Fire Hydrant of Freedom
Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities => Politics & Religion => Topic started by: Crafty_Dog on February 25, 2011, 09:16:09 PM
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Saudi Arabia and the Context of Regional Unrest
On Thursday, much of the global media remained fixated on the continuing turmoil in Libya, but STRATFOR’s attention was drawn to Saudi Arabia. According to a DPA report, a Saudi youth group called for a peaceful demonstration on Friday in the kingdom’s western Red Sea port city of Jeddah, in an expression of solidarity with anti-government protesters in Libya. The group, calling itself Jeddah Youth for Change, distributed a printed statement throughout Riyadh asking people to demonstrate near the al-Beia Roundabout and vowed not to give up its right to demonstrate peacefully.
Ever since the mass risings spread from Tunisia to other parts of the Arab world, the key question has been whether or not the Saudi kingdom could experience similar unrest. The reason why this question is posed is two-fold: 1) The country is the world’s largest exporter of crude, and any unrest there could have massive ramifications for the world’s energy supply; and, 2) The Saudi socio-political culture is such that public demonstrations have been an extremely rare occurrence.
Riyadh’s actions since the ouster of the Tunisian and Egyptian presidents show its grave concern that the regional unrest could spread to Saudi Arabia. Domestically, the Saudi state announced a new $11 billion social welfare package. Regionally, the Saudis have been working hard to ensure that the protests in bordering countries do not destabilize those states (particularly Bahrain and Yemen), which could have a spillover effect into the kingdom.
“The Saudis will have to balance between the need to sustain old relationships such as those with the ulema class and new ones with the Shiite minority and liberal segments of society.”
Since the establishment of their first polity in 1744, the Saudis have demonstrated remarkable resilience and skill in dealing with challenges to their authority. They have weathered a litany of problems in their nearly 270-year history. These include a collapse of their state in the face of external aggression on two occasions (1818 and 1891), feuds within the royal family leading to the abdication of a monarch (1964), the assassination of a second at the hands of a nephew (1975), challenges from the country’s highly influential and expansive ulema class (1960s and 1990s), and rebellions mounted by religious militants on three occasions (1929, 1979 and 2003-04).
The unique nature of the Saudi state and its shared religious and cultural norms in part explain its ability to deal with such threats. Unlike many authoritarian Arab countries, the Saudi state is not detached from the average man; instead, it is very much rooted in the masses. The House of Saud is not the typical elite royal family; on the contrary, it is connected to the entire tribal landscape of the country through marriages.
In addition to the tribal social organization, there is a considerable degree of homogeneity of religious and cultural values. The historical relationship between the House of Saud and the Wahhabi religious establishment has proven effective in sustaining the legitimacy of the regime. Reinforcing all these bonds is the country’s oil wealth.
This arrangement has served the Saudis well for a very long time. But it now appears that they have reached a significant impasse — for a number of reasons.
First, the kingdom is due for a major leadership change considering that the king and the top three princes are extremely old and could die in fairly quick succession. Second is the rise of the kingdom’s archrival, Iran, and its Arab Shiite allies (in Iraq, Lebanon and now Bahrain), which represents the biggest external threat to the kingdom. Third, the regional wave of popular unrest, demanding that the region’s autocratic regimes make room for democracy, is something the Saudis have not had to deal with thus far.
The configuration of the Saudi state and society will likely serve as an arrestor to serious unrest. This means Saudi Arabia is unlikely to be immediately overwhelmed by protests, as has been the case with Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain. But the kingdom is unlikely to contain such pressures for long, especially as a new generation of leaders assumes the mantle.
The future rulers will likely build upon the cautious reforms that have been spearheaded by King Abdullah in recent years. But in the emerging regional climate, it will be difficult to manage the pace and direction of reforms. The Saudis will have to balance between the need to sustain old relationships such as those with the ulema class and new ones with the Shiite minority and liberal segments of society.
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We lose Saudi, it's a new and very ugly world.
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Fear of Domestic Unrest in Saudi Arabia
Unrest in the Persian Gulf region has been limited to small countries like Bahrain, Yemen and Oman. On Tuesday, however, the region’s powerhouse, Saudi Arabia, seemed to be inching closer to unrest within its borders. Reuters reported that authorities in the Eastern Province city of al Hafouf arrested a Shiite cleric who, in a sermon during congregational prayers last Friday, called for a constitutional monarchy. Reuters quoted a local rights activist as saying that state security forces arrested Tawfiq al-Amir, who was previously detained for demanding religious freedom.
“The Saudis fear that any gains made by the Bahraini Shia could energize the kingdom’s Shiite minority.”
Ever since popular risings toppled the Tunisian and Egyptian presidents, the Saudis have worried about the potential for unrest within the kingdom. But when street demonstrations erupted in neighboring Bahrain, Saudi Arabia became even more concerned because Bahrain’s opposition is largely made up of the small island country’s 70 percent Shiite majority.
Terrified at the prospect of empowerment of the Bahraini Shia, Riyadh has been closely working with Manama to contain the unrest. The Saudis fear that any gains made by the Bahraini Shia could energize the kingdom’s Shiite minority (estimated at 20 percent of the population, concentrated in the oil-rich Eastern Province and linked to Bahrain via a causeway). The arrest of the Saudi Shiite cleric, however, could accelerate matters. The world’s largest exporter of crude could experience unrest even before the Bahraini Shia are able to extract concessions from their minority Sunni rulers.
Compounding matters for the Saudis is the fact that this is not just a sectarian rising: There are a great many Sunnis within the kingdom who desire political reforms, too. Such demands create problems for the house of al-Saud at a time when the royal family is reaching a historic impasse due to an aging leadership.
Between the need to manage the transition, contain the general calls for political reforms, and deal with a restive Shiite population, the Saudi kingdom becomes vulnerable to its archrival, Iran, which is looking at the regional unrest as an opportunity to project power across the Persian Gulf. Even if there had been no outbreak of public agitation, Arabian Peninsula leaders were gravely concerned about a rising originating in Iran. From the Saudis’ point of view, the 2011 withdrawal of American forces from Iraq will leave them exposed to an assertive Iran.
And now, domestic turmoil, especially turmoil involving the Shia, exacerbates matters for the Saudis. Political reforms in the kingdom threaten the Saudis’ historic hold on power. But any such reforms also translate into enhanced status of the minority Shiite population, which in turn means more room for potential Iranian maneuvers.
The Saudis are thus facing a predicament in which pressures to effect change on the domestic level have serious geopolitical implications.
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Saudi Arabia was yesterday drafting up to 10,000 security personnel into its north-eastern Shia Muslim provinces, clogging the highways into Dammam and other cities with busloads of troops in fear of next week's "day of rage" by what is now called the "Hunayn Revolution".
Saudi Arabia's worst nightmare – the arrival of the new Arab awakening of rebellion and insurrection in the kingdom – is now casting its long shadow over the House of Saud. Provoked by the Shia majority uprising in the neighbouring Sunni-dominated island of Bahrain, where protesters are calling for the overthrow of the ruling al-Khalifa family, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia is widely reported to have told the Bahraini authorities that if they do not crush their Shia revolt, his own forces will.
The opposition is expecting at least 20,000 Saudis to gather in Riyadh and in the Shia Muslim provinces of the north-east of the country in six days, to demand an end to corruption and, if necessary, the overthrow of the House of Saud. Saudi security forces have deployed troops and armed police across the Qatif area – where most of Saudi Arabia's Shia Muslims live – and yesterday would-be protesters circulated photographs of armoured vehicles and buses of the state-security police on a highway near the port city of Dammam.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudis-mobilise-thousands-of-troops-to-quell-growing-revolt-2232928.html
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http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-27/dubai-shares-rise-on-investor-bets-declines-are-overdone-deyaar-advances.html
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"where most of Saudi Arabia's Shia Muslims live"
10% of Saudi Arabia is Shia. It seems that whereever the Shia are they are proxies for Iran.
In a population of every 27 million that means 2.7 mill are Shia. They can easily muster thousands to walk the streets. Yet they are really a small minority.
20K is nothing.
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Are the Shia dispersed, or are they concentrated in certain regions of the country? My understanding is the latter.
Also, in Bahrain they are 70% and protesting for "freedom and democracy"? We may be concerned about the US 5th Fleet's base there, but how can we oppose this without losing credibility?
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Tuesday, March 8, 2011 STRATFOR.COM Diary Archives
Bahrain's Shiite Split
A recently formed Bahraini Shiite opposition coalition issued a joint statement Tuesday in which it vowed to push for the creation of a republic in Bahrain. As Bahrain has been governed by the al-Khalifa Sunni monarchy for more than two centuries, this is quite a bold aspiration, and eclipses the demands issued by the protest movement thus far. Until now, the predominately Shiite protesters have called for the resignation of the government and other political reforms, but not outright regime change.
The coalition, dubbed the “Coalition for a Republic,” is made up of three Shiite groups: the Haq Movement, the Wafa Movement and the lesser-known London-based Bahrain Islamic Freedom Movement. It does not include the more moderate Al Wefaq Movement, which is significant. Al Wefaq is not only the leading Shiite opposition party (it won 18 of the 40 seats in the lower house during the 2006 elections, though it walked out in protest after the crackdown on demonstrators in February), it also has been the leading player in the opposition coalition that the government has sought to engage for the past several weeks. Though the protesters on the streets have proven that they are not all Al Wefaq followers (many are devoted supporters of the Haq Movement’s founder, Hassan Mushaima), it is still widely believed that Al Wefaq has more support with Bahrain’s Shia.
“The emergence of the ‘Coalition for a Republic’ gives Tehran an additional tool with which it can pressure the al-Khalifa regime, one that differs somewhat from the more moderate Al Wefaq.”
There is now an open split in the Bahraini Shiite community, with one side (led by Al Wefaq) continuing with calls for Bahrain’s prime minister to step down and for the Sunni monarchy to grant the majority Shiite population a greater share of political power, and the other (led by Haq and Wafa) calling for a complete toppling of the monarchy.
The trait that the Haq and Wafa factions have in common is that they are likely both operating under varying levels of influence from Iran, which is the object of immense suspicion these days in Manama’s royal court (not to mention Riyadh’s). As the protector of Shia throughout the Persian Gulf region, Tehran has an interest in fomenting instability wherever a significant Shiite population exists in a country run by Sunnis. Bahrain, situated in the Persian Gulf just off the coast of Iran’s regional rival, Saudi Arabia, fits the bill, as roughly 70 percent of its residents are Shia. Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Bahraini regime has lived in a constant state of unease in relation to its eastern neighbor. But the presence of the U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet is a nice reminder to Tehran that Bahrain has friends in high places.
Though there is no explicit evidence that Iran is behind the creation of this new hard-line Shiite coalition, Tehran is known to have ties to its leader, Mushaima, while the founder and leader of Wafa, Abdulwahab Hussein, is also known for his more extreme viewpoints. The emergence of the “Coalition for a Republic” gives Tehran an additional tool with which it can pressure the al-Khalifa regime, one that differs somewhat from that of the more moderate Al Wefaq.
It would be presumptuous to believe that Iran has total influence over every Shiite opposition group throughout the region. That said, Iran has learned over the years how to effectively play the divisions within these Shiite camps to its advantage, thereby multiplying its options and acting as a spoiler to rival countries with competing interests. This has been exemplified in Iraq, where Iran has a relationship with myriad Shiite actors, from more independent-minded nationalists like Muqtada al-Sadr to more traditional Iranian allies like Ammar al-Hakim. There is a lot of utility in maintaining influence over multiple factions of dissent in a neighboring country, which leads STRATFOR to believe that the creation of this new coalition may be the first signs of a (likely milder) version of the “Iraqization” of the Bahraini Shia. Mushaima (or perhaps eventually Hussein) would play a similar role to al-Sadr; Al Wefaq would mimic the role of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
While the existence of two competing Shiite groups allows Iran more tools with which to influence the events in Bahrain, a split in the Shiite opposition also allows the al-Khalifas (and by extension, the Saudis) an opportunity to try to weaken the protest movement. Al Wefaq will play a central role in this strategy to have a decent chance of success. Though Al Wefaq could always decide that it would rather unite with those calling for an overthrow of the regime, it proved in its decision not to boycott the 2006 parliamentary elections that it is willing to sacrifice some of its principles if it means advancing its political goals.
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Red Alert: Saudi Police Fire On Protesters In Oil Hub
March 10, 2011 | 1946 GMT
Saudi police have reportedly opened gunfire on and launched stun grenades at several hundred protesters March 10 rallying in the heavily Shiite-populated city of Qatif in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province.
The decision to employ violence in this latest crackdown comes a day before Friday prayers, after which various Saudi opposition groups were planning to rally in the streets. Unrest has been simmering in the Saudi kingdom over the past couple weeks, with mostly Sunni youth, human rights activists and intellectuals in Riyadh and Jeddah campaigning for greater political freedoms, including the call for a constitutional monarchy. A so-called “Day of Rage” of protests across the country has been called for March 11 by Facebook groups Hanyn (Nostalgia) Revolution and the Free Youth Coalition following Friday prayers.
What is most critical to Saudi Arabia, however, is Shiite-driven unrest in the country’s Eastern Province. Shiite activists and clerics have become more vocal in recent weeks in expressing their dissent and have been attempting to dodge Saudi security forces. The Saudi regime has been cautious thus far, not wanting to inflame the protests with a violent crackdown but at the same time facing a growing need to demonstrate firm control.
Yet in watching Shiite unrest continue to simmer in the nearby island of Bahrain, the Saudi royals are growing increasingly concerned about the prospect of Shiite uprisings cascading throughout the Persian Gulf region, playing directly into the Iranian strategic interest of destabilizing its U.S.-allied Arab neighbors. By showing a willingness to use force early, the Saudi authorities are likely hoping they will be able to deter people from joining the protests, but such actions could just as easily embolden the protesters.
There is a strong potential for clashes to break out March 11 between Saudi security forces and protesters, particularly in the vital Eastern Province. Saudi authorities have taken tough security measures in the Shiite areas of the country by deploying about 15,000 national guardsmen to thwart the planned demonstrations by attempting to impose a curfew in critical areas. Energy speculators are already reacting to the heightened tensions in the Persian Gulf region, but unrest in cities like Qatif cuts directly to the source of the threat that is fueling market speculation: The major oil transit pipelines that supply the major oil port of Ras Tanura — the world’s largest, with a capacity of 5 million barrels per day — go directly through Qatif.
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Woof,
More coverage on Saudi uprising
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42013013/ns/world_news-mideastn_africa (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42013013/ns/world_news-mideastn_africa)
P.C.
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The house of Saud will go the full Ka-daffy.
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Middle East Tensions Rise With Saudi Protest
Simmering tensions in the predominantly Shiite area of Saudi Arabia’s Eastern province boiled to the surface Thursday, when riot police fired what were reportedly rubber bullets on a demonstration of up to 800 people in the town of Qatif. Though no one was killed, and only a few were reportedly injured, the Saudi security forces proved true to authorities’ pledge earlier in the week that protests in the Kingdom are banned and will not be tolerated.
The incident briefly caused oil prices to spike after having dipped earlier in the day as nervous investors reacted over reports of shots fired at protesters in the main oil-producing region of the world’s largest petroleum producer. The fear was that the same style of protests that first erupted in Tunisia, expanding across much of the Middle East and flaring up in Bahrain, had now finally spread to Saudi Arabia. Though there have been a handful of minor demonstrations in the Eastern province in recent weeks, this was the first time clashes had erupted with security forces. It happened just a day before planned, nationwide demonstrations were scheduled on Facebook. One such group has attracted more than 30,000 members (an unknown number of whom actually reside in Saudi Arabia) in its attempt to replicate the “Day of Rage” that Egypt’s pro-democracy movement made famous after noon prayers on Jan. 28.
“There will undoubtedly be people taking to the streets in Saudi Arabia on Friday. The question is, how many? And, even more importantly, will the security forces be able to clamp down without bloodshed?”
March 11 will be the first major test of whether Saudi Arabia is truly immune to the contagion that helped to overthrow Tunisia and Egypt’s presidents, and now has regimes in Bahrain and Yemen feeling pressured. Certainly, the House of Saud is taking the potential for unrest seriously, as the royal family has seen that the failure to do so in other countries often ended badly. The regime, unsurprisingly, has responded by combining the carrot with the stick, implementing a series of economic concessions in recent weeks aimed at ameliorating popular grievances, in addition to arresting those encouraging its citizens to protest and urging the clergy, Consultative Council and religious police to remind the nation that public demonstrations are prohibited.
Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal urged people on Wednesday to remember that dialogue is the solution to social grievances, not protest, and warned that Riyadh had increased security forces in potential trouble spots to clamp down on anyone that failed to take note. Though the Eastern province – home to the vast majority of Saudi Arabia’s Shia, who make up an estimated 15 percent of the nation’s population – is the area considered by many to be the most likely to experience significant unrest, there are locations across the country that have been named in advance by the online organizers of the March 11 demonstrations. This includes Jeddah, Riyadh, Jezan and even Mecca.
Undoubtedly, there will be people taking to the streets on Friday. The question is, how many? And, even more importantly, will the security forces be able to clamp down without bloodshed?
Saudi Arabia’s regional rival, Iran, is hoping that the answers to those questions will be “a lot” and “no.” Tehran is suspected to be responsible for much of the unrest in Bahrain, and knows that the Shia of the eastern Arabian Peninsula are taking note of the developments across the causeway in the Saudi kingdom. Whether or not the Iranians have significant links in the Shiite zones of Saudi Arabia is unknown, but that doesn’t change the fact that Tehran has an interest in the situation becoming hectic there.
Saudi Arabia is a unique case when compared to other Arab states that have been affected by the Tunisian contagion. It will be much more challenging to enact political change there than in other countries because the royal family is able to use its immense oil wealth to pacify dissent, and blunt popular support for those who think the royal family should give way to a constitutional monarchy. In addition, the Sunnis are a majority in the kingdom, meaning that this is no Bahrain. It is also noteworthy that the royal family has more than 5,000 princes across the country, thus Saudi Arabia is not being run by a top-heavy power structure that is out of touch with popular sentiment.
March 11 is only the first of two planned “Days of Rage,” the second being March 20. But as Friday prayers are always an easier way to organize protests in the Muslim world due to the volume of people already out on the streets, all eyes should be on the Arabian Peninsula.
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By George Friedman
Saudi Arabia is leading a coalition force into Bahrain to help the government calm the unrest there. This move puts Iran in a difficult position, as Tehran had hoped to use the uprising in Bahrain to promote instability in the Persian Gulf region. Iran could refrain from acting and lose an opportunity to destabilize the region, or it could choose from several other options that do not seem particularly effective.
The Bahrain uprising consists of two parts, as all revolutions do. The first is genuine grievances by the majority Shiite population — the local issues and divisions. The second is the interests of foreign powers in Bahrain. It is not one or the other. It is both.
The Iranians clearly benefit from an uprising in Bahrain. It places the U.S. 5th Fleet’s basing in jeopardy, puts the United States in a difficult position and threatens the stability of other Persian Gulf Arab states. For the Iranians, pursuing a long-standing interest (going back to the Shah and beyond) of dominating the Gulf, the uprisings in North Africa and their spread to the Arabian Peninsula represent a golden opportunity.
The Iranians are accustomed to being able to use their covert capabilities to shape the political realities in countries. They did this effectively in Iraq and are doing it in Afghanistan. They regarded this as low risk and high reward. The Saudis, recognizing that this posed a fundamental risk to their regime and consulting with the Americans, have led a coalition force into Bahrain to halt the uprising and save the regime. Pressed by covert forces, they were forced into an overt action they were clearly reluctant to take.
We are now off the map, so to speak. The question is how the Iranians respond, and there is every reason to think that they do not know. They probably did not expect a direct military move by the Saudis, given that the Saudis prefer to act more quietly themselves. The Iranians wanted to destabilize without triggering a strong response, but they were sufficiently successful in using local issues that the Saudis felt they had no choice in the matter. It is Iran’s move.
If Iran simply does nothing, then the wave that has been moving in its favor might be stopped and reversed. They could lose a historic opportunity. At the same time, the door remains open in Iraq, and that is the main prize here. They might simply accept the reversal and pursue their main line. But even there things are murky. There are rumors in Washington that U.S. President Barack Obama has decided to slow down, halt or even reverse the withdrawal from Iraq. Rumors are merely rumors, but these make sense. Completing the withdrawal now would tilt the balance in Iraq to Iran, a strategic disaster.
Therefore, the Iranians are facing a counter-offensive that threatens the project they have been pursuing for years just when it appeared to be coming to fruition. Of course, it is just before a project succeeds that opposition mobilizes, so they should not be surprised that resistance has grown so strong. But surprised or not, they now have a strategic decision to make and not very long to make it.
They can up the ante by increasing resistance in Bahrain and forcing fighting on the ground. It is not clear that the Bahraini opposition is prepared to take that risk on behalf of Iran, but it is a potential option. They have the option of trying to increase unrest elsewhere in order to spread the Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council forces, weakening their impact. It is not clear how much leverage the Iranians have in other countries. The Iranians could try to create problems in Saudi Arabia, but given the Saudis’ actions in Bahrain, this becomes more difficult.
Finally, they can attempt an overt intervention, either in Bahrain or elsewhere, such as Iraq or Afghanistan. A naval movement against Bahrain is not impossible, but if the U.S. Navy intervenes, which it likely would, it would be a disaster for the Iranians. Operations in Iraq or Afghanistan might be more fruitful. It is possible that Shiite insurgents will operate in Iraq, but that would guarantee a halt of the U.S. withdrawal without clearly increasing the Iranians’ advantage there. They want U.S. forces to leave, not give them a reason to stay.
There is then the indirect option, which is to trigger a war with Israel. The killings on the West Bank and Israeli concerns about Hezbollah might be some of Iran’s doing, with the emphasis on “might.” But it is not clear how a Hezbollah confrontation with Israel would help Iran’s position relative to Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf. It diverts attention, but the Saudis know the stakes and they will not be easily diverted.
The logic, therefore, is that Iran retreats and waits. But the Saudi move shifts the flow of events, and time is not on Iran’s side.
There is also the domestic Iranian political situation to consider. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been strong in part because of his successful handling of foreign policy. The massive failure of a destabilization plan would give his political opponents the ammunition needed to weaken him domestically. We do not mean a democratic revolution in Iran, but his enemies among the clergy who see him as a threat to their position, and hard-liners in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who want an even more aggressive stand.
Ahmadinejad finds himself in a difficult position. The Saudis have moved decisively. If he does nothing, his position can unravel and with it his domestic political position. Yet none of the counters he might use seem effective or workable. In the end, his best option is to create a crisis in Iraq, forcing the United States to consider how deeply it wants to be drawn back into Iraq. He might find weakness there that he can translate into some sort of political deal.
At the moment we suspect the Iranians do not know how they will respond. The first issue will have to be determining whether they can create violent resistance to the Saudis in Bahrain, to both tie them down and increase the cost of occupation. It is simply unclear whether the Bahrainis are prepared to pay the price. They do seem to want fundamental change in Bahrain, but it is not clear that they have reached the point where they are prepared to resist and die en masse.
That is undoubtedly what the Iranians are exploring now. If they find that this is not an option, then none of their other options are particularly good. All of them involve risk and difficulty. It also requires that Iran commit itself to confrontations that it has tried to avoid. It prefers cover action that is deniable to overt action that is not.
As we move into the evening, we expect the Iranians are in intense discussions of their next move. Domestic politics are affecting regional strategy, as would be the case in any country. But the clear roadmap the Iranians were working from has now collapsed. The Saudis have called their hand, and they are trying to find out if they have a real or a busted flush. They will have to act quickly before the Saudi action simply becomes a solid reality. But it is not clear what they can do quickly. For the moment, the Saudis have the upper hand. But the Iranians are clever and tenacious. There are no predictions possible. We doubt even the Iranians know what they will do.
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Analyst Reva Bhalla examines the Iranian dilemma with the Gulf Cooperation Council’s decision to deploy forces to Bahrain.
Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries announced Monday that they were deploying military forces to Bahrain under the umbrella of the joint Peninsula Shield Forces. Now this is basically the U.S.-Saudi overt countermove to an Iranian covert destabilization campaign that it has been pursuing in the Persian Gulf region. The question now is how will the Iranians respond?
The reports of the GCC deployment comes just two days after U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates paid a visit to the Bahraini capital. The United States, the Saudis, and the rest of the GCC states have been monitoring very closely the level of Iranian involvement in the Bahraini opposition, understanding very well that the Iranians have a strategic interest in reshaping the political reality of the region in favor of the Shia, thereby destabilizing the balance of power in the region and placing in jeopardy vital U.S. military installations.
Understanding what’s at stake, the GCC countries have made their countermove to Iran’s destabilization campaign and are doing so with apparent U.S. backing. The question now is what do the Iranians do? The Iranians have in place a number of assets in Bahrain to escalate the protests there. But the more stories that come out on Shiites getting killed in the streets by Sunni forces in the security apparatus, the more pressure Iran would be putting on itself to get more overtly involved in the Bahraini crisis. It really isn’t clear that the Iranians are prepared to take such an overt option.
The Iranians much prefer operating in a covert space to shape the political realities on the ground. They did this very effectively in Iraq and Afghanistan, which they saw as a very high-reward and low-risk effort in order to get its strategic objectives met.
In the case of Bahrain, the Iranians face major logistical constraints in trying to project military power to an island that’s nestled between Saudi Arabia and Qatar – two Sunni powers — and an island that is also shielded by the U.S. 5th Fleet. Now the Iranians could choose to stand back but they would do so at the risk of looking ineffectual at a time when Shiites are coming under threat of Sunni forces. On the other hand, the Iranians could stick to their covert plan and use its covert assets in places like Afghanistan, Lebanon or even Saudi Arabia to try to ratchet up crises elsewhere in order to avoid having to get embroiled in a situation it doesn’t want to in Bahrain.
In the case of Iraq, of course the Iranians have a number of covert assets in place up to grab the U.S. attention there but that could also backfire. The United States is in the midst of withdrawal from Iraq and the more the Iranians get involved there, the more justified the United States would theoretically be in delaying its plans for withdrawal, which could completely derail the Iranian plan to consolidate its influence in the heart of the Arab world using its Shiite assets in Iraq.
The Iranian roadmap in the Persian Gulf appears to be off-track as a result of a pretty overt U.S. and Saudi countermove in the region. Now it’s not clear yet what the Iranians’ next steps are going to be, and it’s not clear that the Iranians know that either – but you can bet there is a lot of heavy debate taking place right now in Tehran.
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Due to our attention deficit created by Libya and Japan, this major story is not getting much attention. Some huge details here: Saudis into Bahrain against the wishes of Baraq, ambassadors withdrawn between Iran and Bahrain, an apparently determined majority of the population against the rule of those who enable the presence of our 5th Fleet, and more. Heads up folks!
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MANAMA—Bahrain declared a three-month state of emergency and handed wide powers to the armed forces, as it moved to quell weeks of demonstrations by mainly Shiite protesters a day after the arrival of Saudi troops.
Bahrain also temporarily withdrew its ambassador from Tehran, after Iran described the arrival of the troops as an "occupation."
WSJ's Jerry Seib reports Saudi Arabia has sent troops to quell violence in Bahrain, in defiance of a U.S. order not to get involved.
.Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia denied a report that one of its soldiers had been shot dead by a protester.
Bahrain television reported a member of the security forces had died after being run over by a protester. The government said the state of emergency gives Bahrain's army and security forces a mandate "to take the measures and procedures necessary to preserve the safety of the nation and its people." Bahrain has seen violent clashes over the past few days between security forces, antigovernment demonstrators and pro-regime loyalists, marking an escalation of tensions in the strategic Arab Gulf state, where a swelling number of protesters have taken control of the key financial district and are calling for the downfall of the monarchy.
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.On Tuesday, members of opposition groups reported clashes in Sitra and Shiite and Sunni villages near the capital between progovernment and antigovernment parties.
"There have been attacks in six villages," said Abdul Khalil, a senior member of the moderate Al Wefaq party. "They [pro-government mobs] attacked the Shia and Sunni villages. They had guns and security forces had to use tear gas. This is a terrible and complicated situation."
In the Shiite town of Sitra, pro-government vigilantes armed with knives, swords and batons went on a rampage through the village, one eyewitness said. Police had mobilized outside the local health center by late afternoon, said Mustafa Altooq, 38 years old, who went to visit his wounded brother. He described a chaotic scene of bodies being brought to the health center in the back of cars.
Ali Ibrahim, a consultant at the capital's Salmaniya hospital, said a Sitra man in his 20s died of a serious skull injury, and about an additional 60 people were being treated at the hospital from wounds inflicted by bird shot and rubber bullets. He said casualties were arriving from clashes in villages near Manama.
Bahrain's king announces a state of emergency a day after Saudi forces arrived to help quell mass protests in the country. Video courtesy of Reuters.
.The White House on Tuesday called for "calm and restraint" on all sides, warning that the use of force and sectarian violence by either the Saudis or Shiite opposition groups "will only worsen the situation."
On Monday, Gulf Cooperation Council states responded to a request from Bahrain's ruling al-Khalifa family to dispatch the first deployment of Arab troops across national borders since a revolt in Tunisia in December sparked unrest across the Arab world.
Saudi Arabia said that 1,000 of its soldiers took part and the United Arab Emirates said that 500 of its police officers had arrived at Bahrain's request.
On Tuesday, police helicopters circled overhead as tens of thousands of antigovernment demonstrators marched through the capital to protest the presence of Gulf troops in Bahrain and to call for the downfall of the monarchy.
They marched peacefully to the Saudi Arabian Embassy in the heart of Manama's financial district.
"If we don't win, then we will die," said Muntadar Jaffa, a 20-year-old engineering student who lives on the outskirts of Manama. "People will not leave the streets or go home."
The U.S. is deeply concerned about hard-liners within the Shiite community, who have longstanding ties to Iran and Hezbollah and could try to provoke a military response from the Saudis, risking a wider conflict, officials said.
The U.S. hopes to avoid further escalation. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, on a visit to Egypt in Cairo, spoke with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud about the situation in Bahrain. She said she was "particularly concerned" about the violence and the potential for escalation. About her call to the foreign minister, Mrs. Clinton said she told him all sides "must take steps now to negotiate toward a political solution," not a military one.
The State Department dispatched Jeffrey Feltman, acting assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs, to Bahrain, where he "working the issue aggressively on the ground as we speak," said White House spokesman Tommy Vietor.
The U.S. had tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade its Saudi allies to keep their forces out of the fray.
Tensions between President Barack Obama and the Saudi king flared in February over Mr. Obama's push for the immediate exit of President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, rather than the graceful exit supported by the Saudis.
Officials and diplomats said the Saudis now appeared to be charting a largely independent course in response to unrest in Bahrain.
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"The U.S. hopes to avoid further escalation. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, on a visit to Egypt in Cairo, spoke with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud about the situation in Bahrain. She said she was "particularly concerned" about the violence and the potential for escalation. About her call to the foreign minister, Mrs. Clinton said she told him all sides "must take steps now to negotiate toward a political solution," not a military one.
The State Department dispatched Jeffrey Feltman, acting assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs, to Bahrain, where he "working the issue aggressively on the ground as we speak," said White House spokesman Tommy Vietor.
The U.S. had tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade its Saudi allies to keep their forces out of the fray.
Tensions between President Barack Obama and the Saudi king flared in February over Mr. Obama's push for the immediate exit of President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, rather than the graceful exit supported by the Saudis."
Smart power! Better get State working on translating "reset button" into arabic, stat!
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http://hotair.com/greenroom/archives/2011/03/15/saudius-strains-show-as-bahrain-declares-a-state-of-emergency/
Saudi/US strains show as Bahrain declares a “state of emergency”
posted at 1:37 pm on March 15, 2011 by Bruce McQuain
Yes it’s another fine mess. Of course while the Japanese tragedy and the struggles with their nuclear power plants has sucked all the air out of news elsewhere, there is, in fact much news elsewhere. And not the least of it is coming out of the Middle East where Saudi troops, as a part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), moved into Bahrain ostensibly to “guard government facilities”.
The GCC is composed of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait. It was created in 1991 (think Iraq invasion of Kuwait), the 6 members share common borders and are committed by their charter to help each other in times of need.
The action by the GCC, as you might imagine, is in direct conflict with how the White House has indicated it would prefer the situation in Bahrain be resolved. Obviously that’s not carried much weight with the GCC.
The move created another quandary for the Obama administration, which obliquely criticized the Saudi action without explicitly condemning the kingdom, its most important Arab ally. The criticism was another sign of strains in the historically close relationship with Riyadh, as the United States pushes the country to make greater reforms to avert unrest.
Other symptoms of stress seem to be cropping up everywhere.
Saudi officials have made no secret of their deep displeasure with how President Obama handled the ouster of the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, charging Washington with abandoning a longtime ally. They show little patience with American messages about embracing what Mr. Obama calls “universal values,” including peaceful protests.
The GCC move has prompted both Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense and Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, to cancel upcoming visits to Saudi Arabia.
Again, the apparent genesis of these tensions appear to be related to the way the US handled Egypt. It has caused the Saudis and other GCC nations to trust the US less than before:
The latest tensions between Washington and Riyadh began early in the crisis when King Abdullah told President Obama that it was vital for the United States to support Mr. Mubarak, even if he began shooting protesters. Mr. Obama ignored that counsel. “They’ve taken it personally,” said one senior American familiar with the conversations, “because they question what we’d do if they are next.”
Since then, the American message to the Saudis, the official said, is that “no one can be immune,” and that the glacial pace of reforms that Saudi Arabia has been engaged in since 2003 must speed up.
Obviously the Saudi’s have their own ideas of how to handle this and apparently aren’t taking kindly to the US attempting to dictate how it should handle it’s internal affairs. And, given the treatment of Mubarak, the Saudi rulers can’t help but feel that they’re just as likely to be thrown under the bus if protests were to escalate as was Mubarak.
Consequently, they’ve decided to go their own way and handle it with force within the GCC while throwing money at the problem within the Saudi Kingdom. Speaking of the latter:
One of President Obama’s top advisers described the moves as more in a series of “safety valves” the Saudis open when pressure builds; another called the subsidies “stimulus funds motivated by self-preservation.”
Saudi officials, who declined to comment for this article to avoid fueling talk of divisions between the allies, said that the tensions had been exaggerated and that Americans who criticized the pace of reforms did not fully appreciate the challenges of working in the kingdom’s ultraconservative society.
Of course the difference between their “stimulus funds” and ours is they actually have the money. But it is ironic to see the adviser describe “stimulus funds” in those terms isn’t it? The actual point here should be evident though. The GCC has rejected the “Bahrain model” as the desired method of addressing the unrest. As you recall that was the “regime alteration” model, v. the regime change model.
So where does that leave us?
Demonstrating to Iran that the Saudi-American alliance remains strong has emerged as a critical objective of the Obama administration. King Abdullah, who was widely quoted in the State Department cables released by WikiLeaks as warning that the United States had to “cut off the head of the snake” in Iran, has led the effort to contain Iran’s ambitions to become a major regional power. In the view of White House officials, any weakness or chaos inside Saudi Arabia would be exploited by Iran.
