Fire Hydrant of Freedom
Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities => Politics & Religion => Topic started by: Crafty_Dog on January 29, 2011, 09:54:02 AM
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Egypt gets its own thread for obvious reasons.
I begin by noting how utterly vapid most of the coverage we are seeing is. An internet friend is recommending
http://english.aljazeera.net/watch_now/
I have no idea whether he has lost his fg mind and am in Vancouver for a seminar at the moment, but perhaps one of us can take a look and report back whether it is worth the time.
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RED ALERT: MUBARAK NAMES FORMER AIR FORCE CHIEF AS NEW EGYPTIAN PM
Egypt's former air force chief and minister for civil aviation, Ahmed Shafiq, has
been designated the new prime minister by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and
tasked to form the next Cabinet, Al Jazeera reported Jan. 29. The announcement comes
shortly after Egyptian intelligence chief Omar Suleiman was appointed vice
president, a position that has been vacant for the past 30 years.
Mubarak is essentially accelerating a succession plan that has been in the works for
some time. STRATFOR noted in December 2010 that a conflict was building between the
president on one side and the old guard in the army and the ruling party on the
other over Mubarak's attempt to create a path for his son Gamal to eventually
succeed him. The interim plan Mubarak had proposed was for Suleiman to become vice
president, succeed Mubarak and then pass the reins to Gamal after some time. The
stalwart members of the old guard, however, refused this plan. Though they approved
of Suleiman, they knew his tenure would be short-lived given his advanced age.
Instead, they demanded that Shafiq, who comes from the air force -- the most
privileged branch of the military from which Mubarak himself also came -- be
designated the successor. Shafiq is close to Mubarak and worked under his command in
the air force. Shafiq also has the benefit of having held a civilian role as
minister of civil aviation since 2002, making him more palatable to the public.
Mubarak may be nominally dissolving the Cabinet, ordering an army curfew and now
asking Shafiq to form the next government, but the embattled president is not the
one in charge. Instead, the military appears to be managing Mubarak's exit, taking
care not to engage in a confrontation with the demonstrators while the political
details are being sorted out.
Copyright 2011 STRATFOR.
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RED ALERT: HAMAS AND THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
The following is a report from a STRATFOR source in Hamas. Hamas, which formed in
Gaza as an outgrowth of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB), has an interest in
exaggerating its role and coordination with the MB in this crisis. The following
information has not been confirmed. Nonetheless, there is a great deal of concern
building in Israel and the United States in particular over the role of the MB in
the demonstrations and whether a political opening will be made for the Islamist
organization in Egypt.
The Egyptian police are no longer patrolling the Rafah border crossing into Gaza.
Hamas armed men are entering into Egypt and are closely collaborating with the MB.
The MB has fully engaged itself in the demonstrations, and they are unsatisfied with
the dismissal of the Cabinet. They are insisting on a new Cabinet that does not
include members of the ruling National Democratic Party.
Security forces in plainclothes are engaged in destroying public property in order
to give the impression that many protesters represent a public menace. The MB is
meanwhile forming people's committees to protect public property and also to
coordinate demonstrators' activities, including supplying them with food, beverages
and first aid.
Copyright 2011 STRATFOR.
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I don't know what to make of this story by the UK Telegraph:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8289686/Egypt-protests-Americas-secret-backing-for-rebel-leaders-behind-uprising.html
Egypt protests: America's secret backing for rebel leaders behind uprising
The American government secretly backed leading figures behind the Egyptian uprising who have been planning “regime change” for the past three years, The Daily Telegraph has learned.
By Tim Ross, Matthew Moore and Steven Swinford 9:23PM GMT 28 Jan 2011
The American Embassy in Cairo helped a young dissident attend a US-sponsored summit for activists in New York, while working to keep his identity secret from Egyptian state police.
On his return to Cairo in December 2008, the activist told US diplomats that an alliance of opposition groups had drawn up a plan to overthrow President Hosni Mubarak and install a democratic government in 2011.
The secret document in full: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8289698/Egypt-protests-secret-US-document-discloses-support-for-protesters.html
He has already been arrested by Egyptian security in connection with the demonstrations and his identity is being protected by The Daily Telegraph.
The crisis in Egypt follows the toppling of Tunisian president Zine al-Abedine Ben Ali, who fled the country after widespread protests forced him from office.
The disclosures, contained in previously secret US diplomatic dispatches released by the WikiLeaks website, show American officials pressed the Egyptian government to release other dissidents who had been detained by the police.
Mr Mubarak, facing the biggest challenge to his authority in his 31 years in power, ordered the army on to the streets of Cairo yesterday as rioting erupted across Egypt.
Tens of thousands of anti-government protesters took to the streets in open defiance of a curfew. An explosion rocked the centre of Cairo as thousands defied orders to return to their homes. As the violence escalated, flames could be seen near the headquarters of the governing National Democratic Party.
Police fired rubber bullets and used tear gas and water cannon in an attempt to disperse the crowds.
At least five people were killed in Cairo alone yesterday and 870 injured, several with bullet wounds. Mohamed ElBaradei, the pro-reform leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner, was placed under house arrest after returning to Egypt to join the dissidents. Riots also took place in Suez, Alexandria and other major cities across the country.
William Hague, the Foreign Secretary, urged the Egyptian government to heed the “legitimate demands of protesters”. Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, said she was “deeply concerned about the use of force” to quell the protests.
In an interview for the American news channel CNN, to be broadcast tomorrow, David Cameron said: “I think what we need is reform in Egypt. I mean, we support reform and progress in the greater strengthening of the democracy and civil rights and the rule of law.”
The US government has previously been a supporter of Mr Mubarak’s regime. But the leaked documents show the extent to which America was offering support to pro-democracy activists in Egypt while publicly praising Mr Mubarak as an important ally in the Middle East.
In a secret diplomatic dispatch, sent on December 30 2008, Margaret Scobey, the US Ambassador to Cairo, recorded that opposition groups had allegedly drawn up secret plans for “regime change” to take place before elections, scheduled for September this year.
The memo, which Ambassador Scobey sent to the US Secretary of State in Washington DC, was marked “confidential” and headed: “April 6 activist on his US visit and regime change in Egypt.”
It said the activist claimed “several opposition forces” had “agreed to support an unwritten plan for a transition to a parliamentary democracy, involving a weakened presidency and an empowered prime minister and parliament, before the scheduled 2011 presidential elections”. The embassy’s source said the plan was “so sensitive it cannot be written down”.
Ambassador Scobey questioned whether such an “unrealistic” plot could work, or ever even existed. However, the documents showed that the activist had been approached by US diplomats and received extensive support for his pro-democracy campaign from officials in Washington. The embassy helped the campaigner attend a “summit” for youth activists in New York, which was organised by the US State Department.
Cairo embassy officials warned Washington that the activist’s identity must be kept secret because he could face “retribution” when he returned to Egypt. He had already allegedly been tortured for three days by Egyptian state security after he was arrested for taking part in a protest some years earlier.
The protests in Egypt are being driven by the April 6 youth movement, a group on Facebook that has attracted mainly young and educated members opposed to Mr Mubarak. The group has about 70,000 members and uses social networking sites to orchestrate protests and report on their activities.
The documents released by WikiLeaks reveal US Embassy officials were in regular contact with the activist throughout 2008 and 2009, considering him one of their most reliable sources for information about human rights abuses.
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President Obama, say the 'D-Word'
US appears to shy away from talk about democracy in Middle East, despite
historic anti-government rallies in ally Egypt.
Mark LeVine Last Modified: 28 Jan 2011 12:36 GMT
*Obama has 'sought to equate Egypt's protesters and government as equally
pitted parties in the growing conflict' [AFP]***
It's incredible, really. The president of the United States can't bring
himself to talk about democracy in the Middle East. He can dance around it,
use euphemisms, throw out words like "freedom" and "tolerance" and
"non-violent" and especially "reform," but he can't say the one word that
really matters: democracy.
How did this happen? After all, in his famous 2009 Cairo speech to the
Muslim
world,<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/06/20096410251287187.html>
Obama
spoke the word loudly and clearly - at least once.
"The fourth issue that I will address is democracy," he declared, before
explaining that while the United States won't impose its own system, it was
committed to governments that "reflect the will of the people... I do have
an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability
to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the
rule of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is
transparent and doesn't steal from the people; the freedom to live as you
choose. Those are not just American ideas, they are human rights, and that
is why we will support them everywhere."
"No matter where it takes hold," the president concluded, "government of the
people and by the people sets a single standard for all who hold power."
*Simply rhetoric?*
Of course, this was just
rhetoric,<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/11/2010119947466214.html>
however lofty, reflecting a moment when no one was rebelling against the
undemocratic governments of our allies - at least not openly and in a manner
that demanded international media coverage.
Now it's for real.
And "democracy" is scarcely to be heard on the lips of the
president<http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/01/201112518178586889.html>
or
his most senior officials.
In fact, newly released WikiLeaks cables show that from the moment it
assumed power, the Obama administration specifically toned down public
criticism of Mubarak. The US ambassador to Egypt advised secretary of state
Hillary Clinton to avoid even the mention of former presidential candidate
Ayman Nour, jailed and abused for years after running against Mubarak in
part on America's encouragement.
Not surprisingly, when the protests began, Clinton declared that Egypt was
"stable" and an important US ally, sending a strong signal that the US would
not support the protesters if they tried to topple the regime. Indeed,
Clinton has repeatedly described Mubarak as a family friend. Perhaps Ms
Clinton should choose her friends more wisely.
Similarly, president Obama has refused to take a strong stand in support of
the burgeoning pro-democracy movement and has been no more discriminating in
his public characterisation of American support for its Egyptian "ally".
Mubarak continued through yesterday to be praised as a crucial partner of
the US. Most important, there has been absolutely no call for real
democracy.
Rather, only "reform" has been suggested to the Egyptian government so that,
in Obama's words, "people have mechanisms in order to express legitimate
grievances".
"I've always said to him that making sure that they are moving forward on
reform - political reform, economic reform - is absolutely critical for the
long-term well-being of Egypt," advised the president, although
vice-president Joe Biden has refused to refer to Mubarak as a dictator,
leading one to wonder how bad a leader must be to deserve the title.
Even worse, the president and his senior aides have repeatedly sought to
equate the protesters and the government as somehow equally pitted parties
in the growing conflict, urging both sides to "show restraint". This
equation has been repeated many times by other American officials.
This trick, tried and tested in the US discourse surrounding the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is equally nonsensical here. These are not two
movements in a contest for political power. Rather, it is a huge state, with
a massive security and police apparatus that is supported by the world's
major superpower to the tune of billions of dollars a year, against a
largely young, disenfranchised and politically powerless population which
has suffered brutally at its hands for decades.
The focus on reform is also a highly coded reference, as across the
developing world when Western leaders have urged "reform" it has usually
signified the liberalisation of economies to allow for greater penetration
by Western corporations, control of local resources, and concentration of
wealth, rather than the kind of political democratisation and redistribution
of wealth that are key demands of protesters across the region.
*Al Jazeera interview says it all*
An Al Jazeera English
interview<http://english.aljazeera.net/video/middleeast/2011/01/201112713644706462.html>
on
Thursday with US state department spokesman PJ Crowley perfectly summed up
the sustainability of the Obama administration's position. In some of the
most direct and unrelenting questioning of a US official I have ever
witnessed, News Hour anchor Shihab al-Rattansi repeatedly pushed Crowley to
own up to the hypocrisy and absurdity of the administration's position of
offering mild criticism of Mubarak while continuing to ply him with billions
of dollars in aid and political support.
When pressed about how the US-backed security services are beating and
torturing and even killing protesters, and whether it wasn't time for the US
to consider discontinuing aid, Crowley responded that "we don't see this as
an either or [a minute later, he said "zero sum"] proposition. Egypt is a
friend of the US, is an anchor of stability and helping us pursue peace in
the Middle East".
Each part of this statement is manifestly false; the fact that in the midst
of intensifying protests senior officials feel they can spin the events away
from openly calling for a real democratic transition now reveals either
incredible ignorance, arrogance, or both.
Yet this is precisely an either/or moment. Much as former US president Bush
declared in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, we can either be "with or against"
the Egyptian people. Refusing to take sides is in fact taking sides -the
wrong side.
Moreover, Crowley, like his superiors, refused to use the word democracy,
responding to its use by anchor al-Rattansi with the word "reform" while
arguing that it was unproductive to tie events in Egypt to the protests in
other countries such as Tunis or Jordan because each has its own
"indigenous" forces and reasons for discontent.
That is a very convenient singularisation of the democracy movements, which
ignores the large number of similarities in the demands of protests across
the region, the tactics and strategies of protest, and their broader
distaste and distrust of the US in view of its untrammelled support for
dictatorships across the region.
*Systematic silence*
Ensconced in a system built upon the lack of democracy - not just abroad,
but as we've seen in the last decade, increasingly in the US as well -
perhaps president Obama doesn't feel he has the luxury of pushing too hard
for democracy when its arrival would threaten so many policies pursued by
his administration.
Instead, "stability" and "reform" are left to fill the void, even though
both have little to do with democracy in an real sense.
Perhaps Obama wants to say the D-word. Maybe in his heart he hopes Mubarak
just leaves and allows democracy to flourish. By all accounts, the president
is no ideologue like his predecessor. He does not come from the
political-economic-strategic elites as did Bush, and has no innate desire to
serve or protect their interests.
Feeling trapped by a system outside his control or power to change, maybe
president Obama hopes that the young people of the Arab world will lead the
way, and will be satisfied by congratulations by his administration after
the fact.
But even if accurate, such a scenario will likely never come to pass. With
Egyptians preparing to die in the streets, standing on the sidelines is no
longer an option.
*A gift that won't be offered again*
The most depressing and even frightening part of the tepid US response to
the protests across the region is the lack of appreciation of what kind of
gift the US, and West more broadly, are being handed by these movements.
Their very existence is bringing unprecedented levels of hope and productive
activism to a region and as such constitutes a direct rebuttal to the power
and prestige of al-Qaeda.
Instead of embracing the push for real democratic change, however, surface
reforms that would preserve the system intact are all that's recommended.
Instead of declaring loud and clear a support for a real democracy agenda,
the president speaks only of "disrupting plots and securing our cities and
skies" and "tak[ing] the fight to al-Qaeda and their allies", as he declared
in his State of the Union address.
Obama doesn't seem to understand that the US doesn't need to "take the
fight" to al-Qaeda, or even fire a single shot, to score its greatest
victory in the "war on terror". Supporting real democratisation will do more
to downgrade al-Qaeda's capabilities than any number of military attacks. He
had better gain this understanding quickly because in the next hours or days
the Egypt's revolution will likely face its moment of truth. And right
behind Egypt are Yemen, Jordan, Algeria, and who knows what other countries,
all looking to free themselves of governments that the US and its European
allies have uncritically supported for decades.
If president Obama has the courage to support genuine democracy, even at the
expense of immediate American policy interests, he could well go down in
history as one of the heroes of the Middle East's Jasmine winter. If he
chooses platitudes and the status quo, the harm to America's standing in the
region will likely take decades to repair.
*
Mark LeVine is a professor of history at UC Irvine and senior visiting
researcher at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies at Lund University in
Sweden. His most recent books are Heavy Metal Islam (Random House) and
Impossible Peace: Israel/Palestine Since 1989 (Zed Books).*
*The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not
necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.*
Source:
Al Jazeera
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There are very few, if any would-be Thomas Jeffersons clad in man-dresses in Egypt. Democracy in Egypt will be the genesis of the Islamic Republic of Egypt.
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http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/01/28/amb-john-bolton-democracy-coming-eygpt/
It's the military that is the real government and they are not going to go peacefully.
I think the question is whether and to what extent the Muslim Brotherhood and radical Islamists have infiltrated the leadership. If the military holds firm it's entirely possible, although bloody, that the government can hold onto power. That doesn't necessarily mean Mubarak will be in power, but the military will be, and I think that is why this contrast makes it so important for people to understand, this is not a choice between the Mubarak government on one hand, and sweetness and light, Jeffersonian democracy on the other.
I don't think we have evidence yet that these demonstrations are necessarily about democracy. You know the old saying, "one person, one vote, one time." The Muslim Brotherhood doesn't care about democracy, if they get into power you're not going to have free and fair elections either.
And I think there is substantial reason, for example, to worry the minority Coptic Christian population, about 10% of the population will be very worried if the Muslim Brotherhood came to power.
Let's be clear what the stakes are for the United States. We have an authoritarian regime in power that has been our ally. We don't know at this point what the real alternatives are.
JON SCOTT, ANCHOR: If you are Hillary Clinton, the secretary of state, or if you are President Obama at this moment, what do you do, what do you say? There have been a couple of cautious statements put out by the U.S. State department so far.
BOLTON: Those statements have been mush. I mean this is a case where we are far better advised to remain silent, try to understand better what's going on, what the stakes are, rather than making statements that other people are parsing to say, "oh, they are supporting the demonstrators," "oh, they are supporting the government." I think there is confusion inside the administration.
In all fairness, I think everybody, including leaders of the opposition, was caught off guard by the strength of the protests, but I do think it's important to underline that today is different from the previous days with the Muslim Brotherhood bringing its supporters into the streets, and that's why the stakes are even higher today and in the next few days than they have been.
I do think that the regime is under enormous pressure, there is no doubt about it, but I don't think that just because you have people climbing onto tanks you can assume that they are friendly to democratic values.
I think there is a lot of opposition to the regime and a lot of opposition by the Muslim Brotherhood that is determined to bring down this secular military government, and install one of very harsh Sharia law, which would have enormous implications for the United States, for Israel, for other Arab governments in the region.
You just mentioned the Suez Canal, how would you like the Muslim Brotherhood in charge of that waterway? I think that's the reason why the Obama administration should be working behind the scenes and try to understand better what the ground truth is in Cairo and the other major cities.
Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/01/28/amb-john-bolton-democracy-coming-eygpt/
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http://pajamasmedia.com/michaeltotten/2011/01/29/egyptian-public-opinion/
The chances for democracy and liberalism are different in every country. Tunisia has a good chance because there is a strong middle class and a weak Islamist movement. But in Egypt look at the numbers in the latest Pew poll.
In Egypt, 30 percent like Hizballah (66 percent don’t). 49 percent are favorable toward Hamas (48 percent are negative); and 20 percent smile (72 percent frown) at al-Qaida. Roughly speaking, one-fifth of Egyptians applaud the most extreme Islamist terrorist group, while around one-third back revolutionary Islamists abroad. This doesn’t tell us what proportion of Egyptians want an Islamist government at home, but it is an indicator.
In Egypt, 82 percent want stoning for those who commit adultery; 77 percent would like to see whippings and hands cut off for robbery; and 84 percent favor the death penalty for any Muslim who changes his religion.
Asked if they supported “modernizers” or “Islamists” only 27 percent said modernizers while 59 percent said Islamists:
Is this meaningless? Last December 20 I wrote that these “horrifying figures in Egypt…one day might be cited to explain an Islamist revolution there….What this analysis also shows is that a future Islamist revolution in Egypt and Jordan is quite possible.
I worry that the 59 percent of Egyptians who prefer Islamists to modernizers are going to have to learn the hardest way possible–as the Iranians have and the people of Gaza are learning right now–that modernizers are better. There may not be another way.
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http://bigpeace.com/abostom/2011/01/29/what-do-the-egyptian-crowds-want-caliphate-dreams-and-strict-sharia/
A sobering reminder—based upon hard data—from an essay of mine published in April, 2007:
In a rigorously conducted face-to-face University of Maryland/ WorldPublicOpinion.org interview survey of 1000 Egyptian Muslims conducted between December 9, 2006 and February 15, 2007, 67% of those interviewed-more than 2/3, hardly a “fringe minority”-desired this outcome (i.e., “To unify all Islamic countries into a single Islamic state or Caliphate”). The internal validity of these data about the present longing for a Caliphate is strongly suggested by a concordant result: 74% of this Muslim sample approved the proposition “To require a strict [emphasis added] application of Shari’a law in every Islamic country.”
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http://formerspook.blogspot.com/2011/01/what-president-knew.html
Friday, January 28, 2011
What the President Knew (and Didn't Know)
As the situation in Egypt spirals out of control, the Obama Administration is trying to play both sides of the fence--and put the best possible spin on a worsening crisis.
Friday evening, the White House announced that Mr. Obama had a 30-minute phone conversation with embattled Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, encouraging him to restore cell phone and internet service in his country. Those communication channels were cut earlier in the day, part of Mubarak's attempt to complicate organization efforts by the opposition.
And, in an effort to distance the administration from Mr. Mubarak--a reliable U.S. ally for three decades--the White House trotted out political advisor David Axelrod for an "exclusive" interview with Jake Tapper of ABC. During their conversation, Mr. Axelrod eagerly volunteered that President Obama has "confronted" Mubarak on Egypt's human rights abuses "on several occasions" in recent years.
That message was clearly aimed at the growing throngs of protesters in the streets of Cairo and other Egyptian cities. While the riots have not acquired an anti-American tone (at least not yet), many of those participating in the uprising openly chastised the U.S. for its long-time support of the Mubarak regime. That criticism will likely grow in the hours ahead, with word that the Muslim Brotherhood is now taking an active role in the protests. The Brotherhood (which has been officially banned in Egypt for decades) never misses an opportunity to attack the U.S., through propaganda or other channels. It's almost certain that the protests will become stridently anti-American in the next few days--if not sooner.
That's one reason Washington sent out feelers to the opposition on Thursday. But, on the other hand, we're not quite ready to thrown Mr. Mubarak overboard--at least not yet. When PBS anchor Jim Lehrer pressed Joe Biden on the Egyptian president's record, the Vice President refused to describe him as a dictator. That showed continuing support for the Mr. Mubarak--for that moment. But a few hours later, as protesters clogged the streets of Cairo once more, it became apparent that Washington was hedging its bets, demanding the Mubarak regime respect human rights, and that both sides refrain from violence. Mr. Mubarak wasn't exactly tossed under the bus, but it was hardly a rousing show of support.
Meanwhile, there are nagging questions about the U.S.'s role in forementing the rebellion and whether the President was surprised by the sudden threat to Egypt's stability. As for the first issue, the U.K. Telegraph reports that American diplomats aided an Egyptian dissident's participation in an activist's conference in New York in 2008, hiding his identity from Mubarak's security services. In return, the dissident told American diplomats in Cairo that a coalition of regime opponents would attempt to topple the Egyptian leader in 2011. So, if the Telegraph report is true--and they published a classified U.S. cable that supports the story--then Washington helped put these events in motion.
We should note, however, that the British paper failed to put this development into proper context; as the American Spectator reports, the dissident's support was part of a program, advanced by the Bush Administration, to support legitimate democratic reforms in Egypt and elsewhere. Since then, the Obama team has discontinued the initiative, and appears to be "winging it" on the current crisis. Foreign policy expert Robert Kagan told the Politicio that he was "stunned" by the lack of planning in response to (or in advance of) the current upheaval in Egypt.
The lack of preparation apparently extends to the State Department, which forgot about the Egyptian dissident's vow about a coup attempt in 2011. Indeed, the Obama Administration has been ad-libbing its way through the crisis all week. One of the key indicators: Friday's Presidential Daily (Intelligence) Brief, or PDB. Last night, NBC White House Correspondent Chuck Todd breathlessly reported that Mr. Obama's daily brief lasted 40 minutes and it was devoted entirely to the situation in Europe.
The focus is unsurprising, but the length is. During my own career as a spook, I briefed senior officers and civilian officials during several conflicts and crises, including the invasion of Panama; the First Gulf War and Operation Allied Force. The longest brief I ever delivered for any of those events was 10 minutes--including questions from the audience. Of course, my audiences were fully prepared for what was unfolding. Friday's marathon PDB suggests a commander-in-chief playing catch-up on fast-moving events.
If it's any consolation, he's not alone. This type of situation is the most difficult for any administration. There's little they can do, except observe and issue periodic statements designed not to inflame any of the factions.
But this situation is slightly different. The "dominoes" of U.S.-backed Arab governments are beginning to topple, across North Africa and into the Middle East. Think about the consequences of Islamist governments in control of Egypt (and the Suez Canal); Jordan and Yemen, among others. American access to key waterways could be effectively blocked, making it much more difficult to move warships between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, to the Persian Gulf.
Ironically, the canal is less important for U.S. trade; many of the tanker and container vessels moving crude and products to North America are too large to pass through the canal. However, access problems at the canal would have a devastating effect on the European economy, so there will be pressure from our NATO allies to keep the waterway open.
The loss of Egypt and Jordan would also have dire consequences for Israel. Thirty years of peace with those Arab neighbors would come to an end, and Tel Aviv would (again) be surrounded by hostile foes, committed to the eradication of the Jewish State, and supported by an Iranian regime on the verge of going nuclear. That must be a part of our strategic calculus as well. If Mubarak goes, the tenure of Jordan's King Abdullah will be measured in days, and the West Bank will probably fall under the control of Hamas as well. Meanwhile, Israel's most implacable foe (Syria) sits on the Golan Heights, while Hizballah controls the "new" government in Lebanon. If that isn't a nightmare scenario for Mr. Netanyahu, we don't know what is. What is the U.S. prepared to do to ensure Israel's security in that sort of environment.
And beyond that, how do we respond when the protest movement advances to the Persian Gulf Region? Those oil-rich states, long controlled by autocratic monarchs, are ripe for revolt as well. This is hardly a movement that is limited to Egypt or Tunisia, and there are plenty of Islamists (read: terrorists) ready to stoke the fires of revolution in places like Saudi Arabia; Oman, Dubai and Kuwait.
Despite those past "lectures" to Hosni Mubarak, it seems likely that Mr. Obama (and his administration) was blind-sided by this crisis. We can only hope that he gets up to speed quickly and develops some sort of strategy to protect U.S. interests, including the Suez Canal. The consequences of inaction would be enormous.
***
ADDENDUM: Recent bulletins from Cairo report that Mr. Mubarak has installed his intelligence chief, Omar Sulieman, as Egypt's new vice president. That's not the sort of move Mubarak would make if he was planning to surrender power. The new VP is well-known to U.S. intelligence officials; he's ruthless, extremely competent and not shy about cracking skulls to keep the regime in power. If Mubarak can retain the support of his army, the situation in Cairo (and other Egyptian cities) may resemble Tiananmen Square before the end of the weekend. What happens then is anyone's guess.
One more thought: that 40-minute PDB is also significant in this regard. While the presentation likely included video from media reporting, the unusual length also suggests a substantial stream of intelligence reporting on the uprising. That is encouraging, but it also raises the question of how much information Mr. Obama had received on conditions in Egypt before the uprising began.
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I've been busy teaching all day and have just returned from a pleasant group dinner, so I have seen very little info today, but I would toss into the mix here a reminder that in the Bush era the much derided neo-cons sought to enable the US to avoid the sort of dilema in which in finds itself today with Egypt; indeed as GM's most recent post notes, the democracy activist was being helped in a Bush program. This notion was also a core idea behind the second Iraq War albeit one viciously derided by the loyal and less than loyal opposition in the Democratic Party.
Where would we be now if candidate Obama, candidate Clinton, former Prez candidates Kerry and Gore, Senator Majority Leader Harry "We've already lost" Reid, second in line to the Presidency Nancy Pelosi et al had not advocated cut and run as the Surge was succeeding? What if instead of calling General Petraeus General Betray-us, the Dems had not undercut our efforts?
It seems reasonable to me to think that many Iraqi politicians would not have been preparing for our exit. It seems reasonable to me to think that we would still be welcome in Iraq and Iraq much sturdier in its democracy and the US in much higher repute in the Arab world for having fought for democracy.
Wouldn't that be a good thing in this moment?
Just same ramblings before going to bed , , ,
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http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/egypt-and-iran-will-we-again-fuel-the-fires-of-revolution/?singlepage=true
Egypt and Iran: Will We Again Fuel the Fires of Revolution?
If Obama emulates the horrendous decisions Jimmy Carter made during the Iranian revolution, radical Islam will spread through the region like a forest fire.
January 30, 2011 - by Abraham H. Miller
Egypt is the largest nation in the Arab world and the fulcrum of American foreign policy among Arab nations. Its streets are ablaze with fires; its police have been withdrawn and replaced by the army; an attempt by President Hosni Mubarak to quell the rioters has only inflamed them further. The Obama administration is responding as if it is tiptoeing through a mine field. Those waiting for American leadership have to contend with the empty platitudes of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who is urging restraint on the Mubarak regime.
The scene is all too reminiscent of the Iranian revolution of 1979. Then, President Jimmy Carter not only demanded restraint but also had his administration work behind the scenes to bring down the shah. Carter believed he was watching a democratic revolution unfold, one led by Mehdi Bazargan, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh and Abulhassan Banisadr. Neither Carter nor his advisers understood that this democratic-centrist revolution, like those in Europe, would be short-lived. Bazargan resigned from the government over its authoritarian turn; Ghotbzadeh was shot by a firing squad; and Banisadr fled to France, where he currently lives under heavy police protection.
As someone who spent decades studying riots, revolutions, and other forms of civil violence, I have some advice for the administration:
Hillary Clinton might consider remaining silent for the duration of the event. One of the dramatic non-PC findings of the Kerner Commission Report on our own experiences with civil unrest is that even a legitimate government that hesitates in the face of riots will both inflame and contribute to the duration and intensity of violence. Riots end when there are swift, decisive, and appropriate responses to the violence. Riots persist when the police hesitate, when the police are restrained, and when the rioters feel they are in control.
Studies of revolution, including the Russian Revolution, show that the loyalty of several companies of armed, disciplined, and well-led soldiers willing to continually fire into the mobs would crush any revolution. Such an observation sounds barbaric until you consider the millions of lives that are needlessly wasted in a revolution and its aftermath. Imagine if the second Russian Revolution, the October Revolution, the one the Communists made, had been stopped in its tracks: no Lenin, no Civil War, no Stalin, no Gulags, no invasion of Poland, no totalitarian dictatorship. The taking of a few hundred or thousand lives in the streets of St. Petersburg would have saved the lives of countless millions.
Revolutions are like a cart running downhill, as Alexis de Tocqueville observed in his brilliant analysis of the French Revolution. The American media is focused on the demand for democratic reform voiced by the mobs in the streets of Egypt. But revolutions don’t stop with the initial demands. Revolutions create power vacuums that draw new players with different agendas from those who initially sought to make the revolution. Revolutions move to the extremes, usually to the left. Those who join the mob to demand more liberty will ultimately create a regime that extinguishes all liberty. Did those who ran through the streets of Paris in July 1789 think they were revolting for the ensuing “Terror”? Did the workers who charged the Winter Palace in 1917 think they were fighting for the Gulag? Did Banisadr and Ghotbzadeh think they were replacing the shah of Iran with a theocracy?
The choice in the streets of Egypt is not Mubarak or democracy. It is Mubarak or the Muslim Brotherhood. It is the Muslim Brotherhood, like the ayatollahs of Tehran, who are the best situated to benefit from and direct the revolution, unless of course the Egyptian military holds firm.
If the Brotherhood comes to power, it will behave as did its proxy in Gaza: one man, one vote, one time, with the opposition shot in the legs and thrown off rooftops.
I will not write a brief for the oligarchy nor would I have written one for the shah. But just because you can visibly see evil does not mean that its elimination will produce something better.As the aphorism of revolution states, “Like Saturn, the revolution devours its own children.” And in so doing becomes something its creators never intended.
Our first order of business in Egypt is to produce stability and then to do something we have not done before: Assist the Egyptians in finding a mechanism for a transition to reform through an evolutionary rather than revolutionary path. The only institution capable of doing this is the Egyptian military. They should not be abandoned as was the Iranian military.
Had Obama done more than basked in the adulation of his Cairo speech and actually leaned on the regime to evolve toward a more legitimate and inclusive government, we might not be confronting the mess ahead of us.
For decades we have been dumping billions of dollars worth of advanced weapons into Egypt. A revolution means that those weapons could fall into the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood. This will tilt the balance of power in the Middle East. Emboldened by success in Egypt, radical Islam will next show its power in the Gulf and threaten the world’s oil supply. Already there are riots in Yemen.
The world as we knew it might just spin out of control. It remains to be seen if the Egyptian military, with or without our support, will rise to the task of restoring order and stability in Egypt and become a vehicle for vital political change. But if Obama emulates the horrendous decisions Jimmy Carter made during the Iranian revolution, radical Islam will spread through the region like a forest fire with the Saudis facing the ultimate conflagration.
Abraham H. Miller is an emeritus professor of political science and a former head of the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association.
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http://bigpeace.com/fgaffney/2011/01/30/the-muslim-brotherhood-is-the-enemy/
The Muslim Brotherhood is the Enemy
Posted by Frank Gaffney Jan 30th 2011 at 3:31 am
Suddenly, Washington is consumed with a question too long ignored: Can we safely do business with the Muslim Brotherhood?
The reason this question has taken on such urgency is, of course, because the Muslim Brotherhood (or MB, also known by its Arabic name, the Ikhwan) is poised to emerge as the big winner from the chaos now sweeping North Africa and increasingly likely to bring down the government of the aging Egyptian dictator, Hosni Mubarak.
In the wake of growing turmoil in Egypt, a retinue of pundits, professors and former government officials has publicly insisted that we have nothing to fear from the Ikhwan since it has eschewed violence and embraced democracy.
For example, Bruce Reidel, a controversial former CIA analyst and advisor to President Obama, posted an article entitled “Don’t Fear Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood” at the Daily Beast. In it, he declared: “The Egyptian Brotherhood renounced violence years ago, but its relative moderation has made it the target of extreme vilification by more radical Islamists. Al Qaeda’s leaders, Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri, started their political lives affiliated with the Brotherhood but both have denounced it for decades as too soft and a cat’s paw of Mubarak and America.”
Then, there was President George W. Bush’s former press spokeswoman, Dana Perino, who went so far on January 28th as to tell Fox News “…And don’t be afraid of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. This has nothing to do with religion.”
One reason we might be misperceiving the MB as no threat is because a prime source of information about such matters is the Muslim Brotherhood itself. As the Center for Security Policy’s new, best-selling Team B II report entitled, Shariah: The Threat to America found: “It is now public knowledge that nearly every major Muslim organization in the United States is actually controlled by the MB or a derivative organization. Consequently, most of the Muslim-American groups of any prominence in America are now known to be, as a matter of fact, hostile to the United States and its Constitution.”
In fact, for much of the past two decades, a number of these groups and their backers (including, notably, Saudi billionaire Prince Alwaleed bin Talal) have cultivated extensive ties with U.S. government officials and agencies under successive administrations of both parties, academic centers, financial institutions, religious communities, partisan organizations and the media. As a result, such American entities have been subjected to intense, disciplined and sustained influence operations for decades.
Unfortunately, the relationships thus developed and the misperceptions thus fostered are today bearing poisonous fruit with respect to shaping U.S. policy towards the unfolding Egyptian drama.
A notable example is the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR). A federal judge in the 2008 Holy Land Foundation trial – which successfully prosecuted the nation’s largest terrorism financing conspiracy – found that CAIR was indeed a front for the Ikhwan’s Palestinian affiliate, Hamas. Nonetheless, Fox News earlier today interviewed the Executive Director of CAIR’s Chicago office, Ahmed Rehab, whom it characterized as a “Democracy Activist.”
True to form, Rehab called for the removal of Mubarak’s regime and the institution of democratic elections in Egypt. This is hardly surprising since, under present circumstances, such balloting would likely have the same result it did in Gaza a few years back: the triumph of the Muslim Brotherhood and the institution of brutally repressive theocratic rule, in accordance with the totalitarian Islamic politico-military-legal program known as shariah.
An important antidote to the seductive notions being advanced with respect to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt – and, for that matter, in Western nations like ours – by the Ikhwan’s own operatives, their useful idiots and apologists is the Team B II report. It should be considered required reading by anyone who hopes to understand, let alone to comment usefully upon, the MB’s real character and agenda.
For example, Shariah: The Threat to America provides several key insights that must be borne in mind in the current circumstances especially:
* “The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928. Its express purpose was two-fold: (1) to implement shariah worldwide, and (2) to re-establish the global Islamic State (caliphate).
* “Therefore, Al Qaeda and the MB have the same objectives. They differ only in the timing and tactics involved in realizing them.
* “The Brotherhood’s creed is: ‘God is our objective; the Koran is our law; the Prophet is our leader; jihad is our way; and death for the sake of Allah is the highest of our aspirations.’”
* It is evident from the Creed, and from the Brotherhood’s history (and current activities)…that violence is an inherent part of the MB’s tactics. The MB is the root of the majority of Islamic terrorist groups in the world today.
* The Muslim Brotherhood is the ‘vanguard’ or tip-of-the-spear of the current Islamic Movement in the world. While there are other transnational organizations that share the MB’s goals (if not its tactics) – including al Qaeda, which was born out of the Brotherhood – the Ikhwan is by far the strongest and most organized. The Muslim Brotherhood is now active in over 80 countries around the world.
Of particular concern must be the purpose of the Brotherhood in the United States and other nations of the Free World:
* “…The Ikhwan’s mission in the West is sedition in the furtherance of shariah’s supremacist agenda, not peaceful assimilation and co-existence with non-Muslim populations.”
* “The Ikhwan believes that its purposes in the West are, for the moment, better advanced by the use of non-violent, stealthy techniques. In that connection, the Muslim Brotherhood seeks to establish relations with, influence and, wherever possible, penetrate: government circles in executive and legislative branches at the federal, state and local levels; the law enforcement community; intelligence agencies; the military; penal institutions; the media; think tanks and policy groups; academic institutions; non-Muslim religious communities; and other elites.
* “The Brothers engage in all of these activities and more for one reason: to subvert the targeted communities in furtherance of the MB’s primary objective – the triumph of shariah.”
In short, the Muslim Brotherhood – whether it is operating in Egypt, elsewhere in the world or here – is our enemy. Vital U.S. interests will be at risk if it succeeds in supplanting the present regime in Cairo, taking control in the process not only of the Arab world’s most populous nation but its vast, American-supplied arsenal. It is no less reckless to allow the Brotherhood’s operatives to enjoy continued access to and influence over our perceptions of their true purposes, and the policies adopted pursuant thereto.
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As the Muslim Brotherhood (sexist name?) represents a religion of peace, I don't know why Hillary Clinton's State Dept is urging the evacuation of Americans. If I were Obama today I would appoint Keith Ellison to be our new Ambassador to Egypt and send Clinton and Ellison and a team of his political allies from CAIR in to set up open talks including all sides, all negotiations transparent and broadcast on CSPAN and Al-Jazeera. This is the sit down with anyone moment candidate Obama longed for. Can't we all just talk? With any guts, he would send himself in. Biden can watch the store while he's gone.
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This excerpt from Global Research Intl Affairs, Barry Rubin http://www.gloria-center.org/gloria/2011/01/special-report-egypt-revolt-and-us-policy
There are two basic possibilities: the regime will stabilize (with or without Mubarak) or power will be up for grabs. Now, here are the precedents for the latter situation:
Remember the Iranian revolution when all sorts of people poured out into the streets to demand freedom? Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is now president.
Remember the Beirut spring when people poured out into the streets to demand freedom? Hizballah is now running Lebanon.
Remember the democracy among the Palestinians and free elections? Hamas is now running the Gaza Strip.
Remember democracy in Algeria? Tens of thousands of people were killed in the ensuing civil war.
It doesn't have to be that way but the precedents are pretty daunting.
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GM, good posts. This one I don't think was Glen Beck's fault.
GM previously made this clear here, but others are picking up on it, the English translation sites of Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) have a different, more peaceful message than the Arabic sites, so watch what they do more than what (you think) they are saying. Also at Breitbart's big peace site: http://bigpeace.com/cbrim/2011/01/30/muslim-brotherhood-deception-they-say-different-things-in-english-and-arabic/
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Crafty's musings about Iraq war opposition is interesting. Hard to say how it applies here. The U.S. is in a spectator position at this point. If/when the new regime attacks or threatens American interests, we are in one way in a stronger position with Obama. He actually has an opposition that will stand behind him if he moves to defend America's interests.
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These world developments that run a course that we cannot control or even influence should put one extremely focused thought in our minds. Get our own act in order in terms of own freedoms, healthy economy, strong defense and secure borders. As the Suez threatens to close or whatever happens next in the volatile middle east, what a shame and a sham that we have spent recent decades fighting off our own energy production. With our own house in order, maybe we could lecture Hu or Chavez or Mubarek, or maybe we wouldn't have to so much.
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"GM, good posts. This one I don't think was Glen Beck's fault."
Doug,
As far as Glenn Beck goes, you can accuse him of anything with no standard of proof required. I think he was behind JFK's assassination and smallpox in N. America as well. And if you disagree, you are obviously worse than Hitler. :wink:
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http://www.haaretz.com/news/international/egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-eyes-unity-gov-t-without-mubarak-1.340168
The Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's largest opposition group,is in talks with other anti-government figures to form a national unity government without President Hosni Mubarak, a group official told DPA on Sunday.
Although the Muslim Brotherhood is officially banned from running for elections for parliament, some movement members have presented candidacy for parliament as independents.
Egypt protests - AP - Jan 29
An army officer, borne on the shoulders of anti-government protesters, tearing up a picture of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in downtown Cairo, January 29, 2010.
Photo by: AP
Gamal Nasser, a spokesman for the Brotherhood, told DPA that his group was in talks with Mohammed ElBaradei - the former UN nuclear watchdog chief - to form a national unity government without the National Democratic Party of Mubarak.
The group is also demanding an end to the draconian Emergency Laws, which grant police wide-ranging powers The laws have been used often to arrest and harass the Islamist group.
Nasser said his group would not accept any new government with Mubarak. On Saturday the Brotherhood called on President Mubarak to relinquish power in a peaceful manner following the resignation of the Egyptian cabinet.
Speaking to CNN later Sunday, ElBaradei said he had a popular and political mandate to negotiate the creation of a national unity government.
"I have been authorized -- mandated -- by the people who organized these demonstrations and many other parties to agree on a national unity government," he told CNN.
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http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/obama-will-go-down-in-history-as-the-president-who-lost-egypt-1.340057
Jimmy Carter will go down in American history as "the president who lost Iran," which during his term went from being a major strategic ally of the United States to being the revolutionary Islamic Republic. Barack Obama will be remembered as the president who "lost" Turkey, Lebanon and Egypt, and during whose tenure America's alliances in the Middle East crumbled.
The superficial circumstances are similar. In both cases, a United States in financial crisis and after failed wars loses global influence under a leftist president whose good intentions are interpreted abroad as expressions of weakness. The results are reflected in the fall of regimes that were dependent on their relationship with Washington for survival, or in a change in their orientation, as with Ankara.
America's general weakness clearly affects its friends. But unlike Carter, who preached human rights even when it hurt allies, Obama sat on the fence and exercised caution. He neither embraced despised leaders nor evangelized for political freedom, for fear of undermining stability.
Obama began his presidency with trips to Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and in speeches in Ankara and Cairo tried to forge new ties between the United States and the Muslim world. His message to Muslims was "I am one of you," and he backed it by quoting from the Koran. President Hosni Mubarak did not join him on the stage at Cairo University, and Obama did not mention his host. But he did not imitate his hated predecessor, President George W. Bush, with blunt calls for democracy and freedom.
Obama apparently believed the main problem of the Middle East was the Israeli occupation, and focused his policy on demanding the suspension of construction in the settlements and on the abortive attempt to renew the peace talks. That failure led him to back off from the peace process in favor of concentrating on heading off an Israeli-Iranian war.
Americans debated constantly the question of whether Obama cut his policy to fit the circumstances or aimed at the wrong targets. The absence of human rights issues from U.S. policy vis-a-vis Arab states drew harsh criticism; he was accused of ignoring the zeitgeist and clinging to old, rotten leaders. In the past few months many opinion pieces have appeared in the Western press asserting that the days of Mubarak's regime are numbered and calling on Obama to reach out to the opposition in Egypt. There was a sense that the U.S. foreign policy establishment was shaking off its long-term protege in Cairo, while the administration lagged behind the columnists and commentators.
The administration faced a dilemma. One can guess that Obama himself identified with the demonstrators, not the aging dictator. But a superpower isn't the civil rights movement. If it abandons its allies the moment they flounder, who would trust it tomorrow? That's why Obama rallied to Mubarak's side until Friday, when the force of the protests bested his regime.
The street revolts in Tunisia and Egypt showed that the United States can do very little to save its friends from the wrath of their citizens. Now Obama will come under fire for not getting close to the Egyptian opposition leaders soon enough and not demanding that Mubarak release his opponents from jail. He will be accused of not pushing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hard enough to stop the settlements and thus indirectly quell the rising tides of anger in the Muslim world. But that's a case of 20:20 hindsight. There's no guarantee that the Egyptian or Tunisian masses would have been willing to live in a repressive regime even if construction in Ariel was halted or a few opposition figures were released from jail.
Now Obama will try to hunker down until the winds of revolt die out, and then forge ties with the new leaders in the region. It cannot be assumed that Mubarak's successors will be clones of Iran's leaders, bent on pursuing a radical anti-American policy. Perhaps they will emulate Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who navigates among the blocs and superpowers without giving up his country's membership in NATO and its defense ties with the United States. Erdogan obtained a good deal for Turkey, which benefits from political stability and economic growth without being in anyone's pocket. It could work for Egypt, too.
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Woof,
There seems to be any number of talking heads that think it's a forgone conclusion that Hosni Mubarak will be forced to step down; anyone thinking that doesn't understand the realities of the situation in Egypt or Mubarak. Since 1950 when Mubarak became a pilot in the Egyptian Air Force and working his way up through the ranks he has maintained extremely close ties to the military, his last post in 1972 was as the Commanding General of the Air Force and then his first government post was as Deputy Minister of Defence. The military is supremely loyal to him and he has a very high level of confidence in this loyalty. This is how he has survived all these years going against the wants of another Arab nations and many of his own people, in dealing with Israel and the U.S. and it would be a huge mistake for Obama to try and toss him under the bus. I'm not saying that the Egyptian people don't deserve better but the fact is the military is going to say who rules it, and that's not the people, the Muslim Brotherhood, or anyother opposition Party that might want to ride the unrest to power.
P.C.
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I think the generals are loyal to Mubarak, I think there are serious questions as to the entire military structure's loyalty.
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http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/01/will-egypts-military-officers-free-the-revolution/70465/
Will Egypt's Military Officers Free the Revolution?
:?
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Woof GM,
The Egyptian military is very well disciplined, trained and equipped and Mubarak owns them. The security forces and police were pulled out not because they weren't willing to fight against the protesters, they were pulled out to allow the criminals and radicals to pillage and burn leaving the elite business people and academics and their families unprotected. You see he doesn't need the military to get even with the ones that started the protest. As for the radicals he wants to know who they are and now they are showing themselves and he will deal with them later. It won't be long that the protesters will be asking for the police to come back and the military to restore order. Mubarak knows exactly what he's doing.
P.C.
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I hope your analysis is correct.
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http://www.michaelyon-online.com/egypt-eruption.htm
>
I asked General (ret.) Barry McCaffrey for his thoughts on the evolving situation in Egypt:
Egypt is a few steps short of a disaster. The corrupt, incompetent regime will not survive.
Most likely outcome--- the Generals take charge, announce a reform government, start the process of responding to the injustice and despair of the common citizen. Then the situation staggers along for some period.
Worst outcome the Generals stand with the same gang that has looted the nation--- probably minus Mubarak. Then there is a possible civil war with the soldiers in many cases siding with the people not their officers. The only organized opposition is the Muslim Brotherhood which could then possibly gain power.
Our central US foreign policy concern is the stability of the Peace Treaty with Israel. At the end of the day if required--- we would go to war to prevent the annihilation of the Israelis. This would be a terrible outcome for the entire region.
And--- oh by the way---there is the matter of the Suez Canal and the flow of oil to a Europe with an increasingly ant-Israeli political stance.
We have few good options. The President and Secretary Clinton are carefully walking the line. Oddly enough--- only the last Administration with President Bush and Secretary Condi Rice has ever taken a strong reform position with Mubarak.
This one is important. Egypt is central to peace in the region. Their people have been ill-used by the Mubarak Regime. Watch the enlisted soldiers of the Egyptian Army. If they go with the people--- there will be incredible bloodshed.
Barry McCaffrey
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Woof,
Hysterics. Yes, in situations like this anything can happen but that doesn't mean that it will or that it is even likely. Again I don't understand all the talking heads calling for all the gloom and doom; maybe they own gold? The mob will tire, the criminals and radicals will be rounded up, a few reforms to pacify the masses and some bullying of elites and academics to clip their wings and the shi#y little life of the populace will be restored and so will Mubarak.
P.C.
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Woof,
Life goes on. http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110131/ap_on_re_mi_ea/ml_egypt
P.C.
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http://pajamasmedia.com/michaelledeen/2011/01/30/cancer-carter-and-obama/?singlepage=true
Cancer, Carter and Obama
January 30, 2011 - by Michael Ledeen
There are some eery similarities between Egypt 2011 and Iran 1979, and some of them are unfortunately about American leadership. There are some big differences, too, but for the moment let’s just look at some parallels and try to draw some necessarily tentative conclusions. After all, everything is up for grabs right now and things will probably change a lot in the next few hours and days.
First of all is prostate cancer. The shah was dying of it and Mubarak is afflicted with it. We know Mubarak’s got it. We didn’t know the shah had it. One of the effects of the disease and its treatment seems to be that the person has difficulty making tough decisions, and it inevitably forces him to think about his legacy. The shah didn’t want to go down as a bloody dictator, and he rejected all appeals from his generals to open fire on the demonstrators. This encouraged the opposition and discouraged the military commanders.
Second is the role of Washington. Carter did not know what to do, and he was operating on the basis of very bad intelligence. Above all, he (thanks to his CIA) had very little good information about Khomeini. He and advisers like Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Iran desk officer Henry Precht and NSC staffer Gary Sick all permitted themselves to believe that we could continue to have very good relations with Iran even if the shah were overthrown. They failed to see the nature and extent of the Khomeini movement, saw it as a “progressive revolution,” and UN Ambassador Andrew Young famously called the ayatollah a holy man, and even “some kind of saint.”
I don’t know the quality of our intelligence on the Egyptian opposition, but if former Ambassador Martin Indyk is correct (and all I’ve got to go on is a Tweet saying he said it on BBC Arabic), the White House and State Department may be signaling approval of Mohammed al-Baradei. According to Al Jazeera — a very unreliable source to put it mildly — Obama has told leaders in the Gulf that the United States favors a “peaceful transition” to greater democracy.
Well, so do I. But Baradei is one of the last men I would choose for that role. He doesn’t like America and he’s in cahoots with Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood. He would be likely to try to replay the ghastly catastrophe of 1979. Bad for freedom, bad for the Egyptian people, bad for America. Does our intelligence community not know this? And if they do, why is Obama tilting towards this outcome? If he is, that is…
In 1979 we came down hard on the shah to show restraint towards the demonstrators, just as we are today with Mubarak. I understand that no American government, let alone an Obama government, can openly say to Mubarak: “What are you waiting for? Put it down!” I don’t know what we’re saying privately. Gates has apparently spoken to his counterparts in Cairo and Jerusalem. What did they say? I don’t know, obviously, but that conversation would go a long way to clarify the real facts. I’ll bet you that there was some sort of deadline to Mubarak: if you can’t establish control within x days, we will have to work with the opposition. That would be normal and sensible.
The greatest American sin in 1979 was to confuse the shah. He didn’t know what we wanted. From the State Department he heard calls for sweet reasonableness, entreaties not to use live ammunition against the mobs, and so forth. From Brzezinski he heard pleas to be strong. Maybe even to crack down violently. The shah didn’t know who to believe. Then it got worse. We sent a General Huyser to Tehran with two sets of instructions: a) to support a military coup and b) to prevent a military coup. So the shah and the generals stood by and watched, and Khomeini’s multitudes, who knew exactly what they wanted, fought all-out and won.
It follows that Mubarak has to know exactly what we want. Do we know what we want? My impression is that we are confused, just as in 1979. Obama’s statement the other day (yesterday if I remember rightly) was not encouraging. “The future of Egypt will be determined by the Egyptian people” and we will support them. What does that mean? There’s a fight going on, and we have to take sides. I think Mubarak is entitled to wonder just what we want, and that’s dangerous, because it means that his decisions will be driven at least in part by guesswork and suspicion.
As I’ve said, that we have come to this impasse shows a long-standing policy failure, just as it did in Iran in 1979. We should have supported democratic opposition forces all along (footnote: it’s quite amusing to hear former officials proclaiming “we can’t support dictatorship” when they did precisely that when they were in office. Including some, like C. Rice, who promised to support democrats and then didn’t.). But we didn’t, the London Telegraph’s misleading headline writers notwithstanding. Now we have no attractive options. Too bad.
So even if our intelligence is weak, we still have to make decisions, and the basic rule has to be the same as Hippocrates’ injunction to doctors: don’t make things worse. Don’t inflict an even worse tyranny on the Egyptian people, one that is likely to plunge the region into a big war. If that means working with the generals to create a transition government that promises to shape a more attractive polity, so be it. The lesser of two evils is a legitimate policy decision.
In fact, it’s the most common one. I’m sure Obama hates being in this position, as any of us would. But he’s got to make decisions. Clearly and emphatically. And stay on top of it, which is not at all his style or inclination.
And that’s the final similarity with 1979: the wrong American in the wrong job at a crucial time. Let’s hope that the Almighty truly does protect the blind, the drunk, and the United States of America.
It’s even better to be lucky than to be smart.
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The Egypt Crisis in a Global Context: A Special Report
George Friedman
January 30, 2011 | 2253 GMT
It is not at all clear what will happen in the Egyptian revolution. It is not a surprise that this is happening. Hosni Mubarak has been president for more than a quarter of a century, ever since the assassination of Anwar Sadat. He is old and has been ill. No one expected him to live much longer, and his apparent plan, which was that he would be replaced by his son Gamal, was not going to happen even though it was a possibility a year ago. There was no one, save his closest business associates, who wanted to see Mubarak’s succession plans happen. As his father weakened, Gamal’s succession became even less likely. Mubarak’s failure to design a credible succession plan guaranteed instability on his death. Since everyone knew that there would be instability on his death, there were obviously those who saw little advantage to acting before he died. Who these people were and what they wanted is the issue.
Let’s begin by considering the regime. In 1952, Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser staged a military coup that displaced the Egyptian monarchy, civilian officers in the military, and British influence in Egypt. Nasser created a government based on military power as the major stabilizing and progressive force in Egypt. His revolution was secular and socialist. In short, it was a statist regime dominated by the military. On Nasser’s death, Anwar Sadat replaced him. On Sadat’s assassination, Hosni Mubarak replaced him. Both of these men came from the military as Nasser did. However their foreign policy might have differed from Nasser’s, the regime remained intact.
Mubarak’s Opponents
The demands for Mubarak’s resignation come from many quarters, including from members of the regime — particularly the military — who regard Mubarak’s unwillingness to permit them to dictate the succession as endangering the regime. For some of them, the demonstrations represent both a threat and opportunity. Obviously, the demonstrations might get out of hand and destroy the regime. On the other hand, the demonstrations might be enough to force Mubarak to resign, allow a replacement — for example, Omar Suleiman, the head of intelligence who Mubarak recently appointed vice president — and thereby save the regime. This is not to say that they fomented the demonstrations, but some must have seen the demonstrations as an opportunity.
This is particularly the case in the sense that the demonstrators are deeply divided among themselves and thus far do not appear to have been able to generate the type of mass movement that toppled the Shah of Iran’s regime in 1979. More important, the demonstrators are clearly united in opposing Mubarak as an individual, and to a large extent united in opposing the regime. Beyond that, there is a deep divide in the opposition.
Western media has read the uprising as a demand for Western-style liberal democracy. Many certainly are demanding that. What is not clear is that this is moving Egypt’s peasants, workers and merchant class to rise en masse. Their interests have far more to do with the state of the Egyptian economy than with the principles of liberal democracy. As in Iran in 2009, the democratic revolution, if focused on democrats, cannot triumph unless it generates broader support.
The other element in this uprising is the Muslim Brotherhood. The consensus of most observers is that the Muslim Brotherhood at this point is no longer a radical movement and is too weak to influence the revolution. This may be possible, but it is not obvious. The Muslim Brotherhood has many strands, many of which have been quiet under Mubarak’s repression. It is not clear who will emerge if Mubarak falls. It is certainly not clear that they are weaker than the democratic demonstrators. It is a mistake to confuse the Muslim Brotherhood’s caution with weakness. Another way to look at them is that they have bided their time and toned down their real views, waiting for the kind of moment provided by Mubarak’s succession. I would suspect that the Muslim Brotherhood has more potential influence among the Egyptian masses than the Western-oriented demonstrators or Mohamed ElBaradei, the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who is emerging as their leader.
There is, of course, the usual discussion of what U.S. President Barack Obama’s view is, or what the Europeans think, or what the Iranians are up to. All of them undoubtedly have thoughts and even plans. In my view, trying to shape the political dynamics of a country like Egypt from Iran or the United States is futile, and believing that what is happening in Egypt is the result of their conspiracies is nonsense. A lot of people care what is happening there, and a lot of people are saying all sorts of things and even spending money on spies and Twitter. Egypt’s regime can be influenced in this way, but a revolution really doesn’t depend on what the European Union or Tehran says.
There are four outcomes possible. First, the regime might survive. Mubarak might stabilize the situation, or more likely, another senior military official would replace him after a decent interval. Another possibility under the scenario of the regime’s survival is that there may be a coup of the colonels, as we discussed yesterday. A second possibility is that the demonstrators might force elections in which ElBaradei or someone like him could be elected and Egypt might overthrow the statist model built by Nasser and proceed on the path of democracy. The third possibility is that the demonstrators force elections, which the Muslim Brotherhood could win and move forward with an Islamist-oriented agenda. The fourth possibility is that Egypt will sink into political chaos. The most likely path to this would be elections that result in political gridlock in which a viable candidate cannot be elected. If I were forced to choose, I would bet on the regime stabilizing itself and Mubarak leaving because of the relative weakness and division of the demonstrators. But that’s a guess and not a forecast.
Geopolitical Significance
Whatever happens matters a great deal to Egyptians. But only some of these outcomes are significant to the world. Among radical Islamists, the prospect of a radicalized Egypt represents a new lease on life. For Iran, such an outcome would be less pleasing. Iran is now the emerging center of radical Islamism; it would not welcome competition from Egypt, though it may be content with an Islamist Egypt that acts as an Iranian ally (something that would not be easy to ensure).
For the United States, an Islamist Egypt would be a strategic catastrophe. Egypt is the center of gravity in the Arab world. This would not only change the dynamic of the Arab world, it would reverse U.S. strategy since the end of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Sadat’s decision to reverse his alliance with the Soviets and form an alliance with the United States undermined the Soviet position in the Mediterranean and in the Arab world and strengthened the United States immeasurably. The support of Egyptian intelligence after 9/11 was critical in blocking and undermining al Qaeda. Were Egypt to stop that cooperation or become hostile, the U.S. strategy would be severely undermined.
The great loser would be Israel. Israel’s national security has rested on its treaty with Egypt, signed by Menachem Begin with much criticism by the Israeli right. The demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula not only protected Israel’s southern front, it meant that the survival of Israel was no longer at stake. Israel fought three wars (1948, 1967 and 1973) where its very existence was at issue. The threat was always from Egypt, and without Egypt in the mix, no coalition of powers could threaten Israel (excluding the now-distant possibility of Iranian nuclear weapons). In all of the wars Israel fought after its treaty with Egypt (the 1982 and 2006 wars in Lebanon) Israeli interests, but not survival, were at stake.
If Egypt were to abrogate the Camp David Accords and over time reconstruct its military into an effective force, the existential threat to Israel that existed before the treaty was signed would re-emerge. This would not happen quickly, but Israel would have to deal with two realities. The first is that the Israeli military is not nearly large enough or strong enough to occupy and control Egypt. The second is that the development of Egypt’s military would impose substantial costs on Israel and limit its room for maneuver.
There is thus a scenario that would potentially strengthen the radical Islamists while putting the United States, Israel, and potentially even Iran at a disadvantage, all for different reasons. That scenario emerges only if two things happen. First, the Muslim Brotherhood must become a dominant political force in Egypt. Second, they must turn out to be more radical than most observers currently believe they are — or they must, with power, evolve into something more radical.
If the advocates for democracy win, and if they elect someone like ElBaradei, it is unlikely that this scenario would take place. The pro-Western democratic faction is primarily concerned with domestic issues, are themselves secular and would not want to return to the wartime state prior to Camp David, because that would simply strengthen the military. If they win power, the geopolitical arrangements would remain unchanged.
Similarly, the geopolitical arrangements would remain in place if the military regime retained power — save for one scenario. If it was decided that the regime’s unpopularity could be mitigated by assuming a more anti-Western and anti-Israeli policy — in other words, if the regime decided to play the Islamist card, the situation could evolve as a Muslim Brotherhood government would. Indeed, as hard as it is to imagine, there could be an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood designed to stabilize the regime. Stranger things have happened.
When we look at the political dynamic of Egypt, and try to imagine its connection to the international system, we can see that there are several scenarios under which certain political outcomes would have profound effects on the way the world works. That should not be surprising. When Egypt was a pro-Soviet Nasserite state, the world was a very different place than it had been before Nasser. When Sadat changed his foreign policy the world changed with it. If the Sadat foreign policy changes, the world changes again. Egypt is one of those countries whose internal politics matter to more than its own citizens.
Most of the outcomes I envision leave Egypt pretty much where it is. But not all. The situation is, as they say, in doubt, and the outcome is not trivial.
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FWIW. Morris opinion, one of many. I admit he is not a noted scholar on Egyptian affairs but I like him and usually agree with him. He notes this guy ElBaradei who is being touted by the media is actually no friend of the West it sounds.
WHO LOST EGYPT?
By Dick Morris01.29.2011
In the 1950s, the accusation “who lost China” resonated throughout American politics and led to the defeat of the Democratic Party in the presidential elections of 1952. Unless President Obama reverses field and strongly opposes letting the Muslim brotherhood take over Egypt, he will be hit with the modern equivalent of the 1952 question: Who Lost Egypt?
The Iranian government is waiting for Egypt to fall into its lap. The Muslim Brotherhood, dominated by Iranian Islamic fundamentalism, will doubtless emerge as the winner should the government of Egypt fall. The Obama Administration, in failing to throw its weight against an Islamic takeover, is guilty of the same mistake that led President Carter to fail to support the Shah, opening the door for the Ayatollah Khomeini to take over Iran.
The United States has enormous leverage in Egypt – far more than it had in Iran. We provide Egypt with upwards of $2 billion a year in foreign aid under the provisos of the Camp David Accords orchestrated by Carter. The Egyptian military, in particular, receives $1.3 billion of this money. The United States, as the pay master, needs to send a signal to the military that it will be supportive of its efforts to keep Egypt out of the hands of the Islamic fundamentalists. Instead, Obama has put our military aid to Egypt “under review” to pressure Mubarak to mute his response to the demonstrators and has given top priority to “preventing the loss of human life.”
President Obama should say that Egypt has always been a friend of the United States. He should point out that it was the first Arab country to make peace with Israel. He should recall that President Sadat, who signed the peace accords, paid for doing so with his life and that President Mubarak has carried on in his footsteps. He should condemn the efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood extremists to take over the country and indicate that America stands by her longtime ally. He should address the need for reform and urge Mubarak to enact needed changes. But his emphasis should be on standing with our ally.
The return of Nobel laureate Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has to Egypt as the presumptive heir to Mubarak tells us where this revolution is headed. Carolyn Glick, a columnist for the Jerusalem Post, explains how dangerous ElBaradei is. “As IAEA head,” she writes, “Elbaradei shielded Iran’s nuclear weapons program from the Security Council. He [has] continued to lobby against significant UN Security Council sanctions or other actions against Iran…Last week, he dismissed the threat of a nuclear armed Iran [saying] ‘there is a lot of hype in this debate’.”
As for the Muslim Brotherhood, Glick notes that “it forms the largest and best organized opposition to the Mubarak regime and [is] the progenitor of Hamas and al Qaidi. It seeks Egypt’s transformation into an Islamic regime that will stand at the forefront of the global jihad.”
Now is the time for Republicans and conservatives to start asking the question: Who is losing Egypt? We need to debunk the starry eyed idealistic yearning for reform and the fantasy that a liberal democracy will come from these demonstrations. It won’t. Iranian domination will.
Egypt, with 80 million people, is the largest country in the Middle East or North Africa. Combined with Iran’s 75 million (the second largest) they have 155 million people. By contrast the entire rest of the region — Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, Jordan, UAE, Lebanon, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar combined– have only 200 million.
We must not let the two most populous and powerful nations in the region fall under the sway of Muslim extremism, the one through the weakness of Jimmy Carter and the other through the weakness of Barack Obama.
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"He notes this guy ElBaradei who is being touted by the media is actually no friend of the West it sounds."
I caught a bit on the radio from Limbaugh, who correctly pointed out how friendly the MSM is to the Muslim Brotherhood and how the same MSM is so biased and hostile towards the Tea Party.
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http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/ml_egypt/print
Egypt military promises no force against protests
By MAGGIE MICHAEL and HAMZA HENDAWI, Associated Press Maggie Michael And Hamza Hendawi, Associated Press 7 mins ago
CAIRO – Egypt's military promised Monday not to fire on any peaceful protests and said it recognized "the legitimacy of the people's demands" ahead of a demonstration in which organizers aim to bring a million Egyptians to the streets to press for the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak.
The military statement was the strongest sign yet that the army was willing to let the week-old protests continue and even grow as long as they remain peaceful, even if that leads to the fall of Mubarak. If the 82-year-old president, a former air force commander, loses the support of the military, it would likely be a fatal blow to his rule.
The announcement came after the latest gesture by Mubarak aimed at defusing the upheaval fell flat. Protesters in the street and his top ally, the United States, roundly rejected his announcement of a new government Monday that dropped his interior minister, who heads police forces and was widely denounced by the protesters.
In Washington, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs dismissed the naming of the new government, saying the situation in Egypt calls for action, not appointments.
The new lineup was greeted with scorn in Tahrir Square, the central Cairo plaza that has become the protests' epicenter, with crowds of more than 10,000 on Monday chanting for Mubarak's ouster.
"We don't want life to go back to normal until Mubarak leaves," said Israa Abdel-Fattah, a founder of the April 6 Group, a movement of young people pushing for democratic reform.
The mood in Tahrir — or Liberation — Square, surrounded by army tanks and barbed wire, was celebratory and determined as more protesters filtered in to join what has turned into a continual encampment despite a curfew, moved up an hour to 3 p.m. on its fourth day in effect. Some protesters played music, others distributed dates and other food to their colleagues or watched the latest news on TVs set up on sidewalks.
Young men climbed lampposts to hang Egyptian flags and signs proclaiming "Leave, Mubarak!" One poster featured Mubarak's face plastered with a Hitler mustache, a sign of the deep resentment toward a leader they blame for widespread poverty, inflation and official indifference and brutality during his 30 years in power.
A coalition of protest groups called for a million people to join protests Tuesday — and many protesters spoke of marching out of Tahrir Square to move toward one of the several presidential palaces around Cairo. That would be a significant step: For days, the military has allowed the crowds to gather freely, but only within the confines of Tahrir.
The military's statement suggested the army may allow the protesters to march out of the square as long as they don't engage in violence.
"Your armed forces, realizing the legitimacy of the people's demands and out of concern to carry out its responsibility to protect the nation and citizens, states the following," the spokesman, Ismail Etman said in the introduction of the statement. He said the military "has not and will not use force against the public" and underlined that the "the freedom of peaceful expression is guaranteed for everyone."
He added the caveats, however, that protesters should not commit "any act that destabilizes security of the country" or damage property.
Looting that erupted over the weekend across the city of around 18 million eased — but Egyptians endured another day of the virtual halt to normal life that the crisis has caused, raising fears of damage to Egypt's economy if the crisis drags on. Trains stopped running Monday, possibly an attempt by authorities to prevent residents of the provinces from joining protests in the capital.
Banks, schools and the stock market in Cairo were closed for the second working day, making cash tight. An unprecedented complete shutdown of the Internet was in its fourth day. Long lines formed outside bakeries as people tried to replenish their stores of bread.
Cairo's international airport was a scene of chaos and confusion as thousands of foreigners sought to flee the unrest, and countries around the world scrambled to send in planes to fly their citizens out.
**A big fcuking deal, as our esteemed VP would say.**
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Woof,
The press has now jumped on the freedom and democracy bandwagon for the Egyptian protest, but where are the freedom and democracy folks? I haven't seen any. I've seen people that want Mubarak out because he has sided with Israel and the U.S. on a few matters. I've seen non democratic Arab and Islamic groups represented such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. I've even heard that the Egyptian Marxist Party has called on its members to help spread the protests throughout the country. The people there do say they want freedom but freedom to do what? What did the freedom and democracy movement in Iran do when the U.S. backed Shah fell?
There is no doubt that Mubarak is a bad dude and shame on us for dealing with him but what choice do we have? The press is acting like we should just side on the freedom and democracy movement. Wait a minute, isn't that what we did in Iran? And what was our reward for that morally correct decision and politically obvious right thing to do? Did the people there get freedom and democracy? We need to be practical and realistic and yes it's a hard pill to swallow because we are freedom loving people, but a dictator in our hand is much much better than what will follow him in the vacuum that will be left.
P.C.
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SNAFU: Cluelessness and hypocrisy abound.
Sorry, I'm not buying this "Who lost Egypt?" analysis. Mubarak is 82 and is dying of prostate cancer. Transitions are often tricky in the absence of democracy.
There may not be much we can do at this moment. STFU has its merits sometimes.
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His age and cancer were not an issue recently, were they? Was a transition announced before the riots/protests?
Do you think that if we had a president with an actual resume, that there might be a different outcome?
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- FrontPage Magazine - http://frontpagemag.com -
Why Coptic Christians Fear a Revolution
Posted By Robert Spencer On February 1, 2011 @ 12:35 am
Forgotten in all the excitement over the revolution in Egypt has been the precarious situation of Coptic Christians there. Yet just weeks ago, Copts in Egypt experienced an unprecedented reign of terror. An Islamic jihad-martyrdom suicide bomber murdered twenty-two people and wounded eighty more at the Coptic Christian Church of the Saints in Alexandria, Egypt on New Year’s Eve. Just days later, as Christmas (which Copts celebrate on January 7) 2011 approached, an Islamic website carried this ominous exhortation: “Blow up the churches while they are celebrating Christmas or any other time when the churches are packed.” And if the Muslim Brotherhood takes power in Egypt, the treatment of the Copts is likely only to get worse.
Former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton recently injected a note of realism into the mainstream media euphoria over the heroic “pro-democracy” demonstrators in Egypt. “The overthrow of the Mubarak regime,” Bolton warned, “will not by any sense of the imagination lead to the advent of Jeffersonian democracy. The greater likelihood is a radical, tightly knit organization like the Muslim Brotherhood will take advantage of the chaos and seize power.” And that will be bad news for Egyptian Christians: “It is really legitimate for the Copts to be worried that instability follow Mubarak’s fall and his replacement with the Muslim Brotherhood.”
Apparently aware of this, the head of the Coptic Church, Pope Shenouda III, has forbidden Copts from participating in the demonstrations. It has been widely reported in the West that many Copts are defying this ban; on the other hand, however, a source on the ground in Egypt tells me that the news reports are wrong, and that Copts are not participating. Whatever may be the truth of the matter, it is certain that a Muslim Brotherhood state in Egypt would make their situation even worse than it is already.
Coptic Christians have suffered discrimination and harassment for centuries. A law dating from 1856 and strongly influenced by classic Islamic restrictions on subjugated non-Muslim dhimmi communities remains on the books to this day, and severely restricts the construction of new churches. That law is part of a pervasive tendency toward discrimination: Human Right Watch reported in January 2011 that “despite the fact that the Egyptian Constitution guarantees the equality of rights, there have been reported cases of widespread discrimination against Egyptian Christians.”
Discrimination and harassment have been daily features of Coptic life for years. In February 2007, rumors that a Coptic Christian man was having an affair with a Muslim woman – a violation of Islamic law – led to a rampage that resulted in the destruction of several Christian-owned shops in southern Egypt. A similar rumor induced Muslims to torch Christian homes in southern Egypt in November 2010. And besides physical attacks, Christians have been restricted from speaking freely. In August 2007, two Coptic rights activists were arrested for “publishing articles and declarations that are damaging to Islam and insulting to Prophet Mohammed on the United Copts web site.”
Authorities have even asserted that restriction on speech outside Egypt itself, in connection with people discussing the plight of the Copts. When Pope Benedict XVI spoke out in January 2011 against the persecution of Christians in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East, Al-Azhar University in Cairo, the world’s most prestigious Sunni Muslim institution, reacted angrily, breaking off dialogue with the Vatican and accusing the Pope of interference in internal Egyptian affairs. In a statement, Al-Azhar denounced the pontiff’s “repeated negative references to Islam and his claims that Muslims persecute those living among them in the Middle East.” This was not the first time Al-Azhar had moved against those who decried the persecution of Christians in Egypt rather than against the persecutors: just weeks before taking issue with the Pope’s statements, Al-Azhar demanded that Copts repudiate a U.S. report on Coptic persecution. The Mubarak government of Egypt, meanwhile, recalled its ambassador to the Vatican.
Mistreatment of Christians in Egypt frequently meets with indifference – or worse yet, complicity — from Egyptian authorities. In November 2010, Egyptian security forces opened fire on a crowd of unarmed Christians who were protesting against the discrimination and harassment they faced in Egyptian society; four people were killed. In June 2007, rioters in Alexandria vandalized Christian shops, attacked and injured seven Christians, and damaged two Coptic churches. Police allowed the mob to roam free in Alexandria’s Christian quarter for an hour and a half before intervening. The Compass Direct News service, which tracks incidents of Christian persecution, noted: “In April 2006, Alexandria was the scene of three knife attacks on churches that killed one Christian and left a dozen more injured. The government appeared unable or unwilling to halt subsequent vandalism of Coptic-owned shops and churches…”
The ordeal of Suhir Shihata Gouda exemplifies the experience of many Egyptian Christians, and principally of Christian women, who are frequently victimized by Muslim
men. According to the Jubilee Campaign, which records incidences of Christian persecution, a group of Muslims kidnapped Suhir and forced her to marry a Muslim. When her father complained to police, they beat and cursed him instead of registering his complaint. Finally, her new Muslim husband joined a mob that went to her father’s house and threatened to kill all the Christians in the area if the family complained to authorities again.
This persecution combined with denial in Egypt itself is bad enough, but even worse, Muslims are also targeting Copts worldwide. The Canadian Press reported in December 2010 that “the Shumukh-al-Islam website, often considered to be al-Qaeda’s mouthpiece, listed pictures, addresses and cellphone numbers of Coptic Christians, predominantly Egyptian-Canadians, who have been vocal about their opposition to Islam.” Accompanying this information were calls to murder those listed.
And all this has happened while Egypt has been ostensibly a secular state. If the Muslim Brotherhood ultimately succeeds in imposing Sharia in Egypt, Copts may come to look back at the age of Mubarak as the good old days.
Article printed from FrontPage Magazine: http://frontpagemag.com
URL to article: http://frontpagemag.com/2011/02/01/why-coptic-christians-fear-a-revolution/
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GM: Are you saying that the US has the ability to choose the outcome here?
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Expectations and Reality in Egypt
Tuesday is expected to be another day of mass protests calling for the immediate resignation of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. What makes the crisis in Egypt so concerning for Egyptians and outside observers alike is the sheer opacity of the situation. From Mubarak to the military, to the United States and Israel, and the demonstrators on the streets, everyone is building their own wall of expectations of how this crisis will play out. But in reviewing those expectations, it is equally important to keep in mind the outlying factors that can break those walls down.
Mubarak, who shows no sign of going anywhere just yet, has the expectation that, in spite of him being the target of ire in these demonstrations, he has what it takes to ride this crisis out. More specifically, he is betting that the opposition will remain weak, disunited and unable to cohere into a meaningful threat. Now entering the eighth day of protests, Egyptians are growing weary of going days without working, getting a regular supply of food, having the trash picked up and most of all, living in fear of their homes, shops and banks getting robbed in the absence of police. Mubarak expects that by showing a willingness to negotiate with some of the opposition and holding out an elusive promise of elections, the majority of protesters will come to the conclusion that if they waited 30 years to get rid of Mubarak, they can wait another eight months if it means preventing the country from descending into anarchy. Those protesters that remain on the street will pare down rapidly and can be handled the old-fashioned way in a heavy-handed security crackdown.
Or so the expectation goes.
“Mubarak may be a good motivator to get people out on the streets, but hunger leads to desperation, and desperation can quickly spiral into anarchy.”
Watching from the sidelines, the United States, Israel and many other observers vested in Egypt’s fate are holding onto the expectation that the military, the traditional guarantor of stability in the country, will be able to manage the transition and prevent undesirable political forces from sweeping into power. The military has to gamble that the demonstrators, who largely perceive the military as their path to a post-Mubarak Egypt, will continue to support them in the interest of stability. The military is also trying to keep tabs on itself in watching for any potential coup murmurings arising from the lower ranks of the army, where an Islamist streak, albeit long repressed, remains. As long as the demonstrations can be contained and the military is able to assert its political authority regardless of what Mubarak does, the republic will be saved.
Or so the expectation goes.
Then we have the opposition, united against Mubarak and divided on pretty much everything else. The opposition expects that ire against Mubarak will sustain the demonstrations, force the president out and lead to legitimate elections, providing them with the political space and voice they’ve been demanding for decades. The expectation of ambitious groups like the April 6 Movement, driven mostly by Egyptian youths, is that a general strike called for Jan. 30 will be observed, and that the calls for mass demonstrations on the streets will soon reach the ears of even the small shopkeepers and peasants across the country, which will force the regime to bend to their demands. In other words, the opposition will be able to graduate from a motley crew of ideologies, religious orientations and political interests into a national protest movement before the regime develops the motivation and ability to attempt another major crackdown.
Or so the expectation goes.
The expectations of each of these stakeholders and the reality that waits may be a bridge too far. But there is one factor, less discussed, that could throw off all these expectations entirely: the price of bread. Though the government appears to have about a month of stable wheat supply and no major obstacles to importing more, the ongoing security crisis is causing problems as Egyptians line up outside bakeries in the hope of hording as much bread as possible. With a strain on supply and speculation increasing, the price of bread is climbing, with some reporters claiming the price has quadrupled in Cairo over the past few days. The last time Egypt had a bread crisis was in 2008, when the military took control over bread production and ensured distribution to prevent mass riots. Now, the military is stretched extremely thin, from trying to deal with Mubarak, govern the country, contain the demonstrations, deal with Egypt’s allies and patrol the streets. Mubarak may be a good motivator to get people out on the streets, but as singer-songwriter Bob Marley stated, a hungry mob is an angry mob. Hunger can lead to desperation, and desperation can quickly spiral into anarchy. The regime will look to the military to help enforce price controls on wheat, distribute bread and keep the most destitute Egyptians from joining the demonstrations.
Or so the expectation goes.
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Crafty,
A clear strategy to support Mubarak from the start would have made a difference. The right incentives for Egypt's military could have had them quickly put down and isolate the protests/riots.
You fight a fire when it's small, not when the whole forest is ablaze.
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For the high level officials reading the forum, I propose we designate any unused monies marked for Egypt that are withheld for not meeting our conditions be immediately transferred to Israel for defense assistance. See if that keeps the canal open and the focus on Egyptian domestic priorities.
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"Sorry, I'm not buying this "Who lost Egypt?" analysis."
Neither do I. I posted more for the arm chair opinion on this guy, ElBaradei (and not the critical opinion of Bama).
I still suspect someone in the US is propping him up and promoting him. Apparantly the vast majority of Egyptians don't know of him. So who outside Egypt is making him *the guy*?
My concern, nobel peace prize or not, he does not appear to be in our best interests.
He is an Egyptian Muslim first.
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http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/World-News/Egypt-Protests-Muslim-Brotherhood-In-Talks-With-The-Army-To-Remove-President-Mubarak/Article/201102115920066?f=rss
Opposition And Army Plan Mubarak's Demise
1:17pm UK, Tuesday February 01, 2011
Dominic Waghorn, in Cairo
The Muslim Brotherhood has told Sky News it is in talks with other opposition groups and the army about the removal of President Hosni Mubarak.
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Another dubious pick for Peace Prize? Arafat, Gore, Bamster, and ElBaradei?
***Meanwhile, these paragraphs from today's NYT story about Washington sizing up ElBaradei as a potential leader of Egypt rang all too true:
But now, the biggest questions for the Obama administration are Mr. ElBaradei's views on issues related to Israel, Egypt and the United States. For instance, both the United States and Israel have counted on the Egyptians to enforce their part of the blockade of Gaza, which is controlled by the militant Islamist group Hamas.
But in an interview last June with the London-based Al Quds Al-Arabi, Mr. ElBaradei called the Gaza blockade "a brand of shame on the forehead of every Arab, every Egyptian and every human being." He called on his government, and on Israel, to end the blockade, which Israeli and Egyptian officials argue is needed to ensure security.
Ah. Now we're learning something important here. The Times goes on to detail the deep distrust of ElBaradei among neocons. Cirincione, fyi, is a good guy:
Joseph Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund and a friend of Mr. ElBaradei, said Monday that Mr. ElBaradei wanted Israel to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Israel, along with India and Pakistan, is not a signatory.
One senior Obama administration official said that it was not lost on the administration that Mr. ElBaradei's contentious relations with the Bush administration helped explain why he was now being viewed by some as a credible face of the opposition in Egypt.
"Ironically, the fact that ElBaradei crossed swords with the Bush administration on Iraq and Iran helps him in Egypt, and God forbid we should do anything to make it seem like we like him," said Philip D. Zelikow, former counselor at the State Department during the Bush years. For all of his tangles with the Bush administration, Mr. ElBaradei, an international bureaucrat well known in diplomatic circles, is someone whom the United States can work with, Mr. Zelikow said.
However, he allowed, "Some people in the administration had a jaundiced view of his work."
Among them was John Bolton, the former Bush administration United States ambassador to the United Nations, who routinely clashed with Mr. ElBaradei on Iran. "He is a political dilettante who is excessively pro-Iran," he complained.
Meanwhile, at The Nation, Ari Berman notes:
ElBaradei's emergence has angered pro-Mubarak neoconservatives, such as Malcolm Hoenlein, executive vide president of the Council of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, which is closely aligned with Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu. "There is a myth being created that ElBaradei is a human rights activist," Hoenlein told an Orthodox Jewish website on Sunday. "He is a stooge of Iran, and I don't use the term lightly. When he was the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, for which he got a Nobel Peace Prize, he fronted for them, he distorted the reports."
So this is what's going on, probably. The administration is feeling some heat from these kinds of sources. Ultimately, Obama and Clinton do not, I would expect and hope, agree with Bolton and Hoenlein. And ultimately, I would expect and hope, ultimately meaning pretty soon, they will embrace Mubarak's ouster more publicly.
But these are complicated things. I know that this thread is now going to be full of indignant fulmination against Israel. That's not my intent. My intent is to show that there are a lot of factors in play here. I want to be clear that I obviously do not think the administration should sit on its hands here for Israel's sake; what's going on in Tahrir Square is inspiring and quite clearly deserves the support, issued in the right way at the right time, by the United States of America. Rather, I am saying that the US, given its role in the world, has to weigh things more carefully than any other country in the world does before it speaks and acts. I think we'll do the right thing, but the right thing must be done at the right time in this case.****
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"I know that this thread is now going to be full of indignant fulmination against Israel."
It is?
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http://www.tnr.com/article/world/82435/egypt-riots-american-liberals-cairo
American Liberals and the Streets of Cairo
*
Leon Wieseltier
The contours and consequences of the uprising in Egypt—which, after decades in which Hosni Mubarak destroyed the civil society of his country and stifled the most elementary aspirations of his people, was perfectly inevitable—are still unclear. About the justice of the protestors’ anger there can be no doubt. But the politics of the revolt are murky. Its early stages have not been the work of the Muslim Brotherhood, but it is hard to believe that the Islamist organization will not be tempted to play the Bolshevik role in this revolution: it has the ideology and the organization with which to seize control of the situation, and it is the regime’s most formidable political adversary. The army may decide, with the government seriously wounded and robbed of any semblance of legitimacy, to do more than bring order to the streets. Mubarak, in a characteristic act of a failing dictator, has fired his cabinet, as if the ire of the Egyptian people was directed at his ministers: a pathetic move that brings to mind the memory of the Shah of Iran’s eleventh-hour reshuffle of his doomed government. We know this script. The political popularity, and political authority, of Muhammed ElBaradei is also hard to measure.
What is not unclear, however, is that the Obama administration, and American liberals more generally, have been caught intellectually unprepared for this crisis. The administration’s predicament, it must be said, is strategically complicated: since Mubarak may fall, it cannot afford to alienate the protestors, but since the protestors may fail, it cannot afford to alienate Mubarak. Our officials have been improvising, not altogether brilliantly. Joe Biden fatuously declared that “I would not refer to [Mubarak] as a dictator.” Robert Gibbs said that “this is not about taking sides.” Hillary Clinton, who used to speak warmly of Mubarak as “family,” has called for “restraint” and “reform” and “dialogue,” and warned that a crackdown could affect American aid to Egypt—as if anything but a crackdown is to be expected from Mubarak. And Barack Obama is also trying to finesse things, urging Mubarak to transform “a moment of volatility” into “a moment of promise”—the eloquence is irritating: there are times when the power of language is not the power that is needed—and proclaiming that “the United States will continue to stand up for the rights of the Egyptian people.”
Continue? There is nothing wrong with crisis management in a crisis, but the problem that the Obama administration now confronts is precisely that it has not been a cornerstone of American policy toward Egypt to stand up for the rights of the Egyptian people. It has preferred cronyism with the regime occasionally punctuated by some stirring remarks. What we are witnessing, in the confusion and the dread of the administration, are the consequences of its demotion of democratization as one of the central purposes of American foreign policy, particularly toward the Muslim world. There were two reasons for the new liberal diffidence about human rights. The first was the Bush doctrine, the second was the Obama doctrine. The wholesale repudiation of Bush’s foreign policy included the rejection of anything resembling his “freedom agenda,” which looked mainly like an excuse for war. But whatever one’s views of the Iraq war, it really does not seem too much to ask of American liberals that they think a little less crudely about democratization—not only about its moral significance but also about its strategic significance. One of the early lessons of the rebellion against Mubarak is that American support for democratic dissidents is indeed a strategic matter, and that the absence of such American support can lead to a strategic disaster. Such are the wages of realism. It is a common error that prudence is thought about the short-term; the proper temporal horizon for prudential thinking is distant and long. Realism does not equip one for an adequate appreciation of the historical force of the democratic longing. In this sense, realism is singularly unrealistic. It seems smart only as long as the dictators remain undisturbed by their people, and then suddenly it seems incredibly stupid.
Obama replaced the freedom agenda with an acceptance agenda. His foreign policy has been conducted in a vigorously multicultural spirit. He rightly sensed that an emphasis upon democratization was a critical emphasis—a castigation of the existing dispensations in countries ruled by autocracies and authoritarianisms, and he did not come to castigate. He came in friendship, to “restore America’s standing.” He sought to do so with an embrace of differences, an affirmation of religions, a celebration of civilizations. As a matter of principle, such assertions of respect are right and good. But what if the positive tone misses the point—not about the dignity of other peoples, but about their actual circumstances? Of what use is happy talk to unhappy people? Do societies desperately in need of secularization and its blandishments really need the American president to cite their Scripture to them? In accordance with his warm new priorities, democracy was the fourth of Obama’s five themes is his speech in Cairo in 2009, the one called “A New Beginning.” When he finally got around to it, he introduced it this way: “I know there has been controversy about the promotion of democracy in recent years, and much of this controversy is connected to the war in Iraq. So let me be clear: no system of government can or should be imposed by one nation by any other.” Or: the United States will no longer bother you about how you are living. He then proceeded to a fine little sermon about the virtues of government “through consent, not coercion,” but said nothing about the political conditions in Egypt. The Cairo speech did not discomfit the Mubarak regime. I imagine that many of Obama’s listeners in Cairo that day are on the streets of Cairo today, and some of them attacked the American Embassy.
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Far worse than the old boss.....
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-us-egypt-20110201,0,7079100.story?track=rss
Reporting from Washington —
The Obama administration said for the first time that it supports a role for groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, a banned Islamist organization, in a reformed Egyptian government.
The organization must reject violence and recognize democratic goals if the U.S. is to be comfortable with it taking part in the government, the White House said. But by even setting conditions for the involvement of such nonsecular groups, the administration took a surprise step in the midst of the crisis that has enveloped Egypt for the last week.
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Remember El Baradei tried to swing the 2004 election in the US with his false report of weapons the Americans failed to secure. http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2011/01/028255.php
El Baradei refers to 'the people who organized the demonstrations' approving of him. Maybe he could tell us who finds him respected and qualified, and why.
Like Time Magazine honoring Hitler and Khomeini, the Nobel 'Peace Prize' has strange meanings. A 2009 Nobel winner hosted a State Dinner for the man who holds a 2010 winner in jail, and Arafat the Godfather of modern terrorism won one.
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Woof,
Mubarak said he is stepping down at the end of this term which would be in September. I think that was expected but what is not so clear is who will take his place and how. It still appears to me that Mubarak and the military are not going to let government just go into chaos and that they will dictate who controls the government. Of course anything can happen and outside forces may try to foment somekind of insurgency out of the riots and continue to try and bring about a situation where there's a vacuum that radical elements can fill. As time goes on I see that as being even less likely just for the fact that the state of constant unrest is unsustainable, people are already going hungry and basic services are out.
P.C.
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Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said Feb. 1 he would not seek another term as president in elections slated for September but that he will complete his current term. In a televised national address, his second since the Egyptian unrest began the previous week, Mubarak said he would use the remainder of his term to oversee the transition of power. He also called on the parliament to amend the Egyptian Constitution’s Article 76 (which narrows the pool of potential presidential candidates) and Article 77 (which allows for unlimited presidential terms). It is currently unclear whether these measures will be considered.
The opposition immediately rejected the pronouncement. Each political concession offered during this crisis by the Egyptian political establishment — which until this point had ruled with absolute authority since the 1950s — has only emboldened the opposition. Unrest is thus likely to continue, which means the Egyptian military likely will attempt to force Mubarak to step down before the elections. However, even this will not likely resolve matters, as the need to create a neutral caretaker government until elections can be held will be the basis for further struggles between the regime and the opposition.
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http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7181847/
According to the report, between 1990 and 2003 Egypt used its two research reactors at Inshas in the Nile Delta to irradiate “small amounts of natural uranium,” conducting a total of 16 experiments.
According to the IAEA, none of the experiments fully succeeded; but in each case, they should have been reported to the agency under terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.
Finally, Egypt had to admit that it had not fully disclosed the extent of its nuclear facilities.
It failed to declare the pilot plant used for the plutonium and uranium-separation experiments and did not provide design information for a new facility under construction, also at Inshas.
This facility could be used for more extensive experiments, the IAEA believed, and noted that Cairo should have notified the IAEA of its decision eight years ago.
Chided, but not accused of clandestine action
The IAEA declared the lapses a “matter of concern” and promised to pursue verification.
“The agency’s verification of the correctness and completeness of Egypt’s declarations is ongoing, pending further results of environmental and destructive sampling analyses and the agency’s analysis of the additional information provided by Egypt,” the report said.
Still the IAEA did not accuse Egypt of having a clandestine nuclear weapons program and the Egyptian government, in a statement issued in response, tried to downplay the concern, claiming “differing interpretations” of Egypt’s safeguards obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty had led to the problems.
And Cairo continued to emphasize that its “nuclear activities are strictly for peaceful purposes.”
Albright and others are not so certain.
Cause for concern?
“Egypt has been playing games and it just doesn’t fly that they didn’t know what they had to report. They knew, but didn’t want to report it, and the elimination of this doesn’t eliminate the concern,” Albright said. “Egypt is developing very slowly a capability if they decide to go nuclear.”
William M. Arkin, an NBC News analyst, said that Egypt’s revelations show that “it had gone a lot farther than Iran” in terms of experimentation with separation of plutonium, adding that if the United States had discovered such experiments in Iran, it would no doubt be raising the stakes in the current standoff with Tehran.
One reason Arkin and others cite for the seeming imbalance in criticism for the two countries’ nuclear advances is the U.S.-Egypt relationship.
The U.S. has provided Egypt with $1.3 billion a year in military aid since the Camp David peace accords in 1979, as well as an average of $815 million a year in economic assistance.
By most estimates, Egypt has received more than $50 billion in U.S. aid since 1975 and has proven one of the most reliable U.S. allies in the war on terror.
In fact, Albright, Arkin and National Defense University researcher Judith Yaphe believe that there is a connection between Iran’s nuclear ambitions and those of Egypt.
Efforts to counter Iranian program
Yaphe, who has written extensively on the effect an Iranian nuclear weapon would have on other countries in the Middle East, says part of the issue is pride.
“How can you, as an Egyptian, sit by and let Iran go past you in this area? For Egyptian scientists, it’s a loss of face,” Yaphe said. “Egyptians look very hard at what Iran has done. Iran has the money, but you don’t need a lot of money if you already have the basic infrastructure.”
Albright agreed that Iran is driving Egyptian plans, but suggests it’s more about strategy than pride. “Now, they have to be worried about Iran, as well as Israel.”
A former senior U.S. intelligence official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, noted that it may not just be Iran and Israel that worry Egyptian defense officials.
“They now know that Libya, with whom they have had volatile relations the past two decades, had a nuclear program under way,” the official said, noting Libya’s admissions that it had acquired nuclear weapons development technology from Pakistan in the 1990’s.
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http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110202/ap_on_re_mi_ea/ml_egypt
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Obama’s Brotherhood Moment
Posted By Robert Spencer On February 2, 2011 @ 12:45 am
Game over: Barack Obama has endorsed a role for the Muslim Brotherhood in a new, post-Mubarak government for Egypt.
This should come as no surprise. Obama has behaved consistently all along, from his refusal to back the protesters in Iran, who were demonstrating against an Islamic Republic, to his backing of these protesters in Egypt, to whom he has just given a green light to establish a government that, given numerous historical precedents, will likely be the precursor to an Islamic Republic.
White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said Monday that a post-Mubarak Egyptian ruling group “has to include a whole host of important nonsecular actors that give Egypt a strong chance to continue to be [a] stable and reliable partner.”
Robert Malley, an Obama adviser and Mideast negotiator for Bill Clinton, explained that Obama’s expression of willingness to see the Brotherhood as part of a ruling coalition in Egypt was a “pretty clear sign that the U.S. isn’t going to advocate a narrow form of pluralism, but a broad one.”
In The Post-American Presidency, Pamela Geller and I profile Robert Malley, Samantha Power, and other fierce foes of Israel in the Obama Administration. In light of the information we reveal in the book, the Administration’s stance toward the Muslim Brotherhood comes as no surprise. But the ideology and goals of the Muslim Brotherhood will come as a surprise to most Americans, especially now that the mainstream media is retailing numerous soothing falsehoods about the group. Thus they warrant a closer look.
Contrary to claims that it is a moderate organization, the Muslim Brotherhood is actually the prototypical Islamic supremacist, pro-Sharia group of the modern age. Founded by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928, the Brotherhood emerged as a response to colonialism and Western influence in the Islamic world. Al-Banna wrote that “a wave of dissolution which undermined all firm beliefs was engulfing Egypt in the name of intellectual emancipation. This trend attacked the morals, deeds and virtues under the pretext of personal freedom. Nothing could stand against this powerful and tyrannical stream of disbelief and permissiveness that was sweeping our country.” His remedy? Restoration of Islamic law as the ruling principle of governance.
Al-Banna consequently decried Kemal Ataturk’s abolition of the Caliphate in secular Turkey, which he complained separated “the state from religion in a country which was until recently the site of the Commander of the Faithful.” Al-Banna characterized it as just part of a larger “Western invasion which was armed and equipped with all [the] destructive influences of money, wealth, prestige, ostentation, power and means of propaganda.”[1]
Al-Banna’s Brotherhood had a deeply spiritual character from its beginning, but it didn’t combat the “Western invasion” with just words and prayers. In a 1928 article al-Banna decried the complacency of the Egyptian elite: “What catastrophe has befallen the souls of the reformers and the spirit of the leaders?…What calamity has made them prefer this life to the thereafter [sic]? What has made them…consider the way of struggle [sabil al-jihad] too rough and difficult?”[2] When the Brotherhood was criticized for being a political group in the guise of a religious one, al-Banna met the challenge head-on:
We summon you to Islam, the teachings of Islam, the laws of Islam and the guidance of Islam, and if this smacks of “politics” in your eyes, then it is our policy. And if the one summoning you to these principles is a “politician,” then we are the most respectable of men, God be praised, in politics . . . Islam does have a policy embracing the happiness of this world. . . . We believe that Islam is an all-embracing concept which regulates every aspect of life, adjudicating on every one of its concerns and prescribing for it a solid and rigorous order.[3]
Al-Banna wrote in 1934 that “it is a duty incumbent on every Muslim to struggle towards the aim of making every people Muslim and the whole world Islamic, so that the banner of Islam can flutter over the earth and the call of the Muezzin can resound in all the corners of the world: God is greatest [Allahu akbar]! This is not parochialism, nor is it racial arrogance or usurpation of land.”[4]
In the same article al-Banna insisted that “every piece of land where the banner of Islam has been hoisted is the fatherland of the Muslims” — hence the impossibility of accommodation with Israel, against which the Brotherhood and its offshoots still struggle. But the problem was not just Israel, which after all did not yet exist when the Brotherhood was founded. According to Brynjar Lia, the historian of the Muslim Brotherhood movement: “Quoting the Qur’anic verse ‘And fight them till sedition is no more, and the faith is God’s’ [Sura 2:193], the Muslim Brothers urged their fellow Muslims to restore the bygone greatness of Islam and to re-establish an Islamic empire. Sometimes they even called for the restoration of ‘former Islamic colonies’ in Andalus (Spain), southern Italy, Sicily, the Balkans and the Mediterranean islands.”[5]
Such a call might seem laughable except that the Brotherhood also had weapons and a military wing. Scholar Martin Kramer notes that the Brotherhood had “a double identity. On one level, they operated openly, as a membership organization of social and political awakening. Banna preached moral revival, and the Muslim Brethren engaged in good works. On another level, however, the Muslim Brethren created a ‘secret apparatus’ that acquired weapons and trained adepts in their use. Some of its guns were deployed against the Zionists in Palestine in 1948, but the Muslim Brethren also resorted to violence in Egypt. They began to enforce their own moral teachings by intimidation, and they initiated attacks against Egypt’s Jews. They assassinated judges and struck down a prime minister in 1949. Banna himself was assassinated two months later, probably in revenge.”[6]
The Brotherhood was no gathering of marginalized kooks. It grew in Egypt from 150 branches in 1936 to as many as 1,500 by 1944. In 1939 al-Banna referred to “100,000 pious youths from the Muslim Brothers from all parts of Egypt,” and although Lia believes he was exaggerating at that point, by 1944 membership was estimated as between 100,000 and 500,000.[7] By 1937 it had expanded beyond Egypt, setting up “several branches in Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Morocco, and one in each of Bahrain, Hadramawt, Hyderabad, Djibouti and,” Lia adds matter-of-factly, “Paris.”[8] These many thousands, dispersed around the world, heard al-Banna’s call to “prepare for jihad and be lovers of death.”[9]
The Brotherhood’s ability to attract Muslims in all these disparate societies indicates the power of its religious appeal. It wasn’t offering Muslims a new version of Islam, but a deeply traditional one. The call to restore the purity and vitality of Islam has always struck a chord among Muslims; and the Islam the Brotherhood preached was the traditional one of a total Islamic society, one that could not abide accommodation—let colonial subjugation—to the West. Al-Banna told his followers: “Islam is faith and worship, a country and a citizenship, a religion and a state. It is spirituality and hard work. It is a Qur’an and a sword.”[10]
Al-Banna is a revered figure in the Muslim world today, and by no means only among radicals. His grandson Tariq Ramadan, the well-known European Muslim moderate, praises his grandfather for his “light-giving faith, a deep spirituality, [and] personal discipline.”[11] And many of al-Banna’s writings are still in print and circulate widely.
The Brotherhood has never rejected or renounced al-Banna’s vision or program. And now it is closer to implementing it in its homeland than it ever has been before – no little thanks to Barack Obama.
Notes:
[1] Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, Ithaca Press, 1998. P. 28.
[2] Lia, p. 33.
[3] Lia, pp. 68-9, 75-6.
[4] Lia, p. 79.
[5] Lia, p. 80.
[6] Martin Kramer, “Fundamentalist Islam at Large: The Drive for Power,” Middle East Quarterly, June 1996.
[7] Lia, pp. 153-4.
[8] Lia, p. 155.
[9] Jonathan Raban, “Truly, madly,deeply devout,” The Guardian, March 2, 2002.
[10] Shaker El-sayed, “Hassan al-Banna: The leader and the Movement,” Muslim American Society, http://www.maschicago.org/library/misc_articles/hassan_banna.htm.
[11] Tariq Ramadan, “Foreword,” in Hassan al-Banna, Al-Ma’thurat, Awakening Publications, 2001. Reprinted at http://www.tariq-ramadan.org/document.asp?fichier=foreword&d=38.
Article printed from FrontPage Magazine: http://frontpagemag.com
URL to article: http://frontpagemag.com/2011/02/02/obamas-brotherhood-moment/
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http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/02/the-neocons-split-with-israel-over-egypt/70636/
The Neocons Split with Israel Over Egypt
Feb 2 2011, 8:37 AM ET By Jeffrey Goldberg
Well, this is interesting. The neoconservative (or liberal interventionist) wing of American Jewish political thought (not that all neocons are Jewish, God forbid anyone should think that!) is cheering on the revolution in Egypt, while the Israeli government, and much of Israel's pundit class, is seeing the apocalypse in Mubarak's apparent downfall. Writing in The Times today, Yossi Klein Halevi captures the despairing mood of the Israeli policy elite:
"(T)he grim assumption is that it is just a matter of time before the only real opposition group in Egypt, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, takes power. Israelis fear that Egypt will go the way of Iran or Turkey, with Islamists gaining control through violence or gradual co-optation.
Either result would be the end of Israel's most important relationship in the Arab world. The Muslim Brotherhood has long stated its opposition to peace with Israel and has pledged to revoke the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty if it comes into power. Given the strengthening of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas's control of Gaza and the unraveling of the Turkish-Israeli alliance, an Islamist Egypt could produce the ultimate Israeli nightmare: living in a country surrounded by Iran's allies or proxies.
But the neoconservatives, who have made democracy promotion in the Middle East an overarching goal, are scratching their heads at what they see as Israeli shortsightedness. I asked Elliott Abrams, formerly of the Bush Administration National Security Council, and now at the Council on Foreign Relations, what he makes of the Israeli longing for Mubarak. He was scathing in his response:
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FWIW here's this from the op-ed page of Pravda on the Hudson-- is there any merit here?
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Egypt’s Bumbling Brotherhood
By SCOTT ATRAN
Published: February 2, 2011
AS Egyptians clash over the future of their government, Americans and Europeans have repeatedly expressed fears of the Muslim Brotherhood. “You don’t just have a government and a movement for democracy,” Tony Blair, the former British prime minister, said of Egypt on Monday. “You also have others, notably the Muslim Brotherhood, who would take this in a different direction.”
The previous day, the House speaker, John Boehner, expressed hope that Hosni Mubarak would stay on as president of Egypt while instituting reforms to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood and other extremists from grabbing power.
But here’s the real deal, at least as many Egyptians see it. Ever since its founding in 1928 as a rival to Western-inspired nationalist movements that had failed to free Egypt from foreign powers, the Muslim Brotherhood has tried to revive Islamic power. Yet in 83 years it has botched every opportunity. In Egypt today, the Brotherhood counts perhaps some 100,000 adherents out of a population of over 80 million. And its failure to support the initial uprising in Cairo on Jan. 25 has made it marginal to the spirit of revolt now spreading through the Arab world.
This error was compounded when the Brotherhood threw in its lot with Mohamed ElBaradei, the former diplomat and Nobel Prize winner. A Brotherhood spokesman, Dr. Essam el-Erian, told Al Jazeera, “Political groups support ElBaradei to negotiate with the regime.” But when Mr. ElBaradei strode into Tahrir Square, many ignored him and few rallied to his side despite the enormous publicity he was receiving in the Western press. The Brotherhood realized that in addition to being late, it might be backing the wrong horse. On Tuesday, Dr. Erian told me, “It’s too early to even discuss whether ElBaradei should lead a transitional government or whether we will join him.” This kind of flip-flopping makes many Egyptians scoff.
When the army allowed hundreds of Mubarak supporters and plainclothes policemen through barricades on Wednesday to muscle out protesters, the Muslim Brotherhood may have gained an opportunity. It might be able to recover lost leverage by showing its organizational tenacity in resisting the attempts to repress the demonstrators.
Nonetheless, the Brotherhood did not arrive at this historical moment with the advantage of wide public favor. Such support as it does have among Egyptians — an often cited figure is 20 percent to 30 percent — is less a matter of true attachment than an accident of circumstance: the many decades of suppression of secular opposition groups that might have countered it. The British, King Farouk, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar el-Sadat all faced the same problem that Hisham Kaseem, a newspaper editor and human rights activist, described playing out under Mr. Mubarak. “If people met in a cafe and talked about things the regime didn’t like, he would just shut down the cafe and arrest us,” Mr. Kaseem said. “But you can’t close mosques, so the Brotherhood survived.”
If Egyptians are given political breathing space, Mr. Kaseem told me, the Brotherhood’s importance will rapidly fade. “In this uprising the Brotherhood is almost invisible,” Mr. Kaseem said, “but not in America and Europe, which fear them as the bogeyman.”
Many people outside Egypt believe that the Brotherhood gains political influence by providing health clinics and charity for the poor. But the very poor in Egypt are not very politically active. And according to Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, a former member of the Brotherhood’s Guidance Council, the group has only six clinics in Cairo, a city of 18 million. Many of the other clinics are Islamic in orientation simply because most Egyptians are Islamic. The wealthier businessmen who often sponsor them tend to shun the Brotherhood, if only to protect their businesses from government disapproval.
Although originally the Brotherhood was organized into paramilitary cells, today it forswears violence in political struggle. This has made it a target of Al Qaeda’s venom. In January 2006, Ayman al-Zawahri, the former leader of Egypt’s Islamic Jihad and Al Qaeda’s leading strategist, blasted the Brotherhood’s willingness to participate in parliamentary elections and reject nuclear arms. You “falsely affiliated with Islam,” he said in vilifying the group. “You forget about the rule of Shariah, welcome the Crusaders’ bases in your countries and acknowledge the existence of the Jews who are fully armed with nuclear weapons, from which you are banned to possess.”
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People in the West frequently conflate the Brotherhood and Al Qaeda. And although their means are very different, even many Egyptians suspect that they share a common end that is alien to democracy. When I asked Dr. Erian about this, he retorted that the United States and Mr. Mubarak had conspired after Sept. 11 to “brainwash” people into thinking of all Muslim activists as terrorists, adding that “the street” knew the truth.
The street, however, manifests little support for the Brotherhood. Only a small minority of the protesters in Tahrir Square joined its members in prayers there (estimates range from 5 percent to 10 percent), and few Islamic slogans or chants were heard.
Obviously the Brotherhood wants power and its positions, notably its stance against Israel, are problematic for American interests. “Israel must know that it is not welcome by the people in this region,” Dr. Erian said. Moreover, the Brotherhood will probably have representatives in any freely elected government. But it is because democracies tolerate disparate political groups that they generally don’t have civil wars, or wars with other democracies. And because the Brotherhood itself is not monolithic — it has many factions — it could well succumb to internal division if there really were a political opening for other groups in Egypt.
What we are seeing in Egypt is a revolt led by digitally informed young people and joined by families from all rungs of society. Though in one sense it happened overnight, many of its young proponents have long been working behind the scenes, independent of the Brotherhood or any old guard opposition. Egyptians are a pretty savvy lot. Hardly anyone I talked to believes that democracy can be established overnight.
The Brotherhood leadership talks of a year or two of transition, although that may reflect a vain hope of using that time to broaden its popular support enough to reach a controlling plurality. The more common assessment even among democracy advocates is that the military will retain control — Omar Suleiman, the intelligence chief and new vice president, will be acceptable to Egyptians if the army gets rid of Mr. Mubarak now — and over the next decade real democratic reforms will be instituted.
“Egypt is missing instruments essential to any functioning democracy and these must be established in the transition period — an independent judiciary, a representative Parliament, an open press,” Mr. Kaseem said. “If you try to push democracy tomorrow we’ll end up like Mauritania or Sudan,” both of which in recent decades have had coups on the heels of democratic elections.
A military in control behind the scenes — for a while — is probably the best hope for a peaceful transition. “Let the U.S.A. stay away,” urged Mr. Kaseem, who insisted that he is pro-American and abhors the Brotherhood. “They are only bungling things with calls for immediate reforms and against the Brotherhood. We are handling this beautifully. Even a military leader with an I.Q. of 30 wouldn’t go down the same path as Mubarak because he would understand that the people of Egypt who are out in the streets are no longer apathetic, their interests are mostly secular, they are connected and they will get power in the end.”
If America’s already teetering standing among Egyptians and across the Arab and Muslim world is not to topple altogether, the United States must now publicly hold Mr. Mubarak responsible for the violence and privately inform the Egyptian Army that it cannot support any institution that is complicit.
But there is little reason for the United States to fear a takeover by the Muslim Brotherhood. If Egypt is allowed to find its own way, as it so promisingly began to do over the past week, the problems of violent extremism and waves of emigration that America and Europe most fear from this unhappy region could well fade as its disaffected youth at last find hope at home.
Scott Atran, an anthropologist at France’s National Center for Scientific Research, the University of Michigan and John Jay College, is the author of “Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood and the (Un)making of Terrorists.”
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"How I stopped worrying and learned to love the Muslim Brotherhood."
:roll:
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Well, Stratfor agrees with you GM:
The Egyptian Transition in a Quandary
Egypt’s beleaguered President Hosni Mubarak in his second address to the nation within four days announced Tuesday that he would not seek re-election in the presidential polls slated for September, but would oversee the transition of power to a more democratic system until then — a move that was immediately rejected by his opponents. Shortly thereafter, U.S. President Barack Obama called for an orderly transition that would include people from across the Egyptian political spectrum. The two leaders had talked earlier in the day.
Washington and Cairo (meaning its military establishment) realize that the Egyptian political system, which has been in place for six decades, cannot avoid change. The issue is how to manage the process of change. For those who have supported the Mubarak presidency since 1981, the goal is how to avoid regime change. For the Obama administration, which is already having a difficult time dealing with Iran and the Afghanistan-Pakistan situation, the goal is to ensure that a post-Mubarak Egypt doesn’t alter its behavior, especially on the foreign policy front.
“Washington and Cairo realize that the Egyptian political system, which has been in place for six decades, cannot avoid change.”
Both rely on the country’s military and its ability to oversee the transition. By all accounts, all sides — the military, the various opposition forces and the United States — appear to be in consensus that the way forward entails moving toward a democratic dispensation. Should that be the case, it is reasonable to assume that the country’s single largest and most organized political group, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), would emerge as a key stakeholder in a future regime.
In other words, the two key stakeholders would be the military and the Islamist movement. Of course, there are many other secular opposition forces, but none of them appear to be able to rival the prowess of the MB. Ironically, the only secular group that comes close is the ruling National Democratic Party, whose political future is in doubt.
That said, the military would likely try to encourage the creation of a broad-based alliance of secular forces to counter the MB. The goal would be to have a coalition government to make sure that there are sufficient arrestors in the path of the Islamist movement. The hope is that once the country can move beyond the current impasse, the opposition forces that are united in their desire to see the Mubarak regime fall from power will turn against one another, preferably along ideological lines.
Indeed, STRATFOR is told that the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Field Marshall Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, who is also the country’s defense minister and emerged as deputy premier in the Egyptian government’s new Cabinet announced on Saturday, is looking at the Algerian model as a way to influence future politics in Cairo. The Algerian military in the 1990s was able to guide the formation of a new multi-party democratic political system, one in which all forces (centrists, Islamists and leftists) were accommodated. But the Algerian model was only made possible after a decadelong bloody Islamist insurgency, which was triggered by the army annulling elections in which the country’s then-largest Islamist movement was headed toward a landslide victory in the 1990 parliamentary elections, then the army engaging in a massive crackdown on the Islamists.
Clearly, the Egyptian army would want to avoid that scenario, especially given the state of unrest developing throughout the region. The other thing is that imposing martial law doesn’t appear to be a viable option. Not that such an outcome is inevitable, but the key question is how would the military react to a situation in which the MB would win in a free and fair election.
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Hernando de Soto is someone I hold in high regard. He has done superb work in South America (Peru especially IIRC).
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By HERNANDO DE SOTO
The headline that appeared on Al Jazeera on Jan. 14, a week before Egyptians took to the streets, affirmed that "[t]he real terror eating away at the Arab world is socio-economic marginalization."
The Egyptian government has long been concerned about the consequences of this marginalization. In 1997, with the financial support of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the government hired my organization, the Institute for Liberty and Democracy. It wanted to get the numbers on how many Egyptians were marginalized and how much of the economy operated "extralegally"—that is, without the protections of property rights or access to normal business tools, such as credit, that allow businesses to expand and prosper. The objective was to remove the legal impediments holding back people and their businesses.
After years of fieldwork and analysis—involving over 120 Egyptian and Peruvian technicians with the participation of 300 local leaders and interviews with thousands of ordinary people—we presented a 1,000-page report and a 20-point action plan to the 11-member economic cabinet in 2004. The report was championed by Minister of Finance Muhammad Medhat Hassanein, and the cabinet approved its policy recommendations.
Egypt's major newspaper, Al Ahram, declared that the reforms "would open the doors of history for Egypt." Then, as a result of a cabinet shakeup, Mr. Hassanein was ousted. Hidden forces of the status quo blocked crucial elements of the reforms.
Today, when the streets are filled with so many Egyptians calling for change, it is worth noting some of the key facts uncovered by our investigation and reported in 2004:
• Egypt's underground economy was the nation's biggest employer. The legal private sector employed 6.8 million people and the public sector employed 5.9 million, while 9.6 million people worked in the extralegal sector.
• As far as real estate is concerned, 92% of Egyptians hold their property without normal legal title.
• We estimated the value of all these extralegal businesses and property, rural as well as urban, to be $248 billion—30 times greater than the market value of the companies registered on the Cairo Stock Exchange and 55 times greater than the value of foreign direct investment in Egypt since Napoleon invaded—including the financing of the Suez Canal and the Aswan Dam. (Those same extralegal assets would be worth more than $400 billion in today's dollars.)
The entrepreneurs who operate outside the legal system are held back. They do not have access to the business organizational forms (partnerships, joint stock companies, corporations, etc.) that would enable them to grow the way legal enterprises do. Because such enterprises are not tied to standard contractual and enforcement rules, outsiders cannot trust that their owners can be held to their promises or contracts. This makes it difficult or impossible to employ the best technicians and professional managers—and the owners of these businesses cannot issue bonds or IOUs to obtain credit.
Nor can such enterprises benefit from the economies of scale available to those who can operate in the entire Egyptian market. The owners of extralegal enterprises are limited to employing their kin to produce for confined circles of customers.
