours later, officials in Denmark warned they had found a gas leak along a section of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline off the coast of the Danish island of Bornholm. The following day, the Swedish Maritime Administration announced it also detected two gas leaks on the Nord Stream 1 pipeline in a nearby area. Russia is widely believed to be behind the recent attacks on the Nord Stream pipeline systems, which are both operated by the Russian gas giant Gazprom. But while the Kremlin has not yet shown an intent to target foriegn-owned infrastructure, the gas leaks nonetheless set a dangerous precedent by showing that Russia is capable of attacking oil and gas infrastructure in its near periphery.

On Sept. 28, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store said Norwegian military forces were being deployed to help protect offshore installations. With Russia no longer shipping large volumes of natural gas to Europe, Norway is expected to supply about a quarter of the European Union's natural gas this year.

Following a meeting with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, Danish Defense Minister Morten Bodkov warned that ''Russia has a significant military presence in the Baltic Sea region and we expect them to continue their saber-rattling.''

Speaking on behalf of EU member states, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said on Sept. 28 that ''any deliberate disruption of European energy infrastructure is utterly unacceptable and will be met with a robust and united response.''

The U.S. CIA had reportedly warned the German government of possible attacks on Baltic Sea pipelines prior to the recent gas leaks on the Nord Stream pipelines.

A number of different factors — including the imposition of new sanctions — could drive Russia to adopt a more aggressive strategy to undermine Europe's energy security. In response to Western sanctions pressure, Iran has pursued an aggressive strategy of roiling global energy markets by covertly targeting regional oil and gas infrastructure. Russia could pursue a similarly aggressive strategy, as it shares many of the strategic drivers that have pushed Iran to adopt this approach — namely, the plausible deniability that covert attacks bring, a desire to impose a cost on rivals, interest in driving up energy prices in the short term to increase revenue, and using attacks as a way to gain leverage in negotiations. With its natural gas exports to Europe now nearing zero, Russia also appears to be exhausting its ''gas weapon,'' leaving attacks (or the threat of attacks) on oil and gas infrastructure as the primary way for the Kremlin to apply more pressure on European energy security, particularly for natural gas. In addition, the Russian government may assess that further provocative actions will have a negligible impact on its relationship with the European Union because it has already sunk to its lowest level. To this end, while Iran's attacks against tankers and Saudi oil and gas infrastructure in 2019 resulted in some additional sanctions on Tehran, the Western response was not decisive. This may lead Russia to assess the blowback risk in terms of military escalation and/or new sanctions is low because Western sanctions are already high and NATO countries have already demonstrated that they are seeking to avoid a NATO-Russia conflict. Finally, the Kremlin may even assess that occasional attacks against Europe's energy sector won't close the door to possible future peace negotiations with Ukraine to exit the war.

Should it adopt a more aggressive strategy against Europe's energy sector, Russia could physically attack more oil and gas infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, as well as potentially the Black Sea and North Sea. Russia would likely avoid any actions that could be construed as a physical attack on a NATO member's sovereign territory to avoid triggering a broader NATO-Russia conflict. But this does not necessarily extend to offshore oil and gas infrastructure (and other offshore critical infrastructure, such as submarine communications cables) outside the 12 nautical mile extent from the coast defined as territorial waters. Notably, the perpetrator behind the recent Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas leaks appeared to be extremely precise in terms of where it attacked the pipeline systems. The two attacks on Nord Stream 1 occurred in Denmark's exclusive economic zone but just before the pipeline entered Danish territorial waters, while Nord Stream 2 does not go through Denmark's territorial waters at all.

There is no indication that the drones the Norwegian authorities warned about were Russian. There have also not been any reports of Russian operations beyond the Baltic Sea, such as in the North Sea, which would be far more operationally difficult due to the greater geographic distance from Russia and the fact that it'd entail operating in deeper waters. Most critical oil and gas infrastructure in the North Sea also lies outside the territorial waters of the United Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands.

The Nord Stream incidents occurred the same day that Poland and Norway were inaugurating the Baltic Pipe pipeline system, which carries natural gas from Norway to Poland, traverses through the Baltic Sea and goes through some international waters beyond the 12 nautical mile limit. Due to its proximity to Russia in the Baltic Sea and Poland's very pro-Ukrainian stance, the Baltic Pipe may be the piece of infrastructure that Russia is most likely to attack if it begins more aggressively targeting Europe's energy sector.

Beyond the Baltic, Black and potentially North Seas, Russia's ability to target offshore oil and gas infrastructure is limited. It could still target Europe's energy security through attacks against LNG tankers and other vessels, or LNG terminals (such as regasification lines going back to the mainland). But such attacks would carry a greater risk of triggering a greater military conflict, as LNG terminals are typically in national territorial waters. Any attacks on LNG vessels would also raise the possibility of casualties. While Russia has not demonstrated such a risk appetite outside of Ukraine, this could change amid further battlefield setbacks in Ukraine.

Beyond physical attacks, Russia's cyber capabilities — including its prolific use of data wipers that can paralyze computer systems by deleting data on hard drives — could also cause significant damage to Europe's energy sector. While it could seek to physically disrupt the European gas market with cyberattacks targeting pipeline operators and industrial control systems operating the pipelines, such acts carry a higher risk of escalation if they cause explosions or loss of life. Attacks on less sensitive aspects of the oil and gas industry (such as information technology systems instead of operational technology systems) are less likely to trigger a greater conflict with the West, but can still create social unrest and cause major financial market swings. Cyberattacks can also lead to occasional infrastructure shutdowns, as evidenced by the 2021 ransomware attack on the U.S. Colonial Pipeline company, which took its pipeline in the southeastern part of the United States offline for a week. Finally, Russia could leverage its well-known links with cyber criminals, hacktivists and other cyber threat actors to conduct attacks on its behalf. Russia's recent military mobilization campaign could even potentially bring in new cyber recruits to whom Moscow could offer roles to carry out the same types of cyberattacks they were previously doing as criminals instead of being deployed on Ukraine's front lines.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 02, 2022, 01:12:02 PM
YA:

That "war has just begun" post is very interesting.
Title: Article 5 vs. Russian Donbas
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 02, 2022, 04:04:51 PM
https://www.foxnews.com/world/9-nato-countries-support-ukraines-path-membership-support-nine-countries-former-soviet-bloc?fbclid=IwAR0cUv-OpHP2fir1WrtJGzN49dXlOjGLRosKZ6swmRVN2T7mWqEgYhAwOYg
Title: Re: Article 5 vs. Russian Donbas
Post by: G M on October 02, 2022, 08:52:11 PM
https://www.foxnews.com/world/9-nato-countries-support-ukraines-path-membership-support-nine-countries-former-soviet-bloc?fbclid=IwAR0cUv-OpHP2fir1WrtJGzN49dXlOjGLRosKZ6swmRVN2T7mWqEgYhAwOYg

 :roll:
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 03, 2022, 03:52:27 AM
GM:  Note how I wrote the subject line.
Title: Re: Article 5 vs. Russian Donbas
Post by: DougMacG on October 03, 2022, 04:24:36 AM
Likely wouldn't have this war had we done that sooner.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 03, 2022, 04:30:41 AM
But isn't that precisely what Putin said his red line was?  And weren't the movements towards bringing the Ukes into NATO precisely what triggered the invasion?

Anyway, here is this from Reuters:

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-russia-what-you-need-know-right-now-2022-09-21/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_campaign=daily-briefing&utm_term=10-03-2022

Looks like Zeihan's prediction of great capture of Russian guns and ammo as they are driven back across the Dnieper Rive could be reifying.

Title: My friend has been making this point
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 03, 2022, 05:19:14 AM
WSJ

On Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula, occupied by Russia since 2014, indigenous Crimean Tatars say they are being targeted by Moscow for the military draft, leaving them with a stark choice: flee their homeland or be thrown into the fight against their Ukrainian compatriots.

Russia’s broad military mobilization has sparked rare nationwide protests and a massive flight for the borders, with hundreds of thousands who don’t want to fight fleeing abroad. Nowhere is the situation more desperate than in Crimea, where the Kremlin is seeking to mobilize people who until eight years ago were citizens of Ukraine.

The practice is likely to become more widespread after Russia formally claims four more regions of Ukraine following staged referendums that concluded last week. Moscow already relies heavily on residents of Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions, parts of which Moscow’s forces seized in 2014, to backfill its manpower deficit.

Ukraine’s Crimean Tatars say they have been singled out by the draft, which Russian President Vladimir Putin launched last month to generate new troops after a string of battlefield setbacks.

More than half and possibly up to 90% of people currently drafted from the peninsula are Crimean Tatars, despite making up no more than 13% of the population, according to data collected from community leaders there by independent human rights group CrimeaSOS. In just one settlement, the Kyiv-based group said, 27 out of 28 draft notices were given to Crimean Tatars, who make up less than 40% of the population there.

A Crimean Tatar craftsman from the northern Crimean town of Dzhankoi with no military experience slipped away with his wife and children last week after his name appeared in a list of those liable to be drafted that was leaked online. He made it to Kazakhstan and plans to travel on to Uzbekistan, according to his cousin in Kyiv, Ukraine.

“Go with God,” the man’s cousin wrote him. “Well done.”

On Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula, occupied by Russia since 2014, indigenous Crimean Tatars say they are being targeted by Moscow for the military draft, leaving them with a stark choice: flee their homeland or be thrown into the fight against their Ukrainian compatriots.

Russia’s broad military mobilization has sparked rare nationwide protests and a massive flight for the borders, with hundreds of thousands who don’t want to fight fleeing abroad. Nowhere is the situation more desperate than in Crimea, where the Kremlin is seeking to mobilize people who until eight years ago were citizens of Ukraine.

The practice is likely to become more widespread after Russia formally claims four more regions of Ukraine following staged referendums that concluded last week. Moscow already relies heavily on residents of Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions, parts of which Moscow’s forces seized in 2014, to backfill its manpower deficit.

Ukraine’s Crimean Tatars say they have been singled out by the draft, which Russian President Vladimir Putin launched last month to generate new troops after a string of battlefield setbacks.

More than half and possibly up to 90% of people currently drafted from the peninsula are Crimean Tatars, despite making up no more than 13% of the population, according to data collected from community leaders there by independent human rights group CrimeaSOS. In just one settlement, the Kyiv-based group said, 27 out of 28 draft notices were given to Crimean Tatars, who make up less than 40% of the population there.

A Crimean Tatar craftsman from the northern Crimean town of Dzhankoi with no military experience slipped away with his wife and children last week after his name appeared in a list of those liable to be drafted that was leaked online. He made it to Kazakhstan and plans to travel on to Uzbekistan, according to his cousin in Kyiv, Ukraine.

“Go with God,” the man’s cousin wrote him. “Well done.”
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on October 03, 2022, 06:25:32 AM
"isn't that (NATO membership) precisely what Putin said his red line was?  And weren't the movements towards bringing the Ukes into NATO precisely what triggered the invasion"


Yes on the first part and perhaps on the second.  Here's another theory.  Expansionism is what he knows, all he knows, and perceived weakness is the trigger.

Standing up to Putin could have triggered this, yes.  Partial appeasement did trigger this (?). Giving him a full green light to take Ukraine most certainly would have triggered this. 

Maybe we weren't  the trigger.
Title: Ukraine, VDH, long cold 19th century winter
Post by: DougMacG on October 03, 2022, 07:12:58 AM
https://amgreatness.com/2022/10/02/pushing-the-envelopes-in-ukraine/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 03, 2022, 07:26:25 AM
"isn't that (NATO membership) precisely what Putin said his red line was?  And weren't the movements towards bringing the Ukes into NATO precisely what triggered the invasion"


Yes on the first part and perhaps on the second.  Here's another theory.  Expansionism is what he knows, all he knows, and perceived weakness is the trigger.

Standing up to Putin could have triggered this, yes.  Partial appeasement did trigger this (?). Giving him a full green light to take Ukraine most certainly would have triggered this. 

Maybe we weren't  the trigger.

We were.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/24483306
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 03, 2022, 08:32:41 AM
No surprise, the VDH article is very good.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 03, 2022, 01:42:11 PM
Saw Mike Pompeo on Martha McCallum today.

What a great Sec State he was! Sure wish we had him now!!!

==============================

Daily Memo: Ukraine's Navy to Receive New Flagship
The vessel was produced in Turkey as part of a 2021 deal.
By: Geopolitical Futures


New ship. Ukraine’s navy launched the Ada-class anti-submarine corvette in Istanbul on Sunday. It’s the first of two Turkish-made corvettes under a deal signed in 2021. The vessel, which isn’t expected to be in operation until 2024, will likely become the Ukrainian navy’s new flagship, after its previous flagship was scuttled in March to avoid Russian capture. Turkey continues to support Ukraine with the provision of significant military equipment and economic ties.
Title: Geroge Friedman: What is Russia Thinking?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 04, 2022, 04:01:26 PM
October 4, 2022
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
What Is Russia Thinking??
By: George Friedman

The reason for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was clear: Moscow wanted strategic depth. Nothing Russia has done since, however, has been clear. The military has suffered several reversals, but this alone is not unexpected. Reversals are part of war, and prudent commanders anticipate and respond to them. Ideally, the responses are meant to solve or at least mitigate the problem as the war continues. Moscow is behaving as if the challenges it faces are a surprise.

Russia assumed from the beginning that it would bring overwhelming force to bear on a much weaker military. The expectation was that the Ukrainian military would fragment and thus be unable to offer much resistance. Moscow thought Ukraine believed the same. That the Kremlin was wrong isn’t the fundamental problem. The fundamental problem is that the Russian command structure, starting at the top with Vladimir Putin, didn’t banish their confidence. An invading force should be built on the assumption it is dealing with a powerful and motivated enemy, and that it needs to prepare for a tough war.

Meanwhile, Russia also did not expect the sheer amount of aid and weaponry the United States would send. It saw the U.S. as too disjointed politically and socially and with too strong an opposition to make much of a difference. The Russians have been very effective in waging psychological warfare as a key dimension of combat and engaged, as was reasonable, in creating division over the war in the United States. Moscow believed the U.S. would see the fall of Ukraine and the deployment of Russian troops to NATO’s eastern frontier as a potential recipe for another Cold War. Washington would probably want to respond but would be too fragmented to do so, or so the Russian thinking went.

These failures were evident from the outset of the war. Russia deployed three armored formations to break Ukrainian resistance, which it believed would be far inferior and isolated from American assistance. Neither was the case. The Russians were blocked by logistics problems of their own, as well as Javelin anti-tank missiles. Russian tanks froze in place or made little progress. With the Ukrainians emboldened, the Russians were forced to reevaluate their adversary.

But it seems as though they changed their tactics without changing their opinion of their enemy. Though they consolidated their forces in Donbas and fought an extended battle for control there, they didn’t advance to western Ukraine. They simply retreated toward their own border.

This was a crucial moment for Russia. It was clear that the Ukrainians were a significant and coherent fighting force, and it was clear that the United States was not going to limit its support, even as the Poles intensified the training of Ukrainians. All the while, both tactical and strategic intelligence mapped Russian forces and anticipated Russian moves. In many cases, Ukrainian forces were able to attack Russian forces at the most vulnerable point or retreat when Russian offensives appeared too costly.

It was at this point that the Russians should have reevaluated their likelihood of success. Offensive operations had had only limited success. The Ukrainian force outnumbered the Russian force and fought with discipline, while U.S. resupply and intelligence flowed. Russia retained enough potential power to alarm the West, power it ought to have used to seek peace through negotiations. In other words, Russia should have followed German Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt’s advice about what should be done near the end of World War II. His answer: “Make peace you fools.”

Given the confidence with which the initial attack was launched, making peace was unthinkable. All the dead, all the confidence, all of the well-spoken politicians would have been seen as a fraud. Putin has sought to turn the war from a Russian invasion to an American invasion of Russia. He has threatened nuclear war. He has mobilized truculent thousands, who may be trained by the end of winter, or perhaps never.

The most difficult part of a war is ending it without victory. The United States suffered through this in Vietnam. It is the wars that appear to be easy that are sometimes the hardest to fight and always the hardest to concede. No one doubted, in Russia or America, that World War II would be long, hard and possibly lost. Neither Russia nor the United States thought it could lose in Afghanistan.

It is an odd thing about confidence. Within the confines of reality, confidence is essential to fight a war. The hardest war to fight is the one in which the commander thinks victory is a given. When Russia started the war, it believed the mere sight of Russian tanks would scatter the Ukrainian army. Every reversal since has been dismissed by Moscow as simply an accident of war, instead of what it was: a war begun with certainty now confronting the reality of an enemy force superior to its own. Concern can be productive. Denial is the preface to desire. In war, the continued denial of reality is deadly.

Putin is responsible because he is the president. But the general staff and intelligence services share the blame. What has happened in Ukraine is a systemic breakdown of leadership that lead the country into a poorly understood war, insisting that victory is just around the corner if it simply holds the line. Wars like this usually end in political deaths. Vietnam finished Lyndon B. Johnson, World War II the Japanese and German regimes. Each fought with the hope of something turning up. It never did. The pivotal question is: What makes Russia think it can win next week when it hasn’t won in seven months? There is sometimes an answer to that kind of question, but Russian politicians are now laying blame on others for the failure. Making peace sounds easy to those who didn’t start the war.
Title: In case you were wondering why the Ukraine was so important...
Post by: G M on October 04, 2022, 08:14:58 PM
https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/117/226/881/original/053d76009167cf38.jpeg

(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/117/226/881/original/053d76009167cf38.jpeg)

Not just Biden though...
Title: An important map for reference
Post by: G M on October 05, 2022, 08:16:47 AM
https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/117/289/329/original/23a788aac7df9674.jpg

(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/117/289/329/original/23a788aac7df9674.jpg)
Title: Better double up on Ukraine funding!
Post by: G M on October 05, 2022, 02:01:00 PM
https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2022/10/us-veteran-working-ground-ukraine-no-evidence-billions-us-dollars-sent-ukraine-not-seeing-relief-audio/

https://www.occrp.org/en/the-pandora-papers/pandora-papers-reveal-offshore-holdings-of-ukrainian-president-and-his-inner-circle
Title: Re: Better double up on Ukraine funding!
Post by: G M on October 05, 2022, 04:10:23 PM
https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2022/10/us-veteran-working-ground-ukraine-no-evidence-billions-us-dollars-sent-ukraine-not-seeing-relief-audio/

https://www.occrp.org/en/the-pandora-papers/pandora-papers-reveal-offshore-holdings-of-ukrainian-president-and-his-inner-circle

https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/117/323/107/original/9b02de24fc39db6b.png

(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/117/323/107/original/9b02de24fc39db6b.png)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 06, 2022, 06:18:28 AM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/russian-parliament-defense-committee-chief-to-military-stop-lying-about-ukraine-losses/ar-AA12Dfqp?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=134d77e4dfe941caa7fce78bbc8e7165

===================

WT:

Long winter to grip ‘annexed’ territories in frozen conflict

Lightning counteroffensive soon to become slog

BY BEN WOLFGANG THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed papers Wednesday officially “annexing” four Ukrainian provinces into Russia even as his forces faced more losses on the ground, setting the stage for what U.S. officials believe will be a long, bloody winter with both sides shooting it out on a frozen battlefield.

Mr. Putin’s claimed annexation — roundly rejected by Ukraine, the U.S. and virtually every other government on the planet — signals that the Kremlin has no intention of abandoning its territorial claims in Ukraine despite major defeats over the past two weeks by a well-coordinated, crushing Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Ukrainian troops scored fresh gains in that counterattack Wednesday. They reportedly pushed Russian troops out of more villages in southern and eastern Ukraine, undercutting Moscow’s claims that the front lines have “stabilized.”

Pentagon officials conceded this week that Kyiv’s highly effective counteroffensive campaign is about to become much more difficult as troops contend with plummeting temperatures, frigid conditions and muddy or even frozen terrain. That

cold reality seems to be setting the stage for what military strategists describe as a literal and figurative “frozen conflict,” with neither side able to notch any major victories until the increasingly harsh conditions subside.

U.S. officials say recent military aid packages to Ukraine include coldweather gear such as gloves and uniforms designed for low temperatures. Still, they acknowledge the coming months will be especially difficult for Ukraine, whose momentum could slow or perhaps stop entirely.

“Weather plays a big factor in any war. And here, what we would anticipate is … as the weather changes, maneuver will be much more challenging.” Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Laura K. Cooper told reporters at the Pentagon this week. “You get really muddy ground. It … increases just the challenge to the average fighter, the average soldier, in terms of the impact of the weather on the conditions.”

Sen. Christopher Murphy, Connecticut Democrat and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told the Financial Times this week that “the fighting season is drawing short. The Ukrainians have gained the upper hand and need to continue to press their advantage.”

Ukrainian officials say Russia is prepared to use the cold weather to its advantage, just as it did last month by targeting Ukrainian infrastructure in numerous regions.

“The most likely indication of Moscow’s immediate intentions came earlier in September when Russian forces launched a series of targeted attacks against Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. These missile strikes left much of northern and eastern Ukraine temporarily without electricity while also causing flooding in the south of the country,” said Kira Rudik, a member of the Ukrainian parliament and vice president of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe political party.

“Ukrainians are well aware of the threat posed by large-scale attacks on the country’s civilian infrastructure and are preparing accordingly,” she wrote in an analysis this week posted on the Atlantic Council’s website. “With the winter season fast approaching, [Ukraine] faces the prospect of entire regions suffering power blackouts and heating failures during periods of intense cold weather. The consequences for the civilian population could be catastrophic.”

Officials said there was urgency for Ukrainian forces to recapture territory in the south before winter because the ground has not frozen for the past three years, meaning the terrain will soon become muddy.

Those conditions will make it difficult for both sides to maneuver, forcing trucks and heavy artillery to stay on main roads, where they will be more exposed. The mud also hands an advantage to dug-in Russian troops defending territory they already occupy because they do not have to move across land, officials and analysts said.

Beyond its targeting of Ukrainian infrastructure, Russia could find winter to be a blessing in other arenas. Ukraine’s ability to move troops, vehicles and equipment across the battlefield could be severely diminished, potentially giving Russian troops time to reinforce their defensive front lines in the disputed Donbas region. The cold months will strain the resources of Western European countries supporting Ukraine as they struggle to adjust to a cutoff of Russian oil and natural gas.

A lengthy pause in fighting also gives Russian forces more time to train, equip and deploy the 130,000 reservists Mr. Putin ordered to report last week, although it would also give Kyiv time to secure more arms and training from the U.S. and its Western allies.

A breather couldn’t come at a better time for Moscow.

Even as Mr. Putin formally announced the annexation of the Donetsk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Luhansk provinces, his forces lost more ground in those territories over the past several days. Ukrainians moved closer Wednesday to the strategically vital city of Kherson in the country’s southeast. At least seven outlying villages in Kherson province have been recaptured, local officials said, putting Ukrainian forces just 60 miles from Kherson city.

Ukrainian forces reportedly pushed the Russians out of the city of Snihurivka, north of Kherson. Ukrainian military offi cials also said they had retaken several key villages in the Donetsk province, underscoring how the counteroffensive has broken through Russian lines on multiple fronts in a matter of weeks.

Foreign intelligence analysts say the gains have given Ukraine an ability to hit Russian supply lines, which will be especially vital in the winter.

“Ukrainian formations have advanced up to [12 miles] beyond the [Oskil] River into Russia’s defensive zone towards the supply node of the town of Svatove,” the British Ministry of Defense said Wednesday in a Twitter post. “It is highly likely that Ukraine can now strike the key Svatove-Kremina road with most of its artillery systems, further straining Russia’s ability to resupply its units in the east.”

Those developments seem to have had little impact on Mr. Putin, who pressed ahead with the claimed annexation of Ukrainian territory. In a video call with Russian teachers, the Russian leader said Moscow will treat all Ukrainians with respect, but he added a warning that his troops will “brush off” everything that keeps them from achieving their goals.

“We have 3 million Russian citizens of Ukrainian origin. We do not make any distinctions and are not going to make any distinctions between Russians and Ukrainians, but, while proceeding along our own constructive way, without any doubt, we will brush off everything that prevents us from moving forward,” he said, according to the state-run Tass news agency.

Mr. Putin also signed a decree claiming Russian control over Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia power plant, the largest nuclear facility in Europe. Russian troops have been in control of the plant since the early days of the war, but Mr. Putin’s claim will be rejected by Kyiv, the U.S. and its allies
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on October 06, 2022, 06:55:44 AM
"It has apologized for mobilization errors and keeps expanding a list of waivers from service. This is clearly designed to placate the middle class, albeit at the expense of rural and ethnic-minority populations."

reminds me of the Lincoln 1863 army draft
 pay $300 to get someone else to go the killing fields

or Vietnam
  when students I think were exempt
  check out # 4 (today they would be first to be taken   :wink:):

https://www.wearethemighty.com/lists/vietnam-draft-dodger/#:~:text=Be%20a%20Conscientious%20Objector,conscientious%20objection%20would%20be%20illegal.
Title: WSJ: Ukraine appeals for longer range missiles presents deep questions
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 06, 2022, 01:30:53 PM
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-appeal-for-longer-range-missiles-presents-fresh-test-of-biden-administration-support-11665083684?mod=hp_lead_pos5

WASHINGTON—Flush with recent battlefield successes, Ukrainian officials are pressing their case for acquiring longer-range missiles to strike deeper into Russian-held territory, including Crimea, raising questions about how aggressively the Biden administration will support Kyiv’s war aims.

U.S. officials have urged Ukraine to focus on its battles in the eastern and southern part of the country, particularly around Kharkiv and Kherson, where it has made its largest gains since Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion. Meanwhile, Ukrainian officials are reviving their pleas for more weaponry, including advanced systems like the U.S. Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, congressional and U.S. officials said.

Those long-range missiles are wanted, in part, to strike into Crimea, which Russia is using as a base to launch Iranian-made drones, congressional and Ukrainian officials said. President Biden has so far declined to provide Ukraine with the ATACMS, which would be capable of reaching deep into Russian territory.

The recent Ukrainian military offensive has pushed Russian troops from the Kharkiv region and reached deep into the northern part of the Donetsk region. Those gains may embolden Kyiv to try to press into Crimea, which Russia illegally annexed in 2014.

The administration’s reluctance to provide these long-range missiles reflects a deeper dispute, in part, over how to support Ukraine without risking a broader conflict with Russia, whose leaders have been hinting they may resort to nuclear weapons.

“The reason we are not giving them these weapons is disagreement over striking targets in Crimea,” a congressional official said.


President Biden has so far declined to provide Ukraine with the U.S. Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS.
PHOTO: WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Ukraine’s defense attaché in Washington, Maj. Gen. Borys Kremenetskyi, said Thursday that Russia was mainly using the Iranian-provided drones to attack civilian infrastructure. He added that Ukraine was using air defense systems to blunt the threat but was also looking to attack the sites from which the drones are being flown and controlled.

The Russian Embassy didn’t respond immediately to a request for comment.

While Himars, a U.S. mobile rocket launcher already provided to Kyiv, is an effective system for this purpose, he added that Ukraine wants to acquire longer-range systems that could be fired from the Himars launcher. He didn’t mention the ATACMS missile by name and declined to discuss targets in Crimea.

“We are looking for long-range missiles for Himars,” he told a webinar hosted by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. “We need to hit some targets on the occupied Ukrainian territory. ”

The Biden administration recognizes Crimea as part of Ukraine, and has vowed to support Kyiv’s efforts to restore all of its original territory. In August, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky vowed that Ukraine would take back Crimea “by ourselves, without consultation with any other country in the world.”

U.S. officials argue longer-range missiles aren’t necessary for Ukraine’s current fight, and believe Moscow would see it as an escalation at a time when senior Russian leaders have raised the specter of using the country’s nuclear arsenal.

“We are not going to send to Ukraine rocket systems that can strike into Russia,” Mr. Biden said in May.

The Russian Foreign Ministry warned last month that if Washington supplied Kyiv with longer-range missiles it would cross a “red line” and become “a party to the conflict.” With other U.S.-provided weapons, Mr. Zelensky’s government appears to have abided by U.S. insistence that it not use American arms to strike Russia itself.

The U.S. is also increasingly mindful of its own inventories of weaponry, after pumping almost $17 billion in arms to Ukraine in the past eight months.

Lockheed Martin is currently making about 400 ATACMS a year and could expand production to 500, according to people familiar with production of the missiles. Most of the missiles are being produced for foreign military sales. Taiwan, for example, is set to receive dozens of ATACMS.
Title: Walter Russel Mead: The Question on Putin's Mind
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 06, 2022, 01:43:55 PM


The Question on Putin’s Mind: Would We Risk New York to Keep Odessa Free?
Biden’s efforts to deter him have so far had little success. Now the world’s future may hinge on them.
By Walter Russell Mead
Oct. 6, 2022 12:02 pm ET



‘A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” President Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin said in a joint statement after their summit in June 2021. But Mr. Putin doesn’t always tell the truth.

The reality is that as Mr. Putin’s failing military skedaddles east across occupied Ukraine, nuclear weapons look more attractive. That is not so much because a tactical nuclear strike would be effective against widely scattered Ukrainian forces in the field. It is more that Mr. Putin hopes the political shock waves set off by nuclear explosions in Europe would shatter the West’s resolve to support Ukraine. Is Germany willing to lose Berlin to save Kyiv? Are Americans ready to risk New York to keep Odessa free? These are the questions Mr. Putin is asking himself.


The future of the world may depend on his answers. Meanwhile, the Biden administration faces a terrible dilemma. To yield to Mr. Putin’s nuclear blackmail would be a cowardly act of appeasement from which Neville Chamberlain would recoil—and which would open the door to more nuclear blackmail. Yet to lead the Western alliance into an open-ended nuclear confrontation with Russia is to risk the most catastrophic of wars.

To avoid these unacceptable alternatives, the Biden administration must deter Mr. Putin from using nuclear weapons in the Ukraine conflict even as it continues to support Ukraine in its battle to drive the invaders back.

Deterrence is more complicated than it looks, and the Biden administration’s efforts to deter Russia have had little success. In February, Mr. Putin blew past the Biden administration’s barrage of threats and diplomacy to launch the war in Ukraine.

Not deterring Russian aggression was one of the costliest failures in recent American foreign policy. But it isn’t clear that the Biden administration understands what went wrong—and how similar mistakes might be undercutting its diplomatic efforts today.

Unintentionally and unwittingly, the administration sent Russia mixed messages last winter. On the one hand, a dramatic burst of diplomacy worked to coordinate a broad Western response to the potential invasion, with Europeans joining Americans in threatening severe sanctions. Biden officials broke with precedent to declassify and publicize highly sensitive information about Mr. Putin’s plans in ways that dramatically undercut Russia’s official statements and propaganda. That intelligence helped build Western unity in the face of the Russian attack, and Biden officials are right to take credit for this unorthodox but effective campaign.

At the same time, however, senior American policy makers seriously overestimated Russia’s military strength and acumen. As storm clouds gathered over Kyiv, U.S. officials ordered all senior American diplomats to evacuate. They also urged allies to evacuate and offered Volodymyr Zelensky an airplane to flee.

This was hardly a message of deterrence. As the Russian leader finalized his preparations, the evident American belief in the invasion’s success would, if anything, have eased any doubts Mr. Putin might have felt. Further, since the Biden administration had reassured the Russians that American combat troops would not engage in any Ukrainian war, Mr. Putin did not need to worry about a powerful, immediate American military response.


We will have to do better this time if we expect to deter him from using nuclear weapons. Mr. Putin already knows that fear of a Russian nuclear response has affected American and allied policy. We have limited Ukraine’s access to long-range missile systems that could hit Russian territory. Other North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, including Germany, have made similar calculations.

From Mr. Putin’s point of view, in a war in which almost everything is going wrong, nuclear blackmail is working. Why wouldn’t he double down on the one tactic that works?

The only way to deter any possible use of nuclear weapons is to make Mr. Putin believe that the consequences of such use will be ruinous for Russia as a state and for him as its ruler, and that the West won’t flinch when the time for action comes.


To make his threats credible, Mr. Biden needs, first, to make up his mind that he is prepared to stay the course. “The double-minded man is unstable in all his ways,” the Bible tells us. Facing down Mr. Putin in a nuclear standoff is not a course for a man who lacks conviction.

If Mr. Biden is sure of himself, he must build an ironclad coalition at home and abroad behind those threats. Rather than playing down the danger, he needs to dramatize it. Making a prime-time speech to the country, addressing a joint session of Congress, holding an emergency NATO summit—these can all demonstrate Mr. Biden’s commitment to respond with overwhelming force to Russian nuclear attacks.

While Americans won’t unanimously support this policy, most responsible people in both parties recognize Mr. Putin’s Russia as a threat to American security and world peace. A broad show of national unity on this issue will send a sobering message to Moscow.

Deterring Russia doesn’t mean humiliating it. As President Kennedy understood, deterrence complements diplomacy. The more effective our deterrence, the more flexible our diplomacy can become. Deterrence however comes first. Mr. Biden must bar the door to using nuclear weapons before he can seek a path to peace.
Title: WSJ: Ukes seizing Russki arms
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 06, 2022, 01:56:37 PM
third

KUPYANSK, Ukraine—Captured and abandoned Russian tanks, howitzers and fighting vehicles—quickly scrubbed of their Z tactical markers and repainted with Ukrainian crosses—are being turned against their former owners as Ukraine’s military advances in the eastern part of the country.

Ukraine’s rapid breakthrough in the Kharkiv region a month ago ended up putting hundreds of pieces of Russian armor into Kyiv’s hands, military officials say, as the Russian army left behind its heavy weapons and warehouses of supplies in a disorganized retreat.

Some Russian pieces of equipment were ready for immediate use, while others are being repaired to return to the front. Tanks, vehicles and guns too damaged to salvage are being cannibalized for spare parts. Crucially, Russia has also left behind large quantities of Soviet-standard artillery shells that had nearly run out in Ukraine.

This haul is helping power Ukrainian forces as they retake parts of the eastern Donetsk region, including the town of Lyman, and push further east into nearby Luhansk. Kyiv has regained more than 4,000 square miles of land in the east over the past month, in addition to advances in the south.

One Ukrainian battalion, the Carpathian Sich, seized 10 modern T-80 tanks and five 2S5 Giatsint 152-mm self-propelled howitzers after it entered the town of Izyum last month, said its deputy chief of staff, Ruslan Andriyko.

“We’ve got so many trophies that we don’t even know what to do with them,” he said. “We started off as an infantry battalion, and now we are sort of becoming a mechanized battalion.”

Seizing the Opportunity

Ukraine has captured huge amounts of Russian heavy weapons.

Supplied to Ukraine

Captured from Russia

Tanks

320

421

Infantry

fighting

vehicles

210

445

Armored

fighting

vehicles

40

192

Multiple

rocket

launchers

70

44

The BMP-2, an infantry fighting vehicle, is the most captured weapon by Ukraine. 167 units of the BMP-2(K), 2 of the BMP-2M and 1 of the BMP-2 675-sb3KDZ variants have been captured.

Max speed:

Max firing range:

Weight:

In service:

Origin:

40.4 mph

2.5 miles

15.8 tons

1980

Soviet Union

Crew number

•One 30mm 2A42 cannon

•One coaxial machine gun PKT 7.62mm

•One launcher for AT-5 ‘Spandrel’

or AT-4 ‘Spigot’ ATGW

8 ft.

10.3 ft.

22.1 ft.

Sources: Oryx (weapons supplied and captured); Army Recognition (BMP-2)
Jemal R. Brinson/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
The chief of staff of a Ukrainian artillery battalion on the Kharkiv front said his unit now operates four recently captured Russian 2S19 Msta 152-mm self-propelled howitzers, alongside American-made guns, and now has abundant Soviet-caliber ammunition.

“The Russians no longer have a firepower advantage. We smashed up all their artillery units before launching the offensive, and then we started to move ahead so fast that they didn’t even have time to fuel up and load their tanks,” said the officer. “They just fled and left everything behind.”

Combined with weapons taken during Russia’s retreat from Kyiv and other parts of northern Ukraine in April, these recent gains have turned Moscow into by far the largest supplier of heavy weapons for Ukraine, well ahead of the U.S. or other allies in sheer numbers, according to open-source intelligence analysts. Western-provided weapons, though, are usually more advanced and precise.


Ukraine has captured 460 Russian main battle tanks, 92 self-propelled howitzers, 448 infantry fighting vehicles, 195 armored fighting vehicles and 44 multiple-launch rocket systems, according to visual evidence compiled from social media and news reports from Oryx, an open-source intelligence consulting firm. The real number is likely higher as not every captured piece of equipment gets filmed.

Not all the gear is cutting edge. “What they are capturing is a mix of modern equipment that they can use quite effectively, and some that really belongs in museums,” said Jakub Janovsky, who compiles the count of weapons losses at Oryx.


An officer of one Ukrainian battalion, Ruslan Andriyko, stood atop a captured Russian infantry vehicle in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region on Wednesday.

Russia has also seized Ukrainian weapons, mostly in the early days of the war as it overran large parts of the country. According to Oryx’s count, Russia captured 109 Ukrainian tanks, 15 self-propelled guns and 63 infantry fighting vehicles since February.

At Izyum, Ukraine gained more advanced Russian armor, such as T-90 tanks and BTR-82 infantry fighting vehicles with automatic cannon. The commander of Ukraine’s 92nd brigade, which played a major role on the Kharkiv front, was filmed this week taking a ride in a T-90, which wasn’t part of the Ukrainian arsenal before the war.

Western allies haven’t sent Western-made tanks to Ukraine. But Kyiv has received around 230 upgraded T-72 tanks from Poland and a few dozen more from the Czech Republic. American and European aid focused on providing Ukraine with North Atlantic Treaty Organization-standard precision artillery, such as the U.S.-made M777 and Paladin, German Panzerhaubitze 2000 and Polish Krab howitzers, as well as the Himars missile systems. These weapons allowed Kyiv to hold the line once it started to run out of Soviet-caliber artillery shells in May.

Ukraine’s experience learning how to operate different weapons systems in a relatively short time has made it easier to repurpose the recently acquired Russian weapons, said Col. Serhiy Cherevatyi of Ukraine’s Operational Command East.



A Ukrainian soldier showed a bag full of captured Russian hand grenades to his commander next to a trophy Russian Army car in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region on Wednesday.

A Ukrainian soldier on Wednesday displayed bayonets taken from Russian soldiers in the Donetsk region.
“They are of the Soviet construction school that is easy to understand for us,” he said. “If our people have managed to learn how to use the Panzerhaubitze, the Krabs and the American Paladins, it’s not at all a problem to master the Russian systems that are similar to ours.”

While Ukrainian units often keep smaller captured weapons and ammunition, big-ticket items such as tanks and artillery are usually redistributed through the military’s logistics command, said Oleksiy Danilov, head of the country’s National Security and Defense Council. “But, even then, they usually stay in the same area, which is only fair,” he added.

Carpathian Sich, for example, transferred to other parts of the military captured howitzers and kept tanks for which it could find crews. The battalion commander said these tanks have now been formally allocated to the unit and are regularly supplied by the military’s logistics with ammunition and fuel, and serviced by visiting crews from Ukrainian tank plants. Ukraine was a major tank manufacturer and exporter before the war.

“Gaining the trophies gives us a sense of pride and raises everyone’s combat spirits,” said the commander, who used a captured Russian assault rifle in a recent battle during which the battalion seized a village in the Donetsk region.

Title: Gen Keane
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 06, 2022, 08:38:15 PM
After discussion of Korea, he turns to Ukraine:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PvNfHJcJeKg
Title: Zelensky has done too much coke
Post by: G M on October 06, 2022, 10:35:02 PM
https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/863548.html
Title: Re: WSJ: Ukes seizing Russki arms
Post by: G M on October 07, 2022, 12:19:55 AM
Compare the below with what we left the Taliban.


third

KUPYANSK, Ukraine—Captured and abandoned Russian tanks, howitzers and fighting vehicles—quickly scrubbed of their Z tactical markers and repainted with Ukrainian crosses—are being turned against their former owners as Ukraine’s military advances in the eastern part of the country.

Ukraine’s rapid breakthrough in the Kharkiv region a month ago ended up putting hundreds of pieces of Russian armor into Kyiv’s hands, military officials say, as the Russian army left behind its heavy weapons and warehouses of supplies in a disorganized retreat.

Some Russian pieces of equipment were ready for immediate use, while others are being repaired to return to the front. Tanks, vehicles and guns too damaged to salvage are being cannibalized for spare parts. Crucially, Russia has also left behind large quantities of Soviet-standard artillery shells that had nearly run out in Ukraine.

This haul is helping power Ukrainian forces as they retake parts of the eastern Donetsk region, including the town of Lyman, and push further east into nearby Luhansk. Kyiv has regained more than 4,000 square miles of land in the east over the past month, in addition to advances in the south.

One Ukrainian battalion, the Carpathian Sich, seized 10 modern T-80 tanks and five 2S5 Giatsint 152-mm self-propelled howitzers after it entered the town of Izyum last month, said its deputy chief of staff, Ruslan Andriyko.

“We’ve got so many trophies that we don’t even know what to do with them,” he said. “We started off as an infantry battalion, and now we are sort of becoming a mechanized battalion.”

Seizing the Opportunity

Ukraine has captured huge amounts of Russian heavy weapons.

Supplied to Ukraine

Captured from Russia

Tanks

320

421

Infantry

fighting

vehicles

210

445

Armored

fighting

vehicles

40

192

Multiple

rocket

launchers

70

44

The BMP-2, an infantry fighting vehicle, is the most captured weapon by Ukraine. 167 units of the BMP-2(K), 2 of the BMP-2M and 1 of the BMP-2 675-sb3KDZ variants have been captured.

Max speed:

Max firing range:

Weight:

In service:

Origin:

40.4 mph

2.5 miles

15.8 tons

1980

Soviet Union

Crew number

•One 30mm 2A42 cannon

•One coaxial machine gun PKT 7.62mm

•One launcher for AT-5 ‘Spandrel’

or AT-4 ‘Spigot’ ATGW

8 ft.

10.3 ft.

22.1 ft.

Sources: Oryx (weapons supplied and captured); Army Recognition (BMP-2)
Jemal R. Brinson/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
The chief of staff of a Ukrainian artillery battalion on the Kharkiv front said his unit now operates four recently captured Russian 2S19 Msta 152-mm self-propelled howitzers, alongside American-made guns, and now has abundant Soviet-caliber ammunition.

“The Russians no longer have a firepower advantage. We smashed up all their artillery units before launching the offensive, and then we started to move ahead so fast that they didn’t even have time to fuel up and load their tanks,” said the officer. “They just fled and left everything behind.”

Combined with weapons taken during Russia’s retreat from Kyiv and other parts of northern Ukraine in April, these recent gains have turned Moscow into by far the largest supplier of heavy weapons for Ukraine, well ahead of the U.S. or other allies in sheer numbers, according to open-source intelligence analysts. Western-provided weapons, though, are usually more advanced and precise.


Ukraine has captured 460 Russian main battle tanks, 92 self-propelled howitzers, 448 infantry fighting vehicles, 195 armored fighting vehicles and 44 multiple-launch rocket systems, according to visual evidence compiled from social media and news reports from Oryx, an open-source intelligence consulting firm. The real number is likely higher as not every captured piece of equipment gets filmed.

Not all the gear is cutting edge. “What they are capturing is a mix of modern equipment that they can use quite effectively, and some that really belongs in museums,” said Jakub Janovsky, who compiles the count of weapons losses at Oryx.


An officer of one Ukrainian battalion, Ruslan Andriyko, stood atop a captured Russian infantry vehicle in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region on Wednesday.

Russia has also seized Ukrainian weapons, mostly in the early days of the war as it overran large parts of the country. According to Oryx’s count, Russia captured 109 Ukrainian tanks, 15 self-propelled guns and 63 infantry fighting vehicles since February.

At Izyum, Ukraine gained more advanced Russian armor, such as T-90 tanks and BTR-82 infantry fighting vehicles with automatic cannon. The commander of Ukraine’s 92nd brigade, which played a major role on the Kharkiv front, was filmed this week taking a ride in a T-90, which wasn’t part of the Ukrainian arsenal before the war.

Western allies haven’t sent Western-made tanks to Ukraine. But Kyiv has received around 230 upgraded T-72 tanks from Poland and a few dozen more from the Czech Republic. American and European aid focused on providing Ukraine with North Atlantic Treaty Organization-standard precision artillery, such as the U.S.-made M777 and Paladin, German Panzerhaubitze 2000 and Polish Krab howitzers, as well as the Himars missile systems. These weapons allowed Kyiv to hold the line once it started to run out of Soviet-caliber artillery shells in May.

Ukraine’s experience learning how to operate different weapons systems in a relatively short time has made it easier to repurpose the recently acquired Russian weapons, said Col. Serhiy Cherevatyi of Ukraine’s Operational Command East.



A Ukrainian soldier showed a bag full of captured Russian hand grenades to his commander next to a trophy Russian Army car in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region on Wednesday.

A Ukrainian soldier on Wednesday displayed bayonets taken from Russian soldiers in the Donetsk region.
“They are of the Soviet construction school that is easy to understand for us,” he said. “If our people have managed to learn how to use the Panzerhaubitze, the Krabs and the American Paladins, it’s not at all a problem to master the Russian systems that are similar to ours.”

While Ukrainian units often keep smaller captured weapons and ammunition, big-ticket items such as tanks and artillery are usually redistributed through the military’s logistics command, said Oleksiy Danilov, head of the country’s National Security and Defense Council. “But, even then, they usually stay in the same area, which is only fair,” he added.

Carpathian Sich, for example, transferred to other parts of the military captured howitzers and kept tanks for which it could find crews. The battalion commander said these tanks have now been formally allocated to the unit and are regularly supplied by the military’s logistics with ammunition and fuel, and serviced by visiting crews from Ukrainian tank plants. Ukraine was a major tank manufacturer and exporter before the war.

“Gaining the trophies gives us a sense of pride and raises everyone’s combat spirits,” said the commander, who used a captured Russian assault rifle in a recent battle during which the battalion seized a village in the Donetsk region.
Title: pharmaceutical industry is part of the military industry complex
Post by: ccp on October 07, 2022, 05:28:41 AM
https://nypost.com/2022/10/07/us-buys-290m-in-anti-radiation-drugs-amid-nuke-fears/

it is NOT an "anti radiation" drug

I believes it is used to stimulate platelet production to reduce bleeding

not clear to me if it would even work after radiation exposure


Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 07, 2022, 10:52:23 AM
"Zelensky has done too much coke"

Great subject line!
Title: Re: pharmaceutical industry is part of the military industry complex
Post by: ya on October 07, 2022, 05:03:07 PM
https://nypost.com/2022/10/07/us-buys-290m-in-anti-radiation-drugs-amid-nuke-fears/

it is NOT an "anti radiation" drug

I believes it is used to stimulate platelet production to reduce bleeding

not clear to me if it would even work after radiation exposure
Radiation kills the platelets..this will stimulate platelet production.
Title: Re: pharmaceutical industry is part of the military industry complex
Post by: G M on October 07, 2022, 10:27:50 PM
https://nypost.com/2022/10/07/us-buys-290m-in-anti-radiation-drugs-amid-nuke-fears/

it is NOT an "anti radiation" drug

I believes it is used to stimulate platelet production to reduce bleeding

not clear to me if it would even work after radiation exposure
Radiation kills the platelets..this will stimulate platelet production.

I'm certainly not expert, but I would be willing to bet that if you are at the "Bleeding out of your ass" stage of radiation exposure, some extra platelets aren't going to be much help at that point.
Title: Explosion damages sole bridge linking Crimea to Russia
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 08, 2022, 07:01:22 AM
I have vague memory of posting in this thread an interesting analysis of why this bridge had not been blown up already , , ,


https://www.nationalreview.com/news/explosion-damages-sole-bridge-linking-russia-to-crimea-in-major-setback-for-putin/?utm_source=email&utm_medium=breaking&utm_campaign=newstrack&utm_term=29310898
Title: Remember what you are fighting for!
Post by: G M on October 08, 2022, 08:03:15 AM
(https://westernrifleshooters.us/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/33aac9d011a62546.png)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 08, 2022, 08:29:05 AM
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63183409?fbclid=IwAR0ck1DCudLe0zOK2NHAjeDVrhHz1ZfaSskrGURGKDvLMjoWKbpma2L3iMc
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on October 08, 2022, 10:14:11 AM
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63183409?fbclid=IwAR0ck1DCudLe0zOK2NHAjeDVrhHz1ZfaSskrGURGKDvLMjoWKbpma2L3iMc

I was fascinated with the story about why the bridge hadn't been blown up (yet).   ...  oh well.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 08, 2022, 11:14:22 AM
Do you happen to know which post it is?
Title: Re: Walter Russel Mead: The Question on Putin's Mind
Post by: DougMacG on October 08, 2022, 12:08:47 PM
From Crafty's post:
"The only way to deter any possible use of nuclear weapons is to make Mr. Putin believe that the consequences of such use will be ruinous for Russia as a state and for him as its ruler, and that the West won’t flinch when the time for action comes."

!!!

In other words, the opposite of the feeling our current President gives.  Half of Biden's messages are 'corrected' by "The White House", whoever that is.
Title: Re: Walter Russel Mead: The Question on Putin's Mind
Post by: G M on October 08, 2022, 01:10:13 PM

Let’s risk thermonuclear war to ensure Hunter’s Burisma checks are forever secure!

From Crafty's post:
"The only way to deter any possible use of nuclear weapons is to make Mr. Putin believe that the consequences of such use will be ruinous for Russia as a state and for him as its ruler, and that the West won’t flinch when the time for action comes."

!!!

In other words, the opposite of the feeling our current President gives.  Half of Biden's messages are 'corrected' by "The White House", whoever that is.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 08, 2022, 01:37:40 PM
At this point neither side is willing to lose.  Neither side believes off-ramp is possible.

Putin killed or overthrown might be an off ramp, but the Cabal That Rules Biden (CTRB? haha) has declared regime change, permanent diminishment of Russia is the goal. Which Russian(s) would act in a way that might create that?  And which Russians would want to go all the way?


Putin killed or overthrown might be an off ramp, but the CTRB has declared regime change, permanent diminishment of Russia is the goal.  In the aftermath of Afghanistan, what are the implications of accepting less now?

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on October 08, 2022, 01:42:29 PM
Some people think Putin is the moderate, if he is taken out,  a hawk could replace him. I am puzzled why Russia is not doing much (looks like the Ukis are advancing everywhere). Something is afoot. A small tactical nuke always remains a possibility.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 08, 2022, 02:16:45 PM
"I am puzzled why Russia is not doing much"

Because short of nuclear and/or general WW, they are losing.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 08, 2022, 04:43:51 PM
At this point neither side is willing to lose.  Neither side believes off-ramp is possible.

Putin killed or overthrown might be an off ramp, but the Cabal That Rules Biden (CTRB? haha) has declared regime change, permanent diminishment of Russia is the goal. Which Russian(s) would act in a way that might create that?  And which Russians would want to go all the way?


Putin killed or overthrown might be an off ramp, but the CTRB has declared regime change, permanent diminishment of Russia is the goal.  In the aftermath of Afghanistan, what are the implications of accepting less now?

This isn’t whack-a-mole with hadji or remove a 3rd world tinpot dictator. This is putting the future of humanity at risk so their Eastern European crimes can be hidden.

Russia can wipe us off the map.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 08, 2022, 04:49:14 PM
Read my words carefully and you will see I am saying nothing contrary.

Will the Russian generals allow Putin into the nuclear void?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FfzQFCjDPS0
Title: Re: Ukraine, the bridge, Crimea, Russia
Post by: DougMacG on October 08, 2022, 05:21:36 PM
https://firehydrantoffreedom.com/index.php?topic=1751.msg150398#msg150398

Video of explosion:
https://nypost.com/2022/10/08/fireball-that-destroyed-part-of-russia-crimea-bridge-seen-in-wild-video/
Title: Particularly interesting now that the bridge has been hit
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 08, 2022, 05:43:54 PM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aE5afkEqG08
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 08, 2022, 05:53:11 PM
second

https://asiatimes.com/2022/10/truck-bomb-explodes-on-russias-crimea-bridge/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on October 09, 2022, 08:42:26 AM
Looks like NS2, still has a 50 % functioning pipeline.

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/escobar-nord-stream-2-offers-germany-date-destiny
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on October 09, 2022, 09:32:21 AM
With the appointment of Surovikin as the General for the Ukr war, I expect some Russian victories, Surovikin is known to be brutal, gets things done and is not very particular about following Queensberry rules.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 10, 2022, 07:19:57 AM
With the appointment of Surovikin as the General for the Ukr war, I expect some Russian victories, Surovikin is known to be brutal, gets things done and is not very particular about following Queensberry rules.

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/large-scale-strikes-many-cities-across-ukraine-response-terrorist-crimea-bridge-blast
Title: How will we ever prove our resolve if we don't have a nuclear war with Russia?
Post by: G M on October 10, 2022, 08:09:06 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/biden-should-back-armageddon-language-quickly-get-russians-negotiating-table-adm
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 10, 2022, 11:29:56 AM
Daily Memo: Ukraine Update
Moscow has launched strikes in Ukraine in response to the explosion on the Crimean bridge.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Russian retaliation. Russia’s Ministry of Defense announced a massive strike on targets related to Ukraine’s military command, communications and energy infrastructure following the strike on the Kerch Bridge over the weekend, which Russian President Vladimir Putin called a terrorist attack. As a result of the Russian strikes, five regions in Ukraine – Lviv, Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv and Ternopil – are without power.

Belarus deployment. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to deploy troops “in connection with the aggravation on the western borders of the Union State” – a platform used for integration of the two countries. Lukashenko said Belarus was ready to receive and deploy “more than 1,000” Russian military personnel and repeated his claim that Ukraine plans to strike Belarusian territory. Minsk hasn’t directly participated in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine but remains an important buffer state on Russia’s western border where Moscow has strengthened its presence.
Title: Re: How will we ever prove our resolve if we don't have a nuclear war with Russia?
Post by: DougMacG on October 10, 2022, 11:51:26 AM
Everything Biden does or says exudes weakness, that's why he overcompensates with talk of Armageddon.  Weakness is not how you drive Putin to the bargaining table.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 10, 2022, 12:07:28 PM
I would articulate it as wanting attention.
Title: General Winter deployed to Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 11, 2022, 10:31:59 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/second-day-air-raid-sirens-across-ukraine-energy-facilities-pummeled

He will be operating all over europe.
Title: Don't buy the narrative on Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 11, 2022, 11:00:27 AM
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/dont-buy-the-narrative-on-ukraine/
Title: A pro Ukraine take on the war
Post by: DougMacG on October 11, 2022, 12:12:17 PM
https://www.salon.com/2022/10/11/ukraines-victory-almost-a-done-deal-military-expert-on-how-invasion-imploded/

My first time ever posting 'Salon'.

Please disregard if you already know better.    :wink:
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on October 11, 2022, 08:21:07 PM
Interesting analysis by Col (was a Trump appointee)

https://youtu.be/1u519OI7pPM
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on October 12, 2022, 04:22:43 AM
Interesting analysis by Col (was a Trump appointee)

https://youtu.be/1u519OI7pPM

Yes, interesting. I wondered how consequential the latest Russian attacks were.  I saw them as obligatory retaliation, but he sees it as a turning in the Russian

Strange how one report is all civilian targets and then we hear it is all military and infrastructure, almost no civilians hit. 
Title: Ukraine: NATO in trouble
Post by: G M on October 12, 2022, 06:31:46 AM
https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2022/10/no-single-war-ukraine-nato-trouble/
Title: FA: The Case for Total Uke Victory
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 12, 2022, 09:07:40 AM


Ukraine’s Path to Victory
How the Country Can Take Back All Its Territory
By Andriy Zagorodnyuk
October 12, 2022
Page url
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/ukraines-path-victory



For too long, the global democratic coalition supporting Kyiv has focused on what it should not do in the invasion of Ukraine. Its main aims include not letting Ukraine lose and not letting Russian President Vladimir Putin win—but also not allowing the war to escalate to a point where Russia attacks a NATO country or conducts a nuclear strike. These, however, are less goals than vague intentions, and they reflect the West’s deep confusion about how the conflict should end. More than seven months into the war, the United States and Europe still lack a positive vision for Ukraine’s future.

The West clearly believes that Kyiv’s fight is just, and it wants Ukraine to succeed. But it is not sure yet whether Ukraine is strong enough to retake all its territory. Many Western leaders still believe that the Russian military is too large to be defeated. This thinking has led the members of the pro-Ukrainian coalition to define only their interim strategic military goals. They have not plotted out the political consequences that would come from a complete Russian military collapse.

It is time to start: Ukraine can win big. The country has proved again and again that it is capable of routing Russia. It first did so by preventing Russia from seizing Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and the Black Sea coastline. It succeeded again by halting Russia’s concentrated offensive in the Donbas, the eastern Ukrainian region comprising Donetsk and Luhansk Provinces, part of which Russia has occupied since 2014. Most recently, Ukraine retook Kharkiv Province in less than a week, broke through Russia’s defensive lines in the south, and began liberating parts of the east.

The West must join Kyiv in aiming for an unequivocal Ukrainian victory. It should recognize that Ukraine’s military is not just more motivated than Russia’s but also better led and better trained. To win, Ukraine doesn’t need a miracle; it just needs the West to increase its supply of sophisticated weaponry. Ukrainian forces can then move deeper and faster into enemy lines and overrun more of Russia’s disorganized troops. Putin may respond by calling up additional soldiers, but poorly motivated forces can only delay a well-equipped Ukraine’s eventual triumph. Putin will then be out of conventional tools to forestall losing.

Outside analysts worry that before facing defeat, Putin would try to inflict massive civilian casualties on Ukraine, seeking to coerce the Ukrainian government into making concessions or even into surrendering. He might do so, Western analysts fear, by continuously targeting densely populated areas in Ukrainian cities with long-range missiles—as he has done this week—or through carpet-bombing raids. But Putin lacks the resources to truly level Ukrainian cities. Russia’s remaining inventory of conventional missiles and bombs is large enough to cause substantial damage, but it is not big enough to destroy swaths of Ukraine. And Ukraine has already proved that it will fight on even when Russia reduces cities to rubble. Putin destroyed Mariupol, ruined large parts of Kharkiv, and launched thousands of strikes on other cities and regions. The damage just made Ukrainians more committed to victory and closed off chances for negotiated settlements.

Many Westerners also fear that Putin might act on his threats to use nuclear weapons. But the West can intimidate Putin in ways that will deter him from seriously contemplating such an attack, and a nuclear strike might turn all global powers, not just the United States and Europe, against him. It is ultimately unlikely that Putin will go nuclear. But if he does, the West must make sure that his plan backfires.

As Ukraine’s counteroffensive advances against an increasingly cornered Putin, it should mainly focus on liberating territory that Russia has seized since February 24. But a full Ukrainian victory also entails freeing the parts of the country that Russia has occupied since 2014, which includes Crimea. It means that Ukraine must reclaim its territorial waters and exclusive economic zones in the Black Sea and Azov Sea, without any compromises or conditions.

Russia’s president has increasingly staked his regime on conquering Ukraine, sacrificing his country’s economic growth and international reputation in the process. Such a broad defeat could well push Russian elites to remove him from power. Indeed, as the mass of Putin’s failures and Ukraine’s achievements grows, Putin’s fall may become inevitable. This scares certain leaders, who worry that a power struggle in Russia will breed dangerous instability. But it’s hard to imagine a Russia more dangerous than the one led by Putin, given all the havoc he has wreaked—in Ukraine and throughout the world. The international community should welcome his departure.

ADVANTAGE, UKRAINE

Many Western observers believe that Ukraine will have to cede territory to Russia if it wants peace. They are wrong; territorial gains will only embolden the Kremlin. Putin decided to attack eastern Ukraine in 2014 because he succeeded in occupying Crimea. He invaded the entire country because he managed to establish proxy puppet regimes in the Donbas. Partial success simply motivates Putin to continue his campaigns and seize more territory. The only way to stop the war and to deter future aggression is for the invasion to end with an unequivocal Russian failure.

Winning everywhere might seem overly ambitious, and it certainly won’t be easy. But it is far more possible than most outside observers realize. Ukraine, after all, has repeatedly outperformed international expectations. In the opening weeks of the war, the country stopped Russia’s blitzkrieg against the capital and then forced Moscow to retreat. Putin responded to this defeat by declaring that he would regroup and focus on conquering the Donbas, which is filled with the kind of open fields that favor Russia and its heavy artillery. And yet Ukraine steadily wore Russia down, making it pay for every tract of land with massive casualties. Eventually, Russia was forced to halt.

Ukrainians have also proved that they can make Russia not just retreat but run. Ukraine’s lightning offense across Kharkiv in late September prevented Russia from even trying to annex the province. Its early October victory in Lyman has made Russia’s position in the Donbas deeply uncertain. Ukraine is now even liberating villages in adjoining Luhansk, the only Ukrainian province that Russia entirely seized after February 24. And Ukrainian soldiers are moving closer to Kherson, the first major city that Russia seized in its 2022 offensive.


Ukraine has repeatedly outperformed international expectations.

Ukraine’s repeat successes are not coincidences. The country’s military has structural advantages over its Russian adversary. The Russian military is extremely hierarchical and overly centralized; its officers are unable to make critical decisions without getting permission from senior leaders. It is very bad at multidirectional planning, incapable of focusing on one segment of the frontline without distracting from its operations in another. Ukraine, by contrast, is quick to adapt, with a NATO-style “mission command” system that encourages lower-ranking officers and sergeants to make decisions. Ukraine has also carried out many successful multidirectional attacks. The country’s counteroffensive in the south, for example, diverted critical Russian resources away from Kharkiv, allowing Ukrainian units to advance there with ease.

Ukraine’s advantages are unlikely to dissipate. The Russian military continues to make unsound decisions. A critical number of junior Russian officers were killed in the first months of the war, and without them, Russia will find it harder to organize and train its troops. Unlike Ukraine, Russia does not have a strong core of noncommissioned officers who can help with the war. Although Russia’s mass mobilization will likely have an impact—the influx of new soldiers will complicate Ukraine’s efforts to advance—it will mostly yield inexperienced and poorly trained men who neither want to fight nor know how to fight. As they experience the shock of battle, coming under loud and devastating artillery attacks, many will run. Many will die.

Ukraine has also suffered serious casualties, and its soldiers will continue to fall in combat. But unlike the Russians, who are fighting a “special military operation” fueled by Putin’s imperial delusions, the Ukrainians are fighting a total war to save their country. Ukraine continues to see a steady stream of motivated fighters; Russia continues to see long lines of men fleeing the country. Ukrainians value and respect their military commanders and President Volodymyr Zelensky, and the military protects its soldiers and promotes its brightest. The Russian military, however, mistreats its troops, showing little regard for their lives. This helps explain why Russian soldiers fled from Kharkiv and are now running in parts of the Donbas and Kherson. Armies that run once tend to run again.

QUALITY AND QUANTITY

It is true that Russia has more weapons than does Ukraine. Despite months of losses, Moscow still possesses sizable stockpiles of missiles, guns, and ammunition that it can use to attack Ukrainian forces. But this is not the advantage that it may seem. When it comes to using weapons, Russia and Ukraine follow different philosophies: Ukraine’s focuses on high-tech and precision-driven equipment, whereas Russia’s relies on high quantity but lower-precision systems. Because precision substantially affects accuracy, Ukraine can do more with less. If Ukraine continues to receive a steady supply of Western weapons, it will be able to negate Russia’s numerical superiority.

Long-range firepower is one critical capability where Ukraine will need more support. The country must have enough weapons and ammunition to outfit its brigades with artillery systems and multiple rocket launchers that can reach behind enemy lines, hitting ammunition depots and making it extremely hard for Russia to send in reinforcements. Ukrainian forces have already successfully used such Western systems, especially U.S.-made High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). But they will need even more equipment, including new, powerful weapons that can hit deeper targets. If supplied, U.S.-made Army Tactical Missiles Systems (ATCAMS) would prove particularly useful by allowing Ukraine to destroy Russian battlefield positions up to 190 miles away. Ukraine must also have enough weapons to simultaneously meet its operational requirements in at least two or three regions, such as the east and south, while holding off the Russians in others. If Ukraine maintains an initiative and equally strong presence along the war’s long lines of contact, it can be assured of hitting Russia in the areas where the Russian military is weakest.


The United States and Europe can learn invaluable lessons from the way their weapons perform in Ukraine.

But firepower is not the only thing that Ukraine needs. To defeat Russia, Ukraine must be equipped with more tanks and armored personnel carriers, both of which it used to great effect in retaking Kharkiv Province. Ukrainian artillery units will also need enough counterbattery radars, such as AN/TPQ radar systems, so they can swiftly detect incoming fire. Ukraine needs more midrange air-defense units, such as the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), to protect its troops and cities as they come under Russian bombardment. It will need to sustain all these capabilities, so Ukraine’s military must set up ammunition and spare-parts facilities around its western borders. It must also build comprehensive support facilities closer to the frontlines, where it can quickly repair damaged weapons and equipment.

Ukraine has already proved itself capable of downing Russian aircraft and defying predictions that Russia would gain air superiority. Ukraine has also been able to damage the Russian navy. The country’s successful strike against Russian navy installations and vessels, including the Moskva cruiser—the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s flagship—helped push Russia’s ships farther away from the Ukrainian coast. But sea access denial is an ongoing process, not a one-time achievement, and Ukraine will need help if it wants to fully break Russia’s blockade. The West must supply the country with more coastal missiles, unmanned systems, and detailed intelligence so Ukraine can eventually regain full access to its seas.

The West has reasons to supply Ukraine that go beyond just this conflict. The war has given NATO a rare chance to test its equipment in a real-time, high-intensity operational environment. The United States and Europe can learn invaluable lessons from the way their weapons perform, and the more gear they provide, the more knowledge they will acquire. Together, the West and Ukraine can figure out which weapons systems need tweaking and which ones work best, and Kyiv can use the most effective ones to keep pushing Russian forces back.

SAVING THE WORLD

Putin is aware that Russia is losing on the battlefield, and his not-so-veiled threats to use nuclear weapons are a transparent attempt to halt Western assistance. He likely knows that these threats will not stop Ukraine. But if Putin follows through on them, it would be both to deter the West from helping Ukraine and to shock Kyiv into surrendering.

Breaking the nuclear taboo, however, would devastate the Kremlin in ways that simply losing the war wouldn’t. Tactical nuclear weapons are difficult to target, and the fallout can extend in unpredictable directions, meaning a strike could seriously damage Russian troops and territories. Ukrainians would also fight on even if hit by a nuclear attack—for Ukrainians, there is no scenario worse than Russian occupation—so such a strike would not lead to Kyiv’s surrender. And if Russia goes nuclear, it will face a variety of severe retaliatory measures, some of which may have consequences that go beyond just the battlefield. China and India have so far avoided backing Ukraine or sanctioning Russia, but if the Kremlin launches a nuclear attack, Beijing and Delhi may join the West’s anti-Russian coalition, including by implementing severe sanctions and banning relations with Russia. They may even provide military assistance to Ukraine. For Russia, then, the result of nuclear use would be not just defeat but even more international isolation.


Putin, of course, is capable of making terrible choices, and he is desperate. Neither Ukraine nor the West can discount the possibility that he will order a nuclear attack. But the West can deter him by making it clear that, should Russia launch such a strike, it will directly, and conventionally, enter the conflict. Avoiding NATO involvement is one of the main reasons Putin continues to threaten a nuclear attack—Putin knows that if Russia cannot prevail against Ukraine, it has no chance against NATO—and he is therefore unlikely to do something that would bring the bloc in. That’s especially true given the speed with which NATO would win. Ukraine’s counteroffensive is moving comparatively slowly, giving Putin space to use his propaganda apparatus to manage public perception of the events. Once NATO joined, he would have no time to shield his reputation from the Russian military’s stunning collapse.

NATO has no shortage of ways to seriously threaten Russia without using nuclear weapons. It might not even need a land operation. The Western coalition could credibly tell the Kremlin that it would hit Russian capabilities with direct missile strikes and airstrikes, destroying its military facilities and disabling its Black Sea Fleet. It could threaten to cut all its communications with electronic warfare and arrange a cyber-blackout against the entire Russian military. The West could also threaten to impose sanctions that are totalizing and complete (no exceptions for energy buys), which would quickly bankrupt Russia. Especially if taken together, these measures would cause irreparable, critical damage to the Russian armed forces.

What the West should not and cannot do is be cowed by Russia’s nuclear blackmail. If the West stops aiding Ukraine because it fears the consequences, nuclear states will find it much easier to impose their will on nonnuclear ones in the future. If Russia orders a nuclear strike and gets away with it, nuclear states will have almost automatic permission to invade lesser powers. In either scenario, the result will be widespread proliferation. Even poorer countries will plow their resources into nuclear programs, and for an understandable reason: It will be the only sure way to guarantee their sovereignty.

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

With enough Western weapons, Ukraine will continue breaking through Russian defenses. It will use long-range rockets to destroy command posts, depots, and supply lines, making it impossible for Russia to properly reinforce its battered troops. It will shoot down Russian aircraft, preventing the Russian air force from defending positions. It will keep sinking Russian naval craft. And it will be helped along the way by the Russian military’s many deficiencies: its intense centralization, its emphasis on punishing its forces for mistakes rather than learning from them, and its highly inefficient style of combat. In the face of mounting setbacks, Russian morale will eventually collapse. The country’s soldiers will be forced back home.

Ukraine’s liberation of Crimea and the parts of the Donbas that Russian proxies seized in 2014 will come next. And after Ukraine’s victories elsewhere, these operations are unlikely to be all that taxing. By the time Ukrainian forces get to those regions, the Russian military will most likely be too exhausted to seriously defend them. Many of the male residents of the Russian-controlled Donbas will already have been killed on the frontlines. The survivors (which will likely include most of the region’s remaining male population) are unlikely to be loyal to the Kremlin, given what Putin has put them through. Some Western observers may consider Crimea to be a special case and encourage Ukraine to not press forward there, but although it has been under Russian control longer, its annexation remains every bit as illegal today as it was in 2014. International law should know no compromises or double standards.

The liberation of Crimea and the Donbas should, however, include a reintegration campaign. Because the periods of Russian occupation, with their attendant aggressive propaganda, have lasted so long, residents will need to receive social, legal, and economic assistance from Ukraine as part of reconciliation efforts. These efforts will make for a more delicate operation. As the Ukrainian government restores its governance, it will need to show residents that, unlike Moscow, Kyiv can provide stability and the rule of law.


A Ukrainian victory cannot be secure as long as Putin is in power.

Meanwhile, the world must prepare for what Ukrainian wins in these long-occupied regions will mean for Putin. Annexing Crimea and creating puppet states in the Donbas were two of his signature achievements, and his regime may not survive losing them. The world may want to prepare even before Ukraine moves into Crimea; Putin’s regime will be endangered if Ukraine retakes just the areas Russia seized after February 24. Losing almost all the land it just annexed would be a humiliating failure for Moscow, one that may get Russia’s elites to finally realize that their president’s obsession with war is deeply unproductive and to rise up against him. It would not be the first time in Russian history that a leader has been pushed out of power.

Once Putin is gone, the world must focus on making Russia pay restitution. Moscow should be held fully responsible for the damage it has done to Ukraine, providing reparations to the country and to the Ukrainian people. Ideally, after regime change, Russia will do this of its own volition. But if it doesn’t, the West can redirect hundreds of billions of dollars in frozen Russian assets to Ukraine as collateral. Russia must release all prisoners of war and all Ukrainian civilians it has detained or forcibly moved to Russia. It especially needs to return the thousands of children it kidnapped during the invasion and occupation. Finally, Ukraine and its partners must demand that Moscow hand Putin, other senior Russian leaders, and any figures involved in wartime atrocities over to a globally recognized criminal tribunal. The West should refuse to lift any sanctions on Moscow until these demands are met. They must demonstrate that extreme aggression, genocide, and terror are not acceptable.

This program of penance and justice may seem frightening to international leaders, who believe it could cause instability in Russia. Some analysts even say that the Russian Federation could disintegrate, leading to catastrophic consequences for the rest of the world. Many international leaders had similar fears when the Soviet Union collapsed, including former U.S. President George H. W. Bush, who traveled to Ukraine in 1991 to try to stop the country from seceding from Russia. But these leaders were wrong. Despite the war, Ukraine has become a symbol of democracy around the world. Many other post-Soviet states have grown far wealthier and freer since 1991. If Russia were weakened today, the net outcome would be similarly positive. Its reduced capabilities would make it harder for Moscow to threaten as many people as it does now. And it is simply unjust to try to keep the country’s residents under the foot of a paranoid, genocidal dictator.

Indeed, Ukraine may well need a weaker Russia to protect its wins. At a minimum, it will need substantive regime change to feel safe. Putin’s commitment to eliminating Ukraine and forcing it back into his empire is so extreme that a Ukrainian victory cannot be secure as long as he is in power. And Russia is full of ruthless leaders with a similarly distorted moral compass and a similarly imperialistic worldview. Until Ukraine is allowed to join NATO, it will have to build a powerful military, becoming—as Zelensky put it—a “big Israel.” This is not ideal, and it will be costly. But at least in the near term, it will be the only way that a victorious Ukraine can ensure a long-lasting peace
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 12, 2022, 09:10:54 AM
second

The argument in the Gateway Pundit piece about Russian dominance in tanks is stupid.  As has been proven already, Javelins beat tanks.
Title: Merscheimer-- Russia will not accept losing
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 12, 2022, 10:00:00 AM
Third

https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/2876234/they-are-destroying-the-world-because-they-can-unless-we-stop-them
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 12, 2022, 11:51:52 AM
second

The argument in the Gateway Pundit piece about Russian dominance in tanks is stupid.  As has been proven already, Javelins beat tanks.

How many Javelins are left?
Title: Re: FA: The Case for Total Uke Victory
Post by: G M on October 12, 2022, 11:55:16 AM


Ukraine’s Path to Victory
How the Country Can Take Back All Its Territory
By Andriy Zagorodnyuk
October 12, 2022
Page url
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/ukraines-path-victory



For too long, the global democratic coalition supporting Kyiv has focused on what it should not do in the invasion of Ukraine. Its main aims include not letting Ukraine lose and not letting Russian President Vladimir Putin win—but also not allowing the war to escalate to a point where Russia attacks a NATO country or conducts a nuclear strike. These, however, are less goals than vague intentions, and they reflect the West’s deep confusion about how the conflict should end. More than seven months into the war, the United States and Europe still lack a positive vision for Ukraine’s future.

The West clearly believes that Kyiv’s fight is just, and it wants Ukraine to succeed. But it is not sure yet whether Ukraine is strong enough to retake all its territory. Many Western leaders still believe that the Russian military is too large to be defeated. This thinking has led the members of the pro-Ukrainian coalition to define only their interim strategic military goals. They have not plotted out the political consequences that would come from a complete Russian military collapse.

It is time to start: Ukraine can win big. The country has proved again and again that it is capable of routing Russia. It first did so by preventing Russia from seizing Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and the Black Sea coastline. It succeeded again by halting Russia’s concentrated offensive in the Donbas, the eastern Ukrainian region comprising Donetsk and Luhansk Provinces, part of which Russia has occupied since 2014. Most recently, Ukraine retook Kharkiv Province in less than a week, broke through Russia’s defensive lines in the south, and began liberating parts of the east.

The West must join Kyiv in aiming for an unequivocal Ukrainian victory. It should recognize that Ukraine’s military is not just more motivated than Russia’s but also better led and better trained. To win, Ukraine doesn’t need a miracle; it just needs the West to increase its supply of sophisticated weaponry. Ukrainian forces can then move deeper and faster into enemy lines and overrun more of Russia’s disorganized troops. Putin may respond by calling up additional soldiers, but poorly motivated forces can only delay a well-equipped Ukraine’s eventual triumph. Putin will then be out of conventional tools to forestall losing.

Outside analysts worry that before facing defeat, Putin would try to inflict massive civilian casualties on Ukraine, seeking to coerce the Ukrainian government into making concessions or even into surrendering. He might do so, Western analysts fear, by continuously targeting densely populated areas in Ukrainian cities with long-range missiles—as he has done this week—or through carpet-bombing raids. But Putin lacks the resources to truly level Ukrainian cities. Russia’s remaining inventory of conventional missiles and bombs is large enough to cause substantial damage, but it is not big enough to destroy swaths of Ukraine. And Ukraine has already proved that it will fight on even when Russia reduces cities to rubble. Putin destroyed Mariupol, ruined large parts of Kharkiv, and launched thousands of strikes on other cities and regions. The damage just made Ukrainians more committed to victory and closed off chances for negotiated settlements.

Many Westerners also fear that Putin might act on his threats to use nuclear weapons. But the West can intimidate Putin in ways that will deter him from seriously contemplating such an attack, and a nuclear strike might turn all global powers, not just the United States and Europe, against him. It is ultimately unlikely that Putin will go nuclear. But if he does, the West must make sure that his plan backfires.

As Ukraine’s counteroffensive advances against an increasingly cornered Putin, it should mainly focus on liberating territory that Russia has seized since February 24. But a full Ukrainian victory also entails freeing the parts of the country that Russia has occupied since 2014, which includes Crimea. It means that Ukraine must reclaim its territorial waters and exclusive economic zones in the Black Sea and Azov Sea, without any compromises or conditions.

Russia’s president has increasingly staked his regime on conquering Ukraine, sacrificing his country’s economic growth and international reputation in the process. Such a broad defeat could well push Russian elites to remove him from power. Indeed, as the mass of Putin’s failures and Ukraine’s achievements grows, Putin’s fall may become inevitable. This scares certain leaders, who worry that a power struggle in Russia will breed dangerous instability. But it’s hard to imagine a Russia more dangerous than the one led by Putin, given all the havoc he has wreaked—in Ukraine and throughout the world. The international community should welcome his departure.

ADVANTAGE, UKRAINE

Many Western observers believe that Ukraine will have to cede territory to Russia if it wants peace. They are wrong; territorial gains will only embolden the Kremlin. Putin decided to attack eastern Ukraine in 2014 because he succeeded in occupying Crimea. He invaded the entire country because he managed to establish proxy puppet regimes in the Donbas. Partial success simply motivates Putin to continue his campaigns and seize more territory. The only way to stop the war and to deter future aggression is for the invasion to end with an unequivocal Russian failure.

Winning everywhere might seem overly ambitious, and it certainly won’t be easy. But it is far more possible than most outside observers realize. Ukraine, after all, has repeatedly outperformed international expectations. In the opening weeks of the war, the country stopped Russia’s blitzkrieg against the capital and then forced Moscow to retreat. Putin responded to this defeat by declaring that he would regroup and focus on conquering the Donbas, which is filled with the kind of open fields that favor Russia and its heavy artillery. And yet Ukraine steadily wore Russia down, making it pay for every tract of land with massive casualties. Eventually, Russia was forced to halt.

Ukrainians have also proved that they can make Russia not just retreat but run. Ukraine’s lightning offense across Kharkiv in late September prevented Russia from even trying to annex the province. Its early October victory in Lyman has made Russia’s position in the Donbas deeply uncertain. Ukraine is now even liberating villages in adjoining Luhansk, the only Ukrainian province that Russia entirely seized after February 24. And Ukrainian soldiers are moving closer to Kherson, the first major city that Russia seized in its 2022 offensive.


Ukraine has repeatedly outperformed international expectations.

Ukraine’s repeat successes are not coincidences. The country’s military has structural advantages over its Russian adversary. The Russian military is extremely hierarchical and overly centralized; its officers are unable to make critical decisions without getting permission from senior leaders. It is very bad at multidirectional planning, incapable of focusing on one segment of the frontline without distracting from its operations in another. Ukraine, by contrast, is quick to adapt, with a NATO-style “mission command” system that encourages lower-ranking officers and sergeants to make decisions. Ukraine has also carried out many successful multidirectional attacks. The country’s counteroffensive in the south, for example, diverted critical Russian resources away from Kharkiv, allowing Ukrainian units to advance there with ease.

Ukraine’s advantages are unlikely to dissipate. The Russian military continues to make unsound decisions. A critical number of junior Russian officers were killed in the first months of the war, and without them, Russia will find it harder to organize and train its troops. Unlike Ukraine, Russia does not have a strong core of noncommissioned officers who can help with the war. Although Russia’s mass mobilization will likely have an impact—the influx of new soldiers will complicate Ukraine’s efforts to advance—it will mostly yield inexperienced and poorly trained men who neither want to fight nor know how to fight. As they experience the shock of battle, coming under loud and devastating artillery attacks, many will run. Many will die.

Ukraine has also suffered serious casualties, and its soldiers will continue to fall in combat. But unlike the Russians, who are fighting a “special military operation” fueled by Putin’s imperial delusions, the Ukrainians are fighting a total war to save their country. Ukraine continues to see a steady stream of motivated fighters; Russia continues to see long lines of men fleeing the country. Ukrainians value and respect their military commanders and President Volodymyr Zelensky, and the military protects its soldiers and promotes its brightest. The Russian military, however, mistreats its troops, showing little regard for their lives. This helps explain why Russian soldiers fled from Kharkiv and are now running in parts of the Donbas and Kherson. Armies that run once tend to run again.

QUALITY AND QUANTITY

It is true that Russia has more weapons than does Ukraine. Despite months of losses, Moscow still possesses sizable stockpiles of missiles, guns, and ammunition that it can use to attack Ukrainian forces. But this is not the advantage that it may seem. When it comes to using weapons, Russia and Ukraine follow different philosophies: Ukraine’s focuses on high-tech and precision-driven equipment, whereas Russia’s relies on high quantity but lower-precision systems. Because precision substantially affects accuracy, Ukraine can do more with less. If Ukraine continues to receive a steady supply of Western weapons, it will be able to negate Russia’s numerical superiority.

Long-range firepower is one critical capability where Ukraine will need more support. The country must have enough weapons and ammunition to outfit its brigades with artillery systems and multiple rocket launchers that can reach behind enemy lines, hitting ammunition depots and making it extremely hard for Russia to send in reinforcements. Ukrainian forces have already successfully used such Western systems, especially U.S.-made High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). But they will need even more equipment, including new, powerful weapons that can hit deeper targets. If supplied, U.S.-made Army Tactical Missiles Systems (ATCAMS) would prove particularly useful by allowing Ukraine to destroy Russian battlefield positions up to 190 miles away. Ukraine must also have enough weapons to simultaneously meet its operational requirements in at least two or three regions, such as the east and south, while holding off the Russians in others. If Ukraine maintains an initiative and equally strong presence along the war’s long lines of contact, it can be assured of hitting Russia in the areas where the Russian military is weakest.


The United States and Europe can learn invaluable lessons from the way their weapons perform in Ukraine.

But firepower is not the only thing that Ukraine needs. To defeat Russia, Ukraine must be equipped with more tanks and armored personnel carriers, both of which it used to great effect in retaking Kharkiv Province. Ukrainian artillery units will also need enough counterbattery radars, such as AN/TPQ radar systems, so they can swiftly detect incoming fire. Ukraine needs more midrange air-defense units, such as the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), to protect its troops and cities as they come under Russian bombardment. It will need to sustain all these capabilities, so Ukraine’s military must set up ammunition and spare-parts facilities around its western borders. It must also build comprehensive support facilities closer to the frontlines, where it can quickly repair damaged weapons and equipment.

Ukraine has already proved itself capable of downing Russian aircraft and defying predictions that Russia would gain air superiority. Ukraine has also been able to damage the Russian navy. The country’s successful strike against Russian navy installations and vessels, including the Moskva cruiser—the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s flagship—helped push Russia’s ships farther away from the Ukrainian coast. But sea access denial is an ongoing process, not a one-time achievement, and Ukraine will need help if it wants to fully break Russia’s blockade. The West must supply the country with more coastal missiles, unmanned systems, and detailed intelligence so Ukraine can eventually regain full access to its seas.

The West has reasons to supply Ukraine that go beyond just this conflict. The war has given NATO a rare chance to test its equipment in a real-time, high-intensity operational environment. The United States and Europe can learn invaluable lessons from the way their weapons perform, and the more gear they provide, the more knowledge they will acquire. Together, the West and Ukraine can figure out which weapons systems need tweaking and which ones work best, and Kyiv can use the most effective ones to keep pushing Russian forces back.

SAVING THE WORLD

Putin is aware that Russia is losing on the battlefield, and his not-so-veiled threats to use nuclear weapons are a transparent attempt to halt Western assistance. He likely knows that these threats will not stop Ukraine. But if Putin follows through on them, it would be both to deter the West from helping Ukraine and to shock Kyiv into surrendering.

Breaking the nuclear taboo, however, would devastate the Kremlin in ways that simply losing the war wouldn’t. Tactical nuclear weapons are difficult to target, and the fallout can extend in unpredictable directions, meaning a strike could seriously damage Russian troops and territories. Ukrainians would also fight on even if hit by a nuclear attack—for Ukrainians, there is no scenario worse than Russian occupation—so such a strike would not lead to Kyiv’s surrender. And if Russia goes nuclear, it will face a variety of severe retaliatory measures, some of which may have consequences that go beyond just the battlefield. China and India have so far avoided backing Ukraine or sanctioning Russia, but if the Kremlin launches a nuclear attack, Beijing and Delhi may join the West’s anti-Russian coalition, including by implementing severe sanctions and banning relations with Russia. They may even provide military assistance to Ukraine. For Russia, then, the result of nuclear use would be not just defeat but even more international isolation.


Putin, of course, is capable of making terrible choices, and he is desperate. Neither Ukraine nor the West can discount the possibility that he will order a nuclear attack. But the West can deter him by making it clear that, should Russia launch such a strike, it will directly, and conventionally, enter the conflict. Avoiding NATO involvement is one of the main reasons Putin continues to threaten a nuclear attack—Putin knows that if Russia cannot prevail against Ukraine, it has no chance against NATO—and he is therefore unlikely to do something that would bring the bloc in. That’s especially true given the speed with which NATO would win. Ukraine’s counteroffensive is moving comparatively slowly, giving Putin space to use his propaganda apparatus to manage public perception of the events. Once NATO joined, he would have no time to shield his reputation from the Russian military’s stunning collapse.

NATO has no shortage of ways to seriously threaten Russia without using nuclear weapons. It might not even need a land operation. The Western coalition could credibly tell the Kremlin that it would hit Russian capabilities with direct missile strikes and airstrikes, destroying its military facilities and disabling its Black Sea Fleet. It could threaten to cut all its communications with electronic warfare and arrange a cyber-blackout against the entire Russian military. The West could also threaten to impose sanctions that are totalizing and complete (no exceptions for energy buys), which would quickly bankrupt Russia. Especially if taken together, these measures would cause irreparable, critical damage to the Russian armed forces.

What the West should not and cannot do is be cowed by Russia’s nuclear blackmail. If the West stops aiding Ukraine because it fears the consequences, nuclear states will find it much easier to impose their will on nonnuclear ones in the future. If Russia orders a nuclear strike and gets away with it, nuclear states will have almost automatic permission to invade lesser powers. In either scenario, the result will be widespread proliferation. Even poorer countries will plow their resources into nuclear programs, and for an understandable reason: It will be the only sure way to guarantee their sovereignty.

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

With enough Western weapons, Ukraine will continue breaking through Russian defenses. It will use long-range rockets to destroy command posts, depots, and supply lines, making it impossible for Russia to properly reinforce its battered troops. It will shoot down Russian aircraft, preventing the Russian air force from defending positions. It will keep sinking Russian naval craft. And it will be helped along the way by the Russian military’s many deficiencies: its intense centralization, its emphasis on punishing its forces for mistakes rather than learning from them, and its highly inefficient style of combat. In the face of mounting setbacks, Russian morale will eventually collapse. The country’s soldiers will be forced back home.

Ukraine’s liberation of Crimea and the parts of the Donbas that Russian proxies seized in 2014 will come next. And after Ukraine’s victories elsewhere, these operations are unlikely to be all that taxing. By the time Ukrainian forces get to those regions, the Russian military will most likely be too exhausted to seriously defend them. Many of the male residents of the Russian-controlled Donbas will already have been killed on the frontlines. The survivors (which will likely include most of the region’s remaining male population) are unlikely to be loyal to the Kremlin, given what Putin has put them through. Some Western observers may consider Crimea to be a special case and encourage Ukraine to not press forward there, but although it has been under Russian control longer, its annexation remains every bit as illegal today as it was in 2014. International law should know no compromises or double standards.

The liberation of Crimea and the Donbas should, however, include a reintegration campaign. Because the periods of Russian occupation, with their attendant aggressive propaganda, have lasted so long, residents will need to receive social, legal, and economic assistance from Ukraine as part of reconciliation efforts. These efforts will make for a more delicate operation. As the Ukrainian government restores its governance, it will need to show residents that, unlike Moscow, Kyiv can provide stability and the rule of law.


A Ukrainian victory cannot be secure as long as Putin is in power.

Meanwhile, the world must prepare for what Ukrainian wins in these long-occupied regions will mean for Putin. Annexing Crimea and creating puppet states in the Donbas were two of his signature achievements, and his regime may not survive losing them. The world may want to prepare even before Ukraine moves into Crimea; Putin’s regime will be endangered if Ukraine retakes just the areas Russia seized after February 24. Losing almost all the land it just annexed would be a humiliating failure for Moscow, one that may get Russia’s elites to finally realize that their president’s obsession with war is deeply unproductive and to rise up against him. It would not be the first time in Russian history that a leader has been pushed out of power.

Once Putin is gone, the world must focus on making Russia pay restitution. Moscow should be held fully responsible for the damage it has done to Ukraine, providing reparations to the country and to the Ukrainian people. Ideally, after regime change, Russia will do this of its own volition. But if it doesn’t, the West can redirect hundreds of billions of dollars in frozen Russian assets to Ukraine as collateral. Russia must release all prisoners of war and all Ukrainian civilians it has detained or forcibly moved to Russia. It especially needs to return the thousands of children it kidnapped during the invasion and occupation. Finally, Ukraine and its partners must demand that Moscow hand Putin, other senior Russian leaders, and any figures involved in wartime atrocities over to a globally recognized criminal tribunal. The West should refuse to lift any sanctions on Moscow until these demands are met. They must demonstrate that extreme aggression, genocide, and terror are not acceptable.

This program of penance and justice may seem frightening to international leaders, who believe it could cause instability in Russia. Some analysts even say that the Russian Federation could disintegrate, leading to catastrophic consequences for the rest of the world. Many international leaders had similar fears when the Soviet Union collapsed, including former U.S. President George H. W. Bush, who traveled to Ukraine in 1991 to try to stop the country from seceding from Russia. But these leaders were wrong. Despite the war, Ukraine has become a symbol of democracy around the world. Many other post-Soviet states have grown far wealthier and freer since 1991. If Russia were weakened today, the net outcome would be similarly positive. Its reduced capabilities would make it harder for Moscow to threaten as many people as it does now. And it is simply unjust to try to keep the country’s residents under the foot of a paranoid, genocidal dictator.

Indeed, Ukraine may well need a weaker Russia to protect its wins. At a minimum, it will need substantive regime change to feel safe. Putin’s commitment to eliminating Ukraine and forcing it back into his empire is so extreme that a Ukrainian victory cannot be secure as long as he is in power. And Russia is full of ruthless leaders with a similarly distorted moral compass and a similarly imperialistic worldview. Until Ukraine is allowed to join NATO, it will have to build a powerful military, becoming—as Zelensky put it—a “big Israel.” This is not ideal, and it will be costly. But at least in the near term, it will be the only way that a victorious Ukraine can ensure a long-lasting peace

1. Save a rich person from drowning.

2. Use the reward money to hire Van Halen to play at my birthday party.

3. Marry Cindy Crawford!
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 12, 2022, 12:07:46 PM
How many Russians are willing to get into those tanks to find out?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 12, 2022, 12:09:51 PM
How many Russians are willing to get into those tanks to find out?

I guess we will find out.

Title: WSJ: Uke strategy kicking Russki ass
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 12, 2022, 12:19:38 PM
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-ukraines-strategy-is-running-circles-around-russias-lumbering-military-11665584517?mod=hp_lead_pos5
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 12, 2022, 12:57:57 PM
second post-- this from a forum I play on by a poster who has a good track record:

"FWIW, the Russians have mobilized a significant portion of their anti-satellite weapons in the last couple of days. Assuming they blame the US for the attack on their gas pipelines, the rudimentary protocol, should they choose to implement it would be to respond asymmetrically (we cut off their finger, they respond by cutting off our hand).

"Hypothetically, if they wanted to initiate a dramatic asymmetric response, they may choose to sever the undersea fiberoptic cables connecting us with the rest of the world, and even take down the majority of our communication satellites. It's conceivable that, depending on resources deployed, they could in a matter of a few hours, disable close to 100% of our international communications. Essentially cutting the US off from the rest of the world.

"The next steps, if things ramp up, would most certainly be a series of massive EMP attacks over North America and Europe, followed immediately by nuclear attacks on strategic ground targets. Final phase, if the US launches missiles, would be to attack major population centers and implement their 100 MT nuclear Poseidon "doomsday" torpedoes."
Title: GPF: More pipeline sabotage plus objective conditions in Belarus get dicey
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 12, 2022, 01:04:16 PM
Some officials have described a new oil pipeline incident as sabotage.
By: Geopolitical Futures

More leaks. Poland has reported a leak in one of the two branches of the Druzhba oil pipeline, which connects Russia and Germany via Belarus and Poland. Although the reason for the leak is unknown, Serbian Energy Minister Zorana Mihajlovic described the incident as a “continuation” of what happened to both of the Nord Stream natural gas pipelines – that is, sabotage. The extent of the damage is unclear, but things like this typically drive energy prices up.


Belarusian sabotage? The Belarusian military has begun special exercises to detect and destroy armed groups in the Gomel region on the border with Ukraine. Authorities in Minsk have reported that Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine are grooming Belarusian radicals to foment unrest from within a key Russian ally and important Russian buffer.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 12, 2022, 01:18:44 PM
second post-- this from a forum I play on by a poster who has a good track record:

"FWIW, the Russians have mobilized a significant portion of their anti-satellite weapons in the last couple of days. Assuming they blame the US for the attack on their gas pipelines, the rudimentary protocol, should they choose to implement it would be to respond asymmetrically (we cut off their finger, they respond by cutting off our hand).

"Hypothetically, if they wanted to initiate a dramatic asymmetric response, they may choose to sever the undersea fiberoptic cables connecting us with the rest of the world, and even take down the majority of our communication satellites. It's conceivable that, depending on resources deployed, they could in a matter of a few hours, disable close to 100% of our international communications. Essentially cutting the US off from the rest of the world.

"The next steps, if things ramp up, would most certainly be a series of massive EMP attacks over North America and Europe, followed immediately by nuclear attacks on strategic ground targets. Final phase, if the US launches missiles, would be to attack major population centers and implement their 100 MT nuclear Poseidon "doomsday" torpedoes."

Good thing we are refusing talks and are continuing to antagonize Russia!
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 12, 2022, 02:03:01 PM
At this point Russia is not offering talks so there is nothing to refuse.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 12, 2022, 07:09:39 PM
At this point Russia is not offering talks so there is nothing to refuse.

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/putin-open-bilateral-talks-biden-november-g20-meeting-lavrov
Title: Ukraine, Even the UN gets it
Post by: DougMacG on October 13, 2022, 04:19:28 AM
https://www.businessinsider.com/these-5-countries-sided-with-russia-in-un-vote-2022-10
143 countries voted to condemn Russia's illegal Ukraine annexations in key UN vote. Here are the 5 that didn't.

The UN General Assembly on Wednesday overwhelmingly voted to condemn Russia's annexations in Ukraine.
Of the 193-member body, 143 countries supported Ukraine, while 35 abstained from the vote.
Only five countries, one of which was Russia itself, voted against the measure.

The UN General Assembly on Wednesday issued a sweeping condemnation of Russia's attempt to annex four territories in Ukraine last month in a resolute display of global disapproval.

The vote was sparked by Russia's recent annexation of partially-occupied territories in Ukraine, including the Kherson, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia regions. The UN General Assembly in its measure demanded that Russia reverse the land grab.

The 193-member body issued its most staunch support for Ukraine yet during Wednesday's vote, which saw 143 nations condemn Russia's actions and 35 countries abstain from voting.

Only five countries voted against the resolution, one of which was Russia itself. North Korea, Belarus, Syria, and Nicaragua — all led by dictator-like regimes — joined the increasingly isolated nation.

The remaining 10 countries did not vote — a slight, technical distinction from the abstention option.

After the vote, the German Foreign Office tweeted a photo of the results, saying: "That is what being on the wrong side of history looks like."

It was a stronger response than many Western officials had expected, as well as the most robust showing of support from the UN General Assembly for Ukraine since the war began in February. The body has voted on four resolutions in the months since Russia invaded, including a demand for a Russian cease-fire and a measure to suspend Russia from the UN's Geneva-based Human Rights Council.

Several nations that had previously abstained from or not voted on the prior resolutions joined the majority on Wednesday to vote "yes," including Bangladesh, Morocco, and Iraq. Among the additional surprises were Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Sergiy Kyslytsya, who serves as Ukraine's ambassador to the UN, called the vote a "historic moment," according to the Associated Press, while European Union Ambassador Olof Skoog said the vote sends a message to Russia that they are "isolated."
Title: Re: Ukraine, Even the UN gets it
Post by: G M on October 13, 2022, 05:13:12 AM
Wow! The moral authority of the UN!

 :roll:

https://www.businessinsider.com/these-5-countries-sided-with-russia-in-un-vote-2022-10
143 countries voted to condemn Russia's illegal Ukraine annexations in key UN vote. Here are the 5 that didn't.

The UN General Assembly on Wednesday overwhelmingly voted to condemn Russia's annexations in Ukraine.
Of the 193-member body, 143 countries supported Ukraine, while 35 abstained from the vote.
Only five countries, one of which was Russia itself, voted against the measure.

The UN General Assembly on Wednesday issued a sweeping condemnation of Russia's attempt to annex four territories in Ukraine last month in a resolute display of global disapproval.

The vote was sparked by Russia's recent annexation of partially-occupied territories in Ukraine, including the Kherson, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia regions. The UN General Assembly in its measure demanded that Russia reverse the land grab.

The 193-member body issued its most staunch support for Ukraine yet during Wednesday's vote, which saw 143 nations condemn Russia's actions and 35 countries abstain from voting.

Only five countries voted against the resolution, one of which was Russia itself. North Korea, Belarus, Syria, and Nicaragua — all led by dictator-like regimes — joined the increasingly isolated nation.

The remaining 10 countries did not vote — a slight, technical distinction from the abstention option.

After the vote, the German Foreign Office tweeted a photo of the results, saying: "That is what being on the wrong side of history looks like."

It was a stronger response than many Western officials had expected, as well as the most robust showing of support from the UN General Assembly for Ukraine since the war began in February. The body has voted on four resolutions in the months since Russia invaded, including a demand for a Russian cease-fire and a measure to suspend Russia from the UN's Geneva-based Human Rights Council.

Several nations that had previously abstained from or not voted on the prior resolutions joined the majority on Wednesday to vote "yes," including Bangladesh, Morocco, and Iraq. Among the additional surprises were Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Sergiy Kyslytsya, who serves as Ukraine's ambassador to the UN, called the vote a "historic moment," according to the Associated Press, while European Union Ambassador Olof Skoog said the vote sends a message to Russia that they are "isolated."
Title: Re: Ukraine, Even the UN gets it
Post by: DougMacG on October 13, 2022, 06:36:37 AM
Wow! The moral authority of the UN!
 :roll:

Right.  They have minimal moral authority, if any.  Maybe what these nations value is sovereignty.

BTW, has everyone here condemned the invasion and blamed Putin with singular responsibility for the carnage?
Title: Re: Ukraine, Even the UN gets it
Post by: G M on October 13, 2022, 06:40:30 AM
Wow! The moral authority of the UN!
 :roll:

Right.  They have minimal moral authority, if any.  Maybe what these nations value is sovereignty.

BTW, has everyone here condemned the invasion and blamed Putin with singular responsibility for the carnage?

The US and NATO created the crisis that resulted in the war. Once again, we stick our noses where they don't belong and innocents suffer, but the MIC gets paid, so it's all worthwhile.

https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/117/722/215/original/cae44023ad3f4a3a.png

(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/117/722/215/original/cae44023ad3f4a3a.png)

Trusting what American officials say is always a mistake.

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on October 13, 2022, 07:05:05 AM
Meanwhile, since 1990, the Russians were just minding their own business...

Or were they "belligerently" "bullying their neighbors" as testified by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2007?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 13, 2022, 07:09:05 AM
Meanwhile, since 1990, the Russians were just minding their own business...

Or were they "belligerently" "bullying their neighbors" as testified by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2007?

Mean tweets?

Title: Putin shuts down clean nuclear power in (former?) Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on October 13, 2022, 07:32:16 AM
https://pjmedia.com/news-and-politics/rick-moran/2022/10/12/zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-has-lost-external-power-as-russia-claims-ownership-n1636440

Crimes against humanity, everyday, (while some blame the rape victim).

Title: Re: Putin shuts down clean nuclear power in (former?) Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 13, 2022, 07:58:50 AM
https://pjmedia.com/news-and-politics/rick-moran/2022/10/12/zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-has-lost-external-power-as-russia-claims-ownership-n1636440

Crimes against humanity, everyday, (while some blame the rape victim).

Like the Ukraine being one of the top producers of child exploitation media in the world?
Title: Belarus feeling froggy
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 13, 2022, 08:52:54 AM
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/with-putin-under-pressure-belarus-edges-closer-joining-war-ukraine-2022-10-12/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_campaign=daily-briefing&utm_term=10-13-2022
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on October 14, 2022, 07:08:04 AM
Strange how easy it is to find diametrically opposed views on how the war is going from what should be very credible sources.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/14/russia-missiles-infrastructure-war-ukraine/
War in Ukraine
Russia’s airstrikes, intended to show force, reveal another weakness

By Robyn Dixon
October 14, 2022 at 1:00 a.m. EDT

A house destroyed by Russian shelling in Lezhyne near Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, on Oct. 12. (Wojciech Grzedzinski for The Washington Post)

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On Monday, Russia fired 84 missiles, many at Ukrainian civilian infrastructure targets, causing power outages in many cities. On Tuesday, Russia launched another 28 cruise missiles. And on Thursday, the Ukrainian Armed Forced General Staff said Russia had hit more than 40 settlements since the day before. In all, more than three dozen people were killed.

Are you on Telegram? Subscribe to our channel for the latest updates on Russia’s war in Ukraine.
But no matter how many times Russia fires at Ukraine, pro-war Russian nationalists want more, even though targeting civilian infrastructure is potentially a war crime.

“It has to be done constantly, not just once but for two to five weeks to totally disable all their infrastructure, all thermal power stations, all heating and power stations, all power plants, all traction substations, all power lines, all railway hubs,” said Bogdan Bezpalko, a member of the Kremlin’s Council on Interethnic Relations.

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“Then, Ukraine will descend into cold and darkness,” Bezpalko said on state television. “They won’t be able to bring in ammunition and fuel and then the Ukrainian army will turn into a crowd of armed men with chunks of iron.”

But the hawks, who are demanding publicly on TV broadcasts and on Telegram to know why Russia does not hit more high value targets, won’t like the answer: The Russian military appears to lack sufficient accurate missiles to sustain airstrikes at Monday’s tempo, according to Western military analysts.

“They are low on precision guided missiles,” said Konrad Muzyka, founder of Gdansk, Poland-based Rochan Consulting said, offering his assessment of Russia’s sporadic air attacks. “That is essentially the only explanation that I have.”

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Even as NATO allies on Thursday said they would rush additional air defenses to Ukraine, the experts said the reason Russia had yet to knock out electricity and water service across the country was simple: it can’t.

Since May, Russia’s use of precision guided missiles (PGMs) has declined sharply, with analysts suggesting then that Russian stocks of such missiles may be low.

Tuesday’s attacks mainly used air-launched cruise missiles, which are slower than Iskander guided missiles and easier for Ukraine to shoot down, according to Muzyka. In March, the Pentagon reported that Russia’s air-launched cruise missiles have a failure rate of 20 to 60 percent.

“If Russia had a limitless supply of PGMs, I think that they would still strike civilian targets, because that’s what the Russian way of warfare is,” Muzyka said. He said analysts did not have confirmed information about Russian missile stocks or production levels, and judgments were based on the decline in usage of PGMs and Moscow’s greater reliance on less accurate missiles.


Fresh missile strikes hit Kyiv, Mykolaiv and
At least one person was killed in Zaporizhzhia in a new round of Russian missile attacks across Ukraine on Oct. 11, according to the State Emergency Service. (Video: The Washington Post)
Putin faces limits of his military power as Ukraine recaptures land

But a clue lies in Russia’s failure to destroy the kinds of targets that Ukraine is able to hit using U.S.-supplied HIMARS artillery.

“If we take a look at what HIMARS has done to Russian supply routes, and essentially their ability to sustain war, they’ve done massive damage to Russia’s posture in this war,” Muzyka said. “So technically, you know, if the Russians had access to a large stock of PGMS, they could probably inflict a similar damage to Ukrainian armed forces, but they haven’t.”

“They actually failed to,” he continued. “They even failed to interdict the main Ukrainian supply roads. They failed to destroy bridges, railway, railway intersections, and so on and so forth.”

Stray puppies in a school classroom that Russian occupying forces used as a base in the Kherson region of Ukraine on Oct. 6. (Heidi Levine for The Washington Post)
Russian President Vladimir Putin is juggling so many military problems that some Western analysts are already predicting Russia’s war will fail. Others say it remains too early to write Russia off, especially with hundreds of thousands of conscripted reinforcements potentially headed to the battlefield in coming weeks.

Since day one, Russia has sustained shocking levels of battlefield casualties, battering military morale. It has suffered repeated defeats, including the failure to take Kyiv, a retreat from Snake Island, the rout in Kharkiv and loss of Lyman, a strategic transit hub.