For that reason, several current and former senior American intelligence and regional experts warned that in the months ahead, the administration must proceed delicately when confronting the Saudis about social and political reforms.
”Over the years, the U.S.-Saudi relationship has been fraught with periods of tension over the strategic partnership,” said Ellen Laipson, president of the Stimson Center, a public policy organization. “Post-September 11 was one period, and the departure of Mubarak may be another, when they question whether we are fair-weather friends.”
That phone keeps ringing at 3am, doesn’t it?
Questions: given the “critical objective” as outlined above, is it smart to cancel visits by SecDef and SecState? Doesn’t that possibly signal lack of support for the Saudis and play into the perception the US is a fair-weather friend? Doesn’t that promise the possibility of more actions the Saudi’s might take that will be contra to the US’s advice? Isn’t now the time to be going in there and making the case with top leaders and showing support while trying to twist a few arms to ramp down the situation instead of canceling?
UPDATE: Bahrain declares a “state of emergency”. 2 protesters killed 200 wounded. 1 Saudi soldier reported to have been killed.
Here’s a little insight into the Iranian connection mentioned above:
The entrance of foreign forces, including Saudi troops and those from other Gulf nations, threatened to escalate a local political conflict into a regional showdown; on Tuesday, Tehran, which has long claimed that Bahrain is historically part of Iran, branded the move “unacceptable.”
[…]
“The presence of foreign forces and interference in Bahrain’s internal affairs is unacceptable and will further complicate the issue,” Ramin Mehmanparast, the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, said at a news conference in Tehran, according to state-run media.
Even as predominantly Shiite Muslim Iran pursues a determined crackdown against dissent at home, Tehran has supported the protests led by the Shiite majority in Bahrain.
“People have some legitimate demands, and they are expressing them peacefully,” Mr. Memanparast said. “It should not be responded to violently.”
He added, “We expect their demands be fulfilled through correct means.”
You have to love their chutzpah. A little analysis:
The Gulf Cooperation Council was clearly alarmed at the prospect of a Shiite political victory in Bahrain, fearing that it would inspire restive Shiite populations in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to protest as well. The majority of the population in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich eastern provinces is Shiite, and there have already been small protests there.
“If the opposition in Bahrain wins, then Saudi loses,” said Mustafa el-Labbad, director of Al Sharq Center for Regional and Strategic Studies in Cairo. “In this regional context, the decision to move troops into Bahrain is not to help the monarchy of Bahrain, but to help Saudi Arabia itself .”
So that’s the lens by which much of what happens should be viewed – two regional rivals, each aligned with a different sect of Islam as well as different ethnic groups (Arab v. Persian) attempting to take advantage of a situation in the case of Iran, or trying to prevent change that would favor Iran in the case of Saudi Arabia.
The possible result?
An adviser to the United States government, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to the news media, agreed. “Iran’s preference was not to get engaged because the flow of events was in their direction,” he said. “If the Saudi intervention changes the calculus, they will be more aggressive.”
Of course they have their own problems at home, but Iran will probably, at least covertly, try to support the opposition in Bahrain. It is obviously perceived to be in their best interest to do so.
The primary reason that Bahrain has ended up asking the GCC in is because the recommended way to resolve the crisis, negotiate with the oppositions, was rejected by the opposition. As I mentioned in the earlier post about regime realignment, the entire process hinged on the opposition being willing to engage in honest, good faith negotiations with the government. It appears the Bahranian royal family at least made an attempt to do the things necessary as advised by the US:
The royal family allowed thousands of demonstrators to camp at Pearl Square. It freed some political prisoners, allowed an exiled opposition leader to return and reshuffled the cabinet. And it called for a national dialogue.
But the concessions — after the killings — seemed to embolden a movement that went from calling for a true constitutional monarchy to demanding the downfall of the monarchy. The monarchy has said it will consider instituting a fairly elected Parliament, but it insisted that the first step would be opening a national dialogue — a position the opposition has rejected, though it was unclear whether the protesters were speaking with one voice.
Indeed. But it doesn’t matter now, does it? Events have apparently moved beyond that. The likelihood of this simmering down to the point that such negotiations and dialogue could occur seem remote – especially with Iran in the background keeping this all stirred up.
We live in interesting times.
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Bruce McQuain blogs at Questions and Observations (QandO), Blackfive, the Washington Examiner and the Green Room. Follow him on Twitter: @McQandO
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A tangential observation:
What lesson might the House of Saud be drawing from the apparent success of Kaddaffy Duck vs. the results obtained by Mubarak?
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Saudi troops in Bahrain opened fire on Bahraini demonstrators in Manama’s Pearl Square on March 16, Iran’s Al-Alam Television reported. According to Al-Alam Television, Shiite mosques in Bahrain are urging people to commence a jihad. In addition, the Iranian station reported that Saudi and Bahraini forces fired at hospitals to prevent injured people from getting treatment.
The report of firing is significant in itself. The manner in which Iranian television is portraying the matter, whether true or not, is even more significant. In claiming both that Saudi troops are firing on hospitals and that the clergy have called for jihad, the Iranians are staking out a position designed to maximize the injustice of the Saudi intervention, to maximize Bahraini resistance and to turn the crisis from a political issue into a religious one.
If this becomes a general theme in Iranian media, it means Iran is establishing a framework in which the Saudis become an almost irreconcilable enemy and Bahrain a battleground in a religious conflict. Given Iran’s position, it becomes impossible for Tehran to remain neutral and not provide significant aid to the Bahraini Shiites. The degree and type of aid is uncertain, but obviously it commits the Iranians to some action and lays the justification for a more general confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Justification is not action, but actions of this sort require justification.
The Saudis are clearly attempting to crush resistance quickly with the use of direct force. The Iranians are attempting to rally the Bahrainis. However, framed as jihad, it raises the possibility of the conflict not only escalating in Bahrain but of Sunni-Shiite conflict emerging and intensifying elsewhere. There have been reports of some clashes in Iraq, which is clearly the primary battleground.
The theory STRATFOR has worked from has been that the uprising in Bahrain, whatever its origins, is going to be used by Iran in order to generally enhance its position in the Persian Gulf. Bahrain was a starting point in a broader strategy. Obviously, the longer the Bahrainis resist, the more effective the strategy. The Saudis have acted to crush the Bahraini rising. The Iranians have countered by setting the stage for intensification.
The question now is whether the Saudi attacks intimidate the demonstrators or cause them to become more aggressive.
Editor’s note: A previous version of this piece incorrectly stated that several media outlets reported Saudi troops fired on Bahraini demonstrators in Manama’s Pearl Square on March 16. Iran’s Al-Alam Television reported Saudi troops firing while other outlets reported the incident as Bahraini troops firing on protesters in Pearl Square. The piece has since been corrected.
Read more: Saudi Troops Reportedly Fire On Bahraini Protesters | STRATFOR
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Hmmmmmm.....
I wonder what sort of bold leadership move Obama will make to resolve this.
Right after the final four and the vacation to Rio.
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History Repeats Itself in Eastern Arabia
For the second time in less than two years, Saudi Arabia deployed troops beyond its borders to contain Shiite unrest in its immediate neighborhood. In late 2009, Saudi forces fought to suppress Houthi rebels in the country’s Shiite borderland to the south in Yemen. This time around, a Saudi-led force, operating under the umbrella of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) Peninsula Shield Force, deployed forces to the Sunni-ruled island kingdom of Bahrain to suppress Shiite unrest.
The Saudi royals, highly dependent on the United States for the security of their regime, do not deploy their forces without good reason — especially when they already have their own simmering Shiite unrest to deal with in the country’s oil-rich eastern region and are looking at the potential for instability in Yemen to spill into the kingdom from the south.
From the Saudi perspective, the threat of an Iranian-backed destabilization campaign to reshape the balance of power in favor of the Shia is more than enough reason to justify a deployment of forces to Bahrain. The United States, Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies have been carefully monitoring Iran’s heavy involvement in fueling Shiite protests in their Sunni sheikhdoms and understand the historic opportunity that Iran is pursuing.
“From the Saudi perspective, the threat of an Iranian-backed destabilization campaign to reshape the balance of power in favor of the Shia is more than enough reason to justify a deployment of forces to Bahrain.”
The historical attraction of Bahrain lies in its geography. Bahrain is a tiny island nestled between the Arabian and Qatar peninsulas. It is vulnerable to external interference and valuable to whomever can lay claim to its lands, whether that be the Shia, the Sunni or any outside power capable of projecting authority to the Persian Gulf. Control of the island together with the Strait of Hormuz allowed for domination of the Indian Ocean trade along the Silk Road and the Arabian trade route from Mecca to the Red Sea.
The isles of Bahrain, along with the oases of al Qatif and al Hasa (both located in the modern-day Eastern province of Saudi Arabia), have been the three key economic hubs of the eastern Arabia region since antiquity. Bahrain sat atop a wealth of natural pearls while all three of these areas traded dates and spices and later on, oil, with buyers abroad. Critically, Bahrain, al Qatif and al Hasa have also been heavily populated with Shiite peoples throughout their history.
As a result, Bahrain, al Qatif and al Hasa have vacillated between Sunni and Shiite domination for hundreds of years. The Bahraini island can never exist comfortably in either domain. As a natural extension of the Arabian Peninsula, it would often fall under the influence of roaming Sunni Bedouin tribes, which found it difficult to subjugate the majority Shiite inhabitants. When under Shiite domination, as it was during the century-and-a-half-reign of the Banu Jarwan in the 14th century and during the 17th century with the rise of the Persian Safavid empire in Iran, the Shia in Bahrain struggled to fend off Sunni incursions without significant foreign backing. The Persians, sitting some 125 miles across the Persian Gulf, would often find it difficult to project power to the island, relying instead on the local religious elite, traders, judges and politicians to assert their will, but frequently finding themselves outmatched against outside powers vying for control and/or influence over eastern Arabia. From the Portuguese to the Ottomans to the British (and now) to the United States, each of these outside forces exercised a classic balance of power politics in playing Sunni and Shiite rivalries off each other, all with an eye on controlling, or at least influencing, eastern Arabia.
History repeated itself Monday.
A Saudi-led contingent of Arab forces crossed into Bahraini territory in defense against an Iranian-led attempt to reorient eastern Arabia toward the Shia. And yet again, the Persians are facing a strategic dilemma in projecting power to aid its Shiite proxies living in Sunni shadows. At the same time, the predominant naval power of the Persian Gulf, the United States, is pursuing its own strategic aim of shoring up the Sunni forces to counterbalance a resurgent Iran. It remains to be seen how this latest chapter unfolds, but if history is to serve as a guide, the question of whether Bahrain remains in Sunni hands or flips to the Shiite majority (currently the less likely option) will serve as the pivot to the broader Sunni-Shiite balance of power in the Persian Gulf.
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I wonder at the covert moves the Saudis and other sunni gulf arab states are making right now. I bet some are looking for nuclear technology as we speak.
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As has been pointed out many times before, there is never a power vacuum in human affairs. Those that decry America being the "global cop", strap yourselves in. You might find yourself missing the stability once provided by the US sooner than you think.
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By SIMON HENDERSON
It is easy to see where Bahrain went wrong. It is much more difficult to figure out how to make it go right.
An indigenous Shiite Muslim population outnumbers Sunni citizens by two-to-one, but Shiites are socially and economically discriminated against by the Sunni ruling family. Despite little oil wealth, the al-Khalifa family has evolved over the past 10 years from a benign dictatorship into what often seems like an institutionalized kleptocracy.
The small island in the Persian Gulf, sandwiched between the mainland of Saudi Arabia and the peninsula of Qatar, is the latest Arab state to be swept by this winter's political winds of change. But it is no Egypt or Tunisia, where sweeping away the elderly dictator and his immediate family allows for a fresh start.
Demographically, Bahrain can be likened to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Saddam's Iraq also had a majority Shiite Muslim population; his notionally secular Baath Party was a fig leaf for Sunni Muslim control.
King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa is no Saddam, and his son, Crown Prince Salman, is no Uday, but there is the same distrust of Shiites among the ruling family as there was in the Iraqi dictator's Revolutionary Command Council. An American visitor, once hosted at a diplomatic dinner, was shocked to hear a member of the al-Khalifa family declare: "Shiites are like carpets. They are better when they are beaten."
Historians might judge the beginning of Saddam's decline from the time when his extended family stopped being the foundation of his regime and became a liability. Rivalries among cousins meant that whole branches had to be ruthlessly cut off. Marriages meant in-laws challenged the pecking order.
The al-Khalifa haven't had schisms of Babylonian proportions. Instead, the family has grown laterally while the reins of political power have remained firmly in the hands of the king, a variety of cousins, and the king's uncle, Sheikh Khalifa, who has been prime minister for more than 40 years. They, and other members of the tribe, have profited from the huge commercial expansion of Bahrain. Ordinary citizens—probably around 600,000 in total—have benefited from the trickle down, though the Shiite community less so.
No longer an oil producer of any consequence, Bahrain has still benefited from the high oil prices of recent years. Its banks have a reputation for efficiency. Its hotels, bars and restaurants have attracted many visitors, including Saudis who can drive across a 16-mile causeway completed in the 1980s.
A particular scheme for the al-Khalifa family has been gaining a slice of the action in resorts and luxury housing projects built on artificial islands constructed in the shallow coastal waters. When some of this activity stopped Shiite villagers from harvesting their traditional fishing grounds, there were protests. This week, protesters were further enraged by alleged documentary evidence that the prime minister had bought reclaimed land in the prestigious harbor area for the equivalent of $3 and then resold it for huge profit.
One assumes that when Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East Jeffrey Feltman caught the first plane to Manama this week after Saudi forces rolled across the causeway, democracy was his main talking point. From the Bahraini side, it was almost certainly Iran. The al-Khalifa, who remember the pre-1970s when Tehran claimed the island, tend to see a bearded mullah under every bed.
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AFP/Getty Images
An anti-government protester steps on a torn poster of King Hamad bin Issa al-Khalifa in Manama.
.This week's violence—especially yesterday's crackdown on protesters camped out in the iconic Pearl Roundabout, in which at least six were killed—does not auger well for a return to civil political dialogue. Although the U.S.-educated crown prince had offered concessions, like fair voting districts and combating corruption, on March 13, just before Saudi troops arrived, his harder-line kin almost certainly advocate taking them off the table. Indeed, they probably demand the removal of the table itself.
The U.S. has cards to play but is keen to do so discreetly. It needs to press the ruling family for reform while telling the divided opposition not to reject all compromise. Washington is anxious not to be perceived, by either side, as being part of the problem. The headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, situated adjacent to a suburb of Manama, is a crucial part of the efforts to block Iran's nuclear ambitions and counter any interference with the flow of oil.
Almost worse than the mess in Manama, this crisis reveals that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia are no longer on the same page. Riyadh perceives the White House as demanding universal freedoms from its friends, but not from its adversaries like Iran. The Shiites of Bahrain see themselves as "Baharna," indigenous Bahrainis, rather than putative Iranians. But events are pushing them ever closer to Tehran, where they will surely be greeted with open arms.
Mr. Henderson is the director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
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By KHALID ALNOWAISER
Your Majesty,
As a Saudi national, I am writing to say how pleased I am to see that you've returned to the Kingdom after successful medical treatment. I am sure this feeling is shared by all Saudis, since your citizens not only hold you in high esteem, but view you as the symbol of stability in our country.
Having said that, please permit me to express my concern about the many challenges that now face Saudi Arabia. As you know, the entire Middle East is experiencing profound political turmoil. Regional events have shown that the power of any political system depends upon how strong, peaceful and transparent the relationship is between a regime and its people.
Notwithstanding some positive steps taken in recent years, reform has too often not been achieved. Given recent events, our country needs to make meaningful changes, and we need to do so urgently.
A first step would be to establish institutions that can be real partners with the government. The reformation of the Shura Council in 1993 was a move in the right direction, but in its current form it is not up to the huge challenges that the country faces. We need an effective council that can take part in political decision-making. This can be achieved only if the council members are popularly elected rather than appointed. An effective council will not threaten the regime but rather will help reduce its huge responsibilities.
Like any other successful country, Saudi Arabia must have a social contract that clearly defines the rights and obligations of individuals and the government. This will never be accomplished until there is a formal national constitution. Without one, personal freedom is not guaranteed, which causes social unrest.
The holy Quran is not a constitution, since a constitution is the product of human beings. By contrast, the Quran is the creation of Allah—though it must form the main basis of our constitution since Saudi Arabia is the birth place of Islam.
It's also time to take the initiative to educate Saudis about political rights. This will allow the Kingdom to differentiate itself from other countries where repression exists. Greater political rights will lead to more political stability. Simply stated, if a person knows his political rights, he can work with his government to build the nation. If not, he may be easily solicited by terrorist groups.
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AFP/Getty Images
Saudi children celebrate King Abdullah's arrival in Riyadh last month.
.Economically, we need realistic strategies to solve the Kingdom's chronic problems. Though strategic development plans are announced with great fanfare, they accomplish little. The central management approach adopted by the government should be reconsidered, and regional authorities must be given more power over their affairs. Decentralization should reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies and limit situations like the flooding of Jeddah in 2009 and 2011, in which scores died because the city lacks a decent sewage system. This, despite the fact that we are a wealthy nation sitting on 25% of the world's oil reserves.
Our over-dependence on oil revenue is another important issue that needs to be addressed. We must stop relying on rising oil prices and focus instead on creating alternative sources of revenue.
Current unemployment, as much as 40% among Saudi youth, persists despite efforts to privilege Saudi workers over foreign ones. The housing situation is also dire—it's unacceptable to see one person who owns vast areas of land, while others struggle to afford a basic home. For the sake of political stability and the future of the country, we need to take the issue of wealth distribution seriously.
The recent measures (worth $36 billion) taken by your Majesty for the benefit of Saudis are welcome. Although Saudis appreciate your generosity, our concern is that this may result in a society that is more dependent on the government and less willing or able to rely upon individual initiatives. What all Saudis need—especially our youth—are opportunities, jobs, hope and real political, economic and civil reforms that promote productivity and build up Saudi Arabia.
To establish principles for respecting the law and the legal system, our courts must undergo a major review. This can be achieved by developing effective regulations, promoting accountability and transparency, and combating corruption (which has spread in an unprecedented way) so citizens can continue to trust the government. I hope that Your Majesty's excellent initiative in providing $2 billion aimed at developing the Kingdom's legal system will result in a totally independent constitutional court, which would be a valuable addition to the judiciary.
In terms of education, we need to develop a modern system that cannot be meddled with by anyone—especially those who want the country to continue to live in the past. Philosophy, logic, arts, languages and other modern sciences must be promoted and be part of the mandatory curriculum beginning in elementary school.
Socially, some serious decisions need to be made, particularly with respect to women. Women must have equal opportunity and the rights that men enjoy. Disregarding issues of gender equality will not serve the long-term interests of the country and will only cause discontent and compromise public security.
The Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which monitors the personal behavior of women and youth, is totally unacceptable, not only for a country that is a member of the G-20 but for any country that exists in the 21st century. It's time to abolish this commission in its entirety, especially since its practices clearly violate the 1948 U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, which entitles every individual to freedom and dignity.
The current religious rhetoric in our country is outmoded and is sending the wrong message to the world about our progress. I urge Your Majesty to intervene and take the necessary action to reflect the true and positive picture of Islam and Saudi Arabia, and not to allow those who are using religion as a tool to infringe people's rights and freedoms.
In light of the Internet and satellite TV, it is now impossible to hide what happens inside any country. Thus, we need to act proactively rather than defensively to protect our homeland from the political turmoil roiling the Middle East. I am certain that Your Majesty will, with your wisdom, enlightened leadership, and full faith in the Saudi people, make the right decisions for our beloved country.
Mr. Alnowaiser is a lawyer based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
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http://formerspook.blogspot.com/2011/03/saturday-skedaddle.html
Friday, March 18, 2011
The Saturday Skedaddle
UPDATE//19 March//The U.S. Navy is denying that our 5th Fleet has departed Bahrain. But western diplomatic sources the the World Tribune that only a "skeleton staff" remains at fleet headquarters in Manama. Likewise, those sources also confirm our assessment: the U.S. has written off the current government in Bahrain, and is preparing for its near-term collapse. We should also note that the USS Enterprise carrier battle group remains in the Red Sea, despite the start of No-Fly Zone operations over Libya.
The presence of the Enterprise in that area suggests that Washington is focused on the situation in Yemen and Bahrain. If the governments in those countries collapse, the U.S. would need the "Big E" to support evacuation operations in one (or both) locations. Put another way, you don't keep a fleet carrier (with dozens of fighter aircraft) out of the Libya operation unless you're worried about other contingencies.
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Almost without notice, ships of the U.S. 5th Fleet in Bahrain slipped from their berths and headed into the Persian Gulf early Saturday. An "extended" exercise with Oman was the official reason given, but few believe it. As the security situation in the Manama continues to deteriorate, the Navy cannot afford to have even a single vessel--and its crew--in a port that may be hostile in a few days (or less).
Radio talk show host John Batchelor was among the first to report the news. Experts he spoke with said our relations with key Middle East allies have reached the breaking point:
The news from Manama, the capital of the small island state of Bahrain, is that the Fifth Fleet HQ has gone on maneuvers to Oman for an indefinite time frame. In sum, bug-out from the proxy war in Bahrain between Riyadh and Tehran. Am told that the IRGC has staffed and funded the so-called protesters. The social media messaging that now floods the web, #bahrain, is suspect of being an IRGC disinformation campaign. Of most significance, am told the Bahrain confrontation marks the breakdown of the 65-year-long alliance between Washington and Riyadh. The Kingdom has now turned away. China through the Pakistan connection looks like the choice to replace the US. Spoke Barry Rubin, GLORIA, to learn that Egypt is also tumbling away from the US. Pat Lang, Sic Semper Tyrannis, said that Cairo is looking for another sponsor. What has caused this break between Washington and its allies in the Middle East? Am told that the White House is deaf to experienced diplomats in the region. That the White House is piously ideological in supporting so-called democratic-leaning youth protesters despite the evidence that the "yuppie bloggers" are either naive ideologues themselves, without experience in governance or diplomacy, or else they are tools of the anarchists, Islamists and Twelvers. Asked Barry Rubin if the US is on the brink of losing Egypt. Answer: over the brink. Asked Pat Lang if there was any repairing break with Riyadh. Answer: no.
We should point out that both Lang and Rubin represent the minority viewpoint in these matters, but they are not alone in their thinking by any means. With American vacillation and weakness on display throughout the Middle East, long-time allies are maneuvering for their own survival, and looking for anyone (read: not Iran) who can guarantee their security.
Also of interest is the claim that Tehran is fomenting the unrest, through its IRGC. Before readers dismiss that as a conspiracy theory or crazy talk, remember: Hillary Clinton said essentially the same thing during Congressional testimony last week. Oddly enough, the MSM has yet to follow up on Mrs. Clinton's claim.
Given our retreat across the region, moving ships U.S. Navy vessels (and their crews) of Manama was the prudent thing to do. Now, the speculation is over when they might return. At the moment, the optimistic answer is "no time soon." The worst-case scenario is "never."
We're waiting to hear if the 5th Fleet Commander has shifted his flag to sea. That move, along with the sudden departure of our ships, suggests we have no confidence in the ability of security forces to contain the unrest, and we're preparing for a likely collapse of the Bahrain government.
Meanwhile, our commander-in-chief is reportedly having a swell time in Rio.
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As our VP would say "This is a big fcuking deal"!
UPDATE 1-Saudi Aramco comes closer to China with crude deal
Sun Mar 20, 2011 4:44pm IST
* Planed refinery to process 200,000 bpd of Saudi crude
* Aramco CEO says still seeking the right commercial terms
* CEO says Saudi Arabia is China's "supplier of choice" (adds Aramco CEO quotes)
By Chris Buckley and Koh Gui Qing
BEIJING, March 20 (Reuters) - Saudi Arabia's Aramco is building on its ties with China, with plans to supply crude to a refinery in the southwest of the country, where Beijing is building an oil and gas pipeline that slices through Myanmar.
Aramco Overseas Company, a subsidiary of Saudi Aramco [SDABO.UL], said it had signed a memorandum of understanding with PetroChina Company Ltd, a subsidiary of China's state-owned oil giant CNPC [CNPET.UL], this week.
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Bahrain has the fastest growing economy in the Arab world. Bahrain also has the freest economy in the Middle East according to the 2011 Index of Economic Freedom published by the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal, and is tenth freest economy overall in the world. Now it is also center of distrust and conflict between Saudi and Iran.
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http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/concoughlin/8389222/Why-the-Bahrain-rebellion-could-prove-calamitous-for-the-West.html
Why the Bahrain rebellion could prove calamitous for the West
Saudi Arabia's support for the Gulf state risks drawing Iran into the conflict, writes Con Coughlin.
By Con Coughlin 8:39PM GMT 17 Mar 2011
The issue occupying diplomats at the UN yesterday was how best to respond to the Libyan crisis. But an even graver threat to our future prosperity and security is unfolding in the tiny Gulf state of Bahrain.
At first glance, the decision by Bahrain's Sunni royal family to call in the Saudis to help quell an anti-government revolt by Shia protesters might seem the logical outcome to a dispute that showed no sign of a peaceful resolution. Ever since the protesters made the Pearl roundabout the epicentre of their campaign in mid-February, the ruling family has made strenuous efforts to meet their demands. Sheikh Salman al-Khalifa, the Crown Prince, has repeatedly sought to open a dialogue with the demonstrators, with a view to addressing their concerns. But the more the royal family has attempted to reach out, the more intransigent the demands of the protest movement have become.
When I visited the country with William Hague, the Foreign Secretary, in early February, the first rumblings of discontent were evident. Leaders of the Bahraini Shia, who constitute a clear majority of the population, were seeking to replicate the anti-government protests then taking place in Egypt's Tahrir Square.
But unlike the Cairo protests, which demanded the removal of President Hosni Mubarak, I was assured by our diplomats that the Bahrainis' agenda was more modest. They weren't calling for the overthrow of the Sandhurst-educated King Hamad al-Khalifa; they were more interested in reform than revolution. Like many protesters throughout the Arab world, their main concern was to improve their economic lot. As one diplomat put it: "The protests are anti-government rather than anti-Khalifa."
But the mood darkened considerably in the weeks after the demonstrators set up camp on Pearl roundabout, not least because of the security forces' heavy-handed response to the initial protests, which led to several deaths and many injuries. There was a dramatic escalation in the protesters' demands, with the more militant calling for the removal of the royal family and the establishment of a Shia state.
The Sunni-Shia divide in the country is particularly problematic because of the close family connections many Shia have to Iran. An estimated 30 per cent of Bahraini Shia are of Persian descent, and maintain contact with relatives in Iran. In the past, this has enabled Iran's Revolutionary Guards to establish terrorist cells in the kingdom, aimed at destabilising the monarch. In 1981, a Tehran-organised plot to overthrow the government was uncovered. Bahraini security officials are constantly on the alert for signs of Iranian meddling, and have accused some members of the opposition Shia movement of being funded by Tehran.
The issue is further complicated by Iran's long-standing insistence that it has a legitimate territorial claim over Bahrain. A recent Iranian newspaper editorial claimed that the kingdom was in fact a province of Iran. It is because of these simmering tensions between the states that the royal family's decision this week to call for Saudi reinforcements is fraught with danger.
Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, the ayatollahs have assumed a protective role over the world's Shia. They will not have taken kindly to the sight of 1,000 Saudi troops driving across the 15-mile causeway that links their country to Bahrain, in support of their fellow Sunni royalists.
Iran's relations with the fundamentalist Wahhabi Sunni sect that dominates Saudi Arabia is strained at the best of times. Iran was accused of planning a truck bomb attack that destroyed the US military base at Dharhran in 1996, and in 2003 the Revolutionary Guards were implicated in a series of similar bombings in Riyadh, the Saudi capital. Saudi also accuses the Revolutionary Guards of trying to foment unrest among its own Shia, who constitute around 5 per cent of its 19 million population. The majority live in the Eastern Province, which is also the location of Saudi's vast oil wealth. Last week, when Saudi anti-government demonstrators attempted to stage a "day of rage", most of the disturbances took place in the Shia towns, where the security forces fired tear gas and rubber bullets.
Iran has responded to the Saudi intervention by cutting diplomatic ties with Bahrain and denouncing the reinforcements as "unacceptable". There is considerable concern within British security circles that the situation could spread into a wider conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with calamitous consequences for the West. "They are always squaring up to each other," a senior Whitehall security official told me this week. "But just imagine if it spilled over into open conflict. Not only would we have a major conflict on our hands in the Gulf: the West would be cut off from its major energy supplier."
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Pravda on the Beach (the Left Angeles Times) reports this morning the up to 80 protestors have been removed from the hospital by authorities.
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MANAMA, Bahrain — When Bahrain’s pro-democracy movement began its demonstrations in Pearl Square last month, Atif Abdulmalik was supportive. An American-educated investment banker and a member of the Sunni Muslim elite, he favored a constitutional monarchy and increasing opportunities and support for the poorer Shiite majority.
But in the past week or two, the nature of the protest shifted — and so did any hope that demands for change would cross sectarian lines and unite Bahrainis in a cohesive democracy movement. The mainly Shiite demonstrators moved beyond Pearl Square, taking over areas leading to the financial and diplomatic districts of the capital. They closed off streets with makeshift roadblocks and shouted slogans calling for the death of the royal family.
“Twenty-five percent of Bahrain’s G.D.P. comes from banks,” Mr. Abdulmalik said as he sat in the soft Persian Gulf sunshine. “I sympathize with many of the demands of the demonstrators. But no country would allow the takeover of its financial district. The economic future of the country was at stake. What happened this week, as sad as it is, is good.”
To many around the world, the events of the past week — the arrival of 2,000 troops from Saudi Arabia and other neighbors, the declaration of martial law, the forceful clearing out of Pearl Square, the military takeover of the main hospital and then the spiteful tearing down of the Pearl monument itself — seem like the brutal work of a desperate autocracy.
But for Sunnis, who make up about a third of the country’s citizenry but hold the main levers of power, it was the only choice of a country facing a rising tide of chaos that imperiled its livelihood and future.
“How can we have a dialogue when they are threatening us?” Sheik Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa, the foreign minister and a member of the royal family, asked Friday night at a news conference.
On Sunday, Bahrain was returning to a level of normality, with schools restarting, traffic returning and shops reopening. Indeed, in an overnight report posted on the official Bahrain News Agency, King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa said that a “fomented subversive plot,” brewing for 20 or 30 years, had failed.
But many Shiites stayed home from work in protest of recent events, some checkpoints and curfews remained and a sense of political paralysis prevailed. No political dialogue seemed likely soon.
For government supporters here, it was the way protesters blocked the financial district that was especially worrisome. They say they worry mostly about what happened to Lebanon. Beirut was once the financial capital of the Middle East. Then sectarian tensions among Sunnis, Shiites, Christians and Druze, exacerbated by meddling of foreign powers, broke out in the mid-1970s, leading to civil war.
Not only did the country tear out its own heart, the financial business there pulled out and never returned. Today, much of that business is here in Bahrain. Downtown Manama has mushroomed. Bahrainis worry that if Sunni-Shiite sectarianism grows out of control, the financial business will again pick up stakes and move to the waiting competitors, Dubai and Qatar.
Urgent measures were therefore needed, the government’s defenders say, and they are grateful they were taken. The demonstrators, they argue, had allowed their cause to be taken over by hard-liners inspired by — or linked to — Iran.
No evidence of such links has been presented, and Shiite leaders here deny that they are doing Iran’s bidding. Still, the walls of some Shiite mosques in Bahrain bear portraits of Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah spiritual figures, and ties to Iran run deep among many Shiites in the country.
The takeover of Salmaniya Hospital by the military especially shocked the world. But Hala Mohammed is a Sunni doctor at the hospital and said that in recent weeks it had turned into a mini-Pearl Square with tents and radical posters.
“The doctors who supported the protesters were suddenly issuing decrees on behalf of the entire medical community,” she said. “They had politicized a medical institution. The government didn’t occupy it, it freed it and I am grateful.”
Rana Abdulaal said that many Sunnis like herself had felt imprisoned in their homes for the past month. She said she expected the Shiite opposition to accept offers to begin a dialogue with the government, but it instead refused to join one. “If the government had not acted, there would have been a civil war,” she said, with Sunnis marching on Pearl Square.
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What also troubles Mr. Abdulmalik, the banker, is the way in which Bahrain has been grouped recently in discussions abroad with Libya and Yemen. The elite here think of their country as more like the Persian Gulf’s version of Singapore — a liberal, sophisticated place that is culturally far more open than its neighbors.
On Saturday afternoon, Mr. Abdulmalik led two visitors around Muharraq, the original capital of Bahrain, a warren of lovely alleys and 200-year-old homes being gracefully restored as museums and cultural spaces, because his company supports these projects. By chance, the country’s culture minister, Sheika Mai bint Mohammed al-Khalifa, was at one of the houses.
Ms. Khalifa wears her shoulder-length hair uncovered and was in trousers and sneakers in the Abdullah Al Zayed House, the home of the first newspaper publisher in the gulf, being restored by her foundation.
“Bahrain has always been open, and we don’t want to see it turned into another Iran,” Ms. Khalifa said. In the nearby cultural center her foundation runs, philosophers, poets and thinkers from around the world have taken part in a weekly lecture program. But the program and others like it have ground to a halt because of the recent troubles; a large meeting that Bahrain was planning to host has been suddenly moved to Paris.
Much of the push for democratic reform here, as elsewhere in the region, has come from economic hard times. Bahraini supporters of the government note that in this country there is free education, free medical care, heavily subsidized housing as well as no taxes. Budgetary troubles meant home construction was delayed, pushing some of the poor to join the demonstrations.
“The last few years were very difficult because of the financial crisis,” said Mr. Abdulmalik, the banker. “But that crisis was not so bad because we were dealing with facts. In the last month, we have been dealing with emotions. I told the demonstrators, ‘This country is developing, and you will stifle it.’ Something had to be done, and it was.”
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http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/as-bahrain-reels-iran-stretches-its-tentacles/?singlepage=true
As Bahrain Reels, Iran Stretches Its Tentacles
The mullahs seize an opportunity.
March 21, 2011 - by Banafsheh Zand-Bonazzi
In retaliation for the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s decision to deploy troops to Bahrain, Iran’s hardliners have called for the deployment of suicide bombers there in support of the Shiite protesters.
Iran-Bahrain relations hit an all-time low when the Sunni government of Bahrain called on the Gulf Cooperation Council countries to dispatch troops to Bahrain to assist in quelling the uprising by majority Shiite Muslims against the Sunni leadership. Now six people are reported dead and hundreds injured.
It is unclear how much of a role the Gulf forces played in quashing the protesters. Demanding an answer, Tehran summoned the Saudi ambassador and recalled its own ambassador from Bahrain. Now there is also news that Basiji, the auxiliary Iranian militia, have attacked the Saudi consulate in Mash’had and broken its windows.
One Iranian regime-run site, Shia-Online, published a letter from Bahraini Shiites who have made an appeal to Khamenei calling on the Iranian regime for support. Another, Shia News, published a registration form for those wishing to participate in suicide bombings in Bahrain, the Gulf countries, and all around the world. And another (there are hundreds), Reja News, wrote that Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Bahrain is another attempt on their part to try to shift the power base within the Persian Gulf region.