Without clear legal title to their assets and real estate, in short, these entrepreneurs own what I have called "dead capital"—property that cannot be leveraged as collateral for loans, to obtain investment capital, or as security for long-term contractual deals. And so the majority of these Egyptian enterprises remain small and relatively poor. The only thing that can emancipate them is legal reform. And only the political leadership of Egypt can pull this off. Too many technocrats have been trained not to expand the rule of law, but to defend it as they find it. Emancipating people from bad law and devising strategies to overcome the inertia of the status quo is a political job.
The key question to be asked is why most Egyptians choose to remain outside the legal economy? The answer is that, as in most developing countries, Egypt's legal institutions fail the majority of the people. Due to burdensome, discriminatory and just plain bad laws, it is impossible for most people to legalize their property and businesses, no matter how well intentioned they might be.
The examples are legion. To open a small bakery, our investigators found, would take more than 500 days. To get legal title to a vacant piece of land would take more than 10 years of dealing with red tape. To do business in Egypt, an aspiring poor entrepreneur would have to deal with 56 government agencies and repetitive government inspections.
All this helps explain who so many ordinary Egyptians have been "smoldering" for decades. Despite hard work and savings, they can do little to improve their lives.
Bringing the majority of Egypt's people into an open legal system is what will break Egypt's economic apartheid. Empowering the poor begins with the legal system awarding clear property rights to the $400 billion-plus of assets that we found they had created. This would unlock an amount of capital hundreds of times greater than foreign direct investment and what Egypt receives in foreign aid.
Leaders and governments may change and more democracy might come to Egypt. But unless its existing legal institutions are reformed to allow economic growth from the bottom up, the aspirations for a better life that are motivating so many demonstrating in the streets will remain unfulfilled.
Mr. de Soto, author of "The Mystery of Capital" (Basic Books, 2000) and "The Other Path" (Harper and Row, 1989), is president of the Institute for Liberty and Democracy based in Lima, Peru.
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"I am, as a general rule, wary of revolutions"
LOL, this guy is for real? The liberal Wall Street money man who helped put the revolutionary into the President's spot.
His fortune has gone up several fold in the last several years during a recession. There are not many honest people who could do that. I read he sits on the same board as ElBaradei. Remember I have been posting that some powerful people are pushing this guy, Elbaradei to the forefront.
All over the radio (and I have been told in the NYT) point out the Egyptian military high command was in the US the day the revolt started. Agreed it could not have been coicidence they were meeting people at the Pentagon the day "student's" blackberries were going off.
I wonder how much Soros with all his insider wheeling and dealings is making on this.
OK Rachel, you still want to worry about Soros? He claims what is going on in Egypt is the fault of Israel and its leaders are too stupid and rigid to know what's best for them? I want to know. Who elected Soros? I find it hard to beleive this guy is making his money honestly.
****By George Soros
Thursday, February 3, 2011
Revolutions usually start with enthusiasm and end in tears. In the case of the Middle East, the tears could be avoided if President Obama stands firmly by the values that got him elected. Although American power and influence in the world have declined, our allies and their armies look to us for direction. These armies are strong enough to maintain law and order as long as they stay out of politics; thus the revolutions can remain peaceful. That is what the United States should insist on while encouraging corrupt and repressive rulers who are no longer tolerated by their people to step aside and allow new leaders to be elected in free and fair elections.
That is the course that the revolution in Tunisia is taking. Tunisia has a relatively well-developed middle class, women there enjoy greater rights and opportunities than in most Muslim countries, and the failed regime was secular in character. The prospects for democratic change are favorable.
Egypt is more complex and, ultimately, more influential, which is why it is so important to get it right. The protesters are very diverse, including highly educated and common people, young and old, well-to-do and desperately poor. While the slogans and crowds in Tahrir Square are not advancing a theocratic agenda at all, the best-organized political opposition that managed to survive in that country's repressive environment is the Muslim Brotherhood. In free elections, the Brotherhood is bound to emerge as a major political force, though it is far from assured of a majority.
Some have articulated fears of adverse consequences of free elections, suggesting that the Egyptian military may seek to falsify the results; that Israel may be adamantly opposed to a regime change; that the domino effect of extremist politics spreading to other countries must be avoided; and that the supply of oil from the region could be disrupted. These notions constitute the old conventional wisdom about the Middle East - and need to be changed, lest Washington incorrectly put up resistance to or hesitate in supporting transition in Egypt.
That would be regrettable. President Obama personally and the United States as a country have much to gain by moving out in front and siding with the public demand for dignity and democracy. This would help rebuild America's leadership and remove a lingering structural weakness in our alliances that comes from being associated with unpopular and repressive regimes. Most important, doing so would open the way to peaceful progress in the region. The Muslim Brotherhood's cooperation with Mohamed ElBaradei, the Nobel laureate who is seeking to run for president, is a hopeful sign that it intends to play a constructive role in a democratic political system. As regards contagion, it is more likely to endanger the enemies of the United States - Syria and Iran - than our allies, provided that they are willing to move out ahead of the avalanche.
The main stumbling block is Israel. In reality, Israel has as much to gain from the spread of democracy in the Middle East as the United States has. But Israel is unlikely to recognize its own best interests because the change is too sudden and carries too many risks. And some U.S. supporters of Israel are more rigid and ideological than Israelis themselves. Fortunately, Obama is not beholden to the religious right, which has carried on a veritable vendetta against him. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee is no longer monolithic or the sole representative of the Jewish community. The main danger is that the Obama administration will not adjust its policies quickly enough to the suddenly changed reality.
I am, as a general rule, wary of revolutions. But in the case of Egypt, I see a good chance of success. As a committed advocate of democracy and open society, I cannot help but share in the enthusiasm that is sweeping across the Middle East. I hope President Obama will expeditiously support the people of Egypt. My foundations are prepared to contribute what they can. In practice, that means establishing resource centers for supporting the rule of law, constitutional reform, fighting corruption and strengthening democratic institutions in those countries that request help in establishing them, while staying out of those countries where such efforts are not welcome.
The writer is chairman of the Soros Fund Management and the Open Society Foundations, which support democracy and human rights in more than 70 countries.****
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Savage's essay connects many dots. I am not convinced by the whole argument or the connections are necessarily significant but there is a valid pattern that emerges.
I heard Brezinski being interviewed on Schieffer last night. There is no question he (along with Soros) are totally for the revolution in Egypt and have been thinking along these lnes for some time. We know Jimmy Carter is against the "Jewish lobby". Brezinski certainly is. Soros has set up his own group to lobby opposed to the traditional Jewish lobby group having decided he knows what is in everyone's best interests.
I cannot conclude why Soros would admit he felt no guilt having helped send Jews to their deaths when 14 years old. I do not blame him for saving himself. What 14 yer old would have done different. He may have also at the time thought they were just bing deported not murdered. Is he just in massive denial? Or is he some sort of personalty disorder, narcissistic, pschopathic, or other who has no conscious? I don't know. One cannot even say with any degree of confidence his 70 or so "philanthropic" human rights organizations are even really as much for humanitarian gain as for financial gain. Not withstading the huge tax write offs, one can only guess how much inside information he gleans from these connections spreading his money throughout the world how much he capitalizes by exponentially increasing his net worth - which he clearly has.
What say you Rachel? Or have you just been insulted and disappeared off the board?
http://www.michaelsavage.wnd.com/files/filesSavage/Savage-ObamaGivingMiddleEastToIslamistRadicals-Rev03.pdf
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http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MB02Ak01.html
Food and failed Arab states
By Spengler
Even Islamists have to eat. It is unclear whether President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt will survive, or whether his nationalist regime will be replaced by an Islamist, democratic, or authoritarian state. What is certain is that it will be a failed state. Amid the speculation about the shape of Arab politics to come, a handful of observers, for example economist Nourel Roubini, have pointed to the obvious: Wheat prices have almost doubled in the past year.
Egypt is the world's largest wheat importer, beholden to foreign providers for nearly half its total food consumption. Half of
Egyptians live on less than $2 a day. Food comprises almost half the country's consumer price index, and much more than half of spending for the poorer half of the country. This will get worse, not better.
Not the destitute, to be sure, but the aspiring and frustrated young, confronted the riot police and army on the streets of Egyptian cities last week. The uprising in Egypt and Tunisia were not food riots; only in Jordan have demonstrators made food the main issue. Rather, the jump in food prices was the wheat-stalk that broke the camel's back. The regime's weakness, in turn, reflects the dysfunctional character of the country. 35% of all Egyptians, and 45% of Egyptian women can't read.
Nine out of ten Egyptian women suffer genital mutilation. US President Barack Obama said Jan. 29, "The right to peaceful assembly and association, the right to free speech, and the ability to determine their own destiny … are human rights. And the United States will stand up for them everywhere." Does Obama think that genital mutilation is a human rights violation? To expect Egypt to leap from the intimate violence of traditional society to the full rights of a modern democracy seems whimsical.
In fact, the vast majority of Egyptians has practiced civil disobedience against the Mubarak regime for years. The Mubarak government announced a "complete" ban on genital mutilation in 2007, the second time it has done so - without success, for the Egyptian population ignored the enlightened pronouncements of its government. Do Western liberals cheer at this quiet revolt against Mubarak's authority?
Suzanne Mubarak, Egypt's First Lady, continues to campaign against the practice, which she has denounced as "physical and psychological violence against children." Last May 1, she appeared at Aswan City alongside the provincial governor and other local officials to declare the province free of it. And on October 28, Mrs Mubarak inaugurated an African conference on stopping genital mutilation.
The most authoritative Egyptian Muslim scholars continue to recommend genital mutilation. Writing on the web site IslamOnline, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi - the president of the International Association of Muslim Scholars - explains:
The most moderate opinion and the most likely one to be correct is in favor of practicing circumcision in the moderate Islamic way indicated in some of the Prophet's hadiths - even though such hadiths are not confirmed to be authentic. It is reported that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said to a midwife: "Reduce the size of the clitoris but do not exceed the limit, for that is better for her health and is preferred by husbands."
That is not a Muslim view (the practice is rare in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan), but an Egyptian Muslim view. In the most fundamental matters, President and Mrs Mubarak are incomparably more enlightened than the Egyptian public. Three-quarters of acts of genital mutilation in Egypt are executed by physicians.
What does that say about the character of the country's middle class? Only one news dispatch among the tens of thousands occasioned by the uprising mentions the subject; the New York Times, with its inimitable capacity to obscure content, wrote on January 27, "To the extent that Mr. Mubarak has been willing to tolerate reforms, the cable said, it has been in areas not related to public security or stability.
For example, he has given his wife latitude to campaign for women's rights and against practices like female genital mutilation and child labor, which are sanctioned by some conservative Islamic groups." The authors, Mark Landler and Andrew Lehren, do not mention that 90% or more of Egyptian women have been so mutilated. What does a country have to do to shock the New York Times? Eat babies boiled?
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Reagan answered a question regarding his criticism of the Carter administration during the change of power in Iran during an Oct 1984 debate that has some parallels with Egypt today:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G5Ae5FRHH0k&feature=player_embedded
FWIW, I would love to see democracy in both places. I just don't know what road leads there.
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http://ricochet.com/main-feed/A-Moving-Letter-from-Salim-Mansur
A Moving Letter from Salim Mansur
Claire Berlinski, Ed. · 12 hours ago
Salim Mansur sent me the link to his latest column about Egypt. It is excellent, but what struck me even more was the note he sent me with it. I asked his permission to publish it, which he kindly granted me.
Dear Claire:
Below is my column from today on Egypt. Since I do not have an opportunity to write in public more than one column per week, I am limited to what I can say. Extremely distressed by the crew in Washington, and in most European capitals. Media is so corrupted by left-leaning thinking that there is not much of an analysis to be expected in the media that is now competing with facebook, twitters, etc. The dumbing down of thinking is itself a huge problem the West is facing now as it tries pathetically to undertstand/explain politics and history of other cultures when it no longer has faith in its own civilizational values. I despair, and so I follow Samuel Pepys who confined himself to his diaries while London burned and I am trying to devote my time to reading and writing of my own (that of course I might not be able to publish, and even if published few will read).
I am more convinced now, as I wasn't when Paul Kennedy wrote about the rise and fall of great powers, that the West has gone over the tipping point in its terminal decline. That intelligent people, or people who claim to be intelligent, (I have in mind the talking heads in the U.S. media such as Chris Matthews or Fareed Zakaria) cannot make the difference between the sham of the Muslim Brotherhood talking about freedom and democracy and the generic thirst in man to be free. These are the people who have like the Bourbons learned nothing and forgotten nothing. They are glibly about to put the Lenins of our time into trains heading for Moscows of our time, they find nothing odd that they are pushing for the Muslim Brotherhood to be taken into governing when everything needs to be done to keep the Muslim Brotherhood out even as one carefully negotiate the long historic transition of Arab societies from tribal autorcracy and military dictatorships to representative rule and constitutionally limited government. I read you when I can, and I wish that you and others like you were closer to the main media control in the West, or in government.
Take care, and God bless.
Salim
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http://www.euronews.net/2011/02/03/mubarak-supporters-open-fire/
Look at 1:15
Weird. I'd like to see what a forensic video analyst says.
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GM, Very interesting letter,
"Extremely distressed by the crew in Washington, and in most European capitals. Media is so corrupted by left-leaning thinking that there is not much of an analysis to be expected in the media that is now competing with facebook, twitters, etc. The dumbing down of thinking is itself a huge problem the West"
I would like to take this cue as an opportunity to open up this:
On cable one of the Middle Eastern pundits who is mostly someone who gives a good analysis shocked me when he declared that W. Bush who is normally a modest man should be taking all the credit for what is happening in Egypt. He emphasized that what is happening in Egypt is directly related and and a result of what the US did in Iraq. It would not have happened if Hussain (Saddam - not Obama) was not toppled. It is the spread of Democracy as was the promoted strategy of the "neo-cons".
To me this is quite a twist. So what do conservatives do? Who do we criticize? It is not Obama's weakness that is leading to Mubaraks's ouster. It is a Republican's policy that is leading to it!!!
Indeed I think one can actually trace this back to Bush 1. He who led the charge for globilization, who led the charge for Un backed international coalitions. I remember a George Will column years back that was very critical of HErbert Bush's handling of the Kuwait situation. He pointed that he then set a precedent that establishes that the US cannot act unilaterally without the persmission and approval of the UN and the "international" community.
He was right. George Bush the elder unilaterally set the stage for our weakness. Or so it can be argued.
So should W be taking the credit, or the blame for this. Republicans will try to blame Obama. Liberals including Chris Matthews is trying to have it both ways, crediting Obama and blaming George Bush.
I am not sure. It gets awful confusing. I do think this can and should be traced back to Bush the Elder and in my opinion his abdication of AMerican power in 1990 to the world stage and globalization. Indeed the far left and liberals, and major socialist progressives like Soros should be holding Bush the elder up as some sort of icon.
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**Another great bit from VDH
http://pajamasmedia.com/victordavishanson/clueless-on-egypt/?singlepage=true
My three-week victory, your seven-year mess
It is difficult trying to figure out what the left’s position is on democracy and the Middle East. Here’s a brief effort.
Once upon a time, a number of prominent liberals — among them Thomas Friedman, Fareed Zakaria, John Kerry, Hillary Clinton, Harry Reid — thought it was a good idea to remove Saddam Hussein and supplant his Baathist rule with democracy. I say that with confidence since one can watch the speeches of the senators in question on YouTube debating the 23-writ authorizations to use force in October 2002, in addition to reading the New York Times and Newsweek editorials between 2002-3 of prominent liberal columnists. The New Republic stable of authors was particularly in favor of the Bush-Cheney “just war” to invade Iraq. Jonathan Chait (who would go on to author an infamous essay about why “I hate George Bush”) and Peter Beinhart were especially hard on the fellow left for not joining the Bush effort.
By early 2004, almost all that liberal support had entirely dissipated, predicated on two developments. First, a presidential election was just months away and Bush’s war was no longer “mission accomplished” but turning into a campaign liability. Second, a resistance had formed under hard-core Islamists that was beginning to take a heavy toll on American forces. No WMD had been found, and it was now easy to suggest that one could withdraw support for building democracy in Iraq because two of the 23 writs for going to war were no longer operative, the effort was probably lost, and George W. Bush might well deservedly not be reelected.
No matter. Bush pressed on. His polls sunk yet he was barely reelected. His ongoing “democracy” agenda got little support from those who once had enthusiastically praised the Iraqi adventure and had proclaimed their belief in universal human rights. Few came to Sec. of State Rice’s support when in 2005 she chastised Hosni Mubarak’s regime to grant fundamental rights. Fewer saw any connection between Saddam’s fate and America’s pro-democratic stance and the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, the fright of Mr. Gaddafi who gave up his WMD arsenal, or the sudden willingness of Pakistan to harness Dr. Khan.
Instead, “spreading democracy” was seen by the left as a wounded George Bush’s quirky tic. His talk about “universal” freedom was ridiculed more as a manifestation of a sort of evangelical Christianity than genuine political idealism. Bush’s zeal for democracy, then, was orphaned: the right was now realist again (“they are either incapable of democracy or not worth the effort to implant it”) and the left multicultural (“who are we of all people to say what sort of government others should employ?”).
**Read it all.
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Both sides jockying for political gain to the detriment of any consistency.
To be fair,
one could also ask,
"what's the Right's position?"
The right is now chastizing Obama for losing Egypt and the rise of the "muslim bortherhood".
The left is now conveniently chastizing W for starting this whole thing.
I think the roots of W's spreading democracy around the middle east stems as a natural progression of globalizism his father promoted and Clinton picked up and ran away with at full speed, more than just a bunch of neo cons (who Buchanan likes to point out are all a bunch of Jews defending the interests of Israel).
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I hedge to write this every time I see a riot video, but in spite of all that is posted, I say we err on the side of trying and supporting democracy in this pathetic third world country. (I think that means i support President Obama on this important question - mark that down!) If they turn out to be anti-American - so be it. If they begin to export terrorism, we can start planning now for an effective response to that.
Everyone seems to agree that foreign oversight will be required to pull off free and fair elections. Can we please learn from the failed Venezuelan experience and take democratic authentication seriously this time.
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http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/dave_zirin/01/31/egypt.soccer/index.html
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Doug,
What of the Copts? What if other arab nations, including the Saudis and Jordan fall into the clutches of the Jihadists? The purpose of Iraq was to create a viable alternative to either the jihadis and the strongmen. Thrusting Egypt into the arms of the jihadists is not consistent with that policy.
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GM, Good questions and I don't have answers or solutions. That's why I am in the armchair position - available for comment. 8 million Christians are at risk and 80 million Egyptians overall, and no, I don't trust the Obama administration to make sure true consent of the governed happens. I also don't see a path backwards. Mubarek is leaving. We aren't going to install or control a new strong man. Like leaving Iraq in a fragile democracy, we can have some influence but we have to hope that given the opportunity the people will rise up and keep the extremists in a minority position, busy trying to convince their countrymen that they will be peaceful and inward focused - worthy of the seats they win in the assembly. We can try to influence that positively and we have to prepare for the other possibility.
I hear your valid concerns, but I also hear people like Ragui Assaad, professor at the University of Minnesota's Humphrey School of Public Affairs from Cairo that tear at the idea of freedom back home the way we do thinking about our Founders' Declaration. He is a liberal academic with many friends and family back home including his 80 year old mother who says she would join the protest if she were able. I don't trust his wisdom, or hers, but I trust their honesty. Everybody deserves a shot at freedom. I hate cliches but this toothpaste isn't going back into the tube. Change is coming in Egypt and we have a Commander in Chief who is an expert on having opponents removed from ballots to represent us to make sure ordinary Egyptians get their say. Pray for us. Pray for them, and prepare for war.
From my business background I understand that risk and uncertainty run in multiple directions. You have been articulate and correct on the downside risk, which is quite probable and truly catastrophic. There is upside risk here as well. Put these people and I mean the peaceful ones in charge of making their own economy function, jobs, food, apartments affordable, and the trains (or camels) running on time. As they experience their own landmarks and people blown up, sympathy for radicals may diminish and we could find a reasonably good, self governed partner in our own fight against the extremists.
Besides security interests, we need these horribly run third world countries to break out of oppression and poverty. If achieved, that will have a global security benefit.
A story from my export past: my strongest area was the Middle East mostly because of the knowledge of the owner who was of Middle East origin, secular, but with one of the those common religious first names. I had 12 distributors in Kuwait when it fell to Saddam, many in UAE, a distributor in Bahrain that sold throughout the region, etc, even sold to Bin Laden Telecom in the Kingdom. When Kuwait was rescued we had great successes including the supply contract for a nationwide fiber optic network. For all the times my boss and I went over country lists and strategies to represent several American manufacturers, every time I brought up selling in Egypt he said don't waste your time. Business-wise, I'm sure he was right: 80 million people - don't waste your time.
For a shot at freedom though, 80 million people deserve a chance.
(Sounds like Netanyahu is saying something similar. Like it or not, this spinning ship is going to end up aimed in one of a number of directions.)
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I'd love to see Egypt become a beacon of freedom in the arab world. The dominoes could then fall in another direction. Egypt is the center of gravity, and will tend to pull surrounding nations in whatever way it moves.
I think the Egyptian military has a major hand to play here, and my hope is that they keep Egypt a friend to us and at least the cold peace with Israel when they contribute to the post-Mubarak government.
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Woof,
What needs to happen is a process to separate the wheat from the chaff. Any talks about a new Democratic free form of government needs to have all actors signing on to creating a Constitution that specifically prohibits any other form of government being laid in its place. If freedom and democracy is the true standard then there should be no objections. Right? Then why the F don't they do that?
P.C.
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And if the majority wish to live under sharia, then what?
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Woof,
If that's the case why do they have to hide behind the banner of freedom and democracy? And if that's what they want, is that what we support? Or does the reality of the situation make a dictator that cooporates with us better than a theocracy that wants all the free world dead? We are for the individuals right to choose for himself how he relates to God, we are not for any group (including a majority group), forcing their beliefs onto any other individual or at least the last time I checked that's how it works in a free Democratic society. Are you saying every single individual in Egypt wants a totalitarian theocracy? That might be what we end up with over there but I think it would be better if we didn't help that along.
P.C.
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P.C.
There are several different factors to consider here, amongst them:
1. Clever individuals/groups that understand psywar shape their message to appeal to the target audience. What words tend to resonate with us?
2. There is a bias shaped by the fact that our media has very few resources to draw upon that don't speak english. Those in Egypt that are proficient in english may well have a western philosophical orientation that is atypical of the population. Were an arab language media organization to interview arabic speakers in the US, do you think those arabic speakers here would tend to be valid representations of mainstream American opinions? If you doubt my description of Egyptian opinion, scroll back and read up on the validated polls done in years past.
3. In making strategic choices, one must choose between the real choices offered and not the theoretical best choice one might wish for. Best wishes and unrealistic hope is what keeps the lights on in the casinos in Vegas. A lack of a decisive, pragmatic leadership is why we must worry about a nuclear Iran. An Islamic Republic of Egypt is even more catastrophic in the long term.
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"Are you saying every single individual in Egypt wants a totalitarian theocracy?"
I was going to pose something similar. The Pew research numbers are scary, but they can be read to different conclusions. If 100% of the people want barbaric rules, what do we do, what CAN we do... but it isn't 100% and we know that. Let's say it's 40% and I think that will drop more toward 20%. Not a majority, but if it is a 51% that want to go back to the dark ages, how can we keep them from dominating the others, stoning and mutilating the women etc?
These were questions we luckily faced recently in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Not that we're great at steering the process, but we have some people with some knowledge and some experience. Mistakes to learn from.
Like GM says, we need skill, agility, persuasion, Arabic mastery of language, culture, religion, thinking and subtleties. Not to fall for false statements and translations. If I am Obama, I need the smartest guy in the room on our side and on this mission, authentic Egyptian, and he doesn't need a coat full of rank and medals.
We won't get a seat at the table, but we hopefully have enough pull to get a set of eyes and ears in the room, and access to whatever parties to the discussion will give us access.
The first part of this process up to elections in August is 6 months. How it's all structured is crucial. Someone has to have a vision of how this all ends in order to know how it needs to start. From what we've learned elsewhere, after the first election is where the process of writing a constitution and forming a government begins.
Some of our leverage comes from Mubarek, assuming he stays until the elections. Too bad he is under the bus. On that note, too bad the CIA Director is a political hack, but maybe I underestimate and maybe we have a workup already in place on each of the players and groups as thorough as the Steelers know Green Bay (bad example) - with levers and access points.
If I were Obama I would be meeting with Petreus and Crocker yesterday morning to find out who they know that knows how best to do this. Talk to Allawi,. Maliki, Karzai, whoever else might have insight. The parties don't know how to do this either. If you build their trust maybe you become the moderator, what is Arabic for facilitator?
Then I would turn to the Rumsfeld doctrine and focus on what we don't know that we don't know.
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Woof,
That's what I'm trying to get at guys, if we don't know what it is that Egypt is going to turn into and who is going to be in charge of it, why are we throwing Mubarak under the bus and why aren't we setting up a situation where we can tell who and what we need to be backing. This "roll the dice" foreign policy strategy the President seems to be implementing and the press is championing, scares the hell out of me. Like the question I posed earlier, they might get their freedom but freedom to do what? And I'm saying we should not be backing Islamic rule. As bad as a dictator is, a dictator that isn't trying to destroy Western civilization is a better choice.
Yes, in a perfect world it would be nice if a truly Democratic government took hold there but this ain't no perfect world. Yes, if we can identify an element that represents that movement we should back it but Egypt plays too important of a role in our strategic best interest to let it fall as did Iran.
P.C.
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We should be scared. This administration is the living, breathing example of "credentialed, not educated". I think it's pretty clear that the empty suit has no clue what to do. The only thing in our favor at the moment is that the Egyptian power structure is much smarter and far more competent than ours.
Their strategy appears to be one of divide and conquer the disparate factions while outwaiting the crowds. It might just work.
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Woof,
Maybe if our press and our prez stopped cheerleading, we could get out of this mess without them chalking up another U.S. failure, oh! unless that's the plan. :-P
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/us_egypt
P.C.
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As best as I can tell, it would make sense to limit the democratic process to those that believe in it. Put the MB on the spot with their words elevating theocracy above democracy.
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Egypt, Israel and a Strategic Reconsideration
February 8, 2011
By George Friedman
The events in Egypt have sent shock waves through Israel. The 1978 Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel have been the bedrock of Israeli national security. In three of the four wars Israel fought before the accords, a catastrophic outcome for Israel was conceivable. In 1948, 1967 and 1973, credible scenarios existed in which the Israelis were defeated and the state of Israel ceased to exist. In 1973, it appeared for several days that one of those scenarios was unfolding.
The survival of Israel was no longer at stake after 1978. In the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the various Palestinian intifadas and the wars with Hezbollah in 2006 and Hamas in Gaza in 2008, Israeli interests were involved, but not survival. There is a huge difference between the two. Israel had achieved a geopolitical ideal after 1978 in which it had divided and effectively made peace with two of the four Arab states that bordered it, and neutralized one of those states. The treaty with Egypt removed the threat to the Negev and the southern coastal approaches to Tel Aviv.
The agreement with Jordan in 1994, which formalized a long-standing relationship, secured the longest and most vulnerable border along the Jordan River. The situation in Lebanon was such that whatever threat emerged from there was limited. Only Syria remained hostile but, by itself, it could not threaten Israel. Damascus was far more focused on Lebanon anyway. As for the Palestinians, they posed a problem for Israel, but without the foreign military forces along the frontiers, the Palestinians could trouble but not destroy Israel. Israel’s existence was not at stake, nor was it an issue for 33 years.
The Historic Egyptian Threat to Israel
The center of gravity of Israel’s strategic challenge was always Egypt. The largest Arab country, with about 80 million people, Egypt could field the most substantial army. More to the point, Egypt could absorb casualties at a far higher rate than Israel. The danger that the Egyptian army posed was that it could close with the Israelis and engage in extended, high-intensity combat that would break the back of the Israel Defense Forces by imposing a rate of attrition that Israel could not sustain. If Israel were to be simultaneously engaged with Syria, dividing its forces and its logistical capabilities, it could run out of troops long before Egypt, even if Egypt were absorbing far more casualties.
The solution for the Israelis was to initiate combat at a time and place of their own choosing, preferably with surprise, as they did in 1956 and 1967. Failing that, as they did in 1973, the Israelis would be forced into a holding action they could not sustain and forced onto an offensive in which the risks of failure — and the possibility — would be substantial.
It was to the great benefit of Israel that Egyptian forces were generally poorly commanded and trained and that Egyptian war-fighting doctrine, derived from Britain and the Soviet Union, was not suited to the battle problem Israel posed. In 1967, Israel won its most complete victory over Egypt, as well as Jordan and Syria. It appeared to the Israelis that the Arabs in general and Egyptians in particular were culturally incapable of mastering modern warfare.
Thus it was an extraordinary shock when, just six years after their 1967 defeat, the Egyptians mounted a two-army assault across the Suez, coordinated with a simultaneous Syrian attack on the Golan Heights. Even more stunning than the assault was the operational security the Egyptians maintained and the degree of surprise they achieved. One of Israel’s fundamental assumptions was that Israeli intelligence would provide ample warning of an attack. And one of the fundamental assumptions of Israeli intelligence was that Egypt could not mount an attack while Israel maintained air superiority. Both assumptions were wrong. But the most important error was the assumption that Egypt could not, by itself, coordinate a massive and complex military operation. In the end, the Israelis defeated the Egyptians, but at the cost of the confidence they achieved in 1967 and a recognition that comfortable assumptions were impermissible in warfare in general and regarding Egypt in particular.
The Egyptians had also learned lessons. The most important was that the existence of the state of Israel did not represent a challenge to Egypt’s national interest. Israel existed across a fairly wide and inhospitable buffer zone — the Sinai Peninsula. The logistical problems involved in deploying a massive force to the east had resulted in three major defeats, while the single partial victory took place on much shorter lines of supply. Holding or taking the Sinai was difficult and possible only with a massive infusion of weapons and supplies from the outside, from the Soviet Union. This meant that Egypt was a hostage to Soviet interests. Egypt had a greater interest in breaking its dependency on the Soviets than in defeating Israel. It could do the former more readily than the latter.
(click here to enlarge image)
The Egyptian recognition that its interests in Israel were minimal and the Israeli recognition that eliminating the potential threat from Egypt guaranteed its national security have been the foundation of the regional balance since 1978. All other considerations — Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas and the rest — were trivial in comparison. Geography — the Sinai — made this strategic distancing possible. So did American aid to Egypt. The substitution of American weapons for Soviet ones in the years after the treaty achieved two things. First, they ended Egypt’s dependency on the Soviets. Second, they further guaranteed Israel’s security by creating an Egyptian army dependent on a steady flow of spare parts and contractors from the United States. Cut the flow and the Egyptian army would be crippled.
The governments of Anwar Sadat and then Hosni Mubarak were content with this arrangement. The generation that came to power with Gamal Nasser had fought four wars with Israel and had little stomach for any more. They had proved themselves in October 1973 on the Suez and had no appetite to fight again or to send their sons to war. It is not that they created an oasis of prosperity in Egypt. But they no longer had to go to war every few years, and they were able, as military officers, to live good lives. What is now regarded as corruption was then regarded as just rewards for bleeding in four wars against the Israelis.
Mubarak and the Military
But now is 33 years later, and the world has changed. The generation that fought is very old. Today’s Egyptian military trains with the Americans, and its officers pass through the American command and staff and war colleges. This generation has close ties to the United States, but not nearly as close ties to the British-trained generation that fought the Israelis or to Egypt’s former patrons, the Russians. Mubarak has locked the younger generation, in their fifties and sixties, out of senior command positions and away from the wealth his generation has accumulated. They want him out.
For this younger generation, the idea of Gamal Mubarak being allowed to take over the presidency was the last straw. They wanted the elder Mubarak to leave not only because he had ambitions for his son but also because he didn’t want to leave after more than a quarter century of pressure. Mubarak wanted guarantees that, if he left, his possessions, in addition to his honor, would remain intact. If Gamal could not be president, then no one’s promise had value. So Mubarak locked himself into position.
The cameras love demonstrations, but they are frequently not the real story. The demonstrators who wanted democracy are a real faction, but they don’t speak for the shopkeepers and peasants more interested in prosperity than wealth. Since Egypt is a Muslim country, the West freezes when anything happens, dreading the hand of Osama bin Laden. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was once a powerful force, and it might become one again someday, but right now it is a shadow of its former self. What is going on now is a struggle within the military, between generations, for the future of the Egyptian military and therefore the heart of the Egyptian regime. Mubarak will leave, the younger officers will emerge, the constitution will make some changes and life will continue.
The Israelis will return to their complacency. They should not. The usual first warning of a heart attack is death. Among the fortunate, it is a mild coronary followed by a dramatic change of life style. The events in Egypt should be taken as a mild coronary and treated with great relief by Israel that it wasn’t worse.
Reconsidering the Israeli Position
I have laid out the reasons why the 1978 treaty is in Egypt’s national interest. I have left out two pieces. The first is ideology. The ideological tenor of the Middle East prior to 1978 was secular and socialist. Today it is increasingly Islamist. Egypt is not immune to this trend, even if the Muslim Brotherhood should not be seen as the embodiment of that threat. Second, military technology, skills and terrain have made Egypt a defensive power for the past 33 years. But military technology and skills can change, on both sides. Egyptian defensiveness is built on assumptions of Israeli military capability and interest. As Israeli ideology becomes more militant and as its capabilities grow, Egypt may be forced to reconsider its strategic posture. As new generations of officers arise, who have heard of war only from their grandfathers, the fear of war declines and the desire for glory grows. Combine that with ideology in Egypt and Israel and things change. They won’t change quickly — a generation of military transformation will be needed once regimes have changed and the decisions to prepare for war have been made — but they can change.
Two things from this should strike the Israelis. The first is how badly they need peace with Egypt. It is easy to forget what things were like 40 years back, but it is important to remember that the prosperity of Israel today depends in part on the treaty with Egypt. Iran is a distant abstraction, with a notional bomb whose completion date keeps moving. Israel can fight many wars with Egypt and win. It need lose only one. The second lesson is that Israel should do everything possible to make certain that the transfer of power in Egypt is from Mubarak to the next generation of military officers and that these officers maintain their credibility in Egypt. Whether Israel likes it or not, there is an Islamist movement in Egypt. Whether the new generation controls that movement as the previous one did or whether they succumb to it is the existential question for Israel. If the treaty with Egypt is the foundation of Israel’s national security, it is logical that the Israelis should do everything possible to preserve it.
This was not the fatal heart attack. It might not even have been more than indigestion. But recent events in Egypt point to a long-term problem with Israeli strategy. Given the strategic and ideological crosscurrents in Egypt, it is in Israel’s national interest to minimize the intensity of the ideological and make certain that Israel is not perceived as a threat. In Gaza, for example, Israel and Egypt may have shared a common interest in containing Hamas, and the next generation of Egyptian officers may share it as well. But what didn’t materialize in the streets this time could in the future: an Islamist rising. In that case, the Egyptian military might find it in its interest to preserve its power by accommodating the Islamists. At this point, Egypt becomes the problem and not part of the solution.
Keeping Egypt from coming to this is the imperative of military dispassion. If the long-term center of gravity of Israel’s national security is at least the neutrality of Egypt, then doing everything to maintain that is a military requirement. That military requirement must be carried out by political means. That requires the recognition of priorities. The future of Gaza or the precise borders of a Palestinian state are trivial compared to preserving the treaty with Egypt. If it is found that a particular political strategy undermines the strategic requirement, then that political strategy must be sacrificed.
In other words, the worst-case scenario for Israel would be a return to the pre-1978 relationship with Egypt without a settlement with the Palestinians. That would open the door for a potential two-front war with an intifada in the middle. To avoid that, the ideological pressure on Egypt must be eased, and that means a settlement with the Palestinians on less-than-optimal terms. The alternative is to stay the current course and let Israel take its chances. The question is where the greater safety lies. Israel has assumed that it lies with confrontation with the Palestinians. That’s true only if Egypt stays neutral. If the pressure on the Palestinians destabilizes Egypt, it is not the most prudent course.
There are those in Israel who would argue that any release in pressure on the Palestinians will be met with rejection. If that is true, then, in my view, that is catastrophic news for Israel. In due course, ideological shifts and recalculations of Israeli intentions will cause a change in Egyptian policy. This will take several decades to turn into effective military force, and the first conflicts may well end in Israeli victory. But, as I have said before, it must always be remembered that no matter how many times Israel wins, it need only lose once to be annihilated.
To some it means that Israel should remain as strong as possible. To me it means that Israel should avoid rolling the dice too often, regardless of how strong it thinks it is. The Mubarak affair might open a strategic reconsideration of the Israeli position.
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/07/why_we_cant_rule_out_an_egyptian_reign_of_terror?page=0,0
There are, of course, many different ways of categorizing historical revolutions. But for the purposes of understanding what is happening in Egypt -- and the challenges it may pose for the United States -- one simple, rough distinction may be especially useful. This is the distinction between revolutions that look more like 1688 and revolutions that look more like 1789. The first date refers to England's "Glorious Revolution," in which the Catholic, would-be absolute monarch James II was overthrown and replaced by the Protestant William and Mary and the English Parliament claimed powerful and enduring new forms of authority. The second is, of course, the date of the French Revolution, which began as an attempt to create a constitutional monarchy but ultimately led to the execution of King Louis XVI, the proclamation of the First French Republic, and the Reign of Terror.
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http://hotair.com/archives/2011/02/08/u-s-handling-of-egypt-protests-now-alienating-pretty-much-everyone/
**More bowing required?
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JOHN MACDOUGALL/AFP/Getty Images
German Chancellor Angela Merkel (R) greets Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in September 2010Related Special Topic Page
The Egypt Unrest: Full Coverage
A suite at a luxury hospital clinic in southwestern Germany is being prepared for Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, German news website Spiegel Online reported Feb. 7. The report, dovetailing similar rumors reported by The New York Times on Feb. 5, went into more detail, alleging that talks were under way among Egyptian, U.S. and German officials for Mubarak to find exile in the Max-Grundig-Klinik Buehlerhoehe in the southwestern German town of Buhl near Baden-Baden.
The rumors have not been confirmed, but they fit an endgame scenario to the Egypt crisis that STRATFOR has long been considering. The Egyptian military may see Mubarak as an enormous liability, but it is also trying to construct a legitimate and orderly political transition. Mubarak is 82 years old, in poor health and suffering from cancer. His sickness serves as an ideal alibi to frame his exit from the political scene without the military appearing as though it had to resort to extraordinary measures to remove him or bend to the opposition’s demands. STRATFOR had earlier heard rumors of Mubarak staying at his resort home in Sharm el-Sheikh in the Sinai Peninsula. Meanwhile, negotiations are under way over how to handle the billions of dollars worth of assets that Mubarak’s family is attempting to retain. Such negotiations take a great deal of time and energy, which may explain the repeated calls for patience by the regime elite, as well as by U.S. officials.
The subject of Mubarak’s future exile may well have been discussed at the Munich Security Conference on Feb. 5, where both U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and German Chancellor Angela Merkel reiterated that the transition in Egypt would take time and, as Clinton said, “there are certain things that have to be done in order to prepare.” Merkel said, “There will be a change in Egypt, but clearly, the change has to be shaped in a way that it is a peaceful, a sensible way forward.” Members of Merkel’s ruling Christian Democratic Union, as well coalition partner Free Democratic Party, have also issued similar statements calling for an orderly transition for Mubarak.
The peaceful and sensible way forward for Mubarak may well be in Germany, where Mubarak reportedly travels for annual medical visits and where he had gallbladder surgery in 2010 at Heidelberg University Hospital, roughly 100 kilometers (60 miles) from the rumored exile clinic. STRATFOR cannot help but be reminded of similar arrangements made for the embattled Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who at age 60 and suffering from an enlarged spleen and lymphatic cancer jumped from country to country, including the United States, in exile to seek medical treatment before ending up in Egypt, where he is buried today. This time, the United States appears more interested in avoiding the political complications of receiving an unpopular leader in exile while including a third party, perhaps the Germans, to help manage the transition.
The opposition’s reaction to these rumors must thus be watched closely. An implicit understanding could be in the making, in which Mubarak may remain president in exile, but as a mere figurehead until elections can be held — planned for September — or a less complicated scenario in which he hands power to his vice president, former intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, while on “medical leave.” The Egyptian military, along with U.S. officials, likely hopes this will be enough to take the steam out of the street demonstrations and move Egypt beyond the current crisis. Whether that expectation holds true remains to be seen, but the political expediency of the current crisis could have an impact on the speed in which Mubarak’s health reportedly deteriorates in the coming days.
Read more: A Sign of the Endgame in Egypt? | STRATFOR
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http://www.tabletmag.com/news-and-politics/58461/jewel-of-the-nile/
Jewel of the Nile
Yussuf al-Qaradawi, the world’s most popular and authoritative Sunni cleric, is a Muslim Brotherhood-aligned Egyptian based in Qatar. A return to his home country would be dangerous for Israel and the West.
By Lee Smith | Feb 9, 2011 7:00 AM
President Barack Obama believes that lending American prestige to the Muslim Brotherhood will not pave the way for an eventual Islamist takeover of Egypt. “There are a whole bunch of secular folks in Egypt, there are a whole bunch of educators and civil society in Egypt that wants to come to the fore as well,” the president told Bill O’Reilly in a Super Bowl Sunday interview.
According to the president, the way to empower America’s friends is to “get all the groups together in Egypt for an orderly transition and the one that is a meaningful transition.” As if Egypt’s liberal current isn’t weak enough already, Obama believes that the best way to ensure the sharks don’t come out on top is to throw a whole bunch of liberal guppies into the tank as well.
While the parallels between Iran in 1979 and Egypt in 2011 can be overdrawn, it is foolish to pretend that they are not there. Cairo doesn’t have to literally become a Sunni version of Tehran to do terrible damage to U.S. interests and prestige in the Middle East—and to the hopes and dreams of its own people. And the Egyptians already have their own prospective Khomeini: Yussuf al-Qaradawi, the Qatar-based Muslim Brotherhood preacher who exiled himself from Egypt in 1961.
***
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http://www.jpost.com/LandedPages/PrintArticle.aspx?id=207415
Muslim Brotherhood text reveals scope of radical creed
By OREN KESSLER
09/02/2011
Translated by Palestinian Media Watch, book details group’s goal of global Islamic conquest.
One of the greatest beneficiaries of the unrest in Egypt has been the Muslim Brotherhood.
Banned but tolerated for decades by successive Egyptian regimes, the Islamist movement is now emerging as a central player in the country’s resurgent opposition.
RELATED:
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On Tuesday, two Brotherhood representatives participated in an opposition delegation that met with Vice President Omar Suleiman for the first set of talks over implementing political reforms.
Pundits have portrayed the Brotherhood as uncompromising zealots or beneficent providers of social services that long-deprived Egyptians desperately need.
But a translation released Tuesday of a 1995 book by the movement’s fifth official leader sheds light on just how Egypt’s Brotherhood views itself and its mission. Jihad is the Way is the last of a five-volume work, The Laws of Da’wa by Mustafa Mashhur, who headed the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt from 1996-2002.
Click here for full Jpost coverage of unrest in Egypt
The Jerusalem Post on Tuesday saw excerpts of the text, compiled by Palestinian Media Watch founder Itamar Marcus and analyst Nan Jacques Zilberdik.
They detail the Brotherhood’s objectives of advancing the global conquest of Islam and reestablishing the Islamic Caliphate, the public and private duties of jihad and the struggle Muslims must wage against Israel.
The full text, translated by PMW, will be posted Wednesday on the organization’s website, Palwatch.org.
“The Islamic ummah,” it says, referring to the supranational community of Muslims, “can regain its power and be liberated and assume its rightful position which was intended by Allah, as the most exalted nation among men, as the leaders of humanity.”
Elsewhere, it exhorts Muslims, “Know your status, and believe firmly that you are the masters of the world, even if your enemies desire your degradation.”
Marcus spoke to the Post about what he views as the danger of downplaying the Brotherhood’s ideology, or expecting it to moderate its objectives after being allowed into the political process. The movement differs from international terror groups like Al-Qaida, he said, only in tactics, not in its goals.
Marcus cited passages in the text that urge Muslims to wage jihad only when circumstances are ripe.
“The Brotherhood is not rushed by youth’s enthusiasm into immature and unplanned action which will not alter the bad reality and may even harm the Islamic activity, and will benefit the people of falsehood,” Mashhur wrote.
“One should know that it is not necessary that the Muslims repel every attack or damage caused by the enemies of Allah immediately, but [only] when ability and the circumstances are fit to it.”
Jihad is the Way explicitly endorses the reinstatement of a worldwide Islamic regime.
“It should be known that jihad and preparation towards jihad are not only for the purpose of fending off assaults and attacks of Allah’s enemies from Muslims, but are also for the purpose of realizing the great task of establishing an Islamic state and strengthening the religion and spreading it around the world.”
“Jihad for Allah,” Mashhur wrote, “is not limited to the specific region of the Islamic countries, since the Muslim homeland is one and is not divided, and the banner of Jihad has already been raised in some of its parts, and shall continue to be raised, with the help of Allah, until every inch of the land of Islam will be liberated, and the State of Islam established.”
Hassan al-Banna, the movement’s founder, “felt the grave danger overshadowing the Muslims and the urgent need and obligation which Islam places on every Muslim, man and woman, to act in order to restore the Islamic Caliphate and to reestablish the Islamic state on strong foundations.”
Despite its universal message, the book attaches particular significance to the Holy Land.
“Honorable brothers have achieved shahada [martyrdom] on the soil of beloved Palestine, during the years ’47 and ’48, in their jihad against the criminal, thieving, gangs of Zion,” it says.
“Still today, memory of them horrifies the Jews and the name of the Muslim Brotherhood terrifies them.”
Elsewhere, Mushhar wrote, “The imam and shahid Hassan Al-Banna is considered as a martyr of Palestine, even if he was not killed on its soil ... in all his writings and conversations, he always urged towards jihad and aroused the desire for seeking martyrdom ... he did not content himself only with speech and writing, and when the opportunity arrived for jihad in Palestine, he hurried and seized it.”
Wielding a broader brush, Mashhur wrote, “The problems of the Islamic world – such as in Palestine, Afghanistan, Syria, Eritrea or the Philippines – are not issues of territories and nations, but of faith and religion.
They are the problems of Islam and all Muslims, and their resolution cannot be negotiated and bargained by recognizing the enemy’s right to the Islamic land he stole, and therefore there is no other option but jihad for Allah, and this is why jihad is the way.”
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http://bigpeace.com/dreaboi/2011/02/09/jim-woolsey-the-importance-of-shariah-in-the-egyptian-revolution/
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qBeRt5p242w&feature=player_embedded#[/youtube]
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GM:
Although quite relevant to Egypt, may I ask you to post pieces about the nature of the MB on the "Islam the Religion" so that they don't get lost to future reference?
Thank you,
Marc
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http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/
Exclusive: Saudis told Obama to back Mubarak
Hugh Tomlinson Riyadh
February 10 2011 12:01AM
Saudi Arabia has threatened to prop up President Mubarak if the White House tries to force a swift change of regime in Egypt. In a testy personal telephone call on January 29, King Abdullah told President Obama not to humiliate Mr Mubarak and warned that he would step in to bankroll Egypt if the US withdrew its aid programme, worth $1.5 billion annually. America’s closest ally in the Gulf made clear that the Egyptian President must be allowed to stay on to oversee the transition towards peaceful democracy and then leave with dignity. “Mubarak and King Abdullah are not just allies, they are close friends, and the King is not about to see his friend cast aside and humiliated,” a senior source in the Saudi capital told The Times. Two sources confirmed details of the King’s call, made four days after the people
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Know how the Saudis could afford to bankroll Egypt?
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"Know how the Saudis could afford to bankroll Egypt?"
We drove up the world price of oil from $20 to $100 with our failure to produce or use our own energy? http://www.wtrg.com/oil_graphs/oilprice1947.gif
---
Woolsey makes perfect sense, but how other than 'benevolent' military rule do you accomplish that? Parties must renounce non-democratic governance to participate, but falsely renounce is what they do. He gave examples from across the planet and across the last century, not just MB. What then? No freedom or real vote for others ever because no one can sort out who really supports freedom and democracy?
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"We drove up the world price of oil from $20 to $100 with our failure to produce or use our own energy? http://www.wtrg.com/oil_graphs/oilprice1947.gif "
Yeah. Al Saud could cut production and raise the cost per bbl. We'll fund Egypt one way or the other.
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http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41506482/ns/world_news-mideastn_africa/
Egypt's Mubarak to step down
CAIRO — Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak is to step down after 17 days of pro-democracy protests, two sources told NBC News on Thursday.
Following an all-day meeting of the country's supreme military council, the army said all the protesters' demands would be met and a further statement was expected to be made later Thursday, clarifying the situation.
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Wonder what the House of Saud is going to do now , , ,
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We'll soon find out. Got money in oil futures?
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I was thinking more along the line of investing in Swiss Banks, where the House of Saud will be preparing for its departure.
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If we lose Saudi, Banks will be the least of our concerns.
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I was responding to your comment about investing in oil futures , , ,
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I think the House of Saud will not go easily or quietly.
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(http://drudgereport.com/ob.jpg)
Love this pic on drudge.
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CAIRO—The Egyptian opposition's takeover of the area around the parliament this week began with a trick.
First, they called for a march on the state television building a few blocks north of their encampment in Tahrir Square. Then, while the army deployed to that sensitive communications hub, they moved into the lightly defended area around the parliament to the south.
The feint gave a taste of how a dozen young activists managed to outwit Egypt's feared security forces to launch a historic uprising now in its 17th day—and hint at how the organizers hope to keep pressure on a regime that has dug in its heels.
On Jan. 25, the first day of protests, the organizers had a trick up their sleeves in the impoverished slum of Bulaq al-Dakrour, on Cairo's western edge.
There amid the maze of muddy, narrow alleyways, a seemingly spontaneous protest caught security forces on their heels and swelled in size before those forces could react to crush it.
Regional Upheaval
View Interactive
.A succession of rallies and demonstrations, in Egypt, Jordan, Yemen and Algeria have been inspired directly by the popular outpouring of anger that toppled Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. See how these uprisings have progressed.
Clashes in Cairo
View Interactive
.Since late January, antigovernment demonstrators have swarmed the streets of Cairo, calling for President Hosni Mubarak to step down and at times clashing with the president's supporters. See where the action took place.
.That protest was anything but spontaneous. How the organizers pulled it off, when so many past efforts had failed, has had people scratching their heads ever since.
After his release from detention on Sunday, Google Inc. executive Wael Ghonim recounted his meeting with Egyptian's newly appointed interior minister. "No one understood how you did it," Mr. Ghonim said the minister told him. He said his interrogators concluded there had to have been outside forces involved.
The plotters, who now form the leadership core of the Revolutionary Youth Movement, which has stepped to the fore as representatives of protestors in Tahrir Square, have shared their secret in recent days for the first time.
Their accounts reveal a core of savvy plotters who have managed to stay a step ahead of the security forces with decoy marches and smart politicking that has sustained popular support for their protests.
In early January, when they decided they would try to replicate the accomplishments of the protesters in Tunisia who ousted President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, their immediate concern was how to outfox the Ministry of Interior, whose legions of riot police had managed to contain and quash protests for years. The police were expert at preventing demonstrations from growing or moving through the streets, and at keeping ordinary Egyptians away.
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."We had to find a way to prevent security from making their cordon and stopping us," said Basem Kamel, a 41-year-old architect who is a member of Mohamed ElBaradei's youth wing and was one of the dozen or so plotters.
They met daily for two weeks in the cramped living room of the mother of Ziad al-Alimi, a leading organizer for the opposition group formed by Mr. ElBaradei and one of the chief plotters.
Mr. Alimi's mother, a former activist herself who served six months in prison for her role leading protests during the bread riots in 1977, lives in the middle-class neighborhood of Agouza on the west bank of the Nile.
The group of plotters included representatives from six youth movements connected to opposition political parties, groups advocating labor rights and the Muslim Brotherhood.
They chose 20 protest sites, usually connected to mosques, in densely populated working-class neighborhoods around Cairo, hoping that a large number of scattered protests would strain security forces, draw larger numbers, and increase the likelihood that some would be able to break out and link up in the city's central Tahrir Square.
The group publicly called for protests at those sites for Jan. 25, a national holiday celebrating the country's widely reviled police force. They announced the sites of the demonstrations on the Internet and called for protests to begin at each one after prayers at about 2 p.m. But that wasn't all.
"The twenty-first site, no one knew about," Mr. Kamel said.
To be sure, they weren't the only ones calling for protests that day. Other influential activist groups rallied their resources to the cause. The Facebook page for Khaled Said, the young man beaten to death for no apparent reason by police in Alexandria, had emerged months earlier as an online gathering place for activists in Egypt.
There was an Arabic page and an English page, and each had its own administrators. Mr. Ghonim, the Google executive, has now been identified as one of the administrators, but the pages' other administrators remain anonymous.
An administrator for the English language page, known only by his online moniker El-Shaheed, or The Martyr, recounted the administrators' role in the protests in an interview with The Wall Street Journal via Gmail Chat.
El-Shaheed said he was chatting online with the site's Arabic-language administrator on Jan. 14, just as news broke of Tunisian President Ben Ali's flight from the country. Mr. Kamel and his cohorts, who had already begun plotting their protest, now had another powerful recruiting force.
"I was talking with Arabic admin and we were watching Tunisia and the moment we heard Ben Ali ran away, he said, we have to do something," said El-Shaheed.
The Arabic administrator posted on the Arabic page an open question to readers: "What do you think we should give as a gift to the brutal Egyptian police on their day?"
"The answer came from everyone: Tunisia Tunisia :)," wrote El-Shaheed.
For the final three days before the protest, Mr. Kamel and his fellow plotters slept away from home, fearing police would come to arrest them in the middle of the night and disrupt their plan. They stopped using their own cell phones and in favor of those owned by family members or friends that were less likely to be monitored.
They sent small teams to do reconnaissance on the secret 21st site in Bulaq al-Dakrour. That site was the Hayiss Sweet Shop, whose storefront and tiled sidewalk plaza meant to accommodate outdoor tables in warmer months would make an easy-to-find rallying point in an otherwise tangled neighborhood no different from countless others around the city.
The plotters knew that the demonstrations' success would depend on the participation of ordinary Egyptians in working-class districts such as Bulaq al-Dakrour, where the Internet and Facebook aren't as widely used. They distributed flyers around the city in the days leading up to the demonstration, concentrating efforts on Bulaq al-Dakrour.
More
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Israel Braces for a New Egypt
."It gave people the idea that a revolution would start on January 25," Mr. Kamel said.
The organizers sent small teams of plotters to walk the protest route repeatedly in the days leading up to the protest, at a slow pace and at a fast pace, to get their timing down for sychronizing when the separate protests would link up.
On Jan. 25, security forces predictably deployed by the thousands at the sites of each announced demonstration. Meanwhile, four field commanders chosen from the organizers' committee began ordering their men to the secret gathering point at the sweet shop.
The organizers divided themselves into cells of 10—with only one person per cell aware of the secret destination.
In these small groups, the protesters advanced toward the Hayiss Sweet Shop, massing into a crowd of 300 demonstrators free from police control. The lack of security prompted neighborhood residents to stream by the hundreds out of the neighborhood's cramped alleyways, swelling the crowd into the thousands, according to employees at the Hayiss Sweet Shop who watched the scene unfold.
At 1:15 p.m., they began marching toward downtown Cairo. By the time police realized what was under way and redeployed a small contingent to block their path, the protesters' numbers had grown so quickly that they easily overpowered the police.
The other marches organized at mosques around the city failed to reach Tahrir Square, their efforts foiled by riot-police cordons. The Bulaq al-Dakrour marchers, the only group to reach their objective, occupied Tahrir Square for several hours until after midnight, when police attacked demonstrators with tear gas and rubber bullets.
It was the first time Egyptians had seen such a demonstration in their streets, and it provided an explosive tipping point credited with emboldening tens of thousands of people to come out to protest the following Friday.
That day, they seized Tahrir Square again, and they haven't given it up since.
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Good news today from our intelligence, Muslim Brotherhood is secular. Who knew? :?
Close the thread. We worried for no reason.
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Golly, I sure feel better!
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http://hotair.com/archives/2011/02/10/u-s-director-of-national-intelligence-the-muslim-brotherhood-is-largely-secular/
U.S. Director of National Intelligence: The Muslim Brotherhood is … “largely secular”; Update: Video added
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What a moron (and his aides who prepped him too) This is the guy who didn't know about the Islamo terrorist arrests in UK a while back IIRC.
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The decision by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak not to resign seems to have shocked both the Egyptian military and Washington. CIA Director Leon Panetta spoke earlier as if his resignation was assured and a resolution to the crisis was guaranteed. Sources in Cairo spoke the same way. How the deal came apart, or whether Mubarak decided that transferring power to Vice President Omar Suleiman was sufficient cannot be known. What is known is that Mubarak did not do what was expected.
This now creates a massive crisis for the Egyptian military. Its goal is not to save Mubarak but to save the regime founded by Gamal Abdel Nasser. We are now less than six hours from dawn in Cairo. The military faces three choices. The first is to stand back, allow the crowds to swell and likely march to the presidential palace and perhaps enter the grounds. The second choice is to move troops and armor into position to block more demonstrators from entering Tahrir Square and keep those in the square in place. The third is to stage a coup and overthrow Mubarak.
The first strategy opens the door to regime change as the crowd, not the military, determines the course of events. The second creates the possibility of the military firing on the protesters, which have not been anti-military to this point. Clashes with the military (as opposed to the police, which have happened) would undermine the military’s desire to preserve the regime and the perception of the military as not hostile to the public.
That leaves the third option, which is a coup. Mubarak will be leaving office under any circumstances by September. The military does not want an extraconstitutional action, but Mubarak’s decision leaves the military in the position of taking one of the first two courses, which is unacceptable. That means military action to unseat Mubarak is the remaining choice.
One thing that must be borne in mind is that whatever action is taken must be taken in the next six or seven hours. As dawn breaks over Cairo, it is likely that large numbers of others will join the demonstrators and that the crowd might begin to move. The military would then be forced to stand back and let events go where they go, or fire on the demonstrators. Indeed, in order to do the latter, troops and armor must move into position now, to possibly overawe the demonstrators.
Thus far, the military has avoided confrontation with the demonstrators as much as possible, and the demonstrators have expressed affection toward the army. To continue that policy, and to deal with Mubarak, the options are removing him from office in the next few hours or possibly losing control of the situation. But if this is the choice taken, it must be taken tonight so that it can be announced before demonstrations get under way Feb. 11 after Friday prayers.
It is of course possible that the crowds, reflecting on Mubarak’s willingness to cede power to Suleiman, may end the crisis, but it does not appear that way at the moment, and therefore the Egyptian military has some choices to make.
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With luck and support from the world's democracies, Egypt's people will get a credible political system. What they won't get—now or possibly ever—is an economy able to produce real jobs for their country's large, young population. Establishing a democratic system in Egypt is a walk in the park compared to allowing a 21st-century economy to come to life there.
Egypt isn't just a sad story of political oppression. Egypt is an object lesson for other nations, including ours, struggling to produce enough jobs for young workers.
While Egypt has floundered, some have noted that Turkey's economy has flourished, notwithstanding a strong Islamic presence in both countries. How come?
Editorial Board Member Matt Kaminski on the latest from Egypt. Also, Editorial Board Member Mary Kissel on Toyota and 'pedal misapplications.'
.Everyone cites a favorite datum—Egypt produced Nasser and Mubarak while Turkey got Ataturk and free-market economist Turgut Ozal as prime minister in the 1980s. But here's mine: In Egypt, the percentage of the working population employed by the state is 35%. In Turkey, it's 13%.
One is tempted to ask: What more do you need to know?
The economic literature is vast on the smothering effects of large, inefficient public sectors. If Egypt is now exhibit A for these studies in torpid economies, then exhibits B, C, D and E would be Jordan, Yemen, Tunisia and Algeria, the other nations that erupted the past several weeks. In Jordan nearly 50% of the employed population works for the state. This is an economy?
Consistent data on public work forces across nations is hard to find, but IMD, the Swiss business school, produces a comparison of public-sector employment as a percentage of total population for its Competitiveness Yearbook. It shows a striking correlation between economic success in emerging economies and relatively low populations of public employees, notably in Asia.
Korea, Indonesia, India, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand and even China (at 8.3%) have low public employment as a percentage of total population. In Singapore, it's less than 3%. Also on the list, below 15%, are Colombia, Peru and Chile, three of South America's strongest economies. A low number doesn't guarantee strong growth, but a high number probably kills it.
View Full Image
Associated Press
Protesters in Cairo's Tahrir Square. Who will hire them?
.The MENA countries of the Middle East and North Africa have used public work as a form of social security and tool of political stability. Their universities fed graduates into a nonproductive but high-benefit public economy. Many Tunisian rioters were unemployed college graduates.
The argument being made here is that past some tipping point of a population employed by the state, an economy starts to choke. Egypt is far past that point. In Tahrir Square you are watching the economic and psychological dislocation caused by this misallocation of national energy. This isn't just about a new government. It is a sit-down strike for a better economy.
Egypt faces a hard economic riddle: How does any place that has passed the public-sector tipping point escape these chains? (The crony capitalism of the younger Mubarak, Gamal, merely created a school of golden pilot fish alongside the public whale.)
The U.S. is hardly the place Egypt should look for an answer. Public-sector costs have driven New York, California and New Jersey to the edge of the fiscal cliff. Govs. Chris Christie and Andrew Cuomo are getting good notices for their ideas. But so far they haven't solved anything. Large populations of public workers could burden these states for years in their competition with leaner states. Hosni Mubarak also promised public-sector reform—20 years ago.
With a third of the population employed by the state, Egypt may be past the tipping point what allows a modern economy to grow.
.Podcast: Listen to the audio of Wonder Land here. .But hey, there's always tourism. A major complaint from Egypt is that the protesters are killing tourism. Whether Egypt, France, Italy, or New York City, tourists' cash flow is the last prop beneath economies staggered by the weight of public costs they can't unwind. Egypt has the pyramids, New York has Times Square.
At Davos last month, British Prime Minister David Cameron eloquently sounded the pro-growth trumpet and chided pessimists who "say that slow-growth status for Europe is inevitable." But in a thought-provoking article last month for The Wall Street Journal Europe, "How Big Government Killed Britain's Regions," former U.K. economics official Warwick Lightfoot argued that years of high public-sector wage and benefit settlements had "de-marketized" labor costs in the U.K.'s regions—Wales, Scotland, northern Ireland and the north of England. "The private sector," he said, "cannot flourish because price signals cannot operate properly in the labor market."
Amid the current crisis, Mr. Mubarak decreed a 15% wage and pension increase for public workers. Decades of U.S. governors and mayors did the same thing, poisoning local markets.
California isn't Egypt, yet. But politicians everywhere make the same mistakes, thinking the real economy is always out there somewhere, producing jobs and tax revenue. They think it's sort of like magic. But it isn't.
The first great lesson being learned in the 21st century is that neither the state nor the stork can bring jobs to life in a modern economy. Good luck to Egypt and all other nations on the wrong end of this learning curve.
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http://althouse.blogspot.com/2011/02/what-is-absolutely-clear-is-that-we-are.html
February 10, 2011
"What is absolutely clear is that we are witnessing history unfold. It's a moment of transformation that's taking place because the people of Egypt are calling for change."
Maybe the world doesn't actually work according to the transformative moments visualizations of President Obama.
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Woof,
I have but one word of advice for the protestors in Egypt, "run".
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110211/ap_on_re_mi_ea/ml_egypt
P.C.
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I could easily be wrong, but my guess is that the military will make a move against Mubarak that will be sufficient , , , for now.
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Woof,
I hope you're right and that's definitely a possibility but this could go bad in a heart beat.
P.C.
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Absolutely!
Glenn Beck was in full rant mode last night about all this. He makes a lot of strong points about the true nature of the MB, why this is happening now, and that sort of thing but I was left wondering if he really appreciated something else-- which is the natural yearning to live free of being under the heel of Mubarak's police thugs. As a general principla it is a force which America should be aligned.
I have no problem with the idea that sometimes we must deal with bastards, but we also must keep ready to evolve situations to a higher level, one that is more in tune with what America is about-- which is why BO et al should have been supporting Bush's efforts in Iraq instead of destroying them from the home front.
Where would be now if the Dems had supported the war (or at least not sabotaged it!)? What would the Iraqis have done and be doing now if they had confident that we weren't bugging out?
IMHO we would be sitting a whole bunch prettier than we are now.
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"which is the natural yearning to live free of being under the heel of Mubarak's police thugs. "
What if the heel of Mubarak's police thugs was preventing a hot war with Israel and an Sharia state and the rebirth of the caliphate?
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As I said, "I have no problem with the idea that sometimes we must deal with bastards, but we also must keep ready to evolve situations to a higher level, one that is more in tune with what America is about" because being tied to hated dying 82 year old dictators also has its problems and because America standing for the higher level is one of our greatest strengths-- perhaps our greatest of all. We need to remember that.
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Well said!
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The key problem is what you and I might define as freedom is probably not what many muslims in Egypt define as freedom. Also, having a military junta running a country probably doesn't qualify under most any definition of freedom anyone would care to use.
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http://apnews.myway.com/article/20110211/D9LAIKV80.html
Ahmadinejad: Egyptian protests herald new Mideast
Email this Story
Feb 11, 7:24 AM (ET)
By ALI AKBAR DAREINI
TEHRAN, Iran (AP) - Iran's president said Friday that Egypt's popular uprising shows a new Islamic Middle East is emerging, one that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad claims will have no signs of Israel and U.S. "interference."
The Iranian leader spoke as the country marked the 32nd anniversary of its 1979 Islamic Revolution that toppled the pro-U.S. shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and brought hardline clerics to power.
Ahmadinejad's remarks came hours after Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak announced he is transferring authority to his deputy but refused to step down, angering hundreds of thousands of Egyptians who have been demanding he relinquish his three-decade grip on power.
Tens of thousands marched down Tehran's main boulevard in state-organized anniversary festivities, chanting in support of Egyptian anti-government protesters. Some Iranians set an effigy of Mubarak on fire while others shouted: "Hosni non-Mubarak, 'Mubarak' (congratulations) on the uprising of your people."
Iran's state TV broadcast simultaneous live footage of the gathering at Tehran's Azadi, or Freedom, Square and that of anti-government demonstrations in Cairo's downtown Tahrir Square where tens of thousands had gathered by noon Friday.
Iran, which is at odds with the international community over its controversial nuclear program, has sought to portray the popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt as evidence of a replay of its own Islamic Revolution.
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STRATFOR’s Dr. George Friedman argues that the protesters in Egypt have achieved their primary objective: getting rid of Mubarak. Pay little attention to all the statements, he explains, the army is still in charge.
Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.
Colin: The question now many ask is: will Mubarak’s departure lead to the flowering of a new democracy in Egypt, or the continuation of 60 years of solid military rule, or perhaps a mixture of both? Welcome to agenda with George Friedman.
President Obama said today belongs to the people of Egypt. But what about tomorrow?
George: Well I really don’t know what Obama meant by that. What’s happened here is very simple: an 82-year-old man, who wanted to have his son appointed as his successor, was booted out by the army. Except for Mubarak, the army remains in charge of Egypt. The demonstrators are packing up and going home. In fact, they are rather friendly to the army and now the question really is what happens tomorrow is that the army may or may not declare martial law at some point to get everybody off the streets, they may have not gotten the Muslim Brotherhood for various reasons but the fundamental warp and woof of Egypt is intact. We’ve not had a dramatic sea change.
Colin: George, I suspect demonstrators were friendly to the army because they believed it would lead to ultimate democracy.
George: Well I don’t know what ultimate democracy means and I certainly don’t know what ultimate democracy means in Egypt. I know this much: the demonstrators were deeply opposed to Mubarak, they were not deeply opposed to the army. When the army announced they had essentially staged a coup to force Mubarak out, less 21 hours after a speech saying that he was staying, there was tremendous enthusiasm on the part of the people. And so these demonstrators, whoever they are, are favorably inclined to the military. They were bitterly opposed to Mubarak, they personalized the revolution, they won that part of the revolution. It’s not clear what else they wanted.
Colin: One of the opposition leaders said it would lead to the establishment of modern democratic secular government. We’re still a long way from that. Could it happen?
George: Well if he says it can happen, it certainly can happen. Look, this is a time where people say things and reporters write them down and record them and everybody wonders what they mean. Mostly what’s being said has no meaning. It is simply saying, “It’s over. The world will be better than it was before,” and so on and so forth. Pay very little attention to what people are saying at this point. Even as we saw we didn’t have to pay much attention to what Mubarak said. So let’s take a look at the objective situation, let’s forget all the statements and so on.
The army was in charge yesterday, it was in charge last week, it is in charge now. Whether or not the army will call elections, it will be a decision by the army. And as it has been for about 60 years, they will take place under the aegis of the army. The army remains a central institution of Egypt. It is, as in many of the countries, the most modern, the most efficient and certain the most powerful entity. That has not been shaken. And if there are elections, as the Constitution requires, the candidates will be running within this context. Do I expect an election in which a dramatic change takes place in who was elected? I suspect not, but that I’m not even sure when elections would be called because it’s not really clear whether martial law will be declared. Just a lot of things aren’t clear, except the most important thing: the army is in charge.
Colin: Who are the most important figures in the military?
George: One of the things that the army has shown is that the question of who’s the most significant figure really isn’t that important. It is an institution, not something of individuals. The fact that the army could purge itself of Hosni Mubarak showed that the institution in Egypt transcended the individual. Certainly, they’re going to be shifts and changes in people whose names we don’t even know will emerge from somewhat junior ranks — there was clearly dispute in the military at various points as to what was going to happen. But I would argue that really personalizing it — this person’s gained power, that person’s lost power — is not the point. The institution succeeded in stabilizing itself and I suspect will succeed in stabilizing at least for the immediate future the country, and that’s the most important question.
Colin: George, thank you. And that’s Agenda for this week, thanks very much for joining me, I’m Colin Chapman for STRATFOR. Until the next time, goodbye.
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Woof,
I've known from the beginning of this that Mubarak would not willingly step down and because of his strong ties to the military I thought that they would back him at least long enough for a transitional government to be set up. They did back his play for a time but when he failed to break the protest by injecting violence into the mix the military was left with the choice of acting militarily to quell the protest or try to appease the protesters by sending Mubarak on his way. One way or the other they had to act to end the protest because now serious damage is being done to Egypt's economy. They wisely chose to send Mubarak on his way. However, other than Mubarak being out of the chain of command nothing has changed in Egypt. The same system with the same people is still in place and the protesters have only gotten one thing that they wanted. They are going to want it all and they're going to want it much sooner than the military is going to give it to them. This is far from over.
Guro Craftydog called it right when he said the military would show Mubarak the door, the question now is who is going to do the same to the military? The other question is since Obama was so quick to throw Mubarak under the bus without even knowing what faction will ultimately gain control, how will our other fair weather friends in the region and around the world view our allegiance to them? I agree that a free and Democratic government in Egypt would be a wonderful thing. I think it's great that people there are willing to risk their lives to break free from a dictator's oppression; I'm on their side too. The problem is that those that truly want freedom and Democracy, might not be the ones that end up in power. Like it or not Mubarak the dictator kept a peace in place that protected our best interest and Israel's. Right now the Egyptian military is still honoring that peace but for how much longer? If the people of Egypt or the faction that ultimately gains control of the government puts the military in a position where they have to make another choice between loyalty to longtime ties and being forced to crackdown on their own people, who might be shown the door then?
P.C.
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/11/AR2011021103048.html?hpid=topnews
But a senior Republican member of Congress who has access to intelligence reports said U.S. spy agencies have seen recent indications that other Middle East leaders were dismayed by the United States' treatment of Mubarak.
"The other countries are mad as hell, and they're mad as hell at us," said the lawmaker, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the matter candidly.
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/11/AR2011021103048.html?hpid=topnews
But a senior Republican member of Congress who has access to intelligence reports said U.S. spy agencies have seen recent indications that other Middle East leaders were dismayed by the United States' treatment of Mubarak.
"The other countries are mad as hell, and they're mad as hell at us," said the lawmaker, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the matter candidly.
http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_saudi-arabia-fears-egypt-unrest-could-bolster-iran-s-role-in-region-analysts_1504576
Saudi Arabia is more concerned about losing allies to counter its regional adversary Iran than with the risk that upheavals sweeping Tunisia and Egypt might spread to the kingdom, diplomats and analysts say.
Flush with petrodollars, the world's top oil exporter can splash out to alleviate any social tensions due to unemployment — around 10 percent of the Saudi work force is jobless — and quell any unrest in the absolute monarchy, they say.
But some believe the Saudi rulers would be alarmed if the United States jettisons Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who, like successive Saudi monarchs, has been a longtime US ally since taking power three decades ago.
"The Saudis... are worried that the US has made a foreign policy mistake by appearing to give up support for Mubarak too easily," said Simon Henderson, a Washington-based Saudi watcher.
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Buzzwords like democracy can be easliy mis-used. I don't know how it translates in Arabic. To us, democracy is shorthand for consent of the governed. Rule by the majority (mob rule, MB rule) is the exact opposite. When Reagan discussed the subject, it was "freedom and democracy" and spelled out that freedom includes religious freedom along with the other freedoms. Religious freedom includes in this case the right to be Muslim, the right to not be Muslim, the right to practice Christianity, even to be Jewish??, the right to be of no religion at all, and the right to NOT be ruled by someone else's religion. When that does not happen, you do not have consent of the governed, which was the point of removing the dictator.
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CAIRO—Egypt's new military rulers indicated Saturday they would abide by the country's peace treaty with Israel and said they aim to ensure a peaceful transition to elections and a "free democratic state."
A day after the ouster of Egypt's longstanding president, Hosni Mubarak, the country's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces issued a communiqué saying the country "is committed to all regional and international obligations and treaties." Those treaties include its 1979 peace agreement with Israel.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu welcomed the announcement, saying the peace agreement "has greatly contributed to both countries and is the cornerstone of peace and stability in the entire Middle East."
The military rulers said Egypt's current cabinet would remain in power until a new government was formed. They pledged to insure "a peaceful transition of power in the framework of a free and democratic system." The new elected government "will rule the country to build a free democratic state," the statement said. It didn't set a timetable for the transition to democracy.
Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood said in a statement posted on its website Saturday that it wasn't seeking power or a majority of parliament seats. The group reiterated its previous assertion that it was only a participant in the Egyptian revolution and that its demands echoed those of the nation. It called on the army to rapidly form a new transitional government, scrap emergency laws, amend the constitution, ensure free elections and free all political detainees.
Mr. Mubarak stepped down Friday after 18 days of unrelenting protests, handing power to the military and opening the door to an uncertain new course for the Arab world's most populous country, and for the entire Middle East.
A number of senior government officials and former ministers were banned from traveling outside the country, including information minister Anas al-Fiqi and former prime minister Ahmad Nazif, state news media reported, citing court sources.
In a sign of attempts to restore normalcy, the military relaxed the hours of a nighttime curfew, the Associated Press reported.
In Cairo's Tahrir Square, the epicenter of the mass protests against Mr. Mubarak's rule, soldiers cleared the entrances to the square of barricades, barbed wire and the improvised barriers erected by protesters during the days of the heaviest clashes with pro-Mubarak demonstrators.
The country's stock market will reopen on Wednesday, the bourse said in a statement. It had planned to open on Sunday, after being closed since Jan. 27, two days after the start of the protests. In the last two days of trading before it closed, the exchange dropped 16%
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We shall see.
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By George Friedman
This seems very sound to me:
On Feb. 11, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigned. A military council was named to govern in his place. On Feb. 11-12, the crowds that had gathered in Tahrir Square celebrated Mubarak’s fall and the triumph of democracy in Egypt. On Feb. 13, the military council abolished the constitution and dissolved parliament, promising a new constitution to be ratified by a referendum and stating that the military would rule for six months, or until the military decides it’s ready to hold parliamentary and presidential elections.
What we see is that while Mubarak is gone, the military regime in which he served has dramatically increased its power. This isn’t incompatible with democratic reform. Organizing elections, political parties and candidates is not something that can be done quickly. If the military is sincere in its intentions, it will have to do these things. The problem is that if the military is insincere it will do exactly the same things. Six months is a long time, passions can subside and promises can be forgotten.
At this point, we simply don’t know what will happen. We do know what has happened. Mubarak is out of office, the military regime remains intact and it is stronger than ever. This is not surprising, given what STRATFOR has said about recent events in Egypt, but the reality of what has happened in the last 72 hours and the interpretation that much of the world has placed on it are startlingly different. Power rests with the regime, not with the crowds. In our view, the crowds never had nearly as much power as many have claimed.
Certainly, there was a large crowd concentrated in a square in Cairo, and there were demonstrations in other cities. But the crowd was limited. It never got to be more than 300,000 people or so in Tahrir Square, and while that’s a lot of people, it is nothing like the crowds that turned out during the 1989 risings in Eastern Europe or the 1979 revolution in Iran. Those were massive social convulsions in which millions came out onto the streets. The crowd in Cairo never swelled to the point that it involved a substantial portion of the city.
In a genuine revolution, the police and military cannot contain the crowds. In Egypt, the military chose not to confront the demonstrators, not because the military itself was split, but because it agreed with the demonstrators’ core demand: getting rid of Mubarak. And since the military was the essence of the Egyptian regime, it is odd to consider this a revolution.
Mubarak and the Regime
The crowd in Cairo, as telegenic as it was, was the backdrop to the drama, not the main feature. The main drama began months ago when it became apparent that Mubarak intended to make his reform-minded 47-year-old son, Gamal, lacking in military service, president of Egypt. This represented a direct challenge to the regime. In a way, Mubarak was the one trying to overthrow the regime.
The Egyptian regime was founded in a coup led by Col. Gamal Abdul Nasser and modeled after that of Kemal Ataturk of Turkey, basing it on the military. It was intended to be a secular regime with democratic elements, but it would be guaranteed and ultimately controlled by the military. Nasser believed that the military was the most modern and progressive element of Egyptian society and that it had to be given the responsibility and power to modernize Egypt.
While Nasser took off his uniform, the military remained the bulwark of the regime. Each successive president of Egypt, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, while formally elected in elections of varying dubiousness, was an officer in the Egyptian military who had removed his uniform when he entered political life.
Mubarak’s decision to name his son represented a direct challenge to the Egyptian regime. Gamal Mubarak was not a career military officer, nor was he linked to the military’s high command, which had been the real power in the regime. Mubarak’s desire to have his son succeed him appalled and enraged the Egyptian military, the defender of the regime. If he were to be appointed, then the military regime would be replaced by, in essence, a hereditary monarchy — what had ruled Egypt before the military. Large segments of the military had been maneuvering to block Mubarak’s ambitions and, with increasing intensity, wanted to see Mubarak step down in order to pave the way for an orderly succession using the elections scheduled for September, elections designed to affirm the regime by selecting a figure acceptable to the senior military men. Mubarak’s insistence on Gamal and his unwillingness to step down created a crisis for the regime. The military feared the regime could not survive Mubarak’s ambitions.
This is the key point to understand. There is a critical distinction between the regime and Hosni Mubarak. The regime consisted — and consists — of complex institutions centered on the military but also including the civilian bureaucracy controlled by the military. Hosni Mubarak was the leader of the regime, successor to Nasser and Sadat, who over time came to distinguish his interests from those of the regime. He was increasingly seen as a threat to the regime, and the regime turned on him.
The demonstrators never called for the downfall of the regime. They demanded that Mubarak step aside. This was the same demand that was being made by many if not most officers in the military months before the crowds gathered in the streets. The military did not like the spectacle of the crowds, which is not the way the military likes to handle political matters. At the same time, paradoxically, the military welcomed the demonstrations, since they created a crisis that put the question of Mubarak’s future on the table. They gave the military an opportunity to save the regime and preserve its own interests.
The Egyptian military is opaque. It isn’t clear who was reluctant to act and who was eager. We would guess that the people who now make up the ruling military council were reluctant to act. They were of the same generation as Hosni Mubarak, owed their careers to him and were his friends. Younger officers, who had joined the military after 1973 and had trained with the Americans rather than the Soviets, were the likely agitators for blocking Mubarak’s selection of Gamal as his heir, but there were also senior officers publicly expressing reservations. Who was on what side is a guess. What is known is that many in the military opposed Gamal, would not push the issue to a coup, and then staged a coup designed to save the regime after the demonstrations in Cairo were under way.
That is the point. What happened was not a revolution. The demonstrators never brought down Mubarak, let alone the regime. What happened was a military coup that used the cover of protests to force Mubarak out of office in order to preserve the regime. When it became clear Feb. 10 that Mubarak would not voluntarily step down, the military staged what amounted to a coup to force his resignation. Once he was forced out of office, the military took over the existing regime by creating a military council and taking control of critical ministries. The regime was always centered on the military. What happened on Feb. 11 was that the military took direct control.
Again, as a guess, the older officers, friends of Mubarak, found themselves under pressure from other officers and the United States to act. They finally did, taking the major positions for themselves. The demonstrations were the backdrop for this drama and the justification for the military’s actions, but they were not a revolution in the streets. It was a military coup designed to preserve a military-dominated regime. And that was what the crowds were demanding as well.
Coup and Revolution
We now face the question of whether the coup will turn into a revolution. The demonstrators demanded — and the military has agreed to hold — genuinely democratic elections and to stop repression. It is not clear that the new leaders mean what they have said or were simply saying it to get the crowds to go home. But there are deeper problems in the democratization of Egypt. First, Mubarak’s repression had wrecked civil society. The formation of coherent political parties able to find and run candidates will take a while. Second, the military is deeply enmeshed in running the country. Backing them out of that position, with the best will in the world, will require time. The military bought time Feb. 13, but it is not clear that six months is enough time, and it is not clear that, in the end, the military will want to leave the position it has held for more than half a century.
Of course, there is the feeling, as there was in 2009 with the Tehran demonstrations, that something unheard of has taken place, as U.S. President Barack Obama has implied. It is said to have something to do with Twitter and Facebook. We should recall that, in our time, genuine revolutions that destroyed regimes took place in 1989 and 1979, the latter even before there were PCs. Indeed, such revolutions go back to the 18th century. None of them required smartphones, and all of them were more thorough and profound than what has happened in Egypt so far. This revolution will not be “Twitterized.” The largest number of protesters arrived in Tahrir Square after the Internet was completely shut down.
The new government has promised to honor all foreign commitments, which obviously include the most controversial one in Egypt, the treaty with Israel. During the celebrations the evening of Feb. 11 and morning of Feb. 12, the two chants were about democracy and Palestine. While the regime committed itself to maintaining the treaty with Israel, the crowds in the square seemed to have other thoughts, not yet clearly defined. But then, it is not clear that the demonstrators in the square represent the wishes of 80 million Egyptians. For all the chatter about the Egyptian people demanding democracy, the fact is that hardly anyone participated in the demonstrations, relative to the number of Egyptians there are, and no one really knows how the Egyptian people would vote on this issue.
The Egyptian government is hardly in a position to confront Israel, even if it wanted to. The Egyptian army has mostly American equipment and cannot function if the Americans don’t provide spare parts or contractors to maintain that equipment. There is no Soviet Union vying to replace the United States today. Re-equipping and training a military the size of Egypt’s is measured in decades, not weeks. Egypt is not going to war any time soon. But then the new rulers have declared that all prior treaties — such as with Israel — will remain in effect.
What Was Achieved?
Therefore, we face this reality. The Egyptian regime is still there, still controlled by old generals. They are committed to the same foreign policy as the man they forced out of office. They have promised democracy, but it is not clear that they mean it. If they mean it, it is not clear how they would do it, certainly not in a timeframe of a few months. Indeed, this means that the crowds may re-emerge demanding more rapid democratization, depending on who organized the crowds in the first place and what their intentions are now.
It is not that nothing happened in Egypt, and it is not that it isn’t important. It is simply that what happened was not what the media portrayed but a much more complex process, most of it not viewable on TV. Certainly, there was nothing unprecedented in what was achieved or how it was achieved. It is not even clear what was achieved. Nor is it clear that anything that has happened changes Egyptian foreign or domestic policy. It is not even clear that those policies could be changed in practical terms regardless of intent.
The week began with an old soldier running Egypt. It ended with different old soldiers running Egypt with even more formal power than Mubarak had. This has caused worldwide shock and awe. We were killjoys in 2009, when we said the Iranians revolution wasn’t going anywhere. We do not want to be killjoys now, since everyone is so excited and happy. But we should point out that, in spite of the crowds, nothing much has really happened yet in Egypt. It doesn’t mean that it won’t, but it hasn’t yet.
An 82-year-old man has been thrown out of office, and his son will not be president. The constitution and parliament are gone and a military junta is in charge. The rest is speculation.
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Woof,
That's all fine and well but the unrest has caught on in the area and what I see happening is radical Islamic fascist doing the military equivalent of shaping the battlefield for a future caliphate and the author of that piece failed to recognise the consequences of our allies in the area looking at us very suspiciously now and how our government and the Media couriered this up as being 1776. :-P As Glenn Beck pointed out it wasn't so long ago that all these same players, including Obama as a Senator, said that no one in that region of the world could ever come out of termoil and create some kind of free Democratic government and they said that about Iraq where we had people on the ground setting it up. In Egypt we had nothing going on like that but yet they seemed to think a free democracy was just going to magically appear.
P.C.
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Exactly!
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By JAY SOLOMON
WASHINGTON—Early last year, a group of U.S.-based human-rights activists, neoconservative policy makers and Mideast experts told Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that what passed for calm in Egypt was an illusion.
"If the opportunity to reform is missed, prospects for stability and prosperity in Egypt will be in doubt," read their April 2010 letter.
The correspondence was part of a string of warnings passed to the Obama administration arguing that Egypt, heading toward crisis, required a vigorous U.S. response. Hosni Mubarak, Egypt's 82-year-old dictator, was moving to rig a string of elections, they said. Egypt's young population was growing more agitated.
The bipartisan body that wrote to Mrs. Clinton, the Egypt Working Group, argued that the administration wasn't fully appraising the warning signs in Egypt. Its members came together in early 2010, concerned that the Arab world's biggest country was headed for transition but that the U.S. and others weren't preparing for a post-Mubarak era.
The Cairo uprising has so far had a more orderly outcome, and one better for U.S. interests, than might have been the case. But the U.S.'s hesitant initial embrace of the revolt could reverberate as a democratic wave surges across the Arab world. The U.S. at first alienated protesters—and then alienated the Mubarak regime, a longtime ally, sparking concern from other regional friends.
U.S. officials say the Obama administration focused from the beginning on promoting democracy in Arab states and was aware of the deep problems in Cairo. The administration generally chose not to deliver its message through tough public rhetoric, contending such language alienates foreign governments.
The administration of George W. Bush, by comparison, at times publicly pressed Mr. Mubarak for political reforms, identifying democracy promotion in the Middle East as a key tenet of U.S. foreign policy.
Officials said President Barack Obama and Mrs. Clinton regularly raised democracy issues with their counterparts in private. Mr. Obama focused during three meetings over 18 months with Mr. Mubarak on ending Egypt's 30-year state of emergency, press freedoms and elections. Mrs. Clinton pushed Egypt and other Arab countries to allow the free flow of information, urging them to lift blocks on Facebook, Twitter and other social media.
Moreover, Mr. Mubarak had survived challenges before, and few took seriously the idea he could be toppled. "This type of movement simply never happened before in the Middle East," said Daniel Levy, a former Israeli peace negotiator.
"In a complicated situation, we got it about right," Mr. Obama told reporters Tuesday. The U.S. now faces "an opportunity as well as a challenge" in the broader regional movement.
As a candidate, Mr. Obama campaigned against aggressively intervening in the affairs of other states, largely in response to the Iraq war. His State Department cut funding for civil-society support in Egypt to $9.5 million in 2009 from nearly $30 million a year earlier, although this funding line would later rise.
Washington's ambassador to Cairo, Margaret Scobey, agreed to an Egyptian demand that all grants to civil-society groups from the U.S. Agency for International Development be distributed only to those registered with the Mubarak government.
When Mr. Obama chose Egypt as the venue for his much-anticipated June 2009 speech to the Muslim world, he refrained from specifically pressing Mr. Mubarak on democracy.
The Obama administration reaped strategic gains from this outreach. Cairo embraced Mr. Obama's initiative to accelerate Arab-Israeli peace talks, hosting meetings between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators and attempting to broker a unity government between feuding Palestinian factions.
By early 2010, Mr. Mubarak's government began taking steps widely viewed as aimed at extending his rule or that of his anointed successor. In May, he extended martial law in his country by two years.
The Egypt Working Group sent a letter to the State Department even more alarmist than the one it dispatched in April. "The renewal...heightens our concern that the administration's practice of quiet diplomacy is not bearing fruit," it read.
Following June elections for the lower house of parliament, Egyptian and American nongovernmental organizations reported to State Department contacts a crackdown on anyone seeking to bring transparency to the next set of elections, for Egypt's upper house of parliament, in November. The National Democratic Institute, a U.S. organization that was training Egyptians to be election monitors, saw its Egyptian staff regularly interrogated by Cairo's intelligence services.
"The families of our workers grew terrified about retaliation by the regime," said Les Campbell, who heads NDI's Mideast programs. Mr. Campbell said he held regular meetings with U.S. officials to discuss the problems as the crisis in Egypt worsened.
To try to stop the intimidation tactics, the NDI's chairman—former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright—and Senator John McCain (R., Ariz.), chairman of the International Republican Institute, jointly wrote to Mr. Mubarak in late July asking him to allow international monitors to observe the November vote. They say the Egyptian leader didn't respond.
Sen. McCain sought to pass, with then-Democratic Sen. Russ Feingold of Wisconsin, a Senate resolution formally censuring Egypt's human-rights record. Egypt persuaded the two senators to anonymously place a hold on the resolution, according to congressional officials. Sen. McCain blamed the Obama administration for not publicly backing the bill.
"I was disappointed that we didn't get administration support," Sen. McCain said in an interview. "To think this would have changed things fundamentally at the time in Egypt? I don't know. But we at least should have tried."
Senior U.S. officials said they weren't opposed to Mr. McCain's resolution. They said both the White House and State Department repeatedly raised concerns about the fairness and openness of November elections with their Egyptian counterparts.
For analysts tracking Egypt, the risks inherent in the elections were clear. "If the ruling party plops someone in as president…then you really have the possibility of the lid popping off in Egypt," Robert Kagan, a Working Group member and conservative foreign-policy analyst, said in a November interview. "We're playing this Cold War game of clinging to the dictator for fear of something more radical."
Weeks later, Mrs. Clinton met Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit in Washington and didn't mention the need for transparent elections during their public remarks. Instead, she praised Cairo as the "cornerstone" of Middle East stability.
In the late 2010 upper-house election, Mr. Mubarak's party won 93% of the seats. It was widely viewed as the most corrupt in the country's history.
That prompted the Obama administration to take a harder line on Mr. Mubarak and other regional strongmen. Mrs. Clinton, on a swing through Gulf states in early January, echoed the sharp rhetoric of the Bush years by telling a gathering of Arab leaders in Qatar that their countries risked "sinking into the sand" if they didn't change.
But even in the final stages of Egypt's unrest, the U.S. went back and forth. On Jan. 30—days after protests broke out on Egyptian streets—Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry (D., Mass.) called Vice President Joe Biden to say he had written an opinion piece for the New York Times calling on Mr. Mubarak to resign.
Mr. Biden offered encouragement, Mr. Kerry said in an interview. "My instincts and feeling was the thing was broken with Mubarak," he said.
Just a few days later, the administration's chosen envoy, former ambassador Frank Wisner, delivered a much more tepid message to the Egyptian president, according to people familiar with the matter.
In the end, Mr. Obama took increasingly strident tones that all but called for Mr. Mubarak's removal. As protests continue to roil the region, administration officials say they will stick to basic principles: supporting the core rights of people to assemble and protest peacefully.
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By SAM SCHECHNER
CBS News correspondent Lara Logan on Friday suffered a "brutal and sustained sexual assault and beating" after being separated from her crew in the midst of a crowd in Egypt, the CBS Corp. news unit said Tuesday.
At the time of the incident, Ms. Logan, a veteran war reporter, was covering the celebrations in Cairo's Tahrir Square after former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak stepped down. Ms. Logan was separated from her colleagues by a large "mob of more than 200 people whipped into frenzy," CBS said.
CBS News correspondent Lara Logan suffered a "brutal and sustained sexual assault" last week while reporting in Cairo's Tahrir Square, CBS said Tuesday. Video courtesy of Fox News and photo courtesy of Associated Press/CBS News.
The separation and assault lasted for roughly 20 to 30 minutes, said a person familiar with the matter, who added that it was "not a rape." A CBS News spokesman declined to comment beyond the statement.
CBS said Ms. Logan was rescued by a group of women and roughly 20 Egyptian soldiers, and reunited with her team. She flew back to the U.S. on the first flight Saturday morning, and is now in the hospital recovering, CBS said.
The assault follows a rash of violence against journalists during the uprising in Egypt. In multiple instances, reporters were detained by security forces, or beaten by angry mobs, often described as supporting now-ousted Mr. Mubarak.
In a Feb. 7 interview on public-affairs talk show "Charlie Rose," while Mr. Mubarak was still in power, Ms. Logan said her team had been "heavily, heavily intimidated" while reporting in Egypt. She said they were detained for 16 hours, and their Egyptian driver was badly beaten.
"It was really the first sign of the strategy of the Mubarak regime. They want the spotlight turned off," she said. "It was an instant crackdown."
It is unclear whether Friday's assault against Ms. Logan had political aims. In its statement, CBS News statement said only that Ms. Logan and her team were "surrounded by a dangerous element amidst the celebration."
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"The Cairo uprising has so far had a more orderly outcome, and one better for U.S. interests, than might have been the case."
To borrow from the president's spiritual leader of 20 years: "Those chickens will come home to roost".
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CBS reporter's Cairo nightmare
By MICHAEL SHAIN, DON KAPLAN and KATE SHEEHY
Last Updated: 7:16 AM, February 16, 2011
Posted: 1:19 AM, February 16, 2011
"60 Minutes" correspondent Lara Logan was repeatedly sexually assaulted by thugs yelling, "Jew! Jew!" as she covered the chaotic fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo's main square Friday, CBS and sources said yesterday.
The TV crew with Logan, who is also the network's chief foreign correspondent, had its cameras rolling moments before she was dragged off -- and caught her on tape looking tense and trying to head away from a crowd of men behind her in Tahrir Square.
READ: BATTLE-TOUGH BEAUTY NO 'GIRLY GIRL'
"Logan was covering the jubilation . . . when she and her team and their security were surrounded by a dangerous element amidst the celebration," CBS said in a statement. "It was a mob of more than 200 people whipped into a frenzy.
"In the crush of the mob, [Logan] was separated from her crew. She was surrounded and suffered a brutal and sustained sexual assault and beating before being saved by a group of women and an estimated 20 Egyptian soldiers.
"She reconnected with the CBS team, returned to her hotel and returned to the United States on the first flight the next morning," the network added. "She is currently in the hospital recovering."
A network source told The Post that her attackers were screaming, "Jew! Jew!" during the assault. And the day before, Logan had told Esquire.com that Egyptian soldiers hassling her and her crew had accused them of "being Israeli spies." Logan is not Jewish.
In Friday's attack, she was separated from her colleagues and attacked for between 20 to 30 minutes, The Wall Street Journal said.
Her injuries were described to The Post as "serious."
CBS went public with the incident only after it became clear that other media outlets were on to it, sources said.
"A call came in from The [Associated Press]" seeking information, a TV-industry source told The Post. "They knew she had been attacked, and they had details. CBS decided to get in front of the story."
Most network higher-ups didn't even know how brutal the sexual assault was until a few minutes before the statement went out.
http://www.nypost.com/f/print/news/international/cbs_reporter_cairo_nightmare_pXiUVvhwIDdCrbD95ybD5N
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http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=208463&R=R3
Egyptian youth group: Halt gas shipments to Israel
By JPOST.COM STAFF
02/16/2011 11:36
A coordinator of Egypt's April 6 Youth Movement told USA Today on Wednesday that if the group's demands "are not met, we'll be on the street again."
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This reads to me as much worse than that:
http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Article.aspx?id=207963
If attacks from Sinai start hitting Israel, things could get really hairy really quickly.
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Well, at least Israel has a good friend in the white house.
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Maybe they will be too broke to do anything about it?
Summary
Until just a few years ago, Egypt’s ruling military elite was able to “borrow” money from Egyptian banks with no intention of paying it back. President Hosni Mubarak’s son Gamal changed all that, reforming and privatizing the system in order to build an empire for himself. For the first time in centuries, Egypt’s financial position was not entirely dependent upon outside forces. Now, Mubarak and his reform-minded son are out of the picture and Egypt has a budget deficit and a government debt load that are teetering on the edge of sustainability.
Analysis
Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul Gheit called on the international community Feb. 15 to help speed Egypt’s economic recovery. Such foreign assistance will certainly be essential, but only in part because of the economic disruptions caused by the recent protests. Even more important, the political machinations that led to the protests indicate Egypt’s economic structure is about to revert to a dependence upon outside assistance.
Egypt is one of the most undynamic economies of the world. The Nile River Delta is not navigable at all, and it is crisscrossed by omnipresent irrigation canals in order to make the desert bloom. This imposes massive infrastructure costs upon Egyptian society at the same time as it robs it of the ability to float goods cheaply from place to place. This mix of high capital demands and low capital generation has made Egypt one of the poorest places in the world in per capita terms. There just has not been money available to fund development.
As a result, Egypt lacks a meaningful industrial base and is a major importer of consumer goods, machinery, vehicles, wood products (there are no trees in the desert) and foodstuffs (Egypt imports roughly half of its grain needs). Egypt’s only exports are a moderate amount of natural gas and fertilizer, a bit of oil, cotton products and some basic metals.
The bottom line is that even in the best of times Egypt faces severe financial constraints — its budget deficit is normally in the range of 7 to 9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) — and with the recent political instability, these financial pressures are rising.
The protests have presented Egypt with a cash-crunch problem. At $13 billion in annual revenues, tourism is the country’s most important income stream. The recent protests shut down tourism completely — at the height of the tourist season, no less. The Egyptian government estimates the losses to date at about $1.5 billion. Military rule, tentatively expected to last for the next six months, is going to crimp tourism income for the foreseeable future. Simultaneously, the government wants to put together a stimulus package to get things moving again. Details are almost nonexistent at present, but a good rule of thumb for stimulus is that it must be at least 1 percent of GDP — a bill of about $2 billion. So assuming that everything goes back to normal immediately — which is unlikely — the government would have to come up with $3.5 billion from somewhere.
Which brings us to financing the deficit, and here we get into some of the political intrigue that toppled former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.
One cannot simply walk out of Egypt, so since the time of the pharaohs the Egyptian leadership has commanded a captive labor pool. This phenomenon meant more than simply having access to very cheap labor (free in ancient times); it also meant having access to captive money. Just as the pharaohs exploited the population to build the pyramids, the modern-day elite — the military leadership — exploited the population’s deposits in the banking system. This military elite — or, more accurately, the firms it controlled — took out loans from the country’s banks without any intention of paying them back. This practice enervated the banks in particular and the broader economy in general and contributed to Egypt’s chronic capital shortage. It also forced the government to turn to external sources of financing to operate, in particular the U.S. government, which was happy to play the role of funds provider during the final decade of the Cold War. There were many results, with high inflation, volatile living standards and overall exposure to international financial whims and moods being among the more disruptive.
Over the past 20 years, three things have changed this environment. First, as a reward for Egypt’s participation in the first Gulf War, the United States arranged for the forgiveness of much of Egypt’s outstanding foreign debt. Second, with the Cold War over, the United States steadily dialed back its economic assistance to Egypt. Since its height in 1980, U.S. economic assistance has dwindled by over 80 percent in real terms to under a half-billion dollars annually, forcing Cairo to find other ways to cover the difference (although Egypt is still the second-largest recipient of American military aid). But the final — and most decisive factor — was internal.
Mubarak’s son Gamal sought to change the way Egypt did business in order to build his own corporate empire. One of the many changes he made was empowering the central bank to actually enforce underwriting standards at the banks. The effort began in 2004, and early estimates indicated that as many as one in four outstanding loans had no chance of repayment. By 2010 the system was largely reformed and privatized, and the military elite’s ability to tap the banks for “loans” had largely disappeared. The government was then able to step into that gap and tap the banks’ available capital to fund its budget deficit. In fact, it is this arrangement that allowed Egypt to weather the recent global financial crisis as well as it did. For the first time in centuries, Egypt’s financial position was not entirely dependent upon outside forces. The government’s total debt load remains uncomfortably high at 72 percent of GDP, but its foreign debt load is only 11 percent of GDP. The economy was hardly thriving, but economically, Egypt was certainly a more settled place. For example, Egypt now has a mortgage market, which did not exist a decade ago.
From Gamal Mubarak’s point of view, four problems had been solved. The government had more stable financing capacity, the old military guard had been weakened, the banks were in better shape, and he was able to build his own corporate empire on the redirected financial flows in the process. But these changes and others like them earned the Mubarak family the military’s ire. Mubarak and his reform-minded son are out of the picture now, and the reform effort with them. With the constitution suspended, the parliament dissolved and military rule the order of the day, it stretches the mind to think that the central bank will be the singular institution that will retain any meaningful policy autonomy. If the generals take the banks back for themselves, Egypt will have no choice but to seek international funds to cover its budget shortfalls. Incidentally, we do not find it surprising that now — five days after the protests ended — the banks are still closed by order of the military government.
Yet Egypt cannot simply tap international debt markets like a normal country. While its foreign debt load is small, its total debt levels are very similar to states that have faced default and/or bailout problems in the past. An 8-percent-of-GDP budget deficit and a 72-percent-of-GDP government debt load are teetering on the edge of what is sustainable. As a point of comparison, Argentina defaulted in 2001 with a 60-percent-of-GDP debt load, and it had far more robust income streams. Even if Egypt can find some interested foreign investors, the cost of borrowing will be prohibitively high, and the amounts needed are daunting. Plainly stated, Cairo needed to come up with $16 billion annually just to break even before the crisis and the likely banking changes that will come along with it.
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http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/a-luckier-woman-covering-cairo/?singlepage=true
It wasn’t celebratory that night Lara Logan was attacked. It was terrifying.
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http://legalinsurrection.blogspot.com/2011/02/yuppie-revolution-in-egypt-is-over.html
Sunday, February 20, 2011
The Yuppie Revolution In Egypt Is Over, The Islamist Revolution Has Begun
When it came to overthrowing Hosni Mubarek, the western media thrust itself into the situation and portrayed the uprising as a western-style demand for freedom.
The television screens were filled with stories of relatively western figures such as Google employee Wael Ghonim, who became the face of the new Egypt -- educated, professional, and desirous of freedom as we know it.
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LxJK6SxGCAw&feature=player_embedded#t=0s[/youtube]
Now that Mubarek is gone, the western media mostly has moved on to the next revolution, secure in the perception that Egypt is moving in the right direction.
But that is a false comfort. As I posted yesterday, over a million Egyptians turned out in Tahrir Square last Friday to cheer the vile anti-Semitic Sunni cleric Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who had been exiled by Mubarek, and who espouses the fundamentalist Islamic view that Jews must live as Dhimmis under Islamic control. Instead of accurately reporting the significance of this event, The New York Times whitewashed the cleric as someone who supports a "a pluralistic, multiparty, civil democracy."
Here is the video of the rally (in Arabic, via Israel Matzav) with the crowd chanting:
"To Jerusalem We go, for us to be the Martyrs of the Millions."
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=BLM3CswkfQw#t=13s[/youtube]
[Added: Partial transcript and video of speech with translation at links.]
Where was the western hero Ghonim?
He tried to take the microphone to speak to the crowd, presumably to preach his western values, but he was kept off the stage by Sheik al-Qaradawi's security.
But you probably haven't heard that, because it was not widely reported, except by AFP, Egypt protest hero Wael Ghonim barred from stage (h/t Israel Matzav):
Google executive Wael Ghonim, who emerged as a leading voice in Egypt's uprising, was barred from the stage in Tahrir Square on Friday by security guards, an AFP photographer said. Ghonim tried to take the stage in Tahrir, the epicentre of anti-regime protests that toppled President Hosni Mubarak, b ut men who appeared to be guarding influential Muslim cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi barred him from doing so.
Ghonim, who was angered by the episode, then left the square with his face hidden by an Egyptian flag.
This is the problem with those, like Roger Cohen in The New York Times, who glorify the "Arab Street." Ghonim was not the face of the "Arab Street," he merely was a face to which western media could relate.
Will the western media be as vigorous in exposing what is going on now in Egypt as it was in exposing the wrongs of Mubarek? I think not, because the truth -- that the western media acted as willing dupes once again -- hits too close to home.
As for Ghonim, expect him to follow the path of the intelligentsia wherever Islamist forces have taken control. He'll move to the United States, where he will sit down for another 60 Minutes interview lamenting what has become of his beloved Egypt.
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http://legalinsurrection.blogspot.com/2011/02/yuppie-revolution-in-egypt-is-over.html
Sunday, February 20, 2011
The Yuppie Revolution In Egypt Is Over, The Islamist Revolution Has Begun
When it came to overthrowing Hosni Mubarek, the western media thrust itself into the situation and portrayed the uprising as a western-style demand for freedom.
**I think we are going to look back at 9/11/01 as the "good old days" compared to what's coming.
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There are very few, if any would-be Thomas Jeffersons clad in man-dresses in Egypt. Democracy in Egypt will be the genesis of the Islamic Republic of Egypt.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-20/al-qaeda-s-zawahiri-tells-egyptians-to-establish-islamic-state.html
Al-Qaeda’s Zawahiri Tells Egyptians to Establish Islamic State
By Vivian Salama - Feb 20, 2011 6:12 AM MT
Al-Qaeda’s second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri urged Egyptians to revive Islamic rule and criticized Hosni Mubarak as a “modern-day pharaoh” in remarks that came before the former Egyptian president was toppled.
“The Egyptian regime is in fact a repressive regime that relies on brutality and rigged elections while the Islamic system is consultative and seeks to achieve justice,” the Egyptian militant leader said in an audio recording posted on a website used by Islamist groups including al-Qaeda.
Mubarak was ousted Feb. 11 after 18 days of anti-government protests that demanded political and economic reforms. Al- Qaeda’s Saudi-born leader Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri have often condemned the Mubarak regime for its ties to Israel and the U.S. and urged Muslims to remove U.S.-backed rulers.
Egypt, under the late president Anwar Sadat, was the first Arab nation to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. Mubarak, who took over after Islamists killed Sadat, upheld the accord.
“The reality of Egypt is the reality of deviation from Islam,” Zawahiri, an Egyptian, said in the recording, part of a documentary by al-Qaeda’s media arm As-Sahab titled: “A message of Hope and Good Tidings to Our Folk in Egypt.”
“Secularism entered our countries through military occupation, oppression and massacres,” he said. “Western secularism is animus to Islam and supportive to Zionism.”
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http://www.memri.org/clip_transcript/en/2815.htm
February 18, 2011 Clip No. 2815
Leading Sunni Scholar Sheik Yousuf Al-Qaradhawi Calls for the Egyptian Army to Replace the Government and Prays to Allah for the Conquest of the Al-Aqsa Mosque
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Following are excerpts from a speech delivered by Sheik Yousuf Al-Qaradhawi, chairman of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, at Tahrir Square, Cairo, on Febuary 18, 2011. The speech was delivered live by Egyptian Channel 1
Sheik Yousuf Al-Qaradhawi: I call upon the youth to maintain their spirit. The revolution is not over yet. Do not think that the revolution is over. The revolution continues.
We must contribute to the building of the new Egypt, Egypt which has learned a lot from this revolution. Continue your revolution and protect it. Beware that nobody steals it from you. Protect this revolution. Beware of the hypocrites, who are ready to put on a new face every day.
[...]
A word to the Egyptian army: I salute the Egyptian army, which is the shield of the people and its support. Some of the brothers told me not to be too hasty in praising the army, because it might let you down and not support the revolution. I said to them: By Allah, they will not let me down.
When I delivered my last sermon, following the first [army] announcement, which caused many people to feel frustration, I said that I believe that the Egyptian army is no less patriotic than the Tunisian army. The Tunisian army supported the Tunisian revolution. It is inconceivable that the Egyptian army, which waged four wars for the sake of Egypt and Palestine, would betray its country or sacrifice its people for the sake of a single person. This army is too wise and noble to do such a thing. I swore that the army would join the people, and indeed, they did.
[...]
We demand that the Egyptian army liberate us from the government, which was formed by Mubarak in the days of his soon-to-be-erased rule. We want a new government, without a single one of the faces that people cannot tolerate anymore. Whenever people see these faces, they remember the injustice, the killing, they remember the invasion of the camels, mules, and horses, as well as the snipers who killed the people.
[...]
A message to our brothers in Palestine: I harbor the hope that just like Allah allowed me to witness the triumph of Egypt, He will allow me to witness the conquest of the Al-Aqsa Mosque and will enable me to preach in the Al-Aqsa Mosque.
Oh Allah, allow us to preach in the Al-Aqsa Mosque.
Crowds: Amen.
Sheik Yousuf Al-Qaradhawi: Allow us to enter the Al-Aqsa Mosque safely.
Crowds: Amen.
Sheik Yousuf Al-Qaradhawi: Allow us to enter the Al-Aqsa Mosque without fear.
Crowds: Amen.
Sheik Yousuf Al-Qaradhawi: Accomplish this complete victory for us.
Crowds: Amen.
Sheik Yousuf Al-Qaradhawi: Oh, the sons of Palestine, rest assured that you will be victorious.
Crowds: Amen.
Sheik Yousuf Al-Qaradhawi: The Rafah border crossing will be opened for you. This is what I demand from the Egyptian army and from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.
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Egypt Gets Its Khomeini: Qaradawi Returns in Triumph
This article was published in American Thinker but the full text--with additional material--is posted here. I'd prefer that you forwarded, read, or reprinted this text.
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By Barry Rubin
Friday, February 18 may be a turning point in Egyptian history. On this day Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the best-known Muslim Brotherhood cleric in the world and one of the most famous Islamist thinkers, will address a mass rally in Cairo.
It was 32 years ago almost to the day when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned in triumph to Tehran to take the leadership of that country. Qaradawi has a tougher job but he's up to the challenge if his health holds up.
Up until now, the Egyptian revolution generally, and the Brotherhood in particular, has lacked a charismatic thinker, someone who could really mobilize the masses. Qaradawi is that man. Long resident in the Gulf, he is returning to his homeland in triumph. Through internet, radio, his 100 books, and his weekly satellite television program, Qaradawi has been an articulate voice for revolutionary Islamism. He is literally a living legend.
Under the old regime, Qaradawi was banned from the country. He is now 84 years old--two years older than the fallen President Husni Mubarak--but he is tremendously energetic and clear-minded.
It was Qaradawi who, in critiquing Usama bin Ladin and al-Qaida, argued that Islamists should always participate in elections because they would, he claims, invariably win them. Hamas and Hizballah have shown that he was right on that point.
Symbollically, he will give the Friday prayer sermon to be held in Tahrir Square, the center of the revolutionary movement. The massing of hundreds of thousands of people in the square to hear Islamic services and a sermon by a radical Islamist is not the kind of thing that's been going on under the 60-year-old military regime that was recently overthrown.
The context is also the thanking of Qaradawi for his support of the revolution, an implication that he is somehow its spiritual father.
Qaradawi, though some in the West view him as a moderate, supports the straight Islamist line: anti-American, anti-Western, wipe Israel off the map, foment Jihad, stone homosexuals, in short the works.
One of Qaradawi's initiatives has been urging Muslims to settle in the West, of which he said, “that powerful West, which has come to rule the world, should not be left to the influence of the Jews alone.” He contends that the three major threats Muslims face are Zionism, internal integration, and globalization. To survive, he argues, Muslims must fight the Zionists, Crusaders, idolators, and Communists.
Make no mistake, Qaradawi is not some fossilized Islamic ideologue. He is brilliant and innovative, tactically flexible and strategically sophisticated. He is subtle enough to sell himself as a moderate to those who don't understand the implications of his words or look beneath the surface of his presentation.
What is his view of both the Mubarak regime and the young, Facebook-flourishing liberals who made the revolution? As he said in 2004: “Some Arab and Muslim secularists are following the U.S. government by advocating the kind of reform that will disarm the nation from the elements of strength that are holding our people together.”
Have no doubt. It is Qaradawi, not bin Ladin, who is the most dangerous revolutinary Islamist in the world and he is about to unleash the full force of his power and persuasion on Egypt.
Who are you going to bet on being more influential, a Google executive and an unorganized band of well-intentioned liberal Egyptians or the world champion radical Islamist cleric?
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His books include Islamic Fundamentalists in Egyptian Politics and The Muslim Brotherhood (Palgrave-Macmillan); and The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East, a study of Arab reform movements (Wiley). GLORIA Center site: http://www.gloria-center.org His blog, Rubin Reports, http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com.
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http://www.aina.org/news/20110223210634.htm
Egyptian Armed Forces Fire At Christian Monasteries, 19 Injured
Posted GMT 2-24-2011 3:6:34
(AINA) -- For the second time in as many days, Egyptian armed force stormed the 5th century old St. Bishoy monastery in Wadi el-Natroun, 110 kilometers from Cairo. Live ammunition was fired, wounding two monks and six Coptic monastery workers. Several sources confirmed the army's use of RPG ammunition. Four people have been arrested including three monks and a Coptic lawyer who was at the monastery investigating yesterday's army attack.
Monk Aksios Ava Bishoy told activist Nader Shoukry of Freecopts the armed forces stormed the main entrance gate to the monastery in the morning using five tanks, armored vehicles and a bulldozer to demolish the fence built by the monastery last month to protect themselves and the monastery from the lawlessness which prevailed in Egypt during the January 25 Uprising.
"When we tried to address them, the army fired live bullets, wounding Father Feltaows in the leg and Father Barnabas in the abdomen," said Monk Ava Bishoy. "Six Coptic workers in the monastery were also injured, some with serious injuries to the chest."
The injured were rushed to the nearby Sadat Hospital, the ones in serious condition were transferred to the Anglo-Egyptian Hospital in Cairo.
Father Hemanot Ava Bishoy said the army fired live ammunition and RPGs continuously for 30 minutes, which hit part of the ancient fence inside the monastery. "The army was shocked to see the monks standing there praying 'Lord have mercy' without running away. This is what really upset them," he said. "As the soldiers were demolishing the gate and the fence they were chanting 'Allahu Akbar' and 'Victory, Victory'."
He also added that the army prevented the monastery's car from taking the injured to hospital.
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http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4034077,00.html
Don’t count on democracy
Op-ed: Despite talk about Mideast democracy, what we see is brutal violence, rising Islamism
Guy Bechor
Published: 02.26.11, 13:18 / Israel Opinion
Many festive words had been written and uttered this past month in respect to “democracy” and “popular uprisings.” We were told about the downfall of Middle Eastern tyrants as if this is the 1989 Eastern Europe. A more realistic view may seek new democracies yet discover anarchy, death, aggressive rulers and radical political Islam waiting to take over.
There is not even one beginning of democracy in any of the “revolutions” we are seeing around us.
Middle East
People are talking about Facebook and Twitter, yet in practice we have violent tribes competing for oil, as is the case in Libya, vengeful sects like in Bahrain, hostile regions that seek to disengage in Yemen, as well as wounded military establishments and severe violence.