Ukrainian forces also continue to slowly recover territory in Kherson region, in their ongoing southern offensive.

Russia’s military mobilization also remains in shambles, with angry draftees posting videos online almost daily, complaining of insufficient training and poor equipment. Moscow police raided hostels and cafes on Tuesday to grab men and deliver them to mobilization points, and military recruitment is continuing in Russian prisons, according to independent Russian media site SOTA.

Putin confronted by insider over Ukraine war, U.S. intelligence finds

Lawrence Freedman, professor of war studies at King’s College London, wrote in a newsletter that Russia’s escalation of missile attacks on civilian targets Monday had achieved no clear military gain.

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“Russia lacks the missiles to mount attacks of this sort often, as it is running out of stocks and the Ukrainians are claiming a high success rate in intercepting many of those already used,” Freedman wrote. “This is not therefore a new war-winning strategy but a sociopath’s tantrum.”

Putin’s “need to calm his critics also explains why he has lashed out against Ukrainian cities,” Freedman wrote. “The hard-liners have been demanding attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure for some time and they now have got what they wanted. But they will inevitably be disappointed with the results.”

“These attacks could well be repeated, because it is part of the mind-set of Putin and his generals that enemies can be forced to capitulate by such means,” he added. “But stocks of Kalibr and Iskander missiles are running low.”

As missiles strike Ukraine, Israel won’t sell its vaunted air defense

Amid Russia’s military setbacks, striking at Ukraine’s power grid in recent days was designed to shock and terrify civilians, starve them of energy in the winter and break their will to resist, according to Maria Shagina, an analyst with the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think tank.


Kyiv residents clean up after Russian missile strike
1:20
Kyiv residents cleared debris from their homes and stores after a Russian missile attack on Oct. 10. (Video: Reuters)
One apparent goal of Russia’s strikes on six electrical substations in Lviv, western Ukraine, was to stop Ukraine exporting electricity to Europe, Shagina said. The strikes also crippled the city’s power supply.

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“Now we’re seeing the escalation and weaponization of the critical infrastructure,” she said, adding that it was no accident that Russia had destroyed Ukraine’s capacity to export electricity to Europe at the same time Moscow has weaponized natural gas, cutting supplies to pressure European Union countries.

“There is some intensification of the war, in terms that Russia doesn’t hide even the fact that they have attacked civilian infrastructure, critical infrastructure,” Shagina added. “They’re trying to escalate the war as much as they can.”

Russia’s new commander in Ukraine was decorated after brutality in Syria

Muzyka said Russia, ignoring international conventions, has consistently targeted civilian apartment blocks and infrastructure in two Chechen wars, in Syria and Ukraine.

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“Definitely they focus on the power grid as a way of making civilian lives miserable,” he said. “For Russians, striking civilian areas, residential areas and anything that can potentially impact the lives of civilians is a military objective, because for Russia, the war is total.”

“Essentially what the Russians are trying to do is to wear down Ukrainians, decrease the morale, decrease the willingness to fight and from their point of view, hopefully increase the pressure on the Ukrainian government to enter negotiations with Russia,” he added.


People with Ukrainian flags attend an antiwar protest in front of the German chancellery in Berlin on Tuesday. (Markus Schreiber/AP)
Ukraine has asked Western allies for state of the art air defense systems to protect its civilians and vital infrastructure. But even as NATO pledged more help, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said that getting those systems to Ukraine would take time.

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“Unfortunately, the Western response is rather limited,” Shagina said, adding that Russia is trying “to use the full range of measures they can deploy against the West and Ukraine.”

But no matter how harsh the attacks, the hawks in Russia say it is still not enough.

Russian journalist Andrei Medvedev, a member of the Moscow city council, who runs a popular hard line nationalist pro-war Telegram channel, urged patience, saying the decision “to bomb Ukraine into the Middle Ages” had not yet been taken.

Another hawk, Alexander Kots, the war correspondent of Komsomolskaya Pravda, who has his own influential pro-war Telegram channel, said he hoped the strikes signaled a new kind of warfare that would bombard Ukraine “until it loses its ability to function.”

Natalia Abbakumova contributed to this report.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 14, 2022, 07:20:28 AM
"Strange how easy it is to find diametrically opposed views on how the war is going from what should be very credible sources."

Indeed!

Though it a certain sense it would be stranger yet if it were otherwise.

I find myself thinking of David Gordon's market advice distinction between "Profit and being a Prophet" and the "Thinking in Bets" mindset of a professional poker player.

Trying to prophesize risks leaving one in what Buddha might call "attachment" to advocacy for a particular outcome, whereas a ruthless hunt for profit tends to leave one more objectively responsive to changes as they arise.

All of us here thought poking the Bear was a really poor idea, but now that the fight is on there is no going back to the status quo ante. 
As the facts change so too must we.

Reuters today:
===========
RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR
Russian-backed forces have made some advances in eastern Ukraine, Britain said, even as Moscow's hold weakens in the south, where a Russian-installed official has advised residents to flee a region Russia claims to have annexed.

A British intelligence update said forces led by the private Russian military company Wagner Group had captured the villages of Optyine and Ivangrad south of the fiercely-contested town of Bakhmut, the first such advance in more than three months.

With Russia expected to soon carry out large-scale drills of its nuclear forces as President Vladimir Putin threatens to use them, the United States and its allies will be challenged to ensure they can spot the difference between exercises and the real thing.

Elon Musk said SpaceX cannot "indefinitely" fund the Starlink internet service in Ukraine and send it several thousands more terminals after a report suggested that his rocket company had asked the Pentagon to pay for the donations.
Title: Russki milbloggers: Our deaths are higher than reported
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 14, 2022, 12:27:45 PM
https://www.foxnews.com/world/deaths-among-mobilized-russian-troops-mount-sparking-criticism-home-report?fbclid=IwAR1DT0AXg5nhlEX0a2Bd0ekUVGix74u5WF33cC5yOAlWqTU_9zsFf8J_azU
Title: Running out of munitions to give to Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 15, 2022, 07:23:03 AM
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/us-signals-slowdown-high-end-munitions-deliveries-ukraine
Title: Re: Running out of munitions to give to Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on October 15, 2022, 10:22:15 AM
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/us-signals-slowdown-high-end-munitions-deliveries-ukraine

Happy to help out but we don't want them to grow dependent on it.

How about those other 146 countries that side with their cause, maybe their have ammo.
Title: Re: Running out of munitions to give to Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 16, 2022, 09:13:08 AM
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/us-signals-slowdown-high-end-munitions-deliveries-ukraine

Happy to help out but we don't want them to grow dependent on it.

How about those other 146 countries that side with their cause, maybe their have ammo.

They are utterly dependent on it.

It's ok, the Zelensky crew and our corruptocrats are getting even richer, and that's the real reason for the war.
Title: Re: ET: Ten years of American fukkery in Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 16, 2022, 09:02:11 PM
https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/118/118/552/original/98eda3bb27e31973.jpg

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https://www.theepochtimes.com/before-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-a-decade-of-destabilization_4316990.html?utm_source=Opinion&utm_campaign=opinion-2022-03-09&utm_medium=email&est=%2Bqxu%2BDUNGu8eCZYSGT69Ns14oYtieKUe9gCtosFWn%2FziyTM7KIK9%2FovkGBjAa3KF6H%2B4

Before Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, a Decade of Destabilization
How top US officials played key roles in destabilizing Ukraine, damaging US–Russia relations
By Jeff Carlson and Hans Mahncke March 4, 2022 Updated: March 8, 2022biggersmaller Print
News Analysis

As war rages in Ukraine following the invasion by Russia, the realities on the ground are difficult to assess—it’s estimated that thousands have been killed, including hundreds of civilians, and 2 million have been forced to flee their homes.

Although Russian President Vladimir Putin is rightly deserving of blame, top U.S. officials over the past decade have played important roles in critical events that undermined U.S. relations with Russia and resulted in the destabilization of Ukraine.

The deterioration in our relations with Russia, in many ways, started with President George W. Bush in 2008, when he dangled before Ukraine the promise of NATO membership during the Bucharest declaration, boldly claiming, “We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.”

The promise of NATO membership for Ukraine is something that has never been taken lightly by Russia, which has remained resolutely opposed to any NATO expansion along its borders.

In 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher had promised the Kremlin not to expand NATO eastward in return for German unification. However, in the decades that followed that promise, NATO incorporated 14 additional Eastern European countries.

In his 2020 memoir, Joe Biden’s current CIA director, Bill Burns, explicitly warned about the dangers posed by Ukraine gaining NATO membership, citing his own words in 2008 to then-Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice: “Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all redlines for the Russian elite (not just Putin).​”

“In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle-draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putin’s sharpest liberal critics, I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests,” he wrote.

Ukraine’s Longstanding Political Troubles
In addition to its geographic importance as a centuries-old buffer territory between the East and West, Ukraine is a resource-rich country with an abundance of agriculture exports and large supplies of minerals, iron ore, and coal.

Yet Ukraine’s political upheavals and influence from powerful oligarchs have meant that it’s also one of the poorest countries in Europe. Ukraine’s per-capita nominal gross domestic product stands at around $3,500 compared to the European average of $31,000. Rampant governmental corruption has only served to make a difficult situation worse.

Ukraine has been through two significant revolutions since it gained independence in 1991. The first revolution occurred in 2004, when the apparent winner of the presidential election, Viktor Yanukovych, a candidate favored by Russia, was unseated. Yanukovych made a political comeback in 2010 when he again won the presidential election.

However, Yanukovych was deposed yet again in February 2014, when a U.S.-supported coup installed a new government in Ukraine. Arseniy Yatsenyuk, the candidate pushed by the United States, was installed as prime minister, but would resign two years later amid corruption accusations.

While the 2014 Maidan Revolution has been portrayed as a triumph of democracy over oppression, such a characterization ignores the fact that the resulting coup culminated in the removal of a democratically elected leader of Ukraine.

Ukraine, which became a focal point of a new cold war with Russia, led many U.S. officials to willfully ignore a dangerous rise in fascist sentiments and neo-Nazi movements within the country.

Andriy Parubiy, co-founder of the fascist Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU), served as the chairman of the Ukrainian parliament from April 2016 until August 2019. The ideology of Parubiy’s SNPU, which he co-founded in 1991 with Oleh Tyahnybok, now the current leader of the ultranationalist Svoboda party, was radical nationalism and neo-Nazism.

Parubiy was the “commander” of the Maidan Revolution, which led the various Maidan paramilitary units, and his forces played a material role in the U.S.-backed coup that led to the overthrow of Yanukovych.

The growth of a fascist movement in a country that was serving as the battleground for a new cold war between the U.S. and Russia should have raised many alarms. But rather than distancing themselves from these elements, Western leaders appeared to embrace them.

Indeed, then-U.S. Sen. John McCain met with ultranationalist leader Tyahnybok in the lead-up to the 2014 coup, and Vice President Joe Biden met with Tyahnybok shortly thereafter in April 2014. In June 2017, Parubiy was inexplicably invited to Washington, where he met with a number of American politicians, including McCain and House Speaker Paul Ryan.

Vice President Biden Becomes Ukraine Point Man
It was during events surrounding the February 2014 coup that Biden, then-vice president to Barack Obama, made his first appearance as a Ukraine power broker. Biden had been appointed as the Obama administration’s point man on Ukraine in early 2014.

An intercepted phone conversation between Victoria Nuland, who at the time was assistant secretary for European and Eurasian affairs in the Obama State Department, and then-U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt revealed that the State Department was actively pursuing the ouster of Yanukovych and the installation of opposition leader Yatsenyuk as prime minister. It isn’t known exactly when their discussion took place, only that it transpired prior to Feb. 7, 2014, when the conversation was leaked.

During that leaked discussion, Nuland noted that Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser to Vice President Biden, had informed her that “you need Biden” for the successful installation of Yatsenyuk, and Nuland concluded by telling Pyatt that “Biden’s willing.” Sullivan now serves as the national security adviser to President Biden.

Just two weeks later, on Feb. 22, 2014, Yanukovych was removed as president of Ukraine; within days, Yatsenyuk, Nuland’s preferred candidate, was installed as prime minister of Ukraine.

The U.S. government had effectively assisted in the removal of a democratically elected leader that was friendly to Russia with the installation of a leader who was selected by the United States.

The Kremlin, watching these events unfold, didn’t wait long to react, annexing Crimea a few days later.

Prosecutor Investigating Ukrainian Oligarch Is Fired
One of the members of Yanukovych’s government who lost his position in government as a result of the coup was Mykola Zlochevsky, the owner of Burisma Energy.

He had first served as minister of ecology and natural resources and later as deputy secretary for economic and social security. While he held power in government, Zlochevsky’s companies reportedly received an unusually large number of permits to extract oil and gas.

In April 2014, UK prosecutors seized $23.5 million in assets owned by Zlochevsky that were held at a London bank, alleging that Zlochevsky had engaged in criminal conduct in Ukraine.

Following the sudden loss of Zlochevsky’s government position, Burisma appointed Biden’s son, Hunter, to its board of directors. In addition to Hunter, Burisma also appointed Devon Archer, a Hunter Biden associate who was jailed in February 2022 in New York for his role in a scheme to defraud a Native American tribe of $60 million.

Both Hunter Biden and Archer were hired in April 2014 around the time Zlochevsky’s funds were seized in London. Although Hunter’s appointment wasn’t announced until May 12, 2014, Burisma posted a picture of Archer and Joe Biden on its website on April 17, 2014. The picture had been taken a day earlier at the White House.

During Hunter’s first year at Burisma, the company allegedly paid a $7 million bribe to Ukraine’s chief prosecutors’ office to help shut the UK investigation into Zlochevsky, according to a State Department email. The Ukrainian prosecutor’s office subsequently sent a letter to its UK counterparts stating there was no longer an active case against Zlochevsky. UK prosecutors were then forced to release Zlochevsky’s previously seized funds.

Notably, at the time the alleged bribe was paid in late 2014, Hunter Biden was listed by Burisma as the head of the company’s legal unit. The chief prosecutor, Vitaly Yarema, had previously served as the first vice prime minister of Ukraine following the 2014 U.S.-led coup. Yarema suddenly resigned in February 2015, barely two months later. Yarema’s replacement, Viktor Shokin, was brought out of retirement to become prosecutor general of Ukraine.

Initially, Shokin’s appointment was welcomed by U.S. officials, although he suddenly fell out of U.S. favor in late 2015—around the same time the head of Burisma’s board, Vadym Pozharskyi, emailed Hunter Biden on Nov. 2, 2015. In the email, Pozharskyi pressed Hunter Biden to produce “deliverables,” stating that the “ultimate purpose” was to “close down any cases or pursuits” against Burisma owner Zlochevsky in Ukraine.

Less than three weeks later, Joe Biden began demanding the removal of Shokin, who by this time had restarted the investigation into Zlochevsky and had also successfully sought an order from Ukrainian courts to seize Zlochevsky’s assets. Less than seven weeks after the seizure of Zlochevsky’s assets, on March 29, 2016, Shokin was fired.

Biden later famously bragged that he had leveraged $1 billion in U.S. government loan guarantees to force Shokin’s removal. To this day, Shokin has never been charged with any wrongdoing.

Joe Biden was privately warned by Amos Hochstein, a U.S. special envoy, about Hunter’s association with a corrupt oligarch. Biden is said to have ignored the warnings.

Clinton Campaign’s RussiaGate Hoax Further Impaired Relations
It was against this political backdrop, with Ukraine destabilized and Russia angered by a U.S.-backed coup, that Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign made the fateful decision to accuse Russia of interfering in the 2016 presidential election for the purposes of helping then-candidate Donald Trump. Clinton and her campaign’s politically driven accusations further impaired already-strained U.S.–Russia relations, and the effects of her actions are being felt to this day.

The use of Russia for the attack on Trump was two-pronged. First, the Clinton campaign hired British ex-spy Christopher Steele to write a fabricated dossier that portrayed Trump as a compromised puppet of the Kremlin. In order to provide backing for the dossier’s claims, operatives created a false data trail that purported to show communications between Trump and the Kremlin. In doing so, the Clinton campaign’s operatives fabricated false evidence of collusion between a candidate for president and the Kremlin.

These actions would continue after Trump became president, as evidenced by a Clinton campaign lawyer’s visit to the CIA to hand over more data from these same operatives in February 2017, as revealed in a court filing by special counsel John Durham.

But it wasn’t only the political campaign of Clinton that was making these accusations. The Intelligence Community, acting in a dangerous geopolitical game, assisted the Clinton campaign by backing her claims that Russia was interfering in our elections in order to help Trump.

The Clinton campaign’s creation of the false Trump–Russia collusion narrative, which culminated in the inclusion of Steele’s fictitious dossier in an official intelligence community assessment, effectively tied Trump’s hands with respect to dealings with Russia—raising serious national security implications.

The resulting myopic focus on Russia also shifted our nation’s attention away from a far more dangerous adversary, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

False Claims of Russia Laptop Plot
Four years later, during the 2020 presidential election, the Biden campaign introduced its own claims that Russia was meddling in the election, again in order to assist Trump.

When Hunter Biden’s abandoned hard drive emerged in the months preceding the election, it contained a litany of damaging emails and other incriminating information on the Biden family, including the Nov. 2, 2015, email from the head of Burisma’s board demanding that Hunter Biden shut down the investigations into Burisma’s owner. The laptop also contained other damaging information, including the younger Biden’s entanglements with the CCP.

Although the corporate media and major social media platforms immediately restricted—or in some cases, outright banned—sharing of articles regarding the laptop story, Trump publicly raised the issue during the second presidential debate on Oct. 22, 2020. In response, Biden chose to blame Russia for the emergence of his son’s hard drive.

Biden’s assertion traced back to similar claims from the highest levels of our intelligence community, including former CIA Director John Brennan, who claimed in a joint statement that Hunter Biden’s laptop “has all the classic earmarks of a Russian information operation.”

As it turned out later, the Hunter emails were authentic and not a Russian plot.

Adding to an already tense geopolitical situation, Biden held out NATO membership to Ukraine as recently as December, as did his secretary of state, Antony Blinken. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin went even further, saying the door was open to Ukraine for NATO membership during an October 2021 trip to Ukraine.

These promises, which were sure to provoke Russia, lay in stark contrast to the warnings from Biden’s own CIA director, who had previously stated that NATO membership for Ukraine was the “brightest of all red lines” for Russia.

The overarching national security goal of the United States should have centered around preventing Russia and China from forming further alliances. The vilification of Russia, driven in part by the self-serving actions of top U.S. officials such as Clinton and Biden, seriously undermined that goal.

With the outbreak of war in Ukraine and consequent total isolation of Russia from the West, that goal is no longer attainable.

The likely outcome is that Russia and China will grow even closer.
Title: Why we fight in Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 16, 2022, 10:38:10 PM
https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/118/111/257/original/bf604d80069d0fdc.jpg

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Title: Re: ET: Ten years of American fukkery in Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on October 17, 2022, 06:08:00 AM
"The deterioration in our relations with Russia, in many ways, started with President George W. Bush in 2008, when he dangled before Ukraine the promise of NATO membership during the Bucharest declaration, boldly claiming, “We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.”


   - Again, no mention of context, nearly a decade of Russian "belligerence and "bullying of its neighbors".

Botched and bungled by the Americans, doesn't mean Ukraine wasn't within its right of self defense and sovereignty to seek outside alliances for protection against an aggressor. IMHO.


"Although Russian President Vladimir Putin is rightly deserving of blame, "

   - Yet these accounts never seem to pin blame on Putin.
Title: Re: ET: Ten years of American fukkery in Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 17, 2022, 06:56:47 AM
"The deterioration in our relations with Russia, in many ways, started with President George W. Bush in 2008, when he dangled before Ukraine the promise of NATO membership during the Bucharest declaration, boldly claiming, “We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.”


   - Again, no mention of context, nearly a decade of Russian "belligerence and "bullying of its neighbors".

Botched and bungled by the Americans, doesn't mean Ukraine wasn't within its right of self defense and sovereignty to seek outside alliances for protection against an aggressor. IMHO.


"Although Russian President Vladimir Putin is rightly deserving of blame, "

   - Yet these accounts never seem to pin blame on Putin.
"Ukraine wasn't within its right of self defense and sovereignty"

Like the Orange Revolution?

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/26/ukraine.usa

But while the gains of the orange-bedecked "chestnut revolution" are Ukraine's, the campaign is an American creation, a sophisticated and brilliantly conceived exercise in western branding and mass marketing that, in four countries in four years, has been used to try to salvage rigged elections and topple unsavoury regimes.

Funded and organised by the US government, deploying US consultancies, pollsters, diplomats, the two big American parties and US non-government organisations, the campaign was first used in Europe in Belgrade in 2000 to beat Slobodan Milosevic at the ballot box.

Richard Miles, the US ambassador in Belgrade, played a key role. And by last year, as US ambassador in Tbilisi, he repeated the trick in Georgia, coaching Mikhail Saakashvili in how to bring down Eduard Shevardnadze.

Ten months after the success in Belgrade, the US ambassador in Minsk, Michael Kozak, a veteran of similar operations in central America, notably in Nicaragua, organised a near identical campaign to try to defeat the Belarus hardman, Alexander Lukashenko.

That one failed. "There will be no Kostunica in Belarus," the Belarus president declared, referring to the victory in Belgrade.

But experience gained in Serbia, Georgia and Belarus has been invaluable in plotting to beat the regime of Leonid Kuchma in Kiev.

The operation - engineering democracy through the ballot box and civil disobedience - is now so slick that the methods have matured into a template for winning other people's elections.

If the above seems familiar, it's because they did the same thing here in 2020.

Title: If we don't pump money and weapons into Ukraine...
Post by: G M on October 17, 2022, 07:26:27 AM
How will the MIC get paid? How will the DC Uniparty get the sweet no-show jobs for their kids?


https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/118/160/467/original/8fd54ecbff000c68.jpg

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Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 17, 2022, 07:28:24 AM
A regular poster on my FB page responds to my posting of something by Michael Yon:
===================

I'm not sure how he can say that the Ukraine is a nation of uneducated thugs. First, and foremost Ukraine is also home to over 800 institutes of higher education and has a varied economy, concentrated mostly in and around big cities such as Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Lviv and Odessa.

Putinbots often malign the Ukraine as a neo Nazi state which simply isn't true, except in the minds of Putin and pro Russia Americans. Putin said we must cull the neo Nazi's from the Ukraine. However, during Ukraine's post-Soviet history, the far-right has remained on the political periphery and been largely excluded from national politics since independence in 1991. Unlike most Eastern European countries which saw far-right groups become permanent fixtures in their countries' politics during the decline and fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the national electoral support for far-right parties in Ukraine only rarely exceeded 3% of the popular vote.

Third, while Russia is currently trying to take down the Ukraine power grid, and starve it's citizens. The truth is that Ukrainian soldiers are being equipped with cold weather clothes and gear from cold weather countries like Sweden, Finland, and Canada. At the moment at least two nations are training Ukrainian conscripts to fight through the winter. (Germany and England) Meanwhile and with winter approaching aid organization are gearing up to make sure Ukrainian civilians make it through. Using a total of 27 cargo trucks, UNICEF was able to access the southern Ukrainian city and preposition water purification equipment, sanitation and hygiene supplies, to prevent sickness due to lack of clean water and sanitation – a major threat to vulnerable families caught in war.

Around 110,000 people will benefit said UNICEF, from the filters and chemicals which were part of the aid delivery, along with hygiene kits which should help keep some 14,000 children healthy. “UNICEF is delivering life-saving supplies to important areas including Odessa and surrounds, so they can quickly respond to the most vulnerable families who are affected by the ongoing fighting and shelling in eastern Ukraine,” said UNICEF Ukraine Representative Murat Sahin.

“Provision of safe water supplies and hygiene kits will help an estimated 50,000 children stay healthy in these challenging circumstances.”

As well as Odesa city, these supplies will be delivered to regions close to the fighting, including Mykolaiv, which has come under heavy shelling in recent weeks. Additionally, the supplies will contribute to improving the living conditions of internally displaced families and children, many of whom have fled to Odessa from war-affected districts. "

€19,088,108 WORTH OF AID

As the Russian war in Ukraine nears its six-month anniversary, aid is constantly changing and adapting to the needs on the ground. Two hundred of our colleagues are working in Ukraine, where we have a presence in nearly every region. Currently, our primary focus is on distributing direct financial assistance to internal refugees and other people at risk. We continue to provide food aid, especially in the south, where people fleeing fighting in other areas of Ukraine have sought safety. We have started to provide ready meals in collective centres, and we continue to supply drinking water to people living near the front line. We are also preparing for the winter—we know from our experiences in other war-torn countries that it is vital to prepare for the winter months well in advance.

In the last month alone, we have delivered non-perishable food for 7,600 people and jerry cans of drinking water for 7,100 people to the Kharkiv region. Similarly, in the Dnipropetrovsk region, 6,000 people received help from us, and another 3,200 people were provided with hygiene supplies. We delivered 124 beds with mattresses and bedding to collective centres. However, we are not only focusing on eastern Ukraine; in Kyiv and the surrounding villages, we have delivered food for 11,000 people and to almost 30,000 people in the north. https://reliefweb.int/.../repairing-9000-houses-and-water...

I could go on, but in short the writer of the blog might be a reporter, but right now all he is delivering is Russian based propaganda. Propaganda ments to convince people to give up, even though Russia is losing the war. The Ukrainian people are used to cold winter, after all it is their country. And with the help of it's NATO neighbors, and organizations like UNICEF, reliefweb and others the Ukraine will make it through the winter in far better shape than Russia, and her ill armed, and clothed soldiers....
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 17, 2022, 07:35:38 AM
It's hard to say who will steal more of the relief supplies, UNICEF or the local mafiyas.

 :roll:

A regular poster on my FB page responds to my posting of something by Michael Yon:
===================

I'm not sure how he can say that the Ukraine is a nation of uneducated thugs. First, and foremost Ukraine is also home to over 800 institutes of higher education and has a varied economy, concentrated mostly in and around big cities such as Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Lviv and Odessa.

Putinbots often malign the Ukraine as a neo Nazi state which simply isn't true, except in the minds of Putin and pro Russia Americans. Putin said we must cull the neo Nazi's from the Ukraine. However, during Ukraine's post-Soviet history, the far-right has remained on the political periphery and been largely excluded from national politics since independence in 1991. Unlike most Eastern European countries which saw far-right groups become permanent fixtures in their countries' politics during the decline and fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the national electoral support for far-right parties in Ukraine only rarely exceeded 3% of the popular vote.

Third, while Russia is currently trying to take down the Ukraine power grid, and starve it's citizens. The truth is that Ukrainian soldiers are being equipped with cold weather clothes and gear from cold weather countries like Sweden, Finland, and Canada. At the moment at least two nations are training Ukrainian conscripts to fight through the winter. (Germany and England) Meanwhile and with winter approaching aid organization are gearing up to make sure Ukrainian civilians make it through. Using a total of 27 cargo trucks, UNICEF was able to access the southern Ukrainian city and preposition water purification equipment, sanitation and hygiene supplies, to prevent sickness due to lack of clean water and sanitation – a major threat to vulnerable families caught in war.

Around 110,000 people will benefit said UNICEF, from the filters and chemicals which were part of the aid delivery, along with hygiene kits which should help keep some 14,000 children healthy. “UNICEF is delivering life-saving supplies to important areas including Odessa and surrounds, so they can quickly respond to the most vulnerable families who are affected by the ongoing fighting and shelling in eastern Ukraine,” said UNICEF Ukraine Representative Murat Sahin.

“Provision of safe water supplies and hygiene kits will help an estimated 50,000 children stay healthy in these challenging circumstances.”

As well as Odesa city, these supplies will be delivered to regions close to the fighting, including Mykolaiv, which has come under heavy shelling in recent weeks. Additionally, the supplies will contribute to improving the living conditions of internally displaced families and children, many of whom have fled to Odessa from war-affected districts. "

€19,088,108 WORTH OF AID

As the Russian war in Ukraine nears its six-month anniversary, aid is constantly changing and adapting to the needs on the ground. Two hundred of our colleagues are working in Ukraine, where we have a presence in nearly every region. Currently, our primary focus is on distributing direct financial assistance to internal refugees and other people at risk. We continue to provide food aid, especially in the south, where people fleeing fighting in other areas of Ukraine have sought safety. We have started to provide ready meals in collective centres, and we continue to supply drinking water to people living near the front line. We are also preparing for the winter—we know from our experiences in other war-torn countries that it is vital to prepare for the winter months well in advance.

In the last month alone, we have delivered non-perishable food for 7,600 people and jerry cans of drinking water for 7,100 people to the Kharkiv region. Similarly, in the Dnipropetrovsk region, 6,000 people received help from us, and another 3,200 people were provided with hygiene supplies. We delivered 124 beds with mattresses and bedding to collective centres. However, we are not only focusing on eastern Ukraine; in Kyiv and the surrounding villages, we have delivered food for 11,000 people and to almost 30,000 people in the north. https://reliefweb.int/.../repairing-9000-houses-and-water...

I could go on, but in short the writer of the blog might be a reporter, but right now all he is delivering is Russian based propaganda. Propaganda ments to convince people to give up, even though Russia is losing the war. The Ukrainian people are used to cold winter, after all it is their country. And with the help of it's NATO neighbors, and organizations like UNICEF, reliefweb and others the Ukraine will make it through the winter in far better shape than Russia, and her ill armed, and clothed soldiers....
Title: Re: If we don't pump money and weapons into Ukraine...
Post by: DougMacG on October 17, 2022, 12:09:16 PM
$9 trillion for Iraq and Afghan wars does not add up, right?  If false, it should come down.

Title: Re: If we don't pump money and weapons into Ukraine...
Post by: G M on October 17, 2022, 09:38:45 PM
$9 trillion for Iraq and Afghan wars does not add up, right?  If false, it should come down.

Feel free to contact Joe Kent to see his source for that number. I did send him 100 bucks for his campaign.
Title: Fight to the last Ukrainian!
Post by: G M on October 18, 2022, 08:58:47 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/one-third-ukraines-power-stations-destroyed-who-warns-brutal-winter-coming

Make the world safe for No-show jobs for the DC Uniparty's children !
Title: Re: Fight to the last Ukrainian!
Post by: DougMacG on October 18, 2022, 09:20:33 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/one-third-ukraines-power-stations-destroyed-who-warns-brutal-winter-coming

Make the world safe for No-show jobs for the DC Uniparty's children !

Another Putin war crime against civilians. 

As an aside, I noticed that the return of US troops from Iraq and Afghanistan didn't make the US southern border more secure or shrink the deficit.  Weird.
Title: Re: Fight to the last Ukrainian!
Post by: G M on October 18, 2022, 09:44:05 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/one-third-ukraines-power-stations-destroyed-who-warns-brutal-winter-coming

Make the world safe for No-show jobs for the DC Uniparty's children !

Another Putin war crime against civilians. 

As an aside, I noticed that the return of US troops from Iraq and Afghanistan didn't make the US southern border more secure or shrink the deficit.  Weird.

Was it a war crime when we took out Iraq’s infrastructure in the opening of the Iraq war?

Putin tried to avoid this, we forced it to this point.

This is on NATO and the deep state/GAE.
Title: GPF: Belarus feeling froggy
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 18, 2022, 05:07:33 PM
In Ukraine, a Russia-Belarus Troop Deployment Fuels Fears of a Northern Incursion
8 MIN READOct 18, 2022 | 20:34 GMT


Russia and Belarus will seek to further grow the threat to Ukraine's northern border in the coming weeks, but a Russian ground invasion from Belarus or Belarusian forces joining the war remains unlikely because of Belarus's own calculations. A surge of military activity in Belarus over the past week is fueling fears in neighboring Ukraine that Russia is preparing to launch a renewed thrust toward Kyiv — potentially with the help of Belarusian forces. The week began with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko's Oct. 10 announcement that he had agreed to deploy a joint contingent of Russian and Belarusian forces in response to alleged threats from Ukraine. On Oct. 14, Lukashenko then announced the introduction of a ''counter-terrorist operation regime'' — the implications of which are unclear — and that the deployment of the new Russia-Belarus joint force group, including to his country's southern borders, was connected to an ''elevated terrorist threat'' and alleged ''aggravations'' from NATO and Ukrainian forces. On Oct. 15, the Belarusian defense ministry said the first Russian soldiers who will take part in the new joint force had arrived in the country, and on Oct. 16 claimed that nearly 9,000 Russian soldiers would be deployed to Belarus as part of the new regional grouping of Russian and Belarusian troops in accordance with the two countries' alliance, known as the Union State alliance. The deployment and other factors — such as rumors that Belarus is conducting a military mobilization — have raised concerns that Russia is readying to launch another offensive against Kyiv after failing to seize the Ukrainian capital earlier this year, and that Belarus is also readying to effectively join the war on Russia's side.

On Oct. 13, the Belarusian opposition newspaper Nasha Nivathat reported that Lukashenko had decided to conduct a ''covert mobilization'' under the guise of checking military fitness and summoning conscripts among rural Belarusians, citing unnamed sources in the president's administration. The report came a day after Belarus's parliament approved legal changes canceling military draft deferments for students abroad who were not sent to foreign education institutions by the state.

Russian forces' buildup in Belarus is likely intended to draw some Ukrainian military resources from the south to the north, free up Russia's own training grounds, and use the threat of an invasion from the north to gain leverage during potential peace negotiations with Kyiv. On Oct. 14, Russian President Vladimir Putin griped that the negotiation process with Ukraine had stopped immediately after Russian troops withdrew from northern Ukraine at the end of March. If Putin believes that Russia's retreat from Kyiv earlier this year prompted Ukraine to abandon peace talks, he may also believe that weakening Ukraine's position and forcing it back to the negotiating table can be best achieved in the near-to-medium term by threatening Ukraine's capital again — or at least cultivating this perception in order to make the threat appear more plausible in coming weeks. For Moscow, a higher number of Russian troops in Belarus or the possibility of Belarus joining the invasion helps maintain the threat of an assault on Kyiv. Additionally, Russia likely views Belarus as a preferred location to train its newly drafted Russian reservists (and, in turn, reduce and prevent overcrowding at its own bases and training grounds) amid Moscow's ongoing military mobilization. To that end, the joint contingent and Belarus's threatening actions could force Kyiv to deploy some of its reserves toward Belarus rather than along the front in southern Ukraine. Such a diversion of Ukrainian resources, so Moscow hopes, may help Russian forces stop Ukrainian advances and seize the initiative in the south, as Russia's newly mobilized troops eventually reach the front in the coming weeks and months.

During the G-7 summit on Oct. 11, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky proposed deploying a mission of peacekeepers on his country's northern border to rule out possible provocations against Ukraine from Russian or Belarusian forces in Belarus.

Belarus, for its part, is agreeing to increase the threat to northern Ukraine in exchange for Russian economic support. While Belarus has supported Russia since the start of the war, Ukraine never perceived Minsk's role in the conflict as a serious threat. But Belarus's recent activity suggests it's trying to change that assumption, as Minsk tries to increase its support for Russia and obtain additional political and economic concessions without intervening directly in the conflict. In fact, the deployment of the Russian-Belarusian joint force group to the Ukrainian border came after Lukashenko and Putin met in Sochi on Sept. 26-27 to discuss deepening their countries' economic, security and political cooperation. During those meetings, Lukashenko likely received Putin's preliminary approval for the $1.5 billion ''import replacement'' loan from Russia that Minsk announced it had secured on Oct. 7 — just days before the announcement of Russia's new troop deployment to Belarus. This indicates that Lukashenko is increasing the perceived threat of his forces joining the war against Ukraine in exchange for additional financial support from Russia to prop up Belarus's heavily sanctioned economy. But for such an arrangement to be worth its cost for Russia, Minsk must follow Moscow's instruction to maintain the credibility of that threat, hence the surge in military activity immediately following the loan's announcement.

On Oct. 9, videos from Belarusian media showed 28 Ural trucks and 8 T-72 tanks moving from Belarus to Russia, which analysts later determined were destined for eastern Ukraine. The incident was the latest example of Russia removing materials from Belarusian stockpiles, and strongly suggests Belarus is not preparing to actually join the fight in Ukraine, as moving precious equipment out of the country is not a rational action for a nation preparing to go to war.

On Sept. 16, as part of the two states' further integration within the Union State, Russia and Belarus signed a draft agreement on a general harmonization on the collection of the value-added tax and excise duties. The move was widely interpreted as giving Russia control over Belarus's tax customs policies and underscores Minsk's increasing reliance on Moscow.

Russia is unlikely to quickly accumulate enough forces to launch a successful attack against Kyiv, which will reduce the immediate risk of a renewed Russian thrust into northern Ukraine through Belarus. According to NATO estimates, at least 30,000 Russian troops — including many of Russia's most elite units — took part in Russia's attempt to seize the Ukrainian capital in the early stages of the war, which failed despite Kyiv being relatively undefended, as most of Ukraine's equipment and experienced soldiers were concentrated in the country's east at the time. The Russian forces now arriving in Belarus, by contrast, appear to be largely composed of newly mobilized Russian forces, and they are arriving at Belarusian training grounds largely bereft of heavy equipment. On Oct. 14, Lukashenko also said that ''demanding 10,000-15,000 soldiers from Russia'' was not necessary at this time — suggesting that Russia may begin with a relatively small deployment of roughly that size, even if it becomes larger in the coming months. In addition, Ukraine's forces are currently better equipped and fortified than they were when Russia first tried to take Kyiv, which further indicates the current Russian troops in Belarus are unlikely to succeed where their predecessors failed. In fact, the number of Russian forces needed to realize another attack on the Ukrainian capital would be much better used in the more favorable terrain of southeastern Ukraine than the swampy marshes between Kyiv and Belarus. Moreover, while Russia will still seek to grow the threat of an attack on Kyiv in the coming weeks and months with many more forces and equipment, Ukraine and the West will likely have ample warning to prepare and neutralize this threat.

Belarus remains unlikely to join the war because its forces cannot guarantee a Russian victory, while their participation would destabilize Belarus and leave Lukashenko without leverage vis-a-vis Moscow. The Belarusian armed forces total just around 48,000 combat personnel and are poorly equipped and inexperienced. This force is widely believed incapable of altering the trajectory of the war by successfully attacking Ukraine alongside Russian forces — even if Belarus conducts mobilization to bring tens of thousands of poorly motivated additional soldiers into the war. Lukashenko would likely only consider joining the war if he believed his forces could actually ensure a decisive Russian victory and force Kyiv to accept the loss of its territory, and, ideally, prompt some sort of pro-Russian regime change in Kyiv. But Lukashenko likely does not believe his forces could accomplish this, and it is unclear what Putin could offer to convince Lukashenko to bring Belarusian troops into the war. Coercion of Lukashenko — by, for example, withholding economic support or forcing Belarus into the war — would likely only further destabilize Lukashenko's regime, and make keeping Belarus in Moscow's orbit more politically tenuous and expensive. Lukashenko is only likely to bring his country into the war if he believes it's necessary to preserve his own regime (and, by extension, Putin's) and ensure a Russian victory, but both of these conditions are currently unsatisfied and will likely remain so. Therefore, Minsk and Moscow are likely to engage in provocative military deployments and maneuvers in Belarus and possibly even false-flag attacks on its own soil to increase the perceived threat, but Belarus remains unlikely to join the war because the potential benefits are extremely limited, while the risks for Minsk and Moscow are enormous.
Title: Our brave Uke freedom fighters!
Post by: G M on October 18, 2022, 05:54:13 PM
https://summit.news/2022/10/16/elon-musk-alarmed-after-apparent-inclusion-on-well-known-ukrainian-kill-list/
Title: An Indian take on the Rus-Uke war
Post by: G M on October 18, 2022, 06:52:45 PM
https://www.theburningplatform.com/2022/10/18/india-opines-on-the-russia-404-war/#more-282411
Title: WT: Putin weaponizes winter against Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 19, 2022, 01:43:09 AM
Putin weaponizes winter against civilians

Drones, missiles take out power, clean water in cities across Ukraine

BY BEN WOLFGANG THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Russian forces on Tuesday accelerated their assault on Ukrainian power and water infrastructure in what Pentagon officials called a concerted effort “to inflict pain” on civilians as winter looms.

Whether it will be enough to turn the tide of a military campaign that has gone badly for the Kremlin is another question.

Russian drones and missiles hit the capital of Kyiv and other key cities across Ukraine, specifically power plants and other infrastructure. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said 30% of his country’s power stations had been destroyed over eight days, leading to rolling blackouts.

The calculated attacks, Western defense officials said, are the latest proof of Moscow’s evolving war plan in Ukraine. Having lost significant ground to a military counteroffensive, Russian President Vladimir Putin is embracing a darker strategy of cutting off Ukrainian citizens’ access to basic services such as electricity and clean water as winter sets in, Western officials said.

Kyiv and other cities in central and western Ukraine that were relatively quiet after the initial Russian invasion was repulsed are once again facing daily reminders that their country is at war.

The increasingly brutal attacks on nonmilitary targets appear to have slammed shut whatever window may have been open for diplomatic negotiations on a cease-fire.

“Another kind of Russian terrorist attacks: targeting [Ukraine’s] energy and critical infrastructure,” Mr. Zelenskyy said in a Twitter post. “No space left for negotiations with Putin’s regime.”

Some of Russia’s offensive military arsenal has been drained after nearly eight months of war, but Western officials say Mr. Putin has partially replenished his stockpiles with deliveries of combat drones from Iran. Those “kamikaze” drones have played a crucial role in Russia’s attacks on civilian targets, and Tehran appears poised to ramp up its military assistance.

Ukraine and its Western allies have widely

dismissed Russian and Iranian denials of the weapons pipeline.

Citing multiple Iranian officials, Reuters reported Tuesday that Iran agreed to ship more ground-based missiles and armed drones to the Russian military. The shipments include the short-range Zolfaghar ballistic missiles and Shahed- 136 drones. The drones have been central to Russia’s attacks on Kyiv and other cities.

Despite videos displaying what appear to be clear signs of Iranian missile technology from targeted Ukrainian cities, officials in Tehran insisted Tuesday that they are not taking sides in the conflict and simply want peace.

“Where [the weapons] are being used is not the seller’s issue. We do not take sides in the Ukraine crisis like the West. We want an end to the crisis through diplomatic means,” an Iranian diplomat told Reuters.

British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace made a hastily arranged visit to Washington, reportedly to share intelligence on the emerging Russian-Iranian nexus. According to speculation, the drone and missile shipments could result in a full suspension of the faltering talks with Iran over reviving the 2015 nuclear deal repudiated by President Trump.

The Russian attacks have given new urgency to Mr. Zelenskyy’s plea for the West to provide a comprehensive air shield that could neutralize Moscow’s ballistic missile capabilities and its expanding fleet of Iranian drones. Pentagon officials said they were in contact with Kyiv and would work to bolster Ukraine’s air defense systems, though it was not clear how quickly fresh capabilities might arrive on the front lines.

“This is not something new for Russia. They continue to inflict damage on innocent civilians, on civilian infrastructure, as they fail to achieve their strategic objectives along the front line,” Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder told reporters at the Pentagon on Tuesday.

“They’re obviously trying to inflict pain on the civilian society as well as try to have an impact on Ukrainian forces. What we’ve seen so far is Ukrainian resiliency in their ability to get things like their power grids back online quickly,” he said. “In the meantime, our focus will continue to be on working with them to identify what their needs are, to include things like air defense. We’ll work to try to get those capabilities to them as quickly as possible.”

The situation appears most dire in eastern Ukraine, the epicenter of fighting. In the Donetsk province — which Russia claims to have annexed but which officially remains a part of Ukraine — local authorities have urged residents to evacuate as soon as possible. Gas and water services, they said, likely will not be restored by winter.

Near-constant fighting in the northeastern city of Kharkiv and other major population centers have destroyed infrastructure and badly damaged homes. In addition to the massive challenges facing Ukraine’s power generation system, many roofs, doors and windows are damaged or destroyed.

Western military observers said the shift in Russian strategy stems from frustration. Mr. Putin’s army, previously considered one of the world’s best, has made repeated missteps and strategic blunders in Ukraine. At home, anger toward the war effort has grown steadily over the past several months. It reached a near fever pitch last month after Mr. Putin announced the call-up of as many as 300,000 reservists to refill Russia’s depleted ranks in Ukraine.

The wave of air attacks targeting Ukrainian citizens has coincided with Mr. Putin’s appointment of Gen. Sergei Surovikin as the commander of what Russian officials still refer to as the “special military operation.”

In his first television interview since his appointment, Gen. Surovikin effectively confirmed that Ukrainian advances in the east and south had put Russian defenders on their heels.

“The enemy continually attempts to attack the positions of Russian troops,” Gen. Surovikin said. He acknowledged that the situation was particularly difficult around the southern city of Kherson, which Russian occupying forces were struggling to hold.

“Further actions and plans regarding the city of Kherson will depend on the developing military-tactical situation, which is not easy,” the general said. “We will act consciously, in a timely manner, without ruling out difficult decisions.”

With prospects for a decisive battlefi eld victory dwindling, Mr. Putin now appears set on using winter’s chill as an ally in defeating Ukraine, or at least ensuring so much misery for the population that Mr. Zelenskyy’s government will make concessions to Moscow. “It is highly likely that a key objective of [the Russian attacks] is to cause widespread damage to Ukraine’s energy distribution network. As Russia has suffered battlefield setbacks since August, it has highly likely gained a greater willingness to strike civilian infrastructure in addition to Ukrainian military targets,” the British Defense Ministry said in a Twitter post.

As Ukraine prepares for winter, other parts of Europe are facing their own potential energy crisis after Russia slashed natural gas deliveries to the continent this year. Europe’s energy supply faces more uncertainty after explosions last month rocked the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, which stretch from Russia to Europe.

Some European officials have publicly suggested that Russia is responsible for the explosions, but the Kremlin has denied involvement.

Danish police said Tuesday that the two pipelines sustained “extensive damage” and at least 165 feet of metal pipe appear to be missing.

“It is very serious, and this is by no means a coincidence. It doesn’t just seem planned, but very well planned,” Danish Defense Minister Morten Bodskov said
Title: Re: WT: Putin weaponizes winter against Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on October 19, 2022, 07:36:45 AM
"As Russia has suffered battlefield setbacks since August, it has highly likely gained a greater willingness to strike civilian infrastructure in addition to Ukrainian military targets,” the British Defense Ministry said..."


Putin couldn't defeat the military so now he targets the civilians.  Starving people and freezing people are his objectives.

They should reserve a chair for him at The Hague, and hopefully someone can deliver him there.

The "bridge", BTW, was a military target, and to my knowledge Ukraine has attacked nothing in Russia.

The only attacks outside the border of Ukraine were to the pipelines - and we don't know who did it.
Title: Re: WT: Putin weaponizes winter against Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 19, 2022, 09:10:40 AM
It's totally different when we do it!

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/06/23/allied-air-war-struck-broadly-in-iraq/e469877b-b1c1-44a9-bfe7-084da4e38e41/

"As Russia has suffered battlefield setbacks since August, it has highly likely gained a greater willingness to strike civilian infrastructure in addition to Ukrainian military targets,” the British Defense Ministry said..."


Putin couldn't defeat the military so now he targets the civilians.  Starving people and freezing people are his objectives.

They should reserve a chair for him at The Hague, and hopefully someone can deliver him there.

The "bridge", BTW, was a military target, and to my knowledge Ukraine has attacked nothing in Russia.

The only attacks outside the border of Ukraine were to the pipelines - and we don't know who did it.
Title: Re: WT: Putin weaponizes winter against Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on October 19, 2022, 10:19:03 AM
Comparable winter - in Iraq?  Seriously?

Gulf War I, we went too far liberating Kuwait?  We targeted civilians?  No we didn't. 

What is the analogy?  WE WEREN'T THE INVADING FORCE. 

Was it Kuwait's fault? Angle drilling?  Were they really a province of Saddam's?

Given the opportunity to blame current war on Putin I hear crickets.  But blame America for allegedly going too far in the liberation of a sovereign country is somehow comparable? 

I beg to differ.
Title: Re: WT: Putin weaponizes winter against Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 19, 2022, 10:45:44 AM
Did any Iraqi civilians die as a result of us targeting the infrastructure?

Comparable winter - in Iraq?  Seriously?

Gulf War I, we went too far liberating Kuwait?  We targeted civilians?  No we didn't. 

What is the analogy?  WE WEREN'T THE INVADING FORCE. 

Was it Kuwait's fault? Angle drilling?  Were they really a province of Saddam's?

Given the opportunity to blame current war on Putin I hear crickets.  But blame America for allegedly going too far in the liberation of a sovereign country is somehow comparable? 

I beg to differ.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 19, 2022, 10:53:23 AM
I agree with Doug that the moral bases of these two cases are quite different, but as far as the Rules of War go, it does seem fair to note our actions as well.

I do want to make clear though that there is nothing close to moral parity between what we did in Iraq, and what Putin does in Ukraine (and did in Grozny and elsewhere).  America's record of morality in war is one of which to be quite proud.

PS:  Just watched Gen. Keane talking about Russian bunker busters being used on hospitals etc.
Title: General Winter on the march in Ukraine
Post by: G M on October 20, 2022, 10:01:05 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/ukrainians-asked-reduce-power-usage-warned-rolling-blackouts
Title: They must have been reading Zeihan
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 21, 2022, 04:57:29 PM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/russia-planning-mass-withdrawal-to-avoid-devastating-rout-in-ukraine-isw/ar-AA13dzS0?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=8f52af46bcd14b709badaef5eaf78222
Title: D1: Iranians in Ukraine, more
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 21, 2022, 07:21:50 PM
Second

October 21, 2022   
         
The White House says Iranian troops are in occupied Crimea directly advising Russian forces during drone attacks inside Ukraine. "Russian military personnel that are based in Crimea have been piloting Iranian UAVs, using them to conduct strikes across Ukraine, including strikes against Kyiv in just recent days," retired Navy Rear Adm. John Kirby of the National Security Council said Thursday. "We assess that Iranian military personnel were on the ground in Crimea and assisted Russia in these operations," he alleged in a call with reporters.

Kirby also flagged allegations Moscow is acquiring ballistic missiles from Tehran. The U.S., he said, is especially "concerned that Russia may also seek to acquire advanced conventional weapons from Iran, such as surface-to-surface missiles that will almost certainly be used to support the war against Ukraine."

"The fact is this: Tehran is now directly engaged on the ground and through the provision of weapons that are impacting civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine," Kirby said Thursday. "In fact, they are killing civilians and destroying civilian infrastructure in Ukraine," he said, drawing attention to the seemingly deliberate campaign to destroy or significantly degrade Ukraine's electricity grid, as we've noted several times in our newsletter this week.

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However, "We don't believe it's going to change the course of the war," the former Pentagon spokesman said. "And the other thing that's not going to change is our determination to continue to provide Ukraine with the security assistance and financial assistance that they're going to need to defend themselves."

So, what will the U.S. do about it? Military officials are looking into ways to deliver air defense systems to Ukraine securely, but Kirby cautioned, "I can't tell you today what that's going to look like." (One system to watch: a counter-drone kit known as the Vampire, from L3Harris Technologies, Inc.; but the Wall Street Journal reports it's not at all clear how soon that will even be available.) In the interim, "We're going to continue to vigorously enforce all U.S. sanctions on both the Russian and Iranian arms trade," he said. "We're going to make it harder for Iran to sell these weapons to Russia; we're going to help the Ukrainians have what they need to defend themselves against these threats. And we're going to continue to stand with our partners throughout the Middle East region against the Iranian threat."

The British just added new sanctions on Iran for its drone attacks in Ukraine, which violate United Nations Security Council resolutions (2231, in particular). "By supplying these drones Iran is actively warmongering, profiting off Russia's abhorrent attacks on Ukrainian citizens, and adding to the suffering of the people and the destruction of critical infrastructure," the British said in a statement Thursday. The new sanctions target three military officials as well as the drone manufacturer, Shahed Aviation Industries. Details here.

The European Union added its own sanctions to the same batch of entities, the bloc announced Thursday as well. "This is our clear response to the Iranian regime providing Russia with drones, which it uses to murder innocent Ukrainian citizens," Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala said Thursday. Read over the sanctions here.

The EU also just donated €175 million in humanitarian aid to help Ukraine "get through the winter," Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said Thursday. It's also "providing emergency shelter [to Ukrainians] in the Rivne, Bucha and Kharkiv regions," she announced on Twitter.

=========================

Also see

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/west-and-russia-clash-over-probe-of-drones-in-ukraine/ar-AA13f4Ga?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=f77617aea7874cb68d3080877bfec36c
Title: If only someone had warned us...
Post by: G M on October 24, 2022, 06:43:50 AM
https://twitter.com/RnaudBertrand/status/1498491107902062592
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 24, 2022, 11:34:42 AM
Well curated!
Title: Kherson, and Russian threats to the dam
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 25, 2022, 11:50:10 AM
Very interesting military analysis here


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W3aR2nGJ1gc
Title: US troops already in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 02, 2022, 06:18:15 AM
Obviously, keeping track that what we send them goes to where it should is a most worthy task, but what happens if/when any get killed?

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/pentagon-confirms-us-boots-ground-ukraine-close-front-lines?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1042
Title: GPF: The Battle for Kherson
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 07, 2022, 02:47:18 PM
November 7, 2022
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
The Inevitable Battle for Kherson
Given the region’s strategic importance, neither side is willing to accept defeat.
By: Ridvan Bari Urcosta
In September, Russia was caught off guard when Ukraine launched a counteroffensive in Kharkiv region in the northeast instead of Kherson region in the south. Two months later, indications are that the Kherson offensive is all but ready for launch. Russian authorities ordered the evacuation of tens of thousands of civilians late last month, declared martial law and accused Kyiv of planning a large-scale assault on the region soon. Meanwhile, Kyiv has made advances in recent weeks on the western bank of the Dnieper River, retaking dozens of villages and towns, striking ammunition depots and bridges, while Russia has attacked energy infrastructure and imposed martial law in eastern regions, including Kherson. Though the timing of the strike still isn’t clear, it seems both sides are making preparations for the inevitable.

Why Kherson Matters

Located on the Black Sea and the strategically important Dnieper River, Kherson was one of the first major territories captured by the Russians after Moscow invaded Ukraine. The region, about the size of Belgium, has served as the main gateway to the annexed Crimean peninsula and hosts the biggest port Russia has managed to control in southern Ukraine. Before the war, it was a regional economic hub and home to a major shipbuilding industry. The North Crimean Canal, the main water delivery system for the Russian-annexed Crimean peninsula, also runs through Kherson.

Since February, thousands of Russian troops have been deployed to Kherson as part of Moscow’s push to advance into Mykolaiv and Odesa and seize southern Ukraine. It has been a focal point for Kyiv for months, which is why the Kremlin was taken by surprise when Ukraine’s counteroffensive in September targeted Russian-controlled regions in the northeast instead. Moscow has already lost Kharkiv – and as a result was forced to replace its army commander in charge of the war. It can’t afford to lose Kherson, too.

But Russia is facing both logistical and personnel problems. Its new recruits, acquired through the “partial mobilization,” will need to be trained fast to support troops already deployed to the region. Still, the Russian military is fighting back near Kupyansk and Lyman, building defensive lines from both sides of the Siverskyi Donets River, and continuing offensive operations in Bahamut, Soledar and Ugledar. It’s hoping this strategy will destabilize Ukrainian positions and avoid a concentration of Ukrainian forces near the Kherson region.

Battle Lines, Nov. 4, 2022
(click to enlarge)

For Ukraine, one benefit of taking back Kherson is that it would push Russian forces farther away from other key locations in the south of the country, such as Mykolaiv and Odesa, as well as central Ukraine. Kyiv could also then control the North Crimean Canal. Without control over Kherson region, Russia can’t guarantee water supplies for its annexed peninsula. Kyiv understands that taking away this capability from the Kremlin could instigate a political crisis in Moscow, which could weaken Russia’s resolve and its negotiating position in future talks.

Why the Evacuation Matters

Thus, news about the evacuation of Kherson should be taken seriously. The evacuation was ordered on Oct. 19, just as fighting around Kherson city, the regional capital, intensified. A few days later, on Oct. 24, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu spoke with his counterparts in Britain, France and Turkey, and warned of an “uncontrolled escalation” from Kyiv. The warnings came after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy expressed concern that Moscow was plotting to blow up the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant in the occupied part of Kherson. Russia then accused Kyiv of plotting to destroy the plant’s dam, and said the evacuation of civilians was necessary to protect them from the flooding.

The evacuation plan suggests two important possibilities. First, Russia may be planning to withdraw from Kherson and wants to make sure it doesn’t leave anything important behind – i.e., Russians who were brought over to live in the occupied territory. Second, Russia may actually be increasing its defense capabilities in the region, and wants to clear the area of civilians so the military can better prepare for battle, logistically and otherwise.

The first possibility, however, isn’t likely. There are indications that Russian troops are pulling out of Kherson city: Some administrative buildings are no longer flying the Russian flag, and a Russian-installed official there said on Thursday that Russian troops would likely leave for the eastern bank of the Dnieper River. But a full-scale withdrawal from the region is too risky for Moscow. It would mean acknowledging failure on one of Russia’s most important objectives in the war: controlling Ukraine’s southern coast, including Kherson’s neighboring Mykolaiv region and Odesa. Moreover, the Kremlin couldn’t tolerate the internal political backlash that would result from a full withdrawal, considering the strategic importance of the south.

Both countries are now likely facing a long battle ahead to control Kherson, with both logistical and geographic challenges. The region is located in the Black Sea Lowland, much of which is covered in shrubs and forest, planted as windbreakers to shelter villages located among grain and corn fields. In the summer, the Ukrainian military could hide from Russian artillery and drones in these forests. But it’s now November, and this tactic is no longer feasible.

Moreover, the two major rivers of the region – the Inhulets and the Dnieper – are used by the Russian military as natural defense lines, meaning Ukraine will have to fight in more populated areas to recapture the region. Kherson, however, is mainly rural and one of the least populated regions in Ukraine. It has just two urban centers: the capital and Berislav, a city of just 12,000 people that’s currently under Russian control, as is most of the west-bank of the Dnieper.

Fighting in a low-density area will present challenges for both armies. In such areas, manpower and reconnaissance (i.e., drones and satellite intelligence) are key. Russia will need a greater concentration of forces, and Ukraine will need capabilities that enable its army to advance covertly – in the dark of night, for example. Going from village to village through open plains risks exposure. Both armies will also have to contend with difficult weather conditions. Heavy rain in the fall can make the terrain muddy and hard to penetrate. Winter will also present challenges in terms of moving troops, tanks and equipment.

Long Battle Ahead

Reports suggest that Russia has been preparing for weeks for a Ukrainian offensive in the region. Moscow has reportedly already sent some of its newly mobilized forces to the front line in Kherson. It also reportedly fortified its trenches and positions underground. Ukraine, meanwhile, has been advancing slowly and is likely considering attacking Russian positions elsewhere in the south to increase its chances of success in Kherson, though its ability to sustain heavy fighting in more than one location in the south is unclear.

Despite the apparent retreat of some Russian forces from the regional capital, a battle for Kherson can’t be avoided. Considering the terrain and logistical constraints, it will be a long, grinding affair as neither side is willing to accept defeat. To maintain its strategic advantage in the south, Russia could also resort to other tactics: escalating offensives in other territories, launching airstrikes or using tactical nuclear weapons in low-populated areas. This may explain Kyiv’s hesitance in attacking Russian positions in Kherson. It’s worried about what might follow if it succeeds.
Title: Russian Marines pen letter begging Putin to change strategy
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 07, 2022, 03:15:33 PM
second


https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/the-blood-is-pouring-pouring-russian-marines-pen-letter-begging-vladimir-putin-to-change-strategy-in-ukraine/ar-AA13Q7H4?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=e7b13a943dda4233f760e4898ab3ba92
Title: Stratfor: Russia's Syrian tactics won't work as well in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 08, 2022, 06:59:49 AM
Russia's Scorched-Earth Tactics in Syria Won't Prove as Successful in Ukraine
8 MIN READNov 7, 2022 | 22:25 GMT





In Ukraine, Russia will continue to utilize military tactics learned in Syria, like depopulation and even potentially the use of banned weapons. But without a break in Western support for Kyiv, these tactics will not make a strategic difference in the war, incentivizing Russia's military to increase its pace of attacks on civilian infrastructure and Ukrainian civilians. On Oct. 8, Russia appointed a new military commander for its Ukrainian war — General Sergei Surovikin, whose most recent military experience was in the Syrian civil war in a series of rotations from 2017-2020. Surovikin's appointment led to widespread speculation that in the face of a depleted Russian ground force and successful Ukrainian counterattacks, he would more heavily shift Russia's military tactics to those utilized in its Syrian campaign, like widespread attacks on civilians to displace the population and the potential use of banned weapons like chemical attacks. Indeed, throughout October, Russia began to escalate its attacks against Ukraine's civilian infrastructure, striking power plants and causing widespread blackouts, while also renewing attacks on the capital of Kyiv for the first time in months.

General Surovikin succeeds another Syrian campaign veteran as commander of the war effort in Ukraine. U.S. officials said that General Aleksandr Dvornikov was also reportedly appointed full commander of the war this past spring following Russian troops' retreat from Kyiv in March. But Dvornikov's tenure saw few major gains besides the fall of besieged Mariupol and Sievierodonetsk. Dvornikov also oversaw the targeting of civilians and non-military infrastructure, largely in Mariupol and the Donbas, where the Russian campaign refocused its efforts. Dvornikov was replaced after a Ukrainian offensive in September captured the key city of Izyum in the Kharkiv oblast in a rapid offensive.

Russia's intervention in Syria in 2015 focused heavily on the use of special forces, the air force and military police to support the Syrian government and its Iranian allies on the ground. Often under Russian leadership, these combined forces besieged rebel enclaves, regularly targeted civilian infrastructure, and utilized banned weapons like sarin gas to force surrenders that often would see the civilian population forced to relocate to another rebel-held territory. Russian air force units were a particularly important part of breaking the years-long battle for Aleppo in late 2017, where these tactics eventually broke rebel resistance. Today, Russian jets continue to strike civilian targets in the rebel-held Syrian province of Idlib as Moscow backs pressuring rebel groups by undermining humanitarian conditions in the war-torn region.

The United States and European allies did not respond to most Russian-led human rights violations in Syria with a strategic shift against Moscow or its ally, Syrian President Bashar al Assad, concerned about the risks of escalation in a country of comparatively marginal strategic importance to all sides. For Russia, this lack of response from the West fed into a narrative of success in Syria that now informs Russian military thinking in Ukraine.

Russia attacked only a limited set of civilian targets during the first few weeks of the war, based on the assumption that Ukraine's government would collapse quickly. But since the defeat at Kyiv in March, Moscow has adopted a more intense and widespread campaign against Ukrainian civilians that has started to look increasingly similar to its military campaigns in Syria and Chechnya.
Intercepted Russian communications from before the war indicate that Moscow expected a fast military victory against Ukraine, leading the initial phase of the campaign to focus on a drive to Kyiv and a rapid seizure of much of the country's south without widespread targeting of civilian infrastructure. When Ukrainian resistance forced a Russian retreat from Kyiv in March and bogged down Russian forces around Mariupol in the south, Moscow utilized its scorched-earth tactics seen in Syria and, before that, in the Chechen Wars in the 1990s. Mariupol's civilian infrastructure was targeted and destroyed, with much of the population displaced, until the city fell in May. Russian warplanes and missiles also began to strike civilian targets in other Ukrainian cities (like Kyiv, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv and Odesa) to intimidate the population and create political and military pressure on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's government to retreat forces or surrender. Instead, the attacks rallied the Ukrainian population in favor of the war effort. Russia also brought around 2.8 million Ukrainians to Russia itself, some against their will, from captured territories, in a bid to demographically engineer these regions.

Up until recently, Ukraine's electrical grid had largely been functioning without major interruptions. But since Surovikin took over as Russia's lead military commander in the war on Oct. 8, Kyiv says over 30% of the country's power plants have been targeted and destroyed, which has led to widespread blackouts across Ukraine.

Since Russian troops retreated from Kyiv earlier this year, the capital city had seen a decrease in attacks by Russian air power. But this, too, has changed in recent weeks amid a series of airstrikes targeting Kyiv, as Russia's military shifts back to its former strategy of trying to displace and demoralize civilians across the country with the help of newly supplied missiles from Iran.

Russian strikes on civilian infrastructure and non-combatants will harden Ukraine's resolve to fight on and reinforce NATO's resolve to keep providing Kyiv military support. While causing panic inside Ukrainian cities, Russia's attacks also inspire anger and solidify public support for the counter-offensives against its military occupation of Ukrainian territories. The Russian attacks are also not widespread enough to interrupt Kyiv's command and control of its armed forces, interrupt the logistics that resupply troops on the frontline or displace enough civilians to seriously hamper the war effort. Meanwhile, Russian human rights violations reinforce the political narratives that help justify public support for Ukraine in NATO nations.

Russian strikes on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure have been unable to cut supply routes to NATO, partially because they haven't been widespread enough to break the rail and road links between Romania, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the frontlines. NATO equipment and logistics are also not as dependent on railways. But most importantly, Ukraine's wide land borders give NATO numerous major and minor road routes to access that are either out of range for Russian drones and warplanes or risk interception by Ukrainian air defenses. This contrasts with Russia's position in Crimea, which is far more vulnerable to being cut off from other countries due to its isolation by the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and because Russia relies heavily on rail lines to support its forces.

Europe and, to a lesser extent, the United States are facing rising energy prices and an overall cost of living crisis. But despite this, neither the U.S. government nor any European government has openly considered ending its military support to Ukraine in exchange for the resumption of cheap energy exports from Russia. This is due in part to documented Russian military atrocities at places like Bucha, Izyum and Russia's continued strikes on Ukrainian civilians, which make it difficult for Western governments to justify ending support for Ukraine to their constituents.

Ukraine's military has also made advances near the Russian-occupied city of Kherson, where Russian forces are reportedly withdrawing under military pressure — signaling that Russia's attacks on civilian infrastructure are not halting Ukraine's military counter-offensives.
Russia's military leadership is likely to escalate its use of attacks on civilian infrastructure to show even limited progress to the Kremlin, which could lead to more focused efforts to depopulate regions along the frontlines like Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Izyum and/or Kharkiv, including through the use of banned weapons. The use of scorched-earth tactics in Syria generated praise in Russia for General Surohivkin and other generals, creating a precedent for advancement in the military career through the utilization of such tactics. With Russia's mobilization campaign still unlikely in the near term to rebuild the Russian military to the point where it can conduct wide-scale offensive operations or even hold territory already gained, these scorched-earth tactics could increasingly become a metric of success for the Kremlin. As Ukrainian forces take territory, Moscow could focus more heavily on civilians near the frontline in an attempt to increase the refugee burden on Kyiv and Europe, destroy infrastructure that might be used by the Ukrainian military, and demoralize Ukrainian forces re-taking territory to find their cities and homes in ruins. Russia could utilize banned chemical weapons in this effort — especially chemical weapons that are harder to track, like mustard or chlorine gas. Any confirmed use of chemical weapons, however, would probably be met with increased support for Ukraine by NATO and other countries, along with more Western sanctions against the Russian economy.

Despite Russia's mobilization of around 300,000 conscripts, reports indicate that Russian units are understrength and that most of these new soldiers will take many weeks to be ready for combat. Many of their units are also underequipped, making it unlikely they'll be able to halt Ukrainian counter-offensives in the near term.

Russia maintains large stockpiles of numerous chemical weapons, including the highly deadly VX and sarin gasses, as well as the less-lethal mustard and chlorine gasses.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 08, 2022, 07:02:02 AM
second

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-63545820?fbclid=IwAR3yfh70B7p0JdX0BCqkJT6rdlZ4o1h59Mc8kcyBwNCORj-QDkYFd3tkuSQ
Title: Why we are not being told the Truth about Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 10, 2022, 06:30:39 AM
https://amgreatness.com/2022/11/09/why-are-we-not-being-told-the-truth-about-ukraine/?fbclid=IwAR1fw2-xMghlDY75EDGFB2vd0demMJXugza61PRRMqdxPT0U7D0C_6umjv4
Title: D1
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 10, 2022, 08:57:35 AM
second

November 10, 2022   
         
America's top military officer estimates Russia and Ukraine have both lost around 100,000 troops each, he told an audience Wednesday at the Economic Club of New York. That estimate includes killed and wounded troops, he said; and he suggested around 40,000 civilians have also died from the Russian invasion, which has shaken up energy markets around the world since it began over eight months ago, in late February.

"You're looking at well over 100,000 Russian soldiers killed and wounded," Joint Chiefs Chairman Army Gen. Mark Milley said. "Same thing probably on the Ukrainian side." The last public Pentagon estimate of Russian casualties was delivered in August, putting the figures somewhere between 70,000 and 80,000.

In perspective: The BBC reports that "By comparison, 15,000 Soviet soldiers were estimated to have died in the 1979-89 Afghanistan conflict."

Russia still has around 20,000 to 30,000 forces in the occupied city of Kherson, Milley said on the same day that Russia's military chief announced a withdrawal of troops from the southern provincial capital, the only one Moscow has captured so far. "They made the public announcement they're doing it," Milley said, referring to the withdrawal from Kherson. "I believe they're doing it in order to preserve their force to re-establish defensive lines south of the [Dnieper] river," he said, noting with skepticism, "but that remains to be seen."


Ukraine's military says it advanced about four miles in two directions near Kherson, sweeping up about 100 square miles of previously occupied land, top officer Valeriy Zaluzhnyi said Thursday on Telegram. Reuters has a bit more.

The view from the White House: Russia's apparent Kherson withdrawal is "evidence of the fact that they have some real problems," U.S. President Joe Biden told reporters Wednesday at the White House. And "it will lead to time for everyone to recalibrate their positions over the winter period," he said. Additionally, Biden said, "I found it interesting they waited until after the election to make that judgment [about a military withdrawal from Kherson City], which we knew for some time that they were going to be doing."

"My hope is that now that the election is over, that Mr. Putin will be able to discuss with us and be willing to talk more seriously about a prisoner exchange," the president said. And that includes former WNBA player Brittney Griner, who has been detained in Russia on alleged drug trafficking charges since February. "My intention is to get her home. And we've had a number of discussions so far. And I'm hopeful that, now that our election is over, there is a willingness to—to negotiate more specifically with us," Biden said.

But Ukraine isn't getting a blank check from the U.S., the president said, anticipating possible Republican opposition to helping Ukraine should the GOP retake control of the House, as expected following this week's elections. "There's a lot of things that Ukraine wants [that] we didn't do," Biden said. "For example, I was asked very much whether we'd provide American aircraft to guarantee the skies over Ukraine. I said, 'No, we're not going to do that. We're not going to get into a third world war, taking on Russian aircraft and directly engage.' But would we provide them with all the rational ability to defend themselves? Yes."

He also pointed out the limitations of HIMARS long-range artillery delivered by the U.S. "There's two kinds of, in the average person's parlance, rockets you can drop in those: one that goes over 600 miles and one that goes about 160 miles," Biden said. "We didn't give them any ones that go to 600 miles, because I'm not looking for them to start bombing Russian territory."

Biden's big-picture view of the war: It's "the ugliest aggression that's occurred since World War Two on a massive scale," he told reporters. "And there's so much at stake," he added.
Title: RANE (Stratfor)
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 10, 2022, 03:21:13 PM
third

What Russia's Retreat From Kherson Means for Its War in Ukraine
7 MIN READNov 10, 2022 | 22:26 GMT





Ukrainian artillery unit members fire toward the city of Kherson in southern Ukraine on Oct. 28, 2022.
Ukrainian artillery unit members fire toward the city of Kherson in southern Ukraine on Oct. 28, 2022.

(BULENT KILIC/AFP via Getty Images)

Russia's withdrawal from the strategic southern city of Kherson will shift the fighting in Ukraine eastward, make it harder for the Kremlin to justify its war at home, and spur unsuccessful talk in Moscow and the West of renewing cease-fire negotiations with Kyiv. On Nov. 9, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu ordered the withdrawal of troops stationed in Kherson, the strategic Ukrainian city located along the Black Sea and the Dnieper River that Russia captured in the opening days of its war. Shoigu made the decision at a staged briefing released to Russian state media with the general in charge of Russia's war in Ukraine, Sergei Surovikin, who explained that Ukrainian shelling had made it impossible to properly supply his troops on the right bank of the Dnieper River. The retreat follows reports of several Ukrainian attacks along the Kherson front, as well as rumors that some Russian forces in and around the city (including elements of the 76th and 106th Air Assault Divisions and the 22nd Army Corps) had already fled eastward to the other side of the Dnieper.

Surovikin was appointed the commander of Russia's ''special military operation'' on Oct. 18. In his first interview with state media under the new role, Surovikin hinted at the possibility of Russian forces leaving Kherson by noting he would not rule out making ''difficult decisions'' regarding the region. Reports suggest that Surovikin had likely been pushing for a retreat from Kherson for weeks, but that Russian President Vladimir Putin had previously overruled the new commander's requests.
Kherson was seized just days after the start of Russia's invasion on Feb. 24. It was the first significant urban center in Ukraine that Russia captured after launching its invasion, and remains the only regional capital in the country that has fallen under Russian control since the invasion began.
Russia's retreat will likely take several days or possibly weeks in order to prevent Ukraine from disrupting the withdrawal and further endangering Russian forces. The goal of Russia's withdrawal is to maintain the combat capability of its troops by preventing losses to men and equipment. To ensure those men and equipment aren't harmed as they exit Kherson, the retreat will strive to be methodical. Russia will rely on several lines of defense in order to gradually pull back from line to line, maintaining battle order and control to prevent the several thousands of pieces of Russia's modern military equipment from being destroyed or abandoned. High proportions of Russia's elite airborne troops, as well as formations of the 22nd army corps and the 49th combined arms army, will also remain on the western bank of the Dnieper to screen the troops from Kherson. Ukraine, meanwhile, will likely launch attacks throughout the withdrawal to ensure it is as chaotic and costly as possible for Russia. Ukraine will also be tempted to try to prevent some of Russia's most combat-capable formations from leaving Kherson by effectively encircling them in the area. But given Russia's extensive mining and construction of fortifications in and around Kherson, such an operation would risk resulting in significant casualties for Ukraine, which must conserve manpower whenever possible against its much more populous opponent.


The Kherson retreat will compel Russia to double down on its scorched-earth strategy of targeting Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure. The Russian forces withdrawn from the western bank of the Dnieper will likely be repositioned eastward to the Zaporizhzhia and Donbas regions where Ukraine has recently been deploying more troops. But the growing concentrations of both sides' forces in those areas will make a major breakthrough in the war unlikely. Indeed, the retreat from Kherson is the latest in a series of setbacks Russia has faced on the battlefield in recent months amid persistent Ukrainian advancements. Moscow will perceive the loss of the strategic southern city as further evidence of its inability to break the Ukrainian military's unyielding resistance, which will in turn compel the Russian military to further focus its efforts on breaking the Ukrainian people's and the West's will instead. This will see Russia increasingly use precision weapons to launch attacks that result in civilian casualties and the widespread destruction of critical infrastructure — including Ukraine's electrical grid, communications facilities and decision-making centers.

The loss of Kherson will lead to further disenchantment and alarm among Russian citizens about the trajectory of the war in Ukraine. But the retreat won't keep Moscow from continuing to frame its special military operation as a success, despite the dwindling amount of Ukrainian territory that remains under Russian control. The retreat doesn't come as a surprise for Russians, given the Nov. 9 announcement followed weeks of reports that Russian forces had begun withdrawing from the city. This reduced shock value will, in turn, mitigate the public backlash in Russia from both hard-line and liberal factions casting the retreat as an embarrassment. But the loss of Kherson will nonetheless still cast further doubt in Russians' minds about the possibility of a victory in Ukraine. To justify the invasion as worth the costs to the Russian populace, it will be crucial for the Kremlin to retain control over the areas of Ukraine still occupied by Russian forces, with the land corridor to Crimea being the most important, followed by newly seized areas of Donbas. This means Russian forces are likely to expend large amounts of human and material resources to prevent further Ukrainian advances toward these annexed territories, to where fighting will inevitably shift as the eight-month war grinds on.

Prior to the announced withdrawal from Kherson, high-ranking Russian officials had repeatedly indicated that Russia would never leave the city or other annexed territories of Ukraine. In a strongly-worded speech on Sept. 30, Putin said he wanted ''the Kyiv authorities and their real masters in the West'' to understand that Russia viewed the people living in the Russia-occupied regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia as ''our citizens[,] forever.'' In early May, the Secretary of the General Council of the ruling United Russia party reportedly told Kherson city residents that ''Russia [was] here forever,'' and that there would be ''no return to the past.''
Notably, many pro-war Russian military bloggers and regime hardliners such as Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and Private Military Company Wagner head Evgeniy Prigozhin praised Russia's decision to withdraw from Kherson. This suggests that public condemnation of Russia's withdrawal from the nationalist segment of Russia's information ecosystem will be relatively muted in the short term, but may still grow with time.
Russia's withdrawal from Kherson may lead to increased Western calls for renewed negotiations with Russia and a possible cease-fire over the winter, but Ukraine currently remains unlikely to rejoin talks. On Nov. 9, NBC reported that some Western officials increasingly believe that neither side can achieve their goals in the Ukraine war and believe the expected winter slowdown in fighting is an opportunity to restart diplomatic talks between Russia and Ukraine. Such reports of U.S. and EU officials either informally hinting at or openly calling for negotiations will likely increase amid the likely impending stalemate on the frontlines in eastern Ukraine. But Kyiv remains unlikely to return to negotiations, where it would likely once again face demands from Moscow to de facto relinquish control over all the Ukrainian territory Russia currently occupies, which is politically untenable for Kyiv. Additionally, a cease-fire could threaten Ukraine's currently advantageous position on the battlefield by granting Russia time to rearm and prepare troops for future offensives.

On Nov. 10, U.S. President Joe Biden said Russia's order to evacuate troops from Kherson showed Moscow was having ''real problems'' with its military. Biden told reporters it was ''interesting'' that Russia had waited until after the U.S. congressional election to announce the withdrawal. Biden also said the retreat would allow both sides to recalibrate their positions over the winter, but it remained to be seen whether Ukraine was prepared to compromise with Russia.
Title: Complications of the Ukraine War
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 11, 2022, 05:28:27 AM
https://imprimis.hillsdale.edu/complications-of-the-ukraine-war/
Title: Zeihan-- the Russians are fuct
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 15, 2022, 02:55:06 PM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K9JfO_mI4oQ
Title: Looks like Zelensky may have lied to draw us into the war
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 17, 2022, 09:13:17 AM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/nato-row-breaks-out-as-zelensky-savaged-for-destructive-lies-over-poland-missile/ar-AA14bRZC?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=cdfe38fdd76f4966b2cca7747e23d919
Title: George Friedman: A near miss in Poland
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 18, 2022, 05:11:24 AM
November 18, 2022
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A Near Miss in Poland
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman

Perhaps the best novel by Tom Clancy, who often wrote about Cold War confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union, was "The Hunt for Red October." In it, a state-of-the-art submarine whose captain and crew were defecting to the U.S. crossed the Atlantic while avoiding kill and capture by their former comrades. The stakes were high and tensions rose. In a critical scene, U.S. and Soviet aircraft maneuvered around each other, and when a U.S. sub-hunter tried an emergency landing on a U.S. aircraft carrier, it crashed. The admiral commanding the fleet said, “This business will get out of control.” Snagging a Soviet submarine, from his point of view, wasn’t worth the risk the U.S. was running.

When I heard the initial reports that two Russian missiles had struck Poland, I remembered those words: “This business will get out of control.” It appeared that the Russians were attacking a non-combatant country, one filled with American troops, advisers and contractors, and with systems that monitored Russian actions. It appeared that the Russians had just expanded the war to another country, and perhaps to the rest of NATO. I didn’t know where the missiles had fallen, but I assumed it was a depot for American equipment moving to Ukraine or some surveillance site.

If the Russians had decided to expand the war to Poland, the United States would counter by striking Russia, something it had not yet done. The danger was that with missiles flying, it would be difficult to determine which were carrying nuclear warheads and which were carrying conventional ones. The uncertainty would potentially push the war into a nuclear exchange.

It was vital that the missiles that hit Poland not be Russian. Very quickly, the United States issued statements that the missiles were from Ukrainian air defenses, and eventually Ukraine agreed. I tend to believe this version; spending precious long-range missiles to deliver conventional payloads onto rural Poland is not useful to the war effort and thus not credible. But given the stakes, I did for a moment wonder if the U.S. would deny it was a Russian missile so that it wouldn’t feel compelled to retaliate. But the initial panic gave way to the calming notion that this was simply the whole business getting out of hand.

It also raised the question of why the war continues. The rationale makes enough military sense: Russia wanted strategic depth, and the West doesn’t want a Russian presence on the border of NATO. But the current combat doesn’t. Russia has all but lost the war. Its intent was to take control of Ukraine and block an anti-Russian force from using it as a base. There appears to be no circumstance under which Moscow will succeed in that regard, given the capability of Ukrainian troops and the mass of American weapons. More Russian forces are being readied, but they are unlikely to turn the tide.

The Ukrainians understandably want to regain their entire country. But any viable negotiation will give Moscow the opportunity to save face. If Russia comes back from talks empty-handed, President Vladimir Putin’s position will become even shakier than it is now, forcing him to reject talks and continue the war. To cede a small amount of territory in Donbas, a region with a large Russian population anyway, would be painful to Ukraine, but the number of Ukrainians that would die if the war continues would have to be measured against the pain of making concessions.

The United States holds the cards. Ukraine can’t continue the war without the U.S., which has already made it clear to Kyiv that it’s high time to start negotiating an end. Washington hasn’t lost any of its own troops, of course, but it has spent a great deal of money on the war, some of it weakening the American economy, and the economy of Europe has been sufficiently affected that it raises the question of whether the alliance could last the winter. The U.S. has achieved the mission it set for itself, and it understands that peace will involve concessions to Russia – thus is the nature of negotiations. Ukraine has to weigh the cost of continuing the war, with all the attendant casualties and damages, against whatever concessions may emerge.

If the war does continue, then we are at the point where the business gets out of hand. Though Russia has failed to win, it can still fight, however fruitlessly. If put in a position where there is no room to negotiate, the nuclear option might become attractive to Moscow. I actually don’t think this would be the case, but the risk of Russian irrationality is not worth the price.

As the incident in Poland shows, wars have a tendency to surprise us. As necessary and well-fought as the conflict may be for Ukraine, the country is paying a terrible price. Russia has found its military limit, and it is now facing a reckoning that cannot be predicted. The U.S. has achieved its goal. Moving on will require a negotiation in which Russia asks for something, and deserving or not, it will end this episode of human loss. Those who want everything are often surprised to have received nothing.
Title: Who are the Ukrainian Integral Nationalists?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 18, 2022, 02:35:15 PM

https://archive.ph/2022.11.16-151912/https://www.voltairenet.org/article218395.html

Who are the Ukrainian integral nationalists ?
by Thierry Meyssan

Who knows the history of the Ukrainian "integral nationalists", "Nazis" according to the terminology of the Kremlin? It begins during the First World War, continues during the Second, the Cold War and continues today in modern Ukraine. Many documents have been destroyed and modern Ukraine forbids under penalty of imprisonment to mention their crimes. The fact remains that these people massacred at least four million of their compatriots and conceived the architecture of the Final Solution, that is, the murder of millions of people because of their real or supposed membership in the Jewish or Gypsy communities of Europe.

VOLTAIRE NETWORK | PARIS (FRANCE) | 15 NOVEMBER 2022
DEUTSCH ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΆ FRANÇAIS ITALIANO NEDERLANDS


The German agent, thinker of Ukrainian “integral nationalism” and criminal against humanity, Dmytro Dontsov (Metipol 1883, Montreal 1973).

Like most Western political analysts and commentators, I was unaware of the existence of Ukrainian neo-Nazis until 2014. When the president-elect was overthrown, I was living in Syria at the time and thought they were violent groupings that had burst onto the public scene to assist pro-European elements. However, since the Russian military intervention, I have gradually discovered a lot of documents and information on this political movement which, in 2021, represented one third of the Ukrainian armed forces. This article presents a synthesis of it.

At the very beginning of this story, that is to say before the First World War, Ukraine was a large plain which had always been tossed between German and Russian influences. At the time, it was not an independent state, but a province of the tsarist empire. It was populated by Germans, Bulgarians, Greeks, Poles, Rumanians, Russians, Czechs, Tatars and a very large Jewish minority supposedly descended from the ancient Khazar people.

A young poet, Dmytro Dontsov, was fascinated by the avant-garde artistic movements, believing that they would help his country to escape from its social backwardness. Since the Tsarist Empire had been immobile since the death of Catherine the Great, while the German Empire was the scientific center of the West, Dontsov chose Berlin over Moscow.

When the Great War broke out, he became an agent of the German secret service. He emigrated to Switzerland, where he published, on behalf of his masters, the Bulletin of the Nationalities of Russia in several languages, calling for the uprising of the ethnic minorities of the Tsarist Empire in order to bring about its defeat. This model was chosen by the Western secret services to organize the "Forum of Free Peoples of Russia" this summer in Prague [1].

In 1917, the Bolshevik revolution turned the tables. Dontsov’s friends supported the Russian revolution, but he remained pro-German. In the anarchy that followed, Ukraine was divided de facto by three different regimes: the nationalists of Symon Petliura (who imposed themselves in the area held today by the Zelensky administration), the anarchists of Nestor Makhno (who organized themselves in Novorosssia, the land that had been developed by Prince Potemkin and that had never known serfdom), and the Bolsheviks (especially in the Donbass). The war cry of Petliura’s followers was "Death to the Jews and Bolsheviks". They perpetrated numerous murderous pogroms.

Dmytro Dontsov returned to Ukraine before the German defeat and became the protégé of Symon Petliura. He participated briefly in the Paris peace conference but, for some unknown reason, did not remain in his delegation. In Ukraine, he helped Petliura to ally with Poland to crush the anarchists and Bolsheviks. After the capture of Kiev by the Bolsheviks, Petliura and Dontsov negotiated the Treaty of Warsaw (April 22, 1920): the Polish army undertook to push back the Bolsheviks and to liberate Ukraine in exchange for Galicia and Volhynia (exactly as the Zelensky administration is negotiating today the entry of Poland into the war against the same lands [2]). This new war was a fiasco.

Vladimir Jabotinsky, born in Odessa, thinker of "revisionist Zionism". For him Israel was "a land without a people, for a People without a land">.

To strengthen his side, Petliura secretly negotiated with the founder of the Jewish battalions in the British army (the "Jewish Legion") and now administrator of the World Zionist Organization (WZO), Vladimir Jabotinsky. In September 1921, the two men agreed to unite against the Bolsheviks in exchange for Petliura’s commitment to forbid his troops to continue their pogroms. The Jewish Legion was to become the "Jewish Gendarmerie. However, despite his efforts, Petliura did not succeed in pacifying his troops, especially as his close collaborator Dontsov was still encouraging the massacre of Jews. Finally, when the agreement was revealed, the World Zionist Organization rebelled against the Petliura regime. On January 17, 1923, the WZO set up a commission to investigate Jabotinsky’s activities. Jabotinsky refused to come and explain himself and resigned from his position.

Simon Petliura took over northern Ukraine. Protector of the "integral nationalists", he sacrificed Galicia and Volhynia to fight the Russians.

Petliura fled to Poland and then to France, where he was murdered by a Jewish anarchist from Bessarabia (now Transnistria). During the trial, the latter assumed his crime and pleaded to have avenged the hundreds of thousands of Jews murdered by the troops of Petliura and Dontsov. The trial had a great impact. The court acquitted the murderer. The League against Pogroms, later Licra (International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism), was founded on this occasion.

Not only were the nationalists defeated, but the anarchists as well. Everywhere the Bolsheviks triumphed and chose, not without debate, to join the Soviet Union.

Dmytro Dontsov published literary magazines that fascinated the youth. He continued to promote a Central Europe dominated by Germany and became closer to Nazism as it rose. He soon referred to his doctrine as Ukrainian "integral nationalism ". In doing so, he referred to the French poet, Charles Maurras. Indeed, the logic of both men was initially identical: they sought in their own culture the means to affirm a modern nationalism. However, Maurras was a Germanophobe, while Dontsov was a Germanophile. The expression "integral nationalism" is still claimed today by Dontov’s followers, who, after the fall of the Third Reich, are careful to refute the term "Nazism" with which the Russians describe it, not without reason.

According to him, "Ukrainian nationalism" is characterized by:

"the affirmation of the will to live, power, expansion" (it promotes "The right of strong races to organize peoples and nations to strengthen the existing culture and civilization")
"the desire to fight and the awareness of its extremity" (he praises the "creative violence of the initiative minority").
Its qualities are:
"fanaticism" ;
" immorality".

Finally, turning his back on his past, Dontsov became an unconditional admirer of the Führer, Adolf Hitler. His followers had founded, in 1929, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) around Colonel Yevhen Konovalets. Konovalets called Dontsov "the spiritual dictator of the youth of Galicia". However, a quarrel arose between Dontsov and another intellectual about his extremism that led to war against all, when Konovalets was suddenly murdered. The OUN (financed by the German secret service) then split in two. The "integral nationalists" reserved for themselves the OUN-B, named after Dontsov’s favorite disciple, Stepan Bandera.

In 1932-33, the Bolshevik political commissars, who were mostly Jewish, levied a tax on crops, as in other regions of the Soviet Union. Combined with significant and unpredictable climatic hazards, this policy caused a huge famine in several regions of the USSR, including the Ukraine. It is known as "Holodomor". Contrary to what the nationalist historian Lev Dobrianski says, it was not a plan for the extermination of Ukrainians by the Russians, since other Soviet regions suffered, but an inadequate management of public resources in times of climate change. Lev Dobrianski’s daughter, Paula Dobrianski, became one of President George W. Bush’s aides. She led a merciless struggle to have historians who did not adhere to her father’s propaganda excluded from Western universities [3].

In 1934, Bandera organized, as a member of the Nazi secret service and head of the OUN-B, the assassination of the Polish Minister of the Interior, Bronisław Pieracki.

From 1939, members of the OUN-B, forming a military organization, the UPA, were trained in Germany by the German army, and then still in Germany, but by their Japanese allies. Stepan Bandera offered Dmytro Dontsov to become the leader of their organization, but the intellectual refused, preferring to play the role of a leader rather than an operational commander.

The "integral nationalists" admired the invasion of Poland, in application of the German-Soviet pact. As Henry Kissinger, who could not be suspected of pro-Sovietism, demonstrated, it was not a question of the USSR annexing Poland, but of neutralizing part of it in order to prepare for the confrontation with the Reich. On the contrary, for Chancellor Hitler, it was a question of beginning the conquest of a "vital space" in Central Europe.

From the beginning of the Second World War, under the guidance of Dmytro Dontsov, the OUN-B fought alongside the Nazi armies against the Jews and the Soviets.

The collaboration between the Ukrainian "integral nationalists" and the Nazis continued with constant massacres of the majority of the Ukrainian population, accused of being Jews or Communists, until the "liberation" of Ukraine by the Third Reich in the summer of 1941 to the cry of "Slava Ukraїni!" (Glory to Ukraine), the war cry used today by the Zelensky administration and the US Democrats. At that time, the "integral nationalists" proclaimed "independence" from the Soviet Union in the presence of Nazi representatives and Greek Orthodox clergy, not in Kiev, but in Lviv, on the model of the Hlinka Guard in Slovakia and the Ustasha in Croatia. They formed a government under the leadership of Providnyk (guide) Stepan Bandera, whose friend Yaroslav Stetsko was Prime Minister. Their support in Ukraine is estimated at 1.5 million people. That is, the "integral nationalists" have always been in the minority.

Celebration of independent Ukraine with Nazi dignitaries. Behind the speakers, the three portraits displayed are those of Stepan Bandera, Adolf Hitler and Yevhen Konovalets.

The Nazis were divided between the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, Erich Koch, for whom the Ukrainians were subhuman, and the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Alfred Rosenberg, for whom the "integral nationalists" were true allies. Finally, on July 5, 1941, Bandera was deported to Berlin and placed under Ehrenhaft (honorable captivity), i.e., under house arrest as a high-ranking official. However, after the members of OUN-B murdered the leaders of the rival faction, OUN-M, the Nazis sanctioned Stepan Bandera and his organization on September 13, 1941. 48 of their leaders were deported to a prison camp in Auschwitz (which was not yet an extermination camp, but only a prison). The OUN-B was reorganized under German command. At that time all Ukrainian nationalists took the following oath: "Faithful son of my Fatherland, I voluntarily join the ranks of the Ukrainian Liberation Army, and with joy I swear that I will faithfully fight Bolshevism for the honor of the people. This fight we are waging together with Germany and its allies against a common enemy. With loyalty and unconditional submission I believe in Adolf Hitler as the leader and supreme commander of the Liberation Army. At any time I am prepared to give my life for the truth.

The oath of loyalty to Führer Adolf Hitler by members of the OUN.

The Nazis announced that many bodies had been discovered in the prisons, victims of "Bolshevik Jews. So the "integral nationalists" celebrated their "independence" by murdering more than 30,000 Jews and actively participating in the roundup of Jews from Kiev to Babi Yar, where 33,771 of them were shot in two days, on September 29 and 30, 1941, by the Einsatzgruppen of SS Reinhard Heydrich.
In this tumult, Dmytro Dontsov disappeared. In reality, he had gone to Prague and placed himself at the service of the architect of the Final Solution, Reinhard Heydrich, who had just been appointed vice-governor of Bohemia-Moravia. Heydrich organized the Wannsee Conference, which planned the "Final Solution of the Jewish and Gypsy Questions" [4]. He then created the Reinard Heydrich Institute in Prague to coordinate the systematic extermination of all these populations in Europe. The Ukrainian Dontsov, who now lived in Prague in great luxury, immediately became its administrator. He was one of the main architects of the largest massacre in history. Heydrich was assassinated in June 1942, but Dontsov retained his functions and privileges.

Reinhard Heydrich speaking at Prague Castle. He was in charge of managing Bohemia-Moravia. However, his real function was to coordinate the "final solution" of Jewish and Gypsy questions. Dmytro Dontsov joined his team in 1942 and oversaw massacres across Europe until the fall of the Reich. Prague Castle was the scene of the meeting of the European Political Community against Russia last October.

Stepan Bandera and his deputy Yaroslav Stetsko were placed under house arrest at the headquarters of the General Inspectorate of Concentration Camps in Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen (30 km from Berlin). They wrote letters to their supporters and to the Reich leadership in complete freedom and were not deprived of anything. In September 1944, as the Reich army retreated and Bandera’s followers began to rebel against it, the two leaders were released by the Nazis and reinstated in their previous positions. Bandera and Stetsko resumed the armed struggle, among the Nazis, against the Jews and the Bolsheviks.

Centuria Integral Nationalist Order Ceremony. According to George Washington University, by 2021 it had already penetrated the main NATO armies.

But it was already too late. The Reich collapsed. The Anglo-Saxons got Dontsov, Bandera and Stetsko. The theorist of integral nationalism was transferred to Canada, while the two practitioners of mass murder were transferred to Germany. MI6 and the OSS (predecessor of the CIA) rewrote their biographies, making their Nazi involvement and responsibility for the "Final Solution" disappear.

Stepan Bandera during his exile, celebrating the memory of Yevhen Konovalets.

Bandera and Stetsko were installed in Munich to organize the Anglo-Saxon stay-behind networks in the Soviet Union. From 1950 onwards, they had an important radio station, Radio Free Europe, which they shared with the Muslim Brotherhood of Said Ramadan (the father of Tariq Ramadan). The radio station was sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe, a CIA offshoot of which its director Alan Dulles was a member, as well as future president Dwight Eisenhower, newspaper magnate Henry Luce and film director Cecil B. DeMilles. Psychological warfare specialist and future patron of the Straussians, Charles D. Jackson, was chairman.

Vladimir Jabotinsky, for his part, after living in Palestine, took refuge in New York. He was joined by Benzion Netanyahu (the father of the current Israeli Prime Minister). The two men wrote the doctrinal texts of "revisionist Zionism" and the Jewish Encyclopedia.
Bandera and Stetsko moved around a lot. They organized sabotage operations throughout the Soviet Union, particularly in the Ukraine, and parachuted leaflets. For this purpose, they created the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), which brought together their Central European counterparts [5]. The British double agent, Kim Philby, informed the Soviets in advance about the actions of the Bandera.
Bandera met with Dontsov in Canada and asked him to take the lead in the struggle. Once again, the intellectual refused, preferring to devote himself to his writing. He then drifted into a mystical delirium inspired by Viking myths. He announced the final battle of the Ukrainian knights against the Russian dragon. As for Bandera, he allied himself with the Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek whom he met in 1958. But he was assassinated the following year by the KGB in Munich.

Funeral of Criminal Against Humanity, Stepan Bandera.

Chiang Kai-Shek and Yaroslav Stetsko at the founding of the World Anti-Communist League.

Yaroslav Stetsko continued the struggle through Radio Free Europe and the ABN. He went to the United States to testify before Senator Joseph MacCarthy’s Commission on Un-American Activities. In 1967, he and Chiang Kai-shek founded the World Anti-Communist League [6]. The League included many pro-US dictators from around the world and two schools of torture, in Panama and Taiwan. Klaus Barbie, who assassinated Jean Moulin in France and Che Guevara in Bolivia, was a member. In 1983, Stetsko was received at the White House by President Ronald Reagan and participated, along with Vice President George Bush Sr., in Lev Dobrianski’s "Captive Nations" (i.e., peoples occupied by the Soviets) ceremonies. He finally died in 1986.

But the story does not end there. His wife, Slava Stetsko, took over the leadership of these organizations. She too travelled the world to support any fight against the "communists", or rather, if we refer to Dontsov’s writings, against the Russians and the Chinese. When the USSR was dissolved, Mrs. Stetsko simply changed the title of the League to the World League for Freedom and Democracy, a name it still has today. She then devoted herself to regaining a foothold in Ukraine.

Slava Stetsko ran in the first elections of the independent Ukraine in 1994. She was elected to the Verkhovna Rada, but having been stripped of her nationality by the Soviets, she could not sit. However, she brought the Ukrainian president, Leonid Kuchma, to the CIA offices in Munich and dictated parts of the new constitution to him. Even today, Article 16 of the new constitution states: "Preserving the genetic heritage of the Ukrainian people is the responsibility of the state. Thus, Nazi racial discrimination is still proclaimed by modern Ukraine as in the worst moments of World War II.

Slava Stetsko opening the 2002 session of the Verkhovna Rada.

Slava Stetsko was re-elected at the next two sessions. She solemnly presided over the opening sessions on March 19, 1998 and on May 14, 2002.
In 2000, Lev Dobriansky organized a large symposium in Washington with many Ukrainian officials. He invited Straussian Paul Wolfowitz (a former collaborator of Charles D. Jackson). During this meeting, the "integral nationalists" put themselves at the service of the Straussians to destroy Russia [7].

Dmitro Yarosh when founding the Anti-Imperialist Front against Russia with the jihadists. He is now special adviser to the head of the Ukrainian armies.

On May 8, 2007, in Ternopol, on the initiative of the CIA, the "integral nationalists" of the Ukrainian People’s Self-Defense and Islamists created an anti-Russian "Anti-Imperialist Front" under the joint chairmanship of the Emir of Itchkeria, Dokka Umarov, and Dmytro Yarosh (the current special adviser to the head of the Ukrainian army). The meeting was attended by organizations from Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine and Russia, including Islamist separatists from Crimea, Adygea, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Ossetia and Chechnya. Dokka Umarov, who was unable to go there due to international sanctions, had his contribution read out. In retrospect, the Crimean Tatars are unable to explain their presence at this meeting, if not their past service to the CIA against the Soviets.

The pro-US president, Viktor Yushchenko, created a Dmytro Dontsov Institute, following the "Orange Revolution". Yushchenko is an example of Anglo-Saxon whitewashing. He has always claimed to have no connection with the mainstream nationalists, but his father, Andrei, was a guard in a Nazi extermination camp [8]. The Dmytro Dontsov Institute would be closed in 2010, and then reopened after the 2014 coup.

President Viktor Yushchenko, shortly before the end of his term of office, elevated the criminal against humanity Stepan Bandera to the title of "Hero of the Nation".

In 2011, the mainstream nationalists succeeded in passing a law banning the commemoration of the end of World War II because it was won by the Soviets and lost by the Banderists. But President Viktor Yanukovych refused to enact it. Enraged, the "integral nationalists" attacked the procession of Red Army veterans, beating up old men. Two years later, the cities of Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk abolished the Victory Day ceremonies and banned all manifestations of joy.

In 2014, Ukrainians in Crimea and Donbass refused to recognize the coup government. Crimea, which had declared itself independent before the rest of Ukraine, reaffirmed its independence a second time and joined the Russian Federation. The Donbass sought a compromise. The "Ukrainian nationalists," led by President Petro Poroshenko, stopped providing public services there and bombed its population. In eight years, they murdered at least 16,000 of their fellow citizens in general indifference.

It was also from the 2014 coup that the full nationalist militias were incorporated into the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In their internal regulations, they enjoin each fighter to read the works of Dmytro Dontsov, including his master book, Націоналізм (Nationalism).
In April 2015, the Verkhovna Rada declared members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) "independence fighters." The law was enacted, in December 2018, by President Poroshenko. Former Waffen SS were retrospectively entitled to a pension and all sorts of benefits. The same law criminalized any claim that OUN militants and UPA fighters collaborated with the Nazis and practiced ethnic cleansing of Jews and Poles. Published in Ukraine, this article would send me to jail for writing it and you for reading it.

Inauguration of a commemorative plaque of the Criminal Against Humanity Dmytro Dontsov on the facade of the state news agency Ukrinform. During the ceremony, the general director of Ukrinform assured that Dontsov had founded, in 1918, the first Ukrainian press agency, UTA, of which Ukrinform is the successor.

On July 1, 2021, President Volodymyr Zelenski enacted the Law "On Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine" which places them under the protection of Human Rights. By default, citizens of Russian origin can no longer invoke them in court.

In February 2022, the "full nationalist" militias, which made up one-third of the country’s armed forces, planned a coordinated invasion of Crimea and the Donbass. They were stopped by the Russian military operation to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2202 to end the suffering of the people of Donbass.

Canadian Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland demonstrates her support for President Zelensky with members of the Canadian branch of the OUN. Today, Ms. Freeland is a candidate for the General Secretariat of NATO.

In March 2022, Israeli Prime Minister Nafatali Bennett, breaking with the "revisionist Zionism" of Benjamin Netanyahu (the son of Jabotinsky’s secretary), suggested to President Volodymyr Zelensky that he should agree with Russian demands and denazify his country [8]. Emboldened by this unexpected support, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dared to mention the case of the Jewish Ukrainian president, saying: "The Jewish people in their wisdom have said that the most ardent anti-Semites are usually Jews. Every family has its black sheep, as they say." This was too much for the Israelis, who always worry when someone tries to divide them. His counterpart at the time, Yair Lapid, recalled that the Jews themselves never organized the Holocaust of which they were victims. Caught between its conscience and its alliances, the Hebrew state repeated its support for Ukraine, but refused to send it any weapons. In the end, the General Staff decided and the Minister of Defense, Benny Gantz, closed any possibility of support to the successors of the mass murderers of Jews.

Ukrainians are the only nationalists who are not fighting for their people or their land, but for one idea: to annihilate the Jews and the Russians.
Main sources:
› Ukrainian Nationalism in the age of extremes. An intllectual biography of Dmytro Dontsov, Trevor Erlacher, Harvard University Press (2021).
› Stepan Bandera, The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist. Fascism, Genocide, and Cult, Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, Ibidem (2014).
Thierry Meyssan
Translation
Roger Lagassé
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Selon le rapport de l’IERES de l’Université George Washington (2021), l’Ordre Centuria a déjà pénétré les armées en Allemagne, au Canada, en France, en Pologne, au Royaume-Uni et aux États-Unis
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[1] “The Western strategy to dismantle the Russian Federation”, by Thierry Meyssan, Translation Roger Lagassé, Voltaire Network, 17 August 2022.
[2] “Poland and Ukraine”, by Thierry Meyssan, Translation Roger Lagassé, Voltaire Network, 14 June 2022.
[3] “The Holodomor, new avatar of “European” anti-communism” (excerpt from Le Choix of defeat), Annie Lacroix-Riz (2010).
[4] «The Wannsee Conference in 1942 and the National Socialist living space dystopia», Gerhard Wolf, Journal of Genocide Research, Vol 17 N°2 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2015.1027074
[5] [Bulletins of the Anti-Bolshevik Nations Block are available in the Voltaire Network Library. ABN Korrespondenz (auf Deutsch), ABN Correspondence (in english).
[6] “The World Anti-Communist League: the Internationale of Crime”, by Thierry Meyssan, Translation Anoosha Boralessa, Voltaire Network, 12 May 2004.
[7] “Ukraine : the Second World War continues”, by Thierry Meyssan, Translation Roger Lagassé, Voltaire Network, 26 April 2022.
[8] “Israel stunned by Ukrainian neo-Nazis”, by Thierry Meyssan, Translation Roger Lagassé, Voltaire Network, 8 March 2022.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on November 19, 2022, 05:27:09 PM
I've been thinking 40B is pretty cheap to defeat Russia.  This is the first source I've seen saying that:

https://cepa.org/article/its-costing-peanuts-for-the-us-to-defeat-russia/

Of course there are more costs to come.

 
Title: Ukraine, Kherson retreat
Post by: DougMacG on November 20, 2022, 12:43:36 PM
https://www.ft.com/content/2aa769e3-c0f1-430b-bb26-c6cf10e4b529
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 20, 2022, 02:15:24 PM
Paywall blocked.

Care to paste it?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on November 21, 2022, 07:16:30 AM
https://www.ft.com/content/2aa769e3-c0f1-430b-bb26-c6cf10e4b529
Paywall blocked.
Care to paste it?