In the midst of this feigned concern for the people of Bahrain, the Basiji students issued a statement that announced the willingness of the “Association of Independent Muslim Students” to travel to the country in a show of support — as auxiliary forces.
The Iranian regime has been active in creating a number of front NGOs whose mission it is to recruit people throughout the Muslim countries where Iran hustles for influence to accept suicide bombing missions. The mandate is pretty straightforward: “action against the Kafer or infidels and enemies of the Islamic people.”
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"The U.S. hopes to avoid further escalation. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, on a visit to Egypt in Cairo, spoke with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud about the situation in Bahrain. She said she was "particularly concerned" about the violence and the potential for escalation. About her call to the foreign minister, Mrs. Clinton said she told him all sides "must take steps now to negotiate toward a political solution," not a military one.
The State Department dispatched Jeffrey Feltman, acting assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs, to Bahrain, where he "working the issue aggressively on the ground as we speak," said White House spokesman Tommy Vietor.
The U.S. had tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade its Saudi allies to keep their forces out of the fray.
Tensions between President Barack Obama and the Saudi king flared in February over Mr. Obama's push for the immediate exit of President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, rather than the graceful exit supported by the Saudis."
Smart power! Better get State working on translating "reset button" into arabic, stat!
http://hotair.com/archives/2011/04/07/obama-losing-the-saudis/
Hey JDN, remember when you were crowing about Obama winning? How's that working out?
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MANAMA, Bahrain—Nearly a month after the arrival of troops from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain has become more deeply divided along sectarian lines and is thus a growing threat to become a flashpoint in the broader confrontation between the U.S. and its Arab allies and Iran in the Persian Gulf.
Although Bahrain is a tiny island with a population of fewer than one million people, its large Shia Muslim population and its location between Sunni Muslim-dominated Saudi Arabia and Shia Muslim-led Iran has made unrest there a focal point of regional security concerns for both the U.S. and the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia.
After meeting with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia on Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said publicly that the U.S. has "evidence" of Iranian meddling in Bahrain. He declined to reveal what proof the U.S. had of Iranian interference. Bahrain's government, led by a ruling Al Khalifa family long allied with the Sunni rulers of Saudi Arabia, has complained vociferously about Iran's vocal support for the island's Shia population and provocative coverage on Iranian-backed television stations that reach Bahrain.
Like Mr. Gates and the Saudis, the Bahraini government also has intimated knowledge of more direct efforts by Iran and its ally Hezbollah, the Lebanese militant group, to incite unrest in Bahrain. The Bahrain government also has offered no evidence of specific plots or operational links between Iranian groups or Hezbollah and Bahrianis involved in the protests.
U.S. officials have said they don't believe Iran or other outside groups were behind large-scale demonstrations in Bahrain over the past two months. But they remain concerned that heightened sectarian tensions could provide openings for Iran and Hezbollah to expand their influence in Bahrain and elsewhere in the region.
Yet tensions show little sign of abating as Bahrain's government has expanded a forceful crackdown, arresting hundreds of opposition leaders, activists and protesters under an emergency decree. Most, though not all, are Shiites. Between 300 and 400 people have been detained, many in nighttime raids on their homes, according to human-rights activists. Meanwhile, government-owned companies have announced they have fired hundreds of employees who missed work during the protests or were identified as participating in protests the government considered illegal or inappropriate.
Teachers, doctors and other professionals the government accuses of participating in protests—some of them at their workplaces—also have lost their jobs, and more than a dozen have been jailed. Al Wefaq, the leading mainstream Shiite political party, said a total of 1,000 workers have lost their jobs at the national oil company, the national telecom company and other government firms. The companies have announced smaller numbers, totaling several hundred workers. They have said the workers violated contracts and left work during strikes that were called illegally by union leaders.
The government also shut down the country's sole independent newspaper this week after it published what the government described as "false" photos of demonstrators being beaten. The paper was allowed to begin publishing the next day after its prominent editor, Mansoor al Jamri, resigned. He said editors published the photos without realizing they were from demonstrations that weren't in Bahrain.
Opposition leaders and activists say the government's crackdown appears aimed at stifling all dissent along with protests. "They don't want people to open their mouths," said Abdulla Alderazi, head of the Bahrain Human Rights Society. "But you're just adding fuel to the fire."
The opposition groups, which carried on talks with the government but declined full-scale negotiations before troops from across the causeway that links the island to Saudi Arabia arrived, say they now are willing to negotiate with mediation. But the government, which feels pressure from the minority Sunni Muslim population to deal harshly with protest leaders, has announced that political reform discussions take place in the partially elected Parliament.
That's likely to mean the Shiite opposition groups won't participate. Opposition politicians resigned during the protests. This week, the remaining, largely Sunni parliamentarians, accepted most of those resignations.
"We will have a dialogue through the parliament," said Isa AlKooheji, a Sunni parliamentarian who participated in the previous discussions with the opposition parties before the talks broke down.
The government is moving to address some economic demands by the Shiite community, which has long complained of discrimination and inequities. This week, the government approved plans to build 50,000 new homes over the next decade. The program will be funded in part with a $10 billion aid package the other Gulf Arab states have agreed to provide over the next 10 years.
Still, many leaders on both sides of the divide worry that tensions will only continue to rise until some sort of political solution can be found to bring both communities back into negotiations or meaningful political reforms. "We have a sectarian divide like Bahrain hasn't seen in a hundred years," said one person close to the government. "There's no question that a political solution is the only way out."
Write to Bill Spindle at bill.spindle@wsj.com
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China Expands Naval Presence through Jeddah Port Call
Publication: China Brief Volume: 10 Issue: 25
December 17, 2010 05:34 PM Age: 118 days
Category: China Brief, In a Fortnight, Military/Security, Foreign Policy, China and the Asia-Pacific, Middle East, Home Page
By: Russell Hsiao
Chinese Rear Admiral Wei Xueyi (L), Saudi Rear Admiral Abdullah Al-Sultan (C), and Chinese Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Yang Honglin (R)
China’s naval presence on the global stage is expanding. While counter-piracy and escort operations in the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea have significantly contributed to the Chinese navy's growing profile, foreign port visits by its naval vessels to the Gulf region are emerging as an important element in Chinese naval strategy. China’s overseas naval presence is an important measure of its great power status, and port visits are an effective means of projecting naval power. The Chinese Navy's growing naval activism was recently highlighted by an unprecedented visit by the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) at Jeddah Port in Saudi Arabia. On November 27, China's sixth naval escort flotilla arrived at the port of Jeddah. The port call was officially billed as a five-day "goodwill" visit and marks the first ever call to Saudi Arabia by Chinese naval vessels (Xinhua News Agency, November 28; Fmprc.gov.cn, November 29). In light of the apparent expansion of the diplomatic mission of the PLAN, a careful study of Chinese port visit activities may provide useful insights into Chinese foreign policy objectives.
The sixth naval escort flotilla just completed a five-month long escort mission in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia. According to the official Xinhua News Agency, the flotilla, which is under the command of the chief of staff of the PLAN South Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral Wei Xueyi, included the Chinese Navy’s largest surface combatant, the amphibious dock landing ship Kunlunshan, missile destroyer Lanzhou, and supply ship Weishanhu (Xinhua News Agency, November 28). A reception that was reportedly organized on the deck of Kunlunshan was attended by Rear Admiral Abdullah Al-Sultan, the commander of the Saudi Navy's Western Fleet and other officers. Chinese Ambassador Yang Honglin, Consul General Wang Yong, Military Officer Zhang Zhuoyong, and hundreds of people from the business community were also in attendance (China Review News, November 28; Fmprc.gov.cn, November 29).
The Chinese Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Yang, hailed the sixth naval flotilla's port call as an important milestone in the two countries’ military exchanges that will benefit the deepening of their "strategic friendly relations" (China Review News, November 28). Rear Admiral Abdullah Al-Sultan expressed hope that the visit will help advance the two countries' military exchanges and cooperation, and contribute to the comprehensive development of bilateral relations (China Review News, November 28). Indeed, the port visit will likely enhance cooperation between the Chinese and Saudi navies, promote mutual understanding, and further strengthen lines of communication between the two militaries.
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37292&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=70a403bdf6
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I wonder at the covert moves the Saudis and other sunni gulf arab states are making right now. I bet some are looking for nuclear technology as we speak.
http://arabnews.com/saudiarabia/article354625.ece
Kingdom and China to sign nuclear cooperation pact
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah gestures while chairing the weekly Cabinet meeting in Riyadh on Monday. (SPA)
By ARAB NEWS
Published: Apr 12, 2011 00:34 Updated: Apr 12, 2011 00:35
RIYADH: Saudi Arabia on Monday announced its plan to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement with China. The Cabinet said it has authorized Hashim Yamani, president of the King Abdullah City for Nuclear and Renewable Energy, to hold talks with Chinese officials to reach a deal for peaceful use of atomic energy.
The new move comes after the Kingdom signed its first ever nuclear treaty with France in February. Yamani, who signed that agreement, said it would pave the way for the Kingdom's long-term plans to build power stations utilizing alternative energy sources to produce electricity and water.
The agreement allows the two countries to cooperate in the fields of production, use and transfer of knowledge regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Saudi Arabia has decided to make use of alternative resources such as atomic, solar, geothermal and wind power to meet its growing energy requirements.
Power demand is forecast to increase by 8 percent annually in the Kingdom. Demand for electricity in Saudi Arabia is expected to triple by 2032, which will give rise to the need for energy plants with a total of 80 gigawatts of installed capacity.
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah, who chaired the Cabinet meeting at Al-Yamamah Palace in Riyadh, briefed the ministers on the outcome of his talks with US Defense Secretary Robert Gates and the content of a letter he received from Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa.
The Cabinet discussed the latest developments in some Arab countries. It also welcomed the GCC’s call on the Yemeni government and opposition to meet in Saudi Arabia for talks aimed at reinforcing peace and stability in the country and achieving the hopes and aspirations of the Yemeni people.
The Cabinet also welcomed the statements made by the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Muslim World League condemning Iran’s interference in the internal affairs of GCC countries.
It denounced Israel’s airstrikes on Palestinians in Gaza and its decision to construct more Jewish settlements in occupied Jerusalem. The Cabinet urged the international community to pressure Israel to stop its crimes against the Palestinians and protect their rights.
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http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=26441A.q. Khan's China Connection
Publication: China Brief Volume: 4 Issue: 9
April 28, 2004 08:00 PM Age: 7 yrs
By: Mohan Malik
When it comes to their friends and allies, the nuclear weapons states have long turned a blind eye or actively supported proliferation, in violation of their Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments. Geopolitical and national security interests, balance-of-power considerations and alliance commitments always override non-proliferation concerns, norms and laws. China is a case in point. Beijing's reaction to recent revelations concerning the proliferation activities of Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan has not drawn much attention or analysis, despite the fact that China has been and is likely to remain a source of supplies for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Several recent developments have once again highlighted not only the central role that Beijing has played in the nuclearization of the world's most volatile regions, but also Dr. Khan's intimate links with China's nuclear establishment. Interestingly, the Chinese seem to have been thoroughly beaten in the proliferation game by their own clients and allies - Pakistan and North Korea.
Reacting to reports about the Khan nuclear network, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson urged Islamabad to undertake the investigations "properly" and bring them to a conclusion "quickly." The Chinese preference for conducting investigations "properly" and ending them "quickly" reveals Beijing's apprehensions over exposing the Chinese nuclear establishment's long standing ties with Khan. His numerous visits to China's nuclear installations over the last three decades and gains accrued to China's weapons program from the Dutch centrifuge technology stolen by Khan in the mid-1970s are particularly sensitive issues for Beijing. A senior member of the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) told a Pakistani journalist in early February that "Chinese officials had expressed a desire for the proliferation inquiry to end quickly as they feared that Dr. Khan would publicly detail his network's 'China connection,' thereby embarrassing a crucial ally that Pakistan considers a strategic counterweight to India."
Thus, in contrast with the stance adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency and many other countries that called for a "thorough," "comprehensive," "objective and impartial" inquiry into the Khan saga, Beijing obviously fears an open ended inquiry. According to The Nation (February 16, 2004), China's deputy chief of mission in Islamabad expressed regret over the turning of "Pakistan's famous scientist Dr. A. Q. Khan from a 'hero to a zero' status." Furthermore, Beijing fully supported General Musharraf's decision to pardon Dr. Khan for all his "nuclear sins."
However, China's initial attempts to play the role of a disinterested, neutral bystander in the fast unraveling nuclear network came to an abrupt halt soon after fresh evidence of the China-Pakistan-Libya nexus turned up in the 55,000 tonnes of nuclear material and documents that Libya turned over to the United States and which was flown to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee in early 2004. Apparently, the design that Khan delivered to the Libyans in the shopping bag of his Islamabad tailor was of a Chinese nuclear weapon tested on October 27, 1966. As soon as Libyan arms designs sold by Khan were traced to China, Washington's leverage over Beijing increased significantly. The evidence provided clinching proof of Beijing's involvement in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and insights into the state of both Chinese and North Korean nuclear weapons capabilities. It also raised new questions about the extent and nature of Chinese contributions to Pakistan's nuclear proliferation activities. Although the bomb designs sold to Libya were of a 1960s Chinese vintage, an analysis of Pakistan's May 1998 nuclear tests reveals that China supplied more advanced nuclear weapons designs of the late 1980s and early 1990s to Pakistan, which may have been shared with other countries. Furthermore, it is inconceivable that Chinese security agencies were unaware of Pakistan's nuclear dealings with North Korea, Iran and Libya.
In a departure from the past, Beijing did not deny the report on Chinese-Pakistani links with Libya's nuclear weapons program but launched an "investigation" of its own, while reiterating its non-proliferation commitments. Asked to comment on the Washington Post (February 15, 2004) report about the discovery of some Chinese language documents in Libya giving detailed instructions for assembling an implosion-type nuclear bomb, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhang Qiyue said: "The Chinese side is seriously concerned by the related reports and we are trying to get more information on this issue." She declined, however, to comment on a Reuters report (February 15, 2004) about U.S. officials' claim that "China is still helping Pakistan and Saudi Arabia with nuclear weapons and missile development despite Beijing's promises to control arms proliferation." Since Zhang's statement of February 17, Beijing has said nothing on the outcome of its "investigation" nor has Washington revealed any more information on Libya's "China connection."
Interestingly, almost two weeks later, on March 5, the U.S. State Department declassified government documents on "China, Pakistan, and the Bomb: 1977-1997." These shed new light on three decades of U.S. concern over China's nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. According to one of the declassified documents, "China has provided assistance to Pakistan's program to develop a nuclear weapon capability in the areas of fissile material production and possibly also in nuclear device design." Soon thereafter, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions against private Chinese entities for proliferation activities.
The proliferation modus operandi - whether in China or Pakistan - remains strikingly similar: first, complete denial and protestations of innocence; second, when that becomes unsustainable in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary, denial of state sponsorship; third, shift of responsibility to some rogue individuals or non-state actors, followed by some token "action" against them; fourth, when even this becomes unsustainable or if sanctions are imposed, some stronger action (in the form of new policy guidelines, attribution of responsibility to previous administrations, and "sacrifice" of some individuals to salvage the regime's reputation) and new assurances to the international community that past proliferation activities have now been "completely and permanently shut down." This cycle is repeated despite the fact that state accountability cannot be absolved on grounds that proliferation was the result of private enterprise.
Many U.S. officials believe that embarrassing revelations about the transfer of Chinese nuclear weapon designs to Libya and possibly other countries by a Pakistani proliferation network would force Beijing to reevaluate the strategic costs of its proliferation activities in the larger interests of stability in the Middle East and China's desire to project its image as a responsible great power. Beijing's recent decision to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group is cited as another indication of China's desire for full participation in the nonproliferation regime and a move away from the balance-of-power approach that has hitherto characterized its proliferation policy.
However, many long time China-watchers see no evidence of Beijing abandoning its national security strategy based on the principle of "containment through surrogates" that requires proliferation to countries that can countervail its perceived rivals and enemies. Believing that proliferation is inevitable, the Chinese military has long practiced what John Mearsheimer calls "managed proliferation" it calls for providing nuclear or missile technology to China's friends and allies (Pakistan, Iran, North Korea) so as to contain its rivals through proxies (India in South Asia, the United States in the Middle East and Japan in East Asia). Beijing has also engaged in proliferation to pressure Washington to curb its arms sales to Taiwan.
Many proliferation-watchers believe that China will not stop playing "the proliferation card," as it is the most powerful bargaining chip Beijing possesses, leaving "the China shop" open for business to a select few. Given the Pakistani nuclear program's heavy dependence on external suppliers, a complete shutting down of the Khan nuclear bazaar could lead to the progressive degradation of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent - an outcome that Beijing cannot accept because China's geostrategic interests require a nuclear-armed Pakistan to pin down India. In other words, having made huge strategic investments in Pakistan over the last four decades, China will not remain a mute spectator to the gradual denuclearization of Pakistan. Therefore, Islamabad's dependence on Beijing for both missiles and nukes will increase, not decrease, if it is to keep up with India.
As in the past, contradictions between Beijing's grand strategy and nonproliferation objectives, China's military alliances, and commercial goals will continue to dictate Beijing's proliferation policy. This tension also explains China's reluctance to sign on to the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative under which countries pledge to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction.
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Why is this piece on this thread?
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Because it lends background context for the China-Saudi nuclear pact:
Quote from: G M on March 16, 2011, 10:36:59 AM
I wonder at the covert moves the Saudis and other sunni gulf arab states are making right now. I bet some are looking for nuclear technology as we speak.
http://arabnews.com/saudiarabia/article354625.ece
Kingdom and China to sign nuclear cooperation pact
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah gestures while chairing the weekly Cabinet meeting in Riyadh on Monday. (SPA)
By ARAB NEWS
Published: Apr 12, 2011 00:34 Updated: Apr 12, 2011 00:35
RIYADH: Saudi Arabia on Monday announced its plan to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement with China. The Cabinet said it has authorized Hashim Yamani, president of the King Abdullah City for Nuclear and Renewable Energy, to hold talks with Chinese officials to reach a deal for peaceful use of atomic energy.
Perhaps not so peaceful.
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As our VP would say "This is a big fcuking deal"!
UPDATE 1-Saudi Aramco comes closer to China with crude deal
Sun Mar 20, 2011 4:44pm IST
* Planed refinery to process 200,000 bpd of Saudi crude
* Aramco CEO says still seeking the right commercial terms
* CEO says Saudi Arabia is China's "supplier of choice" (adds Aramco CEO quotes)
By Chris Buckley and Koh Gui Qing
BEIJING, March 20 (Reuters) - Saudi Arabia's Aramco is building on its ties with China, with plans to supply crude to a refinery in the southwest of the country, where Beijing is building an oil and gas pipeline that slices through Myanmar.
Aramco Overseas Company, a subsidiary of Saudi Aramco [SDABO.UL], said it had signed a memorandum of understanding with PetroChina Company Ltd, a subsidiary of China's state-owned oil giant CNPC [CNPET.UL], this week.
http://www.cnbc.com/id/42637280
Saudi Arabia's oil minister said on Sunday the kingdom had slashed output by 800,000 barrels per day in March due to oversupply, sending the strongest signal yet that OPEC will not act to quell soaring prices.
So let's see if China gets special treatment from Saudi over oil supplies.
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Saudi Arabia's Iranian Conundrum
Iran warned Saudi Arabia on Monday of the dire consequences of Riyadh’s intervention in Bahrain. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s adviser for military affairs, Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, told journalists, “The presence and attitude of Saudi Arabia (in Bahrain) sets an incorrect precedence for similar future events, and Saudi Arabia should consider this fact that one day the very same event may recur in Saudi Arabia itself and Saudi Arabia may come under invasion for the very same excuse.” A post-U.S. Iraq renders the Saudi kingdom vulnerable to a future Iranian invasion.
The remarks made by Safavi, who formerly served as commander of Iran’s elite military force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (1997-2007), constitute the first time Tehran has issued such a direct warning. The Saudis and the Iranians have had tense relations since the founding of the Islamic republic in 1979 and increasingly so since the U.S. invasion of Iraq toppled the Baathist regime, which led to a Shiite-dominated Iraqi state and the empowering of Iran. But never before has Iran issued a public statement about an invasion of the Saudi kingdom.
“The key problem for Saudi Arabia is that Tehran doesn’t have to actually resort to war to achieve its ends.”
So, why is the Persian Shiite state engaging in such threats now? The Saudi move to intervene in neighboring Bahrain, where popular unrest was largely waged by the Shiite majority, threatened to topple a Sunni monarchy. Well aware of the implications, the Saudis embarked on their first long-term, overseas military deployment, sending in 1,500 troops to help Bahraini forces crush the Shiite opposition.
The Saudi move succeeded in quelling the unrest (for now at least), which placed Iran in a difficult position. Lacking the capability to physically aid their fellow Shia in the Persian Gulf, the Iranians were caught in an awkward situation. Iran had to do more than issue diplomatic statements and engineer protests against the Saudis and their allies.
Warning the Saudis that they too could be invaded on the same pretext that they used to go into Bahrain is definitely an escalation on the part of the Iranians. Since Iran making good on its threat is unlikely to happen anytime soon (given that the United States would not stand by and allow Iran to attack Saudi Arabia), this can be argued as yet another hollow threat. A more nuanced examination of the situation, however, suggests that Tehran is not just simply engaging in bellicose rhetoric.
Instead, Iran is trying to exploit Saudi fears. The Wahhabi kingdom fears instability (especially now when it is in the middle of a power transition at home and the region has been engulfed by popular turmoil). The clerical regime in Iran sees regional instability as a tool to advance its position in the Persian Gulf region.
Riyadh can never be certain that Tehran won’t ever attack but Iran would have to overcome many logistical difficulties to make good on its threat. The Saudis are also not exactly comfortable with the idea of overt military alignment with the United States. The last time the Saudis entered into such a relationship with the Americans was during the 1991 Gulf War and it lead to the rise of al Qaeda.
Put differently, any conflict involving Iran entails far more risks than rewards for the Saudis. Cognizant of the Saudi perceptions, the Iranian statement is designed as a signal to the Saudis that they should accept Iran as a player in the region or be prepared to deal with a very messy situation. The key problem for Saudi Arabia is that Tehran doesn’t have to actually resort to war to achieve its ends. But Riyadh’s efforts to counter Iran and its Arab Shiite allies are likely to create more problems for the Saudis because crackdowns are contributing to long-term instability in the region and causing agitation among the Shia, which Iran can use to its advantage.
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Iranian Flotilla a Calculated Gamble
A little-known Iranian activist group called the Islamic Revolution Supporters Society announced Tuesday in Tehran that a flotilla of humanitarian activists would set sail for Bahrain from Iran’s southern port city of Bushehr on May 16. The “Solidarity with Oppressed Bahraini People” flotilla would be Iran’s way of calling attention to the Saudi and Bahraini governments for what Iran perceives as the subjugation of a Shiite majority by Sunni rulers. Iran’s Red Crescent Society has spoken in the past about readying aid for Bahrain, but this is the first time we’ve seen an Iranian activist group describe concrete plans to send an aid flotilla to Bahrain.
The aid flotilla public-relations tactic is not new, nor is it unique to Iran. In May of last year, a Turkish humanitarian activist group attempted to send an aid flotilla to the Gaza Strip. Israeli commandos boarded a ship and ended up killing nine civilians. Though accounts of which side initiated the provocation remain in dispute, the diplomatic outrage that ensued scored Ankara a great deal of credibility within the Arab world while largely portraying Israel as an aggressor. In perhaps the most classic illustration of this tactic, the Exodus ship in 1947, carrying Holocaust survivors, broke through a British blockade en route to Palestine. The story was later made into a book and film that vilified the British, portrayed the Zionists as anti-imperialists and played a key role in shaping global perceptions toward the creation of the state of Israel.
Iran is hoping for a similar propaganda feat. Even if the flotilla never makes it to Bahrain’s shores or even fails to set sail — a likely prospect, given that the ships would encounter heavy resistance from Bahraini and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) forces, with the U.S. 5th Fleet standing by from Manama — Iran could still use the affair to try to portray itself as the brave guardian of its Shiite brethren and the Sunni Gulf Arab states as U.S.-dependent assailants. In the early days of the Arab uprisings, Iran seized an opportunity to fuel Shiite dissent in Bahrain, hoping that a sustained crisis there would eventually lead to the empowerment of Shia in eastern Arabia. A quick response by Saudi-led GCC forces has kept Iran from obtaining results in the early phase of this campaign, but time and the current geopolitical dynamics still work in Iran’s favor. In the longer term, Tehran still hopes to reinvigorate growing Shiite grievances by exploiting incidents that highlight a broader Sunni interest in keeping Shia politically disabled.
“By threatening to send an aid flotilla and peacekeepers to Bahrain and hinting at invasions of Saudi Arabia, Iran forces the Bahrainis, Saudis and the Americans to contemplate the risks of direct clashes with Iranians.”
Nonetheless, an attempt to sail a flotilla to Bahrain across troubled diplomatic waters creates the possibility of an incident that would make the Gaza flotilla affair appear minor in comparison. One wrong move by any one side, and a public-relations move could rapidly escalate into a military showdown in which Iran is left with the uncomfortable choice of standing down and taking a credibility hit for failing to come to the aid of Iranian civilian aid workers, or squaring off in a losing fight against the world’s most powerful navy. There are no clear indications yet that Iran will in fact sail the aid flotilla, but a worst-case scenario in the Persian Gulf region would have obvious consequences for global energy prices.
As Iran debates the pros and cons of this flotilla gamble, its diplomatic efforts to sow fissures within the Sunni Arab camp are proceeding apace. In the past week alone, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi has traveled to Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Over the past month, hints of a developing Iranian-Egyptian diplomatic rapprochement have also come to light. The Sunni Arab states may not agree on a lot of things, but — with the exception of Syria, which has a complex alliance with Iran — they do by and large agree on the strategic need to keep Iran at bay. Iran is now trying to chip away at this rare display of Arab solidarity through diplomatic outreach to countries that are too physically distant to feel meaningfully threatened by the Persians (like Egypt) and countries that are more demographically secure, too small, and/or economically entwined with Iran to engage in provocations against it (Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman).
As for the stalwart Sunni regimes, like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, who are leading the resistance against Iranian power projection in the Persian Gulf, Tehran seems to be relying more on scare tactics to try to coerce them to the negotiating table. By threatening to send an aid flotilla and peacekeepers to Bahrain and hinting at invasions of Saudi Arabia, for example, Iran forces the Bahrainis, Saudis and the Americans to contemplate the risks of direct clashes with Iranians. Whether or not Iran follows through with such threats is an important question. If Iranian rhetoric remains just that then the Sunni Arab states are far more likely to throw their efforts into building a shield against Iran than to be pressured into searching for a diplomatic rapprochement with Iran. The flotilla announcement is the latest on Iran’s list of strategic gambits, but it will take more than talk for Tehran to demonstrate it has the backbone to meaningfully challenge a U.S.-backed Arab alliance.
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The complete article can be found at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/world/middleeast/15prince.html?_r=1&hp=&pagewanted=print
May 14, 2011
Secret Desert Force Set Up by Blackwater’s Founder
By MARK MAZZETTI and EMILY B. HAGER
ABU DHABI, United Arab Emirates — Late one night last November, a plane carrying dozens of Colombian men touched down in this glittering seaside capital. Whisked through customs by an Emirati intelligence officer, the group boarded an unmarked bus and drove roughly 20 miles to a windswept military complex in the desert sand.
The Colombians had entered the United Arab Emirates posing as construction workers. In fact, they were soldiers for a secret American-led mercenary army being built by Erik Prince, the billionaire founder of Blackwater Worldwide, with $529 million from the oil-soaked sheikdom.
Mr. Prince, who resettled here last year after his security business faced mounting legal problems in the United States, was hired by the crown prince of Abu Dhabi to put together an 800-member battalion of foreign troops for the U.A.E., according to former employees on the project, American officials and corporate documents obtained by The New York Times.
The force is intended to conduct special operations missions inside and outside the country, defend oil pipelines and skyscrapers from terrorist attacks and put down internal revolts, the documents show. Such troops could be deployed if the Emirates faced unrest in their crowded labor camps or were challenged by pro-democracy protests like those sweeping the Arab world this year.
The U.A.E.’s rulers, viewing their own military as inadequate, also hope that the troops could blunt the regional aggression of Iran, the country’s biggest foe, the former employees said. The training camp, located on a sprawling Emirati base called Zayed Military City, is hidden behind concrete walls laced with barbed wire. Photographs show rows of identical yellow temporary buildings, used for barracks and mess halls, and a motor pool, which houses Humvees and fuel trucks. The Colombians, along with South African and other foreign troops, are trained by retired American soldiers and veterans of the German and British special operations units and the French Foreign Legion, according to the former employees and American officials.
In outsourcing critical parts of their defense to mercenaries — the soldiers of choice for medieval kings, Italian Renaissance dukes and African dictators — the Emiratis have begun a new era in the boom in wartime contracting that began after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. And by relying on a force largely created by Americans, they have introduced a volatile element in an already combustible region where the United States is widely viewed with suspicion.
The United Arab Emirates — an autocracy with the sheen of a progressive, modern state — are closely allied with the United States, and American officials indicated that the battalion program had some support in Washington.
“The gulf countries, and the U.A.E. in particular, don’t have a lot of military experience. It would make sense if they looked outside their borders for help,” said one Obama administration official who knew of the operation. “They might want to show that they are not to be messed with.”
Still, it is not clear whether the project has the United States’ official blessing. Legal experts and government officials said some of those involved with the battalion might be breaking federal laws that prohibit American citizens from training foreign troops if they did not secure a license from the State Department.
Mark C. Toner, a spokesman for the department, would not confirm whether Mr. Prince’s company had obtained such a license, but he said the department was investigating to see if the training effort was in violation of American laws. Mr. Toner pointed out that Blackwater (which renamed itself Xe Services ) paid $42 million in fines last year for training foreign troops in Jordan and other countries over the years.
The U.A.E.’s ambassador to Washington, Yousef al-Otaiba, declined to comment for this article. A spokesman for Mr. Prince also did not comment.
For Mr. Prince, the foreign battalion is a bold attempt at reinvention. He is hoping to build an empire in the desert, far from the trial lawyers, Congressional investigators and Justice Department officials he is convinced worked in league to portray Blackwater as reckless. He sold the company last year, but in April, a federal appeals court reopened the case against four Blackwater guards accused of killing 17 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad in 2007.
To help fulfill his ambitions, Mr. Prince’s new company, Reflex Responses, obtained another multimillion-dollar contract to protect a string of planned nuclear power plants and to provide cybersecurity. He hopes to earn billions more, the former employees said, by assembling additional battalions of Latin American troops for the Emiratis and opening a giant complex where his company can train troops for other governments.
Knowing that his ventures are magnets for controversy, Mr. Prince has masked his involvement with the mercenary battalion. His name is not included on contracts and most other corporate documents, and company insiders have at times tried to hide his identity by referring to him by the code name “Kingfish.” But three former employees, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of confidentiality agreements, and two people involved in security contracting described Mr. Prince’s central role.
The former employees said that in recruiting the Colombians and others from halfway around the world, Mr. Prince’s subordinates were following his strict rule: hire no Muslims.
Muslim soldiers, Mr. Prince warned, could not be counted on to kill fellow Muslims.
A Lucrative Deal
Last spring, as waiters in the lobby of the Park Arjaan by Rotana Hotel passed by carrying cups of Turkish coffee, a small team of Blackwater and American military veterans huddled over plans for the foreign battalion. Armed with a black suitcase stuffed with several hundred thousand dollars’ worth of dirhams, the local currency, they began paying the first bills.
The company, often called R2, was licensed last March with 51 percent local ownership, a typical arrangement in the Emirates. It received about $21 million in start-up capital from the U.A.E., the former employees said.
Mr. Prince made the deal with Sheik Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and the de facto ruler of the United Arab Emirates. The two men had known each other for several years, and it was the prince’s idea to build a foreign commando force for his country.
Savvy and pro-Western, the prince was educated at the Sandhurst military academy in Britain and formed close ties with American military officials. He is also one of the region’s staunchest hawks on Iran and is skeptical that his giant neighbor across the Strait of Hormuz will give up its nuclear program.
“He sees the logic of war dominating the region, and this thinking explains his near-obsessive efforts to build up his armed forces,” said a November 2009 cable from the American Embassy in Abu Dhabi that was obtained by the anti-secrecy group WikiLeaks.
For Mr. Prince, a 41-year-old former member of the Navy Seals, the battalion was an opportunity to turn vision into reality. At Blackwater, which had collected billions of dollars in security contracts from the United States government, he had hoped to build an army for hire that could be deployed to crisis zones in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. He even had proposed that the Central Intelligence Agency use his company for special operations missions around the globe, but to no avail. In Abu Dhabi, which he praised in an Emirati newspaper interview last year for its “pro-business” climate, he got another chance.
Mr. Prince’s exploits, both real and rumored, are the subject of fevered discussions in the private security world. He has worked with the Emirati government on various ventures in the past year, including an operation using South African mercenaries to train Somalis to fight pirates. There was talk, too, that he was hatching a scheme last year to cap the Icelandic volcano then spewing ash across Northern Europe.
The team in the hotel lobby was led by Ricky Chambers, known as C. T., a former agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation who had worked for Mr. Prince for years; most recently, he had run a program training Afghan troops for a Blackwater subsidiary called Paravant.
He was among the half-dozen or so Americans who would serve as top managers of the project, receiving nearly $300,000 in annual compensation. Mr. Chambers and Mr. Prince soon began quietly luring American contractors from Afghanistan, Iraq and other danger spots with pay packages that topped out at more than $200,000 a year, according to a budget document. Many of those who signed on as trainers — which eventually included more than 40 veteran American, European and South African commandos — did not know of Mr. Prince’s involvement, the former employees said.
Mr. Chambers did not respond to requests for comment.
He and Mr. Prince also began looking for soldiers. They lined up Thor Global Enterprises, a company on the Caribbean island of Tortola specializing in “placing foreign servicemen in private security positions overseas,” according to a contract signed last May. The recruits would be paid about $150 a day.
Within months, large tracts of desert were bulldozed and barracks constructed. The Emirates were to provide weapons and equipment for the mercenary force, supplying everything from M-16 rifles to mortars, Leatherman knives to Land Rovers. They agreed to buy parachutes, motorcycles, rucksacks — and 24,000 pairs of socks.
To keep a low profile, Mr. Prince rarely visited the camp or a cluster of luxury villas near the Abu Dhabi airport, where R2 executives and Emirati military officers fine-tune the training schedules and arrange weapons deliveries for the battalion, former employees said. He would show up, they said, in an office suite at the DAS Tower — a skyscraper just steps from Abu Dhabi’s Corniche beach, where sunbathers lounge as cigarette boats and water scooters whiz by. Staff members there manage a number of companies that the former employees say are carrying out secret work for the Emirati government.