The current regimes are not giving up easily and are putting up a fight, also in Sudan, Kuwait, and of course in Iran. So we are indeed seeing social networks, but also brutality and terrible repression of human rights. It is in fact the old Middle East that is speaking up.
Some will say that the revolution won in Egypt, yet this is a superficial view of reality. Mubarak was forced to step down, yet the military establishment that has been ruling Egypt for dozens of years now continues to rule it – and has now taken front stage, rather than staying backstage as it did in the past.
What we had in Egypt was a military revolution that put an end to an uprising on the street. Not even one opposition figure had been brought into the government thus far. One wonders when Egyptian protestors will realize that for the time being they’ve been fooled. The army indeed promised elections in six months, but for now it has all the time in the world to fix the results. Moreover, no dates for the vote had been announced yet.
Tunisian seculars wake up
If there is one change in Egypt, it has to do with the blunt emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood, which mocks democracy. The Islamists are already feeling like the state’s future masters.
The provocative return of the Egyptian Khomeini, Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, was meant to grant this revolution a face and an identity; an Islamist identity. Qaradawi was the one who issued the call for Israel’s destruction last week in his appearance before hundreds of thousands (and possibly millions) of Egyptians in Tahrir Square. He opposes the United States and the Shiites, and is of course in favor of a religious Islamic regime in Egypt. This is a grave blow to anyone who thought that Egypt is moving towards democracy; it is also a sign of things to come.
Just like in Iran in 1978, secular leftist protestors fought to topple the Shah and in favor of Khomeini’s return, yet once he arrived he simply pushed them out of the way. The same is happening in Tunisia. Last week, we saw seculars protesting there after they suddenly realized what they did: With their very own hands they are paving the way for the rise of radical Islam in the country. Preacher Rashid Ghannouchi, who rushed to return to Tunis just like the Egyptian Qaradawi, is organizing the previously banned Islamist party ahead of the “democratic elections.”
The common perception is still about the “domino effect” – that is, tyrants shall be toppled with the click of a button. Another “Like” on Facebook, and we’ll have democracy. However, there are no suckers in the Middle East, and nobody will be giving up easily.
Many observers claimed recently that the warnings uttered by Arab rulers regarding the dangers of radical Islam are meant to keep these regimes in power. Maybe, but nonetheless they may be right. After all, radical Islam is the only organized alternative to the authoritarian regimes and has a solution for every problem: “Islamic law is the solution.”
The Middle East this year is just like what we saw in Iraq in 2003, in Iran in 1979, or in the Palestinian Authority in 2006: Nice talk and theories about liberalism and democracy, yet in practice what we have is anarchy and violence, terrible death, and Islamic autocracy waiting down the road.
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The Evolving Modern Egyptian Republic: A Special Report
March 1, 2011 | 1312 GMT
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STRATFOR
The Egyptian establishment faced internal strife over the transition of power from President Hosni Mubarak even before massive public unrest demanding regime change erupted in mid-January. With Mubarak now out of office, some hope for democracy while others fear the rise of radical Islamist forces. Though neither outcome appears likely, the Egyptian state plainly is under a great deal of stress and is being forced to make changes to ensure its survival.
The modern Egyptian state is a new polity, founded a mere 60 years ago in the wake of a military coup organized by midranking officers under the leadership of Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser overthrew a 150-year-old Albanian dynasty to establish a military-dominated regime. Mubarak was only the third leader of the order established in 1952. Under his rule and that of his predecessor, President Anwar Sadat, Egypt evolved into a complex civil-military Leviathan.
Since the late 1960s, the military has not directly governed the country, allowing for the consolidation of single-party governments led by former military officers assisted by an increasingly civilian-dominated ruling elite. In recent years, however, the military had begun to reassert itself given the succession question, a process accelerated by the outbreak of popular demonstrations. The military has thus assumed a more direct role in security, governance and managing the transition. The National Democratic Party (NDP) regime depends upon the military to ensure its survival, and opposition forces, including the country’s main Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), are reliant upon the Egyptian armed forces to realize their objectives.
The provisional military authority, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, led by the country’s top general, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, will play the pivotal role in the post-Mubarak era. To understand what Egypt’s future holds, one must examine the evolution of the incumbent political arrangement, the central role played by the military in the formation of the state, previous transitions, and the reasons behind the regime’s need to oust one of its own.
Founding and the Nasser Days
On July 23, 1952, the Free Officers Movement, a group of largely junior military officers from lower middle class backgrounds, overthrew the monarchy and established a new political system based on their left-wing Arab nationalist ideology. Within days, King Farouk was exiled after having been forced to abdicate. Within a matter of months, parliament was dissolved and political parties outlawed. A Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) comprising the leadership committee of the Free Officers Movement — a group that included Lt. Col. Nasser, Maj. Abdel Hakim Amer, Lt. Col. Anwar Sadat, Maj. Salah Salem, Maj. Kamal el-Din Hussein, Wing Cmdr. Gamal Salem, Squadron Leader Hassan Ibrahim, Maj. Khaled Mohieddin, Wing Cmdr. Abdel Latif Baghdadi, Maj. Hussein el-Shafei and Lt. Col. Zakaria Mohieddin — was formed and began forging the country’s new political and economic structure.
Among the RCC’s most important changes were radical agrarian reform and the confiscation of private property. By limiting land ownership to 80 hectares (200 acres) per person — reduced to 20 hectares in 1969 — and redistributing some of the confiscated land to peasants, the military established its populist roots. The nationalization of the industry and service sector and the creation of a mammoth public sector were other key factors sustaining the military regime.
As it steered the country away from its monarchical past, early on the new military order encountered internal problems. Within two months of the coup, the civilian figurehead premier, Ali Mahir Pasha, was dismissed due to his differences with the RCC over land reform policy. Maj. Gen. Muhammad Naguib succeeded him. Four months later, in January 1953, the RCC had Naguib disband all political parties, abolish the 1923 constitution and declare a three-year period of transitional military rule.
Issues also emerged with the Regency Council. The council had replaced the ousted monarch and was tasked with exercising the prerogatives of the infant King Fuad II, Farouk’s son. The three-member body included Prince Muhammad Abdel Moneim, a cousin of King Farouk; Col. Rashad Mehanna, a free officer with close connections with the MB; and Bahieddin Barakat, a former president of the Senate. Problems arose when Mehanna also turned against the RCC over the land reform policies. The clash resulted in Mehanna’s being imprisoned over charges of plotting a counter-coup. With Mehanna’s departure, the Regency Council was reduced to a ceremonial status.
Though the Wafd, the MB and the Communists had been neutralized with the move to outlaw political parties, the old order was not officially abolished until June 18, 1953. Egypt now was officially a republic, with Naguib holding both the portfolios of the president and prime minister. While the military would run the show for several years, Nasser laid the foundations of a civilian single-party state in 1953 with the creation of an entity called the Liberation Rally.
Nasser became deputy prime minister, Abdel Hakim Amer succeeded Naguib as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Abdel Latif Baghdadi took over as minister of war and Salah Salem became the minister of national guidance and Sudan affairs. Just who was the ultimate leader of the new regime remained unclear, however, leading to strains between Naguib and Nasser.
The two disagreed on a variety of issues, including the British withdrawal from Egypt; the MB, which Nasser was hostile toward; and the issue of resuming parliamentary life, which Nasser and his supporters opposed. (Their vilification of the politicians led to factionalization within the RCC.) These differences made Nasser distrust Naguib and his mild attitude toward the conservative Wafd and the Islamist MB.
Nasser ultimately began to view Naguib as an obstacle to the revolution. Nasser and his colleagues in the RCC were in a rush to institute their envisioned political order. Naguib in turn regarded Nasser and his supporters as impatient young men who lacked his experience.
Naguib proved the loser in this contest. He tendered a first resignation Feb. 23, 1954, but was restored to office due to pressure from a public that still supported him and out of fears that Khaled Mohieddin was engineering a revolt in the cavalry corps. His second and final resignation came April 19, 1954, as a result of Nasser’s behind-the-scenes efforts to portray Naguib as supporting a return of the Wafd and of the old order in general.
Nasser assumed the positions of prime minister and chairman of the RCC. All the members of the RCC were inducted into the new Cabinet except Mohieddin, the most left-leaning member of the RCC, who was sent away to Europe. Nasser and officers in the RCC loyal to him thus took full control of Egypt.
In January 1955, the RCC appointed Nasser president of Egypt. It took another year to draft the new constitution. That same year, the National Union replaced the Liberation Rally as the state’s sole political party. The new party selected Nasser as its presidential candidate, and in June 1956, Nasser was overwhelmingly elected president in a national referendum.
Nasser’s election as president brought the three-year transitional period from the monarchy to an end. The RCC was dissolved and its members resigned from the military to assume civilian positions. The new constitution established an institutional framework for the new regime, which concentrated power in a strong executive branch.
Now firmly in control, Nasser began paying more attention to foreign policy, in particular, to his Pan-Arab goals. As a first step, he nationalized the Suez Canal, which led to the 1956 war and in the process made Nasser a national hero and enhanced his stature in the wider Arab world. His involvement in regional and international affairs — which saw alignment with the Soviets and hostile relations with the West and Israel; involvement in Syrian, Yemeni, Iraqi, Algerian and Lebanese domestic politics; and tensions with Saudi Arabia and Jordan — had an impact on his efforts to consolidate power at home.
Nasser’s most unusual foreign policy move was the brief merger of Egypt and Syria into the so-called United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958. North Yemen sought to join the merged state the same year to create a loose confederation known as the United Arab States. While the Yemeni component retained its autonomy, the Egyptian-Syrian merger required adjustments to the still nascent political structure of Egypt. A new constitution in 1958 for the UAR created a legislature and two vice presidents, one for Egypt and Syria, which had become provinces of the UAR.
Merging with Syria proved challenging, however. The Syrians resented that Egyptians dominated the UAR. Using Syria as a base to engineer a coup against Iraqi leader Abdel-Kareem Qasim also exacted a toll on the union between Cairo and Damascus. The UAR ultimately collapsed when Syrian army units declared the country independent in 1961 and forced the Egyptians out of Syria.
Fearing that the collapse of the UAR would undermine his position at home, Nasser embarked on a more aggressive drive toward socialist political economy. A new National Charter was devised in 1962, and a new ruling party called the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) replaced the National Union. More than half of the country’s businesses underwent nationalization, and Nasser’s opponents in the military were purged from the ranks.
While Nasser was working on a new constitution in the post-UAR period, the rise to power of pro-Nasser military officers in a coup that overthrew the monarchy in North Yemen once again pulled the Egyptian leader out of domestic politics and into regional geopolitics. A proxy war ensued between the Egyptians, who supported the new Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), and the Saudis, who threw their weight behind the forces of ousted Imam Muhammad al-Badr. Unable to impose a military solution, Egyptian forces backing YAR troops became locked in a stalemate with Yemeni monarchist forces. Many of Nasser’s top comrades came to oppose the military adventure in Yemen.
Further afield, the 1963 coup in Iraq brought pro-Nasser forces to power, and there was once again a move toward a new Arab union. The idea never gained traction because Nasser insisted on his own vision, and by this time Nasser faced serious domestic challenges from individuals who had been with him since the Free Officer and RCC days, including Amer, Sadat and Baghdadi.
A provisional constitution was enacted in 1964 that created a 350-member parliament. Elections were held and the new legislature completed one four-year term and another half term from the 1969 legislative elections before yet another constitution was enacted in 1971. Nasser secured a second six-year term in a fresh presidential election, taking his oath of office in March 1965.
While Nasser and many of his close allies had become civilian leaders, the military remained very much part of the government. It was not until Egypt’s crushing defeat at the hands of Israel in the June 1967 war that the military truly began moving away from actual governance. The defeat was a major setback for the military establishment’s reputation. In the period of introspection that followed the defeat, the regime decided that the military’s direct involvement in governance had degraded its professionalism. The 1967 war was seen as the culmination of a series of miscalculations, including the lack of preparation for the British-French-Israeli assault in the wake of the 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal; the 1961 military coup by Syrian military officers, which led to the collapse of the union between Egypt and Syria; and the losses incurred in Yemen.
In an attempt to recover from the 1967 war, Nasser was forced to make changes to the military order he had established a mere 15 years earlier, removing senior military officers including military chief Field Marshal Amer, air force chief Gen. Muhammad Sidqi Mahmud and nine other generals. (Replaced as commander of the armed forces by Gen. Muhammad Fawzi, Amer eventually committed suicide.) The changes saw a second generation of military commanders come to the fore, a group that, with the exception of the army chief, had no direct ties to the Free Officers Movement. Under pressure from anti-government demonstrations triggered by the 1967 defeat, Nasser embarked on the March 30 Program, an initiative aimed at overhauling the military and the political system. In 1968, Nasser promulgated a law designed to separate the military from the formal government structures, but because the Israelis controlled the Sinai Peninsula, the army retained a privileged position within the state.
Despite these problems on the home front, which remained volatile, Nasser continued to dabble in foreign policy but by now had backed off from his desire to control the Arab world. Instead, he sought an Arab alignment against Israel. Nasser gave himself the additional roles of prime minister and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In December 1969, he appointed Sadat and Hussein el-Shafei as his vice presidents. He had fallen out with a number of his associates from the RCC days, such as Khaled and Zakaria Mohieddin and former Vice President Ali Sabri. Having reconciled with Baghdadi, Nasser considered him as a replacement to Sadat.
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Metamorphosis During the Sadat Era
Nasser’s death due to a heart attack in September 1970 cut short his plans and brought Sadat to power. It was under Sadat’s rule that the major moves to separate the government from the military took place. Initially, Sadat ran into a number of challenges, including the fact that he lacked Nasser’s stature and was opposed by those loyal to his predecessor both within the military and the ruling ASU.
As a result, within the first three years Sadat had to get rid of two sets of senior regime leaders — first, the Nasser loyalists, and then those he himself had brought to replace the pro-Nasser elements. For example, he replaced his vice president, Sabri, with el-Shafei, whom he eventually replaced with Mubarak in 1975. Sadat skillfully used the 1971 constitution and his “Corrective Revolution” to forge a new establishment. Like his predecessor, Sadat relied on the military for his support and legitimacy. Unlike his predecessor, he went one step further by playing the officer corps off each other. To this end, Sadat made full use of his presidential powers and the weakening of the military during the end of the Nasser era.
While Sadat picked up on Nasser’s move to separate the military from governance, he was also making good use of Soviet assistance to rebuild the armed forces in preparation for another war with Israel to reverse the 1967 outcome. Egypt’s “victory” in the 1973 war with Israel greatly contributed to Sadat’s ability to establish his leadership credentials and bring the military under his control.
The following year, he initiated the open-door economic policy, known in Arabic as “infitah,” which steered the country away from the Nasserite vision of a socialist economy and led to the creation of a new economic elite loyal to Sadat. To further weaken the Nasserites and the left wing, he also worked to eliminate the idea of a single-party system by calling for the creation of separate platforms within the ASU for leftist, centrist and rightist forces.
As a result, the ASU weakened and was dissolved in 1978 and its members formed the NDP. In addition to a new ruling party, Sadat allowed multiparty politics in 1976. Sadat also relaxed curbs on the country’s largest Islamist movement, the MB, allowing it to publish material and carve out a limited space in civil society as part of his efforts to counter left-wing forces.
In sharp contrast with the Nasser era, when the government was heavy with serving military officers, the Sadat era saw the creation of a new civilian elite consisting largely of ex-military officers. The elimination of Nasser’s allies, the rise of a new generation of military officers, and the building of a relationship of trust between the serving and former military officers were key factors in shaping a new order in which the military did not feel the need to rule the country directly.
The 1967 defeat had weakened the military’s position in the state, and there were concerns that Nasser’s death and Sadat’s rise would force it to resort to extra-constitutional means to regain power. A mix of purges and the relatively positive outcome of the 1973 war helped rehabilitate the institution, which went a long way toward strengthening the relationship between the presidency and the military.
By this time, Egypt had also switched sides in the Cold War, with Sadat establishing close relations with the United States. The move led to the creation of a new generation of U.S.-trained military officers. Even more important, U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s administration mediated a 1978 peace treaty between Egypt and its historic foe, Israel. That he faced no opposition from within the military in recognizing the state of Israel — still a controversial move among wider Egyptian society — underscores the extent to which Sadat had consolidated his hold on power, and how much Egypt had drifted away from its Nasserist roots.
The 1978 peace treaty made the military more comfortable with its exclusion from government. It did raise concerns about a reduction in the military budget, however, especially when Sadat’s economic policies were leading to the creation of a new civilian economic elite.
Sadat salved the military’s concerns by giving it the freedom to engage in business enterprises. While on one hand he promoted economic liberalization, allowing for the return of the private sector, he also promulgated Law 32 in 1979, which gave the armed forces financial and economic independence from the state. The military became heavily involved in the industrial and service sectors, including weapons, electronics, consumer products, infrastructure development, agribusinesses, aviation, tourism and security. According to the reasoning behind the move, this would keep the military from draining state coffers. In fact, it did drain the state’s coffers via subsidies for the military’s businesses.
In the 1980s, during the days of Defense Minister Mohamed Abu Ghazala, the military created two key commercial entities: the National Services Projects Organization and the Egyptian Organization for Industrial Development. It also created a variety of joint ventures with both domestic and international manufacturing firms.
In addition to the enrichment of the military as an institution, senior officers have long benefited in individual capacities through commissions on contracts involving hardware procurement. Even in the political realm, the military was able to have its say. This especially was true regarding succession, where Sadat appointed former air force chief Mubarak as his vice president.
The strong links via institutional mechanisms and informal norms were key to stability: Retired officers were able to run the show without having to worry about a coup. The political leadership felt it needed to prevent the emergence of a new civilian elite, which it feared could upset the relationship between the presidency and the military and thus increase the chances of a coup.
From the military establishment’s point of view, the new arrangement under Sadat was actually better than the arrangement under Nasser. Under Sadat, the military did not have to shoulder the responsibility of governance, but its interests in the government still were being looked after by people from military backgrounds. This allowed the military to avoid the hassles of governance and accountability for mistakes in governance and to maintain a democratic facade for domestic and foreign consumption.
The military still could briefly intervene should the need arise, as during the 1977 bread riots, when domestic law enforcement was unable to cope with unrest. The military was able to exact a price for helping Sadat then, forcing him to do away with the austerity measures. Overall, common origins, shared socialization, and academy and institutional experiences shaped a collective worldview. This created tight links between the presidency and the military, paving the way for the military to go into the background.
Institutionalization and Decline Under Mubarak
The changes that Sadat brought did not alter the reality that the military was embedded throughout the fabric of state and society. Senior serving officers in the presidential staff and at the Defense Ministry, governors in most provinces, and a parallel military judicial system provided a structural mechanism through which the security establishment maintained a say in policymaking. Even so, the move toward greater civilian political and economic space initiated by Sadat went into effect under Mubarak.
As Sadat did when he first came to power, Mubarak engaged in limited reforms and expanded on the process of developing institutions in an effort to consolidate the regime. The new president freed political prisoners and allowed for a slightly freer press. During the 1980s, Egypt also began having multiparty parliamentary elections in accordance with Law 40 enacted by the Sadat government in 1977 allowing for the establishment of political parties.
While carefully developing political institutions, the regime under Mubarak began addressing the presence of radical Islamist sympathizers in light of Sadat’s assassination. Emergency laws helped immensely to this end; they also helped the military preserve its clout at a time of increasing civilianization of the regime.
While Mubarak sought to broaden his base of support, his government fought the two main Islamist militant movements at the time, Tandheem al-Jihad and Gamaa al-Islamiyah. To do this, the Mubarak government reached out to the country’s main and moderate Islamist movement, the MB. The need to work with the MB to combat jihadists, who, in assassinating Sadat, had threatened the state, allowed the Islamist movement to expand.
The MB remained proscribed, preventing it from operating as a political entity. But the Mubarak government allowed it to spread itself in civil society through academic and professional syndicates as well nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in social services. Elections also allowed the MB to enhance its public presence.
In the 1984 elections, the MB won 58 seats out of a total of 454 in a coalition with the Wafd party, and in the 1987 polls, an MB alliance with the Labor and Liberal parties bagged 60 seats with the MB getting 30, Labor securing 27 and Liberals three. The rise of opposition forces, especially the MB, in the 1980s saw the regime institute new electoral laws in 1990. The Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the mixed voting system was unconstitutional, however, given that it did not allow for people to run as independents.
On its face, the judgment looked like it would help the opposition, freeing it from being bound by lists and thresholds to securing its candidates’ election. The way in which the NDP implemented the new system, however, gave the ruling party an advantage through redistricting. The outcome was a reduced presence of opposition parties in the legislature.
By 1992, the Algerian experiment with democracy had further scared the Mubarak government about the risks of allowing multiparty polls. The Algerian elections almost saw a relatively new Islamist movement, Front Islamique du Salut, secure a two-thirds majority in parliament. An army intervention annulling the polls denied victory to the Algerian Islamists but sparked a decade-long insurgency by more militant Islamist forces. From the point of view of the Mubarak government, the MB was far more organized than Front Islamique du Salut, and Egypt’s jihadist movements were just as well established. This viewpoint received validation from Gamaa al-Islamiyah attacks against the government.
Having political opponents operating within constitutional bounds served the military by stabilizing the regime and giving it a democratic veneer. But the move to allow these forces to create space had unintended consequences, namely the rise of the MB. The NDP could only go so far in rigging the system in favor of the government, which meant the ruling party needed to take steps to enhance its domestic standing.
While the Mubarak regime was toiling with how to have a democratic political system while maintaining the ruling party’s grip, it was also experimenting with economic liberalization. There were efforts toward the privatization of state-owned enterprises in the mid-1990s. But the army made it very clear that its holdings were off-limits to any such moves.
The economic liberalization and the need to bolster the ruling party allowed for the rise of a younger generation of businessmen and politicians. Toward the end of the 1990s, Mubarak’s son Gamal was heading the Future Foundation, an NGO supported by pro-privatization businessmen. Gamal floated the idea of founding a Future Party, but his father brought him into the ruling party and Gamal still presided over the NGO.
The Gamal group included prominent businessmen Mohammed Abul-Einen and steel magnate Ahmed Ezz. This new guard led by Gamal quickly rose through the ranks of the NDP, and by February 2000, Gamal, Ezz and another key businessman, Ibrahim Kamel, became members of the NDP’s General Secretariat. Their entry immediately created a struggle between the military-backed old guard and the business-supported rising elements within the NDP, given that new voices had begun contributing to the policymaking process.
The 2000 parliamentary polls were a defining moment in the history of the NDP because of the need to balance parliamentarian candidacies between the business community and the old guard. Further complicating matters was a Supreme Constitutional Court ruling that members of the judiciary must oversee polling, which meant the usual electoral engineering would become difficult to pull off. Gamal wanted younger candidates who could revitalize the party and improve its public image, something rejected by old guard figures such as NDP Secretary-General Youssef Wali and organizational secretaries Kalam al-Shazli and Safwat Sharif, who later became secretary-general.
Eventually a compromise was reached in which some 42 percent of the NDP candidates were from the rising elements, with as many as a hundred of them in the 30-40 years age bracket. The party also benefited by the move of some 1,400 NDP members to run as independents, an average of six per constituency. In the end, the opposition parties bagged only 38 seats, 17 for the MB and the remaining 21 divided among the legal opposition parties.
While the struggle within the NDP actually benefited the ruling party on election day, it reshaped the landscape of the party. Only 172 of the official NDP candidates (39 percent) won, while another 181 NDP independents won, later joining the NDP. Another 35 genuine independent members of parliament also joined the ruling party, giving the party a total of 388 seats.
Thus, for a time, the NDP was forced to rely on its members who had run as independents to sustain its hold on the legislature. The outcome triggered an internal debate in which Gamal was able to make the case that the party needed internal reforms and pressed for a meritocratic method of candidate selection. Consequently, for the first Consultative Council polls and then local council elections, the NDP formed caucuses that allowed party members to vote for candidates.
This new system further enhanced Gamal’s stature within the party to the extent that he and two of his allies, lawmaker Zakariya Azmi and Minister of Youth and Sports Ali Eddin Hilal, were given membership in the NDP Steering Committee in 2002. This move brought parity between the old guard and the rising elements in the six-member body. In the 2002 party conference, Gamal was also appointed head of the party’s new Policies Secretariat.
Additional business class parliamentarians such as Hossam Awad and Hossam Badrawi gained entry into the NDP General Secretariat. In an election, 6,000 delegates voted in favor of Gamal’s agenda calling for technocratic reforms and economic liberalization, giving his faction majority control of the NDP’s central board. While the old guard under Sharif’s leadership held onto the post of secretary-general, the No. 2 position after Mubarak, Gamal’s influence rivaled that of Sharif.
Essentially, the need to revitalize the ruling party enabled a new generation of businessmen to enter the political realm via the parliamentary vote. The rise of these elites was likely seen as disturbing to the military-backed old guard, as it threatened their political and economic interests. But it served the military’s need to see the NDP sustain its hold on power in order to ensure regime stability.
The Roots and Future of the Current Crisis
It did not take long for the situation to change, however. Sept. 11, the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the George W. Bush administration’s push for democracy in the region complicated matters for the regime. They forced Mubarak to focus on the home front, as opposition forces became emboldened and sought to expand their presence.
Of all the opposition groups, the MB benefited most from this development, winning 88 seats in the 2005 elections. For their part, secular opposition forces began organizing protests under the banner of the Kifayah movement. The combined pressure forced Mubarak to permit a multi-candidate presidential election, though arranged in such a fashion as to make it extremely difficult for an opposition candidate to win.
Most significantly, these changes took place as the aging Mubarak’s health rapidly failed. Regime continuity post-Mubarak became the critical issue for the military and the old guard. These elements did not accept Gamal, as he was seen as leading a group that might bring in a new ruling elite. The old guard disagreed over who from within the regime would be best to succeed Mubarak, in great part because Mubarak failed to appoint a vice president as his predecessors had.
The internal struggle to succeed Mubarak intensified in recent years, especially in the past 18 months. The outbreak of popular protests in Egypt in the wake of the Tunisian unrest vastly complicated this process. The military sought to channel these protests to its advantage to better manage the transition from Mubarak. In the process, it had to engage in domestic security, governance and managing a crisis for the first time since the early 1970s.
Now that Mubarak is out, a military-led provisional authority controlled by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is in power for a six-month interim period. The military council is composed of 18 generals and is chaired by Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, who is also the commander-in-chief of the military. It has moved to suspend the constitution but has thus far not issued an interim legal framework order. Instead, it has appointed an eight-member committee, headed by a renowned legal personality and including a representative of the MB, to work on amendments to the constitution. The amendments will enable the holding of competitive parliamentary and presidential elections, at which time the military council intends to cancel the emergency law.
In addition to stabilizing the situation, a core intent behind the democratization of the political system is the military’s imperative to avoid regime change. The military will need a party aligned with the establishment, especially since it still dominates the caretaker Cabinet, and this is where the fate of the NDP is a significant factor. Besides, the military needs a political force strong enough to counter the MB; however, strength is not just a function of party machinery but also public support, which is where the NDP is seriously lacking.
The history of the modern Egyptian republic and its evolution in the past six decades provides for a great deal of experience. The current crop of generals can use its experience to manage the transition in a way that placates popular demands for a democratic political system while maintaining the military’s grip on power. There are numerous options for revamping the order established in 1952, but none of them will be easy, as the current transition leaders’ predecessors never faced such a robust popular demand for democracy. Regardless, Egypt has essentially returned to the 1952-type situation in which there are only two organized forces in the country, the MB and the military, and the country is in the hands of a provisional military authority.
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http://www.aina.org/news/20110304222016.htm
(AINA) -- A mob of nearly four thousand Muslims has attacked Coptic homes this evening in the village of Soul, Atfif in Helwan Governorate, 30 kilometers from Cairo, and torched the Church of St. Mina and St. George. There are conflicting reports about the whereabouts of the Church pastor Father Yosha and three deacons who were at church; some say they died in the fire and some say they are being held captive by the Muslims inside the church.
Witnesses report the mob prevented the fire brigade from entering the village. The army, which has been stationed for the last two days in the village of Bromil, 7 kilometers from Soul, initially refused to go into Soul, according to the officer in charge. When the army finally sent three tanks to the village, Muslim elders sent them away, saying that everything was "in order now."
A curfew has been imposed on the 12,000 Christians in the village.
This incident was triggered by a relationship between 40-year-old Copt Ashraf Iskander and a Muslim woman. Yesterday a "reconciliation" meeting was arranged between the relevant Coptic and Muslim families and together with the Muslim elders it was decided that Ashraf Iskander would have to leave the village because Muslims torched his house.
The father of the Muslim woman was killed by his cousin because he did not kill his daughter to preserve the family's honor, which led the woman's brother to avenge the death of his father by killing the cousin. The village Muslims blamed the Christians.
The Muslim mob attacked the church, exploding 5-6 gas cylinders inside the church, pulled down the cross and the domes and burnt everything inside. Activist Ramy Kamel of Katibatibia Coptic advocacy called US-based Coptic Hope Sat TV and sent an SOS on behalf of the Copts in Soul village, as they are presently being attacked by the mob. He also said that no one is able to contact the priest and the deacons inside the burning church and there is no answer from their mobile phones.
Coptic activist Wagih Yacoub reported the mob has broken into Coptic homes and has called on Copts to leave the village. "Terrorized Copts have fled and some hid in homes of Muslim neighbors," he added.
Witnesses said the mob chanted "Allahu Akbar" and vowed to conduct their morning prayers on the church plot after razing it.
By Mary Abdelmassih
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This can't be true-- the Pravdas haven't reported it :roll: More seriously now :cry:
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http://hotair.com/archives/2011/03/08/meltdown-women-harassed-attacked-in-tahrir-square-during-international-womens-day-protests/
Not Jeffersonian.
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CAIRO—Clashes between Coptic Christians and Muslims have killed more than a dozen people in recent days in Egypt, heightening a sense that the country's postrevolutionary euphoria is yielding to enduring problems including sectarian violence, poverty and misogyny.
Coptic Christians angry at the burning of a church clashed late Tuesday with thousands of Muslims in a largely Coptic Christian neighborhood near Egypt's capital. At least 13 died and more than 100 wounded in a four-hour clash, said witnesses and the state news agency.
The fighting between different religious groups came just hours after several hundred men roughed up female demonstrators who had gathered in Cairo's Tahrir Square to mark International Women's Day and demand expanded rights and opportunities.
In a separate tussle on Tahrir Square, the nerve center of Egypt's recent revolt, scores of Egyptian troops and men armed with sticks moved Wednesday night into the square and forced out several hundred protesters who had camped there for the past few days. Dozens of people were hurt, witnesses said.
The military's move came amid growing frustration that life hasn't yet gotten back to normal after President Hosni Mubarak ceded power a month ago following massive nationwide protests.
Various groups have continued taking to the streets to press their grievances. Workers have mounted strikes demanding their bosses be fired and salaries raised. Many police are reluctant to return to duty, fearing attacks by citizens angry at years of police corruption and alleged torture, and at police attacks on protesters during last month's pro-democracy uprising.
Egypt's economy, meanwhile, is struggling to regain its footing after virtually all businesses shut down amid protests. Some state-run banks and companies remain closed, as does the stock market.Advertising has dried up as companies hoard money.
"Another 60 days and the economy will go bust," says Naguib Sawiris, chairman of Orascom Telecom, one of the biggest publicly held companies in the Middle East.
Egypt's latest sectarian unrest began last week after a mob of Muslims—furious over a rumored romance between a Coptic Christian man and a Muslim woman—torched a church near Helwan, an industrial city outside Cairo, witnesses said.
On Tuesday, groups of Christians blocked highways around Cairo to protest the incident, snarling traffic and fraying nerves. The events leading to the day's fatal clash began around 2 p.m. in the Cairo suburb of Manshiyet Nasser, a destitute enclave known to many as "garbage city" for a population of mostly Copts who collect and sift through waste throughout the city.
Protesters in Manshiyet Nasser blocked a small bus on a main thoroughfare. Its angry driver stormed into a surrounding neighborhood and returned with dozens of young, mostly Muslim men, one protest participant said Wednesday.
Angry youths soon joined both sides. By late afternoon, some 2,000 Muslims and 500 Christians had gathered, said Rifaat Atif, a Christian pharmacist who said he saw the escalation.
Young men set fire to a recycling factory and several apartments, witnesses said. Some witnesses said Egyptian soldiers stood by, watching. Others, producing shotgun shells they said were recovered from the scene, said soldiers opened fire on Christian protesters.
An officer among nearly 100 soldiers patrolling the site Wednesday said the military has maintained neutrality in recent events and denied troops fired on Christian youth. Most casualties, he said, had occurred before military troops arrived.
"What have we gotten from this revolution?" asked Mr. Atif, the pharmacist. "We don't trust the army anymore. The money has stopped. There's no security."
Hundreds of Christians have also held noisy protests in front of the country's state television building for the past four days, demanding that the interim government act forcefully to defend the rights of Egypt's Christians, who make up about 10% of the population.
The government of Prime Minister Essam Sharaf, appointed last week, held its first cabinet meeting Wednesday, saying it was following reports of the sectarian violence with concern.
For the most part, Muslims and Christians have enjoyed cordial relations in Egypt, which has the Middle East's largest Christian population. But 2010 saw an unusual uptick in tension.
The year began with a shooting outside a church in Upper Egypt on Coptic Christmas that killed six worshippers and a Muslim security guard. Starting in the summer, Salafi Muslims began regular demonstrations outside churches in Alexandria and Cairo against the Coptic Church. The Salafis—who follow an ultra-conservative form of Islam widely practiced in Saudi Arabia—accused the church of having kidnapped two Christian woman who were rumored to have tried to convert to Islam.
On New Year's Day in 2011, a bombing at an Alexandria church killed 23 people.
Adding to sense of looming trouble is Egypt's economy. The stock market was slated to reopen March 6 but a mob of angry retail investors demanded it remain shut until activity in the rest of the economy picks back up, avoiding what the protesters said would be unnecessarily large losses now.
Mr. Sawiris and others want the market opened right away, saying the closed exchange is contributing to an overall sense of unease. "There are no guts in the government. Everyone is scared of mobs right now," he said.
In a statement, Mr. Sharaf's cabinet called on citizens to go back to work and "to delay factional protests and strikes so the government can return stability that would allow the national economy to overcome these difficult times."
Write to David Luhnow at david.luhnow@wsj.com
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The New York Times
Sun, March 20, 2011 -- 2:03 PM ET
-----
Elections Chief Says Egyptian Constitutional Changes Are Approved, The A.P. Reports
The chief of Egypt's elections commission said that a package
of constitutional amendments was approved with 77 percent of
the vote in favor, The Associated Press reported.
The changes eliminate restrictions on political rights and
open the way for parliamentary and presidential elections
within months. Opponents argued that the timeframe was too
quick for political parties to organize. Egypt's best
organized political forces -- the Muslim Brotherhood and
members of the former ruling party -- campaigned for passage.
The commission chief, Ahmed Attiya, said 41 percent of 45
million eligible voters cast ballots in Saturday's
referendum. More than 14 million -- 77.2 percent -- voted in
favor, with around 4 million -- 22.8 percent -- opposed.
Read More:
http://www.nytimes.com?emc=na
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Sharia fever! Catch it!
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CAIRO — In post-revolutionary Egypt, where hope and confusion collide in the daily struggle to build a new nation, religion has emerged as a powerful political force, following an uprising that was based on secular ideals. The Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group once banned by the state, is at the forefront, transformed into a tacit partner with the military government that many fear will thwart fundamental changes.
It is also clear that the young, educated secular activists who initially propelled the nonideological revolution are no longer the driving political force — at least not at the moment.
As the best organized and most extensive opposition movement in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was expected to have an edge in the contest for influence. But what surprises many is its link to a military that vilified it.
“There is evidence the Brotherhood struck some kind of a deal with the military early on,” said Elijah Zarwan, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group. “It makes sense if you are the military — you want stability and people off the street. The Brotherhood is one address where you can go to get 100,000 people off the street.”
There is a battle consuming Egypt about the direction of its revolution, and the military council that is now running the country is sending contradictory signals. On Wednesday, the council endorsed a plan to outlaw demonstrations and sit-ins. Then, a few hours later, the public prosecutor announced that the former interior minister and other security officials would be charged in the killings of hundreds during the protests.
Egyptians are searching for signs of clarity in such declarations, hoping to discern the direction of a state led by a secretive military council brought to power by a revolution based on demands for democracy, rule of law and an end to corruption.
“We are all worried,” said Amr Koura, 55, a television producer, reflecting the opinions of the secular minority. “The young people have no control of the revolution anymore. It was evident in the last few weeks when you saw a lot of bearded people taking charge. The youth are gone.”
The Muslim Brotherhood is also regarded warily by some religious Egyptians, who see it as an elitist, secret society. These suspicions have created potential opportunities for other parties.
About six groups from the ultraconservative Salafist school of Islam have also emerged in the era after President Hosni Mubarak’s removal, as well as a party called Al Wassat, intended as a more liberal alternative to the Brotherhood.
In the early stages of the revolution, the Brotherhood was reluctant to join the call for demonstrations. It jumped in only after it was clear that the protest movement had gained traction. Throughout, the Brotherhood kept a low profile, part of a survival instinct honed during decades of repression by the state.
The question at the time was whether the Brotherhood would move to take charge with its superior organizational structure. It now appears that it has.
“The Brotherhood didn’t want this revolution; it has never been a revolutionary movement,” said Mr. Zarwan of the International Crisis Group. “Now it has happened; they participated cautiously, and they realize they can set their sights higher.”
But in these early stages, there is growing evidence of the Brotherhood’s rise and the overpowering force of Islam.
When the new prime minister, Essam Sharaf, addressed the crowd in Tahrir Square this month, Mohamed el-Beltagi, a prominent Brotherhood member, stood by his side. A Brotherhood member was also appointed to the committee that drafted amendments to the Constitution.
But the most obvious and consequential example was the recent referendum on the amendments, in the nation’s first post-Mubarak balloting. The amendments essentially call for speeding up the election process so that parliamentary contests can be held before September, followed soon after by a presidential race. That expedited calendar is seen as giving an advantage to the Brotherhood and to the remnants of Mr. Mubarak’s National Democratic Party, which have established national networks. The next Parliament will oversee drafting a new constitution.
Before the vote, Essam el-Erian, a Brotherhood leader and spokesman, appeared on a popular television show, “The Reality,” arguing for the government’s position in favor of the proposal. With a record turnout, the vote was hailed as a success. But the “yes” campaign was based largely on a religious appeal: voters were warned that if they did not approve the amendments, Egypt would become a secular state.
==================
Page 2 of 2)
“The problem is that our country will be without a religion,” read a flier distributed in Cairo by a group calling itself the Egyptian Revolution Society. “This means that the call to the prayer will not be heard anymore like in the case of Switzerland, women will be banned from wearing the hijab like in the case of France,” it said, referring to the Muslim head scarf. “And there will be laws that allow men to get married to men and women to get married to women like in the case of America.”
A banner hung by the Muslim Brotherhood in a square in Alexandria instructed voters that it was their “religious duty” to vote “yes” on the amendments.
In the end, 77.2 percent of those who voted said yes.
This is not to say that the Brotherhood is intent on establishing an Islamic state. From the first days of the protests, Brotherhood leaders proclaimed their dedication to religious tolerance and a democratic and pluralist form of government. They said they would not offer a candidate for president, that they would contest only a bit more than a third of the total seats in Parliament, and that Coptic Christians and women would be welcomed into the political party affiliated with the movement.
None of that has changed, Mr. Erian, the spokesman, said in an interview. “We are keen to spread our ideas and our values,” he said. “We are not keen for power.”
He would not comment on whether the Brotherhood had an arrangement with the military, but he said the will of the people to shift toward Islam spoke for itself and was a sign of Egypt’s emerging democratic values. “Don’t trust the intellectuals, liberals and secularists,” Mr. Erian said. “They are a minor group crying all the time. If they don’t work hard, they have no future.”
But the more secular forces say that what they need is time.
“I worry about going too fast towards elections, that the parties are still weak,” said Nabil Ahmed Helmy, former dean of the Zagazig law school and a member of the National Council for Human Rights. “The only thing left right now is the Muslim Brotherhood. I do think that people are trying to take over the revolution.”
Egypt is still a work in progress. Ola Shahba, 32, a member of a group in the youth coalition behind the protests, said, “After the results of the referendum, we need to be humble.”
The coalition and others have said they see the overwhelming approval of the amendments and the rise of the Brotherhood as worrisome, and as evidence that more liberal forces need to organize in a more effective outreach campaign, and fast.
“Freedom is nice; so is democracy,” said Rifaat Abdul Massih, 39, a construction worker. “But I’m a Christian, and we are a bit worried about the future. I voted ‘no’ to give more time to the secular parties. I don’t want to have the Muslim Brotherhood here right away.”
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CAIRO — In post-revolutionary Egypt, where hope and confusion collide in the daily struggle to build a new nation, religion has emerged as a powerful political force, following an uprising that was based on secular ideals. The Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group once banned by the state, is at the forefront, transformed into a tacit partner with the military government that many fear will thwart fundamental changes.
But Egypt had hope, and change! :roll:
It is also clear that the young, educated secular activists who initially propelled the nonideological revolution are no longer the driving political force — at least not at the moment.
Let's try never.
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The turn of events in Egypt or at least coverage all seems to be negative for freedom and positive for the MB. I thought I would look up the Prof. from U of MN Humphrey Institute, Cairo native, who was so optimistic earlier to see what he is saying now. Couldn't find anything more recent than this fluff piece in MSNBC March 1 about young people and hope and change. Can they really be that naive? yes. Is there any chance we are wrong about this turning into a new oppressive regime? I hope so. It is a little ironic that he compares to the Tiananmen protesters. That did not work out very well.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41855758/ns/world_news-mideastn_africa/
Egyptian activist Jihan Ibrahim, 24, during the protests in Cairo that led to the fall of President Hosni Mubarak.
(http://msnbcmedia3.msn.com/j/MSNBC/Components/Photo/_new/110301-miranda-protest.grid-8x2.jpg)
Mideast 'baby boomers': Shock troops of protests
By Miranda Leitsinger Reporter
msnbc.com
Demographics play a key role in unrest sweeping volatile region
The wave of protests breaking across the Mideast and North Africa has a common leading edge — in each case, the unrest was triggered by young people lacking jobs or a viable future.
The youthful revolts and protests are in many ways predictable, experts say, combining a population boom that has produced a high percentage of teenagers and young adults with social conditions that are as volatile as the oil that fuels the region’s economy.
“Young people without jobs, young people who are waiting for a chance, young people without hope … they’re waiting, waiting, waiting,” said Tarik Yousef, dean of the Dubai School of Government. “At some point, you reach a threshold of patience.”
Jihan Ibrahim, a 24-year-old Egyptian activist who was shot in the back with a rubber bullet during one of the protests and fled through a rain of tear gas and water cannons, said the pain and terror were “the price of freedom under this kind of a regime.”
“I want to be able to elect who I want to represent me. I want my government to be transparent,” said Ibrahim, who lived in California for several years when she was younger. “I want free education and decent health care, and decent wage and job opportunities — just like any reasonable human being would ask for.”
Young adults like Ibrahim are part of a regional “youth bulge,” a situation that occurs when infant mortality declines during a period of improved medical technology and families continue to have many children.
Overall, 15- to 24-year-olds make up about 20 percent of the population across the Mideast and North Africa, and 30 percent when that range is extended to 15- to 29-years old, according to a report by the Brookings Institute, a Washington, D.C., think tank.
In the U.S., 15- to 24-year-olds and 15- to 29-year-olds make up 14.1 percent and 21.3 percent of the population, respectively.
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'Like the baby boom generation’
“It’s a bit like the baby boom generation in this country,” said Ragui Assaad, an Egyptian-American and professor of planning and public affairs at the University of Minnesota. “But it’s not because there are more babies — it’s because more babies are surviving.
“What makes the youth bulge particularly problematic is its combination with economic conditions that have made it hard to employ these young people in productive ways.”
Unemployment among the young is stubbornly high in many countries in the region. In 2009, Algeria and Iraq had unemployment rates of 45 percent for 15- to 24-year-olds, according the Brookings report . In Libya, where the government of Moammar Gadhafi is clinging to power amid a massive revolt, the rate was 27 percent in 2005, the most recent data available. And in Egypt, where youth-led protests forced regime change, the rate was 25 percent.
Compare that with an unemployment rate for young Americans of 19.1 percent in July 2010 and 20 percent across the 27 nations of the European Union, as of August 2010.
“The Middle East and North Africa have the highest youth unemployment rate amongst all regions,” Credit Suisse said in a Feb. 25 report on the region’s demographics. “The effect of unemployment in some of these countries is felt even more strongly due to high inflation.”
The surge in the youth population creates “a primary condition for potential destabilization” if this situation “does not translate into youth achievement,” said Yousef, the Dubai educator.
“It sets up a demand for social-economic transformation, modernization that has to be focused on addressing the needs of this particular segment of the population,” he said. “Most of the governments in the regions have precisely failed to do that. Their approach and response to it has been one of, ‘Let’s repress it.’”
As a result, sometimes an individual can ignite a revolution.
The suicide of a 26-year-old unemployed university graduate in Tunisia, who set himself on fire on Dec. 17 after authorities said he did not have a permit to sell fruits and vegetables, was one of the triggers of the youth-led protests in that country and was widely seen as helping spark the protests sweeping the region.
Educated and underemployed
Ibrahim, the Egyptian activist, said educated and underemployed young people organized the early demonstrations. She recalled one protest outside of the Ministry of Petroleum in Cairo that was led by a group of unemployed graduate engineering students.
“We have a ministry that’s supposed to employ them and they don’t,” she said, noting the students were instead “selling sandwiches off of carts.”
“You have people that have time on their hands, they’re oppressed politically and treated horribly by the police, and then unemployed or underemployed, and they’re educated,” she said. “So that definitely has to build up a lot of anger.”
In Iran, where the government has cracked down hard on recent protests and employment is 20 percent among 15- to 24-year-olds, the lack of economic opportunity also has motivated many youth to organize anti-regime protests.
Interactive: Young and restless: Demographics fuel Mideast protests (on this page)
Among them is an anti-government activist who identified himself as a 26-year-old man after being contacted by msnbc.com. He said he has only been able to find a part-time job despite looking for work for two-and-a-half years.
“Injustice. Oppression. Lack of freedom. Our resources used for terrorism and not for jobs, or making Iran better. No future,” he wrote to msnbc.com, declining to identify himself out of fear for his safety.
Though he was beaten by the hardline Basiji militiamen, he said he wouldn’t stop.
“My blood is no less value then Neda … and all of our martyrs,” he wrote, referring to a young woman slain in the initial 2009 opposition protests in Iran. “… We need to free Iran.”
Assaad, the University of Minnesota professor, noted that youth were not willing to accept the “authoritarian bargain” that their parents had agreed to, giving up their freedoms in return for economic stability.
'We are not getting anything in return'
“These young people are saying, ‘We are not getting anything in return, why should we accept that bargain,’” he said. “And so they are demanding a say in how their countries are run.”
Some parallels in history of this youth bulge — and ensuing protests — can be found in the anti-government demonstrations in China’s Tiananmen Square in 1989, the 1986 “People Power” movement in the Philippines that brought down Ferdinand Marcos and the post-World War II protests in Europe and the U.S., Assaad said.
“It’s not a coincidence that the late 1960s in the U.S. where you saw the greatest protests on the part of young people — whether it’s a civil rights movement, or the student movement in the late ‘60s, the anti-war movement — those were led by young people,” Assaad said. “That’s the peak of where the baby boomers were becoming young adults and that same phenomenon was occurring also in Europe as the post-war generation was coming of age.”
Story: China's well-oiled security apparatus stifles calls for change
“Their demands were less economic and more cultural in nature,” he said. “I see the 1968 revolts as more, ‘We want a say in the society and we want to be able to assert ourselves culturally in ways that are different from the previous generation.’”
The Tiananmen protesters also were not primarily making economic demands. “It was a question of, ‘Now that we have this higher level of economic achievement, we would like to have also a say in running our country,’” Assaad said.
But the presence of a youth bulge does not necessarily mean there will be violence or unrest, Assaad said.
“Youth bulges basically create dynamics for things to happen that involve youth and these things could be quite different depending on the conditions in each context,” he said. “It could be cultural demands and counterculture, as well as demands for human rights and marginalized groups, like what happened in the U.S. … In the case of the Middle East, it’s a combination of economic and political.”
In East Asia — Korea, Taiwan, China — and parts of Southeast Asia, for example, the “youth bulge actually coincided with tremendous growth in the economy and good employment opportunities, and as a result, resulted in even more rapid growth” in the ’80s and early ’90s, Assaad said.
Though the Mideast protests have been led by youth, they have grown to include others disgruntled with their governments.
“The government has put the people in a situation where they live in constant fear and I think that’s one of the main reasons why so many people have come out, because they have just had enough,” said Maryam Alkhawaja, a 23-year-old activist in Bahrain who fled her home last year out of fear of imprisonment but returned to document and participate in the protests there.
The peak of the youth bulge was reached somewhere between 2005 and 2010 in much of the Mideast and is now declining in many countries there. But the youth have made a lasting impact, along the same scale of what happened in Eastern Europe in 1989, Assaad said.
“The genie is out of the bottle. You cannot bring those people back to being apolitical and apathetic. They’re going to be there, they’re going to be active, they know now how to do it,” he said. “This region had been the region where democracy had been the slowest to come in the world. … I think that’s going to change now.”
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http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1369259/Egypt-protests-Women-forced-virginity-checks-arrests-Tahir-Square.html
Secret shame of Egypt's army: Women protesters were forced to have 'virginity checks' after being arrested in Tahrir Square
By Daily Mail Reporter
Last updated at 10:10 AM on 24th March 2011
Women arrested by the Egyptian police during protests in Cairo's Tahrir Square were subjected to forced 'virginity tests', according to Amnesty International.
Eighteen demonstrators were detained after army officers cleared the square on March 9 at the end of weeks of protest.
Amnesty today said that the women had been beaten, given electric shocks and then subjected to strip searches while being photographed by male soldiers.
They were then given 'virginity checks' and threatened with prostitution charges if medics ruled they had had sex, according to the charity.
Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1369259/Egypt-protests-Women-forced-virginity-checks-arrests-Tahir-Square.html
Amazing! I mean women usually are treated so much better in the muslim world. Who could have imagined this?
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By MATTHEW KAMINSKI
Cairo
Two months after Hosni Mubarak's ouster, Egyptian politics are a dervish of confused agitation. Each day, it seems, a new party forms to fill liberal, Nasserist, Marxist, Islamist and other niches. A joke has it that 10% of Egyptians plan to run for president.
"All Egyptians now think they are Che Guevara, Castro or something," says Essam el-Erian, a senior leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, bursting into laughter. "This is democracy."
Amid this political ferment, the Brotherhood is an exception: a well-funded, organized and established force. Founded in 1928, it's also the grandaddy of the Mideast's political Islamist movements. The Brotherhood was banned from politics 57 years ago and focused on business, charity and social ventures. But the secretive fraternity always aspired to power.
Now free elections due later this year offer the Brotherhood their best opportunity. The group says it believes in "Islamic democracy," but what does that really mean? I spent a week with members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and it turns out the answers are far from monolithic, though often far from reassuring.
***
Shortly before midnight on Monday, Mohamed Baltagi walks into his office in a middle-class Cairo apartment block and apologizes for the late hour. Brotherhood leaders are all over the place these days—on popular evening chat shows, at public conferences, setting up their new Freedom and Justice Party, or advising the military regime on the interim constitution. The revolution made Dr. Baltagi, an ear-nose-and-throat specialist, a prominent face of what might be called the Brotherhood's progressive wing.
Dr. Baltagi, who is 47, led the group's informal 88-strong caucus in Egypt's parliament during a limited democratic experiment from 2005-10. He wears a moustache and gray business suit and expresses regret that U.S. diplomats shunned him and other Brothers during their time in parliament. The Brotherhood's green flag—with the group's motto "Islam is the solution"—sits on his desk next to the Egyptian tricolor. While the most senior Brotherhood leadership sat out the first few days of anti-Mubarak protests, Dr. Baltagi was in Tahrir Square from the start of the 18-day uprising. He was the only Brother on the 10-member revolutionary steering committee. "It's not a revolution of the Muslim Brotherhood, or of the Islamists," he says. "It's the revolution of all Egyptians."
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AFP/Getty Images
Egyptians in Alexandria celebrate after Hosni Mubarak was forced out of office.
.Unprompted, Dr. Baltagi brings up the charge that Islamists prefer "one man, one vote, one time." "As far as I know," he says, Islamists in Algeria, Egypt and elsewhere were victims, not perpetrators, of repression. Iran's theocracy, to him and every other Brother I spoke to, is a Shiite apostasy irrelevant to Sunni Muslim countries. The Muslim Brothers recently lost elections for student union posts at state-run Cairo University, which the group dominated in the past. "We accepted that," he says. "We accept democracy."
He says the revolution will change the Brotherhood. For the first time, his organization considers its goal in Egypt the establishment of a civic not a religious state, as close to "secular" as an Islamist group might come in words. After some internal wrangling, the Brothers said they could live with an elected Christian woman as president of Egypt—a merely symbolic concession since the odds of that happening are less than zero.
***
The new environment has already exposed internal tensions. Any push for transparency runs against six decades of cloak-and-dagger Brotherhood habits. "We will be working openly in front of everyone," says Dr. Baltagi, "talking openly about our members, programs, fund raising."
So how many Brotherhood members are there? He gives a nervous, almost apologetic smile and says, "for now that is a secret." He offers little more on funding beyond that members tithe and include generous businessmen.
Its conservative culture jars the younger, tech-savvy Brothers. The leadership announced that all members must support the new Freedom and Justice Party, angering especially the youth wing of the group.
A week ago Friday, the Brotherhood didn't call out its supporters to join other anti-Mubarak groups in Cairo's Tahrir Square, the epicenter of the "January 25th Revolution." Islam Lotfi, a 33-year-old lawyer, was one of numerous "young Brothers" who went anyway. The tensions inside the Brotherhood, he says, "are very normal. It is a gap between generations."
Mr. Lotfi has a smoothly shaved, round face and works closely with youth activists across the spectrum. "We want wider opportunities to work inside" the hierarchical Brotherhood, he adds. "It's not accepted by a culture that doesn't believe in young people." Two-thirds of Egypt's 80 million people are under the age of 30.
Abdel Moneim Aboul Fatouh, a leader of the Brotherhood's middle generation, last week refused to fall in line behind Freedom and Justice, instead backing another religious-leaning party. He wants to bring the discontented younger Brothers with him. Dr. El-Erian, a physician who sits on the group's 15-member ruling Guidance Bureau, waves off the defection. "In Israel you have many religious parties," he says. "You can have many Islamist parties [that] can cohere together and make alliances" in a future parliament.
The Brotherhood has seen splits before, with no serious consequences. Fifteen years ago, Abou Elela Mady, then the youngest member of its Shura Council, left to found the Wasat (or Center) Party. He says the Brotherhood's new, tolerant positions are nothing more than "tactical" moves to reassure anxious Egyptians, the military and the West.
Mr. Mady, whose party will compete with the Brothers for the large conservative and poor chunk of the electorate, says he wouldn't form a coalition with them. The Mubarak regime called Wasat a Trojan Horse for Islamists. He likens his group to Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party.
Mr. Mady, who is 53, fits the profile of many current and former Brothers. Born into a lower-class family, he did well in school and got an engineering degree. He joined the Brotherhood in the late 1970s through the university unions. The Brotherhood seeks out ambitious outcasts—a sort of geeky fraternity for those who study hard and feel awkward around girls.
He left the party, he says, because "I wanted to be more open-minded. . . . I now can watch TV, listen to music and shake a woman's hand without feeling you were doing something wrong. Most members frown on it," he says. "The challenge of freedom for the Muslim Brotherhood is much more difficult than the challenge of an authoritarian regime. . . . They have to give concrete answers to difficult questions" about Egypt's future political and economic course.
***
Then there are Egypt's adherents of Salafist Islam, which in its most extreme version is practiced by Osama bin Laden. After last Friday's demonstrations, Salim Ghazor takes me to a large gathering in a lower-class Cairo neighborhood. A line of buses has brought the faithful from across Egypt to the Amr Ibn El-Aas mosque. Lit by a faint moon, bearded men in billowing gellabiyas walk past women in black niqabs into Egypt's oldest mosque. "Islam is the religion and the country," reads a sign.
The Muslim Brothers, who favor Western clothes and neatly trimmed facial hair, have clashed with the traditional Salafists, who looked down on political activity until the revolution. Mr. Ghazor, a teacher, once backed the Brotherhood but went over to the Salafists. "The Brothers care about politics more than the application of Islam," he says. Yet Brothers tend to practice the Salafist brand of Islam—raising the possibility that their movement could become Salaficized.
Here's a sampling. At the prayer meeting, the Salafist cleric Ahmed Farid calls out: "Those who refuse to abide by Islamic law will suffer and be damned." Another, Said Abdul Razim, gives advice for the Coptic Christian minority, about 10% of Egypt's population: "If they want peace and security, they should surrender to the will of Islamic Shariah."
***
On Sunday, I drive to Alexandria, the famed Mediterranean port, to meet the Brotherhood's rising star. Sobhi Saleh, 58, is a former parliamentarian and lawyer whom the military picked for the committee that drafted a raft of amendments to the interim constitution. No other anti-Mubarak political group was represented on the body. In the next parliament, Mr. Saleh would likely help draft a permanent new constitution. "People will be surprised how open-minded we will be," he promises.
Mr. Saleh rehearses the Brotherhood's plans to "purify laws" and "implement Shariah" in Egypt. It wouldn't, he says, be of the Taliban variety. Alcohol would be banned in public spaces. Women would be required to wear the hijab headscarf, but not the full-bodied niqab. These laws are intended to "protect our feelings as an Islamic society," he says.
As for the rights of Coptic Christians, he says that "Muslims have to protect Copts"—a patronizing view held by many Islamists. (Dr. Baltagi, by contrast, had offered that Copts are "fellow citizens.")
Having been a left-wing nationalist in his youth, Mr. Saleh waves away complaints about the Brotherhood's possible dominance over political life. "I do not care about the opinions of secularists who are against their own religion," he says. "If they were real liberals they should accept others and their right to express themselves."
But aren't the Brothers proposing to limit their right to self-expression? "We would ban activities in the public square, not in private space. Islam is against spreading unethical behavior and this is the difference between Islamic democracy and Western democracy. In Islam, everything that is against religion is banned in public. You"—meaning the West—"selectively ban behavior. We are only against those who are against religion and try to diminish it." This view seems to allow limited tolerance of dissenting opinions or minority rights.
The Brotherhood abandoned violence against Egypt's government in the 1970s, but it endorses Hamas and other armed Islamic movements. Every Brotherhood member I spoke to calls the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Camp David accords existing international law that a future government might reopen. Egypt's liberals say the same.
"Israel treats us as enemies," says Mr. Saleh. "If they are enemies for all its neighbors, why is it there?" Should Israel exist? "When they admit our peoples' rights," he says, referring to Palestinians, "we can study this."
The appeal of the Brotherhood remains hard to gauge, with no proper polls, few parties or elections in living memory. The group's candidates took 20% in a partially contested parliamentary poll in 2005, and it aims to win a third of seats this year.
The Brothers won't field a presidential candidate, a savvy move to soothe nerves and avoid governing responsibility. They can wait. Anyway, the military seems to prefer an establishment figure like Amr Moussa, the recent chief of the Arab League. The secular parties are immature, numerous and elitist—not the best recipe for electoral success.
"No one needs to be afraid of us," says Dr. El-Erian. "We need now five years of national consensus of reform, to boost the new democratic system, and then have open political competition." How seriously one chooses to take such reassurances depends on whether the Brotherhood ends up as just another political party in a freer Egypt or stays a religiously-driven cause.
"Skeptical optimism" is a phrase often heard in Egypt these days. Religion wasn't the galvanizing force in Egypt's revolution, and the Brotherhood's 83-year-old brand of political Islam looks its age compared to ideas of modernity and freedom that excited the crowds in Tahrir Square. You don't find the fervency of religious extremism here as in, say, Pakistan. If the generals today or a future regime allow space for pluralism to flourish, Egypt could build on its weak foundations and accommodate a changed Muslim Brotherhood. That assumes, not altogether safely, that the worst instincts of would-be authoritarians in military, clerical or Brother garb are kept in check, and the Arab world's most important democratic transition stays on track.
Mr. Kaminski is a member of the Journal's editorial board.
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Second post of the morning
CAIRO—Soldiers beat hundreds of protesters with clubs and fired heavy volleys of gunfire into the air in a pre-dawn attack that broke up a demonstration in Cairo's central Tahrir Square in a sign of increasing tensions between Egypt's ruling military and the country's protest movement.
A force of about 300 soldiers swept into the square around 3 a.m. and waded into a tent camp in the center where protesters had formed a human cordon to protect several army officers who joined their demonstration, witnesses said.
Several hundred protesters remained Saturday morning in Tahrir Square, where many continued to protest against the military's lack of action on prosecuting former regime officials. Witnesses to Friday night's violence waved spent bullet cartridges left over from the confrontation. A woman who gave her name only as Enas said she saw as many as 10 protesters shot dead last night.
"We said to the army, 'why are you doing this? We are all family,'" Ms. Enas said. "They said 'you want to make Cairo burn, so we will make it burn."
Ms. Enas said protesters were shot as they tried to protect a group of about eight soldiers who were sleeping among the protesters in a tent in the middle of Tahrir Square. Several soldiers had joined the protests against the military in defiance of threats from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces that any soldier caught participating would face a military court.
The troops dragged an unknown number of protesters away, throwing them into police trucks.
"I saw women being slapped in the face, women being kicked," cried one female protester, who was among several who took refuge in a nearby mosque. Troops surrounded the mosque and heavy gunfire was heard for hours. Protesters in the mosque reported large numbers of injured, including several wounded by gunfire.
The assault came hours after protesters poured into Tahrir Square in one of Egypt's largest marches in two months, marking growing frustration among many here at the military's perceived slowness in removing and prosecuting officials from the deposed regime.
Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
A protester waves his national flag as tens of thousands gathered in Tahrir Square on Friday to demand further government purges.
.Friday's "Day of Trial and Cleansing" drew several thousand protesters, one of the biggest gatherings since President Hosni Mubarak was replaced on Feb. 11 by an interim high council of military officers, a show of the abiding strength of Egypt's youth-led protest movement.
The gathering also demonstrated how the prosecution of lingering elements of the old regime, such as Mr. Mubarak and his top aides and officials, will be a critical task for Egypt's military officers if they hope to maintain their high standing among the public.
"People feel they are not doing enough—and if they are doing enough, it's too slow," said Ahmed Wahba, 41, referring to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which is leading Egypt's transition toward democracy. Mr. Wahba, who was protesting in the crowded square Friday, said the Egyptian public won't be satisfied until they "see Mubarak in the middle of [Tahrir] Square, locked up or executed."
Mr. Wahba was standing in front of a mock cage containing an effigy of Mr. Mubarak that demonstrators had erected at one end of the square. People also carried signs with images of the former speaker of parliament's upper house, Safwat Al Sharif, behind bars, and chanted that Mubarak-appointed local governors and mayors should be dismissed from power.
WSJ's Margaret Coker had a first-hand seat to the recent revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. She joins Simon Constable to discuss what's likely to happen next as these Middle East countries transition to new governments.
.Egypt's attorney general has investigated and arrested some of what protesters say are the most-hated characters from the former ruling National Democratic Party. Earlier this week, prosecutors banned travel and froze the personal finances of Mr. El Sherif; Fathi Sorour, the speaker of parliament's lower house; and Zakariya Azmi, Mr. Mubarak's former chief of staff. Mr. Azmi was arrested Wednesday, according to Mena, Egypt's state news agency, along with former housing minister Ibrahim Suleiman. But several demonstrators say the effort has proceeded at a pace they say indicates the sway the old regime still holds over the military leaders who deposed them. These people say delays in the investigations give officials time to put what they say are embezzled assets in foreign accounts.
Another former housing minister, as well as former tourism and interior ministers, have also been arrested on charges of corruption. Ahmed Ezz, a high-level party official and close confidant of the former president's son, Gamal Mubarak, is also in prison awaiting trial.
"We need our money to come back. We will stay here until our money comes again," said protester Mohammed Garib.
Friday's numbers were bolstered by the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's most powerful Islamist political group and a champion of democratic reforms under Mr. Mubarak's rule. The Brotherhood's official call for members to participate in the demonstrations came after two months in which the group was seen as working closely with military leaders.
Following the violence on Friday night, the Brotherhood released a statement blaming the military's attacks on elements of the former regime who hope to cling to power by inciting chaos. The statement praised the military-led transition to democracy and called on Egyptians to continue supporting the armed forces.
The dissatisfaction with the military seems to have spread to within the ranks. In YouTube videos posted this week, at least two Egyptian soldiers said they would participate in Friday's protests. On Thursday, Maj. Mohamed Askar, a spokesman for the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, told CNN that any soldiers who participate in the demonstration will face an "immediate military tribunal."
Despite demonstrators' pique, it remains unclear whether their demands match those of Egypt's 80 million people. According to a poll released this week by the New York-based International Peace Institute, 77% of Egyptians said they still view the military favorably. A separate 2008 poll by the New York-based Charney Research group showed a 90% approval rate.
Protesters nevertheless took Friday's large turnout as a vote of confidence for a youth movement whose power to sway public opinion appeared to have been fading.
The revolutionary youth were humbled when voters accepted a set of controversial constitutional amendments in a referendum in mid-March despite their forceful campaign urging Egyptians to vote "no." Protests last Friday, also organized to seek the prosecution of former regime officials, drew far fewer people.
"Obviously, the Supreme Council is not supporting the people's interests," said Ahmed Naguib, one of the protest leaders who said he helped plan Friday's march in Tahrir Square. "So the people are taking into their own hands what the military council should be taking into their own hands."
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www.jihadwatch.org/2011/04/muslim-brotherhood-leaders-say-they-want-to-establish-an-islamic-state-in-egypt.html
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www.jihadwatch.org/2011/04/muslim-brotherhood-leaders-say-they-want-to-establish-an-islamic-state-in-egypt.html
Imagine how much embarrassment could be avoided if people just bothered to read this forum.
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Friday, April 29, 2011 STRATFOR.COM Diary Archives
Egypt's Changing Foreign Policy Attitudes
Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil al-Arabi said in an interview with Al Jazeera on Thursday that Cairo was working to permanently open the Rafah border crossing with the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. Al-Arabi told the Qatari-owned channel that within seven to 10 days, measures would be adopted to assuage the “blockade and suffering of the Palestinian nation.” The Egyptian foreign minister added, “It is the responsibility of each country in the world not to take part in what is called the humiliating siege. In my view, this (siege) was a disgraceful thing to happen.”
These statements reflect a shift in Egyptian policy toward the Palestinian territory ruled by the Islamist movement since mid-2007. Although occasional openings were allowed, Egypt, under the ousted Mubarak regime and in conjunction with Israel, maintained the blockade of Gaza in an effort to weaken Hamas’ standing among Gazans through economic hardships. So, the question is why is Egypt making such a radical change in policy?
“The only difference now is that the military is directly ruling the country and is in the process of changing the Egyptian political landscape to a multiparty system.”
This is the latest of radical foreign policy moves on the part of the new provisional military authority: There is a push toward reviving diplomatic ties with Iran, and the brokering of a rapprochement between Hamas and its arch secular rival, Fatah, toward the creation of a new Palestinian coalition government. There is also talk of allowing Hamas to open up an office in Cairo.
The common element in these developments is that they are against what Israel has to come to expect of Egypt. It is true that the collapse of the Mubarak government had created fears that it could elevate the Islamists (Muslim Brotherhood) to power, which could in turn lead to the undoing of the 1978 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. Despite the fall of former President Hosni Mubarak’s family and friends, regime change has not happened in Egypt.
The only difference now is that the military is directly ruling the country and is in the process of changing the Egyptian political landscape to a multiparty system. For the foreseeable future, however, Egypt is to be ruled by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Yet, we see shifts in the attitudes toward Israel that one does not expect from the Egyptian military, which has long done business with Israel.
These changes have to do with both domestic and foreign policy concerns of Egypt’s military rulers. On the domestic front, SCAF is well aware of the popular sentiment toward the Palestinians and Israel and is therefore adjusting its behavior accordingly. In an effort to manage a new era of multiparty politics, the military is appropriating the agenda of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood to contain their influence and placate popular sentiment.
Domestic politics, however, is not the only factor informing the shift in Egypt’s foreign policy attitude. The new military rulers also wish to see their country regain its status as the pre-eminent player in the Arab world. From their perspective, this can be achieved by engaging in radical moves vis-a-vis the Palestinians, Israel and Iran. It is unlikely, however, that Egypt is about to truly reverse its position toward Israel. The Egyptians do not wish to create problems with the Israelis.
Opening up Rafah is one thing, but breaking the peace treaty with Israel is another. Were Cairo to abandon this aspect of the relationship with Israel, it would dramatically alter Israel’s national security considerations and create massive tension between the two countries. It is hard to envision a military government in Egypt openly opting for such a scenario. Easier to imagine is for the SCAF-controlled Egypt to behave like Turkey — maintaining relations with Israel yet retaining the ability to criticize it.
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Coptic Christians, left, and Muslims threw stones at each other during clashes in Cairo last weekend.
Sidebar comment: My readings elsewhere leave me with the thought that the apparent neutrality here on Muslim-Coptic fighting is an example of Pravda on the Hudson's politics getting in the way of the Truth.
By DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK
Published: May 12, 2011
CAIRO — The neighbors watched helplessly from behind locked gates as an exchange of gunfire rang out at the police station. Then about 80 prisoners burst through the station’s doors — some clad only in underwear, many brandishing guns, machetes, even a fire extinguisher — as the police fled.
“The police are afraid,” said Mohamed Ismail, 30, a witness. “I am afraid to leave my neighborhood.”
Three months after the ouster of Hosni Mubarak, a crime wave in Egypt has emerged as a threat to its promised transition to democracy. Businessmen, politicians and human rights activists say they fear that the mounting disorder — from sectarian strife to soccer riots — is hampering a desperately needed economic recovery or, worse, inviting a new authoritarian crackdown.
At least five attempted jailbreaks have been reported in Cairo in the past two weeks, at least three of them successful. Other attempts take place “every day,” a senior Interior Ministry official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk publicly.
Newspapers brim with other episodes: the Muslim-Christian riot that raged last weekend with the police on the scene, leaving 12 dead and two churches in flames; a kidnapping for ransom of a grandniece of President Anwar el-Sadat; soccer fans who crashed a field and mauled an opposing team as the police disappeared; a mob attack in an upscale suburb, Maadi, that hospitalized a traffic police officer; and the abduction of another officer by Bedouin tribes in the Sinai.
“Things are actually going from bad to worse,” said Mohamed ElBaradei, the former international atomic energy official, now a presidential candidate. “Where have the police and military gone?”
The answer, in part, is the revolution’s legacy. Public fury at police abuses helped set off the protests, which destroyed many police stations. Now police officers who knew only swagger and brute force are demoralized.
In an effort to restore confidence after the sectarian riot last weekend, the military council governing the country until elections scheduled for September announced that 190 people involved would be sent to military court, alarming a coalition of human rights advocates.
After an emergency cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Essam Sharaf reiterated a pledge he made before the riots: The government backed the police in using all legal procedures, “including the use of force,” to defend themselves, their police stations, or places of worship.
It was an extraordinary statement for a prime minister, in part because the police were already expected to do just that. “This may be the first time a government ever had to say that it was fully supporting its police,” said Bahey el-din Hassan, director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies. “It is an indication of the seriousness of the problem.”
Many Egyptians, including at least one former police officer, contend that the police learned only one way to fight crime: brutality and torture.
Now police officers see their former leader, Interior Minister Habib el-Adly, serving a 12-year prison term for corruption and facing another trial for charges of unlawful killing. Scores of officers are in jail for their role in repressing the protests.
“They treated people like pests, so imagine when these pests now rise up, challenge them and humiliate them,” said Mahmoud Qutri, a former police officer who wrote a book criticizing the force. “They feel broken.”
Mr. Hassan, who has spent his career criticizing the police, said he sympathized. Police officers who defended their stations from protesters are in jail, while those who went home to bed are not facing any trial, he said.
“So the police are asking, ‘What is expected of us?’ It is a very logical question, and the problem is they don’t have an answer,” he said, blaming higher authorities.
Shopkeepers say the police used to demand goods for just half the price. Now, said Mr. Ismail, the witness to the police station jailbreak, the officers who visit his cellphone shop murmur “please” and pay full price. “The tables have turned,” he said.
The change in public attitudes is equally stunning, said Hisham A. Fahmy, chief executive of the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt. “It’s: ‘Talk to me properly! I am a citizen!’ ”
The spike in crime is a remarkable contrast to life in the Mubarak police state, when violent street crime was a relative rarity and few feared to walk alone at night. “Now it is like New York,” said Mr. Fahmy, adding that his group, which advocates for international companies, had been urging military leaders to respond more vigorously.
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At a soccer match pitting a Cairo team against a Tunisian team, police officers ringed the field until a referee made a call against an Egyptian goalie. Then the officers seemed to vanish as a mob of fans assaulted the referee and the visiting team. Five players were injured, two of them hospitalized, and the referee fled.
“When the violence erupted, the police just disappeared,” said Mourad Teyeb, a Tunisian journalist who covered the game. The one policeman he found told him, “I don’t care, I don’t assume any responsibility,” Mr. Teyeb said, adding that he feared for his life and hid in the Egyptian team’s dressing room.
Some see a conspiracy. “I think it is deliberate,” said Dr. Shady al-Ghazaly Harb, an organizer of the Tahrir Square protests, contending that officials were pulling back to invite chaos and a crackdown. “I think there are bigger masterminds at work.”
Interior Ministry officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to discuss the security situation, said the destruction of police stations had contributed to the disorder. The remaining stations are overcrowded with prisoners from other facilities. Of the 80 escapees from the police station, 60 have been recaptured, an officer said.
Mansour el-Essawy, the new interior minister, has called the lawlessness an inevitable legacy of the revolution. Of the 24,000 prisoners who escaped during the revolution, 8,400 are still on the run, and 6,600 weapons stolen from government armories have not been recovered, he said in an interview with an Egyptian newspaper, Al Masry Al Youm.
After the revolution, he said, the police justifiably complained of working 16-hour shifts for low pay. Bribery customarily made up for the low wages, critics say. So the ministry cut back the officers’ hours, and as a result also cut the number on duty at any time. And the sudden loss of prestige made it harder to recruit. “People are not stepping forward to join the police,” he complained.
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Coptic Christians, left, and Muslims threw stones at each other during clashes in Cairo last weekend.
Sidebar comment: My readings elsewhere leave me with the thought that the apparent neutrality here on Muslim-Coptic fighting is an example of Pravda on the Hudson's politics getting in the way of the Truth.
"the Muslim-Christian riot" Imagine civil rights protesters being brutalized in the south being described this way. Or Krystalnacht being described as sectarian violence.
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Exactly.
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Another entry today for Egypt. This one seems rather significant , , ,
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The hunger to come in Egypt
By Spengler
Egypt is running out of food, and, more gradually, running out of money with which to buy it. The most populous country in the Arab world shows all the symptoms of national bankruptcy - the kind that produced hyperinflation in several Latin American countries during the 1970s and 1980s - with a deadly difference: Egypt imports half its wheat, and the collapse of its external credit means starvation.
The civil violence we have seen over the past few days foreshadows far worse to come.
The Arab uprisings began against a background of food insecurity, as rising demand from Asia priced the Arab poor out of the grain
market (Food and failed Arab states, Asia Times Online February 2, 2011). The chaotic political response, though, threatens to disrupt food supplies in the relative near term. Street violence will become the norm rather than the exception in Egyptian politics. All the discussion about Egypt's future political model and its prospective relations with Israel will be overshadowed by the country's inability to feed itself.
Egypt's political problems - violence against Coptic Christians, the resurgence of Islamism, and saber-rattling at Israel, for example - are not symptoms of economic failure. They have a life of their own. But even Islamists have to eat, and whatever political scenarios that the radical wing of Egyptian politic might envision will be aborted by hunger.
The Ministry of Solidarity and Social Justice is already forming "revolutionary committees" to mete out street justice to bakeries, propane dealers and street vendors who "charge more than the price prescribed by law", the Federation of Egyptian Radio and Television reported on May 3.
According to the ministry, "Thugs are in control of bread and butane prices" and "people's committees" are required to stop them. Posters on Egyptian news sites report sharp increases in bread prices, far in excess of the 11.5% inflation reported for April by the country's central bank. And increases in the price of bottled propane have made the cost of the most widely used cooking fuel prohibitive.
The collapse of Egypt's credit standing, meanwhile, has shut down trade financing for food imports, according to the chairman of the country's Food Industry Holding Company, Dr Ahmed al-Rakaibi, chairman of the Holding Company for Food Industries. Rakaibi warned of "an acute shortage in the production of food commodities manufactured locally, as well as a decline in imports of many goods, especially poultry, meats and oils". According to the country's statistics agency, only a month's supply of rice is on hand, and four months' supply of wheat.
The country's foreign exchange reserves have fallen by US$13 billion, or roughly a third during the first three months of the year, Reuters reported on May 5. The country lost $6 billion of official and $7 billion of unofficial reserves, and had only $24.5 billion on hand at the end of April. Capital flight probably explains most of the rapid decline. Egypt's currency has declined by only about 6% since January, despite substantial capital flight, due to market intervention by the central bank, but the rapid drawdown of reserves is unsustainable.
At this rate Egypt will be broke by September.
Egypt imported $55 billion worth of goods in 2009, but exported only $29 billion of goods. With the jump in food and energy prices, the same volume of imports would cost considerably more. Egypt closed the 2009 trade gap with about $15 billion in tourist revenues, and about $8 billion of remittances from Egyptian workers abroad. But tourism today is running at a fraction of last year's levels, and remittances are down by around half due to expulsion of Egyptian workers from Libya. Even without capital flight, Egypt is short perhaps $25 billion a year.
Source: Yahoo
Egyptian Stock Market Index (EGX 30)
Source: Bloomberg
Price controls and currency depreciation have made it more profitable for wholesalers - including some employees of state companies - to export rice and cooking oil illegally. According to the daily al-Ahram, hoarding of rice by wholesalers has pushed up the price of the grain by 35% this year, while 200 containers per day are sold to Turkey and Syria.
"What is happening," the newspaper claims, is that that traders are storing basic items such as rice and barley, hoarded in barns and in large quantities, and are reluctant to send it to the rice mills in order to raise the price of this strategic commodity". The al-Ahram report, headlined, "Conspiracy to Monopolize Rice," demands physical inspection of containers leaving Egyptian ports.
The rest of the story is predictable. Once the government relies on young men with guns to police its merchants, hoarding will only get worse. The Egyptian revolution has cracked down on the commercial elite that ran the country's economy for the past 60 years, and the elite will find ways to transfer as much of its wealth to safety as it can. The normal chain of distribution will break down and "revolutionary committees" will take control of increasingly scarce supplies. Farmers won't get fuel and fertilizer, and domestic supplies will fail.
The Egyptian government will go to the International Monetary Fund and other aid agencies for loans - the government reportedly will ask for $7 billion to tide things over - and foreign money at best will buy a few months' respite. The currency will collapse; the government will print IOUs to tide things over; and the Egyptian street will reject the IOUs as the country reverts to barter.
It will look like the Latin American banana republics, but without the bananas. That is not meant in jest: few people actually starved to death in the Latin inflations. Egypt, which imports half its wheat and a great deal of the rest of its food, will actually starve.
Revolutions don't only kill their children. They kill a great many ordinary people. The 1921 famine after the Russian civil war killed an estimated five million people, and casualties on the same scale are quite possible in Egypt as well. Half of Egyptians live on $2 a day, and that $2 is about to collapse along with the national currency, and the result will be a catastrophe of, well, biblical proportions.
Spengler is channeled by David P Goldman. Comment on this article in Spengler's Expat Bar forum.
(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
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Blame the Jews, in 3......2......1
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Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on the March, but Cautiously
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) officially registered Wednesday for the formation of a new political wing, paving the way for the establishment of the Freedom and Justice Party. With parliamentary elections scheduled in September, Freedom and Justice is expected to do well at the first polls of the post-Mubarak era. Just how well is the main question on the minds of the country’s ruling military council, which would prefer to hand off the day-to-day responsibilities of governing Egypt, while holding onto real power behind the scenes.
Leading MB official Saad al-Katatny, one of the founders of Freedom and Justice, said he hopes for the party to officially begin its activities June 17, and to begin selecting its executive authority and top leaders one month later. Members of Egypt’s Political Parties Affairs Committee will convene Sunday to discuss the application and will announce their decision the next day. They are expected to approve the request. Three and a half months after the fall of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s leading Islamist group is on the verge of forming an official political party for the first time in its history.
“The SCAF wants to get back to ruling and give up the job of governing, but it knows that there has been a sea change in Egypt’s political environment that prevents a return to the way things were done under Mubarak.”
Following Mubarak’s ouster, MB wasted little time in seizing what it saw as the group’s historical moment to enter Egypt’s political mainstream. They announced plans to form a political party on Feb. 14. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which took over administration of the country following the deposal of Mubarak, did nothing to hinder this development, despite the military’s deep antipathy toward Islamist groups. Political instability was (and is) rampant in the country, and the military sought to find a balance that would allow it to maintain control while appearing amenable to the people’s demands, and bring life back to normal. Opening up political space to Islamist groups, including at least two emerging Salafist parties, and announcing plans for fairly rapid elections, was seen by the military as the most effective way to achieve this balance.
It bears repeating that what happened in Egypt in January and February did not constitute a revolution. There was no regime change; there was regime preservation, through a carefully orchestrated military coup that used the 19 days of popular demonstrations against Mubarak as a smokescreen for achieving its objective. Though a system of one-party rule existed from the aftermath of the 1967 War until Feb. 11 of this year, true power in Egypt since 1952 has been with the military and that did not change with the ouster of Mubarak. What changed was that for the first time since the 1960s, Egypt’s military found itself not just ruling, but actually governing, despite the existence of an interim government (which the SCAF itself appointed).
The SCAF wants to get back to ruling and give up the job of governing, but it knows that there has been a sea change in Egypt’s political environment that prevents a return to the way things were done under Mubarak. The days of single-party rule are over. If the military wants stability, it is going to have to accept a true multiparty political system, one that allows for a broad spectrum of participation from all corners of Egyptian society. The generals can maintain control of the regime, but the day-to-day affairs of governance will fall under the control of coalition governments that could never have existed in the old Egypt.
This opens the door for MB to gain more political power than it has ever held and explains why its leaders were so quick to announce their plans for the formation of Freedom and Justice in February. But the group has tempered eagerness with caution. MB is aware of its reputation in the eyes of the SCAF (and the outside world, for that matter) and is playing a shrewd game to dispel its image as an extremist Islamist group. It has been publicly supportive of the SCAF on a number of occasions, and has marketed Freedom and Justice as a non-Islamist party — it includes women and one of its founders is a Copt — based on Islamic principles. MB has also insisted that the new party will have no actual ties to the Brotherhood itself (though this is clearly not the case), while promising that it will not field a presidential candidate in polls due to take place six weeks following the parliamentary elections. In addition, MB has pledged to run for no more than 49 percent of the available parliamentary seats. This is designed to reassure the SCAF that it does not immediately seek absolute political power.
Focusing on whether the SCAF is sincere in its publicly stated desire to transform Egypt into a democracy misses the more important point, which is that the military regime feels it has no choice but to move toward a multiparty political system. The alternatives — military dictatorship and single-party rule — are unfeasible. But there are red lines attached to the push toward political pluralism, and MB is aware of these. Trying to take too much, too quickly, will only incite a military crackdown on the political opening the armed forces have engineered in the last three months. As for the SCAF, it is willing to give Freedom and Justice a chance in the new Egypt, so long as the underlying reality of power remains the same.
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Big piece from Pravda on the Hudson as to where the revolution is headed. It is an interesting read.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/29/magazine/egypts-next-crisis.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha210
Here is the first of 8 pages:
On a recent Wednesday morning, Zakaria Mohyeldin steered his father’s black Skoda sedan through a thick belt of Cairo traffic and drove northward into the sleepy farmland of the Nile Delta. Mohyeldin, a tall, broad-shouldered 27-year-old with a jutting chin and a thicket of jet-black hair, had just quit his job as a stockbroker trainee. The revolution was almost three months old, and the hard work was just beginning, he told me. Mohyeldin had seen his life transformed during those amazing 18 days: battling police in clouds of tear gas, ferrying food to the protesters in Tahrir Square and cheering in awe as Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s modern-day pharaoh, was cast out in a youth-led revolt. Now he wanted to see what he could do to spread the revolution’s high ideals in Egypt’s agricultural heartland. And he was vaguely contemplating a political career, starting in the village of Kafr Shukr, where his grandfather, a former prime minister, was born.
He parked his car outside his family’s old house, now a weathered brick meeting hall along a dusty road lined with vegetable and fruit stalls. Donkey carts bumped along among the cars, and date palms sheltered the lush green fields beyond. Inside the hall, photographs of his grandfather and other relatives adorned the walls. A group of middle-aged local men in brown and gray galabias stood up and addressed him with the respect due to his family: “Zakaria basha.”
A thickset butcher named Elsayed Shahba proclaimed, “What began in Cairo has echoed across the country.” He described how the town’s new “popular committee” — one of the many makeshift civil-defense forces that formed across Egypt during the revolution — protected the courthouse against a band of marauding criminals. It also warned the local member of Parliament, who belonged to Mubarak’s party, never to show his face there again. And now it was trying to reinvent the local government and its corrupt practices: training the police to treat people with respect, lecturing merchants not to gouge customers, forming subcommittees in every field. By Shahba’s account, it seemed the revolution’s ideals were already in bloom in Kafr Shukr.
But a chicken farmer named Ayman Dahroug dismissed the speech with a scornful gesture. “The truth is, there are no leaders in Kafr Shukr anymore,” he said in a loud, angry voice. “It’s only the Muslim Brotherhood that works here now.” Like others in the room, he seemed deeply anxious about the brotherhood’s rising influence. “They are in Kafr Shukr every day. They set up tents with bread, cooking oil, dried fish,” he said. “When they hear someone is sick, they bring medicines. They are at the level of the people. You say you have a popular committee, but I haven’t even heard of it. It is on Facebook, so what? Zakaria, if you want to do something here, you must be here every day like the brotherhood.”
Two other men nodded uneasily. The brotherhood was buying imported meat at a discount and selling it in town, earning goodwill among the poor, one of them said. “They are more active than ever before,” he added.
A third man, sitting cross-legged on the floor, looked at Mohyeldin pleadingly. “The revolution came, the revolution ended,” he said. “Now I want to know, who do I belong to? Everyone says it’s the revolution of youth, but it’s the revolution of everyone who suffered injustice. Now we want someone who will lead us to something correct, and we can’t find anyone.”
Mohyeldin began asking questions — about the local Islamists, the prices of food, the level of political awareness among the villagers. Each answer provoked a storm of arguments among the men, and stern warnings that the town would fall to pieces if someone did not step in and provide an alternative to the brotherhood. “The void of the Mohyeldin family is dangerous,” said Dahroug, the chicken farmer.
“I have quit my job in Cairo,” Mohyeldin said at last. “Now I am prepared to come live here all the time.”
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Who could have seen this coming? :roll:
At least the MB is a secular organization........ :roll:
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CAIRO — The headline screamed from a venerable liberal newspaper: Coptic Christians had abducted a young Muslim and tattooed her with a cross. “Copts kidnap Raghada!”
“They tied me up with ropes, beat me with shoes, shaved my hair,” Raghada Salem Abdel Fattah, 19, declared, “and forced me to read Christian psalms!”
Like many similar stories proliferating here since the revolution, Ms. Abdel Fattah’s kidnapping could not be confirmed. But for members of Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority, the sensational headline — from a respected publisher, no less — served to validate their fear that the Egyptian revolution had made their country less tolerant and more dangerous for religious minorities. The Arab Spring initially appeared to open a welcoming door to the dwindling number of Christian Arabs who, after years of feeling marginalized, eagerly joined the call for democracy and rule of law. But now many Christians here say they fear that the fall of the police state has allowed long-simmering tensions to explode, potentially threatening the character of Egypt, and the region.
“Will Christians have equal rights and full citizenship or not?” asked Sarkis Naoum, a Christian commentator in Beirut, Lebanon. A surge of sectarian violence in Cairo — 24 dead, more than 200 wounded and three churches in flames since President Hosni Mubarak’s downfall — has turned Christian-Muslim tensions into one of the gravest threats to the revolution’s stability. But it is also a pivotal test of Egypt’s tolerance, pluralism and the rule of law. The revolution has empowered the majority but also opened new questions about the protection of minority rights like freedom of religion or expression as Islamist groups step forward to lay out their agendas and test their political might.
Around the region, Christians are also closely watching events in Syria, where as in Egypt Christians and other minorities received the protection of a secular dictator, Bashar al-Assad, now facing his own popular uprising.
“The Copts are the crucial test case,” said Heba Morayef, a researcher with Human Rights Watch here, adding that facing off against “societal pressures” may in some ways be ever harder than criticizing a dictator. “It is the next big battle.”
But so far, there is little encouragement in the debate over how to address the sectarian strife. Instead of searching for common ground, all sides are pointing fingers of blame while almost no one is addressing the underlying reasons for the strife, including a legal framework that treats Muslims and Christians differently.
Christians, who make up about 10 percent of the 80 million Egyptians, say the revolution has plunged them into uncharted territory. Suppressed or marginalized for six decades here, Islamists entering politics have rushed to defend an article of the Egyptian Constitution that declares Egypt a Muslim country that derives its laws from Islam. Christians and liberals say privately they abhor the provision, which was first added as a populist gesture by President Anwar el-Sadat. But the article is so popular among Muslims — and the meaning so vague — that even many liberals and Christians entering politics are reluctant to speak out against it, asking at most for slight modifications.
“Our position is that it should stay, but a clause should be added so that in personal issues non-Muslims are subject to the rules of their own religion,” said Naguib Sawiris, a secular-minded Christian tycoon who has started his own liberal party.
He would prefer to remove religion from the laws entirely the way Western separation of church and state does, he said, but that idea could not prevail in Egypt. “Islam doesn’t separate them,” he said.
The most common sparks for sectarian violence, however, come from Egyptian laws dating from the end of the colonial era. One imposes stricter regulations on building churches than on mosques. Christians often look to get around the restrictions by constructing “community centers” with altars and steeples — sometimes provoking Muslim accusations of deceit and Christian charges of discrimination.
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(Page 2 of 2)
The other statute is one the church supports, although not all its parishioners agree: it enforces the Coptic Church’s near-total ban on divorce, even while Egyptian laws on Muslim divorce have grown increasingly liberal.
Often, Christians who want to divorce convert to Islam — and try, after the divorce, to convert back. The law has spawned many rumors of sectarian “kidnappings” to abet or prevent such a conversion for some Coptic women. The rumors ignite most outbreaks of Muslim-Christian violence, including at least three riots since the revolution, and many other controversies. In Ms. Abdel Fattah’s case, the Cairo police said the account was fabricated, while Ms. Abdel Fattah’s mother said her daughter was too traumatized to speak to reporters.
But despite widespread recognition of the law’s role as a catalyst of sectarian violence, the idea that civic law should enforce religious morals is so deeply embedded here that almost no one is proposing to alter the rule.
“It is explosive,” said Hossam Bahgat, founder of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, one of the few groups that advocate changing the law to at least allow the choice of a civil, nonreligious marriage.
When Copts held a weeklong sit-in to demand equal legal treatment, many who attended nonetheless insisted on the preservation of separate, binding laws on Christian marriages. “So no one will be able to get around the religion,” said Yusef George, a 30-year-old businessman. A spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s largest Islamist group, said it, too, supported the rule.
Some blame their own church for depending too much on Mr. Mubarak. In a pattern common to Syria, Iraq and elsewhere, Coptic leaders cultivated the patronage of Egypt’s secular dictator, with Coptic Pope Shenouda III trading political support for favors and protection. As in Iraq, with the leader deposed, the Christians felt exposed.
“Coptic rights were reserved to be discussed between Mubarak and the pope,” said Mona Makram Ebeid, a Coptic scholar and former lawmaker who suspended her membership in the liberal Wafd party because its newspaper published the headline about Ms. Abdel Fattah, “and the Copts were left out of it completely.”
Church leaders, in turn, blame Islamic fundamentalists they say the revolution has emboldened. “They don’t want any Copts present in Egypt,” said Father Armia Adly, a spokesman for the church.
The Muslim Brotherhood, meanwhile, has named a Christian as deputy leader of its new political party. “We are calling for a civil state,” said Essam el-Erian, a prominent leader of the Brotherhood, adding that the group hoped to promote laws derived from the elements of Islamic law common to other great religions, like “freedom of worship and faith, equality between people, and human rights and human dignity.”
Still, many liberals argue the sectarian conflicts prove Egypt should establish a permanent “bill of rights” to protect religious and personal freedoms before holding elections that could give power to an Islamist majority. It would “remove the sense of angst that exists today in Egypt,” said a spokeswoman for Mohamed ElBaradei, a liberal presidential contender.
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http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MF01Ak01.html
Humpty Obumpty and the Arab Spring
By Spengler
I've been warning for months that Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and other Arab oil-importing countries face a total economic meltdown (see Food and failed Arab states, Feb 2, and The hunger to come in Egypt, May 10). Now the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has confirmed my warnings.
The leaders of the industrial nations waited until last weekend's Group of Eight (G-8) summit to respond, and at the initiative of United States President Barack Obama proposed what sounds like a massive aid program but probably consists mainly of refurbishing old programs.
The egg has splattered, and all of Obumpty's horses and men can't mend it.
Read it all.
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http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7364550n
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I cannot access the complete article from where I am
BY YAROSLAV TROFIMOV
QENA, Egypt—Five weeks after the fall of the Egyptian regime, Ayman Anwar Mitri's apartment was torched. When he showed up to investigate, he was bundled inside by bearded Islamists.
Mr. Mitri is a member of the Christian Coptic minority that accounts for one-tenth of the country's 83 million people. The Islamists accused him of having rented the apartment—by then unoccupied—to loose Muslim women.
Inside the burnt apartment, they beat him with the charred remains of his furniture. Then, one of them produced a box cutter and performed what he considered an appropriate punishment under Islam: He amputated Mr. Mitri's right ...
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I cannot access the complete article from where I am
BY YAROSLAV TROFIMOV
QENA, Egypt—Five weeks after the fall of the Egyptian regime, Ayman Anwar Mitri's apartment was torched. When he showed up to investigate, he was bundled inside by bearded Islamists.
Mr. Mitri is a member of the Christian Coptic minority that accounts for one-tenth of the country's 83 million people. The Islamists accused him of having rented the apartment—by then unoccupied—to loose Muslim women.
Inside the burnt apartment, they beat him with the charred remains of his furniture. Then, one of them produced a box cutter and performed what he considered an appropriate punishment under Islam: He amputated Mr. Mitri's right ...
Hmmmm...... What a unique religious ontology! Good thing the Muslim Brotherhood is a secular organization.
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http://www.torontosun.com/2011/06/10/arab-world-a-relic-of-history
Arab world a relic of history
By Salim Mansur ,QMI Agency
First posted: Saturday, June 11, 2011 2:00:00 EDT AM
Only the politically correct, and they are the majority in the contemporary West, remain surprised of how quickly the so-called “Arab spring” has turned into an “Arab frenzy” and is headed into an “Arab inferno.”
In the long run, everything can likely work out and Arabs hopefully may learn to distinguish between mobocracy, as a tyranny of the majority, and democracy, as a rule of law, in which minorities are protected as equal members of society.
But in the long run, as Lord John Maynard Keynes — the revered economic guru of the liberal-left — pointed out the obvious: “In the long run we are all dead.” What matters is whether in the short or medium term Arab politics can break out of its closed circle of traditional consensus that frowns upon innovation as heresy.
The problem is culture. Arab culture, despite tremendous changes that have occurred elsewhere in the world, remains resilient in adhering to traditional values of patriarchy and the tribal order of father (leader) knows what is best for his tribe or nation.
The Arab League consists of 21 states and the Palestinian Authority. There is not one single democracy in this collection of Arab states, and the predominant reason for the absence of democracy among Arabs is culture.
Democracy is not merely an election, and a representative party with majority support holding power.
For democracy to work, the prerequisite is a culture in which the people recognizes the “other” — irrespective of how the “other” is defined in terms of ethnicity or religion or gender — as equal, and their interests and aspirations as legitimate.
This recognition of the “other” is missing in Arab culture. The “other” is merely tolerated in a subordinate status and since the “other” in the modern context is unwilling to be consigned indefinitely into an inferior position, the result is the repeated cycle of rebellion and repression in Arab history.
One of the most insightful explorations of the reasons for the absence of democracy in the Arab world is provided by an Arab-Moroccan woman, Fatima Mernissi.
Mernissi’s book Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World (1992) is remarkable for the wealth of ideas she presents in explaining the anti-democratic culture of her people, and the fear of modernity that grips them.
The ultimate “other,” and also the ultimate “minority,” is the individual asserting his/her individuality against the collective order of men and things. In Arab culture, individualism — as cultivated in the West — is feared and repressed because its affirmation represents the freedom of an individual contesting with and moving out of the closed circle of the tribe.
The West (“gharb” in Arabic), as Mernissi explains, is frightening because, among many things, freedom renders it strange, and like the female form, freedom is seductive.
Arab culture, on the contrary, demands whatever is desirable and relished in private must be hidden (veiled) in public. The fear of “fitna” or anarchy haunts Arab culture.
“In our time,” Mernissi writes, “freedom in the Arab world is synonymous with disorder.” And so a culture suspicious of the West will continue to prefer arid summers of tribal order over any spring that heralds freedom for its people.
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On first read, some of this piece strikes me as , , , needing a bit more thought. That said, the question presented is of profound importance.
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Democratizing Salafists and the War Against Jihadism
Egypt’s provisional military authority on Sunday approved the application of the country’s first Salafist party, Hizb al-Nour. Days earlier, the world’s oldest — and Egypt’s primary — Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, was licensed by the Political Parties Affairs Committee (which is appointed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces).
According to Egyptian media reports, as many as four other parties of Salafist persuasion are in the making, following unprecedented popular unrest in the country, which led to the fall of Hosni Mubarak’s government.
“The democratization of Salafism even in a limited form could have far-reaching geopolitical implications. Salafists considering democratic politics as a legitimate means of pursuing political objectives can have a moderating effect on ultra-conservative, extremist and radical forces.”
The establishment of Hizb al-Nour marks the first time a Salafist group has sought to enter relatively free electoral politics in the Arab world. Unlike the bulk of Islamists (of the Muslim Brotherhood persuasion), Salafists (also known as Wahhabists) have generally been ideologically opposed to democracy. From the point of view of Salafists/Wahhabists and other radical Islamists, as well as the jihadists, democracy is un-Islamic because they see it as a system that allows man to enact laws, which, in their opinion, is the right of God.
With Hizb al-Nour as a legal political entity, it appears that at least some Egyptian Salafists seem to have moved past a major redline. As far as Egypt is concerned, they are looking at an intense intra-Islamist competition, which could allow the country’s military to consolidate its position while it oversees the shift toward multiparty politics. From the ruling Egyptian council’s perspective, the presence of Salafists in the electoral mix helps it check the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and vice versa.
The case of Egypt notwithstanding, there will be a great many Salafist actors in the region who will continue to insist that Islam and democracy are incompatible. But the democratization of Salafism even in a limited form could have far-reaching geopolitical implications. Salafists considering democratic politics as a legitimate means of pursuing political objectives can have a moderating effect on ultra-conservative, extremist and radical forces.
At the least, it provokes critical debate that could undermine them from within. There are already a significant number of Salafists who do not support the violent ideology of jihadism and consider it to be a deviation from Salafism. That said, jihadism gained ground due to the fact that mainstream Salafists traditionally have never articulated a political program.
If Salafists in significant numbers embrace democratic politics, it could undermine jihadists in the long run. Mainstream politics could serve as an alternative means of pursuing religious goals — one that is less costly than the path of violence and offers a stake in the political system. Furthermore, it provides for a socialization process that could foster norms whereby Salafists can become comfortable with political pluralism.
In the near term, however, Salafists participating in democratic politics can have a destabilizing effect in the region’s most influential Arab state, Saudi Arabia, at a time when popular demands for political reforms have swept the Arab world. Thus far, the kingdom has remained immune to the mass agitation that has overwhelmed almost every other Arab country. In addition to their petroleum wealth, the Saudis have relied on the Salafist religious establishment to prevent the eruption of public unrest.
The political debut of Egyptian Salafists could, however, encourage some among the Saudi Salafists to follow suit. Salafists in the Saudi kingdom could demand political reforms; in the 1990s, a significant current within Saudi Salafism did engage in such a campaign, albeit unsuccessfully. In the current climate, however, the outcome could differ.
While there is concern in the United States and Israel regarding the entry of Islamists into the political mainstream in the Middle East, Salafists embracing democratic politics could actually help counter violent extremism. In the short term, though, it could destabilize the Arab world’s powerhouse and the world’s leading exporter of crude.
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A picture of Mickey Mouse with long beard and Minnie with a full-face veil posted on businessman Naguib Sawiris’ Twitter account has enraged Muslims and prompted 15 lawyers to file a lawsuit against him for blasphemy and insulting Islam.
The Christian Copt telecommunications mogul, who has emerged as a provocative voice in post-revolutionary Egypt, apologized on Twitter, saying that he meant the picture to be humorous, not an affront to the country's majority population of Muslims. "I apologize for those who don’t take this as a joke. I just thought it was a funny picture no disrespect meant! I’m sorry,” the magnate tweeted.
Nonetheless, Sawiris’ apology wasn’t enough to halt the fury and criticism from many Muslims, especially the ultraconservative Salafis, whose lawyers have already sued the billionaire. A Facebook group launched under the name “we are also joking, Sawiris” gathered no less than 90,000 members in recent days, calling for boycotting products or services sold by any of the businessman’s companies, especially the Mobinil mobile phone company.
"If you’re a real Muslim ... boycott his (Sawiris’) products if you love your religion. We have to cut the tongue of any person who attacks our religion,” the group writes. Several other Facebook groups under the same name or the moniker “we hate you Mickey Sawiris” also collected thousands of members angry at what the called “Sawiris’ mockery of and disrespect to Islam.”
The Internet campaign coincides with another offline effort by Islamic clerics, who have spoken to Egyptian and Arab media channels to denounce Sawiris’ act. “We can’t stay silent at any defaming campaigns towards religious symbols. Would Sawiris accept that a nun or a priest gets ridiculed?” Islamic preacher Safwat Hegazi asked in Al Quds al Arabi newspaper.
The flap follows recent attacks by radical Muslims against Christian institutions in Cairo, including the May burning of the Virgin Mary Church and ensuing clashes that left 12 people dead and 230 wounded in the poor neighborhood of Imbaba.
Shares of both Mobinil and Sawiris’ Orascom Telecom fell on the Egyptian stock exchange Monday. This is the second time Sawiris has indirectly provoked Salafis. The first clash came in 2007, when the businessman said that he was “not against veil, but when he walks in the streets of Egypt, he feels like a stranger" due to the growing number of veiled women.
Sawiris recently helped start the Free Egyptians political party, announcing that he would give up his role as Orascom’s executive chairman of the Orascom Telecom Holding Co. to focus on political and social work. The current row, however, might dent his party’s chances in the upcoming parliamentary elections, as Salafis and Islamic clerics have a notable influence on the votes of many Egyptians who base their perspectives according to religious convictions rather than political directions.
-- Amro Hassan in Cairo
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A New Wave of Rage in Cairo
Clashes between anti-regime demonstrators and Egyptian security forces erupted again in Cairo’s Tahrir Square Tuesday night and continued through the following morning. Although exact numbers are unconfirmed, Reuters reported that more than 1,000 people were injured in the incident. A leading pro-democracy activist group is now calling on supporters to return to the square early Thursday morning with tents and reenact the sit-ins that took place in January and February. The military has not said how it will respond but it will likely find a way to effectively handle this resurgence of unrest, triggered in large part by political divisions within the Egyptian opposition.
For a few hours on June 28, the Egyptian capital resembled a much milder version of Cairo on Jan. 28, the original “Day of Rage” which saw protests that would eventually help lead to the toppling of former President Hosni Mubarak. Far fewer people were on the streets this time around — estimates ranged from several hundred to a few thousand — and no confirmed deaths. However, the clashes delivered a stark reminder that the political situation in Egypt is far from settled.
“All segments of the opposition know a great deal rides on what lies ahead. Whoever has a greater say in the constitutional process will largely set the course for the next phase in Egyptian politics.”
The immediate trigger for this case of unrest was a minor scuffle Tuesday night involving alleged “families of martyrs” and Egyptian police in a neighborhood on the west bank of the Nile. The turmoil quickly gathered momentum and culminated with a crowd of people coming together in Tahrir Square. They eventually clashed with Interior Ministry security forces in front of the ministry’s headquarters. This latest outbreak of dissent is attributed to a range of causes — unhappiness over the slow pace of reforms since Mubarak’s ouster, continued economic hardships, ongoing military trials of dissidents and many more complaints. The fundamental issue driving those calling for regime change in Egypt is the timing of the upcoming elections — namely, whether they should occur before or after the writing of the new constitution. All segments of the opposition know a great deal rides on what lies ahead. Whoever has a greater say in the constitutional process will largely set the course for the next phase in Egyptian politics.
The Egyptian military has been governing Egypt since February and is eager to hand over the day-to-day responsibilities of running the country so that it can return to its former role of ruling from behind the scenes. This is why the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has agreed to hold elections in September. Ironically enough, this timeline puts the interests of the military in line with those of their erstwhile enemies, Egypt’s Islamists — most notably, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Such a brief elections timetable benefits the Islamists more than it helps those the SCAF has blamed for orchestrating the clashes last night in Tahrir Square. The Islamists are much more politically organized, and thus don’t need extra time to prepare.
The people chanting for the “downfall of the Field Marshall,” a reference to SCAF head Gen. Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, feel that the only way to pressure the military into acceding to their demands is to prove they retain the ability to summon large crowds back to Tahrir Square. Demonstrations had already been publicly planned for July 8, a day dubbed in activist circles as the “Second Day of Rage” (even though this should technically be the “Third Day of Rage,” since May 27 had already been named the second). However, in an effort to capitalize on the events of Tuesday and Wednesday, the leading pro-democracy activist group, the April 6 Movement, called for the sit-in to begin early, after dawn prayers on Thursday morning.
Whether anyone shows up and whether the military permits the establishment of another tent city in Tahrir Square will reveal how much support the political camp known collectively as the January 25 Movement really has on the Egyptian street. Despite the hype that surrounded the last round of demonstrations in February, only a few hundred thousand demonstrators ever came to Tahrir Square at one time — an impressive number, but not one that denotes widespread revolutionary fervor in a country of more than 80 million. The MB — and the other Islamist groups and parties — have made a calculated decision to abstain entirely from the planned demonstrations, feeling it would not benefit them to anger the SCAF when their interests are already aligned.
For the military, allowing the protests to occur could be a politically astute way of helping the January 25 Movement hurt its own image in the eyes of much of the Egyptian public. Most Egyptians want only a return to normalcy in a country that has seen its economy and internal security significantly degrade over the last five months. Alternately, the military may also simply decide that it is tired of dealing with demonstrations and order a crackdown. A SCAF statement issued Wednesday afternoon stated that “the blood of the martyrs of the revolution is being used to cause a rift between the people and the security institution,” an intimation that the clashes in Tahrir Square have been carefully orchestrated as a way to discredit the SCAF.
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Egypt's Political Awakening Creates New Militant Opportuntiies
A series of coordinated attacks occurred Thursday along Israel’s border with Egypt. While each attack was relatively small, the incidents indicate some degree of coordination among the attackers. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak attributed the attacks to elements emanating from the Gaza Strip, while Israel Defense Forces (IDF) tactical reports stated that the attacks had been launched from across Israel’s border with Egypt along the Sinai peninsula. No one has yet claimed responsibility.
“Egypt’s rolling back of the police state and subsequent political reforms have made it difficult to maintain domestic security and keep militants under control. Indeed, militants are already taking advantage of the political opening.”
Israel has plenty of experience in dealing with threats from militants in Gaza. In response, Israel often conducts preemptive as well as retaliatory airstrikes using real-time intelligence. In addition, whenever things appear to be getting out of control, the IDF conducts a major ground offensive.
Attacks inside Israel have become a rare occurrence. Weakened capability and shifting strategic imperatives have caused Hamas and other militant groups to largely refrain from such attacks. Most attacks usually consist of the firing of rockets from Gaza, a practice Hamas has an interest in both limiting as well as calibrating to enhance its control over the Strip.
In light of recent unrest in the Arab world and the new political and security reality in Egypt, these latest attacks in Israel potentially represent a new kind of threat — one posed by transnational jihadists who have long wanted to undermine Egypt without operational success. It is quite possible that al Qaeda is trying to exploit the post-Mubarak political environment to mobilize its Sinai- and Gaza-based assets in order to create an Egyptian-Israeli crisis that can (potentially) undermine Cairo’s stability.
Egypt After Mubarak
Under the police state run by ousted President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt successfully kept political Islamists restrained, neutralizing the threat from jihadist groups. The unrest that broke out in the Arab world earlier this year has altered the domestic political reality in Egypt. Mubarak’s fall from power in the wake of popular agitation and the Egyptian military regime’s obligated engagement in political reforms have created a new environment — one in which autocratic measures have become largely obsolete.
Egypt’s rolling back of the police state and subsequent political reforms have made it difficult to maintain domestic security and keep militants under control. Indeed, militants are already taking advantage of the political opening. They have stepped up their operations, as evidenced by attacks against energy infrastructure and other targets in the Sinai Peninsula.
The new era of Egyptian multiparty politics has also allowed a variety of Islamist actors to emerge as legitimate political entities. At the same time, Egyptian national sentiment is emerging as a major factor in the foreign policymaking process. This change alone constitutes a threat to Israel’s national security, though it is a more of a long-term issue.
The rise of different types of Islamist actors (Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists and Sufists, among others) as legitimate political entities who pursue constitutional means to come to power makes it difficult for jihadists to directly threaten the stability of the Egyptian regime. With even Salafists and former jihadist groups such as Gamaah al-Islamiyah and Tandheem al-Jihad embracing the political mainstream, the jihadists will have a hard time gaining support for an armed insurrection against the Egyptian state. Realizing that they are not able to directly confront the Egyptian state (despite the Arab unrest), the jihadists are trying to indirectly undermine the regime by exploiting the Israeli-Gaza situation and the renewed militancy in the Sinai.
A New Threat To Israel?
Even before today’s attacks, the Israelis responded to increasing attacks in the Sinai by allowing Cairo to deploy an additional 1,000 troops to the peninsula. That concession indicated that Israel is likely skeptical of the Egyptian military’s ability to effectively deal with this problem, considering current political and security circumstances. Cairo is under a lot of stress domestically and regionally. Egypt is in the early stages of trying to manage political and militant opposition in a tense political climate and it is unable to maintain internal security as effectively as it once did.
Israel, therefore, will likely see today’s attacks as a new kind of threat. The Israeli leadership realizes that the problem is no longer strictly confined to Gaza but has now spread to Egypt itself. However, Israel doesn’t have any good way to control the situation unfolding within the borders of its Arab neighbor. That said, Israeli officials have already begun pointing fingers at the deteriorating security situation in Egypt, a response which likely going to cause tensions between Jerusalem and Cairo — exactly what the jihadists hope to achieve.
The latest video statement from al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri, in which he speaks of an “intellectual” effort in addition to the armed one, is noteworthy. Al-Zawahiri’s comments are part of al Qaeda’s response to the so-called “Arab Spring” — a development in which the jihadists have largely been marginalized. Al-Zawahiri has long been frustrated by the fact that many former jihadists in Egypt (his home country) have renounced violence, attacking al Qaeda and him personally.
For decades, the al Qaeda leader has longed to be capable of undermining the Egyptian state, and now the Arab unrest provides an opportunity (albeit not without challenges of its own). Al-Zawahiri’s status as al Qaeda chief after the death of Osama bin Laden boosts the viability of this endeavor. In this new role, he is more or less free to steer the movement toward his preferred direction. His ascension to the top of the jihadist hierarchy also signals a rise of Egyptians (who have long held a disproportionate amount of influence) within the global jihadist network.
The result is that al Qaeda can be expected to focus heavily on the Egyptian-Gaza-Israeli fault line. This fixation will not only complicate matters for Israel and its efforts to deal with the Gaza Strip, it could also begin to unravel the Egyptian-Israeli relationship that has existed since the signing of the 1978 Camp David Peace Accords.
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http://pajamasmedia.com/spengler/2011/09/13/endgame-for-egypt/?singlepage=true
Endgame for Egypt
September 13, 2011 - 3:21 pm - by David P. Goldman
Robert Musil’s Der Mann Ohne Eigenschaften (“The Man Without Qualities”), one of the great novels of the past century, is a portrait of the Austrian early in 1914. The readers know that their silly world will come to a terrible end a few months later with the outbreak of war, but the protagonists do not. Musil published a first volume and spent the rest of his life trying to write a second, without success, for it is the sort of story that has no end except for the abyss.
Arab politics today has a Musil-like quality of unreality, for the conclusion will be the collapse of the Egyptian state. The misnamed “Arab Spring,” really a convulsion of a dying society, began with food shortages. Egypt imports half its caloric consumption, 45% of its people are illiterate, its university graduates are unemployable, its $10 billion a year tourism industry is shuttered for the duration, and its foreign exchange reserves are gradually disappearing. In August, the central bank’s reported reserves fell below what the bank calls the “danger level” of six months’ import coverage, or $25 billion, from $36 billion in February, although I suspect that even this number is bloated by $5 to $10 billion of Algerian and Saudi loans and trade credits. Despite reports in the press that food price inflation in Egypt has slowed, Arab-language Egyptian media report that the price of some staples, like rice and sugar, have risen by 50% or more since March. The military government is distributing bread and propane (the main cooking fuel).
Egypt turned down a proposed loan from the International Monetary Fund earlier this year because the military government could not accept the conditionality attached to IMF money. The Gulf States and the West may keep Egypt on life support, which would leave a large proportion of Egyptians in a limbo of extreme destitution. The fiscal collapse of Southern Europe (and sever problems elsewhere) makes this an inopportune time to come to the West with a begging bowl. As for the Gulf States: they are not even meeting their commitments to the Palestine Authority, and can’t be expected to carry a $15 to $20 billion annual financing requirement for Egypt.
It does not compute. Western economists can concoct all the economic recovery plans in the world, but a country that can’t teach half its people to read, and can’t produce employable university graduates, and can’t feed itself, is going to go down the drain. Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak kept Egypt under control by keeping most of its people poor, ignorant, and on the farm, and by warehousing its youth in state-run diploma mills. After sixty years of such abuse, Egypt simply can’t get there from here.
The result, I predict, will be a humanitarian catastrophe that makes Somalia look like a picnic. It’s not surprising that the Egyptian mob might attack the Israeli embassy. The Egyptian street has nothing to do but rise up against perceived oppressors, because nothing good awaits them; and the desperation that will follow the collapse of the Arab “Spring” threatens every Middle Eastern regime, such that the rulers have to try to get out in front of the rage. But what will they actually do? The Egyptian military is hanging onto power by its fingernails. If it attacks Israel, it will lose, and generals will be hanged from lamp posts. The Syrian military is too busy killing protesters to attack Israel, or to assist Hezbollah in a confrontation with Israel.