I'm not able to get back in either.  The gist I took from it:  Author can't imagine how Russia can spin this as anything other than defeat.  A short time ago we feared Russia would take the entire Black Sea coast from Ukraine, and it seems to be going the other direction.  I took the article as documentation that Russia did retreat from this city of key strategic location.  BBC map:

(https://external-content.duckduckgo.com/iu/?u=https%3A%2F%2Fichef.bbci.co.uk%2Fnews%2F1024%2Fcpsprodpb%2F16AB9%2Fproduction%2F_126075829_ukraine_invasion_south_map-nc.png&f=1&nofb=1&ipt=5b7a19d4f6fcdb644101584a359422032d61f85dce0f2af4bd9bc7cd1461d81c&ipo=images)

https://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/ny-kherson-ukraine-rejoice-russian-retreat-20221119-fyuv4qcwuzgwtorpjbwlybcz6y-story.html

Ukraine retaking the prized port city could mark a decisive moment, Western officials and military analysts said.
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-kherson-retreat-putin-war-ukraine-what-it-means-rcna56537

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 21, 2022, 08:03:57 AM
Thank you.
Title: Russian morale
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 22, 2022, 05:50:23 AM
Russian struggles prove morale to be potent weapon in war

BY BEN WOLFGANG THE WASHINGTON TIMES

It commands less attention than a perfectly executed battle plan, and it is much harder to quantify than a numerical edge in shells, tanks or fighter planes.

Yet morale has been a deciding factor in battles throughout human history and ultimately could spell doom for Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Scholars and military analysts say low morale in the Russian ranks is one of the biggest reasons why Moscow has failed to achieve many of its key strategic objectives in Ukraine despite its far larger army and massive advantage in virtually all other quantifiable metrics.

From their disastrous effort to capture Kyiv to their humiliating retreat from Kherson, Russian forces appear to have been at a massive psychological disadvantage. Ukrainian soldiers believe deeply in their cause and have been buoyed by successes, but Russian troops by nearly all accounts appear to doubt the competence of their leaders. In some cases, they simply don’t share President Vladimir Putin’s belief that it is necessary to put their lives on the line in Ukraine.

The result has been a massive gulf in motivation, energy level, initiative and confidence. That gap has appeared on the battlefield in several ways, specialists say, because troops with low morale simply don’t perform well.

“They will do the bare minimum,” said retired Army Lt. Gen. Tom Spoehr, now director of the Center for National Defense at the conservative Heritage Foundation. “If you as a leader declare that we’re going to do a mission or raid, they will go the absolute minimum amount of distance they have to to avoid getting in trouble. They won’t push further. They won’t exploit opportunities they see. In some cases when morale

gets horrible, they won’t even do that.

“Maybe the conscripted [Russian] soldier, maybe he or she believes that they’re in Ukraine to fight the danger of Ukrainians,” Gen. Spoehr said in an interview. “But anybody past the age of reason … knows better. They know that Ukraine was not posing a danger to Russia. That impacts what they do. They’ll do those actions that will cause them to stay out of prison, but no more.”

The influx of hundreds of thousands of conscripts in recent weeks called up by the Putin government has only accentuated the morale problems. Despite strict government controls, families of the drafted recruits have posted videos of their difficulties in the field, with minimal training, absent leaders and no clear sense of their duties as they try to hold off Ukrainian forces advancing in the east and south.

Throughout history, high morale in the ranks — the combination of believing your cause is just, that your military can win, and that your commanders are competent and concerned about an individual soldier’s well-being — has proved to be a decisive factor. As the U.S. entered World War II in December 1941, historians and psychologists highlighted the game-changing effect morale could have on the outcomes of battles.

“Morale wins wars, solves crises, is an indispensable condition of a vigorous national life and equally essential to the maximum achievement of the individual,” historian Arthur Upham Pope wrote in a 1941 piece for The Journal of Educational Sociology.

“In battle, morale gives victory,” he said. “The outnumbered, ill-equipped or even outmaneuvered may triumph if their morale is markedly superior.”

Pope cited battles in the Punic Wars, the French Revolution and a host of other conflicts in which outnumbered, outgunned armies defeated their foes largely because of higher morale, belief in their cause and superior leadership. In the Civil War, Confederate units racked up early wins over much larger Union forces partly because of their morale and motivation. That morale declined throughout the war, however, especially after a landmark Union victory at the Battle of Gettysburg and the grinding battle of attrition adopted by commander Ulysses S. Grant.

More recently in Afghanistan, a Taliban insurgent force outlasted the U.S. military and overthrew the Western- backed Afghan government after a 20-year conflict, partly because of its unwavering commitment to drive Western forces out of the country and restore its harsh version of Islamic law.

The defensive force for the weak, corruption-riddled government in Kabul fought well at times but virtually dissolved after political leadership deserted the troops.

In Ukraine, evidence of Russian troops’ low morale has been building since the war began in late February. In September, a New York Times report revealed numerous intercepted phone calls from Russian troops to friends and family. In one message, a soldier declared that “Putin is a fool.”

This month, the Russian military blog Grayzone published a letter supposedly written by members of Russia’s 155th Marine Brigade who blasted military commanders after a disastrous attack on Ukrainian positions in the Donetsk province.

“As a result of the ‘carefully’ planned offensive by the ‘great generals,’ we lost about 300 people killed, wounded and missing in the course of four days. [And] half of our equipment,” the Russian troops wrote, according to Englishlanguage media accounts.

The Russian Defense Ministry publicly denied the claims that it had suffered massive losses in Donetsk, even though Western intelligence services and other observers seemed to confirm the soldiers’ accounts.

It’s little surprise that Russian troops would doubt the intelligence, competence and sympathy of their leaders. From the start, their claims have been divorced from reality, most notably Mr. Putin’s declaration that Russia needed to eliminate Nazis who were secretly running Ukraine.

Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu has come under fierce criticism for Russia’s unrealistic battle plan, and Mr. Putin has cycled through a string of senior commanders looking for someone who can conduct the invasion campaign competently.

On the battlefield, the Russian troops’ anticipated advantages never materialized. The campaign to take Kyiv was doomed by Russian commanders’ failure to bring enough fuel for military vehicles. Russian military leaders initially didn’t deploy electronic warfare systems and other mechanisms to ward off Ukrainian drone strikes, which destroyed Russian armored columns.

Russia also was expected to quickly gain air superiority in Ukraine, but the skies remain uncontested nearly nine months into the fighting.

Despite its presumed status as a premier cold-weather fighting force, recent reports suggest that the Russian military has failed to provide coats, hats, gloves and other mission-critical materials for its troops. That lack of basic supplies fuels doubts among soldiers that their leaders can provide for their basic needs.

“Forces lacking in winter weather clothing and accommodation are highly likely to suffer from non-freezing cold injuries,” the British Defense Ministry said in a recent analysis of the Russian war effort. “The weather itself is likely to see an increase in rainfall, wind speed and snowfall. Each of these will provide additional challenges to the already low morale of Russian forces” and create new logistical headaches for them.

The Washington-based Institute for the Study of War, in one of its daily analyses of the fighting last week, highlighted the demoralized state of Russian forces in one strategic area.

“Multiple reports indicate that the morale and psychological state of Russian forces in the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts are exceedingly low,” the institute survey noted. “Significant losses on the battlefield, mobilization to the front lines without proper training, and poor supplies have led to cases of desertion.”

The survey cited a report in a Russian independent media outlet that said some 300 Russian soldiers were being detained in a basement in a part of Russian-occupied Ukraine for refusing orders to return to the front lines.

Setting aside the fact that many Russian soldiers may not believe in the mission itself, each of those shortcomings reveals systemic problems at the highest levels of the Russian military. If Russian troops can’t trust their commanders, successful missions become all but impossible.

“There’s no question but that the No. 1 corrosive factor in undermining morale is a lack of trust in leadership,” said Col. Timothy Mallard, director of ethical development and college chaplain at the U.S. Army War College.

“Such trust must be both vertical and horizontal at every level of war, beginning within a single unit and extending to the nation — a critical marker of a professional military force,” he told The Washington Times. “Soldiers must trust those who are charged to lead both them and their units in combat, and when they don’t, military effectiveness quickly erodes.”

The results of low morale, Col. Mallard said, include “poor coordination within or amongst units, poor execution of published plans or orders, and poor obedience to the chain of command.”

Furthermore, there is an obvious difference in the leadership styles of Mr. Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Mr. Zelenskyy has given daily video addresses throughout the war, stayed in Kyiv in the darkest early days of the fighting, and now regularly leaves the capital for morale-building visits with the troops. He most recently visited Kherson after the Russian retreat.

Mr. Putin, meanwhile, has been nowhere near the front lines.

“Men and women will do great things if they have some leader next to them, out in front of them, saying this is the way to go,” Gen. Spoehr said. “History is filled with examples of people who went above and beyond as long as their leader was there sharing it.
Title: Russians weaponizing winter
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 26, 2022, 03:20:38 PM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/inside-russia-s-attempt-to-destroy-ukraine-with-darkness-and-cold/ar-AA14AycL?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=514dafd978394502a8667b00b98c0c4f
Title: Pravda on the Potomac: Pressure to track the weapons and money builds
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 27, 2022, 03:39:25 PM
Pressure builds to step up weapons tracking in Ukraine
Legislation would require greater scrutiny of the $20 billion in military aid President Biden has sent Ukraine, and it has bipartisan support
Image without a caption
By Karoun Demirjian
November 27, 2022 at 2:00 a.m. EST


Emboldened by their success in the midterm elections, House Republicans, who will hold a slim majority in the next Congress, have warned the Biden administration to expect far tougher oversight of the extensive military assistance it has provided Ukraine.

Are you on Telegram? Subscribe to our channel for the latest updates on Russia’s war in Ukraine.
The administration, anticipating such demands as the commitment of military aid under President Biden fast approaches $20 billion, has worked in recent weeks to publicize its efforts to track weapons shipments. Both the State Department and the Pentagon have outlined plans, including more inspections and training for the Ukrainians, meant to prevent U.S. arms from falling into the wrong hands — initiatives that have failed thus far to quell Republican skeptics calling for audits and other accountability measures.

Most in Washington are in agreement that, generally, the push for more oversight is a good thing. But experts caution there are credible limitations to ensuring an airtight account of all weapons given to Ukraine that are likely to leave Biden’s harshest critics unsatisfied.


“There are shortcomings of end-use monitoring in the best of circumstances, and of course Ukraine isn’t in the best of circumstances,” said Elias Yousif, a researcher on the global arms trade with the Stimson Center. “There has to be some willingness to be practical about what we can achieve.”

With GOP House win, Biden faces added curbs on foreign policy

To date, the megaphone for demanding change has been controlled primarily by the GOP. Congress “will hold our government accountable for all of the funding for Ukraine,” Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.) said this month in announcing a measure to audit the aid program after Biden requested another $37 billion for the government in Kyiv. “There has to be accountability going forward,” Rep. Kevin McCarthy (Calif.), House Republicans’ current leader, told CNN in the interview in which he warned against giving Ukraine a “blank check” to fight off Russia’s invasion.

Yet the reckoning could begin before the Republican takeover. A series of provisions on offer in the House-passed version of this year’s annual defense authorization bill would require a web of overlapping reports from the Pentagon and the inspectors general who police transfers of articles of war, plus the establishment of a task force to design and implement enhanced tracking measures.


And unlike the rising GOP chorus of Ukraine skepticism, such line items — while yet to be reconciled with the Senate’s version of the bill, which is still pending in that chamber — largely enjoy bipartisan support.

“The taxpayers deserve to know that investment is going where its intended to go,” Rep. Jason Crow (D-Colo.), a veteran-turned-lawmaker, said in an interview.

Crow led an effort in the House Armed Services Committee to include in the defense bill instructions to the Defense Department Inspector General to review, audit, investigate and otherwise inspect the Pentagon’s efforts to support Ukraine. He called the directive “necessary,” even if he does not count himself among the critics insinuating the Defense Department and the Ukrainians have failed to take the matter seriously enough.

U.S. races to track American arms in heat of Ukraine war

“In any war, there can be missteps and misallocation of supplies,” he explained. But Crow also acknowledged that there were likely to be limitations to the scope of accounting that the United States can provide.


“We’re not playing a mission of perfection here. This is a brutal, large-scale land war — house to house, street to street, trench to trench. There will be things lost,” he said. “We’re not trying to prevent every single piece from falling into the hands of the Russians, but we want to make sure it’s not happening at a large scale.”

Lawmakers, Pentagon officials and experts all note that, thus far, there are few tangible reasons for concern. Ukraine, they said, has been a proactive steward of the assistance it has received, readily reporting back about how U.S. military aid has been put to use — a gesture officials believe is in no small part a function of Kyiv’s effort to secure more of it. There also is a sense the Ukrainians have too much existential national pride at stake to risk compromising their effort to drive out the Russians by siphoning off weapons to the black market.

But even the specter of deadly materiel falling through the cracks has many alarmed — especially with the West pouring smaller, less-traceable arms into the country as Ukrainian civilians face desperate challenges to their basic survival.

Part of the concern is due to practical limitations. According to Pentagon press secretary Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder, the United States conducts weapons inspections in Ukraine “when and where security conditions permit,” at locations that “are not near the front line of Russia’s war against Ukraine.” Ryder declined to offer further details about the inspections program, citing concerns about operational security and force protection.


Yet the State Department has a limited budget for weapons inspectors positioned in Ukraine, and thus cannot examine every incoming shipment, according to officials. As of early November, U.S. monitors had performed just two in-person inspections since the war began in February — accounting for about 10 percent of the 22,000 U.S.-provided weapons, including Stinger surface-to-air missiles and Javelin antitank missiles, that require enhanced oversight.

Ukraine wants more air defense. Here’s how it works.

Crow and others want to see the State Department expand its roster of specialists to conduct more regular checks at in-country depots and transfer points.

Another reason is the law. “End-use monitoring” is governed by the Arms Export Control Act, which requires the presidential administration to provide “reasonable assurance” that recipients of military assistance are using the weapons for the purpose they were intended, and complying with any conditions set by the United States.

In most cases, that checkup happens solely at the point where weapons are transferred to Ukrainian custody. Only in special cases, usually when the weapons in question contain sensitive technology, is “enhanced” monitoring required of the recipient nation. That entails tracking serial numbers and submitting reports from the field. In Ukraine, such items include Stingers, Javelins, Avenger air defenses and night-vision devices.


The existing system is not good enough, some lawmakers argue, noting that before the war, Ukraine ranked fairly low on global corruption indexes.


“With the volumes of goods that we’re pushing, it’s our responsibility to have third-party oversight. We do it all over the world,” Rep. Mike Waltz (R-Fla.) said in an interview. He pointed out that such practices are used everywhere from India to Israel and in countries “that are much higher on the corruption and transparency index” than Ukraine.

Waltz, who worked with Crow and others to push several of the defense bill’s bipartisan measures calling for increased oversight, supports keeping Ukrainian fighters well armed. But he believes the Biden administration has been too skittish about using Americans to get a clearer view of how U.S. weapons are being handled.

Private groups work to bring specialized combat gear to Ukraine

“There are veterans’ groups running all over the country right now,” Waltz said, suggesting that they could be subcontracted to report back to the Pentagon and State Department on how weapons are being used closer to the front. Short of that, Waltz argues it ought to be possible to send U.S. inspectors not just to Ukraine’s central weapons depots, but “down to the brigade or even the battalion headquarters level,” without undue risk.


Thus far, the Biden administration has resisted pressure to send inspectors or other military personnel too deeply into Ukraine, for fear of fomenting a wider conflict. According to U.S. officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss operational matters, American specialists currently conduct weapons inspections unarmed — a condition that would likely be unsustainable if they were sent closer to the front lines.

The Biden administration has been adamant, officials and lawmakers who have been briefed by them say, that it will not tiptoe into a situation that risks being interpreted by the Kremlin as direct American involvement in the war.

But Waltz noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin is waging a propaganda campaign accusing the United States and NATO of clandestinely operating in Ukraine to turn the population against Moscow. “That’s a self-limitation on the administration’s part,” he argued. “There is an acceptable risk to having people behind the front lines checking on where all this aid is going and helping the Ukrainians use it more effectively.
Title: Zeihan: Outcome will be known by May
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 28, 2022, 07:59:33 AM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6bMwPTSXOqA
Title: Zeihan on the Patriot Missile Defense Calculus
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 16, 2022, 08:23:26 AM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5_DyC0_K1xI
Title: Legendary Russki brigade got fuct up
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 16, 2022, 10:03:08 AM
second

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/16/russia-200th-brigade-decimated-ukraine/?utm_campaign=wp_post_most&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_most&carta-url=https%3A%2F%2Fs2.washingtonpost.com%2Fcar-ln-tr%2F389715a%2F639ca933ef9bf67b23234460%2F61cdf026ae7e8a4ac205b2b3%2F58%2F72%2F639ca933ef9bf67b23234460&wp_cu=10fdb05edea8f32c1b02f6dfec609335%7CD462DD329F9C56B3E0530100007F597F
Title: Kissinger
Post by: ccp on December 17, 2022, 05:34:26 PM
merges the past (WWI) , the present (Ukraine/Russia) ,

and the future (AI control of weaponry and strategy)

https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-push-for-peace/

I recall he is worried about how AI might wind up be the destroyer of our world

[not bad for a 99 yo.]

===============================

Henry Kissinger
How to avoid another world war
From magazine issue:
17 December 2022


The first world war was a kind of cultural suicide that destroyed Europe’s eminence. Europe’s leaders sleepwalked – in the phrase of historian Christopher Clark – into a conflict which none of them would have entered had they foreseen the world at war’s end in 1918. In the previous decades, they had expressed their rivalries by creating two sets of alliances whose strategies had become linked by their respective schedules for mobilisation. As a result, in 1914, the murder of the Austrian Crown Prince in Sarajevo, Bosnia by a Serb nationalist was allowed to escalate into a general war that began when Germany executed its all-purpose plan to defeat France by attacking neutral Belgium at the other end of Europe.

The nations of Europe, insufficiently familiar with how technology had enhanced their respective military forces, proceeded to inflict unprecedented devastation on one another. In August 1916, after two years of war and millions in casualties, the principal combatants in the West (Britain, France and Germany) began to explore prospects for ending the carnage. In the East, rivals Austria and Russia had extended comparable feelers. Because no conceivable compromise could justify the sacrifices already incurred and because no one wanted to convey an impression of weakness, the various leaders hesitated to initiate a formal peace process. Hence they sought American mediation. Explorations by Colonel Edward House, President Woodrow Wilson’s personal emissary, revealed that a peace based on the modified status quo ante was within reach. However, Wilson, while willing and eventually eager to undertake mediation, delayed until after the presidential election in November. By then the British Somme offensive and the German Verdun offensive had added another two million casualties.


In the words of the book on the subject by Philip Zelikow, diplomacy became the road less travelled. The Great War went on for two more years and claimed millions more victims, irretrievably damaging Europe’s established equilibrium. Germany and Russia were rent by revolution; the Austro-Hungarian state disappeared from the map. France had been bled white. Britain had sacrificed a significant share of its young generation and of its economic capacities to the requirements of victory. The punitive Treaty of Versailles that ended the war proved far more fragile than the structure it replaced.

Does the world today find itself at a comparable turning point in Ukraine as winter imposes a pause on large-scale military operations there? I have repeatedly expressed my support for the allied military effort to thwart Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. But the time is approaching to build on the strategic changes which have already been accomplished and to integrate them into a new structure towards achieving peace through negotiation.


Ukraine has become a major state in Central Europe for the first time in modern history. Aided by its allies and inspired by its President, Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine has stymied the Russian conventional forces which have been overhanging Europe since the second world war. And the international system – including China – is opposing Russia’s threat or use of its nuclear weapons.

This process has mooted the original issues regarding Ukraine’s membership in Nato. Ukraine has acquired one of the largest and most effective land armies in Europe, equipped by America and its allies. A peace process should link Ukraine to Nato, however expressed. The alternative of neutrality is no longer meaningful, especially after Finland and Sweden joined Nato. This is why, last May, I recommended establishing a ceasefire line along the borders existing where the war started on 24 February. Russia would disgorge its conquests thence, but not the territory it occupied nearly a decade ago, including Crimea. That territory could be the subject of a negotiation after a ceasefire.

If the pre-war dividing line between Ukraine and Russia cannot be achieved by combat or by negotiation, recourse to the principle of self-determination could be explored. Internationally supervised referendums concerning self-determination could be applied to particularly divisive territories which have changed hands repeatedly over the centuries.

The goal of a peace process would be twofold: to confirm the freedom of Ukraine and to define a new international structure, especially for Central and Eastern Europe. Eventually Russia should find a place in such an order.

The preferred outcome for some is a Russia rendered impotent by the war. I disagree. For all its propensity to violence, Russia has made decisive contributions to the global equilibrium and to the balance of power for over half a millennium. Its historical role should not be degraded. Russia’s military setbacks have not eliminated its global nuclear reach, enabling it to threaten escalation in Ukraine. Even if this capability is diminished, the dissolution of Russia or destroying its ability for strategic policy could turn its territory encompassing 11 time zones into a contested vacuum. Its competing societies might decide to settle their disputes by violence. Other countries might seek to expand their claims by force. All these dangers would be compounded by the presence of thousands of nuclear weapons which make Russia one of the world’s two largest nuclear powers.

As the world’s leaders strive to end the war in which two nuclear powers contest a conventionally armed country, they should also reflect on the impact on this conflict and on long-term strategy of incipient high–technology and artificial intelligence. Auto-nomous weapons already exist, capable of defining, assessing and targeting their own perceived threats and thus in a position to start their own war.

Once the line into this realm is crossed and hi-tech becomes standard weaponry – and computers become the principal executors of strategy – the world will find itself in a condition for which as yet it has no established concept. How can leaders exercise control when computers prescribe strategic instructions on a scale and in a manner that inherently limits and threatens human input? How can civilisation be preserved amid such a maelstrom of conflicting information, perceptions and destructive capabilities?


CLAIM
Ukraine has become a major state in Central Europe for the first time in modern history

No theory for this encroaching world yet exists, and consultative efforts on this subject have yet to evolve – perhaps because meaningful negotiations might disclose new discoveries, and that disclosure itself constitutes a risk for the future. Overcoming the disjunction between advanced technology and the concept of strategies for controlling it, or even understanding its full implications, is as important an issue today as climate change, and it requires leaders with a command of both technology and history.

The quest for peace and order has two components that are sometimes treated as contradictory: the pursuit of elements of security and the requirement for acts of reconciliation. If we cannot achieve both, we will not be able to reach either. The road of diplomacy may appear complicated and frustrating. But progress to it requires both the vision and the courage to undertake the journey.


WRITTEN BY
Henry Kissinger



Title: Ukes attempted kill of top Russki general
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 19, 2022, 06:32:52 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/ukraine-attempted-decapitation-strike-russias-top-general-even-us-tried-stop-it?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1138
Title: A friend's response to Kissinger
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 19, 2022, 01:56:44 PM
Kissinger makes many historical errors of fact.

1) Germany started WWI on purpose, not "sleepwalking," to pre-empt Russian dominance of the European continent, since Russia was the fastest-growing economy in Europe before WWI, well on its way to continental hegemony. Obviously, Germany failed to achieve that goal.

2) If House was right about a negotiated peace, then why did fighting continue for 2 more years? Germany wasn't ready to surrender until after 2 million US troops entered the war, that's why.

3) Versailles was a negotiated peace that failed after 20 years. WWII ended in unconditional surrender, which has lasted more tha 70 years. Why would a negotiated peace 2 years earlier in WWI have been stronger than Versailles?

4) Russia's "contributions" to the global "balance of power" have been either as one of the aggressor powers we needed to balance against, or as an ally of last resort for the West in the Napoleonic Wars, WWI, and WWII, on the rare occasions that a greater threat than Russia arose. Other than that, Russia has been a rather steadily expansionist land empire for the past 500 years. Since 1991, Russia has gone to war with Georgia (twice), Azerbaijan, Chechnya (twice), Estonia (cyber-attack), and Ukraine (also twice). That's 8 wars in 31 years - an average of one war every 3.8 years. Additionally, since 1991 Russia has allied with Saddam, Qadaffi, Milosevic, Iran, Assad, the Taliban, ISIS, China, Venezuela, Cuba... it's actually difficult to think of a significant regional security threat where Russia wasn't on the side of the aggressor. Milosevic alone started 3 wars, against Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on December 21, 2022, 02:19:57 PM
I'm watching a joint press conference of Biden with zelenski.  A rare moment where the president of the United States raises his stature by being seen on the podium with the president of another country.

I thought our support was to be more low-key. This intentional media event raises the impression that this is a war of the US versus Russia. I didn't think that's what we wanted.

Stated previously, I support US support but not a blank check and I don't know exactly where I would draw the line.

With biden, you can tell he knows this is just play money. With his new budget out, everyone can see that he is making no sacrifice in anything else in order to print more pretend dollars to send in every direction.
Title: Ten thoughts about US Aid to Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 22, 2022, 01:02:53 PM
https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/ten-myths-us-aid-ukraine-luke-coffey?fbclid=IwAR2qTbWa46G_nJ1GDdwPAbLYKBvX_wXGgEw9qdgG6B4gTeDpC50T4OWHUl0


Ten Myths about US Aid to Ukraine


Ukraine is in a national struggle that will determine its geopolitical future: the country will either be a firm member of the Euro-Atlantic community or become a Russian colony. The outcome of this struggle will have long-term implications for America’s global interests, the future of the transatlantic community, and the notion of national sovereignty in the twenty-first century.

Russia is a top geopolitical adversary for the United States. For Americans who believe in strong and secure national borders, the primacy of national sovereignty, and the right to self-defense, support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression is natural. Considering America’s other geopolitical concerns, such as a rising China and a healthy economic relationship with Europe that benefits the American worker, US support for Ukraine is an imperative.

Ukrainians are not asking for, nor do they want, US troops to help them fight Russia. All they ask for is the equipment, weapons, munitions, and financial resources required to give them a fighting chance. Providing Ukraine what it needs to fight Russia effectively will not be cheap.

So far this year, the US Congress has voted on three different supplementals for Ukraine: $13.6 billion in March, $40.1 billion in May, and $12.4 billion in September. The cost that American taxpayers incur to help Ukraine is money well spent and will pale in comparison to the cost of deterring a victorious Russia or an emboldened China on the global stage.

As the war continues, Congress will likely pass additional spending. It is in America’s interest that Ukraine wins the war, and that Russia is decisively defeated. Even though polling overwhelmingly shows broad and bipartisan support for Ukraine, some in Congress are against further US aid for Ukraine.

Here are the top ten myths and misconceptions about US aid for Ukraine and why they are wrong:

Myth 1: There is not enough oversight of US aid to Ukraine.

Reality: There has likely never been more accountability or transparency measures in place for US foreign assistance than what is available for Ukraine aid. Take the biggest (and most controversial) supplemental from last May, which allocated $40.1 billion. This bill was 699 lines long. Of these, 110 lines dealt with accountability, transparency, and reporting requirements. Therefore, 16 percent of the bill’s text was dedicated to oversight. May’s bill also included 16 separate reporting requirements to the US Congress for the Department of Defense, Department of State, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of the Treasury. To date, the three Ukraine supplementals have allocated an additional $14 million for the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense, Department of State, and USAID to increase oversight. There is plenty of accountability and oversight. Those who argue that there is not enough have failed to outline in detail what additional oversight is needed.

Myth 2: We have written more than $66 billion worth of “blank checks” for Ukraine.

Reality: This claim is misleading. The sum of the three Ukraine supplementals totals $66.1 billion, but not all this money goes to Ukraine. Billions of dollars have gone toward other items like replenishing US military stocks, deterrence measures in Eastern Europe outside Ukraine, and energy-related issues. For example, so far $14 billion has gone to replenish US stocks of equipment, $9.7 billion to US European Command to increase the military presence in Eastern Europe, and $2 billion to address the increase of energy costs related to the war in Ukraine. The billions of dollars allocated for military assistance to Ukraine never leave the United States. Despite the perception that opponents of American aid to Ukraine create, funds for military support are not wired to Ukrainian government bank accounts. Instead, the US president uses the appropriated funds for a drawdown of military equipment to be sent to Ukraine. For the US to give funds to the Ukrainian government, like the $13.2 billion for the Economic Support Fund, the secretary of state and administrator of USAID have to jointly submit a report to the relevant congressional committees on the proposed uses of these funds. There are no “blank checks.”

Myth 3: Congress hasn’t had “enough time to debate” US aid to Ukraine or “read the bill.”

Reality: In 2022, Ukraine has been the single most discussed, reported, and debated foreign policy issue in the United States. Lawmakers, policymakers, and commentators routinely discuss the war in Ukraine and the US role in supporting Kyiv. Far from there not being enough time to debate Ukraine, the war is continuously debated throughout the public square and the halls of Congress. Also, lawmakers have had plenty of time to read the supplementals—which have been relatively short in length—before each vote. The Ukraine supplemental from May has been the longest one in length to date, and it received the most criticism on the grounds that there was not enough time to consider it. The text of this bill was 29 pages long and approximately 4,900 words in length. The average adult can reportedly read around 250 words per minute, meaning someone would need approximately 20 minutes to read the text of May’s bill.

Myth 4: This money to Ukraine would be better spent on “the wall” or “baby formula.”

Reality: This is like saying that a man must choose between being a committed husband, a loving dad, or a hard worker. Sometimes in life, one must do more than one important task at a time. The same applies to when governing a superpower. Furthermore, the issues of US support to Ukraine, the horrific and chaotic situation at the southern border, and the shortage of baby formula are not connected issues. When lawmakers voted on the supplemental in May, they did not have to choose between either alleviating the baby formula shortage or supporting Ukraine.

Myth 5: Europe needs to “spend more” before America does.

Reality: Yes, Europe needs to spend more, but it is misleading to suggest that it is not doing much. The US leads in total financial commitments to Ukraine. However, according to the respected Kiel Institute for the World Economy’s Ukraine aid tracker, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Lithuania, Norway, Slovakia, and Czechia have given more to Ukraine than the US as a percentage of GDP. (The United States and United Kingdom are tied for eighth place.) Also, because a lot of aid is unannounced, it is impossible to know how much European countries have given to Ukraine. Of course, Europe can do more, but complaining that it is not spending enough is no excuse for the US to stop supporting Ukraine.

Myth 6: The US should only give “military aid.”

Reality: Some propose this argument to find a middle ground or compromise with those who do not want to provide any aid to Ukraine. However, this proposal is a half-measure that would only get partial results. The Ukrainian military is not the only actor at war with Russia. As shown by Russia’s indiscriminate use of Iranian drones to target civilians, the whole of Ukrainian society is at war. The war has eliminated an estimated 45 percent of Ukraine’s GDP. Even so, the Ukrainian government and essential public services need to function properly for the nation to remain on a total war footing. For years, critics of America’s approach to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan complained that Washington focused too much on the warfighting and not enough on nonmilitary aspects of the conflicts. Now that the US is doing the opposite in Ukraine, many of the same people now criticize this comprehensive approach to US aid. This support needs to be broad in scope. Those who call for the US to give only military support fail to see the bigger picture in Ukraine.

Myth 7: US weapons are ending up on the black market or are not getting to the front lines.

Reality: There is no evidence that weapons are going missing. A CBS report from August (which opponents to US aid for Ukraine often use to make their case) suggesting that a significant percentage of weapons never make it to the front lines was immediately debunked and then retracted. On the contrary, the recent progress Ukraine has made in its counterattacks near Kharkiv and Kherson proves that US weapons are reaching their intended destination—and proves that US aid is effective. There is no evidence that weapons recently supplied to Ukraine have ended up on the black market. For that matter, there is no evidence that weapons provided to Ukraine since 2014 have appeared on the black market in any meaningful sense.

Myth 8: Ukraine is too corrupt to receive aid responsibly.

Reality: To date there have been “no high-profile cases of corruption involving donated military equipment, budget funding, or humanitarian aid.” It is no secret that corruption is a problem in Ukraine. This is the case with most of the states that gained independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since 2014, Ukraine has taken positive steps at fighting corruption. However, US policymakers and commentators need to be realistic about how much and how quickly Ukraine can reform during a war of national survival. In the meantime, the US should continue with the comprehensive and strict oversight measures in place for US aid, and when possible continue helping Ukraine with its anti-corruption reforms.

Myth 9: Russia is a distraction. US focus must be on China.

Reality: Russia is China’s junior partner. A weakened or defeated Russia means a weaker China. Beijing is also watching how Western powers support Ukraine, so a strong and victorious Ukraine makes Taiwan stronger too. Some have suggested that the US should sacrifice its security interest in Ukraine to focus on the threat from China. Many of Russia’s and China’s strategic goals in Europe overlap. Both want a weakened and divided Europe that both can exploit. Both want to eclipse the US partnership with Europe so that the free world is divided and more vulnerable. Russia shifted many of its forces involved with the invasion of Ukraine from its Eastern Military District, so the number of troops near Russia’s border with China is at a historically unprecedented low level. This point demonstrates how much Russia trusts China. The choice between security in Europe or security in the Indo-Pacific is a false dichotomy. In terms of US national interests, these two regions are intimately linked.

Myth 10: Aid to Ukraine puts “America last.”

Realty: America’s foreign policy challenges are too complex to be boiled down to bumper sticker slogans like “America first” or “America last.” Anyone who uses these terms to describe the US role in the world knows little about foreign affairs and is best ignored.
Title: Arguments for a Marshall plan for Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 22, 2022, 01:04:49 PM
https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-what-could-a-marshall-plan-look-like/a-62262435?fbclid=IwAR3JCvTfRq3QcJF3jmTQImPgjglMiqNOeR83sjXYWY1OD08dSdpV6Rsd-UM

A 'Marshall Plan' for Ukraine?
Silja Thoms
10/25/2022October 25, 2022
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen have appealed for a "Marshall Plan" to rebuild war-scarred Ukraine. What would that entail?

https://p.dw.com/p/4DFIp
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Faced with great challenges, politicians commonly advocate for equally substantial remedies. One often reached-for comparison is the US Marshall Plan, which helped rebuild Western Europe after World War II. Decision-makers have launched subsequent programs modeled on the Marshall Plan to support pandemic-stricken economies, protect the environment, and much else.

Ahead of the G7 summit in June, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz called for such a Marshall Plan to rebuild Ukraine.

In a government address ahead of the June summit, Scholz had said his  visit to Ukraine had reminded him of the widespread destruction that had characterized many German cities after World War II.

"Just like war-scarred Europe then, Ukraine today needs a Marshal plan to rebuild," he said. This, he added, was a job for the coming generation.

Speaking at Tuesday's international reconstruction conference for Ukraine in Berlin, Scholz repeated his appeal, and stressed that this amounted to "nothing less than creating a new Marshall Plan for the 21st century, a generational task that must begin now.''

What was the Marshall Plan?
In 1947, then-US Secretary of State George C. Marshall suggested setting up the European Recovery Program (ERP) to help rebuild much of Europe, which had been destroyed in the war. Today, this scheme is commonly known as the Marshall Plan.

People rebuild in Berlin following the war, in a black and white imagePeople rebuild in Berlin following the war, in a black and white image
The Marshall Plan was devised to help postwar Europe get back on its feetImage: akg-images/picture-alliance
The program entailed the US providing loans to finance European reconstruction efforts, as well as importing goods, raw materials and foodstuffs to Europe. More than $12 billion (approximately $150 billion in today's dollars; €142 billion) were provided to 16 different countries — among them West Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain — between 1948 and 1952. West Germany received roughly $1.5 billion. The cash infusion not only kick-started Europe's economic recovery, but also opened up new markets for the United States.

The Marshall Plan had a political dimension, too. Not all European countries received US money. While the US was keen to limit Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union barred Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland from joining the Marshall Plan, fearing US control over the region.









8 images
8 images
In Germany and the rest of Europe, the Marshall Plan is largely remembered as a successful program that helped rebuild the continent. It sparked economic recovery but also helped democratic structures entrench themselves in Europe. That is why, after various wars and crises in the world, many have pointed to the Marshall Plan as a good example for postwar reconstruction.

A Marshall Plan for Ukraine?
Scholz expects the war in Ukraine will not end anytime soon. Just like the original Marshall Plan was geared toward long-term reconstruction, he said so too must the West expect that rebuilding Ukraine will take time.

"We will need many more billions of euro and dollar for reconstruction purposes — for years to come," Scholz told the German parliament back in June. He added that he wants to see Ukraine continue to receive broad European support in financial, economic, humanitarian and political terms, as well as "arms deliveries."

Ukraine estimates that reconstruction costs could amount to $750 billion (€760 billion) . The EU puts those costs at $349 billion.

Werner Hoyer, who heads the European Investment Bank, expects billions in financial aid for Ukraine. He said there is a need for a program targeting "a global audience, rather just EU taxpayers."

The EU has suggested reconstruction efforts should be coordinated by Ukraine in conjunction with EU, G7 and G20 states, as well as international financial institutions and organizations
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on December 24, 2022, 06:41:39 AM
Via Twitter from Simon Mikhailovich

Feels like something big in the works. All these "in person" consultations can't be coincidental:

Putin & top ministers visited Belarus

Medvedev visited Xi w/Putin's "personal message"

Putin attending Defence Ministry's board meeting

Zelensky visiting DC

Something is up.
-------------------------------------

Title: who is Simon Mikhailovich
Post by: ccp on December 24, 2022, 07:03:01 AM
https://hiddenforces.io/podcasts/simon-mikhailovich-soviet-union-tbr/
https://www.bullionreserve.com/about-us
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on December 24, 2022, 10:22:59 AM
Via Twitter from Simon Mikhailovich

Feels like something big in the works. All these "in person" consultations can't be coincidental:

Putin & top ministers visited Belarus

Medvedev visited Xi w/Putin's "personal message"

Putin attending Defence Ministry's board meeting

Zelensky visiting DC

Something is up.

Very interesting.  I wonder what's up.  The Zelensky US visit didn't seem out of place, more money affects everything for him.  I thought the financial support became more public than it needed to be, but maybe it is intended also as a sign of strength aimed at deterrence.

Belarus behaves as part of Russia today.  Putin doesn't need Belarus permission to mount offensives there, I didn't think, unless there is new resistance there and in person persuasion needed.

With China, isn't Russia losing China's support as they lose the war?  Maybe they need to shore up a big energy deal in order to cut Europe off further. 

I still don't see the point of introducing nuclear weapons from Putin's perspective but I would admit he is unpredictable.

This war is a mess for all sides. 

Next for Ukraine it seems to me is to (survive winter and) decide about trying to take back Crimea or to accept peace deals that give it permanently to Russia.

If Putin has a big escalation offensive available to him, why did he wait most of a year to do it?  Why knock out their grid and infrastructure if you still plan to occupy, and use the grid and infrastructure?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 24, 2022, 01:57:18 PM
"With China, isn't Russia losing China's support as they lose the war?"

The way I see it is that China loves seeing us using up bandwidth here while also taking notes (cf.  Spanish Civil War of the 1930s) Kabuki theater satisfied by pretending not to send weapons while green lighting Norks and Iran.

"(W)hy did he wait most of a year to do it?"

Because it was not winter then."

"Why knock out their grid and infrastructure if you still plan to occupy, and use the grid and infrastructure?

When the original blitzkrieg plan failed, the strategy shifted to "Grozny meets Winter".
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on December 25, 2022, 02:49:23 AM
Via Twitter from Simon Mikhailovich

Feels like something big in the works. All these "in person" consultations can't be coincidental:

Putin & top ministers visited Belarus

Medvedev visited Xi w/Putin's "personal message"

Putin attending Defence Ministry's board meeting

Zelensky visiting DC

Something is up.
-------------------------------------


https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/12/sudden-increase-in-russian-navy-activity-in-black-sea/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 25, 2022, 06:47:46 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/first-african-nation-jumps-arm-ukraine-bandwagon-sale-over-100-tanks?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1147
Title: Russia ready to negotiate
Post by: ccp on December 25, 2022, 09:03:12 AM
https://sports.yahoo.com/putin-says-russia-ready-negotiate-093854014.html

but are we?

or are we just interesting in killing more Ukrainians
spending endless dollars to send message we are so tough not to be messed with
and
to protect democracy
and protect borders    :roll:

while we do the opposite in our own country
Title: George Friedman: The State of Play in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 27, 2022, 08:39:44 AM
December 27, 2022
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
The State of Play in Ukraine
By: George Friedman

The war in Ukraine seems permanent. Neither side appears capable of destroying the opposing force or articulating what it would take to reach a peace agreement. The Russians are speaking to Belarus, India and anyone else they might find, but no one can help enough on the battlefield or in the munitions factory to turn the tide. The Ukrainians are speaking to the United States, NATO and anyone else who will listen so that they will continue to receive weapons – perhaps even some new ones. But Ukraine hasn’t broken Russia yet, concerned as it is with preventing the collapse of the country, and doing so may prove difficult. On the battlefield, there is movement on both sides, but movement doesn’t carry with it the taste of victory. When, then, do wars end if the leadership will not concede?

History shows there are several answers to that question.

1. A war ends when one side lacks the material to continue. Germany's campaign in World War II ended when it was unable to produce and field the weapons needed to fend off the Allied powers.

2. A war ends when one side’s morale is exhausted – when soldiers and civilians are simply unwilling to bear the burden of war, even if victory is possible. This was the case for the United States in the Vietnam War.

3. A war ends when there is no hope of a radical increase in military power, and when foreign intervention is impossible. In WWII, Britain persevered knowing it could not defeat Germany but reasonably expecting an American intervention.

4. A war ends when the consequences of defeat seem tolerable to civilians. In World War II, the Italian public saw Allied occupation as a preferable alternative. (Conversely, nations will continue to fight when the cost of defeat is catastrophic.)

There are certainly other circumstances in which a nation would resist beyond hope, and others under which the nation would readily capitulate instead of endure war. But in judging war, the key is less about the military’s appetite for resistance, since fighting is what militaries do, and more about the appetites of the civilians, who produce war material and bear a burden of loss and pain that can make the war unwinnable.

To try to understand how the Ukraine war ends, we must consider all these matters and more, but with a particular focus on the willingness of civilians to continue to fight. The publics are undoubtedly tired on both sides, the Russians by the causalities and subsequent calling up of more conscripts, and the Ukrainians by the constant attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure. The Russians would wish for an end but not at the cost of rebellion by families whose sons were called up. The Ukrainians are constrained by their fear that conceding to the Russians might bring a reign of terror. In this case, the nation most tired of war is also most frightened of the consequences of defeat.

Neither country is concerned with the loss of material. Both would wish for more, but wanting more won’t lead to capitulation. Lack of materials could cause one or both to at least look for a resolution. Both sides are currently fighting with a certain level of weaponry. They are not breaking the other side and have no reason to believe their current supplies will do so. The Russians have their own industrial plant, plus imported weapons from places like Iran. Ukraine has a massive flow of weapons from the West, particularly the United States. This has created a stable but unending war. If this continues, there is a serious possibility of loss of civilian morale. Moscow will therefore try to make sure that its industrial plant and relations stay intact while seeking to undermine shipments to Ukraine. Ukraine will try to make sure the U.S. will at least sustain its weapons deliveries while trying to minimize weapons flowing to Russia from abroad.

Because both face the problem of civilian morale, both will try to minimize the civilian fear of defeat. But so long as Ukraine fears a defeat by Russia, capitulation is practically impossible. The same cannot be said of Russia. Thus the most likely outcome will be peace talks, forced by domestic unrest in both countries. There is already some unrest in Russia, but little in Ukraine. The Russians have not been able to stoke unrest there and will therefore have to engage in an even more intense campaign of terror, if they can. But peace talks will not happen until there is a sense of imbalance as described on both sides. There must be an element of compulsion. So the key is the manipulation of the foreign civilian population, defense of the domestic populations and the introduction of new and practical weapons that will impose pain without triggering foreign intervention.

Over time, then, the sense of the impossibility of victory will trigger peace talks, but not until reality forces it.
Title: Col. McGregor on Ukraine
Post by: ya on December 31, 2022, 11:30:00 AM
US Col. Douglas McGregor on Ukr

https://youtu.be/D4WIdDStqeE (https://youtu.be/D4WIdDStqeE)
Title: Kunstler : Zelensky will not survive
Post by: ccp on January 01, 2023, 11:14:04 AM
"The open questions: how much punishment does Ukraine seek to suffer before it capitulates? Will Zelensky survive? (Even if he runs off to Miami, he may not survive.)"

from what gets leaked to us in the news Putin may not be long for this Earth .

Then what?
Title: Re: Kunstler : Zelensky will not survive
Post by: ya on January 01, 2023, 03:25:01 PM
"The open questions: how much punishment does Ukraine seek to suffer before it capitulates? Will Zelensky survive? (Even if he runs off to Miami, he may not survive.)"

from what gets leaked to us in the news Putin may not be long for this Earth .Then what?

There are some analysts (eg Martin Armstrong), who think that Putin is actually a moderate and if he goes, expect hardliners to replace him.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 01, 2023, 07:10:41 PM
Tucker regularly asks that question.
Title: FA makes the case for taking Crimea
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 02, 2023, 07:57:58 AM
The Case for Taking Crimea
Why Ukraine Can—and Should—Liberate the Province
By Andriy Zagorodnyuk
January 2, 2023
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/case-taking-crimea

For Ukrainians, 2022 was a year of both tragedy and historic achievements. Russia invaded Ukraine in February with nearly 190,000 troops, inflicting untold destruction and killing tens of thousands of people. But within a few weeks, the Ukrainian military managed to stall the offensive. Then, it began forcing the Russians back. Since August, Ukrainian troops have recaptured more than half the territory Russia had seized, upending Moscow’s hopes of success. To try to demonstrate some gains, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that he had annexed four Ukrainian provinces—Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia—at the end of September. But it was for naught. Russia had full control over none of the provinces when Putin made his announcement, and his forces have lost even more ground since then.

Yet Russia still controls one Ukrainian province: Crimea. In 2014, Russia seized the peninsula in a remarkable breach of international law. Putin actively exploits a narrative that claims Crimea’s transfer to Ukraine, carried out by the Soviet Union in 1954, was “erroneous.” In taking the peninsula, Putin believes he has both corrected what he called a “mistake” and improved Russia’s international position, restoring his country to great-power status.

But those premises are false. Crimea has a rich and unique history; it has not been a part of Russia since time immemorial. It became a rightful part of independent Ukraine after a 1991 nationwide referendum in which Ukrainians—including a majority of Crimean residents—voted for independence from the Soviet Union. It is easy to understand why Crimeans wanted out. The Soviet Union was a totalitarian state, whereas Ukraine was en route to becoming a pluralistic democracy. Moscow’s current rule has revitalized many of the Soviet Union’s dictatorial practices in Crimea, including oppressing minorities and subjecting citizens to a state media that peddles propaganda. Moscow turned the area into a giant, menacing garrison, which it then used to invade Ukraine. As long as the peninsula remains in the Kremlin’s hands, Ukraine—and Ukrainians—cannot be free of Russian aggression.

Western states are united in their belief that the 2014 annexation of Crimea was, and is, unacceptable. But the United States and its partners have been squeamish about endorsing any plans that would return Crimea to Ukraine. Many Western policymakers have suggested that Kyiv could not succeed in a military campaign for the province. In November, for instance, Mark Milley, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Ukraine’s odds of kicking the Russians out of Crimea were “not high.” Other analysts believe that reintegrating Crimeans into Ukraine might prove too tricky or that an attack on Crimea would prompt nuclear retaliation. Better, they suggest, that Ukraine not fight for the peninsula. Some even say that Kyiv should offer it up in exchange for peace.

The West’s fears are not entirely unfounded. Russia has had eight years to absorb Crimea and has built up a significant military presence in the peninsula. Crimea also has at least 700,000 Russian residents who moved in after 2014 (out of a population of 2.4 million): a fact that will complicate any reintegration effort. The world can never rule out the chance that Russia will use nuclear weapons, especially when it is governed by Putin. These are all good reasons why Ukraine should be careful in how it goes about freeing Crimea.

But they are not reasons for Ukraine to abandon the peninsula altogether. And there are plenty of reasons why Crimea must be returned. Russia’s military footprint, for example, is actually a reason to fight for Crimea, since a battle over the territory would seriously degrade Russia’s ability to wage war and terrorize Ukraine and other states. The other concerns about Ukraine’s ability to retake the peninsula and nuclear attacks are all at least somewhat overblown. After consecutive months of battlefield success, it is clear that Ukraine has the capacity to liberate Crimea. Although some Crimeans may want to remain part of Russia, many more of them would be happy to escape the Kremlin’s grasp. And Putin’s nuclear threats are likely just bluster. He did, after all, promise to use nuclear weapons earlier in the conflict, only to back down. Ukraine should therefore plan to liberate Crimea—and the West should plan to help.

CRIMEA IS UKRAINE
One of Russia’s key narratives, pushed by Moscow for decades and repeated by many international observers, is that Crimea has a special historical connection with Russia. It is true that the Sevastopol has long been a Russian naval base and that its southern coast is home to many nineteenth-century Russian aristocratic palaces. Most of the peninsula’s people speak Russian. As a result, Putin has reasoned that in taking back Crimea, he corrected a historical error.

But Crimean history is much richer and more diverse than this narrative suggests. The peninsula became a part of Russia only after the country invaded it, in 1783; it has been ruled by multiple empires over the course of the last millennium. Crimea has thousands of unique landmarks with no connection to Russia, and it is home to many ethnic groups. Russia’s version of Crimea’s past is cherrypicked, and its justification for the occupation rests on the ridiculous assumption that past possession and linguistics give one state the right to a neighbor’s land. The United Kingdom ruled Ireland for centuries, and under London’s governance, English became the island’s most widely spoken language. But that does not mean the United Kingdom would be justified in seizing it.

An honest evaluation of history makes clear that Crimea should be part of Ukraine, not Russia. It is legally recognized and accepted as Ukrainian territory by the entire world—including, until 2014, by Russia. Crimea has been governed by Kyiv for 60 of the past 70 years, and so most of its residents know it first and foremost as a Ukrainian peninsula. During the course of that time, the region went from being economically depressed to solidly middle class, thanks to Ukrainian water supplies, energy supplies, and—after Ukrainian independence—a boom in tourist activity. Putin may be right that millions of Russians have an affinity for the territory, but so do millions of Ukrainians—because they have either visited it or lived there. There is a reason that an overwhelming majority of U.N. General Assembly members strongly condemned Crimea’s annexation and deemed it invalid.


Crimea has not been a part of Russia since time immemorial.
Russia will never permit a real referendum on the peninsula’s future, and so it is impossible to know exactly how Crimeans themselves feel today. One poll, conducted in 2019 by the Levada Center, showed that a majority of the peninsula’s residents wanted Crimea to be part of Russia. But it is difficult to trust any polls done in a totalitarian state, and Russia has criminalized opposition to Crimea’s annexation. Polled Crimeans could have been afraid of admitting that they would rather be part of Ukraine. And there are many reasons to think that a free and fair vote on Crimea’s status today would yield the same results as the one held in 1991. Such a referendum would, for starters, have to include the over 100,000 Crimean residents that Russia intimidated, harassed, and even physically assaulted until they left the peninsula. A lot of these people were made to sell their property at a loss and abandon their businesses. (Most of the territory’s large Ukrainian companies and utilities also lost their assets.) These Crimean émigrés would almost certainly opt for Ukrainian governance, giving the pro-Kyiv faction a solid starting base. Many of the peninsula’s remaining residents would also vote for Ukraine, as might some new arrivals who would prefer to live in a liberal state. Crimean residents have been known to complain about how Russia treats the peninsula’s environment, as well as the economic disruptions created by sanctions.

Ukrainian liberation would prove particularly popular among—and meaningful to—hundreds of thousands of Crimean Tatars, a group that has been especially persecuted by Moscow. Unlike the Russians, they have inhabited the peninsula since the early medieval era. For centuries, Crimean Tatars even had their own state on the landmass. Crimea is their only homeland. But under Soviet and Russian rule, they have been violently persecuted. In 1944, for example, they were forcibly deported, allowed to return only in the late 1980s as the Soviet Union was about to collapse. Under Putin’s rule, they have been pressed to leave again. Those who have stayed are frequently forbidden from working, arrested without cause, and detained without being accused of wrongdoing. Some have been kidnapped. Some of their cultural monuments are being dismantled. They deserve an end to Russia’s totalitarian rule.

SAFE, NOT SORRY
Ukraine must retake Crimea for reasons that go beyond justice. Russia has turned Crimea into a large military base, which it used to launch its sweeping invasion. This use of the peninsula is why Russia has had much more success fighting in Ukraine’s south than in its north. Russia continues to use the Crimea-stationed Black Sea Fleet and the peninsula’s air bases to launch drone and missile attacks. This belligerence makes it clear that Ukraine cannot be safe or rebuild its economy until Crimea is out of Russian hands, and so Kyiv will not stop fighting until it regains the province.

Russian control of Crimea is not just a security risk for Ukraine. Moscow’s hold on the peninsula endangers the whole world. From Crimea, Russia projects power across both Europe and the Middle East, threatening the safety of many other states. By occupying the peninsula, Russia has gained authority in both the Black Sea and the Azov Sea, the latter of which Russian troops now completely surround. Controlling both bodies of water has been Putin’s goal for years: the two seas are a massive shipping route for all kinds of products on the Eurasian continent. By occupying Crimea, Russia can control access to many of the seas’ ports and passages, giving it power over vast supplies of many commodities, including coal, iron ore, various industrial products, and grain from Ukraine. (The Ukrainian ports of Berdyansk and Mariupol lost most of their traffic after Russia started restricting access to the Azov Sea in 2018.)

To see why Russia’s power over the peninsula is so dangerous to the rest of the world, consider the ongoing food security crisis—which was prompted by Russia’s invasion. Without Crimea, Russia would not have been able to threaten shipping in the Black and Azov Seas since the vast majority of these sea-lanes fall outside Russia’s exclusive economic zone. Moscow would certainly not be able to use Ukrainian territorial waters and ports to project power. But by occupying Crimea, Russia came to dominate these seas and their ports.

Occupying Crimea has also given Russia more control over the world’s energy supplies. The Black Sea is home to many resources, including significant natural gas deposits that Ukraine was once prepared to tap. In fact, just before Russia began occupying Crimea, Exxon Mobil signed a memo with Kyiv to drill for $6 billion worth of the sea’s natural gas deposits—one of many companies working with Ukraine to access these assets. Had the projects gone through, Europe’s energy map would have been forever transformed, and the continent could more easily have weaned itself from Russian energy. But when Moscow sent troops into Crimea in 2014, the companies all canceled their projects. As long as the province and other areas of the Black Sea remain in Russia’s hands, business will not come back.

WORDS AND DEEDS
So how would Ukraine liberate Crimea? Ideally, it would be done through diplomacy. Putin will never consider peacefully parting with the peninsula, but if he is booted from office, his successors may have a different calculus. They will inherit a severely sanctioned country with a dramatically weakened military. They will still be fighting Ukraine’s more talented armed forces—and therefore staring down more defeats. Finally, they will be facing international litigation, initiated by Ukraine, that demands hundreds of billions of dollars in damages. Moscow will likely lose in court, and Western states will make the government pay by simply transferring Russia’s frozen assets to Kyiv. Faced with such a situation, the Kremlin might offer to return Crimea as part of a deal that prevents Russia from going into bankruptcy and prevents the domestic unrest that would arise with any economic chaos.

But Ukraine cannot count on a change in leadership in Russia. It also cannot bank on Russia’s next leaders being ready for peace. Kyiv, then, needs to retain a military option, and it must start preparing to win such a fight.

Although retaking Crimea would not be easy, Ukraine has the capability to do so—a fact the West is starting to acknowledge. According to NBC News, in December, a Biden administration official told Congress that Kyiv would be able to liberate the peninsula. Ben Hodges, the former commanding general of the U.S. Army Europe, said that Ukraine has a chance to free Crimea by the end of this coming summer.


The most challenging part of a campaign for Crimea may not be outfoxing Russia.
There is a military justification for these projections. By the time Ukrainian forces are ready to move on the peninsula, most Russian capabilities will have been severely damaged. Russia’s surviving soldiers will be exhausted, and the country’s stockpile of precision missiles will have been depleted. Its naval bases, air bases, and resupply routes to Crimea will have been damaged by Ukrainian attacks. Because Crimea is connected to the Eurasian continent only by a narrow, vulnerable isthmus and a bridge, once Ukrainian troops enter the region, the remaining Russian forces will be trapped, making Russian military sites even more vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes. And for all its significance, the Crimean Peninsula is ultimately just land: something the Ukrainian military has been very successful at reclaiming.

Of course, Ukraine will have to consider the capabilities of the Black Sea Fleet, a keystone of Crimea’s Russian military presence. It is a force for which Ukraine has no real equivalent. But although Ukraine’s small navy does not measure up against Russia’s, the Black Sea Fleet is not the obstacle it might seem. The fleet has an assault capacity of roughly 20 old ships, all of which are so vulnerable to strikes that Russia has hidden them away from the Ukrainian coastline. But Ukraine can still acquire and produce enough unmanned vehicles and missile systems to destroy them. And the fleet is smaller than it was at the start of the war thanks to Ukrainian attacks. Ukraine succeeded, for instance, in sinking the fleet’s flagship. The Ukrainians will not have trouble further chipping away at the Russian navy in forthcoming months, at least to a point where the navy cannot effectively stop them. Ukraine, after all, has a good track record of getting around the Black Sea Fleet. If the Russian navy could not defend the Black Sea’s Snake Island, which is less than 0.1 square miles, it is hard to imagine how it would stop Ukraine from crossing the isthmus.

Ultimately, the most challenging part of a campaign for Crimea may not be outfoxing Russia. It could be winning over locals who back Moscow. Despite all of the Kremlin’s abuses, Crimea is home to far more Putin supporters than are other parts of Ukraine, especially given that the population has had an influx of Russian residents and has experienced years of nonstop Russian propaganda. It would be dangerous for Kyiv to assume that Ukraine’s military will be welcomed there as it was in Kherson. Ukraine will need to substantially research what policies it should adopt, including with regard to finance, banking, and law enforcement. It must also figure out how to provide restitution to the many Crimeans who were stripped of their jobs and property by the Russian government. It will need to rework the peninsula’s state services—particularly for education, which has been conducted for years using a Russian curriculum based in propaganda. Critically, it must ensure that residents who support Russia’s dictatorship will not want to destabilize the peninsula, and it must guarantee that law-abiding citizens have a balanced, fair, and democratic government.

STAND YOUR GROUND
Although the West uniformly, and rightly, condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea, it effectively accepted Moscow’s act. The only tangible response that the United States and Europe could muster was a sanctions regime with countless loopholes, allowing the Russian economy to keep growing. Indeed, even the sanctioning states continued to expand their business ties to Moscow, including by increasing their dependence on Russian energy exports.

It is therefore little wonder that the Kremlin felt emboldened to invade the rest of Ukraine. Russia is bent on taking land and increasing its sphere of influence so it can restore its empire. When Moscow senses weakness, it jumps. This is why Kyiv cannot bargain away Crimea for peace, as some Western analysts have suggested. Doing so would further reward and incentivize Putin’s aggression. Additionally, such a deal would not be effective. As long as Putin runs Russia’s government, the Kremlin will never settle for a peace agreement in which Ukraine “just” gives up Crimea. It wants and will keep fighting for more. Indeed, should the West display indecision or hesitation in supporting Ukraine’s goals in Crimea, Russia will try to capitalize on the dithering by working to fracture the states supporting Kyiv.

As a result, Kyiv and its allies must press on, battling until it can make Moscow hand over Crimea via negotiations or until Ukraine has forcibly pried the peninsula from Moscow’s grasp. Doing so is the only way to inflict the kind of major defeat Russia must experience if it is to abandon its imperial ambitions and start abiding by international norms and laws. The United States and Europe should understand that they, too, will benefit from a total Ukrainian victory. It could mark the permanent end of Russian aggression, breathing new life into the liberal world order.

Liberating Crimea would also set an important historical precedent for the wider world. If Ukraine does not retake Crimea—if Russia gets away with annexation—other states will become more likely to wage wars of conquest. They will move to occupy their neighbor’s territory, reasoning that they can get away with certain kinds of land grabs. Winning in Crimea, then, is essential to preventing future conflicts and thwarting a return to conquest.
Title: Ukes hit Russki base in Doneskt, killing many
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 02, 2023, 08:36:16 AM
second

https://www.nationalreview.com/news/ukrainian-new-years-strike-on-russian-base-kills-hundreds/?utm_source=email&utm_medium=breaking&utm_campaign=newstrack&utm_term=30133945
Title: Re: Col. McGregor on Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on January 02, 2023, 12:47:45 PM
US Col. Douglas McGregor on Ukr

https://youtu.be/D4WIdDStqeE (https://youtu.be/D4WIdDStqeE)

I find Col McGregor to be very one-sided in his analysis. Russia is all powerful and Ukraine has no chance.    It doesn't seem like that has been playing out.  It looks to me more like a war neither side can win.

In the past week it looks like Russia has upped its attack and Ukraine has also.  We will see how the latest developments shake out. 

Russia has (almost) every advantage over Ukraine - reminiscent of USA versus North Vietnam.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 02, 2023, 09:44:27 PM
"I find Col McGregor to be very one-sided in his analysis."

Agree. 

Regular guest on Tucker btw. 

Love Tucker, but there is some sort of glitch in him with regard to Russia (this includes Russia in Syria btw).
Title: PJ Media: The other invasion of Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 05, 2023, 09:17:19 AM
https://pjmedia.com/news-and-politics/athena-thorne/2023/01/03/the-other-invasion-of-ukraine-may-be-far-worse-than-russias-n1658236?fbclid=IwAR0LeM-y7MSoMGmbs5pnpBJ_laDOuYjQP9hdCkv3PvM0B7u-KAugrVZtyug
Title: Re: Ukraine - Starlink internet
Post by: DougMacG on January 06, 2023, 03:52:07 AM
It is one of the wonders of the world—or, more accurately, off the world. The Starlink constellation currently consists of 3,335 active satellites; roughly half of all working satellites are Starlinks. In the past six months new satellites have been added at a rate of more than 20 a week, on average. SpaceX, the company which created Starlink, is offering it as a way of providing off-grid high-bandwidth internet access to consumers in 45 countries. A million or so have become subscribers. And a huge part of the traffic flowing through the system currently comes from Ukraine. Starlink has become an integral part of the country’s military and civil response to Russia’s invasion. Envisaged as a celestial side-hustle that might help pay for the Mars missions dear to the founder of SpaceX, Elon Musk, it is not just allowing Ukraine to fight back; it is shaping how it does so, revealing the military potential of near-ubiquitous communications. (Source: economist.com
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on January 06, 2023, 06:22:39 AM
"By the time the fighting finally stops, Ukraine will be fully owned and operated by the likes of Fink, Schwab, and the rest of the globalists. It will be rebuilt from the ground up as the first-ever post-national region, nothing more than a location on the map of the People’s Global Republic, with nominal local governance that can say “no” to none of its masters."

 I wish Putin would invade Davos and teach them a real world lesson
 celebrities et al.....
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on January 06, 2023, 06:40:50 AM
"Ukraine will be fully owned and operated by the likes of..."

  - Very much like what the China belt and road initiative is attempting to do in 149 countries.

Everybody, it seems, wants one world government that they control.

Those of us who don't want to rule or be ruled and controlled don't seem to be the silent majority anymore.  Just silent.  Or silenced.

Title: The case for the war
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 09, 2023, 08:36:32 AM
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63160354?fbclid=IwAR0B5VefMOoKE6sagI8oYiCwFpQu-2Iq6zg7jENxBVewmgV_H99b068FoeI
Title: Gates and Rice: we need to up the game in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 10, 2023, 07:35:46 AM

What a fg unnecessary mess these people have gotten us into!!! 

As for what to do now , , ,

==========================
Time is not on Ukraine’s side
By Condoleezza Rice and Robert M. Gates
January 7, 2023 at 7:00 a.m. EST

Condoleezza Rice was secretary of state from 2005 to 2009. Robert M. Gates was secretary of defense from 2006 to 2011.

When it comes to the war in Ukraine, about the only thing that’s certain right now is that the fighting and destruction will continue.

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Vladimir Putin remains fully committed to bringing all of Ukraine back under Russian control or — failing that — destroying it as a viable country. He believes it is his historical destiny — his messianic mission — to reestablish the Russian Empire and, as Zbigniew Brzezinski observed years ago, there can be no Russian Empire without Ukraine.


Zelensky, Biden outline their hopes for peace
1:47
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and President Biden shared their hopes for peace between Russia and Ukraine in a news conference on Dec. 21. (Video: The Washington Post)
Both of us have dealt with Putin on a number of occasions, and we are convinced he believes time is on his side: that he can wear down the Ukrainians and that U.S. and European unity and support for Ukraine will eventually erode and fracture. To be sure, the Russian economy and people will suffer as the war continues, but Russians have endured far worse.


For Putin, defeat is not an option. He cannot cede to Ukraine the four eastern provinces he has declared part of Russia. If he cannot be militarily successful this year, he must retain control of positions in eastern and southern Ukraine that provide future jumping-off points for renewed offensives to take the rest of Ukraine’s Black Sea coast, control the entire Donbas region and then move west. Eight years separated Russia’s seizure of Crimea and its invasion nearly a year ago. Count on Putin to be patient to achieve his destiny.

Meanwhile, although Ukraine’s response to the invasion has been heroic and its military has performed brilliantly, the country’s economy is in a shambles, millions of its people have fled, its infrastructure is being destroyed, and much of its mineral wealth, industrial capacity and considerable agricultural land are under Russian control. Ukraine’s military capability and economy are now dependent almost entirely on lifelines from the West — primarily, the United States. Absent another major Ukrainian breakthrough and success against Russian forces, Western pressures on Ukraine to negotiate a cease-fire will grow as months of military stalemate pass. Under current circumstances, any negotiated cease-fire would leave Russian forces in a strong position to resume their invasion whenever they are ready. That is unacceptable.

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Opinion writers on the war in Ukraine


The only way to avoid such a scenario is for the United States and its allies to urgently provide Ukraine with a dramatic increase in military supplies and capability — sufficient to deter a renewed Russian offensive and to enable Ukraine to push back Russian forces in the east and south. Congress has provided enough money to pay for such reinforcement; what is needed now are decisions by the United States and its allies to provide the Ukrainians the additional military equipment they need — above all, mobile armor. The U.S. agreement Thursday to provide Bradley Fighting Vehicles is commendable, if overdue. Because there are serious logistical challenges associated with sending American Abrams heavy tanks, Germany and other allies should fill this need. NATO members also should provide the Ukrainians with longer-range missiles, advanced drones, significant ammunition stocks (including artillery shells), more reconnaissance and surveillance capability, and other equipment. These capabilities are needed in weeks, not months.


Increasingly, members of Congress and others in our public discourse ask, “Why should we care? This is not our fight.” But the United States has learned the hard way — in 1914, 1941 and 2001 — that unprovoked aggression and attacks on the rule of law and the international order cannot be ignored. Eventually, our security was threatened and we were pulled into conflict. This time, the economies of the world — ours included — are already seeing the inflationary impact and the drag on growth caused by Putin’s single-minded aggression. It is better to stop him now, before more is demanded of the United States and NATO as a whole. We have a determined partner in Ukraine that is willing to bear the consequences of war so that we do not have to do so ourselves in the future.

President Volodymyr Zelensky’s speech before Congress last month reminded us of Winston Churchill’s plea in February 1941: “Give us the tools, and we will finish the job.” We agree with the Biden administration’s determination to avoid direct confrontation with Russia. However, an emboldened Putin might not give us that choice. The way to avoid confrontation with Russia in the future is to help Ukraine push back the invader now. That is the lesson of history that should guide us, and it lends urgency to the actions that must be taken — before it is too late.
Title: Re: Gates and Rice: we need to up the game in Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on January 10, 2023, 11:03:17 AM
Escalation from our side doesn't seem like the best strategy right now.  There is no defeating Russia once and for all in a relatively contained Ukraine war.

From the article, I would quibble with this:
"Eight years separated Russia’s seizure of Crimea and its invasion nearly a year ago. Count on Putin to be patient to achieve his destiny".

Putin was 62 and healthy then.  In 8 years, if alive, he will be Joe Biden's age.  We don't know what Russia looks like in 8 years. We don't even know what the US will look like then.

The goal for Ukraine, it seems to me, is to win the necessary battles and survive.   A total defeat of Russia by Ukraine isn't in the cards.
Title: Geroge Friedman: Wagner Group in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 13, 2023, 10:56:36 AM
January 13, 2023
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Open as PDF

    
The Wagner Group and Russia’s New General
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman
Moscow has relieved its current general in Ukraine, placing him under the staff of his successor, Gen. Valery Gerasimov. In a way, this makes sense – he can help the new commander find his place – but if he works toward Gerasimov’s failure, it could create problems in morale. The arrangement is odd, but if it works, it works, and Russia is in dire need of something that works.

It’s been nearly a year since Russia invaded Ukraine, and it has yet to claim any semblance of victory. The army has fought battles and has even appeared to have won some, but nothing has been decisive. A potentially decisive battle is being fought now, but the relief of the theater commander does not indicate that it is going well.

The Russian army clearly was not prepared for Ukrainian resistance, nor for the extent to which the United States was prepared to arm Ukrainian troops. Russian intelligence should have known as much, and thus should have baked this into Moscow’s wartime strategy. Russia has yet to lose the war, of course, but conflicts such as this one tend to be affairs of attrition, and the war must be costing Russia far more than it expected.

Which at least partly explains the participation of the Wagner Group, the Russian private military contractor that has served Moscow in many other regions – often to brutal effect – but never served in a theater-level operation that is essentially a multidimensional line. It is not only facing resistance it has not experienced before, but its force has been dramatically increased so that the problems of command are extremely different from lesser wars, the troops less disciplined because of the need to bring in new recruits.

One of the persistent reports about how Wagner swells its ranks is that it conscripts prisoners. Whether or not this is true, it doesn’t change the fact that Wagner fighters need to be extensively trained to wage a war of advanced weaponry. The battles inherent to Ukraine require seasoned and motivated manpower, and whether that comes from prisoners or seminary students, it will have trouble facing a sophisticated enemy. And however the Ukrainian army began the war, it is indisputably now a trained and motivated fighting force.

Wagner already had questions surrounding its effectiveness, and now it reportedly sports a larger force than the Russian army does. That force, moreover, answers to its own command structure outside the purview of the Russian military. It’s easy to see, then, that whatever initial success Wagner may bring could succumb to attrition and in time fail to penetrate deep into Ukrainian territory – even if it is able to break through Ukrainian lines.

The logical outcome of the war in Ukraine is a negotiated peace. But Wagner is neither owned nor operated by President Vladimir Putin, so it’s not clear how the political process of negotiations plays out. I think that if Putin negotiates for trivial gains, he will be politically finished. He must have substantial successes to justify the cost of war.

As for Gerasimov, he may be a superb general, but given the reality, he is going to fight a battle for command over Wagner before he fights the battles for Ukraine. His job is to crash through and surround the enemy and force mass surrender or death. He faces tough resistance from multiple directions, but if he is successful, he may be able to end the stalemate and force the negotiations I thought would come much sooner.
Title: How US should and should not support Ukraine.
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 13, 2023, 11:33:08 AM
Interesting idea:

In return for Ukes accepting some Russian land gains, they get to join NATO.

========================================================

How the U.S. Should — and Should Not — Continue to Support Ukraine

President Joe Biden and Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky walk down the Colonnade to the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, D.C., December 21, 2022.
By JIM TALENT
January 12, 2023 6:30 AM

It may well turn out that the United States cannot, consistent with its own interests, give Zelensky the means to get his entire country back.
Back in May of last year, I outlined the reasons why the United States should support Ukraine in resisting the Russian invasion. Briefly, Russia under Vladimir Putin has for the last 20 years made itself a global adversary of the United States by launching cyberattacks and sponsoring cyber-syndicate crime, threatening NATO allies in Europe, wreaking havoc in Syria, supporting Iran in its regional ambitions, and expressing in word and deed its “unlimited friendship” for China, which is a peer competitor of the United States with designs on global hegemony.

It was therefore very much in America’s interest to frustrate Russia’s ambitions in Europe and weaken the will and power of the Russian state to threaten the United States elsewhere. Supporting Ukraine had the additional advantage of putting us on the side of the good guys in resisting an unprovoked invasion that has been conducted with the savagery that characterizes Vladimir Putin’s approach to the world.

So far, the war has turned out better than anyone could have hoped. But Ukraine’s surprising success on the battlefield, coupled with Russian war crimes, has understandably led the Ukrainian government to pursue ambitious war aims that are, or at least could be, in tension with the interests of the United States.

From the American perspective, Russia has already suffered a stunning defeat. It is isolated diplomatically and damaged economically. Its leadership is challenged at home and has lost credibility abroad; its industrial base is in distress; its army has been exposed, and it has suffered losses in men and matériel that will take years to replace, if they are replaceable at all.

Putin’s strategic goal was to divide NATO and increase the danger to the Baltic allies; instead NATO has emerged more united, and now will be enlarged with the inclusion of Sweden and Finland, two countries with substantial military capabilities. Moreover, the war has pushed our European allies to spend at least somewhat more on defense, and to step away from the climate policies that had compromised the alliance by making some of its most important members dependent on Russian oil and natural gas.

All in all, Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine was, for Russia, an error of such magnitude that it deserves a place on the Mount Rushmore of strategic blunders.

But the fact that Russia has lost does not mean that Ukraine has won.

Ukraine wants to recover all the territory Russia has sliced away from it since 2014, including Donetsk and Luhansk provinces; it also seeks reparations and the establishment of a war-crimes tribunal to prosecute Russian commanders for their brutality against Ukraine. Obviously, Putin will never agree to anything like those terms, unless forced to by losses on the battlefield that Ukraine is unlikely to be able to inflict.

Russia seems, finally, to be learning from its mistakes. It is still conducting a largely pointless offensive against Bakhmut but is otherwise going on the defensive. It conducted an orderly retreat from Kherson and has prepared defenses in depth east of the Dnipro. Its mobilization last fall, though poorly executed, has enabled it to increase manning levels along its lines. To be sure, many of the new troops are badly trained and equipped, but it is easier in war to defend than to attack, and Ukraine cannot count on the advantage of surprise in any future offensives. (For a thorough review of the current state of the war, and the possibilities going forward, see this excellent article by Michael Kofman of the Center for New American Security.)

So what should be U.S. policy now?

First, the Ukrainians deserve a fair chance to achieve their goals. We should continue to provide them the arms they need, including systems we have previously withheld, such as tanks, aircraft, air-defense systems, and longer-range missiles that will extend the reach of their attacks against Russian forces and logistics nodes, and even military targets in Russia itself. Perhaps the Ukrainian army can indeed regain the Donbas; at this point, I would not put anything past them. But even smaller successes will pressure Putin to end the war and also assist in establishing ceasefire lines that are militarily defensible in the future.


I should add that if the Russians manage to reconstitute their forces and launch a major offensive — a small but cognizable risk — we should do everything reasonably possible to ensure that Ukraine doesn’t lose on Putin’s terms. The last thing we need after the Afghanistan disaster is to abandon another ally.

Yet we should also continue signaling that our support for Ukraine’s goals is not open-ended. Solidarity does not mean a blank check to continue fighting indefinitely over a largely static battlefield. That would consume stocks of ammunition that are needed elsewhere, divert funds that ought to be used for building up our own armed forces, and increase the devastation to Ukraine and therefore the cost of rebuilding after the war is over — all without getting Ukraine much more territory than they now control.


Why Ukraine Matters

In other words, it may well turn out that the United States cannot, consistent with its own interests, give Zelensky the means to get his entire country back. But we should commit ourselves to establishing real security for Ukraine once the war is over, including the possibility of admitting Ukraine to NATO in return for yielding some territory to Russia.

Yes, that would mean enlarging the responsibilities of NATO. But Ukraine has reduced the burden of those responsibilities by degrading Russian combat power, probably for years to come. Besides, the Ukrainian army is obviously highly capable and now has more experience fighting in something like maneuver warfare — the most likely kind of war if NATO ever actually engaged Russia — than most NATO members do. Adding those soldiers to the NATO mix would be a significant net gain for the alliance, and it would show that the United States is willing to act firmly to deter aggression, whether the aggressors like it or not.

That is a message we need to send. War is always tragic, but the greatest tragedy of this one is that it might well have been avoided if NATO had long ago done what it is planning to do now: establish a permanent military base in Eastern Europe as a bulwark against Russian aggression.

Instead, NATO countries cut their defense budgets and drew down their forces, even as Putin was stepping up his aggressions. Consider this: In 2013, five years after Russia had detached two provinces from Georgia, the United States did not have a working tank in Europe, and as recently as four years ago, long after Putin had begun his attempt to dismember Ukraine, the German army was so short on rifles that its soldiers were forced to train with broomsticks.

Is it any wonder that Putin believed the West would fold if Russia invaded Ukraine?

As I wrote in May, the war in Ukraine is about a lot more than a heroic people determined to defend their way of life. It is also about the ability of the West, and in particular the United States, to protect its vital national interests by sustaining the tools of our own power and acting in concert with other countries that have similar objectives and interests.

In other words, peace through robust strength and collective security. It’s not an easy or inexpensive strategy, but it’s a lot better than the alternatives.

We pursued that strategy during the Cold War, and as a result defeated the Soviets without ever having to fight them face to face. We haven’t done it since; we’ve allowed our power to atrophy while blundering from one disaster to another. If we can’t do it now, the next war — and everyone knows where that is likely to occur — will make Ukraine look like a skirmish, and will require a lot more from us than sending money and missiles and cheering on the good guys from the sidelines.
Title: Re: How US should and should not support Ukraine.
Post by: DougMacG on January 13, 2023, 03:02:08 PM
quote author=Crafty_Dog

'Interesting idea:

In return for Ukes accepting some Russian land gains, they get to join NATO.'
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Yes.  Makes sense.  If Ukraine gives up land for peace there should be some security in it.  It
(at least partly) makes sense for NATO too.  It would push Russia's line of influence back most of 800 miles from eastern Europe, Germany etc.  It's Russia who should turn down the deal and retreat to the pre-2021 borders.

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 14, 2023, 10:27:24 AM
Very much worth noting is that under this formula, Russia would be getting some of the most valuable parts of Ukraine.  Also note implications for rights in the Black Sea.
Title: Ukrainian opinion, Crimean history
Post by: DougMacG on January 16, 2023, 06:26:53 AM
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/01/13/peace-ukraine-crimea-putin-00077746

Crimea is not Russian.

Khrushchev agreed.
Title: Kissinger now open to Ukraine joining NATO
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 17, 2023, 07:50:48 PM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/kissinger-sheds-resistance-to-ukraine-joining-nato/ar-AA16rCwc?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=a0b4f0f7368048e394d4913717c72b59
Title: Zelensky - more more more
Post by: ccp on January 19, 2023, 07:51:10 AM
https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2023/01/19/no-tanks-zelensky-uses-davos-pulpit-to-scold-western-allies-for-lack-of-heavy-battlefield-weaponry/

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 19, 2023, 02:12:28 PM
Can't say that I blame him.  His people are in a genuinely heavy war-- why wouldn't he want as much as possible?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on January 20, 2023, 10:08:55 AM
Can't say that I blame him.  His people are in a genuinely heavy war-- why wouldn't he want as much as possible?

Yes.

IF one is to agree with:
 - Ukraine deserves our help,
 - this is not a blank check,
 - the amount needs to be limited for both strategic and financial reasons
 - the support needs to come from all of the allies, with the US providing the largest share.

Not everyone agrees with the above, cf. G M, but if you do, the next step is to measure What proportion should be us compared to the total from all the allies and the us.

Next, there is a timeliness to this. How much more than our share will we give while we wait for and lobby our Allies to kick in their share?

I was wondering, is President Biden over in Europe lobbying our allies for greater military and humanitarian support in ukraine, or is he holed up in Delaware hiding from a document scandal of his making?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 20, 2023, 02:34:11 PM
I was reacting to this:

"Zelensky - more more more"

OF COURSE just as he looks out for Ukraine, we should look out for America first.
Title: Zeihan: Holodomor 2
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 25, 2023, 07:24:05 PM


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CDVH_JJIRWI
Title: Amazing footage here
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 26, 2023, 02:10:33 PM
https://www.facebook.com/slavwars/posts/pfbid0rcELurqSDGgHZVuHifpwoyyCDqtiHf9CjK4sT2GopLV9c4YJvbwuHyPNh7A1HfPBl
Title: Re: FA makes the case for taking Crimea
Post by: G M on January 26, 2023, 09:16:04 PM
About as realistic as me writing “The case for
Me banging Cindy Crawford”.

The Case for Taking Crimea
Why Ukraine Can—and Should—Liberate the Province
By Andriy Zagorodnyuk
January 2, 2023
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/case-taking-crimea

For Ukrainians, 2022 was a year of both tragedy and historic achievements. Russia invaded Ukraine in February with nearly 190,000 troops, inflicting untold destruction and killing tens of thousands of people. But within a few weeks, the Ukrainian military managed to stall the offensive. Then, it began forcing the Russians back. Since August, Ukrainian troops have recaptured more than half the territory Russia had seized, upending Moscow’s hopes of success. To try to demonstrate some gains, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that he had annexed four Ukrainian provinces—Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia—at the end of September. But it was for naught. Russia had full control over none of the provinces when Putin made his announcement, and his forces have lost even more ground since then.

Yet Russia still controls one Ukrainian province: Crimea. In 2014, Russia seized the peninsula in a remarkable breach of international law. Putin actively exploits a narrative that claims Crimea’s transfer to Ukraine, carried out by the Soviet Union in 1954, was “erroneous.” In taking the peninsula, Putin believes he has both corrected what he called a “mistake” and improved Russia’s international position, restoring his country to great-power status.

But those premises are false. Crimea has a rich and unique history; it has not been a part of Russia since time immemorial. It became a rightful part of independent Ukraine after a 1991 nationwide referendum in which Ukrainians—including a majority of Crimean residents—voted for independence from the Soviet Union. It is easy to understand why Crimeans wanted out. The Soviet Union was a totalitarian state, whereas Ukraine was en route to becoming a pluralistic democracy. Moscow’s current rule has revitalized many of the Soviet Union’s dictatorial practices in Crimea, including oppressing minorities and subjecting citizens to a state media that peddles propaganda. Moscow turned the area into a giant, menacing garrison, which it then used to invade Ukraine. As long as the peninsula remains in the Kremlin’s hands, Ukraine—and Ukrainians—cannot be free of Russian aggression.

Western states are united in their belief that the 2014 annexation of Crimea was, and is, unacceptable. But the United States and its partners have been squeamish about endorsing any plans that would return Crimea to Ukraine. Many Western policymakers have suggested that Kyiv could not succeed in a military campaign for the province. In November, for instance, Mark Milley, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Ukraine’s odds of kicking the Russians out of Crimea were “not high.” Other analysts believe that reintegrating Crimeans into Ukraine might prove too tricky or that an attack on Crimea would prompt nuclear retaliation. Better, they suggest, that Ukraine not fight for the peninsula. Some even say that Kyiv should offer it up in exchange for peace.

The West’s fears are not entirely unfounded. Russia has had eight years to absorb Crimea and has built up a significant military presence in the peninsula. Crimea also has at least 700,000 Russian residents who moved in after 2014 (out of a population of 2.4 million): a fact that will complicate any reintegration effort. The world can never rule out the chance that Russia will use nuclear weapons, especially when it is governed by Putin. These are all good reasons why Ukraine should be careful in how it goes about freeing Crimea.

But they are not reasons for Ukraine to abandon the peninsula altogether. And there are plenty of reasons why Crimea must be returned. Russia’s military footprint, for example, is actually a reason to fight for Crimea, since a battle over the territory would seriously degrade Russia’s ability to wage war and terrorize Ukraine and other states. The other concerns about Ukraine’s ability to retake the peninsula and nuclear attacks are all at least somewhat overblown. After consecutive months of battlefield success, it is clear that Ukraine has the capacity to liberate Crimea. Although some Crimeans may want to remain part of Russia, many more of them would be happy to escape the Kremlin’s grasp. And Putin’s nuclear threats are likely just bluster. He did, after all, promise to use nuclear weapons earlier in the conflict, only to back down. Ukraine should therefore plan to liberate Crimea—and the West should plan to help.

CRIMEA IS UKRAINE
One of Russia’s key narratives, pushed by Moscow for decades and repeated by many international observers, is that Crimea has a special historical connection with Russia. It is true that the Sevastopol has long been a Russian naval base and that its southern coast is home to many nineteenth-century Russian aristocratic palaces. Most of the peninsula’s people speak Russian. As a result, Putin has reasoned that in taking back Crimea, he corrected a historical error.

But Crimean history is much richer and more diverse than this narrative suggests. The peninsula became a part of Russia only after the country invaded it, in 1783; it has been ruled by multiple empires over the course of the last millennium. Crimea has thousands of unique landmarks with no connection to Russia, and it is home to many ethnic groups. Russia’s version of Crimea’s past is cherrypicked, and its justification for the occupation rests on the ridiculous assumption that past possession and linguistics give one state the right to a neighbor’s land. The United Kingdom ruled Ireland for centuries, and under London’s governance, English became the island’s most widely spoken language. But that does not mean the United Kingdom would be justified in seizing it.

An honest evaluation of history makes clear that Crimea should be part of Ukraine, not Russia. It is legally recognized and accepted as Ukrainian territory by the entire world—including, until 2014, by Russia. Crimea has been governed by Kyiv for 60 of the past 70 years, and so most of its residents know it first and foremost as a Ukrainian peninsula. During the course of that time, the region went from being economically depressed to solidly middle class, thanks to Ukrainian water supplies, energy supplies, and—after Ukrainian independence—a boom in tourist activity. Putin may be right that millions of Russians have an affinity for the territory, but so do millions of Ukrainians—because they have either visited it or lived there. There is a reason that an overwhelming majority of U.N. General Assembly members strongly condemned Crimea’s annexation and deemed it invalid.


Crimea has not been a part of Russia since time immemorial.
Russia will never permit a real referendum on the peninsula’s future, and so it is impossible to know exactly how Crimeans themselves feel today. One poll, conducted in 2019 by the Levada Center, showed that a majority of the peninsula’s residents wanted Crimea to be part of Russia. But it is difficult to trust any polls done in a totalitarian state, and Russia has criminalized opposition to Crimea’s annexation. Polled Crimeans could have been afraid of admitting that they would rather be part of Ukraine. And there are many reasons to think that a free and fair vote on Crimea’s status today would yield the same results as the one held in 1991. Such a referendum would, for starters, have to include the over 100,000 Crimean residents that Russia intimidated, harassed, and even physically assaulted until they left the peninsula. A lot of these people were made to sell their property at a loss and abandon their businesses. (Most of the territory’s large Ukrainian companies and utilities also lost their assets.) These Crimean émigrés would almost certainly opt for Ukrainian governance, giving the pro-Kyiv faction a solid starting base. Many of the peninsula’s remaining residents would also vote for Ukraine, as might some new arrivals who would prefer to live in a liberal state. Crimean residents have been known to complain about how Russia treats the peninsula’s environment, as well as the economic disruptions created by sanctions.

Ukrainian liberation would prove particularly popular among—and meaningful to—hundreds of thousands of Crimean Tatars, a group that has been especially persecuted by Moscow. Unlike the Russians, they have inhabited the peninsula since the early medieval era. For centuries, Crimean Tatars even had their own state on the landmass. Crimea is their only homeland. But under Soviet and Russian rule, they have been violently persecuted. In 1944, for example, they were forcibly deported, allowed to return only in the late 1980s as the Soviet Union was about to collapse. Under Putin’s rule, they have been pressed to leave again. Those who have stayed are frequently forbidden from working, arrested without cause, and detained without being accused of wrongdoing. Some have been kidnapped. Some of their cultural monuments are being dismantled. They deserve an end to Russia’s totalitarian rule.

SAFE, NOT SORRY
Ukraine must retake Crimea for reasons that go beyond justice. Russia has turned Crimea into a large military base, which it used to launch its sweeping invasion. This use of the peninsula is why Russia has had much more success fighting in Ukraine’s south than in its north. Russia continues to use the Crimea-stationed Black Sea Fleet and the peninsula’s air bases to launch drone and missile attacks. This belligerence makes it clear that Ukraine cannot be safe or rebuild its economy until Crimea is out of Russian hands, and so Kyiv will not stop fighting until it regains the province.

Russian control of Crimea is not just a security risk for Ukraine. Moscow’s hold on the peninsula endangers the whole world. From Crimea, Russia projects power across both Europe and the Middle East, threatening the safety of many other states. By occupying the peninsula, Russia has gained authority in both the Black Sea and the Azov Sea, the latter of which Russian troops now completely surround. Controlling both bodies of water has been Putin’s goal for years: the two seas are a massive shipping route for all kinds of products on the Eurasian continent. By occupying Crimea, Russia can control access to many of the seas’ ports and passages, giving it power over vast supplies of many commodities, including coal, iron ore, various industrial products, and grain from Ukraine. (The Ukrainian ports of Berdyansk and Mariupol lost most of their traffic after Russia started restricting access to the Azov Sea in 2018.)

To see why Russia’s power over the peninsula is so dangerous to the rest of the world, consider the ongoing food security crisis—which was prompted by Russia’s invasion. Without Crimea, Russia would not have been able to threaten shipping in the Black and Azov Seas since the vast majority of these sea-lanes fall outside Russia’s exclusive economic zone. Moscow would certainly not be able to use Ukrainian territorial waters and ports to project power. But by occupying Crimea, Russia came to dominate these seas and their ports.

Occupying Crimea has also given Russia more control over the world’s energy supplies. The Black Sea is home to many resources, including significant natural gas deposits that Ukraine was once prepared to tap. In fact, just before Russia began occupying Crimea, Exxon Mobil signed a memo with Kyiv to drill for $6 billion worth of the sea’s natural gas deposits—one of many companies working with Ukraine to access these assets. Had the projects gone through, Europe’s energy map would have been forever transformed, and the continent could more easily have weaned itself from Russian energy. But when Moscow sent troops into Crimea in 2014, the companies all canceled their projects. As long as the province and other areas of the Black Sea remain in Russia’s hands, business will not come back.

WORDS AND DEEDS
So how would Ukraine liberate Crimea? Ideally, it would be done through diplomacy. Putin will never consider peacefully parting with the peninsula, but if he is booted from office, his successors may have a different calculus. They will inherit a severely sanctioned country with a dramatically weakened military. They will still be fighting Ukraine’s more talented armed forces—and therefore staring down more defeats. Finally, they will be facing international litigation, initiated by Ukraine, that demands hundreds of billions of dollars in damages. Moscow will likely lose in court, and Western states will make the government pay by simply transferring Russia’s frozen assets to Kyiv. Faced with such a situation, the Kremlin might offer to return Crimea as part of a deal that prevents Russia from going into bankruptcy and prevents the domestic unrest that would arise with any economic chaos.

But Ukraine cannot count on a change in leadership in Russia. It also cannot bank on Russia’s next leaders being ready for peace. Kyiv, then, needs to retain a military option, and it must start preparing to win such a fight.

Although retaking Crimea would not be easy, Ukraine has the capability to do so—a fact the West is starting to acknowledge. According to NBC News, in December, a Biden administration official told Congress that Kyiv would be able to liberate the peninsula. Ben Hodges, the former commanding general of the U.S. Army Europe, said that Ukraine has a chance to free Crimea by the end of this coming summer.


The most challenging part of a campaign for Crimea may not be outfoxing Russia.
There is a military justification for these projections. By the time Ukrainian forces are ready to move on the peninsula, most Russian capabilities will have been severely damaged. Russia’s surviving soldiers will be exhausted, and the country’s stockpile of precision missiles will have been depleted. Its naval bases, air bases, and resupply routes to Crimea will have been damaged by Ukrainian attacks. Because Crimea is connected to the Eurasian continent only by a narrow, vulnerable isthmus and a bridge, once Ukrainian troops enter the region, the remaining Russian forces will be trapped, making Russian military sites even more vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes. And for all its significance, the Crimean Peninsula is ultimately just land: something the Ukrainian military has been very successful at reclaiming.

Of course, Ukraine will have to consider the capabilities of the Black Sea Fleet, a keystone of Crimea’s Russian military presence. It is a force for which Ukraine has no real equivalent. But although Ukraine’s small navy does not measure up against Russia’s, the Black Sea Fleet is not the obstacle it might seem. The fleet has an assault capacity of roughly 20 old ships, all of which are so vulnerable to strikes that Russia has hidden them away from the Ukrainian coastline. But Ukraine can still acquire and produce enough unmanned vehicles and missile systems to destroy them. And the fleet is smaller than it was at the start of the war thanks to Ukrainian attacks. Ukraine succeeded, for instance, in sinking the fleet’s flagship. The Ukrainians will not have trouble further chipping away at the Russian navy in forthcoming months, at least to a point where the navy cannot effectively stop them. Ukraine, after all, has a good track record of getting around the Black Sea Fleet. If the Russian navy could not defend the Black Sea’s Snake Island, which is less than 0.1 square miles, it is hard to imagine how it would stop Ukraine from crossing the isthmus.

Ultimately, the most challenging part of a campaign for Crimea may not be outfoxing Russia. It could be winning over locals who back Moscow. Despite all of the Kremlin’s abuses, Crimea is home to far more Putin supporters than are other parts of Ukraine, especially given that the population has had an influx of Russian residents and has experienced years of nonstop Russian propaganda. It would be dangerous for Kyiv to assume that Ukraine’s military will be welcomed there as it was in Kherson. Ukraine will need to substantially research what policies it should adopt, including with regard to finance, banking, and law enforcement. It must also figure out how to provide restitution to the many Crimeans who were stripped of their jobs and property by the Russian government. It will need to rework the peninsula’s state services—particularly for education, which has been conducted for years using a Russian curriculum based in propaganda. Critically, it must ensure that residents who support Russia’s dictatorship will not want to destabilize the peninsula, and it must guarantee that law-abiding citizens have a balanced, fair, and democratic government.

STAND YOUR GROUND
Although the West uniformly, and rightly, condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea, it effectively accepted Moscow’s act. The only tangible response that the United States and Europe could muster was a sanctions regime with countless loopholes, allowing the Russian economy to keep growing. Indeed, even the sanctioning states continued to expand their business ties to Moscow, including by increasing their dependence on Russian energy exports.

It is therefore little wonder that the Kremlin felt emboldened to invade the rest of Ukraine. Russia is bent on taking land and increasing its sphere of influence so it can restore its empire. When Moscow senses weakness, it jumps. This is why Kyiv cannot bargain away Crimea for peace, as some Western analysts have suggested. Doing so would further reward and incentivize Putin’s aggression. Additionally, such a deal would not be effective. As long as Putin runs Russia’s government, the Kremlin will never settle for a peace agreement in which Ukraine “just” gives up Crimea. It wants and will keep fighting for more. Indeed, should the West display indecision or hesitation in supporting Ukraine’s goals in Crimea, Russia will try to capitalize on the dithering by working to fracture the states supporting Kyiv.

As a result, Kyiv and its allies must press on, battling until it can make Moscow hand over Crimea via negotiations or until Ukraine has forcibly pried the peninsula from Moscow’s grasp. Doing so is the only way to inflict the kind of major defeat Russia must experience if it is to abandon its imperial ambitions and start abiding by international norms and laws. The United States and Europe should understand that they, too, will benefit from a total Ukrainian victory. It could mark the permanent end of Russian aggression, breathing new life into the liberal world order.

Liberating Crimea would also set an important historical precedent for the wider world. If Ukraine does not retake Crimea—if Russia gets away with annexation—other states will become more likely to wage wars of conquest. They will move to occupy their neighbor’s territory, reasoning that they can get away with certain kinds of land grabs. Winning in Crimea, then, is essential to preventing future conflicts and thwarting a return to conquest.
Title: Ukraine will lose
Post by: G M on January 27, 2023, 12:19:39 AM
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/this-time-its-different/
Title: Losing in Ukraine, collapsing at home
Post by: G M on January 27, 2023, 07:08:06 AM
https://kunstler.com/clusterfuck-nation/pretend-o-rama/


Pretend-O-Rama
“Not only is there no threat from Russia that is independent of American policy, but it is also the expansion of NATO to ‘meet the threat from Russia’ that creates the very threat that expansion was supposed to meet.” — Alistair Crooke
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     I doubt that many Americans — even the masses sunk in vaccine smuggery and obsessive Trump-o-phobia — believe that America’s Ukraine project is working out for us. Of course, to even begin thinking about this debacle, you must at least suspect that our government is lying about virtually everything it has its hand in. Name something it is not lying about, I dare you.

    So, what was the Ukraine project? To use that sad-ass country as a vector to disable and destroy Russia. You can’t over-state the stupidity of that objective. And why did we want to do that? Because… reasons. Oh? And what were they? Well, Russia was… there. Oh? And what was it doing? Trying to take over the world? Uh, no. It was actually just trying to be a normal European nation again after its traumatic 75-year-long experiment with communism, which ended in 1991.

     And then, after that, coming along pretty well under Mr. Putin. Did I say that? Yes, I did, because it is a fact. Russia wrote new private property laws, made commerce legal again, and allowed its citizens to do business. Russia wasn’t threatening any other nations, most particularly its former province, Ukraine. It had even invited Ukraine to be a sovereign member of its trade association, the customs union, with a bunch of other regional states who had rational interests in good regional relations. That’s what set off the maniacs at the US State Department — under Secretary John Kerry, a.k.a. the haircut-in-search-of a-brain — who, in 2014, decided to overthrow Ukraine’s government.

     The project since then was to use the US-controlled Ukraine government to antagonize Russia and, finally, to draw Russia into a military operation intended, SecDef Lloyd Austin said more than once, “to weaken Russia.” Well, everything we’ve done there, from eight years of shelling the Donbas, to kicking Russia out of the West’s banking system, to pouring billions of US dollars into Ukraine’s corrupt government, has only strengthened Russia internally, earned the approbation of many other nations who object to US interference in their regions, and steered poor Ukraine into the graveyard of failed states.

     We are losing this unnecessary proxy war about as steadily as possible, and actually making Russia look good in the process. Russia could have ended the war in five minutes by turning Kiev into an ashtray, but it spent the first eight months of the operation trying to avoid busting up Ukraine’s infrastructure, so as not to turn it into a failed state (that would present new and worse problems). Mr. Putin made many overtures to negotiate an end to the conflict, all rejected by Ukraine, the US, and its NATO “partners.”

     So, now Russia is grinding on-the-ground to reduce Ukraine’s ability to continue making war by systematically killing the troops Ukraine foolishly throws into the battle line, and destroying Ukraine’s heavy weapons. Ukraine is about out of its own soldiers and weapons. Russia is maneuvering to roll over what’s left there and put an end to these pointless and needless hostilities. Contrary to US propaganda, Russia has no ambition to conquer NATO territory. Rather its aim is to restore order to a corner of the world that has been its legitimate sphere of influence for centuries — and more than once been used as a doormat for European armies to invade Russia.

     Apparently, we can’t allow Russia to clean up this mess we made — or we pretend that we can’t, even though it’s happening anyway, whether we like it or not. So now, the US promises to send thirty-one M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine. A bold move, you think? Not exactly. By the time these tanks get anywhere in the vicinity of Ukraine, this war is likely to be over. Never mind the difficult business of training the few remaining eligible Ukrainian men between sixteen and sixty how to operate the tanks, and train maintenance crews, and deliver inventories of spare parts — you see where this is going — not to mention the certainty that the Russians will simply blow them up as fast as they appear on the premises. Anyway, a measly thirty-one tanks that can barely be operated is meaningless compared to hundreds of T-72s backed by newer T-14 tanks the Russians can muster from just over their border with Ukraine.

     The tank proffer is, sad to say (for the dignity of our country), a joke, kind of a last feeble pretense before the whole thing ends in ignominy for the “Joe Biden” team — whoever that actually is. The repercussions are liable to be ugly for our country, not necessarily more military trouble in other lands (which we probably lack the capacity to engage in now), but something more personal: the collapse of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency and a vicious loss of purchasing power here at home. That would provoke a situation worse than the Great Depression of the 1930s, and that’s probably where things are going.

     The Ukraine misadventure will disappear from America’s collective consciousness in a New York minute and a Fourth Turning jamboree of serious domestic political disorder will commence in short order. If you think “Joe Biden’s” term in office has been a disaster so far, just wait. You ain’t seen nuttin yet
Title: George Kennan's warning on Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 27, 2023, 08:18:47 AM
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/george-kennan-warning-on-ukraine?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=Kennan%E2%80%99s%20Warning%20on%20Ukraine&utm_content=20230127&utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017
Title: 2016
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 27, 2023, 02:47:28 PM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JeWHviwLMy8
Title: The Nazi question
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 27, 2023, 02:50:05 PM
My posting this in no way means I agree, but the list in articles from BEFORE the war, is well worth noting:

https://amgreatness.com/2023/01/26/inside-the-nazi-whitewash-of-ukraine/?fbclid=IwAR2rfeXYypKHiLlehS2QYTwbIL_ff9q_p-iFhWCa7mw1GmKt-B-AhV097dg
Title: stepan bandera
Post by: ccp on January 27, 2023, 03:48:14 PM
wow
I never heard of this guy:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stepan_Bandera

Ukraine seems to be in the middle
Nazis in the West
Stalin in the EAst

not sure what Jews have to do with it
weird Zelensky ignores this - must be for political reasons I can only guess if all this is true

of course no mention of this in Western media - if true

I had a Ukranian patient would tell me she fled Soviet Ukraine in the 1950s to the US where he was born
Blamed a Russian Jew for the Russian murder of millions of Ukranians in the early '30s
made a comment about the "damn Jew'
I tried looking up what he was talking about
and while there were a few Jews at the time working with Stalin
I could not find out any particular one that stood out as being behind starvation
I presume it was just an example of "blame the Jews"

I never told him I was a Jew .
I wonder what he would have thought.

He must have liked me since he was  patient for yrs.
Title: Re: The Nazi question
Post by: G M on January 27, 2023, 05:05:02 PM
My posting this in no way means I agree, but the list in articles from BEFORE the war, is well worth noting:

https://amgreatness.com/2023/01/26/inside-the-nazi-whitewash-of-ukraine/?fbclid=IwAR2rfeXYypKHiLlehS2QYTwbIL_ff9q_p-iFhWCa7mw1GmKt-B-AhV097dg

https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2022/11/cia_kgb_mossad__they_all_hired_nazi_war_criminals_as_spies.html

The US IC and the Mossad used Epstein to gather blackmail material by way of child victims. What wouldn’t they do?
Title: Convo with my friend
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 27, 2023, 05:52:37 PM

They no longer use the term special operation.  It's war and not with Ukraine.

And Zelensky made a big mistake with his political purge to root our corruption. He installed people who are known radical nationalists. And when all is said and done, they will get rid of him and blame the "Jew".
Thu 9:37 AM

https://youtu.be/JeWHviwLMy8

Lindsey Graham & John McCain in Ukraine - Preparing for a proxy war with Russia (2016)
=============================
You sent
I'm in a small group that discusses things and this https://amgreatness.com/2023/01/26/inside-the-nazi-whitewash-of-ukraine/?fbclid=IwAR2rfeXYypKHiLlehS2QYTwbIL_ff9q_p-iFhWCa7mw1GmKt-B-AhV097dg was put forward for discussion and is generating some heat.

May I ask for a paragraph or two from you with your take on it that I can take to the group?
=========================


Inside the Nazi Whitewash of Ukraine › American Greatness
And Zelensky is guilty of it too.
But when Lavrov brought it up, he gets called an anti semite.

He gave one of his cronies the highest honor in Ukraine which is the award of horder of Bogdan Khmelnitsky

=======================

You sent
May I ask for you to write a paragraph or two for the group with your bottom line assessment?
=======================
He and his cossacks killed tens of thousands of Jews.

About the Ukranian anti semitism or the denial of it?

Your assessment of the article.  The guy who posted it got kicked out of the group.
Why?

I totally agree with this article. It is basically what I was saying and my Jewish friends from Ukraine agree.

I guess I wonder what is the current definition of a Nazi. If it is someone who hates Jews and minorities and is willing to kill and torture? Is it a political view of a dictatorship or fascism with a level of racism?

Bc the Azov batallian definitely identifies with Nazis in the sense of racial purity and violence.

Many of Zelensky's cronies are ardent nationalists who believe in extreme violence in order to have their own Ukraine.  But to what end do the want it? It's not to be liberal and accepting of all people. Once they get their freedom, they will start ethnic cleansing.

Zelensky is a traitor to Jews. Not because he played Hava Nagila with his penis, that was actually hilarious. But bc he downplays Ukranians antisemitism.  Bc he allowed the Azov batallian to continue committing atrocities against Russian speakers in the East (which BTW you can go to the Amnesty International website and click on their reports from Ukraine from the years 2014 on)
And look at him now..he grew a beard, built up muscle and wears green t-shirts to look like a big Ukranian Slav. And his manner of speaking changed. He used to sound like an intelligent and educated Russian speaker and now he sounds like a dumb musclehead when he speaks.

This quote from the article really struck a cord with me. "The Germans didn’t build gas chambers to murder Jews in Ukraine—they didn’t need them. The extent of Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis was colossal."

They have a monument to Khmelnysky is Kiev. 3 miles from the monument of Babi Yar.
And the Ukranians didn't even build the Babi Yar monument. Bc they know they helped the Germans kill all the Jews in Kiev. It was one of Putins Russian Jewish Oligarchs who used his own money to have it built not long ago.

But then when it was damaged in a Russian bombing, Zelensky was acting all indignant how the Russians desecrated a Jewish monument.

This makes me so angry. I can go on for pages! Lol

https://www.jns.org/opinion/ukraine-backs-antisemitism-at-the-un-while-pressuring-israel-for-arms/

Ukraine backs antisemitism at the UN while pressuring Israel for arms

I've been fuming about how Zelensky is making Israel look bad bc they won't send him billions and give him their weapons.