Emirati law prohibits disclosure of incorporation records for businesses, which typically list company officers, but it does require them to post company names on offices and storefronts. Over the past year, the sign outside the suite has changed at least twice — it now says Assurance Management Consulting.
While the documents — including contracts, budget sheets and blueprints — obtained by The Times do not mention Mr. Prince, the former employees said he negotiated the U.A.E. deal. Corporate documents describe the battalion’s possible tasks: intelligence gathering, urban combat, the securing of nuclear and radioactive materials, humanitarian missions and special operations “to destroy enemy personnel and equipment.”
One document describes “crowd-control operations” where the crowd “is not armed with firearms but does pose a risk using improvised weapons (clubs and stones).”
People involved in the project and American officials said that the Emiratis were interested in deploying the battalion to respond to terrorist attacks and put down uprisings inside the country’s sprawling labor camps, which house the Pakistanis, Filipinos and other foreigners who make up the bulk of the country’s work force. The foreign military force was planned months before the so-called Arab Spring revolts that many experts believe are unlikely to spread to the U.A.E. Iran was a particular concern.
An Eye on Iran
Although there was no expectation that the mercenary troops would be used for a stealth attack on Iran, Emirati officials talked of using them for a possible maritime and air assault to reclaim a chain of islands, mostly uninhabited, in the Persian Gulf that are the subject of a dispute between Iran and the U.A.E., the former employees said. Iran has sent military forces to at least one of the islands, Abu Musa, and Emirati officials have long been eager to retake the islands and tap their potential oil reserves.
The Emirates have a small military that includes army, air force and naval units as well as a small special operations contingent, which served in Afghanistan, but over all, their forces are considered inexperienced.
In recent years, the Emirati government has showered American defense companies with billions of dollars to help strengthen the country’s security. A company run by Richard A. Clarke, a former counterterrorism adviser during the Clinton and Bush administrations, has won several lucrative contracts to advise the U.A.E. on how to protect its infrastructure.
Some security consultants believe that Mr. Prince’s efforts to bolster the Emirates’ defenses against an Iranian threat might yield some benefits for the American government, which shares the U.A.E.’s concern about creeping Iranian influence in the region.
“As much as Erik Prince is a pariah in the United States, he may be just what the doctor ordered in the U.A.E.,” said an American security consultant with knowledge of R2’s work.
The contract includes a one-paragraph legal and ethics policy noting that R2 should institute accountability and disciplinary procedures. “The overall goal,” the contract states, “is to ensure that the team members supporting this effort continuously cast the program in a professional and moral light that will hold up to a level of media scrutiny.”
But former employees said that R2’s leaders never directly grappled with some fundamental questions about the operation. International laws governing private armies and mercenaries are murky, but would the Americans overseeing the training of a foreign army on foreign soil be breaking United States law?
Susan Kovarovics, an international trade lawyer who advises companies about export controls, said that because Reflex Responses was an Emirati company it might not need State Department authorization for its activities.
But she said that any Americans working on the project might run legal risks if they did not get government approval to participate in training the foreign troops.
Basic operational issues, too, were not addressed, the former employees said. What were the battalion’s rules of engagement? What if civilians were killed during an operation? And could a Latin American commando force deployed in the Middle East really be kept a secret?
Imported Soldiers
The first waves of mercenaries began arriving last summer. Among them was a 13-year veteran of Colombia’s National Police force named Calixto Rincón, 42, who joined the operation with hopes of providing for his family and seeing a new part of the world.
“We were practically an army for the Emirates,” Mr. Rincón, now back in Bogotá, Colombia, said in an interview. “They wanted people who had a lot of experience in countries with conflicts, like Colombia.”
Mr. Rincón’s visa carried a special stamp from the U.A.E. military intelligence branch, which is overseeing the entire project, that allowed him to move through customs and immigration without being questioned.
He soon found himself in the midst of the camp’s daily routines, which mirrored those of American military training. “We would get up at 5 a.m. and we would start physical exercises,” Mr. Rincón said. His assignment included manual labor at the expanding complex, he said. Other former employees said the troops — outfitted in Emirati military uniforms — were split into companies to work on basic infantry maneuvers, learn navigation skills and practice sniper training.
R2 spends roughly $9 million per month maintaining the battalion, which includes expenditures for employee salaries, ammunition and wages for dozens of domestic workers who cook meals, wash clothes and clean the camp, a former employee said. Mr. Rincón said that he and his companions never wanted for anything, and that their American leaders even arranged to have a chef travel from Colombia to make traditional soups.
But the secrecy of the project has sometimes created a prisonlike environment. “We didn’t have permission to even look through the door,” Mr. Rincón said. “We were only allowed outside for our morning jog, and all we could see was sand everywhere.”
The Emirates wanted the troops to be ready to deploy just weeks after stepping off the plane, but it quickly became clear that the Colombians’ military skills fell far below expectations. “Some of these kids couldn’t hit the broad side of a barn,” said a former employee. Other recruits admitted to never having fired a weapon.
Rethinking Roles
As a result, the veteran American and foreign commandos training the battalion have had to rethink their roles. They had planned to act only as “advisers” during missions — meaning they would not fire weapons — but over time, they realized that they would have to fight side by side with their troops, former officials said.
Making matters worse, the recruitment pipeline began drying up. Former employees said that Thor struggled to sign up, and keep, enough men on the ground. Mr. Rincón developed a hernia and was forced to return to Colombia, while others were dismissed from the program for drug use or poor conduct.
And R2’s own corporate leadership has also been in flux. Mr. Chambers, who helped develop the project, left after several months. A handful of other top executives, some of them former Blackwater employees, have been hired, then fired within weeks.
To bolster the force, R2 recruited a platoon of South African mercenaries, including some veterans of Executive Outcomes, a South African company notorious for staging coup attempts or suppressing rebellions against African strongmen in the 1990s. The platoon was to function as a quick-reaction force, American officials and former employees said, and began training for a practice mission: a terrorist attack on the Burj Khalifa skyscraper in Dubai, the world’s tallest building. They would secure the situation before quietly handing over control to Emirati troops.
But by last November, the battalion was officially behind schedule. The original goal was for the 800-man force to be ready by March 31; recently, former employees said, the battalion’s size was reduced to about 580 men.
Emirati military officials had promised that if this first battalion was a success, they would pay for an entire brigade of several thousand men. The new contracts would be worth billions, and would help with Mr. Prince’s next big project: a desert training complex for foreign troops patterned after Blackwater’s compound in Moyock, N.C. But before moving ahead, U.A.E. military officials have insisted that the battalion prove itself in a “real world mission.”
That has yet to happen. So far, the Latin American troops have been taken off the base only to shop and for occasional entertainment.
On a recent spring night though, after months stationed in the desert, they boarded an unmarked bus and were driven to hotels in central Dubai, a former employee said. There, some R2 executives had arranged for them to spend the evening with prostitutes.
Mark Mazzetti reported from Abu Dhabi and Washington, and Emily B. Hager from New York. Jenny Carolina González and Simon Romero contributed reporting from Bogotá, Colombia. Kitty Bennett contributed research from Washington.
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The Greater Game in Bahrain
According to rumors cited by anonymous Bahraini and Saudi government sources on Tuesday, the 1,000-plus Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) force, deployed to Bahrain in the spring to quell a Shia-led uprising, has begun to withdraw now that the security situation on the island has largely stabilized. STRATFOR sources in the Saudi and Bahraini governments clarified that there will be a reduction of GCC forces, but not a full withdrawal. A Saudi source went on to explain that a permanent base will be built to station a stripped-down Saudi-led force, ready to deploy on short notice, with Saudi reinforcements less than three hours away across the Bahrain-Saudi causeway.
When GCC forces intervened in Bahrain in mid-March at the request of the Bahraini royal family, the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf were in panic mode. A Shia-led uprising in Bahrain had the potential to activate dissent among Shiite population centers in Eastern Arabia, particularly in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province. The potential for dissent was especially elevated if Iran could bring its forces to bear under the right circumstances. Led by Saudi Arabia, the GCC moved swiftly to help Bahrain clamp down on demonstrations, using their combined security and intelligence powers to identify and neutralize suspected Iranian assets across Bahraini society.
“What STRATFOR is wondering is whether Riyadh, unable to fully trust U.S. intentions, is seriously considering reaching its own accommodation with Iran.”
So far, the GCC’s handling of the crisis in Bahrain has worked. The most destabilizing elements within the opposition have been jailed and a large number of Bahrainis support a return to normalcy on the streets. The Bahraini government is shifting from restoration to maintenance of law and order, gradually reducing the security presence on the streets. Beginning July 2, the government will open a National Dialogue with various civil society groups. The government aims to give the impression that it is sincere about addressing opposition demands, so long as those demands are discussed in an orderly setting. It should be noted that the National Dialogue so far does not include Bahrain’s largest Shiite opposition group, Al Wefaq.
The sight of GCC forces heading home in armored vehicles while Bahraini government officials talk to a select group of opposition leaders may create the impression that calm has returned to Bahrain. However, a much deeper dynamic between the Arabs and Persians needs to be understood as these events unfold. Iran may not have been able to fully exploit the wave of Shia-led unrest that hit Bahrain, and Tehran has historically faced considerable constraints in projecting influence to its co-religionists in Eastern Arabia. Nevertheless, STRATFOR has also picked up indications that Iran was playing a much more deliberate game — taking care to conserve its resources while counting on the perception of a Wahhabist occupation of Shiite-majority land to exacerbate local grievances and stress the GCC states over time. With the Arab states on edge, Iran’s primary aim is to ensure a full withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq — an area where threats to the Islamic republic have historically originated.
This reality stresses Saudi Arabia, a state already bearing the burden of managing an explosive situation in Yemen while sorting out succession issues at home and, most critically, trying to figure out the best path forward in dealing with Iran. It is increasingly evident that the United States is too distracted to meaningfully counterbalance Iran in the near term, especially as Tehran appears to have the necessary leverage to prevent the United States from extending its military presence in Iraq. Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies are left wondering if the United States will temporarily set aside its broader conflict with Tehran and forge a short-term understanding with the Islamic republic. Such an understanding could expand Iran’s sphere of influence in the region on U.S. terms, leaving Saudi Arabia with a deep sense of betrayal and vulnerability. There are no clear indications that negotiations between the United States and Iran have reached such a juncture, but the Saudis have to reckon with the possibility. STRATFOR is wondering whether Riyadh, unable to fully trust U.S. intentions, is seriously considering reaching its own accommodation with Iran first.
This logic is what led STRAFOR today to take a closer look at what was happening behind the scenes of the rumored Saudi withdrawal from Bahrain. The GCC states and Iran are at an impasse. The Arabs demand that Iran cease meddling in their affairs and Iran counters that GCC forces must first withdraw fully from Bahrain. In explaining the plan for the reconfiguration of GCC forces in Bahrain, a Saudi diplomatic source mentioned ongoing talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran and said there are indications that Iran may be backing off its covert activities in Bahrain. This claim obviously merits further investigation. If true, it could represent a preliminary yet highly important step in a developing Saudi-Iranian dialogue. Neither side would be expected to back down completely in the early stages of this dialogue, but a show of good faith, such as a reduction in GCC forces ahead of National Dialogue talks in Bahrain, could set the mood for further talks.
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Saudi Arabia's Limited Options Against Iran
Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal on Thursday vowed revenge for an alleged plot by Tehran to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States with the help of someone claiming to be a member of a Mexican drug cartel. Al-Faisal described the plot as a cowardly attempt by the Iranians to spread their influence abroad through “murder and mayhem” and asserted, “We will not bow to such pressure, we hold them accountable for any action they take against us.” He then said that any action taken by Iran against Saudi Arabia would be met with a “measured response.” When asked to clarify what that response might look like, al-Faisal demurred and replied, “We have to wait and see.”
Ever since the United States went public on Tuesday with the Iranian plot, many have questioned the obvious lack of sophistication and the level of state sponsorship in the operation. Even if this alleged Iranian plot never came to light, however, the Saudis would still be facing the same strategic dilemma and constraints in dealing with its Persian neighbor.
“Saudi Arabia has every interest in trying to convince Iran in the coming months that Riyadh has the will, capability and U.S. support necessary to respond to any Iranian act of aggression.”
Saudi Arabia is facing a nightmare scenario in the Persian Gulf. By the end of the year, the United States is scheduled to complete its troop withdrawal from Iraq, and whatever troop presence the United States tries to keep in Iraq past the deadline will not be enough to convince anyone, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran, that the United States will be able to prevent Iran from emerging as the dominant force in the Persian Gulf region. These next few months are therefore critical for Tehran to reshape the politics of the region while the United States is still distracted, Turkey is still early in its rise and Iran still has the upper hand. Iran can only achieve this goal of regional hegemony if it can effectively exploit the vulnerabilities of its Arab neighbors — especially Saudi Arabia — who are extremely unnerved by the thought of the United States leaving behind a power vacuum in the region for Iran to fill.
Iran’s main strategic intent is to convince the United States and Saudi Arabia that there is no better choice but to reach an unsavory accommodation with Tehran, one that would be negotiated in Iran’s favor and grant Tehran the regional legitimacy it’s been seeking for centuries. The Saudis want to prevent this scenario at all costs, and so can be expected to do everything it can to show Washington that Iran is too dangerous to negotiate with and that more must be done by the United States to keep Iran contained behind its mountain borders. Purported Iranian plots aimed at assassinating Saudi diplomats certainly help underscore that message, but there is still little hiding the fact that the United States simply doesn’t have good options in dealing with Iran in the near term.
The United States doesn’t have the resources to devote to blocking Iran in Iraq, or engaging in military action against Iran. In today’s fragile global economic environment, the Iranian retaliatory option of mining and attempting to shut down the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the world’s seaborne trade passes through each day, remains a potent deterrent. In describing how it intends to hold Iran accountable for this alleged assassination plot, the White House has focused on increased sanctions, but by now it should be obvious that Iran will find ways to insulate itself from sanctions and continue its day-to-day business with a multitude of shell firms looking to make a profit in trading with Iran at higher premiums.
Given that the United States is Saudi Arabia’s main security guarantor, the lack of U.S. options means that Saudi Arabia also has very few, if any, good options against Iran in the current threat environment. Saudi Arabia’s best geopolitical weapon is its oil wealth, but even the threat of flooding the oil markets to cut into Iran’s own oil revenues carries its fair share of complications. Saudi Arabia claims that it would take 30 to 60 days to reach a maximum level of output around 12.5 million barrels per day, but they would have to sustain that level of production for an extensive period of time in today’s depressed market to begin to make a serious dent in Iran’s oil income. There are already questions about whether Saudi Arabia has the capability to surge production on this scale, not to mention the complications it would face from other oil producers that would also suffer the consequences of an oil flood in the markets. So far, there hasn’t been any indication that Saudi Arabia is prepared to go this route in the first place.
Saudi Arabia also has the more traditional option of backing dissidents and Sunni militants in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria in an effort to undercut Iran’s growing influence in the region, but engaging in a full-fledged proxy battle with Iran also carries major implications. Of most concern to Saudi Arabia is Iran’s likely covert response along the eastern littoral of the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia is already extremely concerned with the situation in Bahrain, where it fears growing Shiite unrest will cascade into Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich, Shiite-concentrated Eastern Province. Iran’s capabilities in this region are more limited relative to its covert presence in Iraq and Lebanon, but the Saudi regime is on the alert for signs of Iranian prodding in this tense Sunni-Shiite borderland. A rare security incident in Qatif in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province Oct. 3 clearly highlighted this threat when a group of Shiite rioters reportedly shot automatic weapons at security forces.
Saudi Arabia has every interest in trying to convince Iran in the coming months that Riyadh has the will, capability and U.S. support necessary to respond to any Iranian act of aggression. The reality of the situation, however, reveals just how constrained the Saudi regime is in trying to contain their historic Persian rivals.
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Saudi Nightmares by Robert D. Kaplan and Kamran Bokhari
May 16, 2012 | 0900 GMT
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Stratfor
By Robert D. Kaplan and Kamran Bokhari
The Saudi royals live with an all-consuming fear -- that of an American understanding with Iran. The Saudis know that the American estrangement from Iran is unnatural and cannot go on forever. It has already lasted a third of a century, almost a decade longer than America's estrangement from Communist China. The Saudis also know that the logic of the present standoff over Iran's nuclear ambitions must lead -- through war or peace -- to some sort of American-Iranian dialogue about the two countries' core interests in the Middle East.
The United States had excellent relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran up to 1978, but that was during the Cold War, when both countries were implicitly aligned with the Western camp against the Soviets. It was also during the rule of Iran's shah, an absolute ruler who was seen as predictable and responsible -- much more so than the competing power centers, both clerical and not, that constitute Iran's current regime.
Contemporary Iran is fervently Shiite and thus hostile to Saudi Arabia's austere Sunni Wahhabi religious establishment in a way that the shah's secular regime was not. For example, the shah did not encourage rebellious Shia in neighboring Bahrain and in eastern Saudi Arabia itself, as the Iranian leaders are now doing.
But there is something deeper about Saudi insecurities. The Saudis see a strong and vibrant Shiite power bloc in Iran and Iraq -- to be accorded recognition of sorts by the United States, at some point -- looming across the gulf just as other factors, both internal and external, potentially threaten Saudi power.
The Saudis are extremely uncomfortable with the post-9/11 world. Previously, they could export their internal problems, in the form of radical Wahhabis, allowing them to establish anti-American madrassas and movements throughout the House of Islam, from Morocco to Indonesia, but not within the kingdom itself. However, for the past decade the Saudis have had the Americans bearing down on them to monitor and arrest these radical elements, creating enemies that the regime never had in the past.
Then there is Yemen. Instability in Yemen has always been a problem for Saudi Arabia. Though Yemen has only a quarter of Saudi Arabia's land area, its population is almost as large, so that the all-important demographic core of the Arabian Peninsula is in its mountainous southwest corner. The spillover of Yemeni tribal insurrection and weapons and drug smuggling into Saudi Arabia's Asir, Najran and Jizan provinces -- whose tribal cultures are almost identical with that of Yemen -- is not new. Moreover, Najran and Jizan have large Ismaili populations while on the Yemeni side of the border there are many al-Houthis, all offshoots of mainstream Shi'ism. The Saudis know that because of the Arab Spring and the attendant undermining of longtime Yemeni strongman Ali Abdullah Saleh, the level of chaos inside Yemen has risen substantially and will not subside, with al Qaeda trying to establish footholds in the region. Yemen could easily disintegrate into its constituent parts, making it harder for the Saudis to govern their own southwest.
Yemen demonstrates a larger and more profound problem for the Saudis: the very artificiality of their own state in a peninsula where Yemen is just one region among several. Saudi Arabia is specifically Najd, the parched and deeply conservative upland in the heart of the Arabian Peninsula, home to the al Sauds, who have always had difficulty holding the maritime peripheries. To wit, Hijaz, along the Red Sea in western Saudi Arabia, has always been in a state of tension with Najd in the center. For while the holy cities of Mecca and Medina connote Muslim religiosity in the Western mind, the truth is somewhat the opposite: It is the very pilgrimage of Muslims from all over the Islamic world that lends a certain cosmopolitanism to these holy cities, and thus to the surrounding Hijaz. Hijaz, Yemen, Oman and the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms all manifest the Greater Indian Ocean world from which Najd is isolated. Thus, unlike Iran, which holds the entire Iranian plateau, Saudi Arabia does not govern the whole Arabian Peninsula, and even within its own kingdom, the Saudi power structure is in a state of tension.
The Saudis fear chaos, in other words.
The Saudis also know that their own governing elite is deteriorating. Saudi Arabia is a state that, as its name attests, is based on loyalty not to a terrain or an idea but to a family. Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, who built the Najdi-centered state by conquering Hijaz in 1925, along with his son Faisal bin Abdulaziz (the third monarch), dominated the first generation of Saudi rulers. The second generation was dominated by the so-called Sudeiri Seven -- the seven sons of Ibn Saud's favorite wife, Hassa bint Ahmad al-Sudeiri -- who oversaw political life, often as kings, and lent coherence to the family and thus to the ruling power structure. But that group is disappearing. The current crown prince, Naif, the third oldest Sudeiri, is 80. In the third generation, 19 grandsons will compete with 16 surviving sons of Ibn Saud on the Allegiance Council, appointed in 2006 to formalize the succession process. And there are many more grandsons outside the council. This is too large a group not to engage in complex factionalism, which will weaken the state, even as such infighting makes it harder to deal with pressing challenges.
Then there is the United States, which Saudi Arabia has been forced to rely on but which, especially in recent years, owing to the debacle of Iraq, it has never really trusted. And why should the Saudis trust America? The Saudis are not blind to the shale gas revolution in North America, which, along with the availability of tar sands oil from Canada, might significantly reduce American dependence on Middle Eastern energy over the next decade and beyond. The less oil imported from the Persian Gulf, the less of a national interest the United States will have in buttressing Saudi Arabia and the Saudi near-abroad. True, the United States will still want Gulf oil protected for the benefit of the global system, but that is a far more insignificant need compared to America's own requirement for energy, which will henceforth be met increasingly in the Western Hemisphere.
Finally, there is the unsettling knowledge that despite the anti-American radicalism of the Iranian regime over the decades, even a partial policy shift in Tehran would expose how much closer Americans and Iranians are to each other culturally than are Americans and Saudis. Iran rests on an ancient and urbanized civilization, begetting a richness in literature, cinema and the arts. Even with the mullahs in power, Iranian women drive cars and motorcycles and wear makeup. Armenian and other churches are in evidence in Tehran. This is all a far cry from the suffocating conservative atmosphere of Riyadh.
The Saudis know that only the present moment witnesses an American tilt toward the Sunni world. An understanding with Iran would lead the United States to coolly and conveniently play both sides of the Sunni-Shiite split against the other, which would naturally fit into an American balance of power strategy. A divided House of Islam truly serves American and Israeli interests perfectly. The decades ahead do not look kind to Saudi Arabia, a country with a diminishing underground water table, a significant demographic youth bulge and unemployment among young men as high as 40 percent.
The Saudis' nightmare is that they are alone, with a potential energy-rich America in less need of them, even as the Arabian Peninsula politically begins to disintegrate. Meanwhile, Shiite Iran -- heir to an ancient superpower, rather than the artificial contraption of one family -- over time normalizes its ties with the West. That you can peer into the future does not always mean you can alter it. That is the Saudi dilemma.
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Read more: Saudi Nightmares by Robert D. Kaplan and Kamran Bokhari | Stratfor
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From this week's Economist a look at the ancient rivalry:
http://www.economist.com/node/21554513
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Oman's Geopolitical Centrality
Global Affairs
WEDNESDAY, MAY 29, 2013 - 04:00 Print - Text Size +
Stratfor
By Robert D. Kaplan
Stratfor regularly highlights countries that the media overlooks but that are nevertheless geopolitically important. Poland and Azerbaijan are good examples. Poland, especially if Russia can undermine the independence of Ukraine, is the bellwether state of Central-Eastern Europe. Western-leaning Azerbaijan, wealthy in hydrocarbons, adjoins Iran and is the potential political heartland of Iran's powerful Azeri Turk minority. Oman, at the southeastern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, also belongs in this category. Indeed, the Greater Indian Ocean will be the maritime organizing principle of the 21st century world, and perhaps no country (other than India itself) sits astride it more than Oman. Remember that the Arabian Sea -- the entire western half of the Indian Ocean -- used to be called the Sea of Oman.
Oman occupies the most central maritime transshipment point between the Indian subcontinent and Africa, the two regions of the world that will see the largest population growth and perhaps the largest growth of middle classes in coming decades. Oman, moreover, is geographically situated between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two great rival sectarian states in the Muslim Middle East. Not surprisingly, Oman has often served as a quiet, diplomatic go-between for Iran and the United States.
Oman's diplomatic value underscores how its locational advantages are amplified by its political ones. In Sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said, Oman quite simply has the best educated and among the most enlightened leaders in the Arab world. He is an absolute ruler with sophisticated liberal values. When the Arab Spring led to sustained protests in the capital of Muscat, Sohar and other Omani cities, Qaboos deftly allowed the demonstrations to proceed, then strengthened the role of the elected Shura Council, replaced older ministers with young ones, arrested some of the protest leaders and in general maneuvered in such a way that while the authorities were heavily criticized, his own prestige and power were largely unaffected. Thus, he has emerged from the Arab Spring in a comparatively stronger position vis-a-vis other leaders in the Middle East.
Oman now finds itself in the difficult but enviable position of being able to concentrate on the ultimate challenge of modern societies: building responsive and transparent institutions that ultimately make the role of the ruler himself less paramount. Of course, this is the task of societies throughout the Middle East, but few can conduct this experiment under such advantageous conditions as Oman: A country with a deeply respected ruler who is not under political siege, and who also has access to hydrocarbon revenues for at least another decade or so.
Certainly, Oman's political transition is not without grave risks. Sultan Qaboos is in his 70s and in uncertain health, without an obvious successor. Nevertheless, stability, like power itself, is relative. And relatively speaking, Oman's political prospects look brighter than many other places in the Arab world. Therefore, given Oman's reasonably secure political outlook, let's look more closely at geopolitical and geo-economic developments here.
Oman is taking advantage of its Indian Ocean centrality by building and enlarging a network of ports -- Salalah, Duqm, Muscat and Sohar. Salalah, in the southwestern province of Dhofar -- close to the border with Yemen -- has the advantage of ultra-transshipment centrality between India and Africa and between the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. In the world of container traffic, Salalah already is a transshipment point for the entire navigable, southern rimland of Eurasia from northeastern Asia to East Africa and the Suez Canal. Salalah's expected further expansion will benefit from this fact. Salalah, moreover, lies safely outside the Persian Gulf -- as, especially, does Sohar at the other end of Oman, close to the Strait of Hormuz.
There are plans to link Sohar and Salalah by road, rail and perhaps even pipelines to ports in the United Arab Emirates (like Jebel Ali) and as far north as Kuwait. Were there ever a military cataclysm in the Gulf -- inside the Strait of Hormuz, that is -- Omani ports could figure more prominently.
By using Salalah, ships en route from Asia or the Indian subcontinent to Africa or the Mediterranean need not steer off course into the Persian Gulf. By using Sohar, ships avoid passing through the narrow and potentially treacherous Strait of Hormuz while still (in the future) being connected by road or rail to nearby ports inside the strait. Duqm, more or less midway between Salalah and Sohar, will serve to connect Salalah and Sohar on the same rail network. The development of Duqm serves the unstated political purpose of keeping Oman's somewhat disparate regions economically united.
For the time being, Oman's ports and geography will be important to the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. U.S. military transport planes will be flying equipment from Afghanistan to the Omani airfield at Thumrait in western Dhofar, which is only a short drive to Salalah port. (Because of the high plateau where Thumrait sits, the airfield carries the benefit of lying outside the coastal monsoon belt.) For this and other reasons, Oman sees regular visits by the combatant commander of U.S. Central Command and other U. S. four-star generals. Indeed, U.S. P-3 surveillance planes already fly out of Masirah, an island off north-central Oman, and Oman remains critical for American plans to locate 80 percent of its air and naval assets inside the Persian Gulf region but outside the Strait of Hormuz.
If one thinks of a mid-21st century world in which a fluid Eurasian strategic geography replaces the old geography divided by traditional Cold War and post-Cold War area studies, a world in which railways and pipelines link energy fields in Central Asia with ports in the Middle East both inside and outside the Persian Gulf, a world in which China and India are deeply enmeshed with Africa and the Mediterranean by way of maritime trade and natural resource transfers, the centrality of Oman only increases.
Obviously, the short-term in geopolitics presents real dangers to Oman. A war in the Persian Gulf between the United States and Iran could close ports inside the Strait of Hormuz before the rail and road links are in place to take goods to Omani ports, outside the strait. More crucially, a war between the United States and Iran puts Oman in an extremely delicate diplomatic position: Oman has arguably been among America's closest and quietest allies in the Arab world, even as it maintains close relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Supporting America in such a conflict would be difficult: From the Omani perspective, Iran represents a big power right next door, while the United States (though even more powerful) is far-away. Sanctions against Iran, meanwhile, have had a very negative impact on Oman's economy. This is because Oman lacks a local Iranian business community of the scale that exists, for example, in the United Arab Emirates, which can allow for the kind of bilateral trade that escapes sanctions.
The point is, watch Oman: a fascinating domestic laboratory of political evolution in a most vital geopolitical environment.
Read more: Oman's Geopolitical Centrality | Stratfor
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http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23119656
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http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2472680/Saudi-Arabia-severs-diplomatic-ties-US-response-conflict-Syria.html
Saudi Arabia severs diplomatic ties with US over response to conflict in Syria
Saudi Arabia is an important ally to the U.S. as it provides a secure source of oil
Saudi diplomats now promise a 'major shift' in relations with the U.S. over inaction in the conflict in Syria
Secretary of State John Kerry says he is committed to keeping a good relationship with the Saudis
By Reuters Reporter
PUBLISHED:19:27 EST, 22 October 2013| UPDATED: 12:01 EST, 23 October 2013
Upset at President Barack Obama's policies on Iran and Syria, members of Saudi Arabia's ruling family are threatening a rift with the United States that could take the alliance between Washington and the kingdom to its lowest point in years.
Saudi Arabia's intelligence chief is vowing that the kingdom will make a 'major shift' in relations with the United States to protest perceived American inaction over Syria's civil war as well as recent U.S. overtures to Iran, a source close to Saudi policy said on Tuesday.
Prince Bandar bin Sultan told European diplomats that the United States had failed to act effectively against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, was growing closer to Tehran, and had failed to back Saudi support for Bahrain when it crushed an anti-government revolt in 2011, the source said.
'Major change': Prince Bandar Bin Sultan said the kingdom will make a "major shift" in relations with the United States
'The shift away from the U.S. is a major one,' the source close to Saudi policy said. 'Saudi doesn't want to find itself any longer in a situation where it is dependent.'
It was not immediately clear whether the reported statements by Prince Bandar, who was the Saudi ambassador to Washington for 22 years, had the full backing of King Abdullah.
The growing breach between the United States and Saudi Arabia was also on display in Washington, where another senior Saudi prince criticized Obama's Middle East policies, accusing him of 'dithering' on Syria and Israeli-Palestinian peace.
In unusually blunt public remarks, Prince Turki al-Faisal called Obama's policies in Syria 'lamentable' and ridiculed a U.S.-Russian deal to eliminate Assad's chemical weapons. He suggested it was a ruse to let Obama avoid military action in Syria.
'The current charade of international control over Bashar's chemical arsenal would be funny if it were not so blatantly perfidious. And designed not only to give Mr. Obama an opportunity to back down (from military strikes), but also to help Assad to butcher his people,' said Prince Turki, a member of the Saudi royal family and former director of Saudi intelligence.
Kerry welcomes Iranian diplomacy
Inaction: The Saudis say they are getting upset by President Obama's inaction in dealing with the conflict in Syria
The United States and Saudi Arabia have been allies since the kingdom was declared in 1932, giving Riyadh a powerful military protector and Washington secure oil supplies.
The Saudi criticism came days after the 40th anniversary of the October 1973 Arab oil embargo imposed to punish the West for supporting Israel in the Yom Kippur war.
That was one of the low points in U.S.-Saudi ties, which were also badly shaken by the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. Most of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudi nationals.
Saudi Arabia gave a clear sign of its displeasure over Obama's foreign policy last week when it rejected a coveted two-year term on the U.N. Security Council in a display of anger over the failure of the international community to end the war in Syria and act on other Middle East issues.
Prince Turki indicated that Saudi Arabia will not reverse that decision, which he said was a result of the Security Council's failure to stop Assad and implement its own decision on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Picking sides: Russian President Vladimir Putin, seen here with bin Sultan, has sided with the Syrian government in the conflict
'There is nothing whimsical about the decision to forego membership of the Security Council. It is based on the ineffectual experience of that body,' he said in a speech to the Washington-based National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations.
In London, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said he discussed Riyadh's concerns when he met Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal in Paris on Monday.
Kerry said he told the Saudi minister no deal with Iran was better than a bad deal. 'I have great confidence that the United States and Saudi Arabia will continue to be the close and important friends and allies that we have been,' Kerry told reporters.
Prince Bandar is seen as a foreign policy hawk, especially on Iran. The Sunni Muslim kingdom's rivalry with Shi'ite Iran, an ally of Syria, has amplified sectarian tensions across the Middle East.
A son of the late defense minister and crown prince, Prince Sultan, and a protégé of the late King Fahd, he fell from favor with King Abdullah after clashing on foreign policy in 2005.
But he was called in from the cold last year with a mandate to bring down Assad, diplomats in the Gulf say. Over the past year, he has led Saudi efforts to bring arms and other aid to Syrian rebels.
'Prince Bandar told diplomats that he plans to limit interaction with the U.S.,' the source close to Saudi policy said.
Secretary of State John Kerry says he's confident the U.S. will continue to have a good relationship with Saudi Arabia
This happens after the U.S. failed to take any effective action on Syria and Palestine. Relations with the U.S. have been deteriorating for a while, as Saudi feels that the U.S. is growing closer with Iran and the U.S. also failed to support Saudi during the Bahrain uprising," the source said.
The source declined to provide more details of Bandar's talks with the diplomats, which took place in the past few days.
But he suggested that the planned change in ties between the energy superpower and the United States would have wide-ranging consequences, including on arms purchases and oil sales.
Saudi Arabia, the world's biggest oil exporter, ploughs much of its earnings back into U.S. assets. Most of the Saudi central bank's net foreign assets of $690 billion are thought to be denominated in dollars, much of them in U.S. Treasury bonds.
'All options are on the table now, and for sure there will be some impact,' the Saudi source said.
He said there would be no further coordination with the United States over the war in Syria, where the Saudis have armed and financed rebel groups fighting Assad.
The kingdom has informed the United States of its actions in Syria, and diplomats say it has respected U.S. requests not to supply the groups with advanced weaponry that the West fears could fall into the hands of al Qaeda-aligned groups.
Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki Al Faisal also is outraged the international community has let the war continue in Syria
Saudi anger boiled over after Washington refrained from military strikes in response to a poison gas attack in Damascus in August when Assad agreed to give up his chemical weapons arsenal.
Representative Chris Van Hollen, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives' Democratic leadership, told Reuters' Washington Summit on Tuesday that the Saudi moves were intended to pressure Obama to take action in Syria.
'We know their game. They're trying to send a signal that we should all get involved militarily in Syria, and I think that would be a big mistake to get in the middle of the Syrian civil war,' Van Hollen said.
'And the Saudis should start by stopping their funding of the al Qaeda-related groups in Syria. In addition to the fact that it's a country that doesn't allow women to drive,' said Van Hollen, who is close to Obama on domestic issues in Congress but is less influential on foreign policy.
Saudi Arabia is concerned about signs of a tentative reconciliation between Washington and Tehran, something Riyadh fears may lead to a 'grand bargain' on the Iranian nuclear program that would leave Riyadh at a disadvantage.
Prince Turki expressed doubt that Obama would succeed in what he called an 'open arms approach' to Iran, which he accused of meddling in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and Bahrain.