What we are likely to witness during the next two years will be repellent, even horrifying–but not necessarily dangerous.
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That is a piece worthy of considerable reflection , , ,
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Summary
The Egyptian public is growing more distrustful of Egypt’s military leadership, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). This has led the country’s largest Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), to become more vocal about its grievances, particularly regarding elections, the writing of the constitution and the SCAF’s relationship with Israel. The MB is a historically cautious group, but it currently faces an unprecedented opportunity to increase its political power — an opportunity that the MB fears may soon be closing in light of the SCAF’s recent moves. The SCAF will likely accept the MB’s new stance for now, as too harsh a response could unite the disparate elements of the Egyptian public against the military.
Analysis
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has begun assuming a far more confrontational demeanor toward the country’s ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), a shift away from the conciliatory stance the MB had previously taken. Several grievances against the SCAF are contributing to the MB’s shift. The MB fears that the military council will again delay parliamentary elections — currently expected to take place in November. The group also opposes the SCAF’s recent reinforcement of laws designed to limit dissent and the military’s plans to affect the formation of Egypt’s next constitution. Internally, MB leadership also is under rising pressure from its followers to speak out against the SCAF’s relationship with Israel.
Since the ouster of former President Hosni Mubarak, the MB has been careful to avoid antagonizing the SCAF. The events of the past month appear to have changed that. The turnout for a protest in Alexandria on Sept. 16, after calls for the protest by certain MB members, will say a lot about how the situation has evolved. The changing dynamic between the SCAF and Egypt’s largest Islamist group will place larger pressures on the military, which is seeking to preserve the regime, but also will create additional risks for the MB, an organization that has operated with extreme caution for much of the past several decades.
Egyptian Anti-Israeli Sentiment
In the past month, anti-Israeli sentiment has been rising in Egypt among nearly all segments of society. This theme has moved to the forefront of many demonstrations for the first time since the uprising against Mubarak. The initial trigger was the Israeli response to the Aug. 18 Eilat attacks that emanated from the Sinai Desert: an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strike that left six members of the Egyptian security forces dead. The SCAF expressed anger over the incident, but for strategic reasons, Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel trumped popular demands for a more severe reaction. The SCAF did not even go so far as recalling its ambassador. This created bad publicity for the SCAF at home.
The anti-Israeli sentiments that continued after the fallout from Eilat directly led to the Sept. 9 storming of the Israeli Embassy in Cairo. Who exactly organized the diversion of protests to the embassy from Tahrir Square remains unknown. The MB had officially boycotted the Sept. 9 Tahrir protests, but STRATFOR sources in Egypt claim that the MB was prominent in the gathering outside the embassy. What is clear is that the military allowed the protests outside the embassy to build to a near crisis situation before it dispatched commandos to rescue the remaining Israeli staff.
Israel thanked Egypt for its help on the issue, but the reports that SCAF leader Mohamed Hussein Tantawi had failed to talk with the Israelis during the affair — and even forced U.S. officials to wait for hours before answering their phone calls — show that the SCAF is not simply going to side with these two allies over its own citizenry without pause. Nonetheless, Egyptians perceived the military as having rushed to save the Israelis, while not valuing the lives of the Egyptians killed by the IDF strike in August. The MB issued a statement after the storming of the embassy that called the actions of the protesters justified and cited what it called an insufficient Egyptian response to the IDF strikes following the Eilat attacks, putting the group in opposition to the SCAF on two significant issues.
The SCAF viewed the actions of Sept. 9 differently than it had previous protests and sit-ins, as shown by its Sept. 10 announcement that it was reinforcing the emergency laws that predate its assumption of power. Virtually all Egyptians are united in their opposition to the Mubarak-era emergency laws, which grant the military the legal authority to detain protesters without cause and try them in military courts. The MB has only recently begun to address the issue with a greater sense of urgency. Essam el-Erian, deputy chairman of the MB-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party, has said that the MB would “not allow” parliamentary elections to be held so long as the emergency laws were still in place.
Parliamentary Elections
The timing of elections is another issue that has greatly contributed to the change in the MB’s posture toward the SCAF. Elections were supposed to be held in September, but the military pushed them back when it released its list of electoral laws July 20 (no exact date was established, but they were expected for November). Now there is a rising sentiment that the SCAF will again push elections back, and the MB is under pressure to vocally oppose such a move.
The Egyptian government previously pledged to open nominations for parliamentary elections on Sept. 27. A leading Alexandria-based MB member, Hasan ElBrence, said Sept. 13 that if the SCAF turns back on this pledge, the MB will protest. Speaking at a popular rally in Egypt’s second largest city, ElBrence reportedly said of his group, “We were raised on the idea of martyrdom, and we are more than happy to offer new martyrs and begin new protests and strikes in Tahrir Square if the will of the people is denied.” (It should be noted that ElBrence’s reference to “martyrdom” is not a threat to adopt jihadist tactics; rather, he is saying the MB is prepared to risk a potentially brutal SCAF crackdown when it takes to the streets.) Hussein Ibrahim, the secretary general of the Alexandria wing of the Freedom and Justice Party, said Sept. 13 that the interim government is trying to foment a counterrevolution. Ibrahim’s is just the type of charge the MB would have avoided making in the first few months following Mubarak’s ouster.
Then there is the long-running debate over the military’s plans to implement a set of “supra-constitutional principles” during the writing of Egypt’s next constitution. The MB has opposed this from the outset and has openly criticized the SCAF for the plan. The SCAF has never admitted the objective of the supra-constitutional principles, which would be to prevent a freshly elected parliament — potentially composed largely of Islamists — from overly influencing the nature of the new constitution. This debate has now taken on a new twist. Allegations have been made that the SCAF intends to appoint the 100-person committee responsible for writing the constitution, rather than allowing the eventual parliament to select members from its ranks. This would decrease the utility of the supra-constitutional principles, since in theory the people charged with drafting the new document would be under the influence of the SCAF.
The MB is internally divided on how to proceed. The group’s history as Egypt’s “loyal opposition” has made it exceedingly cautious in nature, but it currently faces an unprecedented opportunity to increase its political power. Now, the MB increasingly sees that opportunity closing in light of the SCAF’s recent moves. The MB has thus begun to make a gamble, increasing its public opposition to the SCAF while hoping that the military’s reaction is not so severe as to wipe out any potential gains for the MB.
The SCAF has not indicated its intent regarding elections, but its strategic relationship with Israel is extremely unlikely to change, as is its desire to influence the writing of the constitution and the enforcement of the emergency laws (even if it nominally abandons them at some point). The SCAF has shown that while it will tolerate a certain amount of dissent, it is willing to adopt harsher tactics in the face of open opposition. The SCAF’s overall strategy thus far, however, has been to play different groups off one another. Adopting too harsh a tone now would risk uniting the opposition, which is exactly what the SCAF will seek to avoid.
Read more: In Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood Confronts Military Leadership | STRATFOR
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Middle East analyst Bayless Parsley examines the decision to hold Egypt’s first elections since the ousting of President Hosni Mubarak.
Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.
Egypt’s ruling military council finally announced a list of dates on Tuesday for the country’s upcoming parliamentary elections. The announcement came as a slight relief to the large number of Egyptians who have been expressing growing concerns that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) was on the verge of delaying the elections yet again. But popular sentiment against military rule in Egypt is still on the rise. Though we are now one step closer to the first elections of the post-Mubarak era, it does not change one fundamental fact: the Egyptian regime is doing what it can to hold onto power, despite publicly championing a looming transition to democratic rule.
Tuesday’s constitutional declaration put to bed growing fears amongst a wide swathe of the Egyptian opposition that the ruling military council was on the verge of delaying yet again setting exact dates for when the elections will be held. The same group of generals that came into power in Feb. with promises to relinquish control to a civilian government within six months are still running the show, and even the Muslim Brotherhood – which for a long time had avoided publicly criticizing the military – has begun to display that it, too, is tiring of SCAF rule. STRATFOR has long said that the military council does in fact want to hold elections, but that it would take its time to ensure that it doesn’t lose control of the process.
The parliamentary polls will be divided into elections for the lower house and the upper house, which is known as the Shura Council. There will be six stages in total, three for each, and the whole process will run from Nov. 28 until March 11, 2012. And though the format of the elections has not yet been finalized, it is looking like the military is going to mandate that roughly 70 percent of the seats be reserved for a list-based system, which is akin to voting for a party ticket, and the rest be reserved for an individual candidate system. Everyone in the Egyptian opposition – from the Muslim Brotherhood to other Islamists to the secular parties – is opposed to anything but a purely list-based system because they feel that allowing individual candidates to run will simply give an advantage to the wealthy former members of the Mubarak National Democratic Party (NDP) regime. But this may be exactly what the military council wants to ensure.
By now, most Egyptians who took joy in the ouster of Hosni Mubarak have woken up to the fact that there really was not such a fundamental change in the country as may have appeared during the height of the Arab Spring. Accusations from Islamists and secularists alike that the military is trying to “hijack the revolution” have become commonplace, while state security has arguably become more intrusive in the Egyptian society, rather than less so. The ongoing criminal trials for Mubarak, his sons, and other high-ranking former NDP officials, meanwhile, are largely going nowhere, and it is the military council that ensures this, as well.
The issue of setting dates for the elections– and the antipathy that it generated towards military rule- was something that brought a bit of unity to a highly fractured opposition. Providing a degree of certitude that the vote will soon take place was a way for the military to ensure that such unity does not grow too strong. This is the game the SCAF feels it must play to maintain the balance in a country over which it wants to maintain control.
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SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT: VIOLENCE IN CAIRO
Violence has broken out in Cairo, beginning today at about 8 p.m. Demonstrators
outside the state television station began firing on soldiers patrolling the area,
according to reports from government sources. Two soldiers were reported dead and 25
soldiers were reported wounded so far. Other reliable reports say that multiple
vehicle fires have broken out and that tear gas is being fired by the police at the
crowd. Demonstrations are also under way at Tahrir Square.
Given elections scheduled for November, and the apparent magnitude of the violence,
it would appear that this event is highly significant. We expect details and
analysis to evolve as the events unfold.
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[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBxMG1e8oLw&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]
Especially if you're a Copt.
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STRATFOR
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October 10, 2011
VIDEO: DISPATCH: A NEW PHASE IN POST-MUBARAK EGYPT
Analyst Bayless Parsley examines the reported death of three Egyptian soldiers
during the Oct. 9 riots and discusses how the deaths mark a new phase in
post-Mubarak Egypt.
Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology.
Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.
The official death toll from yesterday's protest in Cairo has risen to 24, with 272
reported injured. Of the 24 reported killed outside of Egypt's state TV and radio
building, three were allegedly Egyptian soldiers. This would be the first time that
protesters outside of the Sinai have used firearms against the Egyptian military and
marks a new phase in post-Mubarak Egypt.
Oct. 9 was the most violent day in Egypt since the fall of Mubarak and many
Egyptians are now calling it "Black Sunday." What began as a Coptic protest march
from northern Cairo to the state TV building known as Maspero, devolved into a melee
that led to the deaths of over 20 people. Multiple military vehicles were set on
fire, military issue armored personnel carriers were driven through crowds of people
at high speeds and at some point someone from within the crowd fired upon a group of
soldiers who were providing security outside of Maspero. This would be the first
time that any protester in Egypt has used a firearm against an Egyptian soldier
since the demonstrations began in January, and if true, marks a dramatic shift in
tactics.
The protest was organized by a handful of Coptic activist groups who have organized
demonstrations outside of Maspero in the past. Shortly after the violence broke out,
state media blamed the Copts explicitly. Some of these guys even exhorted people to
go out on the streets and protect the army from the Copts. In a country that has
seen sectarian tensions between Copts and certain portions of the majority Muslim
population, it came as no surprise that within a short time, mobs of Muslim men
began to arrive at Maspero carrying torches and sticks. STRATFOR sources on the
ground in Cairo reported witnessing Copts being beaten by civilians expressing
solidarity with the military. While this was happening, anti-military crowds were
converging at nearby Tahrir Square, protesting against the violence used by the
soldiers at Maspero. The two groups later clashed in the square, though no deaths
were reported.
The violence on Sunday was an extremely polarizing event in Egypt. Until now,
violence against the military has been taboo, while the military has avoided using
this much force against the demonstrators as well. The deaths have brought to the
forefront a growing chasm in Egypt between two overarching camps: those who espouse
unity with military and those who openly advocate for the end of military rule. The
government and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces itself have both issued
official statements wishing to calm people's emotions and blame a foreign hand for
instigating the violence. Neither have openly blamed Coptic demonstrators as state
media did in the immediate aftermath of the violence breaking out on Sunday, but
this will not convince either side to moderate their positions in the near future.
As the sectarian issue grows in stature, so too will the chasm between the two
camps, divided over what the role of the military should be, as security conditions
deteriorate in Egypt. The questions now are whether the military will use what
happened on Oct. 9 to justify an increased crackdown on dissidents and how the
events will affect the image of the military in the eyes of Egyptians who normally
stay away from politics.
More Videos - http://www.stratfor.com/theme/video_dispatch
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**Good thing islam is so peaceful and tolerant, otherwise the Copts would be in real trouble.
http://www.hudson-ny.org/2489/egypt-destroying-churches
Egypt Destroying Churches, One at a Time
Muslim Brotherhood: "No More Churches"
by Raymond Ibrahim
October 10, 2011 at 5:00 am
What clearer sign that Egypt is turning rabidly Islamist than the fact that hardly a week goes by without a church being destroyed, or without protesting Christians being attacked and slaughtered by the military?
The latest chaos in Egypt—where the military opened fire on unarmed protesters, and ran armored vehicles over them— killing 35 and injuring over 300, with the count still rising --originated in Edfu, a onetime tourist destination renowned for its pharaonic antiquities, but now known as the latest region to see a church destroyed by a Muslim mob.
This destruction, which spurred the unrest in Egypt, is itself eye-opening as to the situation in Egypt. To sum it up, St. George Coptic church, built nearly a century ago, was so dilapidated that the local council and governor of Aswan approved renovating it, and signed off on the design.
It was not long before local Muslims began complaining and making various demands, including that the church be devoid of crosses and bells—even though the permit had approved them—citing that "the Cross irritates Muslims and their children."
Coptic leaders had no choice but to acquiesce, "pointing to the fact that the church was rebuilt legally, and any concessions on the part of the church was done for the love for the country, which is passing through a difficult phase."
Acquiescence breeds more demands: Muslim leaders next insisted that the very dome of the church be removed—so that the building might not even resemble a church—and that it be referred to as a "hospitality home." Stating that removing the dome would. Most likely collapse the church, the bishop refused.
The cries of "Allahu Akbar!" began: Muslims threatened to raze the church and build a mosque in its place; Copts were "forbidden to leave their homes or buy food until they remove the dome of St. George's Church;" many starved for weeks.
Then, after Friday prayers on Sept. 30, some three thousand Muslims rampaged through the church, torched it, and demolished the dome; flames from the wreckage burned nearby Coptic homes, which were further ransacked by rioting Muslims.
This account of anti-church sentiment in Egypt leads to several sad conclusions:
Animosity toward churches; demands that they be left to crumble; demands to remove crosses and stifle bells; are an integral part of Islamic history and dogma. The fact that church attacks in Egypt always occur on a Friday, Islam's "holy day," and are always accompanied by religious cries of "Allahu Akbar!" should be evidence enough of the Islamist context of these attacks.
Because there was a lull in this animosity from the colonial era to just a few decades ago, most Westerners incorrectly assume that in Islamic history church toleration is the rule, not the exception. Unfortunately Islamic tolerance toward churches has more frequently been draconian, and is back: "The Muslim Brotherhood announced immediately after the revolution that it is impossible to build any new church in Egypt, and churches which are demolished should never be rebuilt, as well as no crosses over churches or bells to be rung."
This is also why Muslim authorities are complacent, and even complicit. According to witnesses, security forces, which were present during the Edfu attack, "stood there watching." Worse, Edfu's Intelligence Unit chief was seen directing the mob destroying the church.
As for the governor of Aswan, he appeared on State TV and "denied any church being torched," calling it, instead, a "guest home" -- a common tactic to excuse the destruction of churches. He even justified the incident: Arguing that the church contractor made the building three meters higher than he permitted, he declared that "Copts made a mistake and had to be punished, and Muslims did nothing but set things right, end of story."
Equally telling is the fact that perpetrators of church attacks are seldom if ever punished. Even if sometimes the most rabid church-destroying Muslims get "detained," it is usually for show: they are released in days, and hailed back home as heroes -- a practise that also goes back to Muslim dogma, which sides with Muslims over infidels.
This year alone has seen the New Year church attack, which left 23 dead; the destruction of the ancient church of Sool, when Muslims "played soccer" with its relics; the Imbaba attacks, where several churches were set aflame; and now Edfu, wherein, as usual "none of the attackers were arrested."
Indeed, three days after Edfu, Muslims attacked yet another church.
Aware that they are untouchable, at least when it comes to making infidel Christians miserable, anti-Christian Muslims have a simple strategy: destroy churches, even if one at a time, safe in the knowledge that not only will they never be prosecuted, but also that Egypt's military and security apparatus will punish the infidel victims should they dare to protest.
Raymond Ibrahim, a widely published Islam-specialist, is a Shillman Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center and an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Forum.
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Egypt: Verifying Facts in a Crisis Event
The violence at the Maspero building in Egypt on Sunday was what STRATFOR refers to internally as a crisis event. Whenever a crisis event breaks out, the first task for any STRATFOR analyst is to rapidly wade through a sea of confusing media reports in an effort to separate fact from fiction. This is a difficult task given the nature of initial media reports — written under pressure, often with limited information — that are often the first source of information in such a situation. As the hours pass, the actuality of the event sometimes becomes more clear and sometimes, less so. In the case of the Maspero protest, it is hard to determine which one was the case.
STRATFOR gets its information from a variety of places. Human intelligence from sources on the ground in locations all over the world is a prime resource. But so is open-source intelligence, or published material. There is a multitude of readily available outlets for open-source intelligence, including online newspapers, 24-hour cable news channels and social media services. Translation services of foreign language media — once the domain of government intelligence agencies — are now also largely open to the public. The quantity of raw information provided by open-source intelligence is substantial, but the quality is not always superior to what can be gained from human intelligence.
“The key is to find the actual source of the information rather than relying on what someone else reports about a report.”
In this instance, a STRATFOR analyst was in Cairo at the time of the protest; in fact, STRATFOR was alerted to the event by this analyst. Open-source reports were checked against the analyst’s direct knowledge of events. The analyst’s observations and interactions with multiple sources were key factors in shaping our coverage of the violence.
A debate is under way in Egypt regarding the conduct of its state media outlets on Sunday. This controversy underlines the obvious problems with relying on state media reports to discover what has actually happened in a crisis event. Immediately after violence erupted at Maspero, some state TV channels explicitly blamed Coptic demonstrators for the reports of gunfire directed at the Egyptian troops who were providing security at the building. The reports of three dead Egyptian soldiers also originated from state media. Some state TV anchors then exhorted Egyptian citizens to take to the streets and protect the army from the Copts, further inflaming the situation.
This behavior generated criticism that state media was seeking to instigate sectarian strife between Egyptians, which would then be used to justify a security crackdown by the military. Egyptians who want the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to relinquish power immediately to a civilian government have expressed their views primarily through social media, especially Twitter. These media platforms are tailor-made for short dispatches from street protests and are suited to those with access to the technology they require. These views have been subsequently transmitted by privately owned Egyptian media, as well as mainstream media outlets based in other countries.
The most explosive claim to come out of the Sunday protests is that people in the crowd (whether Copts or not) used firearms against Egyptian soldiers, killing three of them. These claims have brought post-Mubarak Egypt into a new phase; such violence against the military has been taboo up until this point. The Egyptian government, unlike state media, did not directly blame the Copts. Nor did the SCAF. Official statements issued by both entities on Sunday and Monday sought to soothe sectarian tensions and emphasized that the identities of the alleged shooters remained unknown. These comments have not calmed the anti-SCAF camp, however. Many of these people do not believe any Egyptian soldiers were even killed, citing as evidence the fact that their identities have not yet been released. Others claim that the alleged shooters were saboteurs who infiltrated the crowds to paint the Copts in a negative light or to generate an SCAF crackdown necessitated by the need to prevent sectarian tensions from rising any higher.
Just as state media can be an untrustworthy source at times, so can claims spread on social media by the anti-SCAF segment of Egyptian society. Take, for example, a report posted on Twitter on Monday, which claimed that state-owned Nile TV had retracted its claim that soldiers had been killed during the Maspero protest. All that appeared on Twitter were the words, “Nile TV has announced that there were no soldiers killed in Maspero yesterday, and blamed the announcer being distraught.” There was no link provided to the original broadcast, no transcript and no context, but within minutes it had gone viral.
Clearly this would have been an extremely significant development, and only after closer inspection did STRATFOR clear up what had actually happened. A journalist not affiliated with Nile TV was in the studio and stated on-air that there was no evidence of Coptic involvement in the soldiers’ deaths. He also criticized state media for the way it reported on the Maspero violence. The Nile TV anchor refuted this criticism and the station maintained it had done nothing wrong in its coverage. There was no retraction; state media stood by its story.
This case clearly reflects the flaws of Twitter and the lightning speed of information in the age of social media. Stories spread almost without delay, which is helpful when one needs to gain immediate knowledge about events happening on the other side of the globe. Unfortunately, some of those stories are either misrepresentations of actual events or deliberate disinformation that winds up going viral. The key is to find the actual source of the information rather than relying on what someone else reports about a report. To avoid spreading disinformation, STRATFOR always attempts to confirm from the original source.
There is no perfect source of information. Reality is hard to discern, and it is always subject to debate. The only way to find it is to look around every corner.
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http://townhall.com/columnists/jeffjacoby/2011/10/12/the_cairo_pogrom/page/full/
HAVE YOU EVER seen a pogrom? Sarah Carr has.
"The Coptic Hospital tried its best to deal with the sudden influx of casualties," wrote Carr, a Cairo-based journalist and blogger, in her firsthand account of Sunday's deadly attack on Christian protesters by the Egyptian military. "Its floors were sticky with blood and there was barely room to move among the wounded."
In one room of the hospital morgue Carr counted the bodies of 12 people, some of whom had been killed when soldiers in armored personnel vehicles charged the crowd, firing and random and crushing the protesters they ran over. One of the victims was "a man whose face was contorted into an impossible expression. A priest . . . showed me the remains of the man's skull and parts of his brain. He too had been crushed."
What happened in Egypt on Sunday was a massacre. Government security forces assaulted Coptic Christians as they marched peacefully to the headquarters of the state TV network. They were protesting the recent burning of St. George's, a Coptic church in the Upper Egypt village of El-Marinab. Yet broadcasters loyal to the ruling military junta exhorted "honorable Egyptians" to help the army put down the protests. "Soon afterward, bands of young men armed with sticks, rocks, swords, and firebombs began to roam central Cairo, attacking Christians," the Associated Press reported. "Troops and riot police did not intervene." Video of the violence was quickly uploaded to the Internet. So were even more graphic images of the murdered protesters.
Back during the Tahrir Square demonstrations against strongman Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian military was widely praised for not using force to crush the protests and keep Mubarak in power. Then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates, for example, declared that Egypt's military had "conducted itself in exemplary fashion" and "made a contribution to the evolution of democracy." Popular, too, was the notion that the uprising could catalyze a new era of interfaith solidarity. "Egypt's religious tensions have been set aside," reported the BBC in February, "as the country's Muslims and Christians join forces at anti-government protests."
But the "spirit of Tahrir Square" has ushered in neither liberal democracy nor a rebirth of tolerance for Egypt's ancient but beleaguered Christian minority.
One of the country's leading liberal reformers, Ayman Nour, said Monday that with the latest bloodshed, the military has lost whatever goodwill it accrued last spring. It's hard to believe that the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces cares. In the eight months since Mubarak's ouster, the military has tried and convicted some 12,000 Egyptian civilians in military tribunals, often after using torture to extract confessions. The country's hated emergency laws, which allow suspects to be detained without charge, not only remain in force, but have been expanded to cover offenses as vague as "spreading rumors" or "blocking traffic." And just as Mubarak did, the generals insist that government repression is all that stands between Egypt and social chaos.
As for Egypt's Coptic Christians, their plight has gone from bad to worse. Post-Mubarak Egypt has seen "an explosion of violence against the Coptic Christian community," the international news channel France24 was reporting as far back as May. "Anger has flared up into deadly riots, and houses, shops, and churches have been set ablaze."
With Islamist hardliners growing increasingly influential, hate crimes against Christians routinely go unpunished. Copts, who represent a tenth of Egypt's population, are subjected to appalling humiliations. The mob that destroyed St. George's had first demanded that the church be stripped of its crosses and bells; after the Christians yielded to that demand, local Muslims insisted that the church dome be removed as well. For several weeks, Copts in El-Marinab were literally besieged, forbidden to leave their homes or buy food unless they agreed to mutilate their nearly century-old house of worship. On September 30, Muslim thugs set fire to the church and demolished its dome, pillars, and walls. For good measure, they also burned a Coptic-owned shop and four homes.
Many Copts are choosing to leave Egypt, rather than live under this intensifying anti-Christian persecution. The Egyptian Union of Human Rights Organizations calculated last month that more than 90,000 Christians have fled the country since March 2011. At that rate, estimated human-rights advocate Naguib Gabriel, one-third of Egypt's Coptic population will have vanished within a decade.
Or maybe sooner -- maybe much sooner -- if Sunday's anti-Christian pogrom is a sign of things to come.
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http://pjmedia.com/spengler/2011/12/02/corruption-and-islamism-in-egypt/?singlepage=true
Corruption and Islamism in Egypt
December 2, 2011 - 11:37 am - by David P. Goldman
Egypt under Mubarak was a tightly-controlled kleptocracy, and Egypt since Mubarak has been an uncontrolled kleptocracy, in which public officials steal whatever isn’t tied down. Shiploads of rice, diesel fuel, and other tradables are leaving Egyptian ports for hard-currency markets, while the country–which imports half its caloric consumption–runs out of money. Mubarak’s elite has helicopters revving on their roofs. It’s no surprise Islamists swept this week’s parliamentary elections. Whom do we expect Egyptians to vote for?
A new book by an economics reporter at Egypt’s al-Wafd party’s newspaper alleges massive corruption at the country’s central bank. Reviewed in al-Wafd newspaper today, the book by Mohamed Adel Ajmi claims that central bank chief Farouk Abd El Baky El Okdah exercises one man rule over the country’s banking system through cronies in all the central bank’s major departments. The central bank’s reserves, Ajmi claims, are unaudited and subject to the personal control of the central bank governor, who abused his position to enrich political allies of deposed Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak.
Theft on the grand scale from central banks is nothing new in the Muslim world. Last September, “Mahmoud Bahmani, the head of Iran’s Central Bank, denied rumours that $2-billion has already been transferred out of the country as part of a $3-billion embezzlement,” for example. The al-Wafd report has some credibility, considering that the Egyptian military dismissed all the central bank’s outside directors in October, leaving no-one but political appointees.
The central bank has financed perhaps $7 billion of flight capital out of its reserves, according to Raza Agha of Royal Bank of Scotland, as the Financial Times reported Nov. 4. Egypt’s spendable liquid reserves are well below the $22 billion figure mentioned in most news accounts–probably $13 billion, according to Agha, or less than three months’ import coverage.
The old Mubarak elite is getting out, and the generals are preparing for retirement on yachts in Monte Carlo and townhouses in Chelsea. Stripped of a thin Western veneer, what remains of Egypt is one of the world’s most backward societies, despite the veneer of sophistication that beguiled reporters who parachuted into Cairo for the Tahrir Square theatrics in February. Nearly a third of Egyptians marry cousins (because they count on their clan to protect them). And 45% are illiterate, while 90% of adult women suffered genital mutilation.
What ordinary Egyptians see is that they barely can fill their stomachs on the 5-piaster (less than 1 cent) pita loaves subsidized by the government. They are looking for someone to blame, and there is plenty of blame to go around: the new book from al-Wafd on Egypt’s central bank puts a narrative in place to explain the impending collapse of the Egyptian currency and the food shortages that will come with it. In fact, the surge in corruption is an effect rather than a cause of Egypt’s financial collapse. Once Asian demand pushed grain prices to a permanently higher plateau, the old regime was finished. And once the instability killed Egypt’s tourism, financial collapse became a matter of “when” rather than “if.” Rather than stay and try to get richer, the kleptocrats are salvaging what they can and getting out.
Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak left Egypt without a single untainted institution. As in Iran in 1979, the Westernized elite, who speak foreign languages and keep bank accounts abroad, will decamp for the fleshpots of London. The Islamists are left by default.
The difference between Egypt and a banana republic is the bananas: the collapse of Latin American currencies during the 1980s never led to starvation, because it occurred in countries that exported food. The difference between Egypt and Iran is oil. An Islamist Egypt will resemble not Iran, but Somalia.
What should America’s response be? Cut our losses. It would be an obscenity to provide military (or any other aid) to an Islamist government. Nothing to see here, folks. Keep moving. Non ragioniam da lor, ma guarda e pasa.
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Official figures show that the Islamist bloc has won about 60 percent of the vote in the first stage of Egypt’s complex election process. But Stratfor CEO George Friedman does not think the military will give up power easily.
VIDEO TRANSCRIPT:
Related Links
• Egypt and the Idealist-Realist Debate in U.S. Foreign Policy
Colin: In the first stage of Egypt’s complex electoral system we now have the reality that the Islamist bloc has the running, winning about 60 percent of the vote. Of course, there are two main parties — and different factions within this bloc — but Egypt’s military rulers have already signaled they don’t think the next parliament will be representative enough to oversee the drawing up of a new constitution.
Welcome to Agenda with George Friedman. George, an interesting outcome.
George: The most interesting thing that came out of this election is the fact that the Western media’s candidate for power in Egypt really lost, which were the secular democrats. So think of Egypt right now as having three blocs — the Nasserites, who are secular and military and who run the government; the Islamists, who are divided into various factions and hardly united; and the secular democrats, or those who wanted a European-style constitutional democracy who have really lost.
So the Arab Spring, as we call it, really has changed. The Arab Spring has changed from the idea that what we’re seeing now is the emergence of Western-style democracies to the idea that out of the democratic process is going to either come a more Islamist government or the continuation of the military government.
Colin: Yes, well, STRATFOR has always been doubtful about the so-called Arab Spring, but this is not an outcome sought by the street protesters nor is it what the U.S. wanted. But both must now have to live with it, haven’t they?
George: Well in the first place, the street protesters did not represent all of Egypt. They were a few hundred thousand. It was a very large crowd and they represented some elements of Egypt, but Egypt is a huge country of 80 million and there was no way that that crowd represented them. So the idea that that crowd spoke for Egypt, as was frequently said, was fairly preposterous.
I think the issue now really is whether the democratic process will continue — which I think it will — and what it will yield, which I think will be a very complex mixed Islamist government. And second, whether that government will be allowed to rule Egypt or whether the military will continue its historic role since 1952 of being the dominant modernizing and controlling force in Egypt. Right now I am still betting very much on the military holding power. They will yield in terms of democratic form but whether they are ever going to concede the ministries — or whether they are going to concede them easily — is really, in my mind, questionable.
Colin: But presumably the military will have to make some moves to adapt to the new reality and make some concessions?
George: Well they have made a huge concession — they held an election. The idea that they are going to go so far as to actually give those elected power is, I think, a rather dubious assumption. So what they did was allow political parties and they allowed the political parties to be elected. They may allow some degree of power to the emergent government. But that’s quite a ways down the road there, several elections will be held before that takes place.
But you have to remember that the military in Egypt does not see itself as illegitimate, it doesn’t see itself as Pinochet was viewed in Chile or as military dictatorships were viewed in Argentina. It was the military that staged the revolution against the monarchy that was subservient to the British. It was the military that saved Egypt from imperialism, that’s the way they look at it. It was the military that created some of the modern institutions. And many people, not just in the military but in Egypt, look to the military as guaranteeing both the secular nature of the country and its stability because there is a long history — more than a 50-year history — of that being the case.
So I think the Western tendency to look at a military government as inherently illegitimate really fails to understand Egyptian history. But at the same time history moves on but not easily, not cleanly and usually not peacefully.
Colin: Egypt has had the benefit of large swathes of U.S. aid, $2 billion a year since 1979, and much of it military aid I think. Will this continue?
George: That, of course, is a major question and we have to remember that the origin of that aid — Anwar Sadat, who had been the heir of Nasser’s pro-Soviet regime — was prepared both to break with the Soviet Union by denying them bases in Alexandria and air bases in the Nile Delta and to make peace with Israel. The United States was willing to pay for both of those, but particularly willing to pay for the expulsion of the Soviet Union from Egypt. That’s what we have been paying it for.
One thing we get from that is a high degree of control of the Egyptian military, in a sense that a good part of the military is funded by the United States and a good part of the military is maintained by American technicians. One of the things that everyobody is concerned about is the Islamists becoming aggressive militarily. It’s very hard to do that if the United States doesn’t want them to do that, so long as the United States is doing the funding and so long as the military is being supported by American technicians and contractors.
The bottom line is that U.S. military aid is substantial. It was not a gift, we got a great deal for it. And now it’s one way to keep a country of 80 million people — the largest Arab country in the world — under control regardless of what kind of government it gets.
Colin: So far the Muslim Brotherhood has indicated it won’t tear up the peace treaty with Israel, so presumably so long as this holds the aid will continue.
George: I think the aid from the United States would continue. I’m not sure the aid would end simply if the treaty were suspended or violated. The real issue between Israel and Egypt would be an attempt by Egypt to reoccupy the Sinai Peninsula, which is a buffer zone between the two.
I think that the aid question is really second to wondering where the Muslim Brotherhood will finally wind up. I think it’s a mistake to look at its current condition and assume that it is its permanent condition. I suspect we will see many fissures inside of the Muslim Brotherhood and many different strands emerge very much in conflict with each other. And this is the real reason that in the end the military may hold power — the opposition to the military, the alternative to the military, is incapable of governing because of their fragmentation.
Colin: There’s some evidence, at least, that the Islamic bloc — particularly the Muslim Brotherhood — did well because of the economic promises they made in areas like health and welfare. But can they keep these promises?
George: Well, shockingly, somebody might make an election promise they can’t keep. Of course they can’t keep them. And of course some people voted for them for that reason. And as they fail to keep the promises they will get less popular, others will get more popular, and so on and so forth.
But after over 50 years of a military government, the transition to a civilian government — even if that takes place — is going to take a long time. In these crowds there are very few people who have ever served in government or have ever administered in anything. That was in the hands of the military and the civilian bureaucracy that it controlled. This political process, even if it finally winds up ending up in some sort of true civilian control — not symbolic control, but true civilian control — even if you go to that point, it is going to take a long time.
Colin: George Friedman. And that’s Agenda for this week, until the next time. Thanks for giving us your time. Goodbye.
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IPT News
December 29, 2011
http://www.investigativeproject.org/3360/egypt-winds-of-change-give-way-to-dark-clouds
As President Hosni Mubarak's regime fell in Egypt, some feared that radical Islamists were poised to take over the state and the country. This opinion was not shared in America by leading voices in government and the media, where pundit after politician confidently asserted that the Muslim Brotherhood, the dominant Islamist organization in Egypt, did not enjoy that sort of widespread public support.
This certainty started at the top, as President Obama told Bill O'Reilly, "I think the Muslim Brotherhood is one faction in Egypt. They don't have majority support in Egypt."
The president's appraisal was echoed by United Nations Ambassador Susan Rice in an interview: "There's not indication that the Brotherhood is going to dominate Egyptian politics."
This benign notion of the Egyptian future was pushed by renowned New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof, who wrote that "the biggest losers of the revolution" would be violent Islamist extremist groups" that would "lose steam when the more moderate Muslim Brotherhood" joined the game, and that "Egypt won't change as much as many had expected."
Boy, were they wrong.
Through two rounds of voting (out of three), Egypt's Islamist parties have secured between 67 and 75 percent of seats in the country's first post-Mubarak parliament. The clear leader is the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), which won 86 of the 180 seats up for grabs. The FJP's closest contender thus far has been al-Nour—the political arm of Egypt's fundamentalist Islamist Salafists—which has won roughly 20 percent of seats.
This comes after initial assurances from the Brotherhood that they did not seek to dominate a successive Egyptian government. They pledged not to offer a candidate for president and to run candidates in only about a third of all parliamentary races.
Meanwhile, distinctions between the Brotherhood and the Salafi parties may prove insignificant. "At the end of the day, we and the Brotherhood want the same thing. What is that?" asked Salafi al-Nour chief Sheikh Ayman Shrieb—"Well, we want an Islamic state. Every vote we don't get, we hope it goes to the Brotherhood."
So much for the Brotherhood's previous claim that the revolution had "no Islamic agenda."
News outlets were more than willing to help lower expectations for the Brotherhood's electoral chances.
Kristof, for one, took the Brotherhood's assurances, coupled with the group's stated commitment not to field a presidential candidate, as a good-faith effort to prove it had been "tamed by being brought into the system."
In July, National Public Radio reported on rifts within the movement that not only could hurt at the polls, but which are "causing some in Egypt to question whether the decades-old movement can survive." That report followed a similar CNN story, which cited sources saying it "is unlikely to win more than 20% of the seats in parliament" because much of its past support was based on opposition to Mubarak's rule.
During a discussion held at the Center for the National Interest in April, a panel of experts "agreed with the assessment that the organization [the Brotherhood] is unlikely to win more than fifteen or twenty percent in September's parliamentary elections. The Salafist movement, far more conservative and radical than the MB, is unlikely to win more than a tiny fraction of that number."
Months later, right as the postponed first round of elections were set to commence, Dalia Mogahed, executive director of the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies and former White House advisory council appointee, released a poll showing that only 23% of Egyptians "Support" the Muslim Brotherhood, while 61% "Do Not Support." Commenting on the results, Mogahed noted that "while the Muslim Brotherhood enjoy support from a significant segment of Egyptian society, more Egyptians see a parliament in which the group holds a strong, influential position as bad for the country."
In contrast, writer Barry Rubin made a point of noting the Brotherhood's history of doubletalk. And he correctly predicted the Brotherhood's electoral prowess, saying the group is "following a brilliant strategy to build a united front for Sharia, bringing in other clerics and gradually winning over more and more of the religious establishment to an Islamist position."
The ultra-conservative Salafi party already has called for an all-out ban on alcohol and beach tourism. The Brotherhood claims it will not go as far. Yet even its plan, which calls for strict changes to Egypt's tourism industry, undoubtedly would have a negative impact on the country's bottom-line.
A leading official on Tuesday pledged to bring Egypt into the 1920s via Prohibition.
"We'll prohibit alcohol," former Brotherhood Secretary General Sobhi Saleh told a rally outside Cairo. "Tourism does not mean nudity and drunkenness We Egyptians are the greatest religious people, and we don't need that."
On Thursday, the Brotherhood's Supreme Guide announced that his group's "ultimate goal" of "establishing a caliphate system" is close at hand. The path toward achieving that goal, Mohammed Badie told listeners, begins with the establishment of a "just and reasonable regime."
The statement calls into question the Brotherhood's pledge not to run a presidential candidate since a "just and reasonable regime" likely includes a leader in sync with Brotherhood aspirations.
The Brotherhood seeks to "persuade a figure who they find satisfactory to run Egypt's top post," Chairman Mahmoud Ghozlan said last week. Also at odds with its earlier position, the Brotherhood is now rejecting calls for presidential elections to take place before the constitution is drafted—the exact opposite stance it took a month ago.
Flip-flopping is a liability in American politics. Less so, apparently, in Egypt, where the Brotherhood cultivated support in part by borrowing another American tradition – "walk around" money. Former U.S. Ambassador to Morocco Marc Ginsburg claims Egyptian military and business leaders funneled huge amounts of money to build "an underground supply chain of financial and commodity support to local Islamist political organizations throughout Egypt outside the prying eyes of Cairo-based media."
Only in this case, the vote-buying and community support comes at an additional cost: the Islamists' agenda. That bodes ominously for American interests. Already, Egypt appears to be the next home base for designated terrorist group, Hamas.
But don't be surprised to see pundits, politicians and journalists continue to minimize the ramifications. Some things take more than elections to change.
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Moving GM's post on the Israel thread to here:
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Quote from: G M on January 05, 2011, 06:51:41 PM
The problem is Egypt is very brittle. Were the Muslim Brotherhood to take over, things for the Copts, as well as average Egyptians would be much worse off. Keep in mind that those who could take power in Egypt see the pyramids and other artifacts there as something they'd like to destroy, just as the Taliban destroyed the Buddhas in Bamiyan. And, like the talibs, the destruction of artifacts would be the least of the horrible things done by them.
Egypt used to be very westernized, now salafism is taking deep root in the population. This does not bode well for the future. Classic Egyptian things, like belly dancing are going away because they are "unislamic".
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2077964/The-Salafist-partys-plan-Pyramids--cover-wax.html
The Salafist party's plan for the Pyramids? Cover them in waxBy Michael Burleigh
Last updated at 11:06 AM on 23rd December 2011
Comments ( Share
The pyramids at Giza are the most stunning sight I have ever seen.
True, their lonely eminence is threatened by Cairo's unlicensed building sprawl, with half completed houses inching their way towards them.
Surveying them at night as the calls to prayer multiplied into a thunder of sound from central Cairo already told me a few years back what was coming.
Wonder: The Pyramids at Giza are under threat from destruction or 'concealment' by covering them with wax
For now members of the Nour (The Light) Salafist party, which won 20 per cent of the vote in recent elections, are talking about putting an end to the 'idolatry' represented by the pyramids.
This means destruction - along the lines essayed by the Afghan Taliban who blew up the Banyam Buddhas - or 'concealment' by covering them with wax. Tourists would presumably see great blobs rather than the perfectly carved steps
Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2077964/The-Salafist-partys-plan-Pyramids--cover-wax.html
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With the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood and the even more puritanical Salafist Al Nour Party having stunned both themselves and Egyptians by garnering more than 60 percent of the seats in Egypt’s parliamentary elections, we’re about to see a unique lab test for the Middle East: What happens when political Islam has to wrestle with modernity and globalization without oil?
Islamist movements have long dominated Iran and Saudi Arabia. Both the ayatollahs in Iran and the Wahhabi Salafists in Saudi Arabia, though, were able to have their ideology and the fruits of modernity, too, because they had vast oil wealth to buy off any contradictions. Saudi Arabia could underutilize its women and impose strict religious mores on its society, banks and schools. Iran’s clerics could snub the world, pursue nuclearization and impose heavy political and religious restrictions. And both could still offer their people improved living standards, because they had oil.
Egypt’s Islamist parties will not have that luxury. They will have to open up to the world, and they seem to be realizing that. Egypt is a net importer of oil. It also imports 40 percent of its food. And tourism constitutes one-tenth of its gross domestic product. With unemployment rampant and the Egyptian pound eroding, Egypt will probably need assistance from the International Monetary Fund, a major injection of foreign investment and a big upgrade in modern education to provide jobs for all those youths who organized last year’s rebellion. Egypt needs to be integrated with the world.
The Muslim Brotherhood, whose party is called Freedom and Justice, draws a lot of support from the middle classes and small businesses. The Salafist Al Nour Party is dominated by religious sheiks and the rural and urban poor.
Essam el-Erian, the vice chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood’s party, told me: “We hope that we can pull the Salafists — not that they pull us — and that both of us will be pulled by the people’s needs.” He made very clear that while both Freedom and Justice and Al Nour are Islamist parties, they are very different, and they may not join hands in power: “As a political group, they are newcomers, and I hope all can wait to discover the difference between Al Nour and Freedom and Justice.”
On the peace treaty with Israel, Erian said: “This is the commitment of the state — not any group or party — and we have said we are respecting the commitments of the Egyptian state from the past.” Ultimately, he added, relations with Israel will be determined by how it treats the Palestinians.
But generally speaking, he said, Egypt’s economic plight “is pushing us to be concerned about our own affairs.”
Muhammad Khairat el-Shater, the vice chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood and its economic guru, made clear to me over strawberry juice at his home that his organization intends to lean into the world. “It is no longer a matter of choice whether one can be with or against globalization,” he said. “It is a reality. From our perspective, we favor the widest possible engagement with globalization through win-win situations.”
Nader Bakkar, a spokesman for Al Nour, insisted that his party would move cautiously. “We are the guardians of Shariah,” he told me, referring to Islamic law, “and we want people to be with us on the same principles, but we have an open door to all the intellectuals in all fields.” He said his party’s economic model was Brazil. “We don’t like the theocratic model,” he added. “I can promise you that we will not be another dictatorship, and the Egyptian people will not give us a chance to be another dictatorship.”
In November, Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, an independent Salafist cleric and presidential candidate, was asked by an interviewer how, as president, he would react to a woman wearing a bikini on the beach? “She would be arrested,” he said.
The Al Nour Party quickly said he was not speaking for it. Agence France-Presse quoted another spokesman for Al Nour, Muhammad Nour, as also dismissing fears raised in the news media that the Salafists might ban alcohol, a staple of Egypt’s tourist hotels. “Maybe 20,000 out of 80 million Egyptians drink alcohol,” he said. “Forty million don’t have sanitary water. Do you think that, in Parliament, I’ll busy myself with people who don’t have water, or people who get drunk?”
What to make of all this? Egyptian Islamists have some big decisions. It has been easy to maintain a high degree of ideological purity all these years they’ve been out of power. But their sudden rise to the top of Egyptian politics coincides with the free fall of Egypt’s economy. And as soon as Parliament is seated on Jan. 23, Egypt’s Islamists will have the biggest responsibility for fixing that economy — without oil. (A similar drama is playing out in Tunisia.)
They don’t want to blow this chance to lead, yet they want to be true to their Islamic roots, yet they know their supporters elected them to deliver clean government, education and jobs, not mosques. It will be fascinating to watch them deal with these tugs and pulls. Where they come out will have a huge impact on the future of political Islam in this region.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/world/middleeast/muslim-brotherhood-leader-rises-as-egypts-decisive-voice.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20120312
I found this four page article very interesting.
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.....At Rush Limbaugh for saying something mean to a 30 year old "activist".
JDN must be thrilled at this triumph of democracy!
http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/03/11/egypt-celebrates-international-womens-day/
March 11, 2012
Egypt Celebrates International Women’s Day
…by condemning the 1978 UN Convention Against Gender Discrimination as “incompatible with the values of Islamic sharia.” Need we tell you that the political forces behind this tastefully timed pronouncement were those empowered by the so-called Arab Spring? As the AFP notes:
The Freedom and Justice Party, political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, says it does not endorse gender discrimination, although the Brotherhood argues women should not be allowed to rule the country.
The party is the dominant bloc in both houses of parliament after a sweeping victory in a multi-phase general election that began in November. Women hold just two percent of the seats in parliament.
Meanwhile, MSNBC reports on the brave women who are protesting against this return to medievalism under the ominous headline “An Egyptian Career Woman? Soon it Could Be Rare“:
It’s a sea change from the ousted regime of President Hosni Mubarak, when women were guaranteed 64 parliamentary seats. In the latest post-revolutionary elections, the quota was eliminated and women won only five seats. “The other seats went to the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists,” said El Soud, co-founder of the Revolutionary Women’s Coalition, which has 4,000 members on Facebook.
“We are going backward, backward and backward,” she added.
Indeed. Via Meadia can’t help but wonder: where all the fashionable pundits who rapturously heralded the Arab Spring as the flowering of peace, justice and democracy, now that its victors are enacting their decidedly less appealing agenda? Studiously looking the other way, it seems.
Via Meadia has no interest in telling the Arabs how to manage their revolutions. In the first place they wouldn’t listen, and in the second they shouldn’t: every people has to test and experiment as it struggles to balance its inherited religious views and cultural practices with the challenges of contemporary life. Secular reformers in the Islamic world like the Shah of Iran tried to run roughshod over the religion of the people, and the results haven’t been pretty.
The revolutions that are shaking the Middle East today are populist but not necessarily democratic, and they are rooted in the impact of modern social and economic pressures but they are not ideologically modernist. It may be inconvenient for democracy advocates in the west, but more democratic governance in some countries may lead to fewer rights for women, religious minorities, gays and westernization advocates than these groups enjoyed under past tyrants. In the same way in American history, there have been epochs when more populist government meant fewer rights for minorities: it was Andrew Jackson who sent the Cherokee on the Trail of Tears.
Our democracy advocates and NGO activists like to think of history as a nice linear progression towards the liberal promised land in which all good things work together, and “good” forces and “bad” forces can be clearly distinguished. This is strong hearted but weak brained. History is much deeper and more inscrutable than our PC humanitarians like to think.
Some Americans think that because history is such a mess and the good guys cannot be helped or in some cases even identified, the US should “stay out” of other countries’ politics and affairs. It’s a nice thought, and at least in theory it could save us some trouble, but it isn’t possible. The world is too linked up, American interests are too global, and the American government is too easily affected by the sentiments (misguided though they may sometimes be) of the American people to pursue a policy of principled nonintervention with any consistency or success.
So the Arabs will mush along with their unsatisfactory spring, and the Americans will mush along with our unsatisfactory foreign policy, and the international system will continue to disappoint those expecting a liberal utopia to suddenly appear and make all our problems go away.
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Feminism AWOL on Islam
on: January 23, 2003, 01:28:05 AM »
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Why Feminism Is AWOL on Islam
Kay S. Hymowitz
U.S. feminists should be protesting the brutal oppression of Middle Eastern women. But doing so would reveal how little they have to complain about at home.
Argue all you want with many feminist policies, but few quarrel with feminism?s core moral insight, which changed the lives (and minds) of women forever: that women are due the same rights and dignity as men. So, as news of the appalling miseries of women in the Islamic world has piled up, where are the feminists? Where?s the outrage? For a brief moment after September 11, when pictures of those blue alien-creaturely shapes in Afghanistan filled the papers, it seemed as if feminists were going to have their moment. And in fact the Feminist Majority, to its credit, had been publicizing since the mid-90s how Afghan girls were barred from school, how women were stoned for adultery or beaten for showing an ankle or wearing high-heeled shoes, how they were prohibited from leaving the house unless accompanied by a male relative, how they were denied medical help because the only doctors around were male.
But the rest is feminist silence. You haven?t heard a peep from feminists as it has grown clear that the Taliban were exceptional not in their extreme views about women but in their success at embodying those views in law and practice. In the United Arab Emirates, husbands have the right to beat their wives in order to discipline them??provided that the beating is not so severe as to damage her bones or deform her body,? in the words of the Gulf News. In Saudi Arabia, women cannot vote, drive, or show their faces or talk with male non-relatives in public. (Evidently they can?t talk to men over the airwaves either; when Prince Abdullah went to President Bush?s ranch in Crawford last April, he insisted that no female air-traffic controllers handle his flight.) Yes, Saudi girls can go to school, and many even attend the university; but at the university, women must sit in segregated rooms and watch their professors on closed-circuit televisions. If they have a question, they push a button on their desk, which turns on a light at the professor?s lectern, from which he can answer the female without being in her dangerous presence. And in Saudi Arabia, education can be harmful to female health. Last spring in Mecca, members of the mutaween, the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue, pushed fleeing students back into their burning school because they were not properly covered in abaya. Fifteen girls died.
You didn?t hear much from feminists when in the northern Nigerian province of Katsina a Muslim court sentenced a woman to death by stoning for having a child outside of marriage. The case might not have earned much attention?stonings are common in parts of the Muslim world?except that the young woman, who had been married off at 14 to a husband who ultimately divorced her when she lost her virginal allure, was still nursing a baby at the time of sentencing. During her trial she had no lawyer, although the court did see fit to delay her execution until she weans her infant.
You didn?t hear much from feminists as it emerged that honor killings by relatives, often either ignored or only lightly punished by authorities, are also commonplace in the Muslim world. In September, Reuters reported the story of an Iranian man, ?defending my honor, family, and dignity,? who cut off his seven-year-old daughter?s head after suspecting she had been raped by her uncle. The postmortem showed the girl to be a virgin. In another family mix-up, a Yemeni man shot his daughter to death on her wedding night when her husband claimed she was not a virgin. After a medical exam revealed that the husband was mistaken, officials concluded he was simply trying to protect himself from embarrassment about his own impotence. According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, every day two women are slain by male relatives seeking to avenge the family honor.
The savagery of some of these murders is worth a moment?s pause. In 2000, two Punjabi sisters, 20 and 21 years old, had their throats slit by their brother and cousin because the girls were seen talking to two boys to whom they were not related. In one especially notorious case, an Egyptian woman named Nora Marzouk Ahmed fell in love and eloped. When she went to make amends with her father, he cut off her head and paraded it down the street. Several years back, according to the Washington Post, the husband of Zahida Perveen, a 32-year-old pregnant Pakistani, gouged out her eyes and sliced off her earlobe and nose because he suspected her of having an affair.
In a related example widely covered last summer, a teenage girl in the Punjab was sentenced by a tribal council to rape by a gang that included one of the councilmen. After the hour-and-a-half ordeal, the girl was forced to walk home naked in front of scores of onlookers. She had been punished because her 11-year-old brother had compromised another girl by being been seen alone with her. But that charge turned out to be a ruse: it seems that three men of a neighboring tribe had sodomized the boy and accused him of illicit relations?an accusation leading to his sister?s barbaric punishment?as a way of covering up their crime.
Nor is such brutality limited to backward, out-of-the-way villages. Muddassir Rizvi, a Pakistani journalist, says that, though always common in rural areas, in recent years honor killings have become more prevalent in cities ?among educated and liberal families.? In relatively modern Jordan, honor killings were all but exempt from punishment until the penal code was modified last year; unfortunately, a young Palestinian living in Jordan, who had recently stabbed his 19-year-old sister 40 times ?to cleanse the family honor,? and another man from near Amman, who ran over his 23-year-old sister with his truck because of her ?immoral behavior,? had not yet changed their ways. British psychiatrist Anthony Daniels reports that British Muslim men frequently spirit their young daughters back to their native Pakistan and force the girls to marry. Such fathers have been known to kill daughters who resist. In Sweden, in one highly publicized case, Fadima Sahindal, an assimilated 26-year-old of Kurdish origin, was murdered by her father after she began living with her Swedish boyfriend. ?The whore is dead,? the family announced.
As you look at this inventory of brutality, the question bears repeating: Where are the demonstrations, the articles, the petitions, the resolutions, the vindications of the rights of Islamic women by American feminists? The weird fact is that, even after the excesses of the Taliban did more to forge an American consensus about women?s rights than 30 years of speeches by Gloria Steinem, feminists refused to touch this subject. They have averted their eyes from the harsh, blatant oppression of millions of women, even while they have continued to stare into the Western patriarchal abyss, indignant over female executives who cannot join an exclusive golf club and college women who do not have their own lacrosse teams.
But look more deeply into the matter, and you realize that the sound of feminist silence about the savage fundamentalist Muslim oppression of women has its own perverse logic. The silence is a direct outgrowth of the way feminist theory has developed in recent years. Now mired in self-righteous sentimentalism, multicultural nonjudgmentalism, and internationalist utopianism, feminism has lost the language to make the universalist moral claims of equal dignity and individual freedom that once rendered it so compelling. No wonder that most Americans, trying to deal with the realities of a post-9/11 world, are paying feminists no mind.
To understand the current sisterly silence about the sort of tyranny that the women?s movement came into existence to attack, it is helpful to think of feminisms plural rather than singular. Though not entirely discrete philosophies, each of three different feminisms has its own distinct reasons for causing activists to ?lose their voice? in the face of women?s oppression.
The first variety?radical feminism (or gender feminism, in Christina Hoff Sommers?s term)?starts with the insight that men are, not to put too fine a point upon it, brutes. Radical feminists do not simply subscribe to the reasonable-enough notion that men are naturally more prone to aggression than women. They believe that maleness is a kind of original sin. Masculinity explains child abuse, marital strife, high defense spending, every war from Troy to Afghanistan, as well as Hitler, Franco, and Pinochet. As Gloria Steinem informed the audience at a Florida fundraiser last March: ?The cult of masculinity is the basis for every violent, fascist regime.?
Gender feminists are little interested in fine distinctions between radical Muslim men who slam commercial airliners into office buildings and soldiers who want to stop radical Muslim men from slamming commercial airliners into office buildings. They are both examples of generic male violence?and specifically, male violence against women. ?Terrorism is on a continuum that starts with violence within the family, battery against women, violence against women in the society, all the way up to organized militaries that are supported by taxpayer money,? according to Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, who teaches ?The Sexuality of Terrorism? at California State University in Hayward. Violence is so intertwined with male sexuality that, she tells us, military pilots watch porn movies before they go out on sorties. The war in Afghanistan could not possibly offer a chance to liberate women from their oppressors, since it would simply expose women to yet another set of oppressors, in the gender feminists? view. As Sharon Lerner asserted bizarrely in the Village Voice, feminists? ?discomfort? with the Afghanistan bombing was ?deepened by the knowledge that more women than men die as a result of most wars.?
If guys are brutes, girls are their opposite: peace-loving, tolerant, conciliatory, and reasonable??Antiwar and Pro-Feminist,? as the popular peace-rally sign goes. Feminists long ago banished tough-as-nails women like Margaret Thatcher and Jeanne Kirkpatrick (and these days, one would guess, even the fetching Condoleezza Rice) to the ranks of the imperfectly female. Real women, they believe, would never justify war. ?Most women, Western and Muslim, are opposed to war regardless of its reasons and objectives,? wrote the Jordanian feminist Fadia Faqir on OpenDemocracy.net. ?They are concerned with emancipation, freedom (personal and civic), human rights, power sharing, integrity, dignity, equality, autonomy, power-sharing [sic], liberation, and pluralism.?
Sara Ruddick, author of Maternal Thinking, is perhaps one of the most influential spokeswomen for the position that women are instinctually peaceful. According to Ruddick (who clearly didn?t have Joan Crawford in mind), that?s because a good deal of mothering is naturally governed by the Gandhian principles of nonviolence such as ?renunciation,? ?resistance to injustice,? and ?reconciliation.? The novelist Barbara Kingsolver was one of the first to demonstrate the subtleties of such universal maternal thinking after the United States invaded Afghanistan. ?I feel like I?m standing on a playground where the little boys are all screaming ?He started it!? and throwing rocks,? she wrote in the Los Angeles Times. ?I keep looking for somebody?s mother to come on the scene saying, ?Boys! Boys!? ?
Gender feminism?s tendency to reduce foreign affairs to a Lifetime Channel movie may make it seem too silly to bear mentioning, but its kitschy naivet? hasn?t stopped it from being widespread among elites. You see it in widely read writers like Kingsolver, Maureen Dowd, and Alice Walker. It turns up in our most elite institutions. Swanee Hunt, head of the Women in Public Policy Program at Harvard?s Kennedy School of Government wrote, with Cristina Posa in Foreign Policy: ?The key reason behind women?s marginalization may be that everyone recognizes just how good women are at forging peace.? Even female elected officials are on board. ?The women of all these countries should go on strike, they should all sit down and refuse to do anything until their men agree to talk peace,? urged Ohio representative Marcy Kaptur to the Arab News last spring, echoing an idea that Aristophanes, a dead white male, proposed as a joke 2,400 years ago. And President Clinton is an advocate of maternal thinking, too. ?If we?d had women at Camp David,? he said in July 2000, ?we?d have an agreement.?
Major foundations too seem to take gender feminism seriously enough to promote it as an answer to world problems. Last December, the Ford Foundation and the Soros Open Society Foundation helped fund the Afghan Women?s Summit in Brussels to develop ideas for a new government in Afghanistan. As Vagina Monologues author Eve Ensler described it on her website, the summit was made up of ?meetings and meals, canvassing, workshops, tears, and dancing.? ?Defense was mentioned nowhere in the document,? Ensler wrote proudly of the summit?s concluding proclamation?despite the continuing threat in Afghanistan of warlords, bandits, and lingering al-Qaida operatives. ?uilding weapons or instruments of retaliation was not called for in any category,? Ensler cooed. ?Instead [the women] wanted education, health care, and the protection of refugees, culture, and human rights.?
Too busy celebrating their own virtue and contemplating their own victimhood, gender feminists cannot address the suffering of their Muslim sisters realistically, as light years worse than their own petulant grievances. They are too intent on hating war to ask if unleashing its horrors might be worth it to overturn a brutal tyranny that, among its manifold inhumanities, treats women like animals. After all, hating war and machismo is evidence of the moral superiority that comes with being born female.
Yet the gender feminist idea of superior feminine virtue is becoming an increasingly tough sell for anyone actually keeping up with world events. Kipling once wrote of the fierceness of Afghan women: ?When you?re wounded and left on the Afghan plains/And the women come out to cut up your remains/Just roll to your rifle and blow out your brains.? Now it?s clearer than ever that the dream of worldwide sisterhood is no more realistic than worldwide brotherhood; culture trumps gender any day. Mothers all over the Muslim world are naming their babies Usama or praising Allah for their sons? efforts to kill crusading infidels. Last February, 28-year-old Wafa Idris became the first female Palestinian suicide bomber to strike in Israel, killing an elderly man and wounding scores of women and children. And in April, Israeli soldiers discovered under the maternity clothes of 26-year-old Shifa Adnan Kodsi a bomb rather than a baby. Maternal thinking, indeed.
The second variety of feminism, seemingly more sophisticated and especially prevalent on college campuses, is multiculturalism and its twin, postcolonialism. The postcolonial feminist has even more reason to shy away from the predicament of women under radical Islam than her maternally thinking sister. She believes that the Western world is so sullied by its legacy of imperialism that no Westerner, man or woman, can utter a word of judgment against former colonial peoples. Worse, she is not so sure that radical Islam isn?t an authentic, indigenous?and therefore appropriate?expression of Arab and Middle Eastern identity.
The postmodern philosopher Michel Foucault, one of the intellectual godfathers of multiculturalism and postcolonialism, first set the tone in 1978 when an Italian newspaper sent him to Teheran to cover the Iranian revolution. As his biographer James Miller tells it, Foucault looked in the face of Islamic fundamentalism and saw . . . an awe-inspiring revolt against ?global hegemony.? He was mesmerized by this new form of ?political spirituality? that, in a phrase whose dark prescience he could not have grasped, portended the ?transfiguration of the world.? Even after the Ayatollah Khomeini came to power and reintroduced polygamy and divorce on the husband?s demand with automatic custody to fathers, reduced the official female age of marriage from 18 to 13, fired all female judges, and ordered compulsory veiling, whose transgression was to be punished by public flogging, Foucault saw no reason to temper his enthusiasm. What was a small matter like women?s basic rights, when a struggle against ?the planetary system? was at hand?
Postcolonialists, then, have their own binary system, somewhat at odds with gender feminism?not to mention with women?s rights. It is not men who are the sinners; it is the West. It is not women who are victimized innocents; it is the people who suffered under Western colonialism, or the descendants of those people, to be more exact. Caught between the rock of patriarchy and the hard place of imperialism, the postcolonial feminist scholar gingerly tiptoes her way around the subject of Islamic fundamentalism and does the only thing she can do: she focuses her ire on Western men.
To this end, the postcolonialist eagerly dips into the inkwell of gender feminism. She ties colonialist exploitation and domination to maleness; she might refer to Israel?s ?masculinist military culture??Israel being white and Western?though she would never dream of pointing out the ?masculinist military culture? of the jihadi. And she expends a good deal of energy condemning Western men for wanting to improve the lives of Eastern women. At the turn of the twentieth century Lord Cromer, the British vice consul of Egypt and a pet target of postcolonial feminists, argued that the ?degradation? of women under Islam had a harmful effect on society. Rubbish, according to the postcolonialist feminist. His words are simply part of ?the Western narrative of the quintessential otherness and inferiority of Islam,? as Harvard professor Leila Ahmed puts it in Women and Gender in Islam. The same goes for American concern about Afghan women; it is merely a ?device for ranking the ?other? men as inferior or as ?uncivilized,? ? according to Nira Yuval-Davis, professor of gender and ethnic studies at the University of Greenwich, England. These are all examples of what renowned Columbia professor Gayatri Spivak called ?white men saving brown women from brown men.?
Spivak?s phrase, a great favorite on campus, points to the postcolonial notion that brown men, having been victimized by the West, can never be oppressors in their own right. If they give the appearance of treating women badly, the oppression they have suffered at the hands of Western colonial masters is to blame. In fact, the worse they treat women, the more they are expressing their own justifiable outrage. ?When men are traumatized [by colonial rule], they tend to traumatize their own women,? Miriam Cooke, a Duke professor and head of the Association for Middle East Women?s Studies, told me. And today, Cooke asserts, brown men are subjected to a new form of imperialism. ?Now there is a return of colonialism that we saw in the nineteenth century in the context of globalization,? she says. ?What is driving Islamist men is globalization.?
It would be difficult to exaggerate the through-the-looking-glass quality of postcolonialist theory when it comes to the subject of women. Female suicide bombers are a good thing, because they are strong women demonstrating ?agency? against colonial powers. Polygamy too must be shown due consideration. ?Polygamy can be liberating and empowering,? Cooke answered sunnily when I asked her about it. ?Our norm is the Western, heterosexual, single couple. If we can imagine different forms that would allow us to be something other than a heterosexual couple, we might imagine polygamy working,? she explained murkily. Some women, she continued, are relieved when their husbands take a new wife: they won?t have to service him so often. Or they might find they now have the freedom to take a lover. But, I ask, wouldn?t that be dangerous in places where adulteresses can be stoned to death? At any rate, how common is that? ?I don?t know,? Cooke answers, ?I?m interested in discourse.? The irony couldn?t be darker: the very people protesting the imperialist exploitation of the ?Other? endorse that Other?s repressive customs as a means of promoting their own uniquely Western agenda?subverting the heterosexual patriarchy.
The final category in the feminist taxonomy, which might be called the world-government utopian strain, is in many respects closest to classical liberal feminism. Dedicated to full female dignity and equality, it generally eschews both the biological determinism of the gender feminist and the cultural relativism of the multiculti postcolonialist. Stanford political science professor Susan Moller Okin, an influential, subtle, and intelligent spokeswoman for this approach, created a stir among feminists in 1997 when she forthrightly attacked multiculturalists for valuing ?group rights for minority cultures? over the well-being of individual women. Okin admirably minced no words attacking arranged marriage, female circumcision, and polygamy, which she believed women experienced as a ?barely tolerable institution.? Some women, she went so far as to declare, ?might be better off if the culture into which they were born were either to become extinct . . . or preferably, to be encouraged to alter itself so as to reinforce the equality of women.?
But though Okin is less shy than other feminists about discussing the plight of women under Islamic fundamentalism, the typical U.N. utopian has her own reasons for keeping quiet as that plight fills Western headlines. For one thing, the utopian is also a bean-counting absolutist, seeking a pure, numerical equality between men and women in all departments of life. She greets Western, and particularly American, claims to have achieved freedom for women with skepticism. The motto of the 2002 International Women?s Day??Afghanistan Is Everywhere??was in part a reproach to the West about its superior airs. Women in Afghanistan might have to wear burqas, but don?t women in the West parade around in bikinis? ?It?s equally disrespectful and abusive to have women prancing around a stage in bathing suits for cash or walking the streets shrouded in burqas in order to survive,? columnist Jill Nelson wrote on the MSNBC website about the murderously fanatical riots that attended the Miss World pageant in Nigeria.
As Nelson?s statement hints, the utopian is less interested in freeing women to make their own choices than in engineering and imposing her own elite vision of a perfect society. Indeed, she is under no illusions that, left to their own democratic devices, women would freely choose the utopia she has in mind. She would not be surprised by recent Pakistani elections, where a number of the women who won parliamentary seats were Islamist. But it doesn?t really matter what women want. The universalist has a comprehensive vision of ?women?s human rights,? meaning not simply women?s civil and political rights but ?economic rights? and ?socioeconomic justice.? Cynical about free markets and globalization, the U.N. utopian is also unimpressed by the liberal democratic nation-state ?as an emancipatory institution,? in the dismissive words of J. Ann Tickner, director for international studies at the University of Southern California. Such nation-states are ?unresponsive to the needs of [their] most vulnerable members? and seeped in ?nationalist ideologies? as well as in patriarchal assumptions about autonomy. In fact, like the (usually) unacknowledged socialist that she is, the U.N. utopian eagerly awaits the withering of the nation-state, a political arrangement that she sees as tied to imperialism, war, and masculinity. During war, in particular, nations ?depend on ideas about masculinized dignity and feminized sacrifice to sustain the sense of autonomous nationhood,? writes Cynthia Enloe, professor of government at Clark University.
Having rejected the patriarchal liberal nation-state, with all the democratic machinery of self-government that goes along with it, the utopian concludes that there is only one way to achieve her goals: to impose them through international government. Utopian feminists fill the halls of the United Nations, where they examine everything through the lens of the ?gender perspective? in study after unreadable study. (My personal favorites: ?Gender Perspectives on Landmines? and ?Gender Perspectives on Weapons of Mass Destruction,? whose conclusion is that landmines and WMDs are bad for women.)
The 1979 U.N. Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), perhaps the first and most important document of feminist utopianism, gives the best sense of the sweeping nature of the movement?s ambitions. CEDAW demands many measures that anyone committed to democratic liberal values would applaud, including women?s right to vote and protection against honor killings and forced marriage. Would that the document stopped there. Instead it sets out to impose a utopian order that would erase all distinctions between men and women, a kind of revolution of the sexes from above, requiring nations to ?take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women? and to eliminate ?stereotyped roles? to accomplish this legislative abolition of biology. The document calls for paid maternity leave, nonsexist school curricula, and government-supported child care. The treaty?s 23-member enforcement committee hectors nations that do not adequately grasp that, as Enloe puts it, ?the personal is international.? The committee has cited Belarus for celebrating Mother?s Day, China for failing to legalize prostitution, and Libya for not interpreting the Qur?an in accordance with ?committee guidelines.?
Confusing ?women?s participation? with self-determination, and numerical equivalence with equality, CEDAW utopians try to orchestrate their perfect society through quotas and affirmative-action plans. Their bean-counting mentality cares about whether women participate equally, without asking what it is that they are participating in or whether their participation is anything more than ceremonial. Thus at the recent Women?s Summit in Jordan, Rima Khalaf suggested that governments be required to use quotas in elections ?to leapfrog women to power.? Khalaf, like so many illiberal feminist utopians, has no hesitation in forcing society to be free. As is often the case when elites decide they have discovered the route to human perfection, the utopian urge is not simply antidemocratic but verges on the totalitarian.
That this combination of sentimental victimhood, postcolonial relativism, and utopian overreaching has caused feminism to suffer so profound a loss of moral and political imagination that it cannot speak against the brutalization of Islamic women is an incalculable loss to women and to men. The great contribution of Western feminism was to expand the definition of human dignity and freedom. It insisted that all human beings were worthy of liberty. Feminists now have the opportunity to make that claim on behalf of women who in their oppression have not so much as imagined that its promise could include them, too. At its best, feminism has stood for a rich idea of personal choice in shaping a meaningful life, one that respects not only the woman who wants to crash through glass ceilings but also the one who wants to stay home with her children and bake cookies or to wear a veil and fast on Ramadan. Why shouldn?t feminists want to shout out their own profound discovery for the world to hear?
Perhaps, finally, because to do so would be to acknowledge the freedom they themselves enjoy, thanks to Western ideals and institutions. Not only would such an admission force them to give up their own simmering resentments; it would be bad for business.
The truth is that the free institutions?an independent judiciary, a free press, open elections?that protect the rights of women are the same ones that protect the rights of men. The separation of church and state that would allow women to escape the burqa would also free men from having their hands amputated for theft. The education system that would teach girls to read would also empower millions of illiterate boys. The capitalist economies that bring clean water, cheap clothes, and washing machines that change the lives of women are the same ones that lead to healthier, freer men. In other words, to address the problems of Muslim women honestly, feminists would have to recognize that free men and women need the same things?and that those are things that they themselves already have. And recognizing that would mean an end to feminism as we know it.
There are signs that, outside the academy, middlebrow literary circles, and the United Nations, feminism has indeed met its Waterloo. Most Americans seem to realize that September 11 turned self-indulgent sentimental illusions, including those about the sexes, into an unaffordable luxury. Consider, for instance, women?s attitudes toward war, a topic on which politicians have learned to take for granted a gender gap. But according to the Pew Research Center, in January 2002, 57 percent of women versus 46 percent of men cited national security as the country?s top priority. There has been a ?seismic gender shift on matters of war,? according to pollster Kellyanne Conway. In 1991, 45 percent of U.S. women supported the use of ground troops in the Gulf War, a substantially smaller number than the 67 percent of men. But as of November, a CNN survey found women were more likely than men to support the use of ground troops against Iraq, 58 percent to 56 percent. The numbers for younger women were especially dramatic. Sixty-five percent of women between 18 and 49 support ground troops, as opposed to 48 percent of women 50 and over. Women are also changing their attitudes toward military spending: before September 11, only 24 percent of women supported increased funds; after the attacks, that number climbed to 47 percent. An evolutionary psychologist might speculate that, if females tend to be less aggressively territorial than males, there?s little to compare to the ferocity of the lioness when she believes her young are threatened.
Even among some who consider themselves feminists, there is some grudging recognition that Western, and specifically American, men are sometimes a force for the good. The Feminist Majority is sending around urgent messages asking for President Bush to increase American security forces in Afghanistan. The influential left-wing British columnist Polly Toynbee, who just 18 months ago coined the phrase ?America the Horrible,? went to Afghanistan to figure out whether the war ?was worth it.? Her answer was not what she might have expected. Though she found nine out of ten women still wearing burqas, partly out of fear of lingering fundamentalist hostility, she was convinced their lives had greatly improved. Women say they can go out alone now.
As we sink more deeply into what is likely to be a protracted struggle with radical Islam, American feminists have a moral responsibility to give up their resentments and speak up for women who actually need their support. Feminists have the moral authority to say that their call for the rights of women is a universal demand?that the rights of women are the Rights of Man.
Feminism Behind the Veil
Feminists in the West may fiddle while Muslim women are burning, but in the Muslim world itself there is a burgeoning movement to address the miserable predicament of the second sex?without simply adopting a philosophy whose higher cultural products include Sex and the City, Rosie O?Donnell, and the power-suited female executive.
The most impressive signs of an indigenous female revolt against the fundamentalist order are in Iran. Over the past ten years or so, Iran has seen the publication of a slew of serious journals dedicated to the social and political predicament of Islamic women, the most well known being the Teheran-based Zonan and Zan, published by Faezah Hashemi, a well-known member of parliament and the daughter of former president Rafsanjani. Believing that Western feminism has promoted hostility between the sexes, confused sex roles, and the sexual objectification of women, a number of writers have proposed an Islamic-style feminism that would stress ?gender complementarity? rather than equality and that would pay full respect to housewifery and motherhood while also giving women access to education and jobs.
Attacking from the religious front, a number of ?Islamic feminists? are challenging the reigning fundamentalist reading of the Qur?an. These scholars insist that the founding principles of Islam, which they believe were long ago corrupted by pre-Islamic Arab, Persian, and North African customs, are if anything more egalitarian than those of Western religions; the Qur?an explicitly describes women as the moral and spiritual equals of men and allows them to inherit and pass down property. The power of misogynistic mullahs has grown in recent decades, feminists continue, because Muslim men have felt threatened by modernity?s challenge to traditional arrangements between the sexes.
What makes Islamic feminism really worth watching is that it has the potential to play a profoundly important role in the future of the Islamic world?and not just because it could improve the lot of women. By insisting that it is true to Islam?in fact, truer than the creed espoused by the entrenched religious elite?Islamic feminism can affirm the dignity of Islam while at the same time bringing it more in line with modernity. In doing this, feminists can help lay the philosophical groundwork for democracy. In the West, feminism lagged behind religious reformation and political democratization by centuries; in the East, feminism could help lead the charge.
At the same time, though, the issue of women?s rights highlights two reasons for caution about the Islamic future. For one thing, no matter how much feminists might wish otherwise, polygamy and male domination of the family are not merely a fact of local traditions; they are written into the Qur?an itself. This in and of itself would not prove to be such an impediment?the Old Testament is filled with laws antithetical to women?s equality?except for the second problem: more than other religions, Islam is unfriendly to the notion of the separation of church and state. If history is any guide, there?s the rub. The ultimate guarantor of the rights of all citizens, whether Islamic or not, can only be a fully secular state.
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http://hotair.com/archives/2012/03/14/egyptian-parliamentary-report-israel-is-our-number-one-enemy/
Egyptian parliamentary report: Israel is our “number one enemy”
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Summary
KHALIL HAMRA/AFP/Getty Images
Egyptian Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, in Cairo on Feb. 11
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) released a statement March 24 that strongly condemned the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) for its handling of the transition from military to political leadership. The MB, Egypt's leading Islamist party, questioned the impartiality of the judiciary and criticized SCAF-backed Prime Minister Kamal el-Ganzouri's refusal to dismiss a failing Cabinet. The Brotherhood also accused the military of trying to rig the upcoming presidential election. The SCAF responded a day later, asserting in a statement that it was above "verbal jousting." Alluding to the MB, the statement accused some forces in the country of trying to pressure the military and undermine both the SCAF's mission and the interests of Egyptians.
The entire episode has raised the question of whether the military and the Muslim Brotherhood are moving away from a period of broad cooperation and perhaps paving the way for a resurgence of political violence in Egypt. The military still holds the upper hand in the contest to preserve a strong degree of influence over the country's future civilian government. As they negotiate with the military, Egypt's political Islamists will ultimately make greater sacrifices in the short term in order to avoid derailing the political transition altogether.
Analysis
Given the military's ambitious timeline for settling the country's most contentious political issues, the intensified rhetoric between the leading forces in Egyptian politics was expected. By the end of June, Egypt is scheduled to hold its presidential election (the vote is set for May 23-24, with a runoff scheduled for June 16-17 if no candidate wins an outright majority), draft and ratify a constitution (the final draft must be ratified via public referendum within 15 days of its release), and formally transfer political power from the SCAF to a civilian government. With the political foundation of the country being laid, the MB will push its demands now, before a power balance between the civilians and the military is enshrined in a new constitution.
Competing SCAF and MB Demands
The Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party and the Salafist Nour party together won 70 percent of the seats in the People's Assembly and Shura Council, which make up Egypt's upper and lower houses of parliament, respectively. Now the MB needs to ensure that those gains actually mean something.
During the transition of power in early 2011 from President Hosni Mubarak to the military, the SCAF issued a constitutional declaration that now governs the country. This declaration included a number of amendments to the country's 1971 constitution and left enough ambiguity for the military to adjust the rules as it saw fit. Now that Egypt is preparing to move out of this transition period, the MB wants to use its influence within the constitution-drafting process to orient Egypt toward a British-style system that would give more weight to the parliament, which the Islamists currently dominate. The MB would like a constitution that places clear limits on the military's authority and ensures civilian primacy in the government. Wary of further alienating secularists in the opposition, the Brotherhood has been cautious in airing its intentions on the religious clauses in the constitution. Still, a debate can be expected over the place of Islamic law in the country's legal fabric.
The military has made little secret of what it wants from the new constitution. SCAF-backed Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Selmi in November 2011 circulated for review a draft of "supra-constitutional principles" that essentially laid out the military's ideal constitution. The guidelines called for a constitution that granted the military exclusive control over its budget, gave the SCAF veto authority over the constitution-drafting process and, most critically, called on the military to defend the "constitutional legitimacy" of the state. After public backlash brought military crackdowns at the end of the year, the military backed off the al-Selmi document. Since then the military has probably sent a revised draft outlining its expectations to the MB leadership. However, the military is unlikely to compromise on its core principles in the creation of the constitution.
The military does not want exclusive control of the government; it would rather return to exercising authority behind the scenes. The SCAF also wants immunity from civilian political forces and for its economic assets to be protected. In contrast to the MB's preference for a strong parliament, the military would like the presidency to hold more power. Therefore, the military will bargain with the Muslim Brotherhood to ensure that whoever takes the president's seat is approved by and under the influence of the military. Since the president also appoints one-third of the members in the Shura Council, the SCAF envisions the presidency and a more balanced Shura Council acting as a check on the Islamist-filled parliament.
Notably, the MB has not fielded a presidential candidate of its own so far. The list of candidates the SCAF presumably favors includes Ahmed Shafiq, the last prime minister appointed by Mubarak and Egypt's former air force chief; Hossam Khairallah, who headed Egypt's general intelligence apparatus; Mansour Hasan, the head of the SCAF advisory council; and Omar Suleiman, a Mubarak-era intelligence chief who has yet to formally announce his candidacy.
Candidates with ties to the Mubarak regime will be a tough sell in the upcoming election, and it remains unclear which, if any, of these candidates (or any others who emerge later) could emerge victorious. The SCAF's ability to see its favored candidate through to the presidency stands at the center of negotiations between the MB and the SCAF over the political transition. Suspicions of election engineering could produce a major backlash, which the SCAF is unlikely to risk triggering without an understanding with the MB, the opposition faction that has significant numbers on the streets.
Most important, the military expects to carry out the role of commander-in-chief by using the presidency to dictate Egypt's national security and foreign policy. The creation of a constitutionally mandated National Security Council that institutionalizes the military's role is a possibility. The military will probably concede formal legislative authority on domestic issues to parliament, and it would likely bargain with the Muslim Brotherhood to have parliament appoint a new prime minister in exchange for facilitating the military's choice for president. The military will still want to maintain some form of veto power over the parliament's and Cabinet's decisions.
The Limits of Posturing
There is still a significant gap between the versions of the constitution pushed by the military and those promoted by the MB. The MB derives its leverage from its ability to pull supporters into the streets, creating a security crisis for the military, and its power to boycott, and thus discredit, the political transition.
Neither of these scenarios appears likely. The Brotherhood has achieved the first crucial step of simply entering the political process, managing to gain control of the parliament along the way. If the MB tried to use its popular support to reinvigorate street protests, it would risk a military crackdown and martial law. If the MB boycotted the process altogether, the military would appoint its own council and run the political transition as it saw fit. Both scenarios would enable the military to reassume control over the political transition and to sideline the MB. This is not a gamble that the Brotherhood wants to make.
Nor is this a scenario that the military is necessarily trying to create. It would be a major risk for the military to outright deny the MB a political presence and revert to a police state. The SCAF has been trying to avoid major protests that force the military to crack down and also to maintain foreign aid to keep the country's fragile economy afloat. At the same time, the military currently has greater authority than the MB to influence the terms of the political transition. The MB's authority in parliament does not yet mean anything in practice.
These factors constitute the grounds for an MB-SCAF bargain. Despite its reputation as the most organized and powerful opposition group in the country, the Muslim Brotherhood has had no other choice but to work closely with the military throughout the political transition. The MB's dealings with the military have cost it credibility, with an increasing number of opposition factions accusing the MB of being the "loyal opposition" and the military's stooge. While the MB has deliberately limited its presence on the streets as part of this broad understanding with the SCAF, the SCAF has advanced the political process, albeit piecemeal, and has not stood in the way of the MB's domination of parliament.
The MB Under Pressure
The MB's informal standing with the SCAF now needs to be formalized. The Islamist-controlled parliament's power with respect to the military will be determined in the election of the president, appointment of the prime minister and, most critically, the writing of the constitution. The MB is trying to rebuild its credibility by speaking out against the SCAF, but it is also threatening a crisis so it can push its demands in the constitutional process.
The Muslim Brotherhood is in the weaker position in this negotiation. The SCAF has reminded the MB publicly and privately that by pushing its demands too far it risks losing its political presence altogether. At the same time, the MB is facing rising pressure from liberal secularists, who are now intensifying their protest against the Islamists because they dominate the 100-member constitutional panel. (It was the Islamist-controlled parliament that recently passed a vote to appoint 50 of the panel members from among the parliament, with the rest coming from the outside.) Already, a number of liberal and leftist parties have pulled out of the constitutional panel to protest the heavy concentration of Islamists. These parties claim that the Islamists are not fully representative of Egyptian society and should not have overwhelming influence in drafting the country's post-Mubarak constitution.
Cairo's Administrative Court is expected to deliver a ruling April 10 on whether the current panel is even legal. The judiciary, which is still heavily influenced by the military and secularists, could mandate that a new panel be organized under different parameters to allow the inclusion of more non-Islamist members. Less than a week after the first panel was formed, the MB may already be on the verge of losing some of its clout in the drafting process.
While this debate unfolds, the SCAF can be expected to play the liberals, religious minorities and Islamists off each other, especially on the question of Article Two of the 1971 constitution, which states that Islam is the country's religion, Arabic is its official language and Sharia ("Islamic law") is its primary source of legislation. The SCAF can also use the debate over Article Two to exacerbate rifts between Salafists and moderate Islamists over whether the text should be altered to elevate the status of Sharia.
The Clock Is Ticking
The MB and the SCAF have three months to complete the political transition. Considering the number of contentious issues at play, there is no guarantee they will meet this deadline. The military could make some concessions but will not compromise on its core demand of maintaining authority behind the scenes; it is determined to keep any Islamist-dominated civilian government in check.
Though the SCAF does not hold a formal veto over the process, there are still a number of informal tactics the military can employ to influence the drafting of the constitution and the presidential election. The Muslim Brotherhood lacks the leverage at his point in the political transition to force the military's hand and does not want to derail its political project altogether. More threats can be expected, but the MB will end up making the bigger compromise to see the process through.
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Read more: Negotiating the Final Stage of Egypt's Transition | Stratfor
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Muslim Brotherhoods pick for President - spent years in jail under Mubarak. Not "particularly fond" of Israel but appears to support trade and the Camp David accords and may be less anti Israel than other potential Brotherhood party members:
****Zvi Bar'el / In Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood does not necessarily spell family
The Brotherhood's decision to name a presidential candidate is causing panic in the movement and throughout Egypt, but the military and the secular public have not yet had the final word.
By Zvi Bar'el
Tags: Egypt Muslim Brotherhood
Get Haaretz on iPhone Get Haaretz on Android The Muslim Brotherhood‘s decision to field Khairat al-Shater as a candidate for Egypt’s presidency has stirred panic not only throughout Israel, but throughout Egypt as well, and even within the Muslim Brotherhood itself.
Supposedly, the Muslim Brotherhood’s goal is to seize control of every outlet of the Egyptian government, from the parliament - in which the Brotherhood won forty seven percent of seats - to the constitutional drafting committee, which has a majority of religious members. Now, the actual presidency is in the Brotherhood's sights.
Khairat al-Shater, the Muslim Brotherhood's third-highest ranking member in Cairo, February 28, 2007.
Photo by: Reuters
Nevertheless, the decision to field a presidential candidate should not worry Israel as much as the Muslim Brotherhood‘s resounding victory in the elections should .It is still widely unknown what kind, and how much authority the president elect will have, as the constitution has yet to be drafted - a process which will no doubt cause even more political in-fighting.
However, even if a new president is granted a wide range of powers, (which would still be far less than those bestowed on former president Hosni Mubarak,) the Egyptian parliament already holds vast powers in terms of determining both domestic and foreign policy – powers that any president, whether or not he hails from the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood – will have to reckon with. For example, should the Egyptian parliament wish to alter, or even cancel the Camp David agreements with Israel, it could do so even without a Brotherhood president.
Senior representatives of the Brotherhood, especially Khairat al-Shater, have made it clear that they are obligated to uphold the Camp David Accords, as well as every other agreement Egypt has made with foreign powers, including the agreements to sell oil and natural gas to Israel.
Al-Shater, a millionaire and successful businessman, has many talks with high-ranking U.S. officials under his belt, including talks with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, from whom he requested economic aid. Al-Shater, like his fellow Brotherhood leaders, is not particularly fond of Israel, but it is likely that his disdain for Israel is not as intense as that of Amr Moussa, former Arab League Secretary General, or any of the other 200-plus presidential candidates.
It is important to remember that in fact, veteran left-wingers led the criticism of Anwar Sadat’s signing the peace agreement, and secular intellectuals, journalists, actors, and lawyers were those who cemented the real foundation of the boycott of Israel.
Al-Shater’s stance illustrates the difficulties a religious party faces in trying to adopt an unbiased ideology. This is not surprising. The Brotherhood has influenced and intervened in Egyptian politics since its inception in 1928, and it cannot step aside and let others take away its political achievements. Since its activities were outlawed in 1954, the Brotherhood has not ceased its nationwide spread. The Brotherhood’s most impressive political victory came in 2005, under Mubarak, when the Brotherhood was able to win 88 seats in parliament. Throughout the years, the Brotherhood has been able to neutralize criticism for participating in politics, neglecting the Islamist vision - the ideal of creating one Muslim nation not cooperating with regimes considered to be heretical. Long before the most recent uprising, the Muslim Brotherhood has not had a problem cooperating with left-wing groups, youth movements, or liberal organizations.
The necessity to come to terms witht he Egyptian political reality is what pushed the Brotherhood into fielding a presidential candidate of its own. It was a difficult decision, and the fact that 52 of 108 members of the Shura Council voted against fielding a candidate only further illustrates the difficulty of such a move.
Mohammed Badie, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, is plagued not only by theological misgivings, but by tactical misgivings as well. Will fielding a Brotherhood candidate cause a rift in the movement? Is it impossible, at this point, to bolster the candidcay of Abdel Munim Abu al-Futuh, a member dismissed from party ranks after announcing his participation in the race? Perhaps Badie should unite the movement now, after learning of his high levels of support among young members of the Brotherhood?
Could the brotherhood also put a hamper on other religious candidates, like the leader of the Salafi movement?
Creating a rift among the different religious voices could bring failure to the movement. Could the fact that the Brotherhood changed directions despite its previous decision not to field a candidate erode the party’s image, portraying it as a party that cannot live up to its promises?
Despite these difficult questions, the Brotherhood decided to act like any other political movement, determining that it cannot neglect any branch of politics. Rumors have already spread in Egypt that the Brotherhood decided to field a candidate in an attempt to twist the arm of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which did not allow the Brotherhood to create a new government despite its requests, and showed intent in changing the composition of the constitutional drafting council.
However, the threat of a Brotherhood candidate does not necessarily frighten the Egyptian army, which still has the power to change the composition of the constitutional council, and influence the amount of authority a future president can hold. The army could allow the Brotherhood to create a new government, in return for letting go of its designs on the presidency.
The army could even allow the Brotherhood to run for the presidency, but insist on setting the precedent that the army will in fact determine the president’s political authority.
The army is not the only barrier. The opposition movement - secular parties and various public figures - have already started acting against appointments to the constitutional council, with some resigning from the council and threatening to draw up their own constitution. And of course, Tahrir Square has yet to have the final say.
Read this article in Hebrew.****
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Egyptian Liberals Speak Out Against Brotherhood
IPT News
April 3, 2012
http://www.investigativeproject.org/3518/egyptian-liberals-speak-out-against-brotherhood
Speaking out against religious extremism takes courage in today's Egypt, especially when extremists make up an absolute majority in Parliament. The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) has translated the comments of two courageous Egyptian intellectuals who took to Arabic television to denounce the dominant Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi parties.
As Egyptian liberals, these two commentators have made it their goal to get the message out about the dangers of the Brotherhood and Egypt's Salafi movement.
Philosopher Murad Wahba told Egypt's CBC TV that the Muslim Brotherhood was the latest in a line of historic movements trying to bring Egypt back to religious extremism. These groups "all took us back to the context of the 13th century, and we have developed 'antibodies' against the 21st century. This is the real crisis of our society today," he said in a March 8 broadcast.
For Egyptian thinker Sayyid al-Qimni, the Brotherhood doesn't just reject modern society and the West. To him, there really isn't much distinction between political Islamists like the Brotherhood and Salafis, or even violent jihadists like al-Qaida.
Both the Brotherhood and the Salafis are willing to have "blood on the streets" to protect constitutional guarantees that Islam serves as the state religion and Islamic law as the source of all legislation. Their insistence on protecting state-sponsored discrimination against secular and Christian Egyptians is "ripping Egypt apart," Qimni lamented on Arabian Gulf channel Al-Arabiya TV on Feb. 23.
Both political Islamists and jihadists are willing to do whatever it takes to form an Islamic state ruled by strict religious law, with al-Qaida preferring open violence and the Brotherhood relying on manipulation of the political system, al-Qimni said.
"For one thing, they differ in degree, but not in their nature… some groups say they are conducting political activity, but at the same time declare that they reject democracy," he said. And when the Brotherhood says "that Man cannot make laws unto himself, since Allah alone makes laws – that is exactly what Al-Qaida and other such groups say."
Salafi leaders have confirmed their ideological closeness with the Brotherhood. "At the end of the day, we and the Brotherhood want the same thing. What is that?" Sheikh Ayman Shrieb, the leader of the Salafi al-Nour Party, asked in December. "Well, we want an Islamic state. Every vote we don't get, we hope it goes to the Brotherhood."
The Brotherhood and the Salafis differ in one other key area, al-Qimni said. The Brotherhood is notorious about making political expedient comments at one time and turning on a dime when the moment is right. "Therefore, the difference [between the Brotherhood and al-Qaida] is not in nature, but in timing – one moment they [the Brotherhood] say something, and the next moment they deny it," al-Qimni told viewers.
So while al-Qaida is open about its goal of an Islamic state, the political Islamists seem to have fooled everyone, even government officials, with their deceptive rhetoric.
The examples are abundant. The Brotherhood promised last year not to run a presidential candidate, to respect concerns about the forceful and total transition of the country into an Islamic Republic. But following the group's domination of parliamentary elections, the MB's No. 2 man has thrown his hat into the ring in next month's presidential race.
This flip-flop resembles the group's stance on parliamentary elections and on the independence of its political party from the Brotherhood.
Early last year, officials issued statements that the party would be "completely independent" of the movement, and pledged that the FJP would not contest more than a third of the seats in Egypt's first parliamentary election in more than 30 years. But the FJP is made up almost exclusively of Muslim Brotherhood leaders, and has acted as a tool of the Brotherhood to legalize its ideological platform.
The Brotherhood quickly changed its aim on winning seats in parliament. In early April, Mohsen Radi, a former lawmaker and Brotherhood leader, told Egypt's Al Masry Al Youm that the Brotherhood had raised its target "to secure 35 percent to 40 percent of parliamentary seats." Apparently sticking to earlier cautions, Radi reassured the Egyptian daily that "the Brotherhood will not run for more than 49 percent of parliamentary seats."
But less than a month later, the group's stated plans changed again—albeit ever-so-slightly. On April 30, the Brotherhood Shura Council acknowledged its plan for the FJP to contest half of Egypt's parliamentary seats. In a public display of confidence, Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie also stated that if his group was to contest all available seats, it would be able to win upwards of 75 percent.
Egypt is going to need more voices like Wahba and al-Qimni to remind their countrymen about the promise of last year's peaceful revolution that appears to be fading rapidly.
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MB Charm Offensive Courts Washington
IPT News
April 9, 2012
http://www.investigativeproject.org/3524/mb-charm-offensive-courts-washington
They represent the new political power in Cairo, and given their performances in public events in Washington last week, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party has the art of doublespeak nailed.
At two events, four FJP members spoke about dialogue and respect for the West, in comments often at odds with the party line in their home country. They sidestepped controversial issues and tailored their message of dialogue to exclude the party's extreme positions during an appearance Wednesday at Georgetown University and Thursday at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
They stuck to that theme despite aggressive questions which came mostly from Egyptian secularists.
"We are here to start building bridges with the United States," said Sondos Asem, the senior editor of the Brotherhood website Ikhwanweb.com and the editor of the group's Twitter account. She spoke about the FJP's embrace of "Freedom, Human Dignity, Justice, and Democracy," as well as her own experiences of being considered a security risk under the Mubarak regime.
But the website she edits, Ikhwanonline.com, has previously burned those bridges with hateful and anti-Western rhetoric. In a statement condemning Osama bin Laden's death at the hands of American special forces, an article published by Ikhwanonline condoned attacks on foreign forces occupying Muslim lands, including American troops. The article states, "so long as occupation remains resistance is legitimate and it [the Muslim Brotherhood] calls on the United States, NATO and the EU to end the occupation in Afghanistan and Iraq, and recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people."
Other articles on her website hail violence and terrorism. One celebrates the life and death of Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin, while another claims that America actually creates terrorist states to have reasons to invade the Muslim world.
Abdul Mawgoud Dardery, who serves on the FJP's foreign relations committee, told the Georgetown audience about his "dream" for a new Egypt. "We have a dream" about providing Egyptians with the necessities and "speaking truth to power," he said, making reference to Martin Luther King's "I have a dream" speech.
But Dardery dodged questions about previous comments he had made about Israel and the United States looting Egypt, claiming that what really wanted was a change in American foreign policy. "We cannot forget the Iraq War," he said, while blaming the American Islamophobia for Middle Eastern hostility towards the West. "It was a wrong decision of oil vs. democracy."
FJP members Hussein El-Kazzaz and Khaled Al-Qazzaz defended the group's flip-flopping on political issues, like putting forward a presidential candidate after promising the opposite. The decision to promote a Brotherhood candidate was taken after the military told them they were becoming too powerful. El-Kazzaz said, whereas the group turned down a previous candidate who did not conform to their internal "democratic decision-making process."
When pressed by Professor John Esposito, a strong Islamist sympathizer who suggested the group might have proposed the candidate as a response to rising popularity of a rival Salafi presidential pretender, Al-Qazzaz claimed that the group did not analyze other candidates and wasn't interested in controlling the whole political system. The group, which won 47 percent of the vote, was looking for a president "who would support democracy" even at the cost of the party's own Islamist agenda, he claimed.
On the issue of enforcing Shariah law and on making Egypt an Islamic state, Dardery said that the party was more interested in running the nation according to Islamic principles rather than specific laws.
But when a secular Egyptian activist pressed the speakers about statements supporting a renewed Caliphate, Al-Qazzaz called the term a "cliché" and said that no one should object to a Muslim super state that would be like the European Union.
Khairat el-Shater, the Brotherhood's recently anointed presidential candidate, is far more committed to the concept. He told a panel of ultraconservative Salafi clerics and scholars Tuesday night "that Shariah is his top and final goal and that he would work on forming a group of religious scholars to help parliament achieve this goal."
In response to other questions, the group claimed it would be transparent about funding, that the FJP was creating a think tank, and that the Brotherhood thought that it was okay for people to criticize Islam, despite statements to the contrary from the Brotherhood.
Deceptive statements like these were also common at Thursday's event, cosponsored by the Carnegie Institute, the Swiss Government, and the Heinrich Boell Stiftung.
A reporter asked about the Brotherhood's long history of radical rhetoric and pro-violent jihad ideology during the Carnegie event, during a session entitled "Building New Regimes after the Uprisings." The West simply misunderstood these terms, Dardery said. Jihad, he said, was an internal process and even eating was a form of jihad. Shariah didn't mean applying harsh religious law, but rather is about being inspired by the principles of Islam. He claimed that these interpretations were provided by the Brotherhood in its educational materials and that he was a proud "product of the movement."
But document after document from the Brotherhood's educational materials suggests the opposite. In his book Peace in Islam, MB founder Hassan al-Banna called violent jihad, "one of the best virtues with which to gain the pleasure of Allah, the High and the Blessed, and death in His cause will realise glory in this life and in the hereafter. From this obligation no one is exempt except for those who are incapable of fighting, but they must equip others or guard their families when they are away, if they are able to do so."
In another classic text, Jihad is the Way, former Supreme Leader Mustafa Mashhur elaborates on why violence is the only way to liberate Muslim lands. "Jihad for Allah is not limited to the specific region of the Islamic countries, since the Muslim homeland is one and is not divided, and the banner of Jihad has already been raised in some of its parts, and it shall continue to be raised, with the help of Allah, until every inch of the land of Islam will be liberated, the State of Islam will be established," Mashhur wrote.
During the same session, Tunisian Islamist Sahbi Atig claimed that his party wanted a moderate Islam along the lines of Islamists like Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who advocated benefiting from the West in ways that don't contradict Islam.
Qaradawi, a Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader, is considered so radical that he was recently banned from entering France. In his famous book, Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase, Qaradawi stated that spiritual growth should motivate Muslims to fulfill their Islamic obligations, like "liberating Muslim territories from all aggression or non-Muslim control" and "reinstating the Islamic caliphate system to the leadership anew as required by Sharia."
Al-Qazzaz glossed over FJP radicalism during a session on "Writing a New Constitution." Concerning the constitution's infamous 2nd article, which makes Islam the state religion of Egypt, al-Qazzaz claimed that "all Egyptians agree on this article" because it is a part of Egypt's identity.
That claim ignores Egypt's current reality on the ground. Secular parties have pulled out of the Islamist dominated constitutional committee, with a leading secular politician stating, "We are going to boycott this committee, and we are going to withdraw and let them make an Islamic constitution. We are going to continue struggling for a secular Egypt in the streets."
Al-Qazzaz and other speakers in the two-days of events also failed to mention the Brotherhood's threat of "blood on the streets" if the new constitutional committee did not make Islam the state religion, despite promises to be inclusive when making the new governing document.
When asked whether Egypt would maintain its treaty obligations, al-Qazzaz made a veiled threat about nullifying the nation's peace treaty with the Jewish state. "We have a right to review all treaties," al-Qazzaz said, claiming that it was a right of the Egyptian people to review treaties formed by the dictatorship, as they weren't necessarily binding. That clearly contradicts what the group said during the election process.
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Summary
VINCENZO PINTO/AFP/Getty Images
Egyptian presidential candidate Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh (R) at the World Economic Forum on Jan. 27
Egypt's presidential election will be held May 23-24. After several weeks of campaigning, candidate disqualifications, changes in the lineup of competitors and an attempt to suspend the election, two front-runners have emerged in the race. Former Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa is the best hope for the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), while Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh has emerged as the Islamist candidate with the best chance at victory.
The outcome of the election is far from certain, but one implication is clear: The Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which currently dominates the country's parliament, is not likely to control both the legislative and executive branches. Thus, the SCAF will have some room to maneuver in managing the country's tenuous political transition during the drafting of the constitution.
Analysis
The military and the MB are the two principal centers of power in post-Mubarak Egypt. The transition from a single-party to a multi-party system -- triggered by former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's downfall -- centers on the struggle between these two players. Since the MB emerged as the largest bloc in parliament, the presidential election (and the drafting of a new constitution, which is stalled because of a dispute over the composition of the constituent assembly) is important for the SCAF in its struggle to retain power.
From the SCAF's perspective, it is essential that the MB not control both the legislative and executive branches of government. In fact, the SCAF hopes to use the presidency to keep the MB-dominated parliament in check. The council achieved a partial victory when it engineered the disqualification of the MB's star candidate, Khairat el-Shater. The MB replaced el-Shater with a much weaker candidate: Mohammed Mursi, head of the MB’s political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party. This is why the presidential contest is now a race between Moussa and Aboul Fotouh. The SCAF would score a complete victory if Moussa (who, despite his independent-mindedness, is a product of the Egyptian establishment) becomes president.
The presidency would be an important tool for the SCAF in its efforts to keep an MB-dominated legislature in check, because the president appoints one-third of the upper house of parliament. The parliament has not yet assumed any significant powers, and the SCAF hopes that having its preferred man in the presidency and an executive with sufficient powers under a new constitution will allow it to limit the MB's policymaking authority as the largest bloc in parliament (and thus in the prime minister's position and the Cabinet).
The Candidates
Polls conducted by a state-owned think tank show Moussa in the lead, but several factors could lead Aboul Fotouh to an electoral victory. First, many respect him as a non-partisan national figure, and he is not regarded as a typical Islamist. Aboul Fotouh has attracted a broad range of supporters including liberals, Salafists, Coptic Christians and women, and many MB members likely will vote for him. Furthermore, many liberals and secularists do not want to see the SCAF retain power with Moussa as president.
However, this does not mean Aboul Fotouh will win. Given the state of relations between Aboul Fotouh and the MB, the Islamist vote could be split, especially in the election's first round in which many MB voters likely will vote for Mursi, especially since the MB has carried out an aggressive campaign for its candidate. As a result, Moussa could clear the 50 percent requirement to prevent a second round, which is what the SCAF would prefer. If a second round is triggered, the race likely will be between Moussa and Aboul Fotouh, in which case the Islamist vote likely will consolidate behind Aboul Fotouh and potentially give him a victory.
For Moussa to win, the Islamist split in the first round will be an important factor. Numerous other factors are working in his favor, including support from the SCAF and a large number of business elite, as well as foreign support. He is not as tainted with Mubarak's legacy as some others, such as former intelligence chief Omar Suleiman -- who was disqualified from the election -- and former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq, who remains in the presidential race. Although Moussa served as Mubarak's foreign minister for a decade, his portfolio had almost nothing to do with the internal suppression the regime practiced. It became well known that Moussa was not completely in line with the Mubarak government in 2001, when he left the government to become the secretary-general of the Arab League. This position allowed Moussa to champion pan-Arab issues and the Palestinian cause while building his image as an elder statesman.
From SCAF's point of view, these are good attributes because they want someone with whom they have dealt before to get elected. Of course, Moussa's lack of military background and his independent streak will mean that the military will have to negotiate with him. Moussa will also need to maintain distance from the SCAF if he takes office to avoid the appearance that he follow's the military's every order.
The SCAF's Strong Position
Even if Aboul Fotouh wins the election, it will not pose a major problem for the SCAF. Although the Islamist candidate would push for greater democratization in Egypt, he is far more pragmatic than the MB and is unlikely to make any radical anti-establishment moves. An Aboul Fotouh presidency likely would come with a lot of bargaining and compromises, with a focus on managing the faltering economy -- a key issue for any future president. More important, Aboul Fotouh is a way for the SCAF to keep the Islamists divided, given that he is a rallying point for anti-MB Islamist forces (to both the right and left of the MB on the political spectrum), though he will need to balance between the expectations of Islamists and non-Islamists should he become president.
Whoever wins the presidential election, it will be to the SCAF's advantage (albeit to varying degrees) in its effort to keep the MB's power in check. Although the election likely will occur as scheduled, last-minute disruptions caused by the SCAF issuing a constitutional declaration about presidential powers in relation to parliament are always possible. The SCAF wants to be in a good position to influence the creation of the new constitution, which will be the main event in the political struggle between the military and the civilian political forces in Cairo after the election.
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Read more: Egypt's Election and the Civil-Military Balance of Power | Stratfor
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Good to see that Morsi has spoken of respecting Egypt's international agreements (a.k.a. the peace deal with Israel).
Also the impending disaster concerning insufficient food imports may serve to focus the collective MB mind.
That said, its worth remembering things like this and much, much more:
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The Evils of the Muslim Brotherhood: Evidence Keeps Mounting
by Raymond Ibrahim
Special to IPT News
June 25, 2012
http://www.investigativeproject.org/3641/the-evils-of-the-muslim-brotherhood-evidence
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Egypt's longtime banned Muslim Brotherhood—the parent organization of nearly every subsequent Islamist movement, including al-Qaeda—has just won the nation's presidency, in the name of its candidate, Muhammad Morsi. That apathy reigns in the international community, when once such news would have been deemed devastating, is due to the successful efforts of subversive Muslim apologists in the West who portray the Brotherhood as "moderate Islamists"—forgetting that such a formulation is oxymoronic, since to be "Islamist," to be a supporter of draconian Sharia, is by definition to be immoderate. Obama administration officials naturally took it a step further, portraying the Brotherhood as "largely secular" and "pluralistic."
Back in the real world, evidence that the Brotherhood is just another hostile Islamist group bent on achieving world domination through any means possible is overwhelming. Here are just three examples that recently surfaced, all missed by the Western media, and all exposing the Brotherhood as hostile to "infidels" (non-Muslims) in general, hostile to the Christians in their midst (the Copts) in particular, and on record calling on Muslims to lie and cheat during elections to empower Sharia:
Anti-Infidel: At a major conference supporting Muhammad Morsi—standing on a platform with a big picture of Morsi smiling behind him and with any number of leading Brotherhood figures, including Khairat el-Shater, sitting alongside—a sheikh went on a harangue, quoting Koran 9:12, a favorite of all jihadis, and calling all those Egyptians who do not vote for Morsi—the other half of Egypt, the secularists and Copts who voted for Shafiq—"resisters of the Sharia of Allah," and "infidel leaders" whom true Muslims must "fight" and subjugate.
The video of this sheikh was shown on the talk show of Egyptian commentator Hala Sarhan, who proceeded to exclaim "This is unbelievable! How is this talk related to the campaign of Morsi?!" A guest on her show correctly elaborated: "Note his [the sheikh's] use of the word 'fight'—'fight the infidel leaders' [Koran 9:12]; this is open incitement to commit violence against anyone who disagrees with them…. how can such a radical sheikh speak such words, even as [Brotherhood leaders like] Khairat el-Shater just sits there?" Nor did the Brotherhood denounce or distance itself from this sheikh's calls to jihad.
Anti-Christian: It is precisely because of these sporadic outbursts of anti-infidel rhetoric that it is not farfetched to believe that Morsi himself, as some maintain, earlier boasted that he would "achieve the Islamic conquest (fath) of Egypt for the second time, and make all Christians convert to Islam, or else pay the jizya."
Speaking of Christians, specifically the minority Copts of Egypt, in an article titled "The Muslim Brotherhood Asks Why Christians Fear Them?!" secularist writer Khaled Montasser, examining the Brotherhood's own official documents and fatwas, shows exactly why. According to Montasser, in the Brotherhood publication "The Call [da'wa]," issue #56 published in December 1980, prominent Brotherhood figure Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah al-Khatib decreed several anti-Christian measures, including the destruction of churches and the prevention of burying unclean Christian "infidels" anywhere near Muslim graves. Once again, this view was never retracted by the Brotherhood. As Montasser concludes, "After such fatwas, Dr. Morsi and his Brotherhood colleagues ask and wonder—"Why are the Copts afraid?!"
Lying, Stealing, and Cheating to Victory: In a recent article titled "The Islamist Group's Hidden Intentions," appearing in Watani, the author Youssef Sidhom exposes a document "which carries the logos of both the Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party." Written by the Deputy to the Supreme Guide, Khairat el-Shater and addressed "to all the Brotherhood branches in the governorates," the memo calls on Muslims to cheat, block votes, and "resort to any method that can change the vote" to ensure that Morsi wins, which, of course, he just did—amidst many accusations of electoral fraud. El-Shater concluded his memo by saying, "You must understand, brothers, that our interest lies wherever there is the Sharia of Allah, and this can only be by preserving the [MB] group and preserving Islam."
In short, the Muslim Brotherhood has not changed; only Western opinion of it has. As it was since its founding in 1928, the group is committed to empowering and spreading Sharia law—a law that preaches hate for non-Muslim "infidels," especially Islam's historic nemesis, Christianity, and allows anything, from lying to cheating, to make Islam supreme. Now that the Brotherhood has finally achieved power, the world can prepare to see such aspects on a grand scale.
Raymond Ibrahim is a Shillman Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center and an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Forum
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http://www.breitbart.com/Breitbart-TV/2012/06/24/Egypts-New-President-Our-Capital-Shall-Be-Jerusalem-Allah-Willing
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Exclusive: Muslim Brotherhood Preaching Israel Destruction After Election
IPT News
June 27, 2012
http://www.investigativeproject.org/3650/exclusive-muslim-brotherhood-preaching-israel
"Every Muslim will be asked about the Zionists' usurpation of al-Aqsa Mosque. Why did he not seek to recover it, and wage Jihad in His way? Did he not care about the fatwa of the ulema [scholars] of the Muslims, 'Jihad of self and money to recover al Aqsa is a duty on every Muslim?'" asked Mohamed Badie, General Guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, in a June 14th speech translated exclusively by the Investigative Project on Terrorism.
The speech from the Brotherhood's Ikhwan Online website is evidence that the group has not moderated its position even an iota, despite assurances to Western audiences.
"How happy would be the Muslims if all Muslim rulers made the Palestinian cause a pivotal issue, around which Muslims, rulers and the ruled, would line up," he stated. According to Badie, they would ally to make "the sole goal for all of them the recovery of al Aqsa Mosque, freeing it from the filth of the Zionists, and imposing Muslim rule throughout beloved Palestine."
"The Lord of Glory has threatened these murdering Zionists criminals with a penalty of a kind which operates in this world before the Hereafter, he said, before referencing a Quranic quote calling Jews "apes, despised."
"We say to our people and our brothers in Palestine (all of Palestine): Unity, unity, persistence, persistence, reconciliation, reconciliation, and patience, patience. Make your motto and your starting point be in confronting the Zionists," he added.
Badie also made reference to the role of Hamas-tied convoys, in aiding in the effort to eliminate the Jewish state.
"Know that there stands by you every sincere Muslim mujahid from all over the world, and all the honorable nationalists. Do not presume that you are alone in the field, but there stands at your side and with you every free honorable noble man who rejects injustice, murder and bloodshed," he said, before stating, "Not far off are the Freedom flotillas which will come to you from various States, and Miles of Smiles which touched you from all over the world."
The most recent convoy by Miles of Smiles, which is linked to the U.S. terrorist designated, British organization Interpal, was led by Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood head Hammam Saeed. Hamas' Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh called that convoy "the declaration of victory over the siege and the declaration of the enemy's strategic failure in Gaza."
The inability of the Muslim Brotherhood to change its rhetoric, leads to questions about how Egyptian President-elect Mohamed Morsi will serve to moderate the Islamist group's beliefs and behavior.
Much has been written about how the election of the Muslim Brotherhood candidate isn't a threat to U.S. and Israeli interests in the region, or even to Egyptian society. To take just one example, John Kerry, chairman of the Senate foreign Relations Committee, warned against "prejudging" the Muslim Brotherhood as it prepared to take power in Egypt.
"In our discussions," declared Kerry on Sunday, "Mr. Morsi committed to protecting fundamental freedoms, including women's rights, minority rights, the right to free expression and assembly, and he said he understood the importance of Egypt's post-revolutionary relationships with America and Israel."
But Morsi was singing the same tune as other Muslim Brotherhood leaders less than two months ago.
In a speech obtained and translated by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), and aired originally on Egypt's Misr 25 TV, he advocated violent jihad and the renewal of an Islamic theocracy in Egypt.
Morsi promised the Quran would be the new constitution of the nation, and then led the crowd in chants of the Muslim Brotherhood's motto. "The Quran is our constitution," "jihad is our path," and "death for the sake of Allah is our most lofty aspiration," the jubilant crowd repeated after Morsi.
"Above all – Allah is our goal... The shari'a, then the shari'a, and finally, the shari'a. This nation will enjoy blessing and revival only through the Islamic shari'a. I take an oath before Allah and before you all that regardless of the actual text [of the constitution]... Allah willing, the text will truly reflect [the shari'a], as will be agreed upon by the Egyptian people, by the Islamic scholars, and by legal and constitutional experts," he added.
That's the same message of violence and religious extremism that the General Guide Badie has been preaching for years.
President Obama issued a press release upon Morsi's victory. "We look forward to working together with President-elect Morsi and the government he forms, on the basis of mutual respect, to advance the many shared interests between Egypt and the United States."
That is the sort of statement governments routinely release after elections. The problem, of course, is that talk about "mutual respect" and "shared interests" may very well end up being nothing but empty talk, and that calling something a democracy does not make it so.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/30/world/middleeast/morsi-promises-to-work-for-release-of-omar-abdel-rahman.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20120630
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Calls by Islamists to Destroy Egyptian Pyramids Begin
Tue, July 10, 2012
Muslim Brotherhood
by: Raymond Ibrahim
http://www.radicalislam.org/analysis/calls-islamists-destroy-egyptian-pyramids-begin
According to several reports in the Arabic media, prominent Muslim clerics have begun to call for the demolition of Egypt’s Great Pyramids—or, in the words of Saudi Sheikh Ali bin Said al-Rabi‘i, those “symbols of paganism,” which Egypt’s Salafi party has long planned to cover with wax. Most recently, Bahrain’s “Sheikh of Sunni Sheikhs” and President of National Unity, Abd al-Latif al-Mahmoud, called on Egypt’s new president, Muhammad Morsi, to “destroy the Pyramids and accomplish what the Sahabi Amr bin al-As could not.”