Meanwhile Putin actually apologized (when does he ever apologize???) When Lavrov made a statement that "some of the worst Anti-semites are Jews."
Lavrov also mentioned Hitler having Jewish heritage and boy did the US go bonkers about that.

Meanwhile that is not an antisemitic claim and almost every historian agrees to a very strong possibility that his grandfather was Jewish bc Hitlers father was illegitimate.  And they even did a DNA test on members of the Hitler family which remain and it seems like they do have Ashkenazi DNA.

I hate this rewriting of history and denying facts to fit the narrative that the government wants us to have. Dont feed us this lie that Ukraine is liberal and modern and democratic. It's not. Doesn't mean they deserve to get invaded and killed.  But this isn't a good guy vs bad guy. Ukraine is just as bad as Russia. And when it comes to Jews, much much worse.

I dont know the history of the person who got kicked out of your group, but if this article is the only reason why then it is completely unjustified, and kind of repressive. Bc I would totally post that too with a caveat of being a modern Nazi is not the same as being a Hitler Nazi. I think what is missing is the desire for world domination.

You remember me saying all the time how in the beginning in Eastern Ukraine my feeling was let them kill each other bc the one thing all Ukranians had in common whether Ukranian or Russian speaking is that they were all guilty of killing Jews.

Attachment Unavailable
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Not sure if I sent you the above thing before but this is what no one seems to talk about that. If you Google it, it's all articles praising the artists visions.

And this is the kind of stuff Putin banned a few years ago and got called homophobic.
Title: Ukraine: Not a holy war
Post by: G M on January 28, 2023, 09:26:10 AM
https://orthodoxreflections.com/is-russia-really-fighting-a-holy-war-in-ukraine/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 28, 2023, 07:51:22 PM
I have only read most of the article and have not watched the video.

The article makes several interesting points but also engages in some spectacular horseshit:

"So, it was not a question of taking over Ukraine, nor even, presumably, of occupying it; and certainly not of destroying it."

Seriously?  What of the attempt to capture Kiev in three days?

Then there is the propaganda horseshit that we have killed 20-30 million since WW2.

Blah blah blah.

Thus, it is tough to take seriously the assertions about Uke attacks on civilians in Donbass.
Title: US General: Ukes should take Crimea back:
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 31, 2023, 04:42:50 AM
https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/01/29/ukraine-should-and-properly-supported-can-seize-crimea-argues-ben-hodges
Title: Biden apparently has decided it is ok to start WW3
Post by: ccp on February 01, 2023, 08:45:08 AM
https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2023/01/31/joe-biden-sends-tanks-to-ukraine-after-warning-doing-so-would-be-world-war-iii/

well opinions are allowed to change

what seemed like bad idea last yr might seem not so bad now

I read recently he did refuse to send the  F 16s to Ukraine
perhaps he was thinking they might be used to fly over Russian land and that would be too far  .......

some say he acted too little and too late
others say he should stay away altogether

no easy answer

I still like the give the Ruskis Donbas
for peace but perhaps they would not approve anyway

we can also wait it out to Putin dies a natural or unnatural death
and hope for better then

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on February 02, 2023, 04:48:53 AM
I have believed from the start, that Russia will achieve its aims. It is not backing down. It is the US which will back down. Things seem to be turning in that direction. The only question is will they also take Odessa, I believe it is important for them to do so. The ability of Russians to bear pain (for Ukr) is higher than that of Europeans or Americans and so they will win,

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/escobar-panicked-empire-tries-make-russia-offer-it-cant-refuse (https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/escobar-panicked-empire-tries-make-russia-offer-it-cant-refuse)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 02, 2023, 08:05:52 AM
If Russians take Odesa, Ukraine will lose access to the Black Sea and will be finished as a country.

Transnitia next?
Title: Trump calls for negotiations
Post by: ccp on February 02, 2023, 11:08:57 AM
I like this a lot better then just beating his chest exclaiming this war would have never happened had HE been Prez:

https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2023/02/02/trump-calls-for-peace-negotiations-to-end-ukraine-war/

thumbs up
Title: Darn it! We were just a couple of trillions away from beating Vodka Man Bad!
Post by: G M on February 02, 2023, 02:32:49 PM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/pentagon-lawmakers-ukraine-retaking-crimea-unlikely
Title: Read between the lines. Is this the Uke squeeze on Joe?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 02, 2023, 06:41:43 PM
https://open.spotify.com/album/2fq68DRyxZ7xdWS5ihEtp7?si=0cWkLyHaRAmLW8dPPMBJ5w&nd=1#login
Title: Biden offered 20% of Ukraine to end war?!?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 02, 2023, 07:35:41 PM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/joe-biden-offered-vladimir-putin-20-percent-of-ukraine-to-end-war-report/ar-AA1727Wd?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=0355dfaf459944f19961a2fcc5e20c68
Title: Re: Biden offered 20% of Ukraine to end war?!?
Post by: G M on February 03, 2023, 07:15:25 AM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/joe-biden-offered-vladimir-putin-20-percent-of-ukraine-to-end-war-report/ar-AA1727Wd?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=0355dfaf459944f19961a2fcc5e20c68

I thought Vodka Man Bad was going to be surrendering to the brave Ukrainien Forces by now.

No?
Title: Our tax dollars being funneled into personal accounts?
Post by: G M on February 03, 2023, 07:24:53 AM
https://twitter.com/AZgeopolitics/status/1621146661258166274

In the most corrupt country in eastern europe? No way!
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on February 03, 2023, 07:28:06 AM
hard to imagine
that everywhere in the world we send "aid"

skimming and stealing does not occur

the Swiss love us .  Bahamas too.

 :x
Title: Re: Biden offered 20% of Ukraine to end war?!?
Post by: G M on February 03, 2023, 07:34:03 AM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/joe-biden-offered-vladimir-putin-20-percent-of-ukraine-to-end-war-report/ar-AA1727Wd?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=0355dfaf459944f19961a2fcc5e20c68

I thought Vodka Man Bad was going to be surrendering to the brave Ukrainien Forces by now.

No?

https://westernrifleshooters.us/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/eaa1f5ded022fae2.jpg

(https://westernrifleshooters.us/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/eaa1f5ded022fae2.jpg)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on February 03, 2023, 08:53:42 AM
Putin refused to end war for Donbas as per rumors

well that is a problem

 :-o
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on February 04, 2023, 04:59:03 AM
As long as India/China do not support the west, Russia cannot be defeated.

(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FoEyj-QWYAIsUdq?format=jpg&name=900x900)
Title: Ukrainian Pravda (Russian?) says
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 05, 2023, 05:40:54 AM
https://www.yahoo.com/news/zelenskyy-signs-documents-people-found-181545388.html

https://news.yahoo.com/zelenskyy-strips-ex-yanukovych-era-101300355.html



Title: Ukraine hacks Russia-Donbas officials' call
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 05, 2023, 06:57:09 AM
This would seem to be closely related:

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11712979/Ukraine-hacks-call-Russia-supporting-Ukrainians-charge-treason-blast-anthem.html
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on February 05, 2023, 08:23:19 AM
This is a good read on the war

https://imetatronink.substack.com/p/destroying-mother-of-all-proxy-armieshtml (https://imetatronink.substack.com/p/destroying-mother-of-all-proxy-armieshtml)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 05, 2023, 08:47:40 AM
This is a good read on the war

https://imetatronink.substack.com/p/destroying-mother-of-all-proxy-armieshtml (https://imetatronink.substack.com/p/destroying-mother-of-all-proxy-armieshtml)

But we put Ukrainian flags on our social media! They can't lose!
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 05, 2023, 09:11:51 AM
YA:

"From the moment in early April when Russian forces on the perimeter of Kiev began to withdraw to new positions in eastern Ukraine, western war propagandists have been trumpeting what they characterized as Russia’s “humiliating defeat”. As one who recognized as early as February 28th that the Russian army was executing a strategic feint in and around the Ukrainian capital, I could only shake my head and laugh at the cluelessness of most of the so-called “experts” who have attempted to sell this interpretation of events to hopelessly ignorant western audiences."

Seems clear to me the Russians fully intended to take Kiev. 

To me, this author writes as if in the employ of the Russians, pretending Russian blunders to have been brilliance, ignoring the trigger of the little green men in Donbass, the taking of Crimea, etc.

That said, the analysis is of interest.

I very much note the map at the end of the article!  If I read it correctly it shows Russia has having conquered Odesa and Transnitia, Moldava! In other words, Ukraine, in addition to losing huge (50+%?) of its territory also becomes landlocked, with shipping its grain out the Black Sea a lost option One might reasonably infer from this article this was the Russian mission from the beginning , , , in which case it could be argued the moves of the Western Alliance rather reasonable?


.

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on February 05, 2023, 09:25:55 AM
We have all forgotten about Russian nucl. might. Does anyone think, that if Russia drops even a small nuke on Kiev, the West is going to bomb Russia ?. If Biden took days to even shoot down a balloon, what confidence does it give Europe or Ukr, that the US is going to nuke Russia. France has already said, it wont participate in this.

The Ukr, war was an attempt to degrade Russian military capability, some neocon told the US govt that Russia would collapse...did not happen and very unlikely to happen. China is the biggest manufacturer in the world, they can keep up with anything the west can manufacture.

https://youtu.be/iAd6Q69CFxY (https://youtu.be/iAd6Q69CFxY)
Title: Ukraine is lost, what next?- A must read!
Post by: G M on February 05, 2023, 11:45:48 AM
https://thezman.com/wordpress/?p=29268
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on February 05, 2023, 05:51:54 PM
April/May is a key period. There are videos circulating where the Uki's are pulling in middleage men as well as 16-17 year old to join the army. This suggests, there is not much "meat" left to put on the battlefield. Unless the US or EU is willing to put boots on the ground, things will move Russia's way. Russia is in no hurry to achieve their long term goals. Russia may not have the most modern weapons, but in general their weapons are hardy and cheap to produce.

Once Bakhmut falls, the momentum will shift to Russia, that would be an important turning point in the war.

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on February 06, 2023, 04:46:26 AM
Ukr changes its defense min

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/05/talk-of-resignation-and-retreat-swirls-in-ukraine-as-bakhmut-enters-endgame (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/05/talk-of-resignation-and-retreat-swirls-in-ukraine-as-bakhmut-enters-endgame)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 06, 2023, 06:20:35 AM
Regarding this:

https://thezman.com/wordpress/?p=29268

"Douglas Macgregor likes to remind people that the Roosevelt administration did everything it could to bait the Japanese into launching an attack on American assets. They needed a reason to get into the war and that was viewed as the best avenue."

What hoary bullshit, as are some of the other things Macgregor says.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 06, 2023, 06:26:14 AM
Regarding this:

https://thezman.com/wordpress/?p=29268

"Douglas Macgregor likes to remind people that the Roosevelt administration did everything it could to bait the Japanese into launching an attack on American assets. They needed a reason to get into the war and that was viewed as the best avenue."

What hoary bullshit, as are some of the other things Macgregor says.

https://www.fff.org/2016/12/07/fdrs-pearl-harbor-bait/

https://www.independent.org/news/article.asp?id=1930

https://mises.org/library/how-us-economic-warfare-provoked-japans-attack-pearl-harbor
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 06, 2023, 07:09:49 AM
I've been down this rabbit hole before and have not the time or interest in doing it again.

Japanese imperialism (e.g. invading China) had quite a bit to do with American actions, as did it being in axis with the Nazis.

Moving on and returning to the point at hand:  Ukraine:

I love Tucker, and he makes strong points regarding how we have provoked Russia, but he, and even more so Macgregor, seem to have some major blind spots with regard to Russian intentions and the risks of pulling the plug on the Ukes now.   

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 06, 2023, 07:50:38 AM
I've been down this rabbit hole before and have not the time or interest in doing it again.

Japanese imperialism (e.g. invading China) had quite a bit to do with American actions, as did it being in axis with the Nazis.

Moving on and returning to the point at hand:  Ukraine:

I love Tucker, and he makes strong points regarding how we have provoked Russia, but he, and even more so Macgregor, seem to have some major blind spots with regard to Russian intentions and the risks of pulling the plug on the Ukes now.

Oh? Will China feel free to send spy balloons over America and ship deadly drugs by the ton to be sold by Mexican cartels if we stop funding the eastern european money laundering base for the Biden Crime Family?

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 06, 2023, 08:40:33 AM
Not following how that flows from the preceding posts.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on February 08, 2023, 04:32:25 AM
Bakhmut about ready to fall. The supply lines are being shut off.

(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FobkjInWcAAdjxz?format=jpg&name=medium)
Title: George Friedman: Ukraine heading to another showdown , , , and WW3?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 08, 2023, 07:01:04 AM
February 7, 2023
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
Ukraine Heading to Another Showdown
By: George Friedman
I should say up front that I am not writing about Chinese balloons. Instead, I am writing about the situation in Ukraine, which is getting increasingly dangerous.

Until relatively recently, Russian assaults on Ukraine tended to be contained by the Ukrainian armed force – not universally but frequently enough to prevent Russia from keeping territory or achieving victory. But in the past month or so, Russia has begun to hold its ground. If that becomes the norm, then Ukraine is in serious trouble.

The United States has kept the front intact by introducing new weapons. The current weakness of the Ukrainian army is due to a lack of longer-range rockets that could strike the Russian rear, hitting reinforcements and supplies moving to the front. Without these elements, Russia can’t maintain its position.

The problem is that the range of the new munitions is so great that they can reach Russian territory. The U.S. has made it clear it has no intention of striking Russian soil. In fact, Washington has ordered Ukraine not to use the munitions at their fullest range, and there are rumors that the Americans modified the missiles to ensure they don’t. But Ukraine is fighting an existential war, and its willingness to use anything less than full power is inevitably questionable.

So far, Russia has not been struck, nor has Poland, where supplies and U.S. troops are based. The tacit agreement not to hit either has prevented the war from becoming a direct conflict between the U.S. and Russia. If either side deliberately attacked Russia or Poland, all bets would be off.

With the delivery of new missiles, a new danger thus emerges, not least of which is that Russia could choose to bring the war to even greater heights by forcing escalation. In which case nothing can be ruled out – not even Russian false flag operations. This isn’t merely an analysis of paranoia. Moscow has characterized the conflict as a long war against the West, and if that is indeed how it sees things, then forcing escalation at a time and place of its choosing might be rational. Doing so would demonize the U.S. military and give Russia a freer hand in attacking, say, U.S. positions in Poland. The U.S. has been waging a proxy war without experiencing losses. The fact that body bags are not arriving at Dover Air Force Base has given Washington a great deal of room for maneuver. If the U.S. started taking casualties, and the Russians could demonstrate that the war was based on a first strike by the Americans, the ability of the U.S. to wage war might be limited.

Far-fetched as that may seem, the central issue right now is stabilizing Ukraine’s position by attacking Russian assets in theater without spilling over into Russian territory. If that can be done in absolute terms, it would be hard for Russia to overcome, and it would keep the U.S. out of direct combat by avoiding U.S. domestic political considerations, which have destabilized the U.S. military in a number of wars. But the execution must be flawless, and Russia would have to decline to essentially attack itself.

All wars are complex, and all wars have political dimensions. The U.S. is going to supply long-range rockets, which makes perfect sense in the cold logic of war. But in the event of some failures in controlling the weapons, it could create the unexpected, which is never welcomed in war.
Title: Senator Cotton: The current why of Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 08, 2023, 07:11:07 AM
The American Case for Supporting Ukraine
The U.S. can back its allies and send a message to the Chinese, without sparking a wider war in Europe.
By Tom Cotton
Feb. 7, 2023 1:43 pm ET

After years of observing Russian leaders up close during World War II, Winston Churchill remarked that “there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness.” Churchill therefore warned against “offering temptations to a trial of strength.”

Unfortunately, that’s exactly what President Biden did in his first year in office, tempting Vladimir Putin to pursue his long-standing ambition to reassemble the Russian Empire by conquering Ukraine. Having failed to deter the war, Mr. Biden’s timid approach has now prolonged it.

Thanks to his failures, some Americans wonder whether we should continue to support Ukraine. But cutting off Ukraine wouldn’t end the war. It would only increase the chances of a Russian victory and harm our interests in deterring wider wars in Europe and Asia.

Mr. Biden appeased Russia from the start, from a no-conditions extension of a one-sided nuclear-arms treaty, to the waiving of sanctions on Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline, to freezing an arms shipment to Ukraine. Then came the botched withdrawal from Afghanistan. This humiliating failure telegraphed weakness and incompetence, and Russia soon massed an invasion force along Ukraine’s border.

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Mr. Biden responded by hinting at disunity in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and suggesting he might tolerate a “minor incursion” by Russia into Ukraine. Convinced of his strength and his enemies’ weakness, Mr. Putin went for the jugular.

The Ukrainians stood their ground and fought. Yet Mr. Biden has dragged his feet all along, hesitating fearfully to send the Ukrainians the weapons and intelligence they need to win. Today, Mr. Biden stubbornly refuses to provide fighter jets, cluster munitions and long-range missiles to Ukraine. As a result of Mr. Biden’s half-measures, Ukraine has only half-succeeded.

We should back Ukraine to the hilt, because the likeliest alternative isn’t peace, but rather another “frozen conflict” that favors Russia and harms our interests. Russia would retain key strategic terrain and much of Ukraine’s industry and agriculture. Food and energy prices would remain high, potentially starving many nations and exacerbating the migrant crisis in the West.

Meanwhile, Russia could rebuild its strength and seize the rest of Ukraine when the opportunity arises. Such an outcome would create millions more Ukrainian refugees, drive inflation higher and worsen supply-chain disruptions. Russia would also extend its border deep into Europe. Next on the chopping block could be Moldova, site of another frozen conflict. And after that, a NATO nation.

Stopping Russia also will allow the U.S. to focus on the greater threat from China. A Russian victory would force us to divert more resources for a longer time to Europe to deter Russian expansionism, creating persistent threats on both fronts. But a Ukrainian victory and a durable peace will secure our European flank as we confront China.

The Chinese dictator, Xi Jinping, is closely watching the war in Ukraine. If the West falters, he will conclude that we will never fight to protect Taiwan. In the 1930s, the West tempted the Axis powers by appeasing naked aggression against small countries like Ethiopia and Czechoslovakia. Some Western politicians may have forgotten the lessons of history, but Mr. Xi hasn’t.

Our support for Ukraine can also save American money and lives in the long run. A sizable portion of our outlays will be spent on replacing the older weapons and materiel we’ve sent to Ukraine with newer equipment for our troops. Along with lessons learned from the Ukrainian battlefield, our military can emerge better equipped, trained and prepared to defeat our adversaries.

War is always expensive, but we must measure the current costs against the greater potential cost of wider war in Europe or Asia. The Ukrainians are fighting their own war, with no American troops engaged in direct combat—which won’t be the case if irresolution in Ukraine tempts our enemies to attack a NATO ally or Taiwan. Had the West retaliated when Germany remilitarized the Rhineland in 1936, that small operation might’ve seemed expensive and risky at the time, but it likely would’ve prevented world war.

History also shows that we can oppose Russian aggression without sparking a wider war. We fought proxy wars against Soviet Russia across the world in the last century. We armed insurgents during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Russians not only armed our enemies in Korea and Vietnam, but also took part in the fighting, shooting down American pilots. These proxy wars were more provocative than anything we’ve done to support Ukraine. In no case did they lead to war between our two countries.

Of course, we must also demand that our allies do their fair share. Hardy nations like the United Kingdom, Poland, and the Baltic states have carried their share of the load, but wealthy laggards such as France and especially Germany must do more. As ever, though, we can’t allow European weakness to constrain American action.

The Ukrainian people are fighting with spirit and resolve, exercising what Churchill called “the primary right of men to die and kill for the land they live in.” Their cause is sympathetic, but the world is a dangerous place and America shouldn’t act out of sympathy alone. We act to protect our vital national interests. That’s the case in Ukraine, and we deserve a strategy of victory to match.

Mr. Cotton, a Republican, is a U.S. senator from Arkansas.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on February 08, 2023, 06:15:41 PM
Seymour Hersch says the US took down Nordstream pipeline. Looks like he had to publish on substack, perhaps no mainstream publication would accept it ?

https://seymourhersh.substack.com/p/how-america-took-out-the-nord-stream (https://seymourhersh.substack.com/p/how-america-took-out-the-nord-stream)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 08, 2023, 06:55:38 PM
Tucker ran with the Hersch story tonight.  Gave it 100% credence.

BTW Tucker stated this sabotage was the largest environmental catastrophe in history-- I presume he meant all the nat gas that escaped.  Has anyone made a serious effort to calculate how much gas escaped?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on February 09, 2023, 07:26:15 AM
"Has anyone made a serious effort to calculate how much gas escaped?"

  - My understanding was, one pipeline down for maintenance, one not yet in service.  Hersch reporting said 3 out of 4 we're blown up?  Either way, I don't think that means zero escaped

Lying Russian reporting makes it for sure the largest human caused environmental catratrophe in history.:
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/gazprom-says-800-million-cubic-metres-gas-escaped-pipelines-tass-2022-09-30/

Uncombusted methane is a particularly bad greenhouse gas.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 09, 2023, 08:04:36 AM
The footage of the methane bubbling out of the water sure looked seriously massive.

One would think Greens would be all up in arms about this , , ,
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 09, 2023, 08:09:50 AM
The footage of the methane bubbling out of the water sure looked seriously massive.

One would think Greens would be all up in arms about this , , ,

Global warming killed off all the anti-war activists, perhaps the environmentalists died off as well?
Title: quick search on how much gas leaked
Post by: ccp on February 09, 2023, 08:21:27 AM
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/10/11/nord-stream-gas-leaks-what-happened-and-why-europe-suspects-sabotage.html
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on February 09, 2023, 09:04:22 AM
"Has anyone made a serious effort to calculate how much gas escaped?"

  - Reportedly, Nordstream 1 was down for maintenance and Nordstream 2 was not in service yet. Each had two pipelines. Hersh reporting said 3 out of 4 were blown up.   I don't believe that means zero gas escaped.

(Lying) Russian reporting makes it the largest human caused environmental catratrophe in history:
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/gazprom-says-800-million-cubic-metres-gas-escaped-pipelines-tass-2022-09-30/

Uncombusted methane is a particularly bad greenhouse gas.  Methane has 80 times more warming effect than carbon dioxide. 
https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/methane-emissions-are-driving-climate-change-heres-how-reduce-them#:~:text=Methane%20is%20also%20a%20powerful,keeping%20began%20in%20the%201980s.

If this involved any millions of cubic meters of natural gas, it is quite a stain on Biden's career, just in that sense.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 09, 2023, 03:47:49 PM
A good friend with strong background reminds me that Hersch has made some pretty outlandish claims in the past and to keep my powder dry before giving him full credibility here.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on February 09, 2023, 04:59:00 PM
A good friend with strong background reminds me that Hersch has made some pretty outlandish claims in the past and to keep my powder dry before giving him full credibility here.

Glad to hear this warning.  The story seems way too detailed to be fabricated.  Why would an 85 year old Pulitzer prize winner risk everything for false attention?

I believe the whole story but have no verification except for his word about sources.

OTOH, I believed Sydney Powell over Dominion. Would have bet the farm on that one. They sued her and she vanished. Who knew.   
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 09, 2023, 05:05:40 PM
His exact words:

"This is the same guy who claimed 16 AC-130s serviced a single target in AFG. Treat it as bullshit for now.  It may not be, but there are plenty of problems with the narrative here."
Title: Pentagon looks to restart top secret programs in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 12, 2023, 01:23:52 PM
https://ukrainetoday.org/2023/02/10/pentagon-looks-to-restart-top-secret-programs-in-ukraine/?fbclid=IwAR2GDc5CjAV6WzVPZtljCQSt-BCoqC1cfVEvZnDIvp2IaGO2xxufMzMWk38
Title: Lev Parnas peddles twaddle
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 14, 2023, 05:57:22 AM

How My Work For Trump and Giuliani Sought to Make Ukraine Defenseless
BY LEV PARNAS FEBRUARY 13, 2023 2:36 PM EST

Parnas is a Florida businessman and former associate of Rudy Giuliani serving a sentence for fraud and campaign finance violations
The other day I watched some street interviews in Moscow. The first person said that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was justified because Ukrainian government officials were Nazis. The second said that the invasion was necessary because Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky is a Jew and, as such, is stealing everything. Later, I watched Donald Trump give a campaign speech praising Russian President Vladimir Putin and calling the U.S. intelligence community “lowlifes.” Meanwhile, the people of Ukraine are dying by the tens of thousands.

If that makes you feel bad, you may be able to imagine how I feel: I was used by Trump and his personal lawyer Rudy Giuliani in ways that helped pave the way for Putin to invade Ukraine, my native land. If Trump and Giuliani’s plans had worked, the Ukrainians might not have had the necessary weapons, medical equipment, and other supplies they needed to fight back.

In 2021 and 2022, I was convicted of several serious crimes including fraud, making false statements, and illegally funneling foreign money to the Trump campaign. I was sentenced to 20 months in prison, served four, and am on home confinement for the remainder. Now that I am paying my debt to society, I think it is important to tell my side of the story.

My connection to Trump came through Giuliani, with whom I had done business, and through the large campaign donations I had made to Trump’s campaign. Giuliani, who desperately wanted to be Secretary of State, recruited me to help him further Trump’s interests overseas. I had no official position, but my primary task was to be their go-between with Ukrainian and Russian oligarchs and government officials. In retrospect, I concluded that my real job was to help undermine and destabilize the Ukrainian government.

U.S. President Trump's personal lawyer Rudy Giuliani has coffee with Ukrainian-American businessman Lev Parnas at the Trump International Hotel in Washington, U.S., on Sept. 20, 2019. Aram Roston—Reuters

Trump and Giuliani argued that Ukraine’s leaders were corrupt and anti-American, but I believe there were other reasons Trump had it in for them. He viewed them as political enemies who had supported Hillary Clinton in 2016, hurting his feelings and engaging his unquenchable thirst for revenge. Trump also hated the Ukrainian government because Putin did. Some have said that Putin has compromising information on Trump, regarding money laundering or prostitutes, but those theories are promoted by people who did not know Trump well. I never saw evidence of that kind. Rather, I think the Russian leader had a lot in common with Trump’s father, Fred. Both men were authoritarian leaders who valued ruthlessness and considered it the only way to succeed. I first met Fred when I was selling condos in Brooklyn as a kid and he and Putin struck me the same way. Both men had immense effects on Donald Trump.

Trump acted on his hatred of Ukraine as he tried to improve his re-election chances in 2020. The plan that Giuliani and Trump put into operation was simple. Giuliani sent me to collect compromising information that the Eastern European oligarchs had on Hunter Biden’s activities in Ukraine to use against Joe Biden. It was also my job to convince the new Ukrainian government to announce an official investigation into Hunter Biden. If they didn’t, the U.S. would not send Trump or Vice President Mike Pence to Zelensky’s inauguration, threatening Zelensky’s domestic stature and his ability to stand up to Putin. Trump also paused much needed military aid for Ukraine while he tried to get Zelensky to open the Biden investigation.

Trump didn’t care if this made Ukraine vulnerable to Russia, which had annexed Crimea from the country in 2014. At about the same time, Trump casually asked me: “How long do you think Ukraine could hold out against a Russian invasion?” I responded: “Not long, without our help.” I eventually realized that not only was I enabling Trump’s dirty tricks in the 2020 election, I was also risking that Ukraine would be essentially unarmed when Putin invaded. Trump was determining the future of two countries and affecting the lives of millions. And who was I? Just another guy who’d made some money from the Soviet Union’s collapse, just some guy from the streets of Brooklyn who hadn’t even finished college.

Trump weakened Zelensky, but fortunately, Biden won the 2020 election and Ukraine received a steady supply of weapons. Since my arrest, I have done my best to help the people of Ukraine with charitable works, but Giuliani is still peddling his version of events and even now Republican politicians are campaigning to stop the pipeline of weapons and medical supplies. They are just trying to please Trump, exactly as Giuliani does. And whether they realize it or not, they are making it easier for Putin and his gang to steal everything they can from Ukraine.

For more on Rudy Giuliani, watch When Truth Isn’t Truth: The Rudy Giuliani Story, a new four-part series from TIME Studios that explores the former prosecutor’s rise to power, his fall from grace, and how little he changed in between. The series airs at 10pm ET Sun. Feb. 19 on MSNBC and streaming on Peacock TV.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on February 14, 2023, 06:51:08 AM
interesting take on Trump Ukraine
and the Giuliani connection

"For more on Rudy Giuliani, watch When Truth Isn’t Truth: The Rudy Giuliani Story, a new four-part series from TIME Studios that explores the former prosecutor’s rise to power, his fall from grace, and how little he changed in between. The series airs at 10pm ET Sun. Feb. 19 on MSNBC and streaming on Peacock TV."

of course if it is from TIME about any Republican it is a total "hit " piece
occasionally when I happen to be in the car during Giuliani's radio hour, I tune in.
I like his show .   
Title: Re: Lev Parnas peddles twaddle
Post by: G M on February 14, 2023, 07:26:10 AM
https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2023/02/_since_when_did_ukrainians_become_entitled_to_a_giant_state_.html


How My Work For Trump and Giuliani Sought to Make Ukraine Defenseless
BY LEV PARNAS FEBRUARY 13, 2023 2:36 PM EST

Parnas is a Florida businessman and former associate of Rudy Giuliani serving a sentence for fraud and campaign finance violations
The other day I watched some street interviews in Moscow. The first person said that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was justified because Ukrainian government officials were Nazis. The second said that the invasion was necessary because Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky is a Jew and, as such, is stealing everything. Later, I watched Donald Trump give a campaign speech praising Russian President Vladimir Putin and calling the U.S. intelligence community “lowlifes.” Meanwhile, the people of Ukraine are dying by the tens of thousands.

If that makes you feel bad, you may be able to imagine how I feel: I was used by Trump and his personal lawyer Rudy Giuliani in ways that helped pave the way for Putin to invade Ukraine, my native land. If Trump and Giuliani’s plans had worked, the Ukrainians might not have had the necessary weapons, medical equipment, and other supplies they needed to fight back.

In 2021 and 2022, I was convicted of several serious crimes including fraud, making false statements, and illegally funneling foreign money to the Trump campaign. I was sentenced to 20 months in prison, served four, and am on home confinement for the remainder. Now that I am paying my debt to society, I think it is important to tell my side of the story.

My connection to Trump came through Giuliani, with whom I had done business, and through the large campaign donations I had made to Trump’s campaign. Giuliani, who desperately wanted to be Secretary of State, recruited me to help him further Trump’s interests overseas. I had no official position, but my primary task was to be their go-between with Ukrainian and Russian oligarchs and government officials. In retrospect, I concluded that my real job was to help undermine and destabilize the Ukrainian government.

U.S. President Trump's personal lawyer Rudy Giuliani has coffee with Ukrainian-American businessman Lev Parnas at the Trump International Hotel in Washington, U.S., on Sept. 20, 2019. Aram Roston—Reuters

Trump and Giuliani argued that Ukraine’s leaders were corrupt and anti-American, but I believe there were other reasons Trump had it in for them. He viewed them as political enemies who had supported Hillary Clinton in 2016, hurting his feelings and engaging his unquenchable thirst for revenge. Trump also hated the Ukrainian government because Putin did. Some have said that Putin has compromising information on Trump, regarding money laundering or prostitutes, but those theories are promoted by people who did not know Trump well. I never saw evidence of that kind. Rather, I think the Russian leader had a lot in common with Trump’s father, Fred. Both men were authoritarian leaders who valued ruthlessness and considered it the only way to succeed. I first met Fred when I was selling condos in Brooklyn as a kid and he and Putin struck me the same way. Both men had immense effects on Donald Trump.

Trump acted on his hatred of Ukraine as he tried to improve his re-election chances in 2020. The plan that Giuliani and Trump put into operation was simple. Giuliani sent me to collect compromising information that the Eastern European oligarchs had on Hunter Biden’s activities in Ukraine to use against Joe Biden. It was also my job to convince the new Ukrainian government to announce an official investigation into Hunter Biden. If they didn’t, the U.S. would not send Trump or Vice President Mike Pence to Zelensky’s inauguration, threatening Zelensky’s domestic stature and his ability to stand up to Putin. Trump also paused much needed military aid for Ukraine while he tried to get Zelensky to open the Biden investigation.

Trump didn’t care if this made Ukraine vulnerable to Russia, which had annexed Crimea from the country in 2014. At about the same time, Trump casually asked me: “How long do you think Ukraine could hold out against a Russian invasion?” I responded: “Not long, without our help.” I eventually realized that not only was I enabling Trump’s dirty tricks in the 2020 election, I was also risking that Ukraine would be essentially unarmed when Putin invaded. Trump was determining the future of two countries and affecting the lives of millions. And who was I? Just another guy who’d made some money from the Soviet Union’s collapse, just some guy from the streets of Brooklyn who hadn’t even finished college.

Trump weakened Zelensky, but fortunately, Biden won the 2020 election and Ukraine received a steady supply of weapons. Since my arrest, I have done my best to help the people of Ukraine with charitable works, but Giuliani is still peddling his version of events and even now Republican politicians are campaigning to stop the pipeline of weapons and medical supplies. They are just trying to please Trump, exactly as Giuliani does. And whether they realize it or not, they are making it easier for Putin and his gang to steal everything they can from Ukraine.

For more on Rudy Giuliani, watch When Truth Isn’t Truth: The Rudy Giuliani Story, a new four-part series from TIME Studios that explores the former prosecutor’s rise to power, his fall from grace, and how little he changed in between. The series airs at 10pm ET Sun. Feb. 19 on MSNBC and streaming on Peacock TV.
Title: Two things not to like about Biden-- his face
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 14, 2023, 07:33:07 AM
Given the level of our merry band here I did not think it necessary to write a refutation.

Returning to more substantive matters:

NR PLUS MEMBER FULL VIEW
Biden’s Two-Faced Promises to Ukraine

Happy Valentine’s Day. On the menu today: Last week, President Biden pledged to the Ukrainian ambassador to the U.S. that, “America is united in our support for your country. We will stand with you as long as it takes.” This morning, a new report reveals that the administration’s message to the Ukrainians behind closed doors is the opposite: Future aid packages may well be considerably smaller than originally promised, and the U.S. can’t send assistance “forever.” This continues Biden’s pattern of saying whatever sounds best in public and basking in the subsequent applause, and then ignoring the hard realities until later. With a president who cannot or will not accurately describe his own administration’s policies, it is not the least bit surprising that his team is keeping him far away from any questions about the unidentified flying objects shot down over North America. The country and the world have gotten used to the idea that the president doesn’t really speak for his administration, and what he says at any given moment may or may not align with what the U.S. government’s position actually is.

Biden to Ukraine: ‘As Long as It Takes’ Has an Expiration Date

President Biden said in his State of the Union Address one week ago, speaking to Oksana Markarova, the Ukrainian ambassador to the U.S.: “Ambassador, America is united in our support for your country. We will stand with you as long as it takes.”

This morning, the Washington Post reports that the Biden administration is telling the Ukrainian government exactly the opposite behind closed doors:

Despite promises to back Ukraine “as long as it takes,” Biden officials say recent aid packages from Congress and America’s allies represent Kyiv’s best chance to decisively change the course of the war. Many conservatives in the Republican-led House have vowed to pull back support, and Europe’s long-term appetite for funding the war effort remains unclear. . . .

“We will continue to try to impress upon them that we can’t do anything and everything forever,” said one senior administration official, referring to Ukraine’s leaders. The official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive diplomatic matters, added that it was the administration’s “very strong view” that it will be hard to keep getting the same level of security and economic assistance from Congress.
“’As long as it takes’ pertains to the amount of conflict,” the official added. “It doesn’t pertain to the amount of assistance.”

A week ago, with the whole world watching, the Biden pledge was “as long as it takes.” Today, much more quietly, the message is, “We can’t do anything and everything forever.”

“Definitely a shift,” observes Elbridge Colby.

The State of the Union Address was not the first time Biden used the phrase “as long as it takes” to describe the U.S. policy toward Ukraine. Biden said he told President Zelensky, when Zelensky visited Washington, that, “We’re with you for as long as it takes, Mr. President.” Biden, national-security adviser Jake Sullivan, White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre, and other administration officials have all repeatedly used the phrase “as long as it takes” or variations of it to characterize the U.S. policy toward Ukraine.

And now, “as long as it takes” joins “limited incursion” and “For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power” as presidential statements that are not meant to be taken seriously or literally. Except this one wasn’t an off-the-cuff rhetorical flourish; this was President Biden making a promise he couldn’t keep on the biggest geopolitical stage imaginable.

As noted last week, Vladimir Putin is trying to turn the invasion of Ukraine into a long, bloody war of attrition, calculating that Ukraine will run out of soldiers, arms, and resources before Russia runs out of conscripts and convicts. How do you think Moscow will greet the news that “as long as it takes” doesn’t actually mean as long as it takes?



Title: Re: Lev Parnas peddles twaddle
Post by: DougMacG on February 14, 2023, 09:23:30 AM
Apt title.  Sounds like a bitter man. Very unpersuasive. That was my reaction.

Fred Trump was just like Putin?  Authoritarian?  Good grief.

Dirty tricks?  My belief is Trump believed and was probably right that the Biden family has evidence of corruption sitting in Ukraine if anyone is able to dig it up.

This guy got arrested, convicted for his methods and wasn't able to pass blame up. 
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on February 15, 2023, 05:07:21 AM
I am getting Baghdad Bob vibes

https://twitter.com/i/status/1625553682782687237 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1625553682782687237)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 15, 2023, 07:18:53 AM
I am getting Baghdad Bob vibes

https://twitter.com/i/status/1625553682782687237 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1625553682782687237)

He is a living embodiment of the rot and corruption in American institutions.
Title: A response to the bestarred, bloated buffoon
Post by: G M on February 15, 2023, 08:24:10 AM
I am getting Baghdad Bob vibes

https://twitter.com/i/status/1625553682782687237 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1625553682782687237)

He is a living embodiment of the rot and corruption in American institutions.

https://sonar21.com/public-display-of-the-gross-incompetence-of-u-s-and-nato-military-leaders/
Title: RANE: What to watch for
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 15, 2023, 04:12:28 PM
What To Watch For as Russia Launches Its Next Major Offensive in Ukraine
12 MIN READFeb 15, 2023 | 22:54 GMT



While Russia's upcoming winter offensive is unlikely to gain enough ground to significantly alter the trajectory of the war, it could complicate Ukraine's offensive in the spring, the success of which will depend on Western weapons deliveries. The Institute for the Study of War, an independent U.S.-based research group, claimed on Feb. 8 that ''Russian forces [had] begun their next major offensive'' in Ukraine, citing ''the commitment of significant elements of at least three major Russian divisions to offensive operations'' around the eastern town of Kreminna in Luhansk (one of the territories that comprise the Donbas region). NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg then appeared to confirm this assessment on Feb. 13 by saying ''the reality is that we have [already] seen the start'' of a renewed Russian thrust into Ukraine.
 
High-ranking Ukrainian and Western officials have also indicated that Russia is preparing to launch a larger-scale attack, possibly in the coming days. These claims come amid reports that mobilized Russian soldiers training in Russia, Belarus and occupied Ukraine have moved closer to the front line and the Ukrainian border in recent days, along with large amounts of military equipment including aircraft. Over the past month, Russian forces have also been encircling the strategic eastern city of Bakhmut, and have increased attacks along the front. Taken together, these developments indicate that the accelerated Russian assault Ukrainian officials have warned about for months is underway — and likely only beginning.

On Feb. 12 the British defense intelligence agency assessed that over the past two weeks, Russia had likely suffered its highest rate of casualties since the first week of the Feb. 24 invasion, underscoring the unprecedentedly high intensity of Russia's recent efforts. This was supported by Mediazona and the BBC News Russian service's running tally of confirmed Russian deaths, which on Feb. 12 recorded the highest biweekly rise in deaths since the tally was last updated on Jan. 27.

Russia is attacking first to disrupt Ukraine's preparations for its own offensive, precede Western weapons deliveries, establish defensive positions farther forward to protect the Crimea land corridor, and gain ground toward a major political justification for the war (the seizure of the Donbas). But Moscow is unlikely to fully accomplish these objectives. In recent weeks, Russia has resumed probing attacks in not only Kreminna but farther south in Vuhledar and numerous other disparate places along the front. This is likely an attempt to test Ukrainian formations in several places so that they cannot leave their positions or concentrate where larger Russian breakthrough attempts may be made. But there is currently little information regarding where and if  Russia is concentrating armored vehicles for a breakthrough. Russia's current attacks of various scale suggest Moscow is seeking to seize the initiative to push the frontline deeper into Ukraine. Russia believes that Ukraine is motivated to attack sooner rather than later before Russia's troops become more deeply entrenched. But Moscow would prefer to entrench its forces for the long haul only after pushing the frontline deeper into Ukraine. This is because the Crimea land corridor – Russia's only real prize from the invasion so far — is still well within the reach of the long-range strike systems Ukraine has received from its Western allies, making greater buffer space invaluable to securing the strategic viability of sustaining the corridor. No less importantly, the Kremlin will also be even more politically motivated to secure one of the most prominent remaining goals of the war — to ''liberate'' the Donbas (particularly after failing to ''demilitarize'' and ''denazify'' Ukraine, which President Vladimir Putin originally claimed was the main objective of his ''special military operation''). Finally, Russia would prefer to push its advantage before larger quantities of the new Western equipment recently promised to Ukraine (such as modern tanks) reach the front. In its efforts toward these goals, Moscow hopes to use Russia's manpower advantage to simultaneously attrit the forces Ukraine needs for its own offensive.

On Feb. 13 Andriy Chernyak, a representative of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, asserted Russia's looming new assault would only constitute an intensification of the attacks already underway, arguing that Russian command does not currently have enough resources to launch more large-scale offensive actions.

Putin will likely make his intentions for the future of the war clearer in an upcoming speech, in which he could prepare a new round of mobilization. Months prior to the recent uptick in fighting, Russian forces and mercenaries from the Wagner group launched a campaign to encircle the eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut, where on Feb. 12 they claimed to capture the nearby village of Krasna Hora. The push toward Bukhmut is likely driven by the Kremlin's desire to show that progress is still being made in Ukraine before Putin's constitutionally-mandated annual speech to Russian parliamentarians on Feb. 21 and the first anniversary of the war on Feb. 24. The speech is likely to provide the greatest insight into Putin's plans for the future of the war since his last address to lawmakers in September, in which he claimed to have annexed four regions of Ukraine (none of which Russia now fully controls). During a Feb. 2 speech in Volgograd commemorating the 80th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad, Putin also appeared to compare today's conflict over Ukraine and World War II by alluding to war with the West, and has also returned to using nuclear threats. If Putin draws further connections to World War II in his Feb. 21 speech, it would provide insight into Kremlin's plans for mobilization and escalating the war, and suggest the Russian people should expect even greater sacrifices going forward. It would also contradict the Kremlin's current insistence that its ''special military operation'' is not a war and is going according to plan, and that Western weapons deliveries are incapable of changing the outcome of the conflict. Should Putin use the speech to prepare the Russian people for a new wave of mobilization in the coming weeks, his logic would likely be to have more Russian forces on the battlefield to oppose a Ukrainian offensive in the late spring, though there are for now few signs this scenario is likely.

Lawmakers in Russia's parliament will hold an extraordinary session on Feb. 22, where they will reportedly move forward with legislation that Putin calls for in his Feb. 21 speech. Such legislation is expected to pertain to the Ukrainian territories Moscow claims to have annexed, but speculation persists that it could pertain to future mobilization measures. There is also speculation that Putin could announce steps toward the annexation of the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which would need approval by lawmakers.

U.S. President Joe Biden will likely respond to Putin's address during his visit to Poland Feb. 20-22, where Biden is scheduled to discuss both bilateral cooperation and collective efforts to support Ukraine and bolster NATO's deterrence.

In the coming months, Russia will focus on consolidating its territorial control of eastern Ukraine and is unlikely to attempt risky operations in other parts of the country of lower strategic value. While the invasion is not progressing as initially planned, Moscow continues to believe that Western support for Ukraine's defense will wane with time, and is increasingly preparing for a prolonged conflict that it believes it has a greater chance of winning. In addition, Russia already occupies sufficient territory — most importantly, the Crimea land corridor — for Russian elites and the general public to see the invasion as a success. Russian forces thus have little need to engage in riskier, resource-intensive actions, making it unlikely that Russia will reopen a second front (by, for example, launching an attack from Belarus). For similar reasons, a renewed Russian offensive toward Kharkiv also remains relatively unlikely, as such a thrust would not get closer to seizing the city than Russia's initial invasion did. Instead, Russia is more likely to concentrate its human and material resources on preserving its gains in the eastern Donbas region, where Russia seeks to achieve control over as much territory as it can. In the next stage of its war, one of Russia's primary goals will be to seize Slovyansk and Kramatorsk — the largest cities in the Donbas that are still under Ukrainian control. The cities are just over 40 kilometers (roughly 25 miles) away from the frontline — meaning Russia would only need to advance around 15 km (roughly 10 miles) to put them into the range of its many artillery systems, which Moscow hopes will undermine the strategic value of Ukraine's continued defense of the cities, and therefore the rest of Donbas. Bakhmut is the doorstep to Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, which is also why the Wagner group's push around Bakhmut is significant. Should Bakhmut fall, Ukraine's troops will likely maintain defensive lines very close to minimize the strategic impact of the city's loss on the war.

Ukraine will conduct its own offensive later in the spring, the success of which will largely hinge on deliveries of ammunition from the West. Despite the recent announcement of increased Western military support for Ukraine, logistical constraints mean that it may take three months or more before tanks and critical ammunition reach the battlefront. In addition, Kyiv is concerned that Western military support will not be large enough, come fast enough and/or include the type of equipment needed to force Russian troops out of the Crimea land corridor — and that Ukraine will then miss its window of opportunity to retake the strategic region amid a politically fatigued West and increasingly entrenched Russia. This makes a Ukrainian offensive in the late spring imperative. Successfully beating off Russia's current offensive while minimizing losses of its own men, territory and equipment is important for Ukraine's offensive in the coming months. But by far the more important factor in determining its offensive's success will be the quantity, quality and timing of Western arms deliveries to Ukraine. Tanks and jets have been the primary subject of recent announcements and headlines, given that Ukraine seeks to launch its offensive as soon as it has the weapons to successfully do so. But even more crucial will be sufficient deliveries of ammunition, about which Ukrainian and NATO officials have increasingly sounded alarms.

Speaking at NATO headquarters on Feb. 13, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg warned that the current rate of Ukraine's ammunition expenditure is many times higher than the West's current rate of production, and even suggested artillery and other munitions manufacturers offer more shifts and keep the factories running on weekends to produce as much ammo as possible sooner rather than later. Specifically, he suggested the current production rate of 155 mm artillery ammunition is not sufficient – or on a trajectory to become so. The same is also true for high-precision and long-range systems such as HIMARS. Ukraine will likely need time to stockpile large quantities of these and other resources and move them to the front.

Ukrainian forces are estimated to be firing more than 5,000 artillery rounds every day,  roughly equal to a smaller European country's orders in an entire year in peacetime. But  Russia is currently estimated to be firing three to four times that amount each day amid its latest attacks.
The delivery of modern Western aircraft to Ukraine may only materialize in the second half of the year, but this delay will not deter Kyiv's plan for an offensive in the spring. On Feb. 8, the United Kingdom announced it would begin training Ukrainian pilots on NATO-standard aircraft. This strongly indicates that Ukraine will eventually receive modern Western jets, despite recent statements from U.S. President Joe Biden and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz rejecting the idea of providing Kyiv with such aircraft at this time. Reports also suggest that some U.S. Pentagon officials have already been advocating for the United States to directly send F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine or, at a minimum, approve their transfer by other countries. Western jets are necessary for Ukraine to independently secure its skies in the long term because procuring older Soviet and Russian aircraft for Ukraine is not a viable or effective option. But because the jets could significantly help the country defend itself from Russia's still constant missile and drone attacks, it would be strategically expedient for the West to push for their provision as soon as Ukrainian pilots are trained. British officials have indicated their training program could take between four-to-six months, possibly within the window for Ukraine's impending new offensive. But modern Western aircraft are not strictly necessary for Ukraine to conduct successful offensives against Russia in the coming months, meaning Kyiv's plan is unlikely to be derailed if it doesn't receive these new jets until after the start of its offensive. While the tanks the West is providing Ukraine will be more effective when they have air support from modern aircraft, the Ukrainian soldiers who will ultimately fly these Western jets will likely spend much of their time conducting Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) against Russia's vast array of anti-air complexes.

The latest Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting at NATO headquarters on Feb. 14 did not result in major new concrete disclosures regarding Western weapons support for Ukraine. But in his nightly address to the Ukrainian people later that evening, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky insisted that while ''not everything can [and should] be reported publicly…I can say with confidence: the basic trends remain unchanged.''

F-16s are likely the most practical aircraft for Ukraine's needs, but a specific program to train Ukrainians on how to fly the U.S.-made fighter jets has yet to be announced. Over 4,600 F-16s have been produced since 1975. Despite the U.S. Air Force ceasing purchases of the jet in 2005, F-16s are still being built, as the plane is used by over 20 other operators. European countries such as the United Kingdom are likely to eventually transfer smaller quantities of other aircraft.
Title: Zeihan on Moldova and Transnitia
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 15, 2023, 04:26:41 PM
second

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uo5GjKFhi4o
Title: WSJ: Russian tank losses
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 15, 2023, 06:51:13 PM
Third

Russia Likely Lost More Than Half of Its Tanks in Ukraine, Estimates Show
Moscow has to rely on lower-quality tanks from storage, says think tank

An abandoned battle tank near Yampil, Ukraine.
PHOTO: YASUYOSHI CHIBA/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
By Stephen FidlerFollow
Feb. 15, 2023 11:41 am ET


LONDON—Russia has likely lost more than 2,000 tanks in its war in Ukraine, more than half of its operational tank fleet, according to estimates released Wednesday from the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

The London-based think tank said the loss of the weapons is forcing Russia to rely on its stores of older weapons even as it seeks to increase industrial production.

The estimates suggest that Russia might have lost 50% of modern tanks such as the T-72B3 and T-72B3M and that its inventory of T-80BV/U tanks has been depleted by two-thirds.


Henry Boyd, research fellow at the IISS, estimated a floor of about 1,700 tank losses by Russian forces. “I would suspect the actual figure is somewhere between 20% and 40% higher than that” at between 2,000 and 2,300, he said.

The estimates are used to inform the IISS Military Balance, an annual assessment of military strength worldwide. The report, released Wednesday, puts the current Russian operational tank inventory at 1,800. While Moscow is projected to have a further 5,000 tanks in storage, most are of lower quality and many are likely to be junk, IISS analysts said. Russia’s most modern tank—the T-14 Armata—remains in test, the report said.

Ukraine claims close to 3,300 Russian tank losses. Oryx, an independent team of analysts that has tracked open-source intelligence on equipment losses throughout the war, estimated that more than 1,700 Russian tanks have been destroyed, damaged or captured.

As the U.S. and its allies start sending Abrams, Leopards and other tanks to help Ukraine, those vehicles are set to change the dynamics of the war along the front lines. WSJ examines how the tanks that Ukraine will receive from the West compare with Russia’s vehicles. Illustration: Adam Adada

Ukrainian losses have been less well-documented. The IISS estimates between 450 and 700 Ukrainian tank losses, leaving about 950 operational, according to the report. Western tanks have been promised to Kyiv but are yet to arrive. “Russia’s quantitative advantage has dropped dramatically but it’s still there,” said Mr. Boyd.

Russia also lost last year an estimated 6%-8% of its active tactical combat aircraft, including 10%-15% of the prewar fleets of some multirole and ground-attack aircraft, such as the Su-30SM and Su-34. Douglas Barrie, a military-aerospace specialist at the IISS, said an estimated 20 Su-34 strike aircraft had been lost, along with one or two of the more-advanced Su-35.

Mr. Barrie said the loss of experienced pilots might be more of a concern than a loss of aircraft to Russia, which has failed to establish control of the air over Ukraine.

Ukraine, which started the war with many fewer aircraft, has lost about half of its prewar combat aircraft, the IISS estimated. It calculated Ukraine has 79 combat capable fixed-wing aircraft left.


The organization estimated Russian troop casualties—killed and injured—at between 100,000 and 150,000. Ukrainian losses are probably not far under that—but the losses are less well-documented and the estimate is made with less certainty, IISS analysts said.

The report said Western sanctions are likely to hamper Russia’s efforts to rearm. Even with an increased military budget, “it will be challenging to keep the military forces supplied for the continuing conflict in Ukraine, and that is before taking into account issues of industrial capacity and the impact of Western sanctions on component supplies.”

Russia’s total military spending was estimated to have increased 7.3% in real terms last year and accounted for 4.1% of gross domestic product.

Write to Stephen Fidler at stephen.fidler@wsj.com
Title: Re: WSJ: Russian tank losses
Post by: DougMacG on February 16, 2023, 06:21:11 AM
From the article:
"Russia might have lost 50% of modern tanks such as the T-72B3 and T-72B3M and that its inventory of T-80BV/U tanks has been depleted by two-thirds"
...
"While Moscow is projected to have a further 5,000 tanks in storage, most are of lower quality and many are likely to be junk"
...
"the loss of experienced pilots might be more of a concern than a loss of aircraft to Russia, which has failed to establish control of the air over Ukraine"
--------------

Cherry picking here a little but evidence suggests Russia is less of a power and less of a threat to NATO and the world today than it was one year ago.

I have some doubts about their nuclear capabilities as well.

Ukraine is getting free replenishment fro countries with 25 times the GDP of Russia.  US pays more for food stamp fraud than aid to Ukraine, not exactly bankrupting us. Russia pays for replenishment with its closed pipelines and dwindling oil revenues.

The opposing view that Russia can overwhelm relatively tiny Ukraine in a matter of weeks if not days seems ... slow to materialize.

Biden should:
a. Apologize for the pipeline misunderstanding, and
b. Offer to fix it when Russia surrenders and withdraws with the money no longer needed for tanks.
Title: Re: WSJ: Russian tank losses
Post by: G M on February 16, 2023, 07:02:07 AM
Your threats burned down your city, Doug.

I'm pretty sure no Russians were involved.



From the article:
"Russia might have lost 50% of modern tanks such as the T-72B3 and T-72B3M and that its inventory of T-80BV/U tanks has been depleted by two-thirds"
...
"While Moscow is projected to have a further 5,000 tanks in storage, most are of lower quality and many are likely to be junk"
...
"the loss of experienced pilots might be more of a concern than a loss of aircraft to Russia, which has failed to establish control of the air over Ukraine"
--------------

Cherry picking here a little but evidence suggests Russia is less of a power and less of a threat to NATO and the world today than it was one year ago.

I have some doubts about their nuclear capabilities as well.

Ukraine is getting free replenishment fro countries with 25 times the GDP of Russia.  US pays more for food stamp fraud than aid to Ukraine, not exactly bankrupting us. Russia pays for replenishment with its closed pipelines and dwindling oil revenues.

The opposing view that Russia can overwhelm relatively tiny Ukraine in a matter of weeks if not days seems ... slow to materialize.

Biden should:
a. Apologize for the pipeline misunderstanding, and
b. Offer to fix it when Russia surrenders and withdraws with the money no longer needed for tanks.
Title: Ukraine bravely fighting to the last 15 year old
Post by: G M on February 16, 2023, 07:15:22 AM
https://twitter.com/AZgeopolitics/status/1626192132477165571

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 16, 2023, 09:38:39 AM
Hard for us to tell what that clip is , , ,

Even if your inference is correct (and it might be) the Ukes are showing genuine fighting spirit.  It is almost like they are defending their homeland from invasion , , ,
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 16, 2023, 09:42:22 AM
Hard for us to tell what that clip is , , ,

Even if your inference is correct (and it might be) the Ukes are showing genuine fighting spirit.  It is almost like they are defending their homeland from invasion , , ,

Or young people are being cynically being sent to their deaths over a pointless war that the deep state created.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 16, 2023, 01:55:18 PM
That would be our Deep State.

The Ukes are fighting for their homeland.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 16, 2023, 02:00:40 PM
That would be our Deep State.

The Ukes are fighting for their homeland.

They are fighting for a government we “Color Revolutioned” into power, which then provoked the Russians into this war.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 16, 2023, 02:42:14 PM
Agreed we meddled bigly, but my understanding is that the government that was overthrown was in power as a result of Russian meddling and that its overthrow had the support of a substantial majority.

Can't say that I blame the Ukes for wanting US/NATO support.  Russia was nibbling the Donbas, had taken Crimea, and puppeteer control of Transnitia.

Title: Re: Ukraine NATO Chief says war started in 2014?
Post by: G M on February 17, 2023, 09:28:03 AM
Agreed we meddled bigly, but my understanding is that the government that was overthrown was in power as a result of Russian meddling and that its overthrow had the support of a substantial majority.

Can't say that I blame the Ukes for wanting US/NATO support.  Russia was nibbling the Donbas, had taken Crimea, and puppeteer control of Transnitia.

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/nato-chief-belatedly-admits-war-didnt-start-february-last-year-war-started-2014
Title: Re: A response to the bestarred, bloated buffoon, he was just saying Russia lost
Post by: G M on February 17, 2023, 02:01:33 PM
I am getting Baghdad Bob vibes

https://twitter.com/i/status/1625553682782687237 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1625553682782687237)

He is a living embodiment of the rot and corruption in American institutions.

https://sonar21.com/public-display-of-the-gross-incompetence-of-u-s-and-nato-military-leaders/

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/no-military-winner-likely-ukraine-conflict-will-end-future-negotiations-gen-milley
Title: Something missing in the Biden went to Ukraine story
Post by: DougMacG on February 21, 2023, 07:06:11 AM
US presidents usually make surprise visits to war zones - to visit the troops.

There are no US troops in Ukraine.

Biden made his visit to raise the US profile in the Ukraine war. I thought part of the objective was to NOT make this a US - Russia war. I thought we were offering limited help, behind the scenes, low profile.

I'm not sure what we gain by raising our profile in the war, Russia versus Ukraine.
-----------
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/02/biden-trip-ukraine-kyiv/673134/?utm_source=msn
Title: Re: Something missing in the Biden went to Ukraine story
Post by: G M on February 21, 2023, 07:21:32 AM
Got to keep Hunter's sweet Burisma checks coming.

US presidents usually make surprise visits to war zones - to visit the troops.

There are no US troops in Ukraine.

Biden made his visit to raise the US profile in the Ukraine war. I thought part of the objective was to NOT make this a US - Russia war. I thought we were offering limited help, behind the scenes, low profile.

I'm not sure what we gain by raising our profile in the war, Russia versus Ukraine.
-----------
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/02/biden-trip-ukraine-kyiv/673134/?utm_source=msn
Title: Re: Something missing in the Biden went to Ukraine story
Post by: G M on February 21, 2023, 07:31:45 AM
https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/127/937/132/original/7cbc8fd5d63652bc.png

(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/127/937/132/original/7cbc8fd5d63652bc.png)

Got to keep Hunter's sweet Burisma checks coming.

US presidents usually make surprise visits to war zones - to visit the troops.

There are no US troops in Ukraine.

Biden made his visit to raise the US profile in the Ukraine war. I thought part of the objective was to NOT make this a US - Russia war. I thought we were offering limited help, behind the scenes, low profile.

I'm not sure what we gain by raising our profile in the war, Russia versus Ukraine.
-----------
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/02/biden-trip-ukraine-kyiv/673134/?utm_source=msn
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on February 21, 2023, 08:56:51 AM
I agree with what Pres Biden is saying, at least part way through this speech.

I did not hear the beginning or the end and maybe he put foot in mouth along the way but, main points I heard were, isolate Putin versus the world, reach out to the Russian people, no one is invading Russia, put out the word - this ends when Putin stops. Nobody else is quitting.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 21, 2023, 10:11:11 AM

“We will bravely fight to the last Ukrainian!”


I agree with what Pres Biden is saying, at least part way through this speech.

I did not hear the beginning or the end and maybe he put foot in mouth along the way but, main points I heard were, isolate Putin versus the world, reach out to the Russian people, no one is invading Russia, put out the word - this ends when Putin stops. Nobody else is quitting.
Title: Ukraine is safer
Post by: G M on February 21, 2023, 10:18:50 AM
https://www.breitbart.com/education/2023/02/19/ukrainian-refugee-girl-finds-san-francisco-schools-so-violent-she-wants-to-go-back/

I’m glad we have our priorities in order.
Title: I'm thinking Biden whispers to Zelensky
Post by: ccp on February 22, 2023, 05:26:20 AM
"keep staying mum and I'll keep the taxpayer cash coming
I got some tips on  where you can hide the money too "

https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2023/feb/20/biden-and-zelenskiy-hug-in-kyiv-after-paying-tribute-to-fallen-soldiers-video
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on February 22, 2023, 06:22:35 AM
quote author=G M
“We will bravely fight to the last Ukrainian!”
-------

Almost right.  We will provide not blank check support as long as Ukrainian people are motivated to fight back.  They are risking and sacrificing real lives.  We are expending relatively small money.

Two different, overlapping motives.  They want to keep their country.  We (some of us) want to see Russia:
 - not expand its reach
 - draw down it's arsenal
 - not gain land, sea and resources
 - learn a lesson
 - Putin lose leadership.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 22, 2023, 07:13:39 AM
Yes to the both of you. :-D
Title: WSJ: Win or we are fuct
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 22, 2023, 09:49:57 AM
A year of war in Ukraine hasn’t changed Vladimir Putin, and we hope Western politicians preaching “peace” were listening to his speech on Tuesday. The Russian promised nothing but more war and blamed the West for it. His choice in turn means there is only a binary choice for the West: Give Ukraine the weapons to win, or abandon Ukraine and live with the fallout for decades.

It’s worth noting how little Mr. Putin’s ambitions have changed since he rolled over Ukraine’s border last Feb. 24. His humiliating failure to capture Kyiv in the war’s first days didn’t dissuade him from regrouping to attack the country’s east. Russian forces are now launching a fresh offensive and grinding down Ukrainians in Bakhmut.

The Russians have lost some 2,000 tanks, half of the operational fleet, according to estimates, and appear to be hauling old Soviet equipment out of storage. But Mr. Putin has turned to Iran for a steady supply of drones and other military equipment, and now he’s hoping that China will ship him weapons. “Significantly” more than 100,000 Russians are dead or wounded, the Pentagon says, but Mr. Putin is throwing 200,000 more into the fight, even with little training or equipment.

Mr. Putin’s goal is unchanged: Control most or all of Ukraine, and incorporate it into his greater Russian empire. He still thinks he can outlast the Ukrainian government and its Western supporters. Many in the U.S. and Europe are ready to head to a negotiating table, but Mr. Putin is not. The only settlement he has in mind is Ukraine’s surrender.

The fastest route to peace then is defeating Mr. Putin, which the Biden Administration still seems reluctant to admit. Mr. Biden hasn’t wavered in his rhetorical support for Ukraine, and his Tuesday Speech in Poland struck the right note that autocrats “cannot be appeased” but “must be opposed.”

Yet his air of triumphalism is premature—Ukraine could still lose—and it is backed by ambivalent action. In the latest example, Mr. Biden is still holding back the Army tactical missile system, long-range weapons that the Ukrainians desperately want so they can strike deeper into Russian positions. The Administration is leaking that the U.S. military doesn’t have any to spare, but allied inventory estimates run in the thousands.

This has been the pattern for a year. The Biden team throws up reasons why a certain weapon—tanks, Patriot missile defenses, Himars—can’t be provided to Ukraine. The system is too complex. The training will take too long. Then these objections suddenly vanish after criticism in public and from Congress, and Ukraine gets the goods. Can we skip ahead and provide F-16 fighter jets now?

Getting Ukraine the weapons they need is increasingly urgent. If Russia receives arms from China, the war will descend into an even bloodier stalemate or a Ukrainian defeat. Political support could fray in European capitals and in Washington, even as Beijing’s involvement raised the global risks of defeat.

***
To that end, Mr. Biden might speak more directly to the Americans who are increasingly skeptical of the stakes in Ukraine, and ground his case for U.S. support in core national interests, not Wilsonian flights about foreign “sovereignty” and democracy.

The stakes in Ukraine aren’t confined to Eastern Europe. Russia, Iran and China are working together—you might even call it an Axis—to dominate as much of the world as they can. If Ukraine is absorbed into a Greater Russian Co-Prosperity Sphere, the world will make accommodations to the autocrats.

The risks of backing Ukraine are real, but the risks of abandoning it are greater. The Ukrainians have put up an audacious fight but, absent more advanced U.S. arms, this story could still end with Mr. Putin a greater menace to Europe, China emboldened, and the United States weaker. That’s not a peace to desire.
Title: Pair the preceding with this
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 22, 2023, 09:54:39 AM
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/feb/21/russian-bloggers-emerge-as-vicious-critics-of-puti/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=MA2dYpvDogjqFHADy5L%2BvcdEG8DkIUZsxPgt2S1VpJuqsuua20cOVWwd0MOFS0vZ&bt_ts=1677014363208
Title: D1: Why pledges fall flat
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 23, 2023, 07:24:16 AM
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2023/02/why-war-pledges-ukraine-fell-flat-munich/383249/
Title: VDH view on Ukraine
Post by: ccp on February 23, 2023, 03:47:12 PM
as always he seems to be able to pull all the pieces together

https://dailycaller.com/2023/02/23/victor-davis-hanson-the-ukraine-wars-prelude-to-what/

As an aside

I don't but the idea that it is cheaper to supply Ukraine now then the cost would be otherwise
as some suggest
how the hell can anyone know that
from what I can see it will cost us more now and then later anyway
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on February 23, 2023, 05:12:57 PM
Re: Ukraine Russia will not back down, they will drag on the war until they achieve their goals. The west and the USA does not have the appetite for a long drawn out war. At some point the financial costs will become prohibitive. Provision of advanced fighter jets, missiles only ensures greater destruction of Ukraine as Russia too will escalate. The Minsk agreement needs to be followed, if Ukraine wants peace. There is a real risk they could also lose Odessa and if the Russians take Odessa, Transnystria is next.

The survival of Ukr as a rump state, with no ports and much of its male and female population gone (killed or left the country as refugees), is not conducive to long term viability. China very likely will provide weapons support, covertly or overtly. The clowns in washington have pushed Russia into China's arms, when all along the fight should have been with China.

I know this is likely not a popular version of events, but this what I see.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on February 23, 2023, 05:27:22 PM
Still unconfirmed, but discussion/rumors of a false flag operation on Transnystria.

(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FpmonFxWIAIfYrl?format=jpg&name=medium)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 23, 2023, 05:38:13 PM
GPF today:

"By: Geopolitical Futures

"Moldovan response. Moldova’s foreign minister said Chisinau will begin the process of renouncing several agreements signed under the Commonwealth of Independent States in response to Russia’s attempts to destabilize the country. This comes after the Russian president earlier this week revoked a 2012 decree recognizing Moldova’s independence in resolving the dispute over the Russian-backed separatist region of Transnistria, which borders Ukraine. Moscow has also accused Kyiv of planning a provocation in Transnistria and framing it as a Russian assault on the territory."

As I look at your map a thunderbolt of the blindingly obvious to which I had been oblivious struck me:  What is the move on Odesa comes from Transnitia?!?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on February 23, 2023, 05:45:06 PM
Russia has only  2000 peacekeepers in Transnystria. It has one of the largest stores of russian weapons, the problem is how to get the Russian forces to Transnystria. Russia will want its land borders to extend up to Transnystria. So things might get interesting.

The only way I see is to fly over a portion of Ukraine  and Moldova (risk of getting shot down), and logistical support lines would be hard to maintain. If the end game is to reach Transnystria, it can only be through Odessa, so the war can last a long time.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 23, 2023, 05:52:02 PM
Which also means that Ukraine loses Odesa and with it access to the Black Sea.

https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/putin-cancels-sensitive-moldova-decree-prompting-biden-to-react/

https://moldovalive.md/
 
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on February 23, 2023, 05:52:56 PM
Also, the US coalition is mostly the EU and english speaking countries. The global south is not on board.
https://www.zerohedge.com/political/greenwald-nyt-finally-admits-international-community-does-not-stand-us-ukraine (https://www.zerohedge.com/political/greenwald-nyt-finally-admits-international-community-does-not-stand-us-ukraine)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 25, 2023, 12:47:58 PM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/west-cold-shoulders-chinas-ceasefire-proposal-ukraine?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1269
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on February 26, 2023, 05:44:49 PM
The greyed out countries (140 of them), dont support sanctions against Russia. Now the US is poking China to start a war over Taiwan. How many countries will support that ?.

(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Fp5WTnnXwAEAfHP?format=jpg&name=900x900)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 26, 2023, 08:01:04 PM
Is it fair to say we are poking China over Taiwan?

If we are going to do so, let's discuss this on the Taiwan thread.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on February 27, 2023, 07:40:12 AM
It is commendable, that the US is standing up for Taiwan and against China. My concern is that past history teaches us that we "choose to get involved" in other people's wars for geostrategic reasons, but since the US homeland is itself never directly threatened, we do not  have the will to win them. We can now see Macron/Scholz starting to realize that Ukr is not winning anything, including Crimea. The EU realizes Ukr is a lost cause, if they continue on the same path, they too will be destroyed. The higher energy costs will lead to deindustrialization of Germany and the EU, they will not be competitive, with that the social structures will unravel. Ukr losing millions of prime age men to the EU and Germany, means that there is no one to build that corrupt country back. These refugees will settle in Europe, initially increasing costs for Germany, but over the long term, they will provide new workers and that will be a plus for Germany.

There is absolutely no way the west can defeat Russia. Lets assume, the west works to produce munitions on a war footing. The costs will be astronomical, and it can only lead to the nuking of Ukraine as a start, followed by the potential nuking of the EU. There is a small chance that Russia could get nuked, but it will survive, its a huge country with a low population density, but what happens to Europe ?. I personally also do not see the US nuking Russia, for the sake of Europe (inspite of what the treaties say). France has already indicated it will not participate in any nuclear exchange with Russia.


https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/western-leaders-privately-admit-ukraine-cant-win-war (https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/western-leaders-privately-admit-ukraine-cant-win-war)

P.S. It may also be so that the US realizes that the Ukr war is not winnable and they are pivotting to China.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on February 27, 2023, 09:54:08 AM
From the link:

"Western leaders privately told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that Ukraine can not win the war against Russia and that it should begin peace talks with Moscow this year in exchange for closer ties with NATO."

  - Maybe this IS what a win looks like. 

At the start, Ukraine was not allowed to associate with NATO.  Now it might end up a full member or nearly so, and NATO just added two other countries (?).

At the start it looked like bully Russia would take Kiev and all of Ukraine in a matter of weeks at nearly no cost.  Didn't happen.  Then it looked like they would take the entire coast and I think that failed too.  It looked like all the losses of life and artillery would be Ukrainian.  Not so.  Putin would be empowered with new territory the size of Texas and the new line between Russia and Europe would move one time zone westward.  Isn't happening.

Instead we have: Putin is now the emperor with no clothes. His health and vigor is  in a par with Biden? His tanks, arsenal and troops are depleted, not empowered.  Sanctions we say didn't work because they hurt us too, but they hurt Russia worse, I think.

Also I think Putin's stature at home is at an all time low.  Even dictators need approval of some sort.

Meanwhile, quagmire in Ukraine is barely among our top 100 problems at home, in my view.

https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts

https://www.statista.com/statistics/315032/us-supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-total-costs/#:~:text=In%202021%2C%20the%20total%20cost,around%20113.74%20billion%20U.S.%20dollars.

https://www.aura.com/learn/ppp-loan-fraud

https://reason.org/commentary/californias-public-pension-debt-grows/#:~:text=The%20California%20Public%20Employees'%20Retirement,its%20results%20reported%20in%20July.

https://www.cbo.gov/publication/58870#:~:text=In%202034%2C%20Social%20Security%20revenues,by%2023%20percent%20in%202034.

And so on...
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 27, 2023, 10:36:48 AM
https://dossier.substack.com/p/schrodingers-russia-paradox

From the link:

"Western leaders privately told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that Ukraine can not win the war against Russia and that it should begin peace talks with Moscow this year in exchange for closer ties with NATO."

  - Maybe this IS what a win looks like. 

At the start, Ukraine was not allowed to associate with NATO.  Now it might end up a full member or nearly so, and NATO just added two other countries (?).

At the start it looked like bully Russia would take Kiev and all of Ukraine in a matter of weeks at nearly no cost.  Didn't happen.  Then it looked like they would take the entire coast and I think that failed too.  It looked like all the losses of life and artillery would be Ukrainian.  Not so.  Putin would be empowered with new territory the size of Texas and the new line between Russia and Europe would move one time zone westward.  Isn't happening.

Instead we have: Putin is now the emperor with no clothes. His health and vigor is  in a par with Biden? His tanks, arsenal and troops are depleted, not empowered.  Sanctions we say didn't work because they hurt us too, but they hurt Russia worse, I think.

Also I think Putin's stature at home is at an all time low.  Even dictators need approval of some sort.

Meanwhile, quagmire in Ukraine is barely among our top 100 problems at home, in my view.

https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts

https://www.statista.com/statistics/315032/us-supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-total-costs/#:~:text=In%202021%2C%20the%20total%20cost,around%20113.74%20billion%20U.S.%20dollars.

https://www.aura.com/learn/ppp-loan-fraud

https://reason.org/commentary/californias-public-pension-debt-grows/#:~:text=The%20California%20Public%20Employees'%20Retirement,its%20results%20reported%20in%20July.

https://www.cbo.gov/publication/58870#:~:text=In%202034%2C%20Social%20Security%20revenues,by%2023%20percent%20in%202034.

And so on...
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on February 27, 2023, 11:42:16 AM
"D.C. Uniparty"

You lose me there every time. Plus a new straw man argument in almost every paragraph.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 27, 2023, 03:16:07 PM
"D.C. Uniparty"

You lose me there every time. Plus a new straw man argument in almost every paragraph.

You have a term you prefer?

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 27, 2023, 03:18:04 PM
I very much doubt the deal will allow Ukraine to be anything but a neutral buffer state.

From the link:

"Western leaders privately told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that Ukraine can not win the war against Russia and that it should begin peace talks with Moscow this year in exchange for closer ties with NATO."

  - Maybe this IS what a win looks like. 

At the start, Ukraine was not allowed to associate with NATO.  Now it might end up a full member or nearly so, and NATO just added two other countries (?).

At the start it looked like bully Russia would take Kiev and all of Ukraine in a matter of weeks at nearly no cost.  Didn't happen.  Then it looked like they would take the entire coast and I think that failed too.  It looked like all the losses of life and artillery would be Ukrainian.  Not so.  Putin would be empowered with new territory the size of Texas and the new line between Russia and Europe would move one time zone westward.  Isn't happening.

Instead we have: Putin is now the emperor with no clothes. His health and vigor is  in a par with Biden? His tanks, arsenal and troops are depleted, not empowered.  Sanctions we say didn't work because they hurt us too, but they hurt Russia worse, I think.

Also I think Putin's stature at home is at an all time low.  Even dictators need approval of some sort.

Meanwhile, quagmire in Ukraine is barely among our top 100 problems at home, in my view.

https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts

https://www.statista.com/statistics/315032/us-supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-total-costs/#:~:text=In%202021%2C%20the%20total%20cost,around%20113.74%20billion%20U.S.%20dollars.

https://www.aura.com/learn/ppp-loan-fraud

https://reason.org/commentary/californias-public-pension-debt-grows/#:~:text=The%20California%20Public%20Employees'%20Retirement,its%20results%20reported%20in%20July.

https://www.cbo.gov/publication/58870#:~:text=In%202034%2C%20Social%20Security%20revenues,by%2023%20percent%20in%202034.

And so on...
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on February 27, 2023, 03:40:38 PM
"You have a term you prefer?"

 -  For people who don't know the difference between Chuck Schumer and Marco Rubio? No. I don't wish to call them names.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on February 27, 2023, 03:51:02 PM
"neutral buffer state"

 - Without the right to make agreements to defend their sovereignty and borders, like before?

Didn't work last time.

Maybe that's why there is no agreement as of yet.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 27, 2023, 03:51:10 PM
"You have a term you prefer?"

 -  For people who don't know the difference between Chuck Schumer and Marco Rubio? No. I don't wish to call them names.

What do you call the republicans that after endless lawlessness from the FBI vote to increase their budget?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on February 27, 2023, 11:00:51 PM
DC Uniparty, logic presented is that Republicans let us down once, or let's say a hundred or a thousand times, therefore the parties are the same. Good grief.  The corollary is, elections don't matter, why vote. Add to that the cheat and it's double, why vote.  What self-defeating nonsense. 

AOC knows the parties are different and she's not smarter than you   She votes roughly 100% with her party, always against what I/we believe.  These votes are in near perfect harmony with her Marxism anti American beliefs.  That's the same as who on the right?  Nobody.  It's utter nonsense.

The Supreme Court doesn't matter, the Justices decided on party line vote are the same?  No they aren't.  Why spread such bullsh*t?

If you want to blur the differences and trivialize the elections and the consequences, I don't want to be near it.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 28, 2023, 06:41:52 AM
"DC Uniparty, logic presented is that Republicans let us down once, or let's say a hundred or a thousand times, therefore the parties are the same. Good grief.  The corollary is, elections don't matter, why vote. Add to that the cheat and it's double, why vote.  What self-defeating nonsense.

"AOC knows the parties are different and she's not smarter than you   She votes roughly 100% with her party, always against what I/we believe.  These votes are in near perfect harmony with her Marxism anti American beliefs.  That's the same as who on the right?  Nobody.  It's utter nonsense."

Well said.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on February 28, 2023, 07:15:07 AM
"DC Uniparty, logic presented is that Republicans let us down once, or let's say a hundred or a thousand times, therefore the parties are the same. Good grief.  The corollary is, elections don't matter, why vote. Add to that the cheat and it's double, why vote.  What self-defeating nonsense.

"AOC knows the parties are different and she's not smarter than you   She votes roughly 100% with her party, always against what I/we believe.  These votes are in near perfect harmony with her Marxism anti American beliefs.  That's the same as who on the right?  Nobody.  It's utter nonsense."

Well said.


Actions matter, not words. Endless republican failure theater "Gosh guys, we tried".


https://www.politico.com/news/2022/12/19/government-funding-deal-hits-11th-hour-snag-the-fbi-headquarters-00074663

Leading lawmakers unveiled a $1.7 trillion year-end spending bill early Tuesday as they raced to pass the sprawling package by week’s end, with federal cash expiring at midnight on Friday.

The so-called omnibus would provide the military with $858 billion this fiscal year, a nearly 10 percent increase over current levels. It would fund domestic programs at more than $772 billion, including nearly $119 billion, or a 22 percent increase, for veterans’ medical care, according to the office of Senate Appropriations Chair Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.).

The Senate is expected to act first on the spending package in the coming days, seeking a time agreement that would allow the bill to pass before Thursday night and sending it to the House. Any senator could hold up that deal in exchange for amendments or concessions. Senate Minority Whip John Thune said Monday that he expected conservatives to push for an amendment related to stripping out earmarks — or projects in lawmakers’ home states.

“I don’t anticipate that it would be real thorny getting to a final vote, but it might take a little time,” Thune said, adding that with the holidays looming, “the thing that somebody has to trade is time.”

The biggest hold-up to releasing the text on Monday came, instead, from a dispute among Democrats, first reported by POLITICO, related to the location of the FBI’s new headquarters.

House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer and other Marylanders were pushing to get language inserted into the bill that would favor their home state by changing the GSA’s criteria for selecting the location, while Sens. Mark Warner and Tim Kaine of Virginia were pushing to keep language out of the spending bill, keeping current guidelines in place that would favor Virginia.

Both sides ultimately agreed to disagree. Instead, they worked out a deal requiring the head of the GSA to meet with representatives from both states to consider their ideas on the FBI’s mission requirements, equity and a potential site’s sustainability, according to a Senate Democratic aide.

The final haggling and release of the text comes after staff and key lawmakers worked through the weekend to wrap up the legislation, with Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer quipping that staff and appropriators haven’t slept, working through Hanukkah and the World Cup finale. In a sign that the FBI standoff was the final puzzle piece, Senate Republicans started briefing staff on the details of the spending deal on Monday evening.


“We must wrap the whole process up and vote on final passage before the end of the week,” Schumer said. “It won’t be easy, but we are working hard so we can get it done.”

Senate GOP Leader Mitch McConnell has insisted that the upper chamber pass the measure by Thursday, or else Republicans will back a stopgap bill to fund the government into early next year.

So, the republicans were so outraged by endless FBI criminality, they made sure the FBI got new headquarters and the DOJ got a 10% budget increase!
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 28, 2023, 07:31:04 AM
Ah, once again we have gone off the subject matter of a particular thread.  Including myself in this.  Gents, please let's stay on topic within the context of a thread.

Returning to Ukraine:

https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-quietly-shipping-ammo-to-ukraine-from-massive-stockpile-in-israel-report/?fbclid=IwAR2qQZydJjLBbD8gdI8SV6VzMywWKIHqPUxMyQTRY3MXABJr7TpxYZa35GM#:~:text=The%20US%20military%20is%20quietly,to%20use%20in%20regional%20conflicts
Title: Pentagon gives A-O-K
Post by: ccp on March 01, 2023, 06:17:25 AM
https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2023/03/01/pentagon-investigates-gives-all-clear-over-ukraine-fraud-allegations/

https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2023/01/24/ukraine-corruption-scandal-deepens-as-zelensky-sacks-string-of-officials/

is this not the same Pentagon that I read in reports cannot even track it's own expenditures !!!

https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2022/12/the-bridge-the-pentagon-cant-keep-track-of-its-money

yet the elites ===> more money to Ukraine !!!  All Z needs to do is ask.
Title: Meat grinder
Post by: G M on March 01, 2023, 07:37:22 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/most-bakhmut-front-line-ukrainian-soldiers-killed-within-4-hours
Title: Sen. Hawley's 180
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 01, 2023, 06:42:42 PM


https://www.nationalreview.com/2023/03/josh-hawleys-u-turn-on-military-aid-to-ukraine/?bypass_key=ZmdybjFlVjJua0tvaWo3K285b2xYQT09OjphVEZEWlhkUllubFdXR05pWTFWRlEwb3hUM2haVVQwOQ%3D%3D&lctg=547fd5293b35d0210c8df7b9&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202023-03-01&utm_term=NRDaily-Smart
Title: Re: Sen. Hawley's 180
Post by: DougMacG on March 01, 2023, 08:17:19 PM
Yes.  What changed?  Pretty easy to guess. The war isn't polling well with conservatives. And that's what great leaders do, right, is follow?

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/01/us/politics/ukraine-russia-war-support-biden.html

What the hell does E. Palestine have to do with Ukraine?  We spend more in PPP fraud than we do in Ukraine thwarting Putin.

Not a blank check.  Not in lieu of Europe paying it's share.  Not without audit and controls.  Not if the people of Ukraine are ready to give up the fight.  But aside from the China threat and the threat here from within, what do we have right now that's bigger than this? 

$5.8Triilion in federal spending 2023 and we've spent less than 0.1 trillion putting the world's second most dangerous man in a deadly quagmire of his own making.  The alternative is let him have whatever he wants?

Where is the big debate over the other $5.7 Trillion?

Can anyone name every program that costs more than Ukraine?  (Didn't think so.)  Here's one.  Cost of living adjustments alone to social security for Bidenflation, 100 billion. We could have saved 100 billion per year into perpetuity  - on just one program, by not vo ting for Democrat-Bidenflation. And we could have saved 6 Trillion in two years on the spending that led to that, and stood up to Putin 60 times over. But no.
Title: Re: Sen. Hawley's 180
Post by: G M on March 01, 2023, 09:20:48 PM
How many audits have been done?

Yes.  What changed?  Pretty easy to guess. The war isn't polling well with conservatives. And that's what great leaders do, right, is follow?

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/01/us/politics/ukraine-russia-war-support-biden.html

What the hell does E. Palestine have to do with Ukraine?  We spend more in PPP fraud than we do in Ukraine thwarting Putin.

Not a blank check.  Not in lieu of Europe paying it's share.  Not without audit and controls.  Not if the people of Ukraine are ready to give up the fight.  But aside from the China threat and the threat here from within, what do we have right now that's bigger than this? 

$5.8Triilion in federal spending 2023 and we've spent less than 0.1 trillion putting the world's second most dangerous man in a deadly quagmire of his own making.  The alternative is let him have whatever he wants?

Where is the big debate over the other $5.7 Trillion?

Can anyone name every program that costs more than Ukraine?  (Didn't think so.)  Here's one.  Cost of living adjustments alone to social security for Bidenflation, 100 billion. We could have saved 100 billion per year into perpetuity  - on just one program, by not vo ting for Democrat-Bidenflation. And we could have saved 6 Trillion in two years on the spending that led to that, and stood up to Putin 60 times over. But no.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on March 02, 2023, 05:57:35 AM
"How many audits have been done?"

How many votes in the House and Senate (and White House) does YOUR party have to force an audit?

As is common, quote the entire post and deride it on a single turn of phrase.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 02, 2023, 06:29:19 AM
Just pointing out the massively corrupt boondoggle the Ukraine war has been

https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/feb/04/welcome-to-the-most-corrupt-nation-in-europe-ukraine

We must make the world safe for Hunter's Burisma checks!

https://www.theburningplatform.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Fp_zqf7aUAE2Thp.jpg

(https://www.theburningplatform.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Fp_zqf7aUAE2Thp.jpg)
"How many audits have been done?"

How many votes in the House and Senate (and White House) does YOUR party have to force an audit?

As is common, quote the entire post and deride it on a single turn of phrase.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on March 02, 2023, 06:47:20 AM
"Just pointing out the massively corrupt boondoggle the Ukraine war has been."

You don't need my posts to do that.  I said I support the audits. So did some Republicans and no Democrats. No votes for an audit will be coming from elected representatives of the anti-Uniparty.

The idea that Ukrainians are risking and sacrificing their lives for Hunter Burisma is absurd. Something else is at stake even if you won't admit it.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on March 02, 2023, 06:48:20 AM
Ukraine National Bank
 :-D

suspect many Ukraine owned "dachas" springing up around the world
 :wink:

offshore accounts and bitcoins .....

Pentagon can't even keep account of domestic military spending yet they tell us there is "no evidence " of fraud in Ukraine
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 02, 2023, 06:57:15 AM
"Just pointing out the massively corrupt boondoggle the Ukraine war has been."

You don't need my posts to do that.  I said I support the audits. So did some Republicans and no Democrats. No votes for an audit will be coming from elected representatives of the anti-Uniparty.

The idea that Ukrainians are risking and sacrificing their lives for Hunter Burisma is absurd. Something else is at stake even if you won't admit it.

Yes, they are fighting and sacrificing their lives so that corrupt Ukrainian Oligarchs can launder money for corrupt American Oligarchs rather than be ruled by corrupt Russian Oligarchs,

So now we are risking a global nuclear war to keep the Russians out of Russian Donbas.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 02, 2023, 07:25:07 AM
Ukraine National Bank
 :-D

suspect many Ukraine owned "dachas" springing up around the world
 :wink:

offshore accounts and bitcoins .....

Pentagon can't even keep account of domestic military spending yet they tell us there is "no evidence " of fraud in Ukraine

https://www.occrp.org/en/the-pandora-papers/pandora-papers-reveal-offshore-holdings-of-ukrainian-president-and-his-inner-circle

https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2020/11/16/the-pentagon-failed-its-audit-again-but-sees-progress/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 02, 2023, 07:42:12 AM
I think all of us here are agreed that:

A) in a sense, this war was a war of choice, and that this choice was really stupid for a variety of reasons;

B) there is A LOT of corruption-- and that includes certain powerful Americans, likely including our President and the former Speaker of the House;

C) the Ukes are fighting bravely and well

D) the Russians are being brutal assholes.

Where things get more complicated is in WHAT DO WE DO NOW?

ALL apparent options seriously suck-- and I would submit that advocacy of any one of them requires acknowledgement of its costs.
Title: Re: Ukraine military strategy, Austin Bay
Post by: DougMacG on March 03, 2023, 06:34:29 AM
https://strategypage.com/on_point/2023030191420.aspx

On Point: Ukraine's Combined Arms Warfare Edge

by Austin Bay
March 1, 2023
March 2022's Ukraine war videos of exploding Russian tanks showed the world that Ukrainian soldiers armed with modern anti-tank weapons knew how to ambush and destroy Russia's mightiest armored fighting vehicles.

Wire service photos of Russian vehicle graveyards confirmed Ukrainian military units knew how to defeat and destroy entire Russian military units -- entire formations, not just individual tanks.

Burnt-out tanks, smashed armored infantry carriers, abandoned self-propelled anti-aircraft and artillery vehicles, scores of shrapnel-riddled trucks -- the photos showed the metal bones of a Russian armored BTG (Battalion Task Group).

In February 2022 Russia fielded an estimated 170 BTGs. With these allegedly modern combined arms units Vladimir Putin believed Ukraine would quickly submit to a Russian blitzkrieg.

For many reasons, with Ukrainian will to win and tactical training in the top five, Putin's invasion stalled then collapsed. By midsummer Ukrainian local combined arms attacks had forced Russian retreats.

Combined arms. Alexander the Great used the concept, coordinating Macedonian cavalry, heavy infantry and quick light infantry maneuver and attacks. Napoleon combined infantry, cavalry and artillery. German WWII panzer divisions combined tanks, armored infantry (panzer grenadiers), mobile artillery and air attacks (close air support of ground forces).

The U.S. Army and Army Air Corps of 1944 were very good at combined arms warfare. The December 1944 attacks of 4th Armored Division's Combat Command Reserve (CCR) to relieve Bastogne are an excellent example of combined arms warfare.

Led by Lieutenant-Colonel Creighton Abrams, commanding the 37th Tank Battalion (the M1 Abrams tank is his namesake) and by Lieutenant-Colonel George Jaques commanding the 53d Armored Infantry Battalion (WWII lingo for infantry mounted on halftracks), CCR was a small and understrength brigade. But Abrams and Jaques combined the 37th's three tank companies with the 53rd's three armored infantry companies, forming three combined arms armored teams.

With the 94th Armored Field Artillery Battalion in close support, Teams A, B and C fought a series of small but vicious little battles until CCR reached Assenois, four miles from Bastogne. After a massive artillery preparation, Team C broke through to relieve the 101st Airborne.

The point relevant to Ukraine: Abrams' tanks didn't fight without Jaques' infantry and in an offensive operation, smart infantry commanders didn't fight without tank support. Successful armored operations require well-trained infantry eyes and infantry weapons to protect the tanks from cheap shots and help the tankers identify targets.

With the infantry support, tankers can concentrate their vehicles' enormous firepower and maneuverability on breaking through enemy defenses.

In the complete 21st-century U.S.-style mechanized attack, artillery fire, air support (fixed-wing, helicopter and drone) and space support identify, suppress and very often destroy enemy units attempting to regroup or counterattack.

However, successfully conducting an armored attack's violent ballet of tanks, infantry, air and artillery fire takes intensive training. The Russian soldiers in the BTGs, if they ever got that message, never got the training.

Last year the usual ignorant media briefly claimed "the tank is dead." Fortunately, those claims disappeared. One reason: video of Ukrainians using tanks in successful counterattacks. Real experts pointed out the Ukrainians understood combined arms warfare.

In November 2022 Seth Jones of the Center for Strategic and International Studies wrote: "The Ukrainian military has effectively integrated drones into combined arms warfare" and they are "particularly valuable in a contested environment to improve battlefield awareness without risking loss of life."

Ukrainian small units knew tanks need fuel. StrategyPage.com wrote that Ukrainians focused on attacking "supply trucks and vehicles transporting maintenance personnel." As a result, Russian combat vehicles "could not refuel." Stalled on the road, Ukrainian anti-tank teams and artillery decimated the Russian columns.

Western weapons mattered and still matter. The American-made Javelin anti-tank missile and Stinger anti-aircraft missile have performed superbly.

Ukrainian soldiers and their leaders know how to fight as combined arms teams. That's a huge edge.

About the author:
https://austinbay.net/about/
Title: Ukraine, Vindman and the usual suspects
Post by: G M on March 03, 2023, 06:47:52 AM
https://humanevents.com/2023/03/02/exclusive-alexander-vindman-secretly-pitching-ukrainian-military-for-millions-in-defense-contracts?utm_campaign=64483
Title: Re: Ukraine military strategy, Austin Bay
Post by: G M on March 03, 2023, 07:04:26 AM
https://twitter.com/AZgeopolitics/status/1631571017653952512?cxt=HHwWgICx0cbMwKQtAAAA

Looks like Ukraine is running low on military aged males.


https://strategypage.com/on_point/2023030191420.aspx

On Point: Ukraine's Combined Arms Warfare Edge

by Austin Bay
March 1, 2023
March 2022's Ukraine war videos of exploding Russian tanks showed the world that Ukrainian soldiers armed with modern anti-tank weapons knew how to ambush and destroy Russia's mightiest armored fighting vehicles.

Wire service photos of Russian vehicle graveyards confirmed Ukrainian military units knew how to defeat and destroy entire Russian military units -- entire formations, not just individual tanks.

Burnt-out tanks, smashed armored infantry carriers, abandoned self-propelled anti-aircraft and artillery vehicles, scores of shrapnel-riddled trucks -- the photos showed the metal bones of a Russian armored BTG (Battalion Task Group).

In February 2022 Russia fielded an estimated 170 BTGs. With these allegedly modern combined arms units Vladimir Putin believed Ukraine would quickly submit to a Russian blitzkrieg.

For many reasons, with Ukrainian will to win and tactical training in the top five, Putin's invasion stalled then collapsed. By midsummer Ukrainian local combined arms attacks had forced Russian retreats.

Combined arms. Alexander the Great used the concept, coordinating Macedonian cavalry, heavy infantry and quick light infantry maneuver and attacks. Napoleon combined infantry, cavalry and artillery. German WWII panzer divisions combined tanks, armored infantry (panzer grenadiers), mobile artillery and air attacks (close air support of ground forces).

The U.S. Army and Army Air Corps of 1944 were very good at combined arms warfare. The December 1944 attacks of 4th Armored Division's Combat Command Reserve (CCR) to relieve Bastogne are an excellent example of combined arms warfare.

Led by Lieutenant-Colonel Creighton Abrams, commanding the 37th Tank Battalion (the M1 Abrams tank is his namesake) and by Lieutenant-Colonel George Jaques commanding the 53d Armored Infantry Battalion (WWII lingo for infantry mounted on halftracks), CCR was a small and understrength brigade. But Abrams and Jaques combined the 37th's three tank companies with the 53rd's three armored infantry companies, forming three combined arms armored teams.

With the 94th Armored Field Artillery Battalion in close support, Teams A, B and C fought a series of small but vicious little battles until CCR reached Assenois, four miles from Bastogne. After a massive artillery preparation, Team C broke through to relieve the 101st Airborne.

The point relevant to Ukraine: Abrams' tanks didn't fight without Jaques' infantry and in an offensive operation, smart infantry commanders didn't fight without tank support. Successful armored operations require well-trained infantry eyes and infantry weapons to protect the tanks from cheap shots and help the tankers identify targets.

With the infantry support, tankers can concentrate their vehicles' enormous firepower and maneuverability on breaking through enemy defenses.

In the complete 21st-century U.S.-style mechanized attack, artillery fire, air support (fixed-wing, helicopter and drone) and space support identify, suppress and very often destroy enemy units attempting to regroup or counterattack.

However, successfully conducting an armored attack's violent ballet of tanks, infantry, air and artillery fire takes intensive training. The Russian soldiers in the BTGs, if they ever got that message, never got the training.

Last year the usual ignorant media briefly claimed "the tank is dead." Fortunately, those claims disappeared. One reason: video of Ukrainians using tanks in successful counterattacks. Real experts pointed out the Ukrainians understood combined arms warfare.

In November 2022 Seth Jones of the Center for Strategic and International Studies wrote: "The Ukrainian military has effectively integrated drones into combined arms warfare" and they are "particularly valuable in a contested environment to improve battlefield awareness without risking loss of life."

Ukrainian small units knew tanks need fuel. StrategyPage.com wrote that Ukrainians focused on attacking "supply trucks and vehicles transporting maintenance personnel." As a result, Russian combat vehicles "could not refuel." Stalled on the road, Ukrainian anti-tank teams and artillery decimated the Russian columns.

Western weapons mattered and still matter. The American-made Javelin anti-tank missile and Stinger anti-aircraft missile have performed superbly.

Ukrainian soldiers and their leaders know how to fight as combined arms teams. That's a huge edge.

About the author:
https://austinbay.net/about/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 03, 2023, 08:52:25 AM
Nice find on Vindeman.
Title: Re: Ukraine, VDH comments
Post by: DougMacG on March 03, 2023, 09:17:02 AM
"Americans sympathize with Ukraine’s plight as Vladimir Putin seeks to destroy its autonomy. But woke brooked no deviation from the party line that Ukraine’s Volodomyr Zelenskyy is a saint, while Russia is near bankrupt due to sanctions, and doomed to lose the war.

Accordingly, the United States was obligated to give Ukraine a veritable blank check given Kyiv’s commitment to freedom. Zelenskyy’s team now even talks of a victorious Ukrainian armored counteroffensive into Moscow’s Red Square.

This week, however, we are learning the Russian economy is nearly as strong now as it was before the war. It has mobilized 700,000 troops to ensure that eastern Ukraine becomes a Verdun-like killing field where tens of thousands more will be ground up.

Ukraine bars dissidents and maintains a government media monopoly. And the more Joe Biden promises another $2-3 billion in biweekly aid, the more Zelenskyy acts as if it is a pittance given what supposedly stingy Americans should be capable of supplying."
  - VDH from 'woke wrecking machine'
--------------------------
(Doug's position)
Help Ukraine but NOT a blank check.
Audit and track our money and arms.
Stop when the Ukrainian people want to stop, (not Zelensky).
Zelensky is far from perfect.
Putin is pure evil.
This war is Putin's doing, but came out of Biden (and Obama) weakness.
Title: Ukes put NBC reporter on hit list f saying Russian cannot be ousted from Crimea
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 03, 2023, 02:28:31 PM

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/msnbc-reporter-goes-crimea-shocks-viewers-telling-truth?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1275

https://twitter.com/MaxBlumenthal/status/1631124426463879171?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1631124426463879171%7Ctwgr%5E766140ff1670e816f0b3ba97b2a7a2cdc38e6a10%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.zerohedge.com%2Fgeopolitical%2Fmsnbc-reporter-goes-crimea-shocks-viewers-telling-truth%3Futm_source%3Dutm_medium%3Demailutm_campaign%3D1275
Title: what is this ; another 0.4 bill to Ukraine
Post by: ccp on March 04, 2023, 08:09:25 AM
every week he is sending money

https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2023/03/04/escalation-biden-admin-responds-to-russian-warning-by-handing-zelensky-another-400-million/
Title: Re: Ukes put NBC reporter on hit list f saying Russian cannot be ousted from Crimea
Post by: G M on March 04, 2023, 09:27:03 AM
Zelensky's graft, arrests of dissidents and assassinations means he is heroically defending democracy!


https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/msnbc-reporter-goes-crimea-shocks-viewers-telling-truth?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1275

https://twitter.com/MaxBlumenthal/status/1631124426463879171?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1631124426463879171%7Ctwgr%5E766140ff1670e816f0b3ba97b2a7a2cdc38e6a10%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.zerohedge.com%2Fgeopolitical%2Fmsnbc-reporter-goes-crimea-shocks-viewers-telling-truth%3Futm_source%3Dutm_medium%3Demailutm_campaign%3D1275
Title: Re: The Nazi question
Post by: G M on March 04, 2023, 10:45:51 AM
My posting this in no way means I agree, but the list in articles from BEFORE the war, is well worth noting:

https://amgreatness.com/2023/01/26/inside-the-nazi-whitewash-of-ukraine/?fbclid=IwAR2rfeXYypKHiLlehS2QYTwbIL_ff9q_p-iFhWCa7mw1GmKt-B-AhV097dg

https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2022/11/cia_kgb_mossad__they_all_hired_nazi_war_criminals_as_spies.html

The US IC and the Mossad used Epstein to gather blackmail material by way of child victims. What wouldn’t they do?

https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/129/716/944/original/4ebe007ae3ab81b1.jpg

(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/129/716/944/original/4ebe007ae3ab81b1.jpg)
Title: Russian think tanker
Post by: ya on March 04, 2023, 04:59:06 PM
Here's a great interview with a prominent Russian think tanker, to get the Russian perspective if interested.

https://youtu.be/g0oNvmonEG0 (https://youtu.be/g0oNvmonEG0)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 06, 2023, 09:01:04 AM
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/03/us-artillery-production-ukraine-limited-lack-machine-tools-army-official-says/383615/
Title: Who is the fascist here?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 08, 2023, 08:54:51 AM


‘Who is The Fascist Here?’ Ukrainian Chief Rabbi Attacks Russian-Iranian Military Alliance
avatar
by Ben Cohen


https://www.algemeiner.com/2023/03/06/who-is-the-fascist-here-ukrainian-chief-rabbi-attacks-russian-iranian-military-alliance/?fbclid=IwAR0XkChubINOOR2g3TrFaWANR8Zqk5dAEbjPuYgtH8AWaFDdjTs6Cye_X6w

Rabbi Moshe Azman is seen at the dedication of a symbolic synagogue at Babyn Yar, site of a World War II Nazi massacre of Jews, in May 2021. Photo: Reuters/Gleb Garanich

Ukraine’s chief rabbi on Monday issued a blistering attack against Russia’s ongoing claims that the purpose of its invasion is to “denazify” its southern neighbor.

In an extensive interview with the Voice of America’s Ukrainian-language service, Rabbi Moshe Reuven Azman insisted that Ukraine was “a normal country where all nationalities are treated with respect.”

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Russian propaganda has frequently charged that Ukraine’s democratic government is run by “neo-Nazis.” Azman accused Moscow of having “privatized” the Allied victory over Nazi Germany in World War II.

“Now they decide that they can call anyone who disagrees with them ‘fascists,'” Azman said.

MARCH 7, 2023 5:11 PM0
Current and Former New Hampshire Legislators Issue Call to Support Anti-BDS Bill
Two New Hampshire political leaders on Monday called for pubic support of an anti-BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions) bill that...

“Most people in the world understand this, and to those who do not, I say: ‘Look who Russia is with today,'” the rabbi continued. “Iran, which openly declares that its goal is the destruction of Israel, Syria, North Korea. And with Ukraine there is the whole free world. Who is the fascist here? It cannot be that the whole world are fascists, only Russia and Iran are not fascists.”

Azman painted a bleak picture of the political atmosphere in Russia under President Vladimir Putin.

“It is very scary that people did not learn from the experience of the 1930s, when millions of people were shot for denunciations, and some were happy, pointing fingers,” he argued. “Therefore, I do not see any future there.”

Azman echoed the Ukrainian government’s plea for Israeli military assistance in its confrontation with Russia.

“I understand that Israel itself is in a difficult situation, that Russia is constantly blackmailing Israel, because there are Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran on different sides. Therefore, I cannot condemn Israel for this,” he said. “But I explained that the situation has now changed – Iran, which is trying to develop nuclear weapons and threatens to destroy Israel, has started supplying Russia with drones, which they are testing there and will use against Israel. And in return, they receive technology, aircraft, and nuclear specialists from Russia. Therefore, I think Israel should support Ukraine even in its own interests.”

Azman also discussed the Jewish community’s efforts to bring humanitarian aid to Ukraine during the first year of the invasion.

“We brought aid from Israel — backpacks with first aid, everything needed for emergency care. We saw that in many places water pipes were destroyed, so we are bringing water purification systems. We bring medicines from Israel, we bring rehabilitation equipment for the wounded from the Baltic countries,” he said.
Title: Re: Who is the fascist here?
Post by: G M on March 08, 2023, 10:28:31 AM
https://cne.news/article/2206-zelensky-takes-further-steps-against-ukrainian-orthodox-church

https://www.npr.org/2022/07/08/1110577439/zelenskyy-has-consolidated-ukraines-tv-outlets-and-dissolved-rival-political-par

How many Ukrainian Christian refugees has Israel allowed to settle in Israel?



‘Who is The Fascist Here?’ Ukrainian Chief Rabbi Attacks Russian-Iranian Military Alliance
avatar
by Ben Cohen


https://www.algemeiner.com/2023/03/06/who-is-the-fascist-here-ukrainian-chief-rabbi-attacks-russian-iranian-military-alliance/?fbclid=IwAR0XkChubINOOR2g3TrFaWANR8Zqk5dAEbjPuYgtH8AWaFDdjTs6Cye_X6w

Rabbi Moshe Azman is seen at the dedication of a symbolic synagogue at Babyn Yar, site of a World War II Nazi massacre of Jews, in May 2021. Photo: Reuters/Gleb Garanich

Ukraine’s chief rabbi on Monday issued a blistering attack against Russia’s ongoing claims that the purpose of its invasion is to “denazify” its southern neighbor.

In an extensive interview with the Voice of America’s Ukrainian-language service, Rabbi Moshe Reuven Azman insisted that Ukraine was “a normal country where all nationalities are treated with respect.”

GET THE BEST OF THE ALGEMEINER STRAIGHT TO YOUR INBOX!

SIGN UP!
Russian propaganda has frequently charged that Ukraine’s democratic government is run by “neo-Nazis.” Azman accused Moscow of having “privatized” the Allied victory over Nazi Germany in World War II.

“Now they decide that they can call anyone who disagrees with them ‘fascists,'” Azman said.

MARCH 7, 2023 5:11 PM0
Current and Former New Hampshire Legislators Issue Call to Support Anti-BDS Bill
Two New Hampshire political leaders on Monday called for pubic support of an anti-BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions) bill that...