'We Saudis observe President Obama's efforts in this regard. The road ahead is arduous,' he said. 'Whether (Iranian President Hassan) Rouhani will succeed in steering Iran toward sensible policies is already contested in Iran. The forces of darkness in Qom and Tehran are well entrenched.'
The U.N. Security Council has been paralyzed over the 31-month-old Syria conflict, with permanent members Russia and China repeatedly blocking measures to condemn Assad.
Saudi Arabia backs Assad's mostly Sunni rebel foes. The Syrian leader, whose Alawite sect is derived from Shi'ite Islam, has support from Iran and the armed Lebanese Shi'ite movement Hezbollah. The Syrian leader denounces the insurgents as al Qaeda-linked groups backed by Sunni-ruled states.
In Bahrain, home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, a simmering pro-democracy revolt by its Shi'ite majority has prompted calls by some in Washington for U.S. ships to be based elsewhere.
Many U.S. economic interests in Saudi Arabia involve government contracts in defense, other security sectors, health care, education, information technology and construction.
Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2472680/Saudi-Arabia-severs-diplomatic-ties-US-response-conflict-Syria.html
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/21/this_is_not_how_a_protection_racket_is_supposed_to_work
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http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/world/middleeast/a-mostly-quiet-effort-to-put-saudi-women-in-drivers-seats.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20131027
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http://www.clarionproject.org/news/saudi-arabia-behead-hajj-pilgrim
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Saudi Arabia Wages Jihad Against Jihadism
Security Weekly
Thursday, March 20, 2014 - 03:00 Print Text Size
Stratfor
By Kamran Bokhari
Most discussions of Saudi Arabia and jihadists tend to focus on Riyadh's key role in producing the different variants of jihadism that have emerged since the 1970s. Although this narrative is true, it is dated. Often, once a narrative is formed it remains in currency even after it has become obsolete. This is because reality is usually more complex than presented and is constantly evolving, making it hard for observers to keep up with the shifts taking place. Despite the persistent narrative, in recent years Saudi Arabia has been waging a growing fight against jihadism. If al Qaeda's ideology is to be defeated, it is essential that the Saudis succeed in their efforts.
The news that the Saudi government on March 7 declared two al Qaeda-linked groups in Syria to be terrorist organizations confounded many. In a statement issued by the Interior Ministry, the kingdom formally blacklisted Jabhat al-Nusra (al Qaeda's official branch in Syria) and its rival, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Riyadh included the two along with the Saudi branch of Hezbollah and Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood.
The move against Hezbollah, the Shiite militant group linked to its parent organization in Lebanon, is obvious, given the sectarian struggle in the region. Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood's calls for a republican form of Islamism, which run counter to the monarchy's interests, inform the historic animosity between the Saudis and the Brotherhood. However, the Saudis' denouncement of two groups that share the goal of toppling the Syrian regime -- especially when Damascus and its main regional patron, Iran (the Saudis' principal foe), have the upper hand in the civil war -- is notable. Even though the Saudis do not support Jabhat al-Nusra or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, they benefit from the attacks that these two groups conduct against the Syrians and their Iranian/Shiite allies.
More important, the nuclear negotiations between Tehran and Washington are leading Iran to international rehabilitation and highlighting the divergence in U.S. and Saudi regional interests. Under these circumstances, why is the Saudi kingdom outlawing two groups that make up a large portion of the forces battling the Syrian state?
The Saudis' Reasoning
Recently, we explained how Saudi Arabia cannot effectively combat Iran unless it deals with al Qaeda and transnational jihadism. Al Qaeda and transnational jihadism are, in many ways, the unintended consequences of the Saudis using Salafism and jihadism as instruments to promote their foreign policy interests. For some time, the Saudis pursued this same policy in Syria, but it only created more problems.
Groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant have hijacked the anti-Iran/Shia ethnic and sectarian cause. Moreover, the Syrian regime bounced back last year -- aided by infighting among and against the jihadists -- and began retaking territories lost to the rebels. In addition, the United States and the West have held back support for the non-jihadist rebel groups for fear that jihadists would be the main beneficiaries of regime collapse in Syria.
This situation has forced the Saudis to overhaul their policy on Syria. A key component of this is the cultivation of a rebel force of relatively moderate Salafists and jihadists who are equally opposed to the Alawites and al Qaeda. This policy has yet to produce dividends because the Saudis face a strategic dilemma: Al Qaeda and transnational jihadists are challenging the Saudi monarchy's status as the ultimate authority over Salafism.
This is where Saudi Arabia has a problem in competing with Iran. Arab Shiite militant groups such as Hezbollah and others remain aligned with Iran, or at least do not wish to confront Iran. In contrast, many Salafist-jihadist militants fighting Tehran and the Shia also want to assume leadership of the Sunni world -- and have targeted the Saudi monarchy directly. This puts the Salafist-jihadists on a collision course with Saudi Arabia. From the Saudi perspective, Iran and the Shia represent the "other" and are thus easy to confront. The jihadists, however, are part of the "self" and are thus more difficult to deal with.
Challenges to the Saudi Fight Against Jihadists
Saudi efforts against jihadists are not new. During the mid-2000s, Saudi Arabia put down the al Qaeda insurgency within the kingdom. This forced the jihadists to relocate to Yemen, where the Saudis have largely been able to contain the problem.
The Arab Spring, however, has greatly complicated matters and constrained the Saudis' ability to act in the way they have previously at home or south of their border. Weakening autocratic regimes have created space for the jihadists to expand. At a time when the Saudis need to focus on the challenge posed by the Iranians and their Arab Shiite allies, Riyadh's attention is being diverted.
The jihadist threat from within the Sunni/Arab milieu not only distracts the Saudis from the larger threat of an assertive Iran, it also undermines the Saudi aim of assuming regional leadership. In this regard, Riyadh has two problems: countering the perception that Saudi foreign policy is largely responsible for the proliferation of transnational jihadism and the reality that Saudi Arabia's actions tend to work in favor of al Qaeda's agenda.
Ultimately, the challenge that the Saudis face is hardwired into the nature of their polity, the official ideology of which is Salafism. With the exception of a few occasions (such as the uprising of the Ikhwan militia in the late 1920s, the resistance to modernity in the 1960s, the uprising in 1979 and the short-lived insurgency in the mid-2000s), the Saudis have been able to combat the competing notion of Salafist-jihadism. Indeed, within the confines of the kingdom, the Saudis do not face any competition to their ownership of Salafism.
The problems occur outside their borders, where non-state actors who offer a competing view of Salafism abound and Saudi control is limited. From the Saudi point of view, jihad is only legitimate when sanctioned by the rulers (more specifically, an Islamic polity), which is the Saudi view of the struggle against the Syrian regime. Because it does not control the discursive boundaries of this type of jihad, the Saudis cannot control the actions of groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, which tend to subvert Saudi imperatives for their own ambitions. More specifically, rather than launching the war itself, the Saudi state is using non-state proxies to wage war. This empowers the non-state proxies, who then turn on the Saudi regime, which they consider corrupted.
As a result, the Saudis are less able to leverage jihadists for their strategic objectives. Instead, the jihadists are exploiting the Saudi moves for their transnational ambitions. Well aware of this problem, Riyadh is trying to counter the jihadists on both the ideological and practical levels.
On the practical level, the kingdom is trying to control the flow of money and weapons and give training and diplomatic support to the rebels who oppose al Qaeda and transnational jihadism. But there are limits to exercising such control because the battlefield is fluid. Once deployed, human and material resources can interact in unexpected ways, leading to undesirable outcomes.
Compounding the problem is that ideologies are much harder to control, especially in this age of social media. We are seeing this in the intra-jihadist debate centered on Syria, where leading jihadist theoreticians such as Abu Qatada and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi of Jordan are having a hard time trying to counter the formulations of those who support the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, which no longer takes orders from al Qaeda. If such bona fide jihadist ideologues are struggling to maintain influence over the jihadist landscape, then the Saudis are even more removed from the context.
In essence, the core problem the kingdom faces is that Salafist and jihadist ideas have evolved well beyond the limits the Saudis prefer. This is why the state that exported Salafism and supported jihadists around the world for decades now cannot focus on the real issues -- countering Iran and managing the Arab Spring -- because it is distracted by Salafist-jihadists and is now working against the very forces it fostered.
Read more: Saudi Arabia Wages Jihad Against Jihadism | Stratfor
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Obama Seeks to Repair Ties in Visit to Saudi Arabia
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U.S. President Barack Obama will visit Saudi Arabia Friday seeking to repair fractured relations with the kingdom. The United States and Saudi Arabia have forged a strategic alliance over the last seven decades, but have seen increased divisions since the uprisings that ousted former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Relations have particularly soured as the United States has worked to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran and failed to initiate a military intervention in Syria, where the Saudis are supporting the mainly Sunni opposition to President Bashar al-Assad. A goal of Obama's visit is to convince Saudi Arabia that U.S. relations with Iran will not compromise Washington's commitment to Saudi security. However, Saudi Arabia may not be persuaded, according to one Saudi official "The U.S. has underwritten the regional security order for the past 70 years and it sees now as a good time to disengage. We will have to do it all ourselves."
Marc: This little paragraph brushes over the presence of AQ type groups such as Al Nusra in Syria. The implications of the quote from the Saudi official are profound.
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The world is waking up to the reality of the end of pax Americana.
I guess we need a reset button and some extra deep bows from Buraq.
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Saudi Arabia's Religious Scholars Are a Double-Edged Sword
Analysis
July 30, 2014 | 0419 Print Text Size
Saudi Arabia's Ulema Represent a Double-Edged Sword
Saudi policemen stand guard in front of the Al-Rajhi mosque in central Riyadh in 2011. (FAYEZ NURELDINE/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
There are signs that imams of influential mosques in Saudi Arabia are re-creating distance between themselves and the Saudi government. For instance, imams recently resisted the government's call to condemn an attack on Saudi soil by Yemen-based al Qaeda fighters. Although it is an early indicator, this bodes ill for Saudi Arabia's counterterrorism strategy. Riyadh's dilemma is that the group of religious scholars and preachers, a group known as the ulema, whose ideas have given way to jihadism is also the antidote to violent extremism. Without the robust support of the ulema class, the Saudis cannot combat the jihadism that threatens the kingdom on its northern and southern borders.
Analysis
The identity of the Saudi kingdom is a religious one based on the Salafist ideology of its founding theoretician, Muhammad bin Abdulwahab, a puritanical scholar from the Nejd region of the Arabian Peninsula. His pact with the patriarch of the royal family, Muhammad bin Saud, led to the founding of the first Saudi state in 1744 and the establishment of a monarchy. The legitimacy of the monarchy has been based on religion and manifested by the support of the ulema, which have grown into a massive power center over the centuries.
The Ulema as Tools for Containment
This ultra-conservative establishment of religious scholars has been an important tool that the House of Saud has used to prevent the rise of opposition groups. The Saudis have had great success with this strategy, whether the opponents were left-wing secular Arab nationalists, Islamists or even Salafists and jihadists who see the royal family and its supporters as having deviated from the founders' intent. The religious scholars' adherence to the Koranic verse "Obey Allah and obey his Messenger (Mohammed) and those in authority among you" has proved extremely helpful in maintaining a consensus against more extreme and radical elements.
The utility of the ulema has been seen on a number of occasions throughout the modern Saudi state's history, most recently in the kingdom established in the aftermath of WWI. Its founder, King Abdulaziz bin Abdulrehman, with the backing of the ulema in 1929, obliterated the Ikhwan, a religious and tribal militia that had gone rogue after helping Abdulaziz seize most of the areas that form the modern kingdom. Abdulaziz's son, King Faisal, used the ulema's support in 1963 to move against religious extremists opposed to introducing television in the kingdom. In 1979, his successor, King Khalid, was able to get the ulema to support his decision to allow French commandos to deploy and help regain control of the Holy Mosque in Mecca from a group of renegade Salafist militants under the leadership of Juhayman al-Otaibi.
In 1994, King Fahd had to deal with opposition from within the community of religious scholars. Some of the members rose up -- albeit peacefully and through sermons -- calling for reforms and better adherence to Islamic principles while voicing opposition to the stationing of U.S. forces in the kingdom. The latest and perhaps most significant example of the monarchy's use of the ulema was under King Abdullah's administration, when Riyadh defeated the kingdom's branch of al Qaeda, with critical assistance from the religious scholars, in 2005-2006.
Changes Within the Ulema
Riyadh's continued success in rallying the religious establishment notwithstanding, the ulema class has gone through a great deal of change and internal fragmentation. There are significant factions that are uncomfortable -- to say the least -- with the monarchy's policies, especially those involving reforms. More important, there is considerable overlap between the ideas of the ulema and of transnational jihadists. The jihadists have used this common ground to maintain pockets of latent influence within the kingdom. Moreover, there is sympathy for the jihadists among the ulema ranks.
An undersecretary at the Islamic Affairs Ministry told the kingdom's English daily Arab News on July 19 that authorities were investigating imams of 17 mosques in the capital who, in their Friday sermons, refused to condemn a jihadist attack on the kingdom's border with Yemen. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula militants based in Yemen conducted the cross-border raid on the al-Wadia border post near the small Saudi frontier town of Sharurah. It left four border guards and another Saudi citizen dead. Another report in the daily al-Watan quoted the Islamic Affairs Ministry as saying that some 100 imams ignored the call to condemn the incident.
Saudi Arabia and the Regional Jihadist Threat
Click to Enlarge
Under new management, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula re-established itself in Yemen in 2009 and has remained more or less contained there. The ouster of former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime during the Arab Spring has aggravated divisions in Yemen, where a variety of forces are tearing the state apart. The resulting anarchy in Yemen has enabled the al Qaeda branch to expand in the country and use it as a base to strike Saudi Arabia.
While the Saudis are trying to deal with al Qaeda on their southern flank, another far more powerful transnational jihadist group has appeared to the north. The Islamic State, which declared the re-establishment of the caliphate in its controlled areas in Syria and Iraq, has emerged as a major threat to the kingdom. In order to protect itself, the kingdom deployed 30,000 soldiers to its border with Iraq after Iraqi soldiers reportedly abandoned posts on their side of the boundary in the wake of the Islamic State offensive. On July 18, Saudi security forces raised the threat level in light of intelligence about an Islamic State plot to attack critical infrastructure, particularly desalination plants, in the country.
Under these conditions, it makes sense for the Saudis to target the belligerent ulema. What is surprising, though, is that the authorities revealed their investigations via Saudi media. Normally such matters would be dealt with quietly, and more senior ulema would be involved in an effort to persuade the defiant imams to obey their rulers' orders. That did not happen, however, and the government decided to leak the investigations to the media. This suggests that the problem is not with a few of the ulema but is more widespread. It also suggests that the government is trying to create a national consensus against the dissidents. The disobedient imams appear to be a small group within the wider body of the ulema, but the number of such religious figures could grow.
Jihadists' Strengthening Position
In the past, the jihadists were a small movement and, despite the ambiguity within religious circles, there was not much support for them. But now that jihadists are gaining strength in the region, they are better positioned to parlay latent feelings of sympathy into more substantive support. The quandary for the Saudis is that the ulema class is an incubator for the ideas that promote jihadism as well as the means by which to fight Islamist militancy. Taken into account the country's youths -- increasingly educated, socially and politically aware, unemployed and inspired by the Arab Spring -- and the allure of resurgent jihadist fervor is an even more dangerous threat for Riyadh.
The jihadists are in a position to more effectively challenge the monopoly of influence that the monarchy has long enjoyed over the kingdom's religious scholars. To a great degree, this has to do with overlapping jihadist and Saudi interests, especially those related to fighting the Shia and Iran. Saudi efforts to enact social reforms also create space for the jihadists to exploit. Riyadh has been stretched thin as it deals with the fallout of the Arab Spring in the region, a fact that works to the jihadists' advantage as well. Finally, there is the matter of transitioning leadership from the second- to third-generation of princes.
Most of all, the perception that the monarchy is weak and ineffective in foreign policy matters, contrasted with a jihadist movement that is gaining support, could influence many in the ulema's ranks to quietly support both sides. Thus, the thing to watch for is whether the Saudis -- who have proved extremely resilient for nearly three centuries -- can deal with a much larger jihadist challenge than they have faced before and continue to use the ulema to wage jihad against jihadism.
Read more: Saudi Arabia's Religious Scholars Are a Double-Edged Sword | Stratfor
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Saudi Arabia Faces Challenges in the New Year
Geopolitical Weekly
January 6, 2015 | 09:00 GMT Print Text Size
Stratfor
By Michael Nayebi-Oskoui
The Middle East is one of the most volatile regions in the world — it is no stranger to upheaval. The 2009 uprisings in Iran and the brinksmanship of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government were followed by the chaos of the Arab Spring, the spillover of the Syrian conflict into Iraq and a potential realignment of the U.S.-Iranian relationship. Unlike recent years, however, 2015 is likely to see regional Sunni Arab interests realign toward a broader acceptance of moderate political Islam. The region is emerging from the uncertainty of the past half-decade, and the foundations of its future are taking shape. This process will not be neat or orderly, but changes are clearly taking place surrounding the Syrian and Libyan conflicts, as well as the region's anticipation of a strengthened Iran.
The Middle East enters 2015 facing several crises. Libyan instability remains a threat to North African security, and the Levant and Persian Gulf must figure out how to adjust course in the wake of the U.S.-Iranian negotiations, the Sunni-Shiite proxy war in Syria and Iraq, and the power vacuum created by a Turkish state bogged down by internal concerns that prevent it from assuming a larger role throughout the region. Further undermining the region is the sharp decline in global oil prices. While Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates will be able to use considerable cash reserves to ride out the slump, the rest of the Middle East's oil-exporting economies face dire consequences.
For decades, long-ruling autocratic leaders in countries such as Algeria and Yemen helped keep militancy in check, loosely following the model of military-backed Arab nationalism championed by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt. Arab monarchs were able to limit domestic dissent or calls for democracy through a combination of social spending and repression. The United States not only partnered with many of these nations to fight terrorism — especially after September 2001 — but also saw the Gulf states as a reliable bulwark against Iranian expansion and a dangerous Iraq led by Saddam Hussein. Levantine instability was largely contained to Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, while Israel's other neighbors largely abided by a tacit agreement to limit threats emanating from their territories.
Today, Saddam's iron grip on Iraq has been broken, replaced by a fractious democracy that is as threatened by the Islamic State as it is by its own political processes. Gone are the long-time leaders of states like Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Meanwhile, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Oman are facing uncertain transitions that could well take place by year's end. The United States' serious dialogue with Iran over the latter's nuclear program, once a nearly unthinkable scenario for many in the Gulf, has precipitated some of the biggest shifts in regional dynamics, especially as Saudi Arabia and its allies work to lessen their reliance on Washington's protection.
The Push for Sunni Hegemony
Riyadh begins this year under considerably more duress than it faced 12 months ago. Not only is King Abdullah gravely ill (a bout of pneumonia forced the 90-year-old ruler to ring in the new year in the hospital and on a ventilator), but the world's largest oil-producing country has also entered into a price war with American shale producers. Because Saudi Arabia and its principal regional allies, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, boast more than a trillion dollars in cash reserves between them, they will be able to keep production levels constant for the foreseeable future.
However, other OPEC producers have not been able to weather the storm as easily. The resulting 40 percent plunge in oil prices is placing greater financial pressure on Iran and the Shiite-dominated government in Iraq, Saudi Arabia's largest sectarian and energy rivals. Riyadh's careful planning and building of reserves means the Saudi kingdom's economic security is unlikely to come under threat in the next one to three years. The country will instead continue to focus on not only countering Iran but also rebuilding relationships with regional Sunni actors weakened in previous years.
Riyadh's regional strategy has traditionally been to support primarily Sunni Arab groups with a conservative, Salafist religious ideology. Salafist groups traditionally kept out of politics, and their conservative Sunni ideology was useful in Saudi Arabia's competition against Iran and its own Shiite proxies. Promoting Salafism also served as a tool to limit the reach of more ideologically moderate Sunni political Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates, groups Riyadh sees as a threat because of their success in organizing grassroots support and fighting for democratic reforms.
With rise of external regional pressures, however, Gulf monarchies such as Saudi Arabia are re-evaluating their relationships with the Muslim Brotherhood. Internal threats posed by Salafist jihadists and a desire to limit future gains by regional opponents are pushing countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to try to forge a relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood to limit the risks posed by rival groups in the region.
Restoring relations with the Muslim Brotherhood will also have effects on diplomatic relations. Qatar has long been a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, a fact that has strained its relations with other countries — Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates even went so far as to close their embassies in Qatar. However, the continuation of the United States' rapprochement with Iran and Riyadh's own discomfort with the rise of Salafist jihadist groups has made it reconsider its stance on political Islamism. Riyadh, Bahrain and Abu Dhabi's agreement to resume diplomatic ties with Doha, and the latter's consideration of changing its relationships with Egypt and Libya, points to a shift in how the bloc's engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood has the potential to streamline the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) efforts in the region.
The Gulf monarchies' attempt at reconciling with political Islamists can potentially benefit the GCC. For its part, Qatar has engaged with the staunchly anti-Islamist Libyan government in Tobruk, and it appears tensions with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's government in Egypt have calmed. Both scenarios point to the likelihood of the GCC moving closer to adopting a more unified regional stance beginning in 2015, one more in line with Riyadh's wishes to preserve the framework of the council.
This improvement in relations comes at a critical moment. With the United States and Iran undergoing a rapprochement of their own, the Gulf monarchies will try to secure their own interests by becoming directly involved in Libya, Syria and potentially Yemen. This military action will also aim to project strength to Iran while also filling the strategic void left by the absence of Turkish leadership in the region, especially in the Levant.
However, Qatar has been opposed to this course of action in the past. Despite its small size, the country has used its wealth and domestic stability to back a wide array of Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Ennahda in Tunisia and rebel groups in Syria. Tensions between Qatar and regional allies came to a head in 2014 in the aftermath of Saudi and Emirati support for the July 2013 uprising that ousted the Doha-backed Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt. The tension threatened the stability of the GCC and caused rebel infighting in Syria. This disconnect in Gulf policy has had wide regional repercussions, including the success of Islamic State militants against Gulf-backed rebel groups in Syria and the Islamic States' expansion into Iraq.
Without foreign military intervention on behalf of the rebels, no faction participating in the Syrian civil war will be able to declare a decisive military victory. As the prospects of a clear-cut outcome become less realistic, Bashar al Assad's Russian and Iranian backers are increasing diplomatic efforts to negotiate a settlement in Syria, especially as both are eager to refocus on domestic woes exacerbated by the current drop in global energy prices. Kuwait's recent decision to allow the Syrian regime to reopen its embassy to assist Syrian expats living within its borders points to a likelihood that the Gulf states are coming to terms with the reality that al Assad is unlikely to be ousted by force, and Sunni Arab stakeholders in the Syrian conflict are gradually giving in to the prospect of a negotiated settlement. A resolution to the Syrian crisis will not come in 2015, but regional actors will continue looking for a solution to the crisis outside of the battlefield.
Any negotiated settlement will see the Sunni principals in the region — led by the GCC and Turkey — work to implement a competent Sunni political organization that limits the authority of a remnant Alawite government in Damascus and future inroads by traditional backers in Tehran. Muslim Brotherhood-style political Islam represents one of the potential Sunni solutions within this framework, and with Saudi opposition to the group potentially fading, it remains a possible alternative to the variety of Salafist options that could exist — to include jihadists. Such a solution ultimately relies on a broader democratic framework to be implemented, a scenario that will likely remain elusive in Syria for years to come.
North Africa's Long Road to Stability
North African affairs have traditionally followed a trajectory distinct from that of the Levant and Persian Gulf, a reality shaped as much by geography as by political differences between the Nasser-inspired secular governments and the monarchies of the Gulf. Egypt, Saudi Arabia's traditional rival for leadership of the Sunni Arab world, has become cripplingly dependent on the financial backing of its former Gulf rivals. The GCC was able to use its relative stability and oil wealth to take advantage of opportunities to secure its members' interests in North Africa following the Arab Spring. As a result, Cairo has become a launching pad for Gulf intentions, particularly UAE airstrikes against Islamist militants in Libya and joint Egyptian-Gulf backing of renegade Gen. Khalifa Hifter's Operation Dignity campaign.
Like Syria, Libya represents a battleground for competing regional Sunni ambitions. Qatar, and to a lesser extent Turkey, backed Libya's powerful Islamist political and militia groups led by the re-instated General National Congress in Tripoli after the international community recognized the arguably anti-Islamist House of Representatives in Tobruk. Islamist-aligned political and militia forces control Libya's three largest cities, and Egyptian- and Gulf-backed proxies are making little headway against opponents in battles to gain control of Tripoli and Benghazi, prompting more direct action by Cairo and Abu Dhabi.
Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates are primarily concerned with the possibility of Libya, an oil-rich state bordering Egypt, becoming a wealthy backer of political Islam. Coastal-based infighting has left much of Libya's vast desert territories available for regional jihadists as well as a host of smuggling and trafficking activities, posing a significant security risk not just for regional states but Western interests as well. Egyptian and Gulf attempts to shape outcomes on the ground in Libya have proved largely ineffective, and Western plans for reconciliation talks favor regional powers such as Algeria — a traditional rival to Egyptian and Gulf interests in North Africa — that are more comfortable working with political actors across a wide spectrum of political ideologies to include Muslim Brotherhood-style Islamism.
Libya will likely find itself as the proving ground for the quid pro quo happening between the participants of the intra-Sunni rift over political Islam. In exchange for Saudi Arabia and its partners reducing their pressure on Muslim Brotherhood-style groups in Egypt and Syria, Qatar and Turkey are likely to work more visibly with Tobruk in 2015 in addition to pushing Islamist proxies into a Western-backed national dialogue. Libya's overall security situation will not be settled through mediation, but Libyan Islamists are more likely to re-enter a coalition with the political rivals now that both sides' Gulf backers are working toward settling differences themselves.
Regional Impact
Dysfunction and infighting have marred attempts by the region's Sunni actors to formulate a cohesive strategy in Syria. This has enabled Iran to remain entrenched in the Levant — albeit while facing pressure — and to continue expending resources competing in arenas such as Libya and Egypt. The next year will likely see an evolving framework where Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and to a lesser extent Turkey, will reach a delicate understanding on the role of political Islam in the region. 2014 saw a serious reversal in the fortunes of Muslim Brotherhood-style groups, which inadvertently favored even more far-right and extremist groups such as the Islamic State as the Gulf's various Sunni proxies were focused on competing with one another.
Iran's slow but steady push toward a successful negotiation with the United States, as well as the threats posed by militant Islam throughout the Levant, Iraq and North Africa, is necessitating a realignment of relationships within the Middle East's diverse Sunni interests. Less divisive Sunni leadership will be instrumental in coordinating efforts to resolve the conflicts in both Libya and Syria, although resolution in both conflicts will remain out of reach in 2015 and some time beyond.
A more robust Sunni Arab position, especially in Syria and the Levant, will likely put more pressure on Iran to reach a negotiated settlement with the United States by the end of the year. While a settlement may seem harmful to Gulf interests, the GCC is shifting toward a pragmatic acceptance of an agreement, similar to Riyadh's begrudging accommodation of a future role for the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. The GCC's new goal is to limit Tehran's opportunities for success rather than outright denying it. Part of this will be achieved through an ongoing, aggressive energy strategy. The rest will come from internal negotiations between Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar and Turkey.
The next year will see the Sunni presence in Syria attempt to coalesce behind rebels acceptable to Western governments that are eager to see negotiations begin and greater local pushback against the Islamic State. More cohesive Gulf leadership will also present a more effective bulwark against Iranian and Alawite interests in the Levant. Most important, however, is the opportunity for regional Sunnis, led by Saudi Arabia, to present a more mature and capable response to mounting pressures. Whether through more assertive military moves in the region or by working with states such as Qatar to steer the Muslim Brotherhood rather than embolden the Islamist opposition, 2015 will likely see a shift in Sunni Arab strategies that have long shaped the region.
Read more: Saudi Arabia Faces Challenges in the New Year | Stratfor
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http://pjmedia.com/tatler/2015/01/21/new-saudi-border-security-policy-shoot-on-sight/
Perhaps the pumping is primarily motivated by a fear of The I.S.
They take S.A., the caliphate will pretty much be unstoppable.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/world/middleeast/saudis-expand-regional-power-as-others-falter.html?emc=edit_th_20150126&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193&_r=0
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Russia Hacks its way to Victory
Posted: 28 Jan 2015 03:12 PM PST
Here's an interesting strategy that is in the near term adjacent possible. It is one of the few strategies that could make a relatively unknown hacker a multi-billionaire overnight.
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Russia has been in the throes of a financial crisis since Saudi Arabia began driving down oil prices last fall. Until the Russians reverse this economic assault, Russia will remain weak and vulnerable. For example:
the ruble will remain in crisis,
European sanctions over Russian intervention in the Ukraine will continue to cause meaningful economic pain, and
Russian bonds will still be considered "junk" by the global markets.
Reversing the Pain
Of course, Putin does have one way out. He needs to increase the price of oil. But how? There's only one way to accomplish this quickly and easily; destabilize Saudi Arabia. Fortunately for Putin, the tool necessary to do this (and make a fortune in the process) is readily available.
Russia has three great exports: oil, natural gas, and criminal hacking. To do this Putin needs to connect Russian criminal hackers with ISIS. Once they make the introductions required, things could move forward very rapidly while providing the Russian government copious plausible deniability. What would be the potential result? Here's one scenario:
1. Russian criminal groups would hack Saudi Arabia's northern border's defense grid (taking down radar towers, imaging systems) and the country's communications system (cell phones and military communications).
2. ISIS would then use the blackout to bring a couple of thousand jihadis across the border in one quick movement. ISIS would overrun isolated border outposts seizing equipment and routing troops. It would then move south (with a particular emphasis on the city of Arar in NW Saudi Arabia (it houses the command and control facility for the entire northern border).
3. ISIS expands as hacking/disorder continues. Direct attacks by ISIS with Russian hacking support disrupts Saudi oil production (etc.). Oil prices shoot to the moon. Russian hackers, ISIS, and the Russian government all make billions from the increase in the price of oil (both by going long on oil in the market and through the direct sales of product they produce).
Why a Saudi Hack is so Easy
The Saudis are the perfect target for hackers. It's hard to imagine a country with more vulnerable to cyberattack. Here's why:
Saudi defensive systems and infrastructure have been cobbled together from external contractors who often win their contracts by bribing the royal family. It's a motley collection of tools with lots of vulnerabilities.
Financially motivated guest workers do most of the real work in the Kingdom. These people are easy to bribe/coerce/etc. to get access to critical systems.
The Saudi government/military is extremely reliant on positive command and control. So, if you can isolate command and control from the troops/population, panic will rapidly ensue.
JR
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ISIS isn't the long term problem, Saudi Arabia is
Posted: 13 Feb 2015 09:32 PM PST
Here's a new way to think about something that should be obvious...
To the politicians in DC and financiers in New York, Saudi Arabia is an island of stability in a sea of chaos. A reliable ally, willing to keep the oil flowing, year in and year out. A place that's not vulnerable to the instability that routinely guts the countries around it.
Of course, that line of thinking is utterly misguided. The opposite is true.
In reality, Saudi Arabia is extremely fragile and much of the chaos we see in the Middle East is due to the way Saudi Arabia avoids falling to pieces. Worse, we are largely to blame for this. We go along with this charade, and our willingness to play along is doing much of the damage.
To understand why this illusion Saudi stability is so toxic, let's dig into a very smart idea from thermodynamics called dissipative structures. In fact, the idea was so good that won Ilya Prigogine the Nobel prize in Chemistry. Prigogine's idea provides us with insight into how everything from how biological structures (e.g. bacteria, apes...) to natural phenomena (e.g. tornadoes) to social systems (e.g. nation-states) build order and prevent collapse.
The important part of this idea for us, is that all dissipative structures grow by exporting or expelling waste products into an external environment. In other words, they achieve "order" by getting rid of the disorder produced by building it.
Here it is in very simple terms. Within biological structures, eating produces the energy needed to build and maintain an organism. In turn, consuming food produces disorder in the form of feces. Organisms expel feces into the outside world because holding onto it is dangerous. The same process is true with almost all complex structures. With automobiles, it's exhaust fumes. With complex social systems, it is everything from warfare to pollution.
We could spend all day on this idea, but let's cut to the chase and apply this framework to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is a particularly expensive dissipative structure because it is extremelyrigid, anachronistic, and unchanging. To maintain this archaic structure despite the titanic forces of globalization trying to pull it apart, it must export an incredible amount of disorder (entropy) into the surrounding region. Disorder such as:
A corrosive fundamentalist ideology. The KSA's Wahhabism fuels both ISIS and al Qaeda.
Violent zealots. The vast majority of the hijackers during 9/11 were Saudi as well as thousands of ISIS members.
Financial support. Saudi Arabia provided the start-up funding for both al Qaeda and ISIS.
Obviously, this entropy has come at a cost to everyone in the world. It has been causing instability in the countries around in the Middle East. It caused the terrorism of 9/11 and the recent rise of ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and Libya.
Worse, the damage being done by Saudi Arabia is getting worse with each passing year as it continues to defy the inexorable gravitational attraction of a fluid, dynamic, and tightly integrated global system.
That's the problem.
This means that even if ISIS is defeated in the next couple of years, Saudi Arabia's dysfunction will produce something worse soon thereafter.
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One should examine what motivates the Saudis. That is the core problem.
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Good idea GM. Let's do that:
Three Saudi Options
Posted: 23 Feb 2015 09:50 AM PST
Saudi Arabia sees ISIS as an existential threat. It has a reason to be scared, ISIS is a Wahabi jihad with updated technologies (social media) and techniques (open development). That means when push comes to shove, Saudi troops will either a) turn tail and run or b) join up in droves. To avoid this, the Saudis might attempt something radical:
1. Build a completely useless multi-billion dollar wall around the country. Oh wait, they are already doing that.
2. Ramp support for al Qaeda. Optimally, a big al Qaeda on a western target would force the US to fully engage ISIS, since ISIS is a physical target and al Qaeda isn't. Was al Qaeda's attack on Charlie Hebdo (and the Jewish deli) a Saudi funded endeavor to start the process?
3. Hire western mercenaries to push ISIS around. Erik Prince has been trying to sell this option for years and is waiting in the wings to get it going. A few billion spent this way might be sufficient to turn the tide on ISIS.
The Middle East doesn't Matter Anymore
Posted: 23 Feb 2015 09:15 AM PST
Back in 2003, the US was headed towards complete dependence on foreign oil. Additionally, the demand for energy (particularly from China) was growing far faster than production, which meant an energy price spike was inevitable.
Of course, this could be avoided if another big source of oil was found and exploited. However, based on existing production technology, the only big fields left untapped were in Iraq, but due to sanctions (limiting production to 2m barrels a day, far less than the 8 m bpd projected to be possible).
The result was inevitable. The US invaded Iraq to free up production (that's largely why the fields were secured in the first couple of days of the invasion), but it screwed up. The national security "brain-trust" didn't anticipate that the Iraqi guerrillas would disrupt this production so effectively (I covered this in detail on this blog and in my book). The result? Iraq produced less oil, for years after the invasion, than it did under sanctions.