This is a reference to the Muslim Prophet Muhammad’s companion, Amr bin al-As and his Arabian tribesmen, who invaded and conquered Egypt circa 641. Under al-As and subsequent Muslim rule, many Egyptian antiquities were destroyed as relics of infidelity. While most Western academics argue otherwise, according to early Muslim writers, the great Library of Alexandria itself—deemed a repository of pagan knowledge contradicting the Koran—was destroyed under bin al-As’s reign and in compliance with Caliph Omar’s command.
However, while book-burning was an easy activity in the 7th century, destroying the mountain-like pyramids and their guardian Sphinx was not—even if Egypt’s Medieval Mamluk rulers “de-nosed” the latter during target practice (though popular legend still attributes it to a Westerner, Napoleon).
Now, however, as Bahrain’s “Sheikh of Sheikhs” observes, and thanks to modern technology, the pyramids can be destroyed. The only question left is whether the Muslim Brotherhood president of Egypt is “pious” enough—if he is willing to complete the Islamization process that started under the hands of Egypt’s first Islamic conqueror.
Nor is such a course of action implausible. History is laden with examples of Muslims destroying their own pre-Islamic heritage—starting with Islam’s prophet Muhammad himself, who destroyed Arabia’s Ka‘ba temple, transforming it into a mosque.
Asking “What is it about Islam that so often turns its adherents against their own patrimony?” Daniel Pipes provides several examples, from Medieval Muslims in India destroying their forefathers’ temples, to contemporary Muslims destroying their non-Islamic heritage in Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Malaysia, and Tunisia.
Currently, in what the International Criminal Court is describing as a possible “war crime,” Islamic fanatics are destroying the ancient heritage of the city of Timbuktu in Mali—all to Islam’s triumphant war cry, “Allahu Akbar!”
Much of this hate for their own pre-Islamic heritage is tied to the fact that, traditionally, Muslims do not identify with this or that nation, culture, heritage, or language, but only with the Islamic nation—the Umma.
Accordingly, while many Egyptians—Muslims and non-Muslims alike—see themselves as Egyptians, Islamists have no national identity, identifying only with Islam’s “culture,” based on the “sunna” of the prophet and Islam’s language, Arabic. This sentiment was clearly reflected when the former Leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Muhammad Akef, declared “the hell with Egypt,” indicating that the interests of his country are secondary to Islam’s.
It is further telling that such calls are being made now—immediately after a Muslim Brotherhood member became Egypt’s president. In fact, the same reports discussing the call to demolish the last of the Seven Wonders of the Word, also note that Egyptian Salafis are calling on Morsi to banish all Shias and Baha’is from Egypt.
In other words, Morsi’s call to release the Blind Sheikh, a terrorist mastermind, may be the tip of the iceberg in coming audacity. From calls to legalize Islamic sex-slave marriage to calls to institute “morality police” to calls to destroy Egypt’s mountain-like monuments, under Muslim Brotherhood tutelage, the bottle has been uncorked, and the genie unleashed in Egypt.
Will all those international institutions, which make it a point to look the other way whenever human rights abuses are committed by Muslims, lest they appear “Islamophobic,” at least take note now that the Great Pyramids appear to be next on Islam’s hit list, or will the fact that Muslims are involved silence them once again—even as those most ancient symbols of human civilization are pummeled to the ground?
Raymond Ibrahim, a Middle East and Islam specialist, is a Shillman Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center and an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Forum. A widely published author, he is best known for his book, The Al Qaeda Reader . Mr. Ibrahim's dual-background—born and raised in the U.S. by Egyptian parents —has provided him with unique advantages to understanding of the Western and Middle Eastern mindsets.
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http://www.radicalislam.org/news/90-percent-egyptian-women-undergo-female-genital-mutilation
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http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-egypt-islam-20120729,0,3897778.story
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http://pjmedia.com/spengler/2012/08/08/saudis-to-muslim-brotherhood-drop-dead/?singlepage=true
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Moving BD's post to here:
http://thehill.com/homenews/house/249467-pelosi-well-see-whether-egypt-is-ally
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/world/middleeast/egypt-hearing-from-obama-moves-to-heal-rift-from-protests.html?_r=2&hp
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Fg POTH. :-P
“(Morsi/MB) evidently paralyzed by the conflicting pressure”
How does that match with this?
“The United States Embassy publicly mocked the Brotherhood for sending out conflicting messages in its English and Arabic Twitter accounts. “Egyptians rise up to support Muhammad in front of the American Embassy. Sept. 11,” read an Arabic language post the Brotherhood sent out on the day of the attacks — one of several over the last few days emphasizing outrage at the video or calls for its censorship."
Sounds to me like the MB wasn't paralyzed at all. This is no different than what happened to the Isreali embassy. Note that there that the "convicted" were sentenced to , , , suspended sentences. Why wouldn't the MB figure it would play the same way here?
“Scholars say the furor here reflects different traditions when it comes to religious rights and freedoms. Where Americans prize individual choice, Egyptians put a greater emphasis on the rights of communities, families and religious groups.”
It is utter excrement like this that leads me to call the NYT a pravda. Maybe the reporter should take a look at what is happening to the Coptic Christians. :-P :x
BTW, as has been noted on various occasions in this thread, Egypt will starve in very short order but for the infusion of American money.
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Moving BD's post to here:
http://thehill.com/homenews/house/249467-pelosi-well-see-whether-egypt-is-ally
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/world/middleeast/egypt-hearing-from-obama-moves-to-heal-rift-from-protests.html?_r=2&hp
Sorry for missing the right threads twice this AM. I try!
And I KNEW you'd "love" the NYT article!
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No worries BD, it is not always an obvious call.
And right you were about my response to Pravda on the Hudson :evil:
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Alarm Raised Over Egypt Constitution .
By MATT BRADLEY
CAIRO—The troubled process of drafting Egypt's postrevolutionary constitution has turned rancorous, as secular-minded politicians and intellectuals forcefully object to what they call hard-line Islamists' efforts to use the document to impose Islamic law.
Several liberal politicians called this week for their counterparts on the 100-seat constituent assembly, the body tasked with framing Egypt's new constitution, to resign from their posts. Conservatives on the body are attempting to impose Shariah law and limit freedoms of expression in media and art, to the liberal framers' objections, these politicians allege. An outspoken liberal member of the assembly quit Monday.
The conflict threatens to drag out the final leg of Egypt's fraught transition to a stable democracy, and erode the assembly's already shaky authority to design the blueprint of Egypt's political future.
Assembly leaders have said they plan to finish the document within the next few weeks, after which it will be put to a national referendum. Egypt's new Muslim Brotherhood-backed president, Mohammed Morsi, has pledged to call new parliamentary elections within 60 days of the document's approval.
But discourse within the assembly sessions has grown hostile within the past two weeks, members say. Draft articles have endowed the government with broad powers to police freedom of speech, including the powers to shut down newspapers on political grounds, according to local media reports of participants' accounts from the closed assembly sessions, which were confirmed by people involved in the process.
Unlike in earlier sessions, in which the more pragmatic Muslim Brotherhood played a mediating role between liberals and Salafi Islamists, the Brotherhood members have become abruptly neutral, some members say.
"The situation is uncomfortable," said Ahmed Maher, the leader of the 6th of April Youth Movement, an activist group that was central to the uprising that ousted former President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. Mr. Maher said he and several other secular-leaning members are considering quitting the assemblyover the disagreements with the Salafi members.
A different resolution to the impasse may loom. An administrative court will decide Oct. 2 whether to dissolve the assembly on the grounds that it was nominated by a Parliament that itself was later dissolved as unconstitutional.
The Islamists' increasing confidence may be a vestige of outrage over an American-made film clip that many Muslims say insults the Prophet Muhammad, said Noah Feldman, a professor of law at Harvard University and an expert on Islamic jurisprudence.
Protesters angered by the clips stormed the U.S. Embassy grounds in Cairo two weeks ago, forcing the Brotherhood-backed presidency to accommodate public outrage while demonstrating a strong defense of Islam. That same dynamic may now be playing out in Egypt's constituent assembly, Mr. Feldman said. "It's not a good time to press for a freedom of speech clause," he said.
Brotherhood members of the assembly couldn't be reached to comment on Tuesday.
None of the committee members cited the Internet film clips as a reason for the shift in tone. Emad Abdel Ghaffour, the head of the Salafi Nour Party and a member of the assembly, said the differences between liberals and Islamists were "personal" rather than political. He declined to elaborate.
The original assembly was dissolved in May after a court deemed its makeup unconstitutional. Lawmakers then fought for weeks to divide seats in a new assembly evenly among liberals and Islamists.
Six secular-leaning political parties quit the assembly in June, saying the committee lacked representation from women and Christians. The Islamists' greater ideological unity also appears to have given them a stronger hand.
Critics of the assembly say Islamist members have reversed their previous commitments to hew to a set of guidelines drafted last year by religious scholars at the Cairo-based Al Azhar University, the seat of Sunni Islam and one of the oldest religious institutions in the world. Many also object to the Salafis' insistence that Shariah law take a more prominent role in drafting legislation. The constitution drafted by Egypt's former regime contained vague language that only alluded to "principles" of Shariah law as the "source" of legislation.
The draft articles cited in the local press have already violated Al Azhar's proposed safeguards over freedoms of religion, expression, artistic creation and scientific research, said Mohammed Salmawy, a leader in the National Committee for the Defense of Freedom of Expression, a group of prominent liberal intellectuals and politicians that called Monday for a united stand against Islamist proposals to limit free speech.
Mr. Salmawy's group complained that Islamist committee members struck language from a draft constitution that said "literary and artistic creativity are the cultural right of every citizen."
The proposals "are really shocking in many ways," Mr. Salmawy said. "They are even more backward than what was there during Mubarak's time."
Three secular-minded former presidential candidates were scheduled to meet Tuesday night to discuss organizing protests against the assembly.
Write to Matt Bradley at matt.bradley@dowjones.com
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Several liberal politicians called this week for their counterparts on the 100-seat constituent assembly, the body tasked with framing Egypt's new constitution, to resign from their posts. Conservatives on the body are attempting to impose Shariah law and limit freedoms of expression in media and art, to the liberal framers' objections, these politicians allege.
Hey, it's JDN's triumph of democracy. Good thing that Muslim Brotherhood is a mostly secular organization....
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WND is a site which sometimes hyperventilates, but the gist of this seems on the mark to me.
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http://www.wnd.com/2012/09/egypts-copts-hostage-to-muslim-brotherhood-threats/?cat_orig=world
Coptic Christians were warned it they protested against Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi during his visit to the U.S., they would suffer, reports from Egypt said.
The speech is over, but the retaliation is happening anyway. Egyptian human rights activist and journalist Wagih Yacoub says protests or not, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is acting on those threats.
“We’ve seen it today. People are going to the Sinai, shooting at Christian’s shops. They’re telling the people to leave their homes,” Yacoub said. “It’s especially because they are Christians.”
“The Muslim Brotherhood people are going there to the Sinai and declaring that it is an Islamic state,” Yacoub said.
Yacoub says reports of the threats were real.
“Morsi sent one of his representatives to threaten the church. The representatives told the Copts that there would be retaliation if there were protests against Mosi. The Coptic Church issued a statement today urging the government to secure the Coptic churches and to stop the violence, but the government is doing nothing. The Copts are being evicted from Rafa in Sinai and have been evicted from Basshur, and the government has done nothing at all. There is no security; they’re not doing anything. Morsi is the executive, he has the control of the government after he took over the military, and he has the power in his hands. The government is now mostly run by the Muslim Brotherhood,” Yacoub said. “He is worse than Mubarak and this is part of the plan of the Muslim Brotherhood.”
Middle East Forum research fellow Raymond Ibrahim agrees with the reports of the threats. He says the threats indeed came from the president’s office.
“This is the case. The threats are real; after all, they are being made by the moderate Islamist president himself and his cabinet – not the every-day radical on the streets. Morsi especially made his position clear when a few weeks ago, and contrary to his election-time promises to Copts, he hired only one Copt – a woman – to his new cabinet, even though Copts argue that four representatives would be a more appropriate number considering the size of the Christian population, which according to the Coptic church is 14 percent. The Muslim Brotherhood are masters at manipulating time, that is, implementing their vision incrementally,” Ibrahim said.
An Egyptian citizen living in Cairo, who asked not to be named for security reasons confirmed, Ibrahim and Yacoub’s reports.
“The newly elected Egyptian Islamist President Morsi, a member of the radical Muslim Brotherhood, has directly threatened the Coptic Church in Egypt to prevent U.S. Copts going out to protest against him in New York during his U.N. visit. Human rights activist Magdi Khalil, director of Middle East Forum for Liberties, revealed the threats made by Morsi. Threats were exposed against the Egyptian church on the personal Facebook page of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi. It was made in clear, unambigious terms the president would take retaliatory measures against the church if U.S. Copts participate in any demonstrations against him, or during his speech. Magdi Khalil described the threat as cheap blackmail and appealed to the masses of the Copts abroad not to succumb to this threat and blackmail. Morsi’s Facebook also said several Muslim organizations, in partnership with the Egyptian Embassy in America, plan to organize pro-Brotherhood demonstrations to welcome the Egyptian President and chant for him as though he came on the wings of the Egyptian revolution to implement their demands,” the Cairo resident said.
The requests for a show of support for Morsi materialized. Morsi’s Facebook page has a photo of a pro-Morsi demonstration. The written entry is translated as, “Lift your head up boss, Marina.”
Yacoub says he expects the expulsions of Copts from their towns to continue. Ibrahim agrees.
“If anything, expect worse to come,” Ibrahim said.
Former PLO terrorist turned peace activist Walid Shoebat puts it more bluntly.
“The Copts are toast,” Shoebat said.
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http://www.theblaze.com/stories/us-house-blocks-obama-administrations-plan-to-send-450-million-to-egypt/
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Guest Column: Egypt's Christians - Distraught and Displaced
by Raymond Ibrahim
Special to IPT News
October 4, 2012
http://www.investigativeproject.org/3761/guest-column-egypt-christians-distraught
Reuters reported last week that "Most Christians living near Egypt's border with Israel [in the town of Rafah in Sinai] are fleeing their homes after Islamist militants made death threats and gunmen attacked a Coptic-owned shop." Photos of desecrated churches and Christian property show Arabic graffiti saying things like "don't come back" and "Islam is the truth."
All media reports describe the same sequence of events: 1) Christians were threatened with leaflets warning them to evacuate or die; 2) an armed attack with automatic rifles was made on a Christian-owned shop; 3) Christians abandoned everything and fled their homes.
Anyone following events in Egypt knows that these three points—threatening leaflets, attacks on Christian property, followed by the displacement of Christians—are happening throughout Egypt, and not just peripheral Sinai, even if the latter is the only area to make it to the Western mainstream media. Consider:
Genocidal Leaflets
On August 14, El Fegr reported that leaflets were distributed in areas with large Christian populations, including Upper Egypt, offering monetary rewards to Muslims who "kill or physically attack the enemies of the religion of Allah—the Christians in all of Egypt's provinces, the slaves of the Cross, Allah's curse upon them…"
As a testimony to just how safe the jihadis feel under Egypt's new Islamist president, Mohamed Morsi—who just freed a militant jihadi responsible for the burning of a church leaving several Christians dead—the leaflets named contact points and even a mosque where Muslims interested in learning more about killing Christians should rally "after Friday prayers where new members to the organization will be welcomed."
On the same day these leaflets were distributed, a separate report titled "The serial killing of Copts has begun in Asyut" noted that a Christian store-owner was randomly targeted and killed by Salafis.
Muslim Attacks on Christian Properties and Persons
For months, Arabic-Christian media have been reporting ongoing stories of Muslim "gangs" and "thugs" attacking Christian homes, abducting the residents, including women and children, and demanding ransom monies—not unlike what is happening to Christians in Iraq and Syria. In one particular case, the Muslim gang attacked the home of a Coptic man, "releasing several gunshots in the air, and threatening him either to pay or die." The gang "picked this specific village because Copts form 80% of its inhabitants." Such reports often conclude with an all too familiar postscript: Christians calling police for help and filing complaints, all in vain.
A Coptic Solidarity report from August 20 titled "Copts in Upper Egypt Attacked, Beat, Plundered," tells of just that—how Christians are being beat, their businesses set on fire, and their properties plundered (see also here and here for similar reports). Likewise, according to Al Moheet, a new human rights report indicates that, in Nag Hammadi alone, there are dozens of cases of Muslim gangs abducting Christian Copts and holding them for ransom. Concerning these, the Coptic Church is daily asking for justice and receiving none.
Christian Displacements
The exodus of Copts from their homes also has become an ongoing crisis, so much so that a recent statement by the Holy Synod of the Coptic Orthodox Church of Egypt lamented the "repeated incidents of displacement of Copts from their homes, whether by force or threat." The statement also made clear that what happened in Sinai is no aberration: "Displacements began in Ameriya, then they stretched to Dahshur, and today terror and threats have reached the hearts and souls of our Coptic children in Rafah [Sinai]."
Indeed, back in February, a mob of over 3,000 Muslims attacked and displaced Christians in the region of Ameriya, due to unsubstantiated rumors that a Christian man was involved with a Muslim woman. Christian homes and shops were looted and then torched; "terrorized" women and children who lost their homes stood in the streets with no place to go. As usual, it took the army an hour to drive 2 kilometers to the village, and none of the perpetrators were arrested. Later, a Muslim Council permanently evicted eight Christian families and confiscated their property, even as "Muslims insisted that the whole Coptic population of 62 families must be deported."
A few weeks ago in Dahshur, after a Christian laundry worker accidently burned the shirt of a Muslim man, the customer came with a Muslim mob to attack the Copt at home. As the Christian defended his household, a Muslim was killed. Accordingly, thousands of Muslims terrorized the area, causing 120 Christian families to flee. One elderly Coptic woman returned home from the bakery to find the area deserted of Christians. Rioting Muslims looted Christian businesses and homes. Family members of the deceased Muslim insist that the Christians must still pay with their lives.
The same time the media reported about the displacement of Christians from Rafah, a quarrel between two school girls—a Christian and a Muslim—ended when several "heavily-armed" Muslims stormed the home of the Christian girl, causing her family and three other Christian families to flee the village. When the father returned, he found that all his saved money and possessions had been plundered. When he asked police for help, the officer replied, "I can't do anything for you, reconcile with them and end the problem."
-----
Indeed, this has been the same attitude of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood led government: in all of the above cases, the government looked the other way, or, when called on it, denied reality. Thus the Coptic Holy Synod made it a point to assert in its statement that "nearly one month ago the media had published the violations against the Copts but the Egyptian authorities have not taken the necessary measures to protect the Egyptian families, who have the right to live safely in their homes." As for the Rafah incident—the only incident to reach the mainstream media—Prime Minister Hisham Qandil denied that Christians were forced to flee, saying "One or two [Christian] families chose to move to another place and they are totally free to do so like all Egyptian citizens."
Such governmental indifference is consistent with the fact that, despite promising greater representation for Egypt's Christians, President Morsi just broke his word by allowing only one Copt—a female—to represent the nation's 10-12 million Christians in the newly formed cabinet.
Raymond Ibrahim is a Shillman Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center and an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Forum.
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second post
http://www.radicalislam.org/analysis/six-things-450-million-aid-egypt-will-pay
Six Things the $450 Million Aid to Egypt Will Pay For
Tue, October 2, 2012
by: Ryan Mauro
Attack on US Embassy in Egypt (Photo: Reuters)The U.S. government is about to add $450 million to its $16 trillion debt for the sake of Muslim Brotherhood-run Egypt.
According to the New York Times, the emergency cash transfer is part of a $1 billion aid package pledged in May. The original plan was to provide $190 million as soon as possible, but the declining economic conditions of Egypt convinced the Obama Administration to more than double that amount. Another $260 million will be delivered once Egypt secures a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund.
And it doesn’t stop there. The Times reports:
“In addition to the $1 billion in assistance, the administration is working with Egypt to provide $375 million in financing and loan guarantees for American financiers who invest in Egypt and a $60 million investment fund for Egyptian businesses. All of that comes on top of $1.3 billion in military aid that the United States provides Egypt each year (emphasis mine).”
Here are six things that American taxpayers’ money will pay for once it arrives in Egypt:
1. The Unraveling of the Peace Treaty With Israel.
The pledge by Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammed Morsi to honor the peace treaty with Israel means nothing. The Brotherhood’s line has always been that Israel is the one violating, and therefore nullifying, the treaty.
After a meeting with Secretary of State Clinton, the Egyptian Foreign Minister said, “Mr. President [Morsi] has repeatedly reaffirmed, on all occasions, that Egypt continues to respect all treaties signed as long as the other party to the treaty respects the treaty itself.”
He then implied that Israel was in violation of the treaty. “…Egypt’s understanding of peace is that it should be comprehensive, exactly as stipulated in the treaty itself. And this also includes the Palestinians, of course, and its right to – their right have their own state on the land that was – the pre June 4, 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital.”
Secure America Now’s excellent new pamphlet about Morsi quotes him as saying on April 24, 2004 hat a parliamentary committee is needed “to draft a popular political program to restructure Egyptian-American relations and set a timetable to dispose the so-called peace agreement with the Zionist entity.”
There is no reason to believe that his opinion has changed, especially when the Brotherhood openly states its objective as the destruction of Israel. The Brotherhood Supreme Guide, Mohammed Badie, said on June 14 that Muslims are required to perform “jihad of self and money” for the sake of “imposing Muslim rule throughout beloved Palestine.”
2. Supporting Hamas.
The charter of the Hamas terrorist group states it is “one of the wings of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine.” In December 2011, Hamas even changed its name to “The Islamic Resistance Movement—a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood-Palestine.” The Brotherhood has never condemned Hamas. On the contrary, it has endorsed the terrorist group at every turn and preached to the Muslim world that it is the “resistance” to Israel.
In June 2007, Morsi said, “Muslim Brotherhood support of Hamas is a support of the Palestinian resistance.” In 2011, he told CNN, “We do not use violence against anyone. What’s going on [in] the Palestinian land is resistance.”
At one of Morsi’s campaign stops, a musician performed a song with lyrics that included “brandish your weapons, say your prayers” and “Come on, you lovers of martyrdom, banish the sleep from the eyes of all Jews. Come on, you lovers of martyrdom, you are all Hamas. Indeed, all the lovers of martyrdom are Hamas.”
Hamas, with good reason, believes Egypt will end cooperation with Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip. Hamas chief Khaled Meshal praised the “new era” in the Egyptian-Palestinian relationship after he met with Morsi in June. The next month, Morsi told Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh that “Egypt and Palestine are one entity.”
3. Sharia Law.
Don’t be fooled by the Brotherhood’s adoption of popular terms like “democracy.” Its senior cleric, Sheikh Yousef Qaradawi, explains that their version of “democracy” is different than that in the West. To them, democracy means the level of freedom permitted within the confines of Sharia Law.
Consider the Muslim Brotherhood’s official motto: “Allah is our objective/The Prophet is our leader/The Quran is our law/Jihad is our way/Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”
On April 21, Morsi pledged his commitment to “instituting the religion of Allah” because “every aspect of life is to be Islamicized.” He even promised the radical Salafists, who are even more radical than the Brotherhood, that he’d appoint a clerical council to review all legislation to make it is in compliance with Islam as they see it. Of the 27 members of the National Council for Human Rights, 9 are Islamists, including two Salafists and the Secretary-General of the Brotherhood.
On May 13, Morsi recited the Brotherhood pledge to an adoring audience.
“The Sharia, then the Sharia and finally, the Sharia…I take an oath before Allah and before you all that regardless of the actual text [of the constitution]…Allah willing, the text will truly reflect [Sharia], as will be agreed upon by the Egyptian people, by the Islamic scholars, and by legal and constitutional experts,” he said.
Morsi’s government has arrested a Coptic Christian for allegedly posting the anti-Islam “Innocence of Muslims” film online. Another was sentenced to six years in prison for posting cartoons of Mohammed on Facebook. This is only the beginning. The Brotherhood follows a doctrine of "gradualism" where Sharia Law is implemented in stages. For example, Sheikh Qaradawi advised Egypt to wait five years before cutting off the hands of robbers.
On September 30, a Brotherhood preacher named Wagdy Ghoneim (who used to be an imam in California until he was arrested in 2004) called for prosecution secularists for apostasy. “If anyone tells you that he is a liberal, tell him directly that he is an infidel,” he said.
4. Anti-Semitism and Anti-Americanism
The Brotherhood views the U.S. and Israel essentially as one unit. To them, the U.S. is secretly controlled by the anti-Muslim Zionists. In July 2004, Morsi talked about the “crisis of the Zionist and American enemy.” In 2010, Brotherhood Supreme Guide Badi preached that “resistance is the only solution against the Zio-American arrogance and tyranny.” The context of the statement clearly referred to violent jihad. He opined, “The U.S. is now experiencing the beginning of its end, and is heading towards its demise.”
Morsi has insinuated that the 9/11 attacks were an “inside job” on numerous occasions, claiming in 2007 that the U.S. “never presented any evidences on the identity of those who committed that incident.” This conspiracy theory almost invariably holds that “Zionist” elements within the U.S. government collaborated with Israel to carry them out.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s former Supreme Guide, Mohammed Akef, came to Ahmadinejad's defense in 2005 about “the myth of the Holocaust.” Strangely, Ahmadinejad caused a furor in the U.S. and around the world when he said the 9/11 attacks were an “inside job” and denied the Holocaust but not a word is said when the Brotherhood says the exact same things.
The Brotherhood’s anti-Semitism is just as vulgar as anything that has come from Ahmadinejad’s mouth. In November 2004, Morsi said the “Quran established that the Jews are the ones with the highest degree of enmity towards Muslims” and “there is no peace with the descendants of the apes and pigs.” In July 2007, he talked about the “way to free the land from the filth of the Jews.”
The charter of Hamas is explicit in its anti-Semitism, quoting an Islamic verse that reads, “The time will not come until Muslims fight the Jews (and kill them); until the Jews hide behind the rocks and trees, which will cry: O Muslim! There is a Jew hiding behind me, come on and kill him!”
5. Building the Caliphate
This isn’t an exaggeration. The Brotherhood and its allies won the elections in Egypt, Tunisia and Somalia. Hamas controls the Gaza Strip. In Yemen, the Brotherhood’s Islah affiliate is the strongest party as the country undergoes a transition. The Brotherhood is a major force behind the rebels in Syria and the Brotherhood is gearing up to destabilize Jordan. The Sudanese regime says it is instituting full-blown Sharia Law and if it doesn’t, the Muslim Brotherhood’s affiliate may overthrow it. The Brotherhood suffered a major setback in Libya’s elections, but it remains a potent force in that country.
Resurrecting the Caliphate sounds like a fantasy but the Brotherhood is certain that it is destiny and, if you look around the region, it’s easy to see why they are confident that it will happen soon. At one of Morsi’s campaign rallies, a cleric proclaimed, “We are seeing the dream of the Islamic Caliphate come true at the hands of Mohammed Morsi” and “the capital of the Caliphate and the United Arab States is Jerusalem.” Morsi nodded.
6. Keeping the Brotherhood in Power
If American money helps the Egyptian economy succeed, it helps the Brotherhood succeed. It’s as simple as that. If Morsi succeeds in improving the economy, even if it’s because of international assistance, he gets the credit.
At the same time, Morsi is doing whatever he can to preserve the Brotherhood’s hold on power. There was an argument to be made in favor of U.S. financial assistance when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces were the real power-brokers and served as a check on the Brotherhood’s power. That is no longer the case. Morsi was able to depose the top leaders and replace them with Brotherhood supporters.
At the same time, Morsi is issuing administrative orders to shut down independent television stations. About 50 editors of state newspapers have been replaced with his allies. The state television is giving him positive coverage. The individual who was arrested for posting “Innocence of Muslims” online was also charged with insulting the President and a newspaper that criticized Morsi was confiscated, the best examples attacks on free speech you could ever ask for.
This is what Americans are paying $450 million for. And there’s no money-back guarantee if they are unsatisfied.
-
Anyone think Buraq is unhappy with Egypt today? But he wore a kippa at AIPAC ........
second post
http://www.radicalislam.org/analysis/six-things-450-million-aid-egypt-will-pay
Six Things the $450 Million Aid to Egypt Will Pay For
Tue, October 2, 2012
by: Ryan Mauro
Attack on US Embassy in Egypt (Photo: Reuters)The U.S. government is about to add $450 million to its $16 trillion debt for the sake of Muslim Brotherhood-run Egypt.
According to the New York Times, the emergency cash transfer is part of a $1 billion aid package pledged in May. The original plan was to provide $190 million as soon as possible, but the declining economic conditions of Egypt convinced the Obama Administration to more than double that amount. Another $260 million will be delivered once Egypt secures a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund.
And it doesn’t stop there. The Times reports:
“In addition to the $1 billion in assistance, the administration is working with Egypt to provide $375 million in financing and loan guarantees for American financiers who invest in Egypt and a $60 million investment fund for Egyptian businesses. All of that comes on top of $1.3 billion in military aid that the United States provides Egypt each year (emphasis mine).”
Here are six things that American taxpayers’ money will pay for once it arrives in Egypt:
1. The Unraveling of the Peace Treaty With Israel.
The pledge by Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammed Morsi to honor the peace treaty with Israel means nothing. The Brotherhood’s line has always been that Israel is the one violating, and therefore nullifying, the treaty.
After a meeting with Secretary of State Clinton, the Egyptian Foreign Minister said, “Mr. President [Morsi] has repeatedly reaffirmed, on all occasions, that Egypt continues to respect all treaties signed as long as the other party to the treaty respects the treaty itself.”
He then implied that Israel was in violation of the treaty. “…Egypt’s understanding of peace is that it should be comprehensive, exactly as stipulated in the treaty itself. And this also includes the Palestinians, of course, and its right to – their right have their own state on the land that was – the pre June 4, 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital.”
Secure America Now’s excellent new pamphlet about Morsi quotes him as saying on April 24, 2004 hat a parliamentary committee is needed “to draft a popular political program to restructure Egyptian-American relations and set a timetable to dispose the so-called peace agreement with the Zionist entity.”
There is no reason to believe that his opinion has changed, especially when the Brotherhood openly states its objective as the destruction of Israel. The Brotherhood Supreme Guide, Mohammed Badie, said on June 14 that Muslims are required to perform “jihad of self and money” for the sake of “imposing Muslim rule throughout beloved Palestine.”
2. Supporting Hamas.
The charter of the Hamas terrorist group states it is “one of the wings of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine.” In December 2011, Hamas even changed its name to “The Islamic Resistance Movement—a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood-Palestine.” The Brotherhood has never condemned Hamas. On the contrary, it has endorsed the terrorist group at every turn and preached to the Muslim world that it is the “resistance” to Israel.
In June 2007, Morsi said, “Muslim Brotherhood support of Hamas is a support of the Palestinian resistance.” In 2011, he told CNN, “We do not use violence against anyone. What’s going on [in] the Palestinian land is resistance.”
At one of Morsi’s campaign stops, a musician performed a song with lyrics that included “brandish your weapons, say your prayers” and “Come on, you lovers of martyrdom, banish the sleep from the eyes of all Jews. Come on, you lovers of martyrdom, you are all Hamas. Indeed, all the lovers of martyrdom are Hamas.”
Hamas, with good reason, believes Egypt will end cooperation with Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip. Hamas chief Khaled Meshal praised the “new era” in the Egyptian-Palestinian relationship after he met with Morsi in June. The next month, Morsi told Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh that “Egypt and Palestine are one entity.”
3. Sharia Law.
Don’t be fooled by the Brotherhood’s adoption of popular terms like “democracy.” Its senior cleric, Sheikh Yousef Qaradawi, explains that their version of “democracy” is different than that in the West. To them, democracy means the level of freedom permitted within the confines of Sharia Law.
Consider the Muslim Brotherhood’s official motto: “Allah is our objective/The Prophet is our leader/The Quran is our law/Jihad is our way/Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”
On April 21, Morsi pledged his commitment to “instituting the religion of Allah” because “every aspect of life is to be Islamicized.” He even promised the radical Salafists, who are even more radical than the Brotherhood, that he’d appoint a clerical council to review all legislation to make it is in compliance with Islam as they see it. Of the 27 members of the National Council for Human Rights, 9 are Islamists, including two Salafists and the Secretary-General of the Brotherhood.
On May 13, Morsi recited the Brotherhood pledge to an adoring audience.
“The Sharia, then the Sharia and finally, the Sharia…I take an oath before Allah and before you all that regardless of the actual text [of the constitution]…Allah willing, the text will truly reflect [Sharia], as will be agreed upon by the Egyptian people, by the Islamic scholars, and by legal and constitutional experts,” he said.
Morsi’s government has arrested a Coptic Christian for allegedly posting the anti-Islam “Innocence of Muslims” film online. Another was sentenced to six years in prison for posting cartoons of Mohammed on Facebook. This is only the beginning. The Brotherhood follows a doctrine of "gradualism" where Sharia Law is implemented in stages. For example, Sheikh Qaradawi advised Egypt to wait five years before cutting off the hands of robbers.
On September 30, a Brotherhood preacher named Wagdy Ghoneim (who used to be an imam in California until he was arrested in 2004) called for prosecution secularists for apostasy. “If anyone tells you that he is a liberal, tell him directly that he is an infidel,” he said.
4. Anti-Semitism and Anti-Americanism
The Brotherhood views the U.S. and Israel essentially as one unit. To them, the U.S. is secretly controlled by the anti-Muslim Zionists. In July 2004, Morsi talked about the “crisis of the Zionist and American enemy.” In 2010, Brotherhood Supreme Guide Badi preached that “resistance is the only solution against the Zio-American arrogance and tyranny.” The context of the statement clearly referred to violent jihad. He opined, “The U.S. is now experiencing the beginning of its end, and is heading towards its demise.”
Morsi has insinuated that the 9/11 attacks were an “inside job” on numerous occasions, claiming in 2007 that the U.S. “never presented any evidences on the identity of those who committed that incident.” This conspiracy theory almost invariably holds that “Zionist” elements within the U.S. government collaborated with Israel to carry them out.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s former Supreme Guide, Mohammed Akef, came to Ahmadinejad's defense in 2005 about “the myth of the Holocaust.” Strangely, Ahmadinejad caused a furor in the U.S. and around the world when he said the 9/11 attacks were an “inside job” and denied the Holocaust but not a word is said when the Brotherhood says the exact same things.
The Brotherhood’s anti-Semitism is just as vulgar as anything that has come from Ahmadinejad’s mouth. In November 2004, Morsi said the “Quran established that the Jews are the ones with the highest degree of enmity towards Muslims” and “there is no peace with the descendants of the apes and pigs.” In July 2007, he talked about the “way to free the land from the filth of the Jews.”
The charter of Hamas is explicit in its anti-Semitism, quoting an Islamic verse that reads, “The time will not come until Muslims fight the Jews (and kill them); until the Jews hide behind the rocks and trees, which will cry: O Muslim! There is a Jew hiding behind me, come on and kill him!”
5. Building the Caliphate
This isn’t an exaggeration. The Brotherhood and its allies won the elections in Egypt, Tunisia and Somalia. Hamas controls the Gaza Strip. In Yemen, the Brotherhood’s Islah affiliate is the strongest party as the country undergoes a transition. The Brotherhood is a major force behind the rebels in Syria and the Brotherhood is gearing up to destabilize Jordan. The Sudanese regime says it is instituting full-blown Sharia Law and if it doesn’t, the Muslim Brotherhood’s affiliate may overthrow it. The Brotherhood suffered a major setback in Libya’s elections, but it remains a potent force in that country.
Resurrecting the Caliphate sounds like a fantasy but the Brotherhood is certain that it is destiny and, if you look around the region, it’s easy to see why they are confident that it will happen soon. At one of Morsi’s campaign rallies, a cleric proclaimed, “We are seeing the dream of the Islamic Caliphate come true at the hands of Mohammed Morsi” and “the capital of the Caliphate and the United Arab States is Jerusalem.” Morsi nodded.
6. Keeping the Brotherhood in Power
If American money helps the Egyptian economy succeed, it helps the Brotherhood succeed. It’s as simple as that. If Morsi succeeds in improving the economy, even if it’s because of international assistance, he gets the credit.
At the same time, Morsi is doing whatever he can to preserve the Brotherhood’s hold on power. There was an argument to be made in favor of U.S. financial assistance when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces were the real power-brokers and served as a check on the Brotherhood’s power. That is no longer the case. Morsi was able to depose the top leaders and replace them with Brotherhood supporters.
At the same time, Morsi is issuing administrative orders to shut down independent television stations. About 50 editors of state newspapers have been replaced with his allies. The state television is giving him positive coverage. The individual who was arrested for posting “Innocence of Muslims” online was also charged with insulting the President and a newspaper that criticized Morsi was confiscated, the best examples attacks on free speech you could ever ask for.
This is what Americans are paying $450 million for. And there’s no money-back guarantee if they are unsatisfied.
-
The Christian Exodus From Egypt
For Copts, a persecuting dictator was preferable to the Islamist mob..
By SAMUEL TADROS
Visit any Coptic church in the United States and you immediately recognize the newcomers. You see it in their eyes, hear it in their broken English, sense it in how they cling to the church in search of the familiar. They have come here escaping a place they used to call home, where their ancestors had lived for centuries.
Waves of Copts have come here from Egypt before, to escape Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalizations or the growing Islamist tide. Their country's transformation wasn't sudden, but every year brought more public Islamization. As the veil spread, Coptic women felt increasingly different, alien and marked. Verbal abuse came from schoolteachers, bystanders in the bus station who noticed the cross on a wrist, or commentators on state television.
But life was generally bearable. Hosni Mubarak crushed the Islamist insurgency of the 1980s and '90s. He was no friend to the Copts, but neither was he foe. His police often turned a blind eye when Coptic homes and shops were attacked by mobs, and the courts never punished the perpetrators—but the president wasn't an Islamist. He even interfered sometimes to give permission to build a church, or to make Christmas a national holiday.
To be sure, Copts were excluded from high government positions. There were no Coptic governors, intelligence officers, deans of schools, or CEOs of government companies. Until 2005, Copts needed presidential approval to build a new church or even build a bathroom in an existing one. Even with approval, state security often blocked construction, citing security concerns.
Those concerns were often real. Mobs could mobilize against Copts with the slightest incitement—rumor of a romantic relationship between a Christian man and a Muslim woman, a church being built, reports of a Christian having insulted Islam. The details varied but the results didn't: homes burned, shops destroyed, Christians leaving villages, sometimes dead bodies. The police would arrive late and force a reconciliation session between perpetrators and victims during which everything would be forgiven and no one punished. What pained the Copts most was that the attackers were neighbors, co-workers and childhood friends.
Then came last year's revolution. Copts were never enthusiastic about it, perhaps because centuries of persecution taught that the persecuting dictator was preferable to the mob. He could be bought off, persuaded to hold back or pressured by outside forces. With the mob you stood no chance. Some younger Copts were lured by the promise of a liberal Egypt, but the older generation knew better.
The collapse of the police liberated the Islamists, who quickly dominated national politics but were even more powerful in the streets and villages. This is where the "Islamization of life" (as Muslim Brotherhood leader Khairat Al Shater called for) was becoming a reality.
The Muslim Brotherhood aimed to assuage Coptic fears while speaking in English to American audiences. The reality was different. When Coptic homes and shops were looted in a village near Alexandria in January, Brotherhood parliamentarians and Salafis organized a reconciliation session that didn't punish the attackers but ordered the Copts to evacuate the village.
Soon after, the Brotherhood's Sayed Askar denied that Copts face any problems in building churches, saying they have more churches than they need. Elections featured accusations that Copts backed the old regime. When attempts to build a non-Islamist coalition were led by businessman Naguib Sawiris, a Copt, the Brotherhood's website accused him and his co-religionists of treason.
Westerners may debate how moderate Egypt's Islamists are, but for Copts the questioning is futile. Their options are limited. While Copts are the largest Christian community in the Middle East, they're too small to play a role in deciding the fate of the country. They are not geographically concentrated in one area that could become a safe zone. The only option is to leave, putting an end to 2,000 years of Christianity in Egypt.
The sad truth is that not all will be able to flee. Those with money, English skills and the like will get out. Their poorer brethren will be left behind.
What can be done to save them? Egypt receives $1.5 billion in U.S. aid each year, and Washington has various means to make Egypt's new leaders listen. Islamist attempts to enshrine second-class status for Copts in Egypt's new constitution should be stopped. Outsiders should also keep an eye on Muslim Brotherhood politicians who are planning to take control of Coptic Church finances. At a minimum, donors should demand that attacks on Copts be met with punishment as well as condemnation.
Yet looking at the faces of the new immigrants in my Fairfax, Va., church, I cannot escape the feeling that it is too late. Perhaps the fate of the Copts was sealed long ago, in the middle of the last century, when the Jews were kicked out of Egypt. In the late 1940s, Brotherhood demonstrators chanted, in reference to the sabbath days of Jews and others: "Today is Saturday, tomorrow will be Sunday, oh Christians." And so it is.
Mr. Tadros is a research fellow at the Hudson Institute's Center for Religious Freedom. He is currently writing a book about the Copts for the Hoover Institution.
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Wow. Who could have seen this coming?
The Christian Exodus From Egypt
For Copts, a persecuting dictator was preferable to the Islamist mob..
By SAMUEL TADROS
Visit any Coptic church in the United States and you immediately recognize the newcomers. You see it in their eyes, hear it in their broken English, sense it in how they cling to the church in search of the familiar. They have come here escaping a place they used to call home, where their ancestors had lived for centuries.
Waves of Copts have come here from Egypt before, to escape Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalizations or the growing Islamist tide. Their country's transformation wasn't sudden, but every year brought more public Islamization. As the veil spread, Coptic women felt increasingly different, alien and marked. Verbal abuse came from schoolteachers, bystanders in the bus station who noticed the cross on a wrist, or commentators on state television.
But life was generally bearable. Hosni Mubarak crushed the Islamist insurgency of the 1980s and '90s. He was no friend to the Copts, but neither was he foe. His police often turned a blind eye when Coptic homes and shops were attacked by mobs, and the courts never punished the perpetrators—but the president wasn't an Islamist. He even interfered sometimes to give permission to build a church, or to make Christmas a national holiday.
To be sure, Copts were excluded from high government positions. There were no Coptic governors, intelligence officers, deans of schools, or CEOs of government companies. Until 2005, Copts needed presidential approval to build a new church or even build a bathroom in an existing one. Even with approval, state security often blocked construction, citing security concerns.
Those concerns were often real. Mobs could mobilize against Copts with the slightest incitement—rumor of a romantic relationship between a Christian man and a Muslim woman, a church being built, reports of a Christian having insulted Islam. The details varied but the results didn't: homes burned, shops destroyed, Christians leaving villages, sometimes dead bodies. The police would arrive late and force a reconciliation session between perpetrators and victims during which everything would be forgiven and no one punished. What pained the Copts most was that the attackers were neighbors, co-workers and childhood friends.
Then came last year's revolution. Copts were never enthusiastic about it, perhaps because centuries of persecution taught that the persecuting dictator was preferable to the mob. He could be bought off, persuaded to hold back or pressured by outside forces. With the mob you stood no chance. Some younger Copts were lured by the promise of a liberal Egypt, but the older generation knew better.
The collapse of the police liberated the Islamists, who quickly dominated national politics but were even more powerful in the streets and villages. This is where the "Islamization of life" (as Muslim Brotherhood leader Khairat Al Shater called for) was becoming a reality.
The Muslim Brotherhood aimed to assuage Coptic fears while speaking in English to American audiences. The reality was different. When Coptic homes and shops were looted in a village near Alexandria in January, Brotherhood parliamentarians and Salafis organized a reconciliation session that didn't punish the attackers but ordered the Copts to evacuate the village.
Soon after, the Brotherhood's Sayed Askar denied that Copts face any problems in building churches, saying they have more churches than they need. Elections featured accusations that Copts backed the old regime. When attempts to build a non-Islamist coalition were led by businessman Naguib Sawiris, a Copt, the Brotherhood's website accused him and his co-religionists of treason.
Westerners may debate how moderate Egypt's Islamists are, but for Copts the questioning is futile. Their options are limited. While Copts are the largest Christian community in the Middle East, they're too small to play a role in deciding the fate of the country. They are not geographically concentrated in one area that could become a safe zone. The only option is to leave, putting an end to 2,000 years of Christianity in Egypt.
The sad truth is that not all will be able to flee. Those with money, English skills and the like will get out. Their poorer brethren will be left behind.
What can be done to save them? Egypt receives $1.5 billion in U.S. aid each year, and Washington has various means to make Egypt's new leaders listen. Islamist attempts to enshrine second-class status for Copts in Egypt's new constitution should be stopped. Outsiders should also keep an eye on Muslim Brotherhood politicians who are planning to take control of Coptic Church finances. At a minimum, donors should demand that attacks on Copts be met with punishment as well as condemnation.
Yet looking at the faces of the new immigrants in my Fairfax, Va., church, I cannot escape the feeling that it is too late. Perhaps the fate of the Copts was sealed long ago, in the middle of the last century, when the Jews were kicked out of Egypt. In the late 1940s, Brotherhood demonstrators chanted, in reference to the sabbath days of Jews and others: "Today is Saturday, tomorrow will be Sunday, oh Christians." And so it is.
Mr. Tadros is a research fellow at the Hudson Institute's Center for Religious Freedom. He is currently writing a book about the Copts for the Hoover Institution.
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http://www.timesofisrael.com/jewish-ownership-documents-confiscated-by-cairo-on-national-security-grounds/
Anyone care to flesh this out?!?
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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/05/world/middleeast/coptic-church-chooses-pope-who-rejects-politics.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20121105
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CAIRO — The young activists lingered on the streets around Tahrir Square, scrutinizing the crowds of holiday revelers. Suddenly, they charged, pushing people aside and chasing down a young man. As the captive thrashed to get away, the activists pounded his shoulders, flipped him around and spray-painted a message on his back: “I’m a harasser.”
Egypt’s streets have long been a perilous place for women, who are frequently heckled, grabbed, threatened and violated while the police look the other way. Now, during the country’s tumultuous transition from authoritarian rule, more and more groups are emerging to make protecting women — and shaming the do-nothing police — a cause.
“They’re now doing the undoable?” a police officer joked as he watched the vigilantes chase down the young man. The officer quickly went back to sipping his tea.
The attacks on women did not subside after the uprising. If anything, they became more visible as even the military was implicated in the assaults, stripping female protesters, threatening others with violence and subjecting activists to so-called virginity tests. During holidays, when Cairenes take to the streets to stroll and socialize, the attacks multiply.
But during the recent Id al-Adha holiday, some of the men were surprised to find they could no longer harass with impunity, a change brought about not just out of concern for women’s rights, but out of a frustration that the post-revolutionary government still, like the one before, was doing too little to protect its citizens.
At least three citizens groups patrolled busy sections of central Cairo during the holiday. The groups’ members, both men and women, shared the conviction that the authorities would not act against harassment unless the problem was forced into the public debate. They differed in their tactics: some activists criticized others for being too quick to resort to violence against suspects and encouraging vigilantism. One group leader compared the activists to the Guardian Angels in the United States.
“The harasser doesn’t see anyone who will hold him accountable,” said Omar Talaat, 16, who joined one of the patrols.
The years of President Hosni Mubarak’s rule were marked by official apathy, collusion in the assaults on women, or empty responses to the attacks, including police roundups of teenagers at Internet cafes for looking at pornography.
“The police did not take harassment seriously,” said Madiha el-Safty, a sociology professor at the American University in Cairo. “People didn’t file complaints. It was always underreported.”
Mr. Mubarak’s wife, Suzanne, who portrayed herself as a champion of women’s rights, pretended the problem hardly existed. As reports of harassment grew in 2008, she said, “Egyptian men always respect Egyptian women.”
Egypt’s new president, Mohamed Morsi, has presided over two holidays, and many activists say there is no sign that the government is paying closer attention to the problem. But the work by the citizens groups may be having an effect: Last week, after the Id al-Adha holiday, Mr. Morsi’s spokesman announced that the government had received more than 1,000 reports of harassment, and said that the president had directed the Interior Ministry to investigate them.
“Egypt’s revolution cannot tolerate these abuses,” the spokesman quoted Mr. Morsi as saying.
Azza Soliman, the director of the Center for Egyptian Women’s Legal Assistance, dismissed the president’s words as “weak.” During the holiday, she said, one of her sons was beaten on the subway after he tried to stop a man who was groping two foreign women. The police tried to stop him from filing a complaint. “The whole world is talking about harassment in our country,” Ms. Soliman said. “The Interior Ministry takes no action.”
For years, anti-harassment activists have worked to highlight the problems in Egypt, but the uprising seemed to give the effort more energy and urgency.
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Over the holiday, the groups staked out different parts of Cairo’s downtown. One avoided any violence, forming human chains between women and their tormentors. The other group forcefully confronted men and boys it suspected of harassment, smacking around suspects before hauling them off to a police station.
One of that group’s founders, Sherine Badr el-Din, 30, started her work as an anti-harassment activist by asking men to get off the women-only cars on the Cairo subway, regarded as a safe zone. When they refused, she videotaped them and posted their pictures on the Internet, she said.
Last summer, one of the men attacked her. “I wanted to file a case, but the police officer refused, claiming they were only there to monitor the train schedules.” She said the group escalated its tactics out of frustration, after the police started releasing suspects the group had caught.
“Violence is not our method,” she said. “But the pressure was tremendous.”
Last week, as the group gathered near Tahrir Square, one member had what looked like a stun gun, and another shook a can of spray paint. Most participants were men, and some wore fluorescent green vests, with the words “combating harassment” written on the back.
They mused on the reasons for the frequency of the attacks on their sisters, mothers and friends, finding no sure answer in the blame often laid on poverty or religion, society’s indifference or the state’s contagious chauvinism.
They seemed more certain of the solution, as they plunged into the holiday crowds over several evenings. Some bystanders were supportive. But when violence broke out, there was less support. “I will tell the government on you,” one man screamed as the activists wrestled with a suspect.
Sometimes the patrol acted after seeing a woman being groped. At other times, it justified its attacks as preventive.
Two boys on a scooter hardly knew what hit them. One minute, they were driving along the Nile Corniche, saying something — maybe lewd, maybe not — to two girls strolling on the sidewalk. The next, they were being hauled off the scooter by the men in green vests. The melee that broke out afterward stopped traffic on one of downtown’s busiest roadways, before the police chased the patrol members off.
Afterward, Muhaab Selim, 23, a member of the group, could barely contain his anger. “Why do I have to wait until he touches them?” he yelled. “Why do people defend the harassers?”
By the end of the holidays, one of the group’s leaders, Muhammad Taimoor, 22, had been arrested after fighting with a suspect on the subway. Even so, he called the weekend a success. “We caught some harassers, sprayed them with paint and published their pictures everywhere,” Mr. Taimoor said. “The Interior Ministry wasn’t cooperating with us at all. They weren’t protecting women in the streets.”
While Mr. Taimoor and his colleagues were on patrol, another group, called Imprint, was in a nearby square. Nihal Saad Zaghloul, 27, an activist with the group, said its members stopped more than 30 men who were trying to harass women.
When the group believes someone is being harassed, some members form a wall between the attacker and the victim, while others take the woman to safety. “We don’t push back, and we don’t fight,” Ms. Zaghloul said. They ask police officers to be present, in case the woman wants to file a report.
Ms. Zaghloul, who became active after she and a friend were assaulted, was less critical of the patrol officers than some of the other activists. “They are understaffed, and at the same time, they are part of a society that always blames women, although they know it’s wrong.” She worried that the other group’s methods would alienate the public.
But she added, “No one understands their frustration better than me.”
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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/23/world/middleeast/egypts-president-morsi-gives-himself-new-powers.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20121123
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http://www.investigativeproject.org/3823/islamist-says-morsi-critics-could-be-killed
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http://www.investigativeproject.org/3823/islamist-says-morsi-critics-could-be-killed
Wait, I was told this was a "triumph of democracy".
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The Obama Administration's PR Campaign for Morsi and the MB
IPT News
November 29, 2012
http://www.investigativeproject.org/3827/obama-administration-oversells-morsi
The elected head of a nation made threatening statements toward Israel. His organization called for jihad and celebrated a bus bombing in Tel Aviv.
The United States then hailed Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi as a statesman and a moderate last week.
True, he did help bring about a cessation of Hamas rocket fire from Gaza. But in doing so, he wasn't trying to advance American objectives or the cause of peace.
Morsi knew avoiding a war in Gaza would help secure $1 billion in debt relief from the United States and an International Monetary Fund loan approaching $5 billion.
All of that makes the high praise Morsi received from the Obama administration unnecessary and counterproductive. And the administration's tepid response to Morsi's subsequent power grab – neutering his country's judiciary – fails to make clear whether there will be consequences if he maintains dictatorial power.
"Mr. Obama told aides he was impressed with the Egyptian leader's pragmatic confidence," The New York Times reported after the Gaza ceasefire Nov. 21. "He sensed an engineer's precision with surprisingly little ideology."
The president and his aides must not have been paying attention. Days earlier, Morsi stood in Cairo's al-Azhar mosque and offered unwavering support to Hamas and threatened Israel with violent retribution.
"Let everyone know that the size of Egypt and the capabilities of Egypt, and the people of Egypt have rage, and the leaders of Egypt are enraged at what is hitting Gaza," Morsi said. "The leaders of Egypt are enraged and are moving to prevent the aggression on the people of Palestine in Gaza."
"We in Egypt stand with Gaza," he said. "[W]e are with them in one trench, that he who hits them, hits us; that this blood which flows from their children, it, it is like the blood flowing from the bodies of our children and our sons, may this never happen."
During a Nov. 19 visit to Shifa Hospital in Gaza, Saad Katatni, chairman of Morsi's Freedom and Justice Party and speaker of Egypt's dissolved parliament, continued issuing violent threats of jihad against Israel, saying:
"We are with you in your jihad. We have come here to send a message from here to the Zionist entity, to the Zionist enemy. And we say to them, Egypt is no longer. Egypt is no longer after the revolution a strategic treasure for you. Egypt was and still is a strategic treasury for our brothers in Palestine; a strategic treasure for Gaza; a strategic treasure for all the oppressed."
The Obama administration has yet to criticize the pro-Hamas, pro-jihad rhetoric from Morsi, Katatni and their Brotherhood associates.
Throughout the conflict, the Muslim Brotherhood – where Morsi had been a senior member before seeking office earlier this year – issued a series of pro-Hamas statements and celebrations of attacks on Israel, the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) reports.
During a protest organized by the Brotherhood and its political arm in Al-Qalyubi, preacher Muhammad Ragab called on Muslims "to raise the banner of jihad against the tyrannical, invading and wicked sons of apes and pigs [i.e., the Jews], and to unite against the enemies of Allah."
"The MB thanked Allah for the death of Israelis killed by rockets, and called for jihad against Israel," the MEMRI report says. "The official MB Facebook page reported joyously on the deaths of Israelis. On November 15, 2012, the official MB Facebook page celebrated the death of three Israeli civilians killed by a rocket that hit a house in Kiryat Malakhi: 'Allah akbar and praise to god, three Zionists were killed and five others were injured in a blast at a three-story building in Kiryat Malakhi from resistance rockets.'"
State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland ducked the issue of violent rhetoric from Morsi and the Brotherhood when a reporter raised it in a Nov. 16 press briefing.
"Well, I'm obviously not, from this podium, going to characterize the Egyptian view, nor am I going to speak for them and characterize our private diplomatic conversations," Nuland said. "We all agree on the need to de-escalate this conflict, and the question is for everybody to use their influence that they have to try to get there."
The Muslim Brotherhood's hostile rhetoric against Israel continued on Nov. 22 after the cease-fire was reached. Supreme Guide Dr. Mohamed Badie—considered by Middle East intelligence sources to be the real power broker behind Morsi— issued a statement describing jihad against the Jewish state as "a personal obligation for all Muslims."
"The cause of Palestine is of considerable importance. It is not a cause of power, nor of Palestinians, nor of the Arabs, but is the basic cause of life of every Muslim," Badie said. "For the sake of its return, every Muslim must wage jihad, sacrifice; and expend his money for the sake of restoring it.
"Palestine and Jerusalem is a holy Muslim land, part of the faith of the Muslim ummah," Badie continued. "To forsake any part of it is to forsake the ummah's civilization and faith. This is a great sin."
The Muslim Brotherhood leader continued, saying that the Jews should not "establish a state for themselves" and should be content living as a minority in other nations.
"The enemy knows nothing but the language of force," Badie said. "Be aware of the game of grand deception with which they depict peace accords."
Morsi Grabs Dictatorial Powers
Cairo's streets filled with angry protesters after Morsi turned around and issued an edict making his decisions immune from judicial review just a day after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton praised him as a peacemaker.
"I want to thank President Morsi for his personal leadership to de-escalate the situation in Gaza and end the violence. This is a critical moment for the region," Clinton said during a Nov. 21 joint press conference in Cairo with Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed Kamel Amr. "Egypt's new government is assuming the responsibility and leadership that has long made this country a cornerstone of regional stability and peace."
Morsi's grab for dictatorial power trampled Egypt's judiciary and gave him unchecked rule over Egypt at least until a new constitution is drafted.
At least 40 people were wounded and a teenager was killed Sunday in the Nile Delta city of Damanhoor when a group of anti-Morsi protesters tried storming the Brotherhood's local offices, the Associated Press reported.
Washington's response has been tepid at best, calling for calm but never criticizing Morsi directly. White House Spokesman Jay Carney was asked directly Monday if the administration "condemned" Morsi's unprecedented power grab.
"We are concerned about it and have raised those concerns," Carney said.
During a press briefing also held Monday, the State Department's Nuland tread lightly. Clinton spoke with Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed Kamel Amr that morning, Nuland said, taking "that opportunity to reiterate some of the points that you saw in our statement, that we want to see the constitutional process move forward in a way that does not overly concentrate power in one set of hands, that ensures that rule of law, checks and balances, protection of the rights of all groups in Egypt are upheld, et cetera."
She repeatedly referred back to a statement issued Friday calling for calm in Egypt as a result of Morsi's decree.
U.S. Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., called on the United States to condemn these actions and demand they be reversed. "Stop. Stop. Renounce the statement, and the move that he just made. Allow the judiciary to function," McCain said. "If the judiciary is flawed in some way, then, that's an illness that can be cured over time. But, absolutely, to assume this kind of power is unacceptable to the United States of America and, then, we can outline what actions might be taken. But, first, condemn it."
Egypt's pro-democracy groups also have called on President Obama to condemn Morsi's decree, but their pleas fell on deaf ears.
"I am waiting to see, I hope soon, a very strong statement of condemnation by the U.S., by Europe and by everybody who really cares about human dignity," said prominent opposition figure Mohamed Elbaradei.
The opposition forces have formed a National Salvation Front in response to Morsi's power grab in attempt to circumvent an impending Islamist takeover of the Egyptian government, referring to the move as a "coup" and Morsi as a "pharaoh."
"I'm against the constitution and the dictatorship of Mr. Morsi," anti-Morsi protester Horeya Naguib told the Associated Press Tuesday amid protests in Tahrir Square. "He is selling his own country and looks out for the interests of his group, not the people of Egypt."
Morsi's decree is his second attempt at consolidating power in five months, first ousting military leaders and invalidating a constitutional declaration that limited his control over Egypt's army.
Egyptian opposition politician Hamdeen Sabahy said that protests would continue until Morsi's decree was reversed, stating that Egypt "will not accept a new dictator because it brought down the old one."
Morsi's Long Support For Hamas
It is worth remembering that the administration has tried to cast the Muslim Brotherhood in a false light of moderation since the early days of the Arab Spring. In February 2011, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper appeared before a House committee and described the group as "a very heterogeneous group, largely secular, which has eschewed violence and has decried Al Qaeda as a perversion of Islam."
That comment was widely derided and Clapper walked it back somewhat. But a series of Arabic translations from the Muslim Brotherhood's official website made by the Investigative Project on Terrorism shows that Morsi worked for years alongside Hamas, which began as a splinter group from Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s.
As a leading Muslim Brotherhood member of Egypt's parliament, Morsi wrote a Sept. 23, 2003 letter to Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh thanking God for his survival and declaring his solidarity with Hamas' goal of destroying Israel.
"We thank all of you for your courageous positions in support of our cause, the cause of Palestine – the first Qibla of the Muslims, and your continued support of your brothers on the land of encampment," Morsi wrote, according to Ikhwanonline.com. "We send through you greetings to all our faithful brothers throughout the world, and we assure you that we are we are pledged to God, and we promise you we will continue to the path of jihad and resistance until victory or martyrdom."
In April 2004, Morsi actually led efforts in the Egyptian parliament to scrap the peace treaty with Israel.
The Brotherhood's own website reported that "Dr. Morsi" proposed "a timetable for the disposal of the alleged peace agreement signed with the Zionist entity."
Later that year, Morsi invoked anti-Semitic themes found in the Qur'an and Shariah law, saying the Jews are "the most hostile of men to Muslims" and that "Zionists are traitors to every covenant."
In 2007, he said that he and the Muslim Brotherhood actively supported Palestinian jihadism to annihilate Israel through violent jihad: "[T]he Palestinian issue for the Brotherhood is pivotal and essential, and that the Brotherhood offered and still offers full support for the Palestinian resistance to liberate the Holy Land."
A month later, Morsi participated in a teleconference with Haniyeh, saying "resistance is the right and only way to liberate the land from the defilement of the Jews."
The list goes on and on. Morsi delivered a brief respite in the rocket fire from Gaza toward Israeli civilians. That's a good thing. But pretending this one act somehow transforms him into a statesman, or a reliable international mediator is not. It's reckless.
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Egypt Adds Islamic Influence to Constitution .
By SAM DAGHER And MATT BRADLEY
CAIRO—Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi and his Islamist allies completed a new constitution with references to Shariah, or Islamic law, setting the stage for a new showdown with secularists, liberals and the country's judiciary.
Drafters voted on the constitution's 234 articles, one by one, in a marathon session that started Thursday and lasted more than 16 hours until dawn Friday, with the head of the Islamist-dominated constitutional assembly racing to complete the document before a Supreme Court verdict on Sunday that could dissolve the assembly.
In a controversial move, an additional article was added Friday at the last minute calling for a change in the makeup and membership of the Supreme Constitutional Court, the body challenging the assembly.
The charter that took shape, Egyptian legal experts said, was almost identical to the 1971 constitution written by former President Anwar Sadat, which underpinned a presidential-led autocracy for four decades. But unlike Mr. Sadat's version, the new constitution incorporates mentions of Islamic law that could elevate the role of Islam in Egypt's public life and government.
In one clause worrying for Egypt's liberals, the draft assigns the state with the responsibility to "ensure public morality," a clause that critics said is open to manipulation by Islamists.
State TV broke away from a live broadcast of the proceedings to air an interview with Mr. Morsi, who said he would next put the constitution up for public approval through a national referendum scheduled for mid-December, even if the judiciary opposes it, because a decree he issued last week entitles him to do so.
"I will stop those who want to turn back the clock no matter the cost," he said.
Mr. Morsi cast the decree, which claimed more powers for the president and his Islamist allies, as a temporary fix to expedite a tumultuous democratic transition.
Thousands of youth activists and members of secular and liberal parties camped this week in Cairo's central Tahrir Square, the focal point of the popular uprising that toppled the previous regime nearly two years ago, to demand that Mr. Morsi rescind the edict.
Activists planned a mass protest on Friday in Tahrir to press their demands. A counterprotest on Saturday is set for another venue in Cairo, in what Islamists said was an attempt to avoid violence. At least four people have been killed and hundreds wounded in violence across the country over the past 10 days.
If the Supreme Constitutional Court follows those protests on Sunday by declaring the constitutional assembly to be unconstitutional—as the court did with the Islamist-dominated parliament earlier this year—Islamists are likely to cast the decision as an attack on the president, escalating unrest. Mr. Morsi has said it was necessary to insulate the judiciary from the current political fight because it is stacked with judges appointed under the regime of his predecessor as president, Hosni Mubarak. The new constitution contains language that could further help Mr. Morsi bring the judges to heel.
The vote Friday was a move by Mr. Morsi and the Constituent Assembly, which drafted the new constitution, to outflank the judiciary, said Nathan Brown, an expert on the Egyptian legal system and a professor of political science at George Washington University.
"They're ripping the gavel out of their hands and pounding them over the head," he said.
Now the same Egyptian judges who have spent the past week in open revolt against Mr. Morsi and his Islamist allies could be put in charge of monitoring a national referendum on the constitution, and implementing it if it passes.
More than one quarter of the original 100 members of the Constituent Assembly had either resigned or boycotted Thursday's session to protest what they said was bullying by the body's Islamist majority. Many of those who quit the Assembly also objected to several articles that could elevate the powers of the president, reshape of the judiciary and allow military tribunals to try civilians, among other issues. Secular, liberal and Christian groups had called for the dissolution of Islamist-dominated Constituent Assembly, and the Supreme Constitutional Court was scheduled to take up the matter within days.
Critics accused Mr. Morsi of trying to force a hasty end to the constitution-drafting process amid deep polarization in the country.
"The constitution won't survive because the legitimacy of the constitution has to be in our national consciousness first," Mohamed ElBaradei, a former presidential candidate who is now part of a new national front opposed to Mr. Morsi, told local TV channel al-Nahar. "It's a miserable constitution, I am sad especially because it's coming out in circumstances of total division in Egypt," he said.
Members of the National Salvation Front formed last week by Mr. Baradei and several political figures and parties to oppose Mr. Morsi's decree came out Thursday to demand a complete overhaul of the constitution-drafting process, casting doubt over whether the final product could gain national acceptance.
Mr. Morsi called the deep division provoked by his decree "very healthy and positive" in the interview broadcast on Thursday.
"We aren't used to this and must be happy when we put it into practice: The opponent says his opinion and the supporter says his opinion and the decision maker [the president] bears his responsibility," he said.
Meanwhile, Hossam El-Gheriany, the chairman of the Constituent Assembly, which drafted the constitution, pressed the panel to move through the voting held at the Shura Council, the upper house of parliament.
"We really need this," said Mr. Gheriany, who at times used humor, cajoling, hectoring and banging on his desk to keep the chaotic proceedings on track. "God's hand is with the majority."
The first order of business for Mr. Gheriany was to replace 11 of the 26 absent members to achieve a quorum of 85. He brushed off a member of the panel who warned him of the dangers of rushing the constitution through given the absence of those representing the church, secularists and other segments of the population. "The constitution must come out in a manner that makes the entire nation rally around it," said the objecting member, Mohammed Mohiye.
Some critics complained that repeated references to Shariah law in the draft offered wide leeway of interpretation by judges and security forces. An attempt to define Shariah in Article 219 of the draft may raise more questions than answers, said critics.
"The main concern for me and Copts at large is trying to smuggle Islamic Shariah into articles of the constitution," said Yusuf Sidhum, editor of Al Watan, a Coptic Christian newspaper.
According to the draft, the military would still be allowed to try civilians before military courts—though many Islamists in the assembly had languished in jail for years following truncated military trials.
In another potentially problematic clause added on Wednesday, the constitution limits the political role of former regime figures without articulating their exact identities. Attempts to qualify this clause provoked the most heated and prolonged exchanges toward the end of the assembly's meeting, with the chairman Mr. Gheriany suggesting it be dropped. Members insisted on it but made it applicable to "those who were officials in the former ruling party after the start of the Jan. 25 revolution in 2011."
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Ayman Zawahiri and Egypt: A Trip Through Time
by Raymond Ibrahim
Special to IPT News
November 30, 2012
http://www.investigativeproject.org/3831/ayman-zawahiri-and-egypt-a-trip-through-time
Around 1985, current al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri fled his homeland of Egypt, presumably never to return. From his early beginnings as a teenage leader of a small jihadi cell devoted to overthrowing Egyptian regimes (first Nasser's then Sadat's) until he merged forces with Osama bin Laden, expanding his objectives to include targeting the United States of America, Zawahiri never forgot his original objective: transforming Egypt into an Islamist state that upholds and enforces the totality of Sharia law, and that works towards the resurrection of a global caliphate.
This vision is on its way to being fulfilled. With Islamist political victories, culminating with a Muslim Brotherhood president, Muhammad Morsi, Egypt is taking the first major steps to becoming the sort of state Zawahiri wished to see. Zawahiri regularly congratulates Egypt's Islamists—most recently the attacks on the U.S. embassy in Cairo—urging them to continue Islamizing the Middle East's most strategic nation.
He sent a lengthy communiqué during the Egyptian revolution in February 2011, for example, titled "Messages of Hope and Glad Tidings to our People in Egypt." In it, he reiterated themes widely popularized by al-Qaeda, including: secular regimes are the enemies of Islam; democracy is a sham; Sharia must be instituted; the U.S. and the "Zionist enemy" are the true source behind all of the Islamic world's ills.
Zawahiri continues to push these themes. Late last month, he sent messages criticizing Morsi, especially for not helping "the jihad to liberate Palestine;" called for the kidnapping of Westerners, especially Americans—which the U.S. embassy in Cairo took seriously enough to issue a warning to Americans; and further incited Egypt's Muslims to wage jihad against America because of the YouTube Muhammad movie.
In short, a symbiotic relationship exists between the country of Egypt and the Egyptian Zawahiri: the country helped shape the man, and the man is fixated on influencing the country, his homeland. Accordingly, an examination of Zawahiri's early years and experiences in Egypt—a case study of sorts—provides context for understanding Zawahiri, the undisputed leader of the world's most notorious Islamic terrorist organization and helps explain how Egypt got where it is today. The two phenomena go hand-in-hand.
In this report, we will explore several questions, including: What happened in Egypt to turn this once "shy" and "studious" schoolboy who abhorred physical sports
as "inhumane" towards jihad? What happened to turn many Egyptians to jihad, or at least radical Islam? What is Zawahiri's relationship to the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis—Egypt's two dominant Islamist political players? Did the 9/11 strikes on America, orchestrated by Zawahiri and al-Qaeda, help or hinder the Islamists of Egypt?
Background
Little about Zawahiri's upbringing suggests that he would become the world's most notorious jihadi, partially responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocents in the September 11 attacks and elsewhere. People who knew him stress that Zawahiri came from a "prestigious" and "aristocratic" background (in Egypt, "aristocrats" have traditionally been among the most liberal and secular). His father Muhammad was a professor of pharmacology; his mother, Umayma, came from a politically active family. Ayman had four siblings; he (and his twin sister) were the eldest. Born in the Egyptian capital, Cairo, on June 19, 1951, Zawahiri, as a BBC report puts it, "came from a respectable middle-class family of doctors and scholars. His grandfather, Rabia al-Zawahiri, was the grand imam of al-Azhar, the centre of Sunni Islamic learning in the Middle East, while one of his uncles was the first secretary-general of the Arab League."
According to the Islamist Montasser al-Zayyat, author of the Arabic book, Al Zawahiri: As I Knew Him (translated in English as The Road to Al Qaeda: the Story of Bin Laden's Right-Hand Man), Zawahiri was "an avid reader" who "loved literature and poetry." He "believed that sports, especially boxing and wrestling, were inhumane.... people thought he was very tender and softhearted…. nothing in his youthful good nature suggested that he was to become the second most wanted man in the world…. He has always been humble, never interested in seizing the limelight of the leadership."
Even so, he exhibited signs of a strong and determined character, as "there was nothing weak about the personality of the child Zawahiri. On the contrary, he did not like any opinion to be imposed on him. He was happy to discuss any issue that was difficult for him to understand until it was made clear, but he did not argue for the sake of argument. He always listened politely, without giving anyone the chance to control him."
For all his love of literature and poetry, which Islamists often portray as running counter to Muslim faith, Zawahiri exhibited a notable form of piety from youth. "Ayman al-Zawahiri was born into a religious Muslim family," al-Zayyat wrote. "Following the example of his family, he not only performed the prayers at the correct times, but he did so in the mosque…. He always made sure that he performed the morning prayers [at sunrise] with a group in the mosque, even during the coldest winters. He attended several classes of Koran interpretation, fiqh [Islamic jurisprudence] and Koran recitation at the mosque."
Otherwise, he appeared to lead a normal, privileged lifestyle. Like his family, he followed a prestigious career path. Zawahiri joined the Faculty of Medicine at Cairo University, graduating in 1974 with the highest possible marks. He then earned a Master's degree in surgery from the same university in 1978. He went on to receive a PhD in surgery from a Pakistani university, during his stay in Peshawar, when he was aiding the mujahidin against the Soviets. People who know Zawahiri say that the only relationship he had with a woman was with his wife, Azza, whom he married in 1979, and who held a degree in philosophy. She and three of Zawahiri's six children were killed in an air strike on Afghanistan by U.S. forces in late 2001.
Death of a Martyr
The initial influence on Zawahiri's radicalization appears to have come from his uncle Mahfouz, an opponent to the secular regime and Islamist in his own right, who was arrested in a militant round up in 1945, following the assassination of Prime Minister Ahmed Mahfouz. In reference to this event, Zawahiri's uncle even boasted: "I myself was going to do what Ayman has done," according to Lawrence Wright's The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11.
Though Mahfouz was likely the first to introduce young Ayman to the political scene of radical Islam, no one appears to have had an impact on Zawahiri's development as much as Uncle Mahfouz's mentor and Arabic teacher, Sayyid Qutb—often referred to as the "godfather" of modern jihad. Qutb, then the Muslim Brotherhood's premiere theoretician of jihad, has arguably played the greatest role in articulating the Islamist/jihadi worldview in the modern era, so much so that Zawahiri and others regularly quote his voluminous writings in their own work.
According to the 9/11 Commission Report, "Three basic themes emerge from Qutb's writings. First, he claimed that the world was beset with barbarism, licentiousness, and unbelief (a condition he called jahiliyya, the religious term for the period of ignorance prior to the revelations given to the Prophet Mohammed). Qutb argued that humans can choose only between Islam and jahiliyya. Second, he warned that more people, including Muslims, were attracted to jahiliyya and its material comforts than to his view of Islam; jahiliyya could therefore triumph over Islam. Third, no middle ground exists in what Qutb conceived as a struggle between God and Satan. All Muslims—as he defined them—therefore must take up arms in this fight. Any Muslim who rejects his ideas is just one more nonbeliever worthy of destruction."
Qutb's primary target—and subsequently Zawahiri's—was the Egyptian regime, which he accused of being enforcers of jahiliyya, obstructing the totality of Sharia. Because Qutb was so effective at fomenting Islamist animosity for the regime, President Gamal Abdel Nasser had him imprisoned and eventually executed in 1966. That act that only succeeded in helping propagate Qutb's importance to the jihadi movement, which came to see him as a "martyr" (a shahid, the highest honor for a Muslim), turning his already popular writings into "eternal classics" for Islamists everywhere.
As Zayyat observes, "In Zawahiri's eyes, Sayyid Qutb's words struck young Muslims more deeply than those of his contemporaries because his words eventually led to his execution. Thus, those words provided the blueprint for his long and glorious lifetime, and eventually led to its end…. His teaching gave rise to the formation of the nucleus of the contemporary jihadi movements in Egypt."
It is no coincidence, then, that Zawahiri founded his first jihadi cell in 1966 – the year of Qutb's execution – when he was only 15-years-old. Embracing Qutb's teachings—that jihad is the only answer, that talk, diplomacy, and negotiations only serve the infidel enemy's purposes—his cell originally had a handful of members. Zawahiri eventually merged it with other small cells to form Egyptian Islamic Jihad, becoming one of its leaders. Zawahiri sought to recruit military officers and accumulate weapons, waiting for the right moment to launch a coup against the regime; or, in Zawahiri's own words as later recorded by an interrogator, "to establish an Islamic government …. a government that rules according to the Sharia of Allah Almighty."
Humiliation of Defeat
A year following the establishment of Zawahiri's cell, another event took place that further paved the way to jihad: the ignominious defeat of Egypt by Israel in the 1967 war. Until then, Arab nationalism, spearheaded by Nasser, was the dominant ideology, not just in Egypt, but the entire Arab world. What began with much euphoria and conviction—that the Arab world, unified under Arab nationalism and headed by Nasser would crush Israel, only to lose disastrously in a week—morphed into disillusionment and disaffection, especially among Egyptians. It was then that the slogan "Islam is the solution" spread like wildfire, winning over many to the cause.
At the time of the 1967 war, the future al-Qaeda leader was 16 years old. Like many young people at the time, he was somewhat traumatized by Egypt's defeat—a defeat which, 34 years later, he would gloat upon in his 2001 book Fursan Taht Rayat al-Nabbi, ("Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet"):
"The unfolding events impacted the course of the jihadi movements in Egypt, namely, the 1967 defeat and the ensuing symbolic collapse of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was portrayed to the public by his followers as the everlasting invincible symbol. The jihadi movements realized that wormwoods had eaten at this icon, and that it had become fragile. The 1967 defeat shook the earth under this idol until it fell on its face, causing a severe shock to its disciples, and frightening its subjects. The jihadi movements grew stronger and stronger as they realized that their avowed enemy was little more than a statue to be worshipped, constructed through propaganda, and through the oppression of unarmed innocents. The direct influence of the 1967 defeat was that a large number of people, especially youths, returned to their original identity: that of members of an Islamic civilization."
This theme—that the "enemies of Islam" – first the secular dictators, followed by the USSR and then the U.S., were "paper tigers" whose bark was worse than their bite—would come to permeate the writings of al-Qaeda and other jihadists. For instance, in March 2012, in response to President Obama's plans to cut Pentagon spending, Zawahiri said, "The biggest factor that forced America to reduce its defence budget is Allah's help to the mujahideen [or jihadis] to harm the evil empire of our time [the U.S.]," adding that American overtures to the Afghan Taliban for possible reconciliation was further evidence of U.S. defeat.
The 1973 war between Egypt and Israel appears to have had a lesser impact on Zawahiri, who by then had already confirmed his worldview. Moreover, it was during the 1970s that he was especially busy with "normal" life—earning two advanced university degrees (one in 1974, another in 1978), getting married, and starting a family. Even so, the subsequent peace treaty that the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat signed with Israel incensed many Islamists in Egypt, including Zawahiri, who saw it as a great betrayal to the Islamic Nation, or Umma, prompting jihadis to act now instead of later.
Accordingly, Sadat was targeted for assassination; the time had come for a military coup, which was Islamic Jihad's ultimate goal. But the plan was derailed when authorities learned of it in February, 1981. Sadat ordered the roundup of more than 1,500 Islamists, including many Islamic Jihad members (though he missed a cell in the military led by Lieutenant Khalid Islambouli, who succeeded in assassinating Sadat during a military parade later that same year).
Prison Torture
Zawahiri was among the thousands of Islamists rounded up after Sadat's assassination, leading to one of the most talked-of episodes of Zawahiri's life: his prison experience. He was interrogated and found guilty of possessing firearms, serving three years in prison. During that time, he was among many who were tortured in Egyptian prisons.
Much has been made of Zawahiri's prison-time torture. (It is curious to note that when Egyptian officials called to investigate the officers accused of torturing the Islamist inmates, Zawahiri did not file a case against the authorities, though many others did, and though he bothered to witness to the torture of other members.) Several writers, beginning with al-Zayyat, suggest that along with the dual-impact of the martyrdom of Qutb and the 1967 defeat, this event had an especially traumatic effect on Zawahiri's subsequent development and radicalization.
Still, one should not give this experience more due than it deserves. Zawahiri was an ardent jihadi well over a decade before he was imprisoned and tortured; the overly paradigmatic explanation of humiliation-as-precursor-to-violence so popular in Western thinking is unnecessary here.
On the other hand, in the vein of "that which does not kill you makes you stronger," it seems that Zawahiri's prison experience hardened him and made his already notorious stubbornness and determination that much more unshakeable. In short, if his prison experience did not initiate his jihadi inclinations, it likely exacerbated it.
Moreover, being "found out"—had an indirect impact on his radicalization. After he was released, and knowing that he was being watched by the authorities, he was compelled to quit his native Egypt, meeting other Arabic-speaking Islamists abroad. He met Osama bin Laden as early as 1986 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. That led him to relocate to the Afghan theater of jihad, where the final coalescing of his global jihad worldview culminated.
Shifting Strategy
During his time in Egypt, Zawahiri was a staunch proponent of jihad—believing that no real change or progress can be achieved without armed struggle. This never changed. However, his strategic goal of toppling the Egyptian regime grew more ambitious over time, especially after the Afghan war experience and partnership with bin Laden.
In Egypt, Zawahiri's goal was clear: overthrowing the regime and implementing an Islamic government. The enemy was internal, the secular Hosni Mubarak regime, that took over after Sadat's death. In Zawahiri's thinking, one could consider fighting the far or external enemy until he had beaten the near one. (This is the famous "near/far enemy" dichotomy Islamists have written much on.)
Accordingly, until the late 1990s Zawahiri rarely mentioned what are today the mainstays of Islamist discontent, such as the Arab/Israel conflict, or other matters outside Egypt's borders. In fact, in a 1995 article titled "The Way to Jerusalem Passes Through Cairo" published in Al-Mujahidin, Zawahiri even wrote that "Jerusalem will not be opened [conquered] until the battles in Egypt and Algeria have been won and until Cairo has been opened." This is not to say that Zawahiri did not always see Israel as the enemy. Rather, he deemed it pointless to fight it directly when one could have the entire might of Egypt's military by simply overthrowing the regime—precisely the situation today.
Then, in 1998, Zawahiri surprised many of Egypt's Islamists by forming the International Islamic Front for Jihad on the Jews and Crusaders, under bin Laden's leadership. It issued a fatwa calling on Muslims "to kill the Americans and their allies–civilians and military, an individual obligation incumbent upon every Muslim who can do it and in any country—this until the Aqsa Mosque [Jerusalem] and the Holy Mosque [Mecca] are liberated from their grip." Until then all of Zawahiri's associates believed that his primary focus was Egypt, overthrowing the regime—not the Arab-Israeli conflict and the United States.
Zawahiri's "Mistake"?
It is for all these reasons that many of Egypt's Islamists, beginning with the Muslim Brotherhood, saw al-Qaeda's 9/11 attacks, partially masterminded by Zawahiri, as a severe setback to their movement. The attacks awoke the U.S. and the West, setting off the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, and also giving many Arab regimes – including Mubarak's – free reign to suppress all Islamists. Those regimes happily took advantage. As al-Zayyat, Zawahiri's biographer, wrote:
"The poorly conceived decision to launch the attacks of September 11created many victims of a war of which they did not choose to be a part…. Bin Laden and Zawahiri's behavior [9/11] was met with a lot of criticism from many Islamists in Egypt and abroad…. In the post-September 11 world, no countries can afford to be accused of harboring the enemies of the United States. No one ever imagined that a Western European country would extradite Islamists who live on its lands. Before that, Islamists had always thought that arriving in a European city and applying for political asylum was enough to acquire permanent resident status. After September 11, 2001, everything changed…. Even the Muslim Brotherhood was affected by the American campaign, which targeted everything Islamic."
In retrospect, the "mistake of 9/11" may have indirectly helped empower Islamists: by bringing unwanted Western attention to the Middle East, it also made popular the argument that democracy would solve all the ills of the Middle East. Many Western observers who previously had little knowledge of the Islamic world, were surprised to discover post 9/11 that dictatorial regimes ran the Muslim world. This led to the simplistic argument that Islamists were simply lashing out because they were suppressed. Failing to understand that these dictatorships were the only thing between full-blown Islamist regimes like Iran, many deemed democracy a panacea, beginning with U.S. President George W. Bush, who invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, partially to "spread" and in the name of democracy.
With the so-called "Arab spring" that began in 2011, the Obama administration has followed this logic more aggressively by throwing the U.S's longtime allies like Egypt's Mubarak, under the bus in the name of democracy—a democracy that has been dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, which, as has been mentioned, shares the same ultimate goals of Zawahiri and other jihadists. Recent events—including unprecedented attacks on U.S. embassies in Egypt and Libya, ironically, the two nations the U.S. especially intervened in to pave the way for Islamist domination—only confirm this.
Zawahiri and the Muslim Brotherhood
While Zawahiri's early decades in Egypt are mostly remembered in the context of the above—prestigious and academic background, clandestine radicalization, jihad, prison, followed by fleeing the country—the al-Qaeda leader has a long history with other Islamists groups in Egypt, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Since the "Arab Spring" and ousting of longtime President Hosni Mubarak, it has been the Brotherhood who have, not only dominated Egyptian politics, but have a member, Muhammad Morsi, as Egypt's first elected president.
Zawahiri joined the Brotherhood when he was only 14, then abandoned it to form his own cell less than two years later after Qutb's execution. A proponent of the slogan "jihad alone," Zawahiri soon became critical of the Brotherhood's pragmatic strategies, and wrote an entire book in 1991 arguing against their nonviolent approach.
Titled Al Hissad Al Murr, or "The Bitter Harvest," Zawahiri argued that the Brotherhood "takes advantage of the Muslim youths' fervor by bringing them into the fold only to store them in a refrigerator. Then, they steer their onetime passionate, Islamic zeal for jihad to conferences and elections…. And not only have the Brothers been idle from fulfilling their duty of fighting to the death, but they have gone as far as to describe the infidel governments as legitimate, and have joined ranks with them in the ignorant style of governing, that is, democracies, elections, and parliaments."
It is perhaps ironic that, for all his scathing remarks against them, time has revealed that the Muslim Brotherhood's strategy of slowly infiltrating society from a grassroots approach has been more effective than Zawahiri's and al-Qaeda's jihadi terror. The Brotherhood's patience and perseverance, by playing the political game, formally disavowing violence and jihad—all of which earned the ire of Zawahiri and others—have turned it into a legitimate player. Yet this does not make the Brotherhood's goals any less troubling. For instance, according to a January 2012 Al Masry Al Youm report, Brotherhood leader Muhammad Badie stated that the group's grand goal is the return of a "rightly guided caliphate and finally mastership of the world"—precisely what Zawahiri and al-Qaeda seek to achieve. Half a year later, in July 2012, Safwat Hegazy, a popular preacher and Brotherhood member, boasted that the Brotherhood will be "masters of the world, one of these days."
Zawahiri and Egypt Today
In light of the Egyptian revolution that accomplished what Zawahiri had tried to accomplish for decades—overthrow the regime—what relevance does the al-Qaeda leader have for the Egyptian populace today? The best way to answer this question is in the context of Salafism—the popular Islamist movement in Egypt and elsewhere that is grounded in the teachings and patterns of early Islam, beginning with the days of Islam's Prophet Muhammad and under the first four "righteously guided" caliphs.
As a Salafist organization, al-Qaeda is very popular with Salafis. Its current leader, the Egyptian Zawahiri, is especially popular—a "hero" in every sense of the word—with Egyptian Salafis. Considering that the Salafis won some 25 percent of votes in recent elections, one may infer that at least a quarter or of Egypt's population looks favorably on Zawahiri. In fact, some important Salafis are on record saying they would like to see Zawahiri return to his native Egypt. Aboud al-Zomor, for instance, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader who was implicated for the assassination of Sadat, but who has now been released and is even a leading member of the new Egyptian parliament, has called for the return of Zawahiri to Egypt, "with his head held high and in safety."
Zawahiri's brother, Muhammad, is also an influential Islamist in Egypt, affiliated with the Salafis and Al Gamaa Al Islamiyya. He led a mass Islamist demonstration last spring with typical jihadi slogans. He also was among those threatening the U.S. embassy in Cairo to release the Blind Sheikh—the true reason behind the September attack, not a movie—or else be "burned down to the ground." When asked in a recent interview with CNN if he is in touch with his al-Qaeda leader brother, Muhammad only smiled and said "of course not."
Under Zawahiri's leadership, al-Qaeda has made inroads on Egyptian territory. For example, several recent attacks in Sinai—such as the attacks on the Egypt-Israel natural-gas pipeline—were in fact conducted by a new group pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda. Zawahiri publicly congratulated them for destroying the pipelines, and the organization itself has pledged its loyalty to Zawahiri. More recently, al-Qaeda in the Sinai has been blamed for attacking and evicting Christian minorities living there.
This highlights the fact that groups like the Brotherhood and the Salafis have the same goals—establishment of a government that upholds Sharia law—though they differ as to achieve this. Salafis like al-Qaeda tend to agree that jihad is the solution. Yet, given the Brotherhood's success using peaceful means—co-opting the language of democracy and running in elections—many Salafis are now "playing politics" even though many of them are also on record saying that, once in power, they will enforce Islamic law and abolish democracy.
It is not clear where Zawahiri stands regarding Egypt. Because of his deep roots there, Egypt undoubtedly holds a special place for Zawahiri. But as the leader of a global jihadi network, he cannot afford to appear biased to Egypt—hence why he addresses the politics of other nations, Pakistan for example, and themes like the Arab-Israeli conflict, with equal or more attention.
Likewise, there are different accounts regarding his personality traits and how they would comport with Egypt's current state. For example, whereas his biographer described young Zawahiri as averse to the limelight and open to others' opinions, most contemporary characterizations of Zawahiri suggest he is intractable and domineering—a product, perhaps, of some four decades of jihadi activities, as well as the aforementioned experiences. While the personality traits attributed to him in youth would certainly aid him in influencing Egyptian Islamist politics, those attributed to him now would not.
He has been away too long, and others have stepped in. Either way, to many Islamists around the world, Egypt in particular, Zawahiri is a hero—one of the few men to successfully strike the "great enemy," America. Such near legendary status will always see to it that Ayman Zawahiri—and the Salafi ideology al-Qaeda helped popularize—remain popular among Egypt's Islamists.
Raymond Ibrahim, an expert on al-Qaeda and author of The Al Qaeda Reader, is a Shillman Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center and an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Forum.
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Egyptian security forces at the presidential palace in Cairo on Dec. 4
On Dec. 4, tens of thousands of protestors packed the street in front the presidential palace in Cairo. Police and Interior Ministry security forces reportedly fired tear gas at protestors but were unable to stop them from cutting through the barbed wire that surrounds the building. There have been unconfirmed reports of protestors breaching the main gates, spraying graffiti on the palace walls, possibly reaching the rooftop of the palace, and waving flags in support of the protestors.
Meanwhile, other protestors have mounted at least one police vehicle parked in front of the palace. Reports indicate that Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi has left the building. So far, security forces have either been unable or unwilling to push the protestors back. A military spokesman has denied reports that the armed forces sent troops to protect the presidential palace. Other reports confirm that the security forces are largely composed of Interior Ministry troops. At this point, it is unclear what will happen next.
Organized by secular opposition forces, the protestors are demonstrating against a power grab by the president and the Muslim Brotherhood that included Morsi expanding his executive powers and the government pushing forward with plans for a referendum on a new constitution.
Recently approved by an Islamist-dominated Constituent Assembly after walkouts by secularists, Coptic Christians and journalist members, the draft constitution is scheduled for a plebiscite Dec 15. Much of the Egyptian political opposition criticizes the draft for inadequately representing much of Egyptian society. Some elements within the Egyptian judiciary have refused to oversee the polls.
The protests were planned in advance in hopes of getting Morsi to step down. Whether they are successful depends on how dire the situation actually becomes. This is why today's protests are important: They raise the question of how the military will respond. So far, it has stayed out of the conflict, but if the protests get out of hand, it may have to shift its position
Read more: Egypt: Protesters Amass at the Presidential Palace | Stratfor
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second post of the morning:
By George Friedman
Founder and Chief Executive Officer
Immediately following the declaration of a cease-fire in Gaza, Egypt was plunged into a massive domestic crisis. Mohammed Morsi, elected in the first presidential election after the fall of Hosni Mubarak, passed a decree that would essentially neuter the independent judiciary by placing his executive powers above the high court and proposed changes to the constitution that would institutionalize the Muslim Brotherhood's power. Following the decree, Morsi's political opponents launched massive demonstrations that threw Egypt into domestic instability and uncertainty.
In the case of most countries, this would not be a matter of international note. But Egypt is not just another country. It is the largest Arab country and one that has been the traditional center of the Arab world. Equally important, if Egypt's domestic changes translate into shifts in its foreign policy, it could affect the regional balance of power for decades to come.
Morsi's Challenge to the Nasserite Model
The Arab Spring was seen by some observers to be a largely secular movement aimed at establishing constitutional democracy. The problem with this theory was that while the demonstrators might have had the strength to force an election, it was not certain that the secular constitutionalists would win it. They didn't. Morsi is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and while there were numerous claims that he was a moderate member, it was simply not understood that he was a man of conviction and honor and that his membership in the Brotherhood was not casual or frivolous. His intention was to strengthen the role of Islam in Egypt and the control of the Muslim Brotherhood over the various arms of state. His rhetoric, speed and degree of Islamism might have been less extreme than others, but his intent was clear.
The move on the judiciary signaled his intent to begin consolidating power. It galvanized opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood, which included secular constitutionalists, Copts and other groups who formed a coalition that was prepared to take to the streets to oppose his move. What it did not include, or at least did not visibly include through this point, was the Egyptian military, which refused to be drawn in on either side.
The Egyptian military, led by a young army officer named Gamal Abdel Nasser, founded the modern Egyptian state when it overthrew the British-supported monarchy in the 1950s. It created a state that was then secular, authoritarian and socialist. It aligned Egypt with the Soviet Union and against the United States through the 1970s. After the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who was later assassinated by Islamists, shifted Egypt into an alliance with the United States and signed a peace treaty with Israel.
This treaty was the foundation of the regional balance of power until now. The decision to end the state of war with Israel and use Sinai as a demilitarized buffer between the two countries eliminated the threat of nation-to-nation war between Arabs and Israel. Egypt was the most powerful Arab country and its hostility to Israel represented Israel's greatest threat. By withdrawing from confrontation, the threat to Israel declined dramatically. Jordan, Syria and Lebanon did not represent a significant threat to Israel and could not launch a war that threatened Israel's survival.
Egypt's decision to align with the United States and make peace with Israel shaped the regional balance of power in other ways. Syria could no longer depend on Egypt, and ultimately turned to Iran for support. The Arab monarchies that had been under political and at times military pressure from Egypt were relieved of the threat, and the Soviets lost the Egyptian bases that had given them a foothold in the Mediterranean.
The fundamental question in Egypt is whether the election of Morsi represented the end of the regime founded by Nasser or was simply a passing event, with power still in the hands of the military. Morsi has made a move designed to demonstrate his power and to change the way the Egyptian judiciary works. The uprising against this move, while significant, did not seem to have the weight needed either to force Morsi to do more than modify his tactics a bit or to threaten his government. Therefore, it all hangs on whether the military is capable of or interested in intervening.
It is ironic that the demands of the liberals in Egypt should depend on military intervention, and it is unlikely that they will get what they want from the military if it does intervene. But what is clear is that the Muslim Brotherhood is the dominant force in Egypt, that Morsi is very much a member of the Brotherhood and while his tactics might be more deliberate and circumspect than more radical members might want, it is still headed in the same direction.
For the moment, the protesters in the streets do not appear able to force Morsi's hand, and the military doesn't seem likely to intervene. If that is true, then Egypt has entered a new domestic era with a range of open foreign policy issues. The first is the future of the treaty with Israel. The issue is not the treaty per se, but the maintenance of Sinai as a buffer. One of the consequences of Mubarak's ouster has been the partial remilitarization of Sinai by Egypt, with Israel's uneasy support. Sinai has become a zone in which Islamist radicals are active and launch operations against Israel. The Egyptian military has moved into Sinai to suppress them, which Israel obviously supports. But the Egyptians have also established the principle that while Sinai may be a notional buffer zone, in practice the Egyptian military can be present in and responsible for it. The intent might be one that Israel supports but the outcome could be a Sinai remilitarized by the Egyptians.
A remilitarized Sinai would change the strategic balance, but it would only be the beginning. The Egyptian army uses American equipment and depends on the United States for spare parts, maintenance and training. Its equipment is relatively old and it has not been tested in combat for nearly 40 years. Even if the Egyptian military was in Sinai, it would not pose a significant conventional military threat to Israel in its current form. These things can change, however. The transformation of the Egyptian army between 1967 and 1973 was impressive. The difference is that Egypt had a patron in the Soviet Union then that was prepared to underwrite the cost of the transformation. Today, there is no global power, except the United States, that would be capable of dramatically and systematically upgrading the Egyptian military and financially supporting the country overall. Still, if the Morsi government succeeds in institutionalizing its power and uses that power to change the dynamic of the Sinai buffer, Israel will lose several layers of security.
A New Regional Alignment?
A look at the rest of the region shows that Egypt is by no means the only country of concern for Israel. Syria, for example, has an uprising that, in simple terms, largely consists of Sunnis, many of which are Islamists. That in itself represents a threat to Israel, particularly if the relationship between Syria and Egypt were revived. There is an ideological kinship, and just as Nasserism had an evangelical dimension, wanting to spread pan-Arab ideology throughout the region, the Muslim Brotherhood has one too. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is also the most organized and coherent opposition group in Syria. As Morsi consolidates his power in Egypt, his willingness to engage in foreign adventures, or at least covert support, for like-minded insurgents and regimes could very well increase. At a minimum Israel would have to take this seriously. Similarly, where Gaza was contained not only by Israel but also by pre-Morsi Egypt, Morsi might choose to dramatically change Egypt's Gaza policy.
Morsi's rise opens other possibilities as well. Turkey's Islamic-rooted Justice and Development Party is also engaged in a careful process of reintroducing Islam into a state that was militantly secular. There are fundamental differences between Egypt and Turkey, but there is also much in common. Turkey and Egypt are now engaged in parallel processes designed to create modern countries that recognize their Islamic roots. A Turkish-Egyptian relationship would both undergird the Egyptian regime and create a regional force that could shape the Eastern Mediterranean.
This would, of course, affect American strategy, which as we have said in the past, is now rapidly moving away from excessive involvement in the Middle East. It is not clear how far Morsi would go in breaking with the United States or whether the military would or could draw a line at that point. Egypt is barely skirting economic disaster at the moment because it is receiving a broad range of financial aid from the West. Moving away from the United States would presumably go well beyond military aid and affect these other types of economic assistance.
The fact is that as Egypt gradually evolves, its relationship with the United States might also change. The United States' relationship with Turkey has changed but has not broken since the Justice and Development Party came to power, with Turkey following a more independent direction. If a similar process occurred in Egypt, the United States would find itself in a very different position in the Eastern Mediterranean, one in which its only ally was Israel, and its relationship with Israel might alienate the critical Turkey-Egypt bloc.
Prior to 1967, the United States was careful not be become overly involved in protecting Israel, leaving that to France. Assuming that this speculation about a shift in Egypt's strategic posture came to pass, Israel would not be in serious military danger for quite a while, and the United States could view its support to Israel as flexible. The United States could conceivably choose to distance itself from Israel in order to maintain its relationships with Egypt and Turkey. A strategy of selective disengagement and redefined engagement, which appears to be under way in the United States now, could alter relations with Israel.
From an Israeli point of view -- it should be remembered that Israel is the dominant power in the region -- a shift in Egypt would create significant uncertainty on its frontier. It would now face uncertainty in Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, and while unlikely, the possibility of uncertainty in Jordan. Where previously it faced hostile powers with substantial military capabilities, it would now face weaker powers that are less predictable. However, in an age when Israel's primary concern is with terrorist actions and uprisings in Gaza and the West Bank, this band of uncertainty would be an incubator of such actions.
The worst-case scenario is the re-emergence of confrontational states on its border, armed with conventional weapons and capable of challenging the Israeli military. That is not an inconceivable evolution but it is not a threat in the near term. The next-worst-case scenario would be the creation of multiple states on Israel's border prepared to sponsor or at least tolerate Islamist attacks on Israel from their territory and to underwrite uprisings among the Palestinians. The effect would be an extended, wearying test of Israel's ability to deal with unremitting low-intensity threats from multiple directions.
Conventional war is hard to imagine. It is less difficult to imagine a shift in Egyptian policy that creates a sustained low-intensity conflict not only south of Israel, but also along the entire Israeli periphery as Egypt's influence is felt. It is fairly clear that Israel has not absorbed the significance of this change or how it will respond. It may well not have a response. But if that were the case, then Israel's conventional dominance would no longer define the balance of power. And the United States is entering a period of unpredictability in its foreign policy. The entire region becomes unpredictable.
It is not clear that any of this will come to pass. Morsi might not be able to impose his will in the country. He may not survive politically. The Egyptian military might intervene directly or indirectly. There are several hurdles for Morsi to overcome before he controls the country, and his timeline might be extended for implementing changes. But for the moment, Morsi appears in charge, he seems to be weathering the challenges and the army has not moved. Therefore, considering the strategic consequences is appropriate, and those strategic consequences appear substantial.
Read more: Egypt and the Strategic Balance | Stratfor
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Second post of the day
CAIR Targets Morsi/Brotherhood Critics
IPT News
December 5, 2012
http://www.investigativeproject.org/3837/cair-targets-morsi-brotherhood-critics
Pro-Muslim Brotherhood forces attacked protesters of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi with rocks and clubs in Cairo Wednesday.
It's the latest in a series of clashes since Morsi, a longtime Brotherhood official, issued a Nov. 22 decree effectively placing himself above judicial oversight. He has said he will nullify it if voters approve a Dec. 15 referendum ratifying a controversial new draft constitution rammed through an Islamist-dominated assembly early Friday.
Although the document declares a right to freedom of speech, it also includes a prohibition on "insults" to "religious prophets." Another provision would require government authorization to operate a website.
Wednesday's clashes targeted several hundred anti-Morsi protesters who had camped out near the presidential palace.
Demonstrators say they will do everything possible to defeat the referendum. "Our marches are against tyranny … and we won't retract our position," Hussein Abdel Ghany, a spokesman for the protesters, said Tuesday. Eleven newspapers shut themselves down Tuesday to protest Morsi's "dictatorship," and banks said they would close three hours early in solidarity with the protesters.
The New York Times reported that Morsi's Freedom and Justice Party warned three former presidential candidates, among them Amr Moussa and Mohammed ElBaradei, that they would be held accountable for any violence that occurred.
Egyptian riot police fired tear gas at demonstrators near the presidential palace in Cairo on Tuesday. Officials in Morsi's office said the Islamist leader fled the palace as protesters broke through police lines.
While Egyptians take to the streets to oppose what they claim is a nascent tyranny, Morsi and his Islamist government can count on support from the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). For example, CAIR-Los Angeles boss Hussam Ayloush praised Morsi for assuming more power in order to prevent "corrupt judges" from the "undermining and undoing of every democratic step."
In a Facebook post, Ayloush blamed Egypt's internal strife on the secular opposition: "Much of the Egyptian opposition seem to be more interested in opposing Morsi and the MB than actually helping Egypt become a stable and institutional democracy," CAIR-New York's Cyrus McGoldrick disparaged criticism of Morsi as "a last stand by old pro-West/Mubarak/Israel crowd to keep power in judiciary."
CAIR-San Francisco chief Zahra Billoo dismissed American concerns that the Islamist-backed draft constitution wouldn't protect human rights. "Why do we care about what the Egyptian Constitution says about indefinite detention, when it is being practiced by the U.S. government?" she wrote in a Twitter post Monday.
Several oceans away in Tahrir Square, Egyptian women see things very differently. They charge that the Brotherhood is "paying gangs to go out and rape women and beat men" protesting Morsi's policies.
Female protesters in Tahrir Square provided harrowing accounts of sexual assaults they say were carried out by thugs on the Islamist group's payroll.
A protester identified as Yasmine said she had been at Tahrir Square for several hours filming a recent demonstration when she was suddenly surrounded by 50 men who grabbed her breasts, ripped off her clothes and assaulted her. Men who tried to come to her rescue were beaten away by the mob, but she eventually managed to escape. Yasmine suffered internal injuries and was unable to walk for a week.
A journalist named Afaf el-Sayed said that while protesting at the square just over a month ago, she was attacked by a group of men she claims were "thugs from the Muslim Brotherhood."
While the frequency of these assaults is unclear, "activists have reported nearly 20 attacks in the last ten days and say there has been a dramatic increase in mob sex attacks in the past year," the British Daily Mail reported Saturday.
Writing in the Egyptian newspaper al-Arab al-Yahm, journalist Fathi Khattab charged that Brotherhood militias were behind recent attacks on other prominent Egyptians, including a recent beating of former presidential candidate Abu al-Ezz al-Hariri.
After the ouster of longtime strongman Hosni Mubarak last year, the Brotherhood asked that the drafting of a new constitution be delayed until a new president was democratically elected. Egypt's interim military rulers agreed to that request, a decision many Egyptians now regret. A poll conducted Nov. 28-29 by the Egyptian Center for Public Opinion Research found that 57 percent of Egyptians are satisfied with Morsi's performance in office. While that's strong, it is down from 78 percent in early October.
Veteran Egyptian human-rights activist Magda Adly accused the Muslim Brotherhood of employing the same brutal tactics that Mubarak used against political opponents.
Democracy activist Aida Nassif countered that Mubarak's "fake democracy" was superior to "the dictatorship of the current regime."
She said Morsi must "realize that many invasions and governors have come to Egypt trying to dominate it, but the Egyptians have always refused this and made such dictators lose everything."
One prominent Islamist appears to be looking at things the same way.
Kamal Helbawy, formerly a senior Brotherhood official, told the newspaper al-Arab al-Yahm that "[t]he Constitutional Declaration which President Morsi issued will make a new pharaoh, and the decrees open the door to a great evil." He added that Morsi's actions had "plunged the country into a dark tunnel, which may lead to further bloodshed and tragedy."
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GM:
Any comments on the resistance to Pharoah Morsi?
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GM:
Any comments on the resistance to Pharoah Morsi?
Aside from the complete lack of it from Buraq?
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Well, the facts do not yet rule out the notion that the US/Baraq is perfectly willing to settle for a new strong man who will keep Hamas sufficiently leashed in return for the US billions that keep the people of Egypt from starving and then revolting to over throw him. Arguably this a a realpolitik with which some of us might approve , , , OTOH there is quite the contrast for his support for freedom, democracy, and tolerance when it benefitted the MB and his lack of support for these things now.
There is also the matter of the substantial numbers of Egyptians taking to the streets to literally fight Morsi and the MB. What implications this for your previous predictions? What do you make of their chances?
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Well, the facts do not yet rule out the notion that the US/Baraq is perfectly willing to settle for a new strong man who will keep Hamas sufficiently leashed in return for the US billions that keep the people of Egypt from starving and then revolting to over throw him. Arguably this a a realpolitik with which some of us might approve , , ,
You think HAMAS will be kept on a leash? I think they quit when they were getting their asses handed to them by the IDF.
OTOH there is quite the contrast for his support for freedom, democracy, and tolerance when it benefitted the MB and his lack of support for these things now.
There is also the matter of the substantial numbers of Egyptians taking to the streets to literally fight Morsi and the MB. What implications this for your previous predictions? What do you make of their chances?
I wouldn't bet on some modernist leader/government emerging from this anymore than last time. In fact, unless we see the Egyptian military peel off from the MB, the odds of these protests resulting in anything but death and more public sexual assaults is slim and none.
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As a betting man, I do not think Hamas will be leashed by Morsi over time, especially with Baraq (and SecState Rice/Kerry) at the helm of US foreign policy due to my belief they lack the beliefs and the will necessary to pull the fianncial plug on Egypt and send it into desperate food shortages in a few short months.
OTOH if genuine leverage is applied-- and IMHO the leverage we have here should we have the will is quite substantial-- then it would not surprise me if Morsi barked a fair amount but when push came to shove muffled his fervor.
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http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/dec/6/muslim-brotherhood-inherits-us-war-gear/
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Muslim Brotherhood seeks U.S. alliance as it ascends in Egypt
Vows to honor treaty with Israel
By Ben Birnbaum
The Washington Times
Thursday, April 5, 2012
Khairat al-Shater, a presidential hopeful, filed election papers on Thursday. (Associated Press) more >
A lawmaker from Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood said Thursday that there would be “no referendum at all” on the country’s peace treaty with Israel, hours after the Islamist group’s presidential candidate made his unexpected bid official.
“We respect international obligations, period,” Abdul Mawgoud Dardery, a lawmaker from the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), told The Washington Times.
Mr. Dardery was on a good-will tour of Washington this week with three other Muslim Brotherhood representatives. Long shunned by Washington, the group has sought to soften its image in the West as it prepares to assume greater power in post-revolution Egypt.
On Thursday, the White House downplayed the significance of a meeting between administration officials and the Brotherhood’s envoys.
White House spokesman Jay Carney said the FJP representatives met with “midlevel” officials from the National Security Council and that it was a reflection of the new politics in Egypt and the “prominent role” the group now plays in Cairo.
“We have broadened our engagement to include new and emerging political parties and actors,” Mr. Carney said.
“Because of the fact that Egypt’s political landscape has changed, the actors have become more diverse and our engagement reflects that,” he said. “The point is that we will judge Egypt’s political actors by how they act, not by their religious affiliation.”
Presidential ambitions
The Muslim Brotherhood’s ascendancy to power in the aftermath of longtime President Hosni Mubarak’s ouster last year has raised concerns among secular Egyptians and Coptic Christians, as well as U.S. and Israeli officials, about how the fundamentalist group would rule Egypt’s 85 million people and conduct its foreign relations.
Asked whether a Brotherhood-led government would put the 1979 Camp David Accords to a referendum, as many of the group’s leaders have promised, Mr. Dardery said no.
“No referendum at all concerning international obligations,” he said. “All our international agreements are respected by the Freedom and Justice Party, including Camp David.”
Meanwhile, FJP presidential candidate Khairat al-Shater filed papers Thursday with Egypt's High Presidential Elections Commission. Egyptians will vote in the presidential election’s first round May 23 and 24, with the top two vote-getters facing off in a June 16 runoff.
The Brotherhood had promised not to field a presidential candidate but changed course Saturday, citing threats to democracy from the military council that has ruled Egypt since Mr. Mubarak stepped down in February 2011.
In Washington, Mr. Dardery said the Brotherhood fielded a candidate “to make sure that [the] democracy road is protected by the people of Egypt,” arguing that the military council had refused to give the parliament sufficient authority.
Mr. Shater, a businessman with a reputation for cunning pragmatism, joins a crowded field that includes Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa, former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik and moderate Islamist Abdel Moneim Abdoul Futouh. Salafist preacher Hazem Abu Ismail was disqualified Thursday, increasing Mr. Shater’s chances for victory.
Doubts about democracy
A poll taken by Egypt’s Al Ahram newspaper found that 58 percent prefer an Islamist candidate.
With Mr. Shater’s entry, some analysts now doubt that Mr. Moussa — once considered the overwhelming favorite — will make the runoff.
“Egypt is not moving toward a democracy,” said Eric Trager, an Egypt analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “It is moving toward a competitive theocracy in which the Muslim Brotherhood is pitted against more fundamentalist Salafists.
“The question is only which interpretation of the Shariah will be legislated, not whether Egypt will be a theocratic state.”
The FJP and the hard-line Salafist Nour Party won two-thirds of the seats in recent parliamentary elections and now dominate the constituent assembly tasked with writing Egypt’s new constitution.
The prospect of unchecked Islamist control has frightened secular Egyptians as well as the country’s large Coptic Christian community, which has faced escalating violence over the past year.
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said this week that U.S. officials “want to see Egypt move forward in a democratic transition, and what that means is you do not and cannot discriminate against religious minorities, women, political opponents.”
Egypt’s Islamist tide also has sparked concerns in Israel, which has maintained a cold but stable peace with its southern neighbor since 1979.
“The Muslim Brothers will not show mercy to us, they will not give way to us, but I hope they will keep the peace,” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Tuesday. “It is important for us, but I think that it is also important for Egypt.”
Despite Mr. Dardery’s statements Thursday, many analysts remain skeptical about the Brotherhood’s true intentions.
Trouble in the Sinai
“Their discourse back at home about Israel being an enemy is consistent with where they have been all along, and I don’t think we should expect any change,” said Steven Cook, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of “The Struggle for Egypt.”
“I think their hope is that they can put [the peace treaty] to the side at least for the moment, but the fact that they called for this referendum, the fact that they’ve used this issue makes it hard to believe that they wouldn’t bow to any political pressure [on Israel].”
Israel has had tense relations with Egypt’s military council, which the Jewish state says has not done enough to prevent terrorists from operating in the Sinai Peninsula.
Early Thursday, Mr. Netanyahu warned that the Sinai is becoming a “terror zone” after a rocket fired from the territory struck the southern Israeli resort city of Eilat. No injuries were reported.
The prospect of a further deterioration in relations between the two countries would raise difficult questions for Washington, which has given Egypt roughly $2 billion in aid annually since 1979.
“If they no longer respect agreements reached under previous governments, then they’re not a country worthy of our support,” said Rep. Gary L. Ackerman of New York, the ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Middle East and South Asia subcommittee.
But Mr. Ackerman, echoing a now-common school of thought in Washington, told The Times that Mr. Shater’s candidacy might be a positive development given the alternative.
“If I was writing the morning line on who can beat the Salafists, it’s the Muslim Brotherhood,” he said. “And if I have to choose between horrible and not that great, I’ll take not that great.”
Read more: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/apr/5/muslim-brotherhood-seeks-us-alliance-as-it-ascends/#ixzz2EefhZEVw
Follow us: @washtimes on Twitter
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http://hotair.com/archives/2012/12/10/surprise-new-egyptian-dictator-declares-martial-law-ahead-of-constitutional-referendum/
Surprise: New Egyptian dictator declares martial law ahead of constitutional referendum
posted at 3:41 pm on December 10, 2012 by Allahpundit
Remember when the Egyptian army was supposed to be a check on the Brotherhood’s power, not an arm of it?
As his proposed compromise faded and tensions mounted on Sunday, Mr. Morsi followed through on plans announced the day before to authorize the military to protect national institutions and polling places. His order, printed in the official gazette on Sunday, amounts to a form of martial law, because it will allow soldiers under the direction of the defense minister to arrest civilians under a military code of justice.
The move indicated that, at least in the short term, Egypt’s powerful military was lining up behind the new Islamist president to complete the transition to a new constitution.
The new draft constitution is a sharia fan’s dream, giving Muslim clerics power over civil rights and establishing a legal basis for the sort of morals street-policing for which Saudi Arabia’s mutaween are known and loathed. Why would the military leadership, which partnered with the west for decades under Mubarak and takes billions from the U.S. even now, go for something like that? Two reasons. One: There are more Islamists in the military’s hierarchy than analysts thought. That’s how Morsi got away with firing Field Marshal Tantawi, the leader of the country’s junta and de facto supreme ruler until he was canned. Two: The military as an institution has reached an accommodation with the Brotherhood, an outcome so completely predictable that even a dummy like me saw it coming on the very day that Mubarak was deposed. Quote:
The trick for the Brotherhood will be emulating the Iranian model to coopt the military somehow. They’ll have to do it in reverse order from how Iran did it — i.e., instead of starting a la Iran with an Islamist revolt that’s later secured by a de facto military coup (in 2009), they’ll have to follow today’s de facto coup with an Islamist revolt — but it’s not impossible. If the Egyptian military holds on too tightly to power and the public gets restless again, they could strike a deal with the Brotherhood in which the Islamists take formal control in the name of “democratic legitimacy” in return for guaranteeing that the military can keep its business rackets going.
Quid pro quo. If the Brotherhood leaves the military alone, the military will repay the kindness. And sure enough, here’s what the new sharia-on-steroids draft constitution says about military prerogatives:
According to analysts who have studied it, the centerpiece of the charter is the creation of a 15-member national defense council — including eight military appointees — that is essentially an autonomous overseer of military affairs.