“Most people in the world understand this, and to those who do not, I say: ‘Look who Russia is with today,'” the rabbi continued. “Iran, which openly declares that its goal is the destruction of Israel, Syria, North Korea. And with Ukraine there is the whole free world. Who is the fascist here? It cannot be that the whole world are fascists, only Russia and Iran are not fascists.”

Azman painted a bleak picture of the political atmosphere in Russia under President Vladimir Putin.

“It is very scary that people did not learn from the experience of the 1930s, when millions of people were shot for denunciations, and some were happy, pointing fingers,” he argued. “Therefore, I do not see any future there.”

Azman echoed the Ukrainian government’s plea for Israeli military assistance in its confrontation with Russia.

“I understand that Israel itself is in a difficult situation, that Russia is constantly blackmailing Israel, because there are Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran on different sides. Therefore, I cannot condemn Israel for this,” he said. “But I explained that the situation has now changed – Iran, which is trying to develop nuclear weapons and threatens to destroy Israel, has started supplying Russia with drones, which they are testing there and will use against Israel. And in return, they receive technology, aircraft, and nuclear specialists from Russia. Therefore, I think Israel should support Ukraine even in its own interests.”

Azman also discussed the Jewish community’s efforts to bring humanitarian aid to Ukraine during the first year of the invasion.

“We brought aid from Israel — backpacks with first aid, everything needed for emergency care. We saw that in many places water pipes were destroyed, so we are bringing water purification systems. We bring medicines from Israel, we bring rehabilitation equipment for the wounded from the Baltic countries,” he said.
Title: Ukraine will lose
Post by: G M on March 08, 2023, 07:24:21 PM
https://asiatimes.com/2023/03/ukraine-is-going-to-lose/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on March 12, 2023, 09:07:31 AM
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FrB4HftWcAEW8zY?format=jpg&name=medium)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on March 12, 2023, 09:11:57 AM
well didn't he make a few business trips to Congress?

last time the honorable Joe Biden actually visited him though

 :-D
Title: GPF: Upcoming Xi-Zelensky phone call
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 14, 2023, 11:19:56 AM
Ukraine, China: Xi Plans to Speak With Zelensky for First Time Since Start of Russia-Ukraine War
2 MIN READMar 13, 2023 | 18:57 GMT





What Happened: Chinese leader Xi Jinping plans to speak with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for the first time since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, The Wall Street Journal reported on March 13. The call will likely take place soon after Xi reportedly visits Moscow, Russia, during the week of March 20 to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Why It Matters: Xi's upcoming communication with Zelensky will constitute an adjustment of Beijing's previous approach to the conflict, and the call's likely timing after Xi's visit to Moscow reflects Beijing's effort to play a more active role in mediating an end to the war in Ukraine (or at least appear willing to do so). Zelensky will likely use the call to attempt to establish more regular contact with Chinese officials and ensure that Kyiv's views on the war are accessible and understood in China, though progress toward these goals is doubtful.

Background: On Feb. 24, China's Foreign Ministry released a 12-point "peace plan" for the Russia-Ukraine war, which, among other points, urged an immediate cease-fire and peace talks, respect for sovereignty, no expansion of defense blocs, no use or threat of use of nukes or chemical or biological weapons, and reliable global supply chains for energy and grains.
Title: Must read from Col. McG
Post by: G M on March 14, 2023, 05:51:58 PM
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/the-gathering-storm/
Title: Aside from this, they are totally about to win!
Post by: G M on March 14, 2023, 05:58:32 PM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/ukrainian-official-we-dont-have-resources-counteroffensive
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on March 15, 2023, 04:48:21 AM
Hypothetical video of drone

https://twitter.com/i/status/1635879377417191425 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1635879377417191425)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on March 15, 2023, 06:08:00 AM
it seems like a game of chicken

for the Russian pilots :

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_(game)

or kind of like "Russian roulette":

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_roulette

I sense the Russian pilots  will celebrate the winner with a bottle of vodka
Title: Mustache Boltono: What to do in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 15, 2023, 07:03:19 PM
Why Won’t the West Let Ukraine Win Against Russia?
Its defense would be more effective if it didn’t have to fight with one hand behind its back.
By John Bolton
March 15, 2023 3:43 pm ET


New intelligence suggesting that a “pro-Ukraine group” sabotaged the Nord Stream pipelines in September triggered surprising political blowback in Europe. Spurred by potential economic disruption, speculation arose that Ukrainian involvement, direct or indirect, would undercut support for Kyiv’s resistance to Russia’s 2022 invasion. Ukraine denied any responsibility. German authorities suggested it might be a Kremlin “false flag” operation, scripted to throw suspicion on Kyiv.

But even if Ukraine masterminded the raid, why would successfully disrupting Nord Stream imperil foreign assistance? Such a potentially harmful reaction exposes a larger problem, which has repeatedly manifested itself since Russia’s unprovoked aggression. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been spooked by Moscow’s threats to “escalate” the conflict if Ukraine isn’t kept on a tight leash. Although President Biden failed, indeed barely tried, to deter Russia’s war, Vladimir Putin has masterfully deterred NATO from responding robustly enough to end the conflict promptly and victoriously. Time to solve this problem is growing short.

Moscow’s successful intimidation highlights Washington’s failure to state clear war objectives and forge a strategy to achieve them. Mr. Biden wants Russia to “lose,” but seems afraid of Ukraine actually “winning.” If he believes America’s official position—restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity—he should reaffirm it, and craft a plan to do so. If not, he should say so. We can then at least have an intelligible debate.

Instead, ambiguous goals and fear of Russian escalation have led to today’s military gridlock. Just before the invasion, Mr. Biden ruled out U.S. military force, with no reciprocal Kremlin response. Days later, he said “no one expected the sanctions to prevent anything from happening.” In May 2022, his defense secretary and national security adviser asked their Russian counterparts to consider a cease-fire, signaling weakness and irresolution.

Russia’s deterrence and NATO’s lack of strategy are further evidenced by internal NATO debates about what weapons to supply Ukraine, whether Polish MiGs, Himars rocket artillery, Abrams tanks, ATACMS munitions, or F-16s. Such disputes over weaponry, when it is needed and where, and Ukraine’s own capabilities, reflect a disjointed strategy, which leads to confusion (or worse) on the battlefield, pretty much where we are. And, to say the quiet part aloud, a prolonged military stalemate can only benefit the much larger aggressor, aided by China and others, as the West aids Ukraine.

Much of NATO’s wrangling over weapons tracks Washington’s insistence that Kyiv not attack targets inside Russia or even Crimea, notwithstanding U.S. recognition of Crimea as sovereign Ukrainian territory. Under this bizarre reasoning, NATO pressures Ukraine not to strike inside Russia, and to spare key assets like Nord Stream, whereas the Kremlin can strike anywhere within Ukraine. Observers, recalling America’s catastrophic Afghanistan withdrawal, could conclude Washington either doesn’t know its own mind or is eager to avoid pressing Moscow too hard militarily. Russia’s deterrence works.

Today, White House policy is essentially: We support Ukraine’s defending itself, but not enough to be too effective. This formula for protracted, inconclusive war ignores risks to America as well as Ukraine. Critical U.S. munitions supplies are being depleted, and our current capacity to restock is insufficient, mirroring concerns about replacing our aging nuclear-powered submarine fleet while also supplying Australia under the Aukus deal. Although it is better we experience these problems now, before America itself comes under fire, shortfalls in U.S. stockpiles buttress isolationists who don’t want to assist Ukraine in the first place.

One thing is plain: Fears of Russian escalation are unwarranted. Our prewar intelligence vastly overestimated Russian combat-arms capabilities, and the passing months show those capabilities steadily diminishing. Where is the hidden Russian army that threatens NATO? If it exists, why isn’t it already deployed in Ukraine? Mr. Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling also has deterred NATO, but for no good reason. Moscow’s threats to date have been bluffs. Only in the most extreme circumstances—total Russian battlefield collapse, or Mr. Putin’s own regime on the verge of ouster—would using nuclear weapons realistically be an option. Accordingly, we should focus on deterring Mr. Putin in those scenarios, including threatening his own demise, rather than let his bluffing deter us.

The Biden administration may not intend it, but its doubt and hesitation both impede the war effort and open the door politically to those who oppose U.S. aid entirely. Hence the urgent need to state our war objectives clearly. Failure to do so exposes Ukraine’s supporters to claims they are granting Kyiv a “blank check” or that we are in another “endless war” (after 13 months and no U.S. casualties). While this is a domestic political problem, it also reflects national-security leadership failures. Mr. Biden needs to get his act together.

Mr. Bolton is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.” He served as the president’s national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the United Nations, 2005-06.
Title: Re: Mustache Boltono: What to do in Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 15, 2023, 09:08:50 PM
Intellectually and morally bankrupt.



Why Won’t the West Let Ukraine Win Against Russia?
Its defense would be more effective if it didn’t have to fight with one hand behind its back.
By John Bolton
March 15, 2023 3:43 pm ET


New intelligence suggesting that a “pro-Ukraine group” sabotaged the Nord Stream pipelines in September triggered surprising political blowback in Europe. Spurred by potential economic disruption, speculation arose that Ukrainian involvement, direct or indirect, would undercut support for Kyiv’s resistance to Russia’s 2022 invasion. Ukraine denied any responsibility. German authorities suggested it might be a Kremlin “false flag” operation, scripted to throw suspicion on Kyiv.

But even if Ukraine masterminded the raid, why would successfully disrupting Nord Stream imperil foreign assistance? Such a potentially harmful reaction exposes a larger problem, which has repeatedly manifested itself since Russia’s unprovoked aggression. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been spooked by Moscow’s threats to “escalate” the conflict if Ukraine isn’t kept on a tight leash. Although President Biden failed, indeed barely tried, to deter Russia’s war, Vladimir Putin has masterfully deterred NATO from responding robustly enough to end the conflict promptly and victoriously. Time to solve this problem is growing short.

Moscow’s successful intimidation highlights Washington’s failure to state clear war objectives and forge a strategy to achieve them. Mr. Biden wants Russia to “lose,” but seems afraid of Ukraine actually “winning.” If he believes America’s official position—restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity—he should reaffirm it, and craft a plan to do so. If not, he should say so. We can then at least have an intelligible debate.

Instead, ambiguous goals and fear of Russian escalation have led to today’s military gridlock. Just before the invasion, Mr. Biden ruled out U.S. military force, with no reciprocal Kremlin response. Days later, he said “no one expected the sanctions to prevent anything from happening.” In May 2022, his defense secretary and national security adviser asked their Russian counterparts to consider a cease-fire, signaling weakness and irresolution.

Russia’s deterrence and NATO’s lack of strategy are further evidenced by internal NATO debates about what weapons to supply Ukraine, whether Polish MiGs, Himars rocket artillery, Abrams tanks, ATACMS munitions, or F-16s. Such disputes over weaponry, when it is needed and where, and Ukraine’s own capabilities, reflect a disjointed strategy, which leads to confusion (or worse) on the battlefield, pretty much where we are. And, to say the quiet part aloud, a prolonged military stalemate can only benefit the much larger aggressor, aided by China and others, as the West aids Ukraine.

Much of NATO’s wrangling over weapons tracks Washington’s insistence that Kyiv not attack targets inside Russia or even Crimea, notwithstanding U.S. recognition of Crimea as sovereign Ukrainian territory. Under this bizarre reasoning, NATO pressures Ukraine not to strike inside Russia, and to spare key assets like Nord Stream, whereas the Kremlin can strike anywhere within Ukraine. Observers, recalling America’s catastrophic Afghanistan withdrawal, could conclude Washington either doesn’t know its own mind or is eager to avoid pressing Moscow too hard militarily. Russia’s deterrence works.

Today, White House policy is essentially: We support Ukraine’s defending itself, but not enough to be too effective. This formula for protracted, inconclusive war ignores risks to America as well as Ukraine. Critical U.S. munitions supplies are being depleted, and our current capacity to restock is insufficient, mirroring concerns about replacing our aging nuclear-powered submarine fleet while also supplying Australia under the Aukus deal. Although it is better we experience these problems now, before America itself comes under fire, shortfalls in U.S. stockpiles buttress isolationists who don’t want to assist Ukraine in the first place.

One thing is plain: Fears of Russian escalation are unwarranted. Our prewar intelligence vastly overestimated Russian combat-arms capabilities, and the passing months show those capabilities steadily diminishing. Where is the hidden Russian army that threatens NATO? If it exists, why isn’t it already deployed in Ukraine? Mr. Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling also has deterred NATO, but for no good reason. Moscow’s threats to date have been bluffs. Only in the most extreme circumstances—total Russian battlefield collapse, or Mr. Putin’s own regime on the verge of ouster—would using nuclear weapons realistically be an option. Accordingly, we should focus on deterring Mr. Putin in those scenarios, including threatening his own demise, rather than let his bluffing deter us.

The Biden administration may not intend it, but its doubt and hesitation both impede the war effort and open the door politically to those who oppose U.S. aid entirely. Hence the urgent need to state our war objectives clearly. Failure to do so exposes Ukraine’s supporters to claims they are granting Kyiv a “blank check” or that we are in another “endless war” (after 13 months and no U.S. casualties). While this is a domestic political problem, it also reflects national-security leadership failures. Mr. Biden needs to get his act together.

Mr. Bolton is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.” He served as the president’s national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the United Nations, 2005-06.
Title: Bolton big talker
Post by: ccp on March 15, 2023, 09:26:04 PM
"Hence the urgent need to state our war objectives clearly. Failure to do so exposes Ukraine’s supporters to claims they are granting Kyiv a “blank check” or that we are in another “endless war” (after 13 months and no U.S. casualties)"

so how to we win the war in 6 months, John?

send some jets some cruise missiles
or nukes

teach us how to end this without risking escalating to WW3

I hear a lot of bitching but nothing more then tough talk

Title: so how many dead are there
Post by: ccp on March 15, 2023, 09:32:58 PM
I keep reading different estimates

one thing that happens a lot is the misunderstanding between
how many killed

vs casualties
even the media seems to get the numbers confused
in many US media I read 200 K Russians killed
in another up to 60 K killed and 200 K casualties

only 100 K Ukrainians killed
I don't believe the Western sources
I have no idea what to believe

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 16, 2023, 05:47:50 AM
"I have no idea what to believe"

In these times that is a sign of wisdom.

Regarding Bolton, he has been a major player and is of known conceptual framework.  In other words, he is in the front rank of those qualified to make the case in this moment-- therefore I posted it.

Title: WSJ on DeSantis
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 16, 2023, 07:42:03 AM
Ron DeSantis’s First Big Mistake
The Florida Governor toys with Trumpian retreat on Ukraine.
By The Editorial BoardFollow
March 15, 2023 6:54 pm ET


Ron DeSantis is sketching out a presidential campaign based on his manifest governing success in Florida and as a fearless fighter for principle who ignores the polls. Then how to explain his puzzling surrender this week to the Trumpian temptation of American retreat?

That’s not too strong a way to describe his decision to call the war in Ukraine a “territorial dispute” that isn’t a vital U.S. interest. He told Fox News that giving the Ukrainians long-range weapons and fighter jets ought to be “off the table,” invoking the prospect of nuclear war with Russia. And he called for “peace,” albeit without explaining how to avoid making it a peace of the grave for Ukrainians if the West withdraws its support while Vladimir Putin advances.

***
The argument goes that Mr. DeSantis is reading the political mood: About 40% of Republicans say the U.S. is providing “too much” support for Ukraine, up from about 9% in March last year. Yet some of this is a function of polarized U.S. politics. Many Republicans oppose helping Ukraine because Mr. Biden is doing it, and the mirror image is Democrats from the antiwar left putting Ukrainian flag stickers on their electric cars.


Mr. Biden hasn’t helped public support for Ukraine by tethering his case to bromides about democracy and international “rules,” rather than the U.S. national interest, which for good reason grates on many GOP voters. Mr. Biden hasn’t worked to build coalitions with the hard-power Jacksonians in Congress such as Sen. Tom Cotton. He also hasn’t made a dispassionate case for why keeping an adversary like Mr. Putin off the NATO border and degrading his military power makes the U.S. safer.


Mr. DeSantis has a point that Mr. Biden doesn’t have “defined objectives” in Ukraine—other than giving it enough arms to resist but not enough to drive Russia out of the country. This is a recipe for extended conflict. The Governor also rightly warns about the threat from China and dwindling U.S. weapons arsenals.

But he may regret describing the war in Ukraine as a mere “territorial dispute.” This is flirting with GOP isolationism that has emerged from time to time in history and has usually been an electoral cul-de-sac. The party’s isolationism in the 1930s consigned it to decades in the wilderness, and that naivete was on national display when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. The electoral stigma wasn’t removed until Dwight Eisenhower, the victor of D-Day, rescued the GOP from Republican Robert Taft’s unwillingness to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The modern GOP model is Ronald Reagan, who combined principle with practicality and sold his policy to the public through persuasion. He paired a rapid expansion of U.S. military power with diplomatic efforts to end the Cold War. He saw the struggle against the Soviet Union as moral, but he didn’t hesitate to arm enemies of communism, even unpalatable ones. Aiding Ukraine now is in that Reagan Doctrine tradition.

Reagan also didn’t indulge a false choice between influencing world affairs and managing economic and social problems at home. He saw a roaring economy and cultural cohesion as essential elements of national power. Reagan hated nuclear weapons and wanted to protect against their use. But he didn’t let Soviet threats dictate U.S. actions, as the populist U.S. right is doing now with Mr. Putin.

All of this is captured in a recent Cold War historyfrom William Inboden, and by press reports that Mr. DeSantis recently sat down with Mr. Inboden to discuss foreign policy. Mr. DeSantis is clearly still refining his views, and his remarks on Ukraine left some room to improve them later.

***
Before he joins the campaign in earnest, the Governor may want to consider that the political risks on foreign policy aren’t only from the Trumpian right. Abandoning Ukraine may cost him with GOP voters who think he is bending in fear of Mr. Trump. Mr. DeSantis has sounded more hawkish notes on Russia in the past, and the press will play those up as contradictions. This could become less a policy issue than a matter of character. What does Ron DeSantis believe, anyway?

The politics of Ukraine may also shift as facts on the battlefield do. If Ukraine manages a victory even as Republicans call for retreat, the GOP will have surrendered one of its core selling points as the party voters trust on national security. It would then be all the harder to marshal support and resources for a stronger U.S. military deterrent against China.

And what if Russia swallows all or most of Ukraine? Mr. Putin will then set up shop closer to the Polish border and be even stronger as a malign force in Europe. The U.S. will be drawn deeper into the continent’s problems, not free to focus on the threat posed by China, which in any event will conclude that the U.S. is weaker. Is that the world President DeSantis wants to inherit on Jan. 20, 2025?

***
Reagan is declassé to some on the right, but China and Russia and Iran are combining forces to threaten the U.S. in a way not seen since the 1980s. Still relevant is Reagan’s 1983 warning, in his “evil empire” speech: “Beware the temptation of pride,” the impulse to “blithely” declare “yourselves above it all,” to “ignore the facts of history” and label the contest “a giant misunderstanding” and “thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong.”

The Gipper’s “peace through strength” remains the benchmark for Republican success in world affairs. Let’s hope there’s still a lane for that kind of candidate in the GOP primary field, or the country and world are in more trouble than we have imagined.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on March 16, 2023, 07:46:49 AM
"Regarding Bolton, he has been a major player and is of known conceptual framework.  In other words, he is in the front rank of those qualified to make the case in this moment-- therefore I posted it."

i do not disagree with you posting him
or even anything he says

but he states we have failed to win in Ukraine via proxy

but I did not see actual specifics on how he would have handled it differently or more importantly now what do we do to win.

what is exactly his strategy
it has to be risky
no ?

I would like to know how he would manage this now
that is all.

Title: Re: WSJ on DeSantis
Post by: G M on March 16, 2023, 07:47:44 AM
The WSJoke.

 :roll:

Ron DeSantis’s First Big Mistake
The Florida Governor toys with Trumpian retreat on Ukraine.
By The Editorial BoardFollow
March 15, 2023 6:54 pm ET

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Florida Governor Ron DeSantis makes his first trip in Davenport, Iowa, March 10.
PHOTO: JONATHAN ERNST/REUTERS

Ron DeSantis is sketching out a presidential campaign based on his manifest governing success in Florida and as a fearless fighter for principle who ignores the polls. Then how to explain his puzzling surrender this week to the Trumpian temptation of American retreat?

That’s not too strong a way to describe his decision to call the war in Ukraine a “territorial dispute” that isn’t a vital U.S. interest. He told Fox News that giving the Ukrainians long-range weapons and fighter jets ought to be “off the table,” invoking the prospect of nuclear war with Russia. And he called for “peace,” albeit without explaining how to avoid making it a peace of the grave for Ukrainians if the West withdraws its support while Vladimir Putin advances.

***
The argument goes that Mr. DeSantis is reading the political mood: About 40% of Republicans say the U.S. is providing “too much” support for Ukraine, up from about 9% in March last year. Yet some of this is a function of polarized U.S. politics. Many Republicans oppose helping Ukraine because Mr. Biden is doing it, and the mirror image is Democrats from the antiwar left putting Ukrainian flag stickers on their electric cars.

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Mr. Biden hasn’t helped public support for Ukraine by tethering his case to bromides about democracy and international “rules,” rather than the U.S. national interest, which for good reason grates on many GOP voters. Mr. Biden hasn’t worked to build coalitions with the hard-power Jacksonians in Congress such as Sen. Tom Cotton. He also hasn’t made a dispassionate case for why keeping an adversary like Mr. Putin off the NATO border and degrading his military power makes the U.S. safer.

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Mr. DeSantis has a point that Mr. Biden doesn’t have “defined objectives” in Ukraine—other than giving it enough arms to resist but not enough to drive Russia out of the country. This is a recipe for extended conflict. The Governor also rightly warns about the threat from China and dwindling U.S. weapons arsenals.

But he may regret describing the war in Ukraine as a mere “territorial dispute.” This is flirting with GOP isolationism that has emerged from time to time in history and has usually been an electoral cul-de-sac. The party’s isolationism in the 1930s consigned it to decades in the wilderness, and that naivete was on national display when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. The electoral stigma wasn’t removed until Dwight Eisenhower, the victor of D-Day, rescued the GOP from Republican Robert Taft’s unwillingness to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The modern GOP model is Ronald Reagan, who combined principle with practicality and sold his policy to the public through persuasion. He paired a rapid expansion of U.S. military power with diplomatic efforts to end the Cold War. He saw the struggle against the Soviet Union as moral, but he didn’t hesitate to arm enemies of communism, even unpalatable ones. Aiding Ukraine now is in that Reagan Doctrine tradition.

Reagan also didn’t indulge a false choice between influencing world affairs and managing economic and social problems at home. He saw a roaring economy and cultural cohesion as essential elements of national power. Reagan hated nuclear weapons and wanted to protect against their use. But he didn’t let Soviet threats dictate U.S. actions, as the populist U.S. right is doing now with Mr. Putin.

All of this is captured in a recent Cold War historyfrom William Inboden, and by press reports that Mr. DeSantis recently sat down with Mr. Inboden to discuss foreign policy. Mr. DeSantis is clearly still refining his views, and his remarks on Ukraine left some room to improve them later.

***
Before he joins the campaign in earnest, the Governor may want to consider that the political risks on foreign policy aren’t only from the Trumpian right. Abandoning Ukraine may cost him with GOP voters who think he is bending in fear of Mr. Trump. Mr. DeSantis has sounded more hawkish notes on Russia in the past, and the press will play those up as contradictions. This could become less a policy issue than a matter of character. What does Ron DeSantis believe, anyway?

The politics of Ukraine may also shift as facts on the battlefield do. If Ukraine manages a victory even as Republicans call for retreat, the GOP will have surrendered one of its core selling points as the party voters trust on national security. It would then be all the harder to marshal support and resources for a stronger U.S. military deterrent against China.

And what if Russia swallows all or most of Ukraine? Mr. Putin will then set up shop closer to the Polish border and be even stronger as a malign force in Europe. The U.S. will be drawn deeper into the continent’s problems, not free to focus on the threat posed by China, which in any event will conclude that the U.S. is weaker. Is that the world President DeSantis wants to inherit on Jan. 20, 2025?

***
Reagan is declassé to some on the right, but China and Russia and Iran are combining forces to threaten the U.S. in a way not seen since the 1980s. Still relevant is Reagan’s 1983 warning, in his “evil empire” speech: “Beware the temptation of pride,” the impulse to “blithely” declare “yourselves above it all,” to “ignore the facts of history” and label the contest “a giant misunderstanding” and “thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong.”

The Gipper’s “peace through strength” remains the benchmark for Republican success in world affairs. Let’s hope there’s still a lane for that kind of candidate in the GOP primary field, or the country and world are in more trouble than we have imagined.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on March 16, 2023, 08:04:32 AM
"Reagan also didn’t indulge a false choice between influencing world affairs and managing economic and social problems at home. "

not false choice
we have mega problems here at home

"The modern GOP model is Ronald Reagan, who combined principle with practicality and sold his policy to the public through persuasion. He paired a rapid expansion of U.S. military power with diplomatic efforts to end the Cold War"

he did not have ccp to contend with
and 30 trill in debt

" And what if Russia swallows all or most of Ukraine? Mr. Putin will then set up shop closer to the Polish border and be even stronger as a malign force in Europe. The U.S. will be drawn deeper into the continent’s problems, not free to focus on the threat posed by China, which in any event will conclude that the U.S. is weaker. Is that the world President DeSantis wants to inherit on Jan. 20, 2025?"

so WSJ thinks sending F 16 s is the magic answer that will win the war for Ukes?
if not then what do we do
send troops from Jamaica Barbados to help us win in Europe?

another big talker short on substance

is it not obvious the Ukes cannot win this this way by now

how does the WSJ propose we keep this from being endless
from sending more billions over with no gain ?



Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 16, 2023, 08:20:13 AM
All good points , , , AND , , ,

I liked that the editorial readily acknowledged countervailing points and would offer that "our" POV has its own cognitive dissonances.

For example, now that we have told the Ukes we have their back "as long as it takes" and the Uke people (attention GM, note this does not necessarily include Uke leaders) have genuinely shown great courage and commitment to their freedom from Russia-- what will be made of us if we undo our commitment (stupidly made yes, but that is not the point) to them.  Will the conclusion drawn (e.g. by the Philippines, Australia, Japan, India) not be that once again the Americans are feckless fair-weather allies?  Thus will not our vacillation sabotage our need for allies against China?


Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 16, 2023, 09:16:14 AM
All good points , , , AND , , ,

I liked that the editorial readily acknowledged countervailing points and would offer that "our" POV has its own cognitive dissonances.

For example, now that we have told the Ukes we have their back "as long as it takes" and the Uke people (attention GM, note this does not necessarily include Uke leaders) have genuinely shown great courage and commitment to their freedom from Russia-- what will be made of us if we undo our commitment (stupidly made yes, but that is not the point) to them.  Will the conclusion drawn (e.g. by the Philippines, Australia, Japan, India) not be that once again the Americans are feckless fair-weather allies?  Thus will not our vacillation sabotage our need for allies against China?

Zelensky has the dirt on the Biden crime family and others from the DC Uniparty. Ukraine is where they launder money and Hunter probably raped children while in a blackout state.

The Ukes fighting bravely is like the Gulf Cartel fighting bravely against Los Zetas. It is not our fight and certainly not something we should be risking WWIII over.

It’s a border dispute over a border that has been disputed for ages.

Meanwhile, if anyone trusts the US in any way, except to act in a feckless and stupid manner, they haven’t been paying attention.
Title: The F 16 vs the Russkis
Post by: ccp on March 16, 2023, 11:08:35 AM
I cannot vouch for the sources but a quick google search I found this:

https://en.as.com/en/2022/03/11/latest_news/1646953335_806897.html
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-does-air-forces-f-16-stack-against-best-chinese-and-russian-fighters-116086
Title: Byron York breakdown on DeSantis Ukraine position
Post by: ccp on March 17, 2023, 06:33:11 AM
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/ron-desantis-in-the-mainstream-on-ukraine
Title: Re: Byron York breakdown on DeSantis Ukraine position
Post by: DougMacG on March 17, 2023, 08:05:30 AM
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/ron-desantis-in-the-mainstream-on-ukraine

Great article ccp.  Too bad we only hear pundit and opponent characterisations of his view when it is so easy to just publish his own words and context.

I thought he was trying to thread a political needle but instead he is presenting the most reasonable approach to a very complicated (and dangerous) situation.

I was also led to believe his view on the Russia vs Ukraine war is opposed to mine when in fact he is articulating my view far better than I can.

These aren't statements that will come back to bite him, like a Governor who knows nothing about foreign policy. These are statements that will guide him well in debates and in future governance.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on March 17, 2023, 08:30:15 AM
welcome back !

 :wink:

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 17, 2023, 11:46:11 AM
WWWOOOFFF!!!
Title: Ukraine's secret weapons
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 19, 2023, 06:34:40 AM
https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a42929480/ukraine-secret-weapons/?utm_source=pocket-newtab
Title: Re: Ukraine's secret weapons
Post by: G M on March 19, 2023, 11:52:17 AM
https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a42929480/ukraine-secret-weapons/?utm_source=pocket-newtab

Meaningless in any real terms.

Meanwhile:

https://venik.substack.com/p/on-ammunition?r=26wszn

Running out of ammo, running out of Ukes.

Western war tourists are irrelevant.
Title: Re: Ukraine's secret weapons
Post by: G M on March 20, 2023, 10:42:15 AM
https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a42929480/ukraine-secret-weapons/?utm_source=pocket-newtab

Meaningless in any real terms.

Meanwhile:

https://venik.substack.com/p/on-ammunition?r=26wszn

Running out of ammo, running out of Ukes.

Western war tourists are irrelevant.

https://sonar21.com/understanding-the-scale-and-brutality-of-the-war-in-ukraine/
Title: Hersh: The cover up
Post by: G M on March 22, 2023, 06:49:49 AM
https://seymourhersh.substack.com/p/the-cover-up?r=nrwh
Title: the silence over the pipeline sabotage is just so peculiar
Post by: ccp on March 22, 2023, 07:42:03 AM
all very strange
how no reports the German government is not saying much about this
and are either being lied to by US Biden
or are in cahoots with the cover up

just all so strange

as for the US MS media to be saying nothing - not surprising since their party is in the WH

if it is a big deal in Germany then why are there (to my knowledge ) reports of their outrage mentioned in US?

clearly there is a cover up of immense proportions here






Title: Re: the silence over the pipeline sabotage is just so peculiar
Post by: G M on March 22, 2023, 07:44:17 AM
all very strange
how no reports the German government is not saying much about this
and are either being lied to by US Biden
or are in cahoots with the cover up

just all so strange

as for the US MS media to be saying nothing - not surprising since their party is in the WH

if it is a big deal in Germany then why are there (to my knowledge ) reports of their outrage mentioned in US?

clearly there is a cover up of immense proportions here

The German government knows.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 22, 2023, 08:09:32 AM
My read on it:

The Germans have been duplicitous in this way for a very long time. 

Nord Stream 1 and 2 are but current incarnations of a well established dynamic-- witness e.g. their backstabs of the embargo against Saddam Hussein, Bush 43's efforts to nip the Iranian nuke program-- in order to do business through the back door.

The precise purpose of NS 1-2 was to enable the Germans to cut a separate deal with Russia, instead of linking their well being to that of Eastern Europe (NATO, Ukraine.)

Erroneous as the policy to move into Ukraine was, now that the fight is underway, at its core removing the Germans of the option of backstabbing was not a stupid idea-- analogous to Cortes burning his ships as he set off to conquer the Aztecs because he did not want his men to change the mind if/when the going got tough.




Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on March 22, 2023, 08:32:59 AM
".Erroneous as the policy to move into Ukraine was, now that the fight is underway, at its core removing the Germans of the option of backstabbing was not a stupid idea

you mean by US blowing up the pipeline?

but what has that got to do with the near total media blackout on the matter
(at lease here is US- I don't know about Deutsch land media)

and why is not Germany pissed ?

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on March 22, 2023, 10:29:03 AM
".Erroneous as the policy to move into Ukraine was, now that the fight is underway, at its core removing the Germans of the option of backstabbing was not a stupid idea

you mean by US blowing up the pipeline?

but what has that got to do with the near total media blackout on the matter
(at lease here is US- I don't know about Deutsch land media)

and why is not Germany pissed ?

Hersh's story was leaking into German awareness, thus prompting the malignant retards at Langley to come up with the "Ukes on a sailboat" story.

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 22, 2023, 11:44:10 AM

"you mean by US blowing up the pipeline?"

Well, a cut out would be a good idea , , ,

"but what has that got to do with the near total media blackout on the matter
(at lease here is US- I don't know about Deutsch land media)"

Nothing, but that was not the point I was addressing.

"and why is not Germany pissed?"

Because to assert being pist would require admission of the backstabbers that they have been.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on March 22, 2023, 12:58:52 PM
"Because to assert being pist would require admission of the backstabbers that they have been."

well the pipeline was there before Putin invaded Crimea and then the rest of Ukraine:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nord_Stream

so not sure .....

You may be right, but somehow I think something else is going on ......



Title: In vino veritas
Post by: G M on March 23, 2023, 01:35:02 PM
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1607477025962430465.html

Truth
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on March 23, 2023, 05:37:37 PM
The world is changing, US hegemony is likely over.

https://twitter.com/i/status/1638908528969797632 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1638908528969797632)
Title: Re: Ukraine's secret weapons
Post by: G M on March 26, 2023, 09:09:05 AM
https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a42929480/ukraine-secret-weapons/?utm_source=pocket-newtab

https://dnyuz.com/2023/03/25/stolen-valor-the-u-s-volunteers-in-ukraine-who-lie-waste-and-bicker/
Title: Chinese drones coming next month?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 27, 2023, 03:57:05 PM
The Real Reason China is Arming Russia in Ukraine
by Con Coughlin  •  March 26, 2023 at 5:00 am

Facebook Twitter WhatsApp Telegram Send Print
Just as Iran has used Ukraine's brutal war to test the effectiveness of its drone and missile technology, so China's emerging industrial-military complex is reportedly looking for opportunities to conduct a rigorous evaluation of its new weapons systems; Chinese arms manufacturers are reportedly keen to test the effectiveness of their new weapons systems in Ukraine.

Chinese drones, which reports say are due to be delivered to the Russian Defence Ministry next month, would enable the Russians to deliver warheads weighing between 35 and 50 kilograms.
Title: Why would they not want an investigation?
Post by: G M on March 28, 2023, 07:48:30 AM
https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2023/03/at-un-security-council-biden-regime-rejects-calls-for-international-investigation-of-nord-stream-attack-russia-may-demand-compensation/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=at-un-security-council-biden-regime-rejects-calls-for-international-investigation-of-nord-stream-attack-russia-may-demand-compensation

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 28, 2023, 12:42:29 PM
Hoisted on our globalist petard , , ,
Title: forget the F 16s
Post by: ccp on March 28, 2023, 01:36:19 PM
https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2023/03/28/exclusive-pentagon-tells-senators-it-opposes-sending-f-16s-ukraine-citing-costs-time-constraints/

not as simple as sending 50 F 16 to ukraine and the war is won.

who would have thunk. this ?

I will hold off listening to Mark Levin who will be screaming and ranting about this for days....just kidding
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 28, 2023, 02:15:05 PM
OTOH if what I reported the other day about China sending lots of drones to Russia some time next month is born our, THAT likely would be a real game changer.

PS:  IMHO the Abrams tank promise was both weak (given under threat from the Germans that they would not send Leopold's otherwise) and stupid (very complex piece of equipment- tricky to keep running and lots of training is required, requires jet fuel for the engines, etc.)

 
Title: Ukraine better cut a deal
Post by: G M on March 29, 2023, 10:11:01 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/zelensky-admits-fear-waning-support-us-if-they-stop-helping-us-we-will-not-win
Title: Karl Rove makes the case for the Uke War
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 02, 2023, 08:20:54 AM
Put America First by Aiding Ukraine
Besides being moral, it’s in our strategic and economic interest to help stop Putin.
By Karl RoveFollow
March 29, 2023 5:51 pm ET

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Vladimir Putin at the Novo-Ogaryovo residence outside Moscow, March 29.
PHOTO: GAVRIIL GRIGOROV/POOL SPUTNIK KREMLIN/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Neo-isolationists on the right and left dismiss Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as of little consequence to the U.S. To them, it’s a territorial dispute between faraway countries. Some even allege that America is largely responsible for the war: By encouraging democracy’s spread in Eastern Europe, the U.S. unnerved Vladimir Putin. It’s understandable, they say, that the dictator then unleashed his military to subjugate Ukraine.

That’s claptrap. Mr. Putin could have lived in peace with a democratic Ukraine just as Russia has coexisted for decades with neighboring democracies Finland and Norway. And the latter was one of the founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The blame for this war’s death and destruction lies squarely with the man in the Kremlin. It was Mr. Putin’s ambition to reconstruct Russia’s imperial empire that led Russia to seize Crimea in 2014 and invade the rest of Ukraine more than a year ago.

Well either way, the neo-isolationists argue, sending weapons and economic assistance to Ukraine takes away America’s ability to meet our own needs. And, besides, we won’t be affected by the war’s outcome.

More claptrap.

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Ukraine’s heroic resistance to Russia, a power hostile to the U.S., has dramatically improved America’s strategic position world-wide. The Kremlin has become far weaker, while NATO, which includes many of our most trusted allies, has become far stronger and more united than it has been since the Cold War. But if Russia prevails in the war, that progress would be reversed.

A Putin victory would also embolden some very nasty characters on the world stage, including North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, Iran’s mullahs and China’s Xi Jinping. As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg argues, “Beijing is watching closely and learning lessons that may influence its future decisions. So, what happens in Europe today could happen in Asia tomorrow.”

And Mr. Putin has made clear he’d prefer his bloody adventurism in Europe not to end in Ukraine. In addition to asserting in his July 2021 essay, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” that the “true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia,” Mr. Putin suggested Lithuania, Moldova, Belarus, and parts of Poland and Slovakia were once integral parts of Russia. The strongman told us he wants to grab more territory, and several of his targets are NATO allies, which the U.S. has pledged by treaty to aid with our armed forces if they’re attacked. Neo-isolationists worry about what weapons and aid to Ukraine are costing America, but pulling our support risks American lives down the road.

There’s more than our strategic interests at stake. A Europe threatened by an aggressive, resurgent and hostile Russia isn’t in our economic interests, either. The European Union bought $349 billion of U.S. goods in 2022; our bilateral trading and investment relationship with the EU is the largest in the world. If Mr. Putin conquers Ukraine and demands fealty from European nations, it will result in fewer purchases of American exports.

You can bet Europe won’t be importing much liquefied natural gas from Louisiana if Mr. Putin conquers Ukraine. The Continent will get its energy from the unchecked dictatorship to the east. And rather than Europe buying everything from computers and farm machinery to consumer goods and business services from the U.S., China and Russia would likely use their “no limits” partnership to pressure Europe to buy from them instead. That would all cost American jobs and economic growth.

A Putin victory in Ukraine would also raise questions in Asia about America’s resolve. Our allies there would likely strengthen trade and investment ties with China at America’s expense. And if China invades Taiwan, say goodbye to the $43.7 billion in goods America sold the island nation in 2022 and our imports of $91.8 billion, mostly chips and electronic components. Remember when the Covid pandemic squeezed semiconductor supplies in 2020? This would be far worse.

And sending military assistance to Ukraine is good for our economy to begin with. Washington is largely paying for American workers to make the weapons, bullets, missiles and equipment we send.

If the U.S. abandons Ukraine after all its courage and sacrifice, it would be a strategic, economic and moral catastrophe that would reduce our influence around the world and damage our economy. Aiding Ukraine is putting America’s interests first.

Mr. Rove helped organize the political-action committee American Crossroads and is author of “The Triumph of William McKinley” (Simon & Schuster, 2015).
Title: Ukraine is doing this with our tax dollars
Post by: G M on April 02, 2023, 09:06:31 AM
https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2023/04/breaking-ukrainian-security-forces-raid-monastery-in-kiev-to-forcibly-evict-orthodox-priests-suspected-of-being-pro-russia-patriarch-pavel-placed-under-house-arrest/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 02, 2023, 05:51:39 PM
Given the ethnic realities of Ukraine, this does not surprise.
Title: As I told you…
Post by: G M on April 03, 2023, 04:35:10 PM
".Erroneous as the policy to move into Ukraine was, now that the fight is underway, at its core removing the Germans of the option of backstabbing was not a stupid idea

you mean by US blowing up the pipeline?

but what has that got to do with the near total media blackout on the matter
(at lease here is US- I don't know about Deutsch land media)

and why is not Germany pissed ?

Hersh's story was leaking into German awareness, thus prompting the malignant retards at Langley to come up with the "Ukes on a sailboat" story.

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/dont-talk-about-nord-stream-details-wapo-report-upend-official-narrative

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on April 04, 2023, 07:50:44 AM
Given the ethnic realities of Ukraine, this does not surprise.

Ethnic? Tribal maybe...

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/zelensky-govt-tags-senior-ukrainian-orthodox-bishop-ankle-monitor

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on April 04, 2023, 08:24:07 AM
Given the ethnic realities of Ukraine, this does not surprise.

Ethnic? Tribal maybe...

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/zelensky-govt-tags-senior-ukrainian-orthodox-bishop-ankle-monitor

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=06jNW8cVIVg

Tucker is correct.
Title: I was told...
Post by: G M on April 05, 2023, 07:52:31 AM
Given the ethnic realities of Ukraine, this does not surprise.

Ethnic? Tribal maybe...

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/zelensky-govt-tags-senior-ukrainian-orthodox-bishop-ankle-monitor

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=06jNW8cVIVg

Tucker is correct.

https://i0.wp.com/politicallyincorrecthumor.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/told-fighting-for-democracy-milton-ukraine-journalists-political-parties.jpg?w=501&ssl=1

(https://i0.wp.com/politicallyincorrecthumor.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/told-fighting-for-democracy-milton-ukraine-journalists-political-parties.jpg?w=501&ssl=1)
Title: Clinton "mea culpa"
Post by: ccp on April 06, 2023, 08:57:12 AM
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/nuclear-weapons-ukraine-putin/2023/04/05/id/1115184/
Title: Re: Clinton "mea culpa"
Post by: G M on April 06, 2023, 09:33:37 AM
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/nuclear-weapons-ukraine-putin/2023/04/05/id/1115184/

Maybe someone is nervous now that former presidents are on the menu for any local prosecutor…
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 07, 2023, 03:53:43 PM
https://taskandpurpose.com/news/us-military-gun-trucks-ukraine-iranian-drones/?fbclid=IwAR1q0k2SCsPx6V43_yOfIipsbBcsouB1fZMLs71NNBCPulJ3ZcnFYWvSViE
Title: wonder who leak the top secret military docs
Post by: ccp on April 08, 2023, 03:18:22 PM
https://nypost.com/2023/04/08/leaked-pentagon-docs-show-russian-intelligence-compromised-by-us/

I am thinking it would not be Russia itself as embarrassing
I am thinking China would keep their penetration of US intelligence secret
and not embarrass their "friend"

Iran ?
N Korea ?

or inside job ?

of course we will NEVER know
even if US intelligence does find out they will not tell the plebes .
Title: suddenly leaked documents are fake news
Post by: ccp on April 09, 2023, 12:10:05 PM
disinformation

from Russia , Ukraine , USA , France , Musk

who knew who knows ?

not to worry

our intelligence has this under total control .....     :roll:

still waiting to hear about the hobby balloons Biden the Great ripped  out the sky in a show of military prowess sending message around the globe the US is not to be messed with ..

hard not to be totally cynical and sarcastic these days.

https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2023/04/08/now-both-ukraine-and-russia-say-leaked-u-s-intelligence-assessments-of-war-are-photoshop-fakes/
Title: Re: suddenly leaked documents are fake news
Post by: G M on April 09, 2023, 12:50:44 PM
"hard not to be totally cynical and sarcastic these days."

This is the way.



disinformation

from Russia , Ukraine , USA , France , Musk

who knew who knows ?

not to worry

our intelligence has this under total control .....     :roll:

still waiting to hear about the hobby balloons Biden the Great ripped  out the sky in a show of military prowess sending message around the globe the US is not to be messed with ..

hard not to be totally cynical and sarcastic these days.

https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2023/04/08/now-both-ukraine-and-russia-say-leaked-u-s-intelligence-assessments-of-war-are-photoshop-fakes/
Title: Well, this is interesting
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 11, 2023, 06:40:03 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/us-spying-zelensky-heres-whats-known-so-far-leaked-intelligence-files?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1393

US Is Spying On Zelensky: Here's What's Known So Far From The Leaked Intelligence Files
Tyler Durden's Photo
BY TYLER DURDEN
MONDAY, APR 10, 2023 - 09:22 PM
The highly classified Pentagon documents which were leaked online in recent weeks, but which began being confirmed and reported as authentic by The New York Times and others only in the past few days, contain some embarrassing revelations. This has sent DOJ and US intelligence officials scrambling to discover the source of the leaks.

CNN is confirming Monday based on one of the documents which appeared online that the US has been spying on Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky - a disclosure which has caused officials in Kiev to be "deeply frustrated".





"One document reveals that the US has been spying on Zelensky," CNN reports. "That is unsurprising, said the source close to Zelensky, but Ukrainian officials are deeply frustrated about the leak."

The US intelligence document suggests that American officials have been worried about possible Zelensky decision-making to strike deep into Russian territory, which would escalate the war and potentially bring Russian and NATO into direct clashes:

The US intelligence report, which is sourced to signals intelligence, says that Zelensky in late February "suggested striking Russian deployment locations in Russia’s Rostov Oblast" using unmanned aerial vehicles, since Ukraine does not have long-range weapons capable of reaching that far.

An additional possibility is that the US intelligence community might be monitoring the Ukrainian presidency's office as part of efforts to oversee and account for how the tens of billions in aid sent to Kiev is being utilized.

The Washington Post details that "many of the documents seem to have been prepared over the winter for Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior military officials, but they were available to other U.S. personnel and contract employees with the requisite security clearances."


Here are 14 more major revelations contained within the leaked intel document trove based on various media sources:

Locations of CIA recruitment efforts focused on human agents which have access to closed-door conversations of world leaders
Russia's Wagner Group tried to obtain weapons from a NATO member: Turkey. Also, some of the internal future plans of Wagner are apparently known to US intelligence
Details of sensitive satellite technology used to track Russian forces, namely the "LAPIS time-series video" - described as an advanced satellite system, which up until now has been a closely guarded secret
Ukraine battlefield assessments prepared by the Pentagon
The Guardian: "One slide suggested that a small contingent of less than a hundred special operations personnel from NATO members France, America, Britain, and Latvia were already active in Ukraine."
Descriptions of intelligence collection activities by the CIA, NSA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, law enforcement agencies and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
One Feb. 23 review of the battlefield situation in Ukraine’s Donbas forecasts a "grinding campaign of attrition" by Russia that "is likely heading toward a stalemate, thwarting Moscow’s goal to capture the entire region in 2023."
WaPo: "The U.S. intelligence community has penetrated the Russian military and its commanders so deeply that it can warn Ukraine in advance of attacks and reliably assess the strengths and weaknesses of Russian forces."
WaPo: "A single page in the leaked trove reveals that the U.S. intelligence community knew the Russian Ministry of Defense had transmitted plans to strike Ukrainian troop positions in two locations on a certain date in February and that Russian military planners were preparing strikes on a dozen energy facilities and an equal number of bridges in Ukraine."
WaPo: A summary of analysis from the CIA’s World Intelligence Review, a daily publication for senior policymakers, says that Beijing is likely to view attacks by Ukraine deep inside Russian territory as "an opportunity to cast NATO as the aggressor," and that China could increase its support to Russia if it felt the attacks were "significant."
Ukraine's robust Soviet-era air defenses -- which have thus far minimized the participation of Russian aircraft - could run out of ammunition in next several weeks. 
A purported CIA intelligence update -- claims Israel's Mossad supported protests against Prime Minister Netanyahu's Supreme Court reform scheme.
One report says internal discussions show that South Korean officials are wary of requests to hand over artillery shells to the United States to replenish American stockpiles, out of concern they'd end up in Ukraine.
Another report says that Ukrainian Air Defense is in peril if it's not reinforced by Western allies
Meanwhile, the expanding breadth of subject matter has many suggesting a US source is responsible. It's being called "a nightmare for the Five Eyes" - and could damage intelligence-sharing relationships between the US and its partner countries.


The breach could also prove embarrassing for Russia as it deals with the claims that US intelligence has deeply penetrated some key areas of government, such as the Defense Ministry.

"The focus now is on this being a U.S. leak, as many of the documents were only in U.S. hands," former Pentagon official Michael Mulroy told Reuters. As opposed to electronic downloads, it appears most or all of these leaks are in the form of photographs of paper documents.



Title: Ukraine war leak biopsy
Post by: G M on April 11, 2023, 06:49:13 AM
https://www.theburningplatform.com/2023/04/11/russo-ukrainian-war-leak-biopsy/#more-299555
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 11, 2023, 12:21:10 PM
Weirdness when I click on that.  May I ask you to paste please?
Title: Ukraine is totally winning!
Post by: G M on April 11, 2023, 12:56:41 PM
https://ace.mu.nu/archives/403951.php

Maybe the plucky Ukrainian rebels will steal the Death Star plans from Darth Putin!
Title: Who could have seen this coming? Today's episode
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 12, 2023, 10:44:36 AM


https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/apr/12/us-army-special-forces-ukraine-says-leaked-pentago/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=%2F9BkxrtPsLAKplwZ4jM6otwq3uuN7edaKHE%2BL21wDzsgvZtW%2F3GG14AmVNtRmSop&bt_ts=1681313882551
Title: Seymor Hersh: Corruption Quagmire
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 12, 2023, 11:16:11 AM
For the record, people whom I respect regard SH as a highly unreliable source:



https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2023/04/hersh-on-bidens-ukraine-corruption-quagmire-this-is-not-just-bad-leadership-there-is-none/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on April 13, 2023, 04:02:47 AM
 The leaks are to prepare for withdrawal of US support to Ukraine and focus on China. I sense the Biden admin is realizing that the war has gone badly for the US (its a proxy war), their calculations went awry. They had expected that after arming and prepping Ukr from 2014 onwards, kicking Russia out of SWIFT, stealing their money, sanctions would collapse Russia.

- It is clear that Ukr will not win. Russia will drag out the war and win a war of attrition, or use heavier weapons and destroy Ukr. Trillion plus will be required to rebuild Ukr. Ukr cannot survive, its lost half its working population. The EU will pay the price. Russia might not stop until they get Odessa.

- Kicking Russia out of SWIFT and stealing their US$ deposits has not had the expected result. Russia survived that, but now the whole world is trying their best to move away from the dollar.

- US has lost influence in the Middle East. MBS (Mr Bone Saw) is mighty displeased with Biden, he is working with Xi to get rid of US influence. Note the recent amity between Saudis and Iran, as well as Yemen (Houthis) and Saudis under Chinese leadership.

- Overall, there is a feeling in the Global South, particularly in Africa that the west (EU) only exploits them. There are several videos where Macron was insulted by host Africans, same for the German ambassador (got kicked out with 48 hr notice).

- Biden is realizing that this is the beginning of the end of US dominance, France is pushing back on the USA with respect to supplying more weapons to Ukr. They know, Russian sanctions will deindustrialize Europe. Cheap gas and energy is needed for their continued success, while the EU can buy gas/oil from the middle east, they are paying a more expensive price, which ultimately is passed on to consumers leading to inflation.

Looks like Mission Accomplished is coming soon.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Ftkvt6_WcAE93BK?format=jpg&name=medium)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on April 13, 2023, 04:42:02 AM
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/12/discord-leaked-documents/ (https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/12/discord-leaked-documents/)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 13, 2023, 05:49:45 AM
YA:  Paywall blocked for me on the WaPo article.

Your analysis seems astute to me, but I don't fully follow this:

"They had expected that after arming and prepping Ukr from 2014 onwards, kicking Russia out of SWIFT, stealing their money, sanctions would collapse Russia."

Are you including Trump in this analysis?
Title: Belarus has nuke capable delivery?!?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 13, 2023, 06:31:48 AM
second

https://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/russia-ukraine-war-vladimir-putins-nuclear-move-breaks-pact-with-china/NVYFDNJ3TJAE3CM2ZVBCB4QYSQ/?fbclid=IwAR29WSj_vzKlAlTMnz63ltPz65f5NmY2x3us9Og-LqzL7Hl8PWI-9-C5pbg
Title: Re: Seymor Hersh: Corruption Quagmire
Post by: G M on April 13, 2023, 07:02:58 AM
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/seymour-hersh-breaks-my-lai-story

For the record, people whom I respect regard SH as a highly unreliable source:



https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2023/04/hersh-on-bidens-ukraine-corruption-quagmire-this-is-not-just-bad-leadership-there-is-none/
Title: Re: Ukrainea
Post by: ccp on April 13, 2023, 07:22:03 AM
Seymour Hersh picked up My Lai?

I didn't know that
I remember that

the media went hog wild with that story

completely different from today
when media no longer does their real job - journalism
and instead operates as propaganda outlet for Democrats

it is almost as if the Dems and MSM are circulating their networks insync  :wink:
Title: There will be so much losing, you'll get tired of all the losing...
Post by: G M on April 13, 2023, 07:28:01 AM
https://asiatimes.com/2023/04/ukraines-spring-offensive-a-likely-death-trap-for-us-nato/
Title: Eric Bolling interview of John Bolton
Post by: ccp on April 13, 2023, 08:32:48 AM
worth a listen

even through Bolton has lost some credibility :

https://www.newsmax.com/newsmax-tv/john-bolton-china-russia/2023/04/12/id/1115979/
Title: FP: The West needs a new strategy in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 13, 2023, 08:54:28 AM
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-richard-haass-west-battlefield-negotiations?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=The%20West%20Needs%20a%20New%20Strategy%20in%20Ukraine&utm_content=20230413&utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017

The West Needs a New Strategy in Ukraine
A Plan for Getting From the Battlefield to the Negotiating Table
By Richard Haass and Charles Kupchan
April 13, 2023


https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-richard-haass-west-battlefield-negotiations

After just over a year, the war in Ukraine has turned out far better for Ukraine than most predicted. Russia’s effort to subjugate its neighbor has failed. Ukraine remains an independent, sovereign, functioning democracy, holding on to roughly 85 percent of the territory it controlled before Russia’s 2014 invasion. At the same time, it is difficult to feel sanguine about where the war is headed. The human and economic costs, already enormous, are poised to climb as both Moscow and Kyiv ready their next moves on the battlefield. The Russian military’s numerical superiority likely gives it the ability to counter Ukraine’s greater operational skill and morale, as well as its access to Western support. Accordingly, the most likely outcome of the conflict is not a complete Ukrainian victory but a bloody stalemate.

Against this backdrop, calls for a diplomatic end to the conflict are understandably growing. But with Moscow and Kyiv both vowing to keep up the fight, conditions are not yet ripe for a negotiated settlement. Russia seems determined to occupy a larger chunk of the Donbas. Ukraine appears to be preparing an assault to break the land bridge between the Donbas and Crimea, clearing the way, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky often asserts, for Ukraine to fully expel Russian forces and restore its territorial integrity.

The West needs an approach that recognizes these realities without sacrificing its principles. The best path forward is a sequenced two-pronged strategy aimed at first bolstering Ukraine’s military capability and then, when the fighting season winds down late this year, ushering Moscow and Kyiv from the battlefield to the negotiating table. The West should start by immediately expediting the flow of weapons to Ukraine and increasing their quantity and quality. The goal should be to bolster Ukraine’s defenses while making its coming offensive as successful as possible, imposing heavy losses on Russia, foreclosing Moscow’s military options, and increasing its willingness to contemplate a diplomatic settlement. By the time Ukraine’s anticipated offensive is over, Kyiv may also warm up to the idea of a negotiated settlement, having given its best shot on the battlefield and facing growing constraints on both its own manpower and help from abroad.

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The second prong of the West’s strategy should be to roll out later this year a plan for brokering a cease-fire and a follow-on peace process aimed at permanently ending the conflict. This diplomatic gambit may well fail. Even if Russia and Ukraine continue to take significant losses, one or both of them may prefer to keep fighting. But as the war’s costs mount and the prospect of a military stalemate looms, it is worth pressing for a durable truce, one that could prevent renewed conflict and, even better, set the stage for a lasting peace.   

THE WAR THAT WILL NOT END
For now, a diplomatic resolution to the conflict is out of reach. Russian President Vladimir Putin likely worries that if he stops fighting now, Russians will fault him for launching a costly, futile war. After all, Russian forces do not completely control any of the four oblasts that Moscow unilaterally annexed last September, NATO has grown bigger and stronger, and Ukraine is more alienated than ever from Russia. Putin seems to believe that time is on his side, calculating that he can ride out economic sanctions, which have failed to strangle the Russian economy, and maintain popular support for the war, an operation that, according to polls from the Levada Center, more than 70 percent of Russians still back. Putin doubts the staying power of Ukraine and its Western supporters, expecting that their resolve will wane. And he surely calculates that as his new conscripts enter the fight, Russia should be able to expand its territorial gains, allowing him to declare that he has substantially expanded Russia’s borders when the fighting stops.

Ukraine is also in no mood to settle. The country’s leadership and public alike understandably seek to regain control of all the territory Russia has occupied since 2014, including Crimea. Ukrainians also want to hold Moscow accountable for Russian forces’ war crimes and make it pay for the immense costs of reconstruction. Besides, Kyiv has good reason to doubt whether Putin can be trusted to abide by any peace deal. Rather than looking to the West for diplomatic intervention, then, Ukrainian leaders are asking for more military and economic help. The United States and Europe have provided considerable intelligence, training, and hardware, but they have held off providing military systems of even greater capability, such as long-range missiles and advanced aircraft, for fear that doing so would provoke Russia to escalate, whether by using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine or deliberately attacking the troops or territory of a NATO member.

Although Washington is right to keep a watchful eye on the risk of escalation, its concerns are overblown. Western policy is caught between the goals of preventing catastrophic failure (in which an under-armed Ukraine is swallowed by Russia) and catastrophic success (in which an over-armed Ukraine leads a cornered Putin to escalate). But it is difficult to see what Russia would gain from escalation. Expanding the war by attacking a NATO member would not be in Russia’s interests, since the country is having a hard enough time fighting Ukraine alone, and its forces are severely depleted after a year of war. Nor would using nuclear weapons serve it well. A nuclear attack would likely prompt NATO to enter the war directly and decimate Russian positions throughout Ukraine. It could also alienate China and India, both of which have warned Russia against the use of nuclear weapons.

But the implausibility of nuclear use isn’t the only reason the West should discount Russia’s posturing; giving in to nuclear blackmail would also signal to other countries that such threats work, setting back the nonproliferation agenda and weakening deterrence. China, for instance, might conclude that nuclear threats can deter the United States from coming to Taiwan’s defense in the event of a Chinese attack.


A destroyed vehicle in Chasiv Yar, Ukraine, April 2023
A destroyed vehicle in Chasiv Yar, Ukraine, April 2023
Kai Pfaffenbach / Reuters
It is thus time for the West to stop deterring itself and start giving Ukraine the tanks, long-range missiles, and other weapons it needs to wrest back control of more of its territory in the coming months. European countries have begun to deliver Leopard tanks, and the United States has pledged 31 Abrams tanks, which are scheduled to arrive in the fall. But both sides of the Atlantic should increase the size and the tempo of deliveries. More tanks would enhance Ukrainian forces’ ability to punch through Russia’s defensive lines in Ukraine’s south. Long-range missiles—namely, the Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, which the United States has so far refused to provide—would allow Ukraine to hit Russian positions, command posts, and ammunition depots deep in Russian-held territory, preparing the way for a more successful Ukrainian offensive. The U.S. military should also begin training Ukrainian pilots to fly F-16s. Training would take time, but starting it now would allow the United States to deliver advanced aircraft when the pilots are ready, sending a signal to Russia that Ukraine’s ability to wage war is on an upward trajectory.

Yet for all the good that greater Western military help would do, it is unlikely to change the fundamental reality that this war is headed for stalemate. It is of course possible that Ukraine’s coming offensive proves stunningly successful and allows the country to reclaim all occupied territory, including Crimea, resulting in a complete Russian defeat. But such an outcome is improbable. Even if the West steps up its military assistance, Ukraine is poised to fall well short of vanquishing Russian forces. It is running out of soldiers and ammunition, and its economy continues to deteriorate. Russian troops are dug in, and fresh recruits are heading to the front.

Moreover, if Moscow’s military position were to become precarious, it is quite possible that China would provide arms to Russia, whether directly or through third countries. Chinese President Xi Jinping has made a big, long-term wager on Putin and will not stand idly by as Russia suffers a decisive loss. Xi’s visit to Moscow in March strongly suggests that he is doubling down on his partnership with Putin, not backing away from it. Xi might also calculate that the risks of providing military assistance to Russia are modest. After all, his country is already decoupling from the West, and U.S. policy toward China seems destined to get tougher regardless of how much Beijing supports Moscow.

Ramping up the provision of military assistance to Ukraine, while it will help Ukrainian forces make progress on the battlefield, thus holds little promise of enabling Kyiv to restore full territorial integrity. Later this year, a stalemate is likely to emerge along a new line of contact. When that happens, an obvious question will arise: What next?

AFTER STALEMATE
More of the same makes little sense. Even from Ukraine’s perspective, it would be unwise to keep doggedly pursuing a full military victory that could prove Pyrrhic. Ukrainian forces have already suffered over 100,000 casualties and lost many of their best troops. The Ukrainian economy has shrunk by some 30 percent, the poverty rate is spiking, and Russia continues to bombard the country’s critical infrastructure. Around eight million Ukrainians have fled the country, with millions more internally displaced. Ukraine should not risk destroying itself in pursuit of goals that are likely out of reach.

Come the end of this fighting season, the United States and Europe will also have good reason to abandon their stated policy of supporting Ukraine for “as long as it takes,” as U.S. President Joe Biden has put it. Maintaining Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign and secure democracy is a priority, but achieving that goal does not require the country to recover full control of Crimea and the Donbas in the near term. Nor should the West worry that pushing for a cease-fire before Kyiv reclaims all its territory will cause the rules-based international order to crumble. Ukrainian fortitude and Western resolve have already rebuffed Russia’s effort to subjugate Ukraine, dealt Moscow a decisive strategic defeat, and demonstrated to other would-be revisionists that pursuing territorial conquest can be a costly and vexing enterprise. Yes, it is critical to minimize Russian gains and demonstrate that aggression doesn’t pay, but this goal must be weighed against other priorities.

The reality is that continued large-scale support of Kyiv carries broader strategic risks. The war is eroding the West’s military readiness and depleting its weapons stockpiles; the defense industrial base cannot keep up with Ukraine’s expenditure of equipment and ammunition. NATO countries cannot discount the possibility of direct hostilities with Russia, and the United States must prepare for potential military action in Asia (to deter or respond to any Chinese move against Taiwan) and in the Middle East (against Iran or terrorist networks).

The war is imposing high costs on the global economy, as well. It has disrupted supply chains, contributing to high inflation and energy and food shortages. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimates that the war will reduce global economic output by $2.8 trillion in 2023. From France to Egypt to Peru, economic duress is triggering political unrest. The war is also polarizing the international system. As geopolitical rivalry between the Western democracies and a Chinese-Russian coalition augurs the return of a two-bloc world, most of the rest of the globe is sitting on the sidelines, preferring nonalignment to ensnarement in a new era of East-West rivalry. Disorder is radiating outward from the war in Ukraine.

Against this backdrop, neither Ukraine nor its NATO supporters can take Western unity for granted. American resolve is crucial for European staying power, but Washington faces mounting political pressure to reduce spending, rebuild U.S. readiness, and bulk up its capabilities in Asia. Now that Republicans control the House of Representatives, it will be harder for the Biden administration to secure sizable aid packages for Ukraine. And policy toward Ukraine could change significantly should Republicans win the White House in the 2024 election. It is time to ready a Plan B.

GETTING TO YES
Given the likely trajectory of the war, the United States and its partners need to begin formulating a diplomatic endgame now. Even as NATO members ramp up military assistance in support of Ukraine’s coming offensive, Washington should start consultations with its European allies and with Kyiv on a diplomatic initiative to be launched later in the year.

Under this approach, Ukraine’s Western supporters would propose a cease-fire as Ukraine’s coming offensive reaches its limits. Ideally, both Ukraine and Russia would pull back their troops and heavy weapons from the new line of contact, effectively creating a demilitarized zone. A neutral organization—either the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—would send in observers to monitor and enforce the cease-fire and pullback. The West should approach other influential countries, including China and India, to support the cease-fire proposal. Doing so would complicate diplomacy, but getting buy-in from Beijing and New Delhi would increase the pressure on the Kremlin. In the event that China refused to support the cease-fire, Xi’s ongoing calls for a diplomatic offensive would be exposed as an empty gesture.

Assuming a cease-fire holds, peace talks should follow. Such talks should occur along two parallel tracks. On one track would be direct talks between Ukraine and Russia, facilitated by international mediators, on the terms of peace. On the second track, NATO allies would start a strategic dialogue with Russia on arms control and the broader European security architecture. Putin’s effort to undo the post–Cold War security order has backfired and ended up strengthening NATO. But that reality only increases the need for NATO and Russia to begin a constructive dialogue to prevent a new arms race, rebuild military-to-military contacts, and address other issues of common concern, including nuclear proliferation. The “2 plus 4” talks that helped end the Cold War provide a good precedent for this approach. East and West Germany negotiated their unification directly, while the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union negotiated the broader post–Cold War security architecture.

Provided that Ukraine makes battlefield gains this summer, it is at least plausible that Putin would view a cease-fire and peace plan as a face-saving off-ramp. To make this approach even more enticing, the West could also offer some limited relief from sanctions in return for Russia’s willingness to abide by a cease-fire, agree to a demilitarized zone, and participate meaningfully in peace talks. It is of course conceivable that Putin would reject a cease-fire—or accept it only for the purpose of rebuilding his military and making a later run at conquering Ukraine. But little would be lost by testing Moscow’s readiness for compromise. Regardless of Russia’s response, the West would continue to provide the arms Ukraine needs to defend itself over the long term and make sure that any pause in the fighting did not work to Russia’s advantage. And if Russia rejected a cease-fire (or accepted one and then violated it), its intransigence would deepen its diplomatic isolation, shore up the sanctions regime, and strengthen support for Ukraine in the United States and Europe.

Another plausible outcome is that Russia would agree to a cease-fire in order to pocket its remaining territorial gains but in fact has no intention of negotiating in good faith to secure a lasting peace settlement. Presumably, Ukraine would enter such negotiations by demanding its top priorities: the restoration of its 1991 borders, substantial reparations, and accountability for war crimes. But because Putin would surely reject these demands out of hand, a prolonged diplomatic stalemate would then emerge, effectively producing a new frozen conflict. Ideally, the cease-fire would hold, leading to a status quo like the one that prevails on the Korean Peninsula, which has remained largely stable without a formal peace pact for 70 years. Cyprus has similarly been divided but stable for decades. This is not an ideal outcome, but it is preferable to a high-intensity war that continues for years.

CONVINCING KYIV
Persuading Kyiv to go along with a cease-fire and uncertain diplomatic effort could be no less challenging than getting Moscow to do so. Many Ukrainians would see this proposal as a sellout and fear that the cease-fire lines would merely become new de facto borders. Zelensky would need to dramatically scale back his war aims after having promised victory since the early months of the war—no easy task for even the most talented of politicians.

But Kyiv may ultimately find much to like in the plan. Even though the end of fighting would freeze in place a new line of contact between Russia and Ukraine, Kyiv would not be asked or pressured to give up the goal of taking back all of its land, including Crimea and the Donbas. Rather, the plan would be to defer settling the status of the land and people still under Russian occupation. Kyiv would forgo an attempt to retake these territories by force now, a gambit that would surely be costly but is likely to fail, instead accepting that the recovery of territorial integrity must await a diplomatic breakthrough. A breakthrough, in turn, may be possible only after Putin is no longer in power. In the meantime, Western governments could promise to fully lift sanctions against Russia and normalize relations with it only if Moscow signed a peace agreement that was acceptable to Kyiv.

This formula thus blends strategic pragmatism with political principle. Peace in Ukraine cannot be held hostage to war aims that, however morally justified, are likely unattainable. At the same time, the West should not reward Russian aggression by compelling Ukraine to permanently accept the loss of territory by force. Ending the war while deferring the ultimate disposition of land still under Russian occupation is the solution.


Under the best of circumstances, Ukrainians have tough days ahead of them.
Even if a cease-fire held and a diplomatic process got underway, NATO countries should continue to arm Ukraine, removing any doubts in Kyiv that its compliance with a diplomatic roadmap would mean the end of military support. Moreover, the United States could make clear to Kyiv that if Putin violated the cease-fire while Ukraine honored it, Washington would further step up the flow of arms and waive restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to target military positions inside Russia from which attacks are being launched. Should Putin spurn a clear opportunity to end the war, Western governments would win renewed public favor for providing such additional support to Ukraine.

As another incentive to Ukraine, the West should offer it a formalized security pact. Although NATO is unlikely to offer membership to Ukraine—a consensus within the alliance appears out of reach for now—a subset of NATO members, including the United States, could conclude a security agreement with Ukraine that pledges it adequate means of self-defense. This security pact, although it would fall short of an ironclad security guarantee, might resemble Israel’s defense relationship with the United States or the relationship that Finland and Sweden enjoyed with NATO before they decided to join the alliance. The pact might also include a provision similar to Article 4 of the NATO treaty, which calls for consultations when any party judges its territorial integrity, political independence, or security to be threatened.

Alongside this security pact, the EU should craft a long-term economic support pact and propose a timetable for admission to the EU, guaranteeing Ukraine that it is on the path toward full integration into the union. Under the best of circumstances, Ukrainians have tough days ahead of them; EU membership would offer them the light at the end of the tunnel that they so deserve to see.

Even with these inducements, Ukraine might still refuse the call for a cease-fire. If so, it would hardly be the first time in history that a partner dependent on U.S. support balked at being pressured to scale back its objectives. But if Kyiv did balk, the political reality is that support for Ukraine could not be sustained in the United States and Europe, especially if Russia were to accept the cease-fire. Ukraine would have little choice but to accede to a policy that gave it the economic and military support needed to secure the territory under its control—the vast majority of the country—while taking off the table the liberation by force of those territories still under Russian occupation. Moreover, the West would continue to use sanctions and diplomatic leverage to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity—but at the negotiating table, not on the battlefield.

A WAY OUT
For over a year, the West has allowed Ukraine to define success and set the war aims of the West. This policy, regardless of whether it made sense at the outset of the war, has now run its course. It is unwise, because Ukraine’s goals are coming into conflict with other Western interests. And it is unsustainable, because the war’s costs are mounting, and Western publics and their governments are growing weary of providing ongoing support. As a global power, the United States must acknowledge that a maximal definition of the interests at stake in the war has produced a policy that increasingly conflicts with other U.S. priorities.

The good news is that there is a feasible path out of this impasse. The West should do more now to help Ukraine defend itself and advance on the battlefield, putting it in the best position possible at the negotiating table later this year. In the meantime, Washington should set a diplomatic course that ensures the security and viability of Ukraine within its de facto borders—while working to restore the country’s territorial integrity over the long term. This approach may be too much for some and not enough for others. But unlike the alternatives, it has the advantage of blending what is desirable with what is doable
Title: Re: FP: The West needs a new strategy in Ukraine
Post by: G M on April 13, 2023, 09:18:15 AM
This article was a steaming pile of stupid.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-richard-haass-west-battlefield-negotiations?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=The%20West%20Needs%20a%20New%20Strategy%20in%20Ukraine&utm_content=20230413&utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017

The West Needs a New Strategy in Ukraine
A Plan for Getting From the Battlefield to the Negotiating Table
By Richard Haass and Charles Kupchan
April 13, 2023


https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-richard-haass-west-battlefield-negotiations

After just over a year, the war in Ukraine has turned out far better for Ukraine than most predicted. Russia’s effort to subjugate its neighbor has failed. Ukraine remains an independent, sovereign, functioning democracy, holding on to roughly 85 percent of the territory it controlled before Russia’s 2014 invasion. At the same time, it is difficult to feel sanguine about where the war is headed. The human and economic costs, already enormous, are poised to climb as both Moscow and Kyiv ready their next moves on the battlefield. The Russian military’s numerical superiority likely gives it the ability to counter Ukraine’s greater operational skill and morale, as well as its access to Western support. Accordingly, the most likely outcome of the conflict is not a complete Ukrainian victory but a bloody stalemate.

Against this backdrop, calls for a diplomatic end to the conflict are understandably growing. But with Moscow and Kyiv both vowing to keep up the fight, conditions are not yet ripe for a negotiated settlement. Russia seems determined to occupy a larger chunk of the Donbas. Ukraine appears to be preparing an assault to break the land bridge between the Donbas and Crimea, clearing the way, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky often asserts, for Ukraine to fully expel Russian forces and restore its territorial integrity.

The West needs an approach that recognizes these realities without sacrificing its principles. The best path forward is a sequenced two-pronged strategy aimed at first bolstering Ukraine’s military capability and then, when the fighting season winds down late this year, ushering Moscow and Kyiv from the battlefield to the negotiating table. The West should start by immediately expediting the flow of weapons to Ukraine and increasing their quantity and quality. The goal should be to bolster Ukraine’s defenses while making its coming offensive as successful as possible, imposing heavy losses on Russia, foreclosing Moscow’s military options, and increasing its willingness to contemplate a diplomatic settlement. By the time Ukraine’s anticipated offensive is over, Kyiv may also warm up to the idea of a negotiated settlement, having given its best shot on the battlefield and facing growing constraints on both its own manpower and help from abroad.

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The second prong of the West’s strategy should be to roll out later this year a plan for brokering a cease-fire and a follow-on peace process aimed at permanently ending the conflict. This diplomatic gambit may well fail. Even if Russia and Ukraine continue to take significant losses, one or both of them may prefer to keep fighting. But as the war’s costs mount and the prospect of a military stalemate looms, it is worth pressing for a durable truce, one that could prevent renewed conflict and, even better, set the stage for a lasting peace.   

THE WAR THAT WILL NOT END
For now, a diplomatic resolution to the conflict is out of reach. Russian President Vladimir Putin likely worries that if he stops fighting now, Russians will fault him for launching a costly, futile war. After all, Russian forces do not completely control any of the four oblasts that Moscow unilaterally annexed last September, NATO has grown bigger and stronger, and Ukraine is more alienated than ever from Russia. Putin seems to believe that time is on his side, calculating that he can ride out economic sanctions, which have failed to strangle the Russian economy, and maintain popular support for the war, an operation that, according to polls from the Levada Center, more than 70 percent of Russians still back. Putin doubts the staying power of Ukraine and its Western supporters, expecting that their resolve will wane. And he surely calculates that as his new conscripts enter the fight, Russia should be able to expand its territorial gains, allowing him to declare that he has substantially expanded Russia’s borders when the fighting stops.

Ukraine is also in no mood to settle. The country’s leadership and public alike understandably seek to regain control of all the territory Russia has occupied since 2014, including Crimea. Ukrainians also want to hold Moscow accountable for Russian forces’ war crimes and make it pay for the immense costs of reconstruction. Besides, Kyiv has good reason to doubt whether Putin can be trusted to abide by any peace deal. Rather than looking to the West for diplomatic intervention, then, Ukrainian leaders are asking for more military and economic help. The United States and Europe have provided considerable intelligence, training, and hardware, but they have held off providing military systems of even greater capability, such as long-range missiles and advanced aircraft, for fear that doing so would provoke Russia to escalate, whether by using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine or deliberately attacking the troops or territory of a NATO member.

Although Washington is right to keep a watchful eye on the risk of escalation, its concerns are overblown. Western policy is caught between the goals of preventing catastrophic failure (in which an under-armed Ukraine is swallowed by Russia) and catastrophic success (in which an over-armed Ukraine leads a cornered Putin to escalate). But it is difficult to see what Russia would gain from escalation. Expanding the war by attacking a NATO member would not be in Russia’s interests, since the country is having a hard enough time fighting Ukraine alone, and its forces are severely depleted after a year of war. Nor would using nuclear weapons serve it well. A nuclear attack would likely prompt NATO to enter the war directly and decimate Russian positions throughout Ukraine. It could also alienate China and India, both of which have warned Russia against the use of nuclear weapons.

But the implausibility of nuclear use isn’t the only reason the West should discount Russia’s posturing; giving in to nuclear blackmail would also signal to other countries that such threats work, setting back the nonproliferation agenda and weakening deterrence. China, for instance, might conclude that nuclear threats can deter the United States from coming to Taiwan’s defense in the event of a Chinese attack.


A destroyed vehicle in Chasiv Yar, Ukraine, April 2023
A destroyed vehicle in Chasiv Yar, Ukraine, April 2023
Kai Pfaffenbach / Reuters
It is thus time for the West to stop deterring itself and start giving Ukraine the tanks, long-range missiles, and other weapons it needs to wrest back control of more of its territory in the coming months. European countries have begun to deliver Leopard tanks, and the United States has pledged 31 Abrams tanks, which are scheduled to arrive in the fall. But both sides of the Atlantic should increase the size and the tempo of deliveries. More tanks would enhance Ukrainian forces’ ability to punch through Russia’s defensive lines in Ukraine’s south. Long-range missiles—namely, the Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, which the United States has so far refused to provide—would allow Ukraine to hit Russian positions, command posts, and ammunition depots deep in Russian-held territory, preparing the way for a more successful Ukrainian offensive. The U.S. military should also begin training Ukrainian pilots to fly F-16s. Training would take time, but starting it now would allow the United States to deliver advanced aircraft when the pilots are ready, sending a signal to Russia that Ukraine’s ability to wage war is on an upward trajectory.

Yet for all the good that greater Western military help would do, it is unlikely to change the fundamental reality that this war is headed for stalemate. It is of course possible that Ukraine’s coming offensive proves stunningly successful and allows the country to reclaim all occupied territory, including Crimea, resulting in a complete Russian defeat. But such an outcome is improbable. Even if the West steps up its military assistance, Ukraine is poised to fall well short of vanquishing Russian forces. It is running out of soldiers and ammunition, and its economy continues to deteriorate. Russian troops are dug in, and fresh recruits are heading to the front.

Moreover, if Moscow’s military position were to become precarious, it is quite possible that China would provide arms to Russia, whether directly or through third countries. Chinese President Xi Jinping has made a big, long-term wager on Putin and will not stand idly by as Russia suffers a decisive loss. Xi’s visit to Moscow in March strongly suggests that he is doubling down on his partnership with Putin, not backing away from it. Xi might also calculate that the risks of providing military assistance to Russia are modest. After all, his country is already decoupling from the West, and U.S. policy toward China seems destined to get tougher regardless of how much Beijing supports Moscow.

Ramping up the provision of military assistance to Ukraine, while it will help Ukrainian forces make progress on the battlefield, thus holds little promise of enabling Kyiv to restore full territorial integrity. Later this year, a stalemate is likely to emerge along a new line of contact. When that happens, an obvious question will arise: What next?

AFTER STALEMATE
More of the same makes little sense. Even from Ukraine’s perspective, it would be unwise to keep doggedly pursuing a full military victory that could prove Pyrrhic. Ukrainian forces have already suffered over 100,000 casualties and lost many of their best troops. The Ukrainian economy has shrunk by some 30 percent, the poverty rate is spiking, and Russia continues to bombard the country’s critical infrastructure. Around eight million Ukrainians have fled the country, with millions more internally displaced. Ukraine should not risk destroying itself in pursuit of goals that are likely out of reach.

Come the end of this fighting season, the United States and Europe will also have good reason to abandon their stated policy of supporting Ukraine for “as long as it takes,” as U.S. President Joe Biden has put it. Maintaining Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign and secure democracy is a priority, but achieving that goal does not require the country to recover full control of Crimea and the Donbas in the near term. Nor should the West worry that pushing for a cease-fire before Kyiv reclaims all its territory will cause the rules-based international order to crumble. Ukrainian fortitude and Western resolve have already rebuffed Russia’s effort to subjugate Ukraine, dealt Moscow a decisive strategic defeat, and demonstrated to other would-be revisionists that pursuing territorial conquest can be a costly and vexing enterprise. Yes, it is critical to minimize Russian gains and demonstrate that aggression doesn’t pay, but this goal must be weighed against other priorities.

The reality is that continued large-scale support of Kyiv carries broader strategic risks. The war is eroding the West’s military readiness and depleting its weapons stockpiles; the defense industrial base cannot keep up with Ukraine’s expenditure of equipment and ammunition. NATO countries cannot discount the possibility of direct hostilities with Russia, and the United States must prepare for potential military action in Asia (to deter or respond to any Chinese move against Taiwan) and in the Middle East (against Iran or terrorist networks).

The war is imposing high costs on the global economy, as well. It has disrupted supply chains, contributing to high inflation and energy and food shortages. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimates that the war will reduce global economic output by $2.8 trillion in 2023. From France to Egypt to Peru, economic duress is triggering political unrest. The war is also polarizing the international system. As geopolitical rivalry between the Western democracies and a Chinese-Russian coalition augurs the return of a two-bloc world, most of the rest of the globe is sitting on the sidelines, preferring nonalignment to ensnarement in a new era of East-West rivalry. Disorder is radiating outward from the war in Ukraine.

Against this backdrop, neither Ukraine nor its NATO supporters can take Western unity for granted. American resolve is crucial for European staying power, but Washington faces mounting political pressure to reduce spending, rebuild U.S. readiness, and bulk up its capabilities in Asia. Now that Republicans control the House of Representatives, it will be harder for the Biden administration to secure sizable aid packages for Ukraine. And policy toward Ukraine could change significantly should Republicans win the White House in the 2024 election. It is time to ready a Plan B.

GETTING TO YES
Given the likely trajectory of the war, the United States and its partners need to begin formulating a diplomatic endgame now. Even as NATO members ramp up military assistance in support of Ukraine’s coming offensive, Washington should start consultations with its European allies and with Kyiv on a diplomatic initiative to be launched later in the year.

Under this approach, Ukraine’s Western supporters would propose a cease-fire as Ukraine’s coming offensive reaches its limits. Ideally, both Ukraine and Russia would pull back their troops and heavy weapons from the new line of contact, effectively creating a demilitarized zone. A neutral organization—either the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—would send in observers to monitor and enforce the cease-fire and pullback. The West should approach other influential countries, including China and India, to support the cease-fire proposal. Doing so would complicate diplomacy, but getting buy-in from Beijing and New Delhi would increase the pressure on the Kremlin. In the event that China refused to support the cease-fire, Xi’s ongoing calls for a diplomatic offensive would be exposed as an empty gesture.

Assuming a cease-fire holds, peace talks should follow. Such talks should occur along two parallel tracks. On one track would be direct talks between Ukraine and Russia, facilitated by international mediators, on the terms of peace. On the second track, NATO allies would start a strategic dialogue with Russia on arms control and the broader European security architecture. Putin’s effort to undo the post–Cold War security order has backfired and ended up strengthening NATO. But that reality only increases the need for NATO and Russia to begin a constructive dialogue to prevent a new arms race, rebuild military-to-military contacts, and address other issues of common concern, including nuclear proliferation. The “2 plus 4” talks that helped end the Cold War provide a good precedent for this approach. East and West Germany negotiated their unification directly, while the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union negotiated the broader post–Cold War security architecture.

Provided that Ukraine makes battlefield gains this summer, it is at least plausible that Putin would view a cease-fire and peace plan as a face-saving off-ramp. To make this approach even more enticing, the West could also offer some limited relief from sanctions in return for Russia’s willingness to abide by a cease-fire, agree to a demilitarized zone, and participate meaningfully in peace talks. It is of course conceivable that Putin would reject a cease-fire—or accept it only for the purpose of rebuilding his military and making a later run at conquering Ukraine. But little would be lost by testing Moscow’s readiness for compromise. Regardless of Russia’s response, the West would continue to provide the arms Ukraine needs to defend itself over the long term and make sure that any pause in the fighting did not work to Russia’s advantage. And if Russia rejected a cease-fire (or accepted one and then violated it), its intransigence would deepen its diplomatic isolation, shore up the sanctions regime, and strengthen support for Ukraine in the United States and Europe.

Another plausible outcome is that Russia would agree to a cease-fire in order to pocket its remaining territorial gains but in fact has no intention of negotiating in good faith to secure a lasting peace settlement. Presumably, Ukraine would enter such negotiations by demanding its top priorities: the restoration of its 1991 borders, substantial reparations, and accountability for war crimes. But because Putin would surely reject these demands out of hand, a prolonged diplomatic stalemate would then emerge, effectively producing a new frozen conflict. Ideally, the cease-fire would hold, leading to a status quo like the one that prevails on the Korean Peninsula, which has remained largely stable without a formal peace pact for 70 years. Cyprus has similarly been divided but stable for decades. This is not an ideal outcome, but it is preferable to a high-intensity war that continues for years.

CONVINCING KYIV
Persuading Kyiv to go along with a cease-fire and uncertain diplomatic effort could be no less challenging than getting Moscow to do so. Many Ukrainians would see this proposal as a sellout and fear that the cease-fire lines would merely become new de facto borders. Zelensky would need to dramatically scale back his war aims after having promised victory since the early months of the war—no easy task for even the most talented of politicians.

But Kyiv may ultimately find much to like in the plan. Even though the end of fighting would freeze in place a new line of contact between Russia and Ukraine, Kyiv would not be asked or pressured to give up the goal of taking back all of its land, including Crimea and the Donbas. Rather, the plan would be to defer settling the status of the land and people still under Russian occupation. Kyiv would forgo an attempt to retake these territories by force now, a gambit that would surely be costly but is likely to fail, instead accepting that the recovery of territorial integrity must await a diplomatic breakthrough. A breakthrough, in turn, may be possible only after Putin is no longer in power. In the meantime, Western governments could promise to fully lift sanctions against Russia and normalize relations with it only if Moscow signed a peace agreement that was acceptable to Kyiv.

This formula thus blends strategic pragmatism with political principle. Peace in Ukraine cannot be held hostage to war aims that, however morally justified, are likely unattainable. At the same time, the West should not reward Russian aggression by compelling Ukraine to permanently accept the loss of territory by force. Ending the war while deferring the ultimate disposition of land still under Russian occupation is the solution.


Under the best of circumstances, Ukrainians have tough days ahead of them.
Even if a cease-fire held and a diplomatic process got underway, NATO countries should continue to arm Ukraine, removing any doubts in Kyiv that its compliance with a diplomatic roadmap would mean the end of military support. Moreover, the United States could make clear to Kyiv that if Putin violated the cease-fire while Ukraine honored it, Washington would further step up the flow of arms and waive restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to target military positions inside Russia from which attacks are being launched. Should Putin spurn a clear opportunity to end the war, Western governments would win renewed public favor for providing such additional support to Ukraine.

As another incentive to Ukraine, the West should offer it a formalized security pact. Although NATO is unlikely to offer membership to Ukraine—a consensus within the alliance appears out of reach for now—a subset of NATO members, including the United States, could conclude a security agreement with Ukraine that pledges it adequate means of self-defense. This security pact, although it would fall short of an ironclad security guarantee, might resemble Israel’s defense relationship with the United States or the relationship that Finland and Sweden enjoyed with NATO before they decided to join the alliance. The pact might also include a provision similar to Article 4 of the NATO treaty, which calls for consultations when any party judges its territorial integrity, political independence, or security to be threatened.

Alongside this security pact, the EU should craft a long-term economic support pact and propose a timetable for admission to the EU, guaranteeing Ukraine that it is on the path toward full integration into the union. Under the best of circumstances, Ukrainians have tough days ahead of them; EU membership would offer them the light at the end of the tunnel that they so deserve to see.

Even with these inducements, Ukraine might still refuse the call for a cease-fire. If so, it would hardly be the first time in history that a partner dependent on U.S. support balked at being pressured to scale back its objectives. But if Kyiv did balk, the political reality is that support for Ukraine could not be sustained in the United States and Europe, especially if Russia were to accept the cease-fire. Ukraine would have little choice but to accede to a policy that gave it the economic and military support needed to secure the territory under its control—the vast majority of the country—while taking off the table the liberation by force of those territories still under Russian occupation. Moreover, the West would continue to use sanctions and diplomatic leverage to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity—but at the negotiating table, not on the battlefield.

A WAY OUT
For over a year, the West has allowed Ukraine to define success and set the war aims of the West. This policy, regardless of whether it made sense at the outset of the war, has now run its course. It is unwise, because Ukraine’s goals are coming into conflict with other Western interests. And it is unsustainable, because the war’s costs are mounting, and Western publics and their governments are growing weary of providing ongoing support. As a global power, the United States must acknowledge that a maximal definition of the interests at stake in the war has produced a policy that increasingly conflicts with other U.S. priorities.

The good news is that there is a feasible path out of this impasse. The West should do more now to help Ukraine defend itself and advance on the battlefield, putting it in the best position possible at the negotiating table later this year. In the meantime, Washington should set a diplomatic course that ensures the security and viability of Ukraine within its de facto borders—while working to restore the country’s territorial integrity over the long term. This approach may be too much for some and not enough for others. But unlike the alternatives, it has the advantage of blending what is desirable with what is doable
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 13, 2023, 10:14:10 AM
I don't disagree haha.

FP is a flunky for the State Dept, globalism etc.

A leading indicator of what the next spiel will be.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on April 14, 2023, 04:48:32 AM
There is a God somewhere, look at Germany and UK.

(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FtmoC44aEAIzEga?format=jpg&name=small)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 14, 2023, 08:24:35 AM
https://apnews.com/article/china-taiwan-weapons-germany-ukraine-2a51d2c64c12fca75683d20fbafba475
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on April 14, 2023, 08:26:26 AM
"China ***vows*** not to sell arms to any party in Ukraine war"

 :wink:
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on April 14, 2023, 09:08:22 AM
"China ***vows*** not to sell arms to any party in Ukraine war"

 :wink:

We know they are. It’s not even up for debate.
Title: ET: Given that they have been our cannon fodder, there is a certain logic here
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 14, 2023, 09:16:23 AM
Of course, there will be vast amounts of corruption, globalism, etc guiding this should it ever come to pass:

===================================

US to Help Fund Ukraine Reconstruction With Russian Assets: State Department Official
Andrew Thornebrooke
April 13, 2023Updated: April 13, 2023
ET

 

The Biden administration is planning to help fund the $400 billion reconstruction of Ukraine after the Russian invasion ends and to turn the Eastern European nation into a new center for European energy production, according to a senior State Department official.

The United States will help to provide the massive sum by selling of assets seized from Russian oligarchs and providing the proceeds to Ukraine, said Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland during an April 13 speech at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

“We will help Ukrainian cities and towns and villages so displaced Ukrainians can return home without fear, reunite with their loved ones, and get back to their businesses, their farms, and to the work of building a peaceful democratic future,” Nuland said.

The World Bank estimates that the effort to rebuild Ukraine would cost at least $411 billion over the next decade, though Nuland said that was a “conservative figure,” suggesting the real cost could be far higher.

To that end, Nuland said that the United States was working with its international partners to help fund the massive sum by doing more than merely selling off confiscated Russian goods.

Indeed, she said, the United States is negotiating with the international community to consider using $300 billion in frozen assets from the Russian Central Bank to fund the reconstruction of Ukraine.

The effort will no doubt face hurdles, however, as U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen previously admitted there are “significant legal obstacles” to such seizures.

Currently, the $300 billion in Russian central bank foreign assets frozen by sanctions are held abroad, but remain under Russian ownership.

Nuland connected the effort to the United States’ wider support of Ukraine, saying that rebuilding Ukraine was necessary to ensure that authoritarianism did not spread through Europe.

“The American people have provided extraordinary levels of military, economic, and humanitarian support to Ukraine,” Nuland said.

“Why? Because the American people understand the stakes. That might cannot be allowed to make right.”

Ukraine: The Future of European Energy?
The United States and its allies will also work to leverage the reconstruction of Ukraine towards more strategic, and more profitable, ends.

By rebuilding the Ukrainian energy sector, Europe can effectively replace its dependency on Russia, said Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Laura Lochman.

“Energy is obviously a fundamental element of economic recovery and prosperity going forward anywhere,” Lochman said.

“[But in Ukraine,] the elements are there in terms of the nuclear, the natural gas, biomass. There’s renewables that are already being put in place and plans for much greater deployment of renewables.”

To that end, Lochman said that one goal of reconstruction was to transform Ukraine into “an energy powerhouse for the European region” in such a way as to “strengthen European energy security.”

By investing in Ukrainian energy development, she said, Ukraine could reap up to $70 million a month, all while moving Europe away from destabilizing authoritarian powers.

“That will happen with infrastructure investment in Ukraine,” Lochman said, “and [with] continued adoption of European norms and standards.”

Mark Loughran, Central and Eastern Europe president for the Honeywell Corporation, said that the move was a massive opportunity for both the public and private sectors, in and out of Ukraine.

“To start to make the decisions of what the future would look like, it is clearly imperative that Ukrainians are fully connected to the European grid and able to sell into the European grid,” Loughran said.

“There’s a massive opportunity there. The decisions have to be made about the construct to do that, and about the massive amount of materials that are going to be needed.”
Title: WSJ: Help Ukraine take Crimea
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 18, 2023, 06:05:58 AM
Ukraine Should Take Crimea From Russia
It would be a just outcome and serve America’s interests.
By Luke Coffey
April 17, 2023 6:38 pm ET

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A Russian service member walks at a mobile recruitment center in Crimea, April 15.
PHOTO: ALEXEY PAVLISHAK/REUTERS

As Russia’s war against Ukraine drags on, the risk that fatigued Western policy makers will become desperate to end the fighting at any cost will grow. There are already some suggesting that Kyiv should accept a special status for Crimea that leaves Russian troops there. Such an outcome would amount to geopolitical negligence. Any settlement that doesn’t return Crimea to Kyiv’s control signals to other belligerent powers that military land grabs will be tolerated—setting a dangerous precedent for the 21st century.

Some argue that it’s unclear if Crimea really belongs to Ukraine or Russia. Yet topographically, the peninsula is merely an extension of the Ukrainian steppes, with no natural land connection with the Russian Federation. Crimea’s history is likewise relatively clear. The peninsula has unique political, economic and cultural ties to southern Ukraine—something that various Russian leaders and other political figures have acknowledged for hundreds of years.

When the Soviet Union dissolved and Ukraine re-emerged as an independent state, the international community, including the Russian Federation, recognized Crimea as being part of Ukraine. In the 1991 referendum that led to that independence, every region—including Crimea—voted in favor. On the same day as the referendum, Ukraine also held presidential elections. Not only did a pro-independence candidate win, all six presidential candidates running also supported independence. The message to the world was clear: Every region of Ukraine, including Crimea, supported independence from the Soviet Union. To top it off, Russia was one of the first countries to recognize Ukraine’s independence, beating the U.S. by more than three weeks.

The political support in Crimea for independence sprang from a long history of tight political connection between the peninsula and the rest of southern Ukraine. For much of the period between 1443 and 1783, the Crimean Khanate, the local power, included not only the Crimean Peninsula but also much of the territory between the Dnieper and Donets rivers in Ukraine’s modern-day Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and western Donetsk oblasts. Even after Empress Catherine the Great first annexed Crimea in 1783, it was administratively part of the newly created Taurida Oblast, which included other land that had historically been part of the Khanate and today is part of southern Ukraine.

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The peninsula’s political closeness to southern Ukraine was built on economic and cultural ties of a sort that Crimea hasn’t had with Russia. The simple fact that land naturally connects the peninsula to southern Ukraine—and not to Russia—meant that it made no economic sense to break Crimea off from Ukraine. Moscow knows this. When Nikita Khrushchev reassigned Crimea from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954, he did so because of “the commonality of the economy, the territorial proximity, and the close economic and cultural ties between the Crimean Oblast and the Ukrainian SSR,” in the words of a contemporaneous Soviet statesman, Mikhail Tarsov. Leaving the peninsula outside Ukrainian control would be a break from history, not a continuation of it.

If Moscow keeps control of Crimea, Russia’s military bases there could launch attacks against the rest of Ukraine while also using the peninsula as a convenient place to refit and refurbish damaged military vehicles for future use. In this way, a continued Russian occupation of Crimea would deter international investors from taking part in Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts because there would always be the possibility of renewed fighting, which would particularly threaten the Ukrainian economy. From the peninsula Moscow can assault Ukraine’s otherwise lucrative global commercial shipping, including the export of grain to Africa and the Middle East.

Returning Crimea to Kyiv is also in America’s interests, whether or not U.S. policy makers care about Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Russian control of the peninsula allows Moscow to launch military action outside the region. Russia already has used its presence in occupied Crimea to launch and support naval operations backing up Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Russia has shipped hundreds of thousands of tons of grain and wheat from Crimea to Syria to help the Assad regime address food shortages. Russia has also conducted hundreds of trips between Crimea’s port city of Sevastopol and the Russian naval base in Tartus, Syria, to transport military hardware and resupplies.

Ukraine has the momentum and motivation to take this important strategic position out of Russian hands. While nobody outside President Volodymyr Zelensky’s inner circle knows for sure where Ukraine’s next counterattack will hit, one possible location will be in the south, from the Zaporizhzhia region in the direction of Melitopol. Kyiv’s goal would be to drive a wedge between the Russian-occupied city of Mariupol and Crimea’s Isthmus of Perekop. Such a move could be the fastest, most direct way to cut off the Kremlin’s only land bridge from Russia to Crimea. The most northern point of the Molochnyi estuary, which flows up from the Sea of Azov, is only 10 miles south of the center of Melitopol. Between the estuary and the city center run the main roads and rail networks used by Russia to reinforce its front lines in the south. If Ukraine takes the city, it would leave Russian forces without a land route from Russia for resupply or reinforcements.

If Ukrainians are successful at cutting the land bridge, the next step would likely be entering the peninsula itself. Russia knows this, and satellite imagery shows new antitank obstacles and fortified trenches being constructed across Crimea.

All Kyiv needs is Western weapons and munitions. For the sake of stability—within and outside the region—let’s give Ukraine the tools it needs to get the job done now.

Mr. Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.
Title: He is the new Churchill and above reproach!
Post by: G M on April 20, 2023, 09:45:27 AM
https://ace.mu.nu/archives/404085.php

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 20, 2023, 09:37:35 PM
Let me see if I have this right:

The hypothesis here is that the Russians are selling oil to Zelensky?!?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on April 20, 2023, 10:29:12 PM
Let me see if I have this right:

The hypothesis here is that the Russians are selling oil to Zelensky?!?

Diesel.

https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/investigation-ukraine-buys-huge-amounts-of-russian-fuels-from-bulgaria/

There are always workarounds and money to be made.


Title: Newsweek: After Bakhmut
Post by: ya on April 21, 2023, 04:44:08 AM
https://www.newsweek.com/after-bakhmut-draining-battle-leaves-ukraine-battered-russia-rising-opinion-1795453 (https://www.newsweek.com/after-bakhmut-draining-battle-leaves-ukraine-battered-russia-rising-opinion-1795453)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 22, 2023, 08:17:45 AM
Nice find.

The absence of arrogance in the tone of the expression is well received.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on April 22, 2023, 09:23:25 AM
Nice find.

The absence of arrogance in the tone of the expression is well received.

It's a very good article and is very much in line with what some here were saying since festivities kicked off over there.
Title: Anyone remember Ukraine?
Post by: G M on April 26, 2023, 07:36:28 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/biden-preparing-ukrainian-offensive-fail
Title: From a FB sidebar
Post by: Crafty_Dog on April 29, 2023, 06:02:12 AM
From a FB sidebar

No one ever said that sanctions would end the war, but when coupled with battlefield loses of men and equipment things don't look good. "The report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies gives stark numbers of Russian military losses – almost 10,000 units of key equipment such as tanks, trucks, artillery pieces and aerial drones, according to one estimate.

But it also says Russia can dip into Cold War-era and older stocks on the front lines to make up in numbers what it may have lost in technology.

“The quality of the Russian military in terms of advanced equipment will likely decline, at least over the near term,” the CSIS report says.

It notes how Russian losses of main battle tanks, especially modern ones, have been severe.

A captured Russian T-72B3 tank awaits repairs on February 13, 2023, at a warehouse in eastern Ukraine.
John Moore/Getty Images
“Moscow is estimated to have lost anywhere from 1,845 to 3,511 tanks one year into the war,” the CSIS report says, with losses of its newer, upgraded T-72B3 main battle tank, first delivered in 2013, noted as especially damaging.

The Netherlands-based open source intelligence website Oryx says it has visual evidence of more than 500 variants of T-72B3 destroyed, damaged, abandoned or captured as of this week.

Western officials, speaking during a briefing Tuesday, also noted the pressure on the Russian tank fleet.

“They’re going backwards in terms of equipment,” the officials said of Russian armor, noting that T-55 tanks, introduced in 1948, are now turning up on the battlefield." Fox news reported that over 230 US tanks and 1,500 other vehicles have reached the Ukraine. Along with the US trained Ukraine soldiers who now know how to use them. Sky News reported the other day that Russia can no longer build tanks because they lack engine parts, so they are trying to retrofit older museum aged tanks with newer optics, and send them off to war. And France 24 is reporting that Russia is short of the men needed to build tanks, plances, and other weapons. Along with the fact that they have had to choose to use the bearing they have to build tanks, or to keep their train rolling stock operational.

I could go on, but now that the war is over a year old, and they have lost almost 50% of their prewar equipment the qualitative edge it might have had is disappearing. Russia is back fighting it's traditional style of warfare. Take a hill with overwhelming man power, even if you loose 50% or more of your fighting men. But this too has a downside, the men now being sent to the field have next to no training, even the tank drivers only have a minimal amount of training. They are driving cold war era tanks, with 17 year old drivers. Who before the war didn't even have drivers licenses.

And this doesn't even include the Russia dead and or wounded. Or the draft age men who have fled the country. The one thing Putin counted on was that NATO and the US would toss in the towel. But, since no one in NATO is actually fighting the war that isn't likely to happen any time soon. The truth is according to US sec. of defense the US wants to see the Russian military, and economic sector destroyed. That is their policy, and they will keep supplying weapons and training to the Ukraine to make sure no matter who wins, Russia loses....I predict that the war will be over before the leaved in the Ukraine turn red and gold. Russia has lost, but everyone in Moscow is afraid to admit it....
Title: Re: From a FB sidebar
Post by: G M on April 29, 2023, 06:26:51 AM
Wishful thinking.

From a FB sidebar

No one ever said that sanctions would end the war, but when coupled with battlefield loses of men and equipment things don't look good. "The report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies gives stark numbers of Russian military losses – almost 10,000 units of key equipment such as tanks, trucks, artillery pieces and aerial drones, according to one estimate.

But it also says Russia can dip into Cold War-era and older stocks on the front lines to make up in numbers what it may have lost in technology.

“The quality of the Russian military in terms of advanced equipment will likely decline, at least over the near term,” the CSIS report says.

It notes how Russian losses of main battle tanks, especially modern ones, have been severe.

A captured Russian T-72B3 tank awaits repairs on February 13, 2023, at a warehouse in eastern Ukraine.
John Moore/Getty Images
“Moscow is estimated to have lost anywhere from 1,845 to 3,511 tanks one year into the war,” the CSIS report says, with losses of its newer, upgraded T-72B3 main battle tank, first delivered in 2013, noted as especially damaging.

The Netherlands-based open source intelligence website Oryx says it has visual evidence of more than 500 variants of T-72B3 destroyed, damaged, abandoned or captured as of this week.

Western officials, speaking during a briefing Tuesday, also noted the pressure on the Russian tank fleet.

“They’re going backwards in terms of equipment,” the officials said of Russian armor, noting that T-55 tanks, introduced in 1948, are now turning up on the battlefield." Fox news reported that over 230 US tanks and 1,500 other vehicles have reached the Ukraine. Along with the US trained Ukraine soldiers who now know how to use them. Sky News reported the other day that Russia can no longer build tanks because they lack engine parts, so they are trying to retrofit older museum aged tanks with newer optics, and send them off to war. And France 24 is reporting that Russia is short of the men needed to build tanks, plances, and other weapons. Along with the fact that they have had to choose to use the bearing they have to build tanks, or to keep their train rolling stock operational.

I could go on, but now that the war is over a year old, and they have lost almost 50% of their prewar equipment the qualitative edge it might have had is disappearing. Russia is back fighting it's traditional style of warfare. Take a hill with overwhelming man power, even if you loose 50% or more of your fighting men. But this too has a downside, the men now being sent to the field have next to no training, even the tank drivers only have a minimal amount of training. They are driving cold war era tanks, with 17 year old drivers. Who before the war didn't even have drivers licenses.

And this doesn't even include the Russia dead and or wounded. Or the draft age men who have fled the country. The one thing Putin counted on was that NATO and the US would toss in the towel. But, since no one in NATO is actually fighting the war that isn't likely to happen any time soon. The truth is according to US sec. of defense the US wants to see the Russian military, and economic sector destroyed. That is their policy, and they will keep supplying weapons and training to the Ukraine to make sure no matter who wins, Russia loses....I predict that the war will be over before the leaved in the Ukraine turn red and gold. Russia has lost, but everyone in Moscow is afraid to admit it....
Title: WSJ
Post by: G M on April 29, 2023, 07:10:22 AM
https://archive.fo/jZu4c

Wishful thinking.

From a FB sidebar

No one ever said that sanctions would end the war, but when coupled with battlefield loses of men and equipment things don't look good. "The report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies gives stark numbers of Russian military losses – almost 10,000 units of key equipment such as tanks, trucks, artillery pieces and aerial drones, according to one estimate.