That loss of production in combination with disruption caused by Nigerian guerrillas (who copied the success of the Iraqis), produced an energy crunch that drove the global economy into a massive recession. Worse, this recession became a decade long depression due to the disruption caused by the banks and hedge funds we allow to hack the global financial system.
One of the benefits of this oil crunch was that high prices spurred technological innovation that led to an upheaval in the US energy system over the last decade. New technology has enabled US oil and natural gas production to boom. Not only that, this tech enables energy production to scale industrially -- that's a big change if you understand the implications.
The most immediate benefit of a return to US energy autonomy has been lower natural gas, oil, and gasoline prices (autonomy that will only grow as solar zooms). However, there's other benefits that should be obvious too. Since the US isn't dependent on Middle Eastern energy anymore, US national security policy will be decoupled from Middle Eastern conflicts. Like it or not, this is inevitable.
What does this mean?
If the US does get involved in Middle East conflicts it's due to outdated policy and doctrine.
Nobody in the West will do anything to stop the spread of ISIS (as a humanitarian crisis it rates well below Rwanda).
Saudi Arabia is going to get desperate to get the US to intervene. It sees ISIS as an existential threat. How will it do that? I've got some ideas...
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Pasting this post from YA on the Iran forum here as well:
This has been known on many pak discussion forums for years,,,
Saudi Arabia prepares for Iran nuclear deal
Saudi Arabia is quietly preparing for an international nuclear agreement with Iran that it fears will rehabilitate its Shiite Persian rival. King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud's approach eschews the public spectacle of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's speech to Congress (indeed, the Saudis don't want any association with Israel) and instead focuses on regional alliances to contain an emergent Iran.
Author Bruce RiedelPosted March 8, 2015
The Saudis publicly welcomed US Secretary of State John Kerry's assurances in Riyadh last week that Washington will not accept a bad nuclear deal with Iran, and that a deal will not inaugurate a grand rapprochement between Washington and Tehran. They remain deeply skeptical about the negotiations, however, and are preparing for any outcome in the P5+1 process.
The Saudis recognize that a successful deal between Iran, the US, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany will enjoy broad international backing and United Nations endorsement. Riyadh has no interest in being isolated in a dissenting minority with Netanyahu against a deal backed by a global majority. The royal family despises Israel, and Netanyahu is regarded as a war criminal by most Saudis. Any hint of mutual interest with Israel is unpalatable in the kingdom.
So the Saudi approach is to strengthen its regional alliances for long-term confrontation with Tehran. Most immediately, this means strengthening the unity of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It has strong allies in Abu Dhabi and Manama. In Riyadh's eyes, there are two weak links in GCC collusion against Iran: Oman and Qatar. Neither is likely to give up their bilateral lucrative ties to Iran, but Salman is pressing both to adhere to GCC unity and not facilitate Iranian subversion.
Yemen is the key GCC battlefield. The victory of the Iranian-backed Zaydi Shiite Houthis in seizing control of most of north Yemen, including Sanaa, has led the Saudis and the GCC to move their embassies to Aden, where they are trying to back the tattered remnant of the Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi regime in south Yemen. The inauguration of Sanaa-Tehran air flights last month, a first, only underscores the extent of Iran's success in achieving a key goal in the kingdom's backyard and in its historically weak underbelly. The Saudis are on the defense in Yemen.
Egypt is Riyadh's key Arab partner. The kingdom played an important role in bringing Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to power, and Salman met him a week ago to coordinate closely on regional issues, especially Iran. Cairo is too preoccupied with its own domestic terror threat from the Islamic State (IS) and spillover from Libya's disintegration to be very helpful against Iranian machinations elsewhere, however, and is more of a liability (especially financially) than an asset, albeit one Saudi Arabia is determined to keep afloat.
The Shiite government in Baghdad is regarded as a long-lost Arab partner. The Saudis expect Iran to emerge as the big winner in the war with IS, no matter how long it takes and how bloody it is. The Saudis know history, geography, demography and sectarian affiliation favor Iran in Iraq. They believe that President George W. Bush made a colossal error in 2003 and that President Barack Obama has made an "unholy alliance" today with Iran in Iraq. The only option now is to contain the Shiite breakthrough here, too.
Syria has been lost to Iran as well, but Riyadh still hopes to oust Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The Saudis are pouring money into the Lebanese army, as a potential brake on Hezbollah, along with the French. Salman also recently met with Jordan's King Abdullah to coordinate with Amman on Syria and with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as well.
Riyadh's most crucial ally is Pakistan, the only Muslim nuclear weapons state. Last year, for the first time, the Saudis publicly displayed their vintage Chinese-made intermediate-range ballistic missiles — the only ones they have that can reach Tehran — at a military parade. In the reviewing stands was Pakistani Chief of Army Staff Gen. Rahul Sharif, the man who controls Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. It is the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world, and the Saudis have been helping to pay for its development since the 1970s. It was a very calculated signal.
Salman, in late February, summoned the Pakistani prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, to Riyadh. The highly unusual and urgent public invitation was linked in the Pakistani press to "strategic cooperation" against Iran. Salman visited Islamabad a year ago as crown prince and gave Sharif a $1.5 billion grant to reaffirm the Saudi-Pakistani strategic accord. Sharif spent three days in the kingdom last week in response to the king's invitation. He received a royal reception.
One immediate result of the talks is a plan for Pakistan to move its embassy in Yemen to Aden.
The speculation in Islamabad is that the king sought assurances from Sharif that, if the Iran negotiations produce either a bad deal or no deal, Pakistan will live up to its longstanding commitment to Saudi security. That is understood in Riyadh and Islamabad to include a nuclear dimension.
Sharif also visited the kingdom in January of this year. He was apparently told that then-King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud was at death's door, and Sharif came to pay his respects and meet with Salman before the king died. No other leader was given this advance notice — another sign of the critical importance of the Saudi-Pakistani axis.
The exact details of what the Pakistani nuclear commitment to the kingdom includes is, of course, among the most closely held secrets of our world. Both Riyadh and Islamabad prefer to maintain ambiguity and deniability.
The Saudis have not given up on Obama; the United States is still their oldest ally. Washington is too important to irritate with speeches. The Saudis prefer a more subtle approach.
Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/saudi-arabia-prepares-for-iran-nuclear-deal.html##ixzz3UN27uGzE
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http://link.foreignpolicy.com/view/525443c6c16bcfa46f732b5d2f756.1xkg/41ba70b0
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http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/middle-east/63570-150308-saudi-arabia-becomes-world-s-biggest-arms-importer-amid-regional-concerns
I posted on the Middle East thread that I would bet Saudis are already working on nuclear weapons. They are proactive not reactive in general.
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King Abdullah didn’t belong to this arm of the country’s ruling family, nor do Prince Muqrin and Prince Saud al Faisal, who served as foreign minister for 40 years before he was replaced Wednesday.
“The major change brought by King Salman has been the transfer of power to a new generation,” said Abdelaziz al Ghassim, an Islamist political activist and lawyer in Riyadh. “Prince Muqrin did not hold any power at any time anyway. And now that the new generation has been prepared, it is taking over the top positions.”
In a kingdom where elderly and infirm monarchs made all major decisions for decades, this is a significant departure, already translated since January into a surprisingly activist foreign policy that asserted Saudi leadership of a Sunni bloc confronting Iran. Angered by the U.S. outreach to Iran and eager to showcase its own ability to use military force, Saudi Arabia last month began airstrikes in Yemen, the first foreign war that Riyadh has run since it led a military campaign on the same soil in 1934.
“During King Abdullah, we did not have a foreign policy, and just watched events unfold in front of our eyes in Yemen,” said prominent Saudi sociologist and commentator Khalid al Dakhil. The new administration in Riyadh, he added, “is making the right choices and having the will to follow through.”
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei predictably had a less charitable take on Riyadh’s new approach, complaining earlier this month that Saudi Arabia’s traditional caution in world affairs has been jettisoned by “inexperienced youngsters who want to show savagery instead of patience and self-restraint.”
Though the world’s attention has focused on these changes in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy, the developments at home have been just as important.
Along with his moves to curb Iranian influence, King Salman shored up domestic support by appeasing Saudi religious conservatives who had come to view King Abdullah’s tentative modernization drive, which included the creation of a coeducational university, with open hostility.
Within days of taking over, King Salman replaced the head of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, removing an official long criticized by conservatives for attempting, under King Abdullah’s direction, to defang the kingdom’s feared religious police.
Under new leadership, the Committee’s bearded enforcers have already become more active, resuming patrols in shopping malls where they have not been seen in years and raiding beach-front compounds used by foreigners.
Wednesday’s decree by King Salman also removed from her post the most senior female official in the kingdom, the deputy education minister, whose appointment in 2009 was hailed by the West as an encouraging sign of the kingdom’s progress on women’s rights.
Mohsen al Awaji, an Islamist lawyer and activist who was imprisoned six times, most recently in 2013, praised King Salman’s new outreach to fellow conservatives as “a very positive indication.”
“During King Abdullah, a lot of the decisions were taken against the will of the people—in internal and external affairs. King Abdullah had opened a very serious conflict with the conservatives,” Mr. Awaji said. “But King Salman is a man of common sense.”
While Saudi Arabia remains some of the world’s most repressive societies, the new administration in Riyadh has also made conciliatory moves toward Islamist dissenters, relaxing or ending restrictions on some, and ending King Abdullah’s policy of trying to crush the Muslim Brotherhood.
In a nation where stability and continuity have long been the official mantra, these changes are barely acknowledged in government discourse. But combined with the Yemen war, they have already bolstered the new king’s popularity, even among longtime critics of the regime.
“What was happening under King Abdullah was not real reform but fake liberalism,” says Saudi political analyst Abdullah al Shammari, a former senior diplomat and professor.
Saudi Arabia’s conservative brand of Islam is the glue that holds the kingdom together, and the new regime has wisely recognized the perils of attempting to dilute it, Mr. Shammari observed.
“Saudi Arabia is the center of Islam, and it is not our choice to be liberal. The moment Saudi Arabia tries to be liberal, it will collapse,” he said.
The architect of King Abdullah’s policies to roll back conservative restrictions—an approach welcomed by the U.S.—and to crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood was Khalid al Tuwaijiri, the head of the Royal Court.
King Salman removed him within hours of taking over in January, appointing to that position his son, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who held the job until his elevation on Wednesday to deputy crown prince. The young prince remains in charge of the Defense Ministry and the inter-ministerial committee overseeing economic affairs and development.
Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who succeeded his father as interior minister and has worked closely with the U.S. to curb al Qaeda and Islamic State, runs a separate committee responsible for political and security affairs.
The new economic committee, in particular, has brought significant changes to the way Saudi Arabia’s economy is governed, with ministries formerly run as individual fiefs now put under the prince’s direct control, and ministers deemed to be underperforming fired without ceremony.
“Every minister knows they are watched much more closely than before,” said Khalid al Sweilem, former head of investment at Saudi Arabia’s central bank and a fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Prince Mohammed bin Salman “is very much involved and he is looking at what is good for the country, not at what is good for a particular ministry.”
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Saudi Arabia: A New National Guard for a New King?
Analysis
May 8, 2015 | 09:00 GMT
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Saudi Arabian National Guard personnel listen as a member of the U.S. 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment explains how to operate an M252 mortar during Operation Desert Shield. (SPECIALIST HENRY/Wikimedia)
Summary
The Saudi Arabian National Guard, also known as the White Army, has been a critical pillar of the Saudi state dating back to the kingdom's founding. For over fifty years, the National Guard has adapted to the region's changing political and military landscapes and helped the House of Saud maintain a leading role on the Arabian Peninsula. Today, the Saudi Arabian National Guard is once again at a juncture, because Saudi Arabia's role in the Middle East and North Africa is changing rapidly. Riyadh is engaged in increasingly proactive regional military campaigns and political efforts. At the same time, the state is facing a complex political succession. In January, King Salman ascended the throne, following the death of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, and is now working to consolidate his power base. This combination of changing regional dynamics and domestic transition could compel Riyadh to reform, restructure, or reorganize the Saudi Arabian National Guard. Such a process, however, will be difficult because of the National Guard's delicate position within tribal politics and the critical role it plays in the Saudi power structure.
Analysis
Historically, the Saudi Arabian National Guard is rooted in a group known as the Ikhwan, a Wahabi religious force of hardened and conservative tribal fighters. The Ikhwan played a key role in putting King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud on the throne of the newly established Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Initially, this group was deeply loyal to the king. The Ikhwan, however, had their own vision for the kingdom and inevitably clashed with the royal family. While Ibn Saud was focused on building Saudi Arabia into a modern nation state, the Ikhwan wanted to expand upon their recent conquests by invading the territory of perceived non-believers in the British protectorates of Transjordan, Iraq and Kuwait. The king had no intention of risking his new state in a war with the British and what began with the Ikhwan undermining his authority by carrying out unsanctioned raids, rapidly developed into the Ikhwan Revolt in 1927. It took until January 1930 for the monarchy to stamp out the uprising.
Following the revolt, Saudi Arabia decided to build a professional military — the Royal Saudi Land Forces. Eventually, it became apparent that these troops would need to be bolstered by an auxiliary force and the already armed tribal fighters were a natural choice to fill the role. In 1954, a year after the death of Ibn Saud, the Saudi government transformed the Office of the Jihad and Mujahideen, which managed the Ikhwan and other tribal forces, into the Saudi Arabian National Guard. The guard, however, remained a relatively small force — the main Saudi military was still the priority.
This started to change in the early 1960s when the House of Saud became increasingly unsure of their hold over the professional military. Having witnessed a string of military coups throughout the Arab World, the monarchy decided to transform the national guard into a force that was both unquestionably loyal to the royal family and also equal in strength to the Royal Saudi Land Forces. The king began this transformation by appointing Abdullah bin Abdulaziz — who would later become king in 2005 — as the National Guard commander in 1962. This provided the institution with a great deal of prestige and brought about a series of reforms to modernize the force. To facilitate this transformation, the House of Saud turned to the United States in the 1970s to help train, equip and increase the National Guard's conventional capabilities. At this time, the guard also began to recruit fighters from a few, markedly loyal tribes. This reform process paid off over the ensuing decades, as the national guard grew in conventional strength and came to play a key role in national politics — a position it continues to enjoy today.
The Current National Guard
The Saudi Arabian National Guard has come a long way since the Ikhwan Revolt and in 2015 is now a pillar of the nation's security structure. In many senses, it now holds the pre-eminent role within the Saudi state and is specifically charged with safeguarding the House of Saud. The National Guard is also charged with protecting the key holy sites, Mecca and Medina, as well as with providing security for oil and natural gas infrastructure. The prestige of these internationally important pilgrimage destinations and the guaranteed revenues from the energy sector are two of the essential pillars of Saudi power.
Today, the Saudi Arabian National Guard and the Royal Saudi Land Forces are of approximately equal strength in terms of numbers of troops. There are, however, noted differences in the two forces' munitions and capabilities. Unlike the regular military, the national guard is predominantly a mechanized and mobile force designed to respond rapidly to threats across the country. Meanwhile, the Royal Saudi Land Forces possess all of Saudi Arabia's main battle tanks and the vast bulk of the nation's heavy artillery. While the Saudi Arabian National Guard is expected to act as an auxiliary force in the face of an external threat, the Royal Saudi Land Forces bear the primary burden of responding to these threats. The national guard possesses considerable capabilities, but their duties are internal. They are a last line of defense for the nation and for the House of Saud itself.
Power Shifts and the National Guard
Going forward, Saudi Arabia seeks to project more power across the Middle East and North Africa. As Riyadh adopts this new posture, however, it must also sort out the reconfiguration of power accompanying King Salman's January accession to the throne. The new king has already reshuffled a number of high-level positions and chosen his nephew, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Naif, as his successor. This move replaced King Salman's original successor, his half-brother Prince Muqrin. As in decades past, the Saudi Arabian National Guard's position in these negotiations is key.
The current commander of the Saudi Arabian National Guard is Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah — a rival of King Salman's son, Defense Minister and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Because of his role as head of the National Guard, Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah represents a potential challenge to King Salman's power consolidation. To mitigate this threat, Stratfor sources indicate that King Salman may be planning to centralize the security establishment in the hands of his son, current Defense Minister Prince Mohammed bin Salman. This could mean incorporating the national guard into the Ministry of Defense — effectively ending the national guard's role as a separate ministry with the ability to counterbalance the Royal Saudi Land Forces. Such a decision would also indicate that King Salman is more concerned about external threats at the moment than he is about pushback from the royal family against his consolidation of power.
Such a momentous change to the role of the Saudi Arabian National Guard would make strategic sense for the monarchy but would also be extremely challenging. Although incorporating the national guard into the Ministry of Defense would consolidate power around King Salman, this move would require overcoming objections from the influential National Guard leadership and the increasingly powerful Allegiance Council, which is a bastion of entrenched interests wary of the king's consolidation.
The Saudi Arabian National Guard's ranks also include numerous powerful tribal groups, which are key to the balance of domestic power. Many of these tribes have seen their influence grow along with that of the National Guard and would be reluctant to forfeit their position. The commander of the guard, Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah, enjoys respect because of his considerable military experience and training. On the other hand, the current defense minister, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has little to no military experience beyond the recently initiated Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen. King Salman would need to carefully negotiate any reforms to avoid offending these tribal forces.
Since its inception in the 1950s, the Saudi Arabian National Guard has grown into an influential, prestigious and capable security force. If it is at risk of being disbanded or subsumed by a relatively young and inexperienced minister of defense, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the new king would need to shepherd this transition with extreme caution. Upsetting the traditional balance of power could introduce a new internal conflict, not only in the House of Saud, but throughout the whole of Saudi Arabia.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/11/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-king-wont-attend-camp-david-meeting.html?emc=edit_th_20150511&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193
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http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/11/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-king-wont-attend-camp-david-meeting.html?emc=edit_th_20150511&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193
Obviously Obama hasn't done enough bowing.
Time for another Cairo speech !
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The Islamic State (ISIS) suicide bombing in Saudi Arabia on May 23 is significant in that it's the group's first claimed suicide bombing in the country, but it's also a strategic move to spark sectarian upheaval in the Shiite-majority province that holds 90% of royal family's oil reserves.
The Islamic State is trying to spark a cycle of sectarian violence that will destabilize Saudi Arabia and heighten the Royal Family's tension with Iran. The terror group thrives in environments where Shiites feel they need Iranian protection and where Sunnis feel threatened by real or imagined Iranian influence. The Saudi Eastern Province has the added benefit of endangering the Royal Family's most critical resource.
The bombing's objective is to spur Islamic State supporters in Saudi Arabia into action against the Shiites and the royal family. An October 2014 poll found that 5% of the Saudi population of 29 million has a positive opinion of the Islamic State (2% very positive and 3% somewhat positive).
The Saudi population includes about 8.5 million foreign residents, and it is unclear if they are included in the poll. This means that the Islamic State has a pool of somewhere between 1 million and 1.45 million supporters in Saudi Arabia that could be inspired to act.
The prospects for the Islamic State are much brighter if an atmosphere of sectarian warfare is instigated; a scenario that can be easily envisioned.
The sensitivity of the Saudi royal family to the bombing's impact on sectarianism was evident in the immediate booking of the grand mufti on state television to condemn the attack on "sons of the homeland." The language was deliberately chosen to assure the Shiite minority that the Saudi government cares about their well-being and to distance itself from any Salafists who may cheer the bombing.
The New York Times reported on how Saudis were declining to donate blood in the wake of the Islamic State bombing, deriding them as infidels and one saying that a Shiite "does not deserve even my spit." Although there are Saudi Sunnis who stand up for Shiites -- like one prominent human rights activist who is a leader in the Shammar tribe -- their rarity is apparent in the very fact that their activism makes news headlines.
The Saudi government may deploy Salafist-dominated security forces to the Eastern Province to prevent attacks and to stop the Shiites from holding large demonstrations of grief that could easily turn political and demand better treatment.
The Eastern Province is known for its protests against the Saudi government and subsequent arrests of activists and clerics demanding an end to discrimination and democratic reform. The leader of the Municipal Council in Qatif, where the bombing took place, has already blamed the Saudi government for promoting anti-Shiite sentiment.
Through the bombing, the Islamic State has created a catch-22: Any move by the Saudi government to enhance security in the province risks inflaming the passions of the Shiites, resulting in clashes and oppression that further the cycle.
The popularity of Sunni terrorist groups known for oppressing Shiites is a strong indication of how quickly sectarian fervor could sweep across Saudi Arabia, particularly if there are mass Shiite protests and Iran rallies to their side.
The aforementioned poll found that 52% of Saudis support Hamas and 33% support the Muslim Brotherhood. A November 2014 poll by Zogby showed that Saudi Arabia is the only Middle Eastern besides Turkey where a majority (53%) feel that the Muslim Brotherhood played a positive role in Egypt and Tunisia.
A frightening 15% of Saudis most favor Al-Qaeda's branch in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, among all the forces fighting the Syrian regime. About 9% support the Islamic Front, a Saudi-backed Salafist group and 3% preferred the Islamic State.
The Iranian regime and its radical Shiite proxies like Hezbollah and the Houthis are looking for an opportunity to strike back at the Saudis for their military intervention in Yemen and ongoing support for Syrian rebels. There is no better opportunity than upheaval in the Eastern Province, especially at this time when Iran's economy is suffering from low oil prices.
The objective of the bombing in Qatif is to make Saudi Arabia an extension of the Shiite-Sunni battlefield seen in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. And the Islamic State isn't crazy for thinking it could happen.
Ryan Mauro is ClarionProject.org’s national security analyst, a fellow with Clarion Project and an adjunct professor of homeland security. Mauro is frequently interviewed on top-tier television and radio. Read more, contact or arrange a speaking engagement.
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http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2015/06/19/wikileaks-says-its-leaking-more-than-500000-saudi-documents-classified-and-very-urgent/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Firewire&utm_campaign=Firewire%20-%20HORIZON%206-20-15%20FINAL
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http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2015/07/23/saudis-really-really-dont-believe-the-white-house-that-the-iran-deal-will-prevent-a-nuclear-weapon-so-much-so-that-saudi-media-has-this-scary-suggestion-on-how-to-respond/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Firewire_Morning_Test&utm_campaign=Firewire%20Morning%20Edition%20Recurring%20v2%202015-07-24
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http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2015/07/23/saudis-really-really-dont-believe-the-white-house-that-the-iran-deal-will-prevent-a-nuclear-weapon-so-much-so-that-saudi-media-has-this-scary-suggestion-on-how-to-respond/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Firewire_Morning_Test&utm_campaign=Firewire%20Morning%20Edition%20Recurring%20v2%202015-07-24
http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=943.msg18429#msg18429
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Pretty good GM!!!
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Saudi Arabia and Hamas: A Pragmatic Partnership
Analysis
July 27, 2015 | 09:30 GMT
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Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz (C) before the Gulf Cooperation Council summit in Riyadh on May 5, 2015. (FAYEZ NURELDINE/AFP/Getty Images)
Forecast
Saudi Arabia will try to recruit various regional proxies, including Hamas, to its Sunni Arab coalition against Iran.
Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Hamas will cooperate more in the post-nuclear deal environment.
As Saudi influence grows, Iran will have a diminished role in Palestinian affairs.
Analysis
In the wake of the nuclear accord with Iran, Saudi Arabia has not been content to simply wait and see what shape regional developments take. Riyadh has already become more active as it positions itself as the leader of a Sunni Arab coalition to oppose a rejuvenated Tehran by, for one thing, chipping away at Iran's proxies in the region. One example of this strategy is the developing relationship between Saudi Arabia and Hamas, which Saudi Arabia has worked to strengthen over the past several months. Reinserting itself into Palestinian politics would extend Riyadh's power beyond the Gulf into the Levant and provide for Saudi Arabia to engage both Egypt and Israel beyond the three countries' shared concerns over Iran and the Islamic State. In pursuing closer ties with Hamas, however, Riyadh will have to be careful not to provoke its allies or to push other groups further into Iran's sphere of influence.
A Complicated Relationship
Saudi Arabia and Hamas have a long history of interaction. Hamas is far from financially independent; it has always depended on multiple sources of external support. In the early 2000s, Saudi Arabia was Hamas' chief patron, with some reports claiming that Saudi Arabia provided as much as 50 percent of Hamas' operating budget. Starting in 2004, however, Riyadh reduced this funding, in part because the West began to more closely scrutinize Saudi Arabia's financing of terrorist groups in the wake of Sept. 11 and various suicide attacks claimed by Hamas during the Second Intifada.
When Hamas was briefly elected to head the Palestinian National Authority in 2006, Saudi Arabia publicly defied the United States by ignoring Washington's request to cut off funding to the group. Then, in February 2007, Riyadh helped negotiate what would be a short-lived coalition government between Fatah and Hamas. Even afterward, Saudi Arabia maintained financial support to Hamas and still emphasized the importance of cooperation between Hamas and its rival, Fatah.
It was at this point that Iran increased its support of Hamas. It was a strange relationship on paper: a Sunni Arab militant group descended from the Muslim Brotherhood aligning with a Persian Shiite self-styled Islamic Republic. But Iran was eager to capture any influence it could in Palestine as it looked to connect a crescent of Iranian-satellites from Tehran to the Mediterranean.
After Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in June 2007, abrogating the Saudi-brokered compromise, Iran's influence over Hamas steadily grew. Tehran provided military assistance to Gaza in addition to helping Hamas meet its monthly budgetary requirements. Much to Saudi Arabia's chagrin, Iran played this role for Hamas until 2012, when Khaled Meshaal, Hamas' then and current political leader, broke with Bashar al Assad's Iran-allied Alawite regime in part because of the violent crackdowns al Assad carried out upon Sunni Muslims in Syria.
Iranian support for Hamas did not dry up completely; Iran even increased funding during last summer's Operation Protective Edge, when Hamas and other Palestinian groups clashed with Israeli forces in Gaza. Overall, though, the Shiite power has greatly reduced its funding for Hamas. Hamas has survived in recent years by cobbling together support from Qatar and Turkey. But as it struggles to meet numerous financial obligations, Hamas would benefit from a renewed friendship with Riyadh and the economic perks that come with it. And Saudi Arabia is in some ways a more natural partner for Hamas than Iran, as a result of their shared Arab and Sunni identities.
Riyadh's Broader Strategic Goals
Saudi Arabia's ultimate goal is to build a Sunni, Arab coalition that can counter the imposing shadow Iran is casting over the region. Saudi Arabia is already combating Iran on multiple, more consequential fronts than the Gaza Strip: The kingdom leads a broad coalition of regional powers pushing back against the Iran-backed Houthi advance in Yemen, it supports numerous anti-Assad rebel groups in Syria and it pays Arab Sunni Iraqi tribes to convince them to fight the Islamic State. The warming of ties with Hamas, like Riyadh's recently improved relationship with Sudan, is a less overt tactic in pursuit of the same overall goal.
Backing Hamas can help Saudi Arabia's regional alliance against Iran in three ways. First, by becoming the chief benefactor of Hamas, Saudi Arabia would force its way directly into Levantine regional dynamics. If Hamas tightens its relationship with Riyadh, Egypt and Israel will effectively have to deal with Saudi Arabia whenever an issue with Hamas arises. The more influence that Saudi Arabia can exert in the region, the more likely the United States will be predisposed to side with the kingdom's overall interests.
Second, support for Hamas would allow Saudi Arabia to take credit for helping to combat the nascent Islamic State threat developing in Gaza. There is at least a small group of aspiring Islamic State militants in the Gaza Strip with which Hamas must deal. For example, on July 19, Islamic State sympathizers planted and detonated bombs beneath five vehicles belonging to members of the military wings of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Saudi financial support could help eliminate this embryonic threat by reducing the economic hardship that drives militants to join groups such as the Islamic State. Relative to other Saudi operations to fight the Islamic State, assistance to Hamas is a minor step, but it fits with Riyadh's desire to be seen as the most willing and effective Islamic State opponent in the region.
Third, and most obviously, funding and support from Saudi Arabia would reduce Hamas' dependence on Iran for aid. As Saudi Arabia repairs its relationship with Hamas, it diminishes Iran's ability to exert influence over the Palestinian group. That in turn means Iran will have one less satellite, or proxy, on the periphery of the main battleground, located in the heartland of Greater Syria and Mesopotamia.
As a result, Saudi Arabia has been pursuing closer relations with Hamas for months now, calling on Egypt, its regional ally, to ease restrictions on the group. In fact, it was in part because of discreet Saudi cajoling that Cairo decided to drop Hamas' designation as a terrorist group and to reopen the Rafah border crossing for several long stretches in recent weeks. The most obvious sign of reconciliation between the two groups, however, occurred last week: Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal made a rare trip to Saudi Arabia and had an even rarer meeting with King Salman, during which the two discussed the challenges posed by the Islamic State and the possibility of increasing Saudi financial support for Hamas. Stratfor sources indicate that Meshaal may also have raised the possibility of at least a limited warming of ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia in trying to combat their mutual enemy, the Islamic State. But from Riyadh's point of view, the distrust and enmity run too deep to pursue such an arrangement at this time. Hamas, isolated and poor as it is, must try to preserve as many different avenues of friendship as possible in the region, but the simple fact is that the group has more in common with Saudi Arabia than with Iran.
The Difficulties of Befriending Hamas
In reaching out to Hamas, Saudi Arabia will have to overcome numerous obstacles. Riyadh must make sure that by repairing its relationship with Hamas, it does not harm ties with West Bank-based Fatah, a group that could offer Iran another opening to pursue in Palestine. In the past, Iran has managed to find other Palestinian proxy groups to challenge Hamas and to fulfill its aims, as it did during Operation Protective Edge in 2014 by funding and arming Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The relationship between Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Iran has weakened significantly in recent months — Tehran was not pleased with the Palestinian militant group's neutrality regarding Saudi moves in Yemen. Besides, Palestinian Islamic Jihad is also fundamentally a Sunni, Arab organization. Still, by itself, a strong Saudi relationship with Hamas does not mean Iran has lost all influence in Gaza; it reduces Tehran's options, but does not eliminate them entirely.
Riyadh also risks irritating the very regional powers it hopes to recruit to its Sunni Arab-led, anti-Iran coalition. Relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia have been unusually cooperative in recent months, and the two find themselves with more in common in the wake of the Iran deal. But any militant activity in Gaza could strain ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia if Riyadh is unable to restrain Hamas. Egypt, Turkey and Qatar all have ties with Hamas of varying strength, and though Saudi Arabia could see the ability to influence Hamas' actions as an opportunity to improve relations with those countries, it could also be perceived as a challenge. This is especially the case for Egypt, which is suspicious of Hamas' Muslim Brotherhood doctrines and views Hamas' activities and relationships to be within its sphere of influence.
Despite numerous obstacles to repairing their relationship, Hamas needs a financial backer and Saudi Arabia has the funds to help. Saudi Arabia is trying to build and lead a Sunni Arab coalition against Iran, and to achieve that goal it will have to engage in a great deal of diplomacy and military action, both behind the scenes and more overtly on the battlefields in Syria and Iraq. But Riyadh can also make smaller, more subtle adjustments in its foreign policy. By choosing to support Hamas now, it demonstrates its broader, regional concern with the spread of the Islamic State and proves that it is an influential player in the Levant. Strengthening its ties with Hamas, then, is a small step that both weakens Iranian influence and elevates Saudi Arabia's profile. These kinds of pragmatic relationships are the inevitable product of the U.S.-Iran reconciliation and represent an illustrative microcosm of what overall Saudi strategy will look like in the coming months and years.
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http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/refugee-crisis-saudi-arabia-says-it-has-taken-2-5-million-fleeing-syrians-1519532
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http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/07/will-the-united-states-help-if-saudi-arabia-starts-to-fall-apart/?utm_content=buffer1b9c1&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer
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http://www.meforum.org/5582/saudis-cheap-oil
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http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-declares-all-atheists-are-terrorists-in-new-law-to-crack-down-on-political-dissidents-9228389.html
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Somewhere we have a post about SA fibbing abut the refugees it claims to take in and asserting that in point of fact it has taken none. Please help me find it.
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Somewhere we have a post about SA fibbing abut the refugees it claims to take in and asserting that in point of fact it has taken none. Please help me find it.
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/12/facts-figures-syria-refugee-crisis-international-resettlement/
Key facts:
The six Gulf countries - Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain - have offered zero resettlement places to Syrian refugees.
Other high income countries including Russia, Japan, Singapore and South Korea have also offered zero resettlement places.
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Can't say that Pravda on the Hudson does not have a real good point here
Saudi Arabia, an ISIS That Has Made It
Black Daesh, white Daesh. The former slits throats, kills, stones, cuts off hands, destroys humanity’s common heritage and despises archaeology, women and non-Muslims. The latter is better dressed and neater but does the same things. The Islamic State; Saudi Arabia. In its struggle against terrorism, the West wages war on one, but shakes hands with the other. This is a mechanism of denial, and denial has a price: preserving the famous strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia at the risk of forgetting that the kingdom also relies on an alliance with a religious clergy that produces, legitimizes, spreads, preaches and defends Wahhabism, the ultra-puritanical form of Islam that Daesh feeds on.
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Wahhabism, a messianic radicalism that arose in the 18th century, hopes to restore a fantasized caliphate centered on a desert, a sacred book, and two holy sites, Mecca and Medina. Born in massacre and blood, it manifests itself in a surreal relationship with women, a prohibition against non-Muslims treading on sacred territory, and ferocious religious laws. That translates into an obsessive hatred of imagery and representation and therefore art, but also of the body, nakedness and freedom. Saudi Arabia is a Daesh that has made it.
The West’s denial regarding Saudi Arabia is striking: It salutes the theocracy as its ally but pretends not to notice that it is the world’s chief ideological sponsor of Islamist culture. The younger generations of radicals in the so-called Arab world were not born jihadists. They were suckled in the bosom of Fatwa Valley, a kind of Islamist Vatican with a vast industry that produces theologians, religious laws, books, and aggressive editorial policies and media campaigns.
One might counter: Isn’t Saudi Arabia itself a possible target of Daesh? Yes, but to focus on that would be to overlook the strength of the ties between the reigning family and the clergy that accounts for its stability — and also, increasingly, for its precariousness. The Saudi royals are caught in a perfect trap: Weakened by succession laws that encourage turnover, they cling to ancestral ties between king and preacher. The Saudi clergy produces Islamism, which both threatens the country and gives legitimacy to the regime.
One has to live in the Muslim world to understand the immense transformative influence of religious television channels on society by accessing its weak links: households, women, rural areas. Islamist culture is widespread in many countries — Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Mali, Mauritania. There are thousands of Islamist newspapers and clergies that impose a unitary vision of the world, tradition and clothing on the public space, on the wording of the government’s laws and on the rituals of a society they deem to be contaminated.
It is worth reading certain Islamist newspapers to see their reactions to the attacks in Paris. The West is cast as a land of “infidels.” The attacks were the result of the onslaught against Islam. Muslims and Arabs have become the enemies of the secular and the Jews. The Palestinian question is invoked along with the rape of Iraq and the memory of colonial trauma, and packaged into a messianic discourse meant to seduce the masses. Such talk spreads in the social spaces below, while up above, political leaders send their condolences to France and denounce a crime against humanity. This totally schizophrenic situation parallels the West’s denial regarding Saudi Arabia.