Critically, the council has the power to approve declarations of war, a provision that analysts cast as a kind of safety valve for the United States, which remains wary of an Islamist government with ties to the Palestinian militant group Hamas that might jeopardize the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.
The council would handle military trials, which also are allowed for Egyptian civilians who are deemed a threat to the military. Although parliament must approve the overall budget figure, the council would handle all of its details, which are not required to be made public.
And in a provision that challenges any pretense of civilian oversight of the military, the draft charter requires that the president appoint the defense minister from among the ranks of the military.
The military’s defense budget will also be the province of the national defense council, not parliament, which means the men with guns will continue to operate as a “state within a state.” But even that’s good news for the Brotherhood, at least for now: A constitution that placed the military directly under Morsi’s command might spook Egypt’s western benefactors, who worry about a new war with Israel. By giving the military some sort of ostensible veto power over war, the MB is signaling to the U.S. that it’s safe to keep the money and weapons coming. That’s one of the reasons why the White House has been so embarrassingly docile about Morsi’s power grab. Not only are they trying to build goodwill among Egyptians by showing respect for “democracy,” even if the referendum results in a freakishly illiberal, undemocratic new constitution, but in theory they’ve got a failsafe via Egypt’s semi-independent military in case the MB decides to get frisky with Tel Aviv. In fact, almost as if to flaunt America’s acquiescence in all this, Morsi’s spokesman reiterated today that he’s planning to visit the U.S. in 2013.
The obvious next step for the Brotherhood once this new accommodation is in place is to further consolidate power by having its Islamist allies inside the military start purging the more secular officers. They’re not going to let the army operate autonomously forever; the risk of a new military coup is too high, especially when the order inevitably comes for a new war with Israel. In fact, I wonder if they’ll engage in some lesser adventurism first in order to win the military’s loyalty as part of the consolidation process. Making a move on Libya would destroy relations with the U.S., but if/when the MB amasses enough power to contemplate another bout with the IDF, they’ll have already committed to those relations being destroyed. Anyway, can’t wait for the joint Obama/Morsi presser next year!
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http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/12/10/us-sending-20-more-f-16s-to-egypt-despite-turmoil-in-cairo/
US sending 20 more F-16s to Egypt, despite turmoil in Cairo
By Maxim Lott
Published December 10, 2012
FoxNews.com
Turmoil in Egypt isn't stopping a shipment of 20 F-16 fighter jets, including this one - already emblazoned with Egypt's flag.
Instability in Egypt, where a newly-elected Islamic government teeters over an angry population, isn't enough to stop the U.S. from sending more than 20 F-16 fighter jets, as part of a $1 billion foreign aid package.
The first four jets are to be delivered to Egypt beginning Jan. 22, a source at the naval air base in Fort Worth, where the planes have been undergoing testing, told FoxNews.com. The North African nation already has a fleet of more than 200 of the planes and the latest shipment merely fulfills an order placed two years ago. But given the uncertainty in Cairo, some critics wonder if it is wise to be sending more top gun planes.
“Should an overreaction [by Egypt] spiral into a broader conflict between Egypt and Israel, such a scenario would put U.S. officials in an embarrassing position of having supplied massive amounts of military hardware … to both belligerents,” said Malou Innocent, a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute. “Given Washington's fiscal woes, American taxpayers should no longer be Egypt’s major arms supplier.”
“Given Washington's fiscal woes, American taxpayers should no longer be Egypt’s major arms supplier.”
- Malou Innocent, the Cato Institute
The U.S. government ordered and paid for the fighter jets for Egypt's military as part of foreign aid for Egypt back in 2010, when Hosni Mubarak ruled. The fighter jets were supposed to be delivered in 2013, and delivery will go ahead as scheduled even though Hosni Mubarak has been removed from power and replaced by Mohamed Morsi, who led the Muslim Brotherhood before becoming Egypt's president.
Morsi was democratically elected, but last month attempted to seize dictatorial powers for himself. After widespread protests and violence in Egypt's capital of Cairo, Morsi backed off from his power grab. But he is pushing through a controversial new constitution for Egypt that would more strictly enforce Islamic Shariah law, and only recently said he reserves the right to have the military arrest protesters without charges.
"The Morsi-led Muslim Brotherhood government has not proven to be a partner for democracy as they had promised, given the recent attempted power grab," a senior Republican congressional aide told FoxNews.com.
Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, (R-Fla.), who chairs the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, recently criticized U.S. military aid to Egypt:
“The Obama administration wants to simply throw money at an Egyptian government that the president cannot even clearly state is an ally of the United States,” Rep. Ros-Lehtinen said.
The $213 million order, which is paid for by U.S. taxpayers and is part of Egypt's foreign aid package from America, had to be approved by lawmakers in Washington.While the basic F-16 has been a military workhorse for top air forces for more than 25 years, the cockpit electronics are constantly updated and the models Egypt is getting are the best defense contractor Lockheed Martin makes.
"This is a great day for Lockheed Martin and a testament to the enduring partnership and commitment we have made to the government of Egypt," said John Larson, vice president, Lockheed Martin F-16 programs. "We remain committed to providing our customer with a proven, advanced 4th Generation multirole fighter."
"In an air combat role, the F-16's maneuverability and combat radius exceed that of all potential threat fighter aircraft," the U.S. Air Force description of the plane reads.
"The F-16 can fly more than 500 miles, deliver its weapons with superior accuracy, defend itself against enemy aircraft, and return to its starting point. An all-weather capability allows it to accurately deliver ordnance during non-visual bombing conditions."
A Pentagon spokesman said the U.S. and Egypt have an important alliance that is furthered by the transfer.
"The U.S.-Egypt defense relationship has served as the cornerstone of our broader strategic partnership for over thirty years," said Lt. Col. Wesley Miller. "The delivery of the first set of F-16s in January 2013 reflects the U.S. commitment to supporting the Egyptian military's modernization efforts. Egyptian acquisition of F-16s will increase our militaries' interoperability, and enhance Egypt's capacity to contribute to regional mission sets."
Last month, State Department official Andrew J. Shapiro explained why the administration plans to continue military aid to Egypt:
“I know that the uncertainty over the Egyptian transition has prompted some in Congress to propose conditioning our security assistance to Egypt. The administration believes that putting conditions on our assistance to Egypt is the wrong approach, and Secretary Clinton has made this point strongly. Egypt is a pivotal country in the Middle East and a long-time partner of the United States. We have continued to rely on Egypt to support and advance U.S. interests in the region, including peace with Israel, confronting Iranian ambitions, interdicting smugglers, and supporting Iraq,” he said.
Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/12/10/us-sending-20-more-f-16s-to-egypt-despite-turmoil-in-cairo/
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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/world/middleeast/allies-of-egypts-morsi-beat-protesters-outside-palace.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20121211
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Interesting piece which fleshes out some things to which we have been referring in more general terms.-- Marc
Egypt: Political Considerations of a Loan Delay
December 12, 2012 | 1101 GMT
Summary
Egypt's Islamist-led government is now in a race to resolve a political crisis, push through a constitutional referendum and regain the parliament before the country's economy worsens even further. The Muslim Brotherhood and Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi are betting that they can achieve their immediate political goals without risking too much on the economic front. This is why Egypt decided to postpone a $4.8 billion loan agreement with the International Monetary Fund on Dec. 11. While the economic situation in Egypt is hardly encouraging, a one-month delay in loans will not bring about economic collapse.
The government said it wanted an extra month to explain its new economic program, which includes tax hikes on consumer goods and services and subsidies reductions, to the media and to the public. Revenues from a new tax regime would provide Cairo with much needed capital. But amid the ongoing political crisis and just days ahead of a Dec. 15 constitutional referendum, the Islamist-led government is trying to deprive its political opponents of ammunition they could use against it. More important, the government wants to avoid undermining its own support base with a platform of unpopular tax hikes, many of which were reversed by Morsi on Dec. 10.
Analysis
Egypt is operating at a balance-of-payments deficit of $11.2 billion in the 2011-12 financial year (which ended in June), and the country has been living far beyond its productive means. Without the confidence of financiers, there is very little that can keep Egypt afloat if the government continues the massive subsidy programs. Yet cutting subsidies and introducing new taxes would be politically difficult, especially at this stage. Oil Minister Osama Kamal warned that Egypt would not meet its goal of lowering energy subsidies by 39 percent by June 2013.
Egypt's economic outlook may seem bleak, but Cairo is not wholly dependent on the International Monetary Fund loan for its survival. Egypt still has about $15 billion in foreign currency reserves, and Cairo has received bridge financing from a variety of sources. In October, Turkey sent Egypt the first $500 million tranche of a $2 billion loan; the second tranche is due Jan. 30, 2013. The remaining $1 billion would be used to finance Turkish imports to Egypt.
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In addition, Qatar has lent Egypt $1 billion, as has Saudi Arabia, which promised another $230 million in soft loans. The African Development Bank recently announced that it would transfer the first $500 million tranche of a $2.5 billion loan by the end of December. Kuwait has lent $1.8 billion. None of these has been tied to the International Monetary Fund loan. U.S. aid, including $1.3 in military assistance and another $1 billion in loans and debt forgiveness, has stalled in Washington, but this assistance likewise was pledged independently of the International Monetary Fund.
Even if Egypt does not take the International Monetary Fund loan, Cairo has other options. It can devalue its currency or reduce consumption, especially of imported goods. However, those options would be politically costly -- but less so than subsidy cuts or new taxes. They are also short-term fixes, not long-term solutions. Ultimately, the government will have to make some difficult political decisions if it is to achieve long-term financial stability.
Unpopular Programs
Several issues will affect the government's choices in the short term. The first will be the Dec. 15 national referendum on a new constitution. Definitively holding off on any major tax hikes or the widely unpopular International Monetary Fund loan is important for the Muslim Brotherhood to rally its support base. Holding off on those unpopular programs could also help the Brotherhood win over some opposition members.
Constitutional approval would set the stage for parliamentary elections, and the government may get more leeway to implement economic reforms if the Brotherhood wins a parliamentary majority. Egypt will likely move forward with increased taxes -- just not until the current political crisis has passed. Protests would persist, and the military could intervene at any time. But that will not necessarily prevent a painful adjustment. The government will also learn from its mistakes and implement reform more gradually than before. It will also likely receive the loan from the International Monetary Fund, though the timing will be an issue the longer the agreement is delayed.
The tax hike, the subsequent reversal and the decision to delay the loan highlight the challenges of an inexperienced government. The challenges come as the government is trying to push forward the constitutional referendum, which will help define a working arrangement with the military. These factors may cause the government to act incoherently as regards economic policy -- a development that could have serious implications for investor confidence and a reviving Egyptian economy with or without the International Monetary Fund loan.
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Read more: Egypt: Political Considerations of a Loan Delay | Stratfor
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Second post of the morning
Can God Save Egypt?
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Published: December 11, 2012 13 Comments
When you fly along the Mediterranean today, what do you see below? To the north, you look down at a European supranational state system — the European Union — that is cracking up. And to the south, you look down at an Arab nation state system that is cracking up. It’s an unnerving combination, and it’s all the more reason for the U.S. to get its economic house in order and be a rock of global stability, because, I fear, the situation on the Arab side of the Mediterranean is about to get worse. Egypt, the anchor of the whole Arab world, is embarked on a dangerous descent toward prolonged civil strife, unless a modus vivendi can be found between President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood and his growing opposition. If Syria and Egypt both unravel at once, this whole region will be destabilized. That’s why a billboard on the road to the Pyramids said it all: “God save Egypt.”
Having watched a young, veiled, Egyptian female reporter tear into a Muslim Brotherhood official the other day over the group’s recent autocratic and abusive behavior, I can assure you that the fight here is not between more religious and less religious Egyptians. What has brought hundreds of thousands of Egyptians back into the streets, many of them first-time protesters, is the fear that autocracy is returning to Egypt under the guise of Islam. The real fight here is about freedom, not religion.
The decisions by President Morsi to unilaterally issue a constitutional decree that shielded him from judicial oversight (he has since rescinded most of it after huge protests) and then to rush the completion of a new, highly imperfect, Constitution and demand that it be voted on in a national referendum on Saturday, without sufficient public debate, have rekindled fears that Egyptians have replaced one autocracy, led by Hosni Mubarak, with another, led by the Muslim Brotherhood.
Morsi and the other Muslim Brotherhood leaders were late comers to the 2011 Tahrir Square revolution that ended six decades of military rule here. And because they were focused only on exploiting it for their own ends, they have grossly underestimated the deep, mostly youth-led yearning for the freedom to realize their full potential that erupted in Tahrir — and it has not gone away.
Whenever anyone asked me what I saw in Tahrir Square during that original revolution, I told them I saw a tiger that had been living in a 5-by-8 cage for 60 years get released. And there are three things I can tell you about the tiger: 1) Tiger is never going back in that cage; 2) Do not try to ride tiger for your own narrow purposes or party because this tiger only serves Egypt as a whole; 3) Tiger only eats beef. He has been fed every dog food lie in the Arabic language for 60 years, so don’t try doing it again.
First, the Egyptian Army underestimated the tiger, and tried to get it back in the cage. Now the Muslim Brothers are. Ahmed Hassan, 26, is one of the original Tahrir rebels. He comes from the poor Shubra el-Kheima neighborhood, where his mother sold vegetables. I think he spoke for many of his generation when he told me the other day: “We all had faith that Morsi would be the one who would fulfill our dreams and take Egypt where we wanted it to go. The problem [now] is that not only has he abandoned our dream, he has gone against it. ... They took our dream and implanted their own. I am a Muslim, but I think with my own mind. But [the Muslim Brothers] follow orders from their Supreme Guide. ... Half of me is heartbroken, and half of me is happy today. The part that is heartbroken is because I am aware that we are entering a stage that could be a real blood bath. And the part that is happy is because people who were completely apathetic before have now woken up and joined us.”
What’s wrong with Morsi’s new draft constitution? On the surface, it is not some Taliban document. While the writing was dominated by Islamists, professional jurists had their input. Unfortunately, argues Mona Zulficar, a lawyer and an expert on the constitution, while it enshrines most basic rights, it also says they must be balanced by vague religious, social and moral values, some of which will be defined by clerical authorities. This language opens loopholes, she said, that could enable conservative judges to restrict “women’s rights, freedom of religion, freedom of opinion and the press and the rights of the child,” particularly young girls. Or, as Dan Brumberg, a Middle East expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace, put it, the draft constitution could end up guaranteeing “freedom of speech, but not freedom after speech.”
The wild street demonstrations here — for and against the constitution — tell me one thing: If it is just jammed through by Morsi, Egypt will be building its new democracy on a deep fault line. It will never be stable. Egypt is thousands of years old. It can take six more months to get its new constitution right.
God is not going to save Egypt. It will be saved only if the opposition here respects that the Muslim Brotherhood won the election fairly — and resists its excesses not with boycotts (or dreams of a coup) but with better ideas that win the public to the opposition’s side. And it will be saved only if Morsi respects that elections are not winner-take-all, especially in a society that is still defining its new identity, and stops grabbing authority and starts earning it. Otherwise, it will be all fall down
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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/world/middleeast/obama-walks-a-fine-line-with-egyptian-president.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20121215
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Summary
While not as powerful as before the fall of the Mubarak government, the Egyptian military is still the most coherent and most powerful institution in Egypt. To remain that way, it needs a strategy for managing a new era of turbulent multiparty politics. Pakistan's is the only military in the Muslim world that has retained its privileged position in an increasingly democratic political system. Similarities between the two countries outweigh their differences, offering the Egyptian armed forces a template for their bid to keep power.
Analysis
Much has been said about how the Muslim Brotherhood wishes to model itself after Turkey's ruling party, the Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party, by reducing the role of the military in the political arena. But little has been said about how the Egyptian generals will avoid that fate. The Egyptian military needs a civilian vehicle through which it can manage the country. This would allow Egypt -- the Arab world's most important country -- to continue its foreign policy behavior at a time of growing unrest in the region. The only potential partner for the military at this time is the Muslim Brotherhood, which has shown it can cooperate with the Egyptian armed forces.
While the military values the country's other political blocs, it does not value them the same way it does the Brotherhood. The secularists and the Salafists are levers the military can use to constrain the Brotherhood and thus prevent the group from bringing the military under civilian control. In a reversal, the Muslim Brotherhood's biggest challenge since Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi's Nov. 22 decree has come from the non-Islamist left. Previously, the Brotherhood's biggest challenge came from the Salafists on the right. Circumstances will shape whether this situation reverses once again; either way, the armed forces will be able to use these various alignments to shape Egypt's political transition.
A Working Relationship
The Egyptian armed forces see Pakistan as an example of how to manage the new political landscape in Egypt. From a strategic level, the Egypt is presently divided between Brotherhood and anti-Brotherhood forces. Similarly, Pakistan was long divided between pro-Pakistan People's Party and anti-Pakistan People's Party elements. Egypt's generals would like to see the Muslim Brotherhood emulate the Pakistan People's Party, which previously was the military's adversary but has since developed a fairly good working relationship with the country's security sector. The ideological differences between the two -- Egypt's ruling party is Islamist and Pakistan's is more secular -- do not undermine the fact that the main parties are willing to work with the security establishment with varying degrees of enthusiasm.
The evolution of Pakistani civilian-military relations since 1988, when the military regime of former President Gen. Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq ended, offers insights into what could transpire in Egypt. In many ways, Egypt today is similar to Pakistan in the 1990s, when the military used what it termed constitutional and legal means to control the system and the Pakistan People's Party. In 1990, 1993 and 1996, Pakistan's generals used the judiciary, the presidency and opposition parties to dismiss sitting governments and dissolve the parliament to prevent civilian governments from gaining ground.
Egyptian generals benefit from having developed a working relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood more quickly than their Pakistani counterparts could with the Pakistan People's Party -- something that did not happen in Pakistan until 2008. However, in Egypt the president hails from the main political party; in Pakistan, the president was a civilian bureaucrat and a creation of the military-dominated establishment. The Egyptian army will therefore have to work with Morsi to contain the legislative branch, which the Muslim Brotherhood sees as a means to consolidate power. Like the Pakistani security establishment, the Egyptian generals will seek to thwart the ruling party by helping smaller parties gain additional seats in parliament in hopes of denying the ruling party of a majority.
To that end, the coming years could see the Egyptian parliament dismissed prematurely more than once. In a more extreme step, Egypt's army could compel the president to drop his support for the ruling party, as happened in Pakistan in 1996, or even engineer the ouster of Morsi or his successors as president. Morsi's distancing himself from the Muslim Brotherhood in the future is not out of the question, especially given growing pressures on him to act as a national figure rather than a partisan one. These forces mean he increasingly will find himself squeezed between the Muslim Brotherhood, the military and the political opposition.
Egypt's army could even intervene along the lines of Pakistan in 1999, when Gen. Pervez Musharraf seized the presidency in a coup. Given the domestic, regional and international climate, this would only happen if the Egyptian army faced a situation in which the civilian institutions were unable to govern and/or unrest reached a level where the Muslim Brotherhood-led government could not control the situation.
Knowing the fate of Musharraf and the damage inflicted on the Pakistani security establishment during his tenure, the Egyptian generals would avoid seizing power too overtly. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces would allow Egypt's senior military leaders to avoid having to have the top general assume the presidency. Instead, the collective leadership of the council would take over, though it would probably eventually appoint a new president, as it did after Mubarak's ouster. The current draft Egyptian constitution institutionalizes the role of the military in politics, a clause the final draft will likely contain, thereby facilitating any future interventions against the presidency.
The Egyptian military will have to do a better job than Pakistan has done in avoiding being squeezed between assertive executive legislative and judicial branches. Doing so will require keeping Egypt's branches of government divided internally, and that means getting to the point where the Muslim Brotherhood faces competition from a constellation of smaller political forces, especially in the legislature.
Pakistan's national Islamist parties have always been weak and never have posed a realistic challenge to the Pakistan People's Party, and Egypt's secularist parties will likely be the same way.
But Pakistani generals allowed smaller regional parties such as the Pakistan Muslim League in Punjab, Muttahida Qaumi Movement in urban Sindh and the Awami National Party in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province to develop, limiting the power of the Pakistan People's Party and forcing it to work with the military. Egypt is not as divided along regional lines as Pakistan, meaning the potential for strong regional parties is absent. But Egypt has enough smaller parties the military can encourage to check the power of the Muslim Brotherhood -- something it is already doing.
Read more: Egypt's Military and the Pakistani Model | Stratfor
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http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/dec/21/future-looks-bleak-for-egypts-coptic-christians/
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Obama Gives Cold Shoulder to Egyptian Secular Democrats
by Michael Meunier
Special to IPT News
December 21, 2012
http://www.investigativeproject.org/3862/obama-gives-cold-shoulder-to-egyptian-secular
When Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton visited Egypt last July, she was met with widespread protest from Coptic Christians and secular activists objecting to what they all believed was the Obama administration's role in helping the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) ascend to power in Egypt.
The secretary asked to meet with 10 Christian leaders, myself included. All of those invited refused to meet with her and boycotted her visit. Most of us had been both publically and privately warning members of Congress and the administration of the danger the Muslims Brotherhood poses and about their desire to turn Egypt into a theocratic Islamic fascist country. Yet we were ignored.
Going back to April 2007, Democrats made special efforts to link up with the MB when visiting then-House Majority Leader Rep. Steny Hoyer, D-Md., met with Saad el-Katatni, the MB's parliamentary leader, at former U.S. Ambassador Francis Ricciardone's home, at a time when then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has publically refused to meet with the Brotherhood.
Mr. Ricciardone, who I can call a friend, once told me that his friendship with another MB leader, Essam El- Erian, extended for close to 30 years. Perhaps that was the catalyst for this meeting and subsequent meetings that took place at his residence.
A stream of meetings, as well as public and private contacts, followed between current U.S. Ambassador Anne Patterson and Brotherhood members since her arrival in Egypt shortly after the revolution. The ambassador seemed to favor the Brotherhood and the hard line Salafis over the rest of the secular players in Egypt.
In fact, she has turned down requests for meetings from heads of political parties and other secular politicians, myself included, who oppose the Brotherhood.
Other U.S. officials such as Deputy Secretary of State William Burns and Sen. John Kerry made the pilgrimage to MB headquarters and made sure to meet with their shadowy influential leader, Khairat El-Shater, at times even publicly praising him Kerry did. Those visits were made during a time where no political group had emerged as a leader in post-revolution Egypt.
The MB used these high-level meetings to tell the Egyptian people that the U.S. is supporting them and does not object to their rule. Many of us reached out to U.S. officials at the State Department and complained that the U.S. policy regarding the MB was putting the secular forces in Egypt at a disadvantage because it seemed to be propping the MB, but our concerns were dismissed.
We warned of the MB's desire to impose Sharia law once in power and the grim effect it would have on the rights of the millions of Christians and moderate Muslims, and on women and children, yet all of our warnings were dismissed. It seems that a policy decision was made to bring the MB to power in Egypt at all costs, and it happened.
After less than six months in office, President Mohamed Morsi issued an edict exempting his decrees from judicial review, and he is now forcing Egyptians to vote on a constitution that would impose Sharia law, violate human rights and religious freedom of Christians, degrade women, regulate child labor and kill the tourism industry for violating Islamic Sharia.
Youth and large portions of the Egyptian population responded to the president's new powers and draft of the constitution by taking to the streets and surrounding the presidential palace in protest.
Morsi then sent his own armed militia to attack the protesters with numerous weapons including shotguns, swords and firebombs.
The Brotherhood militia killed 10 people, wounded hundreds and kidnapped top youth activists, and tortured them inside the presidential palace for two days before turning them over to the police.
As the Supreme Constitutional Court was poised to dissolve the constitutional assembly, Morsi again sent his Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi militias to besiege the courthouse and prevent the judges from entering the building.
Upon arrival, the judges were turned away by the militia after their lives had been threatened, and to this day the militias are still surrounding the courthouse preventing the judges from meeting.
The president wanted to prevent the court from dissolving the assembly until after he pushes the referendum through and the constitution becomes effective.
Morsi again sent his armed militia to burn down the opposition Al-Wafd Party headquarters in response to the opposition and media stepping up their protests and criticism of the constitution, which large numbers of Egyptians reject and view as a setback for freedom.
They demolished cars and fired shots at the Al-Wafd Party, which is the oldest secular party in Egypt. Another set of Morsi's militia besieged "Media City" where most of the independent TV channels are located. The militia attacked TV anchors known to disagree with Morsi and prevented TV guests who are known to oppose Morsi from entering the city, so they could not appear on TV and criticize the referendum.
Simultaneously, another group of the Morsi's militia attacked the headquarters of newspapers knowing to oppose Morsi and the referendum. The Al-Watan newspaper was among the newspapers whose editor-in-chief went on TV to appeal to the president to stop his militia from attacking reporters and the newspaper building.
Through this all, President Obama's position amounts to, "This is an internal matter and we leave to the Egyptian people to sort out!!"
What the Brotherhood is doing in Egypt is holding a gun to the head of its opposition trying to pass a constitution that so far failed to garner a greater support among Egyptians.
Once that becomes the law of the land, the race is on to turn Egypt into another theocracy headed by an Islamist fascist regime that soon after will threaten the security of the free world. At the heart of it is the Obama administration and its failed foreign policy, and what I see as the desire to destroy moderate Egypt and turn it over to the fanatic elements of the society, creating a monster that will turn on its creator.
Michael Meunier is the President of Al Haya Party in Egypt. He is the founder of the U.S. Copts Association and a democracy, human rights and religious freedom activist.
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http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/12/29/257561.html
Brotherhood’s Shater seeks ‘total control’ of media: Egypt’s opposition group
Saturday, 29 December 2012
Khairat al-Shater, who was the Brotherhood’s main presidential candidate before he was disquieted by the election committee, reportedly called for shutting down TV channels owned by opposition groups. (Al Arabiya) inShare4 By Al Arabiya
Egypt’s opposition group, the Popular Front, said on Wednesday that it had laid hands on a leaked document signed by the Muslim Brotherhood’s deputy chairman Khairat al-Shater in which he urged the government to claim “total control of the media.”
Shater, who was the Brotherhood’s main presidential candidate before he was disquieted by the election committee, reportedly also called for shutting down TV channels owned by opposition groups.
Al-Tahreer newspaper reported that Shater even advised his brethren at the helm of Egypt’s policy making to find ways to contain the more radical Salafi Islamists. Salafis have strongly stood by the Brotherhood in recent constitutional battles, but the Brotherhood see extremist Islamists as potential future threats.
Shater also urged for the Brotherhood’s followers and strongmen to help raise funds to promote the movement’s policies among the Egyptian public.
The document strengthens “the importance of finding the right way and putting suitable plans to marginalize the role of the hardliners and hinder their expansion within the Islamist Public, because of the growing threat they represent now and in the future, and the difficulty of dealing with the threat later.”
The powerful businessman of the Brotherhood also urged “the shift of all sovereign duties of the ministry of foreign affairs to Dr. Issam Haddad,” and “discussing the proposal of Dr. Mahmood Ghezlan on cleansing the media from remnants of the departed regime and closing down, gradually, all private TV channels.”
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rBtkyBhzJ4o
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rBtkyBhzJ4o
Is it possible he was just quoting Chuck Hagel?
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I am not clear why Egypt needs these weapons.
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/01/10/calls-to-pull-plug-on-us-gifts-tanks-f-16-jets-to-egypt-grows/
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I am not clear why Egypt needs these weapons.
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/01/10/calls-to-pull-plug-on-us-gifts-tanks-f-16-jets-to-egypt-grows/
They need them to attack Israel.
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http://pjmedia.com/blog/in-context-muhammad-morsis-islamically-correct-jew-hatred/
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The sale to Egypt of this military equipment while Egyptians go hungry can only be seen as a signal from Obama to Netanyahu:
"you don't run this show, I am the one who calls the shots and the one who says when where and if."
More pressure against Bibi not to attack unilaterally.
What else can this mean?
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MATT BRADLEY
CAIRO—Dozens of people were killed as violence engulfed cities across Egypt for the second straight day Saturday, challenging Egypt's police and military to contain mounting lawlessness on a national scale.
At least 26 people were killed and nearly 300 were injured in rioting in the coastal city of Port Said on Saturday after a Cairo court sentenced 21 people to death for their role in a deadly soccer riot last February. Meanwhile, Friday's antigovernment riots in Cairo and other cities continued into early afternoon on Saturday, leaving at least 11 people dead, mostly in the impoverished coastal city of Suez.
The harsh verdict and back-to-back outbursts of violence have lent an air of desperation to Egyptian politics just as the country marked the second anniversary of a revolution that ended the 30-year rule of former President Hosni Mubarak and ushered in a two-year period of political instability.
The bloody street fights throughout the country often involve angry youth and have become a routine feature of Egypt's fraught transition to democracy. But this latest flare-up comes amid profound political divisions, an imminent economic crisis and months ahead of expected parliamentary elections that threaten to accelerate the country's plunge into instability.
The weekend's rallies showed that many Egyptians continue to view the street-level protests and violence—not the ballot box—as the surest way to express their political will. The general focus of rage is President Mohammed Morsi's Islamist government, who his secular opponents complain has brought little real change, particularly to a police force that remains incapable of containing mass demonstrations.
"When we call for the reform of the security sector and the security sector refuses this call, it leads to things like Port Said," said Khaled Fahmy, a political analyst and history professor at the American University in Cairo. "When we say that the security sector has to be reformed, this is exactly what we mean."
Adding to the political confusion as the death toll mounted, the National Salvation Front, the umbrella political group that represents opponents to Egypt's Islamist-backed presidency, issued a statement announcing that they would boycott the parliamentary vote unless Mr. Morsi devolved power to his opponents and amended the constitution.
Mr. Morsi cancelled a scheduled trip to Ethiopia and deployed Egypt's military in Suez and Port Said. In Port Said, hundreds of relatives and friends of the convicted defendants tried to breach prison walls to spring the convicts from jail.
The 21 people sentenced to death on Saturday were among 73 defendants, including several police officers, accused of participating in one of the world's deadliest soccer riots. Rulings for the rest of the defendants will be read on March 9. The verdict for the 21 announced Saturday isn't final—the defendants are almost certain to appeal and the head of Al Azhar, a government-managed Islamic university, must first accept or reject the capital sentences.
The head of Al Azhar has historically served a rubber-stamp religious role, and he is likely to approve the judge's decision.
Egyptian soccer hooligans, known here as Ultras, have been demonstrating in Cairo for the past week in anticipation of the court verdict over the alleged murder of 74 soccer fans during a stadium riot last February. Ultras backing the Port Said-based Al Masry team rushed the pitch following their win over the Cairo-based Al Ahly team. The ensuing melee saw dozens of Al Ahly fans suffocate while trying to leave the stadium. Others were tossed from the bleachers or slashed with knives.
Ultras supporting Al Ahly dubbed the incident a massacre and blamed Egypt's police for the deaths. The soccer fans accused the ministry of interior of doing little to stop the violence as part of a decade-long vendetta between soccer hooligans and the police.
Others said police deliberately orchestrated the attack.
"They are to blame for derelection of duty and the murders happened under their watch," said Mahmoud Adel, a member of the Al Ahly fan club committee who was at the game last year. Mr. Adel said thousands of Al Ahly fans erputed into cheers and applause at the Al Ahly club in Cairo when the decision was read.
"It's a strong verdict, but what happened deserves an even stronger verdict," he said.
A Port Said resident and lawyer of one of the defendants given a death sentence said the verdict was nothing more than "a political decision to calm the public. There is nothing to say these people did anything and we don't understand what this verdict is based on," Mohammed al-Daw told the Associated Press. "Kids were taken from their homes for wearing green T-shirts," he said, referring to the Al Masry team color
The court's ruling in the Port Said case came a day after protesters descended on city squares across Egypt on Friday to mark the second anniversary of the revolution that toppled Hosni Mubarak's 30-year autocracy and to press their demands against Egypt's Islamist leadership.
The Muslim Brotherhood and its conservative Islamist allies have dominated every national vote since Mr. Mubarak stepped down. In statements this week, the Brotherhood championed Egypt's "glorious revolution" but warned of the "evil forces of darkness [who] desperately endeavor to spoil the celebration [by] spreading chaos and terror across the country."
In a statement on his official Twitter account, Mr. Morsi expressed his sympathy for the deaths of protesters and police officers in Suez and vowed to pursue those responsible.
In Egypt's capital, marchers converged Friday from across the city onto Tahrir Square, the nerve center of the 2011 revolution. Demonstrators chanted anti-Islamist slogans.
"This is not a memory or a memorial," said Sayyid Gouda, a 36-year-old accountant who was wearing a gas mask around his neck as he gazed out on the crowds on the square. "This is a new wave of the revolution to restore our country."
In condemning the Muslim Brotherhood, which exercises expansive control over Egypt's government, Mr. Gouda and other activists drew from the same lexicon of resistance that defined the uprising two years ago. President Morsi and his Brotherhood backers are "fascists" who should be imprisoned for trying to take over Egypt and turn it into an Islamist state, Mr. Gouda said.
Though many of the tens of thousands of demonstrators were peaceful, according to televised images of the protests, dozens of rock-throwing youth laid seige to the Brotherhood's headquarters in the Nile Delta cities of Ismailia and Damanhour, according to the state news agency.
For the second time this week, assailants armed with Molotov cocktails attacked the offices of the Brotherhood's website in downtown Cairo, the Brotherhood reported on the site.
Friday's protests saw the first major appearance of a new group of masked protesters calling themselves the "Black Block," after a protest strategy historically associated with the violent European anarchist movement. Sporting black clothing and concealing black face-masks, members of the group were responsible for blocking a tramway in the coastal city of Alexandria to make way for protesters and clashed with police in front of the presidential palace in Cairo, state media said.
The apparently loosely affiliated new group swore on its unofficial Facebook FB +1.48%page to shield antigovernment protesters from Brotherhood thugs.
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http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2013/01/27/egyptian-path-darkens/
January 27, 2013
Egyptian Path Darkens
[UPDATED to reflect breaking news]
The situation in Egypt continues to darken; President Morsi has just declared a state of emergency and announced a curfew in three provinces following widespread riots. Hundreds of Egyptians have hit the streets in recent days to protest against President Mohamed Morsi and the death sentence handed down to 21 people for rioting at a soccer match. Forty-five people have died since the protests began on Thursday. Reuters reports:
Three people were shot dead and hundreds were injured in Egypt’s Port Said on Sunday during the funerals of 33 protesters killed at the weekend in the city.
Gunshots had killed many of the 33 who died on Saturday when residents went on the rampage after a court sentenced 21 people, mostly from the Mediterranean port, to death for their role in deadly soccer violence at a stadium there last year.
Elsewhere in Egypt, police fired teargas at dozens of stone-throwing protesters in Cairo in a fourth day of clashes over what demonstrators there and in other cities say is a power grab by Islamists two years after Hosni Mubarak was overthrown.
Egypt’s recent struggles are often portrayed as a conflict between Islamists in the Muslim Brotherhood and the liberal groups in the Cairo street. But while the MSM has given much attention to the Muslim Brotherhood’s increasing infringement on civil liberties, the truth is that these policies, while important, will not determine the future of Egyptian politics. This latest wave of violence and those that are certain to follow, stems largely from the sorry state of the Egyptian economy.
Most Egyptians these days are poor, unemployed, and frustrated with both the current and the past leadership of the country. And since the beginning of the Arab Spring, Egypt has seen its currency plummet as investors flee. Unless these trends are reversed, the restlessness and violence is only likely to get worse.
The latest outbreak of violence and the draconian measures now being taken to contain it only highlight the reality that neither Egypt’s government, its liberal opposition or its military guardians have any idea what to do. So far, Egypt hasn’t really seen a revolution. It’s seen faction-fighting and a change of regime, but society itself remains largely unchanged. Will that persist as the Muslim Brotherhood government is seen increasingly as unable to solve the country’s problems? It is much too soon to tell, but the government of Egypt is not standing on solid ground.
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Maybe things will go better if we give the military some fighter jets , , ,
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Egypt Army Chief Fears State Collapse .
CAIRO—Egypt's army chief warned on Tuesday that the state could collapse if the latest political crisis roiling the nation drags on, but also defended the right of people to protest.
Troops deployed in the two riot-torn Suez Canal cities of Port Said and Suez stood by and watched on Monday night as thousands took to the streets in direct defiance of a night curfew and a state of emergency declared by the president a day earlier. Residents of those two cities and Ismailiya, a third city also under the emergency, marched through the streets just as the curfew came into force at 9 p.m.
The display of contempt for the president's decision was tantamount to an outright rebellion that many worried could spread to other parts of the country. Already, protesters across much of Egypt are battling police, cutting off roads and railway lines, and besieging government offices and police stations as part of a growing revolt against the rule of Islamist President Mohammed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood group.
At least 60 people have been killed since Friday.
Mr. Morsi's opponents protest that Islamists have monopolized power and not lived up to the ideals of the pro-democracy uprising that ousted authoritarian leader Hosni Mubarak nearly two years ago.
"The continuation of the conflict between the different political forces and their differences over how the country should be run could lead to the collapse of the state and threaten future generations," said the army chief, Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, who is both head of the military and defense minister.
The warning was the military's first public comment since the latest crisis erupted last week around the second anniversary of the uprising. Mr. el-Sissi was speaking to military academy cadets and the comments were posted on the armed forces' official Facebook page.
On Sunday night, Mr. Morsi ordered the army to restore order in the Suez Canal cities of Port Said and Suez and slapped a 30-day state of emergency and night curfew on the two cities, as wells as Ismailiya. The army hasn't deployed in Ismailiya, however, which has seen little of the deadly violence flaring in the other two cities.
On Tuesday, tanks were fanned out on the streets of Port Said, a strategic city of some 600,000 located 140 miles northeast of Cairo on the Mediterranean coast and at the tip of the Suez Canal. New funerals were held for six more of those killed in clashes, with thousands marching and chanting against Mr. Morsi.
"Erhal! Erhal!" or "Leave, leave!" the mourners chanted.
The military is Egypt's most powerful institution and was the de facto ruler since a 1952 coup by army officers seized power and later toppled the monarchy. Generals forced Mr. Mubarak from power at the end of the uprising and then a ruling military council took over from him.
Their nearly 17 months in power that followed tainted the military's reputation, with critics charging the ruling generals of mismanaging the transition to democratic rule, human rights violations and hauling thousands of civilians before military tribunals.
Mr. Morsi became the first freely elected and civilian president in June and was immediately plunged into a power struggle with the military when it tried to curtail his powers. Two months after he took office, he ordered the retirement of the country's top two generals, regained powers the generals had taken away from him and handpicked Mr. el-Sissi as defense minister and army chief.
The timing of Mr. el-Sissi's warning is particularly significant because it came as Mr. Morsi appears to have failed to stem the latest bout of political violence as the country sank deeper into chaos and lawlessness and opposition to Mr. Morsi grew.
Some of the demonstrators in Port Said on Monday night waved white-and-green flags they said were the colors of a new and independent state. Such secession would be unthinkable in Egypt, but the move underlined the depth of frustration in the city.
Mr. El-Sissi acknowledged the difficult challenges facing his troops in Port Said and Suez, and spoke of the "realistic threat" facing the nation as a result of what he called the political, economic and social challenges.
"The deployment of the armed forces poses a grave predicament for us insofar as how we balance avoiding confrontations with Egyptian citizens, their right to protest and the protection and security of vital facilities that impact Egypt's national security," he said.
Since coming to office nearly seven months ago, Mr. Morsi has failed to tackle the country's massive problems, which range from an economy in free fall to surging crime, chaos on the streets and lack of political consensus. His woes deepened when the main opposition coalition turned down his offer for a dialogue to resolve the crisis, insisting that he meets their conditions first.
The wave of unrest has touched cities across much of the country since Thursday, including Cairo, the three Suez Canal cities, Alexandria on the Mediterranean in the north and a string of cities in the Nile Delta.
The violence accelerated Friday, the second anniversary of the start of the uprising, with protests to mark the event turned to clashes around the country that left 11 dead, most of them in Suez.
The next day, riots exploded in Port Said after a court convicted and sentenced to death 21 defendants—mostly locals—for a mass soccer riot in the city's main stadium a year ago. Rioters attacked police stations, clashed with security forces in the streets and shots and tear gas were fired at protester funerals in mayhem that left 44 people dead over the weekend.
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Egypt Army Chief Fears State Collapse .
CAIRO—Egypt's army chief warned on Tuesday that the state could collapse if the latest political crisis roiling the nation drags on, but also defended the right of people to protest.
Troops deployed in the two riot-torn Suez Canal cities of Port Said and Suez stood by and watched on Monday night as thousands took to the streets in direct defiance of a night curfew and a state of emergency declared by the president a day earlier. Residents of those two cities and Ismailiya, a third city also under the emergency, marched through the streets just as the curfew came into force at 9 p.m.
The display of contempt for the president's decision was tantamount to an outright rebellion that many worried could spread to other parts of the country. Already, protesters across much of Egypt are battling police, cutting off roads and railway lines, and besieging government offices and police stations as part of a growing revolt against the rule of Islamist President Mohammed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood group.
At least 60 people have been killed since Friday.
Mr. Morsi's opponents protest that Islamists have monopolized power and not lived up to the ideals of the pro-democracy uprising that ousted authoritarian leader Hosni Mubarak nearly two years ago.
"The continuation of the conflict between the different political forces and their differences over how the country should be run could lead to the collapse of the state and threaten future generations," said the army chief, Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, who is both head of the military and defense minister.
The warning was the military's first public comment since the latest crisis erupted last week around the second anniversary of the uprising. Mr. el-Sissi was speaking to military academy cadets and the comments were posted on the armed forces' official Facebook page.
On Sunday night, Mr. Morsi ordered the army to restore order in the Suez Canal cities of Port Said and Suez and slapped a 30-day state of emergency and night curfew on the two cities, as wells as Ismailiya. The army hasn't deployed in Ismailiya, however, which has seen little of the deadly violence flaring in the other two cities.
On Tuesday, tanks were fanned out on the streets of Port Said, a strategic city of some 600,000 located 140 miles northeast of Cairo on the Mediterranean coast and at the tip of the Suez Canal. New funerals were held for six more of those killed in clashes, with thousands marching and chanting against Mr. Morsi.
"Erhal! Erhal!" or "Leave, leave!" the mourners chanted.
The military is Egypt's most powerful institution and was the de facto ruler since a 1952 coup by army officers seized power and later toppled the monarchy. Generals forced Mr. Mubarak from power at the end of the uprising and then a ruling military council took over from him.
Their nearly 17 months in power that followed tainted the military's reputation, with critics charging the ruling generals of mismanaging the transition to democratic rule, human rights violations and hauling thousands of civilians before military tribunals.
Mr. Morsi became the first freely elected and civilian president in June and was immediately plunged into a power struggle with the military when it tried to curtail his powers. Two months after he took office, he ordered the retirement of the country's top two generals, regained powers the generals had taken away from him and handpicked Mr. el-Sissi as defense minister and army chief.
The timing of Mr. el-Sissi's warning is particularly significant because it came as Mr. Morsi appears to have failed to stem the latest bout of political violence as the country sank deeper into chaos and lawlessness and opposition to Mr. Morsi grew.
Some of the demonstrators in Port Said on Monday night waved white-and-green flags they said were the colors of a new and independent state. Such secession would be unthinkable in Egypt, but the move underlined the depth of frustration in the city.
Mr. El-Sissi acknowledged the difficult challenges facing his troops in Port Said and Suez, and spoke of the "realistic threat" facing the nation as a result of what he called the political, economic and social challenges.
"The deployment of the armed forces poses a grave predicament for us insofar as how we balance avoiding confrontations with Egyptian citizens, their right to protest and the protection and security of vital facilities that impact Egypt's national security," he said.
Since coming to office nearly seven months ago, Mr. Morsi has failed to tackle the country's massive problems, which range from an economy in free fall to surging crime, chaos on the streets and lack of political consensus. His woes deepened when the main opposition coalition turned down his offer for a dialogue to resolve the crisis, insisting that he meets their conditions first.
The wave of unrest has touched cities across much of the country since Thursday, including Cairo, the three Suez Canal cities, Alexandria on the Mediterranean in the north and a string of cities in the Nile Delta.
The violence accelerated Friday, the second anniversary of the start of the uprising, with protests to mark the event turned to clashes around the country that left 11 dead, most of them in Suez.
The next day, riots exploded in Port Said after a court convicted and sentenced to death 21 defendants—mostly locals—for a mass soccer riot in the city's main stadium a year ago. Rioters attacked police stations, clashed with security forces in the streets and shots and tear gas were fired at protester funerals in mayhem that left 44 people dead over the weekend.
Maybe things will go better if we give the military some fighter jets , , ,
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http://www.investigativeproject.org/3898/there-he-goes-again-egypt-morsi-stuns-us-senators
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http://www.investigativeproject.org/3898/there-he-goes-again-egypt-morsi-stuns-us-senators
What you islamiphobes don't get is that Morsi is just the arab world's Don Rickles. When he calls Jews the descendants of apes and pigs, it's out of love.
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(http://www.dogbrothers.com/kostas/DB_Egypt.jpg)
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Summary
Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi on Aug. 12 announced the retirement of the country's top five officers from military service. Defense Minister and head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi and army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Sami Annan were both given top civilian posts as advisers to the president, while the air and naval chiefs along with the air defense chief were also retired from service and given top civilian positions. Second-tier commanders took over from the retired officers, while unconfirmed reports in Egyptian media suggest that the deputies of the promoted commanders have taken over the posts vacated by their superiors.
The military needs to secure its influence in the new political system in which the president is no longer drawn exclusively from the armed forces, which had been the case in Egypt since Lt. Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser established the modern Egyptian republic through a military coup in 1952. It is also grappling with internal tensions due to younger officers' frustrations over a lack of opportunity for promotion. The president's move may have partially addressed both issues. Given that the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces had heavily circumscribed Morsi's powers just before the June presidential election, it is unlikely his decision was a unilateral one, and it may have been made in cooperation with the ambitious younger members of the armed forces to nudge out the aging military leadership.
Analysis
Egypt's second- and third-tier commanders and the general staff officer corps have for some time been displeased with the top brass's refusal to relinquish posts and allow those below a chance at promotion. Indeed, Stratfor sources in Cairo said resentment reached an all-time high after the 2011 uprising against former President Hosni Mubarak and has not subsided. The internal schisms have received little attention amid the larger struggle between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood for control of Egypt, but the recent retirements, promotions and reassignments suggest that an internal restructuring within the military was also under way.
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Tantawi has been at the helm of the military establishment since the 1990s. He gave no indication that he intended to retire, and it is unlikely that his or the others' retirements were purely voluntary. Instead, they likely came as a result of pressure from subordinates who charge that the professionalism of the military as an institution is harmed when the normal flow of promotions is disrupted and aging generals remain at the helm for too long.
The retirements and promotions come at a time when the military is searching for a new arrangement that will preserve its authority now that the country has moved away from the single-party model to a multi-party one with competitive elections. The military has always wanted to resume ruling from behind the scenes and leave day-to-day matters of governance to civil authorities, and the new civilian assignments for the now-retired generals will likely be the conduit through which the defense establishment maintains its oversight of the political system.
In addition to Tantawi and Annan, who were made presidential advisers, the former air force chief will become the head of military production. Likewise, the former naval chief has reportedly been named head of the Suez Canal Authority, an important revenue-generating asset for the country, and the former air defense chief was named chairman of the Arab Organization for Industrialization, a military development group. Under this arrangement, the military can go back to operating key state institutions through retired commanders, as was the case under Anwar Sadat and Mubarak. Unlike previous times, however, these commanders will be working with a president whose background is in the Muslim Brotherhood, not the military. Furthermore, these three appointments show that the defense establishment will be able to continue to dominate the country's economic sector.
Since Mubarak's ouster and the beginning of Egypt's political transition, the Muslim Brotherhood's efforts to assert its power have repeatedly been countermanded by the military, and Morsi's decree could similarly be reversed. However, Tantawi reportedly consented to the move, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces released a statement saying the shifts were settled via negotiation between the president and the military, indicating the military will not directly challenge the moves.
Under the new arrangement, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces remains powerful, but its composition and leadership have changed. Sensing an opening, Morsi has already issued presidential orders beyond what may have been agreed upon with the military. Morsi canceled a June 17 constitutional addendum issued by the ruling council and amended the constitutional declaration issued on March 30, 2011, with one that grants him full executive and judicial authority as well as the power to set all public policies in Egypt and sign international treaties. The declaration also gives Morsi the right to form a new constituent assembly tasked with drafting an Egyptian Constitution should any future developments prevent the current assembly from carrying out its responsibilities.
These presidential orders have not been implemented, and the judiciary or the military is likely to block them from ever being enacted just as they have done with previous initiatives intended to empower the legislature or the president. While Morsi may have achieved a symbolic victory in removing long-serving members of the former Mubarak regime from their military posts, the military had its own reasons for going along with the moves -- reasons that are intended to increase, not reduce, the military's influence over the civilian government. Furthermore, Morsi is unlikely to exercise unencumbered authority any time soon, especially with the new constitution, which will likely limit the powers of the president, being drafted.
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Read more: Egypt's Evolving Civil-Military Relations | Stratfor
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http://pjmedia.com/barryrubin/2013/02/26/who-will-the-muslim-brotherhood-heed-allah-or-tom-friedman-and-such-people-no-contest/?singlepage=true
Who Will the Muslim Brotherhood Heed: Allah or Tom Friedman (and such people)? No Contest
February 26th, 2013 - 10:16 am
Sigh. I really don’t want to write this article, but we have too good a case study of contemporary Western foreign policy reporting, debate, and elite attitudes toward international affairs to ignore. Doing a better job here is vital, as this task involves the fate of millions of people, matters of war and peace, the most basic interests of the United States, and the decency of intellectual discourse.
I refer, of course, to Thomas L. Friedman’s latest effort: “The Belly Dancing Barometer.” (Tens of millions of lives are at stake — that’s worth a flippant title and goofy concept, right?)
Friedman writes:
Since the start of the 2011 revolution in Tahrir Square, every time the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood faced a choice of whether to behave in an inclusive way or grab more power, true to its Bolshevik tendencies it grabbed more power and sacrificed inclusion. [President] Morsi’s power grab will haunt him.
The Brotherhood needs to understand that its version of political Islam — which is resistant to women’s empowerment and religious and political pluralism — might be sustainable if you are Iran or Saudi Arabia, and you have huge reserves of oil and gas to buy off all the contradictions between your ideology and economic growth. But if you are Egypt, you need to be as open to the world and modernity as possible to unleash all of the potential for growth.
So, let me get this straight.
Friedman is saying that you cannot trust the Brotherhood, as it seeks total power and is anti-democratic.
Hmm: what’s Friedman been saying the last two years? Well, he has been an apologist for the Brotherhood, a cheerleader for the course taken by the “Arab Spring,” and has constantly insisted that the “democratic” revolution is going well. Indeed, in January 2012 I wrote an analysis of Friedman’s coverage titled: “Friedman Cheers as Egyptians are Enslaved.”
Now, when it’s too late? Friedman is supposedly outraged to see what’s going on there.
Now, he concludes that the Egyptian regime is not democratic at all.
However, he draws no conclusions about how U.S. policy should change to adjust for his discovery. Does Friedman now favor — as he hints in the article — using real pressure on Egypt if the regime continues to be repressive at home? Will he criticize Obama for not doing so?
If Mursi [I'll stick with my transliteration] has “Bolshevik tendencies,” might that not also lead to his doing something nasty to U.S. interests?
It’s like identifying a mass murderer, and then asking him “Do you really think you can get away with this without a vast criminal organization behind you?”, rather than hollering: “Help! Police! There’s a mass murderer over there!”
On top of that, Friedman uses that “needs to understand” phrase, so beloved by editorialists but totally absurd when dealing with dictators. Well, what if they don’t understand, Mr. Friedman? How about saying:
Herr Hitler needs to understand that he cannot conquer the whole world. Germany lacks the economic base to do so.
Also, do we now believe in economic determinism? Was the USSR sustainable? Can you imagine someone writing this in 1917 about the Bolsheviks?
Mr. Lenin needs to understand that the Soviet Union [yes, I know it wasn't founded until several years later, but I'm trying to make a point here -- BR] should abandon its Bolshevik tendencies because it will never work out.
Sure, the Soviet Union failed. But it took almost 75 years, and tens of millions died as a result.
And since when did a Middle Eastern radical dictatorship — even one that was elected — put economic pragmatism ahead of seeking its goals: the PLO or Palestinian Authority? Saddam Hussein? Gamal Abdel Nasser?
Has the Iranian government dropped their nuclear weapons program because of economic sanctions?
Arguably, one such leader did bow to economic necessity to moderate. His name was Anwar al-Sadat, and now his regime — under Sadat’s successor, Mubarak — is the villain for America and the West.
Note that Friedman never says: President Obama needs to understand that he cannot trust this Muslim Brotherhood regime, should see it as a threat to U.S. interests, and must work to undermine it.
Moreover, is Friedman correct, and Mursi wrong? Is the world really going to cut off the money to Egypt if it keeps getting more Islamist? Will the U.S. insist the IMF stop aiding the Egyptian regime, or even … stop sending it free weapons?
Aide: “President Obama! The Muslim Brotherhood is grabbing more power and not being inclusionary!”
Obama: “Jumping Saul Alinsky! We must cut off aid at once! Then he’ll learn that he must be open to the world in order to unleash Egypt’s potential for growth!”
But wait! Egypt doesn’t have a potential for economic growth. It isn’t going to happen. The country has too many people and not enough resources. What if Mursi knows that Egypt isn’t going to be the new China, with shining cities of high rises, factories pumping out consumer durables for export, and so on?
If he knows that there is no real chance for economic prosperity … maybe that is why he follows the policies he does! Might it be that Mursi knows more about Egypt than Friedman, or even Obama?
Perhaps Mursi could intimidate or blackmail those with oil and gas, as his predecessor Gamal Abdel Nasser did. And, after all, the Arab nationalists faced precisely the same problem as Mursi does, and yet stayed in office for 60 years. Yes, they had the USSR, but that hardly gave a lot of economic aid. Why can’t the Islamists run Egypt for the next 60 years?
Aide: “President Mursi! We must abandon Islamism! We can’t afford it!”
Mursi: “Oh well, I guess the IMF is more important than Allah. Mwa-ha-ha! Just kidding!”
If you know anything about societies like Egypt, you would understand that these societies have a lot of flexibility. People can get along with far less than in the West, and be a lot more passive in the face of suffering, because that’s the way they always had to live. This is a largely agricultural society. Some can go back to the villages, or be sustained by extended families, or tighten their belts. They have low expectations. And the “Arab Spring” has not changed that fact, at least for a majority. What proportion of the Egyptian public participated in those romanticized events before the Mubarak regime was overthrown in 2011? Say, 100,000 out of a population of 70 million?
And many of them were Muslim Brotherhood cadre.
The Egyptian people also know they face repression, and they have a deeply embedded ideology to comfort them and to drive them onward. And why are they so poor and miserable? It’s not Mursi, but America, the West, Israel, and now even the Saudis who are blamed for their suffering. Obviously, not everyone is going to believe this, but enough will — or will get bopped upside the head — to keep the regime in power. Wait until you see what’s going to happen in Syria as a new dictatorship takes control there as well.
The one ray of hope in Egypt is that there are now four Islamist parties: the Brotherhood, “moderates,” radical Salafi, and “moderate” (i.e., pro-regime) Salafi. If the democratic opposition wasn’t led by such a bunch of quarreling incompetent egomaniac politicians, there might actually be some hope of defeating Islamists in the parliamentary elections due in a few months.
This is all a tragedy for the poor victims in the Middle East, and a farce for the well-paid, much-honored careerist opportunists and ideologues in the West.
What’s so frustrating about this mess: not only are the policies so bad, not only is the permitted debate so narrow, but these people don’t even try to come up with logical arguments because they know they can get away with any old trash and still get applauded.
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Forgive the frivolous tangent, but shouldn't that be "WHOM will the MB heed?" :lol:
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February 28, 2013
The Egypt Bomb Goes Tick Tick Tick
Egypt is set to explode, according to former Finance Minister Samir Radwan. Joblessness stands at 74 percent for people under 30, according to government figures. This figure is unlikely to improve, the FT reports:
“I expect unemployment to increase because there are no signs that the economy is picking up,” says Mr Radwan. “Already some 1,500 [business] establishments have shut down.”
President Mohamed Morsi announced last week that Parliamentary elections will be held in April, prompting an outcry from his liberal opponents. But neither the Muslim Brotherhood nor any other potential candidate has any viable plan to ease unemployment. This, really, is all one needs to know about Egypt.
The economy is in a meltdown. And the situation on the ground will only be exacerbated by the hordes of young people (under-30s make up an estimated 60 percent of Egypt’s population) unable to find work to pay for the rising costs of basic goods. Radwan is right, the time bomb in Egypt is ticking. There is nothing worse for an unstable country than a restive, and hungry, youth. The only question now is, when the explosion comes, what will rise from the debris?
[Update: An earlier version of this post mistakenly stated that 74 percent of Egyptians are unemployed, rather than jobless. This error has been corrected.]
- See more at: http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2013/02/28/the-egypt-bomb-goes-tick-tick-tick/
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http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2013/0301/A-warning-to-John-Kerry-on-Middle-East-trip-Egypt-could-become-the-next-Iran
A warning to John Kerry on Middle East trip: Egypt could become the next Iran
Take note, Secretary of State John Kerry: Under the rule of Mohammad Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt is in danger of becoming a Sunni version of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The US must demand the protection of human rights and back rhetoric with action.
By Nesreen Akhtarkhavari / March 1, 2013
Egypt's President Mohammed Morsi, right, embraces Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at the 12th summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Cairo, Egypt Feb. 6. As US Secretary of State John Kerry visits Egypt this weekend, op-ed contributor Nesreen Akhtarkhavari warns: 'Just as the revolution in Iran was hijacked by the Shiite clergy in 1979, the Muslim Brotherhood is doing the same in Egypt now.'
As Secretary of State John Kerry heads to Egypt March 2 he should be wary of one concerning possibility: Under the rule of Mohammad Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt is in danger of becoming a Sunni version of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Opposition leaders’ refusal to meet with Mr. Kerry over what they perceive to be as unprincipled US support for Mr. Morsi should serve as a wake-up call and warning to Washington.
Morsi’s first step after winning the June 2012 presidential election was to create an alliance with other Islamic groups, and sideline seculars and liberals who could derail the establishment of a religious state. Next, he gave himself immunity from legal prosecution and managed to quickly hoard more power than deposed dictator Hosni Mubarak ever dreamed of having. After a number of maneuvers, Morsi pushed forward a constitution drafted mostly by Brotherhood members and their allies, ignoring the protests of secular opponents, Christians, women, and liberals against the discriminatory language and key articles placed in the new constitution.
The new constitution sets the legal ground for creating what could become an Islamic state. It restricts the role of the judicial and legislative branches and stipulates that laws and their interpretations are subject to Islamic jurisprudence. It further gives legal-oversight power on “matters related to the Islamic sharia” to Al-Azhar University, the oldest and highest Sunni religious institution in Egypt.
The new constitution and its wide implications for personal freedom and social justice should concern the international community. It explicitly recognizes only the three Abrahamic religions (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism), and leaves other minorities, such as those of the Baha’i faith, without meaningful constitutional protection. Strict adherence to the concept of apostasy prevents Muslims from changing their religion, a crime punishable by death. Blasphemy laws restrict freedom of expression, especially on religious matters, with retributions as severe as death for comments related to the prophet Mohammed or the Koran.
According to Sunni jurisprudence, women are subject to male guardianship under which their personal freedoms, social life, and career choices are severely restricted. This restriction is not banned under Egypt’s new constitution. And because the new constitution fails to set a minimum age for marriage and does not criminalize sexual trafficking of minors, children, especially girls, could be forced into marriages at the age of nine with the approval of their male guardians.
During the last three decades, Iran, under the control of the Islamic Shiite clergy, was transformed into a religious state with endless human rights violations. In most cases, the world stood by watching. Egypt is learning from the Iranian experience. If the political conditions in Egypt remain the same, Egypt could soon follow Iran’s footsteps.
In spite of the deep and highly politicized Sunni-Shiite divide, the Sunni-based Muslim Brotherhood doctrine recognizes Shiite Islam as a legitimate sect. Many Islamists in Egypt see their country as Iran’s equal Sunni counterpart and may perceive the collaboration between the two nations as another step toward Islamic world expansion.
With little regard to the controversy surrounding the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadeinejad’s recent visit to Egypt to participate in an Islamic summit, Morsi warmly welcomed him. He left the Sunni religious institution, Al-Azhar, and the flying shoe of a Syrian dissident to deliver condemnations of Iran’s Shiite expansion efforts in Arab-Sunni territories and their support of the Syrian regime. Meanwhile, Morsi negotiated with the Iranian president about ways to improve political collaboration and economic partnership. Recently, Egypt and Iran signed an agreement to foster tourism between the two countries.
It is important that the international community carefully watches this newly forged alliance and takes steps to prevent the repeat of the Iranian experience. This is not a call against Islam, but against the establishment of a theocratic state that practices a wide range of human right abuses with impunity, under the banner of religion.
It is not enough that world leaders such as Secretary Kerry make clear in their public discourse that such practices will not be tolerated, but the rhetoric should be reinforced in private talks to demonstrate seriousness. International investments and funds to support Egypt’s economy should continue to be conditioned upon implementation of the rule of law and protection of human rights.
International human rights and civic organizations should be diligent in supporting similar organizations in Egypt. Having a strong and active “third sector” is the only way to ensure that state abuse, torture, and imprisonment are widely reported and actions are taken to support the victims and their families, and to bring perpetrators, including the state, to account.
It is critical that international trade unions continue their support of Egyptian trade unions. The current religious state sees these unions as a threat to its dominance and is enacting laws to control their independence, operation, and right to assemble and protest.
Just like the revolution in Iran was hijacked by the Shiite clergy in 1979, the Muslim Brotherhood is doing the same in Egypt now.
Morsi and his government seem to have learned well from the Iranian regime about how to deal with opposition. The tens of thousands of disappointed activists, bloggers, seculars, liberals, trade union members, and frustrated Egyptians back in the streets in a “revolution of rage” calling for Morsi’s resignation, are brutally attacked, tortured, imprisoned, and killed as Iran did with the protestors of the Youth Green Movement in 2009.
There is a fine line between interference in domestic affairs and the responsibility of the world community toward the protection of human rights and individual freedoms. Kerry and the rest of the Obama administration must remember this.
Recognizing that only Egyptians can determine the type of government they want, the protection of the rights of minorities and individuals is a global responsibility that we all share as nations, organizations, and people.
Dr. Nesreen Akhtarkhavari is director of Arabic Studies and an assistant professor at DePaul University in Chicago. Her research focuses on Islamic law and minority and women’s rights. This piece was written in association with The OpEd Project, which seeks to expand the range of opinion voices.
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a) I do not believe I exagerate when I say that without US aid, Egypt is merely a couple of months from mass starvation. Thus we have powerful leverage. That said, if we combine the vote of the Salafist parties and the MB parties, what % of the vote was it? Was it not a huge majority? How do we make the case for the rights of minorities over the right of a large majority?
I suppose one option is to say that in return for our money we need to see X, Y, and Z in the way of religious freedom (e.g. the Coptics) women's rights, minority political rights, freedom of speech, etc-- i.e. take it or leave it, it's up to you guys! But exactly what happens then? Does Morsi kow tow? How would that play out? What then happens to the alliance/uneasy balance of power between the Salafists and the MB? How does the Egyptian street react? Is chaos and anarchy and option? Is this a good or a bad thing?
I am NOT arguing one way or the other here, merely raising what seem to me questions that must be thought about.
b) My sense of history on Iran may be a bit hazy, but the way I remember it is that the outpouring of support for Khomeni upon his return was extraordinary. I do not remember a hijacking at all; I remember the people getting exactly what they thought they wanted. Life is tough and it is tougher when you are stupid. If anyone has a reputable summary of this period, please post it in the Iran thread.
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http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/kerry-praises-egypts-version-democracy_705070.html
Kerry Praises Egypt's 'Version of the Democracy'
1:34 PM, Mar 4, 2013 • By JERYL BIER
Secretary of State John Kerry announced on Sunday the release of a quarter of a billion dollars in aid to Egypt. The Associated Press reports:
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry on Sunday rewarded Egypt for President Mohammed Morsi's pledges of political and economic reforms by releasing $250 million in American aid to support the country's "future as a democracy."
Yet Kerry also served notice that the Obama administration will keep close watch on how Morsi, who came to power in June as Egypt's first freely elected president, honors his commitment and that additional U.S. assistance would depend on it.
The day before, the secretary of state hinted that the Obama administration was continuing to throw its weight behind Morsi in remarks at the Marriott Zamalek Hotel in Cairo. Kerry had meet with some opposition leaders on Saturday and a reporter apparently caught Kerry at his hotel after the meeting. There is a partial transcript of a reporter's impromptu question and Kerry's answer on the State Department's website [emphasis added]:
QUESTION: (In progress) heard his conversation with the opposition members. Did you hear anything from them that would suggest that they’re going to renounce their boycott of the election and actually take part?
SECRETARY KERRY: No, I heard very passionate people who are deeply committed to Egypt and to their version of the democracy that they fought for in their revolution. And I completely understand that. I wanted to hear from them. I explored their strategy and thoughts.
They’re deeply committed to human rights, to democracy, to freedom of expression, and to a real political process in which they feel they have a voice. America supports all of those things. And so listening to them was really important. There was a divergence of views in terms of the adamancy, but they all shared a sense that they needed to be more part of the process, more included, and they recognized the economic challenge, but they believe there’s also a need to fill the promise of democracy. And so do we. We believe that too.
There's no explanation of what Kerry meant by the remark.
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IMHO what happened here is subject to more than one interpretation. It certainly is not a bad thing that SecState Kerry met with the opposition and said what he said in response to that question; it begins to stake out ground not previously in play. $250M keeps Morsi on a short leash-- they will burn through that quickly enough-- and one doubts there will be much expression of indignation over Kerry's "internal meddling".
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-egypt-slides-toward-financial-ruin/2013/03/06/85974478-85e4-11e2-98a3-b3db6b9ac586_story.html?hpid=z3
From the article:
The economic facts are stark: Egypt’s official foreign-currency reserves in February were $13.5 billion, which would cover a little less than three months of imports. But U.S. officials say that accessible, liquid reserves total only $6 billion to $7 billion. Already, imports are harder to find, including the raw materials needed by Egyptian manufacturers. The Egyptian stock market tumbled 5 percent early this week, sensing danger ahead.
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Quoting:
A top Egyptian court Wednesday suspended parliamentary elections scheduled to begin on April 22. The Cairo Administrative Court said the electoral law must be reviewed by the Supreme Constitutional Court. Egypt's main opposition group, the National Salvation Front, had planned to boycott the elections, claiming the electoral law favored Islamists and demanding an overhaul to the Islamist-backed constitution. President Mohamed Morsi said it would respect the court's decision, which was another instance of confrontation between Egypt's prerevolutionary judiciary and the Islamist ruling party. The announcement came amid continued violence and turmoil in Port Said over death sentences issued over the 2012 football riots that killed 74 people. On Wednesday, Egypt's interior minister dismissed Port Said's security chief. Meanwhile, Egypt has backed away from making economic policy changes necessary to negotiate a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund. The delays have come just days after a visit from U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry during which he committed $250 million in assistance but urged political collaboration on economic reform.
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Announcing a Symposium and Webcast on
The Muslim Brotherhood And The West
A Panel Discussion sponsored by the
Foreign Policy Research Institute,
Al Mesbar Studies & Research Centre,
and the Reserve Officers Association
Wednesday, March 20, 2013
1:45 p.m. Registration; 2:00 – 4:00 p.m. Program ROA, One Constitution Avenue, NE, Washington, DC
Free and Open to the Public
Reservations required
Also available thru audio webcast/teleconference Register by email to: events@fpri.org or telephone: (215) 732-3774 x303
To register for webcast/teleconference only use this link:
https://cc.readytalk.com/r/uz0psms4njfh
FEATURING
Lorenzo Vidino, Senior Fellow, FPRI/Senior Fellow,
Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich
Abdullah Bijad Alotibi, Journalist/Board of Advisors, Al Mesbar
Joseph Braude, Writer/Collaborating Researcher, Al Mesbar
Moderator: Tally Helfont, Managing Director of FPRI’s Program
on the Middle East
Few observers foresaw the Arab Spring, but it should not have surprised anyone that the Islamist movements - the most organized movements in the Arab world - became the main beneficiaries of the turmoil that ensued. Islamism, in its gradualist and pragmatic approach embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots worldwide, seems ready to reap the rewards of its three decades-old decision to abandon violence and focus on grassroots activities. This monumental change has created many concerns among liberals, religious minorities and, more generally, all non-Islamists in the countries where Islamists have won. In addition, Arab states ruled by non-Islamist regimes have expressed concern. The former worry that Islamist ideology - even in its more contemporary, pragmatic form - remains deeply divisive and anti-democratic, often at odds with their values and interests. The latter believe that on foreign policy issues, most of the positions of various Brotherhood-inspired parties are on a collision course with the policies of established regimes in the region.
In association with Al Mesbar Studies and Research Centre (based in the United Arab Emirates), the Foreign Policy Research Institute has just published as an E-Book The West and the Muslim Brotherhood After the Arab Spring, edited by Lorenzo Vidino.
The book provides an overview of each of eight countries’ policies towards Islamism, including the United States, Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Spain, and Israel. In this program, Vidino highlights the key lessons of the volume, and comment is offered by Abdullah Bijad Alotibi and Joseph Braude.
Download E-Book:
http://www.fpri.org/articles/2013/02/west-and-muslim-brotherhood-after-arab-spring
E-Book
Table Of Contents
* Introduction, Lorenzo Vidino
* U.S. Policy and the Muslim Brotherhood, Steven Brooke
* Between ‘Engagement’ and a ‘Values-Led’ Approach: Britain and the Muslim Brotherhood from 9/11 to the Arab Spring, Martyn Frampton & Shiraz Maher
* Canada and the Arab Islamists: Plus Ça Change, Alex Wilner
* Political Islam According to the Dutch, Roel Meijer
* Germany and the Muslim Brotherhood, Guido Steinberg
* France and Islamist Movements: A Long Non-dialogue, Jean-François Daguzan
* Spain and Islamist Movements: from the Victory of the FIS to the Arab Spring, Ana I. Planet and Miguel Hernando de Larramendi
* Israel and the Arab Spring: Understanding Attitudes and Responses to the “New Middle East,” Benedetta Berti
ABOUT THE PANELISTS:
Lorenzo Vidino specializes in Islamism and political violence in Europe and North America. Currently a Senior Fellow at FPRI and at the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, he previously held positions at the RAND Corporation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, the U.S. Institute of Peace, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He has taught at Tufts University, the University of Maryland, the National Defense University and the University of Zurich. He is the author of three books, most recently The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West (Columbia University Press, 2010), and articles in several prominent newspapers, including The International Herald Tribune, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, and The Boston Globe. He has testified before the U.S. Congress and consults with governments, law firms, think tanks and media in several countries. A native of Milan, Italy, he holds a law degree from the University of Milan Law School and a doctorate in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
Abdullah Bijad Alotibi, a Saudi writer and researcher, is a member of the board of advisors at Al Mesbar Studies & Research Centre. Alotibi has written for many Arabic and Saudi newspapers such as Al Ittihad, Okaz, and Al Hayat (London). He currently contributes a weekly article to Asharq Al-Awsat, Al Ittihad, and Al Majalla. He has published several research papers for Al Mesbar’s monthly publication including “Loyalty and Enmity: the Ideology of the Political Opposition in Islam†and “Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood.†Alotibi works as a consultant at The Middle East Broadcasting Center Group and has also worked on and supervised various media documentaries and programs for Al Arabia Channel.
Joseph Braude studied Near Eastern Languages at Yale and Arabic and Islamic History at Princeton. Fluent in Arabic, Persian, and Hebrew, he contributes a weekly Arabic-language broadcast, "Letter from New York," to MED Radio, a national network in Morocco, and is a regular contributor to Public Radio International's America Abroad. His writing has appeared in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Los Angeles Times Sunday Magazine, among other publications.
His latest book, The Honored Dead (Random House - Spiegel & Grau, 2011), is a study of the relationship between state and society in the Arab world based on four months which he spent embedded with the Moroccan police in Casablanca; Braude is the first Westerner ever to have gained embed access to an Arabic security service. His prior book, The New Iraq (Basic Books, 2003), examines the challenge of state-building in Iraq in light of the country's history, culture, and institutions.
Tally Helfont is the Managing Director of FPRI's Program on the Middle East. Her current research focuses on the Levant, regional balance of power, and radical ideologies therein.
Ms. Helfont has instructed training courses in Civil Information Management to U.S. Military Civil Affairs Units and Human Terrain Teams assigned to Iraq and Afghanistan.
She is the author of the FPRI monograph, The Palestinian Islamic Jihad's U.S. Cell [1988-95]: The Ideological Foundations of Its Propaganda Strategy, and has published numerous FPRI E-Notes, and in Orbis. Helfont conducted research in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the summer of 2011, about which she also authored several articles. She is proficient at various levels in Hebrew, Arabic, and French.
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Summary
Egypt is attempting to attract foreign direct and portfolio investment while delaying making foundational changes to the country's economic system. During a recent state visit to India that ended March 20, Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi made several ambitious statements about Egypt's future as an emerging economy in a public effort to spin the country's economic downturn as a moment of opportunity.
Meanwhile, Egypt is in negotiations with the International Monetary Fund, which is studying the possibility of extending a $4.8 billion loan to Egypt, pending improvements in the country's financial outlook. In order to secure the loan, Egypt must cut back on social spending. However, cutting spending will only worsen the country's political and security situation. A range of recent actions taken by the government demonstrate that Cairo is attempting to spur economic growth and investment where it can while postponing politically costly social spending adjustments.
Analysis
The most notable announcement in recent days was that the government will attempt to implement bread and cooking fuel ration cards within two months. This move came after an announcement that transportation fuel ration cards will be implemented by the end of July. Ration cards would put caps on how much access Egyptians would have to subsidized goods. They would not necessarily reduce the amount of bread or fuel being consumed by a particular household, but they would certainly better allow the government to control and anticipate its own costs.
If implemented with a means-testing mechanism -- a way to tell how much of a given subsidized good a household legitimately needs -- then the ration card system could more effectively aim Egypt's large subsidies toward portions of the population that really need them. As with most indiscriminate subsidy programs, most of the subsidies in Egypt are used by people with the means to purchase larger quantities of subsidized fuel, electricity, food and other goods. A ration card system implemented carefully could mitigate this problem and help to alleviate the government's deficit spending.
The implementation of such a system would be difficult and would require an evaluation of the individuals and households applying for ration cards in order to avoid fraud. It will likely take longer than the government's estimate of two months to implement a system like this. It is not at all clear that Egypt has the bureaucratic means to put a program like this in place carefully, and it is highly likely that the program will be implemented unevenly, if at all. Even if perfectly implemented, a rationing system would have political costs -- even if rations are sufficient for each household, the appearance of reducing benefits to a population with a high poverty rate will lend additional political momentum to ongoing unrest.
In addition to offering a timeline for the ration card system, the Egyptian government is extending assurances to portfolio investors and loans to the tourism industry. The Foreign Investor Repatriation Mechanism, which opened March 17, guarantees to stock, treasuries and bond investors in Egypt that if they bring in foreign currency, they will be able to pull it out when necessary. The mechanism also guarantees Egyptian Central Bank aid in bank-level transactions, should investors need to liquidate their holdings. This system is designed to reassure investors that Egypt is a safe investment environment and to address the steep decline in Egypt's capital and financial account flows following the global financial crisis and the Arab Spring.
The Egyptian Central Bank is also attempting to stabilize the domestic tourism industry. A major source of foreign revenue, Egypt's services sector has been suffering since the unrest of the Arab Spring began. An ongoing devaluation of the Egyptian pound should help improve Egypt's attractiveness as a vacation destination, but growing security concerns are likely to outweigh those benefits in the short and medium term. To help bridge the gap, the central bank has offered to reschedule and postpone payments on more than 60 percent of outstanding loans to the tourist industry, including hotels. However, the real key to stimulating the tourist industry will be reducing protests and associated violence -- a goal that is unlikely to be reached any time soon.
The picture that emerges from Egypt's most recent moves is that though the government has a range of financial tools it can use to attempt to stabilize the economy, serious political barriers stand in the way of addressing more fundamental problems. Fuel subsidies remain the biggest burden on the country's trade deficit and government budget, and any real moves toward controlling subsidized energy consumption will indicate that Egypt is ready to make foundational changes. In order to make such moves, however, the new Muslim Brotherhood-led government would need to be very secure in its political position, something that seems unlikely in the immediate future and, at the very least, will not be achieved until parliamentary elections can be held. Without that fundamental political stability, a financial and economic solution will remain out of Egypt's reach.
Read more: Egypt's Careful Economic Changes | Stratfor
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http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/egypts-muslim-brotherhood-sets-militia-enforce-rule/#fm
http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/christian-activist-egypt-tortured-opposing-muslim-brotherhood
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CAIRO—Thousands of Coptic Christians and Muslims clashed in downtown Cairo on Sunday following a funeral mass for four Christians killed in weekend violence outside the capital, a new low point in Egypt's worsening sectarian troubles.
At least one person was killed and 66 people were injured in the clashes, Egypt's state news agency reported.
The street battles began early Sunday afternoon, as mourners leaving the funeral at Egypt's main Coptic Christian cathedral clashed with youths from Abasseya, a poor Cairo neighborhood next to the church compound. The funeral procession was held to honor four Christians who were killed, along with one Muslim, in sectarian fighting in the village of El Khusus on Friday.
By nightfall on Sunday, the mostly Muslim rioters had managed to surround much of the downtown cathedral, blocking rescue workers from entering the sprawling church campus, according to Christians inside.
Christians who took shelter inside the cathedral said police did little to subdue the crowds of angry Muslim youths outside. Instead, the Christians complained, police attacked the cathedral compound and fired tear gas into the church's courtyard.
The police didn't release a statement regarding the attacks. The Interior Ministry didn't respond to requests to comment.
Egypt has seen a rise in bloody conflicts between Muslims and the Christians who make up about 10% of Egypt's 90 million people. But Sunday's siege around the cathedral signified a new low.
It also augurs fresh trouble for Islamist-backed President Mohammed Morsi, whose administration has presided over a worsening economy, rising crime and an increasingly vocal opposition since he was voted into office in late June 2012.
As the violence kicked off in Abasseya, a Cairo criminal court voted to acquit former presidential candidate Ahmed Shafiq on charges of corruption dating from his time as civil-aviation minister under the regime of ousted President Hosni Mubarak.
The verdict clears the path for Mr. Shafiq, who lost a tight presidential race to Mr. Morsi last summer, to return to Egypt from the United Arab Emirates, where he has lived for much of the past year.
As the public's patience with Mr. Morsi wears thin, people close to Mr. Shafiq said he hopes to throw his hat back into the political ring. He has already called for presidential elections before 2016, the date of the next scheduled vote, because "the president has so far proven that he is incompetent to rule this country," said Ahmed Sarhan, Mr. Shafiq's former campaign spokesman, on Sunday.
"You can see what happened today: Almost no Christian trusts" Mr. Morsi, said Mr. Sarhan, referring to the Abasseya violence. Mr. Shafiq "truly thinks that we need an early presidential election after all this failure. We cannot afford to dive further into this chaos."
A survey late last month by private Egyptian polling group Baseera found that only 37% of Egyptians would vote for Mr. Morsi again if presidential elections were held tomorrow.
The violence comes amid an uptick in sectarian rhetoric from Muslim Brotherhood leaders. Last week, Egypt's Brotherhood-dominated legislature passed a law that would allow the use of religious slogans during political campaigns, clearing the way for the Brotherhood's own mantra "Islam is the solution." When asked on a television talk show last week whether Christians should be allowed to use a similar slogan—"Christianity is the solution"—Yasser Hamza, an official with the Freedom and Justice Party, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood organization that Mr. Morsi once helped lead, said no.
"This is an Islamic nation with an overwhelming Muslim majority," said Mr. Hamza. "The minority doesn't have absolute rights, it has relative rights."
The violence in El Khosos, northeast of Cairo, began, according to local media reports, when Christian youths spray-painted a swastika on a building owned by Al Azhar University, one of the most important religious institutions in Sunni Islam.
The incident quickly deteriorated, turning into a gunfight that left five people dead.
Those who attended the funeral of the four Christians on Sunday afternoon described an emotional, highly politicized atmosphere. Because of the size of the crowd, pallbearers could barely get the caskets through the door of the church. Parishioners shouted slogans against Mr. Morsi and the Brotherhood even after the service began.
"The anger was palpable in the church," said Khaled Fahmy, a professor of history at the American University in Cairo who attended the funeral. "The priest could not actually conduct the prayers. He was shouted down with slogans."
In a statement On Sunday evening, the Freedom and Justice Party, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, blamed unstated "enemies of Egypt" for provoking sectarian violence to "create sedition among citizens." The party condemned the attacks and called for an investigation.
Sunday's funeral for the four slain Christians took on the trappings of an anti-Morsi rally, witnesses said, with youths in the procession chanting slogans against the Brotherhood.
Witnesses gave contradictory accounts of how the fighting started. Muslim residents said Christians pelted nearby youths with rocks as they left the church, before turning on security forces who had arrived to calm the scene.
"The Christians just came out and attacked the people on the street," said a man from Abasseya who gave his name as Mohammed. "The Christians were the ones who started this. They even attacked the police who had come to protect them."
Christian witnesses said the Abasseya youths assaulted them after the funeral with rocks, Molotov cocktails and homemade rifles—one-shot, locally manufactured devices that have become increasingly common in street-level riots. The fighting continued into the night, as both sides appeared unwilling to yield. As the sun set Sunday, Muslims on the street outside the cathedral chanted "God is great!" and made lewd gestures at Christian youths watching from the roofs of the cathedral complex. Inside the compound, Christians gathered rocks to throw at the crowd gathered outside.
Coptic Christians holed up inside the cathedral accused the police of attacking the church in concert with neighborhood Muslims. "This conflict is because of Morsi. He's creating division so that he can seize the whole country" said George Adli, 28 years old. "The police attacked the Christians, not the Muslims because the police are Islamists, too."
Mr. Adli, who said he had witnessed the fighting from the beginning, said many of the young Christians he knows are making plans to leave Egypt. He himself plans to move to Canada within two months, he said. "It's gotten very bad," he said. "Morsi is bad. Egypt is bad. Everyone just wants to leave."
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http://atlasshrugs2000.typepad.com/atlas_shrugs/2013/06/lawlessness-blackouts-sexual-attack-roil-egypt-as-us-warns-against-pyramids-tourism.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=facebook
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http://atlasshrugs2000.typepad.com/atlas_shrugs/2013/06/lawlessness-blackouts-sexual-attack-roil-egypt-as-us-warns-against-pyramids-tourism.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=facebook
A triumph of democracy ! Thanks president Obama!
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http://freedomoutpost.com/2013/06/kerry-waive-restrictions-on-foreign-aid-sends-egypt-1-3-billion/
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http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2013/06/17/egypt-shoots-tourism-industry-in-the-foot/
June 17, 2013
Egypt Shoots Tourism Industry in the Foot
Handing over control of a tourist hotspot to a party that loathes tourists is asking for trouble, but that’s exactly what Egypt has just done. On Sunday, President Morsi appointed Adel al-Khayat of the Gamaa al-Islamiyya party as Governor of Luxor, a region home to the ruins of two temples and several monuments, widely known as the “open air museum.” The party, Gamaa al-Islamiyya, not only holds conservative views against sunbathing, women wearing shorts, and alcohol, but is also responsible for the 1997 attack in Luxor that killed 60 tourists. The New York Times reports:
“A fatwa, or religious decree, published on the Gamaa al-Islamiyya’s Web site advised members of the group not to build tourist accommodations. ‘Because tourist villages have aspects that anger Allah, including alcohol, gambling and other forbidden things, building these hotels and villages is considered aiding their owners in sin and aggression, and is not permitted,’ the decision read.”
This is a boneheaded move for a country that relies so heavily upon tourism for its economic well-being. Tourism accounts for more than 11 percent of Egypt’s GDP, and 90 percent of Egyptians employed in Luxor work in industries that depend on tourism to stay afloat. The revolution and the political turmoil following it has already dealt a blow to the country’s tourist economy, and this recent appointment will only make things worse. Egypt’s death spiral continues…
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http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/21/us-soldiers-set-deploy-egypt-riot-control/
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/24/you_can_t_eat_sharia
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/27/will_june_30_be_midnight_for_morsis_cinderella_story
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http://minutemennews.com/2013/06/obama-supports-terrorism-the-egyptian-peoples-message-for-america/
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Egypt's Tamarod Movement Challenges the Muslim Brotherhood
Analysis
June 28, 2013 | 0600 Print Text Size
Summary
The shared interests that have driven the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and the country's military together over the past year remain, but large, sustained protests could strain that relationship and force the military to reassess its options. Anti-government protests planned for June 30 by a recently formed opposition movement called Tamarod represent a particularly potent threat to the political legitimacy of President Mohammed Morsi's regime.
The Tamarod movement's ultimate intent with the upcoming demonstrations is to instigate enough unrest on Egypt's streets to force the military to intervene -- an unlikely result. However, even if the protests fizzle and fall short of this goal, Tamarod has given a voice to the growing, visceral dissatisfaction with Morsi's government in Egypt -- one that could undermine the Muslim Brotherhood's ability to govern and its performance in future elections.
Analysis
The Tamarod movement claims it has collected some 15 million signatures on a petition calling for an early presidential election and for Morsi to leave office. The opposition wants to delegitimize the Morsi regime to force its removal and -- since the military would not want to govern the country -- ultimately be installed in its place. But this ambitious plan would require either huge numbers of protesters or security incidents larger than those that occurred in Port Said and other Egyptian cities in March. The opposition may also have underestimated the Muslim Brotherhood's ability to mobilize its own supporters, either for counter-demonstrations or to provide its constituents with staples such as food and fuel.
Thus, it is unlikely that the Tamarod protests will succeed in deposing Morsi. But the size and intensity of the upcoming protests will still test the legitimacy of the regime. Opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood-led government is getting stronger, and Morsi's position appears to be vulnerable because the Muslim Brotherhood's attempts to solve Egypt's economic problems have been ineffective. The opposition hopes to break the political alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood, the country's most organized political entity, and the Egyptian military, the country's ultimate arbiter of power.
Opposition Parties Unite
Tamarod, which means "rebel" in Arabic, has united a range of Egyptian opposition groups. The movement was founded by three activists previously associated with the Egyptian Movement for Change, known as the Kefaya movement, which started in 2004 in opposition to then-President Hosni Mubarak. Though Kefaya was involved in the protests that brought down the former president in 2011, it did not organize them or participate in large numbers. Tamarod began attracting small numbers of volunteers in recent months and announced its existence and platform on May 1.
What's at Stake in Egypt's Weekend Protests
Since then, Tamarod has seen its support grow exponentially. The group maintains a headquarters in Cairo and boasts networks of grassroots organizers and volunteers in every Egyptian province. Several other secular opposition groups have rallied around Tamarod's momentum, including the National Salvation Front, the April 6 youth movement, the Constitution party and the Egyptian Conference party. Since the fall of Mubarak, the Egyptian opposition has been undermined by friction among these smaller parties, but Tamarod has been able to unite them around a common goal -- the removal of Morsi. The movement has been so successful that other politicians are trying to co-opt its influence for themselves. For example, Ahmed Shafiq, Mubarak's former prime minister and Morsi's opponent in the June 2012 presidential election, signed the petition to the chagrin of some Tamarod supporters, who view his participation as an attempt to restore the previous regime.
Morsi has also begun to face opposition from Islamist and religious factions. In April, the Salafist Al-Nour group joined the National Salvation Front, a largely secular and liberal umbrella group for the political opposition, in calling for Morsi to form a new government, and Al-Nour has tried to remain neutral publicly in the Tamarod issue by refusing to participate in any demonstrations -- either for or against Morsi. Moreover, though the country's religious establishment at al-Azhar University has long been at odds with the Muslim Brotherhood, the university's top religious scholar, Sheikh Ahmed el-Tayeb, issued a fatwa a week ago declaring that peaceful protests against the government are legitimate under Islamic law.
All of this points to a deeper malaise affecting Egypt's fledgling democracy. The country's political forces are seeking a democratic order, but they remain inherently anti-democratic in their approaches. The Tamarod movement reflects this problem: The secular opposition hopes that instability in the streets will force the army to disassociate itself from the current political process. Divisions among the opposition remain, but a consensus is growing that, one way or another, Morsi must step down.
Still, the full extent of Tamarod's capabilities remain unclear. While the movement has certainly energized and united the opposition, the group's claim of gathering millions of petition signatures is likely inflated. The petitions being passed out by grassroots volunteers cannot realistically be tracked, and anyone can add their name on Tamarod's website multiple times. Thus, the June 30 protests will indicate just how popular the movement has become. The group will be truly effective only if it can force the hand of the military. Absent an intervention, the protests will be no more significant over the long-term than were the Port Said protests in March or anti-Morsi protests in November and December 2012.
The Regime's Waning Popularity
Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood is struggling to consolidate its power and move Egypt beyond political gridlock, and the group's popularity is waning due to ineffective governance. Because of disputes between the Morsi regime and the judiciary, overdue parliamentary elections have yet to be scheduled -- even though Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court ruled June 2 that the interim governing body, the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated Shura Council, is illegal. Egypt's economic crisis has persisted, with little progress made on the subsidy reforms needed for Egypt to secure an International Monetary Fund loan or address its trade deficit and dwindling foreign reserves. The government is considering implementing a smart-card system to ration fuel, but implementation of the program has been delayed multiple times, and fuel shortages have become frequent. Furthering Egypt's woes, Ethiopia recently raised tensions with Cairo by announcing plans to build a dam on an upstream section of the Blue Nile, and militants in Sinai kidnapped security forces in May.
Agenda
Egypt's Current Crisis (Agenda)
Since the Muslim Brotherhood has been unable to make any of the needed systemic changes, the group is attempting to boost its popularity in other ways. As part of the subsidy reforms, the Morsi government plans to engage in a bread-rationing program and attempt to prevent bakers from selling flour for profit. Reforming bread subsidies is a contentious issue in Egypt, since many of the country's 84 million people rely on them. To limit political backlash, the Muslim Brotherhood is utilizing hundreds of nongovernmental organizations to provide bread directly to people. The group will likely organize other, similar programs to try to stem the rising tide of dissent against it.
The Military's Cautious Role
The Egyptian military is caught between a desire to perpetuate its own hold over the state while struggling to prevent the polity from descending into anarchy, and the best way to do that remains cooperation with Morsi's government. Since the military has no desire to rule the country directly, it needs to maintain the integrity of the office of the presidency and its partnership with the Muslim Brotherhood. Though the army is more ideologically aligned with the secular opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood is still the most organized civilian organization in Egypt. Thus, the military and the Muslim Brotherhood are unlikely partners, and the forces binding them together have not shifted meaningfully.
The military would not mind if Morsi's popularity took another hit and would likely welcome organized challengers to balance him. However, it cannot stand aside if the unrest leads to violence that undermines the state. In the past, the army has intervened in limited, tactical ways, such as in Port Said. On June 23, Egyptian military chief Col. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi warned that the army would intervene if clashes with the opposition spin out of control and threaten to lead the country into "a dark tunnel of conflict." Already troops have begun to deploy around media and government buildings.
The Tamarod movement will likely fail to oust Morsi because the protests will probably lack the overwhelming scale necessary to provoke much more than a minor intervention. Moreover, a removal of Morsi by the military would set a dangerous precedent, making street protests the deciding factor in political power. Still, the Tamarod movement is a manifestation of the growing popular dissatisfaction with Morsi's regime -- and the first indication that the opposition might be capable of coalescing into something beyond fragmented parties.
If the June 30 protests help the opposition organize around particular leaders and principles, the movement will be remembered as a key development in Egyptian political history. But if it splinters soon after the protests, Tamarod will embody little more than another moment of social catharsis while Egypt continues stumbling along on the same path it has for 28 months since Mubarak's fall.
Read more: Egypt's Tamarod Movement Challenges the Muslim Brotherhood | Stratfor
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I read an AP version of the Egypt protest story yesterday and Strat and WSJ (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324328204578573423054562056.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEADTop) and I still cannot tell who is better or worse from our point of view, Morsi or whoever would replace him if the crowd today had its way. Summarized by the last line in the WSJ editorial: "The alternatives are all ugly."
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vux_-vJvHww
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/07/03/15-anti-obama-photos-from-tahrir-square-protests-that-you-probably-havent-seen/
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second post
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57592254/state-dept-orders-diplomats-to-leave-egypt/
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Summary
Egypt's crisis goes much deeper than the recent political chaos. With the leader of the Supreme Constitutional Court taking over the presidency at the behest of the military, the new government will likely represent a coalition of interests facing many of the same challenges that brought about Mohammed Morsi's downfall. Egypt's population has grown well beyond the means of the state to support its needs, and even a strong state will struggle to ensure sufficient supplies of basic staples, particularly fuel and wheat.
Analysis
Underlying the question of what political structure will emerge from this week's crisis, the fundamental fact is that Egypt is running out of money. Dwindling foreign reserves point to a negative balance of payments that is sapping central bank resources. At the same time, Egypt's reliance on foreign supplies of fuel and wheat is only growing. Egyptian petroleum production peaked in 1996 and the country first became a net importer in 2007. Government fuel subsidies are an enormous burden on state finances and, throughout the past year, failures to pay suppliers and a shortage of foreign exchange available to importers have caused supply shortfalls and price spikes throughout the country.
The government has a few options, including backing off subsidies in hopes that higher prices will help reduce consumption and therefore cut down on the net drain on state finances. That route carries a high risk of a major political backlash, so it is more likely that the government will continue, if not increase, its commitment to using state funds to guarantee sufficient supply and low prices.
The second major challenge stems from Egypt's extreme vulnerability to international food markets. Though dire warnings of food shortages have been frequent in the media, they have not yet appeared with any significant frequency within Egypt. However, this is not to say that they will not eventually appear. Bread is a staple of the Egyptian diet, and Egypt relies on imports for more than half of its wheat consumption. Although farmland within Egypt is increasingly dedicated to growing wheat, there is simply not enough arable land for Egypt to feed its population.
In fact, although Egypt is a vast country geographically, most of it is uninhabitable desert. Population growth is accelerating in Egypt's densely packed urban centers, threatening to worsen these underlying challenges. Population growth in 2012 hit its highest levels since 1991, reaching 32 births per 1,000 people and bringing the country's population to 84 million, according to initial government estimates. This represents an increase of 50 percent from 1990, when the population was just 56 million. Egypt's fertility rate is currently 2.9 children per woman and is expected to remain above the replacement ratio of 2.1 for at least the next two decades. As a result, the United Nations projects the Egyptian population to exceed 100 million by 2030. This means that Egypt will have a growing pool of young people of working age in the coming decades, creating substantial challenges for the Egyptian state to provide them with economic opportunities, or at the least sufficient basic goods.
Ousted Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak faced similar problems, and growing poverty and joblessness are arguably among the root causes of the uprising in 2011 that unseated him. The wave of protests that challenged Morsi, who became the first democratically elected president in the country's history, should be understood as a continuation of this swelling trend. While previous governments in Egypt have been able to leverage strategic rent from foreign countries interested in maintaining stability in Egypt, which is the linchpin between the Middle East and North Africa and the manager of the Suez Canal, the country has become increasingly peripheral to the strategic needs of major powers.
As a result, although Egypt has been able to secure some limited funding from regional players such as Qatar, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Libya, it remains locked in negotiations with the International Monetary Fund over some broader, more sustainable financial relief. It is possible that the new government will find a level of stability that the increasingly isolated Muslim Brotherhood leadership was unable to sustain in the face of rising disputes with former coalition partners and a firmly obstructionist judiciary. However, the military's decision to unseat Morsi underlined the instability inherent in Egypt's political system and may make it even more difficult for Egypt to return to the good graces of financial markets or Western powers. In any case, mounting demographic and economic pressures mean that the job of managing Egypt's economic challenges will become incrementally more difficult with each passing year and for each faction that occupies the presidential palace.
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Analysis
The Arab Spring was an exercise in irony, nowhere more so than in Egypt. On the surface, it appeared to be the Arab equivalent of 1989 in Eastern Europe. There, the Soviet occupation suppressed a broad, if not universal desire for constitutional democracy modeled on Western Europe. The year 1989 shaped a generation's thinking in the West, and when they saw the crowds in the Arab streets, they assumed that they were seeing Eastern Europe once again.
There were certainly constitutional democrats in the Arab streets in 2011, but they were not the main thrust. Looking back on the Arab Spring, it is striking how few personalities were replaced, how few regimes fell, and how much chaos was left in its wake. The uprising in Libya resulted in a Western military intervention that deposed former leader Moammar Gadhafi and replaced him with massive uncertainty. The uprising in Syria has not replaced Syrian President Bashar al Assad but instead sparked a war between him and an Islamist-dominated opposition. Elsewhere, revolts have been contained with relative ease. The irony of the Arab Spring was that in opening the door for popular discontent, it demonstrated that while the discontent was real, it was neither decisive nor clearly inclined toward constitutional democracy.
This is what makes Egypt so interesting. The Egyptian uprising has always been the most ambiguous even while being cited as the most decisive. It is true that former President Hosni Mubarak fell in 2011. It is also true that elections were held in 2012, when a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood's election as president highlighted the reality that a democratic election is not guaranteed to produce a liberal democratic result. In any case, the now-deposed president, Mohammed Morsi, won by only a slim margin and he was severely constrained as to what he could do.
But the real issue in Egypt has always been something else. Though a general was forced out of office in 2011, it was not clear that the military regime did not remain, if not in power, then certainly the ultimate arbiter of power in Egyptian politics. Over the past year, so long as Morsi remained the elected president, the argument could be made that the military had lost its power. But just as we argued that the fall of Hosni Mubarak had been engineered by the military in order to force a succession that the aging Mubarak resisted, we can also argue that while the military had faded into the background, it remained the decisive force in Egypt.
Modern Egypt was founded in 1952 in a military coup by Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser was committed to modernizing Egypt, and he saw the army as the only real instrument of modernization. He was a secularist committed to the idea that Arab nations ought to be united, but not Islamist by any means. He was a socialist, but not a communist. Above all else, he was an Egyptian army officer committed to the principle that the military guaranteed the stability of the Egyptian nation.
When the uprisings of the Arab Spring came, Nasser's successors used the unrest to force Mubarak out, and then they stepped back. It is interesting to consider whether they would have been content to retain their institutional position under a Muslim Brotherhood-led government. However, Morsi never really took control of the machinery of government, partly because he was politically weak, partly because the Muslim Brotherhood was not ready to govern, and partly because the military never quite let go.
This dynamic culminated in the demonstrations of this "Egyptian Summer." The opposition leadership appears to support constitutional democracy. Whether the masses in the streets do as well or whether they simply dislike the Muslim Brotherhood is difficult to tell, but we suspect their interests are about food and jobs more than about the principles of liberalism. Still, there was an uprising, and once again the military put it to use.
In part, the military did not want to see chaos, and it saw itself as responsible for averting it. In part, the military distrusted the Muslim Brotherhood and was happy to see it forced out of office. As in 2011, the army acted overtly to maintain order and simultaneously to shape the Egyptian political order. They deposed Morsi, effectively replacing him with a more secular and overtly liberal leadership.
But what must be kept in mind is that, just as in 2011, when the military was willing to pave the way for Morsi, so too is it now paving the way for his opposition. And this is the crucial point -- while Egypt is increasingly unstable, the army is shaping what order might come out of it. The military is less interested in the ideology of the government than in containing chaos. Given this mission, it does not see itself as doing more than stepping back. It does not see itself as letting go.
The irony of the Egyptian Arab Spring is that while it brought forth new players, it has not changed the regime or the fundamental architecture of Egyptian politics. The military remains the dominant force, and while it is prepared to shape Egypt cleverly, what matters is that it will continue to shape Egypt.
Therefore, while it is legitimate to discuss a military coup, it is barely legitimate to do so. What is going on is that there is broad unhappiness in Egypt that is now free to announce its presence. This unhappiness takes many ideological paths, as well as many that have nothing to do with ideology. Standing on stage with the unhappiness is the military, manipulating, managing and containing it. Everyone else, all of the politicians, come and go, playing a short role and moving on -- the military and the crowd caught in a long, complex and barely comprehensible dance.
Read more: The Next Phase of the Arab Spring | Stratfor
Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter | Stratfor on Facebook
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Someone I know who travels around the World went to Egypt not too long ago. She loved the pyramids. She did not go to see the mummies. She is a Buddhist and does not believe in disturbing the dead. But above all she complained about people approaching her and the other travelers trying to sell them things and asking for money. She said it is like that in poor countries but in Egypt her experience was worse. Usually one can just say no and the beggar or vendor would back off but there they were in her face and very pushy and would not take no for an answer.
Just anecdotal.
Anyone on this board been to Egypt?
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http://frontpagemag.com/2013/dgreenfield/morsi-appoints-member-of-al-qaeda-allied-group-that-massacred-european-tourists-in-luxor-governor-of-luxor/
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Not short, but seems worthy of the time:
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/morsi-brotherhood-lost-egypt-bsabry.html
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Summary
The latest deadly clashes in Cairo are likely to undermine the Egyptian military's plans for the country and push it toward greater violence. The political unrest in Egypt sparked by the ouster of President Mohammed Morsi worsened when at least 42 supporters of Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood were killed and another 300 were wounded in a confrontation with security forces outside the Republican Guards headquarters July 8.
Analysis
It is not entirely clear what led to the shooting, with the military reporting that pro-Morsi "terrorists" sought to climb the walls of the Republican Guards headquarters where Morsi is being held and the Brotherhood claiming that the attack was unprovoked. The Muslim Brotherhood's political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, called for a general uprising in Egypt and called on the international community to intervene to prevent further "massacres." The military also closed the Brotherhood's Cairo headquarters, claiming that stockpiled weapons were found inside.
The country's second-largest Islamist group, the Hizb al-Nour party, which has been siding with the opposition and endorsed the military's post-Morsi roadmap, announced that it was pulling out of the political process after the killings. A day earlier, al-Nour issued a statement opposing the moves to appoint Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the main secularist umbrella group, the National Salvation Front, as prime minister. The decision by al-Nour -- already uncomfortable with the direction of the roadmap -- to pull out from the political process after the July 8 killings shows how the political landscape is polarizing along ideological lines.
At this early stage, al-Nour's decision could be a tactical one, designed to manage an increasingly difficult situation and/or extract concessions from the military authorities. However, it works to the advantage of the Muslim Brotherhood's strategic imperative of trying to prevent the roadmap from succeeding. The Brotherhood understands that it is unlikely to be able to restore the Morsi presidency and is thus trying to create a situation in which the military cannot impose a new political order.
The Brotherhood's central leader, Mohammed Badie, issued a statement that military chief Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was pushing Egypt into a Syria-like situation, and the movement has called for an uprising to resist the military coup. However, the Brotherhood is not interested in an armed conflict. Rather, such statements and protests are geared toward creating a gridlock, where the Brotherhood can force the military and its political opponents into negotiations with the Islamist movement. The Brotherhood is attempting to extract concessions to minimize its political losses and eventually re-enter the process without looking as though it had accepted the coup.
Such a strategy involves weeks, if not months, of civil unrest, which entails considerable risks. Though the Brotherhood is a well-disciplined organization, some of its elements could be radicalized by the Morsi ouster and the clashes that have been taking place since. Already there are reports in the Egyptian press about the formation of an Ikhwan Ahrar Front that has criticized Badie and other senior Brotherhood leaders, blaming them for the 42 deaths. Moreover, there is no shortage of more right-wing Islamist elements that can seize the opportunity to push for an armed struggle. Attacks have already occurred in the Sinai, and a jihadist outfit called Ansar al-Shariah announced its formation.
Indeed, al Qaeda-style jihadists who have long condemned democracy as un-Islamic are seizing upon Morsi's ouster to reiterate that the Muslim Brotherhood's participation in mainstream politics cannot succeed, and change can only be brought about through armed struggle, as in Syria. This is a problem for both the Brotherhood and its opponents, as neither wants jihadists to exploit their enmity. There is considerable talk among political pundits about present-day Egypt going the way of Algeria during the 1990s, when a nearly decade-long insurgency killed as many as 200,000 people after the 1992 military coup annulled the elections in which an Islamist movement was poised to win overwhelmingly.
However, there are many differences between Egypt and Algeria. Algeria's Front Islamique de Salut, which was headed for an electoral victory, was a new party formed hurriedly and serving as an umbrella for multiple Islamist currents -- the core of which were Salafists (including many jihadists). In sharp contrast, Egypt's Brotherhood has been around for 85 years and is a well-organized group that has long been on the path of mainstream politics. This is why jihadism, though born in Egypt, never displaced mainstream Islamism despite the decades-long suppression of the Brotherhood at the hands of the autocratic regimes during the Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak presidencies.
Furthermore, Egypt's two main jihadist groups, Tandheem al-Jihad and Gamaah al-Islamiyah, have long renounced violence and in fact adopted the Brotherhood approach in the wake of the Arab Spring uprising that ousted Mubarak. Therefore, it is unlikely that transnational jihadists will be able to steer Egypt toward a civil war like Algeria's during the 1990s or post-Arab Spring Syria's. That said, Egypt is likely to see its share of violence (in many cases in the form of militant attacks) as a result of many other factors. Fighting is likely to continue and escalate along ideological lines with selective engagement by the military, which may or may not distinguish between the Brotherhood and the more radical elements. Moreover, the Muslim holy month of Ramadan begins at sundown July 8. Ramadan generally motivates Muslims -- especially Islamists -- to strive harder for their causes and makes it easier to mobilize their followers, though activities during this time are more likely after sundown, when Muslims break their daily fasts.
Conversely, the Brotherhood's use of inflammatory rhetoric in an already charged atmosphere in an effort to mobilize its supporters against the coup will only give the more radical elements openings to exploit and could blur the line between the Brotherhood's cadre and more radical forces. With the Brotherhood's senior leadership in jail, the mainstream Islamist movement may not be able to control the unrest it is currently fomenting. Jihadist forces, realizing that the window of opportunity for them is narrow, would like to prevent any compromise between the military and the Brotherhood in the short term. Therefore, the duration and intensity of the crisis in Egypt will depend upon the Brotherhood and the military's ability (or lack thereof) to reach a political compromise.
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IPT News
July 10, 2013
http://www.investigativeproject.org/4076/violent-mb-rhetoric-drives-fuels-egyptian-tension
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Dozens of Muslim Brotherhood officials – including Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie – are being arrested by Egyptian officials for allegedly inciting violence that ended with more than 50 people dead on Monday.
Most of the violence took place outside the Egyptian Army's Republican Guard headquarters in Cairo, as Brotherhood members protested last week's ouster of President Mohamed Morsi after massive popular demonstrations. Brotherhood officials blame the army for the deaths, saying it opened fire on peaceful demonstrators.
Army officials say the Brotherhood plotted the violence by throwing bricks and stones, firing guns at soldiers and tossing Molotov cocktails and other weapons, said an article in the Arabic-language Alarab translated by the Investigative Project on Terrorism. An army spokesman said they would seek to charge Brotherhood officials "with trying to ignite sedition against the armed forces to the detriment of public security of the armed forces and the consequent damage to public security."
It is unclear exactly what happened outside the Republican Guard building and whether the army's response was excessive. A New Yorker reporter spoke with a doctor who said he witnessed the violence outside his apartment building. He described hearing "people through megaphones encouraging jihad" and then seeing masked men on motorcycles fire guns past protesters and at the soldiers guarding the building. "Then the Army started firing. And the protestors were firing. I saw firing from both sides."
A CBS News report describes videos showing "protesters on rooftops lobbing projectiles at troops below, including firebombs and toilet seats. It also showed some armed protesters firing at close range at the troops, but it did not show what the military did."
Brotherhood rhetoric throughout the past week has emphasized violence over passive, peaceful protest.
Morsi set that tone himself July 2 after the army issued a 48-hour ultimatum for him to leave office or negotiate a settlement with opposition leaders.
"I am prepared to sacrifice my blood for the sake of the security and stability of this homeland," Morsi said in a speech that further inflamed the situation. A spokesman later added that Morsi would rather die "standing like a tree" than yield power.
Similarly, the head of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party urged Morsi supporters to die defending his rule. "Now is the time for martyrdom," said Mohamed Al-Beltagy. He is among those being charged in the wake of Monday's violence.
After interim leadership was announced, Badie gave a speech declaring it a fraud.
"People of Egypt, those gathered in all its squares, the Brotherhood has lived with you and you with them and they served you," he said. "Morsi is my president, your president and the president of all Egyptians. God, you are the witness, all these people have gone out in the streets to support your religion and free Egypt from attempts to steal its revolution. We will remain in all the squares to protect our elected President Mohamed Morsi."
An Al Jazeera report Monday also translated by the IPT said the Brotherhood was calling for an 'Intifada' against those who forced them from power.
Meanwhile, the Brotherhood is rejecting a proposal to revamp Egypt's constitution and hold new elections within six months. It continues to demand that Morsi be reinstated as president.
"We do not deal with putchists," said Brotherhood spokesman Tareq El-Morsi. "We reject all that comes from this coup."
Gulf states are expressing their pleasure at seeing the Brotherhood forced from powering, with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates promising $12 billion in emergency aid to alleviate Egypt's economic crisis.
A perception that Morsi failed to act enough on economic challenges, while trying to entrench Muslim Brotherhood power over that government, fueled much of the anger and protests against him. The group stands to lose even more if it continues to incite against the country's new direction.
"The Brotherhood is facing a serious existential challenge," Khaled Fahmy, chairman of American University in Cairo's history department told Al-Ahram. "They can either adopt a critical attitude and ask themselves what went wrong, or blame other political forces and the whole democratic system for their own shortcomings."
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Also, I note that Saudi Arabia has given the new govt $5B (!) and the UAE (or was it Qatar?) has given $3B. This is serious $$$!!! In contrast the US gives a bit under $2B per year.
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The U.S. moves forward with plan to send F-16s to Egypt
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The United States is going forward with a plan to deliver four F-16 fighter jets to Egypt despite the current political crisis. The U.S. administration has been careful not to designate the removal of Mohamed Morsi from Egypt's presidency last week as a coup, or by law Washington would have to suspend financial assistance. U.S. defense officials said the jets, built by Lockheed Martin, would likely be sent in August. The delivery is part of a deal for 20 planes in total, eight of which were sent to Egypt in January. The Pentagon reiterated that the administration is reviewing U.S. assistance to Egypt, however "The delivery remains scheduled as planned." On Wednesday, Kuwait pledged $4 billion in assistance to Egypt in order to alleviate its failing economy, adding to the $8 million promised by Saudi Arabia and Qatar a day prior. Meanwhile, Egyptian prosecutors are working to detain Muslim Brotherhood leaders, accusing them of inciting violence outside the Republican Guard headquarters on Monday, which left 51 Morsi supporters dead. Additionally, signs of improving living conditions for many people in Egypt, particularly a sudden end to energy shortages and a reemergence of the police, suggest a campaign by the opposition to undermine Morsi while he was in power.
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http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/07/10/egyptian-christians-face-horror-at-islamists-hands-in-the-wake-of-morsis-ouster/
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second post
Cutting Off Aid to Egypt Would Be a Mistake
The military move last week stopped a burgeoning theocracy. Now Egypt needs U.S. help more than ever.
by JOHN BOLTON
Decisive action by Egypt's military has brought down President Mohammed Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood government, but the Brotherhood is not going quietly. It has condemned the coup as "illegitimate," arguing that its candidates won free and fair elections. It refuses to cooperate with the interim government and on Monday provoked the military to violence. More than 50 demonstrators were killed—no doubt the Brotherhood, in its twisted thinking, considers them martyrs to the cause.
The anti-Morsi protesters who last week effectively triggered the army's move to depose him were briefly elated at his fall. But now they are hopelessly divided about how to proceed. Ironically, this "opposition" initially included the leading Salafist political party, which is even more radically Islamist than the Brotherhood. The Salafists' support for the coup has wavered, but the group clearly has an eye on outmaneuvering the Brotherhood in the new political environment.
i
The military has so far remained cohesive, underlining Mr. Morsi's error in believing that he had brought it under control following his year-long effort as president to pack the armed forces with generals loyal to the Brotherhood. The military acted to overthrow Mr. Morsi only reluctantly and would likely prefer returning to its barracks (and its own lucrative business enterprises) and its decades-long role directing Egypt's overall state security.
After the past week's violence, however, it is probably impossible for the military to withdraw from a continuing, prominent role, especially since its civilian allies are so feckless. Nonetheless, new interim President Adly Mansour has decreed a rapid return to electoral politics: a constitutional referendum in four months, parliamentary elections two months later and presidential elections thereafter. It is hard to imagine a more rapid transition, if it could be implemented successfully.
Unfortunately, continuing instability and violence in Egypt appear likely, a far cry from the flourishing of democracy that "Arab Spring" advocates confidently predicted two-plus years ago. Their confidence now rings especially hollow given the Muslim Brotherhood's significant election victories last year in both presidential and parliamentary elections. That those victories now lie in ruins is only due to Mr. Morsi's overreaching and incompetence.
In the midst of Egypt's political disarray and economic collapse, what should America's policy be? Unfortunately, there doesn't seem to be a policy. Even President Obama's media supporters now complain that he remains irresolute while Egyptians riot, the Camp David accord with Israel teeters, and world oil prices rise for fear that the Suez Canal might close.
Refraining from unnecessary public statements may be tactically wise now. But what are America's leaders doing behind the scenes as the future of the most populous and influential Arab nation hangs in the balance?
Many Americans, concerned that a "democratically elected" government has been ousted, argue that we should, as current law requires, terminate assistance to Egypt until another election takes place. This view is wrong on several counts.
First, while the Muslim Brotherhood prevailed in the 2012 elections, it worked assiduously thereafter to cement itself in power by manipulating the instruments of governance, such as packing the military, challenging the Mubarak-era appointees in the judiciary and writing a constitution that suited its ultimate objective of an Islamist state.
Second, democracy rests on much more than simply conducting elections. Liberty is the more profound objective, encompassing attributes like freedom of conscience and speech and constitutional restraints on government power. These are as important to a free society as the bare mechanics of elections. Thus understood, the Brotherhood's single-minded focus under President Morsi—to establish a harsh theocracy that would put an end to freedom of conscience and dissent—was manifestly unacceptable.
Accordingly, the military had little choice but to move, both to prevent the Brotherhood from continuing its own creeping coup and to avoid potentially deadly civil conflict. That the Brotherhood has launched violent protests since July 3 shows its determination to reclaim power and likely presages even broader violence. Had the army hesitated beyond last week, instability, carnage and the threat to any prospect of a free, open society would likely have been much worse.
It follows that cutting off U.S. assistance to Egypt now would be seriously mistaken, as would pressuring other donors to withhold financial assistance to rescue Egypt's economy from the deepening morass that Mr. Morsi let it become. Such cutbacks also would send exactly the wrong political message to the factions within Egypt, the Middle East more broadly, and America's friends and allies world-wide. Congress should make a quick, technical statutory fix that allows U.S. aid to continue despite the coup.