But it also says Russia can dip into Cold War-era and older stocks on the front lines to make up in numbers what it may have lost in technology.

“The quality of the Russian military in terms of advanced equipment will likely decline, at least over the near term,” the CSIS report says.

It notes how Russian losses of main battle tanks, especially modern ones, have been severe.

A captured Russian T-72B3 tank awaits repairs on February 13, 2023, at a warehouse in eastern Ukraine.
John Moore/Getty Images
“Moscow is estimated to have lost anywhere from 1,845 to 3,511 tanks one year into the war,” the CSIS report says, with losses of its newer, upgraded T-72B3 main battle tank, first delivered in 2013, noted as especially damaging.

The Netherlands-based open source intelligence website Oryx says it has visual evidence of more than 500 variants of T-72B3 destroyed, damaged, abandoned or captured as of this week.

Western officials, speaking during a briefing Tuesday, also noted the pressure on the Russian tank fleet.

“They’re going backwards in terms of equipment,” the officials said of Russian armor, noting that T-55 tanks, introduced in 1948, are now turning up on the battlefield." Fox news reported that over 230 US tanks and 1,500 other vehicles have reached the Ukraine. Along with the US trained Ukraine soldiers who now know how to use them. Sky News reported the other day that Russia can no longer build tanks because they lack engine parts, so they are trying to retrofit older museum aged tanks with newer optics, and send them off to war. And France 24 is reporting that Russia is short of the men needed to build tanks, plances, and other weapons. Along with the fact that they have had to choose to use the bearing they have to build tanks, or to keep their train rolling stock operational.

I could go on, but now that the war is over a year old, and they have lost almost 50% of their prewar equipment the qualitative edge it might have had is disappearing. Russia is back fighting it's traditional style of warfare. Take a hill with overwhelming man power, even if you loose 50% or more of your fighting men. But this too has a downside, the men now being sent to the field have next to no training, even the tank drivers only have a minimal amount of training. They are driving cold war era tanks, with 17 year old drivers. Who before the war didn't even have drivers licenses.

And this doesn't even include the Russia dead and or wounded. Or the draft age men who have fled the country. The one thing Putin counted on was that NATO and the US would toss in the towel. But, since no one in NATO is actually fighting the war that isn't likely to happen any time soon. The truth is according to US sec. of defense the US wants to see the Russian military, and economic sector destroyed. That is their policy, and they will keep supplying weapons and training to the Ukraine to make sure no matter who wins, Russia loses....I predict that the war will be over before the leaved in the Ukraine turn red and gold. Russia has lost, but everyone in Moscow is afraid to admit it....
Title: Polish General Speaks
Post by: G M on April 29, 2023, 01:50:41 PM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/we-simply-dont-have-ammo-polish-general-says-can-no-longer-supply-ukraine-warns-russia

https://archive.fo/jZu4c

Wishful thinking.

From a FB sidebar

No one ever said that sanctions would end the war, but when coupled with battlefield loses of men and equipment things don't look good. "The report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies gives stark numbers of Russian military losses – almost 10,000 units of key equipment such as tanks, trucks, artillery pieces and aerial drones, according to one estimate.

But it also says Russia can dip into Cold War-era and older stocks on the front lines to make up in numbers what it may have lost in technology.

“The quality of the Russian military in terms of advanced equipment will likely decline, at least over the near term,” the CSIS report says.

It notes how Russian losses of main battle tanks, especially modern ones, have been severe.

A captured Russian T-72B3 tank awaits repairs on February 13, 2023, at a warehouse in eastern Ukraine.
John Moore/Getty Images
“Moscow is estimated to have lost anywhere from 1,845 to 3,511 tanks one year into the war,” the CSIS report says, with losses of its newer, upgraded T-72B3 main battle tank, first delivered in 2013, noted as especially damaging.

The Netherlands-based open source intelligence website Oryx says it has visual evidence of more than 500 variants of T-72B3 destroyed, damaged, abandoned or captured as of this week.

Western officials, speaking during a briefing Tuesday, also noted the pressure on the Russian tank fleet.

“They’re going backwards in terms of equipment,” the officials said of Russian armor, noting that T-55 tanks, introduced in 1948, are now turning up on the battlefield." Fox news reported that over 230 US tanks and 1,500 other vehicles have reached the Ukraine. Along with the US trained Ukraine soldiers who now know how to use them. Sky News reported the other day that Russia can no longer build tanks because they lack engine parts, so they are trying to retrofit older museum aged tanks with newer optics, and send them off to war. And France 24 is reporting that Russia is short of the men needed to build tanks, plances, and other weapons. Along with the fact that they have had to choose to use the bearing they have to build tanks, or to keep their train rolling stock operational.

I could go on, but now that the war is over a year old, and they have lost almost 50% of their prewar equipment the qualitative edge it might have had is disappearing. Russia is back fighting it's traditional style of warfare. Take a hill with overwhelming man power, even if you loose 50% or more of your fighting men. But this too has a downside, the men now being sent to the field have next to no training, even the tank drivers only have a minimal amount of training. They are driving cold war era tanks, with 17 year old drivers. Who before the war didn't even have drivers licenses.

And this doesn't even include the Russia dead and or wounded. Or the draft age men who have fled the country. The one thing Putin counted on was that NATO and the US would toss in the towel. But, since no one in NATO is actually fighting the war that isn't likely to happen any time soon. The truth is according to US sec. of defense the US wants to see the Russian military, and economic sector destroyed. That is their policy, and they will keep supplying weapons and training to the Ukraine to make sure no matter who wins, Russia loses....I predict that the war will be over before the leaved in the Ukraine turn red and gold. Russia has lost, but everyone in Moscow is afraid to admit it....
Title: Ukraine is totally winning! Deep state backing away from Biden disaster
Post by: G M on May 02, 2023, 03:39:19 PM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/why-long-awaited-ukrainian-counteroffensive-delayed

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/we-simply-dont-have-ammo-polish-general-says-can-no-longer-supply-ukraine-warns-russia

https://archive.fo/jZu4c

Wishful thinking.

From a FB sidebar

No one ever said that sanctions would end the war, but when coupled with battlefield loses of men and equipment things don't look good. "The report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies gives stark numbers of Russian military losses – almost 10,000 units of key equipment such as tanks, trucks, artillery pieces and aerial drones, according to one estimate.

But it also says Russia can dip into Cold War-era and older stocks on the front lines to make up in numbers what it may have lost in technology.

“The quality of the Russian military in terms of advanced equipment will likely decline, at least over the near term,” the CSIS report says.

It notes how Russian losses of main battle tanks, especially modern ones, have been severe.

A captured Russian T-72B3 tank awaits repairs on February 13, 2023, at a warehouse in eastern Ukraine.
John Moore/Getty Images
“Moscow is estimated to have lost anywhere from 1,845 to 3,511 tanks one year into the war,” the CSIS report says, with losses of its newer, upgraded T-72B3 main battle tank, first delivered in 2013, noted as especially damaging.

The Netherlands-based open source intelligence website Oryx says it has visual evidence of more than 500 variants of T-72B3 destroyed, damaged, abandoned or captured as of this week.

Western officials, speaking during a briefing Tuesday, also noted the pressure on the Russian tank fleet.

“They’re going backwards in terms of equipment,” the officials said of Russian armor, noting that T-55 tanks, introduced in 1948, are now turning up on the battlefield." Fox news reported that over 230 US tanks and 1,500 other vehicles have reached the Ukraine. Along with the US trained Ukraine soldiers who now know how to use them. Sky News reported the other day that Russia can no longer build tanks because they lack engine parts, so they are trying to retrofit older museum aged tanks with newer optics, and send them off to war. And France 24 is reporting that Russia is short of the men needed to build tanks, plances, and other weapons. Along with the fact that they have had to choose to use the bearing they have to build tanks, or to keep their train rolling stock operational.

I could go on, but now that the war is over a year old, and they have lost almost 50% of their prewar equipment the qualitative edge it might have had is disappearing. Russia is back fighting it's traditional style of warfare. Take a hill with overwhelming man power, even if you loose 50% or more of your fighting men. But this too has a downside, the men now being sent to the field have next to no training, even the tank drivers only have a minimal amount of training. They are driving cold war era tanks, with 17 year old drivers. Who before the war didn't even have drivers licenses.

And this doesn't even include the Russia dead and or wounded. Or the draft age men who have fled the country. The one thing Putin counted on was that NATO and the US would toss in the towel. But, since no one in NATO is actually fighting the war that isn't likely to happen any time soon. The truth is according to US sec. of defense the US wants to see the Russian military, and economic sector destroyed. That is their policy, and they will keep supplying weapons and training to the Ukraine to make sure no matter who wins, Russia loses....I predict that the war will be over before the leaved in the Ukraine turn red and gold. Russia has lost, but everyone in Moscow is afraid to admit it....
Title: WSJ: A New Masada is born in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 05, 2023, 12:29:34 PM
Russian bloggers and Putin propaganda to the contrary, , ,

============================================

A New Masada Is Born in the Ukraine War
The Azov Brigade takes its inspiration from a legendary Jewish battle.
By Bernard-Henri Lévy
May 4, 2023 6:27 pm ET

I met a year ago with Illia Samoilenko, an officer in the Azov Brigade, which for three months kept the Ukrainian city of Mariupol from falling into Russian hands. We were buried 50 yards below ground, speaking in a maze of galleries that were once atomic shelters under Azovstal’s old steel mill. Ammunition and rations were running low. The cold rooms where they kept the dead had lost power. The severely wounded moaned in silence, awaiting the final assault.

In Vladimir Putin’s delirious telling, their persecution was normal and just. He claimed the brigade was filled with neo-Nazis whose termination would liberate Ukraine from its worst elements. That was one of the pretexts for Russia’s invasion. In truth, these men took inspiration from—and modeled the bravery of—one of Judaism’s most legendary battles.

Mr. Samoilenko told me that neither he nor his comrades harbored the slightest doubt that they would die, but they believed it was better to die standing than to live on their knees. If their deaths could slow the advance of Russian troops, he added, they wouldn’t have been in vain.

In this desperate and heroic resistance, I heard the echo of Europe’s past: the siege of Troy, Leonidas the Spartan defying the powerful Persian army, the Battle of Roncevaux Pass in the time of Charlemagne, Madrid in 1936, the Warsaw Ghetto and more.


But Mr. Samoilenko had another image in mind: first-century Masada, where in the Judean desert Roman legions besieged hundreds of Jewish soldiers entrenched behind the high walls of a limestone fortress, opposing the occupier with a magnificent resistance that remains part of the annals of the Jewish people.

There are two significant differences between Masada and Azovstal. The walls of the former were built on a rocky outcrop. With its subterranean galleries and trenches, Azovstal was practically the inverse. Once the resistance fighters of Masada understood that the battle had been lost, they chose to die by their own swords. The men formed a human chain in which each would stab his neighbor—with the last turning his blade on himself. In Azovstal the men received and, resentfully though honorably, obeyed orders to surrender.

Still, in Mr. Samoilenko’s view, it was the same heroism. It was the same bitter joy at the idea that the act of resistance inflicted on the enemy a narcissistic and strategic defeat. It was the same calm, stoic acceptance—devoid of useless rhetoric and with no hint of sacrifice—of inevitable death. And it was the same fundamental choice before the order to surrender, first explained by historian Flavius Josephus: to deny an unworthy enemy the pleasure of killing you with his own hands.

All this is what Mr. Samoilenko came to Israel to say when—thanks to a prisoner exchange—he was liberated in September 2022 by Donetsk separatists who had, by some miracle, spared him. And it’s what the Israelis themselves kept repeating during that visit, initiated by the Israeli Friends of Ukraine, the Nadav Foundation and a group of Israel Defense Forces reservists: “Azovstal is our Masada.”

Far too many Americans and Europeans are taken by the Putinist propaganda that the brigade harbors some strain of neo-Nazism. More precisely, too few take the trouble to listen to researchers such as Vyacheslav Likhachov who have shown that since 2015 the unit has purged any questionable elements who may have indulged the far right in its earliest years.

That’s why I’m happy to recall that conversation from a year ago.

So is Holocaust descendant Volodymyr Zelensky, who on Feb. 24, 2022, had neither tanks nor apparatchiks with which to confront the giant. In the face of Goliath the Philistine and the invasion, he could find nothing to oppose it save for the intelligence of his courage and the power of his strategy. His fight finds parallels in the Hanukkah story: in Judah Maccabee’s stunning victory of weak over strong, humble over arrogant, and over the false brilliance of the profaned temple, where a small lamp continues to flicker. In much the same way as the Jews overcame the Seleucid Empire in the second century B.C., Mr. Zelensky has for 14 months kept at bay an army believed to be one of the world’s most powerful.

If today there is, outside of Israel, a place where the values of Jewish heroism live, it’s Ukraine.

Mr. Lévy is author of “The Will to See: Dispatches From a World of Misery and Hope” and author and director of the documentary “Slava Ukraini.” This article was translated from French by Matthew Fishbane.
Title: Re: WSJ: A New Masada is born in Ukraine
Post by: G M on May 05, 2023, 01:29:21 PM
Bernard-Henri Lévy

Have you read his other writing?

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/donald-trumps-plot-against-america-480644

Russian bloggers and Putin propaganda to the contrary, , ,

============================================

A New Masada Is Born in the Ukraine War
The Azov Brigade takes its inspiration from a legendary Jewish battle.
By Bernard-Henri Lévy
May 4, 2023 6:27 pm ET

I met a year ago with Illia Samoilenko, an officer in the Azov Brigade, which for three months kept the Ukrainian city of Mariupol from falling into Russian hands. We were buried 50 yards below ground, speaking in a maze of galleries that were once atomic shelters under Azovstal’s old steel mill. Ammunition and rations were running low. The cold rooms where they kept the dead had lost power. The severely wounded moaned in silence, awaiting the final assault.

In Vladimir Putin’s delirious telling, their persecution was normal and just. He claimed the brigade was filled with neo-Nazis whose termination would liberate Ukraine from its worst elements. That was one of the pretexts for Russia’s invasion. In truth, these men took inspiration from—and modeled the bravery of—one of Judaism’s most legendary battles.

Mr. Samoilenko told me that neither he nor his comrades harbored the slightest doubt that they would die, but they believed it was better to die standing than to live on their knees. If their deaths could slow the advance of Russian troops, he added, they wouldn’t have been in vain.

In this desperate and heroic resistance, I heard the echo of Europe’s past: the siege of Troy, Leonidas the Spartan defying the powerful Persian army, the Battle of Roncevaux Pass in the time of Charlemagne, Madrid in 1936, the Warsaw Ghetto and more.


But Mr. Samoilenko had another image in mind: first-century Masada, where in the Judean desert Roman legions besieged hundreds of Jewish soldiers entrenched behind the high walls of a limestone fortress, opposing the occupier with a magnificent resistance that remains part of the annals of the Jewish people.

There are two significant differences between Masada and Azovstal. The walls of the former were built on a rocky outcrop. With its subterranean galleries and trenches, Azovstal was practically the inverse. Once the resistance fighters of Masada understood that the battle had been lost, they chose to die by their own swords. The men formed a human chain in which each would stab his neighbor—with the last turning his blade on himself. In Azovstal the men received and, resentfully though honorably, obeyed orders to surrender.

Still, in Mr. Samoilenko’s view, it was the same heroism. It was the same bitter joy at the idea that the act of resistance inflicted on the enemy a narcissistic and strategic defeat. It was the same calm, stoic acceptance—devoid of useless rhetoric and with no hint of sacrifice—of inevitable death. And it was the same fundamental choice before the order to surrender, first explained by historian Flavius Josephus: to deny an unworthy enemy the pleasure of killing you with his own hands.

All this is what Mr. Samoilenko came to Israel to say when—thanks to a prisoner exchange—he was liberated in September 2022 by Donetsk separatists who had, by some miracle, spared him. And it’s what the Israelis themselves kept repeating during that visit, initiated by the Israeli Friends of Ukraine, the Nadav Foundation and a group of Israel Defense Forces reservists: “Azovstal is our Masada.”

Far too many Americans and Europeans are taken by the Putinist propaganda that the brigade harbors some strain of neo-Nazism. More precisely, too few take the trouble to listen to researchers such as Vyacheslav Likhachov who have shown that since 2015 the unit has purged any questionable elements who may have indulged the far right in its earliest years.

That’s why I’m happy to recall that conversation from a year ago.

So is Holocaust descendant Volodymyr Zelensky, who on Feb. 24, 2022, had neither tanks nor apparatchiks with which to confront the giant. In the face of Goliath the Philistine and the invasion, he could find nothing to oppose it save for the intelligence of his courage and the power of his strategy. His fight finds parallels in the Hanukkah story: in Judah Maccabee’s stunning victory of weak over strong, humble over arrogant, and over the false brilliance of the profaned temple, where a small lamp continues to flicker. In much the same way as the Jews overcame the Seleucid Empire in the second century B.C., Mr. Zelensky has for 14 months kept at bay an army believed to be one of the world’s most powerful.

If today there is, outside of Israel, a place where the values of Jewish heroism live, it’s Ukraine.

Mr. Lévy is author of “The Will to See: Dispatches From a World of Misery and Hope” and author and director of the documentary “Slava Ukraini.” This article was translated from French by Matthew Fishbane.
Title: no I haven't but
Post by: ccp on May 05, 2023, 01:43:19 PM
Bernard-Henri Lévy

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernard-Henri_L%C3%A9vy#:~:text=Bernard%2DHenri%20Georges%20L%C3%A9vy%20(%2F,New%20Philosophers)%20movement%20in%201976.

is he happy NOW Biden is president?
the US is spiraling out of control?

probably since he has his stash
since he thinks he is immune
since he is virtue signaler
has the lamb's blood painted over his front door jam

that won't stop the CCP
or real plagues not the fanciful made up plagues of the Bible
Title: Rewriting Azov's reality
Post by: G M on May 05, 2023, 01:53:02 PM
https://thegrayzone.com/2022/12/08/adl-ukraines-azov-battalion-far-right/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 05, 2023, 03:10:52 PM
"He was a founder of the New Philosophers (Nouveaux Philosophes) school. This was a group of young intellectuals who were disenchanted with communist and socialist responses to the near-revolutionary upheavals in France of May 1968, and who developed an uncompromising moral critique of Marxist and socialist dogmas.[15] In 1977, the television show Apostrophes[16] featured Lévy together with André Glucksmann as a nouveau philosophe. In that year, he published Barbarism with a Human Face (La barbarie à visage humain, 1977), arguing that Marxism was inherently corrupt."

 , , ,

"The movie itself is, as stated in its official Cannes presentation:

"The third part of a trilogy, opus three of a documentary made and lived in real time, the missing piece of the puzzle of a lifetime, the desperate search for enlightened Islam. Where is that other Islam strong enough to defeat the Islam of the fundamentalists? Who embodies it? Who sustains it? Where are the men and women who in word and deed strive for that enlightened Islam, the Islam of law and human rights, an Islam that stands for women and their rights, that is faithful to the lofty thinking of Averroes, Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, Ibn Tufail, and Rumi? ...""

Granted to vapidity of his anti-Trump comments, but OTOH he doesn't sound like a knee-jerk lefty to me.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 06, 2023, 05:34:43 PM
My Russian born Jewish friend responds to the Azov as Masada article with this:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fy910FG46C4

Frankly I don't find some of the passages terribly persuasive.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on May 06, 2023, 05:44:51 PM
My Russian born Jewish friend responds to the Azov as Masada article with this:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fy910FG46C4

Weird how all that got memory-hole'd once it was decided that Ukraine was the good guys...
Title: China to the rescue in Ukraine?!?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 09, 2023, 06:07:21 PM
https://www.nationalreview.com/the-morning-jolt/to-end-russias-war-on-ukraine-the-biden-administration-turns-to-china/?lctg=547fd5293b35d0210c8df7b9&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=MJ_20230508&utm_term=Jolt-Smart
Title: Russians seen wiring Uke nuke power plant?!?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 10, 2023, 05:58:17 AM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F4REzpCfjYg

 :-o :-o :-o
Title: Zeihan on the "inevitable" counter attack
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 10, 2023, 06:14:16 AM


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HQUgJ4Te6Bc
Title: Zeihan
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 11, 2023, 03:37:06 PM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JbiAyWBI0fE
Title: Well, that is embarrassing , , ,
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 13, 2023, 07:27:32 AM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/someone-in-russia-broke-into-a-military-airfield-to-set-fire-to-a-bomber-jet-and-russian-cops-only-found-out-it-was-happening-on-social-media-report/ar-AA1b1TBH?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=8559a9a05f2a4703ab31388192d813eb&ei=29
Title: Uke tank making a couple of kills; Russian surrenders to a drone
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 16, 2023, 02:18:53 PM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zq2VDXhCUsM



https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1593710982790107138
Title: Zelensky continues to demonstrate his hatred for Christianity
Post by: G M on May 19, 2023, 09:35:57 AM
https://www.westernjournal.com/zelenskyy-gives-highly-repulsive-gift-pope-francis-offend-every-christian/
Title: No problem, we can just send them money and weapons forever!
Post by: G M on May 19, 2023, 05:31:46 PM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/us-preparing-ukraine-war-become-frozen-conflict
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 19, 2023, 07:15:55 PM
Has this been reported anywhere else?

https://www.westernjournal.com/zelenskyy-gives-highly-repulsive-gift-pope-francis-offend-every-christian/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on May 19, 2023, 07:47:56 PM
Has this been reported anywhere else?

https://www.westernjournal.com/zelenskyy-gives-highly-repulsive-gift-pope-francis-offend-every-christian/

https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/amp/news/254303/pope-francis-and-ukraine-s-president-zelenskyy-meet-at-vatican
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on May 19, 2023, 08:00:46 PM
Has this been reported anywhere else?

https://www.westernjournal.com/zelenskyy-gives-highly-repulsive-gift-pope-francis-offend-every-christian/

https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/amp/news/254303/pope-francis-and-ukraine-s-president-zelenskyy-meet-at-vatican

https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2023/05/18/peace-mission-ukraine-russia-vatican-envoys-245330
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 20, 2023, 06:55:29 AM
OK.

Title: SO MUCH LOSING, YOU'LL GET TIRED OF LOSING! Ukraine edition
Post by: G M on May 20, 2023, 07:34:37 AM
https://sonar21.com/more-cowbell-for-ukraine-while-former-u-s-military-officers-and-diplomats-plead-for-sanity/
Title: Re: SO MUCH LOSING, YOU'LL GET TIRED OF LOSING! Ukraine edition
Post by: G M on May 21, 2023, 08:54:28 PM
https://sonar21.com/more-cowbell-for-ukraine-while-former-u-s-military-officers-and-diplomats-plead-for-sanity/

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/us-national-security-experts-urge-no-more-weapons-ukraine-ny-times
Title: Re: Ukraine (useful citations)
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 22, 2023, 06:35:47 AM
Not the strongest list of signers I've ever seen , , ,

but let's engage a bit, because there is merit, incomplete as it may be, in the piece:

A)

"Western policy has repeatedly put Zelenskyy in near-impossible positions, caught between the need to show signs of progress on the battlefield to justify further Western support and arms deliveries and, on the other hand, the shocking human cost of continued war represented by the fresh graveyards where tens of thousands of Ukrainians now lie buried."

Here's the way I remember it-- we were ready to do jack sh*t (e.g. Biden pulled our navy out of the Black Sea in the run up, offers to fly Z. out of the country in the early days, etc) all while talking sh*t (e.g. Sec Def Austin and VP Harris talking about Ukraine joining NATO in the run up to the Russian invasion) etc.  So yes, our feckless incoherence has put Z, dedicated to defending his country from Russian dismemberment, into reversing our bluster into substance with proof of Uke fighting will.  I would submit that the Ukes and Z. have met this burden. 

B)

Unaddressed by this piece are the consequences of what is advocated here-- telling the Russians that we have run out of the will to do "whatever it takes".  We are agreed that to do exactly what remains spectacularly incoherent and undefined, and often includes goals likely to provoke escalations far beyond what we currently have.   What is left of our credibility when it comes to defending Taiwan etc if we pull the rug out from under the Ukes now?


"https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16116-document-05-memorandum-conversation-between"

Good citation here, the most specific I have seen.

Even more substantive is this:
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997-06/arms-control-today/opposition-nato-expansion

Many real serious names among the signatories e.g. Sen. Sam Nunn (no one's idea of a defense weenie!) and others.

That said, this "1999 – NATO admits Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to NATO" strikes me as disingenuous in its failure to engage with the fact that the Soviet Empire invaded each of these countries quite brutally, in 1956, 1980, and 1968 respectively.

This too is disingenuous:  "2019 – U.S. unilaterally withdraws from Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty."  President Trump correctly did this because the Russians were cheating, and the Chinese were not part of the treaty, so the only country limited by the treaty was America.

Similarly, "2020 – U.S. unilaterally withdraws from Open Skies Treaty."  Again, this would be President Trump yes?  The same man we here praised for taking a hard line with talking softly with Putin and carrying a big stick, yes? 

I repeat my question: Having blundered our way into this stupid and unnecessary war (President Clinton and wife, President Obama and Sec. State Clinton, President Magoo and Grifter Son in Ukraine)

"What is left of our credibility when it comes to defending Taiwan etc if stirring "Whatever it takes, as long as it takes" we pull the rug out from under the Ukes now?

GM's piece has merit and brings useful historical perspective up from the Memory Hole, but it, and those of similar mind (e.g. our GM) do need to engage with this question.




Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on May 22, 2023, 06:44:57 AM
You seem to think we have any credibility left. We can't/won't defend our own border. We can't/won't defend our own cities from lawless chaos.

We won't even defend our children from deviant groomers.

WE
HAVE
ZERO
CREDIBILITY
Title: Hersh: Something else cooking in Ukraine
Post by: G M on May 22, 2023, 07:08:12 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/seymour-hersh-something-else-cooking-ukraine
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 22, 2023, 07:08:55 AM
A rhetorically potent response.

Herewith mine:

Often what you say communicates as "Giving up."  It may be as you predict with such certainty, but consider the possibility that you might be wrong--like the rest of us here, not for the first or last time!   

In which case your rhetorical flourish leads us to "A shot not fired is always a miss."

We can, and should, fight to articulate for what we fight and win the election despite what cheating seems likely to go on (and we have made some progress in some states since the last one) AND do what makes sense to each of us to prepare for what happens should our efforts fail.

I see supply chain failures and social disorder/collapse as distinct possibilities, and so my family and I prepare as best we can AND continue my efforts here on this forum and elsewhere.

But I drift from the subject of this thread.

So returning to the point at hand, what are the actual implications of what you say? 

Does pulling the rug from under the Ukes somehow increase the likelihood of defending our border?  Not that I can see. 

Does pulling the rug from under the Ukes somehow increase the likelihood of our defending our super chip supply chain from Taiwan?  Not that I can see.

Without answer to these points, your response is makes a valid point, but does not support your apparent recommended course of action.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 22, 2023, 07:16:15 AM
Hersh's track record is , , , mixed.

The piece is interesting, but it is not clear to me that in point of fact that it is true. 

Poland wants to cut a deal?  I read more and more broadly than most and I am unwilling at present to take Hersh's words at face value.

And if true, then so what?  This war is a murky mess.  OF COURSE there are cross currents!

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on May 22, 2023, 07:28:00 AM
Russia winning is inevitable. All we are doing is wasting lives and money we don't have.

The world knows how weak and decadent the west has become.

We have already burned through weapons we can't replace for YEARS.

The longer this grinds on, the worse it is for US.

Beijing looks at this idiocy and laughs.
Title: Kunstler: Fade to black in Ukraine
Post by: G M on May 22, 2023, 07:34:12 AM
https://www.theburningplatform.com/2023/05/22/fade-to-black-in-ukraine/#more-303470
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 22, 2023, 07:39:53 AM
Some of the passages there have bite, but the personal attacks on Z for wanting to fight the invasion of his country reek of Russki propaganda.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on May 22, 2023, 07:42:36 AM
Some of the passages there have bite, but the personal attacks on Z for wanting to fight the invasion of his country reek of Russki propaganda.

Z is a corrupt piece of garbage. Stop buying into the CIA psyop.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 22, 2023, 07:55:58 AM
Consider working on your perception of the color grey.

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on May 22, 2023, 09:03:39 AM
Consider working on your perception of the color grey.

Just because he was recruited by the CIA for this role doesn’t add any good to him and his crew of klepcrats.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 22, 2023, 09:33:06 AM
Umm , , , in that one here is saying that is does, the response is , , , non-responsive.

As a matter of logic, I would note that nor does it hurt. 
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on May 22, 2023, 09:36:47 AM
Umm , , , in that one here is saying that is does, the response is , , , non-responsive.

As a matter of logic, I would note that nor does it hurt.

Our CIA has been a rogue organization much longer than we’d like to believe. They aren’t Tom Clancy-esque heroes.

Ukraine was and is a criminal enterprise pretending to be a country.

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 22, 2023, 09:39:58 AM
Sorry, but in that it fails to engage with the tremendous fighting spirit of the Uke people in all this IMHO that is simply glib. 
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on May 22, 2023, 09:46:55 AM
Sorry, but in that it fails to engage with the tremendous fighting spirit of the Uke people in all this IMHO that is simply glib.

The Slavs tend to be tough as nails, that doesn’t make the Ukrainian mafiya state something else.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 22, 2023, 01:49:24 PM
I'm thinking a very reasonable inference of the Ukes fighting like they have is that they give a fk about having a country.    If you cannot acknowledge that this is a reasonable inference, I got nothing further on this point for you.



Title: Zeihan on "Who Started it?"
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 22, 2023, 02:34:44 PM


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rh4QU7hxKVg
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on May 22, 2023, 03:03:20 PM
I'm thinking a very reasonable inference of the Ukes fighting like they have is that they give a fk about having a country.    If you cannot acknowledge that this is a reasonable inference, I got nothing further on this point for you.

How is the Basque nation going? The Free Palestine movement?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 22, 2023, 03:04:45 PM
Non-responsive.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on May 22, 2023, 04:11:17 PM
Non-responsive.

Just because you fight for a nation doesn’t mean you are entitled to one.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 22, 2023, 08:10:21 PM
Still non-responsive to the question of sincerity of motivation.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on May 23, 2023, 07:42:21 AM
Still non-responsive to the question of sincerity of motivation.

The motivation of the cannon-fodder is irrelevant, unless you think the highly motivated German troops in WWII meant something important.
Title: Candace understands Zelensky
Post by: G M on May 23, 2023, 07:43:20 AM
https://www.newsweek.com/candace-owens-volodymyr-zelensky-ultimate-criminal-twitter-1801412
Title: Orban understands the war
Post by: G M on May 23, 2023, 09:25:17 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/its-obvious-there-will-be-no-victory-poor-ukrainians-orban
Title: How Ukraine really works
Post by: G M on May 24, 2023, 06:49:46 AM
https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=852,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/138/616/894/original/7499bbdb2619b9b7.png

(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=852,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/138/616/894/original/7499bbdb2619b9b7.png)
Title: Re: How Ukraine really works
Post by: G M on May 24, 2023, 07:41:20 AM
https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=852,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/138/616/894/original/7499bbdb2619b9b7.png

(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=852,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/138/616/894/original/7499bbdb2619b9b7.png)

https://www.zerohedge.com/military/us-arms-makers-are-price-gouging-amid-ukraine-war
Title: Gatestone: Why the Ukes Fight
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 25, 2023, 06:14:43 AM
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/19673/report-from-ukraine

Report from Ukraine: Why They Fight
by Richard Kemp
May 25, 2023 at 5:00 am

Send   
Print
I asked what they now needed most from our countries. Of course more guns, more ammo, more tanks, more rockets plus combat planes always featured. But another consistent answer was striking even if not surprising: please do not try to force our country to make peace with the invaders.

The government in Kyiv has so far documented 19,393 kidnapped children, and there are most likely many more that are as yet unidentified.

Like the torture and murder of civilians in Izium and elsewhere, and the summary execution of prisoners of war, these kidnappings are war crimes. It is for these abductions that the International Criminal Court in March issued arrest warrants against Vladimir Putin and his so-called Children's Rights Commissioner, Maria Lvova-Belova.

Putin's forces and civilian bureaucrats have seized children from orphanages and children's homes, removed them directly from their parents or taken them into "care" after killing their families. Some have been forcibly fostered or adopted in cities including Moscow, Saint Petersburg and Rostov. Names and dates of birth are sometimes changed to render them untraceable.

While torture and murder cannot be undone, Russia's child kidnapping can, and it is inexplicable that so far there has been no large scale international outrage.

[K]nowledge of these wicked depredations is why they fight; and why they and the fighting men on Ukraine's other battlefields remain determined to keep attacking, holding the invaders from their families' doors until they drive them back beyond their borders, no matter what the personal cost might be.


Russian forces and civilian bureaucrats have seized nearly 20,000 Ukrainian children from orphanages and children's homes, removed them directly from their parents or taken them into "care" after killing their families. Knowledge of these wicked depredations is why Ukrainians fight on the battlefield, determined to keep attacking, holding the invaders from their families' doors. Pictured: A Ukrainian soldier in Bakhmut, Ukraine, on April 23, 2023. (Photo by Anatolii Stepanov/AFP via Getty Images)
This week, near Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, I spent time with commanders and soldiers who have been fighting the Russian invaders in the shattered city, sometimes for months on end. This has been one of the longest battles anywhere in the world since 1945 and by far the most brutal in this war, with Russians and Ukrainians often fighting at close quarters, artillery hammering the city into Stalingrad-like rubble and a level of slaughter unequalled anywhere else in Putin's vicious war.

Talking to these battle-worn men, their gratitude for the arms, ammunition and equipment supplied by the West was palpable and sometimes emotional. They credited us with keeping them alive and keeping them fighting. I asked what they now needed most from our countries. Of course more guns, more ammo, more tanks, more rockets plus combat planes always featured. But another consistent answer was striking even if not surprising: please do not try to force our country to make peace with the invaders.

This from men who have seen their brothers-in-arms cut down by bullets, bomb blasts and scything shell splinters; have battled to prevent the life ebb from their comrades' mangled bodies; have endured the mind-numbing percussion of unending artillery bombardments and have risked their very lives with every hour spent in the ruined city. At one point the deadly reality of life in Bakhmut was driven home by fleets of laden ambulances hurtling past us, heading away from the battle zone.

With their blunt rejection of peace negotiations, were these fighting men disproving the words of US General Douglas MacArthur in his famous Duty, Honor, Country speech at West Point: "The soldier above all others prays for peace, for it is the soldier who must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war"?

I did not ask them that question because I immediately understood what lay behind their grim determination to keep fighting despite the horror of it all.

Earlier I had visited nearby Izium, where the Russian occupation is marked not only by rubbleised and bullet-pocked schools, hospitals, houses and apartment blocks but also by shallow graves in the middle of the woods, now empty and each marked by a rough-hewn timber cross.

After the Russians had been driven out by the Ukrainian army's counter offensive last September, 447 bodies were exhumed here, mostly civilian men, women and children, almost all showing signs of violent death, many executed, some mutilated and some with hands bound. The surrounding woodland is scarred with tank scrapes, large holes in the ground where Russian armour had been dug in to provide added protection against artillery and anti-tank fire and to aid concealment from ground and air. One of these scrapes had contained the corpses of 17 Ukrainian soldiers. Before they piled earth on top of them, the Russians had, for good measure, dumped an anti-tank mine on the bodies, intended to kill and maim those tasked with digging them out.

Some of the dead civilians had been brought to these woods from the town of Izium and from Balakliia, a few miles away. In both places I walked around police stations containing squalid cells and lightless basements where the Russians had jammed in their captives, men, women and children; and terrorised, tortured, sexually abused and murdered them.

I saw the same baleful sites at Bucha near Kyiv a few days later. Places like this are to be found in many towns and villages the Russians occupied. They are horribly reminiscent of Nazi torture and killing centres I've visited in Poland, France and on the Channel Island of Alderney. Like them, these sites deserve to be preserved, both as a reminder of the evil men do and as a memorial to the poor souls who suffered so terribly under the Russian jackboot.

From areas of the country that Putin's army occupied since the invasion last February, they have also abducted Ukrainian children, including babies, on an industrial scale. The government in Kyiv has so far documented 19,393 kidnapped children, and there are most likely many more that are as yet unidentified.

Some are still held in areas of Ukraine the Russian army continues to occupy, and others have been transported to Russian territory. Like the torture and murder of civilians in Izium and elsewhere, and the summary execution of prisoners of war, these kidnappings are war crimes. It is for these abductions that the International Criminal Court in March issued arrest warrants against Vladimir Putin and his so-called Children's Rights Commissioner, Maria Lvova-Belova.

Putin's forces and civilian bureaucrats have seized children from orphanages and children's homes, removed them directly from their parents or taken them into "care" after killing their families. Some have been forcibly fostered or adopted in cities including Moscow, Saint Petersburg and Rostov. Names and dates of birth are sometimes changed to render them untraceable. Those children who speak up for their native land, sing the national anthem or speak ill of Putin are "re-educated" by Russian authorities, a process that has included extended periods of detention and solitary confinement as well as bullying and savage beatings. Some children have been enlisted into a Russian "youth army" where they are trained and prepared to fight one day against their own people.

In Kyiv I met the red-eyed mothers of some of these children, every one of them going through a living hell that will never end until their sons and daughters are returned to them. The Ukrainian government and the NGO Save Ukraine, as well as individual parents that are able to, are making efforts to retrieve these children but so far only very small numbers have been brought home. While torture and murder cannot be undone, Russia's child kidnapping can, and it is inexplicable that so far there has been no large-scale international outrage.

The kidnapping of Ukrainian children has grotesque echoes of the Third Reich, which forcibly removed at least 20,000 Polish children from their families and transported them to Germany — the same number as the children that we know have been kidnapped by Putin so far. Many of them faced an almost identical fate as the abducted Ukrainian children today.

Returning to the defenders of Bakhmut, knowledge of these wicked depredations is why they fight; and why they and the fighting men on Ukraine's other battlefields remain determined to keep attacking, holding the invaders from their families' doors until they drive them back beyond their borders, no matter what the personal cost might be.

Colonel Richard Kemp is a former British Army Commander. He was also head of the international terrorism team in the U.K. Cabinet Office and is now a writer and speaker on international and military affairs. He is a Shillman Fellow at Gatestone Institute.

Follow Richard Kemp on Twitter

Title: Wagner chief "Putin's war has backfired"
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 25, 2023, 06:21:13 AM
second

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/wagner-chief-reveals-20000-his-fighters-killed-bakhmut-says-putins-war-has-backfired?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1512
Title: Re: Gatestone: Why the Ukes Fight
Post by: G M on May 25, 2023, 06:53:56 AM
I also note the lack of outrage of what is happen to children at the former border with Mexico.


https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/19673/report-from-ukraine

Report from Ukraine: Why They Fight
by Richard Kemp
May 25, 2023 at 5:00 am

Send   
Print
I asked what they now needed most from our countries. Of course more guns, more ammo, more tanks, more rockets plus combat planes always featured. But another consistent answer was striking even if not surprising: please do not try to force our country to make peace with the invaders.

The government in Kyiv has so far documented 19,393 kidnapped children, and there are most likely many more that are as yet unidentified.

Like the torture and murder of civilians in Izium and elsewhere, and the summary execution of prisoners of war, these kidnappings are war crimes. It is for these abductions that the International Criminal Court in March issued arrest warrants against Vladimir Putin and his so-called Children's Rights Commissioner, Maria Lvova-Belova.

Putin's forces and civilian bureaucrats have seized children from orphanages and children's homes, removed them directly from their parents or taken them into "care" after killing their families. Some have been forcibly fostered or adopted in cities including Moscow, Saint Petersburg and Rostov. Names and dates of birth are sometimes changed to render them untraceable.

While torture and murder cannot be undone, Russia's child kidnapping can, and it is inexplicable that so far there has been no large scale international outrage.

[K]nowledge of these wicked depredations is why they fight; and why they and the fighting men on Ukraine's other battlefields remain determined to keep attacking, holding the invaders from their families' doors until they drive them back beyond their borders, no matter what the personal cost might be.


Russian forces and civilian bureaucrats have seized nearly 20,000 Ukrainian children from orphanages and children's homes, removed them directly from their parents or taken them into "care" after killing their families. Knowledge of these wicked depredations is why Ukrainians fight on the battlefield, determined to keep attacking, holding the invaders from their families' doors. Pictured: A Ukrainian soldier in Bakhmut, Ukraine, on April 23, 2023. (Photo by Anatolii Stepanov/AFP via Getty Images)
This week, near Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, I spent time with commanders and soldiers who have been fighting the Russian invaders in the shattered city, sometimes for months on end. This has been one of the longest battles anywhere in the world since 1945 and by far the most brutal in this war, with Russians and Ukrainians often fighting at close quarters, artillery hammering the city into Stalingrad-like rubble and a level of slaughter unequalled anywhere else in Putin's vicious war.

Talking to these battle-worn men, their gratitude for the arms, ammunition and equipment supplied by the West was palpable and sometimes emotional. They credited us with keeping them alive and keeping them fighting. I asked what they now needed most from our countries. Of course more guns, more ammo, more tanks, more rockets plus combat planes always featured. But another consistent answer was striking even if not surprising: please do not try to force our country to make peace with the invaders.

This from men who have seen their brothers-in-arms cut down by bullets, bomb blasts and scything shell splinters; have battled to prevent the life ebb from their comrades' mangled bodies; have endured the mind-numbing percussion of unending artillery bombardments and have risked their very lives with every hour spent in the ruined city. At one point the deadly reality of life in Bakhmut was driven home by fleets of laden ambulances hurtling past us, heading away from the battle zone.

With their blunt rejection of peace negotiations, were these fighting men disproving the words of US General Douglas MacArthur in his famous Duty, Honor, Country speech at West Point: "The soldier above all others prays for peace, for it is the soldier who must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war"?

I did not ask them that question because I immediately understood what lay behind their grim determination to keep fighting despite the horror of it all.

Earlier I had visited nearby Izium, where the Russian occupation is marked not only by rubbleised and bullet-pocked schools, hospitals, houses and apartment blocks but also by shallow graves in the middle of the woods, now empty and each marked by a rough-hewn timber cross.

After the Russians had been driven out by the Ukrainian army's counter offensive last September, 447 bodies were exhumed here, mostly civilian men, women and children, almost all showing signs of violent death, many executed, some mutilated and some with hands bound. The surrounding woodland is scarred with tank scrapes, large holes in the ground where Russian armour had been dug in to provide added protection against artillery and anti-tank fire and to aid concealment from ground and air. One of these scrapes had contained the corpses of 17 Ukrainian soldiers. Before they piled earth on top of them, the Russians had, for good measure, dumped an anti-tank mine on the bodies, intended to kill and maim those tasked with digging them out.

Some of the dead civilians had been brought to these woods from the town of Izium and from Balakliia, a few miles away. In both places I walked around police stations containing squalid cells and lightless basements where the Russians had jammed in their captives, men, women and children; and terrorised, tortured, sexually abused and murdered them.

I saw the same baleful sites at Bucha near Kyiv a few days later. Places like this are to be found in many towns and villages the Russians occupied. They are horribly reminiscent of Nazi torture and killing centres I've visited in Poland, France and on the Channel Island of Alderney. Like them, these sites deserve to be preserved, both as a reminder of the evil men do and as a memorial to the poor souls who suffered so terribly under the Russian jackboot.

From areas of the country that Putin's army occupied since the invasion last February, they have also abducted Ukrainian children, including babies, on an industrial scale. The government in Kyiv has so far documented 19,393 kidnapped children, and there are most likely many more that are as yet unidentified.

Some are still held in areas of Ukraine the Russian army continues to occupy, and others have been transported to Russian territory. Like the torture and murder of civilians in Izium and elsewhere, and the summary execution of prisoners of war, these kidnappings are war crimes. It is for these abductions that the International Criminal Court in March issued arrest warrants against Vladimir Putin and his so-called Children's Rights Commissioner, Maria Lvova-Belova.

Putin's forces and civilian bureaucrats have seized children from orphanages and children's homes, removed them directly from their parents or taken them into "care" after killing their families. Some have been forcibly fostered or adopted in cities including Moscow, Saint Petersburg and Rostov. Names and dates of birth are sometimes changed to render them untraceable. Those children who speak up for their native land, sing the national anthem or speak ill of Putin are "re-educated" by Russian authorities, a process that has included extended periods of detention and solitary confinement as well as bullying and savage beatings. Some children have been enlisted into a Russian "youth army" where they are trained and prepared to fight one day against their own people.

In Kyiv I met the red-eyed mothers of some of these children, every one of them going through a living hell that will never end until their sons and daughters are returned to them. The Ukrainian government and the NGO Save Ukraine, as well as individual parents that are able to, are making efforts to retrieve these children but so far only very small numbers have been brought home. While torture and murder cannot be undone, Russia's child kidnapping can, and it is inexplicable that so far there has been no large-scale international outrage.

The kidnapping of Ukrainian children has grotesque echoes of the Third Reich, which forcibly removed at least 20,000 Polish children from their families and transported them to Germany — the same number as the children that we know have been kidnapped by Putin so far. Many of them faced an almost identical fate as the abducted Ukrainian children today.

Returning to the defenders of Bakhmut, knowledge of these wicked depredations is why they fight; and why they and the fighting men on Ukraine's other battlefields remain determined to keep attacking, holding the invaders from their families' doors until they drive them back beyond their borders, no matter what the personal cost might be.

Colonel Richard Kemp is a former British Army Commander. He was also head of the international terrorism team in the U.K. Cabinet Office and is now a writer and speaker on international and military affairs. He is a Shillman Fellow at Gatestone Institute.

Follow Richard Kemp on Twitter
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 25, 2023, 09:07:02 AM
True as that non-sequitur may be, it has absolutely nothing to do with the subject of this article-- which IS relevant to arguments you have made about Uke motivations. 


Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on May 25, 2023, 09:13:54 AM
Try as that non-sequitur may be, it has absolutely nothing to do with the subject of this article-- which IS relevant to arguments you have made about Uke motivations.

Just pointing how selective selective outrage can be.

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 25, 2023, 12:36:38 PM
A point well grasped by all here, but no particular reason I can see for this particular article to need to note that.
Title: Green Beret who fought in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 26, 2023, 04:56:25 AM
Haven't watched this yet, but it sounds interesting:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r-LoQ_ND1oA
Title: Running out of Ukraine money
Post by: G M on May 26, 2023, 06:48:49 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/ron-paul-bidens-running-out-ukraine-money-good
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 27, 2023, 07:16:47 AM


This bears watching:

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/central-europe-firms-stake-positions-ukraine-reconstruction-race-2023-05-25/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=Newsletter&utm_campaign=Weekend-Briefing&utm_term=052723

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russia-belarus-sign-document-tactical-nuclear-weapon-deployment-belarus-2023-05-25/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=Newsletter&utm_campaign=Weekend-Briefing&utm_term=052723

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-tells-united-states-dont-lecture-moscow-nuclear-deployments-2023-05-27/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=Newsletter&utm_campaign=Weekend-Briefing&utm_term=052723

Title: Ethnic Russian Ukes attack Russian soil
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 27, 2023, 09:51:30 AM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_uLzlwTBc2c
Title: George Friedman: Considering Maskirovka
Post by: Crafty_Dog on May 30, 2023, 05:18:54 AM
May 30, 2023
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
Considering Maskirovka
By: George Friedman

Soon after Josef Stalin signed a mutual defense pact with Adolf Hitler, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill said that Russia was a mystery wrapped in an enigma. Russian military planners were undoubtedly pleased by what they might have taken as praise. One of the foundations of their military doctrine is the principle of maskirovka, or the use of various deceptions and denials to mask their true intentions. Maskirovka doesn’t always work, but when it does, it can utterly transform a battle, even a war.

Trusting in the common perception of the state of the Russian military can be designed to be fatal. I have long wondered about the chaotic structure of Russian forces in Ukraine and about the amount of time and resources Russia devotes to secondary targets. It’s tempting to assume that Moscow is foundering or that it was fated to defeat, but the fact that maskirovka is embedded so deeply in the Russian military psyche makes it necessary to periodically rethink Russian plans and resources. These things are unknown by design, but what if it turns out that the Russian bungling is a ploy, its real force and intention hidden, waiting to strike? When thinking about the Russians, creating a model diametrically opposed to what you believe, and then taking it apart, is essential.

The current consensus is that Russia has lost the organization, resources or trained manpower necessary to do more than hold its ground or perhaps advance with very limited objectives. This view is based on command confusion in which the Russian armed forces are competing with the Wagner Group, rather than commanding it. It would explain the extended battle in Bakhmut – to say nothing of Russia’s general inability to cripple Ukrainian forces and penetrate deeper into Ukraine. Penetration and destruction are the essence of warfare. A divided chain of command could explain the failure, and the inability to repair it could easily lead an enemy to assume that a Russian victory is all but impossible.

Let’s assume for the sake of argument that Russia built the battle of Bakhmut to draw the Ukrainians forward into a more vulnerable position. A smashing defeat of Ukraine there would create a massive crisis in the Ukrainian command and stoke serious tensions with allies. If the disparity of force were sufficient, Russian forces might move decisively to Ukraine’s western border. The purpose of the battle, then, would be to convince Ukraine to carry out a broad attack in the hope of breaking Russia’s will. For Russia, the true goal would not be to end the battle quickly but to significantly weaken Ukraine’s defense of the heartland and to encourage forces planned for the offensive to form into large units. The next step would be massive airstrikes on the concentrations using drones. The key would be the generation of military targets for air attack, followed by a massive, decisive infantry attack into the heartland (the type Russia should have opened with).

To be sure, this scenario is difficult to take seriously. Even if it were all going according to script, the strategy would be compromised by the inability to field large numbers of trained fighters, to protect the transportation of rapid, surprise deployment, and to hide the concentration of forces from Western intelligence. (Doing so is difficult but not impossible. The U.S. and British succeeded at Normandy, and the Germans at the Ardennes, though detection capabilities in World War II were obviously more limited than they are now.)

The critical issue here is the timing of detection relative to the ability of Ukrainian forces to form an attack and disrupt Russian forces. Russian air defense would have to be limited to avoid hinting at a large concentration of other forces. And the infantry would have to move into Ukraine in battle-ready form. The process of moving forward and creating a unified force under coherent Russian command represents the key and most unlikely phase of the operation.

The complexity of the project at all levels convinces me that the Russian command is simply dysfunctional and highly vulnerable to Ukrainian action. If there’s a maskirovka ploy afoot it must have been executed by now. But there is no hint of it. It’s hard to see anything but weakness in the Russian force at the moment.
Title: Re: These weapons will find their way to W. Europe and N. America
Post by: G M on May 31, 2023, 08:06:55 PM
https://twitter.com/imetatronink/status/1531639067330215936

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/02/ukraine-weapons-end-up-criminal-hands-says-interpol-chief-jurgen-stock

https://www.rebelnews.com/swedish_police_warn_that_weapons_sent_to_ukraine_could_land_in_the_hands_of_criminal_gangs

https://twitter.com/LMFireSystems1/status/1664048621619224577

You read it here first!
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on June 03, 2023, 07:10:00 AM
UA missile launcher supposed to be in Ukraine is found at our own Southern border.

what a joke .

https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/us-news/anti-tank-missile-launcher-bound-30140269

what was that song ; "dance, dance till we all drop "

for US politicians it is "spend, spend till we all drop"
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 03, 2023, 07:29:33 AM
UA missile launcher supposed to be in Ukraine is found at our own Southern border.

what a joke .

https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/us-news/anti-tank-missile-launcher-bound-30140269

what was that song ; "dance, dance till we all drop "

for US politicians it is "spend, spend till we all drop"

https://www.theburningplatform.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/FxnjUbwWIAARr7d.jpg

(https://www.theburningplatform.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/FxnjUbwWIAARr7d.jpg)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 03, 2023, 07:32:05 AM
UA missile launcher supposed to be in Ukraine is found at our own Southern border.

what a joke .

https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/us-news/anti-tank-missile-launcher-bound-30140269

what was that song ; "dance, dance till we all drop "

for US politicians it is "spend, spend till we all drop"

https://www.theburningplatform.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/FxnjUbwWIAARr7d.jpg

(https://www.theburningplatform.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/FxnjUbwWIAARr7d.jpg)

(https://westernrifleshooters.us/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/1da8b86a7d43f019.jpeg)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 04, 2023, 02:22:55 AM
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/19678/biden-not-serious-about-ukraine
Title: report Ukraine had plans to blow Nordstream
Post by: ccp on June 06, 2023, 11:24:15 AM
https://www.reuters.com/world/us-had-intelligence-ukrainian-plan-attack-nord-stream-pipeline-washington-post-2023-06-06/

Does Ukraine possess the ability to have done this w/o the US?

this part cracks me up :

****White House spokesperson John Kirby said on Monday that investigations into the Nord Stream attack were active.

"The last thing that we're going to want to do from this podium is get ahead of those investigations," Kirby said when asked about The Post's reporting on the matter.


me =>.  :roll: :roll: :roll:
Title: Pravdas covering up Nazis?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 06, 2023, 02:18:49 PM
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/05/world/europe/nazi-symbols-ukraine.html

I am paywalled from this.  Could someone post it please?
Title: GPF: The consequences of the Dam break
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 07, 2023, 04:38:51 AM
Ukraine’s Dam Collapse Changes the Landscape and the War
The full extent of the damage will not be clear for many weeks.
By: Antonia Colibasanu
The long-feared destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam became a reality on Tuesday, flooding towns and villages downstream in southern Ukraine and forcing hasty evacuations. Built in 1956 as part of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant, the dam created an 18 billion-cubic-meter reservoir that provided critical water supplies for the entire Crimean Peninsula as well as the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in Europe. Both Russia, which occupies Crimea and the nuclear plant, and Ukraine have accused each other of destroying the dam. Either way, the event has important tactical and strategic implications, and it highlights the significance of the Dnieper River as a frontline in the war.

Consequences for Ukraine’s Offensive

The Dnieper begins in Russia and flows through Belarus before entering Ukraine, where until the war it served as a major commercial corridor and route to the Black Sea. Since Russia’s invasion, it has mostly served as an obstacle. Russian forces attacking from Crimea crossed the Dnieper early in the war and occupied the Kherson region, where the river forms a large delta. For almost the next nine months, the Russian army was stationed on both sides of the river in Kherson.

Russian Forces in Ukraine, as of June 5, 2023
(click to enlarge)

In November 2022, Ukraine liberated the urban western bank of Kherson and pushed the Russians across the Dnieper. In the process, the Antonivka road bridge and railway bridge were destroyed, severely limiting large troop movements across the river in the area and making it practically impossible for Russian forces to continue along the M14 highway to Odesa. Both sides mined their banks of the Dnieper over the ensuing months.

Strategic Infrastructure Near the Kakhovka Dam
(click to enlarge)

It is not hard to see why the Dnieper is so important, especially for the campaign in southern Ukraine. Russian offensive goals aside, Crimea is only about 80 kilometers (50 miles) away and looks potentially vulnerable. The stretch of the eastern bank that Russia holds in Kherson is not far from the mouth of the Dnieper, where the river narrows. To defend their position, Russian forces cut down trees, stationed snipers in houses along the river and established trenches and other fortifications.

Since the bursting of the Nova Kakhovka dam, many of those Russian fortifications are or will soon be under water. Ukrainian positions on the west bank are threatened as well, but not nearly to the same extent due to the higher elevation on their side. However, Russian mass evacuations in the run-up to Ukraine's long-awaited counteroffensive meant that few were present at the time of the incident. In addition, Crimea relied on the Kakhovka reservoir for potable water, but its supplies will dwindle now that the North Crimean Canal is no longer usable. On the positive side for Moscow, the deluge will significantly hamper any Ukrainian advance toward Crimea by land. It also greatly shortens Russian lines in one of its weaker defensive positions.

The military advantage of destroying the dam, according to Russian military bloggers, is that it makes any Ukrainian attempt to cross the Dnieper and march east much more difficult. Indeed, Western military sources say the Russians are "almost certainly" to blame, considering that a breach of this magnitude would require the pre-positioning of explosives and that the Russians have had control of the dam since the beginning of the war. However, blowing up the dam would also indicate Russian desperation. It would imply that Moscow lacks the capability to move its soldiers westward to reclaim the rest of Kherson.

Nuclear and Ecological Disaster

The dam’s destruction also creates additional problems for Kyiv. The country was already running low on electricity before it lost the Kakhovka hydroelectric station. In addition, the reservoir provided cooling water for the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant. Without enough water, the plant could suffer a meltdown. The facility’s Ukrainian operating company anticipates that the reservoir should provide enough water for now, but water levels are dropping by about 5 centimeters (2 inches) per hour, according to the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In the early morning, it was at approximately 16.4 meters. Below 12.7 meters it becomes impossible to pump into the plant’s cooling circuits, giving operators just days to find a solution. The IAEA chief said that there was no immediate risk but that it was essential that a cooling basin remain intact to provide enough water to cool the idled reactors. In the event of a meltdown, radioactive material could travel several hundred miles – well beyond Ukraine – depending on the material and the weather.

Aside from nuclear risks, the dam explosion will have other lasting effects for Ukraine. The Kakhovka reservoir supplied an enormous irrigation system that supported Ukrainian industrial and agricultural production. Before the war, about 80 percent of Ukraine’s production of vegetables and fruits relied on this irrigation network. Rebuilding this system could take decades and add incredible sums to Kyiv’s already daunting reconstruction bill.

Last but not least, wildlife around the Dnieper River will be devastated by the disruption of their sanctuary. According to Ukraine’s presidential office, the destruction of the dam caused 150 metric tons of oil to leak from the dam mechanism, and another 300 metric tons could escape. A total dam failure would wash away much of the river’s eastern bank, according to the Ukraine War Environmental Consequences Work Group, an association of activists and professionals documenting the war's environmental effects. It is also unknown what other contaminants may be in the floodwaters. The picture should become clearer over the next five to seven days, when the water level is expected to start dropping. The dam's destruction is changing the military geography in southern Ukraine. But its fallout will be even broader, posing dire prospects for Ukraine's socio-economic recovery in the long term, given the importance of the flooded area for the country’s agricultural production
Title: At the Nord Stream Bomb Site, a Boot Used by US Military Divers Was Discovered.
Post by: G M on June 07, 2023, 06:08:28 PM
https://ace.mu.nu/archives/404806.php

Title: Zeihan
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 08, 2023, 10:25:22 PM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlrUkIRCSWI
Title: Who could have seen this coming?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 08, 2023, 10:29:37 PM
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/06/08/now-grant-ukraine-permission-to-strike-russia/?fbclid=IwAR13uH6-1anKJTy6OELC5zoX_C7d9eZN9rzpikafw1_5BgeFYpfqshqpBXQ
Title: Let's check in on the Ukrainen Offensive...
Post by: G M on June 10, 2023, 10:44:12 AM
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/anatomy-of-a-nato-planned-trained
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 10, 2023, 05:47:51 PM
Devastating news if true.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 10, 2023, 07:11:06 PM
Devastating news if true.

https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-war-scale-out-of-proportion-with-nato-planning-cavoli-2023-2
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 10, 2023, 09:23:18 PM
Devastating news if true.

https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-war-scale-out-of-proportion-with-nato-planning-cavoli-2023-2

https://sonar21.com/reality-is-settling-in-for-zelensky-and-his-failed-offensive/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 11, 2023, 05:18:38 AM
Business Insider is on my mental list of suss sites, but it does appear to confirm the Uke losses.

I appreciate to Sonar21 blogger being clear that was he passing along is pure smoke, so though it sounds possible/plausible not much weight can be given to it.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 11, 2023, 07:28:03 AM
Business Insider is on my mental list of suss sites, but it does appear to confirm the Uke losses.

I appreciate to Sonar21 blogger being clear that was he passing along is pure smoke, so though it sounds possible/plausible not much weight can be given to it.

Biz Insider is Dick1 for business.
Title: CokeRatsky admits Uke OOFensive has started
Post by: G M on June 11, 2023, 07:33:10 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/zelensky-belatedly-confirms-major-ukraine-offensive-has-begun
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on June 11, 2023, 07:58:15 AM
this is a bottomless pit

 :roll:
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 11, 2023, 08:12:16 AM
this is a bottomless pit

 :roll:

No, they'll move on to the next shiny object once Ukraine really collapses. Probably the next bioweapon release.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 11, 2023, 06:23:23 PM
"Dick1" 

?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 11, 2023, 06:30:17 PM
"Dick1" 

?

D1 AKA Defense One.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 11, 2023, 07:37:54 PM
Ah.
Title: Re: Let's check in on the Ukrainen Offensive...
Post by: G M on June 12, 2023, 06:30:27 AM
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/anatomy-of-a-nato-planned-trained

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/sitrep-61123-ukraine-reorients-and
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 13, 2023, 06:18:15 AM
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-releases-video-captured-german-tanks-us-fighting-vehicles-ukraine-2023-06-13/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=Newsletter&utm_campaign=Daily-Briefing&utm_term=061323
Title: As the National Security Kool-Aid drinkers realize they lost....Again
Post by: G M on June 13, 2023, 07:51:04 AM
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/unwinnable-war-washington-endgame
Title: Re: As the National Security Kool-Aid drinkers realize they lost....Again
Post by: G M on June 13, 2023, 01:23:30 PM
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/unwinnable-war-washington-endgame

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/democratic-backsliding/

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 13, 2023, 01:46:44 PM
Though he makes some good points, Col. MacGregor has not impressed me the times I saw him on Tucker.  Not someone upon whom I would rely to make even handed assessments.
Title: FP: What is US strategy?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 16, 2023, 11:32:45 AM
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/14/ukraine-counteroffensive-russia-war-biden-west-us-military-aid-weapons-strategy/?fbclid=IwAR1apz4GxK60aLTR50AXS21V8SiWYywBbCapOe9L0WF9lGCLN9tNRqDP9po
Title: credibility of this source unknown
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 22, 2023, 07:10:55 AM
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/sitrep-62123-russia-re-orients-to?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1351274&post_id=129527640&isFreemail=true&utm_medium=email
Title: So, who has the $6B?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 22, 2023, 08:00:49 AM
second

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-12217357/Pentagon-overestimates-value-weapons-sent-Ukraine-6-2-Billion.html
Title: D1: daily update
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 22, 2023, 08:50:11 AM
June 22, 2023   
         
Another bridge linking Ukraine to its Russian-occupied Crimean peninsula was attacked Thursday in what one Ukrainian official described as "a blow to the military logistics of the occupiers."

Location: Southern Kherson, bordering Crimea. Reuters reports Ukrainians know it as the Chonhar road bridge, and Russians call it the Chongar Bridge. "It is on a route used by the Russian military to move between Crimea and other parts of Ukraine under its control," the wire service reports.

Russian occupation officials say British-provided Storm Shadow cruise missiles hit the bridge, and promised to repair the damage, which you can see here, "in the very near future." The Associated Press has a bit more, here.

Counteroffensive latest: It's still a tough slog and will likely remain that way for some time. Ukrainian President Volodymir Zelenskyy seems to know this perhaps as well as anyone. This is partly why he spoke to the BBC Wednesday to encourage patience. "Some people believe this is a Hollywood movie and expect results now. It's not. What's at stake is people's lives," he said.

There are, however, some indications that Russian forces are taking heavy losses in certain places where Ukrainian troops are concentrating their efforts. But Ukraine is facing significant resistance, too. "If Ukrainian forces sustain too much attrition, the counteroffensive could culminate early," said Rob Lee of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, writing Wednesday on Twitter. "But, if Russia sustains enough losses, it could create the conditions for further Ukrainian advances," he noted.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on June 22, 2023, 09:44:00 AM

blah blah blah...>2050

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on June 27, 2023, 08:01:38 PM
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/06/27/ukraine-recaptures-donbas-territory-from-russia/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 27, 2023, 11:12:00 PM
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/06/27/ukraine-recaptures-donbas-territory-from-russia/

https://www.theburningplatform.com/2023/06/26/extermination/
Title: Cocaine snorting rat-faced dictator
Post by: G M on June 28, 2023, 06:24:20 AM
https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=852,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/141/533/699/original/eab3aa26ef8174f9.png

(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=852,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/141/533/699/original/eab3aa26ef8174f9.png)

He's doing that to protect their democracy!
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 28, 2023, 07:11:10 AM
Ummm , , , a bit simplistic perhaps?

There is a war going on , , ,
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 28, 2023, 07:14:27 AM
Ummm , , , a bit simplistic perhaps?

There is a war going on , , ,

Will that be the excuse here in 2024?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 28, 2023, 07:43:41 AM
I'm making a distinct point here, which is that the meme was written in a manner oblivious to the obvious counter arguments.  Thus, is serves only to accentuate the collective militant understanding of one faction.  Yes, memes tend to do this, but ideally they have wit and humor as well (see cf. Alinsky)  That said, this one serves particularly little purpose.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 28, 2023, 07:48:40 AM
I'm making a distinct point here, which is that the meme was written in a manner oblivious to the obvious counter arguments.  Thus, is serves only to accentuate the collective militant understanding of one faction.  Yes, memes tend to do this, but ideally they have wit and humor as well (see cf. Alinsky)  That said, this one serves particularly little purpose.

I think it makes clear what exactly he is. Governments love "states of emergency" to violate rights. CocaineManGood is not morally different than VodkaManBad.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 28, 2023, 08:07:11 AM
Who invaded whom here?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 28, 2023, 09:49:16 AM
Who invaded whom here?

NATO invaded for decades, against their word and the advice of many in the west.
Title: Re: Cocaine snorting rat-faced dictator-Tucker’s take
Post by: G M on June 28, 2023, 09:50:15 AM
https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=852,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/141/533/699/original/eab3aa26ef8174f9.png

(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=852,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/141/533/699/original/eab3aa26ef8174f9.png)

He's doing that to protect their democracy!
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 28, 2023, 01:09:52 PM
"NATO invaded for decades"

Seriously dude?  Berlin Wall?  Hungary 1956? Czechslovakia 1968?  Poland 1980?  Recognize any of these?  As a basis for East Europe nations wanting the protection of being in NATO?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 28, 2023, 01:46:37 PM
"NATO invaded for decades"

Seriously dude?  Berlin Wall?  Hungary 1956? Czechslovakia 1968?  Poland 1980?  Recognize any of these?  As a basis for East Europe nations wanting the protection of being in NATO?

Soviet Union? Not the same as Russia, just as the GAE isn’t the America we grew up in.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 28, 2023, 01:49:40 PM
Putin was Soviet KGB and now the "president for life" of Russia.

You make a distinction without much difference.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 28, 2023, 02:05:11 PM
Putin was Soviet KGB and now the "president for life" of Russia.

You make a distinction without much difference.

Putin is a product of that, but he isn’t a marxist.

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/how-vladimir-putin-helped-resurrect-the-russian-orthodox-church/article16361650/

If he was, the GAE would love him.

He is hated because he defends Christianity and opposes pedo-groomers.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on June 28, 2023, 02:07:57 PM
Might there be some additional reasons?
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on June 28, 2023, 02:11:06 PM
Might there be some additional reasons?

Well, Ukraine is where our Oligarchs like to do a lot of their criminal acts and launder money.
Title: Watch the whole video
Post by: G M on June 29, 2023, 01:43:45 PM
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/06/27/ukraine-recaptures-donbas-territory-from-russia/

https://www.theburningplatform.com/2023/06/26/extermination/

https://twitter.com/BowesChay/status/1673825546218663939

This could have been avoided, but we must protect Hunter's sweet, sweet Burisma checks and make the world safe for Drag Queen Story Hour!
Title: Re: These weapons will find their way to W. Europe and N. America
Post by: G M on July 02, 2023, 02:02:01 PM
https://twitter.com/imetatronink/status/1531639067330215936

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/02/ukraine-weapons-end-up-criminal-hands-says-interpol-chief-jurgen-stock


https://www.rebelnews.com/swedish_police_warn_that_weapons_sent_to_ukraine_could_land_in_the_hands_of_criminal_gangs

https://www.revolver.news/2022/07/psst-looking-for-a-javelin/

https://www.revolver.news/2022/08/even-cbs-news-asks-where-all-those-weapons-are-going/

https://www.newswars.com/french-rioters-filmed-brandishing-military-grade-weapons-as-unrest-grows/

Who could have foreseen this?

Good thing that can't happen here!
Title: Ukrainians suffering and dying for Hunter’s Burisma checks
Post by: G M on July 03, 2023, 02:55:15 PM
https://sonar21.com/judge-napolitano-and-i-discuss-prigozhin-plus-a-horrific-video-of-ukrainian-troops-trapped-in-a-minefield/
Title: We must defend Ukraine's democracy!
Post by: G M on July 04, 2023, 07:00:20 AM
https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=852,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/142/022/222/original/20e6fee35937e491.jpg

(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=852,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/142/022/222/original/20e6fee35937e491.jpg)

https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=852,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/141/533/699/original/eab3aa26ef8174f9.png

(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=852,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/141/533/699/original/eab3aa26ef8174f9.png)

He's doing that to protect their democracy!
Title: FA: Zelensky's fight after the War
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 04, 2023, 07:58:31 AM
If that meme accurately summarizes the facts of the case, then that is a very bad thing.

If inconvenient facts are left out, if is a very dishonest thing. 

In these times, who the hell knows?

Anyway, this is from Foreign Affairs, which definitely is a Trilateral Commission-Globalist outfit, but nonetheless whether we read it forwards or backwards, it raises considerations worth contemplating.

=======================

Zelensky’s Fight After the War
What Peace Will Mean for Ukraine’s Democracy
By Henry E. Hale and Olga Onuch
July 4, 2023
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/zelenskys-fight-after-war

Russia’s war against Ukraine has transformed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s image. Before Russia launched its full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, many regarded him as an untested figure whose former career as an actor and comedian did not inspire much confidence. After it began, however, he became—in former U.S. President George W. Bush’s judgment—“the Winston Churchill of our time.”

In the war’s first days, many Western observers assumed that Zelensky would buckle, flee, surrender, or die. Instead, he stayed in Kyiv and led Ukraine with resolve. His popularity skyrocketed. A July 2022 poll conducted by the authors and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology found that 65 percent of people in unoccupied Ukraine believed Zelensky to be the best man to lead the country to victory. The second most popular choice, former president Petro Poroshenko, had the support of five percent. Another 19 percent either said there was no difference between the politicians or declined to answer. More than 80 percent of respondents described Zelensky as intelligent, strong, and honest.

But when the war finally ends, Zelensky will face major challenges. Wartime leadership requires very different skills and capacities than does leadership during peacetime. Notably, Ukrainians are less confident in Zelensky’s leadership when they are asked to consider the future. In the same July 2022 poll, 55 percent identified Zelensky as the best person to lead the country’s postwar reconstruction, and the share saying there was no difference between him and the alternatives or that refused to answer was 28 percent. To overcome these potential misgivings, Zelensky will have to rebuild and fortify not only Ukraine’s cities and infrastructure but also its democracy. He will have to end the country’s tendency to shape government around personal patronage networks, which are prone to corruption, and craft an inclusive conception of patriotism. He will also need to respect the rules and the spirit of the Ukrainian constitution. Zelensky’s ability to meet these challenges will determine his country’s fate and the future of its democracy.


The Russian invasion rallied Ukraine’s vibrant, inclusive civic nation and strengthened an associated sense of duty and commitment to democracy. Data collected in February 2023 by the MOBILISE Project, showed that approximately 80 percent of Ukraine’s civilian population is involved in the war, through volunteering, protest action, or giving financial support. Others are putting partisan differences aside, uniting in support of the reforms that will be required by EU accession. These positive developments are threatened by Ukraine’s long-standing tradition of what is known as patronalism, which is the feeling that personal connections are necessary to get almost anything done, feeding distrust in the rule of law. This reliance on patrons cultivates deep personal connections among those in one’s own network, but it also spawns nepotism, reliance on bribes, and often violence when trust breaks down. Those in power have repeatedly taken advantage of this situation to create their own political machines that accumulate wealth and suppress opposition. Although the people have repeatedly risen up to thwart Ukraine’s most notorious power grabs, the country’s political class is still prone to corruption and the tendency to favor personal connections over democratic institutions. As long as there is a perception that “everybody does it,” these practices are likely to continue.

It is possible that the sense of unity the war sparked may dissipate when it ends. Of course, the Ukrainian government could replace it with a new sense of national purpose provided by Ukraine’s application to join the EU, which will give new impetus to much-needed reforms. But these reforms could generate enough opposition to drive the country back toward patronalism. EU membership, for example, will require a major adjustment for Ukraine’s businesses, for they will have to become aligned with EU regulations. It will also oblige Kyiv to take steps to eliminate corruption, necessitating extensive reforms of the Ukrainian judicial system. These reforms will put pressure on both ordinary citizens and elites, challenging the latter’s vested interests. Opposition from ordinary people whose businesses will be affected, and from elites whose interests will be threatened, is likely. Thus, the dangers of a return to patronal politics as usual are real. It cannot be guaranteed that the democratic gains the country has made will be sustained. It is possible, although not highly probable, that Ukraine may shift from the patronal democracy it has typically been in recent years—in which a significant amount of corruption has been leavened by a general commitment to democratic transfers of power when incumbents lose elections—to a more authoritarian or centralized system.

When wider political opposition to Zelensky’s government reemerges, as it is likely to do once the war ends, it is possible that Zelensky and his supporters may be tempted to protect their leadership by amassing power for themselves—even if the initial aim is only to push through reforms or rebuild the country. Such justifications have been used by leaders seeking to strengthen their rule in eastern Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere time and again. This kind of ramped-up “presidentialism” could set in motion processes that might undermine reforms. Already, some of Zelensky’s critics have interpreted his removal of the mayor of Chernihiv, Vladyslav Atroshenko, on abuse-of-office charges as a threat to local government. The same critics have charged that the Zelensky administration’s weakening of the country’s oligarchs masks an effort to gain this power for itself. And while it is too early to tell whether this interpretation of his moves is well grounded, the possibility must nonetheless be guarded against.


Zelensky’s far-reaching popularity itself could pose a threat to Ukrainian democracy.

Some of the actions that Zelensky’s government has taken to prosecute the war could also threaten Ukrainian democracy when peace is restored. For example, the February 2022 decision to consolidate most private television channels into a single state broadcaster was arguably necessary at the start of the war as the country struggled for survival. Such an action would be unjustifiable in peacetime. Zelensky’s critics in parliament—the leaders of the European Solidarity party in particular—as well as think tanks and NGOs such as Opora, Chesno, and the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, have publicly and privately voiced concerns that the president may be unwilling to give up this control when the war ends. No leader, after all, relishes being criticized or—as they see it—vigorously attacked and ridiculed, as happens in open societies. But if Ukraine is to continue to deepen its already vibrant democracy, these measures will have to be reversed when the war ends and the threat of Russian aggression is gone.

It is also possible that Zelensky’s far-reaching popularity itself could pose a threat to Ukrainian democracy. There is no one in Ukraine who has anything close to his stature and public support as a political leader. If this level of popularity is sustained, it could lead Zelensky to conclude that he needs to stay in power, effectively denying others the chance to gain the needed stature. Perhaps the greatest thing that U.S. President George Washington ever did, greater even than leading his forces to victory in the Revolutionary War, was to step away from the presidency at a time when he was still revered as a war hero and was far and away the country’s most prominent leader. He thereby set a precedent for the peaceful transfer of power. Shortly before being elected in 2019, Zelensky declared that a president should only serve a single five-year term. A strong case can be made that breaking this particular promise would not harm Ukrainian democracy, and could even bring stability in wartime. But if Zelensky wins re-election, the future trajectory of Ukrainian democracy may come to depend on whether he will abide by the country’s two-term limit. There is currently no indication that he would consider violating it.

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE NATIONALISM

The rise of civic national identity in Ukraine, an identity that places civic duty and attachment to the country above all else, is one of the great achievements of Ukrainian independence. This identity has been elevated and nurtured by Zelensky and consolidated by the war. Nevertheless, it has been consistently challenged by other visions of what it means to be a Ukrainian. One extreme alternative vision connects national identity solely to ethnocultural identity, according to which the concept of being a good and reliable citizen depends on speaking the right language, holding the right view of the country’s history, and revering the right cultural figures. To adherents of this view, those who do not share these ethnocultural traits are often regarded as a threat. The more nationalist proponents of this exclusive ethnocultural identity are a small minority. And those who could be considered liberal nationalists but who still promote a more ethnoculturally flavored patriotism in parliament, such as those in the European Solidarity party, are quick also to highlight the importance of civic national duty and the centrality of the state. In fact, for most politicians, even right-wing ones, civic and ethnocultural identities can be complementary much as they are in France.

Nonetheless, some politicians may seek political gain by capitalizing on or seeking to exacerbate these divides. There are many historical examples of countries that have been traumatized by brutal wars resorting to more exclusive definitions of the nation in an effort to wall off foreign influence. This happened among some of Ukraine’s western neighbors following World War II and the fall of communism. Such moves can lead to division, oppression, and internal conflict, weakening the country and opening up opportunities for exploitation. In Ukraine’s case, the risk, albeit very small, is that an illiberal nationalist movement can gain renewed support and push for the hardening of more extreme views of Ukrainian identity, according to which true national security and prosperity can only be achieved through some kind of ethnic purification.

Fortunately, there is no indication so far that such exclusivist forms of nationalism are gathering force. Rather, the war seems to have strengthened Ukrainians’ commitment to liberalism and to inclusive ideas of the nation. This has happened even as a strong grassroots shift has occurred toward speaking Ukrainian (many people in Ukraine speak Ukrainian and Russian). Indeed, bilingual citizens are increasingly distancing themselves from other “Russian” aspects of their identities. In fact, there is some evidence this shift is particularly pronounced among southeastern Russophone Ukrainians who are seeing this shift to Ukrainian language practice as an element of their civic duty to the state.

It will be essential for the Ukrainian government to sustain broad national unity as it pursues reform efforts, and Ukrainian reformers can look cautiously to Georgia for inspiration. In 2003, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili successfully capitalized on the optimism generated by the Rose Revolution to immediately and dramatically eliminate petty corruption throughout the government, including in the previously notorious traffic police as well as basic state services. Saakashvili’s brilliance was not so much to propose a technically impressive anticorruption plan as to convince millions that things would actually change, thereby setting in motion a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. Of course, Georgia’s history is also a cautionary tale, with other, high-level corrupt practices continuing. Ukraine needs an even more far-reaching reform effort. What Georgia shows, though, is that it is only when people are convinced that change is coming that they will alter their own behavior and adapt to the new expected reality. Formulating attractive proposals is relatively easy; convincing people that things will change is much more difficult.

The end of the war, whenever it comes, may offer Zelensky and the rest of the country just such a moment. The president will need to find a way to translate the population’s will to fight into an equally strong conviction that the old approach to running the country is no longer possible. And he must then follow through on his promises. The moment will come, and it must be hoped that he lives up to it
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on July 04, 2023, 08:23:43 AM
sounds exactly what Democrat President Woodrow Wilson did during WW1

almost never reported in MSM
Title: Re: We must defend Ukraine's democracy!
Post by: G M on July 04, 2023, 09:14:45 AM
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2023-000011_EN.html

Perhaps we should send some FBI Agents to educate the SBU on policing while respecting human rights and the due process of law!


https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=852,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/142/022/222/original/20e6fee35937e491.jpg

(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=852,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/142/022/222/original/20e6fee35937e491.jpg)

https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=852,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/141/533/699/original/eab3aa26ef8174f9.png

(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=852,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/141/533/699/original/eab3aa26ef8174f9.png)

He's doing that to protect their democracy!
Title: Re: Watch the whole video
Post by: G M on July 04, 2023, 09:33:20 AM
If the Uke soldier survives, as he sits in a wheelchair in the shattered rump state of what was Ukraine, at least he can take solace in all the westerners who put Ukraine’s flag on their social media accounts!


https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/06/27/ukraine-recaptures-donbas-territory-from-russia/

https://www.theburningplatform.com/2023/06/26/extermination/

https://twitter.com/BowesChay/status/1673825546218663939

This could have been avoided, but we must protect Hunter's sweet, sweet Burisma checks and make the world safe for Drag Queen Story Hour!
Title: Zelensky warns of possible nuke Gulf of Tonkin
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 05, 2023, 06:30:10 AM


https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/ukraine-preparing-nuclear-explosion-russian-reduces-zaporizhzhia-plant-presence?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1625
Title: Ukes blow up Russian ammo dump
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 05, 2023, 04:34:43 PM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/drones-easily-spotted-russian-arms-dump-near-a-city-where-piles-of-ammo-were-lying-in-the-open-ukraine-bombed-it-causing-massive-explosions-video-shows/ar-AA1dt9Fl?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=6aba72a93d76478aba2c5ed775e1e09a&ei=15
Title: 3,000 reservists to Europe
Post by: ccp on July 14, 2023, 08:15:07 AM
added to 80 K in Europe

 :-o

https://www.dailywire.com/news/biden-authorizes-pentagon-to-send-3000-reservists-to-europe
Title: OK, but then where are the other numbers coming from?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 15, 2023, 07:10:41 PM
https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/five-numbers-to-remember-about-us-aid-to-ukraine/?fbclid=IwAR2fREWEe9WMjrHk0zxUOy0gjQ5xWRxBOMJS6sJtG-Seh4LFfIOEyt-AaRU
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on July 16, 2023, 08:52:40 AM
Different perspective than what the media and NATO is saying

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/incredible-shrinking-nato (https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/incredible-shrinking-nato)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 16, 2023, 09:40:51 AM
Zero Hedge usually is :-D

Just skimmed it. Intriguing, though a red flag for me the assertion that the Stingers/Javelins did not work.  I thought they took out an excrement load of Russki tanks?

Edited to add:

"headed by a barely functioning senile old man whose furious outbursts are causing his cabinet members to shy away from the Oval Office"

Actually the stories I read had it as "aides", not cabinet members-- exactly the sort of error that I associate ZH with making.  I am signed up on its email list, and regular read its missives, but I do not assume it to be a paragon of journalistic precision.  Definitely pro-Russian.

Here is Zeihan on similar issues:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PXE3dM0ZAB0
Title: D1: Crimea bridge damaged
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 17, 2023, 08:09:04 AM
July 17, 2023   
         
Russia's bridge to occupied Ukrainian Crimea was attacked overnight, triggering traffic jams that threatened to slow Moscow's efforts to resupply its military in the 17th month of Vladimir Putin's Ukraine invasion.

Location: The Kersh Bridge. The Associated Press calls the $3.6 billion bridge the longest in Europe and a "conspicuous symbol" of Russia's illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula when Putin initially invaded Ukraine with a covert force in 2014.

Until it's repaired, "Russia will only have one ground supply line—the [coastal] highway on the Sea of Azov—to sustain (or evacuate) its tens of thousands of troops in occupied Kherson and Crimea if [Ukraine] manages to degrade/destroy the bridge," said George Barros of the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War, writing Sunday evening on social media.

Ukrainian officials have not officially confirmed their involvement. Ukrainian Security Service spokesperson Artem Degtyarenko said in a statement Monday, "We are watching with interest as one of the symbols of Putin's regime once again failed to withstand the military load."

Another Kyiv official was similarly coy in response. "The peninsula is used by the Russians as a large logistical hub for moving forces and assets deep into the territory of Ukraine," Andriy Yusov, a spokesperson for Ukraine's military intelligence department, said Monday. "Of course, any logistical problems are additional complications for the occupiers," he added.
=====================================

GPF:

By: Geopolitical Futures
Black Sea activity. Two drone boats exploded under the Kerch Strait Bridge early Monday morning, damaging one section and forcing Russia to close the bridge to traffic. The bridge links Russia to Crimea and is a vital supply route for Russian forces in southern Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Black Sea grain corridor, which since July 2022 had enabled the safe export of Ukrainian grains by ship, expired on Monday after Russia refused to extend it. A Kremlin spokesperson said Moscow would return to the agreement when its demands on Russian fertilizer exports and the removal of sanctions are met. Russia’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement that Russia had withdrawn its guarantees for safe navigation in the northwestern section of the Black Sea.
Title: Aid to Ukraine by country
Post by: DougMacG on July 21, 2023, 04:41:41 AM
https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/data-sets/ukraine-support-tracker-data-17410/
Title: Who is paying and how much are they paying?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 21, 2023, 06:58:56 AM
https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/data-sets/ukraine-support-tracker-data-17410/
Title: Russian strikes on Uke ports
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 21, 2023, 08:09:04 AM
second

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/putin-strikes-back-ukrainian-ports?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1351274&post_id=135284992&isFreemail=true&utm_medium=email
Title: Hmmm
Post by: Crafty_Dog on July 21, 2023, 08:29:49 AM


China and Ukraine. China’s vice commerce minister held talks with Ukraine’s deputy economy minister in Beijing. They expressed interest in expanding trade, including Ukrainian exports of grain, edible oil, minerals and industrial products and Chinese electronics exports. The Chinese minister also urged Kyiv to protect the rights and interests of Chinese companies in the country.
Title: Pravda on the Potomac begins to prepare us for bad news
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 14, 2023, 06:51:00 AM


https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/ukrainians-begin-despair-bloody-counteroffensive-yields-small-gains?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1744
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on August 14, 2023, 10:33:29 AM
I keep haring from pro Ukranian hawks "expert" analysts hat we could have won this if only we handed out what Ukraine really needs in weapons "to win this"

first it was tanks

then jets

then advance jets

now what?

yet I never hear them with specifics

weren't the same experts expecting Russian forces to trample over Ukraine ?

endless know it alls on cable

we should do this , we should do that......

do what ?  what in tarnation should be do - end them our whole stockpile of most advanced weapons they are not trained to use?

here we go again .  always underestimating the enemy when it is communists.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 14, 2023, 03:58:48 PM
Tragically, it looks like we here we right that it was feckless stupidity to mess with Rusia on its border.
Title: NRO: Ukraine rebuilding
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 29, 2023, 02:08:19 PM
https://www.nationalreview.com/the-morning-jolt/when-the-biggest-land-war-in-europe-since-wwii-comes-to-your-suburban-street/?lctg=547fd5293b35d0210c8df7b9&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=MJ_20230828&utm_term=Jolt-Smart
Title: Interesting read from NRO
Post by: Crafty_Dog on August 31, 2023, 08:48:54 AM
https://www.nationalreview.com/the-morning-jolt/the-front-line-starts-at-the-waters-edge-the-war-as-seen-from-odesa/?lctg=547fd5293b35d0210c8df7b9&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=MJ_20230831&utm_term=Jolt-Smart
Title: Re: Interesting read from NRO
Post by: DougMacG on August 31, 2023, 11:11:11 AM
Very interesting and pulls at the heart strings.

We aren't the ones making the biggest sacrifice.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on August 31, 2023, 11:35:40 AM
I like the reminder of the Potemkin steps and its history :

https://artsandculture.google.com/story/short-guide-to-the-potemkin-stairs-in-odesa-ministry-of-culture-and-information-policy-of-ukraine/TgXxjAsMz1d_QQ?hl=en

as great a scene in movie history as any other.

I posted once before my grandfather came from Odessa

and escaped the first revolution in '05.

amazing how Russia still dominates this region .

the country with endless strings of strong men leaders .

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on August 31, 2023, 12:08:32 PM
Did your grandfather from Odessa see himself as Russian or ukrainian?
Title: George Friedman disagrees with Gen. Keane
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 05, 2023, 03:19:40 PM

September 5, 2023
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
A Shift in Ukrainian Strategy
By: George Friedman
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced over the weekend that he replaced his defense minister with someone new – unsurprising, given the exhaustion the minister must have endured since the Russian invasion (and even before). Even so, the move is less about the concern Zelenskyy felt for his defense minister and more about the fact Ukraine has reached a critical stage in the war.

It is so critical, in fact, that a group of senior U.S. generals met with Ukrainian generals on the border with Poland. The meeting was held there to validate the claim that U.S. forces are not involved in Ukraine proper, which is both true and false. U.S. forces are not in Ukraine, but logistical support and strategic advice have been generous. Coupled with the defense minister’s replacement, the message the U.S. delivered was that Ukrainian strategy was going to fail, and a new strategy had to be adopted. Clearly, Zelenskyy listened.

Ukraine’s strategy has been brilliant, especially in the early stages of the war. Rather than attempting to block Russian advances with concentrated forces that Russia could destroy relatively easily, Ukraine distributed its force into small units, each granted a high degree of freedom. The point was to focus on the tactical level rather than create a single, integrated and centrally commanded force. It doomed Russia’s initial invasion. A massed force engaged and slowly attritted by much smaller forces made it impossible for Russia to destroy the Ukrainian army as quickly as it intended. The army’s knowledge and familiarity with the terrain it was fighting on enabled small teams to locate and engage Russian forces and then disappear like phantoms.

The hope was that a discouraged Moscow would simply reconsider its campaign. That didn’t happen; the Russian army instead spent a year trying to capture cities rather than destroying the Ukrainian army. Uncertain as the strategy was, it played to Russia’s strengths in massed forces and artillery. It had the added benefit of, in theory, destroying Ukrainian morale. But given the way the Wagner Group carried the campaign out, the subjugation of the cities took too long, and whatever psychological effects were possible quickly dissipated.

With Wagner now sidelined, the Russian General Staff is now in control, and it has devised a particularly sound, if unimaginative, strategy. In reverting to its earlier strategy, Russia is massing forces in order to force the Ukrainian army to fight and, in theory, lose. Moscow now knows the extent to which Ukraine will fight, and it understands the essence of Ukrainian strategy. The possibilities of a Russian victory are therefore higher, to some extent.

U.S. generals believed they could see things more clearly. To them, the time for diffused defense against massed Russian forces is over. The Ukrainian army is now blooded, equipped and experienced with weapons that are appropriate for the next phase of the war. The U.S. evidently thinks that if Ukraine does not change its strategy, it will be defeated. Washington is arguing for massing forces into one or two powerful thrusts to serve as an effective force. Given that it has access to artillery, drones and excellent intelligence, plus a battle-hardened force, the time has come to break the Russian offensive, drive through any gaps and threaten Russian logistics.

To me, there seems to be a small but obvious element of desperation in this move. Ukraine is not beaten, and though both sides are tired, one is defending its homeland and that may give it an advantage. I am reminded of the Vietnam War, where there was an element of teaching the Vietnamese to fight like Americans – i.e., massing and moving. But the Vietnamese were not as eager to fight as the Ukrainians clearly are.

I have no idea what the tone of the meeting on the border was. It’s hard to believe, but Americans don’t always resist others. More likely, they didn’t need to be briefed to know how to behave. In any case, with minimal knowledge of the situation on the ground, I think that a shift in the approach to the battle is needed. And I would guess the new defense minister does too.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on September 06, 2023, 08:03:03 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/corrupt-billionaire-behind-zelenskys-rise-fame-power-arrested?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1803
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on September 10, 2023, 06:26:40 AM
So the G20 is over, and the final communique did NOT criticize Russia over the war with Ukr. This suggests that the G20 countries had no consensus, as to whether Russia is to be blamed for the war. Support for Ukr is winding down.

- Agreed to by the US too.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on September 10, 2023, 04:00:57 PM
Zelensky preparing for Biden visit

https://twitter.com/i/status/1700548524100718622
Title: Who blew up Nordstream?
Post by: DougMacG on September 17, 2023, 03:08:56 PM
Analysis and new evidence seems to have gone silent amongst all these investigations. 

This is from June.

https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/who-blew-up-the-nord-stream-pipeline-suspects-and-theories.html

If Ukraine did it, then it can be judged in the context of war.

If the US did it, it seems a bit dishonest to be denying it.  We are in a Presidential campaign, judging and debating Ukraine support policy, and we don't even know one of the most important pieces of it.

https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/who-blew-up-the-nord-stream-pipeline-suspects-and-theories.html
Title: Ukraine, Russia withdraws Black Sea Fleet
Post by: DougMacG on October 05, 2023, 12:51:10 AM
https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-withdraws-black-sea-fleet-vessels-from-crimea-base-after-ukrainian-attacks-51d6d4f5
Title: Kirby: Uke aid near end of rope
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 13, 2023, 10:18:46 AM
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/kirby-bluntly-says-ukraine-aid-near-end-rope-wont-be-indefinite

ZH is a biased source-- not any background context here.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on October 19, 2023, 08:52:28 PM
Europe is outpacing the United States in aid to Ukraine. The Kiel Institute, which closely tracks contributions, estimates total European commitments from member states and institutions as of July 2023 to be over $145 billion, nearly double the United States’ total bilateral commitment of almost $77 billion.

https://www.gmfus.org/news/europes-ukraine-contributions-reveal-reliable-partnership-united-states
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 20, 2023, 06:04:29 AM


I'm all for it being 100%, but that is good to know.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on October 20, 2023, 07:49:05 AM


I'm all for it being 100%, but that is good to know.

A rare area of disagreement.  From my view, aren't we the largest 'country of Europe', the largest member of NATO, largest adversary of Russia, the ones who will bear the highest cost of it spreads outward, etc.  I don't know what the right amounts are for support and the lack of oversight on the money, but I like that these bold, unprovoked (I know we disagree on that) acts, Crimea 2014 and this now, have resulted in resistance, pushback, losses and quagmire for Russia. Next best thing to defeat IMHO.

If Europe is paying twice what we are, this is not a US war, it is not US vs Russia, and we are not being the world's policeman, and that is good.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 20, 2023, 10:57:17 AM
Well and reasonably argued.

That said, Ukraine is not part of NATO and Europe's economy is as large as ours.  Europe's chosen path of appeasement has much to do with how this war got started AND WE ARE BUSY ELSEWHERE even as some of Europe stabs our back by trading with hostile powers (China, Iran).  Yes I simplify, but sometimes that is a way of cutting to the chase.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 22, 2023, 04:34:15 PM
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/battle-for-avdeevka-close-study?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1351274&post_id=138120324&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&token=eyJ1c2VyX2lkIjo1ODg4MTI0MCwicG9zdF9pZCI6MTM4MTIwMzI0LCJpYXQiOjE2OTc5NDkyMzEsImV4cCI6MTcwMDU0MTIzMSwiaXNzIjoicHViLTEzNTEyNzQiLCJzdWIiOiJwb3N0LXJlYWN0aW9uIn0.Q_5u1NwOpgUx_Hc1wrOJz6xLXGq9U5WZC7brwRo7FzE&r=z2120&utm_medium=email
Title: Russian fleet withdrawing from Crimea
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 26, 2023, 01:54:19 PM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/the-russian-fleet-is-withdrawing-from-crimea-it-may-already-be-too-late/ar-AA1iTpJH
Title: George Friedman: Extreme Thoughts on Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 27, 2023, 06:38:27 AM
Answering Readers on ‘Russia, Ukraine and Thinking Extreme Thoughts’
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman

I normally try to reply to responses to my articles individually. This has become increasingly difficult as our readership increases and the thoughtfulness and complexity of the questions rise. However, in the responses to my recent article on how to end the Russia-Ukraine war, giving individual answers to every reader was impossible. I still need to answer them, so I will occasionally do it in later articles, like this one. I will focus on the most frequent criticisms and novel ideas. Of course, the fewer the criticisms, the more readily I can respond.

To remind you, I proposed a strategy for ending the Ukraine war. Its premise was that, given performance and forces, Russia could not overrun and occupy Ukraine. The second assumption was that Ukraine could not break the Russian army and reoccupy Russian-held territory. The third assumption was that U.S. weapons and sanctions directed at Russia would not have a greater impact on Russia now than in the past. In addition, the United States would not deploy ground forces.

Therefore, I argued that a military end to the war is unlikely. I argued that the war, like all wars, must end and that a non-military solution needs to be found. Given my premises this is obvious. The Ukrainians would not accept an end, as it could mean the loss of their homeland, in whole or in part. The Russians would not accept it because, contrary to several readers’ thoughts, Russia launched the war out of fear that a force in Ukraine would take Moscow. Separated from hostile forces by just 300 miles (480 kilometers), Moscow has not been so exposed in quite a while. Nations that start wars are frequently motivated by fear. Japan prior to World War II feared a U.S. blockade, depriving it of essential resources and enabling the U.S. to defeat it without a fight.

In the present conflict, no side has been able to find a basis for ending the war, but nor can they continue – and in this I include the United States. Obviously, only a radical solution, an extreme solution, is likely to work.

The U.S. needs to continue to block Russia from encroaching on NATO’s border. Ukraine must hold as much of its land as possible. Russia must demonstrate that it wasn’t beaten and take only a small piece of Ukraine. Therefore, Russia is the problem. It cannot agree to simply end the war.

At the end of World War II, Germany and Japan relented partly because of exhaustion, but also because fairly quickly the Allies allowed – even helped – them to rebuild. This was not meant to solve the problem but indicated that the U.S. did not mean to destroy them. Some readers have said this was only because these countries were totally devastated. I don’t agree. In war there is little fear of what you have already survived. There is dread over and hope for what will come, and that is what the Americans played on.

I am far from a bleeding heart, nor do I particularly like the Russians per se. But ending the war within the framework of the U.S. interest is very much in my interest.

The Russian people and the state have faint dreams of fully joining the advanced industrial world. They have been blocked by a lack of resources, lack of expertise and the war. Russia will in time overcome this, but rapid growth would influence public expectations and shift their views of their own government and the United States. After World War II, quite minimal U.S. efforts using native populations had a dramatic impact. A U.S. offer to aid Russia’s economic recovery may draw Moscow into a different policy. If not, then little is lost. But if so, it might bring about the end of this war. It is certainly possible that it will not work, but if it doesn’t, we can continue the war or find another solution. The Russians may welcome a new economic reality over continuing a war with little hope. But if we don’t offer this or something similar, the war will continue, as the Russians have not lost.

So this answers some questions and criticisms. These seem to me the most powerful criticisms of my last article. I will close with this: Beware of gridlock. When it breaks open, it goes all over the place.
Title: Re: George Friedman: Extreme Thoughts on Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on October 27, 2023, 07:06:28 AM
Very interesting.  Marc, what do you think about that?

I am stuck on moral grounds versus practical ones.  As stated previously, there are no good answers, so we must choose one of the bad ones.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on October 27, 2023, 09:32:06 AM
As we all have seen from what I have posted here of him over the years, GF is a deep thinker and IMHO this piece penetrates to deep essences.

I do have trouble with this:  "A U.S. offer to aid Russia’s economic recovery may draw Moscow into a different policy
And, I would like to see him connect what he says here with the implications of what he says for our dealings with the Axis of Evil.   Seems to me what he says has serious potential for being taken as weakness.

Should we go down this path, IMHO it needs to have requirements of the Euros to fulfill their 3% of GDP requirements! And that  doing so is a requirement for us to be obliged under Article 5.

Still, his analytical framework very much deserves being part of the national conversation on this.
Title: Ukranians stealing like last day on Earth
Post by: ccp on October 31, 2023, 08:26:54 AM
https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2023/10/31/zelensky-advisor-admits-govt-officials-stealing-like-no-tomorrow-as-biden-pushes-for-billions-more-to-ukraine/

Whereever there is US money being granted there is stealing.

 :x
Title: A Russian leaning source
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 02, 2023, 07:27:27 AM
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/time-magazine-profile-depicts-grim?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1351274&post_id=138367671&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=z2120&utm_medium=email
Title: Pro-Russian Analysis
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 03, 2023, 04:12:02 PM
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/zaluzhny-pens-oped-for-the-economist?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1351274&post_id=138536904&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=z2120&utm_medium=email
Title: The Meatgrinder Report
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 04, 2023, 05:25:12 PM

https://theconservativetreehouse.com/blog/2023/11/04/the-meatgrinder-report-u-s-and-eu-officials-gently-discussing-need-for-ukraine-to-enter-peace-negotiations-with-russia/

Not a stupid piece, but its implications in the context of Russia as part of the Axis remain unconsidered.
Title: Simplicitus: Ukraine needs to negotiate
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 06, 2023, 12:16:21 AM
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/western-officials-increasingly-pushing?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1351274&post_id=138584380&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=z2120&utm_medium=email
Title: GPF: Ready for negotiations?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 06, 2023, 12:47:02 PM
Ready for negotiations? The U.S. and European governments have held talks with Ukrainian officials on possible peace negotiations with Russia, according to a report from NBC News. The talks have reportedly included conversations over what concessions Kyiv might need to make to reach a deal amid concerns that the war has reached a stalemate and that Ukraine is running out of troops. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy acknowledged in an interview with NBC News over the weekend that the situation on the battlefield remains difficult and again called for more support on air defense.
Title: Zelensky: Not the right time for elections
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 07, 2023, 08:59:29 PM
https://www.oann.com/newsroom/zelensky-declares-its-not-the-right-time-for-elections-in-ukraine/
Title: WHOA!!!
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 07, 2023, 09:07:18 PM
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/marching-toward-a-night-of-the-long?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1351274&post_id=138684143&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&token=eyJ1c2VyX2lkIjo1ODg4MTI0MCwicG9zdF9pZCI6MTM4Njg0MTQzLCJpYXQiOjE2OTk0MTg0MjIsImV4cCI6MTcwMjAxMDQyMiwiaXNzIjoicHViLTEzNTEyNzQiLCJzdWIiOiJwb3N0LXJlYWN0aW9uIn0.QF_TK0V8ml_3NZT7teGtktCyS4mFZ2-CgwG9g-SO_DU&r=z2120&utm_medium=email
Title: Re: WHOA!!!
Post by: DougMacG on November 08, 2023, 06:38:34 AM
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/marching-toward-a-night-of-the-long?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1351274&post_id=138684143&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&token=eyJ1c2VyX2lkIjo1ODg4MTI0MCwicG9zdF9pZCI6MTM4Njg0MTQzLCJpYXQiOjE2OTk0MTg0MjIsImV4cCI6MTcwMjAxMDQyMiwiaXNzIjoicHViLTEzNTEyNzQiLCJzdWIiOiJwb3N0LXJlYWN0aW9uIn0.QF_TK0V8ml_3NZT7teGtktCyS4mFZ2-CgwG9g-SO_DU&r=z2120&utm_medium=email

They are nothing without western assistance. Makes you wish we had a President and that we had expertise in free and fair elections. Aid could be tied to free and fair elections, yes, even in wartime.

With Putin, we know he kills off his rivals. With Zelensky, I don't know that but the possibility is there.
Title: A pro-Russian opiner
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 13, 2023, 02:34:39 PM
Wild Day as the Ukrainian Game of Thrones Revs Up!
SIMPLICIUS THE THINKER
NOV 13

 




READ IN APP
 
The Ukrainian project is starting to come undone at the seams. What began as hints of brewing conflict has now turned into a full rift between the Ukrainian leadership and military staff.

A storm of new reports paint a dismal picture of a final desperate scramble for power.


⚡️ Minister of Defense of Ukraine Rustem Umerov is preparing submissions for dismissal :

- Commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Sergei Naev (may become one of the main defendants in the case that concerns the defense of the Kherson region in 2022);

- Commander of the Operational-Strategic Group of Troops "Tavria" Alexander Tarnavsky;

— Commander of the Medical Forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Tatyana Ostashchenko;

This was reported by Ukrayinska Pravda with reference to sources in the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

And:

Rumors are beginning to circulate that a major purge of the MOD is imminent. The new Minister of Defense Umerov is preparing proposals for the dismissal of the commander of the Medical Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine T. Ostashchenko Commander of the Operational-Strategic Group of Troops "Tavria" Alexander Tarnavsky Commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Sergei Naev. Earlier today, ex-People's Deputy Borislav Bereza, citing sources in the State Bureau said that Naev and the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valery Zaluzhny could be served with suspicions (of crimes).

Here’s Bereza’s post referenced above:


Keep in mind, in such a flood of reports it’s nigh impossible to corroborate or verify them all, but taken as a whole they represent a general sense of the urgent escalation happening behind the scenes.

From Rezident_UA channel:

Ukrainian sources write that Andriy Ermak will allegedly try to coordinate with the Biden Administration the replacement of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Zaluzhny, who is not satisfied with the Office of the President.

It was Zaluzhny who refused to begin the second stage of the counter-offensive with crossing the Dnieper and proposed to go on the defensive instead of offensive actions.

So Yermak/Zelensky are trying to coordinate with Biden to get rid of Zaluzhny, while other forces coordinate with Zaluzhny to boot Zelensky?

Ihor Mosiychuk, former Rada deputy and former Azov Battalion deputy commander, released a series of videos today speaking on the subject, which I’ve compiled below. He appears to confirm Yermak’s trip to DC to boot Zaluzhny:


In fact the drama and intrigue is coming to such a boil as to reach levels of absurdity most of us have never seen. A People’s Deputy in the Ukrainian Rada, Dubinsky—who happens to be in a major quarrel with the above Mosiychuk, as well—released this statement today on his official social media accounts. He openly calls Yermak “the real president of Ukraine,” begging Tucker Carlson to intervene, and even confirms yesterday’s wild theory that Zelensky is trying to contact Trump in order to get him to “unblock” Ukrainian aid via the Republican party which Trump is perceived to control:

I am publicly addressing journalist Tucker Carlson, who will not be afraid to cover the topic of political persecution of the only politician and former journalist in Ukraine, who openly spoke about corruption of the country’s senior officials and the facts of theft of US financial assistance through the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, in which deputies of the Servant of the People Party and officials of the Office of the President are involved.

Now the real president of Ukraine named Yermak is in the United States trying to convince the American government that there is no corruption in Ukraine, and to blame the theft committed by him and those from his circle on the scheming of “Kremlin agents.” He is also trying to arrange a telephone conversation between Zelensky and Trump in order to gain support in Congress for aid to Ukraine, which he and Zelensky are plundering.

I am the only one talking about this corruption, which is supported by numerous facts and journalistic investigations, and it is for this that they want to put me in jail on yet another trumped-up charges.

By joining our forces, we will be able to reveal to the world the truth about the gang of swindlers who captured Ukraine. Reveal the Ugly Truth that Yermak and Zelensky and their associates are trying to hide.

And low and behold, now there appears to be a treason case against Dubinsky who is said to have been visited by the SBU. Mosiychuk shortly released a new video claiming Dubinsky is under house arrest on orders of Yermak, presumably for the statements above, and that he’s under suspicion of being a Russian GRU agent with codename ‘Buratino’.