All of which leaves one skeptical of Western democracies’ thunderous declarations regarding the necessity of fighting terrorism. Their war can only be myopic, for it targets the effect rather than the cause. Since ISIS is first and foremost a culture, not a militia, how do you prevent future generations from turning to jihadism when the influence of Fatwa Valley and its clerics and its culture and its immense editorial industry remains intact?
Every weekday, get thought-provoking commentary from Op-Ed columnists, The Times editorial board and contributing writers from around the world.
Is curing the disease therefore a simple matter? Hardly. Saudi Arabia remains an ally of the West in the many chess games playing out in the Middle East. It is preferred to Iran, that gray Daesh. And there’s the trap. Denial creates the illusion of equilibrium. Jihadism is denounced as the scourge of the century but no consideration is given to what created it or supports it. This may allow saving face, but not saving lives.
Daesh has a mother: the invasion of Iraq. But it also has a father: Saudi Arabia and its religious-industrial complex. Until that point is understood, battles may be won, but the war will be lost. Jihadists will be killed, only to be reborn again in future generations and raised on the same books.
The attacks in Paris have exposed this contradiction again, but as happened after 9/11, it risks being erased from our analyses and our consciences.
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and here would be one small example: http://www.salon.com/2015/11/20/western_ally_saudi_arabia_sentenced_a_palestinian_poet_to_death_for_renouncing_islam/?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=socialflow
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The New Duranty Times and Slate are getting awful close to recognizing the core problem is islam. :-o
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Problem may be this
(http://libertyblitzkrieg.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Screen-Shot-2015-11-29-at-10.27.16-AM.jpg)
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And, another step along the spiraling stairs into nuclear armageddon
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/world/middleeast/iran-saudi-arabia-execution-sheikh-nimr.html?emc=edit_na_20160103&nlid=49641193&ref=cta&_r=0
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And, another step along the spiraling stairs into nuclear armageddon
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/world/middleeast/iran-saudi-arabia-execution-sheikh-nimr.html?emc=edit_na_20160103&nlid=49641193&ref=cta&_r=0
Who could have seen this coming
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Ummmm , , , all of us here?
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Ummmm , , , all of us here?
Actually below is what I was looking for.
Re: Politics
« Reply #127 on: June 06, 2008, 03:59:30 PM »
A headline from the future with President Obama: "The Sunni-Shia Nuclear Arms Race Escalates".
I wonder how much gas will be then....
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Pretty good GM, pretty good! 8-)
Though if your secondary point is that gas prices will be driven up, that would appear to be much less the case than most people previously assumed , , ,
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Just wait for shots to be exchanged, or for Hezbollah to strike Saudi oil production choke points. The last few US oil companies with deep pockets will be yuuuuuuge!
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http://atimes.com/2016/01/saudi-arabia-in-policy-hell/
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y Tommy Stubbington And
Nikhil Lohade
Updated Jan. 5, 2016 4:24 p.m. ET
6 COMMENTS
The prolonged rout in oil has left Saudi Arabia’s long-standing peg of its currency to the dollar at its most vulnerable point in more than a decade.
For almost 30 years, the kingdom has held the riyal at a fixed exchange rate and that has brought stability to government finances. Ninety percent of the government’s revenue comes from oil, which is priced in dollars.
But fewer dollars are coming in now, straining a budget that is committed to generous subsidies and public-sector wages. Abandoning the peg would make those dollars stretch further when converted to a local riyal, because without the peg, the riyal would weaken.
What’s more, to hold the peg, Saudi Arabia spends billions of its dollars buying riyals in foreign-exchange markets.
With oil trading around $36 a barrel, some investors and Saudi Arabian businesses believe the government will succumb to the pressure and let the peg go—something long regarded as unthinkable. That is a minority view, but one that is growing in popularity.
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This week, the number of riyals that forward contracts can buy for a dollar in a year’s time surged to a 16-year high.
“We have a new economic reality in the Gulf region, with oil prices so much lower,” said Michael Cirami, a portfolio manager at Eaton Vance. “That requires an adjustment.”
Mr. Cirami isn’t betting on a weaker riyal, but he thinks Riyadh could shift its policy in the next few years.
The debate over the Saudi peg underscores how the oil-price rout has upended conventional wisdom in economies linked to crude. OPEC’s supremacy, for instance, has been eroded and rich oil states have fallen into budget deficits.
The riyal is fixed at roughly 3.75 to the dollar, and one-year forward contracts were buying the greenback for 3.822 on Tuesday, close to the high of 3.8235 hit on Monday. The moves reflect both speculators betting on a weaker riyal and some local businesses hurrying to lock in better rates, analysts say.
The price of oil has fallen by more than half since the middle of 2014, forcing the kingdom to run a record deficit of nearly 367 billion riyals ($98 billion) last year. Last week the government laid out billions of riyals in budget cuts.
Meantime, Saudi Arabia and Iran have intensified their diplomatic spat over the kingdom’s execution of a dissident cleric. That clash could push Saudi Arabia’s defense costs up while it is already fighting an expensive war in Yemen and supporting allies in conflicts elsewhere, analysts say.
To prop up its currency, the kingdom is buying the riyal with the dollar reserves accrued during years of high oil prices, analysts say. Those reserves fell to $635.2 billion at the end of November, down 15% from a peak of $746 billion in August last year, according to the latest central bank data.
It is impossible to say how far the riyal would fall were the peg to be removed, but a decline likely would be far greater than the 2% devaluation implied by the forward rates.
Many economists said the Saudi government will keep spending dollars to avoid devaluation, which would come with uncomfortable long-term consequences. Households and businesses have debt in foreign currencies, and payments costs would rise if the local currency falls. Consumers also would have to pay more for imports, from cars to luxury goods.
That could be a tough path for the government, local analysts said. Saudis already are angered by cuts to subsidies in the state budget.
“Speculation over a devaluation of the Saudi riyal has mounted in the past few days, but we think such a move is likely to be used as a last resort,” said Jason Tuvey, Middle East economist at Capital Economics. “In light of the potential political ramifications, this is something that the authorities will be extremely keen to avoid.”
During last week’s budget announcement, Saudi officials gave no indication that they were considering a change to the peg. But some analysts are reluctant to take the dismissals at face value. Officials at the Swiss National Bank, for instance, publicly backed the franc’s link to the euro mere days before the bank stunned markets by abandoning it a year ago.
In recent months, two oil-rich nations also have abandoned their dollar pegs.
Azerbaijan scrapped its peg to the greenback in December and its currency quickly lost half its value. Kazakhstan, another economy dependent on natural resources, let its currency float freely in August and saw it lose more than a quarter of its value in one day.
China has also moved to devalue the yuan since the summer as it grapples with slowing economic growth.
“The last year has shown us that when economic fundamentals change, pegs break,” said Peter Kinsella, an emerging-market strategist at Commerzbank in London.
Write to Tommy Stubbington at tommy.stubbington@wsj.com and Nikhil Lohade at Nikhil.Lohade@wsj.com
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http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/isis-wahhabism-saudi-arabia_b_5717157.html
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Of course. Down size the military and beef up the legal tort system on the war on terror.
A nod to her NY cronies:
http://nypost.com/2016/04/17/hillary-supporting-bill-allowing-911-victims-to-sue-saudi-arabia/
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NLtLeK7YLGY&ebc=ANyPxKrqKZzy6rv_ziRfnj8w1qqUXXGliQSw8oEWBDlJc0YI2PsHkZOj8ecL1d-MyYYsKYFA9UXYYIZPh_e_QQem3kct1X3ycw&nohtml5=False
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One opinion piece on the matter:
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/20/business/international/saudi-threat-to-sell-us-assetscould-hurt-but-mostly-the-saudis.html?_r=0
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The Long Divorce
How the U.S.-Saudi relationship grew cold under Barack Obama's watch.
Simon Henderson, April 19, 2016
The initial defining moment of President Barack Obama’s attitude toward Saudi Arabia, for many people, was when he bowed to King Abdullah as he shook his hand at the London G-20 summit meeting in April 2009. The gesture, which the White House vehemently denied was a bow at all, was variously interpreted as the new president groveling toward an important ally, or an early sign of Obama’s capacity to charm.
The Saudis themselves probably weren’t fooled. They would have known of Obama’s 2002 speech in Chicago, just over a year after the terror attacks of 9/11. That speech is most famous for Obama’s opposition to President George W. Bush’s planned invasion of Iraq, which he referred to as a “dumb war.” But the then-state senator also had a pointed message about the two countries that formed the pillars of U.S. influence in the Middle East.
“You want a fight, President Bush?” Obama asked. “Let’s fight to make sure our so-called allies in the Middle East – the Saudis and the Egyptians – stop oppressing their own people, and suppressing dissent, and tolerating corruption and inequality.”
So much has changed in the world since that awkward bow in 2009, never mind since 2002, and the nature of the U.S.-Saudi relationship has changed along with it. As the eight years of George W. Bush came to an end, the oil price was less than $50 per barrel, and would climb to well over $100 in 2014. Few people had heard of shale oil — mention of the possibility of U.S. energy independence, which the oil could soon make possible, would have been met with derisive laughter. In the Middle East, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was very much in power, as was Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. It would be two more years before uprisings would seize those countries, and Washington’s response in both cases would dismay Saudi officials.
Obama will meet King Salman in Riyadh on April 20, during what will likely be his final trip to Saudi Arabia during his presidency. Such meetings between national leaders are usually used for discussions about common interests rather than detailed agendas. The common question is: Are the allies on the same metaphorical page? But with the United States and Saudi Arabia today, it will be more interesting to see whether they can plausibly suggest they are still reading from the same book.
Although the upcoming visit is being touted as an effort in alliance-building, it will just as likely highlight how far Washington and Riyadh have drifted apart in the past eight years. For Obama, the key issue in the Middle East is the fight against the Islamic State: He wants to be able to continue to operate with the cover of a broad Islamic coalition, of which Saudi Arabia is a prominent member. For the House of Saud, the issue is Iran. For them, last year’s nuclear deal does not block Iran’s nascent nuclear status – instead, it confirms it. Worse than that, Washington sees Iran as a potential ally in the fight against the Islamic State. In the words of one longtime Washington-based observer: “Saudi Arabia wanted a boyfriend called the United States. The United States instead chose Iran. Saudi Arabia is beyond jealousy.”
Despite the possible pitfalls, both sides will have assembled lists of “asks” for the visit. These will probably be expressed in side meetings, given the king’s increasing delegation of his powers to Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, known as MbN, and particularly his son, Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, aka MbS. Besides the Islamic State and Iran, the topics are likely to include Yemen, where the kingdom is increasingly bogged down, though there is hope for peace talks. The crucial interlocutor will be MbS, the 30-year-old who is increasingly expected to become king sooner rather than later – though the notional succession currently in place would first hand the crown to his cousin, MbN. MbS is known for touting his vision of a modernized Saudi Arabia with an economy that has moved beyond oil.
Obama’s attitude toward Saudi Arabia does not seem to have changed since his 2002 speech, and his comments about the kingdom’s rulers will be an elephant in the room during these talks. The president’s criticism of America’s “so-called allies” is a recurring theme in Jeffrey Goldberg’s cover story for the Atlantic, “The Obama Doctrine.” The 19,000-word article begins with Obama’s retreat from his “red line” after Bashar al-Assad’s forces used sarin gas against civilians in 2013 – an event that shocked U.S. allies in the Middle East and forced them to reconsider what U.S. security guarantees actually meant, but which the president described as a decision that made him “very proud.”
Why Obama decided to give the interview now — rather than, say, in April 2017 — is a mystery to many, who see it as damaging his diplomatic credibility. The profile will cast a dark cloud over Obama’s meetings in Riyadh and make the platitudes of his public statements less convincing. Counterterrorism cooperation, for instance, will be a key element in the talks – but in the Atlantic, Obama questioned “the role of America’s Sunni Arab allies play in fomenting anti-American terrorism,” Goldberg wrote, and “is clearly irritated that foreign-policy orthodoxy compels him to treat Saudi Arabia as an ally.”
When Malcolm Turnbull, the new Australian prime minister, last year asked Obama, “Aren’t the Saudis your friends?” Goldberg writes: “Obama smiled. ‘It’s complicated,’ he said.”
Obama’s skepticism appears to have permeated his entire administration. It’s gotten to the point where Saudi officials fear that the administration prefers their rivals in Tehran to their longstanding ally. “In the White House these days, one occasionally hears Obama’s National Security Council officials pointedly reminding visitors that the large majority of 9/11 hijackers were not Iranian, but Saudi,” Goldberg wrote. When the author observed to Obama that he wasn’t as likely as his predecessors to instinctively back Saudi Arabia in a dispute with Iran, Goldberg continued, Obama “didn’t disagree.”
Obama simply doesn’t seem to share the view of many Middle East leaders that the Islamic Republic of Iran wants to diminish U.S. influence and change the balance of power in the region. Saudi leaders increasingly fear the president has no interest in constraining Iran’s regional ambitions. The single line that probably generated the most apoplexy in Riyadh when the Atlantic profile was published was when the president implored Iran and its rivals “to find an effective way to share the neighborhood and institute some sort of cold peace.”
Saudi Arabia has no interest in sharing the Arab world with its archrival. It sees Iran as challenging its leadership of the Islamic world and undermining its standing in the Arab world. Given Iran’s nuclear agreement and its revival in oil production, Riyadh’s status as a leader of the energy world is also threatened — even if it will be years, if ever, that Iran can rival its standing as the world’s largest oil exporter.
These fundamentally different perspectives on the Middle East may be the cause of the tensions between Riyadh and Washington, but Obama and King Salman will face other problems when they come face-to-face this week. Meetings with the 80-year-old Saudi monarch are carefully choreographed to obscure, at least to the public gaze, Salman’s increasing infirmity. Obama has already encountered this. When he came to Riyadh early last year to offer condolences on the death of King Abdullah, he had a conversation with Salman during which the king simply walked away without warning. Aides attempted to excuse him, saying he needed to break for prayers. Last September, when King Salman visited the Oval Office, he brought his favorite son, Muhammad bin Salman, to do the talking.
For most meetings, King Salman has a computer screen, often obscured by flowers, in front of him, serving as a teleprompter. With a recent U.S. delegation, the royal court devised another stratagem – the king spent the meeting looking beyond the group at a widescreen television suspended from the ceiling. An aide off to one side furiously hammered talking points into a keyboard.
The two heads of state will not be able to avoid discussing their rival interpretations of the events of 9/11, when 15 out of the 19 hijackers were Saudi. The issue has been revived by the calls in Congress for the publication of the missing 28 pages from the 9/11 report, which have remained classified, supposedly to spare the Saudi government embarrassment because of possible connections between the hijackers and Saudi officials. Riyadh’s continuing sensitivity on this point was underscored over the weekend, when the kingdom warned that it would sell off U.S. assets worth hundreds of billions of dollars if Congress passes a bill allowing the Saudi government to be held responsible in American courts for any role in the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
How this issue will play out is hard to predict. But as I first wrote in an August 2002 Wall Street Journal op-ed, there is much more to the links between the hijackers and the House of Saud than many are willing to admit. That article cited a Jan. 9 story in U.S. News & World Report, titled “Princely Payments,” in which senior intelligence officials and a former Clinton administration official said that two senior Saudi princes had been paying off al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden since a 1995 bombing in Riyadh, which killed five U.S. military advisors.
Saudi officials vehemently denied the claim, with current Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir quoted as saying: “Where’s the evidence? Nobody offers proof. There’s no paper trail.”
As I wrote in the Wall Street Journal in 2002: “I followed the lead and quickly found U.S. and British officials to tell me the names of the two senior princes. They were using Saudi official money — not their own — to pay off bin Laden to cause trouble elsewhere but not in the kingdom. The amounts involved were ‘hundreds of millions of dollars,’ and it continued after Sept. 11. I asked a British official recently whether the payments had stopped. He said he hoped they had, but was not sure.”
If the Saudi leadership hopes to repair its relationship with the United States, it must find a way to put questions like this to bed. But the starkness of the president’s criticisms in the Atlantic probably make rapprochement to the former levels of diplomatic and economic intimacy between the United States and Saudi Arabia impossible, in any case.
The president certainly doesn’t intend to travel to Riyadh to sign the death certificate of the relationship. Nevertheless, the Obama administration may have ushered in a new era in ties between Washington and Riyadh – one more distant and marred by suspicion than in years past. One way or another, it will be a historic trip.
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Frankly I am not so clear as to why we need to kiss up to the Saudis. We have known since shortly after 9/11 that Saudi money was behind the attacks as well as many of the attackers were from Saudi Arabia. W clearly buried it. I am not sure why he was so infatuated with them. Must have had something to do with a bond formed by his father during desert storm.
Saudis are very dubious friends indeed. Though we would all prefer them to Iran.
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Asked and answered:
Frankly I am not so clear as to why we need to kiss up to the Saudis. ...
... Though we would all prefer them to Iran. [and ISIS and al Qaida and Boko Haram etc.]
Take it one step further, some of the 'moderate' Arab states will soon be allies of Israel, because Israel never was a threat to them and the common enemies Iran, ISIS etc. are.
The Kingdom is a strange place but they are our strategic ally.
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Actually, if we were to seriously produce oil like we have the potential to do, their usefulness is seriously reduced.
Asked and answered:
Frankly I am not so clear as to why we need to kiss up to the Saudis. ...
... Though we would all prefer them to Iran. [and ISIS and al Qaida and Boko Haram etc.]
Take it one step further, some of the 'moderate' Arab states will soon be allies of Israel, because Israel never was a threat to them and the common enemies Iran, ISIS etc. are.
The Kingdom is a strange place but they are our strategic ally.
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https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/saudi-arabia-brink-vikram-mansharamani?trk=eml-b2_content_ecosystem_digest-hero-14-null&midToken=AQEM_FYkB3NwIQ&fromEmail=fromEmail&ut=1uDiFxsOzlN7c1
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My former customer, Saudi builder Binladin, reportedly cuts 50,000 jobs.
Construction company Saudi Binladin Group has laid off 50,000 staff, a newspaper reported on Friday, as pressure on the industry rises amid government spending cuts to survive an era of cheap oil.
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/30/saudi-builder-binladin-reportedly-cuts-50000-jobs-as-government-cuts-bite.html
(Can't really say no relation to the famous al Qaida leader.)
It's not only North Dakota feeling the squeeze.
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Forecast
Although Islamic State-related attacks in Saudi Arabia have increased over the past year, strikes against hard targets still appear to be out of reach.
For al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the end of a more than one-year unofficial truce with the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen puts Saudi targets back in the crosshairs.
Saudi authorities may struggle to maintain control of the jihadist threat as Islamic State fighters return from Syria and Iraq with more advanced skills.
Analysis
Jihadism has deep roots in Saudi Arabia, the second-largest source of foreign militants in Iraq and Syria since the Syrian civil war began in 2011. Since the mid-2000s, Saudi security forces have contained the jihadist threat in the kingdom, aware of the economic and security dangers it could pose if left unchecked. But in the past year, Islamic State activity in Saudi Arabia — and a recent series of raids against alleged militants — has raised fears that the threat may be growing beyond authorities' control.
Saudi Jihadism: A Chronology
The jihadist threat in Saudi Arabia is nothing new. In mid-2002, al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia launched a campaign of attacks in the country against both foreigners and the Saudi government. Saudi authorities eventually dismantled the group, forcing its members to flee the country. Many relocated to Yemen, where they helped to found al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
Aside from a failed 2006 assault on the Abqaiq oil collection and processing facility, an amateurish attack in 2007 that killed three French citizens, and a foiled assassination attempt against Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in 2009, Saudi Arabia has been eerily quiet. But the calm was shattered in 2015 when militants associated with the Islamic State began bombing mosques in Saudi Arabia's restive Eastern Province in an effort to inflame sectarian tensions in the kingdom.
Before long, the attacks spread beyond Eastern Province and Shiite targets. After a series of raids in Taif in early July 2015, Saudi officials stopped a man wearing a suicide vest at a roadblock in Riyadh on July 16. To avoid capture, the man detonated his device, setting off a government crackdown that led to the arrest of over 400 alleged Islamic State supporters within two days.
The following month, a suicide bomber detonated explosives inside a mosque in Abha, a city in western Saudi Arabia. The attack killed 15 worshippers, including 10 members of a special Saudi state security unit, and wounded many others. Since then, three other attacks against Shiite mosques in Eastern Province have occurred, along with a handful of small bombings in Riyadh and several assassinations of police and security officers. In addition, a number of raids against Islamic State members have been conducted in Riyadh, Dammam and Asir.
A raid outside Mecca on May 5 sparked a firefight that left four Islamic State fighters dead. Saudi security forces fatally shot two of them — one of whom had been named a suspect in the Abha mosque bombing — and the remaining two detonated suicide bombs to avoid capture. The same day, two other Islamic State members were allegedly arrested in Jeddah. Three days later, two gunmen killed a security officer who thwarted their attempted attack on a police station outside Taif.
A New Generation
These attacks differ from al Qaeda's operations in the early 2000s, which targeted foreigners and employed large vehicle bombs. Al Qaeda's Saudi branch understood the importance of expatriates to the Saudi economy and sought to cripple it by driving them and their families out of the country. Al Qaeda's campaign included assassinations, armed assaults on expatriate housing compounds and even an attack on the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah. In April 2004, the U.S. Department of State issued a travel warning, advising U.S. citizens to defer travel to the country, and ordered all nonessential diplomatic and consular staff to leave Saudi Arabia.
The threat environment could change even more as Islamic State fighters return from Iraq and Syria, bringing with them experience gained on the battlefield. Like the previous generation of al Qaeda operatives in the kingdom, the Islamic State fighters could use their honed skills to conduct more complex and strategic attacks. Both groups have a history of attacking tourist attractions in Egypt and Tunisia to undermine those nations' economies. A more sophisticated Islamic State campaign might echo previous al Qaeda initiatives, targeting expatriates to impair the Saudi economy.
Don't Forget al Qaeda
In addition to the growing Islamic State menace, Saudi Arabia faces a renewed threat from AQAP. Following the March 2015 Saudi-led intervention in Yemen's civil war, al Qaeda and the Saudi coalition reached an unofficial truce: The Saudi coalition would refrain from attacking the group in exchange for the jihadists' cooperation in fighting Houthi forces and former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. AQAP benefited greatly from this arrangement, seizing the opportunity afforded by the chaos to snatch up large quantities of money, weapons and manpower while it controlled Mukalla. Despite losing several key leaders to U.S. airstrikes, the group is now arguably stronger in terms of men and resources than it has ever been.
But the truce fell apart on April 25. Coalition forces entered Mukalla after AQAP withdrew to avoid heavy casualties. As a result, the group will likely begin to attack coalition forces. Furthermore, it could draw on its increased might to relaunch efforts to export terrorism to Saudi Arabia. Since Saudis have always constituted an important component of AQAP, the group could try to use its ties in the kingdom to facilitate new attacks.
Despite the surge in jihadist activity in Saudi Arabia over the past year, there is currently no sign that Saudi authorities will lose control of the threat. Nonetheless, potential targets in the kingdom must practice heightened awareness as they look for signs of change in the jihadist threat, such as attacks on oil infrastructure or expatriates, the use of larger and more sophisticated explosive devices, or increased surveillance on possible attack sites.
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second post
18WednesdayMAY 2016
POSTED BY MISHGEA | May 18, 2016 11:33:21 | ECONOMICS
≈ 28 COMMENTS
Liquidity Crunch or Worse
Saudi Arabia burnt through its reserves faster than anyone thought.
In signs of a huge liquidity crunch, at best, the country has delayed paying contractors and now considers paying them in IOUs and tradable bonds.
In retrospect, the Saudi threat to dump US assets looks more ridiculous than ever.
Please consider Saudi Arabia Considers Paying Contractors With IOUs.
Saudi Arabia has told banks in the country that it is considering giving contractors IOUs to settle some outstanding bills, according to people with knowledge of the discussions. A projected budget deficit this year is prompting the government to weigh alternatives to limit spending. Contractors would receive bond-like instruments to cover the amount they are owed by the state which they could hold until maturity or sell on to banks, the people said, asking not to be identified because the information is private.
Contractors have received some payments from the government in cash and the rest could come in “I-owe-you” notes, the people said.
The government started delaying payments last year to prevent the budget deficit from exceeding $100 billion after the oil slump.
Beyond a Liquidity Crisis
Deficits don’t shrink if you delay paying the bills. Deficits arose because more money was spent than collected. On May 17, the Senate Passed a Bill Allowing 911 Victims to Sue Saudi Arabia. Obama threatens a veto. Meanwhile, Saudi threatens to dump $750 billion in U.S. securities and other American assets if the bill becomes law.
Does Saudi Arabia even have $750 billion. Color me skeptical.
Saudi Arabia’s bluff that it would sell US assets if the Obama signed the bill seems more ridiculous than ever.
For discussion of Saudi involvement in 911 and the alleged dumping threat please see Understanding the Saudi, Chinese “Economic Nuclear War” Threat; Saudi 911 Round-Up.
For discussion of Saudi Treasury holdings, please see Treasury Department Finally Discloses Saudi Treasury Holdings – Incorrectly?
There is no “nuclear” economic threat by Saudi Arabia or China as some have proclaimed.
Mike “Mish” Shedlock
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I don't at this point, agree. This opens up a whole can of worms. This could very well come back to bite us. Sounds like a big money grab to me.
My mind could be changed possibly:
https://www.conservativereview.com/commentary/2016/09/obama-is-defending-the-saudi-government-agains-911-families
And families were already compensated from donations:
http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/06/news/economy/911_compensation_fund/
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Please post in the Legal Issues in the War on Islamic Fascism thread as well.
FWIW, at present, I lean towards opposing this bill.
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One would think this strategy comes from the LEFT. Instead this time it is driven by the Right in an ass backwards way to spite Obama. I dunno .
Apart that this sets a precedent that will be used against us Saudi Arabia will retaliate:
http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2016/09/28/saudis-allies-warn-us-retaliation-911-bill/
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Good morning. As it contemplates an initial public offering of its state-run oil company, Saudi Arabia launched the sale of $17.5 billion of debt Wednesday, people familiar with the situation told the Journal, in what would mark the largest emerging-market bond issue ever. It is the kingdom’s first international bond sale, a bid to support a sweeping effort to keep its economy afloat as oil income dwindles.
The sale is the latest example of a Persian Gulf state turning to international markets to offset declining oil revenues. Other oil exporters from the Gulf region raised $20 billion in total through international bond issues earlier this year. The issue would exceed Argentina’s $16.5 billion debt sale as the biggest from an emerging-market economy. For better or worse, there are $67 billion in orders for the debt, which seems to indicate a certain comfort level at nearly four times oversubscribed. The global plunge in oil prices has cast doubt about investor demand for shares in Saudi Arabian Oil Co., the world’s largest player.
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http://www.dailywire.com/news/13535/islamophobic-saudi-arabia-deports-40000-muslim-michael-qazvini?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social&utm_content=102516-podcast&utm_campaign=beingconservative
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By Karen Elliott House
May 18, 2017 7:10 p.m. ET
12 COMMENTS
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
President Trump will receive an effusive welcome here from his royal hosts determined to underscore that once again Saudi Arabia and the U.S. are close allies. Barack Obama favored Iran, but that’s over. King Salman, 81, is gathering 50 Islamic leaders to meet Mr. Trump. This unprecedented assembly is intended to show not only that Saudi Arabia is the leader of the Islamic world but that Muslim leaders support the U.S. against Islamic State terrorists.
While the elderly monarch is host, the indisputable power behind the throne is his young son, Deputy Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, 31. He is orchestrating a two-day summit spectacular that will star Donald Trump and the new face of Saudi Arabia—a country now enjoying once-forbidden entertainment and a much larger role for women, who may be allowed to drive as early as this summer. Conservatives seethe but can’t block change.
The young prince and the president have much in common. Both are outsiders, brash, unorthodox and new to politics. Each faces strong opposition at home. Both seek to spur economic growth by reducing the role of government. And each is fighting orthodoxy: MBS, as the prince is known, wants to curb the role of religion and tradition, which inhibit modernization, while Mr. Trump battles leftist orthodoxy and political correctness. Both are smart marketers.
Mr. Trump’s presence is an opportunity for the prince to show off his modernization effort. An extravaganza featuring something for everyone—the Harlem Globetrotters taking on a Saudi basketball team, car races, country singer Toby Keith —is intended to convince Americans there is a new, open Saudi Arabia and Saudis that mixing cultures and sexes isn’t evil.
How can the son of a king be an outsider? In a culture that reveres age, especially among the royal family’s thousands of princes, the appointment last year of a young man who isn’t a senior prince, nor even his father’s eldest son, came as a shock. Like Mr. Trump, Mohammed bin Salman faces a “resistance” in the form of determined opponents among his royal relatives. Social media has created a “virtual opposition” by enabling disgruntled citizens to express their views.
So both the prince and the president seek success to bolster their leadership, easier to achieve in diplomacy than domestic affairs. Given the badly frayed state of U.S.-Saudi relations, Mr. Trump is guaranteed a win, at least with Saudis, because he isn’t Barack Obama. The president has further pleased Riyadh by making this his first stop on his first foreign trip. No president has ever put Saudi Arabia first so visibly.
But the Saudis want concrete support once Air Force One lifts off for Israel, Rome and then a NATO summit in Brussels. Both countries see Iran as a threat, but the U.S. president demands more burden-sharing from allies. So the prince, who also is defense minister, is said to be ready to invite the U.S. military back to Saudi bases vacated in 2003 in the face of opposition to foreign troops in the land of the two holy mosques. Riyadh is fighting a costly war against Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, and the prince wants more U.S. support.
If the leaders agree to return the U.S. military here, it would mark a significant new commitment to Saudi Arabia’s defense—and surely be seen by Iran as a provocation. It would be a clear triumph for both leaders—and a repudiation of Mr. Obama’s exhortation that Saudi Arabia “share the neighborhood” with Iran.
The U.S. wants to curb Iranian expansion but may be cautious about new entanglements as Saudi-Iranian tensions are rising. Prince Mohammad recently slammed the door on any dialogue with Iran, insisting that Tehran seeks domination of the Muslim world. “We know we are a major target,” he said. “We will not wait until the battle is in Saudi Arabia, but we will work so the battle is there.” Iran immediately warned that if Riyadh persisted with “such stupidity,” nothing will be “left in Saudi Arabia except Mecca and Medina.”
Beyond bases and Islamic nation support in the fight against ISIS terrorists, King Salman seeks to tie the House of Saud to the Trump family. The king has just named another of his sons, Khalid, 29, a former fighter pilot, as ambassador to the U.S. Sending his son to Washington is a very personal gesture to a president with family working in the White House.
Prince Mohammad faces much tougher domestic challenges than President Trump does. The prince has to transform an economy and society long addicted to oil revenues, which have collapsed, and persuade coddled Saudis they must work. Mr. Trump is trying to raise U.S. GDP growth to 3% from 1%; Saudi Arabia has no growth. Mr. Trump seeks to spur U.S. energy production, while the prince is suppressing Saudi production to stabilize prices, in part weakened by growth in U.S. oil production. The U.S. got good news that unemployment is down to 4.4%. Saudi unemployment officially is 11%, but among the 70% of Saudis under 30 the true figure is triple that.
Mr. Trump, for all the angry opposition at home, is more secure than the deputy crown prince. Should his father die, a new king may remove Mohammad bin Salman. Some Saudis believe King Salman will promote MBS to crown prince and thus next in line to be king—but he hasn’t yet done so.
Regardless of these uncertainties, Mohammed bin Salman is confidently pushing ahead with ambitious plans to transform Saudi Arabia. Like Mr. Trump, the prince needs some clear wins over the next several years—an end to the costly Yemen war; successful privatization of Aramco, the national oil company, and other government companies set for public sale. He must persuade skeptical citizens that his plans will in coming years provide Saudis a prosperous life without dependence on oil.
Ms. House, a former publisher of The Wall Street Journal, is the author of “On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines—and Future” ( Knopf, 2012).
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second post
https://clarionproject.org/5-things-trump-saudi-arabia/
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https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-opec-plans-oil-cuts-into-2018-aramcos-ipo-1495567353?mod=e2tw
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http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/isis-wahhabism-saudi-arabia_b_5717157.html
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I am not sure I disagree with Rand on this one. I understand the bolstering up of Saud against Iran and *maybe * but on the other hand Osama Bin Ladin was a Saudi. Why would not believe the arms will simply get siphoned to our enemies? I know the Sauds showed off a building with 200 computers to combat terror but...........
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/senators-trump-arms-sale/2017/05/25/id/792425/
I would sign off on this if Netanyahu feels it is a good idea. Just my take .
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http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/isis-aim-saudi-arabia_b_5748744.html
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http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40155829
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https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/05/world/middleeast/qatar-saudi-arabia-egypt-bahrain-united-arab-emirates.html?emc=edit_ta_20170605&nl=top-stories&nlid=49641193&ref=cta&_r=0
also see
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/05/saudi-arabia-allies-break-diplomatic-ties-qatar-links-terror/
from 2016
http://mobile.reuters.com/article/amp/idUSKBN12Z2SL
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third post
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/home-office-terrorist-funding-report-saudia-arabia-focus-not-publish-conservatives-government-a7766381.html
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third post
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/home-office-terrorist-funding-report-saudia-arabia-focus-not-publish-conservatives-government-a7766381.html
We are long part the point where it is time to recognize that the Saudis are just ISIS with better P.R.
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I have always said that a key to understanding Trump is in his life experience with "The Apprentice". The values of the show are quite Machiavellian.
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/336555-pentagon-cant-square-trump-comments-on-qatar
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https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/21/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman.html?emc=edit_na_20170621&nl=breaking-news&nlid=49641193&ref=cta
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Saudi Arabia's 'Mr. Everything' Is Now Crown Prince, Too
After months of speculation and palace intrigue, Saudi King Salman shook up the kingdom's line of succession on June 21 by naming his powerful son, Mohammed bin Salman, crown prince and removing all titles from Mohammed bin Nayef, the former crown prince. This is the second time Salman has overhauled the line of succession and the Saudi government since taking the throne in January 2015. The move is a controversial one, considering it cuts large and powerful segments of the royal family out of the succession plan. And should the young bin Salman ascend the throne, it could mean Saudi Arabia will be ruled for six decades by father and son.
Today's announcement has several important implications. But none is as important as the amount of trust being placed in bin Salman, who has already amassed enough power to be dubbed "Mr. Everything" by some Western governments. As bin Salman has concentrated his power, bin Nayef has been increasingly sidelined. Today's reshuffle will only remove him from power even further, ousting him from his position at the head of the Interior Ministry and from all other leadership roles.
The Next King
If bin Salman becomes king, he will be the youngest Saudi ruler in modern history, able to potentially preside over decades of policy and reform in the kingdom. The crown prince is known for spearheading the country's economic reform, an agenda he will likely continue to push, and he may well turn his attention to effecting social change as well.
Perhaps more important, bin Salman has a vested interest in trying to solve Saudi Arabia's long-term economic and social challenges, including its overreliance on the oil sector and growing calls for more social liberties. Unlike Saudi leaders who have come before him attempting reform, he doesn't have the luxury of kicking the can down the road; any procrastination would create problems that are his to fix later on.