Egypt's military deserves the sign of U.S. support that continued assistance would send, especially to counter the deleterious consequences in 2011 when President Hosni Mubarak came under public pressure and President Obama wavered in support, then ultimately tossed Mr. Mubarak aside. Everyone, whatever their politics, agrees that Egypt's economy needs massive assistance.
Plainly this is the time for American leadership—not to sort out Egypt's manifold internal political difficulties, but to assert a clear-eyed view of America's enduring interests in the Middle East. Let's hope the Obama administration wakes up in time.
Mr. Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad" (Simon & Schuster, 2007).
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third post
Editor's note: George Friedman will return to the Geopolitical Weekly on July 16.
By Michael Nayebi-Oskoui
Ongoing debates surrounding the categorization of Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi's July 3 ouster from office -- whether it qualified as a military coup or a democratic uprising -- are best left to think tanks. What Egypt needs, according to its geography, population size and economic condition, is stability, and this stability is best achieved through the centralization of strong state power and control. History bears this out; the pharaohs were able to build an empire on the banks of a river coursing through the desert under such a model. Subsequent foreign occupiers took heed of the pharaonic example, instituting a strong centralized authority backed with military might. Gamal Abdel Nasser's military coup overthrew the monarchy in 1952, establishing the latest iteration of a stable, independent Egyptian state.
Egypt's Challenges
The presence of a democratic political system along the lines of a Western-style liberal democracy is at best an arbitrary indicator of stability for many Middle Eastern governments, particularly Egypt. And for a region that is facing the United States' diminishing direct engagement, this stability is key. Whatever its motivation, when Egypt's military expelled Morsi, it largely guaranteed two of Washington's key interests: namely, that it will not attack Israel, and more important, it will keep the Suez Canal free and clear to international trade. As Morsi has no doubt learned by now, little else regarding the domestic politics and policies of the Egyptian state affects the decision making of the United States or other Western powers as long as the military-backed order is maintained.
The events of the past week have established a difficult precedent for the military and its management of the Egyptian state. Since the 2011 unrest that preceded the ouster of former President Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian society has increasingly looked to public protest and social unrest as a legitimate means of affecting political change, at least outwardly. While the military has remained the final arbiter of power, its position has become less secure following each wave of unrest.
The 18 months of direct military rule after Mubarak's removal from office brought Egypt's generals into direct competition with the aspirations of Egypt's youth movements, culminating in large-scale protests in January 2012 that led to the call for elections. Those elections brought Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood to power. When state security forces joined protesters during the Port Said riots of early 2013, the military again had to intervene to ensure domestic stability and security, again setting a precedent of direct involvement that ran counter to nearly 50 years of indirect state management through a pliant political front party.
With the fall of Morsi's government, the military has again stepped into a very public and difficult role of having to reconcile the various political factions of the Egyptian public while maintaining its own interests, within the geopolitical constraints of the Egyptian state. The democratic system that led to the installment of Morsi's government failed to harness or contain the proliferation of street politics that emerged after Mubarak's fall. If ongoing Islamist protests against the military's most recent political roadmap are any indication, it doesn't appear Egypt's generals will have much more success managing the country's emergent protest culture. A distracted Egyptian military and an increasingly restive Egyptian population do not bode well for domestic, or regional, stability.
The Middle East's Need for Strong Leadership
Democracy is often touted by Western pundits as an ideal for Middle Eastern states, but the reality of the democratic process often results in outcomes that undermine Western and international interests in the region. Post-Gadhafi Libya has had relative success in holding elections and convening an elected government largely representative of the various regions and political currents within the country. However, the General National Congress has failed to reach consensus or extend its authority beyond the confines of the building where it meets. The inability of the central government or its military to impose its will on strong local centers has prevented the re-emergence of a Libyan strongman like Gadhafi, but it has also hampered the establishment of a permanent government to manage the Libyan state, including imposing Gadhafi-era stability.
The result has been fluctuating oil production, ongoing violence in regional centers such as Benghazi and general lawlessness in its vast swathes of desert territory, the latter of concern to Westerners seeking to limit the expansion of regional Islamist militant organizations. Libya's democratic experiment has resulted in a central government that is not convincingly stronger than any of its regional power centers -- Libya is now much more a collection of competing power centers than a centralized state. We can understand the constraints of Egypt's generals preventing them from flirting with such a system.
Unlike Libya, Iran's political system presents a case study in which democratic practices help cement strong centralized authority, and by extension, stability in the region. Like Egypt, Iran's political system features an element of stability that persists beyond the time frame of individual presidents or administrations in the role of the supreme leader, himself a representative of a broader military-clerical partnership. Unlike the Egyptian military, however, the Iranian supreme leader's role is formally acknowledged within the Iranian Constitution, which at least on paper provides a system of checks and balances and a system of nominating and removing him from office if need be.
Iran's democratic system has allowed for enough competition for power within its system to prevent the Islamic republic from coalescing around one figure or one institution, and it is exactly this competition for authority that has helped the regime endure through two supreme leaders and several presidents. Though not directly elected, Iran's supreme leader helps ensure the continuation of key Iranian policy throughout the course of different presidential administrations, though as outgoing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's second term has shown us, presidents are not the pawns of the supreme leader.
But more than anything else, Iran's stability draws on its geographic identity and relative security. With its mountainous geography helping to define a millennia-old Persian identity, Iran has persisted even after several waves of invasion. Iran's rugged territory and the various ethnic and linguistic groups that it supports favor a strong centralized power tempered with localized self-rule under the Persian administrative system. In short, the historical legacy of Persian administration is reflected in modern Iran's unique democratic system; by creating a venue for competition between various political factions, it leaves the military-clerical elite better able to contain this opposition and impose order. Egypt lacks any such system, thereby ensuring that large-scale unrest rather than organized political competition will continue to limit the military's options in managing the Egyptian state.
The Military's Geopolitical Reality
Egypt's borders, like those in most of the Arab world, are artificial boundaries drawn up by European powers through large stretches of featureless desert. Unlike many of its neighbors, Egypt boasts a largely homogenous population and a well-defined geographic core: the Nile Valley. But Egypt's geography presents challenges as well.
Much like ancient Egypt, modern Egypt features very densely populated strips of population living along the Nile surrounded by large regions of desert. Egypt's geographical reality has long shaped its political necessities, favoring a strong centralized authority with the organizational skill to control and move large groups of people around difficult terrain. Infrastructure is costly to develop, and while the Nile can support a large population, it requires labor- and management-intensive irrigation systems and food distribution schemes to ensure there is enough wheat and bread to go around. Egypt's military has for the past five decades moved comfortably into the role previously held by strong foreign occupiers and Egypt's original rulers, although the population growth of recent years has added significant strain to the military's ability to manage its population's needs given Egypt's limited economic resources.
The challenge for Egypt's military now is whether it can continue to maintain its monopoly on authority. Like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's related parties in Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia and Turkey, Egypt's military regime also inspired similar military-backed governments in the Arab world, from Algeria to Iraq. The past decade has not been good to these secular military regimes -- there was the ouster of Saddam Hussein, a popular uprising against the Syrian Baathist regime and the dissolution of the Algerian military's monopoly on power. The Egyptian military's continued dominance over domestic affairs, although challenged in recent years, is increasingly becoming anomalistic rather than part of a larger regional trend.
The tide is slowly but surely shifting against Nasser's military-backed secular Arab nationalist political system. Egypt's has remained the most entrenched in the region, but in the face of rising social discontent and the political aspirations of its population, Egypt's military faces a difficult long-term scenario: adapt and loosen its hold on power to survive as in Algeria and Turkey, or resist and risk being overthrown as seen in the Baathist republics of Syria and Iraq.
For decades, the military-dominated political system in Egypt faced little in the way of meaningful challenges to its authority and prestige. Even now, the military remains the most powerful institution within the state even if some of its influence and political maneuverability has declined. But the rising instability following the unrest of 2011 has forced the military out of its preference -- ruling behind a political proxy -- into more directly addressing the challenges of the state.
Egypt's opposition is lauding the military involvement that lead to Morsi's ouster, but the 18 months of military rule after the fall of Mubarak's regime illustrated how quickly public sentiments could turn against Egypt's generals. Morsi's defiant speech in refusal of the military's demands that he step down would have been unthinkable a decade ago. And with the Muslim Brotherhood again in the role of the opposition, the Egyptian military is sure to face rising challenges to its goal of quietly guaranteeing the security and stability of the Egyptian state from behind the scenes, even as economic, energy and food security problems continue to mount.
Egypt's military leadership cannot move the country back in time, before the proliferation of independent political parties and protest culture took hold. The military's acquiescence to public demands, albeit in line with its own desire to limit the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, came at the expense of validating large-scale unrest as a legitimate form of political participation, ultimately limiting the military's own actions in the future. The results of Egypt's democratic experiment of the past few years has left the Arab world's most populous state and strongest military facing serious indigenous competition for authority for the first time in its modern history. As the Muslim Brotherhood and the democratic process continue to weaken the military's absolute hold on power, the stability of the Egyptian state and the broader region will increasingly come into question.
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A boy with courage and wisdom.
http://www.upworthy.com/a-12-year-old-egyptian-boy-flabbergasts-an-interviewer-they-werent-expecting-a-political-genius-4?g=3 (http://www.upworthy.com/a-12-year-old-egyptian-boy-flabbergasts-an-interviewer-they-werent-expecting-a-political-genius-4?g=3)
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That was awesome.
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http://www.investigativeproject.org/4086/copts-face-violent-onslaught-in-wake-of-morsi
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Summary
Though the Egyptian military deployment into the Sinai Peninsula includes a significant amount of firepower, the sheer size of the rugged terrain, as well as the number of hostile elements in the region, will severely restrict the military's efforts to suppress Sinai militancy. Unrest in Sinai had been climbing gradually, but the military's removal of President Mohammed Morsi on July 3 sparked a new wave of violence, with attacks occurring daily against Egyptian police and military targets. The military responded by sending armor, combat helicopters and personnel into the region. Ultimately, the deployment will not have much of a long-term impact on militancy there unless it is maintained indefinitely or the forces are increased significantly.
Analysis
Reports indicate that the Egyptian military, with Israel's consent, has bolstered its military presence in the peninsula above the restrictions in the 1979 peace accords. There are currently around 11 infantry battalions and at least one tank battalion in Sinai, and other reports indicate that more tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers have been shuttled into the region. There are also combat helicopters operating in support of ground operations.
One of the two most recently deployed infantry battalions is being moved to El Arish. Conflicting reports place the other battalion in Sharm el-Sheikh or Rafah. In early July, multiple tanks, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles were reported to be operating at the border of Gaza and Sinai. The picture that is developing is of a concentration of forces primarily around El Arish and Rafah.
Recent and Growing Instability
Increasing Militancy in the Sinai Peninsula
The amount of firepower deployed is among the most significant in these specific zones of the Sinai Peninsula since 1979. Sinai is demarcated into specific zones, each of which is permitted a specific allocation of forces under the watchful eye of a multinational peacekeeping force. Egypt and Israel have had little choice but to override these limits over the past three years as security incidents have steadily increased in number and intensity, including attacks across Israel's southern border and deadly ambushes on Egyptian police, border patrols and the military. To be sure, for more than a decade Sinai has been a chaotic place, replete with intermittent kidnappings, rocket attacks and pipeline bombings, but the pace and severity has become more acute recently.
Sinai
In August 2012, militants ambushed and killed 16 Egyptian soldiers before stealing an armored personnel carrier, which they used to ram through the newly constructed Israeli border fence in an effort to conduct a complex suicide attack. An Israel Defense Forces helicopter was able to engage and destroy the vehicle. In response to this incident, Egypt was allowed to deploy several thousand infantry, hundreds of armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles and around two battalions of main battle tanks (similar in size and makeup to what we are seeing currently). Several weeks of operations were conducted against militants in the area. It is not entirely clear but it seems that most of these forces were withdrawn after the security operation was completed last year.
At the heart of the cooperation between the militaries of Egypt and Israel is the need to preserve the strategic truce in place since 1979. Egypt's security interests include protecting the free flow of commerce through the Suez Canal, keeping the various energy pipelines from being disrupted and preventing further kidnappings and extortions. But most important, it wants to limit logistical flows to Palestinian groups and keep militant attacks on Israel to a minimum so that Israel will not take unilateral action in Sinai and threaten Egypt's sovereignty. Israel desires a quiet southern border so it can concentrate on the many other threats it faces on its other borders, such as the Syrian civil war to the north and the always volatile Gaza Strip.
Gaza in particular complicates the Sinai security situation. The Israeli security perimeter and naval blockade effectively limit Gaza's logistics to its southern border with Sinai. While the Rafah crossing itself is heavily monitored and screened, smuggling tunnels beneath the border have served as the critical supply route for all of Gaza. Militants have traveled both ways through these tunnels, and while they initially conducted attacks mostly in southern Israel, the efforts of Egyptian forces to interdict the militants have made Egypt a target as well. Egyptian and Israeli officials have on several occasions voiced frustration over what they describe as Hamas' lackluster response to the flow of weapons and militants into Sinai. Hamas has taken action against some groups but has focused more on controlling threats to its power than assisting surrounding governments.
In the wake of Operation Pillar of Defense in late 2012, Israel and the Egyptian military could not follow through on pledges to keep the Rafah border crossing open due to high militant activity in Sinai. Hamas was believed to be using the militant threat through the region as leverage in its negotiations with the Egyptian military and Israel. The Morsi government sanctioned some smaller operations to destroy some tunnels and root out some militants, but the Egyptian military restrained itself from conducting full-scale operations while the government tried negotiations with the various parties in the peninsula. The Muslim Brotherhood also did not want to be overaggressive and risk straining its relationship with Hamas. When domestic unrest captured Cairo's attention, these talks stalled and Sinai militancy began to escalate again, further frustrating the military.
A Pre-Planned Assault
The timing, pace and scale of the military buildup in Sinai indicates that an operation had been planned for some time. It also appears that while the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas are still trying to adjust to the new political reality in Cairo, the military is using the opportunity to conduct more thorough operations in Sinai.
One of the Egyptian military's interesting moves was the decision to deploy personnel and armor at the Gaza border just before Morsi's removal. (Reports suggest that as many as 50 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, as well as at least one battalion of troops, were deployed.) It seems the Egyptian command anticipated the potential for Gaza militants to respond negatively to Morsi's ouster and positioned forces in a way that they could not only threaten to completely sever the militants' important logistics line but also block militants from flowing back into Sinai. The current size of the Egyptian force in Sinai and the complete lack of movement by Israel Defense Forces suggest that Egypt has no intent to directly engage Gaza or enter its territory.
Considering the similarities between the latest deployment and last year's force, it is likely that the purposes are the same. Egypt's military is taking advantage of the recent political chaos to pursue its decided objective of bringing Sinai militancy back to tolerable levels. Though the deployed force seems large, the Sinai Peninsula is vast and rugged. The units will have to disperse into several smaller units to cover the entirety of the terrain and be effective in rooting out small militant cells.
The militants' preferred tactics will likely be ambushes and improvised explosive devices, the effects of which will be somewhat mitigated by the use of armored vehicles. Infantry and armor will likely work in conjunction to sweep through the territory, while airpower will be available when targets have been flushed out and identified. Militants in the region have also recently shown a propensity to attack fixed installations with predominantly small arms and rocket-propelled grenades. The abundance of armor will help protect against these types of attacks and shore up defenses.
Like many conventional responses to guerrilla-type combat environments in difficult terrain, the Egyptian military crackdown will probably have limited effects and will only temporarily degrade or suppress militancy in the region. But dynamics have shifted such that this type of security operation in Sinai will become the norm. This operation is more about managing security than completely eliminating the threat -- a decidedly unrealistic goal -- and the main players in the region will have to adjust to the evolving security balance.
Read more: Egypt's Military Looks to Manage Sinai Militants | Stratfor
Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter | Stratfor on Facebook
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Morsi accused of plotting with Hamas ahead of massive rallies in Egypt
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The Egyptian army announced it is detaining ousted President Mohamed Morsi over alleged links with the Palestinian militant group Hamas in connection with his escape, along with other Muslim Brotherhood leaders, from prison in 2011 during the revolution, which saw the fall of former President Hosni Mubarak. In addition to conspiring with Hamas, the army is holding Morsi for allegedly killing prisoners and officers, as well as kidnapping officers and soldiers, and setting fire to the prison. A top Egyptian court ordered Friday that Morsi be held for 15 days pending an investigation. Morsi has been detained at an undisclosed location since his removal from office on July 3. The judicial order was issued ahead of planned major rival protests for Friday. Earlier in the week, army chief General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi called for Egyptians to take to the streets to show support for a military mandate to stop "violence and terrorism."
Meanwhile, after receiving a legal opinion from lawyers, the U.S. administration has concluded it is not legally required to determine whether the Egyptian military's ouster of President Mohamed Morsi was a coup. If the United States were to designate the events as such, it would be legally required to halt financial assistance to Egypt, a move the administration is concerned could further destabilize the country. A senior official remarked, "The law does not require us to make a formal determination as to whether a coup took place, and it is not in our national interest to make such a determination."
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second post
Morsi Charged, MB Slammed As Egyptians Rally
by IPT News • Jul 26, 2013 at 3:55 pm
http://www.investigativeproject.org/4102/morsi-charged-mb-slammed-as-egyptians-rally
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Hundreds of thousands of Egyptians took to the streets Friday in competing rallies for and against the military's July 3 ouster of President Mohamed Morsi.
The Muslim Brotherhood and other Morsi backers have held constant demonstrations since, many of which have turned violent. That prompted Army Gen. Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi to call for a rally Friday to show the depth of popular support for removing Morsi. The Brotherhood criticized that as a pretext for civil war and called for its own demonstration to show support for Morsi.
At least four people died in early clashes in Alexandria. They follow an edict by Brotherhood spiritual leader Yusuf al-Qaradawi that Morsi's power be defended violently. "If he, who has disobeyed the ruler, does not repent, then he must be killed," Qaradawi said on Al Jazeera Sunday.
Morsi has been in custody since being forced from office. Before Friday's rallies began, Egyptian prosecutors ordered him detained for more 15 days while they investigate espionage, murder and conspiracy charges against him in connection with a January 2011 jailbreak. Morsi was among 30 Muslim Brotherhood members freed in the jailbreak, while 14 security officers were killed.
The investigation seeks to determine if Morsi conspired with the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas in the attack. Morsi has an association with Hamas that goes back at least a decade. A Brotherhood spokesman rejected the allegations as "nothing more than the fantasy of a few army generals and a military dictatorship."
But a former prominent member of the Brotherhood says the military had to force Morsi from office.
In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, the Brotherhood's former European spokesman Kamal Helbawy said Morsi's ouster was not a coup, but a response to massive popular sentiment that kept a tense situation from growing more violent. The Brotherhood, Helbawy said, brought this on themselves.
Morsi and the Brotherhood failed "to propose a vision for the country," Helbawy said. "Moreover, [Morsi] deepened the society's divisions, increased polarization, relied solely on his constituency, neglected to use those with expertise and experience here in Egypt, ignored requests to amend the constitution and change the government and the attorney general, issued the Pharaoh-esque constitutional declaration in November 2012, and refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Tamarod [Rebel] campaign and the June 30 revolution."
Helbawy quit the Brotherhood last year, saying the group broke its promise not to run a candidate for president and was trying to monopolize power in Egypt. It's fine for the Brotherhood to protest, he said in the interview, but criticized the violent rhetoric including chants of "Fight to the death," and "Victory or martyrdom." That message, and resulting violence, will further hurt the Islamist cause around the world, he said.
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http://www.glennbeck.com/2013/08/05/watch-anti-obama-music-video-goes-viral-in-egypt/?utm_source=Daily&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2013-08-05_241927&utm_content=5054942&utm_term=_241927_241934
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A headline in a major Egyptian state newspaper this week referred to the proposed U.S. envoy to Egypt as the "Ambassador of Death." Posters in Cairo's Tahrir Square, a center of pro-government rallies, depict President Barack Obama with a beard and turban, exclaiming his "support for terrorism."
Another large Egyptian newspaper alleged Sen. John McCain, who traveled to Cairo this week in an effort to break a deadlock between the government and its Islamist rivals, has chosen sides by employing Muslim Brotherhood staffers in his office.
Photos of President Obama were burned, defaced or shown with a beard during the protests.
Egypt's state and privately owned media outlets, already no strangers to demonizing the U.S., have embarked on a particularly critical campaign. The latest salvos have targeted Robert Ford, the likely nominee for American ambassador to a country that is pivotal to U.S. foreign policy.
Egypt's state and privately owned media outlets have embarked on a particularly critical campaign against the U.S. Adam Entous joins Lunch Break with more. Photo: AP.
The moves highlight the depth of public distrust of U.S. policies, and draw from a "reservoir of anti-Americanism and conspiratorial theories," said Vali Nasr, dean of the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies and a former senior Obama administration adviser.
America, he says, has few fans in the country after the 2011 overthrow of U.S. ally Hosni Mubarak and last month's military ouster of Muslim Brotherhood-backed President Mohammed Morsi. "We're caught in a situation of having to essentially try to find a balance between our values and our interests. It satisfies nobody," Mr. Nasr said. "The Mubarak people are unhappy with the way he was shoved off without a thank you. The military thinks we coddled the Brotherhood and didn't intervene to control them. And the Brotherhood thinks that we never supported them when they needed support, and then gave the green light to the military."
The latest anti-American hysteria is a throwback to Mr. Mubarak's three decades of rule, when state-owned media fixated on a common enemy such as Israel or the U.S. in what critics called a bid to rally the nation and deflect from government shortcomings. Now, according to several observers, Egypt's new military-backed government is using the same playbook to divert attention from internal tensions toward what newspaper headlines and television anchors call U.S. meddling in Egyptian affairs.
"The state media are programmed to the line of whoever is in power. They don't need instructions or calls to be told what to write," said Hisham Qassem, a founding publisher of privately owned Al Masry Al Youm, a major newspaper. Years of state-cultivated xenophobia have left Egyptians suspicious of foreign policy and America's interests in Egypt, said Mr. Qassem, who is now starting up his own newspaper and news channel.
Egypt's state media acts independently, said a spokesman for the Egyptian military, Ahmed Ali.
U.S. officials say they are used to the onslaught. "There's been a great deal of misinformation out there," State Department spokeswoman Jennifer Psaki said Thursday. "We've been taking every step possible to convey what our view is."
The spike in rhetorical hostilities only adds to the discomfort in a relationship that has been vital to both countries in recent years. Egypt has come to count on some $1.5 billion in mostly military aid each year from the U.S., while Washington wants Egypt to maintain its peace treaty with Israel and help the U.S. against terrorism.
The Obama administration last month didn't declare the military's ouster of Mr. Morsi a coup. The White House froze the transfer of F-16 warplanes but hasn't cut off other forms of assistance. Based on that, the country's state media has reasoned that the U.S. is unlikely to cut off aid, analysts said.
Hopes that America could reset its relationship with Egypt by appointing a new ambassador are dwindling as well, after the fierce media campaign that has targeted Mr. Ford. Mr. Ford has served as the U.S. Ambassador to Damascus since late 2010.
The White House hasn't formally nominated Mr. Ford for the Cairo post.
A fluent Arabic speaker, Mr. Ford has served in many of the Middle East's toughest spots. In Iraq, he was known for pressing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government to crack down on Shiite militias who were attacking U.S. troops, often in collaboration with Iranian intelligence organizations.
Some in the Egyptian government have voiced displeasure with Mr. Ford's expected nomination. One official in Cairo said he had hoped to have "a fresh face" as the next U.S. ambassador, not a diplomat seen tied to unpopular U.S. policies in the Muslim world.
The campaign against Mr. Ford comes despite requests, according to U.S. officials, from Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel to Egyptian military chief Gen. Abdel Fattah Al Sisi to intervene to stop the incitement of anti-Americanism.
Mr. Ford's former boss in Baghdad, recently retired American Ambassador James Jeffrey, said the charges in the Egyptian press were "completely unfounded."
"He is the best we have," Mr. Jeffrey said of Mr. Ford. "His service in Iraq and in Syria were on orders of the president to go where the situation was the most delicate and dangerous, and to do the very best he could."
One U.S. official said: "If it's not Ford's nomination, they'd find a way to criticize someone else."
The criticism against Mr. Ford erupted this week. An article on Monday in Al Ahram, the flagship state newspaper, called Mr. Ford "the engineer of destruction in Syria, Iraq and Morocco" and "the man of blood."
The privately owned Al Watan newspaper this week called Mr. Ford "a superstar in the world of intelligence" sent to Cairo to "finally execute on Egyptian lands what all the invasions has failed to do throughout the history."
While stressing the media is acting on its own, Mr. Ali, the military spokesman, said: "You can't bring someone who has a history in a troubled region and a lot of unrest, make him the U.S. ambassador to Egypt and then expect people to be happy with it."
On a trip this week to Cairo as part of efforts to urge reconciliation between the Brotherhood and the government, Sen. McCain, an Arizona Republican, showed visible frustration with the rising anti-American sentiment.
"Let me just say as a friend of Egypt, we Americans see the demonization of our country in Egyptian state media and these kind of actions are harmful to our relationship and to your friends," Sen. McCain said Tuesday. He warned that some representatives in the Congress wanted to sever America's relationship with Egypt.
A spokesman for Mr. McCain on Thursday denounced accusations in Al Watan that the senator had Brotherhood staffers. "It's sad to see these supposedly legitimate news outlets make comments so transparently absurd and outrageous," the spokesman said.
The demonization of America in Egyptian state media has the potential to play out in dangerous ways that can't be reined in by the government, some observers said.
In the past few months, two U.S. citizens were stabbed on Egyptian streets—one fatally—with one of the attackers telling police that he had traveled from afar to Cairo in search of an American to kill. Last fall, thousands of protesters stormed the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, some scaling the walls of the fortified compound, tearing down the American flag and replacing it with an Islamist one.
Egypt's media appeared to bolster sentiments voiced by Raeef Elwishee, a protester living in a dirty, torn tent in Tahrir Square, to demonstrate his support of the military's overthrow of the Brotherhood.
Mr. Elwishee, 51 years old, said he is a dual U.S.-Egyptian citizen with a wife and three children who live in Missouri. He now spends his time holding anti-American placards in Tahrir Square, one with Mr. Obama's face crossed out with red.
"In general, Egyptians want America out of Egyptian affairs. For the U.S. to take the Brotherhood's side is not goodwill. They have a deal to give power to the Brotherhood in Egypt and in exchange the U.S. will give Sinai to Israel," Mr. Elwishee said with a slight American accent.
When asked for his thoughts on Mr. Ford, Mr. Elwishee didn't hesitate. "He's a troublemaker. It's enough to know that he was ambassador to Syria," he said. "He is top in one of the U.S. spy agencies…and we don't need that kind of relationship."
When asked where he had read about Mr. Ford serving as an intelligence agent, Mr. Elwishee answered: "I'm telling you from the newspapers I read and the people who watch TV and tell me about it."
—Jay Solomon and Leila Elmergawi contributed to this article.
Write to Maria Abi-Habib at maria.habib@wsj.com and Adam Entous at adam.entous@wsj.com
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Christians, police, army being killed
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/world/middleeast/lawless-sinai-shows-risks-rising-in-fractured-egypt.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20130811&_r=0
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In Egypt, a Crackdown Threatens to Divide the Muslim Brotherhood
Geopolitical Diary
Thursday, August 15, 2013 - 02:24 Text Size Print
Six weeks after toppling the government, the Egyptian military moved to crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood, raising questions about the future of the world's largest Islamist movement. The Brotherhood has demonstrated an ability to weather far worse suppression, but this time it is facing a different sort of crisis -- one that could strip its status as Egypt's largest political movement.
Some 300 people were killed Wednesday in clashes resulting from the military government's decision to forcibly break up Brotherhood sit-ins protesting the coup that overthrew President Mohammed Morsi. In the wake of the violence, the government imposed a monthlong state of emergency. On the same day, Cairo appointed 25 new provincial governors, 19 of whom are generals (17 from the military and two from the police).
Clearly, the regime is unwilling to tolerate the Brotherhood's resistance to the post-coup political process and has prepared for the worst. What it has not done and is unlikely to do is deliver a decisive finishing blow to the Brotherhood. Gamal Abdel Nasser, the founder of the modern republic of Egypt and of the current regime, tried to do just that in 1954 when he launched a major campaign to crush the movement. The Brotherhood was resilient and emerged from that experience with its core intact.
What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman explains.
Nasser's popularity enabled him to move aggressively against the Brotherhood without much cost. Likewise, military chief Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's moves against the Brotherhood, though nowhere near the scale of those carried out in the Nasser era, are backed by popular demand. However, the key difference is that Nasser was running a classic military regime, while al-Sisi is pursuing an agenda in which the military will not govern but rather will rule from behind the scenes. Obviously, the Egyptian military today is under different constraints -- the country's geopolitical environment has been significantly altered, especially in light of the Arab Spring and in the age of worldwide social media and cellphone videos.
Indeed, al-Sisi must ensure that the army retains popular support, and that will only be possible so long as the Brotherhood's opponents feel that they benefit from the post-Morsi political process and the country's economic woes do not exceed tolerable levels. The Brotherhood hopes that the military will be unable to stabilize Egypt's economic and political situation, providing the Islamist movement with an opportunity to stage a political comeback.
That could happen eventually, but at present the Brotherhood is in the midst of the greatest crisis since its inception. During the suppression of the Nasser era, the Brotherhood could portray itself as the victim of a brutal campaign ordered by an autocratic regime; what it is faced with today comes in the aftermath of a popular uprising against the Islamist movement's government. The Muslim Brotherhood's power peaked and then suffered a steep decline.
Many of the group's rank and file do not recall the suppression of the 1950s and 1960s. There is a good chance that their generation will see the coup and the suppression that followed it as evidence that mainstream politics does not pay off, a conclusion that could lead them to resort to radical and militant Islamism. They are battle hardened after weeks of violent protests against security forces, and many of them have taken up firearms, Molotov cocktails or simply paving stones. They are angry at the security forces and angry about friends killed in the clashes. There are many Salafist and jihadist forces that will work hard to recruit the disillusioned youth of the Brotherhood.
At the same time, there are many within the Brotherhood who have long wanted to see the group move beyond Islamism and follow the lead of Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party. Such introspection will have to wait until after the group has made it through the current hostilities afflicting the Egyptian state and society. But once the current period has passed, these members will likely hold the movement's leadership responsible for the loss of the power that the Brotherhood had gained democratically -- and this will lead to an internal shakeup of the organization.
Between these two forces pulling the movement in different directions, the group is bound to enter a lengthy period of internal crisis. It could even lose its position as the most organized political group in Egypt, the largest Arab state. Whether this will happen is not clear, but it is the clear hope of the military and its civilian allies.
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http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/08/14/muslim-brotherhood-supporters-attack-churches-around-egypt-in-apparent-retalliation-for-military-crackdown-as-149-people-killed/
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-religion/3054727/posts
http://world.time.com/2013/08/14/egypts-military-cracks-down-on-muslim-brotherhood-will-chaos-follow-killings/
http://blogs.cbn.com/globallane/archive/2013/08/14/muslim-brothers-massive-church-attack-in-egypts.aspx
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Steven Hayward writes at Powerline:
Here’s a historical counter-factual thought experiment for you: suppose the German military, in the spring of 1933, decided that the ascension of Hitler and his Nazis was bad news for Germany, moved to remove Hitler by a coup, outlawed the Nazi party, and in ruling henceforth by military decree thereby ended more than a decade of democratic weakness that was the Weimar Republic. What judgment would you cast?
Of course you can only approve of this course with the perfect hindsight of knowing what actually happened after 1933 (or after 1938, when the Munich agreement may have forestalled a military move against Hitler). Without today’s hindsight, a Wilsonian idealist in 1933 might well have condemned the German military, just as today’s State Department can’t speak with a clear voice about how we should think about the problems in Egypt.
So let’s be clear: the Muslim Brotherhood is a fascist political faction with murderous intent. Full stop. They not only deserve to be put down; they need to be put down if Egypt—and possibly the region as a whole—is going to have a future in the modern world. The military rulers are absolutely correct to outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood.
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There can be little doubt that the current violence is a deliberate provocation of the Muslim Brotherhood.
http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2013/08/egypts-agony-and-americas-cluelessness.php
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Concur.
Quick snap mini-poll for us here-- what should the US do?
a) Suspend aid and stay out of it;
b) keep aid going i.e. support military
c) or?
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(I'll come back to answer the poll.)
Mark Steyn's column, Consensus in Egypt, is a don't miss, read it all.
By Mark Steyn
August 18, 2013 8:09 AM
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/356073/consensus-egypt-mark-steyn
everywhere except Washington people are thinking strategically
...
Eighty per cent of Egyptians say things are worse than under Mubarek.
...(as Bernard Lewis once warned) America is harmless as an enemy but treacherous as a friend.
Whatever regime emerges in Cairo, it will be post-American.
A year before the fall of Mubarak, David Pryce-Jones, in a conversational aside, quoted to me Lord Lloyd, British High Commissioner to the old Kingdom of Egypt in the Twenties: “Ah, the jacarandas are in bloom. We shall soon be sending for the gunboats.” There’s more wisdom about Arab springs in that line than in all the blather of Obama, Clinton, Kerry and Anne Patterson combined.
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/356073/consensus-egypt-mark-steyn
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Concur.
Quick snap mini-poll for us here-- what should the US do?
a) Suspend aid and stay out of it;
b) keep aid going i.e. support military
c) or?
B. Just give the military enough aid to be sure they crush the MB into dust.
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IMHO any answer needs to take into account that without aid, Egypt starves in short order, probably less than three months. Rand Paul fails to include this in his analysis when he calls for terminating aid. If we do continue aid, the implications are profound-- all pretense at finding a modus operandi with political Islam will be done. Given the profound stupidity of throwing away our accomplishments in Iraq, we have zero credibility now-- at the same time we dramatically reduce our military capabilities and have barked that we are pivoting to southeast Asia to deal with the Chinese.
If we cut aid, Egypt descends into anarchy.
I'm OK with the military, which seems to have the support of the majority, kicking MBs ass as we continue aid. Yes the MB won an election that it promised it would not participate in, but once in it was becoming one man one vote one time and suppressing the Christians etc hence the majority opposition that led the military to overthrow Morsi.
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"Islam is the answer" is popular graffiti all over the Muslim world. Let them live and die with that on their lips.
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Umm , , , given the extraordinary outpouring by the Egyptian people demanding the removal of Morsi that led the military to act, I'd say quite a few people are getting a clue.
I would paste the URL here but I don't know how to on my mom's Mac, but apparently according to the Telegraph the Egyptian ambassador to the UK has said that the MB should be eradicated just like the Nazis should have in the mid-30s for their "one man one vote one time" policies enforced with extreme prejudice viz opposition.
IF the military stomps the MB, this could be a role model for the rest of the middle east in dealing with Islamic Fascism.
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Saudi Arabia has said that if we cut aid, it will step in.
Big strategic considerations here if we do or do not step aside , , ,
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"Quick snap mini-poll for us here-- what should the US do?
a) Suspend aid and stay out of it; b) keep aid going i.e. support military; c) or?"
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The present situation involves a bad group killing off the capabilities of a much worse group.
The only answer for the U.S. is to stay quiet as a church mouse. This crisis is (mostly) not about us.
Yes, keep aid going. The time to suspend aid would have been in reaction to the elected leader destroying the constitution. Our aid is to Egypt; they are the ones lacking a constitutional government and using it in ways that some might find controversial.
Of course, as I write, the Obama administration is doing the opposite, publicly taking the death-to-America side and suspending aid. http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/20/politics/us-egypt-aid/?hpt=po_c1
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Bret Stephens, WSJ today:
Stephens: A Policy on Egypt—Support Al Sisi
In a zero-sum game, the U.S. should hold its nose and back the military.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324747104579022723029024470.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEADTop
A better foreign policy would be conducted to keep our nightmares at bay: stopping Iran's nuclear bid, preventing Syria's chemical weapons from falling into terrorist hands, and keeping the Brotherhood out of power in Egypt.
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The Stephens article makes sense to me.
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Meanwhile, the American people say otherwise:
(http://www.people-press.org/files/2013/08/Better-Approach.png)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/08/19/poll-americans-criticize-obama-on-egypt-want-aid-cut-off/
Classic media work. Call Muslim Brotherhood the legitimate government. Call their ouster a coup. Ignore their calls for death to America, death to Christians, death to Jews and Israel, death to women's rights, gays, rape victims, and efforts to take over the entire region, etc. Label the military the oppressor. Poll the result. Make the poll result into a news story that drives policy.
If you push-polled the other direction, you would get the opposite result.
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How many of those polled could locate Egypt on the world map?
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Doug's analysis of the poll makes sense to me.
I would add that, as this thread evidences, until rather recently I too thought we had substantial leverage due to our aid. However as the facts change (Saudis stepping in) I change my opinion.
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For whatever we each think of the Egyptian military, interesting that everyone from John Bolton at AEI to Thomas Friedman at the NY Times recognize that rule by the Muslim Brotherhood is the worst possible outcome. (Yet the media portrays them as the oppressors.)
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324108204579020851300268912.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEADSecond
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/21/opinion/friedman-close-to-the-edge.html?adxnnl=1&ref=opinion&adxnnlx=1377098820-663nSha7SdwquoAe93IAgw
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I spoke to three Egyptian doctor colleagues who are also I would call friends of mine. One came here from Egypt with nothing became an excellent specialist from hard work, putting his head down and through sheer determination accomplished a very good reputation. He is now disgusted at the piecemeal dismantling of his profession. He also resents the immigrants who come here illegally and demand their rights. He says, "no one gave me anything". "I came here and worked for everything I have and asked for nothing" except that opportunity.
Another is a Coptic. He said what has Islam done for the world unlike Christianity?
A third is Muslim. He was against Mubarak but also does not like the Muslim Brotherhood. Everything is based on "hate" he says.
I like them all refer patients to them and would go to them myself for care if I needed it.
What a shame about what is going on in Egypt one of the world's most ancient places.
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Charles Krauthammer weighs in on Crafty's mini-poll.
What’s the United States to do? Any response demands two considerations: (a) moral, i.e., which outcome offers the better future for Egypt, and (b) strategic, i.e., which outcome offers the better future for U.S. interests and those of the free world.
As for Egypt’s future, the Brotherhood offered nothing but incompetent, intolerant, increasingly dictatorial rule. In one year, Morsi managed to squander 85 years of Brotherhood prestige garnered in opposition — a place from which one can promise the moon — by persecuting journalists and activists, granting himself the unchallenged power to rule by decree, enshrining a sectarian Islamist constitution and systematically trying to seize the instruments of state power. As if that wasn’t enough, after its overthrow the Brotherhood showed itself to be the party that, when angry, burns churches.
The military, brutal and bloody, is not a very appealing alternative. But it does matter what the Egyptian people think. The anti-Morsi demonstrations were the largest in recorded Egyptian history. Revolted by Morsi’s betrayal of a revolution intended as a new opening for individual dignity and democracy, the protesters explicitly demanded Morsi’s overthrow. And the vast majority seem to welcome the military repression aimed at abolishing the Islamist threat. It’s their only hope, however problematic, for an eventual democratic transition.
And which alternative better helps secure U.S. strategic interests? The list of those interests is long: (1) a secure Suez Canal, (2) friendly relations with the United States, (3) continued alliance with the pro-American Gulf Arabs and Jordanians, (4) retention of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, (5) cooperation with the U.S. on terrorism, which in part involves (6) isolating Brotherhood-run Gaza.
Every one of which is jeopardized by Brotherhood rule.
What, then, should be our policy? The administration is right to deplore excessive violence and urge reconciliation. But let’s not fool ourselves into believing this is possible in any near future. Sissi crossed his Rubicon with the coup. It will either succeed or not. To advocate a middle way is to invite endless civil strife.
The best outcome would be a victorious military magnanimously offering, at some later date, to reintegrate the more moderate elements of what’s left of the Brotherhood.
But for now, we should not be cutting off aid, civilian or military, as many in Congress are demanding. It will have no effect, buy no influence and win no friends on either side of the Egyptian divide. We should instead be urging the quick establishment of a new cabinet of technocrats, rapidly increasing its authority as the soldiers gradually return to their barracks.
Generals are very bad at governance. Give the reins to people who actually know something. And charge them with reviving the economy and preparing the foundations for a democratic transition — most importantly, drafting a secular constitution that protects the rights of women and minorities.
The final step on that long democratic path should be elections. First municipal, then provincial, then national. As was shown in the post-World War II democratizations, the later the better.
After all, we’ve been here. Through a half-century of cold war, we repeatedly faced precisely the same dilemma: choosing the lesser evil between totalitarian (in that case, communist) and authoritarian (usually military) rule.
We generally supported the various militaries in suppressing the communists. That was routinely pilloried as a hypocritical and immoral betrayal of our alleged allegiance to liberty. But in the end, it proved the prudent, if troubled, path to liberty.
The authoritarian regimes we supported — in South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Chile, Brazil, even Spain and Portugal (ruled by fascists until the mid-1970s!) — in time yielded democratic outcomes. Gen. Augusto Pinochet, after 16 years of iron rule, yielded to U.S. pressure and allowed a free election — which he lost, ushering in Chile’s current era of democratic flourishing. How many times have communists or Islamists allowed that to happen?
Regarding Egypt, rather than emoting, we should be thinking: what’s best for Egypt, for us and for the possibility of some eventual democratic future.
Under the Brotherhood, such a possibility is zero. Under the generals, slim.
Slim trumps zero.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-krauthammer-the-choice-in-egypt/2013/08/22/eb9350da-0b5b-11e3-8974-f97ab3b3c677_story.html?hpid=z2
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While waiting for my flight to Switzerland on Wednesday I had a conversation with a very bright, very well educated, probably very rich, condscending British Euro weenie businessman. As often seems to happen around me, conversation wandered to international relations. The Brit weenie was shocked that I thought
a) we should not support the opposition to Assad in Syria because they were AQ Islamo-fascists; and
b) we should support the Egyptian military to honor the majority call of the people to overthrow the MB, and
c) the whole fg point of the war against Islamo-fascism is that for civilization to win was that the Arab peoples needed to decide to fight it and that in essence, that is what is happening now in Egypt. This is what we have been waiting for and our leadership (both the Demogogues and the Patricians) are utterly clueless, see the Newt piece I posted in the Foreign Affairs thread.
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Summary
While protests organized by the National Alliance to Support Legitimacy, a group of supporters of ousted President Mohammed Morsi, did materialize after Friday prayers in Egypt, their relatively small numbers do not pose a meaningful challenge to the military's consolidation of its ruling power. Secularist protests expressing displeasure at the release of former President Hosni Mubarak to house arrest have also been underwhelming, and there has been no sign of cooperation between Islamist and secular opposition elements. Last week's crackdown by the military, culminating in the weak showing Aug. 23 by the military's opponents, are evidence that the military authority does not face a serious challenge and that the path is clear for the military to proceed with its political roadmap.
Analysis
The military's crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in the last week has had its intended effect: The group's leadership is imprisoned, and the specter of deadly military tactics has inhibited the group's ability to mobilize large numbers in the street. The protest culture that has defined Egypt since January 2011 is suffering from temporary fatigue.
Muslim Brotherhood supporters had called for protests in 28 locations. Many Cairo suburbs saw demonstrations, including Ain Shams, Abbassiya, Ramsis and Shubra. In addition, there have been demonstrations around the country in Giza, Alexandria, Ismailia, Port Said and Tanta. Minor clashes between pro-Brotherhood protesters and both security forces and local Brotherhood opponents have been reported. Security forces used tear gas to control protesters in Tanta, and there have been small clashes reported in Zagazig, Giza and Dakahlia. MENA reported that some protesters at a pro-Morsi rally in Suez carried weapons.
Both military and security forces pre-emptively deployed in the vicinity of the Rabaa Al-Adawiya mosque in Nasr City, which has been a focal point of Muslim Brotherhood support since Morsi's removal. In addition, Al-Ahram reported that the military has closed off all entrances to Tahrir Square with tanks and barbed wire in an attempt to limit the potential for clashes between pro-Brotherhood protesters and the anti-Brotherhood demonstrators who have made Tahrir their home.
Despite the geographic breadth of the Brotherhood's marches, the numbers have been tellingly small. Local media sources such as Nile News TV report that many of the demonstrations number in the hundreds, and Reuters reported that some mosques had even canceled midday prayers, notable for the fact that in the past the group has typically launched protests after Friday prayers. Al-Ahram reported that thousands of Brotherhood supporters were demonstrating across Egypt but arrived at that figure only by adding together small protests numbering in the hundreds scattered around the country -- a far cry from the social unrest that has punctuated Egyptian politics in the last two years.
Even more underwhelming has been the overall reaction to Mubarak's release to house arrest Aug. 22. The April 6 Movement, which had originally called for demonstrations against Mubarak's release, canceled its protests. And although the Tamarod opposition group condemned the release yesterday, thus far it has not done more than express its displeasure in statements. The Revolutionary Socialists movement is one of the few groups to actually follow through on its call for protests, but the group lacks the ability to mobilize meaningful numbers in the streets. Small protests in Cairo numbering in the low hundreds against Mubarak, the Brotherhood and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces are taking place around Cairo, but they are relatively tame and there have been no reports of the military or security forces intervening to stop them. More important is that there has been no indication that these anti-Mubarak protesters have found common cause with the Islamists; indeed, their protests do not significantly distinguish between being critical of Mubarak and Morsi.
The weak showing of today's demonstrations indicates that Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and the military's aggressive moves to assert authority in the last week have been successful. The Muslim Brotherhood's ability to mobilize large numbers of supporters has been curtailed, and Al-Ahram reported late Aug. 22 that both the second-largest Islamist party, al-Nour, which initially supported the coup, and the leftist Popular Alliance Party had both responded with cautious optimism to a proposal by Deputy Prime Minister Ziad Bahaa-Eldin meant to end the cycle of violence. That such groups are openly negotiating with the government further establishes that many of the groups that would oppose the military in the end lack the will and capability to challenge its power and instead prefer to work within the context of the stability that the military can enforce in the street.
With its integrity reinforced, the military will move forward with its political roadmap. It will strongly influence the writing of a new constitution that will enshrine its economic and political advantages in constitutional law, and it will focus on reviving economic activity and containing jihadist threats in Sinai. There will continue to be protests, sectarian violence and political conflicts. And the crackdown on Islamists may have the unintended consequence of leading to more jihadism. But these facts of Egyptian culture should not obfuscate the fact that has prevented the United States and other powers from breaking ties with the Egyptian military: In ruling Cairo, the military is peerless.
Read more: And a New King Rose Over Egypt | Stratfor
Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter | Stratfor on Facebook
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Why It Matters Who Wins in Egypt
Posted By Daniel Greenfield On August 23, 2013 @ frontpagemag.com
These days and weeks of bloody struggle in Egypt have implications that go far beyond the country and the region.
The conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood and its opponents will determine whether an Islamic terrorist group will run Egypt.
Forgotten in all the Arab Spring cheerleading is the simple fact that the Muslim Brotherhood is a terrorist group. And not only is it a terrorist group but it is the single most influential Sunni Islamic terrorist group in the world, spawning entire networks of terrorist organizations; including Al Qaeda.
Egypt holds great resources and great wealth, advanced weapons and even limited nuclear capability. But beyond that it is also where the modern age of terror began, where Western ideas crossbred with the ancient Jihad of Islam to create a new strategic threat.
The Arab Spring, the Islamist Winter and the Military Summer are more than just seasons for Egypt, they are also transformative phases for the country that long stood at the crossroads of terrorism.
The road to America’s modern confrontation with Islamic terrorism began in Egypt. The World Trade Center bombing was spawned by a leader of the Egyptian Islamic Group, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. Mohamed Atta, the key figure in the September 11 attacks, was an Egyptian member of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Today the Engineers Syndicate, the Brotherhood front group that Atta was a member of, is holding rallies in support of Morsi.
The Syndicate is one of many front groups that the Muslim Brotherhood uses to recruit new members. That same process takes place at most American colleges through front groups such as the Muslim Students Association; four of whose chapter presidents became high-ranking Al Qaeda members. One of whom co-founded Al Qaeda.
The clash between the Egyptian military and the Muslim Brotherhood is at the heart of the War on Terror. Al Qaeda may often be associated with Saudi Arabia, but its real roots lie closer to Egypt.
Before Ayman al-Zawahiri became the leader of Al Qaeda, he was a member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and headed up the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a terrorist organization spun off from the Muslim Brotherhood that eventually merged into Al Qaeda.
Membership in the Muslim Brotherhood is a biographical note that Ayman al-Zawahiri shared with Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda’s interim Emir after Bin Laden’s death was Saif al-Adel, an Egyptian member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, maintaining the Egyptian identity of the new Al Qaeda leadership.
Zawahiri was described as the “brains” of Al Qaeda while Bin Laden was its purse and its public image. That organizational and interpersonal relationship mimics the greater one between the Muslim Brotherhood and its wealthy Gulf oil backers.
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and other oil kingdoms may fund terrorism, protect terrorists and fill out their ranks; they may spread the corrosion of its clerics into the West, but they aren’t its brains.
Al Qaeda after Bin Laden is more “Egyptian” and more “Brotherhood” than ever. It draws its rank and file Jihadists from the usual sources, but its orientation has shifted away from Azzam’s global Jihad against the infidels and toward the Islamic civil wars that Zawahiri had sought to fight all along.
There have been no major Al Qaeda operations launched against America. Instead Al Qaeda has reemerged as a loosely aligned group of franchises fighting to take over Muslim countries.
The strategy that emerged distinctly in Iraq, where Al Qaeda often seemed more focused on killing Shiites than on killing Americans, has exploded into full scale civil war in Syria, where Al Qaeda in Iraq is operating as the Al Nusra Front.
In Syria, Al Qaeda’s Al Nusra Front and the Muslim Brotherhood’s brigades in the Free Syrian Army appear to also be loosely aligned, fighting toward the same objectives.
The Arab Spring helped complete the realignment of Al Qaeda’s objectives. It became what its Egyptian faction of Muslim Brotherhood activists had always wanted it to be; a force for helping them take over entire countries, rather than aimlessly bombing Western targets.
Al Qaeda’s two biggest operations took place after the Arab Spring and were carried out on a much bigger scale than September 11. In Mali and in Syria, Al Qaeda franchises attempted to capture entire countries. These operations were aligned with the regional objectives of the Muslim Brotherhood.
When Al Qaeda attempted to seize Mali, President Mohammed Morsi came out firmly against any intervention. Morsi also aggressively pushed for intervention in Syria and called for a No Fly Zone.
The second wave of attacks of September 11, a day most remembered for the assault on the Benghazi mission and the murder of Ambassador Stevens, was concentrated largely in countries and areas under the control of the Brotherhood and allied Islamists, whether it was entire countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, or cities, such as Benghazi.
In Washington and London, the politicians wanted to believe that the Muslim Brotherhood was a check on its violent splinter groups like the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Egyptian Islamic Group and even on Al Qaeda. Instead the Muslim Brotherhood was quietly working with them to advance the common Islamist objectives of imposing total Islamic rule on the region in the form of a united Caliphate.
Morsi’s regime freed Egyptian Islamic Group terrorists and even attempted to appoint an EIG leader as governor in Luxor, where memories still linger of its infamous massacre. That appointment may have been one of the tipping points that toppled the Brotherhood, but it was also a clear message that not only was the Muslim Brotherhood not disavowing its so-called splinter groups, but it was aiding them.
Washington and London may think that they are playing the Muslim Brotherhood against Al Qaeda, but they are the ones being played.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s defeat has damaged the group’s morale by hitting its sense of historical inevitability. It is a long way from being destroyed, but if it suffers a series of defeats in Egypt, Syria and beyond, it will lose members and momentum. And the Brotherhood’s loss will also be Al Qaeda’s loss.
Obama’s weakness created an opening that the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Qaeda took advantage of. Now they are at the climactic moment in their great game of Jihad. Either they win here and the road to the Caliphate becomes much smoother or they lose badly and risk becoming relics of history.
It’s a crucial strategic moment that will determine whether the next bomb goes off in America or Egypt.
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Which group has as its symbol a black hand against a yellow background?
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Which group has as its symbol a black hand against a yellow background?
The old school Italian mafia was known as the black hand. A Black hand tat is used by the Mexican Mafia. Egyptian mafia???
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GM you have PM.
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GM you have PM.
Copy.
A quick look says there was a old anti-jew/anti-brit group that was known as the black hand. HAMAS antecedent
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Thank you.
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http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/04/world/meast/egypt-interim-president-interview/index.html
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http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/04/world/meast/egypt-interim-president-interview/index.html
Good thing we got that dumb cowboy Bush out of the white house and now live in a new era of Smart Power!
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http://www.siotw.org/modules/news_english/item.php?itemid=1317
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http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323342404579076393770615038.html?mod=WSJ_hps_LEFTTopStories
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Moving GM's post to here:
Quote from: Crafty_Dog on Today at 12:13:26 PM
"I but point out that for a goodly percentage of those supporting the overthrow of the MB were doing so not merely as a matter of economics."
The poll, by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, also finds a small decline among Egyptians in favorable views of the United States – now just 19 percent – while 61 percent of respondents said the billions of dollars the U.S. gives their country in military and economic aid has a “mostly negative” impact.
Asked their views on Egyptian-U.S. ties, 38 percent indicated the relationship should be more distant, 35 percent said it should remain as it is now, and 20 percent said it should be closer.
Among other findings:
--On the role of religion in government, 61 percent chose Saudi Arabia as the preferred model. (Turkey came in at 17 percent).
--Asked whether Egypt’s laws should strictly adhere to the Qur’an, 60 percent said yes while 32 percent said it should follow the values and principles of Islam and only six percent said laws should not be influenced by the teachings of the Qur’an.
-- Seventy percent of respondents viewed the Muslim Brotherhood favorably, down from 75 percent in 2011. The Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party, also received the highest support rating among political parties, 56 percent.
--Priority issues in the election are the economy and a fair judiciary (81 percent each), with others including free speech (60 percent), equal rights for women (41 percent) and religious freedom (38 percent.)
The foreign policy issue with arguably the biggest implication for regional stability related to the peace treaty with neighboring Israel. The agreement, hammered out at Camp David in 1978 and signed at the White House the following year, remains the centerpiece of decades of U.S. mediation between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
The survey found that 61 percent of Egyptians want to abandon it, while only 32 percent think it should be maintained.
Support for annulling it has grown in particular among younger Egyptians (up by 14 points since 2011) as well as among those with higher education levels (up 18 percent since last year.)
- See more at: http://cnsnews.com/news/article/egyptians-want-ditch-peace-treaty-israel-poll-shows
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The Obama Administration plans to suspend the delivery of "nonessential" weapons to Egypt's military-led government. If gestures that made America feel good about itself were the stuff of a successful foreign policy, then the White House has scored another hit.
Back in the real world, it's hard to see how this policy shift helps U.S. interests in Egypt and the region. The annual $1.2 billion Egyptian military aid program predates by three decades the 2011 uprising against Hosni Mubarak and subsequent stillborn attempts to establish a legitimate government. America's security alliance with Egypt has kept this combustible patch of the Middle East stable since the Camp David peace accords in 1978.
July's ouster of President Mohammed Morsi, an Islamist who was freely elected in 2012, prompted the Obama Administration to review the program. Senator John McCain wanted to stop aid to punish the Egyptian brass for the coup. The status quo would keep the bilateral military relationship separate from Egypt's messy politics. So in his wisdom, President Obama is splitting this baby down the middle.
The Administration is expected to hold back shipments of a dozen Apache helicopters and four F-16 fighters. The message to Cairo, as White House spokesman Jay Carney explained on Wednesday: "We are not able to continue with business as usual."
Pending the formal announcement expected in coming days, the Administration didn't say what share of the program will be affected. The U.S. will continue to support Egypt's counterterrorism efforts against Islamist militias in the turbulent Sinai Peninsula, supply critical spare parts for U.S.-built equipment and train Egyptian soldiers. What's "half measures" in Arabic?
The U.S. is managing to anger nearly everyone in Cairo. The Islamists who demand President Morsi's return and the shrinking band of liberal democrats will see this as continued U.S. support for the generals. The generals get to feel the back of Washington's hand without being given an incentive to change their behavior at home. Israel is also upset, since its peace with Cairo was premised in part on U.S. aid.
The U.S. will always be the Egyptian military's best and for some equipment only option. But if the government concludes the U.S. is a fickle friend, it may turn to Russia and the Gulf states for closer political ties and even some weapons. As Iran and resurgent al Qaeda seek to squeeze the U.S. out of the region, Washington can hardly afford to lose reliable Middle Eastern allies.
The other priority in Egypt is to stem the recent spiral of political violence and repression and get the Arab world's largest country back on track to civilian rule. But how does a symbolic American sanction help nudge Egypt that way?
The Islamists and the generals sought and got the current war of attrition. Egypt is a broken place. The military crackdown, the bloodiest since Nasser ruled in the 1960s, has seen thousands of Morsi supporters land in jail. The Muslim Brotherhood has been banned again. Hundreds have died in clashes, including more than 50 on Sunday. Reconciliation seems more remote than ever.
A smart policy would be to try to use whatever influence the U.S. has left to broker disputes, but the Obama Administration hasn't done this since Mubarak's ouster. Now it seems to be giving up the little leverage it has in Cairo. The good, fuzzy feeling in Washington may prove fleeting.
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Thousands of students have gathered at Egypt's Al-Azhar University Monday calling for the reinstatement of ousted President Mohamed Morsi. The protests have continued a day after Egyptian riot police clashed with students, some of whom were reportedly throwing stones, firing tear gas as the demonstrations spread outside of the campus. The protests have come amid a debate over a draft law aimed at severely restricting demonstrations. Meanwhile, up to four people, including an eight-year-old girl, were killed when one or two armed men on motorcycles opened fire on a wedding party outside a Coptic Christian church in the Giza district of Cairo. Egypt's Christian minority has been increasingly targeted since the overthrow of Morsi in July, however this appeared to be the deadliest attack in months. Egypt's Interim Prime Minister Hazem Beblawi condemned the attack and said security forces are looking for those responsible.
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Russian and Egyptian officials have opened up talks on defense cooperation, coming amid tensions in U.S. and Egyptian relations. Russian Foreign Minster Sergei Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu are meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy, Defense Minister Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, and interim President Adly Mansour in the highest-level Russian visit to Egypt in years. Lavrov expressed his support for a democratic transformation in Egypt and said, "We are quite confident that Egypt will overcome its current crises and put into consideration the interests of all political, ethnic, and religious blocs within society." Russian officials say the talks are focusing on military and technical cooperation, which could mean an arms deal. Beyond that, the Egyptian government hopes to broaden economic relations with Russia. In October, the United States announced a suspension of a large portion of its $1.3 billion in military assistance to Egypt. Russian and Egyptian officials however have downplayed strains with the United States. A spokesman for the Egyptian Foreign Ministry said, "Our strategy is to expand, not to replace one party with another."
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http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/11/15/Russia-offers-Egypt-helicopters-and-air-defense-systems.html?utm_source=Sailthru&utm
Russia is proposing to sell Egypt modern fighter jets, helicopters and air defense systems reportedly worth $2 billion, Russian officials said, in a clear sign of returning military cooperation between the two countries. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, along with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, travelled to Egypt on Thursday to seek valuable contracts with the country’s government after the United States curbed its military aid to Cairo last month. Shoigu had confirmed that military collaboration was discussed in meeting with his Egyptian counterpart Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi but did not elaborate further.
“We agreed today to take steps toward creating a legal basis for our agreements [on military collaboration],” he said, according to RIA Novosti news agency.
Mikhail Zavaly, a senior official with Russia’s arms export agency Rosoboronexport who will lead its delegation at the upcoming Dubai air show, confirmed Russia wanted to sell military hardware to Egypt, according to Agence France-Presse.
“Now we are offering Egypt modern helicopters, air defense equipment and the modernization of previously purchased military equipment,” he told the RIA Novosti news agency.
“The word is now with our partners,” he added.
He did not give further details but Russian daily Vedomosti said negotiations were ongoing about the sale of MiG-29M/M2 fighter jets, low range air defense systems and Kornet anti-tank rockets. Citing Russian defence sources, Vedomosti said the deals were worth more than $2 billion and could be financed by Egypt’s Arab Gulf allies.
Earlier this week a senior Rosoboronexport official told RIA Novosti that Russia wanted to sell military hardware to Egypt.
“We are ready to negotiate with the Egyptian side the possibility of deliveries of new weaponry as well as repairing equipment supplied in Soviet times,” the Rosoboronexport official said.
But the official noted that such new supplies would depend on Egypt’s ability to pay for them. “Moscow is ready to discuss with Cairo a possible loan to that country,” he said.
The Soviet Union was the main weapons supplier to Egypt in the 1960s and early 1970s, but cooperation declined after the U.S.-brokered peace treaty with Israel when Cairo began to enjoy generous U.S. aid. However, the U.S. government suspended some of its military aid to Cairo after Mursi’s ouster.
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Stratfor
Russia and Egypt Rekindle Relations
Analysis
November 14, 2013 | 0937 Print Text Size
Russia and Egypt Rekindle Relations
Interim Egyptian President Adly Mansour (R), Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (2-L) and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu at the presidential palace in Cairo on Nov. 14. (KHALED DESOUKI/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
Russian and Egyptian relations are improving as both countries respond to changes in the Middle East and look for alternative partners to work with on multiple fronts. The countries' foreign and defense ministers met Nov. 13-14, the highest-level meeting Moscow and Cairo have held in years. The conference is in preparation for a possible visit to Cairo by Russian President Vladimir Putin later this month, Putin's first such visit to Egypt. However, despite their common interests at the moment, both countries realize that a permanent alignment is not sustainable.
Analysis
Russia and Egypt have a long and tumultuous history. Egypt was a staunch supporter of communist regimes around the world in the early part of the Cold War, and the Soviet Union supported Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser as he modernized the Arab nation. At the time, Egypt and the West were experiencing spats over Egypt's nationalizing the Suez Canal and expelling Western diplomats. However, when Anwar Sadat assumed the presidency in Cairo in 1970, the country began to turn toward the West and relations cooled with Moscow after Sadat expelled thousands of Soviet military advisers.
Today, changes in the Middle East are undermining the positions of Egypt and Russia. The United States and Iran could be headed toward a compromise, which would alter the reality of the region. If such a deal takes place, Russia would lose its last significant bit of leverage in the Middle East, since the Syria issue has already been played out. Russia is now seeking a new advantage in the Middle East, both to anchor itself in the region and to counter the United States. This also comes as Russia is attempting to propel itself onto the international stage as an alternative power to the United States.
U.S.-Egyptian relations have dropped off substantially since the July 3 coup, and in light of Washington's decision to cut military aid to Cairo in October, there are no signs of improvement. With the United States now tilting toward Iran, Arab nations are scrambling.
Egypt's Crisis Threatens Foreign Aid
Already Egypt is in serious economic distress due to falling energy production and skyrocketing inflation. The Egyptians have turned to their Gulf Arab allies for help, thus far receiving $7 billion of the $12 billion promised from states such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. But the Gulf Arab aid is not enough to keep Egypt stable, and the country is seeking a supplementary patron not only for aid but also to try to shape U.S. behavior.
There are three main areas in which Russia and Egypt can begin to develop stronger relations. The first is financial -- Egypt's foreign reserves are dwindling and foreign aid has been insufficient, while Russia has excess cash in its reserves and growing oil-supported wealth funds.
The second potential area of cooperation is military. Reports have emerged that Russia and Egypt are negotiating a considerable military deal, certainly the largest and most important between the countries since the 1970s. Price estimates for the deal, which reportedly centers primarily on MiG-29 fighter aircraft, air defense missile systems and anti-tank guided missiles, range from $1.5 billion to $4 billion.
Finally, Russia can support Egypt with larger grain exports. In the 2012-13 grain season, Russia made up a third of Egypt's grain imports, approximately 2.7 million tons. Russia is currently having a healthy year for grain production at home, with a rise in exports for 2013-14 expected. The problem in recent months between Egypt and Russia has been the price -- Cairo has been unable to afford Russian grain, which is more expensive than grain from countries such as Ukraine. An agreement for discounted grain is a possibility going forward.
Even with so many important potential deals, there are limits on the Russo-Egyptian relationship -- and on Russia ever replacing the United States in relations with Egypt. Egypt will always have some sort of relationship with the United States, and Russian support so far from home is typically piecemeal as Moscow deals with domestic problems. Moreover, Egypt's Gulf Arab allies would not be welcoming of Cairo's attempts to swap Washington for Moscow. But at this time, Egypt and Russia are seeking any advantage they can from rekindling the relationship while the region realigns. Egypt has specific needs that Russia can fill, and Russia needs to continue shaping the Middle East in order to keep U.S. focus far from its immediate region.
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Putin Backs Sisi’s Bid for Egypt’s Presidency
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Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday conveyed his support for Egyptian Field Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's bid for Egypt's presidency, wishing him "luck" in the upcoming contest. Meeting with Egyptian authorities in Moscow, Putin told Sisi, "I know that you have decided to run for president of Egypt. This is a very responsible decision, to take upon yourself responsibility for the fate of the Egyptian people." Though Sisi has not officially announced his candidacy for the presidency, his visit to Moscow is another sign that such announcement is imminent. Sisi's meeting with Russian officials aimed at finalizing a $2 billion arms agreement between Egypt and Russia. "Our visit offers a new start to the development of military and technological co-operation between Egypt and Russia. We hope to speed up this co-operation," Sisi remarked on the meeting.
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Second post
'Worse Than Mubarak: Egypt's New Constitution and the Police State' (Mara Revkin, Foreign Affairs)
"Egypt is not the first country in the world to declare a 'war on terror,' but it is one of the only nations to have written counterterrorism into its constitution. Last month, an overwhelming 98.1 percent of voters approved Egypt's new charter in a referendum marred by a heavy-handed military campaign to stifle dissent. The new constitution further marginalizes Islamists from political life and enhances the powers of the military and security services by, among other things, banning all political activity based on religion and giving the military veto authority over the president's choice of defense minister for the next eight years. But as problematic as those measures are, one of the constitution's most alarming sections has been overlooked: an unprecedented counterterrorism clause that lays the legal foundation for a police state that is a military dictatorship in all but name.
Buried on page 62 of a rambling document that most Egyptians admit they have not even read is Article 237, the most sweeping counterterrorism mandate in any Egyptian constitution. It obligates the state to 'fight all types and forms of terrorism and track its sources of funding within a specific time frame in recognition of the threat it represents to the nation and citizens.' Article 237 doesn't define 'terrorism' or the scope of the powers it grants the government, deferring them to future legislation. But for now, Egypt has no parliament. The military dissolved it last summer as part of its overthrow of former President Mohammed Morsi. With new parliamentary elections not expected until later this year, legislative authority rests solely in the hands of the military-appointed interim president, Adly Mansour."
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Summary
Russia and Egypt are nearing a $3 billion arms purchase agreement that will be financed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Russian daily Vedomosti reported Feb. 14. While Egypt is not completely breaking with the United States, its move to enhance its ties with Moscow shows that Cairo feels it should no longer depend on Washington as its sole powerful ally. This shift in Egypt's strategic foreign policy stems from the internal disagreement in Washington on how to manage Cairo following the July 3, 2013, coup that has degraded the political and security situation in the world's largest Arab state. Egypt's efforts to enhance ties with Russia could enable the Kremlin to make minor gains in extending its geopolitical influence in the Middle East, but the region's dependence on the United States will not be significantly reduced.
Analysis
According to Vedomosti report quoting two unnamed Russian government sources, Cairo and Moscow already have either initialed or signed contracts for Egypt's purchase of MiG-29 fighters, air and coastal defense systems, Mi-35 attack helicopters, and other smaller arms. The report came a day after Russian Vladimir Putin met with Egyptian army chief Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. During the meeting, Putin remarked, "Mr. Defense Minister, I know that you have decided to run for president. This is a very important decision -- to undertake responsibility for the fate of the Egyptian people. On my own behalf and on behalf of all Russians I would like to wish you success."
These words represented Russia's rejoinder to the United States that it, too, can use elections around the world to its advantage. This is in line with Putin's September 2013 New York Times op-ed in which he implied that each country would find its own way to democracy. But the Russians are not just trying to get into the election game; they are also using the disconnect between the Obama administration and the al-Sisi regime to their advantage. Though U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has had some 30 phone calls with al-Sisi since the coup, the U.S.-Egyptian relationship remains sour.
Click to Enlarge
A key reason for this is the disagreement within the U.S. administration and the Congress about the need to balance the relationship with the military and nurture the democratic process. There are competing realist points of view. One side argues that the military is the only institution in Egypt that can hold Cairo together and that Egypt's democratization process has failed and the region is in great turmoil. Therefore, the United States should return to working with Egypt's armed forces to help the country limp back to some semblance of normalcy.
On the other side are those who believe the Egyptian armed forces on their own are not capable of stabilizing the country. From their perspective, the continuing political unrest and the growing jihadist insurgency will deteriorate under military-imposed order. This camp points to the growing non-Islamist opposition to the military's dominance of politics, given the splits within the Tamarod movement that organized massive demonstrations and called on the military to oust former President Mohamed Morsi. This faction wants to see a compromise between the army and the Muslim Brotherhood that will resolve the political crisis the jihadists are exploiting.
Ultimately, the United States does not have much choice in the matter and thus has no good options on how to manage the faltering political economy of Egypt. What is worse is that the ambivalence within Washington is fueling mistrust between the United States and Egypt.
The Saudi Angle
While this has been developing, Saudi Arabia -- which has had its own problems with Washington over the U.S.-Iran rapprochement and over its reluctance to act aggressively against the Syrian regime -- has rushed into support Egypt financially.
Working with their Gulf Cooperation Council partners, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, the Saudis have poured billions into the coffers of the Egyptian state since the coup. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi's underwriting the Egypt-Russia arms deal is only the latest financial commitment from the Saudis and their Gulf allies. It is somewhat odd that while the Saudis and the Russians are at loggerheads over Moscow's support for the Syrian regime, Riyadh has encouraged Cairo to purchase arms from Moscow. Paying for weapons that Egypt is trying to purchase from Russia is a way for Saudi Arabia to try and manage the divergence of Riyadh's and Washington's interests in the region.
From the Saudi point of view, the United States can no longer manage the region and is pursuing a dangerous policy. The kingdom believes it has no choice but to pursue its own independent policy of trying to deal with the region's problems. The Egyptians share the Saudi view on U.S. intentions and capabilities regarding the Middle East and thus are working closely with each other. Notably, neither the Egyptians nor the Saudis are radically turning away from the United States; there are no alternative to the Americans.
Egypt's Geographic Challenge
The region's two major Arab powers will thus continue to cooperate with the United States where they absolutely must. But they believe that they can no longer rely on Washington, as has been the case in recent decades. It is unclear whether the arms deal will be finalized, but if it is it will underscore Egypt's ongoing efforts to diversify the pool of suppliers for its defense needs as the country's armed forces already field weaponry from the United States, France, and Russia -- another example of decreasing dependency on Washington.
The Persistence of U.S. Leverage
While the United States could lose some influence in Egypt, there are major limits to how far Moscow can pull Cairo in its direction. Russia is not a reliable partner for Egypt, and Cairo knows that Moscow is using it as leverage in the struggle brewing in Russia's near abroad
The Saudis, Russians and Egyptians are all hoping -- for different reasons -- that this arms deal will upset the United States. Cairo hopes that the prospect of Egypt's tilting toward Russia will terrify the United States. The Americans will be unimpressed by the Egyptian move to purchase weapons from the Russians because they know that Egypt will not be able to rebuild its military in any reasonable time and certainly not without U.S. help. The United States is also taking into account that the Saudis do not intend to completely alienate Washington and that the Egyptians can only go so far in reducing their dependence on the United States.
Thus, the United States will accommodate Egypt, but Washington will be somewhat inflexible because it believes Cairo is trapped in its relationship Washington. Washington will quietly tell Cairo and Riyadh that if they have other sources of weapons, the United States will review all of its arms sales, since U.S. products are no longer needed for Egyptian security. The United States will try to create panic in Cairo and Riyadh and force them to think they have overplayed their hand.
Washington has already convinced them that it has lost interest in the region, and now it will try to reaffirm this and turn the tables on them. For their part, the Russians do not expect a major relationship with the Egyptians and are taking the current arrangement only as far as it can go.
Russia also knows it cannot act as an alternative to the United States in the region. It means to create problems for the United States in the Middle East as a way to ensure that there are limits to how far Washington can push into the Russian periphery. The Kremlin is already pursuing this in Syria but is facing challenges on Iran, as evidenced by Tehran's interest in working with Washington to end sanctions. Therefore, exploiting the downturn in U.S. ties with Egypt and Saudi Arabia is Russia's way of trying to sustain its bargaining position with the United States.
Read more: Egypt and Russia Strengthen Ties to Raise U.S. Concerns | Stratfor
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http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/371565/obamas-blame-it-video-was-fraud-cairo-well-benghazi-more-proof-andrew-c-mccarthy
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In a televised address Monday, Egypt's interim Prime Minister Hazem el-Beblawi announced the resignation of his cabinet. Beblawi gave no reason for the government's departure, however the move could pave the way for army chief Field Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to declare his bid for presidency. To run for president, Sisi would need to first leave his post as defense minister. According to an Egyptian official, the cabinet resigned so that Sisi would not appear to be acting alone. The announcement came amid a number of strikes over the past few days including by public transport and textile workers, doctors, and garbage collectors. Beblawi acknowledged the sharp increase in strikes, but claimed no government could address all the demands of its people in such a short amount of time. He said the government "made every effort to get Egypt out of the narrow tunnel in terms of security, economic pressures, and political confusion." Interim President Adly Mansour has asked Beblawi to run the government's affairs until a successor is named, according to the state-run newspaper al-Ahram.
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Summary
Egypt is expecting severe power outages in upcoming months after suffering rare winter blackouts. According to the Ministry of Petroleum, Egypt needs to import $1 billion worth of natural gas in the next few months to satisfy demand this summer. However, political, financial and infrastructure constraints will likely keep Egypt from achieving this goal. Last summer, as seven-hour-long rolling blackouts affected businesses and consumers throughout the country, the Tamarod movement helped oust former President Mohammed Morsi, a move that illustrated people's outrage over the Muslim Brotherhood's inability to solve Egypt's energy problems. As Egypt's rapidly growing population continues to demand more natural gas, domestic production will soon fail to meet the needs of a nation looking for political stability and economic growth under a new democratic government that is set to be elected in the coming months.
Like Morsi's government, the incoming administration will have limited options, given tensions in the region and its political and economic constraints. Perhaps most important, Cairo will have to decide whether it will decrease domestic natural gas consumption to fulfill its export obligations or pump more gas into a heavily subsidized domestic market to forestall summer outages -- and thus curry favor with the public. Both options have significant ramifications on the country's struggling economy.
Analysis
In 2003, Egypt began producing surplus natural gas that Cairo was able to export, largely to Asia and Europe, providing the country with a substantial source of revenue. But Egypt's population has grown rapidly over the past three decades, thanks to improved health care, increased food production and a lack of family planning. In 2014, domestic natural gas consumption will finally catch up with production, due in part to generous energy subsidies. In fact, from 2009-2012, consumption rose 24 percent while production declined by 3 percent. By July 1, the Petroleum Ministry believes natural gas consumption will surpass production by a rate of 1.74 billion cubic meters per year.
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This has left Egypt looking for import agreements. But regardless of who wins the upcoming elections -- Defense Minister Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is widely expected to win the presidency -- the new government will only have a few options to satisfy the public's demand.
Tensions with Gulf Partners
During the Morsi administration, a cash-strapped Egypt looked for outside help to alleviate its economic problems. One option was a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund, but this came with strict conditions, including subsidy reforms. Instead of absorbing the political risk involved in tackling the problem, Morsi sought aid from Egypt's neighbors in the Gulf. Foreign currency, petroleum products and natural gas assistance helped buoy Egypt's economy, but relying on bailouts from the Gulf Cooperation Council is not a sustainable long-term solution.
When Morsi reached out to the Gulf Cooperation Council, Qatar seized a unique opportunity to enhance its regional influence by engaging with the Muslim Brotherhood -- the only Gulf state to do so. Qatar sent several liquefied natural gas shipments to Egypt. While Egypt began to divert increasing quantities of its natural gas to the domestic market, cargoes from Qatar were given to British Gas and GDF Suez operating in Egypt so that they could meet their export obligations in Europe and Asia. However, when the Muslim Brotherhood was ousted and designated a terrorist organization by the military-backed interim government, Qatar's relationship with Egypt soured. Qatar stopped sending LNG, and foreign firms lost their ability to meet their export quotas.
Egypt is still receiving petroleum aid from its Arab neighbors, but the halt of LNG shipments from Qatar must be viewed as part of a larger rift among the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Because Egypt is a pivotal country in the Arab world, the Gulf countries understand that instability in Egypt affects the whole region. Saudi Arabia prefers that Egypt be run with a strong military hand, because Riyadh fears the populist tactics that brought the Muslim Brotherhood to power in Egypt could fuel grassroots Islamism in the Gulf and threaten the stability of the monarchies. But Qatar still stands behind the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood and is the Gulf country in the best position to export natural gas to Egypt.
Kuwait has stepped in to mediate this conflict, because it views regional instability as detrimental to its own internal cohesion. Kuwait's looming internal political and economic strains, as well its significant Shiite minority and geographic proximity to Shiite bastions in Iraq and Iran, prevent it from acting as aggressively as Saudi Arabia. To maintain a careful balance between its neighbors, Kuwait will work to defuse tensions within the Gulf Cooperation Council, but talks are unlikely to provide any immediate natural gas assistance to Egypt, leaving Cairo to search for other solutions to its energy problems.
Import Options
To avoid shortages this summer, the government is trying to import natural gas to cover the expected deficit, but this will be expensive and difficult. Cairo has two options, but neither provides a feasible solution.
One option is to import natural gas by pipeline from Israel, but this is difficult due to security concerns and would require reversing the pipeline direction. For years, militant groups have targeted the Arab Gas Pipeline that was used to pump Egyptian natural gas across the Sinai Peninsula to Israel, and it already has been attacked five times in 2014. Even if the army could secure the pipeline, it would take time and money to alter the pumping stations so the flow of gas could be reversed back into Egypt. Israel has said it intends to export 40 percent of the natural gas from its Tamar and Leviathan fields, which could provide massive political leverage in the region. If al-Sisi is elected, it would be difficult for him to maintain his nationalist image as a strong military leader if he made Egypt reliant on Israel for its energy. However, energy imperatives might force him to consider this idea more seriously, especially if it can be done in cooperation with Jordan and the Palestinian Territories.
The other option is for the Egyptian government to lease a floating LNG import terminal. Although Egypt has two LNG export plants, it has no import terminal that can regasify imported LNG. To solve this problem, the government issued a tender to lease a floating storage and regasification unit in October 2013. The tender was awarded to Norway's Hoegh LNG in January 2014, but the firm turned down the contract because it doubted the government would be able to pay the $250 million bill. There are a few other units on the market that could be leased, but even if the government could sign an agreement in March, the unit would take six months to a year to install and would not be operational in time for the summer.
Reforming Domestic Energy Markets
While importing gas will be difficult, Egypt's government can work to improve its domestic energy usage and production, but these are not short-term solutions. Regressive energy subsidies, which amount to about 10 percent of Egypt's gross domestic product, have long encouraged excessive consumption, largely by wealthy Egyptians and energy-intensive businesses that can afford to pay higher, unsubsidized prices. Successive governments have tried to reform the subsidy program, but the fear of causing social unrest has prevented the implementation of any reform.
As subsides continue to hurt the economy, the government must attempt to attract foreign investment to bring in the capital and technology necessary to increase natural gas production. Egypt's current fields are aging, and potential new production is becoming more expensive and challenging as producers look to expand to deeper waters. Regardless of success, advanced extraction techniques and exploration in more challenging areas will not alleviate the immediate shortages. It will likely take several years for any new investments to increase production, and the current fields will continue to decline.
Cairo's relationship with foreign energy firms will likely deteriorate further in the coming months, because the government must maintain public support and continue diverting large portions of the foreign firms' export-marked gas for domestic consumption. In January, British Gas was forced to break its contracts when the Egyptian government diverted more than 50 percent of the company's production in Egypt to the domestic market. Further straining the situation is the $6 billion in arrears that Cairo is struggling to pay foreign energy firms. The incoming government may continue to divert larger amounts of natural gas for domestic use to maintain popular support and social stability, but this will further alienate foreign investors and hinder needed extraction technology from coming to Egypt.
Read more: Egypt's Energy Problems Worsen | Stratfor
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A court in southern Egyptian city of Minya on Monday sentenced 529 Muslim Brotherhood supporters to death on charges including murdering a policeman and attacking other officers in riots after security forces broke up two protest camps on August 14, 2013. The group is among more than 1,200 supporters of Mohamed Morsi on trial since a crackdown on Islamists after the military removed the president in July. In December, the government declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. Only about 147 defendants were present at the unprecedentedly rushed hearings, which began Saturday. Others were released or are on the run being tried in absentia. Sixteen defendants were acquitted. The verdict, the largest capital punishment verdict in the history of the Egyptian judiciary, and the sentences are subject to appeal, and are likely to be overturned, according to lawyers.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/26/world/middleeast/egypt-religious-minorities.html?emc=edit_th_20140426&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193&_r=0
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http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/26/world/middleeast/egypt-religious-minorities.html?emc=edit_th_20140426&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193&_r=0
Shocking!
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In the first televised interview of his campaign, former Field Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi vowed that the banned Muslim Brotherhood will not exist if he wins the presidency. Sisi led the military's ouster of Islamist President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013 and the Muslim Brotherhood has since been designated a terrorist organization. The military-backed government has killed more than a thousand pro-Morsi demonstrators and imprisoned over 10,000 political opponents, primarily Islamists. Sisi claimed the Muslim Brotherhood has ties to militant groups and mentioned that two plots to assassinate him had been discovered. He said it would not be possible for the Brotherhood to re-enter political life in Egypt and asserted, "It's not me who finished the Muslim Brotherhood -- the Egyptian people have." Sisi is widely expected to win Egypt's presidential election on May 26 and 27.
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FP Magazine
The lawyers for two of three Al Jazeera journalists being tried in Egypt on charges of fomenting violence have quit accusing the Qatar-based news agency of a "vendetta." The lead defense lawyer, Farag Fathy said "Al Jazeera is using my clients" and that the network was "fabricating quotes" attributed to him. Additionally, the court has demanded defense lawyers pay $170,000 to view footage prosecutors say shows the journalists fabricated news reports to incite unrest. The trial has been adjourned until May 22, and the journalists have again been denied bail. Meanwhile, Al Jazeera Arabic correspondent Abdullah Elshamy, who has been held without charges since August 2013, has been transferred to solitary confinement after smuggling a video out of Tora prison highlighting his deteriorating health. Elshamy has been on hunger strike for 107 days protesting his detention.
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Egypt's election commission extended voting into a third day as low voter turnout is preventing former General Abdullah Fattah al-Sisi, who is forecast to win the presidency, from attaining the broad mandate and legitimacy he is seeking. The commission said the extension was in response to a "large" number of citizens who weren't able to make it to polling stations due to a heat wave in Egypt. However, turnout remained low on Wednesday, suggesting a lower level of support for Sisi. The Democracy International observer mission said the extension raised questions about the credibility of the electoral process.
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Egyptian special forces arrested 15 Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant militants in Sinai on June 28, the Jerusalem Post reported. The group reportedly intended to relay messages and set up rebel cells in Egypt.
Read more: Egypt: 15 Iraqi Rebels Arrested In Sinai | Stratfor
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Egypt: Deaths in policy custody, once a spark for revolt, now met by shrugs' (Louisa Loveluck, The Christian Science Monitor)
"With little public outcry, more than 80 people have died in custody over the past year, according to independent monitor Wikithawra. In June 2010, photos of the shattered face of Khaled Said, a young man killed in police custody, laid the groundwork for mass protests in Egypt against longtime strongman Hosni Mubarak. His downfall in February 2011 was a landmark in the so-called Arab Spring, which still has aftershocks roiling the region.
Last July, Egypt's military ousted the country's first elected president, Mohamed Morsi, and launched an aggressive crackdown against dissidents. Egypt's police are back to the most brutal practices of the Mubarak era, and deaths in custody have surged once again. But this time popular anger is muted, as many swing behind a repressive security state as a bulwark against the chaos and sectarianism that came in Mubarak's wake, particularly after police retreated from the streets."
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Click here to watch: New Group in Cairo Threatens to Carry Out Terror Attacks
A video has surfaced of a new terrorist group in Cairo that has threatened to carry out terrorist attacks in Egypt. The group, which calls itself the "Helwan Brigades", released a video in which its members are seen holding weapons and saying, "Our message to [the Interior Ministry] is that you are our targets." “We are fed up with the peacefulness of the Muslim Brotherhood. We are no Muslim Brotherhood. We are fed up with their peaceful demonstrations. When we go on demonstrations, blood is shed, women are raped, and property is stolen,” said one member of the group. “This is a warning to the Interior Ministry in south Cairo. This is what we have throughout south Cairo. Our message to you is that you are our targets because of what you have done to us. You did not spare us. You did not care that we are your brothers. You have shed blood, raped women, and even got the women of Muslims pregnant,” he threatened. “None of you opposed this or was held accountable, because you support a coup. Your army is the Camp David army, which for 60 years [fought] the Muslims, but did not shoot a single bullet at the Jews,” he charged.
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Egypt has been plagued by unrest and terrorist attacks for several years, and there has been an increase in attacks since the ouster last year of Muslim Brotherhood president Mohammed Morsi. Most of the terrorist attacks have been claimed by the Al-Qaeda-inspired Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. Among the attacks claimed by the group was the assassination of a top Egyptian police general, who was gunned down as he left his home in a west Cairo neighborhood, and a bus bombing on a tour bus filled with South Korean tourists in the Sinai. The group has also claimed responsibility for several rocket attacks that targeted the Israeli resort city of Eilat. Egypt’s government has said there is a direct link between the Muslim Brotherhood and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, and on this basis blacklisted the Brotherhood as a terror organization.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/08/world/as-egyptians-grasp-for-stability-sisi-fortifies-his-presidency.html?nlid=49641193&src=recpb&_r=0
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http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29811722?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=*Mideast%20Brief&utm_campaign=2014_The%20Middle%20East%20Daily_10.29.14
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Click here to watch: Egypt Expels Gazans While the World sits Silently
Arab residents of Gaza were rounded up by armed soldiers and forced to flee their homes, which were promptly exploded in impressive plumes of dust and sand - but the soldiers were Egyptian, and there has been no international criticism of the buffer zone Egypt is establishing by force on the Gaza side of the Sinai border. In the buffer zone plan, Egypt is seizing and evacuating all homes and farmland up to 500 meters (over 1,640 feet) into Gaza, all along the 13 kilometer (over eight mile) border. Additionally, a channel with a depth and width of 20 meters (over 65 feet) will be dug along the Gaza border. The expulsion is in fact being sped up, after the Egyptian army said Saturday night it discovered hundreds more smuggling tunnels into Sinai from satellite imagery, reports the Arabic-language Sky News as cited by Yedioth Aharonoth. As of last week, 200 families living in the buffer zone area defined by Egypt had accepted a financial package to compensate their abandonment of their homes, but 680 more families were still refusing. Video uploaded on Saturday shows the expulsion in full steam, as Egyptian tanks and helicopters can be seen over a Gazan town. Armed soldiers go house-by-house and residents flee with all of their belongings loaded into cars, before cranes knock down their homes and explosions rend the air.
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The Egyptian move follows two lethal terror attacks two weeks ago on Friday, in which at least 31 Egyptian soldiers were killed in El-Arish in the Sinai by a suicide bombing and a shooting attack. Egyptian sources revealed last week that Hamas terrorists had provided the weapons for the attack through one of its smuggling tunnels under the border to Sinai; the attacks were conducted by Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis jihadists, members of a group sympathetic to Islamic State (ISIS). Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi justified the expulsion by citing the attacks, which led him to declare Sinai in a state of emergency, and insisting "Egypt is fighting a war of existence." Despite the fact that Hamas terrorists aim to destroy Israel, IDF actions to defend Israel from attack such as in the recent counter-terror operation have been met with a tidal wave of international criticism - the Egyptian expulsion of Gaza has been met with no such condemnation so far. Egypt has been cracking down on Hamas, in recent months banning the Muslim Brotherhood offshoot and implementing a siege on Gaza. While Egypt has deployed troops to the Sinai to fight the rampant jihadist terrorism in the region in coordination with Israel, concerns remain that the Egyptian disarmament of the peninsula as part of its peace agreement with Israel may be in danger of collapsing altogether, posing a potential military threat to Israel.
Source: Arutz Sheva
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• A Libyan tribal leader said 13 Egyptian Coptic Christians were held by people smugglers, not abducted, and that they have been freed, however Egypt’s Foreign Ministry denies the report.
• Masked gunmen killed two Egyptian policemen guarding a Coptic Christian church in Minya Tuesday, a day ahead of Coptic Christmas celebrations.
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CAIRO — A series of simultaneous bombings targeting security facilities in the Sinai killed at least 26 people Thursday night, prompting fears that the Egyptian government’s campaign of home demolitions, curfews and sweeping arrests has failed to choke off a budding insurgency there.
The wave of bombings was the first major outburst of violence since the main Islamist militant group operating in the Sinai pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in November.
Through a Twitter account linked to the group, now known as the Sinai Province of the Islamic State, it claimed responsibility for the attacks on more than a half-dozen locations.
The assault, involving nearly simultaneous bombings in several places around the cities of Arish and Rafah, was the most complicated and widely coordinated terrorist attack in Egypt in years. It was also the deadliest attack in the Sinai since a multistage assault on a military checkpoint killed at least 31 people on the night of Oct. 24.
Indeed, the ambition of the attack suggested either that the Sinai militants may be following the advice, or the example, of the Islamic State extremist group, or perhaps that the Sinai outfit sought a spectacular attack to advertise its new affiliation.
Residents of the Sinai and the Egyptian state news media said that attackers had deployed multiple car bombs and mortars against several government targets: the North Sinai security headquarters in Arish, the provincial capital; a nearby army base; a hotel used by the police; a security camp near the border town of Rafah; and several checkpoints.
Al Ahram, Egypt’s flagship state newspaper, reported that its office in Arish had also been struck, although apparently only because it was near the security headquarters and not because it was a target.
Health officials said the bombings had injured more than 100 people, according to the state news media. “This means that the military does not control Sinai, as it claims,” said Khalil al-Anani, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies who studies extremism. “The insurgency is getting stronger and stronger, and the government’s strategy is a failure.”
Borhan el-Beek, a resident of Arish, said his home was about 400 yards from a complex of security buildings that were attacked in four places about 7:30 p.m., not long after the start of the nightly curfew.
“Now there are soldiers and patrols filling the streets,” he said, “and I can see from my balcony there are tanks making the rounds.”
The army “has been fighting terrorism for a year and a half, and how are the percentages? Is it increasing or decreasing?” he asked. “In the North Sinai, we just don’t know.”
Islamist militants have long found a haven in the rugged and loosely governed Sinai Peninsula, capitalizing on its marginalization and the widespread resentment of the police. In the 18 months since the military ousted President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, however, the Sinai has become the center of a campaign of retaliatory attacks on Egyptian security forces that has become the most significant challenge to rule of Mr. Morsi’s successor, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
In an effort to combat the attacks, Mr. Sisi, a former defense minister, has ordered a virtual military occupation of the region. Helicopter gunships have destroyed homes and buildings believed to conceal militants. Residents describe large networks of police informants and widespread arrests.
After the embarrassment of the Oct. 24 attack, security forces announced the forced evacuation and demolition of more than 800 homes within about a kilometer of the border with the Gaza Strip and Israel. That ultimately led to the razing of much of the border town of Rafah.
The authorities said that was necessary to seal off tunnels under the border with Gaza, which they said had been used by militants to attack and escape.
But the scale of Thursday’s assault indicates that the militants have retained sufficient ability to operate despite the crackdown.
“They have displaced a lot of people, and that undoubtedly creates a lot of resentment and increases the atmosphere of permissiveness for this kind of violence,” said Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and a former deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs.
“It is clear that this extremely coercive approach is not working,” she added.
Spokesmen for the military and the police did not respond to requests for comment. Mr. Beek, the resident of Arish, said he wished the Sinai could return to the time before the surge in violence. He lamented the forced evacuations, strict curfews and constrictions on the ability to enter or leave the Sinai.
“More increases in the pressure on the citizens of Sinai, making them feel really like seventh- and eighth-rate citizens,” he said.
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http://www.wsj.com/articles/egypt-strikes-islamic-state-targets-in-libya-1424071790?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTTopStories
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http://www.wsj.com/articles/egypt-strikes-islamic-state-targets-in-libya-1424071790?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTTopStories
Wait, I thought Obama gave a speech in Cairo that was going to make all this go away.
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A powerful and symbolic statement with ACTION by Al Sisi that I am sure the Coptics will note.
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A powerful and symbolic statement with ACTION by Al Sisi that I am sure the Coptics will note.
Well, I bet the U.S. State Department is working on a heck of a Twitter hashtag that will make ISIS really regret their junior varsity actions.
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Wait, I thought Obama gave a speech in Cairo that was going to make all this go away.
Funny what difference 6 years can make. More than half the country back then hoped that was true. Now it is known that even air strikes won't stop this enemy.
You earn peace in one of two ways, defeat or deter your enemies. It is too late for this President to establish any deterrence and he seeks 'authorization' to prevent us from defeating anyone. After losing the House, the Senate, 64% of the Governorships and 70% of the state legislative chambers, he is now in the process of guaranteeing the election of a Hawk to succeed him.
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Funny how Jordan and now Egypt have leaders who have stepped up to face this enemy and yet we have an empty chair. Eastwood was very prescient.
Then again, Obama's golf balls aren't going to hit themselves...
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GM,
On the Point of Jordan and Egypt stepping up to the plate. I like that regional powers are taking care of their own business on a local level. They don't need us to be the police man any longer.
TC
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"he is now in the process of guaranteeing the election of a Hawk to succeed him."
Step right up the first female President: Hillary. "Break all those glass ceilings". The Hawkster in waiting. :wink: Warrior woman. Don't mess with this Amazon.
And that is partly what the Warren crowd is about. She is a "war monger". Poor code stink. They won't know what to do. We know they won't vote Republican.
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GM,
On the Point of Jordan and Egypt stepping up to the plate. I like that regional powers are taking care of their own business on a local level. They don't need us to be the police man any longer.
TC
Yes, but they lack the ability to destroy ISIS. We are they only ones with the capacity to take them out.
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ISIS has how many troops right now? 40,000? Scattered over how much terrain?
How many does Egypt have? How many does Jordan have? House of Saud? UAE? Kuwait?
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http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/02/19/pentagon-refuses-to-back-egyptian-bombing-of-isis-in-libya-after-christian-slaughter/
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In recent weeks, Egypt has begun diluting its forces stationed along the Philadelphi route on its border with Gaza, Israeli defense officials warned Thursday. This move has prompted fear among defense officials that a terrorist takeover could occur in Sinai and violence against Israel would resume. Egyptian president Abdel Fatah al-Sisi delighted the Israeli defense establishment when, in recent months, he allocated substantial resources to fight terrorism in Sinai - particularly, the destruction of smuggling tunnels between Sinai and Gaza as part of the construction of a buffer zone. However, with the threat of an Islamic State (ISIS) presence in Libya on its western border, Egypt has started transferring large numbers of forces there.
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"Egypt is working according to its priorities, and at this time the Libyan border is more threatening," a defense official told Walla! News. "It is a border of more than a thousand kilometers being penetrated by ISIS terrorists, raging across Libya and murdering Egyptian citizens," he explained. "The transition of special forces from Sinai to the border with Libya will harm Egypt's pressure on terrorist organizations that may act against Israel," the official warned. While Israel's cooperation with Cairo in the fight against terrorism has tightened and been very effective in the past year, there is still cause for concern in Israel. In light of recent tensions with Washington, Cairo has begun to get closer with Russia, which could play against Israel in the future.
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http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-weekend-interview-islams-improbable-reformer-1426889862?mod=trending_now_4
Islam’s Improbable Reformer
‘We are keen on a strategic relationship with the U.S. above everything else,’ says Egypt’s new president. ‘And we will never turn our backs on you—even if you turn your backs on us.’
ENLARGE
Photo: Zina Saunders
By
Bret Stephens
March 20, 2015 6:17 p.m. ET
168 COMMENTS
Cairo
When then-Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi appointed a little-known general named Abdel Fattah Al Sisi to be his new defense minister in August 2012, rumors swirled that the officer was chosen for his sympathy with the teachings of Mr. Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood. One telltale sign, people said, was the zabiba on the general’s forehead—the darkened patch of skin that is the result of frequent and fervent prayer.
A pious Muslim must surely also be a political Islamist—or so Mr. Morsi apparently assumed. But the general would soon give the world a lesson in the difference between religious devotion and radicalism.
“There are misconceptions and misperceptions about the real Islam,” now-President Sisi tells me during a two-hour interview in his ornate, century-old presidential palace in Heliopolis. “Religion is guarded by its spirit, by its core, not by human beings. Human beings only take the core and deviate it to the right or left.”
Does he mean to say, I ask, that members of the Muslim Brotherhood are bad Muslims? “It’s the ideology, the ideas,” he replies.
“The real Islamic religion grants absolute freedom for the whole people to believe or not believe. Never does Islam dictate to kill others because they do not believe in Islam. Never does it dictate that [Muslims] have the right to dictate [their beliefs] to the whole world. Never does Islam say that only Muslims will go to paradise and others go to hell.”
Jabbing his right finger in the air for emphasis, he adds: “We are not gods on earth, and we do not have this right to act in the name of Allah.”
***
When Mr. Sisi took power in July 2013, following street protests against Mr. Morsi by an estimated 30 million Egyptians, it wasn’t obvious that he would emerge as perhaps the world’s most significant advocate for Islamic moderation and reform. His personal piety aside, Mr. Sisi seemed to be a typical Egyptian military figure. Unflattering comparisons were made to Hosni Mubarak, a former air force general and Egypt’s president-for-life until his downfall in 2011.
The similarities are misleading. Mr. Mubarak came of age in the ideological anti-colonialist days of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, trained in the Soviet Union, and led the air campaign against Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Anwar Sadat elevated him to the vice presidency in 1975 as a colorless second-fiddle, his very lack of imagination being an asset to Sadat. He became president only due to Sadat’s assassination six years later.
Mr. Sisi, now 60, came of age in a very different era. When he graduated from the Military Academy, in 1977, Egypt was a close American ally on the cusp of making peace with Israel. Rather than being packed off to Russia, he headed for military training in Texas and later the infantry course at Fort Benning, Ga. He returned for another extended stay in the U.S. in 2005 at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pa.
Recalling the two visits, he notes the difference. “The U.S. had been a community that had been living in peace and security. Before 9/11, even the military bases were open. There was almost no difference between civilian life and life on a military base. By 2005, I could feel the tightening.”
The remark is intended to underscore to a visiting American journalist his deep sympathy with and admiration for the U.S. He also goes out of his way to stress that he has no intention of altering the pro-American tilt of Egyptian foreign policy, despite suggestions that he is flirting with Russia’s Vladimir Putin for potential arms purchases and the construction of Egypt’s first nuclear power plant.
“A country like Egypt will never be mischievous with bilateral relations” with America, he insists. “We will never act foolishly.” When I ask about the delivery of F-16 fighters to Egypt—suspended by the U.S. after Mr. Morsi’s overthrow, and now pending a decision by President Obama—he all-but dismisses the matter.
“You can never reduce our relations with the U.S. to matters of weapons systems. We are keen on a strategic relationship with the U.S. above everything else. And we will never turn our backs on you—even if you turn your backs on us.”
There is also a deeper purpose to Mr. Sisi’s pro-American entreaties and his comments on 9/11: He wants to remind his critics of the trade-off every country strikes between security and civil liberties.
It’s a point he returns to when I note the anger and disappointment that so many Egyptian liberals—many of whom had backed him in 2013—now feel. New laws that tightly restrict street protests recall the Mubarak era. Last June several Al Jazeera journalists, including Australian reporter Peter Greste, were sentenced to lengthy prison terms on dubious charges of reporting that was “damaging to national security,” though they have since been released. The Muslim Brotherhood has been banned, Mr. Morsi is in prison and on trial, and Egyptian courts have passed death sentences on hundreds of alleged Islamists, albeit mostly in absentia.
“My message to liberals is that I am very keen to meet their expectations,” Mr. Sisi rejoins. “But the situation in Egypt is overwhelmed.” He laments the Al Jazeera arrests, noting that the incident damaged Egypt’s reputation even as thousands of international correspondents “are working very freely in this country.”
Later, while addressing a question about the Egyptian economy, he offers a franker assessment. “In the last four years our internal debt doubled to $300 billion. Do not separate my answer to the question regarding disappointed liberals. Their country needs to survive. We don’t have the luxury to fight and feud and take all our time discussing issues like that. A country needs security and order for its mere existence. If the world can provide support I will let people demonstrate in the streets day and night.”
Sensing my skepticism, he adds: “You can’t imagine that as an American. You are speaking the language of a country that is at the top of progress: cultural, financial, political, civilizational—it’s all there in the U.S.” But if American standards were imposed on Egypt, he adds, it would do his country no favors.
“I talk about U.S. values of democracy and freedom. They should be honored. But they need the atmosphere where those values can be nurtured. If we can bring prosperity we can safeguard those values not just in words.”
All of this seems in keeping with Mr. Sisi’s military upbringing and reminds me of Pervez Musharraf, the former Pakistani general turned president. But the comparison is fundamentally inapt. Under Mr. Musharraf, Pakistan continued to make opportunistic deals with terrorists while giving safe harbor to leaders of the Afghan Taliban.
By contrast, it’s impossible to doubt the seriousness of Mr. Sisi’s opposition to Islamic extremism, or his aversion to exporting instability. In late February he ordered the bombing of Islamic State targets in neighboring Libya after ISIS decapitated 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians. Egypt’s security cooperation with Israel has never been closer, and Mr. Sisi has moved aggressively to close the tunnels beneath Egypt’s border with Gaza, through which Hamas has obtained its weapons.
Later this month, Mr. Sisi will host an Arab League summit, the centerpiece of which will be a joint Arab antiterrorism task force. He says he won’t put Egyptian boots on the ground to fight ISIS in Iraq, which he says is a job for Iraqis with U.S. help. And he takes care to avoid mentioning Iran’s regional ambitions or saying anything critical of its nuclear negotiations, which he says he supports while adding that “I understand the concern of the Israelis.”
But he does say the new force is needed “to preserve what is left” of the stable Arab world. In particular, he stresses that “there shouldn’t be any arrangements at the expense of the Gulf states. The security of the Gulf states is indispensable for the security of Egypt.”
He also decries the Western habit of intervening militarily and then failing to take account of the consequences. “Look, NATO had a mission in Libya and its mission was not accomplished,” he says. The U.N. continues to impose an arms embargo on Libya that adversely affects the legitimate, non-Islamist government based in Tobruk while “armed militias obtain an unstoppable flow of arms and munitions.”
“I wasn’t with the Gadhafi regime,” he says, “but there is a difference between taking an action and being aware of what that action will bring about. The risks of extremism and terrorism weren’t clear in the minds of the U.S. and Europe. It is really dangerous if countries lose control because extremists will cause them problems beyond their imagination.” The same lesson, he emphasizes, applies to the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
But Mr. Sisi is not a dogmatic critic of muscular U.S. involvement in the Middle East. Pondering the prospect of a broad U.S. retreat from the region, Mr. Sisi sounds like the most enthusiastic proponent of Pax Americana.
“The United States has the strength, and with might comes responsibility,” he says. “That is why it is committed and has responsibilities toward the whole world. It is not reasonable or acceptable that with all that might the United States will not be committed and have responsibilities toward the Middle East. The Middle East is passing through the most difficult and critical time and this will only entail more involvement, not less.”
Meantime, Mr. Sisi sees it as his personal mission to save Egypt, even as he insists he has no intention of becoming another president-for-life. When I ask him to name Mr. Mubarak’s biggest mistake, he says simply: “He stayed in power for a long time.”
A day before our interview, I watched him close an investment conference in the resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh, where he celebrated General Electric’s decision to invest to ease Egypt’s chronic power outages. He describes his economic philosophy as “the need to encourage the business community to come here and invest.” He constantly stresses the imperative of acting swiftly: “The magnitude of the effort needed to secure the needs of 90 million people is huge and beyond any one man’s effort.”
He’s also aware that the most important work will take time. In January Mr. Sisi went before the religious clerics of Cairo’s Al-Azhar university to demand a “revolution” in Islam. The follow-through won’t be easy. “The most difficult thing to do is change a religious rhetoric and bring a shift in how people are used to their religion,” he says. “Don’t imagine the results will be seen in a few months or years. Radical misconceptions [about Islam] were instilled 100 years ago. Now we can see the results.”
That’s not to say he doesn’t think it’s doable. “Popular sympathy with the idea of religion was dominating the whole scene in Egypt for years in the past. This does not exist anymore. This is a change I consider strategic. Because what brought the Muslim Brotherhood to power was Egyptian sympathy with the concept of religion. Egyptians believed that the Muslim Brothers were advocates of the real Islam. The past three years have been a critical test to those people who were promoting religious ideas. Egyptians experienced it totally and said these people do not deserve sympathy and we will not allow it.”
Throughout our interview, Mr. Sisi has been speaking in Arabic through an interpreter. But after delivering this point, he said in colloquial American English, “You got that?”
Mr. Stephens writes the Journal’s “Global View” column.
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CAIRO—An Egyptian court on Saturday sentenced ousted President Mohammed Morsi to death for breaking out of prison during the height of the nation’s uprising in 2011, the latest blow against Islamist critics of the government.
The decision is the harshest of multiple sentences given to Mr. Morsi and underscores the breadth of current President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi’s crackdown on his chief political opponents, the Muslim Brotherhood. The court’s preliminary verdict Saturday is subject to review by the Grand Mufti, Egypt’s highest religious authority, whose opinion isn’t legally binding but is traditionally adopted by the court. A final verdict based his opinion will be delivered June 2 but will be open to appeals, which can take years in Egypt’s clogged judicial system.
Mr. Morsi has already been sentenced to 20 years in prison last month in a separate case in which he was found guilty of fomenting violence during a series of protests in 2012 that dogged his year in office.
The former Egyptian president was among 106 members and leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood sentenced to death on Saturday, including the group’s spiritual guide Mohammed Badie and prominent Islamic scholar, Youssef al-Qaradawi, who is based in Qatar.
The decision—broadcast on state television as Mr. Morsi and some of co-defendants smiled defiantly from inside the caged dock used to hold the accused—was received quietly in Egypt. However, authorities said it may have inspired a violent response in the restive Sinai Peninsula where security forces have struggled to contain a low-level Islamist insurgency.
Hours after the verdict was delivered, unknown gunmen attacked a vehicle carrying several judges and aides in the northern Sinai town of al-Arish, killing three judges, a driver, and wounding three others, according to Egypt’s state news agency. There was no immediate claim of responsibility, but the state news agency quotes unnamed security officials saying the attack may have been retaliation for the verdict against Mr. Morsi.
Saturday’s decision is latest in a series of mass trials that have led to death penalty verdicts against the leadership and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood. Human rights organizations have criticized the mass sentences, while some Western governments, including the U.S., have expressed concern over the apparent lack of due process.
If Saturday’s verdicts are confirmed, the entire top leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood will be facing either life in prison or execution stemming from trials that began under Mr. Sisi’s leadership. The sentences represent the most comprehensive crackdown of the group since the modern Egyptian state was founded.
“The death penalty has become the favorite tool for the Egyptian authorities to purge the political opposition,” Amnesty International said in a statement on Saturday, calling Mr. Morsi’s trial “grossly unfair.”
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a close ally of Mr. Morsi, slammed the Egyptian court’s decision and criticized western governments for not speaking forcibly enough against the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood.
“Unfortunately, they decided to execute Morsi. Egypt is turning to ancient Egypt,” Mr. Erdogan said, highlighting that Cairo could hang a leader elected democratically with 52% support.
Amr Darrag, a former cabinet minister under Mr. Morsi, said the verdict marks “one of the darkest days in Egypt’s history” in a statement from Turkey, where he remains in exile.
The defendants were accused of breaking out of Wadi al Natroun prison days after the 2011 uprising first began. He and other senior leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood had been ordered jailed by then president Hosni Mubarak , whose rule was being undermined by massive street protests that resulted in his resignation 18 days after they began on Jan. 25, 2011. Two days after being detained, the prison was raided by armed groups who clashed with jail guards, ultimately beating the authorities into retreat.
In a phone call to Al Jazeera Arabic broadcast on the day of his escape, a panicked Mr. Morsi is heard saying he and his Muslim Brotherhood colleagues were freed by unknown men in both prison uniforms and in civilian clothes, and urged authorities to instruct him on how to proceed, vowing not to leave the prison without official permission. In 2013, months after he had been deposed and arrested by Mr. Sisi, prosecutors charged Mr. Morsi with breaking out of the prison with the help of Hamas operatives they alleged had infiltrated Egypt during the chaotic uprising.
Mr. Al Sisi later became president after winning in a landslide against a weak opponent in 2014.
In a statement, Hamas said some of the defendants found guilty in the case are members of their organization who had died before the 2011 uprising or who were serving lengthy prison sentences in Israel.
Critics of the regime have drawn comparisons between Mr. Morsi’s legal fate and that of Mr. Mubarak who has had nearly every legal case against him dismissed or has resulted in acquittal. On May 9, Mr. Mubarak was sentenced to three years in a retrial for corruption, but legal experts said he is unlikely to serve any of the time in prison owing to several years of detention—mostly in a military hospital—since his ouster in 2011.
—Emre Peker in Istanbul contributed to this article.
Write to Tamer El-Ghobashy at tamer.el-ghobashy@wsj.com
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Egypt’s Leader Reinvents Himself as Bulwark Against Terrorism
Abdel Fatah Al Sisi, criticized for cracking down on his Islamist opponents, is embraced for his stand against Islamic State
By Tamer El-Ghobashy
May 18, 2015 5:30 a.m. ET
WSJ
CAIRO—The specter of an expanding Islamic State has alarmed leaders across the Middle East. But for Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, that threat has become an opportunity to transform himself from an international outcast to an ally in the regional war against terrorism.
Since Mr. Sisi came to power in a coup two years ago, his government has criminalized street protests, sentenced hundreds to death in mass trials and, according to the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights, imprisoned some 40,000 political opponents and their supporters, drawing widespread international criticism.
He also has declared his main political opponent, the Muslim Brotherhood, a terrorist organization, despite its explicit denunciation of violence, putting the popular Islamist organization in the same category as avowedly militant groups such as Islamic State and al Qaeda.
On Saturday, a special court set up in the police academy in Cairo sentenced to death ousted President Mohammed Morsi, the former Muslim Brotherhood leader, and more than 100 other leaders and members of the organization, underscoring the breadth of Mr. Sisi’s crackdown.
Egypt's deposed President Mohammed Morsi in a defendant's cage as a judge sentences him and more than 100 others to death on Saturday. ENLARGE
Egypt's deposed President Mohammed Morsi in a defendant's cage as a judge sentences him and more than 100 others to death on Saturday. Illustration: Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
The Egyptian leader’s tough response to the emergence of Islamic State coupled with Iran’s expanding sway in traditionally Sunni Muslim spheres of influence have boosted the 60-year-old retired army general’s stock in the region as a bulwark against extremism.
At the same time, his declarations about the need to “revolutionize” Islam to increase tolerance in the Arab and Islamic world have helped his image in Washington, opening the way for the Obama administration’s cautious embrace of the Egyptian leader.
The administration lifted a ban on arms sales to Cairo in March and promised to restore a $1.3 billion aid package, an annual commitment set forth in the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty.
The aid was withheld after Mr. Morsi—Egypt’s first freely elected president—was deposed in a military coup led by Mr. Sisi in 2013, while he was still defense minister and head of the armed forces.
In renewing normal aid ties, National Security Council spokeswoman Bernadette Meehan said, the U.S. would seek to balance vital U.S.-Egyptian security ties with meaningful Egyptian political overhauls.
A State Department official on Sunday said the mass death sentences were deeply troubling.
‘‘Sisi played this card very well by convincing the administration that the main objective is to fight terrorism. A common enemy brings the countries together again.’’
—Khalil al-Anani, Middle East scholar
“We have consistently spoken out against the practice of mass trials and sentences, which are conducted in a manner that is inconsistent with Egypt’s international obligations and the rule of law,” the official said.
Despite criticism of his methods, Mr. Sisi’s strategy of emphasizing the threat of terrorism, while selectively committing resources to fighting it, has paid off, said Khalil al-Anani, a Middle East scholar at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington.
“Sisi played this card very well by convincing the administration that the main objective is to fight terrorism,” Mr. Anani said. “A common enemy brings the countries together again.”
The cautious U.S. embrace of Mr. Sisi hasn’t appeared to markedly shift perceptions of him in Egypt.
To his supporters, he has brought welcome stability to Egypt following the upheavals of the Arab Spring, the ouster of longtime ruler Hosni Mubarak and the brief, turbulent presidential tenure of Mr. Morsi.
The death sentence imposed on Mr. Morsi on Saturday is subject to review by the Grand Mufti, Egypt’s highest religious authority, whose opinion isn’t legally binding but is often adopted by the court. A final verdict will be delivered June 2 but will be open to appeal, which can take years in Egypt’s clogged judicial system.
The former Egyptian president was among 106 members and leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood sentenced to death on Saturday, including the group’s spiritual guide, Mohammed Badie, and prominent Islamic scholar, Youssef al-Qaradawi, who is based in Qatar.
If the verdicts are confirmed, the entire top leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood will be facing either life in prison or execution stemming from trials that began under Mr. Sisi’s leadership. The sentences represent the most comprehensive crackdown on the group since the modern Egyptian state was founded.
In statements released from the group’s media offices overseas, the Brotherhood condemned the judge’s decision, calling it illegitimate and politically driven.
Amnesty International called the trial “grossly unfair,” saying “the death penalty has become the favorite tool for the Egyptian authorities to purge the political opposition.”
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a close ally of Mr. Morsi, slammed the court’s decision and criticized Western governments for not speaking forcibly enough against the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood.
The defendants were accused of breaking out of Wadi al Natroun prison days after the 2011 uprising began. Mr. Morsi and other senior leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood had been ordered jailed by then-President Mubarak, whose rule was being undermined by massive street protests that resulted in his resignation 18 days after they began on Jan. 25, 2011.
Two days after being detained, the prison was raided by armed groups who clashed with jail guards, beating the authorities into retreat.
In a phone call to Al Jazeera Arabic broadcast on the day of his escape, a panicked Mr. Morsi is heard saying he and his Muslim Brotherhood colleagues were freed by unknown men in both prison uniforms and in civilian clothes, and urged authorities to instruct him on how to proceed, vowing not to leave the prison without official permission.
For his domestic critics, the warming U.S. attitude to Mr. Sisi has potentially damaging consequences for peaceful opponents of his government. They worry that it will give Egyptian authorities further license to treat the nonviolent opposition as harshly as those armed militants who have carried out sporadic attacks against police and security forces in Egypt.
“We are as exposed as we’ve ever been without even Western rhetoric suggesting that human rights in Egypt are a major concern,” said one activist whose colleagues are serving prison terms.
Hazem Abdel Azim, a top official in the Egyptian leader’s presidential campaign last year, announced on April 27 that he was withdrawing from politics indefinitely.