Are you shaking your head yet?

Continuing, last time I had referenced the Ukrainian ex-General Marchenko’s recent comments vis a vis Zaluzhny—which Mosiychuk also references above. Now you can see for yourself how in Ukrainian society, suddenly it’s becoming quite fashionable to begin conditioning viewers to the acceptance of Zaluzhny as president. Here on a popular network the host and Marchenko openly float the idea:


He says God grant that Zaluzhny becomes president, and they would both very much like that to happen. Do you see what’s happening, folks?

Now, there’s word that the CIA Director himself, William Burns, is heading straight to Kiev on Nov. 15th, under the obviously logical explanation that the purpose of the urgent visit is to convince Zelensky to freeze the conflict. Read the astute analysis below:

On Wednesday, November 15, CIA Director William Burns is scheduled to visit Kiev. The chief American intelligence officer will try to convince Zelensky that it is necessary to temporarily freeze the conflict and for now refuse to return lost territories by military means.

That is, in fact, Burns suggests Zelensky commit political suicide, because a truce and a freeze mean the complete and final collapse of his career. If the President of Ukraine agrees, there will be a carrot waiting for him: an honorary pension in Europe or the USA. If he refuses, they will use the whip: the Biden administration will turn on the spigot of military and financial assistance.

Most likely, Zelensky will refuse and will become a problem for the United States. And they know how to solve them; the history of South Vietnam will not let you lie. In principle, Burns’ visit is the last chance for Zelensky to return to the track of American politics. His resistance will mean that the US will begin to pursue a “freeze” line using more stringent methods.

Another thing is that this “freezing” is a temporary phenomenon. Any American administration - Biden, Trump or the bald devil - will never give up such a bridgehead on the borders of Russia, which is today's Ukraine. Its appearance is a great foreign policy success for the US. And Washington will fight to preserve it.

The US needs a pause in the war in order to solve its internal problems, put out the fire in the Middle East, try to find a status quo with China, and at the same time re-equip the Ukrainian army. Therefore, the war will continue in any case, the only question is with or without a break. Well, Burns will leave Kiev with nothing. But he will give Zelensky a black mark.

Recall that just yesterday a new ‘bombshell’ article from WaPo tried to sneakily pin the NordStream blame on Zaluzhny, by way of some stooge ‘taking orders’. It went out of its way to state that Zelensky ‘had no knowledge of what was happening.’


Interestingly, people pointed out how the information in the article was not particularly new, as an article from long ago had already outlined the same theories. So why resurrect this now?

It appears obvious that two competing factions are trying to outdo each other in the sphere of Western media. Zaluzhny fired his shot in the unsanctioned Economist piece, and it would seem that Zelensky backers are doing their own parallel counter-work.

So let’s summarize recent developments:

Zaluzhny’s aides are deleted, one by assassination

Large-scale new ‘house cleaning’ of entire general staff is reportedly announced from Zelensky’s side

Major media campaigns from both sides push urgent narratives of stalemates, Zaluzhny implying the war will be lost, and an eye-opening exposé on a ‘isolated’ and ‘messianic’ Fuhrer-bunker version of Zelensky

Zelensky suddenly cancels presidential elections, likely sussing the plan to promote Zaluzhny as challenger

Money spigot has still been turned off for the foreseeable future, with no realistic plans on horizon at the moment

Ukraine now catastrophically losing on virtually every front of the war, set to soon lose another major, strategically critical city

Many influential voices like Arestovich now openly push ceasefire

The ‘grim reaper’ CIA director set to pay visit, which only happens on eve of some major pivot or escalation. Diplomats and Foreign Secretaries are sent to ‘discuss options’ or ‘negotiate’—CIA directors are sent to deliver final threats of action

Now, much of the foregoing information is already being discussed elsewhere. But the one chief question no one else seems to be asking is the most critical of all: if factions in the West intend to replace Zelensky with Zaluzhny, then what is the actual purpose? What do they intend for Zaluzhny to do or accomplish that Zelensky cannot?

Some haven’t thought this through, and just assume that “Zaluzhny is a strong leader” and therefore is being made to replace Zelensky so that he can whip the military into shape and win the war. But why would Zaluzhny need to be president to do that? He’s already the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and that’s literally his job description.

So, logically speaking, the only possible explanation I can see making sense is that Zaluzhny is being chosen to sell the ceasefire to the people. Such a thing would sound more acceptable from the standpoint of a military leader and strategist who can explain that the situation is hopeless without time to recover and replenish the forces with an armistice. And more importantly, to sell it to the troops. Coming directly from the general the troops respected would make it far more palatable than coming from the sniffly, jonesing, headcase-in-cargo-pants.

But the problem is, this clashes with Zaluzhny’s own Oped where he pushed for more weapons and more war, and didn’t seem keen to accept any ceasefires, but simply warned that this would be the case if nothing was done. Of course, he could potentially twist that into complying with both antipodes by proposing that all those newfangled arms and robots he requested in his piece could be provided during a ‘temporary détente’, particularly one sold to the public with the added flair of some kind of NATO candidacy guarantee, etc.

This is speculation, but on simple logic, I can only assume that Zelensky’s brewing initiative to cleanse the ranks is aimed at getting rid of all ‘collaborators’ who may already be party to a growing Zaluzhny-helmed conspiracy to oust him. In short, he may be trying to decapitate all Zaluzhny loyalists to prevent the seizure of power by armed military coup in the near to medium-term future.

For the record, this announcement came from Alexey Goncharenko, high ranking deputy of the Verkhovna Rada:


On his official Telegram with over 250,000 subscribers he posted:

This week there will be procedural actions against the generals. Bankova makes her move.

And this was backed, as stated earlier by ex-Rada deputy Bereza who stated his own sources in the State Bureau of Investigation have corroborated the coming purge:

: Ex-Rada deputy Borislav Bereza throws in with Goncharenko. Says high level military firings are imminent based on his "sources within the State Bureau of Investigation"

Recall Russian intel bigwig Patrushev’s recent statement that there are people ‘waiting in the wings’ ready to take over power in Kiev, hinting at a coming military coup.

Today, soldiers from AFU’s 28th brigade said they’ll take up arms if Zaluzhny is arrested:

💥💥💥Ukrainian militants speak in defence of Zaluzhniy

The AFU men from the 28th brigade said that if the commander-in-chief is arrested, they will take up arms to rescue him💥💥💥

⚡️As they say, stock up on popcorn!⚡️


One final interesting observation is the angle of ‘corruption’ has been pushed very heavily by involved players. We’ve spoken about this before but there’s a reason MSM articles began to appear over the past couple months once again accusing Ukraine of being corrupt, and Zelensky specifically, airing various bits of dirty laundry on his regime.

Then Arestovich began to season the stew with a constant string of attacks, specifically, against Zelensky’s “corruption” and how this is the main issue plaguing Ukraine.

El Mundo:


Now, with his new pledge of support for Zaluzhny, ex-General Marchenko actually cited corruption as the main reason for this support; reminder:

Maj. General of the AFU Dmitry Marchenko believes that Ukraine needs a president with the experience of the French army Charles de Gaulle, who will defeat corruption, and this could be the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian troops Valery Zaluzhny - RIA Novosti

So it’s clear that the corruption angle can be used as the main tip of the spear against Zelensky, but the second part is that it could also potentially be used as one of the reasons to pause hostilities. For instance, Zaluzhny could take power and say “we cannot win this war with the vast corruption the previous Zelensky regime has bequeathed to us, so let us take this détente to clean up all the mess that Zelensky left, and in a couple years we’ll emerge as a glorious, sparkling European Nation™, by way of both EU and NATO membership, etc. It can be argued that it will take some time to clean all the deeply embedded rank corruption in all layers of the state which Zelensky putatively left.

Here’s one astute analysis on this angle:

More and more experts and heads of intelligence services around the world are inclined to think that without the removal, including by force, of the top military-political leadership of Ukraine in the spring of 2024, the process of Ukrainian settlement will not begin.

The list of those subject to care or arrest includes from 10 to 25 people who must absorb all the toxicity of the current political realities.

From the failure of the Istanbul agreements and the explosions of SP-1 and 2 to the death and emigration of 18 million citizens of Ukraine. While this option does not suit only the UK, active discussions on this issue have begun in the USA.

Since the summer, Europeans have been actively discussing the topic of corruption in the highest echelons of power in Ukraine. The Stratfor company conducted its measurements among top officials of the USA, Great Britain, Canada, Turkey, EU, UAE, Saudi Arabia on the topic “how would you feel about the forceful scenario of the departure of President V. Zelensky and his entourage?” The data showed that if the loss of Zelensky at the head of Ukraine leads to a long-term settlement of the Ukrainian-Russian armed conflict, 62% are ready to allow such a solution to the issue.

In connection with the understanding of these realities, the percentage of video messages from Vladimir Zelensky in a deranged state from a room with white walls will only increase.

But then there is one final part to the equation. All this only takes into account Ukraine’s angle, with the assumption that Russia will play ball and agree to a ceasefire. Let’s say Zaluzhny wrests power and follows the playbook as described above, then heavy international pressure on Russia to sign a ceasefire begins. And what if Russia says, unequivocally, no? That’s when things will truly get interesting, because I don’t think the West has thought that far, nor has any plan for what to do after that point.

The only thing that can happen then is either Zaluzhny, being the supposed pro-grunt sympathetic general that he is, could betray the West and effect a total surrender to Russia in order to save hundreds of thousands of more Ukrainian lives, or he will have no choice but to basically become Zelensky 2.0, taking the former leader’s place as doomed steward to the Apocalypse of Ukraine, taking the sinking ship down with him as Russia simply overruns and destroys what’s left of the stricken rump-state.

The only question is what will be the breaking point? One idea is that Avdeevka will be the straw on the camel’s back. Not only will it be difficult for Zelensky in general to cover up for that failure, but even the forces waiting to ramp up the coup against him may be awaiting that final moment so they can use his failure of Avdeevka to rachet up all the propaganda of ‘failure’ as a final blow to oust him. We can likely expect a torrent of articles and engineered resistance against him in that case.


The knives are out!


So that being said, let’s turn briefly to Avdeevka itself to see how close we may be to such a moment.

Latest updates indicate Russian forces have briefly switched to the southeastern direction and have made several important breakthroughs of as much as 700m into the industrial sector at the SE edge of the city proper:



Here’s how those battles actually look at the moment in that exact sector:


Meanwhile the north is consolidating its new gains into Stepove and the outlying ‘steppe’ of fields.


From Ukrainian sources:


The situation continues to get worse for Ukraine. They’ve resorted to fakes and provocations, as usual, posting videos of Russian losses from mid-October. Despite this, one frontline Russian source said that the losses are currently 1:8 in Russia’s favor:


Whether we believe that or not, the fact is Russia is advancing daily and it’s looking no different than the Soledar-Bakhmut slow-constriction process.

I’ve seen a recent pro-UA article claiming that coming winter conditions will be either equally bad for both sides, or even worse for Russia. That makes no sense; winter conditions will clearly be worse for the AFU because particularly in winter you need a constant supply of things like oil and gas for heaters, generators, etc. Food becomes more critical because human bodies burn much more calories each day in the cold. All these things under extreme pressure due to supply line fire control means the entrenched and surrounded Ukrainian defenders will be in excruciatingly miserable conditions.

Additionally, complete defoliation of tree cover will give even clearer line of sight to Russian fire-control capabilities and allow easier identification of enemy positions to pound out.

That being said, Russia is in no particular rush and is likely enjoying the current meltdown happening amongst Ukrainian leadership. At this pace Avdeevka could still potentially hold out another 2-3 months, depending how hard Russia presses in. Particularly if Ukrainian reports are accurate, which say according to their side that Russia does not yet have full fire-control over that one main MSR


They claim Russia has partial control by attempting to strike vehicles with FPV drones, something I discussed last time. But that’s not a highly secure or dependable form of fire-control. They still need to get closer to establish director LOS for true FC systems like ATGMs, tanks, or laser guided mortars, etc.

But at the rate things are going, it sometimes feels like it’s a race between Avdeevka and Ukraine as a state itself, as to who will collapse first.

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Title: Does Nikki Haley get this?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 14, 2023, 08:01:01 AM
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4305675-ukraine-is-waking-up-to-reality/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on November 14, 2023, 08:09:52 AM
"does Haley get this?"

good question

is Donbas worth another Vietnam or endless Afghanistan war?

Maybe to Ukraine but not to me or us IMHO



Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: G M on November 14, 2023, 08:19:40 AM
"does Haley get this?"

good question

is Donbas worth another Vietnam or endless Afghanistan war?

Maybe to Ukraine but not to me or us IMHO

https://www.forbes.com/sites/kavyagupta/2023/08/08/how-nikki-haley-built-an-8-million-fortune-and-helped-bail-out-her-parents/?sh=51daf39b7b4c

https://www.leefang.com/p/nikki-haleys-sudden-wealth-rooted

Nimarata "Nikki" Haley

Nimarata: From Hindi, meaning "Daughter of the American Military Industrial Complex". Probably.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 14, 2023, 10:15:52 AM
The Haley thread is the place for that, not here.  This is the Ukraine thread.

Title: And You Thought the Archduke Ferdinand Thing was a Mess …
Post by: Body-by-Guinness on November 14, 2023, 07:02:15 PM
I am astounded by what a hall of mirrors the Ukraine has become. The ostensive narrative is the US is there as part of a noble effort to assist the little guy in the face of Russian aggression, though that aggression likely would not have occurred had in not been for the threat of a new, potential, NATO member, namely Ukraine, adjoining Russian territory (or, for that matter, if Trump has seen a second term as, despite Progressive fables, he has credibility Biden lacks on the intestinal fortitude front, witness all the "Russian mercenaries" he had smoked in Syria). And it would not surprise me at all if Neocons embraced the whole admit-Ukraine-to-NATO notion in part to allow dotty, creepy uncle Joe to show he’s not soft on Russia like that wretched Donald Trump was, even though those with a firmer grasp of the international obvious made clear Russia would never allow a NATO member state to adjoin its territory.

And hey, I doubt dotty, creepy uncle Joe’s handlers took much swaying despite the warnings of those with a grasp on the obvious as the handlers had a flank to nail down: Ukraine (among other) corruption. Can’t have creepy, dotty uncle Joe succumbing to Hunter’s hamfisted shakedowns for the “Big Guy” and thus letting that awful Donald Trump say “I told you so” or, worse yet, return to the White House. So they opt instead to conceal past corruption with, wait for it, more corruption! But just because these folks ignored the obvious re Russia and backed the presidency of a dotty, creepy, corrupt septuagenarian on the fast track to the memory ward Joe, it doesn’t mean they are stupid. Completely.

Well maybe it does. But not 100 percent! They are at least smart enough to know that when concealing corruption with more corruption some sort of sleight of hand is required lest the credulous plebes catch on. And when palming cards on such a grand scale, garden variety half naked lass distractions simply won’t do: they need a freaking good v. evil war to serves as their version of buxom babe in spike heels and a g-string shaking her ta-tas as the deck gets stacked. How ‘bout that you people able to embrace the obvious, they figured, we’ll take your warning, raise you with the “free” world’s stock of munitions, and make lemonade out of your putative lemons, and no one will notice the corruption behind the curtain. See? We ain’t all dumb….

Of course corrupt Ukrainians can gaze past the curtain they helped raise, and know how to play the game: take the billions tossed toward their war effort, skim some off the top for their rainy day funds, kick some back to those that control the spigot just so they aren’t tempted to reduce the flow, all the while keeping the trump card in more than one sense up a sleeve: end the gravy train, or let the Russians win, and there might be some ‘splaining to do, most likely before the next election. It's not like any auditors are gonna wander around a war zone, and should one accidents aren't difficult to arrange.

What could possibly go wrong, beside other geopolitical foes less gullible than the average MSM reporter noting the house of cards being erected, grasping that the US has committed its munitions reserves to a new Big Muddy far removed from its strategic interests, all while being putatively led by a brain dead kleptocrat unable to navigate a press conference, let alone a significant geopolitical crisis? Add for grins and giggles an immense national debt, an intentionally porous border, an also intentionally non-productive underclass made so to inspire reliable voting behavior, institutions across the American landscape that at least half the population no longer trusts, among numerous other structural, institutional, and ethical crises facing the nation, and a geopolitical enemy would be a fool not to exploit it.

And when they do, and if we should survive the reckoning that ensues, and should those that emerge do so sans the illusions foisted by our political leaders and those in the media carrying their water, let’s hope the seeds of a republic as originally envisioned by this nation’s founders survive, and further hope that the justice those founders would visit upon all who brought us here land hard on all who deserve it.


 
Title: Simplicius:
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 20, 2023, 02:29:36 AM
Simplicius writes from a very distinct POV.  How much merit is there in what he says?

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/new-raft-of-articles-tighten-the?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1351274&post_id=138959073&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=z2120&utm_medium=email
Title: George Friedman: Remember Ukraine?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 21, 2023, 05:44:24 AM
ovember 21, 2023
View On Website
Open as PDF

    
Remember Ukraine?
By: George Friedman

Some of you may remember Ukraine. Just a few months ago, it was all the talk. Since then, war has broken out between Hamas and Israel, a potentially game-changing summit took place between the United States and China, and Elon Musk grabbed headlines again. Between the tragic and the absurd, we have somehow managed to routinize the conflict in Ukraine.

Routinizing Ukraine is not unreasonable; the war has trended in that direction. There have been many battles involving advances and retreats. But none of the movements or battles have been decisive, which means Ukraine continues to fight for its survival. None of the fears the participants had about entering the war in the first place are illegitimate. And the stakes – a potential redefining of Europe – technically remain in place.

Wars in which all sides have reasonable fears are the most dangerous. No side can quit, and until one side achieves an overwhelming advantage and imposes a new reality, the war must go on even if the losses are difficult to endure. Absent an overwhelming advantage, compromise becomes necessary, but it can be equally hard. In this war, there are still expectations that Russia will destroy the Ukrainian army and force the U.S. to silence its guns. This has not happened. The primary reason is that Russia is short on troops, and since drafting them into service is extremely unpopular, Moscow has had to improve its recruitment, relying on large bounties for enlistees – some 12,000 rubles ($137), according to the Atlantic Council – and asking for donations from a sympathetic public to purchase equipment. Mints are a major weapon of war, and it’s unclear if Moscow is printing any more money. The fear of inflation is likely a consideration.

Things are difficult for Ukraine too. The army has had little success in the field lately, and Poland has blocked trucks from crossing its border with Ukraine. This is not trivial. Poland has been deeply anti-Russian for years, has been one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters, and agreed to be a base for U.S. and European weapon transfers into Ukraine. Poland has not abandoned Ukraine entirely; the source of the border dispute is a perception that Ukrainian carriers are unfair competition for their Polish counterparts. In peacetime, this is a reasonable issue. In wartime, it is not. How much this will affect the Ukrainian economy is unclear, but it will certainly affect morale, and it will likely make the U.S. wonder whether its de facto supply depot will allow weapons to go to Ukraine in the coming months. (For its part, Russia will correctly see this as a sign of weakness.)

It is in this context that U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin arrived in Ukraine to declare that Washington still stands behind its ally. Though the exact purpose of Austin’s visit is unclear, it’s never a good sign when an ally has to declare its continued support under unknown circumstances. In truth, Austin is there in his capacity as a Cabinet member and political figure, not a general, and speaking on behalf of his government, he will likely note that Ukraine is in as bad a position as Russia. They are losing options – both in their desired outcomes and in their ability to wage war.

And though I don’t have any personal knowledge of the matter, I assume Kyiv will try to negotiate an end to the conflict. I suspect this would not be a problem for many Ukrainians. The end of the war would have to give Russia some increased buffer zone without bringing it too close to the NATO countries on the border with Ukraine. Ukraine will not win, nor will Russia. Clearly there are talks underway at some level between Russia and the United States. Whether my solution has merit is dubious. That we are near the end of the war (expressed in months) is not. Perhaps the world’s relative indifference to Ukraine and Russia will send a signal to both.
Title: Where are the M1 Abrams?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on November 23, 2023, 08:10:44 PM
IIRC the military advised these weren't really necessary, that they used jet fuel instead of normal tank fuel or something like that but the Germans said they weren't sending their tanks (Leopolds?) unless we sent Abrams.  TARFU.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/why-ukraine-hasn-t-been-using-its-dozens-of-powerful-us-abrams-tanks/ar-AA1kpLcU?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=2789a6ec47ba4ee9b99191f933a0c8ea&ei=29
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ya on December 02, 2023, 12:12:55 PM
Ongoing discussions between Ukr-Russia, per Seymour Hersh

"Russia would be left with unchallenged control of Crimea and, pending an election to be held under martial law in March, with essential control of the four provinces, or oblasts, that Russia annexed last year: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and the still embattled Kherson. In return—in a concession not foreseen—Russia, that is, Putin himself, would not object to Ukraine joining NATO."

(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GAW_hPpXkAE224S?format=jpg&name=small)
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 02, 2023, 12:20:51 PM
Off the top of my head that seems rather workable.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on December 03, 2023, 07:55:46 AM
Thanks for posting the map with it ya. The geography of those regions makes sense for Russia.

Free, fair, secret ballot elections in those oblasts under (internationally supervised) martial law could determine their future allegiance, that makes some sense.

The concession of NATO membership for the remainder is a big deal for Russia.

Do we want (remainder of) Ukraine in NATO?   

We get the obligation of defending them in exchange for their help defending us, (if Canada attacks)?

I see it in deterrence, Russia stops there, but if it happens we are bound by treaty (Article 5?) to defend the member state?

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 03, 2023, 08:55:44 AM
The Ukes into NATO would seem to give a plausible guarantee against further Russian adventurism.

Title: Klitscho
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 03, 2023, 08:50:15 PM


https://www.foxnews.com/world/klitschko-jabs-zelenskyy-claims-ukraine-becoming-authoritarian?fbclid=IwAR2uh1xr57GxPvF1WQ9P2Vwf3Mido4LdzBHgjyx_0fG9u0WbsdjPiYAqunQ
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 05, 2023, 02:34:14 AM
Can someone access this please?

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-us-planning-russia-war/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on December 05, 2023, 05:38:37 AM
Can someone access this please?

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-us-planning-russia-war/

STALEMATE: UKRAINE’S FAILED COUNTEROFFENSIVE
Miscalculations, divisions marked offensive planning by U.S., Ukraine

By Washington Post Staff
December 4, 2023 at 6:00 a.m. EST

(Illustration by Emily Sabens/The Washington Post; Amanda Andrade-Rhoades for The Washington Post; Gavriil Grigorov/AFP/Getty Images; Simon Wohlfahrt/AFP/Getty Images; Demetrius Freeman/The Washington Post; Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post; Ed Ram for The Washington Post; iStock)

On June 15, in a conference room at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, flanked by top U.S. commanders, sat around a table with his Ukrainian counterpart, who was joined by aides from Kyiv. The room was heavy with an air of frustration.

Austin, in his deliberate baritone, asked Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov about Ukraine’s decision-making in the opening days of its long-awaited counteroffensive, pressing him on why his forces weren’t using Western-supplied mine-clearing equipment to enable a larger, mechanized assault, or using smoke to conceal their advances. Despite Russia’s thick defensive lines, Austin said, the Kremlin’s troops weren’t invincible.

This is the first of two parts examining the Ukrainian counteroffensive that launched in June. Read the second part, describing how the counteroffensive unfolded, here.
Part one:
Reported by Michael Birnbaum, Karen DeYoung, Alex Horton, John Hudson, Isabelle Khurshudyan, Mary Ilyushina, Dan Lamothe, Greg Miller, Siobhan O’Grady, Kostiantyn Khudov, Serhii Korolchuk, Ellen Nakashima, Emily Rauhala, Missy Ryan and David L. Stern.
Written by Missy Ryan.
Over three months, reporters in Washington, London, Brussels and Riga, Latvia, as well as in Kyiv and near the front lines in Ukraine, spoke to more than 30 senior officials from Ukraine, the United States and European nations to examine the military planning behind the counteroffensive and how that contributed to the operation failing to achieve its goals. The Post spoke to former Russian service members who had fought in the war, as well as Russian war bloggers and analysts.
Washington Post reporters, photographers, news assistants and security advisers drove hundreds of miles throughout Ukraine to speak to soldiers and government officials for this series. Journalists made numerous front-line visits in the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions, including in embeds with combat units within five miles of Russian forces.
End of carousel
Reznikov, a bald, bespectacled lawyer, said Ukraine’s military commanders were the ones making those decisions. But he noted that Ukraine’s armored vehicles were being destroyed by Russian helicopters, drones and artillery with every attempt to advance. Without air support, he said, the only option was to use artillery to shell Russian lines, dismount from the targeted vehicles and proceed on foot.

“We can’t maneuver because of the land-mine density and tank ambushes,” Reznikov said, according to an official who was present.

The meeting in Brussels, less than two weeks into the campaign, illustrates how a counteroffensive born in optimism has failed to deliver its expected punch, generating friction and second-guessing between Washington and Kyiv and raising deeper questions about Ukraine’s ability to retake decisive amounts of territory.

As winter approaches, and the front lines freeze into place, Ukraine’s most senior military officials acknowledge that the war has reached a stalemate.

This examination of the lead-up to Ukraine’s counteroffensive is based on interviews with more than 30 senior officials from Ukraine, the United States and European nations. It provides new insights and previously unreported details about America’s deep involvement in the military planning behind the counteroffensive and the factors that contributed to its disappointments. The second part of this two-part account examines how the battle unfolded on the ground over the summer and fall, and the widening fissures between Washington and Kyiv. Some of the officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive deliberations.

Key elements that shaped the counteroffensive and the initial outcome include:

● Ukrainian, U.S. and British military officers held eight major tabletop war games to build a campaign plan. But Washington miscalculated the extent to which Ukraine’s forces could be transformed into a Western-style fighting force in a short period — especially without giving Kyiv air power integral to modern militaries.

● U.S. and Ukrainian officials sharply disagreed at times over strategy, tactics and timing. The Pentagon wanted the assault to begin in mid-April to prevent Russia from continuing to strengthen its lines. The Ukrainians hesitated, insisting they weren’t ready without additional weapons and training.

● U.S. military officials were confident that a mechanized frontal attack on Russian lines was feasible with the troops and weapons that Ukraine had. The simulations concluded that Kyiv’s forces, in the best case, could reach the Sea of Azov and cut off Russian troops in the south in 60 to 90 days.

● The United States advocated a focused assault along that southern axis, but Ukraine’s leadership believed its forces had to attack at three distinct points along the 600-mile front, southward toward both Melitopol and Berdyansk on the Sea of Azov and east toward the embattled city of Bakhmut.

● The U.S. intelligence community had a more downbeat view than the U.S. military, assessing that the offensive had only a 50-50 chance of success given the stout, multilayered defenses Russia had built up over the winter and spring.

● Many in Ukraine and the West underestimated Russia’s ability to rebound from battlefield disasters and exploit its perennial strengths: manpower, mines and a willingness to sacrifice lives on a scale that few other countries can countenance.

● As the expected launch of the offensive approached, Ukrainian military officials feared they would suffer catastrophic losses — while American officials believed the toll would ultimately be higher without a decisive assault.

The year began with Western resolve at its peak, Ukrainian forces highly confident and President Volodymyr Zelensky predicting a decisive victory. But now, there is uncertainty on all fronts. Morale in Ukraine is waning. International attention has been diverted to the Middle East. Even among Ukraine’s supporters, there is growing political reluctance to contribute more to a precarious cause. At almost every point along the front, expectations and results have diverged as Ukraine has shifted to a slow-moving dismounted slog that has retaken only slivers of territory.

“We wanted faster results,” Zelensky said in an interview with the Associated Press last week. “From that perspective, unfortunately, we did not achieve the desired results. And this is a fact.”

Together, all these factors make victory for Ukraine far less likely than years of war and destruction.

The campaign’s inconclusive and discouraging early months pose sobering questions for Kyiv’s Western backers about the future, as Zelensky — supported by an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians — vows to fight until Ukraine restores the borders established in its 1991 independence from the Soviet Union.

“That’s going to take years and a lot of blood,” a British security official said, if it’s even possible. “Is Ukraine up for that? What are the manpower implications? The economic implications? Implications for Western support?”

The year now stands to end with Russian President Vladimir Putin more certain than ever that he can wait out a fickle West and fully absorb the Ukrainian territory already seized by his troops.

Gaming out the battle plan
In a conference call in the late fall of 2022, after Kyiv had won back territory in the north and south, Austin spoke with Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s top military commander, and asked him what he would need for a spring offensive. Zaluzhny responded that he required 1,000 armored vehicles and nine new brigades, trained in Germany and ready for battle.

“I took a big gulp,” Austin said later, according to an official with knowledge of the call. “That’s near-impossible,” he told colleagues.

In the first months of 2023, military officials from Britain, Ukraine and the United States concluded a series of war games at a U.S. Army base in Wiesbaden, Germany, where Ukrainian officers were embedded with a newly established command responsible for supporting Kyiv’s fight.

The sequence of eight high-level tabletop exercises formed the backbone for the U.S.-enabled effort to hone a viable, detailed campaign plan, and to determine what Western nations would need to provide to give it the means to succeed.

“We brought all the allies and partners together and really squeezed them hard to get additional mechanized vehicles,” a senior U.S. defense official said.

During the simulations, each of which lasted several days, participants were designated to play the part either of Russian forces — whose capabilities and behavior were informed by Ukrainian and allied intelligence — or Ukrainian troops and commanders, whose performance was bound by the reality that they would be facing serious constraints in manpower and ammunition.

Russia held these Ukrainian teens captive. Their testimonies could be used against Putin.

The planners ran the exercises using specialized war-gaming software and Excel spreadsheets — and, sometimes, simply by moving pieces around on a map. The simulations included smaller component exercises that each focused on a particular element of the fight — offensive operations or logistics. The conclusions were then fed back into the evolving campaign plan.

Top officials including Gen. Mark A. Milley, then chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Col. Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, commander of Ukrainian ground forces, attended several of the simulations and were briefed on the results.

During one visit to Wiesbaden, Milley spoke with Ukrainian special operations troops — who were working with American Green Berets — in the hope of inspiring them ahead of operations in enemy-controlled areas.

“There should be no Russian who goes to sleep without wondering if they’re going to get their throat slit in the middle of the night,” Milley said, according to an official with knowledge of the event. “You gotta get back there, and create a campaign behind the lines.”

Ukrainian officials hoped the offensive could re-create the success of the fall of 2022, when they recovered parts of the Kharkiv region in the northeast and the city of Kherson in the south in a campaign that surprised even Ukraine’s biggest backers. Again, their focus would be in more than one place.

But Western officials said the war games affirmed their assessment that Ukraine would be best served by concentrating its forces on a single strategic objective — a massed attack through Russian-held areas to the Sea of Azov, severing the Kremlin’s land route from Russia to Crimea, a critical supply line.

The rehearsals gave the United States the opportunity to say at several points to the Ukrainians, “I know you really, really, really want to do this, but it’s not going to work,” one former U.S. official said.

At the end of the day, though, it would be Zelensky, Zaluzhny and other Ukrainian leaders who would make the decision, the former official noted.

Officials tried to assign probabilities to different scenarios, including a Russian capitulation — deemed a “really low likelihood” — or a major Ukrainian setback that would create an opening for a major Russian counterattack — also a slim probability.

“Then what you’ve got is the reality in the middle, with degrees of success,” a British official said.

The most optimistic scenario for cutting the land bridge was 60 to 90 days. The exercises also predicted a difficult and bloody fight, with losses of soldiers and equipment as high as 30 to 40 percent, according to U.S. officials.

Key findings from our reporting on Ukraine’s counteroffensive
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The United States was deeply involved in the military planning behind the operation. Ukrainian, U.S. and British military officers held eight major tabletop war games to build a campaign plan.
U.S. and Ukrainian officials sharply disagreed at times over strategy, tactics and timing.
The Pentagon wanted the assault to begin in mid-April to prevent Russia from continuing to strengthen its lines. The Ukrainians hesitated, insisting they weren’t ready without additional weapons and more training. The counteroffensive began in June.
U.S. military officials were confident that a mass, mechanized frontal attack along one axis in the south of Ukraine would lead to a decisive breakthrough. Ukraine attacked along three axes, believing that would stretch Russian forces. Ukraine abandoned large, mechanized assaults when it suffered serious losses in the first days of the campaign.
The wargame simulations concluded that Kyiv’s forces, in the best case, could reach the Sea of Azov in the south of Ukraine and cut off Russian troops in 60 to 90 days. Ukrainian forces have advanced only about 12 miles. The Sea of Azov is still far out of reach. Ukraine’s top commander now acknowledges that the war has reached a “stalemate.”
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American military officers had seen casualties come in far lower than estimated in the major battles of Iraq and Afghanistan. They considered the estimates a starting point for planning medical care and battlefield evacuation so that losses never reached the projected levels.

The numbers “can be sobering,” the senior U.S. defense official said. “But they never are as high as predicted, because we know we have to do things to make sure we don’t.”

U.S. officials also believed that more Ukrainian troops would ultimately be killed if Kyiv failed to mount a decisive assault and the conflict became a drawn-out war of attrition.

But they acknowledged the delicacy of suggesting a strategy that would entail significant losses, no matter the final figure.

“It was easy for us to tell them in a tabletop exercise, ‘Okay, you’ve just got to focus on one place and push really hard,’” a senior U.S. official said. “They were going to lose a lot of people and they were going to lose a lot of the equipment.”

Those choices, the senior official said, become “much harder on the battlefield.”

On that, a senior Ukrainian military official agreed. War-gaming “doesn’t work,” the official said in retrospect, in part because of the new technology that was transforming the battlefield. Ukrainian soldiers were fighting a war unlike anything NATO forces had experienced: a large conventional conflict, with World World I-style trenches overlaid by omnipresent drones and other futuristic tools — and without the air superiority the U.S. military has had in every modern conflict it has fought.

“All these methods … you can take them neatly and throw them away, you know?” the senior Ukrainian said of the war-game scenarios. “And throw them away because it doesn’t work like that now.”

Disagreements about deployments
The Americans had long questioned the wisdom of Kyiv’s decision to keep forces around the besieged eastern city of Bakhmut.

Ukrainians saw it differently. “Bakhmut holds” had become shorthand for pride in their troops’ fierce resistance against a bigger enemy. For months, Russian and Ukrainian artillery had pulverized the city. Soldiers killed and wounded one another by the thousands to make gains measured sometimes by city blocks.

The city finally fell to Russia in May.

Before-and-after images of the destroyed Ukrainian city of Bakhmut

Zelensky, backed by his top commander, stood firm about the need to retain a major presence around Bakhmut and strike Russian forces there as part of the counteroffensive. To that end, Zaluzhny maintained more forces near Bakhmut than he did in the south, including the country’s most experienced units, U.S. officials observed with frustration.

Ukrainian officials argued that they needed to sustain a robust fight in the Bakhmut area because otherwise Russia would try to reoccupy parts of the Kharkiv region and advance in Donetsk — a key objective for Putin, who wants to seize that whole region.

“We told [the Americans], ‘If you assumed the seats of our generals, you’d see that if we don’t make Bakhmut a point of contention, [the Russians] would,’” one senior Ukrainian official said. “We can’t let that happen.”

In addition, Zaluzhny envisioned making the formidable length of the 600-mile front a problem for Russia, according to the senior British official. The Ukrainian general wanted to stretch Russia’s much larger occupying force — unfamiliar with the terrain and already facing challenges with morale and logistics — to dilute its fighting power.

Western officials saw problems with that approach, which would also diminish the firepower of Ukraine’s military at any single point of attack. Western military doctrine dictated a concentrated push toward a single objective.

The Americans yielded, however.

“They know the terrain. They know the Russians,” said a senior U.S. official. “It’s not our war. And we had to kind of sit back into that.”

The weapons Kyiv needed
On Feb. 3, Jake Sullivan, President Biden’s national security adviser, called together the administration’s top national security officials to review the counteroffensive plan.

The White House’s subterranean Situation Room was being renovated, so the top echelons of the State, Defense and Treasury departments, along with the CIA, gathered in a secure conference room in the adjacent Eisenhower Executive Office Building.

Most were already familiar with Ukraine’s three-pronged approach. The goal was for Biden’s senior advisers to voice their approval or reservations to one another and try to reach consensus on their joint advice to the president.

The questions posed by Sullivan were simple, said a person who attended. First, could Washington and its partners successfully prepare Ukraine to break through Russia’s heavily fortified defenses?

And then, even if the Ukrainians were prepared, “could they actually do it?”

Milley, with his ever-ready green maps of Ukraine, displayed the potential axes of attack and the deployment of Ukrainian and Russian forces. He and Austin explained their conclusion that “Ukraine, to be successful, needed to fight a different way,” one senior administration official closely involved in the planning recalled.

Ukraine’s military, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, had become a defensive force. Since 2014 it had focused on a grinding but low-level fight against Russian-backed forces in the eastern Donbas region. To orchestrate a large-scale advance would require a significant shift in its force structure and tactics.

The planning called for wider and better Western training, which up to that point had focused on teaching small groups and individuals to use Western-provided weapons. Thousands of troops would be instructed in Germany in large unit formations and U.S.-style battlefield maneuvers, whose principles dated to World War II. For American troops, training in what was known as “combined arms” operations often lasted more than a year. The Ukraine plan proposed condensing that into a few months.

Instead of firing artillery, then “inching forward” and firing some more, the Ukrainians would be “fighting and shooting at the same time,” with newly trained brigades moving forward with armored vehicles and artillery support “in a kind of symphonic way,” the senior administration official said.

The Biden administration announced in early January that it would send Bradley Fighting Vehicles; Britain agreed to transfer 14 Challenger tanks. Later that month, after a grudging U.S. announcement that it would provide top-line Abrams M1 tanks by the fall, Germany and other NATO nations pledged hundreds of German-made Leopard tanks in time for the counteroffensive.

A far bigger problem was the supply of 155mm shells, which would enable Ukraine to compete with Russia’s vast artillery arsenal. The Pentagon calculated that Kyiv needed 90,000 or more a month. While U.S. production was increasing, it was barely more than a tenth of that.

“It was just math,” the former senior official said. “At a certain point, we just wouldn’t be able to provide them.”

As Ukraine flies through artillery rounds, U.S. races to keep up

Sullivan laid out options. South Korea had massive quantities of the U.S.-provided munitions, but its laws prohibited sending weapons to war zones. The Pentagon calculated that about 330,000 155mm shells could be transferred by air and sea within 41 days if Seoul could be persuaded.

Senior administration officials had been speaking with counterparts in Seoul, who were receptive as long as the provision was indirect. The shells began to flow at the beginning of the year, eventually making South Korea a larger supplier of artillery ammunition for Ukraine than all European nations combined.

The more immediate alternative would entail tapping the U.S. military’s arsenal of 155mm shells that, unlike the South Korean variant, were packed with cluster munitions. The Pentagon had thousands of them, gathering dust for decades. But Secretary of State Antony Blinken balked.

Inside the warhead of those cluster weapons, known officially as Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions, or DPICMs, were dozens of bomblets that would scatter across a wide area. Some would inevitably fail to explode, posing a long-term danger to civilians, and 120 countries — including most U.S. allies but not Ukraine or Russia — had signed a treaty banning them. Sending them would cost the United States some capital on the war’s moral high ground.

In the face of Blinken’s strong objections, Sullivan tabled consideration of DPICMs. They would not be referred to Biden for approval, at least for now.

Can Ukraine win?
With the group agreeing that the United States and allies could provide what they believed were the supplies and training Ukraine needed, Sullivan faced the second part of the equation: Could Ukraine do it?

Zelensky, on the war’s first anniversary in February, had boasted that 2023 would be a “year of victory.” His intelligence chief had decreed that Ukrainians would soon be vacationing in Crimea, the peninsula that Russia had illegally annexed in 2014. But some in the U.S. government were less than confident.

U.S. intelligence officials, skeptical of the Pentagon’s enthusiasm, assessed the likelihood of success at no better than 50-50. The estimate frustrated their Defense Department counterparts, especially those at U.S. European Command, who recalled the spies’ erroneous prediction in the days before the 2022 invasion that Kyiv would fall to the Russians within days.

Some defense officials observed caustically that optimism was not in intelligence officials’ DNA — they were the “Eeyores” of government, the former senior official said, and it was always safer to bet on failure.

“Part of it was just the fact of the sheer weight of the Russian military,” CIA Director William J. Burns later reflected in an interview. “For all their incompetence in the first year of the war, they had managed to launch a shambolic partial mobilization to fill a lot of the gaps in the front. In Zaporizhzhia” — the key line of the counteroffensive if the land bridge was to be severed — “we could see them building really quite formidable fixed defenses, hard to penetrate, really costly, really bloody for the Ukrainians.”

Perhaps more than any other senior official, Burns, a former ambassador to Russia, had traveled multiple times to Kyiv over the previous year, sometimes in secret, to meet with his Ukrainian counterparts, as well as with Zelensky and his senior military officials. He appreciated the Ukrainians’ most potent weapon — their will to fight an existential threat.

“Your heart is in it,” Burns said of his hopes for helping Ukraine succeed. “But … our broader intelligence assessment was that this was going to be a really tough slog.”

Two weeks after Sullivan and others briefed the president, a top-secret, updated intelligence report assessed that the challenges of massing troops, ammunition and equipment meant that Ukraine would probably fall “well short” of its counteroffensive goals.

The West had so far declined to grant Ukraine’s request for fighter jets and the Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, which could reach targets farther behind Russian lines, and which the Ukrainians felt they needed to strike key Russian command and supply sites.

“You are not going to go from an emerging, post-Soviet legacy military to the U.S. Army of 2023 overnight,” a senior Western intelligence official said. “It is foolish for some to expect that you can give them things and it changes the way they fight.”

U.S. military officials did not dispute that it would be a bloody struggle. By early 2023, they knew that as many as 130,000 Ukrainian troops had been injured or killed in the war, including many of the country’s best soldiers. Some Ukrainian commanders were already expressing doubts about the coming campaign, citing the numbers of troops who lacked battlefield experience.

Yet the Pentagon had also worked closely with Ukrainian forces. Officials had watched them fight courageously and had overseen the effort to provide them with large amounts of sophisticated arms. U.S. military officials argued that the intelligence estimates failed to account for the firepower of the newly arriving weaponry, as well as the Ukrainians’ will to win.

“The plan that they executed was entirely feasible with the force that they had, on the timeline that we planned out,” a senior U.S. military official said.

Austin knew that additional time for training on new tactics and equipment would be beneficial but that Ukraine didn’t have that luxury.

“In a perfect world, you get a choice. You keep saying, ‘I want to take six more months to train up and feel comfortable about this,’” he said in an interview. “My take is that they didn’t have a choice. They were in a fight for their lives.”

Russia gets ready
By March, Russia was already many months into preparing its defenses, building miles upon miles of barriers, trenches and other obstacles across the front in anticipation of the Ukrainian push.

After stinging defeats in the Kharkiv region and Kherson in the fall of 2022, Russia seemed to pivot. Putin appointed Gen. Sergei Surovikin — known as “General Armageddon” for his merciless tactics in Syria — to lead Russia’s fight in Ukraine, focusing on digging in rather than taking more territory.

In the months after the 2022 invasion, Russian trenches were basic — flood-prone, straight-line pits nicknamed “corpse lines,” according to Ruslan Leviev, an analyst and co-founder of the Conflict Intelligence Team, which has been tracking Russian military activity in Ukraine since 2014.

But Russia adapted as the war wore on, digging drier, zigzagging trenches that better protected soldiers from shelling. As the trenches eventually grew more sophisticated, they opened up into forests to offer better means for defenders to fall back, Leviev said. The Russians built tunnels between positions to counter Ukraine’s extensive use of drones, he added.

The trenches were part of multilayered defenses that included dense minefields, concrete pyramids known as dragon’s teeth, and antitank ditches. If minefields were disabled, Russian forces had rocket-borne systems to reseed them.

Unlike Russia’s offensive efforts early in the war, these defenses followed textbook Soviet standards. “This is one case where they have implemented their doctrine,” a senior Western intelligence official said.

Konstantin Yefremov, a former officer with Russia’s 42nd motorized rifle division who was stationed in Zaporizhzhia in 2022, recalled that Russia had the equipment and grunt power necessary to build a solid wall against attack.

“Putin’s army is experiencing shortages of various arms, but can literally swim in mines,” Yefremov said in an interview after fleeing to the West. “They have millions of them, both antitank and antipersonnel mines.”

The poverty, desperation and fear of the tens of thousands of conscripted Russian soldiers made them an ideal workforce. “All you need is slave power,” he said. “And even more so, Russian rank-and-file soldiers know they are [building trenches and other defenses] for themselves, to save their skin.”

In addition, in a tactic used in both World War I and II, Surovikin would deploy blocking units behind the Russian troops to prevent them from retreating, sometimes under pain of death.

Their options were “either to die from our units or from their own,” said Ukrainian police Col. Oleksandr Netrebko, the commander of a newly formed police brigade fighting near Bakhmut.

Yet, while Russia had far more troops, a deeper military arsenal and what one U.S. official said was “just a willingness to endure really dramatic losses,” U.S. officials knew it also had serious vulnerabilities.

By early 2023, some 200,000 Russian soldiers had been killed or wounded, U.S. intelligence agencies estimated, including scores of highly trained commandos. Replacement troops who were rushed into Ukraine lacked experience. Turnover of field leaders had hurt command and control. Equipment losses were equally staggering: more than 2,000 tanks, some 4,000 armored fighting vehicles and at least 75 aircraft, according to a Pentagon document leaked on the Discord chat platform in the spring.

The assessment was that the Russian force was insufficient to protect every line of conflict. But unless Ukraine got underway quickly, the Kremlin could make up its deficits inside of a year, or less if it got more outside help from friendly nations such as Iran and North Korea.

It was imperative, U.S. officials argued, for Ukraine to launch.

More troops, more weapons
In late April, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg made an unannounced trip to see Zelensky in Kyiv.

Stoltenberg, a former Norwegian prime minister, was in town to discuss preparations for the NATO summit in July, including Kyiv’s push to join the alliance.

But over a working lunch with a handful of ministers and aides, talk turned to preparation for the counteroffensive — how things were going and what was left to be done.

Stoltenberg — due the next day in Germany for a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, a consortium of roughly 50 countries providing weaponry and other support to Kyiv — asked about efforts to equip and train Ukrainian brigades by the end of April, according to two people familiar with the talks.

Zelensky reported that the Ukrainian military expected the brigades to be at 80 or 85 percent by the end of the month, the people said. That seemed at odds with American expectations that Ukraine should already be ready to launch.

The Ukrainian leader also stressed that his troops had to hold the east to keep Russia from shifting forces to block Kyiv’s southern counteroffensive. To defend the east while also pushing south, he said, Ukraine needed more brigades, the two people recalled.

Ukrainian officials also continued to make the case that an expanded arsenal was central to their ability to succeed. It wasn’t until May, on the eve of the fight, that Britain announced it would provide longer-range Storm Shadow missiles. But another core refrain from Ukraine was that they were being asked to fight in a way no NATO nation would ever contemplate — without effective power in the air.

As one former senior Ukrainian official pointed out, his country’s aging MiG-29 fighter jets could detect targets within a 40-mile radius and fire at a range of 20 miles. Russia’s Su-35s, meanwhile, could identify targets more than 90 miles away and shoot them down as far away as 75 miles.

“Imagine a MiG and a Su-35 in the sky. We don’t see them while they see us. We can’t reach them while they can reach us,” the official said. “That’s why we fought so hard for F-16s.”

American officials pointed out that even a few of the $60 million aircraft would eat up funds that could go much further in buying vehicles, air defenses or ammunition. Moreover, they said, the jets wouldn’t provide the air superiority the Ukrainians craved.

“If you could train a bunch of F-16 pilots in three months, they would have got shot down on day one, because the Russian air defenses in Ukraine are very robust and very capable,” a senior defense official said.

Biden finally yielded in May and granted the required permission for European nations to donate their U.S.-made F-16s to Ukraine. But pilot training and delivery of the jets would take a year or more, far too long to make a difference in the coming fight.

Kyiv hesitates
By May, concern was growing within the Biden administration and among allied backers. According to the planning, Ukraine should have already launched its operations. As far as the U.S. military was concerned, the window of opportunity was shrinking fast. Intelligence over the winter had shown that Russian defenses were relatively weak and largely unmanned, and that morale was low among Russian troops after their losses in Kharkiv and Kherson. U.S. intelligence assessed that senior Russian officers felt the prospects were bleak.

But that assessment was changing quickly. The goal had been to strike before Moscow was ready, and the U.S. military had been trying since mid-April to get the Ukrainians moving. “We were given dates. We were given many dates,” a senior U.S. government official said. “We had April this, May that, you know, June. It just kept getting delayed.”

Meanwhile, enemy defenses were thickening. U.S. military officials were dismayed to see Russian forces use those weeks in April and May to seed significant amounts of additional mines, a development the officials believed ended up making Ukrainian troops’ advance substantially harder.

Washington was also getting worried that the Ukrainians were burning up too many artillery shells, primarily around Bakhmut, that were needed for the counteroffensive.

As May ground on, it seemed to the Americans that Kyiv, gung-ho during the war games and the training, had abruptly slowed down — that there was “some type of switch in psychology” where they got to the brink “and then all of a sudden they thought, ‘Well, let’s triple-check, make sure we’re comfortable,’” said one administration official who was part of the planning. “But they were telling us for almost a month … ‘We’re about to go. We’re about to go.’”

Some senior American officials believed there wasn’t conclusive proof that the delay had altered Ukraine’s chances for success. Others saw clear indications that the Kremlin had successfully exploited the interim along what it believed would be Kyiv’s lines of assault.

In Ukraine, a different kind of frustration was building. “When we had a calculated timeline, yes, the plan was to start the operation in May,” said a former senior Ukrainian official who was deeply involved in the effort. “However, many things happened.”

Promised equipment was delivered late or arrived unfit for combat, the Ukrainians said. “A lot of weapons that are coming in now, they were relevant last year,” the senior Ukrainian military official said, not for the high-tech battles ahead. Crucially, he said, they had received only 15 percent of items — like the Mine Clearing Line Charge launchers (MCLCs) — needed to execute their plan to remotely cut passages through the minefields.

And yet, the senior Ukrainian military official recalled, the Americans were nagging about a delayed start and still complaining about how many troops Ukraine was devoting to Bakhmut.

U.S. officials vehemently denied that the Ukrainians did not get all the weaponry they were promised. Ukraine’s wish list may have been far bigger, the Americans acknowledged, but by the time the offensive began, they had received nearly two dozen MCLCs, more than 40 mine rollers and excavators, 1,000 Bangalore torpedoes, and more than 80,000 smoke grenades. Zaluzhny had requested 1,000 armored vehicles; the Pentagon ultimately delivered 1,500.

“They got everything they were promised, on time,” one senior U.S. official said. In some cases, the officials said, Ukraine failed to deploy equipment critical to the offensive, holding it in reserve or allocating it to units that weren’t part of the assault.

Then there was the weather. The melting snow and heavy rains that turn parts of Ukraine into a soup of heavy mud each spring had come late and lasted longer than usual.

In the middle of 2022, when the thinking about a counteroffensive began, “no one knew the weather forecast,” the former senior Ukrainian official said.

That meant it was unclear when the flat plains and rich black soil of southeastern Ukraine, which could act as a glue grabbing hold of boots and tires, would dry out for summer. The Ukrainians understood the uncertainty because they, unlike the Americans, lived there.

As the preparations accelerated, Ukrainian officials’ concerns grew more acute, erupting at a meeting at Ramstein Air Base in Germany in April when Zaluzhny’s deputy, Mykhailo Zabrodskyi, made an emotional appeal for help.

“We’re sorry, but some of the vehicles we received are unfit for combat,” Zabrodskyi told Austin and his aides, according to a former senior Ukrainian official. He said the Bradleys and Leopards had broken or missing tracks. German Marder fighting vehicles lacked radio sets; they were nothing more than iron boxes with tracks — useless if they couldn’t communicate with their units, he said. Ukrainian officials said the units for the counteroffensive lacked sufficient de-mining and evacuation vehicles.

Austin looked at Gen. Christopher Cavoli, the top U.S. commander for Europe, and Lt. Gen. Antonio Aguto, head of the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine, both sitting next to him. They said they’d check.

The Pentagon concluded that Ukrainian forces were failing to properly handle and maintain all the equipment after it was received. Austin directed Aguto to work more intensively with his Ukrainian counterparts on maintenance.

“Even if you deliver 1,300 vehicles that are working fine, there’s going to be some that break between the time that you get them on the ground there and the time they enter combat,” a senior defense official said.

By June 1, the top echelons at U.S. European Command and the Pentagon were frustrated and felt like they were getting few answers. Maybe the Ukrainians were daunted by the potential casualties? Perhaps there were political disagreements within the Ukrainian leadership, or problems along the chain of command?

The counteroffensive finally lurched into motion in early June. Some Ukrainian units quickly notched small gains, recapturing Zaporizhzhia-region villages south of Velyka Novosilka, 80 miles from the Azov coast. But elsewhere, not even Western arms and training could fully shield Ukrainian forces from the punishing Russian firepower.

When troops from the 37th Reconnaissance Brigade attempted an advance, they, like units elsewhere, immediately felt the force of Russia’s tactics. From the first minutes of their assault, they were overwhelmed by mortar fire that pierced their French AMX-10 RC armored vehicles. Their own artillery fire didn’t materialize as expected. Soldiers crawled out of burning vehicles. In one unit, 30 of 50 soldiers were captured, wounded or killed. Ukraine’s equipment losses in the initial days included 20 Bradley Fighting Vehicles and six German-made Leopard tanks.

Those early encounters landed like a thunderbolt among the officers in Zaluzhny’s command center, searing a question in their minds: Was the strategy doomed?
(end of part 1 of 2)

STALEMATE: UKRAINE’S FAILED COUNTEROFFENSIVE
In Ukraine, a war of incremental gains as counteroffensive stalls

By Washington Post Staff
December 4, 2023 at 6:00 a.m. EST

(Illustration by Emily Sabens/The Washington Post; Wojciech Grzedzinski for The Washington Post; Staff Sgt. Jordan Sivayavirojna/U.S. National Guard; Sasha Maslov for The Washington Post; iStock)

ZAPORIZHZHIA, Ukraine — Soldiers in the 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade waited for nightfall before piling — nervous but confident — into their U.S.-provided Bradley Fighting Vehicles. It was June 7 and Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive was about to begin.

The goal for the first 24 hours was to advance nearly nine miles, reaching the village of Robotyne — an initial thrust south toward the larger objective of reclaiming Melitopol, a city near the Sea of Azov, and severing Russian supply lines.

Nothing went as planned.

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How we reported on Ukraine’s counteroffensive
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This is the second of two parts examining the Ukrainian counteroffensive that launched in June. Read the first part in the series, which looks at the military planning for the operation, here.
Part two:
Reported by Michael Birnbaum, Karen DeYoung, Kamila Hrabchuk, Alex Horton, John Hudson, Mary Ilyushin, Kostiantyn Khudov, Isabelle Khurshudyan, Dan Lamothe, Kostiantyn Khudov, Serhii Korolchuk, Greg Miller, Serhiy Morgunov, Siobhán O’Grady, Emily Rauhala, David L. Stern, and Missy Ryan.
Written by Isabelle Khurshudyan.
Over three months, reporters in Washington, London, Brussels and Riga, Latvia, as well as in Kyiv and near the front lines in Ukraine, spoke to dozens of Ukrainian officers and troops and over 30 senior officials from Ukraine, the United States and European nations to examine how the counteroffensive unfolded on the ground, and the widening fissures between Kyiv and Washington. The Post spoke to former Russian service members who fought in the war, as well as Russian war bloggers and analysts.
Washington Post reporters, photographers, news assistants and security advisers drove hundreds of miles throughout Ukraine to speak to soldiers and government officials for this series. Journalists made numerous front-line visits in the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions, including in embeds with combat units within five miles of Russian forces.
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The Ukrainian troops had expected minefields but were blindsided by the density. The ground was carpeted with explosives, so many that some were buried in stacks. The soldiers had been trained to drive their Bradleys at a facility in Germany, on smooth terrain. But on the mushy soil of the Zaporizhzhia region, in the deafening noise of battle, they struggled to steer through the narrow lanes cleared of mines by advance units.

The Russians, positioned on higher ground, immediately started firing antitank missiles. Some vehicles in the convoy were hit, forcing others behind them to veer off the path. Those, in turn, exploded on mines, snarling even more of the convoy. Russian helicopters and drones swooped in and attacked the pileup.

Troops, some experiencing the shock of combat for the first time, pulled back to regroup — only to attack and retreat, again and again on successive days, with the same bloody results.

“It was hellfire,” said Oleh Sentsov, a platoon commander in the 47th.

By day four, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s top commander, had seen enough. Incinerated Western military hardware — American Bradleys, German Leopard tanks, mine-sweeping vehicles — littered the battlefield. The numbers of dead and wounded sapped morale.

Zaluzhny told his troops to pause their assaults before any more of Ukraine’s limited weaponry was obliterated, a senior Ukrainian military official said.

Rather than try to breach Russian defenses with a massed, mechanized attack and supporting artillery fire, as his American counterparts had advised, Zaluzhny decided that Ukrainian soldiers would go on foot in small groups of about 10 — a process that would save equipment and lives but would be much slower.

Months of planning with the United States was tossed aside on that fourth day, and the already delayed counteroffensive, designed to reach the Sea of Azov within two to three months, ground to a near-halt. Rather than making a nine-mile breakthrough on their first day, the Ukrainians in the nearly six months since June have advanced about 12 miles and liberated a handful of villages. Melitopol is still far out of reach.

This account of how the counteroffensive unfolded is the second in a two-part series and illuminates the brutal and often futile attempts to breach Russian lines, as well as the widening rift between Ukrainian and U.S. commanders over tactics and strategy. The first article examined the Ukrainian and U.S. planning that went into the operation.

This second part is based on interviews with more than 30 senior Ukrainian and U.S. military officials, as well as over two dozen officers and troops on the front line. Some officials and soldiers spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe military operations.

Key findings from reporting on the campaign include:

● Seventy percent of troops in one of the brigades leading the counteroffensive, and equipped with the newest Western weapons, entered battle with no combat experience.

● Ukraine’s setbacks on the battlefield led to rifts with the United States over how best to cut through deep Russian defenses.

● The commander of U.S. forces in Europe couldn’t get in touch with Ukraine’s top commander for weeks in the early part of the campaign amid tension over the American’s second-guessing of battlefield decisions.

● Each side blamed the other for mistakes or miscalculations. U.S. military officials concluded that Ukraine had fallen short in basic military tactics, including the use of ground reconnaissance to understand the density of minefields. Ukrainian officials said the Americans didn’t seem to comprehend how attack drones and other technology had transformed the battlefield.

● In all, Ukraine has retaken only about 200 square miles of territory, at a cost of thousands of dead and wounded and billions in Western military aid in 2023 alone.

Nearly six months after the counteroffensive began, the campaign has become a war of incremental gains. Damp World War I-style trenches lace eastern and southern Ukraine as surveillance and attack drones crowd the skies overhead. Moscow launches missile assaults on civilian targets in Ukrainian cities, while Kyiv is using both Western missiles and home-grown technology to strike far behind the front lines — in Moscow, in Crimea and on the Black Sea.

Ukrainian spies with deep ties to CIA wage shadow war against Russia

But the territorial lines of June 2023 have barely changed. And Russian President Vladimir Putin — in contrast to the silence he often maintained in the first year of the war — trumpets at every opportunity what he calls the counteroffensive’s failure. “As for the counteroffensive, which is allegedly stalling, it has failed completely,” Putin said in October.

Training for battle
On Jan. 16, five months before the start of Ukraine’s counteroffensive, Gen. Mark A. Milley, then chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited soldiers with the 47th, just days after the unit arrived at the Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany.

Milley, trailed by staff and senior military officials based in Europe, zigzagged across a muddy, chilly training range, bantering with Ukrainian soldiers and watching as they fired on stationary targets with rifles and M240B machine guns.

The installation had been used to train small groups of Ukrainian soldiers since 2014, when Russia invaded and illegally annexed Ukraine’s Crimea Peninsula. In anticipation of the counteroffensive, the effort was scaled up with one or more battalions of about 600 Ukrainian soldiers cycling through at a time.

In a white field tent, Milley gathered with U.S. soldiers overseeing the training, who told him they were trying to replicate Russian tactics and build some of the trenches and other obstacles the Ukrainians would face in battle.

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Key findings from our reporting on Ukraine’s counteroffensive
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The United States was deeply involved in the military planning behind the operation. Ukrainian, U.S. and British military officers held eight major tabletop war games to build a campaign plan.
U.S. and Ukrainian officials sharply disagreed at times over strategy, tactics and timing.
The Pentagon wanted the assault to begin in mid-April to prevent Russia from continuing to strengthen its lines. The Ukrainians hesitated, insisting they weren’t ready without additional weapons and more training. The counteroffensive began in June.
U.S. military officials were confident that a mass, mechanized frontal attack along one axis in the south of Ukraine would lead to a decisive breakthrough. Ukraine attacked along three axes, believing that would stretch Russian forces. Ukraine abandoned large, mechanized assaults when it suffered serious losses in the first days of the campaign.
The wargame simulations concluded that Kyiv’s forces, in the best case, could reach the Sea of Azov in the south of Ukraine and cut off Russian troops in 60 to 90 days. Ukrainian forces have advanced only about 12 miles. The Sea of Azov is still far out of reach. Ukraine’s top commander now acknowledges that the war has reached a “stalemate.”
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“The whole thing … for them to be successful with the Russians is for them to be able to both fire and maneuver,” Milley said, describing in basic terms the essence of the counteroffensive’s “combined arms” strategy, which called for coordinated maneuvers by a massed force of infantry, tanks, armored vehicles, engineers and artillery. If this were the United States or NATO, the operation also would have included devastating air power to weaken the enemy and protect troops on the ground, but the Ukrainians would have to make do with little or none.

The 47th had been selected to be a “breach force” at the tip of the counteroffensive and would be equipped with Western arms. But as Milley made his rounds and chatted with Ukrainian soldiers — from young men in their 20s to middle-aged recruits — many they told him that they had only recently left civilian life and had no combat experience.

Milley kept silent. But later, in the meeting with U.S. trainers, he seemed to acknowledge the scale of the task ahead. “Give them everything you’ve got here,” he said.

The 47th was a newly created unit tabbed for the training in Germany. Ukraine’s military leadership had decided that more-experienced brigades would hold off the Russians during the winter, while fresh soldiers would form new brigades, receive training abroad and then lead the fight in the spring and summer. More than a year of war — with up to 130,000 troops dead or wounded, according to Western estimates — had taken a heavy toll on Ukraine’s armed forces. Even the most battle-hardened brigades were now largely composed of drafted replacements.

About 70 percent of the soldiers in the 47th didn’t have any battlefield experience, according to one senior commander in the brigade.

The 47th’s leadership was also strikingly young — its commander, though combat-hardened, was just 28 years old and his deputy was 25. Their youth had been billed as an advantage; young officers would absorb NATO tactics unaffected by the Soviet way of war that still infused parts of the Ukrainian military.

Some of the Ukrainian soldiers thought the American trainers didn’t grasp the scale of the conflict against a more powerful enemy. “The presence of a huge number of drones, fortifications, minefields and so on were not taken into account,” said a soldier in the 47th with the call sign Joker. Ukrainian soldiers brought their own drones to help hone their skills, he said, but trainers initially rebuffed the request to integrate them because the training programs were predetermined. Drone use was later added following Ukrainian feedback, a U.S. official said.

The U.S. program had benefits, Joker said, including advanced cold-weather training and how to adjust artillery fire. But much was discarded once real bullets flew. “We had to improve tactics during the battle itself,” he said. “We couldn’t use it the way we were taught.”

U.S. and Ukrainian officials said they never expected that two months of training would transform these troops into a NATO-like force. Instead, the intention was to teach them to properly use their new Western tanks and fighting vehicles and “make them literate in the basics of firing and moving,” a U.S. senior military official said.

No order to attack
When soldiers from the 47th returned to Ukraine in the spring, they expected the counteroffensive to start almost immediately. In early May, the brigade relocated closer to the front line, hiding their Bradleys and other Western equipment in the tree lines of rural Zaporizhzhia. The 47th’s insignia on vehicles was covered up in case locals sympathetic to Russia might reveal their location.

But weeks passed with no order to attack. Many in the unit felt the element of surprise had been lost. The political leadership “shouldn’t have been announcing our counteroffensive for almost a year,” said one unit commander in the 47th. “The enemy knew where we’d be coming from.”

Milley and other senior U.S. military officers involved in planning the offensive argued for the Ukrainians to mass forces at one key spot in Zaporizhzhia, to help them overcome stiff Russian defenses and ensure a successful breakthrough in the drive to Melitopol and the Sea of Azov. The Ukrainian plan, however, was to push on three axes — south along two distinct paths to the Sea of Azov, as well as in eastern Ukraine around the besieged city of Bakhmut, which the Russians had seized in the spring after a nearly year-long battle.

Ukrainian military leaders decided that committing too many troops to one point in the south would leave forces in the east vulnerable and enable the Russians to take territory there and, potentially, in Kharkiv to the northeast.

To split the Russian forces in Zaporizhzhia, Ukrainian marine brigades at the western edge of the neighboring Donetsk region would push south toward the coastal city of Berdyansk. That left the 47th and other brigades, part of what Ukraine referred to as its 9th Corps, to attack along the counteroffensive’s main axis, toward Melitopol.

The plan called for the 47th, and the 9th Corps, to breach the first Russian line of defense and take Robotyne. Then the 10th Corps, made up of Ukraine’s paratroopers, would join the fight in a second wave pushing south.

“We thought it was going to be a simple two-day task” to take Robotyne, said the commander of a Bradley Fighting Vehicle who goes by the call sign Frenchman.

Mining all approaches
Days after the counteroffensive launched, Oleksandr Sak, then the 47th’s commander, visited a Russian position his troops had captured. He noted anti-drone guns, thermal imagery scopes and small surveillance drones, among other abandoned materiel. “I realized the enemy had prepared,” he said. “We didn’t catch them off-guard; they knew we were coming.”

Also left behind were posters with Russian propaganda. One showed an image of men kissing in public with a red “X” over it, next to an image of a man and woman with two children. “Fighting for traditional families,” the poster said.

Sak also found a map that the Russians had used to mark their minefields. For just one part of the front — about four miles long and four miles deep — more than 20,000 mines were listed.

Ukraine is now the most mined country. It will take decades to make safe.

“I wouldn’t say it was unexpected, but we underestimated it,” Sak said. “We conducted engineering and aerial reconnaissance, but many mines were masked or buried. In addition to those by the front line, there were mines deeper into enemy positions. We passed enemy positions and encountered more mines where we thought there were none anymore.”

A chief drone sergeant in the 47th said that only on foot did they find remote-detonation traps, describing their discovery as a “surprise.”

U.S. military officials believed that Ukraine could have made a more significant advance by embracing greater use of ground reconnaissance units and reducing its reliance on imagery from drones, which weren’t able to detect buried mines, tripwires or booby traps.

The Zaporizhzhia region is largely composed of flat, open fields, and the Russians had chosen what high ground there was to build key defenses. From there, soldiers and officials said, Russian units armed with antitank missiles waited for convoys of Bradley Fighting Vehicles and German Leopard tanks. A mine-clearing vehicle always led the pack — and was targeted first with the help of reconnaissance drones.

“We constantly faced antitank fire and destroyed up to 10 Russian antitank guided missile systems per day,” Sak said. But, he added, “day after day, they pulled in more” of the systems.

Some 60 percent of Ukraine’s de-mining equipment was damaged or destroyed in the first days, according to a senior Ukrainian defense official. “Our partners’ reliance on armored maneuver and a breakthrough didn’t work,” the official said. “We had to change tactics.”

Within a week of the start of the counteroffensive, teams of sappers would work in twilight hours, when it was light enough for them to de-mine by hand but not so bright that the Russians could spot them. Once they cleared a small pathway, infantry would follow — a slow, grueling advance one wood line at a time.

Often, when Ukrainian soldiers reached a Russian outpost, they would find that it too had been booby-trapped with mines. And rather than withdraw, Russian forces held their positions even under heavy artillery bombardment, meaning the Ukrainians would have to engage in close combat with small arms to advance.

Throughout the Zaporizhzhia region, the Russians had deployed new units, called “Storm Z,” with fighters recruited from prisons. The former inmates attacked in human waves called “meat assaults” and were used to preserve more-elite forces. Around Robotyne — the village the 47th was supposed to reach on the first day of the counteroffensive — they were mixed in with Russia’s 810th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade and other regular army formations.

“Robotyne was one of the toughest assignments,” a member of the 810th engineering unit said in an interview with a pro-war Russian blogger. “We had to go all out to prevent the enemy from breaking through. As sappers and engineers, we had to mine all approaches both for infantry and their vehicles.

“The famous Leopards are burning, and we tried to make sure they burn bright.”

Fleets of drones
Early in the assault on Robotyne, a Russian machine-gun nest carved into a building was preventing Ukrainian infantry from advancing. A drone company within the 47th sent up two modified racing drones strapped with explosives. One glided through a window and exploded. Another, guided by a pilot with the call sign Sapsan, spiraled into another room and detonated the ammunition inside, he said, also killing several enemy soldiers.

It was an early high point in the use of small drones like pinpoint artillery. Drone operators — wearing a headset that receives a video feed from the drone in real time — hunted for armored vehicles using first-person-view drones, known as FPVs. FPVs are so precise and fast that they can target the weak parts of vehicles, such as engine compartments and tracks, operators say.

Video from Ukraine's 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade shows highly maneuverable racing drones strapped with explosives hitting targets. (Video: The Washington Post)
But Russia is also deploying fleets of the same hand-built attack drones, which cost less than $1000 each and can disable a multimillion-dollar tank. Unlike artillery ammunition, which is a precious resource for both Russia and Ukraine, the low-cost, disposable FPV drones can be used to hit small groups of infantry — navigated directly into trenches or into troops on the move.

Evacuating the wounded or bringing fresh supplies to a front-line position also became harrowing and potentially deadly tasks, often saved for nighttime because of the threat of drones.

“At first, our problem was mines. Now, it’s FPV drones,” said Sentsov, the platoon commander in the 47th. “They hit the target precisely and deal serious damage. They can disable a Bradley and potentially even blow it up. It’s not a direct explosion, but they can hit it in a way to make it burn — not only stop the vehicle but destroy it.”

U.S. military officials, drawing on their own doctrine, called for artillery to be used to suppress the enemy while mechanized ground forces advanced toward their objective.

“You’ve got to move while you’re firing the artillery,” a senior U.S. defense official said. “That sounds very fundamental, and it is, but that’s how you’ve got to fight. Otherwise, you can’t sustain the quantity of artillery and munitions that you need.”

But Ukrainian officials have said the ubiquity and lethality of different types of drones on both sides of the front line has been the biggest factor preventing the Ukrainians or the Russians from gaining significant ground for months.

“Because of the technical development, everything came to a standstill,” a high-ranking Ukrainian military official said. “The equipment that appears on the battlefield lives for a minute at the most.”

Chaotic battlefield conditions
The 47th claimed the liberation of Robotyne on Aug. 28. Air assault units in Ukraine’s 10th Corps then moved in, but have been unable to liberate any other villages.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on December 05, 2023, 06:45:44 AM
Once again we see that Russians are good at wars of attrition.

Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on December 05, 2023, 07:27:01 AM
Once again we see that Russians are good at wars of attrition.

So Kamala had this right, a big country invaded a little country...

Putin's big head fake to Kiev and Odesa, and all the whining about NATO overstepping, he ended up getting exactly what he wanted (orso it looks at this point) .

I haven't read the long Wash Post story yet.  Looks like a serious, well researched, accurate piece - by the same people who won a Pulitzer Prize for a complete BS story about Russian collusion they never retracted.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 05, 2023, 10:02:56 AM
Pravda on the Potomac not being on my regular reading list  :-o I only know of the piece because Laura Ingraham discussed it in some detail last night.
Title: when warfare fails send in the lawyers for lawfare
Post by: ccp on December 06, 2023, 08:41:26 AM
 :roll:

funny first time we have seen Garland in the news for few months:

https://www.yahoo.com/gma/justice-department-announces-war-crimes-151249992.html

Do not worry Zelensky - American shysters to the rescue!

Title: They All Moved Away on the Group W Bench
Post by: Body-by-Guinness on December 16, 2023, 10:52:34 PM
Chiefio is well worth following:

https://chiefio.wordpress.com/2023/12/13/ukraine-losing-elections-compressing-distancing/
Title: Pro-Russian analysis 3.0
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 18, 2023, 05:15:08 AM
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/more-afu-downers-from-the-press-mill?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1351274&post_id=139868169&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&token=eyJ1c2VyX2lkIjo1ODg4MTI0MCwicG9zdF9pZCI6MTM5ODY4MTY5LCJpYXQiOjE3MDI4NzIwMDUsImV4cCI6MTcwNTQ2NDAwNSwiaXNzIjoicHViLTEzNTEyNzQiLCJzdWIiOiJwb3N0LXJlYWN0aW9uIn0.jeAA9RWzASi9sXuSryKj5Sa7rU1jKX1K66Vev-HaSNQ&r=z2120&utm_medium=email
Title: WSJ: How to make Russia Pay
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 18, 2023, 05:07:04 PM
second

How to Make Russia Pay for Ukraine
Lawmakers in the U.S. and Europe work together to seize and redirect frozen sovereign assets.
By J. French Hill and Lulzim Basha
Dec. 18, 2023 5:51 pm ET



The world must stand united in the common goal to help Ukraine in the face of Russia’s illegal aggression and Vladimir Putin’s growing geopolitical threats throughout Europe. That’s why we, as two legislators on both sides of the Atlantic, have joined forces to make Russia pay for Ukraine’s long-term reconstruction consistent with the norms of international law.

In November, House Foreign Affairs Chairman Michael McCaul’s legislation, the REPO for Ukrainians Act, passed the committee 40-2. It would seize all Russian sovereign assets in the U.S., namely Russian central-bank reserves frozen at the Federal Reserve. An equally strong, complementary effort is proceeding through the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. PACE’s Political Affairs Committee unanimously adopted a memorandum last week on the confiscation of Russian state assets.

Any national legislation must meet three objectives to ensure the best possible outcome for Ukraine. First, the U.S. must play a leadership role by working in close coordination with allies. Washington is doing so, advancing legislation that President Biden should sign into law whenever it arrives on his desk. Since only an estimated $8 billion of the roughly $280 billion in frozen or immobilized Russian sovereign assets are in the U.S., full multilateral cooperation is critical for success.

Second, legislation should maximize the potential monetary benefits to Ukraine at no cost to taxpayers. Two easy fixes could improve the U.S. legislation and be a model for others. All sovereign and state assets, including state-owned enterprises, should be defined clearly and included in any final legislation, not only central-bank reserves. Language in the House bill limiting the seizure to “dollar denominated” Russian assets or “wholly owned” state-operated enterprises should also be deleted. Minority shareholders can be protected separately.

Third, lawmakers should provide mandatory authority to the executive branch to seize and vest title and interest in the Russian assets for Ukraine’s benefit. That would avoid legal uncertainties and be supported by the international law of countermeasures.

The Council of Europe in May established a Register of Damages Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation Against Ukraine at The Hague, to which the U.S. is a signatory. The contemplated international funding mechanism and claims tribunal are referenced in both pending U.S. legislation and PACE resolutions and need to be enacted soon.

Given the urgency of helping Ukraine, the U.S. and Europe must present a united front against Russia by acting sooner rather than later. Mr. Putin must pay for his aggression and war crimes. Strong legislation to seize all Russian sovereign assets is a start.

U.S. action would send a compelling signal, urging the West to bolster its collective effort in support of Ukraine’s fight for its sovereignty, territory and democracy as Europe’s bulwark against Russian aggression. Collective action now would also put other authoritarian nations on notice that there are significant financial consequences under both international law and new national legislation for wrongful acts against sovereign countries.

Mr. Hill, a Republican, represents Arkansas’s Second Congressional District. Mr. Basha is a member of Albania’s Parliament
Title: In depth blog
Post by: Crafty_Dog on December 27, 2023, 03:13:54 AM
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/sitrep-122623-crimean-strikes-and?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1351274&post_id=140084652&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=z2120&utm_medium=email
Title: WSJ: Ukraine may have to accept cease fire
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 03, 2024, 08:39:14 AM
Ukraine May Have to Accept a Cease-Fire
The good news is it would open the door to eventual EU and NATO membership.
By
William A. Galston
Follow
Jan. 2, 2024 12:55 pm ET


The word “crisis” is overused, but it accurately describes what Ukraine faces as 2024 begins.

According to a recent report in the Washington Post, troops on the front line are running out of ammunition. Artillery shells are being rationed, forcing the Ukrainians to cancel planned assaults and making it hard to hold defensive positions against Russian attacks. A press officer for a Ukrainian battalion recently said that ammunition shortages had forced his unit to reduce its rate of firing by 90% since the summer. “We lack everything,” a member of another unit said. Although his comrades are highly motivated, he added, “You can’t win a war only on motivation.” He doubted they could hold their position much longer.

As Ukraine struggles, its allies dither. Congress went home for the holiday without resolving the legislative impasse over continuing U.S. aid for Ukraine. Hungary’s pro-Russian leader vetoed the European Union’s proposed $52 billion assistance package. If these logjams aren’t broken soon, Ukraine’s ability to sustain the war, its economy, and the basic functions of its government will be jeopardized.

This is an all-hands-on-deck emergency. If negotiators can’t reach a deal by the time the Senate reconvenes, President Biden must get directly involved. There is little doubt that an agreement would include provisions on immigration that many Democrats won’t like, but that’s the price he must pay for allowing the situation at the southern border to spin out of control. Meanwhile, European nations must muster the political will to provide Kyiv with country-to-country aid if bribes and threats can’t force Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to end his opposition to the EU plan.

The West also must seize frozen Russian central-bank assets in Western financial institutions and use them for Ukraine’s benefit. In November, the House Foreign Affairs Committee advanced a measure to do this by a vote of 40-2, and a similar proposal received unanimous support from a European Parliament committee. Until recently, senior Biden administration officials had expressed concerns that seizing Russian assets would set a precedent with unpredictable consequences. But as Ukraine’s plight has worsened, the administration has intensified discussions with European allies about a coordinated strategy to redeploy Russian assets on Ukraine’s behalf, with a target date of Feb. 24—the second anniversary of the Russian invasion—to reach an agreement. Mr. Biden should spare no effort to ensure the success of these talks.

Even if aid for Ukraine is renewed, it is essential to consider a realistic ending for the war. Ukraine’s insistence on regaining all the territory Russia has seized since 2014 is understandable and legally impeccable, but events over the past year have made it clear that this goal can’t be achieved anytime soon. Ukraine’s vaunted counteroffensive failed as Russia’s reinforced defenses held. Russia’s economy has proved more resilient than expected, and it is ramping up military production much faster than Ukraine and its allies. The conflict has exposed the hollowing out of the West’s defense industrial base, in Europe especially and to a considerable extent in the U.S. The West’s collective inability to provide Ukraine with the artillery shells it needs is evidence of neglect that will take years to remedy.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently disclosed that Ukraine’s military leaders wanted to mobilize an additional 500,000 troops, which would require unpopular changes to Ukraine’s draft laws and additional outlays of $13 billion. While Russian President Vladimir Putin has also been mindful of political considerations, Russia’s manpower pool is about four times the size of Ukraine’s, and its economy is nine times as large.

Recent reports, which Mr. Putin hasn’t denied, suggest that he is ready to agree to a cease-fire along the current battle lines. Although he is unwilling to retreat, these reports indicate that he had shelved his aim to dominate all of Ukraine.

There are good reasons to be skeptical that Mr. Putin has pared his ambitions in Ukraine, which are part of his plan to reconstitute the Soviet empire, the collapse of which he has termed the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. Still, Western leaders should explore whether he is serious about ending the fighting. It would be unwise to assume that public opinion in the West will indefinitely support an open-ended commitment to a conflict that has settled into a stalemate.

A cease-fire wouldn’t imply recognition of Russia’s territorial claims, and it would open the door to measures that would anchor Ukraine to the West, including eventual membership in the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the meantime, Russia’s frozen assets could be used to reconstruct Ukraine.

This arrangement would be a bitter pill both for the Ukrainians, who are passionate about regaining all their territory, and for Mr. Putin, who fears the prospect of a new power linked to the West on Russia’s border. But it is the only realistic path to a lasting peace in Europe.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 06, 2024, 07:41:26 AM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ukrainian-forces-snuck-into-russia-raided-military-positions-and-mined-the-only-road-in-the-area-kyiv-says/ar-AA1mwn6c?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=8bc49c52108042caa8d072c552c52d5a&ei=23


https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/shock-and-awe-ukrainian-special-forces-strike-deep-into-russian-territory-rattling-belgorod-residents/ar-AA1mykpW?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=ec208de80d534b8a9c40ea8677668ba9&ei=11
Title: WSJ
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 07, 2024, 01:52:54 AM
https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/heres-how-the-russian-and-ukrainian-war-efforts-compare-in-10-charts-1cf9a74f?mod=world_lead_pos2

Some good charts in the article that will not appear here:

============================================


Here’s How the Russian and Ukrainian War Efforts Compare, in 10 Charts
Vladimir Putin is wagering he can outlast Western support for Ukraine—if he can keep Russia’s war machine running
Summer 2023
Current
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
Ukraine
Russia
By Georgi KantchevFollow
, Anastasiia MalenkoFollow
 and Elizaveta GalkinaFollow
Updated Jan. 6, 2024 12:12 am ET

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TEXT
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Almost two years after Russia invaded Ukraine, the conflict has reached a pivot point.

Western financial help and ammunition supplies for Ukraine are running low, while public support is showing some cracks. Russia, with its larger population, has so far withstood the worst of Western sanctions and ramped up its war economy for a prolonged fight.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is now betting he can outlast the West’s support for Ukraine and make a decisive breakthrough if Russia’s economy can keep ticking over.

Here’s a snapshot of the state of the war:

Military capacity
Russia’s military budget, at over $100 billion for 2024, is the highest it has been since Soviet times, growing by more than two-thirds from last year. Its manufacturing capacity has also overcome initial shortages to help Moscow’s war machine churn out weaponry for a lengthy campaign, often at the expense of civilian production.

Russia
Ukraine
2019
'20
'21
'22
'23
'24
0
25
50
75
100
$125
billion
Ukraine is also investing in domestic military production capabilities, but it is no match for a much larger Russian military-industrial complex running at full steam. Kyiv could fall further behind as Western support dries up.

Russia invaded in Feb. 2022
War-related
Other
2019
'20
'21
'22
'23
75
100
125
150
175
Equipment and manpower
Though U.S. estimates suggest Russia has suffered 315,000 killed or injured since the start of the war—nearly 90% of its prewar fighting force—its population was around 3½ times as large as Ukraine’s before the invasion, giving it a battlefield edge. Tens of thousands of inmates have been released from its prisons to serve the war effort, while some 300,000 reservists have also been mobilized.

Russia
Ukraine
2015
'16
'17
'18
'19
'20
'21
'22
0
10
20
30
40
50
million
For Ukraine, a shortage of manpower is becoming a major issue, with authorities in Kyiv now scrambling to find ways to get more fighting-age men to the front lines.

Economy
Russia’s economy has ridden the wave of sanctions better than the West expected, thanks in large part to how it has redirected oil exports to China and India and evaded price caps through a shadow fleet of tankers. This lifeline has helped Russia switch to a war economy and find alternative sources for components it previously bought from the West.

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Russia invaded in Feb. 2022
2021
'22
'23
0
5
10
15
20
$25
billion
Still, the Russian economy is facing challenges. Inflation is growing, while years of low birthrates, combined with an exodus of fighting-age men to the front lines or overseas, have depleted its labor force, worsening its longer-term outlook.

June 2018
'19
'20
'21
'22
'23
0
1
2
3
4
5
million
In the short term, Ukraine is in a more precarious position, with Western assistance dwindling and concerns growing over how U.S. attitudes might change after the 2024 presidential election. Without sufficient support, Ukraine may have to resort to painful spending cuts or even printing money to fill its deficit—something that would pose a grave risk to the health of its economy.

Russia invaded in Feb. 2022
Budget deficit & debt repayment needs
Foreign financing
2022
'23
0
2.5
5.0
7.5
$10.0
billion
Politics
Though public support for Ukraine in the West remains high, there are growing concerns in Kyiv about the depth of U.S. commitment. A Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults found that the percentage of people saying Washington is providing too much support rose to 31% in December from 7% at the start of the war. Support for Ukraine, though still high, also shows signs of fading in the European Union, opinion polls suggest.

Mar. 2022
May '22
Sept. '22
Jan. '23
June '23
Dec. '23
0
25
50
75
100
%
Too much
About right
Not enough
Not sure
In Russia, Putin continues to command broad support and has jailed critics and silenced antiwar voices. He is expected to win another six-year term in power in March’s presidential election.

Russia invaded in Feb. 2022
2021
'22
'23
0
25
50
75
100
%
Approve
Disapprove
No answer
Ukrainian polls show continued opposition to territorial concessions and consistently high trust in the military, even as President Volodymyr Zelensky’s trust levels have registered some declines.

Russia invaded in Feb. 2022
Aug. 2021
'22
'23
0
20
40
60
80
100
%
Trust
Don't trust
Difficult to say
Write to Georgi Kantchev at georgi.kantchev@wsj.com, Anastasiia Malenko at anastasiia.malenko@wsj.com and Elizaveta Galkina at elizaveta.galkina@wsj.com
Title: Nepal shuts off permits for Gurkhas to fight for Russia in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 07, 2024, 02:23:29 AM


https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/nepal-halts-permits-for-its-citizens-to-serve-in-russian-army-after-10-killed-in-ukraine-war/ar-AA1myBvz?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid
Title: WSJ
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 07, 2024, 02:51:20 AM
third

Pentagon’s Ukraine Coffers Run Dry, Threatening Kyiv’s Grip on Its Territory
Funding for more weapons and ammunition is held up in fight over border policy; ‘We’re out of money’

Russia in recent days has launched some of the war’s biggest missile attacks; damage Jan. 3 in Kyiv. PHOTO: ANATOLII STEPANOV/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
By Lindsay WiseFollow
, Ian LovettFollow
, Doug CameronFollow
 and Nancy A. YoussefFollow
Jan. 7, 2024 5:30 am ET

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The Washington stalemate over U.S. policy at the southern border is beginning to reverberate on the Ukraine battlefield, where Kyiv’s troops are running out of ammunition and the Pentagon says it can’t provide more without emptying its own arsenal.

In recent weeks, the Pentagon has run out of money to send more hardware and ammunition, just as Russia intensified its ground assaults and missile and drone attacks on Ukraine. The White House has asked for $45 billion to fund security assistance for Ukraine, but Senate Republicans are demanding border-policy changes in return.

“We’re out of money,” Pentagon spokesman Maj. Gen. Patrick Ryder said Thursday.

Short of congressional approval of more funding, the White House can either dip into the Pentagon’s arsenal with no guarantee the gear will be replaced, or leave Ukraine to rely on its own growing but still small arms industry and European allies.

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Without an influx of weapons and ammunition, Ukraine could soon find itself in a dire situation. Ill-equipped to defend the 600-mile front, Ukrainian generals would have to choose between giving ground or sending outgunned troops into the trenches without artillery cover. In either case, Russia would be well-positioned to take more than the 20% of Ukraine’s territory it already holds. Officials in Kyiv and Washington warn that if Russia succeeds, other authoritarian leaders around the world would be emboldened by what they would perceive as U.S. weakness.

Ukraine’s counteroffensive last summer gained little ground in the country’s southeast at heavy cost. In October, as Ukraine ran low on shells and manpower—and Washington’s attention seemed to shift to the Israel-Hamas fighting in Gaza—the Russians went back on the attack.

Moscow has mobilized Russia’s economy for war against its much smaller neighbor, and Russia’s superior firepower is already yielding results. Its forces are consolidating control over Marinka in eastern Ukraine, a town of a few thousand inhabitants before the war that has been reduced to rubble by Russian bombardments.

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Assault operations paused
The Pentagon’s dwindling funds have led the U.S. to trim the size of packages for Ukraine, and Ukrainian soldiers said they started to notice a shortage of artillery a few months ago.

“We’ve stopped all assault operations in the area,” said the 31-year-old commander of a drone squad working near Robotyne, a village on the southeastern front retaken by Ukrainian forces over the summer. “We’re focused on holding our ground and defending positions.”

Meanwhile, Russia has repeatedly demonstrated the need for Ukraine to have a stocked arsenal of air-defense missiles: A barrage of 99 missiles fired Tuesday was the second significant salvo in less than a week, after one of the largest missile attacks of the war the previous Friday.

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In all, the U.S. has already provided around $44 billion in military assistance. That volume of arms transfers isn’t worked into the Pentagon’s regular annual budget, so the administration has relied on supplemental budgets passed by Congress, akin to those that funded the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Pentagon warehouses have been the biggest source of weapons for Ukraine. In addition, the U.S. has paid military contractors for missiles, shells, specialized vehicles and other systems to send directly to Ukraine. The Pentagon has authority to transfer about $4.2 billion in weapons from the U.S. arsenal to Ukraine, but no money to replenish those stocks. There are no imminent plans to announce additional aid packages, defense officials said.

Ukraine still has some U.S. arms on the way: Defense companies are continuing to sell Kyiv weapons paid for with U.S. tax dollars under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.

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As of late November, RTX, formerly known as Raytheon, and Lockheed Martin had secured the largest portion of the $27 billion spent by the Pentagon on new contracts to arm Ukraine and refill the U.S. armory. RTX said it still expects another $4 billion in Ukraine-driven contracts over the next two years on top of the $3 billion already secured.

‘We’ll do the right thing’
The supplemental request under debate on Capitol Hill totals $110.5 billion to fund security assistance for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan. Most of the roughly $45 billion earmarked for Ukraine would run through 2025; it includes $12 billion for direct sales of weapons, $18 billion to refill Pentagon and allied stockpiles and around $4 billion to boost domestic production.

“I’m confident that ultimately we’ll do the right thing,” Sen. Todd Young (R., Ind.) said shortly before lawmakers headed home for Christmas.

Although a bipartisan group of negotiators in the Senate missed an initial end-of-year goal to reach an agreement on border-policy changes to unlock more Ukraine aid, the lawmakers met remotely over the Christmas recess and resumed meeting in person in the Capitol last week. The group has reached agreement on some issues but continues to haggle over several key provisions, according to people familiar with the conversations.

Even if senators can pass a border deal, it’s uncertain if or when the House might take it up.

House Speaker Mike Johnson (R., La) will be constrained by a narrow two-vote GOP majority. Johnson, who visited the border last week, has said that any deal on Ukraine aid was contingent on changes in U.S. immigration policy largely outlined in a border-security bill passed last spring by the Republican-controlled House. The bill would continue building former President Donald Trump’s border wall, reinstate a policy requiring asylum seekers to wait in Mexico and make it nearly impossible to claim asylum at the southern border.

The lead Republican negotiator in the Senate, Oklahoma Sen. James Lankford, has warned that the House border bill can’t pass his Democratic-led chamber.

SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS
Is the U.S. doing enough to support Ukraine? Why or why not? Join the conversation below.

On the front in Ukraine, with shells running low, artillery gunners can’t fire on small groups of enemy soldiers, enabling Russian troops to approach Ukrainian lines and threaten entrenched infantry. The Ukrainians are adapting by using explosive drones in place of artillery to strike Russian vehicles and infantry. The drones are cheaper than shells and more accurate, but less powerful and more labor intensive.

“They have 140 million people. We have 40 million. They have stores of Soviet weapons—even if they’re not great, they still fire,” said Serhiy Knish, a 55-year-old veteran who left the military in November. “Aid from the West is why we can still stand as a country.”
Title: 400K Weapons Sent to Ukraine Can't be Accounted For
Post by: Body-by-Guinness on January 12, 2024, 04:04:04 PM
Including shoulder-fired missiles. What could possibly go wrong:

https://pjmedia.com/rick-moran/2024/01/12/40000-weapons-sent-to-ukraine-have-gone-missing-pentagon-ig-n4925416
Title: Serious level of detailed analysis
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 13, 2024, 08:01:44 AM

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/us-launches-strikes-on-yemen-and?publication_id=1351274&post_id=140635883&isFreemail=true&r=379fkp
Title: New Russian tactic
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 17, 2024, 04:36:55 AM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/russia-has-shifted-beyond-its-stupid-missile-attack-strategy-and-it-is-bad-news-for-ukraine/ar-AA1n6V9k?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=1d0e8d27f68b4a97b38ea69919193fda&ei=7
Title: The Minsk Agreements
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 21, 2024, 05:46:44 AM
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_agreements
Title: Zelensky unhappy with Trump
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 23, 2024, 08:14:49 AM
https://thenationalpulse.com/2024/01/20/zelensky-says-trumps-peace-talk-is-dangerous-and-makes-him-stressed/
Title: ISW: Uke drones really fg with Russians
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 24, 2024, 06:07:37 AM
The following is from Gen. Keene's Institute for the Study of War. I respect Gen. Keene and find this site to be an ongoing source of quality open source intel. Recommended!

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 23, 2024 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are struggling to compensate for Ukrainian drone and rear-area strikes at the level necessary to break out of positional warfare. A prominent Russian milblogger stated on January 23 that Russian forces need to figure out how to break out of positional warfare but that Russian forces are unable to concentrate in numbers sufficient to break through Ukrainian lines because Ukrainian forces strike all force concentrations larger than a battalion.[10] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces target Russian force concentrations even in near rear areas. The milblogger reported that Ukrainian forces still target small Russian groups of one-to-two infantry companies and of 10 armored vehicles with drone strikes, preventing Russian forces from even reaching Ukrainian forward defensive lines. The milblogger complained that Russian forces’ only solution thus far has been to attack with 10-20 dismounted infantrymen with armored vehicles supporting at an “extreme” distance behind the infantry. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger responded in agreement with the first milblogger, claiming that Ukrainian technological advancements have made it difficult for Russian forces to concentrate several divisions in a discrete geographic area without Ukrainian forces detecting the force concentration.[11] The milblogger emphasized that Russian forces need to both obtain indirect fire superiority over Ukrainian forces and overhaul Russian command-and-control (C2) to break out of positional warfare. The milblogger stressed that Russian forces on the frontline need to be able to quickly communicate to minimize the time between spotting and striking a target and that this change will only occur with a significant change in C2 processes
Title: Arrests in $40 Million Defense Funds Theft
Post by: Body-by-Guinness on January 28, 2024, 12:41:50 PM
I’d bet a great deal it’s a small percentage of what has gone missing:

https://pjmedia.com/rick-moran/2024/01/28/ukrainian-officials-arrested-for-stealing-40-million-in-arms-funds-n4925911
Title: $40M now accounted for
Post by: Crafty_Dog on January 29, 2024, 05:51:31 AM
https://www.foxnews.com/world/5-ukrainian-officials-arrested-theft-40-million-war-funds-ukraine-corruption-persists?intcmp=tw_fnc
Title: WSJ: A New Strategy can save Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 05, 2024, 06:06:45 AM


A New Strategy Can Save Ukraine
Kyiv should focus on defense, depend less on foreign aid, and threaten Russia more in Crimea.
By Stephen J. Hadley and Matthew Kroenig
Feb. 4, 2024 11:48 am ET




The war in Ukraine has reached a critical point. The goal remains for it to emerge as an independent, prosperous country within internationally recognized borders and able to defend itself. That will require accelerating the delivery of advanced weapons and technology and pursuing a new military and diplomatic strategy to defend Ukrainian territory, increase Ukraine’s defense production, enhance its air defenses, and step up attacks against Russia’s supply lines and vulnerable military position in Crimea. If the Biden administration embraces this approach, it could address congressional reluctance to provide more aid to Ukraine absent a clear strategy.

Ukraine’s 2023 spring counteroffensive was less successful than many had hoped, giving Russian forces time to dig in behind trenches and minefields. New tactics, such as using drones to spot armored vehicles and precision weapons to destroy them, have offered the Russian invaders a defensive advantage. The West’s willingness to aid Ukraine isn’t guaranteed, especially in the face of gridlock in Washington. The war of attrition favors Russia, given its advantages in industry and manpower and Vladimir Putin’s high tolerance for casualties.

To account for these realities, Ukraine and its supporters should pursue an adapted strategy with five major elements.

First, Ukraine’s military effort should focus more on defense. Kyiv needs to maintain the territory it still controls even as it prepares for counteroffensives. This includes Odesa, which provides access to the Black Sea—vital to Ukraine’s economy, which depends on exporting grain to international markets. Ukrainian forces should establish fortified defensive lines and use advanced sensors and drones to prevent future Russian land grabs.

Second, Ukraine needs to reduce its dependence on foreign assistance. Ukraine has a robust defense industry that is producing more weapons than before Russia’s 2022 invasion. Kyiv has signed more than 20 agreements with foreign partners for joint maintenance and production of weapons, giving it increased industrial capacity domestically and abroad. The German company Rheinmetall and Turkish firm Baykar plan to build facilities in Ukraine to produce tanks and drones, respectively. But the U.S. lags behind. Washington should foster joint ventures with Ukraine’s defense industry by helping U.S. defense firms mitigate the risks of doing business in a war zone and reducing regulations, including restrictions on technology transfers under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.

Third, the U.S. and others should help Ukraine build an enhanced air- and missile-defense network. Ukraine needs to defend itself from Russia’s brutal air campaign. Western allies should reallocate Patriot batteries from other parts of Europe to Ukraine and cooperate with Kyiv to develop low-tech, low-cost defenses against drones and other battlefield weapons.

Fourth, Ukraine should target Russian supply lines in eastern Ukraine and western Russia. This would disrupt Russian logistics and complicate Moscow’s effort to consolidate its territorial gains. The U.S. and Europe should let Ukraine use the weapons they supply to target Russian forces in Russia that are attacking Ukraine. The same should apply to Russian supply lines and logistics.

Fifth, Ukraine should step up the threat to Russia’s vulnerable military position in Crimea. This should include long-range strikes as well as special operations against Russian forces, bases and supply lines. Why the Kerch Bridge to Russia remains standing is a mystery.

To enable these strikes, the U.S. and Western supporters should provide Ukraine longer-range weapons with larger payloads and lift their prohibitions against using these arms for attacks on forces and logistics inside Russian territory. Germany should immediately provide the Taurus missile, and the U.S. should deliver the 190-mile-range Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS. That wouldn’t meaningfully deplete U.S. stockpiles, as America has a substantial inventory and an active production line and is phasing out the system in favor of the more sophisticated, longer-range Precision Strike Missile. In addition, Western supporters should provide Ukraine with F-16 aircraft armed with high-speed antiradiation missiles to suppress Russian integrated air and missile defenses and allow Ukrainian missiles to reach their targets.

Crimea may be the most important center of gravity in this war. Mr. Putin can afford to cede villages in the Donbas, but losing the peninsula would be a major blow. It may be the only way to persuade him to wind down the conflict.

We doubt this approach would result in a negotiated peace treaty or even a formal cease-fire agreement. It could nevertheless result in a de facto stalemate with an active but static line of contact between the two militaries and far less combat. This would save lives and give Ukraine breathing space.

Many in Ukraine and the West would object that this would also give Russia breathing space, which it could use to prepare its next effort to subdue and absorb Ukraine. The multiyear defense commitments to Ukraine being developed by the U.S. and other Western countries would reduce this risk.

Ukraine still recalls the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Kyiv surrendered its nuclear weapons in exchange for bilateral U.S. and U.K. security assurances. That failed to deter Russia from invading. Given that unhappy experience, Kyiv can be forgiven for wanting more today—namely, membership in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NATO membership is off the table at least until there is a stable line of separation between Ukrainian and Russian forces and reduced conflict. It would have to be clear that incorporation into NATO wouldn’t put the alliance instantly at war with Russia or commit it to any Ukrainian military effort to recover territory occupied by Russia. But the international community would continue to recognize such territory as Ukrainian under international law.

These are sensitive issues, but analogous ones were overcome when West Germany joined NATO in 1955. In our view, only the prospect of NATO and EU membership would give President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian people the assurance that Russia would be deterred from taking over more of Ukraine. It also would furnish the political cover needed to accept an outcome that leaves Russian forces temporarily in possession of Ukrainian territory.

NATO membership for Ukraine must reflect complete consensus within the alliance. Noticeable divisions at Bucharest in 2008 suggested to Mr. Putin that NATO wouldn’t come to Ukraine’s defense, inviting his 2014 invasion.

Supporting Ukraine isn’t an act of philanthropy. If Ukraine and the West falter, Russia may succeed in conquering Ukraine. Mr. Putin wants to restore the Russian empire—a revanchist ambition that may drive him to invade a NATO member. The result would be war with NATO and the U.S., something no one should want.

Mr. Hadley chairs the Atlantic Council’s international advisory board. He served as White House national security adviser, 2005-09. Mr. Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a member of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the U.S.
Title: GPF: Rumors of a big reshuffle
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 05, 2024, 07:38:29 AM
second

By: Geopolitical Futures
Reshuffle. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed rumors that he may soon replace the popular commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces. In an interview with an Italian TV channel, Zelenskyy said the country’s top leadership needs a reset, not only in the military but also in government. Anonymous sources close to the president and within the military said that in addition to top commander Gen. Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Zelenskyy may replace Chief of the General Staff Serhii Shaptala.
Title: Ukraine: Time to Lick Wounds and Declare Victory
Post by: Body-by-Guinness on February 08, 2024, 11:11:35 AM
Piece argues it's time to negotiate an end to the war. I think the Finnish example makes for an apt analogy.

Ukraine Should Negotiate an End to the War with Russia and Justifiably Claim Victory
February 8, 2024
By IVAN ELAND

Also published in Inside Sources Tue. February 6, 2024   Show More »
Russian leader Vladimir Putin, despite his public swaggering, has privately signaled support for a settlement in his war with Ukraine that would freeze current battle lines, according to former Russian officials close to the Kremlin and U.S. and international officials who have received Putin’s offers.

After a failed recent counteroffensive and less certain continued U.S. and European assistance, Ukraine should accept negotiations that could require it to give up territory but nevertheless credibly claim victory in the war against Russia.

Understandably, after Putin’s unnecessary and brutal invasion of Ukraine, which has purposefully killed many Ukrainian civilians, President Volodymyr Zelensky and other Ukrainian leaders are still pledging to fight until they regain all their lost territory. Yet, Ukraine’s uncompromising position, which demands that the Russian military withdraw from all Ukrainian land and pay for damages, is untenable.

Even if the war ended today, and existing battle lines became future national boundaries, the magnitude of Ukraine’s victory should not be forgotten. Recent news reports have focused on the failed counteroffensive and the vicissitudes of Western aid. Still, Ukraine, a country much smaller in population and much weaker in military power than invading Russia, not only repulsed the initial Russian attack but has succeeded in clawing back territory in previous counteroffensives in Kherson and the northeast region of Ukraine, after which Putin licked his wounds and made a prior entreaty for a ceasefire in the fall of 2022.

The Ukrainian military has fought tenaciously, and the civilian population has valiantly endured many intentional Russian attacks and depredations that should be deemed war crimes. In short, Ukraine has nothing to be ashamed of.

Instead, Ukraine can be satisfied that it has inflicted severe pain on Putin and Russia—for example, catastrophic casualties, erosion of military capability through destroyed equipment, economic pain and the destabilization of Putin’s rule, as indicated by an aborted coup against his government.

Despite the calm exterior of a former KGB operative, Putin is likely livid at the horrific performance of his generals and vastly overrated military. And in the negotiations, perhaps Ukraine could regain more of its territory.

In the future, Putin, in his created kleptocracy, cannot be sure that, once again, any “much improved” military will be just another shell for corruption and, therefore, incompetence on the battlefield. Even if current battle lines become frozen, Putin, despite his show of arrogance and despite the fears of other Eastern European countries, will likely be deterred by this black eye from using his badly decimated army to invade any NATO country or engage in other substantial mischief anytime soon.

Ukraine is not the first smaller country to best the big Russian bear in a conflict. In 1939, Russia invaded Finland. Like the Ukrainians, the Finns fought hard and effectively to preserve their country from Russia’s larger army. Although Finland had to give up some territory, it prevented Russia from erasing Finland from the map. Today, the world perceives that Finland won the Winter War against Russia. Bearing this out, Finland became a prosperous, non-communist country living in the shadow of an imperially oriented great power.

Ukraine should keep the Finnish example in mind when assessing the costs and benefits of continuing to fight this bitter war. A pragmatic conclusion should question the sensibility of continuing the bloody fight and suffering many more casualties in an unlikely, and even quixotic, effort to regain from a dug-in Russia the Russian-speaking areas of eastern Ukraine, which may well prefer to be in Russia.

A measure to help both countries save face and sell a negotiated settlement to their own publics would be to conduct legitimate, internationally monitored referenda in Crimea and east and southeast Ukraine (unlike Putin’s early sham referenda in those areas) to allow the people there to genuinely determine the country they want to call home.

For Ukraine, the future of continued war looks dismal; the future, if peace is restored, looks much brighter. Ukraine made inroads in being able to start the application process for becoming a member of the European Union—its ticket to future prosperity and becoming part of the West. As it did with Finland after 1940, the world will regard the outcome of this war as an unlikely but courageous victory for Ukraine in preserving its sovereignty against a hostile great power aggressor.

Ending the war rapidly, despite some loss of territory, is the ticket to getting its economy rapidly on the road to prosperity.