“I feel the political climate isn’t less dangerous than Mubarak’s days if one speaks freely,” Mr. Abdel Azim tweeted, referring to the long periods of authoritarian rule by the ex-Egyptian president. He didn’t respond to requests for further comment.
In Washington, congressional supporters of the Egyptian leader said he is a mainstay of international efforts to combat terrorism.
“They still have a way to go with their democratic reforms, but America needs strong allies like Egypt in the region,” said Rep. Mac Thornberry (R., Texas), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.
Other members of Congress, however, voiced doubts over the wisdom of renewed arms sales to Mr. Sisi’s government.
Sen. Patrick Leahy (D., Vt.), co-author of a provision in the 2015 appropriations bill that now links continued U.S. military aid for Egypt to its progress on improving human rights and democracy, said this isn’t the time to hand Egypt a blank check.
“The United States should defend principles of democracy and human rights, and President al-Sisi’s government has systematically and flagrantly trampled on both,” Mr. Leahy said in an email.
Mr. Anani, the Middle East scholar, said he believes there is a long-term cost for both Egypt and its allies in making the military campaign against Islamist militants their central focus.
“It is back to the old days where security trumps everything else,” he said. “It is a shortsighted policy that can become counterproductive, increasing the kind of extremism that has created this regional instability.”
—Dahlia Kholaif in Cairo
contributed to this article.
Write to Tamer El-Ghobashy at tamer.el-ghobashy@wsj.com
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https://www.facebook.com/StandWithUs/videos/10152960188182689/
What's the over/under on his brutal murder?
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CAIRO — Egypt is moving away from democracy, stifling freedom of expression, arresting thousands for political dissent and failing to hold the security forces accountable for “arbitrary or unlawful killings,” the Obama administration has determined in a formal report to Congress.
The administration concludes in the same report that Egypt is nevertheless too important to national security to end the roughly $1.5 billion a year it receives in American aid, most of it military. But after making that conclusion, the report proceeds to recite a discordant litany of the Egyptian government’s abuses and failings, apparently seeking to stop just short of the kind of embrace Washington once gave the strongman Hosni Mubarak.
Quietly submitted to Congress on May 12 without public announcement, the report captures the awkwardness of Washington’s rapidly shifting views of Egypt: first backing President Mubarak, then the 2011 revolt that ousted him, and now rebuilding ties with a new strongman, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
Western diplomats are increasingly seeking to make the best of their relationship with Mr. Sisi, the former general who led a military takeover here two years ago, deposing the elected president, even amid reports that his government is tightening its crackdown on dissent.
“America is making the same mistake it did when they were supporting Hosni Mubarak,” said Mohamed Lotfy, a human rights advocate who was stopped last week at Cairo’s airport to prevent him from traveling to Germany during a visit there by Mr. Sisi.
By crushing hopes for peaceful and democratic political change, “Sisi is creating a new generation of terrorists, and exporting them to Syria and Iraq,” Mr. Lotfy said, while the United States has damaged its credibility in the region by “contradicting its values — or at least the values that it tries to export in speeches.”
Activists suggest that the Egyptian government may be cracking down now in anticipation of a call for a general strike by one of the activist groups that kicked off the revolt against Mr. Mubarak in 2011. It may also be preparing for potential protests at the end of the month, on the second anniversary of Mr. Sisi’s ouster of President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood.
In recent weeks, the Egyptian police have detained at least three leaders of the left-leaning April 6 group, which has tried to call for the general strike on Thursday, and rights groups say several other activists have been rounded up or disappeared as well.
Mr. Lotfy said his group, the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms, was tracking the disappearances of 10 people, and Mona Seif, another activist, said she had confirmed 17.
Magdy Ashour, an Islamist activist who was featured in a documentary about the 2011 uprising called “The Square,” has also been detained, according to news reports.
Negad el-Borai, a prominent human rights lawyer, said he expected to be arrested as well, having been called in three times in recent weeks for interrogation about his opposition to torture and his previous work for human rights groups.
“Because of my past activities, I think they want revenge,” Mr. Borai said in an interview. “It will be a very hard summer.”
A talk show host, Reem Magued, was recently removed from the airwaves, and she said in an interview on another television program that her network, OnTV, had canceled her show because of government pressure. Its executives told her “there are pressures from a ‘sovereign institution’ ” — an intelligence agency, she said.
There have been efforts to suppress labor actions as well. On Sunday, a new video emerged showing soldiers firing into a crowd of workers at a military-owned cement factory in Sinai, apparently in an attempt to squelch a possible demonstration.
Two workers present, speaking on the condition of anonymity for their safety, said in separate telephone interviews that a group of workers had been approaching the administration office to request an ambulance for an injured colleague when the soldiers began shooting, killing at least one and wounding at least two others.
Spokesmen for the military, the Interior Ministry and the Foreign Ministry did not respond to messages seeking comment.
Sarah Leah Whitson, director of the Middle East division of Human Rights Watch, accused the Obama administration of shrugging off such rights violations even though “the government’s own memo acknowledges a laundry list of the worst human rights abuses.”
But Amy Hawthorne, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former State Department official, noted that the administration could have kept the report vague or even classified but chose to lay out at least some of the criticism.
“They are not doing as the U.S. did with the Mubarak regime — attempting to praise the regime for cosmetic steps at reform or downplay serious rights abuses,” she said.
The administration’s report credits Egypt with beginning to overhaul its economy by cutting subsidies, increasing taxes and improving the business climate, “including for U.S. businesses.” Because Egypt is the most populous Arab state and a bellwether in the region, its “success or failure impacts the prospects of peace, stability, democracy and economic growth across the Middle East,” it says.
But “the overall trajectory for rights and democracy has been negative,” the report continues. “A series of executive initiatives, new laws and judicial actions severely restrict freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom of peaceful assembly and due process, and they undermine prospects for democratic governance.”
It noted that four American-Egyptian dual citizens were in Egyptian jails for cases with “potentially political overtones”; one of the four, Mohamed Soltan, was recently released and deported.
“Government forces have committed arbitrary or unlawful killings during the dispersal of demonstrators, of persons in custody, and during military operations in the Northern Sinai Peninsula,” the report says, adding that Egyptian security forces killed “at least 1,000” in one day when they cleared two Islamist sit-ins on Aug. 14, 2013.
“The government has not held accountable any individual or government entities for violence associated with the clearing operations,” the report continues, adding, “Impunity remains a serious problem.”
Merna Thomas contributed reporting.
A version of this article appears in print on June 8, 2015, on page A6 of the New York edition with the headline:
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Police in Cairo on Monday inspected the wreckage of a convoy carrying Egypt’s top prosecutor, Hisham Barakat, who was killed by the attack.
Publish Date June 29, 2015. Photo by Hatem Safwat/European Pressphoto Agency.
CAIRO — A powerful bomb killed Egypt’s top prosecutor as he drove to work Monday morning, broadening the violent insurgency against the government that militants have been waging for two years.
The prosecutor, Hisham Barakat, was the most senior official to be killed in Egypt since the insurgency began in 2013, after the military ousted the country’s first freely elected president, Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Gen. Osama Bedeir, chief of security here in Cairo, said the bomb was in a car parked along Mr. Barakat’s route and was probably detonated by remote control. The apparently sophisticated mode of attack foiled security measures that were meant to protect Mr. Barakat, who had repeatedly received death threats.
The daylight assassination of so senior a figure was a blow to President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who rose to power on a promise to restore stability after years of political tumult. His government has justified a broad crackdown against Islamists and other opponents as necessary to eradicate the threat from militants.
This month, militants carried out separate attacks near the Pyramids at Giza and the Karnak temple in Luxor, two of Egypt’s most popular tourist destinations, further denting the government’s efforts to project order. Monday’s attack appeared to set Egypt on a course for more violence. The killing of Mr. Barakat was seen as likely to embolden the militants while prompting an even more forceful response from the security services. There was no immediate claim of responsibility.
As one of the nation’s most prominent judicial officials, Mr. Barakat was a focal point for militant groups vowing retaliation for the prosecutions of hundreds of Islamists and the death sentences handed down against senior Brotherhood leaders, including Mr. Morsi.
Many of Mr. Barakat’s prosecutions had also been criticized by human rights advocates, who said the cases were built on flimsy evidence and politically motivated charges.
An Egyptian jihadist group affiliated with the Islamic State — one that has killed judges in the past — posted a video Sunday that appeared to threaten more attacks against the judiciary. The group, which calls itself the Sinai Province, included images that appeared to show an attack in May that killed several judges; fighters are seen spraying a minibus with machine-gun fire.
The three-minute video also included brief images of several other prominent judges, including one who sentenced Mr. Morsi to death.
But analysts said the bombing on Monday might have been the work, instead, of one of a number of militant groups that have surfaced in the last year with smaller-scale attacks. The emergence of these groups, with names like Revolutionary Punishment, have added to longstanding fears in Egypt that Islamists and other opponents of the government would turn to violence in response to the government’s crackdown.
The rise of the new groups coincided with a shift in the insurgency’s focus: After nearly two years of attacks mainly against the security services, killing hundreds of soldiers and police officers, the militants have broadened their targets to include civilian officials in the judiciary.
“This was something that was a long time in the making,” said Mokhtar Awad, a researcher at the Center for American Progress in Washington who studies Egyptian Islamist groups. “The groups that I classify as non-jihadist violent Islamists have always had, at the center of their discourse, the issue of retribution. It was clear that police officers were No. 1 on their list, but eventually, this had to include judges.”
The explosion on Monday hit Mr. Barakat’s small convoy around 10 a.m. as it left the Heliopolis neighborhood near Cairo International Airport. The force of the blast set several cars on fire and shattered windows along the street, injuring at least eight people.
Egyptian officials initially said that Mr. Barakat’s wounds were not life-threatening and included bruises to his face and a dislocated shoulder. Later, the Health Ministry said Mr. Barakat had suffered a lacerated liver and died in the hospital from internal bleeding.
The explosion raised troubling questions about the government’s security measures, which failed to protect one of its most vulnerable officials even though militants had attempted similar attacks before. In September 2013, Mohamed Ibrahim, who was interior minister at the time, survived a bomb attack on his convoy in Cairo.
Ahmed Shazly, who lives near the site of the latest bombing, said Mr. Barakat appeared to follow the same routine every morning, leaving for work in a two-vehicle convoy, one of them apparently an armored vehicle.
In a statement on Monday, Mr. Sisi praised Mr. Barakat as a “model of judicial integrity” who “exemplified patriotism and diligence.” The government said it was canceling celebrations planned for Tuesday to commemorate the start of the mass protests that preceded Mr. Morsi’s ouster.
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http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3163910/Terror-high-seas-Egyptian-navy-vessel-erupts-huge-fireball-ISIS-carry-rocket-strike-patrol-ship-Mediterranean.html
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http://www.timesofisrael.com/in-a-first-new-egyptian-schoolbook-teaches-peace-deal-with-israel/
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http://www.clarionproject.org/news/why-has-egypt-imprisoned-children-mocking-isis
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http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2016/03/17/former-defense-secretary-says-obama-went-against-the-entire-national-security-team-on-egypt-coup/
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http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2016/03/17/former-defense-secretary-says-obama-went-against-the-entire-national-security-team-on-egypt-coup/
Funny, it might cause some to question his loyalties...
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http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/12/11/bombing-at-egypts-main-coptic-christian-cathedral-kills-25.html
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http://www.meforum.org/6453/trump-bid-ti-amplify-muslim-reformers
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http://pamelageller.com/2017/03/russia-egypt-libv.html/
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Can Trump Cut a Deal With Egypt?
Washington has a strong hand to ask for real concessions.
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi in Cairo, March 2.
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi in Cairo, March 2. Photo: khaled desouki/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
By Eric Trager
March 30, 2017 6:51 p.m. ET
9 COMMENTS
The relationship between Egypt and the U.S. will look sunnier on Monday, when President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi visits President Trump in Washington. Under the Obama administration, Mr. Sisi’s authoritarianism made him persona non grata. The key question: Can Mr. Trump translate the warm welcome into a “good deal” for America?
This isn’t the first U.S.-Egypt “reset.” Upon taking office, President Obama courted Mr. Sisi’s predecessor, Hosni Mubarak, who had resented the Bush administration’s “freedom agenda.” Mr. Obama emphasized convergence with Egypt on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, while playing down human-rights concerns.
Mr. Obama’s priorities shifted, however, once Mr. Mubarak was overthrown in 2011. The White House backed Egypt’s democratic transition and cooperated with the Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Morsi, who won the 2012 presidential election.
The following year, after mass protests in Egypt, the military, led by Mr. Sisi, ousted Mr. Morsi and oversaw a deadly crackdown on Morsi supporters. The Obama White House responded by withholding weapons shipments. Cairo interpreted this as U.S. support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which Egypt soon declared a terrorist organization. Weapons shipments resumed in 2015, but Cairo’s distrust of Washington persisted. Meanwhile, Egypt deepened its ties to Russia through arms deals and joint military exercises.
Now Mr. Sisi will encounter a friendlier White House. Mr. Trump is skeptical of democracy promotion and won’t press Egypt on political reform. Officials in the Trump administration have praised Mr. Sisi’s 2014 speech urging Muslim clerics to combat extremism. And they share his view that the Brotherhood is a terrorist organization.
Warmer relations could improve intelligence sharing and strategic cooperation. At the very least, Cairo should consult with Washington regarding Russia’s reported deployment of troops in western Egypt. Perhaps support for Mr. Sisi would dampen the anti-Americanism in Egypt’s media. If Mr. Trump insists, maybe Mr. Sisi will release Aya Hegazy, a U.S. citizen who has been arbitrarily detained since 2014.
Still, both countries’ domestic politics pose challenges. Egyptian officials have requested more U.S. military and economic aid. Egypt also wants Washington to renew cash-flow financing, which enables it to sign more expensive weapons contracts. But Mr. Trump vows to cut foreign aid.
Meanwhile, Mr. Trump ought to prioritize Egypt’s counterterrorism efforts. Egypt’s military was built to fight land wars, and its brass refuses to focus aid on counterterrorism. Cairo may try to win this debate by playing to Mr. Trump’s pledge to create jobs: Buying weapons systems ultimately helps employment in the defense industry.
Mr. Trump’s best chance to cut a “good deal” with Mr. Sisi may be on Monday, when the Egyptian leader receives the Washington welcome he has long desired. But if Mr. Sisi pockets that victory without conceding anything on his country’s deepening relationship with Russia, prosecution of Americans, or aid priorities, Mr. Trump will have wasted Washington’s best hand in years.
Mr. Trager is a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and author of “Arab Fall: How the Muslim Brotherhood Won and Lost Egypt in 891 Days.”
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Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi presided on July 22 over the opening of a new military base in northwest Egypt to protect coastal regions, ABC News reported July 24. Al-Sisi says it is the largest base in the Middle East. The base was opened the day before the 65th anniversary of the coup that ended the Egyptian monarchy and is named after the country's first president, Mohammed Naguib.
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http://www.speroforum.com/a/SVXSVSQOMN42/81795-Christians-apologize-to-Muslims-after-Muslims-attack?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=LEJYGFVVZY5&utm_content=SVXSVSQOMN42&utm_source=news&utm_term=Christians+apologize+to+Muslims+after+Muslims+attack#.WdNOOnrcCeQ
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second post
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/a-north-korean-ship-was-seized-off-egypt-with-a-huge-cache-of-weapons-destined-for-a-surprising-buyer/2017/10/01/d9a4e06e-a46d-11e7-b14f-f41773cd5a14_story.html?utm_term=.63ef7526d5c6
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We need to not the big Jihadi attack on the Sufi mosque in the Sinai and its implications.
We like Al Sisi but I am reading that he tends to go heavy military response and get a lot of innocent people and not so many of the jihadis-- which is presently problems in getting popular support.
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Russia is taking another step toward restoring its military presence in the Middle East, announcing on Nov. 30 that it is working on a preliminary agreement with Egypt on the reciprocal use of air bases in each country. Egyptian authorities still must approve the draft agreement, which Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev has signed, but they are expected to do so soon. The agreement would be good for five years and could be extended.
Moscow is interested in expanding its influence in the Middle East for three main reasons. First, it wants to gain the leverage and freedom needed to solve broader international and economic challenges on its own terms. Second, it has an interest in containing the threat of radical Islam, which reaches into the Russian heartland. And finally, at a time when Western sanctions are weighing heavily on its economy, Moscow is looking to gain influence in and access to new markets for Russian arms, goods and energy.
The strategic implications for Russia are notable. Gaining basing rights in Egypt would allow Russia to project military power into Libya, the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and the Mediterranean should it choose to. Even if it doesn't use that capability, the mere fact that it has it will give it greater diplomatic clout in Africa. It will also legitimize Russia's presence in the region and make it a more valuable partner for other countries there. Russia is also in discussions with Sudan on the possibility of constructing a Russian naval base there.
It couldn't be any clearer that Russia wants to restore and grow its presence in the Middle East, and it has found a willing partner in Egypt. Egypt's relationship with its historical ally, the United States, has soured since Washington temporarily cut military aid to the country after the 2013 military-led coup, as it was legally obligated to do. Though aid was eventually restored, the move was not received well by the Egyptian military, which is heavily reliant on foreign aid. Since 2013, Cairo has been rebuilding its relationship with Moscow, buying heavy equipment, including fighter jets, missiles and attack helicopters, in the hopes of diversifying its sources of arms and reducing the risk that it will again be left to its own devices. That said, Egypt is not interested in replacing the United States with Russia: Its military is still overwhelmingly dominated by American equipment, and many of its officers have American training. Rather, Egypt hopes to gain access to the best each military has to offer and will not hesitate to leverage the two against each other.
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The Future of Israel's Peace Treaty with Egypt
by Efraim Inbar
The Jerusalem Post
November 27, 2017
http://www.meforum.org/7051/future-of-israel-egypt-peace-treaty
Originally published under the title "For How Long Will the Peace Treaty with Egypt Be Robust?"
Israel's 40-year-old peace treaty with Egypt has proven more durable than contemporary cartoonists imagined. Israel is celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the historic visit of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem, that led to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The move by Egypt, the largest and strongest Arab state, changed the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Sadat violated the Arab taboo against good neighborly relations with the Jewish state and opened the way for additional peace agreements. The defection of Egypt from the Arab military coalition eliminated the option of a two-front conventional war against Israel and saved the Israeli taxpayer billions of dollars. The heavy price paid by Israel to Egypt was total withdrawal from the Sinai and removal of settlements. But, in retrospect, it worked out well, turning Israel into "the land had peace for forty years."
The peace treaty withstood many difficult tests: Israel's strike on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1982, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the 1987 Palestinian uprising, Israeli measures against the Palestinian terrorism campaign since 2000 and the Israel-Gaza wars. Even the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt (2012-13) did not cancel the peace treaty.
Israeli expectations for normal inter-state and people-to-people interactions with Egypt were not realized.
Unfortunately, Israeli expectations for normal inter-state and people-to-people interactions were not realized. The rooted cultural and religious barriers to having good relations with the Jewish state have been too difficult to overcome. In the Arab world, Israel is mostly seen as an alien body. For Egypt, this has not changed after 40 years of formal peace. In the absence of drastic change in the Arab educational systems, these perceptions of Jews and their state will continue. Hopes for peaceful relations with Arab countries – such as between the US and Canada – are fanciful dreams. This insight should be taken into consideration when calculating the Israeli price for Arab peace offers.
Moreover, the robustness of the peace treaty is not self-evident. History teaches us that most wars break out in violation of a peace treaty.
The survival of the peace treaty seems threatened by several developments. We have to remember that the change in Egypt's position toward Israel was a result of Cairo gradually preferring the US to the Soviet Union. Egypt's position toward Israel changed because it preferred the US to the Soviet Union.
Egypt realized that the US had greater leverage on Israel in its attempt to gain back the Sinai. However, its pro-American orientation is not a constant. Nowadays, the US seems to have become a less desirable ally. Its international standing has deteriorated and its Middle East policy, under presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump, favors disengagement rather than involvement.
At the same time, Russia has become more influential in the region. Egypt seems to sense the change and now buys Russian weapons. It also purchased two Russian nuclear reactors, which has created a long-term dependency upon Moscow. A change in Egypt's foreign policy orientation also affects its relations with Israel.
The region, whose character is changing due to the ascendance of Iran, also provides reasons to worry.
Egypt's pro-American orientation is not a constant. With U.S. influence waning, Cairo has begun buying Russian weapons again.
States in the region are aware of a projected American weakness and are left with only two choices when facing an Iran that cooperates with Russia. They can form an alliance to curb Iranian influence (the choice of Saudi Arabia and most of the Gulf States) or get closer to Iran (the choice of Turkey and Qatar). Egypt is usually seen as part of the Sunni moderate camp that fears greater Iranian clout. Egypt is much more dependent upon financial support from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.
Nevertheless, Egypt supported Bashar Assad in Syria – an Iranian ally. If the Gulf region falls under Iranian influence, Cairo might have to adopt a different posture and also look for support in Tehran. This might put an end to the peace treaty with Israel.
Finally, the large growth of the Egyptian military and its modernization is a source of concern. The growth of the Egyptian air force, navy and land forces remains a mystery, particularly with no enemy on Egyptian borders in sight. The investments in logistics infrastructure from Cairo eastwards and the building of tunnels under the Suez Canal seem to have no reasonable civilian rationale. Moreover, the demilitarization of Sinai, the most important stabilizing element in the peace treaty, has been eroded, as Israel agreed to the infusion of Egyptian units into the Sinai to fight the radical Islamic insurgency.
While an Egyptian-Israeli military confrontation is unlikely, we see the emergence of conditions that make an Egyptian attack easier.
Everything must be done by Jerusalem to preserve the peace treaty with Egypt, but Israel should still prepare itself for worst-case scenarios.
Efraim Inbar is president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies, professor emeritus of political studies at Bar-Ilan University, and a Shillman-Ginsburg fellow at the Middle East Forum.
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https://clarionproject.org/graphic-video-isis-executions-on-egyptian-streets/
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Islamists Scheme to Disrupt Egyptian Presidential Elections
by Hany Ghoraba
Special to IPT News
February 27, 2018
https://www.investigativeproject.org/7358/islamists-scheme-to-disrupt-egyptian-presidential
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Need a North Korean Missile? Call the Cairo Embassy
By DECLAN WALSHMARCH 3, 2018
A statue of the muzzle and bayonet of an AK-47, given to Egypt by North Korea, honors the military partnership between the two countries. Credit Keith J Smith/Alamy
CAIRO — On an island in the Suez Canal, a towering AK-47 rifle, its muzzle and bayonet pointed skyward, symbolizes one of Egypt’s most enduring alliances. Decades ago, North Korea presented it to Egypt to commemorate the 1973 war against Israel, when North Korean pilots fought and died on the Egyptian side.
But now the statue has come to signify another aspect of Egypt’s ties to North Korea: a furtive trade in illegal weapons that has upset President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s otherwise cozy relationship with the United States, set off a painful cut in military aid and drawn unremitting scrutiny from United Nations inspectors.
Egypt has purchased North Korean weapons and allowed North Korean diplomats to use their Cairo embassy as a base for military sales across the region, American and United Nations officials say. Those transactions earned vital hard cash for North Korea, but they violated international sanctions and drew the ire of Egypt’s main military patron, the United States, which cut or suspended $291 million in military aid in August.
Tensions may bubble up again in the coming weeks with the publication of a United Nations report that contains new information about the cargo of a rusty North Korean freighter intercepted off the coast of Egypt in 2016. The ship was carrying 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades worth an estimated $26 million.
The report, due to be released this month, identifies the customer for the weapons as an arm of the Arab Organization for Industrialization, Egypt’s main state weapons conglomerate. Mr. Sisi heads the committee that oversees the group.
Egypt has previously denied being the intended recipient of the weapons, or breaching international sanctions. In response to questions about the United Nations finding, the State Information Service said this past week: “The relevant Egyptian authorities have undertaken all the necessary measures in relation to the North Korean ship in full transparency and under the supervision” of United Nations officials.
After the Trump administration slashed aid last summer, Egyptian officials said they were cutting military ties to North Korea, reducing the size of its Cairo embassy and monitoring the activities of North Korean diplomats. The relationship with North Korea is “limited to representation, and there is almost no existing economic or other areas of cooperation,” Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry said at a news conference with Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson in Cairo last month.
But that diplomatic representation, in an embassy that doubles as a regional arms dealership, is the problem, American officials have said. In addition, Washington worries that North Korea, a longtime supplier of ballistic missile technology to Egypt, is still supplying missile parts, said Andrea Berger, a North Korea specialist at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies.
“Ballistic missile customers are the most concerning of North Korea’s partners and deserve the highest attention,” she said. “Egypt is one of those.”
The Embassy
North Korea’s largest embassy in the Middle East, an elegant, three-story Victorian building with a rusty brass plate over the entrance, sits on a leafy street on an island in the Nile. The embassy walls display photos of North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, standing in a garden or strolling through a fish market. Its windows are usually shuttered, and security guards discourage passers-by from taking photos.
Like those of many North Korean outposts, the duties of the Cairo embassy extend well beyond diplomacy.
In Africa especially, North Korean diplomats have engaged in a wide variety of ruses and schemes to earn hard currency, United Nations investigators say. In South Africa and Mozambique, North Korean diplomats have been implicated in rhino poaching. In Namibia, North Koreans built giant statues and a munitions factory. In Angola, they trained the presidential guard in martial arts.
In Egypt, their business is weapons. United Nations inspectors and North Korean defectors say the Cairo embassy has become a bustling arms bazaar for covert sales of North Korean missiles and cut-price Soviet-era military hardware across a band of North Africa and the Middle East.
Shielded by diplomatic cover and front companies, North Korean officials have traveled to Sudan, which was then subject to an international trade embargo, to sell satellite-guided missiles, according to records obtained by the United Nations. Others flew to Syria, where North Korea has supplied items that could be used in the production of chemical weapons.
Inside the embassy, arms dealing goes right to the top. In November 2016, the United States and the United Nations sanctioned the ambassador, Pak Chun-il, describing him as an agent of North Korea’s largest arms company, the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation.
At least five other North Korean officials based in Egypt, employed by state security or various arms fronts, have been sanctioned. One of them, Kim Song-chol, traveled to Khartoum in 2013 as part of a $6.8 million deal for the sale of 180 missiles and missile parts to Sudan.
According to this year’s sanctions report, Mr. Kim and another sanctioned official based in Cairo, Son Jong-hyok, continue to deal with Sudan’s state-controlled Military Industrial Corporation.
Photo
The North Korean Embassy in Cairo is the hub of an arms bazaar for military sales across the region, American and United Nations officials say. Credit Agence France-Presse
“An arms dealer with a diplomatic passport is still an arms dealer,” Samantha Power, the United States ambassador to the United Nations, told the Security Council in 2016.
The Ship
For weeks in the summer of 2016, American intelligence had covertly tracked the Jie Shun, the ship filled with rocket-propelled grenades that has become a focus of Cairo’s ties to North Korea. As it neared the Suez Canal in August, according to a Western diplomat familiar with the case, the Americans warned the Egyptians it might be carrying contraband, effectively forcing them to intervene.
The seizure was the largest interdiction of munitions since sanctions were imposed on North Korea in 2006 — a significant victory in the international effort, including an arms embargo and export restrictions, to force Kim Jong-un to abandon his nuclear weapons program.
For the next three months, with the Jie Shun impounded at Ain Sokhna port, a diplomatic tug-of-war played out. The Americans wanted to send officials to inspect the dilapidated freighter and its illicit cargo. North Korea sent a diplomat to negotiate its release.
The Egyptians refused both demands, but in November 2016 agreed to allow United Nations inspectors to board the ship. But by then, valuable information about the identity of the customer for the rockets, which had been hidden under mounds of iron ore, was missing. The North Korean crew had been sent home, which meant the inspectors could not interview them.
But one piece of evidence remained, in the form of a name stenciled on the rocket crates: “Al Sakr Factory for Developed Industries (AOI),” Egypt’s principal missile research and development company and a subsidiary of its sprawling state weapons conglomerate, the Arab Organization for Industrialization.
Mohamed Abdulrahman, the chairman of Al Sakr, did not respond to emailed questions about the shipment. In its statement, Egypt’s State Information Service said the measures taken by the country were “praised” by the United Nations’ sanctions committee, “which reiterated that the way Egypt dealt with this case is a model to be followed in similar situations.”
Secret Missile Cooperation
The Jie Shun shipment was a glaring example of how cash-starved North Korea has helped finance its nuclear program by hawking stocks of cheap, Soviet-era weapons to countries that developed a reliance on those systems during the Cold War, American officials and analysts say.
But it also pointed to an established smuggling route and an entrenched military-to-military trading relationship that American officials say has long been a conduit for ballistic missile technology.
A North Korean freighter carrying 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades was intercepted off the coast of Egypt and held at the Ain Sokhna port, above, while the United States and North Korea wrestled over its fate. Credit Amr Abdallah Dalsh/Reuters
Starting in the 1970s, Cairo and Pyongyang collaborated to extend the range and accuracy of Soviet Scud missiles, said Owen Sirrs, a former agent with the Defense Intelligence Agency. In the late 1990s, American officials worried that Egypt was trying to buy North Korea’s Nodong missile system, which has a range of about 800 miles.
“We were sending démarches to the Egyptians to say, ‘Knock it off — we’re sending you hundreds of F-16s, and you don’t need that North Korean crap,’” said Mr. Sirrs, who was based in Cairo at the time and now lectures at the University of Montana.
It is unclear if Egypt ever acquired the Nodong missiles. Although Cairo has spent billions on high-profile military purchases in recent years, including Russian fighter jets, French aircraft carriers and German submarines, it has been notably cagey about its offensive missile capabilities.
In 2013, a shipment of spare parts for Scud-B missiles, which have a shorter range than the Nodong, was intercepted in transit as it was shipped by air from the North Korean Embassy in Beijing to a military-controlled company in Cairo. The missile components had been labeled parts for fish-processing machinery.
Egypt denied that the military company had ordered the Scud parts.
Such missiles could strike Israel from deep inside Egyptian territory. They could also reach Ethiopia, with which Egypt has a simmering dispute over a new dam on the Nile.
The Politics of Sanctions Evasion
The Trump administration has scored some successes in its drive to isolate North Korea from its allies, notably with the Philippines and Singapore last fall. But Egypt, which receives $1.3 billion annually in American aid, has resisted Mr. Trump’s entreaties.
Egypt’s relationship with North Korea runs deep. President Hosni Mubarak was regularly feted in Pyongyang before his ouster in 2011. An Egyptian tycoon, Naguib Sawiris, built North Korea’s main cellphone network and invested in a bank there. Along with the AK-47 monument on the Suez Canal, North Korea built a large war museum in Cairo that is frequently visited by Egyptian schoolchildren.
Egypt’s military leaders are reluctant to cut those ties and lose access to Soviet-era weapons and ballistic missile systems, analysts say, a posture bolstered by their reflexive distaste for appearing to bow to American pressure. They may feel that, based on past experience, American criticism will eventually abate.
“They think they can evade the consequences,” said Andrew Miller of the Project on Middle East Democracy, who until last year worked on Egypt at the State Department. “That they are continuing to stonewall and obfuscate and pursue this course of action indicates they think they can get away with it, and whatever price will be imposed on them will be bearable.”
At the North Korean Embassy in Cairo, now under a new ambassador, business continues as usual. North Korean state media has said little about the ambassador, Ma Tong-hui, other than to note that his previous post was as head of a little-known government body in Pyongyang called the Disarmament and Peace Institute.
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Why Egypt Supports U.S. Withdrawal From Iran Nuclear Deal
by Hany Ghoraba
Special to IPT News
May 22, 2018
https://www.investigativeproject.org/7465/why-egypt-supports-us-withdrawal-from-iran
President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal focused understandable attention on the parties which negotiated it. But the move also carries implications for other regional states, including Egypt.
In 2015, Egypt welcomed any initiative to stop a nuclear arms race in the region, but viewed the negotiations skeptically. "We would hope that the agreement reached between the parties would be comprehensive and fulfilling that would prevent an arms race in the Middle East and the complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons," said Egyptian foreign ministry spokesman Bader Abdul Atti. Three years later, former Egyptian Foreign Minister and incumbent Arab League Secretary General Ahmed Aboul Gheit expressed the same skepticism, saying the agreements focus solely on the nuclear program; it "is not the only element that should be pursued with Iran because it implements policies in the region that lead to instability."
While the deal limited Iran's uranium enrichment for a limited time, Iran never stopped supporting terrorist groups targeting Egypt, including the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas and Hizballah. And the deal failed to address Iran's expansionist ambitions in the region.
Egypt has been in conflict with Iran's Islamist regime since the 1979 revolution ousted Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and led to Ayatollah Khomeini's ascent to power. Egypt provided refuge to the dethroned Shah a year after Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel at Camp David in 1978. In response, Iran ended direct flights to Egypt in 1979, and broke off all diplomatic relations with Egypt in 1980. Egypt remains the only Arab country without an embassy in Tehran.
Iran provoked Egyptians years later by naming a main street in Tehran in honor of Khalid Islambouli, an Egyptian terrorist who assassinated President Anwar Sadat during a 1981 military parade. The street name remains, despite an Iranian promise aimed at improving relations, and new larger-than-life wall graffiti of the terrorist decorate buildings in Tehran.
That form of animosity from Iran was met by Egypt's full support to the Iraqi state war against Iran (1979-1988) in which Egypt sold Iraq large amounts of its surplus Soviet-made weapons. Despite being in a major feud with Iraq as a result of Iraq's role in rallying the Arab states to boycott Egypt after the Camp David treaty, Egypt still chose to support Iraq against the Islamist regime, recognizing the greater long-term threat of Iran on Egypt and the entire region.
Iranian espionage operations in Egypt spiked with multiple Iranian cells uncovered trying to infiltrate Egyptian society and institutions. In one example, Iran used a former Muslim Brotherhood member to attempt to establish a radical Shiite Islamist political party in Egypt under the name Shiite Liberation Party to promote Iranian Islamic revolution policies. Hizballah, Iran's terrorist proxy, planned terrorist attacks against Egyptian targets. Egyptian authorities arrested 49 Hizballah members in 2009 for planning three bombings in Taba, a city that borders Israel. The cell's members managed to escape and flee the country after Hamas terrorists broke into the Wadi Al Natroun jail in January 2011 amid the 2011 uprising against Hosni Mubarak's government. One, Sami Shehab, appeared later in Lebanon at a Hizballah celebration.
Iran frequently hosts and supports Muslim Brotherhood leaders including former spokesman Kamal Al Hilbawy and Swiss-based financier Youssef Nada. Nada claims that he is simply seeking peace initiatives between Arabs and Iranians, but in reality he worked to bolster Iran's regional influence by routing intelligence from Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in Arab countries to Iranian operatives.
During a 2016 meeting with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Hilbawy described Ayatollah Khomeini as being his mentor as influential to Muslim Brotherhood members as their founder Hassan al-Banna and Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Qutb. "We always say that we learned from Imam Khomeini as much as we learned from Imam Hassan al-Banna, Imam Maududi, Imam Sayyid Qutb ... and we are still learning from our brothers who are alive here [in Iran]," Hilbawy said.
He reaffirmed Muslim Brotherhood and Iranian animosity towards the United States: "We saw with our own eyes how the Soviet Union collapsed thanks to God ... and I pray to God Almighty we would witness the renaissance of Islam and unity of the Muslim Ummah, so we can see with our own eyes the overtaking of the remaining superpower (USA) as it falls and divides in front us day after day."
Iran, Hilbawy said, is the only country that the West fears and he hopes Iran becomes a model for the rest of the Arabic and Islamic world.
For nearly three decades, Iran has been a major financier for Hamas – the Muslim Brotherhood's Palestinian terror wing, which has been an obstacle for a sustainable peace between Palestinians and Israelis. Hamas also has worked to destabilize Egyptian national security and the peace agreement with Israel. It compromised Egyptian national security by digging tunnels to smuggle personnel, weapons and commodities, which has led the Egyptian army to launch a major campaign to destroy thousands of these tunnels across the Egyptian/Gazan border in the past years.
Critics say the nuclear deal's terms gave Iran a clear path toward developing a bomb once the deal ends. Egypt is well aware of this fact and the threat posed by Iran's developing ballistic missiles capabilities. The Khorramshahr medium-range missile tested last September can travel 2,000 kilometers with a payload of 1,800 kilograms. Once operational, it can reach Tel-Aviv. If it can travel 700 kilometers further, it can reach Cairo. Egypt, therefore, is understandably concerned about sanction relief that helps Iran fund such offensive missile technology.
Furthermore, Iran's hegemonic ambitions include financing Yemen's Shi'ite Houthi rebels who toppled their government in 2014 and controlled the Yemeni capital Sana'a. That move gave Iran control of the Bab-al Mandeb strait and thus threatens Egypt's military and commercial interests in the Red Sea.
Moreover, Iran-backed allies are gaining ground politically, with Hizballah winning 13 parliament seats in recent Lebanese elections. Iranian-backed Houthi fighters have held Yemen's capital Sanaa for four years.
Accordingly, Egyptian officials believe that the United States withdrawing from the nuclear deal may be a step to slow Iran's expansion and stop the region from falling into further chaos. While most agree on the Iranian threat to Egyptian interests, political strategist Ahmed Sarhan said it might have been better "re-negotiating the deal... not breaking it while [the U.S.] kept pressuring Iran to stop their regional hostility."
But political analyst Amr Bakly, director of Cairo Liberal Forum, praised the move. "The last three years have proven the failure of all the Obama administration's attempts to contain the Iranian regime. The end result was Iran receiving funds and economic privileges that enabled the regime to contain the rising domestic anger against it and sustain its continuous infiltration of the region through funding of the insurgency and instability in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, I do not think that increasing pressure on Iran could negatively affect the stability in the region, because since the signing of the deal by Iran, its foreign policies have not changed and therefore the world has to deal with the Iranian regime by its true nature. I believe that the outcome of the recent Lebanese elections has accelerated Trump's decision to withdraw from Iran's deal," Bakly said.
In 2014, Iranian MP Ali Reza Zakani bragged that Iran controls four Middle Eastern capitals – Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad and Sana'a in Yemen – demonstrating its expansionist ambitions in the region. Egypt will not sit idle watching a fifth capital added to that list and hence, welcomes curbing the Iranian regime by the United States.
Hany Ghoraba is an Egyptian writer, political and counter-terrorism analyst at Al Ahram Weekly, author of Egypt's Arab Spring: The Long and Winding Road to Democracy and a regular contributor to the BBC.
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Egypt's Islamist Televangelists Lose Clout
by Hany Ghoraba
Special to IPT News
July 9, 2018
https://www.investigativeproject.org/7523/egypt-islamist-televangelists-lose-clout
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http://www.jordantimes.com/news/region/egypt-finalising-details-long-term-hamas-israel-truce-%E2%80%94-source
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Egypt Goes on an Arms Spending Spree
Egyptian troops patrol the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt as they keep an eye on Hamas forces in 2016.
Over the past five years, Egypt has drastically increased its arms imports, making it the third largest destination for weapons in the world.
Military necessity does not adequately explain the major increase in arms purchases. Egypt has pursued the arms buildup to bolster regional influence and global prestige and to lessen its dependence on the United States.
The buildup has come at a significant cost to military efficiency, because the types of weaponry differ widely throughout the armed forces.
Ultimately, such expenditures are unsustainable due to Egypt's economic realities.
Over the past few years, Egypt has opened the checkbook, embarking on an arms purchasing program that has quickly made it one of the biggest importers of weapons in the world. The outlay of cash, however, is all the more remarkable given Egypt's fragile economic situation and its lack of a major conventional adversary. Its motivations stem not so much from a military need but from a desire to regain the influence of a country that is used to throwing its weight around the region. Ultimately, though, simple economics might curtail the spending spree.
The Big Picture
Egypt has traditionally held great sway over events in its wider region — not least because of its status as the most populous country in the Middle East. Cairo's decision to pursue a significant arms buildup will therefore impact its position in the region, as well as its relationships with other global powers, albeit at a cost that goes beyond the mere financial outlay.
See Egypt's Uphill Battle
Opening the Checkbook
According to a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute report released in March, Egypt is now the third largest arms importer in the world (after India and Saudi Arabia). Indeed, in the five years since Abdel Fattah al-Sisi became president, the country's arms imports have increased by a whopping 215 percent. During that period, Egypt signed major deals with a diverse array of suppliers, including the United States, Russia, France and Germany. The purchases have significantly upgraded the Egyptian arsenal, offering Cairo capabilities it previously lacked, including amphibious assault ships.
Egypt has enjoyed an improving economy in recent years, although the buying spree predates the uptick in its economic fortunes. Cairo went to the International Monetary Fund two years ago, obtaining a $12 billion loan that has since improved its macroeconomic indicators. Al-Sisi's government has remained committed to economic reform, in part because the continued delivery of the money is contingent on Cairo's implementation of austerity measures and structural reforms. As a result, Egypt's sizable deficits are diminishing, its inflation is improving, and its debt forecast is looking rosier, all of which have led the World Bank to predict a 5.8 percent growth rate for the country in 2020. Greater overall stability in Egypt over the past couple of years has facilitated a recovery in the essential tourism and energy industries. Even overall unemployment rates have improved — although youth unemployment is still high, even by regional standards.
A chart shows the growth of Egypt's GDP since 2005.
Military necessity, however, does not lie at the root of the increase in Egyptian arms purchases. Although the country is embroiled in a difficult counterinsurgency against Islamists in the Sinai Peninsula, most of its recent purchases, including surface-to-air missiles and major warships, are completely unsuited to Sinai fighting. In fact, few of the recent arms deals address the army's needs in the Sinai, where Egyptian troops are largely waging a campaign with pre-existing capabilities and equipment. If anything, Egyptian forces fighting on the peninsula have suffered from a lack of resources. To a great extent, the Egyptian infantry conducting a majority of the fighting in the Sinai lacks advanced body armor and individual fighting gear amid a wider dearth of effective equipment, training and supplies. In terms of vehicles, the army has deployed older and more vulnerable M-60A3 tanks on the peninsula, while its more advanced — and much better protected — M1 Abrams tanks have remained outside the theater.
Coincidentally, Egypt didn't even buy some of the equipment that is most suited to its battle in the Sinai, the mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles. Instead, the United States began giving hundreds of them to Cairo free of charge in early 2016 as part of the Pentagon's Excess Defense Articles program.
Nor is Egypt's buying spree the result of a pressing need to deter major conventional adversaries. Aside from Israel and Saudi Arabia, none of Egypt's immediate neighbors come close to matching the country's military power. And Saudi Arabia hardly represents a realistic military threat, especially because the kingdom has provided significant economic aid to Cairo to bolster al-Sisi's government since the overthrow of President Mohammed Morsi in 2013. The long history of conflict between Egypt and Israel might give Cairo reason to maintain a robust military defense to guard against a potential downturn in relations with Israel, but such an eventuality appears remote at present.
After all, Egypt's relations with Israel have manifestly improved under the al-Sisi government, and Israel has even provided indirect assistance to the Egyptian army in its Sinai operations.
Egypt's recent arms purchases stem more from broader geopolitical factors than from mere military need.
Regaining a Lost Luster
A more convincing explanation for its recent arms purchases lies more in broader geopolitical factors than in mere military need. Egypt, the most populous country in the Arab world (currently about 100 million), was traditionally the Middle East's most influential state, especially during the Cold War. During the past two decades, however, its influence has diminished due to the growing economic heft of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Turkey's re-engagement with the region and Iran's move to bolster its presence in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon in the wake of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's ouster in 2003. Internal factors, such as the Arab Spring and its aftermath, also diverted Egypt's focus inward for some time. But in a bid to restore some of its former shine and prestige, the government is loosening the purse strings to acquire high-end weapons, including the massive Mistral-class amphibious assault ships, to once again highlight its military might and influence.
Egypt's decision to search far and wide for suppliers is also no accident, because the country has long harbored worries about the risks of overdependence on a single foreign supplier such as the United States, which has supplied most of the Middle Eastern giant's military equipment since the 1978 Camp David Accords. Washington exacerbated Cairo's fears in October 2013 when it cut military and economic aid to Egypt due to the military's role in removing Morsi from power. The U.S. decision infuriated the Egyptian military, which became increasingly alarmed at the prospect of becoming hostage to U.S. demands. The choice to diversify its supplier base not only insulated Egypt from the dangers of overdependence on a single supplier but also enhanced the country's influence with a number of strong foreign powers, including France and Russia.
A chart shows the sources of Egypt's weapons purchases.
The cost of buying more arms from different suppliers, however, has not been simply financial. In general, militaries are more effective when they can operate largely similar equipment and weaponry across the force. Such standardization greatly facilitates logistics, maintenance and training, because spare parts can be easily sourced and troops need not become familiar with a hodgepodge of equipment. Egypt's extremely diverse arsenal, therefore, imposes significant constraints on its military. Its air defense forces, for instance, operate surface-to-air missile batteries that originate from the United States, Russia, France and now Germany. All the batteries are widely different platforms, making it exceedingly difficult to train forces in the same service across the various equipment.
Charts show the breakdown of age groups in Egypt's population since 1950.
Egypt's Achilles' Heel
Despite the IMF loans, the economy will remain the country's Achilles' heel. In the end, no amount of economic growth can outpace its exceptional population growth rate and its citizens' needs for basic services and resources. The United Nations estimates that by 2050, Egypt's population will reach 150 million, and 200 million by 2100. Though the country's military is locked in a difficult battle with Islamist militias in the Sinai, al-Sisi has referred to uncontrolled population growth as the country's greatest national security threat due to its capacity to hamstring the economy and the government. Egypt's economy might have improved in the past few years, but the country can ill afford to continue its major arms buildup over the long term — especially because much of the weaponry has been financed by loans Cairo still needs to pay back.
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https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46775842?fbclid=IwAR35Hu2tNlgrUBgzfnxp-EKzm3PkN81A8UXl8ic2cxrNQ5PQH9RP8OvKTT4
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Source unknown
https://btnews.online/egypt-pumps-poison-gas-into-terror-tunnel-from-gaza-9-muslim-terrorists-missing/?fbclid=IwAR3eOOx_2Fpr1DttqP9jXAqizkbuUhVabWolz-f2gRLSIywLhGYYXUcS32s
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***Egypt pumps poison gas into terror tunnel from Gaza – 9 Muslim terrorists missing***
That WILL work.
You mean they do not offer the Palestinians jobs benefits
and a chance to vote for liberals ?
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What Happened
During a Senate budget hearing on April 9, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States would penalize Egypt under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) should Egypt buy Russian Su-35 fighter jets. A bipartisan group of U.S. senators sent a letter to Pompeo before the hearing, urging him to pressure Egypt to avoid the arms deal while Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was in Washington. Pompeo responded to the senators' concerns by saying he believed Egypt understood the warning, and he said he was hopeful it would not go through with any such deal.
Why It Matters
The United States has so far been hesitant to use CAATSA-related sanctions against friendly countries for fear of irking its allies. As a result, there are signs countries have ignored the 2017 law, as evidenced by Turkey's current arms deal with Russia. But now, Washington is using CAATSA to threaten one of its strongest allies in the Middle East. In doing so, the United States is likely looking to boost CAATSA's credibility — using Egypt as an example to warn others that just because it's provided waivers in the past, doesn't mean it will do so in the future.
The United States' threat of imposing CAATSA-related sanctions against Egypt could be the start of a more robust U.S. push to combat Russia's global influence.
This is also the first time the United States has attempted to block an arms deal between Russia and Egypt in recent years, and could indicate the start of a more robust U.S. push to stem Moscow's global influence. In which case, Washington could begin coming down on other allies that are seeking to purchase military weapons from Russia, such as Saudi Arabia, India, Serbia and Algeria. The move also signals that the United States believes its relationship with Egypt is strong enough to withstand CAATSA-related sanctions, underlining the closeness displayed during al-Sisi’s recent visit with U.S. President Donald Trump.
Background
CAATSA was initially passed into law to impose sanctions on Iran, North Korea and Russia in an effort to combat these countries' global influences. The first CAATSA-related sanctions were applied to punish China for importing Russian arms in September 2018. The act is currently being used against Turkey as it attempts to finish an arms deal with Russia to buy the S-400 missile system. Over the past two years, other U.S. allies have repeatedly received waivers protect them from coming under CAATSA-related sanctions.
In their letter, the U.S. senators also urged Pompeo to press al-Sisi on Egypt's human rights record and the detention of American citizens. Pompeo deflected these concerns at the Senate hearing, saying he did not want to characterize the Egyptian leader as a "tyrant."
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https://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2019/06/22/caroline-glick-mohamed-morsi-death-is-a-reminder-of-why-he-was-dangerous/?fbclid=IwAR1_Hod6vvO5L3N-f-RqnTdMXDG-n5IabuOPZrHKC213jRrSxJuSfe3AE0w
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January 3, 2020 Open as PDF
In Egypt, el-Sissi’s Economic Vision Falls Flat
By: Hilal Khashan
Since the 1952 military coup that overthrew the Egyptian monarchy, Egypt has had a long tradition of rule by military officers. The first three presidents from 1954 until 1981 (Mohammad Naguib, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat) were members of the Free Officers movement, which carried out the 1952 coup. After Sadat’s assassination in 1981, air force commander and vice president Hosni Mubarak took office. In 2012, however, the election of Mohammed Morsi, a civilian with links to the Muslim Brotherhood, ended decades of military leadership.
The Egyptian military viewed Morsi with disdain; from its perspective, having a civilian president, especially one hailing from the Muslim Brotherhood, was unacceptable. And so, a year after Morsi’s election, he was ousted in a coup that involved the chief of General Staff and current President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, restoring the military’s prominent role in the country’s political affairs. Since then, el-Sissi has allowed the military to assume an ever-larger role in Egypt’s economy and introduced two massive projects that he promised would revive the country’s stagnant finances. These projects, however, have fallen flat.
A Legacy of Suspicion and Betrayal
El-Sissi has tried to avoid his predecessors’ mistakes. In 1953, Gen. Mohammad Naguib abrogated the monarchy and declared Egypt a republic. He believed the mission of the army had ended with the overthrow of King Farouk and wanted it to surrender political authority to civilians. Naguib’s preference for a civilian government did not suit Nasser, who overthrew him in 1954 and placed him under house arrest. Nasser also attempted to dismiss the chief of the General Staff, Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, whom he blamed for the 1961 coup in Damascus that led to the dissolution of the United Arab Republic, a unified state consisting of Egypt and Syria. Nasser accused Amer of negligence and mistreatment of Syrian army officers. Amer, who enjoyed the full support of the Egyptian army, threatened to stage a coup and overthrow Nasser. The two men reached a compromise according to which Amer would not seek to oust Nasser from office, provided that he stayed out of military affairs. This arrangement worked until the 1967 Six-Day War, when Nasser finally decided to get rid of Amer after the humiliating military defeat.
When Amer attempted to launch a coup, Nasser had him arrested and eliminated him with a lethal dose of cyanide.
Sadat, who took over after Nasser’s death in 1970, had no tolerance for sharing power with political and military competitors. In May 1971, he launched what he called the Corrective Revolution and purged all rivals. After the 1973 war with Israel, Minister of Defense Gen. Ahmad Badawi, whom Egyptians admired as a war hero and a man of good intentions, disapproved of Sadat’s decision to turn to the U.S. and downscale Egypt’s political and military ties with the Soviet Union. Many Egyptians claim that Sadat orchestrated Badawi’s death in a helicopter crash that also killed 13 ranking officers in March 1981. Following Sadat’s assassination in October 1981, his successor, Hosni Mubarak, immediately discharged 18 ranking officers because he had suspicions about their loyalty to him.
The Army Shifts Gear
In 1954, Nasser introduced sweeping social, political and economic reforms. After his adoption of socialist reforms in 1962, he appointed army officers as bank and plant managers, in part because he thought they cared about the well-being of fellow Egyptians but also to dissuade them from seeking political power. But Nasser did not transform the army into a political or economic player. Under Amer’s command, the military retained its autonomy and generous financial allocations.
The military’s shift in focus to economic matters occurred soon after Mubarak took office and Israel completed its withdrawal from Sinai following the Camp David Accords. Mubarak was worried that, after Egypt’s disengagement from the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Egyptian Armed Forces might refocus its attention from war to domestic politics. He understood the implications of the army perceiving itself as the guardian of society and the instrument of social change.
Mubarak built on Sadat’s 1975 infitah (open-door policy) and adopted neoliberalism. The implementation of the new economic orientation relied on an alliance between a small group of businesspeople close to Mubarak and the top military brass.
Preparing the Egyptian Armed Forces to assume an economic role required adding civilian lines of production to existing military industries. The strategy of the Ministry of Military Production that Nasser founded in 1954 needed revision. During the Cold War, Nasser was unsuccessful in securing weapons from the West because he refused to join the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact. To achieve a modicum of self-sufficiency in military procurement, he launched a modest weapons industry program. Signing the peace treaty with Israel and adopting neoliberal economics created new opportunities for the EAF. No longer content with manufacturing light weapons, such as grenade launchers, rifles and machine guns, military plants expanded their lines of production to include consumer items. For example, Al-Maadi Company for Engineering Industries, which has links to the Ministry of Military Production, began manufacturing a wide range of civilian goods, such as culinary and electrical appliances, agricultural equipment and medical instruments.
Mubarak took advantage of the high social regard for the military and arranged for the establishment of lucrative joint ventures with the EAF. The military’s role in the economy grew at the same time that the EAF’s mission shifted from preparing for war against Israel to counterterrorism and special operations. Still, Mubarak’s economic alliance with the military failed to protect his regime against a massive popular uprising in 2011 that led to his political demise.
El-Sissi Transforms the Military Into an Economic Driver
When el-Sissi assumed the presidency in 2014, he chose to cement his ties with the military establishment and gradually broke ties with the business elite. Egyptians had come to believe that the Mubarak government and its partners in the business world robbed the country blind. El-Sissi used this as an opportunity to give senior military officers a greater role in the country’s economic affairs. He reasoned that the armed forces are more trustworthy and committed to the public good than greedy civilian entrepreneurs. The military’s commercial operations do play a social justice role by making strategic staple foods – such as meat, poultry, cooking oil and formula milk – available to the public at affordable prices, though not for noble reasons.
El-Sissi insists that the military’s commercial projects do not exceed 3 percent of Egypt’s gross national product, but in reality, they account for more than 50 percent. Since Morsi’s ouster in 2013, military sector companies have flourished. El-Sissi has pushed to list army business establishments on the stock exchange, a sign of their growing role in the Egyptian economy. The move would have significant implications, establishing a firm link between the interests of the army and those of the people, and potentially preventing another uprising.
The army now owns 600 hotels and resorts, major asphalt and concrete batching plants, and organic fertilizer facilities. It also constructs roads and highways, bridges, sewage treatment plants, swimming pools and irrigation systems. The range of civilian goods produced by the army covers nearly every part of daily life, from food to medicines and clothing. All 16 factories owned by the Ministry of Military Production likely are now involved in manufacturing civilian goods, and this number does not include many private companies run by the military.
Army businesses don’t disclose financial information to government agencies, so their finances are shrouded in secrecy. All army enterprises are exempt from import fees and income taxes, and those that build their plants on free land owned by the EAF are not subject to taxation. Investors both at home and abroad therefore feel discouraged from investing in the economy. Army companies are often awarded no-bid contracts for government infrastructure projects, allowing the military to increase its share of the Egyptian economy steadily. The Armed Forces Engineering Authority, an agency of the Ministry of Defense, has expanded its non-military projects to include psychological rehabilitation and supply of civil servants.
In addition to expanding the military’s economic role, el-Sissi embarked on two massive, controversial projects. Two months into his presidency, he ordered the construction of a parallel Suez Canal, which he claimed would more than double the canal’s revenue of $5.5 billion. Government officials described the expansion, undertaken by seven foreign contractors, as Egypt’s gift to the world. One year after completing the controversial project, which cost more than $8 billion and depleted Egypt’s foreign currency reserves, revenue from the two parallel canals dropped to $5 billion. In 2016, revenue started to rise modestly, not because of increased traffic but because of rising toll fees. After seeing the disappointing economic returns, el-Sissi changed the objective of the project from invigorating the stagnant economy into giving the Egyptian people a morale boost.
The second controversial project was a new administrative capital near Cairo at the edge of the Nile Delta. The army owns 51 percent of the shares of the company that is currently developing the new administrative capital at an estimated cost of $45 billion. In January 2019, el-Sissi inaugurated the largest cathedral in the Middle East and a large mosque, second only to the Grand Mosque in Mecca, in the new city.
Dubai Ports World was granted a concession to operate the Ain Sokhna transit port near the southern terminus of the Suez Canal, angering Egyptians who know that the UAE would never develop the port to the point that it could compete with Dubai’s Port of Jebel Ali. El-Sissi compromised the economic development of the Suez Canal area in exchange for receiving UAE financial aid and recognition of his political legitimacy. For the same reasons, he also relinquished Tiran and Sanafir islands – seen as national icons because Egypt fought two wars with Israel in 1956 and 1967 over the Tiran Passes – to Saudi Arabia.
El-Sissi’s ambitions are personal. He has no economic vision that promotes investments. He is interested more in glorifying himself than in embarking on real economic development. He follows in the footsteps of Nasser but lacks his charisma. Egyptians remember Nasser for nationalizing the Suez Canal and constructing the High Dam. El-Sissi, on the other hand, has built two unnecessary projects and failed to defend Egypt’s vital interests in the waters of the Nile River.
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As Biden Takes Office, the U.S.-Egyptian Bond Comes Into Question
Emily Hawthorne
Emily Hawthorne
Middle East and North Africa Analyst, Stratfor
6 MINS READ
Dec 23, 2020 | 10:00 GMT
Egyptian tanks take part in joint military exercises at a base near the Mediterranean coast, located northwest of the capital of Cairo, on Nov. 15, 2018.
Egyptian tanks take part in joint military exercises at a base near the Mediterranean coast, located northwest of the capital of Cairo, on Nov. 15, 2018.
(KHALED DESOUKI/AFP via Getty Images)
HIGHLIGHTS
The U.S.-Egypt accord, one of the cornerstone bilateral relationships shaping stability in the Middle East and North Africa, will come under pressure as the Biden administration enters the White House promising greater scrutiny of Egyptian actions and as Egypt prioritizes regional stability in areas of less U.S. interest....
The U.S.-Egypt accord, one of the cornerstone bilateral relationships shaping stability in the Middle East and North Africa, will come under pressure as the Biden administration enters the White House promising greater scrutiny of Egyptian actions and as Egypt prioritizes regional stability in areas of less U.S. interest. Congress and the incoming Biden administration have already threatened the government of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi with sanctions and conditions on economic aid tied to human rights concerns. On top of this, Cairo is already reconsidering whether it needs to maintain its historic economic, security and diplomatic reliance on Washington at the same level. Even so, the United States is unlikely to terminate its substantial arms sales and aid to Egypt.
Egypt And The United States: A Long History Of Strong Cooperation.
Egypt is the fourth-largest recipient of U.S. aid in the world, with transfers of Foreign Military Financing and Economic Support Funds worth over a billion dollars annually for many years, in large part because Egypt has long been aligned closely with the United States on all regional conflicts.
The United States is Egypt's strongest Western partner diplomatically and economically, based on a bedrock of decades of cooperation on counterterrorism and mediation of regional conflicts.
Ever since modern Egypt's independence, Cairo has oscillated between its dependence on the United States as its near-sole security guarantor, economic patron and source of investment and its ties with Russia.
Egypt has been especially valuable to the United States in the Middle East because of its longstanding peace agreement with Israel; at a time when regional relationships with Israel are shifting, Egypt's deal with Israel serves as a model for maintaining normalization over the long term.
Domestically, Egypt's focus on political and economic stability at the cost of personal freedoms will clash with the Biden administration's renewed focus on human rights. This increases the risk of U.S. sanctions and stipulations related to economic aid, which could disrupt Egyptian economic stability. Under the al-Sisi administration, disappearances and arrests of nongovernmental organization workers, journalists and human rights campaigners have reached their peak in modern Egyptian history. The trend has been part of the government's effort to maintain political stability by sharply managing dissent. The instability following the Arab Spring and the resurgence of jihadist violence in the Sinai and Western desert have also focused the al-Sisi administration's attention on eliminating the Muslim Brotherhood and related groups, often leading Cairo to categorize any dissent as Brotherhood-linked. Such actions increasingly concern Western partners of Egypt, and the Biden administration has promised to review relations with Cairo with an emphasis on policing human rights violations.
According to organizations like the Project on Middle East Democracy, repression in Egypt reached high levels in 2020 under al-Sisi.
U.S. President-elect Joe Biden tweeted during the campaign in July 2020 that there would be "no more blank checks for Trump's favorite dictator" in reference to al-Sisi and the increasing number of forced disappearances and arrests of human rights campaigners in Egypt.
Al-Sisi did enjoy good ties with U.S. President Donald Trump, who indeed referred to the Egyptian leader as his "favorite dictator" and said in al-Sisi's presence in May 2017 that the United States seeks "partners, not perfection." Congressional Democrats has already made clear, most recently via a letter to the al-Sisi government in October 2020, that Egypt's behavior is under increasing scrutiny and that arms sales and economic aid will be evaluated with Egypt's actions in mind. The Trump administration, which had little tolerance for political Islamist movements and took its partners' concerns at face value, embraced Cairo's campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood in a way the Biden administration might not.
Meanwhile, Egypt's increasing focus on ensuring stability in its immediate neighborhood does not match the top U.S. priorities in the Middle East, lessening opportunities for coordination and collaboration between the two over mediating regional conflict. As Egypt has emerged from a post-Arab Spring period of severe instability, it has shifted its mediation efforts toward issues abroad that directly impact Egyptian stability. This includes Eastern Mediterranean energy competition; ensuring stability in the Nile River Valley; border security with Libya and Sudan; and containing state supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, like Turkey. Cairo is not convinced that these priorities align with U.S. priorities, which remain intensely focused on containing Iran and countering terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria.
Egypt has engaged in a series of unusual military drills in recent months with regional partners, indicating a desire to display its independence.
Egypt traditionally has not deployed its military forces abroad to places like Iraq and Syria per its domestic military doctrine, reducing opportunities for direct coordination with the U.S. military.
While Egypt will remain a key U.S. partner and recipient of aid, it will also seek closer relations with partners like Russia, which does not pressure Egypt over human rights abuses, and France, which has promised not to condition arms sales on human rights and is more active in the theaters in which Egypt is keenly interested. As Biden's Middle East policies take shape once he takes office, the future of Egypt as a key partner in regional counterterrorism and intelligence operations will become clearer. The Biden administration will not want to lose Egypt's valuable counterterrorism cooperation. Egypt meanwhile is likely to continue in 2021 to experience greater macroeconomic stability than most other countries in the region, which will boost support for government and domestic stability — as well as Cairo's willingness to challenge pressure by foreign governments like the United States over its politics.
So far, Egypt is the only Middle Eastern country expected by the IMF and World Bank to experience economic growth in 2020, giving it a substantial head start in 2021, a time when most countries worldwide will still be grappling with COVID-19 related contractions.
Egypt is the third-largest military arms importer in the world; Russia and France are major suppliers, increasingly so in recent years.
French President Emmanuel Macron told al-Sisi in December 2020 that French arms sales to Egypt would not be conditioned on human rights abuses, a reflection of the economic importance of this relationship to France.
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Egypt as a Declining Regional Power
Cairo’s main focus is maintaining stability at home rather than projecting power abroad.
By: Hilal Khashan
In June 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama delivered an address to the Muslim world proposing a new start in Arab-U.S. relations. He chose to deliver his potentially trailblazing speech at Cairo University in Egypt as a recognition of the country’s historic role in the Muslim world. (Subsequent developments, including the Arab uprisings and the rise of the Islamic State, dashed hopes for a shift on both sides.)
However, Egypt’s prominence as a regional leader has been declining for years. Beginning in the early 1970s during Anwar Sadat’s presidency, the country became increasingly inward-focused. It prioritized combating political opposition and Islamist militancy at home rather than projecting power abroad. Since Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi’s 2013 coup, which overthrew Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated President Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s foreign policy has been a reflection of its internal affairs. Countries that support the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Turkey and Qatar, are considered ideological adversaries, while those that oppose political Islam, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are seen as tactical allies.
From Pan-Arabism to Egypt First
Britain’s occupation of Egypt in 1882 cut off Egypt from its traditional foreign policy theaters, especially in West Asia. Under British occupation, Egyptian nationalism developed differently from the nationalist movements in West Asia and North Africa. Most Egyptian heads of state did not try to project power beyond Egypt’s borders, though there were two notable exceptions: King Farouk and President Gamal Abdel Nasser.
Farouk was a descendant of Muhammad Ali, who seized power in Egypt in 1805 and aspired to create an Arab kingdom. Farouk decided to lead Egypt into the 1948 Arab-Israeli war against the wishes of his own government and army command. In 1950, he closed the Tiran Passes to Israeli shipping, and the following year, he played an instrumental role in drafting the Joint Arab Defense Treaty to confront Israel.
Nasser, meanwhile, had distinct Arab roots, unlike most Egyptians, and hailed from the Asyut governorate in Upper Egypt. He militarily and economically supported the Algerian war of independence in 1954-62. In 1957, he sent troops to Syria to defend the country against a possible Turkish invasion. In 1960, he dispatched army units to Kuwait after Iraqi President Abdul Karim Qasim threatened to occupy it. Two years later, he sent one-third of the Egyptian army to Yemen to defend the fledgling republican regime after a coup overthrew its king. Even after Egypt’s staggering defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War, Nasser remained a powerful figure in the Arab world. Though many Arab leaders viewed him as an enemy, the vast majority of the Arab public saw him as the uncontested champion of Arab nationalism.
Since Nasser’s death in 1970, however, Egypt’s regional ambitions have been limited. Egyptian presidents have recognized that the poor state of the country’s economy disqualified it from playing a leading role in regional politics. Anwar Sadat, who succeeded Nasser, opposed sending a single Egyptian soldier to fight on behalf of Arabs. During his presidency, he was boycotted by most Arab leaders because he made unilateral peace with Israel. Hosni Mubarak, who became president in 1981 after Sadat’s assassination, sent Egyptian troops to Saudi Arabia in 1990 as part of the U.S. coalition to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. But his move was not motivated by a desire for Egypt to become a regional power but by a desire to stop Iraq from becoming one.
El-Sissi’s Politics of Regime Survival
Current President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi has mostly followed suit. Since becoming president, he has been preoccupied with internal security matters. As the only Egyptian president to stage a coup to seize power since 1952, his top concern has been staying in control, not reestablishing Egypt’s leadership of the Arab world. His focus has been on safeguarding Egypt’s borders from incoming militants and arms, which could be used to support Egypt’s homegrown militant movements.
El-Sissi has no regional power ambitions. However, he doesn’t want the aggressive foreign policies of the Saudi and Emirati crown princes to overshadow Egypt’s historical role in the region. He has deep concerns about the Gulf countries’ peace deals with Israel, which threaten to limit the need for Egypt’s regional mediation. Cairo gained its reputation as a regional peace broker after the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. But since then, the Palestinians have turned to Turkey to facilitate a reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, while Hamas has sought Qatar’s help to ease Israel’s blockade on Gaza. Egypt is also increasingly economically alienated. Last October, Israel Pipeline Company signed a deal with the UAE to transport oil from Abu Dhabi to Europe via the Eilat-Ashkelon Pipeline. The agreement effectively reduces oil shipments via the Suez Canal by 17 percent and compromises Egypt’s Sumed oil pipeline from the Gulf of Suez to Alexandria.
Egypt-Israel Oil and Gas Pipelines
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Egypt adopted a relatively proactive and pro-Palestinian approach to Israel’s recent operation in Gaza. (By comparison, it was relatively passive during similar bouts of violence in 2009 and 2014.) In 2014, Egypt pressured Hamas to accept Israel’s terms for a cease-fire, but this time around, it brokered a deal that took effect without any preconditions. It painted Israel as the aggressor in the conflict, and a prominent Egyptian Islamic scholar called on Muslims to seize Jerusalem and halt Israel’s West Bank settlements.
Still, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu thanked el-Sissi for facilitating the cease-fire. As for Hamas, it was skeptical of Egypt’s offer of $500 million for Gaza’s reconstruction, knowing that Egyptian companies run by the armed forces would lead the reconstruction efforts and that these efforts would increase Egypt’s influence over Gaza.
Egypt’s government-controlled media referred to Cairo’s efforts to negotiate a cease-fire deal as the dawning of a golden era in Egyptian foreign policy. The media lauded Egyptian officials’ negotiation skills, ignoring the fact that Biden played the decisive role in stopping the fighting. The claim that Egypt was restoring its relevance as an international peace broker rings hollow because in Egypt, Gaza is often considered more of a domestic matter rather than a regional one. (Cairo occupied the Gaza Strip from 1948 until 1967.) In any event, successful mediation does not make a country a regional power.
Egyptian media have exaggerated el-Sissi’s achievements. They claimed that his forceful diplomacy protected the Palestinians against Israeli aggression. It also spread propaganda about his military coup, claiming it was a popular revolution that saved Egypt from the Muslim Brotherhood. The media also glorified Egypt’s massive troop mobilization in the northwest – which it claimed resolved the Libyan crisis to Egypt’s advantage.
Egypt has myriad other problems with which to contend. It has a weak economy, heavy debt, poor educational system and high unemployment. According to the World Bank, Egypt’s per capita income in 2019 was $3,000 compared to $8,000 for the Middle East and North Africa region. Although real incomes saw modest growth over the past few years, they are not sustainable in the long term because Egypt’s economic reforms are superficial. The Egyptian economy relies heavily on the public sector, led by the armed forces. The International Monetary Fund strongly recommended that the government promote the private sector, but instead, it increased the military’s involvement in the economy.
Adjust Net National Income Per Capita, 2011 - 2019
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The 1952 military coup ended a century of capitalistic development. Nasser’s nationalization of the economy had devastating consequences for Egypt’s economic growth. When Sadat made peace with Israel, he slashed the military budget but allowed the armed forces to play an active role in the economy to generate revenue. Under Mubarak, the military effectively dominated the economy, a trend that only grew under el-Sissi, who’s dependent on the loyalty of senior army officers who oppose any attempts at privatization.
Egypt is also facing a low-intensity insurgency in northern Sinai and an intensifying water dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. (The project, which is still under construction, has already decreased Egypt’s production of staple crops – wheat, rice, and sugar – by more than 25 percent.) El-Sissi believes Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is seeking to transform his country into an economic hub and marginalize Egypt’s role in the region.
The Nile River
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A country with an economy controlled by its military and facing an existential threat to its water supply can hardly expect to become a regional power. El-Sissi has shifted Egypt’s focus from the Middle East to Africa, in part because of the dispute over the dam, but he remains too preoccupied with the existential threat from the south to worry about restoring Egypt’s regional power status.
Egypt enjoys geostrategic advantages that qualify it to play a leading regional role. It straddles Africa, Asia and Europe and controls one of the world’s most important maritime routes. It is the Arab world’s most populous country and has its most homogeneous population. However, Egypt remains inwardly focused, and its people have little interest in non-Egyptian affairs. Considering the state of the country’s economy, it’s unlikely these conditions will change any time soon.
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GPF
March 31, 2022
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Egypt’s Food Crisis Pushes the Country to the Edge
The war in Ukraine has exacerbated the country’s food security problems.
By: Hilal Khashan
Russia’s war on Ukraine has adversely affected the Arab region, which heavily depends on wheat imports, including from these two countries. The fallout from the war varies from country to country, but it has hurt one Arab nation more than the others: Egypt. In Egypt, wheat shortages have further exacerbated supply issues precipitated by poor government planning and the country’s rapid population growth. For example, Egypt’s agricultural sector has been under pressure because of reduced flow from the Nile River as a result of the government’s mismanagement of the dispute over the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
These problems have been compounded by inflation, which accelerated after the 2013 coup led by current President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi. Many expected the new political leadership to stabilize the country and relaunch the economy, but the situation only worsened. In response to surging inflation, el-Sissi angered many Egyptians by urging them to refrain from buying expensive food items and to start losing weight. A revolt is inevitable, and it’s only a matter of time before a minor incident ignites a full-blown rebellion.
Volatile Issue
Bread – which in colloquial Egyptian Arabic translates as aish, literally meaning life – is more than just a staple food for most Egyptians. Egypt is the world’s largest wheat importer, with its domestic production covering only 50 percent of consumption. Moreover, at least 80 percent of Egypt’s wheat and cooking oil imports come from Russia and Ukraine. Though there is no immediate food shortage, Egypt must now find new, more expensive providers from farther afield because of the disruption in supplies from two of its traditional sources. (It’s notable that the war has also affected the tourism sector, reducing the flow of travelers into Egypt from Russia and Ukraine. The loss of revenues from tourism and the sudden flight of foreign investment makes it extremely difficult for the government to meet its financial obligations.)
Egyptian Imports of Wheat and Cooking Oil
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Since the war began last month, food prices have increased 25-50 percent and are likely to keep rising. But el-Sissi has responded to the problem with insensitive remarks, imploring the Egyptian people to pray to God for relief, thus leaving their welfare and survival up to divine intervention. Some on social media have lamented the president’s reaction.
Food supplies and prices have historically been a volatile issue in Egypt. Attempts by previous governments to reduce bread subsidies resulted in massive public protests. In 1977, President Anwar Sadat decided to slash subsidies on staple food items, causing violent riots that he blamed on Egyptian communists. Despite the International Monetary Fund’s insistence on curtailing subsidies, Sadat reinstated them, deeming that his political survival was more important than financial reform. During the 2011 uprising, Egyptian demonstrators chanted “bread, freedom and social justice.” When the government considered cutting bread subsidies in 2017, protests erupted again. Demonstrators blocked traffic and were undeterred by the deployment of the army. El-Sissi responded by ordering the immediate issuance of temporary bread ration cards to defuse the crisis.
Last week, el-Sissi announced that Egypt’s Solidarity and Dignity Program would secure around $7 billion to mitigate the consequences of the international food and energy crisis. But the funds are unlikely to make much difference in a country with more than 100 million people, where malnutrition is responsible for more than 65 percent of child mortality. Egypt, after all, is one of three dozen countries that account for 90 percent of the world’s malnutrition.
Economic and Political Condition
Moreover, the food issue needs to be examined against the backdrop of Egypt’s economic and political decline. With a per capita income estimated at $3,570, compared to the world average of $11,000, Egypt is an economically underdeveloped country. The Egyptian economy does not run according to economic principles but instead according to el-Sissi’s whims. The Central Bank recently devalued the Egyptian pound by 17 percent to the dollar. It also raised the interest rate by 1 percent in response to rising inflation as the government sought an $8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund. El-Sissi doesn’t show a genuine desire to establish inclusive and sustainable economic growth. Corruption, nepotism, and consolidation of the public sector’s share of the market are driving the competition out of business.
Egypt's GDP Per Capita, 2020
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After investing in megaprojects such as the new administrative capital and impressive palaces under el-Sissi’s administration, the government is also severely in debt. When el-Sissi staged the coup in 2013, Egypt’s public debt was less than $17 billion. Last year, it reached a record high of $138 billion. Servicing this debt equals three times the combined revenue accrued from the Suez Canal and tourism.
The United Arab Emirates has taken advantage of Cairo’s financial difficulties. It has acquired substantial business assets in Egypt, with its investments now exceeding $6 billion. Roughly 1,200 UAE companies are already active in Egypt, and Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth fund aims to buy the Egyptian government’s shares in several firms, including the International Commercial Bank, for $2 billion. The UAE also dominates Egypt’s arts, film and media industries.
Under el-Sissi’s management, authoritarianism has also been on the rise in Egypt. The country at least had the pretense of democracy under former President Hosni Mubarak. Egyptians tolerated his despotic rule until he began grooming his son to succeed him. El-Sissi, however, doesn’t hide behind a veneer of democracy. He brutally eliminated the opposition and even oppressed officials, party leaders, activists and army officers who backed his 2013 coup to overthrow Mohammad Morsi, Egypt’s first civilian president. When he took power, he tried to charm the Egyptian people by telling them: “Do you not know that you are the light of my eyes?” But he lacked the charisma of former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and became a tyrant instead.
El-Sissi depoliticized and suppressed Egyptian civil society, either jailing its leaders or driving them to seek asylum abroad. He brands anyone who disagrees with him a foreign agent threatening the fabric of the nation. He also doesn’t trust the people around him. In the tradition of other Arab presidents, he is grooming his son, Mahmoud, to play a crucial role in Egyptian politics and eventually succeed him. He recently promoted him to deputy head of Egyptian general intelligence and put him in charge of Egyptian relations with Israel. El-Sissi’s son is involved in secret talks with the Israelis to create an industrial city in northern Sinai as part of a plan to resettle Palestinians. Considering the declining quality of life in Egypt, his authoritarianism could accelerate attempts to oust him.
Pushed to Revolt
So where is this situation leading? For years, the common perception was that most Egyptians were politically passive because they felt powerless. Even informed and educated people won the reputation as being members of the “couch party,” an Egyptian term referring to the silent majority. The 2011 uprising, however, debunked the claim that the masses will not rebel.
El-Sissi has appeared insensitive to Egyptians’ concerns about rising food prices, suggesting they purchase less expensive food. He also invested billions in palaces and a new administrative capital, and purchased expensive military hardware, including two helicopter carriers and Rafale fighter jets, even though Egypt hasn’t gotten involved in foreign conflicts, not even to defend its claims to the Nile River.
El-Sissi therefore shouldn’t feel secure about his political position. The army – which was historically very popular among Egyptians, though its support has been waning of late – doesn’t support the establishment of dynasties, including the one Mubarak tried to hand over to his son. Given its disapproval of el-Sissi’s erratic economic and regional policies, it’s unlikely he will remain in power long enough to see his own son succeed him. El-Sissi lost the military’s support in part because he eliminated the ranking officers who backed his coup against Morsi and in part because the military did not want to associate with a ruler who failed to deliver on his promises to the people. It was a professional army until Mubarak and el-Sissi used bribery to curry favor within its ranks. Its second-tier officers are politically disinclined and elicit a sense that el-Sissi will be Egypt’s last military ruler.
Arab satellite TV stations have devoted round-the-clock coverage to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, describing it as a war between the forces of democracy and authoritarianism. With the Russian army’s failures there, Arabs suddenly woke up to the reality that dictatorships are inherently weak despite their impressive array of munitions. U.S. President Joe Biden said, “the world’s democracies must prepare for a long fight against autocracy.” As the conflict unfolds, his strong words will echo in the Arab region. One would expect Egypt – the most populous Arab country with a brief, if unstable, democratic interlude in 2011-12 – to lead the second phase of the Arab uprisings.
One potential spark for such a revolt is the recent protests at the Maspero Television Building, the headquarters of the Egyptian Radio and Television Union, over a decision to scale down operations, lay off several thousand employees, slash salaries and reduce benefits. The state-controlled union was generally supportive of el-Sissi’s government, defending his policies, defaming his critics, and legitimizing his regime after the coup. So far, security forces have not suppressed the protests. Should they spread to Cairo, however, the police will crush the unrest with a force that could ignite a new uprising.
The Arab region is often described as a volcano ready to erupt. Egypt, the Arab region’s historical pacesetter, will likely be the site of the first eruption thanks to its population and its heavy cultural, literary and political influences.
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April 21, 2022
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Egypt’s Coptic Christians: A History of Exclusion and Discrimination
The rhetoric about national unity doesn’t correspond to reality.
By: Hilal Khashan
Two incidents earlier this month highlighted the discrimination facing Egypt’s Coptic Christians. In Alexandria, a Coptic priest was stabbed to death by someone whom the police described as a mentally deranged elderly person. Then, a leading Egyptian magazine apologized to its readers after publishing a controversial religious edict about stores selling food to the infidel, an implicit reference to Copts, during the day in the fasting month of Ramadan. These incidents cast doubt on President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi’s pledge to guarantee equal treatment to Copts and Muslims and end centuries of persecution and discrimination.
From Persecuted Majority to a Pariah Minority
Coptic Christians in Egypt constitute the largest concentration of Christians in the Arab world, totaling at least 10 percent of the country’s almost 106 million inhabitants. The word “Copt” is a synonym for “Egypt” and evolved from “Hikuptah,” the earlier name of Memphis, Pharaonic Egypt’s ancient capital southwest of present-day Cairo. Egypt became part of the Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantium) when it was established in 330. In 451, the Council of Chalcedon split Christianity between the Chalcedonians, who believed Jesus had two distinct natures (divine and human), and the Miaphysites, who believed Jesus had only one nature. The Byzantine rite subscribed to Chalcedonianism and the Copts to Miaphysitism, leading to the latter’s religious suppression and persecution. When the Muslim armies invaded Egypt in 639, the Copts did not support the Byzantines, hoping the new conquerors would grant them the freedom to worship.
Egypt's Religious Demography
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The Copts enjoyed greater freedoms during the Rashidum Caliphate, which ended in 661. The Umayyad Caliphate was more Arab than Islamic in orientation, employing Christians and Jews in the administration. The state assured them freedom to worship provided they paid the poll tax, from which 70 percent of Christians and Jews (clerics, minors, ill people, women and elderly) were exempt. Treatment of Copts took a turn for the worse during the reign of Caliph Umar bin Abdulaziz (717-720). Under the Abbasids, the status of Copts reflected the personal orientation of the ruler, not sharia law, which assured Christians of state protection and freedom to worship.
The Fatimids (909-1171) founded Cairo in 973 as their capital, employed Copts to administer their finances, and granted them freedom of religion. However, with the rise of the Mamluks to power, the Copts witnessed a reversal. In 1260, the Mamluks decisively defeated the Mongols in the Battle of Ain Jalut, preventing them from capturing Egypt and ending their sweep into Syria and Iraq. The Mamluks punished the Copts severely because the Mongols used Christian auxiliaries from Armenia and Georgia to slaughter Muslims while sparing the lives of Coptic villagers. This period generated among Muslims the enduring conviction that the Copts were eager to collaborate with foreign Christians against them.
In 1805, Muhammad Ali established a dynasty and set out to transform Egypt into a modern state. At that time, Egyptians saw France as a beacon of liberalism. In 1831, a Muslim cleric returned to Cairo after completing his studies in Paris and promoted a form of secular nationalism in which the Copts would stand on equal terms with Muslims. But European meddling in Egyptian affairs in the second half of the 19th century and Egypt’s occupation by the British in 1882 led Muslims to see Islam as the answer to their problems and Copts as foreign agents. The last religious reform took place in 1855, when Khedive Muhammad Said abolished the poll tax and admitted the Copts into the military. However, his sectarian reforms didn’t end discrimination against the Copts – which was embedded in folk culture and medieval religious values.
Impact of British Colonialism
The Khedives’ corruption, financial mismanagement and reckless borrowing from British and French banks imposed Anglo-French dual control over Egypt’s finances, undermining Egyptian sovereignty. Blatant European intervention aroused Egyptian nationalism and resentment of foreigners who dominated the country. It also caused anguish over the Copts’ ties with the British and their unwillingness to take a decisive stand in support of the Urabi Revolt, which started in 1879, to end foreign meddling in domestic affairs. In 1882, the British occupied Egypt, declared it a protectorate and administered it through high commissioners.
In 1906, Coptic Christian judge Boutros Ghali sentenced four Egyptians to death over the Denshawai incident involving a British army officer who died from heatstroke after being chased by Egyptian villagers. In 1910, an Egyptian nationalist assassinated Ghali, marking the beginning of a crisis between Copts and Muslims that persists to this day. The following year, the Copts organized a Christian conference in Asyut to end discrimination against them, demanding equality in public offices, proportionate representation in the parliament and declaration of Sunday as a public holiday.
In 1919, the Copts actively participated in a spectacular demonstration of solidarity with Muslims in Saad Zaghlul’s uprising, demanding an end to British occupation. In 1921, Coptic politician Makram Ebeid cofounded with Zaghlul the Wafd Party, which emerged as Egypt’s premier nationalist political force. Ebeid was the party’s secretary-general from 1936 until 1942 when the British suspended Egyptian political life during the Second World War.
Violence Against the Copts
Less than two years after overthrowing the monarchy, Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged as Egypt’s strongman. He promised to create a modern economy, institute democracy and deliver social justice. His erratic policies ruined the economy, exacerbated repression and failed to improve the lives of the poor. Nasser’s economic and social policies negatively impacted the Coptic entrepreneurial class and ended their distinguished status in professional occupations.
Nasser was a towering and charismatic figure, and the Copts avoided making any public demands during his presidency. His successors were no more sympathetic toward the Copts than he was. In 1981, President Anwar Sadat banished the leader of the Egyptian Coptic Church, Pope Shenouda, to a Sinai monastery because he articulated Coptic demands for justice and equality. Sadat’s presidency from 1970 until his assassination in 1981 saw the rise of violence against Copts, a trend that dramatically accelerated in subsequent years.
The violence coincided with massive demographic changes, triggered by the Six-Day War and fighting across the Suez Canal. Exacerbated by severe economic difficulties and internal migration from rural areas to urban centers, the demographic shift brought millions of Muslims and Copts to Egypt’s large cities, causing friction between them and frequent violent outbursts. In contemporary times, most acts of violence against the Copts are driven by three factors: religious bias, church building and interfaith relationships.
In 2000, a disagreement over a business transaction in el-Kosheh village led to the death of 21 Copts. The court acquitted all 96 suspects. A Coptic bishop commented on the court’s extraordinary ruling, saying: “If the perpetrators of the murder are allowed to walk free, it will be seen as a green light to kill Christians.” After each massacre of Copts, the Interior Ministry frequently organizes reconciliation sessions in the name of national unity to avoid making the aggressors face justice. In 2017, the Islamic State killed seven Copts in Arish, Sinai’s central city, forcing most Christians to flee because they doubted the army’s ability or willingness to protect them against further attacks. In 2011, 13 Copts lost their lives after radical Islamists stormed a church to free a young woman, claiming that she had converted to Islam and was jailed by her family. A few days before the 2011 uprising, an attack on al-Qudiseen Church in Alexandria killed 23 worshippers, and a similar attack on St. Peter’s Church in Cairo in 2016 killed 25 Copts. No one claimed responsibility for either massacre. After such attacks, the Coptic church usually calls for calm, stressing that they originate from abroad, aim to wreck Egyptian unity and target citizens rallying behind the government against terrorism.
Attacks on Copts, July 2012-Nov. 2019
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The building of churches is also a contentious issue. Based on the Ottomans’ 1856 Hamayouni Decree, the church building law limited the construction of new churches in Egypt to 25 per year, pending the sultan’s approval. The decree applied mainly to Copts. Egyptian presidents abided by the Ottoman decree despite Coptic protestation that the community needed many more new churches because old ones were being torn down and the population was growing. Nasser, who was on good terms with Egyptian Coptic leader Pope Kyrillos VI, temporarily resolved the issue by informally allowing the construction of 50 churches every year, a practice that his successors did not continue.
The Copts resorted to unauthorized church building, often leading to bloody clashes between Muslims and Copts. In 1972, Muslim protesters in al-Khanka village burned the Holy Bible Society, which Copts were converting into a church. In 1981, an angry mob in a Cairo neighborhood destroyed a church under construction, killing 20 Copts. President Anwar Sadat refused to call the incident sectarian sedition, dismissing it as a petty neighborhood disagreement.
Interfaith marriages, though rare, are another source of discord between Muslims and Copts. Punishments for marrying someone of another faith can range from being disowned by the family to violent assault. Such relationships are frowned upon, and Coptic clerics often urge young people to find their soulmates within their own religious community. Police reports never indicate when romantic relationships are the cause of violent incidents, often attributing them instead to frivolous personal feuds. In addition, Egyptian authorities do not recognize marriages between Muslim women and non-Muslims, even if they are performed abroad.
El-Sissi’s Sincerity
Under current President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi’s leadership, Coptic participation in the political system is still minimal. Until recent years, the government had not appointed a single Coptic Christian governor of the country’s 27 governorates. There are now two Coptic governors, one appointed by el-Sissi. There are only 33 Copts in Egypt’s 568-member parliament, several of them directly appointed by the president. El-Sissi chose a Copt to head the supreme constitutional court in a departure from historical practices. But the Copts remain grossly underrepresented in public life. There are no Coptic university presidents, military generals, or newspaper and magazine editors, and very few ambassadors and attorneys in senior judicial positions.
Last month, el-Sissi promised to build a church next to each mosque in government housing projects. He also oversaw passage of the celebrated 2016 Church Construction Law, which many hoped would make church building easier. However, it still applied restrictions to the building of churches, especially the requirement that their size correspond to the size of the Christian community in the area. Under the law, church building applications also require official approval for security reasons.
It’s unclear if el-Sissi’s concern for Coptic Christians is sincere. Critics accuse him of expressing support for the community to win the West’s support. Irrespective of how he feels about the Copts, their full integration in society is a stubborn issue in a country where religious identity determines an individual’s station in life. Coptic students complain that some classmates refuse to talk to them because they are Christian, and others say that all they want is to walk safely in public without being harassed. They lament that the rhetoric about national unity doesn’t correspond to reality.
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The Significance of Egypt’s Scrapped Plan to Make Rockets for Russia
Apr 18, 2023 | 20:56 GMT
Egypt's push to preserve its close ties with Russia amid Moscow's growing international isolation will expose Cairo to U.S. and international retaliation that could further weaken the Egyptian economy. According to leaked U.S. intelligence documents obtained by the Washington Post, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi proposed a plan in February to supply Russia with up to 40,000 rockets, as well as gunpowder and artillery. The top-secret Pentagon documents — which are dated Feb. 17 and were reported by the Washington Post on April 10 — also showed that el-Sisi had instructed his subordinates to keep the scheme a secret ''to avoid problems with the West,'' and to tell factory workers that they were building rockets for the Egyptian army (and not Russian troops fighting in Ukraine). On April 17, the Washington Post then published another set of leaked documents that showed el-Sisi ultimately abandoned the plan in early March after holding talks with senior U.S. officials, and agreed to send artillery rounds to Ukraine instead. U.S. officials have since confirmed that the Egypt-Russia weapon transfer never took place. But the fact that el-Sisi proposed such a plan in the first place — and sought to keep it quiet, only to later scrap the project amid U.S. pressure — nonetheless highlights the tricky balancing act Egypt finds itself in, as it tries to reduce its reliance on the United States by diversifying its foreign partnerships, without exposing itself to sanctions that could jeopardize the billions of dollars of U.S. aid that the Egyptian economy still heavily depends on.
For decades, Egypt has sought to offset its deep reliance on the United States by also maintaining close ties with Russia and other U.S. adversaries. But the scrapped weapons transfer shows how this balance is becoming increasingly difficult. Egypt has historically been a geopolitical power in the Arab world, Middle East, Mediterranean and Africa. But the economic and security challenges it has faced in the 20th and 21st centuries have left Cairo partially dependent on stronger external powers for aid and security support. In recent decades, the United States has served as Egypt's primary patron, annually providing the North African country with approximately $1.3 billion worth of aid. But over the years, Cairo has also cultivated strong relationships with Russia and, more recently, China — the United States' top two strategic rivals. This balancing act has enabled Egypt to maintain its strategic autonomy by keeping it from becoming too reliant on any one foreign partner. It has also enabled Cairo to maximize the economic benefits it can enjoy through aid, investment and trade cooperation from a wide array of powerful partners. Compared with the United States, Russia grants Egypt access to investment and support with fewer human rights and governance conditions as well, and additionally serves as a key source of wheat and energy exports. But as evidenced by el-Sisi's scrapped plan to supply Russia weapons, Egypt's traditional balancing act between the United States and Russia has become particularly risky amid Moscow's growing international isolation following its invasion of Ukraine last year, and the West's consequent sanctions campaign against the Kremlin and its supporters.
Since Egypt became a sovereign state in 1952, Egypt has maintained close ties with both Eastern and Western powers — particularly Russia and the United States, at times very pointedly playing them off each other for Cairo's benefit. This was particularly evident during the Cold War, which saw the government of then-Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser leverage his close relationships with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, and eventually the U.S. government.
Egypt is the third-largest recipient of U.S. aid in the world. Since 1978, the United States has provided Egypt with over $50 billion in military assistance and $30 billion in economic assistance.
Egypt imported 80% of its wheat from Russia and Ukraine prior to the war.
China is also one of Egypt's key economic partners. Cairo and Beijing have recently been deepening their security ties as well, with the two countries working closely on industrial military projects.
The fact that el-Sisi was considering sending weapons to Russia indicates he believed that even if such a plan was made public, the United States would not cut off aid to Egypt for fear of destabilizing the Middle East. In addition to solidifying its political ties with Russia, el-Sisi's proposed weapons transfer was likely aimed at bolstering his country's economy by bringing new business to Egypt's defense sector. Egypt's macroeconomic fundamentals have been shaky over the past year; the Egyptian pound has steadily deteriorated, despite two devaluations seeking to stem the currency's decline, which has eaten into Egyptians' savings and has eroded their purchasing power. In a bid to access more foreign currency that can help Cairo prop up the pound and reduce its dependence on external debt, El-Sisi was likely trying to boost military equipment exports by producing rockets for Russia. The Egyptian president's desire to keep the scheme a secret (including from even those making the rockets) shows he was aware of its potential to roil ties with Washington. But his desire to propose the plan regardless also indicates he didn't think the United States would go so far as to cut off aid to Egypt in retaliation. This calculation was likely based on the fact that the aid Cairo receives from Washington is, according to the U.S. State Department, related to maintaining the two countries' ''mutual interests in Middle East peace and stability,'' which creates a strong imperative among U.S. leaders to continue sending cash to Egypt, even if Egypt periodically engages in controversial action at home and abroad. Indeed, the United States has yet to cut off most aid flows to Egypt, despite growing calls from lawmakers in Congress to do so amid the el-Sisi government's growing ties with Russia and domestic human rights violations.
Egypt provides stability in the Middle East by maintaining the longest peace accord with Israel of any regional state, and by remaining neutral in most regional conflicts. Egypt also closely with the U.S. military in counterterrorism missions. In recent years, the United States has only withheld small tranches of economic aid to Egypt over human rights violations.
But Egypt's desire to maintain ties with Russia nonetheless exposes it to greater risks at an especially precarious time for the Egyptian economy. In Washington, El-Sisi's proposal to manufacture and send rockets to Russian troops fighting against U.S.-armed troops in Ukraine is being perceived as a betrayal of U.S. national security interests. This will risk intensifying existing U.S. congressional pressure to cut aid to Egypt, especially in the wake of Cairo's recent moves to purchase Russian weapons. Most of Egypt's military arsenal is from the U.S. and other Western sources, including France. But under el-Sisi, Egypt has sought out larger purchases of higher-tech Russian equipment — including Sukhoi Su-35 aircraft — despite warnings from U.S. officials that this could lead to sanctions or cutoffs of U.S. military aid. Even though the Su-35 deal has run aground (in part due to fears of triggering U.S. retaliation), Cairo's desire to diversify its military suppliers — and foreign relationships more broadly — remains. And that desire will continue to expose Egypt to potential sanctions from both the United States and its allies, as European countries could also view the revelations about el-Sisi's aborted plan to give rockets to Russia as enough justification to scrutinize the economic aid they also provide to Egypt
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November 9, 2023
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Egypt’s Singular Role in Gaza
For Cairo, there are risks and opportunities involved in managing whatever comes next.
By: Kamran Bokhari
As the international community struggles to figure out what to do with Gaza after the war, Egypt is poised to play its biggest role there in more than 50 years. Whether it likes it or not, it is the focal point of efforts that involve the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Turkey, a responsibility that will present as many opportunities as risks.
Egypt and Neighboring Countries
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On Nov. 8, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the Gaza Strip cannot continue to be run by Hamas, but that neither could it be reoccupied by Israel beyond a transition period after the end of the military offensive. He also mentioned that U.S.-led international efforts are meant to ensure that there is no displacement of the Palestinian population and to reinstate the “unity of governance” between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
This is a difficult road map to follow. The key challenge will be to minimize the length of Israel’s occupation and administration of Gaza. Already there is mounting international and domestic pressure on the Biden administration to broker a cease-fire. That so many Palestinians have been killed – more than 10,000 as of Nov. 7 – has shifted the narrative on the war from condemnation of Hamas to criticism of the Israeli counteroffensive. Implicit in this pressure is the debate over the broader occupation of the Palestinian Territories, the rise of Hamas and the immorality of terrorism.
Under these circumstances, it is in neither America’s nor Israel’s interest to see Gaza reoccupied. After all, Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza in 2005, when the territory was still under the control of the Palestinian Authority, and when Israel Defense Forces had largely stopped Hamas’ suicide bombing campaigns. However, Hamas’ legislative victory the following year created a situation in which Hamas would rule Gaza while its rival, Fatah, would govern the West Bank. Toppling the Hamas government in Gaza would upend this 16-year arrangement, which allowed Egypt to step back from the conflict – other than to manage the flow of goods and people in and out of the Gaza Strip.
Gaza Strip Evacuation Zone, November 2023
(click to enlarge)
Egypt’s position on Gaza is defined by two different periods. The first began with the war in 1948, when Egypt, Syria and Jordan sought to seize control of what used to be British-ruled Palestine, large parts of which had become the state of Israel that same year. The Arabs lost the war, of course, but Egypt gained control of the Gaza Strip. After the 1952 coup – which essentially established the military-dominated regime that rules Egypt to this day – Cairo continued to advance an agenda of defeating Israel and liberating Palestine (if not necessarily as an independent state).
This would lead Egypt, Syria and Jordan to fight and lose the 1967 war, in which Cairo lost control of Gaza as well as the Sinai Peninsula – a much larger and more strategic piece of land. Thus, the final war between Egypt and Israel in 1973 was no longer about Palestine so much as it was about retrieving the Sinai, which the Egyptians eventually reclaimed per the 1978 peace treaty with Israel. In other words, a new normal was established in which Cairo no longer considered Palestine a strategic issue. And when, a decade or so later in this second era, the Palestine Liberation Organization decided to give up armed struggle to pursue its cause diplomatically, the Palestinian issue became, from Cairo’s point of view, an Israeli concern.
The Middle East Before and After the Six-Day War
(click to enlarge)
Even so, the rise of Hamas was a major problem for Cairo because Hamas is an armed offshoot of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s largest opposition movement. Yet Egypt took comfort in the fact that between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, Hamas would be contained. It wasn’t, and the group’s takeover of Gaza forced Cairo to take a more active role in managing the territory. The new Egyptian strategy was two-fold: coordinate with Israel on a blockade of Gaza and establish a working relationship with Hamas so that Cairo can serve as a mediator with Israel – which it did during the wars in 2008, 2012, 2014 and 2021.
This arrangement was tested in the wake of the Arab Spring uprising, when the Muslim Brotherhood briefly came to power in 2012. Though the group took a pragmatic approach to Gaza, the Egyptian establishment wasn’t taking any chances; it was too concerned about the prospect of a Muslim Brotherhood government in Cairo, Islamist militancy in the Sinai and a Hamas-led regime in Gaza. To the establishment, this was a threat not just to Egypt’s stability but to the peace treaty with Israel. Thus came the coup in 2013 that removed the Muslim Brotherhood from power and installed military chief Abdel Fattah el-Sissi as the country’s president.
While suppressing the Muslim Brotherhood at home, the new government continued its limited, pragmatic engagement with Hamas as a way to insulate itself from the brand of Islamism gaining ground next door. Meanwhile, el-Sissi had other major issues to deal with, including a floundering economy kept afloat by billions of dollars of assistance from the Gulf Arab states.
Regime stability was a stated priority of el-Sissi’s when he confirmed he would seek a third term – an announcement he made just four days before the Oct. 7 attacks radically altered Egypt’s strategic environment. Cairo will now have to do much of the heavy lifting. It’s unclear how the government will deal with the messy process of regime change in Gaza while maintaining regime stability at home, especially since the Egyptian public is highly sensitive to the suffering of the Palestinians in Gaza. It is so sensitive, in fact, that the government made the unusual move of allowing pro-Palestinian demonstrations to take place in Cairo on Oct. 20, during which protesters criticized Egypt’s handling of the economy.
However, Hamas’ dismantlement by Israel isn’t without opportunities for Cairo. Egypt is eager to weaken the Islamist movement, as are its benefactors in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which oppose Islamism on its merits but also want to deny Iran the ability to exploit the Gaza issue. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are therefore likely willing to invest in the efforts to re-establish a post-Hamas order in Gaza. No other country than Egypt would benefit as much from the arrangement. (This is especially important as Saudi Arabia recently said it would stop giving out money to countries such as Egypt with no strings attached.)
But it’s still a tall order. Once the dust settles, Hamas will be weakened but probably not eliminated. The Palestinian Authority in the West Bank will have to restore its writ over Gaza, but the group is famously corrupt and approaching a chaotic transition. Israel can bring down the Hamas regime in Gaza, but Egypt will have to take the lead in establishing a new order there, and fast in order to avoid the pandemonium of an Israeli reoccupation becoming longer than intended.
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As a result, Egyptians are PO'd at the Houtis.
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February 6, 2024
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Israel-Hamas War Underscores Egypt’s Indecisiveness
Cairo is walking a tightrope, unwilling to either categorically condemn or support Hamas’ attack.
By: Hilal Khashan
Like many other states, Egypt was caught off guard by the Israel-Hamas war. The magnitude of Hamas’ attack on Oct. 7 left Egypt little room to mediate a cease-fire between Israel and the militant group, as it had done many times in the past. Cairo’s response underscores its pattern of indecisive decision-making. Rather than demand that the fighting stop, Egyptian officials merely urged against the expansion of the war into other parts of the Middle East. Egypt was essentially walking a tightrope, unwilling to either categorically condemn or support Hamas’ attack. President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi isn’t concerned about the fate of Hamas, which is a close ally of his arch enemy, the Muslim Brotherhood. Rather, he’s worried about the far-reaching implications of creating a new regional reality – especially at a time when the Israel-Palestine conflict appeared to be easing and when more Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, appeared to be accelerating peace talks with Israel.
Attitudes Toward Gazans
Egyptians have developed a perception of Palestinians as troublemakers who require continuous scrutiny by the country’s intelligence services. This attitude is the result of a number of high-profile incidents involving Palestinian groups. In 1978, members of the ultraradical Palestinian Abu Nidal Organization assassinated Egypt’s minister of culture. In 1985, members of the same organization hijacked an Egyptian airliner on its way to Malta. In an effort to rescue the passengers, an Egyptian commando force launched an operation that killed 56 hostages in the crossfire. In 2012, unknown attackers killed 16 Egyptian soldiers near the Kerem Shalom crossing in North Sinai Governorate. Many Egyptians accused Hamas of perpetrating the attack, which it vehemently denied.
Palestinians attempting to flee Gaza into Egypt have also faced discrimination and mistreatment. Palestinian travelers trying to enter Egypt through the Rafah crossing have long endured harsh humanitarian conditions, including shortages of drinking water and food, not to mention astronomical prices for basic necessities and a lack of public bathrooms. Those stranded at the border, including children, older people and those seeking medical treatment, must wait days to cross. Travelers have described their journeys as agonizing and humiliating.
When the crossing is open, Egyptian immigration officers approve just a small number of applications to leave Gaza. To have their applications accepted, travelers must pay $3,000 to agencies that work with a mafia of Egyptian officers and intelligence personnel. In times of crisis, bribes of up to $10,000 per person – more than 90 percent of which goes to Egyptians – are commonplace. Many people have fallen victim to scams that promise them passage if they pay bribes, only to find that their names have been left off the lists of approved applications.
These mafias have no mercy for the injured seeking treatment outside Gaza, as even they must pay $5,000 to enter Egypt. One Palestinian woman who accompanied her injured relative to a hospital in Cairo said hospital personnel prohibited wounded Palestinians from buying SIM cards or accessing the internet. They and their accompanying relatives also could not enter the cafeteria in the hospital and had to buy food from security personnel, who charged them exorbitant prices. After being attacked by el-Sissi’s supporters, she deleted her tweet and explained that she did not deny that Egypt was helping Palestinians.
Egyptian border guards charge Hamas $5,000 for each truck entering Gaza. Hamas covers the cost of food coming from Egypt, most of which is expired or nearly expired. Many Gazans report that they must pay Hamas for the food it provides them, whether donated by other countries or purchased from Egypt. Prices for all food products have skyrocketed. The price of salt, for example, soared from 10 cents per pound to $5.
Jordan’s King Abdullah has urged el-Sissi to open the Rafah crossing to bring in humanitarian aid. El-Sissi does not seem to want to antagonize the Biden administration, though Abdullah believes Washington would give the green light for the move, especially after the International Court of Justice ordered Israel to take steps to ensure the provision of humanitarian aid to Gazans.
Reluctance to Help
Egypt’s reluctance to open the border is part of its pattern of unassertive actions. After withdrawing from the Gaza Strip in 2005, Israel signed a deal with Egypt that would govern management of the Philadelphi Corridor, a narrow buffer zone along the Gaza-Egyptian border. Under the agreement, Israel handed over responsibility for border control on Gaza’s side of the corridor to the Palestinian Authority. The security situation in Gaza changed when Hamas expelled the Palestine Liberation Organization from the strip, and Israel and Egypt imposed a crippling blockade. Due to the movement of large numbers of Gazans to north Sinai in search of food and basic supplies, Egypt took control of the Palestinian side of the corridor. The last thing Egypt wanted was a heavily armed extremist group with close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood on its doorstep. Cairo even sent troops to the United States for training on locating and destroying tunnels used for smuggling weapons and other goods to Gaza. After President Hosni Mubarak was ousted in 2011, Egypt eased its restrictions. But following the 2013 coup against President Mohamed Morsi, Cairo again imposed severe restrictions on the movement of Gaza residents to Sinai. Egyptian workers bulldozed homes on the Egyptian side of Rafah City to create a buffer zone with Gaza. They also flooded the tunnels through which consumer items, weapons and militants were smuggled.
Israeli leaders now say they want to reimpose control over the corridor, angering Egypt, which argues that their bilateral agreement requires parties to obtain permission from the other party before carrying out any military action. Egypt also says Israel’s seizure of the Philadelphi Corridor would constitute a threat to its sovereignty and violate the 1978 Camp David Accords. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu downplayed the deterioration of relations with Egypt, stressing the depth of ties with el-Sissi and hinting that the leaks about his dissatisfaction with Israeli behavior are only for local consumption.
Indeed, Egypt cooperated with Israel in all of its previous wars against Hamas. For example, during the 2014 war in Gaza, several Israeli observers expressed astonishment at Egypt’s subtle approval of the conflict, which lasted 51 days. At the time, a political commentator for Israel’s Channel 13 broadcaster went so far as to say that anyone who would hear el-Sissi’s position would believe that he is a member of a Zionist movement and suggested that his stance stemmed from Hamas' being a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Egyptian officials say Israel’s attempt to control the Philadelphi Corridor will jeopardize bilateral relations, while the Israelis believe their close ties, fostered over decades since Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977, will survive the temporary occupation of the corridor. The most Egypt can do if Israel takes control of the corridor is freeze bilateral security coordination without severing diplomatic relations. Since the significant Israeli operations north of Gaza Sector and the city of Khan Younis are nearing an end, the Israeli military will soon turn to Rafah. Given that more than half the population of Gaza has taken refuge near the Egyptian border, an Israeli assault on the third and final part of the strip will force Palestinians into northern Sinai.
Lack of Interest
Egyptian attitudes toward Palestinians aren’t unique in the Arab world. Arabs often accuse the Palestinians of selling their land to the Jews and fighting among themselves while asking Arab countries for help. They frequently tell the Palestinians to try to solve their problems on their own before asking for assistance. Arab leaders and citizens, especially in Egypt, say they have given generously to the Palestinians and sacrificed thousands of their youth for the Palestinian cause. To rationalize their own failure to confront Israel, they blame the Palestinians, describing them as ungrateful traitors. They view the presence of Palestinians in any country as a bad omen for its people. Egyptians have detached themselves from the question of Palestine, viewing it as a matter for the Palestinian people to resolve. They argue that Egypt, caught in a maze of poverty, must focus on its economic development and extricate itself from foreign issues.
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March 27, 2024
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In Egypt, a Hunger Revolt Is Unlikely
No matter how bad the economy gets, the president is careful to maintain power.
By: Hilal Khashan
Egypt has been suffering an economic crisis for years, but now things are so bad that, according to observers, it threatens to result in a revolution of the hungry. Given that more than a quarter of Egypt's population lives in extreme poverty, this prediction may not seem so far-fetched.
Indeed, many analysts argue Egypt has a history of hunger revolts. The first documented hunger revolution in history was an Egyptian Pharaonic revolution against King Pepi II Neferkare in the third millennium B.C. It ended his rule but ushered in 180 years of chaos. Famines continued during the reign of Ptolemy III Euergetes, Ptolemy IV Philopator and the Romans, who burdened the Egyptians with heavy taxes. The first food revolts in the Islamic era occurred in the early years of the Umayyad dynasty, when hungry people attacked the governor's palace and forced him to flee to Syria. Famines continued during the days of the Abbasid Empire through the Mamluk period.
Current President Abdul Fattah el-Sisi's inability to manage his country’s resources has alienated him from much of the population. Yet the Egyptian people are unlikely to rise against him because, for all his policy mistakes, he does at least try to prevent them from starving. And his insistence on borrowing money to provide low-quality staple food items at heavily subsidized prices will only hurt the economy further.
Public Discontent
Which is not to say Egyptians are happy about the state of things. Egypt has periodically witnessed demonstrations denouncing the steady rise in food prices and rejecting el-Sisi's regime. A few days ago, hundreds of Egyptians demonstrated in Alexandria, dozens of whom were arrested by security forces, to protest the escalating prices, raising the slogan “Sisi, the enemy of God, we are hungry.” During the 2011 uprising, Egyptians chanted “bread, freedom, social justice,” making bread the top of their most important demands. (Bread has been a driver of Egyptian protests throughout history.)
Last year, the government imported frozen Brazilian chicken, which state-run media presented as a solution to the local chicken shortage and which officials considered a corrective to a government recommendation to eat chicken feet. Food scarcity led to a surge in theft, including a robbery at a post office and the looting of grocery stores. In some instances, people stole livestock and slaughtered them for free distribution to people experiencing food insecurity. Social media activists shared on YouTube scenes of people searching for food in garbage bags dumped on roadsides. One commenter said people were eating garbage because "a rabid dog” – a reference to el-Sisi – “stole their food and made them hungry."
Failed Economic Policies
The Egyptian government failed to rein in prices, carry out structural economic reforms and reduce the military's intrusion in the economy. Instead, el-Sisi resorted to loans from the International Monetary Fund and his allies in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to provide food for the Egyptians. El-Sisi opted for selling many of the Egyptian state's assets to Gulf countries in exchange for billions of dollars to postpone the total collapse of the economy.
But the collapse may be inevitable. Since el-Sisi took power in 2014, the Egyptian economy has faced many challenges, including a devaluation of the pound, foreign currency shortages, high inflation, increased debt, declining foreign investment and tourism, poor infrastructure and an aversion to structural reforms. Observers attribute el-Sisi's economic predicament to his failure to adequately address fundamental problems. El-Sisi also insisted on implementing giant projects financed with substantial foreign loans, such as the new administrative capital and a high-speed train, that did not generate a direct economic return. Spending is also a problem. He spent approximately $9 billion on an unnecessary expansion of the Suez Canal that failed to generate reliable revenue, and bought $45 billion worth of weapons that do not serve Egypt’s needs. The currency exchange rate for the dollar topped 60 Egyptian pounds a few weeks ago. Remittances from Egyptians abroad also decreased to $23 billion last year, compared with about $32 billion the previous year. Meanwhile, the military establishment continues to control the economy, leading to investment flight. The absence of parliamentary influence and oversight institutions further aggravates the financial burden.
The tens of billions of dollars of foreign aid throughout el-Sisi's rule have not helped. Saudi Arabia and the UAE provided more than $12 billion immediately after el-Sisi overthrew President Mohammed Morsi in 2013. (El-Sisi holds the January 2011 uprising responsible for Egypt’s economic plight, saying it cost the country $450 billion between 2011 and 2020.) The government is hard-pressed to provide essential services to its citizens, estimated at more than $35 billion annually, knowing that Egypt imports 85 percent of its food. The government is borrowing to survive, and the only way to fulfill its obligations to debtors is to borrow more. El-Sisi said a few days ago that he was aware of the extent of the suffering and economic pressures. Yet he held the people responsible for maintaining Egypt's security and stability and claimed that the war in Gaza was partly responsible for the current economic situation.
But el-Sisi does not have a development plan; he has tactics to buy time and remain in power. These include the Ras el-Hekma project on the northern coast near the Libyan border, part of a mysterious investment deal Egypt signed with the UAE in February, according to which Abu Dhabi will pay Cairo $35 billion within two months. The Egyptian government celebrated the agreement to develop tourism in the area as a victory. About $24 billion of the deal will serve Egypt's foreign debt. Public debt, meanwhile, remains a problem, as the value of interest payments is equivalent to 50 percent of government revenues, and the debt-to-GDP ratio is close to 100 percent. The debt service bill will likely rise to more than 62 percent of state revenues.
Moody's credit rating agency changed Egypt's outlook from stable to negative, indicating the increased risks of the country's continued weakness amid the difficulty of rebalancing the overall economy and the exchange rate. Despite the positive local and international outlook toward the substantial cash flows coming to Egypt, Cairo needs to be more convincing to amend its credit rating. If the exchange rate is not allowed to move flexibly and inflation remains high, the gains of the past few weeks could quickly erode, as happened after the 2016 currency devaluation.
This is to say nothing of Egypt's demographic problems. The population currently stands at 105 million people, compared to 19 million in 1952. Other factors that are no less important should be considered, such as the monopoly of power, arbitrary financial decisions, chaos, corruption and the dominance of individual interests at the expense of society.
In September 2023, el-Sisi told Egyptians they had to accept famine to achieve his development vision. But it is unlikely that he will allow Egyptians to go hungry because it would undermine his regime. El-Sisi constantly tells Egyptians that they must continue to sacrifice their rights and be patient and that criticism and opposition can destroy the country.
Egypt's Foreign Modernizers
Egyptians need to gain experience in self-rule. Gamal Abdel Nasser was the first native head of state to rule Egypt since the pharaohs. He and his four successors did not achieve their economic development goals, let alone their political ones. When Macedonian-born Muhammad Ali Pasha became the sole ruler of Egypt in 1805, he realized that the realities of European politics and their colonial pursuits impacted Egypt. He understood that the Ottoman sultan's power alone was insufficient to defend Egypt or shield it from European ambitions. He reasoned that it must build national instruments of power, so he endeavored to build a strong state inspired by Europe's experience. His modernization covered all aspects of life, making Egypt a primary driver of political events in North Africa and West Asia. Ali built a strong army, developed industry and agriculture, improved irrigation systems, opened schools and hospitals, and established a modern administration and a French-style judicial system.
Ismail Pasha, who ruled Egypt between 1863 and 1879, represented the true continuation of Ali’s developmental work, which shaped modern Egypt. Given the wide-ranging reforms and economic development that took place during his reign, it was clear that Ismail wanted to fashion Egypt into a European-style country. But he went too far into debt, opening the door for British intervention and occupation in 1882.
Since the early 19th century, primarily Italian, Greek, Armenian and Syrian-Lebanese expatriates heavily contributed to Egypt's economic and cultural development. Expatriates from other nations, mainly Russia and Germany, arrived in Egypt in the 20th century. When Nasser came to power, he purged them from public life, forcing most of them to leave the country. In doing so, he committed a severe disservice to Egyptian modernization.
Now there is el-Sisi, who has destroyed the foundations for a strong economy based on accountability and an enabling environment that could attract huge investments instead of obtaining unsustainable loans. He cannot change his course because he is unable to reform.