 
IVAN ELAND is Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute and Director of the Institute’s Center on Peace & Liberty.

https://www.independent.org/news/article.asp?id=14824
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on February 08, 2024, 11:18:03 AM
not clear why Biden et al push Netanyahu for cease fire and negotiate

but do not with Zelensky.



Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Body-by-Guinness on February 08, 2024, 11:47:36 AM
not clear why Biden et al push Netanyahu for cease fire and negotiate

but do not with Zelensky.
Zelensky conceals embarrassing relationships, facilitates graft, and participates in "help hide the billions" shell games.

Netanyahu does not.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 08, 2024, 03:00:43 PM
"Not clear why Biden et al push Netanyahu for cease fire and negotiate but do not with Zelensky."

Some quality rhetorical pugilism there!
Title: .5B to Ukraine from two Euros
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 10, 2024, 09:27:15 AM


https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ukraine-s-military-to-receive-double-boost-from-nato-allies/ar-BB1i3eP0?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=386b9605492e46908dae2e0250a72e8d&ei=35
Title: Musk: Putin can't lose
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 13, 2024, 04:50:07 AM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/musk-says-putin-can-t-lose-in-ukraine-opposes-senate-bill/ar-BB1ibG0f?ocid=msedgntp&pc=HCTS&cvid=94b4dacda7b44868bf9d51318593f1f9&ei=11
Title: Avdeevka going down?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 14, 2024, 05:12:50 AM
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/sitrep-21324-avdeevka-turns-critical?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1351274&post_id=141644874&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=z2120&utm_medium=email
Title: Former Sec Def Robert Gates 2.0
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 15, 2024, 05:36:57 AM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jiss0TNGTFA
Title: Eussian Doomsday Space Weapon Steals Headlines of Avdeevka Collapse
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 16, 2024, 08:06:46 AM
Planetary Scare: Russian Doomsday Space Weapon Steals Headlines of Avdeevka Collapse

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/planetary-scare-russian-doomsday?publication_id=1351274&post_id=141657380&isFreemail=true&r=379fkp



Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on February 16, 2024, 10:39:55 AM
Warning disclosure, this is the New Yorker, normally a contrary indicator of truth.  A few points of note:

1.  I especially like the second half of this quote:

“Most people who start a war think it will be over quickly. And, of course, nobody starts a war that they think they can’t win.

[Doug] There is your peace plan, deterrence.

2. I wonder how accurate this assessment is.  According to the reporting, the US under Biden has been VERY involved in the Ukraine war, besides providing arms, giving intelligence and military strategy, even though they reportedly aren't taking our strategy advice.

3.   “The longer a war continues, the more likely autocracies are to win.”

4. [What is the end game?]   “You have to create the space for Ukraine to claim victory under less-than-ideal conditions,” she said. “Because, if you say the only thing that is victory is the Russians go home entirely from Crimea and Donbas, Ukraine is in nato, and Moscow somehow disappears off the face of the earth—that’s an unrealistic goal. To me, Ukrainian victory is a situation in which Russia can’t do this again or at least is going to have a very hard time doing it again.”
Title: WSJ: The Uke case for more arms
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 16, 2024, 02:02:51 PM
Western Weapons Are Ukraine’s Only Hope
Ukraine is outmanned. It needs U.S. assistance to make sure that it isn’t outgunned as well.
By Jillian Kay Melchior
Feb. 15, 2024 4:02 pm ET




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A soldier speaks with a recruit at a Ukrainian battalion’s recruiting center in Kyiv, Ukraine, Feb. 10. PHOTO: ROMAN PILIPEY/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Kyiv, Ukraine

My interview with Petro Poroshenko this week began with a discussion of the importance of U.S. military support. It ended with the former Ukrainian president wiping away tears as he named friends who have died in the war.

“It’s all the time like your personal tragedy,” Mr. Poroshenko says. Among those who broke his heart: Oleg Barna, 56, a lawmaker, teacher, “a great father and husband” and an “enormously wise person. . . . I knew him for ages.” He insisted on participating in an assault operation and was “killed saving a friend.” Serhii Ikonnikov, “killed on his birthday, 25.” Glib Babich, 53, a musician and “one of the greatest poets I ever met,” dead. His list goes on.

Such losses take on a strategic significance as Western support for Ukraine wanes. Since Vladimir Putin launched his full invasion two years ago, Kyiv and its Western supporters have divided defensive responsibilities: Ukraine provides the people; the West supplies the weaponry.

Western weapons are a force equalizer that enable Ukraine, a nation of 39.7 million in 2022, to stand toe-to-toe with Russia, population 144.7 million. Western weapons free up Ukrainian manpower that would otherwise be devoted to defense production. This support “is a factor that can reduce Russia’s quantitative advantage,” says Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to President Volodymyr Zelensky. “We were in fact doing that as long as we had enough resources. Today, we are facing a certain shortage.”

The arms shortage is dire. “Without U.S. support, the situation is desperate,” says Rostyslav Pavlenko, a lawmaker from Ukraine’s European Solidarity party. “The Europeans are doing what they can, we are doing what we can, but given the mismatch in numbers . . .” He trails off. Mykola Bielieskov, a research fellow at the Kyiv-based National Institute for Strategic Studies, says, “You either fight with modern weapons or you fight with men. That’s it.”

Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, a Ukrainian lawmaker from the European Solidarity party, says that “if we will fight Russia through a normal, symmetrical approach, they mobilize more, we mobilize more, they win. We can win only through an asymmetrical approach.” Anastasia Radina, a lawmaker from the ruling Servant of the People party, is even blunter: “We cannot compete with lives. We will run out. It’s really disturbing.”

Ukraine is looking for ways to increase its fighting force. In December the military suggested mobilizing as many as 500,000 more to fight. Lawmakers are considering legislation that would create a more comprehensive list of those eligible for military service and impose new consequences on those who fail to register, among other provisions. But tough choices accompany efforts to expand the military, and any political mistake could undermine national unity. Some soldiers have been fighting since day one. They’ve gained valuable experience but need rest.

Superior training is another force equalizer, but preparing new soldiers for battle requires money. If too many prime-age workers are away at war, the Ukrainian economy will struggle to produce tax revenue. “We need to remember that every service member costs the state significant amounts of money,” Mr. Podolyak says. Last year military, defense and security salaries, which aren’t covered by international donors, accounted for some 51% of Ukraine’s total defense-and-security budget of $48.3 billion.

Drafting an additional 400,000 to 500,000 soldiers would cost more than $8.4 billion, estimates Roksolana Pidlasa, a Servant of the People lawmaker who is head of the parliament’s budget committee. Russia is mobilizing about 1,000 new recruits a day, according to Serhii Kuzan, head of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center, a Kyiv think tank. Moscow is also ramping up its domestic military manufacturing with support from its friends. Iran has been supplying Russia with Shahed drones, and North Korea is providing ammunition and ballistic missiles that Ukraine can shoot down only with dwindling Patriot or SAMP-T air-defense resources.

Without U.S. weapons, Ukraine is becoming outgunned and outmanned. “We can choose to allow this to happen, but this is only a problem because of our own self-limitation,” says Fred Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute. “The industrial capacity of the collective West dwarfs that of Iran plus North Korea plus Russia.”

Ukrainians are frantically trying to explain their dilemma to the U.S. They warn that Mr. Putin’s ambitions don’t stop in Ukraine, and that the risks to Americans range from economic havoc to an attack on a North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally. China is watching as it eyes Taiwan, and small countries are paying attention as they assess whether the U.S. can be trusted as an ally. Russia is “totally an existential threat for us,” Ms. Klympush-Tsintsadze says, “but how come [Americans] don’t see it as a challenge or a real threat to them? . . . That is something that is puzzling to many Ukrainians.”

Several sources say they feel Ukraine has become a hostage to America’s internal politics. Maryan Zablotskyi, a Servant of the People lawmaker, returned Monday from Washington. “Once they meet you, they promise you the world,” he says of U.S. lawmakers. “Unfortunately I think the word ‘Ukraine’ has become too politicized.” Ukraine’s biggest problem, he adds, is “relying on the promises of U.S. politicians and not doing the work with the American public.”

Mr. Poroshenko says he remains optimistic Washington will come through. But as Ukraine waits for weapons, “the price for every single day, or the price for every single hour, is rising dramatically. . . . Those who will read your article cannot imagine what does it mean, every single week, to be at the funeral of your friends.”

Ms. Melchior is a London-based member of the Journal editorial board.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 17, 2024, 09:33:40 AM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ukrainian-forces-achieve-significant-blow-against-russian-air-force/ar-BB1iqT8x?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=81f0f43438534379bef1365fccfe308e&ei=11
Title: Amazing what Trump is shaking loose from the Euros
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 18, 2024, 03:42:08 PM
https://mil.in.ua/en/news/the-czech-republic-found-almost-a-million-shells-for-ukraine/?fbclid=IwAR3vP6IFrVACbVAR9xDrpySXrJa0qGwW-JCzMcSpqJIM3dSBeMvyFRYCYaI
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 20, 2024, 04:17:52 AM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/six-russian-fighter-jets-shot-down-in-just-three-days/ar-BB1iwIaZ?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=8f8ce1b148e444aa93224387406ee09d&ei=12
Title: Fox: Obama and Biden opposing views on Ukraine
Post by: ccp on February 20, 2024, 11:37:46 PM
Assuming the sources of this article are true:

https://www.yahoo.com/news/obama-balked-bidens-assertion-russia-221127214.html

FWIW I am still not sure who was right.

If Obama had done more about Crimea would Putin have advanced into Ukraine.
Jury is out, and I don't think anyone but Putin will ever know.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 21, 2024, 03:01:24 AM
Interesting.
Title: Zelensky's Leadership Days Numbered?
Post by: Body-by-Guinness on February 21, 2024, 05:54:56 AM
A less than optomistic view of what's in store for Ukraine and Zelensky:

REGIME CHANGE IS COMING ...TO KIEV
Zelensky May Soon Be Forced Out Thanks to Avdiivka

STEPHEN BRYEN
FEB 19, 2024
Washington has fondly hoped that it could bring about regime change in Russia.  Now it seems even more likely that there will be regime change, but not in Russia --in Kiev.

The catalyst for regime change in Kiev is the bloody and now ended battle over Avdiivka.


Avdiivka is very close to Donetsk city, the capital area of the Donbas region.  Donetsk is about halfway between Mariupol on the Sea of Azov and Luhansk in the north.  Both Donetsk and Luhansk are regions (oblasts) in eastern Ukraine with mostly Russian-speaking populations.  Both Donetsk and Luhansk, along with Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, were annexed by the Russians in September 2022.


Russian soldiers hold annexation documents ready for signature, September 30, 2022 Annexations included Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts
The recent battle over Avdiivka has gone on for four months, but since January the Russians began wearing down the Ukrainian defenders of the city.  The Russian operation included attacks from the north, some of it focused on a huge Coke-making plant; and from the South in multiple thrusts on the city’s flanks.  By the end of the first week of February the Russian armed forces had cut the city into two, and were steadily advancing while pounding the city with artillery and FAB bombs. These are high explosive bombs of different sizes (FAB-500, FAB-1500) where the number is the bomb size in kilograms.


Avdiivka coke plant

Avdiivka was highly fortified and a difficult target for the Russian army.  The Russians focused on flank attacks that eventually squeezed off resupply of weapons and food and made rotation of forces difficult. By the last week of the battle the roads in and out of the city were under Russian fire control.

Zelensky staked his reputation on Avdiivka and wanted it held at all costs.  He fired his overall commander Valerii Zaluzhny, who saw Avdiivka as a lost cause.  Zaluzhny wanted to pull Ukrainian forces back from the existing line of contact and move them into defensible fortifications that could protect Kiev and other important cities.


Zelensky takes a selfie at Avdiivka on December 29, 2023. This area was captured by Russian troops in mid-February, 2024
Enter Syrsky, who had been ground commander under Zaluzhny and was now put in charge of all Ukrainian military forces.  Syrsky is the same guy whose tactics led to the collapse of Bakhmut and very heavy casualties, earning that city the name of "meat grinder."

Syrsky immediately called up three or four brigades to save Avdiivka from collapse.  But his planned rescue operation almost immediately got into serious trouble.

Some of Syrsky's brigades were being assembled and organized in a small town around 15 kilometers from Avdiivka, called Selydove.  The Russians discovered the Ukrainian army operations in Selydove and attacked with Iskander missiles and cluster weapons. According to Russian sources on various blogs (Telegram, X, for example), the Russian attack all but wiped out an entire brigade with heavy Ukrainian casualties.


A destroyed building in Selydove. Was it a hospital or a barracks, or both?

Ukraine's propaganda mill went into high gear, alleging the Russian attack was aimed at a hospital's maternity ward in Selydov.  But the reality was that Ukraine lost around 1,000 to 1,500 soldiers. Most western news sources parroted the Ukrainian line.


Russian airstrikes hit a hospital according to the region’s governor
Zelensky was on his way to the Munich Security Conference where he got a standing ovation. Before he left Kiev he ordered Syrsky to stop the Russians from taking Avdiivka.


Zelensky speaks at Munich Security Conference
Syrsky committed the 3rd Brigade to the fight for the city.  The 3rd Separate Assault Brigade which, in reality is the reformed Azov Brigade.  The Azov brigade is the backbone of Zelensky's ultra nationalist support in Ukraine. If any organization in Ukraine fits Putin's description of Ukrainian Nazis, the 3rd Brigade is the premier example.  Zelensky's political power depends on the Ukrainian military, and in particular the ultra-nationalists.


‘Azov’ far-right activists shout slogans during the march. Thousands of Ukrainian servicemen and volunteers took part in the March of patriots marking the Volunteer Day honouring soldiers who joined the Ukrainian Army during a military conflict in eastern Ukraine. (Photo by Pavlo Gonchar/SOPA Images/LightRocket )

The 3rd Brigade did not perform as advertised.  When its units got into Avdiivka, coming in from the north, they found the situation dire. By that time there were around 4,500 Ukrainian soldiers in the northern parts of the city, mostly holed up in the Coke Plant.  Another 3,500 were in the center of the city verging on the southern town’s districts and an old abandoned airfield.

The 3rd Brigade disobeyed orders and ran out of the town, countermanding Syrsky and Zelensky's explicit orders.  Above all, Zelensky did not want to get embarrassed while he was at the Munich conference exactly while he was running around trying to get more ammunition for "the cause."  Some from the 3rd Brigade surrendered to the Russians.


Ukrainian troops surrendering
This is what triggered Syrsky to signal a retreat and abandon Avdiivka. That retreat was a significant blow to Zelensky's prestige and, apparently, there were angry phone calls from Munich to Syrsky.  But Syrsky had little choice, other than to openly surrender. Instead he announced a "new" strategy, precisely what Zaluzhny had previously recommended.


Syrsky interview by German TV outlet ZDF a few days before he ordered Avdiivka abandoned
The loss of Avdiivka leaves Zelensky in a bad situation.  He has all but lost his most ardent supporters in the Army, has humiliated his former commander Zaluzhny and replaced him with Syrsky who has a reputation as a loser.  He has lost face with the Europeans, and probably with the United States, although it is hard to tell for sure.

Zelensky counters by saying Ukraine will get Avdiivka back “absolutely.”

Washington does not want a deal with the Russians.  All its focus has been on handing Russia multiple defeats, squeezing the Russians dry, and replacing its leader, Putin. Biden's "team" also can't stomach the idea that the Ukrainians might make a deal with Russia and undermine "the policy."

Most of the central elements of Washington's policy have failed.  Excessive sanctions did not break the Russian economy but succeeded in driving the Russians in a wholly new direction, embracing China and India and BRICS. US technology did not turn the tide of war in Ukraine’s favor. Not talking to the Russians helped solidify the Russian view that Washington and NATO were the enemy, intensifying their already stressed view that they had been lied to over the years about NATO expansion.  While the US and Europe either could not, or would not, revitalize their defense industrial base, the Russians did so, with a vengeance. Meanwhile the US and Europe are standing by for the war to end and hundreds of billions are sunk into rebuilding Ukraine, which is less and less likely to happen under US and European auspices.

The bottom line is Zelensky's regime is tottering.  Because of Zelensky's martial law based regime, there will be no elections and no open political process.  But anger in the army is growing, and sooner or later they will choose a leader, most likely Zaluzhny. 

There will be regime change in Kiev, coming soon.

https://weapons.substack.com/p/regime-change-is-coming-to-kiev?r=1qo1e&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=email&fbclid=IwAR05P7o5VhWlW-9SVNQIKibN9BLkTAtlJdLBU6XEayiRffRQscgkP4OasPo
Title: Former Sec Def Gates: Russia is winning
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 21, 2024, 05:42:38 PM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/russia-has-broken-the-stalemate-in-ukraine-former-us-defense-secretary/ar-BB1iFMWa?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=15547049a5aa4edba8d1db2bfafbfd4c&ei=6
Title: Re: Former Sec Def Gates: Russia is winning
Post by: DougMacG on February 22, 2024, 06:32:47 AM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/russia-has-broken-the-stalemate-in-ukraine-former-us-defense-secretary/ar-BB1iFMWa?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=15547049a5aa4edba8d1db2bfafbfd4c&ei=6


Looks to me like he's (mostly) right, and it brings up some other points.

One is that we've never seen any public auditing of where our two years of funding so far has gone. If one penny of it has been wasted, that is too much.

"600 mile front"  Certainly that is to Russia's advantage if this is "a larger country invading a smaller one" .

The US pause makes me wonder if the Europeans will step up in our absence. From the article:

"Gates noted that European allies in NATO, “who we so often criticize,” have stepped up their support to Ukraine, but lack the ability to immediately send weapons. Production timelines will see NATO support reach the battlefield in 2025, he estimated."

(Doug).   Besides the US and Canada, NATO is 29 nations of Europe. If their weaponry readiness is zero at this point, we've uncovered a bigger problem than Ukraine.

Some months ago I argued against tying our border issue to Ukraine. Reason was that our border is an intentional, Democrat caused crisis and they won't budge. They can only be defeated and that takes time while the Ukraine need is immediate.

But since then, President Biden and the Senate Democrats did tie our border security to Ukraine funding. Within their bill they admitted that under certain circumstances such as more than 5,000 crossings per day, we do have the power  to close the border if we choose to. So do it.

The need to close our border is more immediate to US national security than the war in Ukraine, and Democrats said they want the issues tied, so be it.

Interestingly, Gates moves from his first point that Russia is winning to his last point that Ukraine needs our funding now. Our funding now to what end?

Aside from the human tragedy of war, it's not all bad that Putin has has been caught up in a quagmire. But so are we.

Seems to me that the point of the war continuing on both sides is positioning for negotiating the end game. Russia's side of it is clear. They want the world to recognize they are in permanent control of the territory and people they now occupy.

What is it we want at this point? To drive Russia back to where they started, pre-2022, to where they started pre-2014?  Yes, but if so, what would that take and are we willing to do it?  (No)

This funding bill will not do that.

Just like we had at the beginning of the war, we are stuck with a choice between two or more lousy alternatives.

The pause is forcing Europe to consider how they will defend themselves without us and I don't see them helping with the invasion at our border. An upcoming US election that overwhelmingly puts a stronger leader in place with Congress behind him is the only way to send a message of deterrence out on all fronts.

Otherwise, sending more money without a plan and without fixing our other problems makes us weaker, not stronger.
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: ccp on February 22, 2024, 07:47:40 AM
what little I guess
is Trump claiming he could fix this in a day
means he will pressure Zelensky to give Russia land and make a "deal"
by threatening to stop all support.

Whether that would work, whether that is the right answer I hesitate a lot.
But that is what I am thinking about when Trump beats his chest like a gorilla telling us how only he can fix this in 24 hrs.

Perhaps this is better then open ended quagmired blood money pit.

If there was any great answer we all know by now.



Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 22, 2024, 01:08:13 PM
They created this mess and now they are unhappy that we do not have a happy ending solution to the La Brea tar pits into which they have mired us.

=====================

A woman in a hot-air balloon realized she was lost. She lowered her altitude and spotted a man in a boat below. She shouted to him, "Excuse me, can you help me? I promised a friend I would meet him an hour ago, but I don't know where I am."

The man consulted his portable GPS and replied, "You're in a hot air balloon, approximately 30 feet above a ground elevation of 2,346 feet above sea level. You are at 31 degrees, 14.97 minutes north latitude and 100 degrees, 49.09 minutes west longitude.

She rolled her eyes and said, "You must be a Republican.

"I am," replied the man. "How did you know?"

"Well," answered the balloonist, "everything you told me is technically correct. But I have no idea what to do with your information, and I'm still lost. Frankly, you've not been much help to me."

The man smiled and responded, "You must be an Obama Democrat."

"I am," replied the balloonist. "How did you know?"

"Well," said the man, "you don't know where you are or where you are going.. You've risen to where you are, due to a large quantity of hot air. You made a promise you have no idea how to keep, and you expect me to solve your problem. You're in exactly the same position you were in before we met, but somehow, now it's my fault."
Title: Ukraine: Reaping What They’ve Sown
Post by: Body-by-Guinness on February 26, 2024, 03:20:12 PM
Ye gods, what an utter freaking mess: Ukraine backed Hillary and sought to waylay Trump in 2016, with various tendrils unfurling in a manner that make it clear they are reaping all sort of harvests the sowed unintentionally. But honest, besides all this stuff the Biden admin has been totally on the up and up where all things Ukraine related are concerned:

https://www.realclearinvestigations.com/articles/2022/03/10/how_ukraine_conspired_with_dems_against_trump_to_prevent_the_kind_of_war_happening_now_under_biden_820873.html?fbclid=IwAR0XQHu4Jojy8qn25j57LX3YFGiMpfhFKYfcEjoJLcb-Iu9biqzK9aC77yo
Title: Shouldn't this stuff be secret?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 27, 2024, 04:35:35 PM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/cia-builds-12-secret-spy-bases-in-ukraine-along-russian-border-becoming-best-source-of-information-about-kremlin/ar-BB1j0gNE?ocid=msedgntp&pc=HCTS&cvid=f570127e71204647a5c35757836bc9f3&ei=17
Title: GPF: Uke SF in Chad fighting Wagner?!?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on February 29, 2024, 01:35:48 PM
New battleground. Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, Kyrylo Budanov, confirmed for the first time that Ukrainian special operations forces were deployed to Sudan. Speaking at a forum in Kyiv on Ukraine’s future, Budanov reportedly said the goal of the deployment was to destroy the enemy everywhere it's located. The Kyiv Post has previously reported on the presence of Ukrainian special forces in Sudan seeking to capture fighters from Russia’s Wagner Group.

Open to talks. Russian officials are ready to hold talks with Ukraine in Turkey if given instructions to do so, Russian chief negotiator Vladimir Medinsky said. His comments came in response to the Turkish president’s remarks that his country would host peace negotiations again if asked. Medinsky led the Russian delegation that previously participated in talks with Ukraine in Istanbul.
Title: Major NYT piece: How the CIA secretly helps Ukes fight Russia
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 03, 2024, 06:37:45 PM



A soldier in camouflage gear in a forest whose trees have been largely stripped of leaves.
A Ukrainian Army soldier in a forest near Russian lines this month. A C.I.A.-supported network of spy bases has been constructed in the past eight years that includes 12 secret locations along the Russian border.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times
The Spy War: How the C.I.A. Secretly Helps Ukraine Fight Putin
For more than a decade, the United States has nurtured a secret intelligence partnership with Ukraine that is now critical for both countries in countering Russia.

A Ukrainian Army soldier in a forest near Russian lines this month. A C.I.A.-supported network of spy bases has been constructed in the past eight years that includes 12 secret locations along the Russian border.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Share full article


801
Adam EntousMichael Schwirtz
By Adam Entous and Michael Schwirtz
Adam Entous and Michael Schwirtz conducted more than 200 interviews in Ukraine, several other European countries and the United States to report this story.

Published Feb. 25, 2024
Updated Feb. 28, 2024
阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版
Nestled in a dense forest, the Ukrainian military base appears abandoned and destroyed, its command center a burned-out husk, a casualty of a Russian missile barrage early in the war.

But that is above ground.


Not far away, a discreet passageway descends to a subterranean bunker where teams of Ukrainian soldiers track Russian spy satellites and eavesdrop on conversations between Russian commanders. On one screen, a red line followed the route of an explosive drone threading through Russian air defenses from a point in central Ukraine to a target in the Russian city of Rostov.

The underground bunker, built to replace the destroyed command center in the months after Russia’s invasion, is a secret nerve center of Ukraine’s military.

There is also one more secret: The base is almost fully financed, and partly equipped, by the C.I.A.

“One hundred and ten percent,” Gen. Serhii Dvoretskiy, a top intelligence commander, said in an interview at the base.

Now entering the third year of a war that has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, the intelligence partnership between Washington and Kyiv is a linchpin of Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. The C.I.A. and other American intelligence agencies provide intelligence for targeted missile strikes, track Russian troop movements and help support spy networks.

But the partnership is no wartime creation, nor is Ukraine the only beneficiary.

It took root a decade ago, coming together in fits and starts under three very different U.S. presidents, pushed forward by key individuals who often took daring risks. It has transformed Ukraine, whose intelligence agencies were long seen as thoroughly compromised by Russia, into one of Washington’s most important intelligence partners against the Kremlin today.


The Ukrainians also helped U.S. officials pursue the Russian operatives who meddled in the 2016 U.S. presidential election between Donald J. Trump and Hillary Rodham Clinton.Credit...Damon Winter/The New York Times  (MARC:  !!!)

The listening post in the Ukrainian forest is part of a C.I.A.-supported network of spy bases constructed in the past eight years that includes 12 secret locations along the Russian border. Before the war, the Ukrainians proved themselves to the Americans by collecting intercepts that helped prove Russia’s involvement in the 2014 downing of a commercial jetliner, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17. The Ukrainians also helped the Americans go after the Russian operatives who meddled in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

Around 2016, the C.I.A. began training an elite Ukrainian commando force — known as Unit 2245 — which captured Russian drones and communications gear so that C.I.A. technicians could reverse-engineer them and crack Moscow’s encryption systems. (One officer in the unit was Kyrylo Budanov, now the general leading Ukraine’s military intelligence.)

And the C.I.A. also helped train a new generation of Ukrainian spies who operated inside Russia, across Europe, and in Cuba and other places where the Russians have a large presence.

The relationship is so ingrained that C.I.A. officers remained at a remote location in western Ukraine when the Biden administration evacuated U.S. personnel in the weeks before Russia invaded in February 2022. During the invasion, the officers relayed critical intelligence, including where Russia was planning strikes and which weapons systems they would use.

“Without them, there would have been no way for us to resist the Russians, or to beat them,” said Ivan Bakanov, who was then head of Ukraine’s domestic intelligence agency, the S.B.U.


The details of this intelligence partnership, many of which are being disclosed by The New York Times for the first time, have been a closely guarded secret for a decade.

In more than 200 interviews, current and former officials in Ukraine, the United States and Europe described a partnership that nearly foundered from mutual distrust before it steadily expanded, turning Ukraine into an intelligence-gathering hub that intercepted more Russian communications than the C.I.A. station in Kyiv could initially handle. Many of the officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence and matters of sensitive diplomacy.

Now these intelligence networks are more important than ever, as Russia is on the offensive and Ukraine is more dependent on sabotage and long-range missile strikes that require spies far behind enemy lines. And they are increasingly at risk: If Republicans in Congress end military funding to Kyiv, the C.I.A. may have to scale back.

To try to reassure Ukrainian leaders, William J. Burns, the C.I.A. director, made a secret visit to Ukraine last Thursday, his 10th visit since the invasion.

From the outset, a shared adversary — President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia — brought the C.I.A. and its Ukrainian partners together. Obsessed with “losing” Ukraine to the West, Mr. Putin had regularly interfered in Ukraine’s political system, handpicking leaders he believed would keep Ukraine within Russia’s orbit, yet each time it backfired, driving protesters into the streets.

Mr. Putin has long blamed Western intelligence agencies for manipulating Kyiv and sowing anti-Russia sentiment in Ukraine.

Toward the end of 2021, according to a senior European official, Mr. Putin was weighing whether to launch his full-scale invasion when he met with the head of one of Russia’s main spy services, who told him that the C.I.A., together with Britain’s MI6, were controlling Ukraine and turning it into a beachhead for operations against Moscow.

But the Times investigation found that Mr. Putin and his advisers misread a critical dynamic. The C.I.A. didn’t push its way into Ukraine. U.S. officials were often reluctant to fully engage, fearing that Ukrainian officials could not be trusted, and worrying about provoking the Kremlin.


Ukraine is more dependent on sabotage and long-range missile strikes that require spies far behind enemy lines.Credit...Ivor Prickett for The New York Times

Yet a tight circle of Ukrainian intelligence officials assiduously courted the C.I.A. and gradually made themselves vital to the Americans. In 2015, Gen. Valeriy Kondratiuk, then Ukraine’s head of military intelligence, arrived at a meeting with the C.I.A.’s deputy station chief and without warning handed over a stack of top-secret files.

That initial tranche contained secrets about the Russian Navy’s Northern Fleet, including detailed information about the latest Russian nuclear submarine designs. Before long, teams of C.I.A. officers were regularly leaving his office with backpacks full of documents.

“We understood that we needed to create the conditions of trust,” General Kondratiuk said.

As the partnership deepened after 2016, the Ukrainians became impatient with what they considered Washington’s undue caution, and began staging assassinations and other lethal operations, which violated the terms the White House thought the Ukrainians had agreed to. Infuriated, officials in Washington threatened to cut off support, but they never did.

“The relationships only got stronger and stronger because both sides saw value in it, and the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv — our station there, the operation out of Ukraine — became the best source of information, signals and everything else, on Russia,” said a former senior American official. “We couldn’t get enough of it.”

This is the untold story of how it all happened.

A Cautious Beginning
The C.I.A.’s partnership in Ukraine can be traced back to two phone calls on the night of Feb. 24, 2014, eight years to the day before Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Millions of Ukrainians had just overrun the country’s pro-Kremlin government and the president, Viktor Yanukovych, and his spy chiefs had fled to Russia. In the tumult, a fragile pro-Western government quickly took power.

The government’s new spy chief, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, arrived at the headquarters of the domestic intelligence agency and found a pile of smoldering documents in the courtyard. Inside, many of the computers had been wiped or were infected with Russian malware.

“It was empty. No lights. No leadership. Nobody was there,” Mr. Nalyvaichenko said in an interview.

He went to an office and called the C.I.A. station chief and the local head of MI6. It was near midnight but he summoned them to the building, asked for help in rebuilding the agency from the ground up, and proposed a three-way partnership. “That’s how it all started,” Mr. Nalyvaichenko said.









The situation quickly became more dangerous. Mr. Putin seized Crimea. His agents fomented separatist rebellions that would become a war in the country’s east. Ukraine was on war footing, and Mr. Nalyvaichenko appealed to the C.I.A. for overhead imagery and other intelligence to help defend its territory.

With violence escalating, an unmarked U.S. government plane touched down at an airport in Kyiv carrying John O. Brennan, then the director of the C.I.A. He told Mr. Nalyvaichenko that the C.I.A. was interested in developing a relationship but only at a pace the agency was comfortable with, according to U.S. and Ukrainian officials.

To the C.I.A., the unknown question was how long Mr. Nalyvaichenko and the pro-Western government would be around. The C.I.A. had been burned before in Ukraine.

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine gained independence and then veered between competing political forces: those that wanted to remain close to Moscow and those that wanted to align with the West. During a previous stint as spy chief, Mr. Nalyvaichenko started a similar partnership with the C.I.A., which dissolved when the country swung back toward Russia.

Now Mr. Brennan explained that to unlock C.I.A. assistance the Ukrainians had to prove that they could provide intelligence of value to the Americans. They also needed to purge Russian spies; the domestic spy agency, the S.B.U., was riddled with them. (Case in point: The Russians quickly learned about Mr. Brennan’s supposedly secret visit. The Kremlin’s propaganda outlets published a photoshopped image of the C.I.A. director wearing a clown wig and makeup.)

Mr. Brennan returned to Washington, where advisers to President Barack Obama were deeply concerned about provoking Moscow. The White House crafted secret rules that infuriated the Ukrainians and that some inside the C.I.A. thought of as handcuffs. The rules barred intelligence agencies from providing any support to Ukraine that could be “reasonably expected” to have lethal consequences.





The result was a delicate balancing act. The C.I.A. was supposed to strengthen Ukraine’s intelligence agencies without provoking the Russians. The red lines were never precisely clear, which created a persistent tension in the partnership.

In Kyiv, Mr. Nalyvaichenko picked a longtime aide, General Kondratiuk, to serve as head of counterintelligence, and they created a new paramilitary unit that was deployed behind enemy lines to conduct operations and gather intelligence that the C.I.A. or MI6 would not provide to them.

Known as the Fifth Directorate, this unit would be filled with officers born after Ukraine gained independence.

“They had no connection with Russia,” General Kondratiuk said. “They didn’t even know what the Soviet Union was.”

That summer, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, blew up in midair and crashed in eastern Ukraine, killing nearly 300 passengers and crew. The Fifth Directorate produced telephone intercepts and other intelligence within hours of the crash that quickly placed responsibility on Russian-backed separatists.

The C.I.A. was impressed, and made its first meaningful commitment by providing secure communications gear and specialized training to members of the Fifth Directorate and two other elite units.

“The Ukrainians wanted fish and we, for policy reasons, couldn’t deliver that fish,” said a former U.S. official, referring to intelligence that could help them battle the Russians. “But we were happy to teach them how to fish and deliver fly-fishing equipment.”

A Secret Santa
In the summer of 2015, Ukraine’s president, Petro Poroshenko, shook up the domestic service and installed an ally to replace Mr. Nalyvaichenko, the C.I.A.’s trusted partner. But the change created an opportunity elsewhere.

In the reshuffle, General Kondratiuk was appointed as the head of the country’s military intelligence agency, known as the HUR, where years earlier he had started his career. It would be an early example of how personal ties, more than policy shifts, would deepen the C.I.A.’s involvement in Ukraine.

Unlike the domestic agency, the HUR had the authority to collect intelligence outside the country, including in Russia. But the Americans had seen little value in cultivating the agency because it wasn’t producing any intelligence of value on the Russians — and because it was seen as a bastion of Russian sympathizers.

Trying to build trust, General Kondratiuk arranged a meeting with his American counterpart at the Defense Intelligence Agency and handed over a stack of secret Russian documents. But senior D.I.A. officials were suspicious and discouraged building closer ties.

The general needed to find a more willing partner.

Months earlier, while still with the domestic agency, General Kondratiuk visited the C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va. In those meetings, he met a C.I.A. officer with a jolly demeanor and a bushy beard who had been tapped to become the next station chief in Kyiv.





After a long day of meetings, the C.I.A. took General Kondratiuk to a Washington Capitals hockey match, where he and the incoming station chief sat in a luxury box and loudly booed Alex Ovechkin, the team’s star player from Russia.

The station chief had not yet arrived when General Kondratiuk handed over to the C.I.A. the secret documents about the Russian Navy. “There’s more where this came from,” he promised, and the documents were sent off to analysts in Langley.

The analysts concluded the documents were authentic, and after the station chief arrived in Kyiv, the C.I.A. became General Kondratiuk’s primary partner.

General Kondratiuk knew he needed the C.I.A. to strengthen his own agency. The C.I.A. thought the general might be able to help Langley, too. It struggled to recruit spies inside Russia because its case officers were under heavy surveillance.

“For a Russian, allowing oneself to be recruited by an American is to commit the absolute, ultimate in treachery and treason,” General Kondratiuk said. “But for a Russian to be recruited by a Ukrainian, it’s just friends talking over a beer.”

The new station chief began regularly visiting General Kondratiuk, whose office was decorated with an aquarium where yellow and blue fish — the national colors of Ukraine — swam circles around a model of a sunken Russian submarine. The two men became close, which drove the relationship between the two agencies, and the Ukrainians gave the new station chief an affectionate nickname: Santa Claus.

In January 2016, General Kondratiuk flew to Washington for meetings at Scattergood, an estate on the C.I.A. campus in Virginia where the agency often fetes visiting dignitaries. The agency agreed to help the HUR modernize, and to improve its ability to intercept Russian military communications. In exchange, General Kondratiuk agreed to share all of the raw intelligence with the Americans.

Now the partnership was real.

Operation Goldfish

Today, the narrow road leading to the secret base is framed by minefields, seeded as a line of defense in the weeks after Russia’s invasion. The Russian missiles that hit the base had seemingly shut it down, but just weeks later the Ukrainians returned.

With money and equipment provided by the C.I.A., crews under General Dvoretskiy’s command began to rebuild, but underground. To avoid detection, they only worked at night and when Russian spy satellites were not overhead. Workers also parked their cars a distance away from the construction site.

In the bunker, General Dvoretskiy pointed to communications equipment and large computer servers, some of which were financed by the C.I.A. He said his teams were using the base to hack into the Russian military’s secure communications networks.

“This is the thing that breaks into satellites and decodes secret conversations,” General Dvoretskiy told a Times journalist on a tour, adding that they were hacking into spy satellites from China and Belarus, too.

Another officer placed two recently produced maps on a table, as evidence of how Ukraine is tracking Russian activity around the world.

The first showed the overhead routes of Russian spy satellites traveling over central Ukraine. The second showed how Russian spy satellites are passing over strategic military installations — including a nuclear weapons facility — in the eastern and central United States.


The C.I.A. began sending equipment in 2016, after the pivotal meeting at Scattergood, General Dvoretskiy said, providing encrypted radios and devices for intercepting secret enemy communications.

Beyond the base, the C.I.A. also oversaw a training program, carried out in two European cities, to teach Ukrainian intelligence officers how to convincingly assume fake personas and steal secrets in Russia and other countries that are adept at rooting out spies. The program was called Operation Goldfish, which derived from a joke about a Russian-speaking goldfish who offers two Estonians wishes in exchange for its freedom.

The punchline was that one of the Estonians bashed the fish’s head with a rock, explaining that anything speaking Russian could not be trusted.

The Operation Goldfish officers were soon deployed to 12 newly-built, forward operating bases constructed along the Russian border. From each base, General Kondratiuk said, the Ukrainian officers ran networks of agents who gathered intelligence inside Russia.

C.I.A. officers installed equipment at the bases to help gather intelligence and also identified some of the most skilled Ukrainian graduates of the Operation Goldfish program, working with them to approach potential Russian sources. These graduates then trained sleeper agents on Ukrainian territory meant to launch guerrilla operations in case of occupation.

It can often take years for the C.I.A. to develop enough trust in a foreign agency to begin conducting joint operations. With the Ukrainians it had taken less than six months. The new partnership started producing so much raw intelligence about Russia that it had to be shipped to Langley for processing.

But the C.I.A. did have red lines. It wouldn’t help the Ukrainians conduct offensive lethal operations.

“We made a distinction between intelligence collection operations and things that go boom,” a former senior U.S. official said.

‘This is Our Country’
It was a distinction that grated on the Ukrainians.

First, General Kondratiuk was annoyed when the Americans refused to provide satellite images from inside Russia. Soon after, he requested C.I.A. assistance in planning a clandestine mission to send HUR commandos into Russia to plant explosive devices at train depots used by the Russian military. If the Russian military sought to take more Ukrainian territory, Ukrainians could detonate the explosives to slow the Russian advance.

When the station chief briefed his superiors, they “lost their minds,” as one former official put it. Mr. Brennan, the C.I.A. director, called General Kondratiuk to make certain that mission was canceled and that Ukraine abided by the red lines forbidding lethal operations.

General Kondratiuk canceled the mission, but he also took a different lesson. “Going forward, we worked to not have discussions about these things with your guys,” he said.

Late that summer, Ukrainian spies discovered that Russian forces were deploying attack helicopters at an airfield on the Russian-occupied Crimean Peninsula, possibly to stage a surprise attack.

General Kondratiuk decided to send a team into Crimea to plant explosives at the airfield so they could be detonated if Russia moved to attack.

This time, he didn’t ask the C.I.A. for permission. He turned to Unit 2245, the commando force that received specialized military training from the C.I.A.’s elite paramilitary group, known as the Ground Department. The intent of the training was to teach defensive techniques, but C.I.A. officers understood that without their knowledge the Ukrainians could use the same techniques in offensive lethal operations.

Image
Joe Biden and Petro Poroshenko talking by a stairway.
Petro Poroshenko, then the president of Ukraine, right, and Joseph R. Biden Jr., then the U.S. vice president, during a meeting in Kyiv in 2015.Credit...Pool photo by Mikhail Palinchak
Image

At the time, the future head of Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, General Budanov, was a rising star in Unit 2245. He was known for daring operations behind enemy lines and had deep ties to the C.I.A. The agency had trained him and also taken the extraordinary step of sending him for rehabilitation to Walter Reed National Military Medical Center in Maryland after he was shot in the right arm during fighting in the Donbas.

Disguised in Russian uniforms, then-Lt. Col. Budanov led commandos across a narrow gulf in inflatable speedboats, landing at night in Crimea.

But an elite Russian commando unit was waiting for them. The Ukrainians fought back, killing several Russian fighters, including the son of a general, before retreating to the shoreline, plunging into the sea and swimming for hours to Ukrainian-controlled territory.

It was a disaster. In a public address, President Putin accused the Ukrainians of plotting a terrorist attack and promised to avenge the deaths of the Russian fighters.

“There is no doubt that we will not let these things pass,” he said.

In Washington, the Obama White House was livid. Joseph R. Biden Jr., then the vice president and a champion of assistance to Ukraine, called Ukraine’s president to angrily complain.

“It causes a gigantic problem,” Mr. Biden said in the call, a recording of which was leaked and published online. “All I’m telling you as a friend is that my making arguments here is a hell of a lot harder now.”

Some of Mr. Obama’s advisers wanted to shut the C.I.A. program down, but Mr. Brennan persuaded them that doing so would be self-defeating, given the relationship was starting to produce intelligence on the Russians as the C.I.A. was investigating Russian election meddling.

Mr. Brennan got on the phone with General Kondratiuk to again emphasize the red lines.

The general was upset. “This is our country,” he responded, according to a colleague. “It’s our war, and we’ve got to fight.”

The blowback from Washington cost General Kondratiuk his job. But Ukraine didn’t back down.

One day after General Kondratiuk was removed, a mysterious explosion in the Russian-occupied city of Donetsk, in eastern Ukraine, ripped through an elevator carrying a senior Russian separatist commander named Arsen Pavlov, known by his nom de guerre, Motorola.

The C.I.A. soon learned that the assassins were members of the Fifth Directorate, the spy group that received C.I.A. training. Ukraine’s domestic intelligence agency had even handed out commemorative patches to those involved, each one stitched with the word “Lift,” the British term for an elevator.

Again, some of Mr. Obama’s advisers were furious, but they were lame ducks — the presidential election pitting Donald J. Trump against Hillary Rodham Clinton was three weeks away — and the assassinations continued.

A team of Ukrainian agents set up an unmanned, shoulder-fired rocket launcher in a building in the occupied territories. It was directly across from the office of a rebel commander named Mikhail Tolstykh, better known as Givi. Using a remote trigger, they fired the launcher as soon as Givi entered his office, killing him, according to U.S. and Ukrainian officials.

A shadow war was now in overdrive. The Russians used a car bomb to assassinate the head of Unit 2245, the elite Ukrainian commando force. The commander, Col. Maksim Shapoval, was on his way to meeting with C.I.A. officers in Kyiv when his car exploded.

At the colonel’s wake, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, Marie Yovanovitch, stood in mourning beside the C.I.A. station chief. Later, C.I.A. officers and their Ukrainian counterparts toasted Colonel Shapoval with whiskey shots.

“For all of us,” General Kondratiuk said, “it was a blow.”

Tiptoeing Around Trump
The election of Mr. Trump in November 2016 put the Ukrainians and their C.I.A. partners on edge.

Mr. Trump praised Mr. Putin and dismissed Russia’s role in election interference. He was suspicious of Ukraine and later tried to pressure its president, Volodymyr Zelensky, to investigate his Democratic rival, Mr. Biden, resulting in Mr. Trump’s first impeachment.

But whatever Mr. Trump said and did, his administration often went in the other direction. This is because Mr. Trump had put Russia hawks in key positions, including Mike Pompeo as C.I.A. director and John Bolton as national security adviser. They visited Kyiv to underline their full support for the secret partnership, which expanded to include more specialized training programs and the building of additional secret bases.

The base in the forest grew to include a new command center and barracks, and swelled from 80 to 800 Ukrainian intelligence officers. Preventing Russia from interfering in future U.S. elections was a top C.I.A. priority during this period, and Ukrainian and American intelligence officers joined forces to probe the computer systems of Russia’s intelligence agencies to identify operatives trying to manipulate voters.


In one joint operation, a HUR team duped an officer from Russia’s military intelligence service into providing information that allowed the C.I.A. to connect Russia’s government to the so-called Fancy Bear hacking group, which had been linked to election interference efforts in a number of countries.

General Budanov, whom Mr. Zelensky tapped to lead the HUR in 2020, said of the partnership: “It only strengthened. It grew systematically. The cooperation expanded to additional spheres and became more large-scale.”

The relationship was so successful that the C.I.A. wanted to replicate it with other European intelligence services that shared a focus in countering Russia.

The head of Russia House, the C.I.A. department overseeing operations against Russia, organized a secret meeting at The Hague. There, representatives from the C.I.A., Britain’s MI6, the HUR, the Dutch service (a critical intelligence ally) and other agencies agreed to start pooling together more of their intelligence on Russia.

The result was a secret coalition against Russia — and the Ukrainians were vital members of it.

March to War
In March 2021, the Russian military started massing troops along the border with Ukraine. As the months passed, and more troops encircled the country, the question was whether Mr. Putin was making a feint or preparing for war.

That November, and in the weeks that followed, the C.I.A. and MI6 delivered a unified message to their Ukrainian partners: Russia was preparing for a full-scale invasion to decapitate the government and install a puppet in Kyiv who would do the Kremlin’s bidding.

U.S. and British intelligence agencies had intercepts that Ukrainian intelligence agencies did not have access to, according to U.S. officials. The new intelligence listed the names of Ukrainian officials whom the Russians were planning to kill or capture, as well as the Ukrainians the Kremlin hoped to install in power.

President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine at a news conference in Kyiv in March 2022.Credit...Lynsey Addario for The New York Times
President Zelensky and some of his top advisers appeared unconvinced, even after Mr. Burns, the C.I.A. director, rushed to Kyiv in January 2022 to brief them.

As the Russian invasion neared, C.I.A. and MI6 officers made final visits in Kyiv with their Ukrainian peers. One of the MI6 officers teared up in front of the Ukrainians, out of concern that the Russians would kill them.

At Mr. Burns’s urging, a small group of C.I.A. officers were exempted from the broader U.S. evacuation and were relocated to a hotel complex in western Ukraine. They didn’t want to desert their partners.

No Endgame
After Mr. Putin launched the invasion on Feb. 24, 2022, the C.I.A. officers at the hotel were the only U.S. government presence on the ground. Every day at the hotel, they met with their Ukrainian contacts to pass information. The old handcuffs were off, and the Biden White House authorized spy agencies to provide intelligence support for lethal operations against Russian forces on Ukrainian soil.

Often, the C.I.A. briefings contained shockingly specific details.

On March 3, 2022 — the eighth day of the war — the C.I.A. team gave a precise overview of Russian plans for the coming two weeks. The Russians would open a humanitarian corridor out of the besieged city of Mariupol that same day, and then open fire on the Ukrainians who used it.

The Russians planned to encircle the strategic port city of Odesa, according to the C.I.A., but a storm delayed the assault and the Russians never took the city. Then, on March 10, the Russians intended to bombard six Ukrainian cities, and had already entered coordinates into cruise missiles for those strikes.

The Russians also were trying to assassinate top Ukrainian officials, including Mr. Zelensky. In at least one case, the C.I.A. shared intelligence with Ukraine’s domestic agency that helped disrupt a plot against the president, according to a senior Ukrainian official.

When the Russian assault on Kyiv had stalled, the C.I.A. station chief rejoiced and told his Ukrainian counterparts that they were “punching the Russians in the face,” according to a Ukrainian officer who was in the room.


Within weeks, the C.I.A. had returned to Kyiv, and the agency sent in scores of new officers to help the Ukrainians. A senior U.S. official said of the C.I.A.’s sizable presence, “Are they pulling triggers? No. Are they helping with targeting? Absolutely.”

Some of the C.I.A. officers were deployed to Ukrainian bases. They reviewed lists of potential Russian targets that the Ukrainians were preparing to strike, comparing the information that the Ukrainians had with U.S. intelligence to ensure that it was accurate.

Before the invasion, the C.I.A. and MI6 had trained their Ukrainian counterparts on recruiting sources, and building clandestine and partisan networks. In the southern Kherson region, which was occupied by Russia in the first weeks of the war, those partisan networks sprang into action, according to General Kondratiuk, assassinating local collaborators and helping Ukrainian forces target Russian positions.

In July 2022, Ukrainian spies saw Russian convoys preparing to cross a strategic bridge across the Dnipro river and notified MI6. British and American intelligence officers then quickly verified the Ukrainian intelligence, using real-time satellite imagery. MI6 relayed the confirmation, and the Ukrainian military opened fire with rockets, destroying the convoys.

At the underground bunker, General Dvoretskiy said a German antiaircraft system now defends against Russian attacks. An air-filtration system guards against chemical weapons and a dedicated power system is available, if the power grid goes down.

The question that some Ukrainian intelligence officers are now asking their American counterparts — as Republicans in the House weigh whether to cut off billions of dollars in aid — is whether the C.I.A. will abandon them. “It happened in Afghanistan before and now it’s going to happen in Ukraine,” a senior Ukrainian officer said.

Referring to Mr. Burns’s visit to Kyiv last week, a C.I.A. official said, “We have demonstrated a clear commitment to Ukraine over many years and this visit was another strong signal that the U.S. commitment will continue.”

The C.I.A. and the HUR have built two other secret bases to intercept Russian communications, and combined with the 12 forward operating bases, which General Kondratiuk says are still operational, the HUR now collects and produces more intelligence than at any time in the war — much of which it shares with the C.I.A.

“You can’t get information like this anywhere — except here, and now,” General Dvoretskiy said.

Natalia Yermak and Christiaan Triebert contributed reporting.

Audio produced by Patricia Sulbarán.

Image

A home, flying Ukrainian and American flags, standing in the destroyed and mostly abandoned village of Rubizhne in the Kharkiv region, close to the Russian border, in December.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times
Adam Entous is a Washington-based investigative correspondent and a two-time Pulitzer Prize winner. Before joining the Washington bureau of The Times, he covered intelligence, national security and foreign policy for The New Yorker magazine, The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal. More about Adam Entous

Michael Schwirtz is an investigative reporter with the International desk. With The Times since 2006, he previously covered the countries of the former Soviet Union from Moscow and was a lead reporter on a team that won the 2020 Pulitzer Prize for articles about Russian intelligence operations. More about Michael Schwirtz
Title: Simplicius
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 07, 2024, 08:00:33 PM
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/sitrep-3724-macron-raises-rhetoric?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1351274&post_id=142344278&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=z2120&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email
Title: VDH comparison to Verdun
Post by: ccp on March 08, 2024, 08:04:17 AM
and Ukraine should forget about Donbas and Crimea

and get peace.

Better then continuing to fight an endless standoff.

https://dailycaller.com/2024/03/07/victor-davis-hanson-million-casualties-ukraine-stalemate/
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 09, 2024, 05:26:34 AM
Just had a couple of hours yesterday of very interesting conversation with someone of subtantial first hand information about all of this.  He said essentially what VDH is saying here.
Title: VDH podcast with Sen. Ron Johnson
Post by: ccp on March 09, 2024, 06:00:45 AM
https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/wisconsin-watch-dog-interview-with-ron-johnson/id1570380458?i=1000647756958

they talk a lot about Ukraine

They more or less agree it is time to deal

Donbass and Crimea an d promise to keep Ukraine out of NATO for peace and Russia recognizes rest of Ukraine as independent.

My minimal opinion thinks this is the most sensible way out for both sides
as otherwise we could go on like this for another 10 yrs at this rate.
 
Title: Ukraine/Russia War Data Visualization
Post by: Body-by-Guinness on March 09, 2024, 12:16:00 PM
I can’t attest for their accuracy of all shown here, but it’s some pretty darn interesting ways to frame this info:

https://informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/ukraine-russian-war-infographics-data-visuals/#two-years
Title: Re: Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 09, 2024, 05:12:31 PM
Seems like a serious effort, well aware of the abundant pitfalls.
Title: American casualites in Ukraine?
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 11, 2024, 10:38:54 AM
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/us-troops-may-have-been-killed-in-strike-on-patriots-in-ukraine-russia/ar-BB1jGZRp?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=b0e524a3ea4e46f992ee2bf1f2f6aa24&ei=26
Title: NYT: CIA in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 12, 2024, 07:48:41 AM
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/25/world/europe/cia-ukraine-intelligence-russia-war.html?unlocked_article_code=1.ZU0.cVMV.WUQNdzfehBE8&smid=nytcore-android-share

A Ukrainian Army soldier in a forest near Russian lines this month. A C.I.A.-supported network of spy bases has been constructed in the past eight years that includes 12 secret locations along the Russian border.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

The Spy War: How the C.I.A. Secretly Helps Ukraine Fight Putin

For more than a decade, the United States has nurtured a secret intelligence partnership with Ukraine that is now critical for both countries in countering Russia.

A Ukrainian Army soldier in a forest near Russian lines this month. A C.I.A.-supported network of spy bases has been constructed in the past eight years that includes 12 secret locations along the Russian border.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times



Published Feb. 25, 2024
Updated Feb. 28, 2024

Nestled in a dense forest, the Ukrainian military base appears abandoned and destroyed, its command center a burned-out husk, a casualty of a Russian missile barrage early in the war.

But that is above ground.

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Not far away, a discreet passageway descends to a subterranean bunker where teams of Ukrainian soldiers track Russian spy satellites and eavesdrop on conversations between Russian commanders. On one screen, a red line followed the route of an explosive drone threading through Russian air defenses from a point in central Ukraine to a target in the Russian city of Rostov.

The underground bunker, built to replace the destroyed command center in the months after Russia’s invasion, is a secret nerve center of Ukraine’s military.

There is also one more secret: The base is almost fully financed, and partly equipped, by the C.I.A.

“One hundred and ten percent,” Gen. Serhii Dvoretskiy, a top intelligence commander, said in an interview at the base.

Now entering the third year of a war that has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, the intelligence partnership between Washington and Kyiv is a linchpin of Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. The C.I.A. and other American intelligence agencies provide intelligence for targeted missile strikes, track Russian troop movements and help support spy networks.

But the partnership is no wartime creation, nor is Ukraine the only beneficiary.

It took root a decade ago, coming together in fits and starts under three very different U.S. presidents, pushed forward by key individuals who often took daring risks. It has transformed Ukraine, whose intelligence agencies were long seen as thoroughly compromised by Russia, into one of Washington’s most important intelligence partners against the Kremlin today.

The Ukrainians also helped U.S. officials pursue the Russian operatives who meddled in the 2016 U.S. presidential election between Donald J. Trump and Hillary Rodham Clinton.Credit...Damon Winter/The New York Times

The listening post in the Ukrainian forest is part of a C.I.A.-supported network of spy bases constructed in the past eight years that includes 12 secret locations along the Russian border. Before the war, the Ukrainians proved themselves to the Americans by collecting intercepts that helped prove Russia’s involvement in the 2014 downing of a commercial jetliner, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17. The Ukrainians also helped the Americans go after the Russian operatives who meddled in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

Around 2016, the C.I.A. began training an elite Ukrainian commando force — known as Unit 2245 — which captured Russian drones and communications gear so that C.I.A. technicians could reverse-engineer them and crack Moscow’s encryption systems. (One officer in the unit was Kyrylo Budanov, now the general leading Ukraine’s military intelligence.)

And the C.I.A. also helped train a new generation of Ukrainian spies who operated inside Russia, across Europe, and in Cuba and other places where the Russians have a large presence.

The relationship is so ingrained that C.I.A. officers remained at a remote location in western Ukraine when the Biden administration evacuated U.S. personnel in the weeks before Russia invaded in February 2022. During the invasion, the officers relayed critical intelligence, including where Russia was planning strikes and which weapons systems they would use.

“Without them, there would have been no way for us to resist the Russians, or to beat them,” said Ivan Bakanov, who was then head of Ukraine’s domestic intelligence agency, the S.B.U.


The details of this intelligence partnership, many of which are being disclosed by The New York Times for the first time, have been a closely guarded secret for a decade.

In more than 200 interviews, current and former officials in Ukraine, the United States and Europe described a partnership that nearly foundered from mutual distrust before it steadily expanded, turning Ukraine into an intelligence-gathering hub that intercepted more Russian communications than the C.I.A. station in Kyiv could initially handle. Many of the officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence and matters of sensitive diplomacy.

Now these intelligence networks are more important than ever, as Russia is on the offensive and Ukraine is more dependent on sabotage and long-range missile strikes that require spies far behind enemy lines. And they are increasingly at risk: If Republicans in Congress end military funding to Kyiv, the C.I.A. may have to scale back.

To try to reassure Ukrainian leaders, William J. Burns, the C.I.A. director, made a secret visit to Ukraine last Thursday, his 10th visit since the invasion.

From the outset, a shared adversary — President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia — brought the C.I.A. and its Ukrainian partners together. Obsessed with “losing” Ukraine to the West, Mr. Putin had regularly interfered in Ukraine’s political system, handpicking leaders he believed would keep Ukraine within Russia’s orbit, yet each time it backfired, driving protesters into the streets.

Mr. Putin has long blamed Western intelligence agencies for manipulating Kyiv and sowing anti-Russia sentiment in Ukraine.

Toward the end of 2021, according to a senior European official, Mr. Putin was weighing whether to launch his full-scale invasion when he met with the head of one of Russia’s main spy services, who told him that the C.I.A., together with Britain’s MI6, were controlling Ukraine and turning it into a beachhead for operations against Moscow.

But the Times investigation found that Mr. Putin and his advisers misread a critical dynamic. The C.I.A. didn’t push its way into Ukraine. U.S. officials were often reluctant to fully engage, fearing that Ukrainian officials could not be trusted, and worrying about provoking the Kremlin.


Ukraine is more dependent on sabotage and long-range missile strikes that require spies far behind enemy lines.Credit...Ivor Prickett for The New York Times

Yet a tight circle of Ukrainian intelligence officials assiduously courted the C.I.A. and gradually made themselves vital to the Americans. In 2015, Gen. Valeriy Kondratiuk, then Ukraine’s head of military intelligence, arrived at a meeting with the C.I.A.’s deputy station chief and without warning handed over a stack of top-secret files.

That initial tranche contained secrets about the Russian Navy’s Northern Fleet, including detailed information about the latest Russian nuclear submarine designs. Before long, teams of C.I.A. officers were regularly leaving his office with backpacks full of documents.

“We understood that we needed to create the conditions of trust,” General Kondratiuk said.

As the partnership deepened after 2016, the Ukrainians became impatient with what they considered Washington’s undue caution, and began staging assassinations and other lethal operations, which violated the terms the White House thought the Ukrainians had agreed to. Infuriated, officials in Washington threatened to cut off support, but they never did.

“The relationships only got stronger and stronger because both sides saw value in it, and the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv — our station there, the operation out of Ukraine — became the best source of information, signals and everything else, on Russia,” said a former senior American official. “We couldn’t get enough of it.”

This is the untold story of how it all happened.

A Cautious Beginning
The C.I.A.’s partnership in Ukraine can be traced back to two phone calls on the night of Feb. 24, 2014, eight years to the day before Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Millions of Ukrainians had just overrun the country’s pro-Kremlin government and the president, Viktor Yanukovych, and his spy chiefs had fled to Russia. In the tumult, a fragile pro-Western government quickly took power.

The government’s new spy chief, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, arrived at the headquarters of the domestic intelligence agency and found a pile of smoldering documents in the courtyard. Inside, many of the computers had been wiped or were infected with Russian malware.

“It was empty. No lights. No leadership. Nobody was there,” Mr. Nalyvaichenko said in an interview.

He went to an office and called the C.I.A. station chief and the local head of MI6. It was near midnight but he summoned them to the building, asked for help in rebuilding the agency from the ground up, and proposed a three-way partnership. “That’s how it all started,” Mr. Nalyvaichenko said.

The situation quickly became more dangerous. Mr. Putin seized Crimea. His agents fomented separatist rebellions that would become a war in the country’s east. Ukraine was on war footing, and Mr. Nalyvaichenko appealed to the C.I.A. for overhead imagery and other intelligence to help defend its territory.

With violence escalating, an unmarked U.S. government plane touched down at an airport in Kyiv carrying John O. Brennan, then the director of the C.I.A. He told Mr. Nalyvaichenko that the C.I.A. was interested in developing a relationship but only at a pace the agency was comfortable with, according to U.S. and Ukrainian officials.

To the C.I.A., the unknown question was how long Mr. Nalyvaichenko and the pro-Western government would be around. The C.I.A. had been burned before in Ukraine.

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine gained independence and then veered between competing political forces: those that wanted to remain close to Moscow and those that wanted to align with the West. During a previous stint as spy chief, Mr. Nalyvaichenko started a similar partnership with the C.I.A., which dissolved when the country swung back toward Russia.

Now Mr. Brennan explained that to unlock C.I.A. assistance the Ukrainians had to prove that they could provide intelligence of value to the Americans. They also needed to purge Russian spies; the domestic spy agency, the S.B.U., was riddled with them. (Case in point: The Russians quickly learned about Mr. Brennan’s supposedly secret visit. The Kremlin’s propaganda outlets published a photoshopped image of the C.I.A. director wearing a clown wig and makeup.)

Mr. Brennan returned to Washington, where advisers to President Barack Obama were deeply concerned about provoking Moscow. The White House crafted secret rules that infuriated the Ukrainians and that some inside the C.I.A. thought of as handcuffs. The rules barred intelligence agencies from providing any support to Ukraine that could be “reasonably expected” to have lethal consequences.



The result was a delicate balancing act. The C.I.A. was supposed to strengthen Ukraine’s intelligence agencies without provoking the Russians. The red lines were never precisely clear, which created a persistent tension in the partnership.

In Kyiv, Mr. Nalyvaichenko picked a longtime aide, General Kondratiuk, to serve as head of counterintelligence, and they created a new paramilitary unit that was deployed behind enemy lines to conduct operations and gather intelligence that the C.I.A. or MI6 would not provide to them.

Known as the Fifth Directorate, this unit would be filled with officers born after Ukraine gained independence.

“They had no connection with Russia,” General Kondratiuk said. “They didn’t even know what the Soviet Union was.”

That summer, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, blew up in midair and crashed in eastern Ukraine, killing nearly 300 passengers and crew. The Fifth Directorate produced telephone intercepts and other intelligence within hours of the crash that quickly placed responsibility on Russian-backed separatists.

The C.I.A. was impressed, and made its first meaningful commitment by providing secure communications gear and specialized training to members of the Fifth Directorate and two other elite units.

“The Ukrainians wanted fish and we, for policy reasons, couldn’t deliver that fish,” said a former U.S. official, referring to intelligence that could help them battle the Russians. “But we were happy to teach them how to fish and deliver fly-fishing equipment.”

A Secret Santa
In the summer of 2015, Ukraine’s president, Petro Poroshenko, shook up the domestic service and installed an ally to replace Mr. Nalyvaichenko, the C.I.A.’s trusted partner. But the change created an opportunity elsewhere.

In the reshuffle, General Kondratiuk was appointed as the head of the country’s military intelligence agency, known as the HUR, where years earlier he had started his career. It would be an early example of how personal ties, more than policy shifts, would deepen the C.I.A.’s involvement in Ukraine.

Unlike the domestic agency, the HUR had the authority to collect intelligence outside the country, including in Russia. But the Americans had seen little value in cultivating the agency because it wasn’t producing any intelligence of value on the Russians — and because it was seen as a bastion of Russian sympathizers.

Trying to build trust, General Kondratiuk arranged a meeting with his American counterpart at the Defense Intelligence Agency and handed over a stack of secret Russian documents. But senior D.I.A. officials were suspicious and discouraged building closer ties.

The general needed to find a more willing partner.

Months earlier, while still with the domestic agency, General Kondratiuk visited the C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va. In those meetings, he met a C.I.A. officer with a jolly demeanor and a bushy beard who had been tapped to become the next station chief in Kyiv.

After a long day of meetings, the C.I.A. took General Kondratiuk to a Washington Capitals hockey match, where he and the incoming station chief sat in a luxury box and loudly booed Alex Ovechkin, the team’s star player from Russia.

The station chief had not yet arrived when General Kondratiuk handed over to the C.I.A. the secret documents about the Russian Navy. “There’s more where this came from,” he promised, and the documents were sent off to analysts in Langley.

The analysts concluded the documents were authentic, and after the station chief arrived in Kyiv, the C.I.A. became General Kondratiuk’s primary partner.

General Kondratiuk knew he needed the C.I.A. to strengthen his own agency. The C.I.A. thought the general might be able to help Langley, too. It struggled to recruit spies inside Russia because its case officers were under heavy surveillance.

“For a Russian, allowing oneself to be recruited by an American is to commit the absolute, ultimate in treachery and treason,” General Kondratiuk said. “But for a Russian to be recruited by a Ukrainian, it’s just friends talking over a beer.”

The new station chief began regularly visiting General Kondratiuk, whose office was decorated with an aquarium where yellow and blue fish — the national colors of Ukraine — swam circles around a model of a sunken Russian submarine. The two men became close, which drove the relationship between the two agencies, and the Ukrainians gave the new station chief an affectionate nickname: Santa Claus.

In January 2016, General Kondratiuk flew to Washington for meetings at Scattergood, an estate on the C.I.A. campus in Virginia where the agency often fetes visiting dignitaries. The agency agreed to help the HUR modernize, and to improve its ability to intercept Russian military communications. In exchange, General Kondratiuk agreed to share all of the raw intelligence with the Americans.

Now the partnership was real.

Operation Goldfish
Today, the narrow road leading to the secret base is framed by minefields, seeded as a line of defense in the weeks after Russia’s invasion. The Russian missiles that hit the base had seemingly shut it down, but just weeks later the Ukrainians returned.

With money and equipment provided by the C.I.A., crews under General Dvoretskiy’s command began to rebuild, but underground. To avoid detection, they only worked at night and when Russian spy satellites were not overhead. Workers also parked their cars a distance away from the construction site.

In the bunker, General Dvoretskiy pointed to communications equipment and large computer servers, some of which were financed by the C.I.A. He said his teams were using the base to hack into the Russian military’s secure communications networks.

“This is the thing that breaks into satellites and decodes secret conversations,” General Dvoretskiy told a Times journalist on a tour, adding that they were hacking into spy satellites from China and Belarus, too.

Another officer placed two recently produced maps on a table, as evidence of how Ukraine is tracking Russian activity around the world.

The first showed the overhead routes of Russian spy satellites traveling over central Ukraine. The second showed how Russian spy satellites are passing over strategic military installations — including a nuclear weapons facility — in the eastern and central United States.


The C.I.A. began sending equipment in 2016, after the pivotal meeting at Scattergood, General Dvoretskiy said, providing encrypted radios and devices for intercepting secret enemy communications.

Beyond the base, the C.I.A. also oversaw a training program, carried out in two European cities, to teach Ukrainian intelligence officers how to convincingly assume fake personas and steal secrets in Russia and other countries that are adept at rooting out spies. The program was called Operation Goldfish, which derived from a joke about a Russian-speaking goldfish who offers two Estonians wishes in exchange for its freedom.

The punchline was that one of the Estonians bashed the fish’s head with a rock, explaining that anything speaking Russian could not be trusted.

The Operation Goldfish officers were soon deployed to 12 newly-built, forward operating bases constructed along the Russian border. From each base, General Kondratiuk said, the Ukrainian officers ran networks of agents who gathered intelligence inside Russia.

C.I.A. officers installed equipment at the bases to help gather intelligence and also identified some of the most skilled Ukrainian graduates of the Operation Goldfish program, working with them to approach potential Russian sources. These graduates then trained sleeper agents on Ukrainian territory meant to launch guerrilla operations in case of occupation.

It can often take years for the C.I.A. to develop enough trust in a foreign agency to begin conducting joint operations. With the Ukrainians it had taken less than six months. The new partnership started producing so much raw intelligence about Russia that it had to be shipped to Langley for processing.

But the C.I.A. did have red lines. It wouldn’t help the Ukrainians conduct offensive lethal operations.

“We made a distinction between intelligence collection operations and things that go boom,” a former senior U.S. official said.

‘This is Our Country’
It was a distinction that grated on the Ukrainians.

First, General Kondratiuk was annoyed when the Americans refused to provide satellite images from inside Russia. Soon after, he requested C.I.A. assistance in planning a clandestine mission to send HUR commandos into Russia to plant explosive devices at train depots used by the Russian military. If the Russian military sought to take more Ukrainian territory, Ukrainians could detonate the explosives to slow the Russian advance.

When the station chief briefed his superiors, they “lost their minds,” as one former official put it. Mr. Brennan, the C.I.A. director, called General Kondratiuk to make certain that mission was canceled and that Ukraine abided by the red lines forbidding lethal operations.

General Kondratiuk canceled the mission, but he also took a different lesson. “Going forward, we worked to not have discussions about these things with your guys,” he said.

Late that summer, Ukrainian spies discovered that Russian forces were deploying attack helicopters at an airfield on the Russian-occupied Crimean Peninsula, possibly to stage a surprise attack.

General Kondratiuk decided to send a team into Crimea to plant explosives at the airfield so they could be detonated if Russia moved to attack.

This time, he didn’t ask the C.I.A. for permission. He turned to Unit 2245, the commando force that received specialized military training from the C.I.A.’s elite paramilitary group, known as the Ground Department. The intent of the training was to teach defensive techniques, but C.I.A. officers understood that without their knowledge the Ukrainians could use the same techniques in offensive lethal operations.


At the time, the future head of Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, General Budanov, was a rising star in Unit 2245. He was known for daring operations behind enemy lines and had deep ties to the C.I.A. The agency had trained him and also taken the extraordinary step of sending him for rehabilitation to Walter Reed National Military Medical Center in Maryland after he was shot in the right arm during fighting in the Donbas.

Disguised in Russian uniforms, then-Lt. Col. Budanov led commandos across a narrow gulf in inflatable speedboats, landing at night in Crimea.

But an elite Russian commando unit was waiting for them. The Ukrainians fought back, killing several Russian fighters, including the son of a general, before retreating to the shoreline, plunging into the sea and swimming for hours to Ukrainian-controlled territory.

It was a disaster. In a public address, President Putin accused the Ukrainians of plotting a terrorist attack and promised to avenge the deaths of the Russian fighters.

“There is no doubt that we will not let these things pass,” he said.

In Washington, the Obama White House was livid. Joseph R. Biden Jr., then the vice president and a champion of assistance to Ukraine, called Ukraine’s president to angrily complain.

“It causes a gigantic problem,” Mr. Biden said in the call, a recording of which was leaked and published online. “All I’m telling you as a friend is that my making arguments here is a hell of a lot harder now.”

Some of Mr. Obama’s advisers wanted to shut the C.I.A. program down, but Mr. Brennan persuaded them that doing so would be self-defeating, given the relationship was starting to produce intelligence on the Russians as the C.I.A. was investigating Russian election meddling.

Mr. Brennan got on the phone with General Kondratiuk to again emphasize the red lines.

The general was upset. “This is our country,” he responded, according to a colleague. “It’s our war, and we’ve got to fight.”

The blowback from Washington cost General Kondratiuk his job. But Ukraine didn’t back down.


One day after General Kondratiuk was removed, a mysterious explosion in the Russian-occupied city of Donetsk, in eastern Ukraine, ripped through an elevator carrying a senior Russian separatist commander named Arsen Pavlov, known by his nom de guerre, Motorola.

The C.I.A. soon learned that the assassins were members of the Fifth Directorate, the spy group that received C.I.A. training. Ukraine’s domestic intelligence agency had even handed out commemorative patches to those involved, each one stitched with the word “Lift,” the British term for an elevator.

Again, some of Mr. Obama’s advisers were furious, but they were lame ducks — the presidential election pitting Donald J. Trump against Hillary Rodham Clinton was three weeks away — and the assassinations continued.

A team of Ukrainian agents set up an unmanned, shoulder-fired rocket launcher in a building in the occupied territories. It was directly across from the office of a rebel commander named Mikhail Tolstykh, better known as Givi. Using a remote trigger, they fired the launcher as soon as Givi entered his office, killing him, according to U.S. and Ukrainian officials.

A shadow war was now in overdrive. The Russians used a car bomb to assassinate the head of Unit 2245, the elite Ukrainian commando force. The commander, Col. Maksim Shapoval, was on his way to meeting with C.I.A. officers in Kyiv when his car exploded.

At the colonel’s wake, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, Marie Yovanovitch, stood in mourning beside the C.I.A. station chief. Later, C.I.A. officers and their Ukrainian counterparts toasted Colonel Shapoval with whiskey shots.

“For all of us,” General Kondratiuk said, “it was a blow.”

Tiptoeing Around Trump
The election of Mr. Trump in November 2016 put the Ukrainians and their C.I.A. partners on edge.

Mr. Trump praised Mr. Putin and dismissed Russia’s role in election interference. He was suspicious of Ukraine and later tried to pressure its president, Volodymyr Zelensky, to investigate his Democratic rival, Mr. Biden, resulting in Mr. Trump’s first impeachment.

But whatever Mr. Trump said and did, his administration often went in the other direction. This is because Mr. Trump had put Russia hawks in key positions, including Mike Pompeo as C.I.A. director and John Bolton as national security adviser. They visited Kyiv to underline their full support for the secret partnership, which expanded to include more specialized training programs and the building of additional secret bases.

The base in the forest grew to include a new command center and barracks, and swelled from 80 to 800 Ukrainian intelligence officers. Preventing Russia from interfering in future U.S. elections was a top C.I.A. priority during this period, and Ukrainian and American intelligence officers joined forces to probe the computer systems of Russia’s intelligence agencies to identify operatives trying to manipulate voters.

In one joint operation, a HUR team duped an officer from Russia’s military intelligence service into providing information that allowed the C.I.A. to connect Russia’s government to the so-called Fancy Bear hacking group, which had been linked to election interference efforts in a number of countries.

General Budanov, whom Mr. Zelensky tapped to lead the HUR in 2020, said of the partnership: “It only strengthened. It grew systematically. The cooperation expanded to additional spheres and became more large-scale.”

The relationship was so successful that the C.I.A. wanted to replicate it with other European intelligence services that shared a focus in countering Russia.

The head of Russia House, the C.I.A. department overseeing operations against Russia, organized a secret meeting at The Hague. There, representatives from the C.I.A., Britain’s MI6, the HUR, the Dutch service (a critical intelligence ally) and other agencies agreed to start pooling together more of their intelligence on Russia.

The result was a secret coalition against Russia — and the Ukrainians were vital members of it.

March to War
In March 2021, the Russian military started massing troops along the border with Ukraine. As the months passed, and more troops encircled the country, the question was whether Mr. Putin was making a feint or preparing for war.

That November, and in the weeks that followed, the C.I.A. and MI6 delivered a unified message to their Ukrainian partners: Russia was preparing for a full-scale invasion to decapitate the government and install a puppet in Kyiv who would do the Kremlin’s bidding.

U.S. and British intelligence agencies had intercepts that Ukrainian intelligence agencies did not have access to, according to U.S. officials. The new intelligence listed the names of Ukrainian officials whom the Russians were planning to kill or capture, as well as the Ukrainians the Kremlin hoped to install in power.


President Zelensky and some of his top advisers appeared unconvinced, even after Mr. Burns, the C.I.A. director, rushed to Kyiv in January 2022 to brief them.

As the Russian invasion neared, C.I.A. and MI6 officers made final visits in Kyiv with their Ukrainian peers. One of the MI6 officers teared up in front of the Ukrainians, out of concern that the Russians would kill them.

At Mr. Burns’s urging, a small group of C.I.A. officers were exempted from the broader U.S. evacuation and were relocated to a hotel complex in western Ukraine. They didn’t want to desert their partners.

No Endgame
After Mr. Putin launched the invasion on Feb. 24, 2022, the C.I.A. officers at the hotel were the only U.S. government presence on the ground. Every day at the hotel, they met with their Ukrainian contacts to pass information. The old handcuffs were off, and the Biden White House authorized spy agencies to provide intelligence support for lethal operations against Russian forces on Ukrainian soil.

Often, the C.I.A. briefings contained shockingly specific details.

On March 3, 2022 — the eighth day of the war — the C.I.A. team gave a precise overview of Russian plans for the coming two weeks. The Russians would open a humanitarian corridor out of the besieged city of Mariupol that same day, and then open fire on the Ukrainians who used it.

The Russians planned to encircle the strategic port city of Odesa, according to the C.I.A., but a storm delayed the assault and the Russians never took the city. Then, on March 10, the Russians intended to bombard six Ukrainian cities, and had already entered coordinates into cruise missiles for those strikes.

The Russians also were trying to assassinate top Ukrainian officials, including Mr. Zelensky. In at least one case, the C.I.A. shared intelligence with Ukraine’s domestic agency that helped disrupt a plot against the president, according to a senior Ukrainian official.

When the Russian assault on Kyiv had stalled, the C.I.A. station chief rejoiced and told his Ukrainian counterparts that they were “punching the Russians in the face,” according to a Ukrainian officer who was in the room.

Image
A man shoveling sand on a beach where fortifications were built.
A Ukrainian Army soldier preparing defenses at a beachfront position in Odesa in 2022.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times
Image
A crowd of people with police officers at the edges.
Crowds gathering for food handouts in the southern Ukrainian city of Kherson after it was retaken from Russian occupation, in 2022.Credit...Finbarr O'Reilly for The New York Times
Within weeks, the C.I.A. had returned to Kyiv, and the agency sent in scores of new officers to help the Ukrainians. A senior U.S. official said of the C.I.A.’s sizable presence, “Are they pulling triggers? No. Are they helping with targeting? Absolutely.”

Some of the C.I.A. officers were deployed to Ukrainian bases. They reviewed lists of potential Russian targets that the Ukrainians were preparing to strike, comparing the information that the Ukrainians had with U.S. intelligence to ensure that it was accurate.

Before the invasion, the C.I.A. and MI6 had trained their Ukrainian counterparts on recruiting sources, and building clandestine and partisan networks. In the southern Kherson region, which was occupied by Russia in the first weeks of the war, those partisan networks sprang into action, according to General Kondratiuk, assassinating local collaborators and helping Ukrainian forces target Russian positions.

In July 2022, Ukrainian spies saw Russian convoys preparing to cross a strategic bridge across the Dnipro river and notified MI6. British and American intelligence officers then quickly verified the Ukrainian intelligence, using real-time satellite imagery. MI6 relayed the confirmation, and the Ukrainian military opened fire with rockets, destroying the convoys.

At the underground bunker, General Dvoretskiy said a German antiaircraft system now defends against Russian attacks. An air-filtration system guards against chemical weapons and a dedicated power system is available, if the power grid goes down.

The question that some Ukrainian intelligence officers are now asking their American counterparts — as Republicans in the House weigh whether to cut off billions of dollars in aid — is whether the C.I.A. will abandon them. “It happened in Afghanistan before and now it’s going to happen in Ukraine,” a senior Ukrainian officer said.

Referring to Mr. Burns’s visit to Kyiv last week, a C.I.A. official said, “We have demonstrated a clear commitment to Ukraine over many years and this visit was another strong signal that the U.S. commitment will continue.”

The C.I.A. and the HUR have built two other secret bases to intercept Russian communications, and combined with the 12 forward operating bases, which General Kondratiuk says are still operational, the HUR now collects and produces more intelligence than at any time in the war — much of which it shares with the C.I.A.

“You can’t get information like this anywhere — except here, and now,” General Dvoretskiy said.

Natalia Yermak and Christiaan Triebert contributed reporting.

Audio produced by Patricia Sulbarán.
Title: Re: NYT: CIA in Ukraine
Post by: DougMacG on March 12, 2024, 09:06:24 AM
Too bad we didn't have a spy network in Gaza.
Title: GPF: Uke drones hitting Russia
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 12, 2024, 04:05:25 PM
Drones and raids. Ukrainian drones targeted eight Russian regions overnight. The attacks sparked a fire at a fuel and energy complex in Nizhny Novgorod and damaged another in Oryol. Separately, Russian volunteers fighting for Ukraine said they had crossed the border and were battling Russian forces in Belgorod and Kursk. The attacks appear intended to disrupt Russian elections this week.
Title: Ukes hitting into Russia
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 13, 2024, 02:33:11 PM
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13191589/Jordans-Queen-Rania-says-Israel-one-October-7-Palestinians-156-calls-war-end.html
Title: WSJ: the Cost of Peace in Ukraine
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 13, 2024, 02:47:33 PM
Not that I agree with all of this:

The Dire Cost of ‘Peace’ in Ukraine
Kyiv can’t stand on its own, but a Russian victory would leave the U.S. far worse off.
By William A. Galston
March 12, 2024 1:37 pm ET

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán met Donald Trump Friday at Mar-a-Lago, and told Hungarian state media on Sunday that Mr. Trump “will not give a penny in the Ukraine-Russia war. Therefore, the war will end, because it is obvious that Ukraine cannot stand on its own feet.”

Mr. Orbán is probably right. Mr. Trump’s antipathy toward Ukraine is no secret, and our European allies will find it difficult to sustain Ukraine’s struggle against Vladimir Putin without the U.S., linchpin of the pro-Ukraine coalition.

As Washington delays aid to Kyiv, the situation on the ground is deteriorating. Although Ukraine’s recent reverses in Avdiivka haven’t produced an all-out Russian surge, Russia’s forces are slowly advancing along several fronts. Ukrainian forces can bend only so much before they break.

I recently participated in a background briefing on the situation from some leading politico-military experts, who agreed that Ukraine faces three principal problems. First, it is running short on manpower, not because it has reached the bottom of the demographic barrel but because its mobilization policy is too narrow. Ukraine excludes men under 27 from the draft, in part to help meet the labor-force needs of the civilian economy. Although the precise level of the staffing shortfall is one of Ukraine’s carefully guarded military secrets, it’s clear that it’s substantial and growing.

At bottom this is a political issue. An expanded draft is unpopular, and almost no Ukrainian official wants to take the lead in proposing one. Last month, Gen. Valerii Zaluzhny was replaced as commander in chief of Ukraine’s armed forces, in part because President Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly was unhappy about Gen. Zaluzhny’s support of the Defense Ministry’s request for another 500,000 troops. A proposal to lower the draft age to 25 is tied up in Ukraine’s Parliament and may remain so until Mr. Zelensky signals his backing.

Ukraine’s second problem is its lack of strong fortifications where it most needs them. In part this is an issue of resources. With Ukraine’s forces holding the line along an extended front and Ukrainians working continuously to keep the country’s infrastructure functioning, building strong defensive positions behind the front line hasn’t been the highest priority. The government’s strategy of defending current positions at all costs while preparing to retake the offensive has also contributed to the inadequacy of its rearguard defenses.

Ukraine’s much-discussed ammunition shortage is the third major problem. According to numerous reports, including from front-line commanders, Russian forces have enjoyed a 5-to-1 advantage in these essential supplies for several months, and the imbalance may be growing. Russia also enjoys air superiority because Ukraine lacks adequate supplies of antiaircraft missiles. Our allies are helping to fill these gaps, but without the U.S. in the lead, the shortfall will continue.

This is why Kyiv and all of Europe are anxiously watching Washington, where additional aid for Ukraine has become entangled with other issues, including immigration policy, some Democrats’ objection to unrestricted aid for Israel, and Republican fiscal hawks’ desire to slash the so-called discretionary budget, the portion of federal spending subject to annual appropriations.

Last month, Mr. Trump’s disapproval of a Senate compromise on border security to accompany a Ukraine aid package led Minority Leader Mitch McConnell to block a bill he supported, forcing the Senate to send the House an aid bill for Ukraine, Israel and Asia-Pacific allies with no immigration provisions. Speaker Mike Johnson’s refusal to bring this bill to the floor produced the current impasse.

As I’ve written, House backers of aid for Ukraine are working on parliamentary procedures that could get a bill to the floor over the speaker’s objections. In mid-February, a bipartisan group led by Reps. Brian Fitzpatrick (R., Pa.) and Jared Golden (D., Maine) introduced a compromise proposal to strengthen border security and provide defense funding for Ukraine, with no aid for Kyiv’s government operations. Over the weekend, Sen. Lindsey Graham suggested that Mr. Trump might if re-elected be willing to aid Ukraine with loans rather than grants.

No one knows which of these strategies, if any, has the best chance of succeeding. What we know is that if the U.S. fails to act, Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression will weaken and ultimately fail. This would bring Mr. Putin closer to his long-term goals—obliterating Ukraine’s sovereignty, weakening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and restoring Russian control over the peoples and territories of the former Soviet bloc.

After his Mar-a-Lago visit, Mr. Orbán called Donald Trump a “man of peace.” So, I suppose, was Neville Chamberlain. The problem, as Chamberlain discovered, is that your own pacific intentions don’t matter much if the other side doesn’t share them.
Title: Crimea: Russian ship down
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 16, 2024, 11:52:31 AM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RkLIdbD67Cw
Title: How the Russian Navy Lost to a Country Without Any Boats
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 22, 2024, 04:48:31 PM
How the Russian Navy Lost to a Country Without Any Boats

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y6UeNBj9rrU
Title: Avidiivaka Battle Analysis
Post by: Body-by-Guinness on March 23, 2024, 03:39:47 PM
Deep look with lots of links in the piece of a recent Ukraine/Russia major battle:

Battle of Avdiivka: A Preliminary Analysis

BY JOHN HARDIE | March 22, 2024 | @JohnH105
This article offers a preliminary analysis of the Battle of Avdiivka, particularly its final weeks. While more information will no doubt come to light as time passes, some initial conclusions stand out. Overall, the battle was favorable for Ukraine in that it sapped a large amount of Russian combat power. But once the city’s fall became inevitable, Ukraine’s withdrawal commenced too late. Ukraine also failed to adequately prepare a secondary line of defense behind Avdiivka. Still, Russia will likely be unable to make major additional gains in the area, at least in the near term.

Background: Russia’s Monthslong Offensive at Avdiivka

A small city located near Donetsk, Avdiivka had been on the front line for nearly a decade. By fall 2023, it was already semi-encircled. Moscow launched its most recent offensive in October, aiming to envelop Avdiivka from the north and southwest.

Russia devoted a sizable force to the operation. It consisted mainly of units from the 1st Army Corps and from Central Military District (CMD) brigades that had recently redeployed to the Avdiivka area. The initial attack comprised mechanized infantry and armor units totaling perhaps a regiment in strength — far larger than the company- or platoon-sized assaults on which both sides have come to rely. In the subsequent days, Russia continued to feed additional units into the offensive. Artillery and aviation provided support, although Russia probably struggled to synchronize between combat arms.

Facing a prepared Ukrainian defense, Russia’s initial attacks yielded little more than heavy losses. Ukrainian drone reconnaissance could quickly spot Russian columns as they advanced through fields. Ukrainian mines, first-person view (FPV) attack drones, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and artillery fire chewed up the attacking forces. Russian observers complained of insufficient counter-battery fire and poor coordination between units, manned largely by hastily trained personnel.

To shore up Avdiivka’s defense, Ukraine transferred additional forces to the area. They included the 47th Mechanized Brigade, equipped with Western-supplied Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and Leopard tanks. The 47th Brigade redeployed from Zaporizhzhia Oblast to Avdiivka’s northern flank in October despite having had little time to recover from significant losses suffered during Ukraine’s unsuccessful 2023 counteroffensive.

After its initial attacks failed, Russia reverted to inching forward using small assault groups. (This shift echoed a similar Ukrainian adaptation during Kyiv’s recent counteroffensive.) The Russians took a large slag heap near Avdiivka later in October, gaining important high ground at the city’s northern edge.

Russian forces eventually began attempting to penetrate the city itself. They achieved minor gains in southern Avdiivka in November, December, and January. In the latter case, 150 troops from Russia’s 60th “Veterans” Sabotage-Assault Brigade reportedly used an underground pipe to infiltrate to the rear of Ukrainian forces at the “Tsars’ka Okhota” fortified restaurant complex, although Ukraine ultimately contained the breakthrough. Meanwhile, in January, Russia also crept forward on Avdiivka’s northern outskirts.

Russia’s modest gains came at the cost of enormous losses, including hundreds of vehicles and many thousands of troops. Its equipment losses would eventually force Russia to transfer in some vehicles from its 25th Combined Arms Army, fighting in the area near Lyman to the northeast.

At the same time, Ukraine also ran increasingly low on men and ammunition. Kyiv’s troops grew exhausted due to lack of rotation, while Russia threw in more and more reserves. (According to Ukrainian military officials, Russia had around 40,000 to 50,000 troops in the Avdiivka area.) Russia enjoyed a considerable quantitative advantage in artillery, while shell hunger hamstrung Ukraine’s counter-battery fire and defense against assaults. Heavy Russian artillery fire and bombing gradually reduced Ukrainian defensive positions.

Russian Breakthrough

Russian bombing reportedly intensified in January. Moscow’s “UMPK,” an add-on kit that turns dumb bombs into guided glide bombs that can be launched from standoff range, enabled the Russian Air Force to play a greater role than it could earlier in the war. While often inaccurate, the UMPK allowed Russia to pound static targets. Russia reportedly dropped dozens of bombs on Avdiivka per day. Ukrainian troops later described Russian bombing as a key factor behind the city’s fall. The continual bombardment took a toll on morale, with most troops in Avdiivka suffering concussions, Ukrainian soldiers recounted.

In early February, Russian forces broke into Avdiivka from the north, through the “Ivushka” garden community. They thus bypassed the Avdiivka Coke and Chemical Plant, the key defensive stronghold at the city’s northwestern end. Ukrainian reports said the Russians exploited fog, which impedes unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations.

The Russians pushed toward the 00542 road and Industrial Avenue. The 00542 was Ukraine’s main supply route — and only paved road — into Avdiivka. It feeds into Industrial Avenue, which connects the coke plant to the “9th Quarter” high-rise microdistrict in southwestern Avdiivka. The 9th Quarter’s tall buildings provide a dominant height for conducting surveillance and drone and ATGM strikes. The 9th Quarter also sits next to the Avdiivka-Sjeverne road, Ukraine’s secondary ground line of communication to the city.

The breakthrough and the pace of Russia’s subsequent advance appeared to catch Ukraine off-guard. By February 5, Russian forces had reportedly pressed to within roughly a kilometer from the mouth of the 00542 road.

Reports vary as to which Russian units led the attack. According to some Russian and Ukrainian sources, elements of the 114th Motor Rifle Brigade (1st Army Corps), reinforced by units from the 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, CMD) and 30th Motor Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, CMD), executed the main effort.

However, other Russian and Ukrainian reports give different accounts. According to prominent Russian blogger Boris Rozhin, elements of the 74th Motor Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD), supported by 114th Brigade units, were the first to enter Avdiivka. He said these forces were tasked with severing the 00542 road and allowing troops from the 35th, 55th, 15th, and 30th motor rifle brigades (41st and 2nd CAAs, CMD) to enter battle, which they allegedly did by the end of February 9. (A Ukrainian unit fighting in Avdiivka later said Russia had indeed deployed forces from those six brigades plus the 2nd CAA’s 21st Motor Rifle Brigade.) Meanwhile, Rozhin said, Russian assault groups also attacked Avdiivka from the northeast and south.


Estimation of Russian advances in Avdiivka as of February 8, 2024, based on Ukrainian reports and other open-source information.
Ukraine Deploys Reinforcements

Kyiv scrambled to deploy reinforcements, most notably the elite 3rd Assault Brigade, led by the former commander of the Azov Regiment. One 3rd Brigade officer later asserted that the reinforcements were tasked with containing Russia’s advance to enable the withdrawal of other Ukrainian units. However, another Ukrainian military source told the Long War Journal that he believed the Ukrainian command initially aimed to reverse Russia’s gains and hold Avdiivka. Ukrainian journalist Yuriy Butusov reported the same. Regardless, by this point, Avdiivka’s fall was likely inevitable, as the 3rd Brigade officer noted.

When it deployed to Avdiivka, the 3rd Assault Brigade had been in the middle of replenishing its ranks and equipment after tough fighting in the Bakhmut area. Many of the 3rd Brigade troops who fought in Avdiivka had not seen combat before. Two officers from the brigade lamented that its already difficult task was made harder by a lack of well-prepared defensive positions within the city. Ukrainian troops recounted having to defend positions that were already lost or destroyed. Ukrainian soldiers also say they were heavily outnumbered. Still, Kyiv’s forces likely continued to inflict significant losses.

Video footage confirms that elements of the 3rd Assault Brigade had entered battle by February 13. However, its deputy commander later indicated that 3rd Brigade troops had arrived as early as February 4. Butusov similarly reported that the 3rd Brigade deployed to the Avdiivka area on February 3 and entered battle on February 6. The commander of the brigade’s 2nd Assault Battalion indicated his troops fought in the city for “nine days,” meaning they arrived on February 8 or 9. The commander of that battalion’s “NC 13” platoon said his men stayed in Avdiivka for “seven days.” A 3rd Brigade medic similarly said her unit (the 3rd Assault Company) arrived in Avdiivka on February 10.

Meanwhile, Ukraine withdrew some exhausted units from the 110th Mechanized Brigade, a press officer said on February 13. Since the 110th’s formation nearly two years prior, it had served as the backbone of Avdiivka’s defense, reportedly without rotation. A Ukrainian soldier later said the resultant exhaustion had led 110th Brigade troops to abandon their positions “without prior coordination.”

Russia Pushes Deeper Into Avdiivka

Russian forces continued to push past the railway that runs through Avdiivka. By February 13, they had reportedly severed Industrial Avenue after capturing the “Avtobaza” facility near that road. The Russians were soon threatening Lastochkyne, a small village just west of the city. Assault units from Russia’s 30th Brigade were the first to reach Industrial Avenue, soldiers from the brigade later claimed. By the afternoon of February 15, Russian forces, reportedly from the 30th and 114th brigades, had reached the intersection between the 00542 road and Industrial Avenue and taken the nearby “Brevno” restaurant complex.

Ukrainian accounts and video footage indicate BMPs (infantry fighting vehicles) and tanks supported Russian assault infantry inside Avdiivka. Russian spetsnaz (elite infantry) and SSO (special operations forces), equipped with night-vision devices, reportedly conducted nighttime assaults and sabotage operations and directed artillery fire and airstrikes. UAV crews from various units also directed artillery fire and bomb strikes and targeted Ukrainian forces using FPV drones.

Meanwhile, Russia was also advancing around “Zenit,” an old air defense base that served as a key defensive stronghold south of Avdiivka. On or around February 11, Russian forces reportedly began advancing near Opytne, a village southwest of Avdiivka. They were threatening to encircle Zenit by linking up with the Russian troops consolidated at Avdiivka’s southwestern edge. From there, they likely aimed to reach the 9th Quarter and cut the Avdiivka-Sjeverne road.

Late Withdrawal

Withdraw operations are highly challenging. If not carefully orchestrated, they can result in heavy casualties. Ukraine’s withdrawal from Avdiivka took too long to commence and at times seems to have been poorly coordinated. As some Ukrainian soldiers pointed out, the delay echoed Kyiv’s previous decisions to cling to nearly encircled cities — most notably Bakhmut — well after doing so became unwise.

Despite the growing risk of encirclement, Ukraine apparently held onto its easternmost position within the Avdiivka pocket, the Donetsk Filtration Station, for a remarkably long time. Information from Russian and Ukrainian sources indicates Ukrainian troops likely began withdrawing from the station on February 15. Russian forces, reportedly from the “Pyatnashka” and “Viking” units (1st Army Corps), took the station by the morning of February 16.

The delay’s consequences were perhaps most acute at Zenit. According to a soldier from a 110th Brigade company that defended Zenit, by January Ukrainian troops had to ration small-arms ammunition, food, and water. At around 9 PM on February 13, the soldiers were reportedly told to retreat “on their own.” Ukraine’s 53rd Mechanized Brigade was responsible for covering the withdrawal from Zenit, the brigade later said.

Small groups of 110th Brigade troops began leaving for Avdiivka on foot, but many were killed or wounded on the way there, according to soldiers from the brigade. The 110th said the withdrawal occurred amid “continuous bombardment by enemy aircraft and artillery, constant attacks by FPV drones, attacks on evacuation vehicles, and shelling of evacuation routes.”

Some of the troops at Zenit stayed behind to hold off the Russians and enable the evacuation of six wounded comrades. But on the morning of February 15, they were told evacuation vehicles could not reach their position. The troops were forced to abandon the wounded, narrowly escaping Zenit through a corridor that was reportedly just 120 meters wide. They then had to flee westward on foot to the villages of Sjeverne and Tonen’ke. By that point, Russia had rendered the 00542 road unusable, attacking anything that passed with artillery and tank fire, a 110th Brigade spokesman confirmed. (Troops from Russia’s 114th Brigade raised a flag on the famous sign on the 00542 by February 16.)

Infantrymen from Russia’s 1st “Slavic” Motor Rifle Brigade (1st Army Corps) took Zenit by the afternoon of February 15. Some of the wounded Ukrainian soldiers left behind at Zenit were later seen dead in Russian-released footage. The Ukrainians allege they were shot.

That same day, 1st Brigade forces also took the “Cheburashka” and “Vinogradniki-2” areas on Avdiivka’s southwestern outskirts. According to Russian sources, Russian troops reached Vinogradniki-2 using the same pipe previously used to infiltrate to the Tsars’ka Okhota area. Troops from the “Veterans” Brigade participated in the assault on southwestern Avdiivka. Elements of that brigade, along with forces from the 1487th Motor Rifle Regiment, 87th Rifle Regiment, and 10th Tank Regiment, reportedly continued to attack in southern and southeastern Avdiivka.

Withdrawing in Small Groups

Accounts from Ukrainian soldiers, along with video footage that began emerging on social media by February 16, indicate Ukrainian troops withdrew from Avdiivka itself in small groups over multiple days, often on foot. Because Russia had fire control over the 00542 road, the Ukrainians relied mainly on dirt roads. Retreating Ukrainian troops had to brave Russian artillery, bombs, and one-way attack drones. A unit from Ukraine’s 3rd Assault Brigade later said a “large number” of vehicles were “lost and damaged” during the withdrawal.

As Ukrainian troops withdrew, Russian forces pushed deeper into the city. Troops from Russia’s 55th Brigade reached the park in central Avdiivka by February 16. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, they pushed toward the city’s center via Soborna Street. Meanwhile, troops from Russia’s 74th Brigade progressed through the residential and industrial areas near the quarry on Avdiivka’s northeastern outskirts.

At this point, Ukrainian forces still held the coke plant, which reportedly housed around 1,000 troops. Ukraine reportedly also retained control of the area between the rail station and Turhenjeva Street in southwestern Avdiivka, providing a corridor through which to withdraw toward Sjeverne. Elements of Russia’s 30th Brigade were allegedly attacking southward to try to block the Avdiivka-Sjeverne road.

Colonel-General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukraine’s newly installed commander-in-chief, officially announced the withdrawal shortly before 1 AM on February 17. Syrskyi said he had ordered Ukrainian units to leave the city “in order to avoid encirclement.” A Ukrainian military spokesman later said the withdrawal was completed on February 17.

Ukraine’s 47th Mechanized Brigade said troops from its 25th Assault Battalion were the last to leave the coke plant. Soldiers from the 3rd Assault Brigade’s 2nd Assault Battalion, responsible for holding Ukraine’s left flank, withdrew “next to last,” its commander said. The 3rd Brigade reportedly received its withdrawal order on February 16 and had largely evacuated the coke plant by 5 AM the next day. Ukrainian troops claimed no one was left behind at the plant and the withdrawal from the facility proceeded in a hasty but orderly manner. 3rd Brigade officers said some of the brigade’s units were at times encircled but managed to break out.

According to Ukraine’s military intelligence directorate (HUR), troops from the 3rd and 110th brigades, HUR and SSO units, the State Border Guard Service’s “Dozor” unit, and the 225th Separate Assault Battalion held the evacuation corridor while the main force withdrew. Ukraine’s 53rd Brigade said it held the 9th Quarter. 53rd Brigade troops withdrew shortly after dawn on February 17, just before Russia took control of the Avdiivka-Sjeverne road. Some Ukrainian servicemen claimed Ukrainian artillery provided good cover for the withdrawal.

In many cases, Ukrainian troops appear to have hurriedly abandoned their positions, leaving behind things such as anti-tank weapons, ammunition, grenades, and Starlink terminals.­ In some (perhaps most) cases, higher echelons did coordinate the retreats using radio communications and drones. But some soldiers reportedly did not receive formal withdrawal orders and simply retreated on their own accord to avoid destruction or capture.

According to The New York Times, Ukrainian soldiers said some units retreated before others were aware the withdrawal had begun, putting them at risk of encirclement. The soldiers reportedly said communication issues, stemming from incompatible radio equipment operated by different Ukrainian units, led troops to be captured, wounded, or killed. Russian electronic warfare may have also played a role. According to a 3rd Brigade officer, Russian jamming made it difficult for Ukrainian units to communicate with higher echelons during the last several days of Avdiivka’s defense.

Russia Completes Capture of Avdiivka

Later on February 17, troops from Russia’s 114th Brigade raised a flag at the Avdiivka coke plant, while 35th Brigade soldiers occupied the Avdiivka rail station. Troops from Russia’s 239th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, CMD), 24th Spetsnaz Brigade, and 35th Brigade reached the Avdiivka city administration building, near the 9th Quarter. Russian soldiers raised a flag at the 9th Quarter’s southern end that same day.

74th Brigade troops operated in northeastern Avdiivka (reportedly along Pervomaiska Street) and raised a flag as far south as Mira Street. Gunfire could be heard in footage shared by 74th Brigade soldiers on February 17, indicating some Ukrainian troops may have still been in the city at that time. Similarly, Pyatnashka soldiers claimed (without providing evidence) that they encountered Ukrainian troops in Avdiivka on February 17.

The withdrawal was a perilous moment for Ukraine. If the bulk of Kyiv’s forces in Avdiivka were encircled and destroyed or captured, it would sap morale and facilitate further Russian gains west of the city.

On February 18, the commander of Ukraine’s “Tavria” Operational-Strategic Grouping of Troops, whose aera of responsibility includes Avdiivka, admitted that “a certain number of Ukrainian soldiers were captured” during the withdrawal’s “final stage.” A platoon commander from the 53rd Brigade said that while everyone from his battalion managed to escape, some Ukrainian troops “did get stuck.” He said his platoon had planned to return but was later ordered not to do so. The withdrawal “was planned very badly” if it was planned at all, he opined.

Exactly how many Ukrainians were captured remains unclear, however. Estimates vary. At the high end, a February 20 New York Times report cited two Ukrainian soldiers who estimated that 850 to 1,000 troops were captured or missing. This would have constituted a very large portion (perhaps even a majority) of Ukraine’s force inside Avdiivka during the city’s final defense. But while unnamed Western officials said that range seemed correct, available evidence suggests the true figure was much lower.

The estimate provided to The Times exceeds even the (likely inflated) figures touted by Colonel-General Andrei Mordvichev, the Russian commander responsible for Avdiivka. On February 24, he claimed that roughly 200 Ukrainian troops had surrendered during the clearing of Avdiivka and another 100 were expected in the coming days. U.S. officials told The Washington Post that Ukrainian officials had privately estimated that around 100 soldiers were captured. This estimate tracks with the number of purported Ukrainian prisoners seen in Russian-released videos reviewed by the Long War Journal.

On balance, it appears the bulk of the Ukrainian force in Avdiivka escaped the pocket, even if the withdrawal was less than orderly at times.

Aftermath of Avdiivka’s Fall

During the monthslong battle for Avdiivka, Ukraine failed to construct a solid second line of defense behind the city. This left Ukrainian troops in a tough spot once Avdiivka fell, forcing them to dig in and lay mines amid active fighting.

Russia has since managed to capture a handful of low-lying villages west of Avdiivka through attritional attacks by small assault groups. Moscow likely hopes its forces can reach the city of Pokrovsk, an important logistical hub in Donetsk Oblast. Pokrovsk is around 40 kilometers from Avdiivka as the crow flies.

Meanwhile, to the southwest, Russian forces are attacking near the towns of Marinka and Krasnohorivka, forcing Ukraine’s 3rd Assault Brigade to quickly redeploy two companies to the latter. Russia reportedly also transferred its 10th Tank Regiment to Novomykhailivka to try to help the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade finish taking that village.

However, Russia likely will not manage to make large-scale gains, at least in the near term. Russian momentum has slowed, and the bodies of water west of Avdiivka can serve as natural barriers. In addition, a new Czech-led initiative to secure 800,000 artillery shells for Kyiv should help alleviate Ukraine’s shell hunger. So will the eventual passage of the U.S. supplemental assistance bill, expected in April.

Furthermore, Russia has so far proven unable to rebuild force quality. As such, the Russians will likely continue to struggle to scale offensive operations. Moscow’s initial attacks at Avdiivka provide a good example. Russia will thus have to continue attempting to inch forward through small-scale assaults, suffering heavy losses in the process.

This will give Ukraine more time to build fortifications near Avdiivka and elsewhere, which the Ukrainians have finally begun doing in earnest. And over the long run, Russia cannot sustain such a high rate of losses.

John Hardie is the deputy director of FDD’s Russia Program and a contributor to FDD's Long War Journal.

https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/03/battle-of-avdiivka-a-preliminary-analysis.php?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=battle-of-avdiivka-a-preliminary-analysis
Title: How Russian Navy lost to a country without any ships
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 25, 2024, 02:16:47 PM
Note discussion of Sevastopol too.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y6UeNBj9rrU
Title: Biden backstabs Ukes going after Russian oil and gas
Post by: Crafty_Dog on March 25, 2024, 02:58:58 PM
https://archive.is/zqSqh