The Price of Reform
Still, change will come at a price. Any effort to push the boundaries of social reform in the kingdom risks ruffling the feathers of the conservative clerical establishment, which many in the royal family view as the foundation of the House of Saud's legitimacy and support. Many Saudis are firm believers in the conservative social fabric of the country and could resent swift adjustments to social strictures. As a result, any reform must be undertaken carefully while gauging pushback from the public.
In fact, bin Salman already has had to retract some of his suggestions for remedying Saudi Arabia's economic ills: In April, the king reinstated public sector bonuses, seven months after they were eliminated to improve the budget deficit. Popular resistance also prompted Salman to replace the water and electricity minister in April of last year when Saudis protested higher utility prices on Twitter.
Just because bin Salman is now closer to the throne doesn't mean he will have an easier time pushing through his reforms. If the reshuffle has upset other members of the House of Saud — particularly third-generation descendants of King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud who have been completely shut out of the line of succession — they will find ways to hamper the crown prince.
Nevertheless, bin Salman has made a name for himself at home and abroad. Not only has he been instrumental in leading the economic reform called for under the Vision 2030 platform, but he also has made his mark on Saudi Arabia's foreign policy and regional defense strategy in his position as the country's defense minister. He has been particularly instrumental to the kingdom's intervention in Yemen and to its increasingly aggressive stance toward Iran. (Last month he promised to move the fight against Tehran inside Iranian borders.)
Bin Salman has also worked hard to build a close relationship with the United States. But bin Nayef's unseating removes a known partner to U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Bin Salman has skillfully portrayed himself as someone who is fully aligned with the United States in fighting terrorism, but he lacks the decade of experience that bin Nayef accumulated in his campaign against al Qaeda. Moreover, Saudi Arabia's intervention in Yemen, which was one of the first moves bin Salman made as defense minister, has proved costly and has become less and less popular. Bin Salman still faces the risk of blowback on that front.
With a long-term vision for reform, bin Salman has quickly risen within the halls of power. In doing so, he joins the ranks of other Gulf Cooperation Council leaders such as his new counterpart, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. But Saudi Arabia's economic and social issues are far more difficult than those facing the United Arab Emirates, where Al Nahyan's role is secure and well established. So although bin Salman is currently next in line for the throne, whether or not he actually becomes king will depend on how well he navigates the challenges of being crown prince — and how well he addresses the kingdom's problems with concrete action.
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It can be difficult to separate the important from unimportant on any given day. Reflections mean to do exactly that — by thinking about what happened today, we can consider what might happen tomorrow.
In the absolute monarchy of Saudi Arabia, the king is the ultimate decider. On June 21, King Salman implemented a significant decision by shaking up the line of succession to the kingdom's throne with the announcement that his nephew, Mohammed bin Nayef, would be removed from his role of crown prince in favor of his own son, Mohammed bin Salman. The elevation of his scion capped a two-year period during which Salman handed him successively greater power and more leadership responsibilities. While the shift marks a major change for the succession path, it follows a road the king has long traveled.
Several previous personnel and ministry makeovers since Salman took the throne in January 2015 have emphasized that economic reform is the kingdom's top priority. Amid the first major rounds of government streamlining, the king named bin Salman the head of the Council of Economic and Development Affairs, adding to his other official titles such as minister of defense. In April 2016, the massive Vision 2030 economic reform plan was announced, and Mohammed bin Salman has been a public face for reform ever since.
Before he announced the reshuffle at the top, King Salman had already begun gutting the formal and official powers that Mohammed bin Nayef held. Over the previous weekend, the name of the Bureau of Investigation and Public Prosecution was changed to simply the Bureau of Public Prosecution, and it was removed from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior, which had been led by bin Nayef before Salman stripped him of all titles. The bureau was instead put under the control of a prosecutor who reports directly to the king. That move was likely driven by two motives. It could be seen as a streamlining driven by economic reform goals, especially since the bureau investigates mainly domestic economic fraud cases (in addition to doing some terrorism investigations). The new crown prince, hoping to guide Saudi Arabia smoothly through economic transformations and being aware of the growing demand among Saudis for transparency, has prioritized anti-corruption policies. But the changes to the Bureau of Public Prosecution clearly played into palace politics as well; any shifting of power, even slight, away from bin Nayef benefitted bin Salman. Other overhauls of Saudi agencies within the past year, including changes implemented in November 2016 and April 2017, reinforced bin Salman's authority within the government, especially on economic and defense matters.
Perhaps the most critical component of the economic reform program that bin Salman is spearheading is the move to put 5 percent of the state-owned Saudi Arabian Oil Co., or Saudi Aramco, up for an initial public offering. The sale, expected to bring in between $25 billion and $100 billion, will be the financial engine that helps power the country's economic reform. The money it generates will go into the Saudi Public Investment Fund, which will be used to pay for the country's strategic investments domestically and abroad, underpinning its economic reform, diversification and transformation initiatives.
Bin Salman's economic plans are ambitious — already, the Public Investment Fund has invested in Uber and put $45 billion into the SoftBank-led tech investment fund worth roughly $100 billion that was launched last month. And the key to success is maximizing Saudi Aramco's valuation so the kingdom can reap as much reward as possible from the IPO. State-owned oil companies often fare worse than their private brethren in financial markets because they present political risks, especially given the large contributions they make to the broader national economy. With this in mind, and under bin Salman's leadership, Riyadh has sought to maximize Saudi Aramco's value while reducing its tax burden.
To that end, Riyadh cut the oil company's tax obligation in March from roughly 85 percent to 50 percent. That move increases the company's revenue earnings by 333 percent, which, in theory, should triple the valuation of Saudi Aramco and its stock offering. Outside estimates suggest that this could have pushed the company's valuation to between $1 trillion and $1.5 trillion, giving the IPO a value of between $50 billion and $75 billion. However, bin Salman thinks that the worth of the country's crown jewel should top $2 trillion. So Riyadh is planning even more ways to increase it, including tax breaks for the company's heavily subsidized domestic fuel sales.
Though bin Salman has been actively lobbying for the IPO, he has faced internal challenges from allies and members of the royal family who are sensitive to any decisions, such as making a portion of Saudi Aramco public, that could cut their influence or could trim their share of the proceeds. In their eyes, the state-owned company's wealth belongs to the royal family. And beyond tension within the royal family, the crown prince has been butting heads with the Saudi Aramco leadership. Last week, The Wall Street Journal reported that Saudi Aramco's executives had briefed the Saudi Cabinet on the potential location of the IPO: The company's leadership wants to go public on the London Stock Exchange, because they see it as the least risky decision. Bin Salman, however, prefers to list the IPO on the New York Stock Exchange.
A New York-based IPO listing is indeed a much riskier move and could open up Saudi Aramco's shares to class-action lawsuits and potentially even damages under Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act court cases. Moreover, Saudi Aramco would need to comply with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's rules for oil companies, which require countries to report booked reserves. For the good of the IPO, Saudi Arabia has already allowed third-party reviews of its reserves (which is not an SEC requirement), but the country has long regarded the size, status and cost of its oil reserves as a state secret. The SEC also typically requires oil companies to move reserves into production within five years or remove them. For Riyadh, which intends to take a long-term view on oil production, that would not sit well.
But there are grander plans in the works when it comes to bin Salman's preference for a U.S.-based IPO. In addition to being in charge of economic reforms, bin Salman also holds Saudi Arabia's defense portfolios, and in both areas, his worldview is clearly aligned with Washington's. On the security front, Saudi Arabia has been leaning heavily on U.S. backing for counterterrorism and other initiatives to curtail Iran's influence in the region. This dynamic is playing out in the current Qatar-Gulf Cooperation Council crisis. Meanwhile, on bin Salman's 2016 trip to the United States, he made a raft of deals with U.S. tech companies (including Uber) while visiting Silicon Valley, signaling that he's interested in aligning with the United States economically as well.
To bin Salman, the Saudi Aramco IPO is not only a way to finance Vision 2030, but it is also a way to get closer to the United States, which is why he's pushing for a New York listing. That's a much weightier role for Saudi Aramco than its corporate leadership has seen for it thus far, and it comes with risks the company may not be eager to take. But ever since taking charge of Saudi Arabia's economic agenda, bin Salman has been on an almost uninterrupted ascent. And with his most recent promotion within the Saudi government, there is little to suggest that he will have trouble getting his way with Aramco.
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A lot of subtleties in this one
The Peril of Saudi Expansion in the Gulf of Aqaba
by Cynthia Farahat
American Thinker
June 26, 2017
http://www.meforum.org/6792/saudi-gulf-of-aqaba
Originally published under the title "Gulf of Aqaba Treaty: a Saudi Repudiation of the Camp David Accords."
After more than a year of a heated debate, Egypt finally ceded two small Red Sea Islands to Saudi Arabia, giving KSA control over the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. These waterways separate the Sinai Peninsula from the Arabian mainland and portions of the coastline are owned by Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Giving ownership of Tiran and Sanafir Islands and control of the gulf and straits to Saudi Arabia is a strategic mistake and a security threat for five reasons.
1) Almost every regime in Saudi Arabia has furthered expansionist, imperialistic agendas. Historically, Saudi rulers have attempted to lead the Muslim Umma (nation) by conquest or political and religious imperialism. King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud's seizure of power in 2015 wasn't smooth, there were and still are attempts to overthrow him.
The Saudi internal conflict will most likely escalate after King Salman's historic precedent to move the Saudi succession from the house of Abdulaziz ibn al-Saud to the house of Salman. King Salman may believe that asserting his territorial control of Gulf of Aqaba will help him strengthen his domestic position by increasing his regional and international power. Whether the Tiran treaty, and succession coup stunt works or backfires is yet to be seen.
Nearly all Saudi rulers have furthered a religious imperialistic agenda.
2) King Salman has allegedly agreed to a portion of the Camp David Accords, which guarantees Israel unfettered access through the Straits of Tiran. This acquiescence creates a serious catch-22 for the King. While the deal increases King Salman's regional power, an agreement with the Jewish state threatens his domestic authority, because he is bound by Islamic Sunni jurisprudence.
For example, the Saudi view of treaties with Israel was expressed by King Salman supporter and Saudi celebrity Sheikh, Salman al-Ouda. When Mr. al-Ouda was asked about the legitimacy of treaties with Israel, he answered with a Fatwa issued in 1988-1989 and signed by 60 Sunni scholars. It declared jihad against Israel adding, "under no circumstances is a person or an entity to recognize Jewish authority over any fraction of the land of Palestine."
If King Salman were to actually abide by any element of the Camp David Accords, his rule would become illegitimate according to Saudi Arabia's fundamentalist Islamic system. These are the views Saudi rulers indoctrinate their citizens to adopt as the sole legitimate Islamic position towards Israel.
3) According to the Sunni Saudi narrative, suicide bombings against Jews and non-Muslims is a legitimate form of dissent. For example, a member of Saudi Arabia's Supreme Council of Scholars and advisor at the Saudi Royal Court, Abdallah Ibn Man'a, previously stated in an official Fatwa, "The best form of jihad for Allah, is martyrdom in his cause. Whoever dies in such an operation, is a martyr."
Saudi Arabia's King Salman (left) and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Cairo, April 8, 2016.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia indoctrinates its security officers into adopting the belief in suicide bombings. For example, former security police officer and current Muslim sheikh Sami bin Khalid Awad el-Hamoud received his Master's degree in Islamic jurisprudence from King SaudUniversity in Riyadh. His thesis was titled, "Suicide Operations: Its Forms and Its Jurisprudence," where he argued that any region governed by non-Muslim laws is a "house of war," where jihad in all its forms should be exercised.
Since Salman has never shown any intention of abandoning Islamic jurisprudence, which is Saudi Arabia's raison d'être, his only solution under Sunni theology would be to officially agree to the accords, but unofficially continue to support militant Islamic activities.
It's puzzling why Egypt and Israel would agree to further associate with King Salman, who was accused by German intelligence of financing terrorism in Pakistan and Bosnia. While Israel is officially granted freedom of passage in the Gulf of Aqaba by the Camp David Accords, there is absolutely no evidence that Salman will abide by the accords or that he would not abuse his power in the Gulf of Aqaba. This would deeply endanger both Egypt and Israel.
4) The possibility that King Salman will facilitate a jihadist migration into Sinai, given his history as a terror financier, is not far-fetched. The presence of more jihadists in Sinai would endanger both Egypt and Eilat. Sadly, this scenario is likely given the fact that KSA plans to build a bridge linking Sinai to Arabia. Many have taken KSA's newfound control of the Gulf of Aqaba at face value and celebrated it as a Saudi adoption of part of the Camp David Accords. The treaty should be more accurately viewed as a Saudi repudiation of the accords, given the negative possible outcomes for both Egypt and Israel's security.
A warning about Saudi control of Tiran and Sanafir, was communicated in a 1957 CIA intelligence brief titled, "Prospects of an Armed Clash in the Gulf of Aqaba." The brief warned -- "Saudi Arabia, which controls the east coast of the Straits of Tiran, could conceivably take unilateral action to prevent entry of Israeli or Israeli-bound vessels into the Gulf." The briefing continued, "In the event that Saudi forces were to occupy the islands they might attempt to control shipping through the straits of Tiran from positions on the islands." It's still 1957 in Saudi Arabia, and if Salman and his son are overthrown, the possibility of replacing them with an Iranian friendly option, such as Prince Ahmed bin Abdel Aziz al-Saud, would mean that a Saudi-Iran coalition could be created.
5) Signs of other security concerns caused by the treaty have already begun to manifest. The Muslim Brotherhood's Turkey-based Egyptian Revolutionary Council (ERC) has basically declared jihad in Gulf of Aqaba in an official statement on its official Facebook page. The ERC called upon Egyptians living in the cities overlooking the Red Sea to "struggle to liberate" the islands and the Gulf of Aqaba and treat them as "occupied territories."
Giving ownership of Tiran and Sanafir Islands to Saudi Arabia is a strategic mistake.
In another veiled call for terrorism, the statement also urged citizens to "treat all Saudi companies and institutions, as occupying forces." Not only does this destabilize Egypt's security, more dangerously it can inspire a coup d'état in Egypt. A coup could be launched with the excuse of defending Egyptian land, which may work given President el-Sisi's plummeting popularity after the treaty signing.
The issue of the Red Sea islands is part of a broader and reoccurring question of whether or not the free world should be making deals and treaties with Islamic theocracies. The international community would be well advised to refrain from further official treaties with Sunni and other theocratic nations, until these regimes reform their governments and recognize the modern international laws and treaties, to which they have already committed. Until that time, it is irresponsible to make treaties, which have repeatedly backfired. Saudi control of the Gulf of Aqaba, is almost as dangerous to regional peace as President Barack Obama's Iranian nuclear deal.
Cynthia Farahat is a fellow at the Middle East Forum and a columnist for the Egyptian daily Al-Maqal.
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It can be difficult to separate the important from unimportant on any given day. Reflections mean to do exactly that — by thinking about what happened today, we can consider what might happen tomorrow.
The diplomatic crisis in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has taken another turn. The Washington Post reported Sunday that the U.S. intelligence community had information suggesting the United Arab Emirates arranged a cyberattack on Qatar's state news agency in late May that set the dispute in motion. Unnamed U.S. intelligence officials claimed that Abu Dhabi orchestrated a breach of the Qatar News Agency's website and social media accounts to post erroneous statements from Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani expressing support for Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah. The United Arab Emirates, along with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Egypt, then used the false quotes as a pretext to sever diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar. The revelation doubtless will further complicate relations in and beyond the GCC. At the same time, however, it's hardly a surprise.
Though Emirati officials have flatly denied allegations of their involvement, Qatar's leaders have had no trouble believing Abu Dhabi could be behind what they described as a "shameful act of cyber terrorism." The United Arab Emirates, after all, has a long-standing reputation for meddling — along with Saudi Arabia — in Qatar's affairs. Early into their statehood in the 1960s and 1970s, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates quibbled over their territorial boundaries. Riyadh wound up the clear winner in the disputes, but Abu Dhabi benefited as well. Qatar accused the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia more than 30 years later of trying to instigate a countercoup against Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, who had recently overthrown his father. When his son, the current emir, then usurped his father in 2014, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh tried to bring the new leader to heel. They limited their relations with Qatar, demanding that Doha change what they considered destabilizing policies. The efforts met with some success, but they also set the stage for the current crisis in the GCC.
In light of its history with Qatar, the United Arab Emirates' alleged involvement in the hacking scandal seems par for the course. Abu Dhabi's deep distrust of Islamist and opposition movements has made it wary of Doha, which it sees as a force for instability in the region. From the United Arab Emirates' perspective, Qatar's support for groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Taliban, Hamas and Hezbollah — as well as the leeway the country gives its media — encourage extremism and subvert order in the region. Abu Dhabi will tolerate only so much, as its past interferences in Doha's affairs have demonstrated.
Of course, pinning down a clear attribution for a cyberattack sometimes proves impossible. A media platform makes an easy target for a skilled hacker, and determining the United Arab Emirates' level of involvement in the the alleged breach will be tricky, to say the least. Though the new intelligence implicates Abu Dhabi as the coordinator of the attack, evidence has yet to surface that it carried out the hack. A third party, for instance a Russian mercenary hacker, may well have committed the intrusion. Russia's potential involvement in the incident would align with Moscow's strategy to destabilize the United States' strategic relationships, this time in the Middle East, and to pit the GCC members against one another.
Either way, the incident will make it next to impossible for the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia to muster greater U.S. support for their anti-Qatar initiatives. And the irony is that the United States' apparent support for Riyadh and Abu Dhabi's anti-terrorism efforts helped catalyze the crisis in the first place. By focusing on the fight against Islamic extremism during the Riyadh summit in May — just days before the alleged hack — U.S. President Donald Trump may have inadvertently sent Saudi and Emirati leaders the message that they had his backing, no matter what. The Pentagon and the State Department, however, took a more balanced approach to the crisis in deference to the United States' delicate relationship with Qatar, home to one of the largest U.S. military bases in the Middle East. (If the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia decided to run with the White House's seemingly unwavering support despite the rest of the government's hesitation, they weren't the first U.S. allies to do so. The seemingly mixed messages coming out of Washington have created plenty of confusion on the international stage over where the United States stands on issues such as Russia and North Korea.)
Revelations over the hack also stand to change the already shifting relationship between the U.S. intelligence community and that of the United Arab Emirates. The United States depends on its ties with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Qatar to ensure regional security, as well as its own national security. The details about the alleged hack won't change that. But the incident will probably damage the trust that Washington and Abu Dhabi share, even aside from the fact that U.S. officials leaked information about the hack to the press.
In the GCC, likewise, the episode has shaken the already battered bonds of trust between the bloc's members. The UAE foreign affairs minister made reference on Monday to a possible "refashioning of the GCC" and said that its annual summit, scheduled for December, is unlikely to occur if the dispute continues. The diverse bloc has endured its share of problems in the past, but the latest upset could leave more damage in its wake than previous crises have. And relations in the GCC are likely to get worse before they get any better, jeopardizing future efforts at economic and security cooperation among the Gulf states.
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Sep 14, 2017 | 23:24 GMT
Saudi Arabia's Next Generation Makes Ready
A portrait shows King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud Salman (R) and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
(AMER HILABI/AFP/Getty Images)
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Change is coming to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and it may soon reach the top of the nation's monarchy. Amid the sweeping economic and political shifts underway throughout the tightly controlled country, anticipation is building about further adjustments to come. Chief among them is the king's impending abdication, which he is rumored to be planning for the near future in order to clear a path to the throne for new Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
The king's departure would come at a time when the nation is struggling to enact an ambitious and much-needed plan for economic reform. Many of the program's details are unclear or unsettled, and Riyadh is so determined to find the most effective mix of measures that it is heavily revising its National Transformation Plan a little more than a year after its introduction. Like its Gulf neighbors, Saudi Arabia has a penchant for drafting five-year economic initiatives: It has done so repeatedly since 1970. However, it has rarely revisited those plans so soon after implmementing them. As Riyadh rethinks its approach, it will likely set more achievable targets for employers in the private sector while scheming up new ways to bring in revenue from sources other than the oil on which it currently relies. Even the centerpiece of the kingdom's multilayered reform package — the initial public offering of a portion of state-owned energy giant Saudi Arabian Oil Co. — may be delayed until 2019, a year after its target deadline.
Riyadh's attempt to overhaul the Saudi economy has come alongside an effort to revamp the nation's politics. In addition to updating the rules of succession, King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud Salman named Mohammed bin Salman crown prince. Having already streamlined unwieldy ministries and established governing committees over the past two years, the freshly appointed prince wasted no time in creating a security directorate that united some of the intelligence functions of the kingdom's investigative police under his control. The king's expected abdication will mark an even more momentous political change, ushering to the throne the youngest Saudi king in nearly a century and the first monarch from the third generation of Saudi Arabia's founder, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud.
The king's decision to step down is not a matter of if, but when. The real intrigue, however, lies in the changes that it heralds at the country's core, in the strict social mores and political Islam that form the backbone of Saudi society. To smooth the way for the kingdom's approaching leadership transition, the crown prince is likely tightening his grip over political expression, even as he tests the waters of social reform.
This crackdown was made clear in a recent string of arrests that raised questions about the motives behind them. So far this month, authorities have detained dozens of activists, scholars and popular clerics, some of whom are connected to the Muslim Brotherhood-aligned Sahwa movement. Of course, there could be a simple explanation for the arrests: They may merely be part of Saudi Arabia's ongoing dispute with Qatar. The sheikhs in question publicly advocated mending ties with Doha, and Riyadh doubtless found the clerics' stance troubling — particularly since they boast millions of Twitter followers and the ability to shape public opinion.
By the same token, it's logical to expect the crown prince to try to rein in popular dissent. Given Twitter's popularity in Saudi Arabia, the ruling family has every reason to silence influential voices that spread narratives contradicting Riyadh's own. Protests are not unheard of in the kingdom, especially with regard to labor issues. And although mass demonstrations against the ruling family are rare, calls for popular dissent have circulated widely on social media channels in recent weeks. Whether the public will actually answer those calls with action is unclear, but the possibility is one Riyadh cannot afford to ignore at such a critical juncture.
Nevertheless, the recent arrests could also portend a larger, more gradual change underway. Much like the neighboring United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia may be adopting a more stringent stance against Islamist movements that resemble the Muslim Brotherhood and its anti-establishment ideology. The detainees, after all, belonged to the ranks of Saudi Arabia's independent clerics rather than those who work closely with the royal family and rely on Riyadh for financial and political support. The fate of the prisoners' independent peers in the months ahead will be an important indicator of whether some strains of political Islam are truly falling out of favor in the kingdom — and whether, by extension, a more liberal social atmosphere is in the offing.
Meanwhile, Stratfor sources indicate that when the crown prince takes the throne, he plans to separate the titles of "king" and "custodian of the two holy mosques," which are currently intertwined. (The latter refers to Saudi Arabia's control over Mecca and Medina, two of Islam's holiest sites.) Though Saudi monarchs have used the second moniker only since the 1980s, it is a centuries-old label intended to communicate the kingdom's religious legitimacy and power in the Islamic world. Should the crown prince abandon it, the move would position the king as a secular civil leader rather than a guiding spiritual figure. And though a small adjustment in some ways, it would make a big statement by a young ruler seeking to forge a new path for an ever-changing kingdom while managing dissent along the way.
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• Saudi Arabia: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has said the government will eschew extremism and pursue a more moderate version of Islam. The country’s clerics and state institutions – historically, along with oil revenue, the pillars of government control – are the object of his comments. Though this is a logical next step in Saudi Arabia’s reform agenda, the crown prince has taken it faster than we expected. We need to understand how the government intends to make these reforms palatable since they risk destabilizing the country.
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Wow big news:
one Maria Bartiromo's favorite guests (among others) just got arrested:
https://apnews.com/0a56ff948429490bbb24b5ff57d4f08a
Be interesting to hear the upcoming analysis of this.
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https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/05/world/middleeast/saudi-crown-prince-purge.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FSaudi%20Arabia&action=click&contentCollection=world®ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection
Apparently Trump is for it.
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The two may be related:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MoN4dZHaX6w
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/i-will-return-saudi-arabia-moderate-islam-crown-prince
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The Saudi Cauldron
Weekend events show the Middle East conflicts to come.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman meets with Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in Riyadh, Oct. 30.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman meets with Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in Riyadh, Oct. 30. Photo: Dalati Nohra Associated Press
By The Editorial Board
Nov. 5, 2017 6:05 p.m. ET
30 COMMENTS
Authoritarian governments tend to be most vulnerable when they are trying to change, so the weekend events in Saudi Arabia are worth watching for more than the usual royal family Kremlinology. They reflect the drive for Saudi reform and the contest between the Saudis and Iran for regional influence.
Saudi authorities made a wave of arrests Saturday, including members of the royal family and cabinet members. The targets include Prince al-Waleed bin Talal, a billionaire investor in Apple and Twitter and once a major investor in the Journal’s parent company, News Corp .
The arrests are being advertised as part of an anti-corruption campaign endorsed by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is trying to consolidate power as the heir apparent to his father, King Salman. The Crown Prince has been making enemies among royals no longer in favor and the arrests are a sign that he is brooking little dissent as he tries to reform the Kingdom’s economy and even some of its social mores. While the U.S. has a stake in the Kingdom’s successful evolution, the arrests are a sign that the transition will be rocky.
All the more so given that Iran will try to exploit any instability. That’s the message sent by the resignation of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Saad Hariri Saturday on a trip to Saudi Arabia. He said he feared an assassination plot and he blamed Iran for causing “devastation and chaos.” Iran and its Hezbollah militia in Lebanon blamed the Saudis and U.S., and the resignation ends the alliance between the Sunni Muslim Mr. Hariri and the Shiite Hezbollah. Israel welcomed the resignation, and one reading is that this will open the way for Israel or Saudi Arabia to attack Hezbollah to reduce its growing influence in Syria and the Levant.
Meanwhile, the Saudis shot down a missile aimed at Riyadh that was fired from Yemen by Houthi rebels allied with Iran. The missile launch shows the Houthis are far from defeated in their war with a Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.
Behind all this is the effort by Iran, backed by Russia, to exploit the opening created by the fall of Islamic State to dominate the region. Israel and Saudi Arabia can’t let that happen, and with the U.S. seemingly on the sidelines, expect more conflict to come.
Appeared in the November 6, 2017, print edition.
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Being the peaceful and rational people we know them to be, I'm sure this will all turn out fine, and not a civil war that spawns WWIII or anything...
The Saudi Cauldron
Weekend events show the Middle East conflicts to come.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman meets with Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in Riyadh, Oct. 30.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman meets with Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in Riyadh, Oct. 30. Photo: Dalati Nohra Associated Press
By The Editorial Board
Nov. 5, 2017 6:05 p.m. ET
30 COMMENTS
Authoritarian governments tend to be most vulnerable when they are trying to change, so the weekend events in Saudi Arabia are worth watching for more than the usual royal family Kremlinology. They reflect the drive for Saudi reform and the contest between the Saudis and Iran for regional influence.
Saudi authorities made a wave of arrests Saturday, including members of the royal family and cabinet members. The targets include Prince al-Waleed bin Talal, a billionaire investor in Apple and Twitter and once a major investor in the Journal’s parent company, News Corp .
The arrests are being advertised as part of an anti-corruption campaign endorsed by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is trying to consolidate power as the heir apparent to his father, King Salman. The Crown Prince has been making enemies among royals no longer in favor and the arrests are a sign that he is brooking little dissent as he tries to reform the Kingdom’s economy and even some of its social mores. While the U.S. has a stake in the Kingdom’s successful evolution, the arrests are a sign that the transition will be rocky.
All the more so given that Iran will try to exploit any instability. That’s the message sent by the resignation of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Saad Hariri Saturday on a trip to Saudi Arabia. He said he feared an assassination plot and he blamed Iran for causing “devastation and chaos.” Iran and its Hezbollah militia in Lebanon blamed the Saudis and U.S., and the resignation ends the alliance between the Sunni Muslim Mr. Hariri and the Shiite Hezbollah. Israel welcomed the resignation, and one reading is that this will open the way for Israel or Saudi Arabia to attack Hezbollah to reduce its growing influence in Syria and the Levant.
Meanwhile, the Saudis shot down a missile aimed at Riyadh that was fired from Yemen by Houthi rebels allied with Iran. The missile launch shows the Houthis are far from defeated in their war with a Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.
Behind all this is the effort by Iran, backed by Russia, to exploit the opening created by the fall of Islamic State to dominate the region. Israel and Saudi Arabia can’t let that happen, and with the U.S. seemingly on the sidelines, expect more conflict to come.
Appeared in the November 6, 2017, print edition.
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The last time that a major Sunni power fought a war in Yemen, many unanticipated bad things followed. That was Egypt in the 1960's. I'm more concerned about the Saudi-Iran conflict and the various proxy wars that could spin out of this conflict than I am concerned about the Nork's.
Egypt's failures in Yemen led it to gin up conflicts - one of which was the Six Days War. Just sayin' ...
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Some random thoughts:
*There was a high level meeting with the US a couple of days before this night of the long scimitars. Green light given?
*This followed closely on the heels of the Crown Prince calling for a return to moderate Islam. Combine this with what may be the populist play of going after corruption -- this may be the support the CP seeks to break the power of the Salfist-Wahhabis.
*The CP may be intensely motivated by desire to meet President Trump's call to "Drive them out". Trump and America are very popular right now with this faction in Saudi Arabia. I was greeted quite warmly by rich Saudis a couple of times while in Amman.
*With the accidental :wink: ? helicopter crash it may be worth noting that some or all on board had dealings with the Podesta Group.
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Nov 8, 2017 | 01:23 GMT
Saudi Arabia: Where Ambition and Geopolitics Align
Change is in the air in the desert kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Three days of palace intrigue in Riyadh have captivated Saudis and foreign observers alike as dozens of princes, ministers and former officials were swept up in an anti-corruption campaign led by young Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
The crackdown is certainly driven by the legitimate motives of restructuring the royal family's patronage networks and curtailing corruption. However, it is also designed to cement the powerful prince's status at the top of the country's economic and political hierarchy. For years bin Salman and his father, King Salman, have meticulously planned the young ruler's rapid ascent to the throne. But their quest to consolidate power is as much a product of Saudi Arabia's geopolitical environment as it is of their personal ambition.
With a New Generation, a New Balance of Power
The Salmans' attempt to amass power has been years in the making. Because Saudi Arabia's founder, King Abdulaziz, had 36 sons, much of the kingdom's contemporary history has been characterized by competition — and alliance-building, often along maternal lines — among the family's various branches. Control of certain positions or institutions would often go to specific bases of royal influence. For instance, former Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz led the Defense Ministry for nearly 50 years before passing it to his brother, the current king. In much the same way, former King Abdullah eventually handed the reins of the Saudi Arabian National Guard to his son. Some princes even managed to carve out their own roles in the kingdom's economy, though certain sectors, including the all-important oil industry, remained in the hands of technocrats.
This patchwork power structure created an informal system of checks and balances that prevented any single royal faction from dominating the country. As a result, sweeping change in Saudi Arabia has historically required consensus among the ruling family. But that system now seems to have run its course. The sons of the kingdom's founder are aging, and his grandsons are eager to claim their birthright. As they do, King Salman has taken it upon himself to restructure the House of Saud and the balance of power within it.
Since assuming the throne in January 2015, the king has worked to reorganize the Saudi state under the control of his son Mohammed — the oldest of the founder's grandsons — while eliminating challenges from familial rivals. In fact, just hours after taking office, King Salman named Mohammed bin Salman defense minister, giving him a leading role in the country's military apparatus. In the years that followed, the crown prince also became the face of the kingdom's Vision 2030 plan for economic reform and the head of several important economic councils, including the newly created supreme council of the Saudi Arabian Oil Co.
Mohammed bin Salman quickly rose to prominence, but it wasn't until this year that he was able to unseat two of his greatest competitors. In June, the king passed over the powerful Mohammed bin Nayef, who controlled the Interior Ministry and thus some of the country's intelligence services, to name bin Salman crown prince. By the following month, the newly appointed ruler had built a security directorate that gave him additional oversight into the investigative functions of the Saudi intelligence community. Bin Salman then removed Prince Miteb bin Abdullah from his post at the head of the Saudi Arabian National Guard in November, curbing his cousin's clout while enhancing his own in the process.
A Need for Reform Rooted in Geopolitics
But there is more spurring the crown prince's activities than a simple generational shift. Today the Saudi kingdom faces the biggest economic crisis it has encountered since the discovery of oil in 1938. Stubbornly low crude prices have slowed the country's oil-dependent economy, and though they may temporarily rise — indeed, on Nov. 6 prices reached their highest peak since June 2015 — it is clear that oil will not reliably fuel Saudi Arabia's economic growth as it once did. Bin Salman, who is only 32 years old, will doubtless preside over the rocky economic transition ahead as the importance of oil in the global energy mix diminishes over the next few decades.
The fiscal challenges this adjustment has caused have already forced Saudi Arabia to tighten its belt. Earlier this year, Saudi officials slashed certain subsidies and at one point even considered canceling all of them. But as difficult as the reduction in oil revenue and social spending has been for Riyadh, finding a new economic model to replace its current one, oriented around petroleum exports, will be even harder.
In all likelihood, a massive reform package like the Vision 2030 program that seeks to leverage the kingdom's strength — massive financial reserves that can be funneled toward investment — may be its best chance for growth in the long run. And as Saudi Arabia searches for ways to boost its labor productivity, it will have greater economic incentive to encourage the participation of women in the workforce and in public life. All of these changes are significant and sensitive issues that Saudi Arabia's next ruler must grapple with over the next decade or two. And all are problems the crown prince cannot address from a position of weakness, since their solutions are likely to alienate some of the country's most influential factions.
... sweeping change in Saudi Arabia has historically required consensus among the ruling family. But that system now seems to have run its course.
Beyond the domestic forces shaping bin Salman's economic policies, there are also external forces pushing the crown prince to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy. Saudi Arabia's goals of combating terrorism and curbing the ability of regional rivals, such as Iran, to aid militant groups throughout the region have pushed Riyadh to remain engaged in a costly war in Yemen. Meanwhile, Tehran's growing political and security ties to places like Iraq, Syria and Lebanon have fueled Riyadh's fears that Iran is gaining influence in the Middle East at Saudi Arabia's expense.
Bin Salman has already proved more than willing to challenge Iran in the places where it has most sway, especially with a mighty ally — Washington — at his back. Wary of the ways in which Iran might use its ties to militias in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, the United States has supported Saudi Arabia's aspirations of regional dominance. Though the crown prince would likely stick to his assertive tactics abroad with or without Washington's approval, the heft of U.S. support has certainly aided his endeavors.
A Risky Gamble
Overhauling the kingdom's traditional methods of decision-making carries certain risks. The swift upset of patronage networks and power channels is bound to invite pushback from the Saudi elite. So far it is unclear whether bin Salman intends to shrink the circle of power to a group of his closest advisers, or to monopolize power himself. But what it is clear is that the crown prince is betting on his popularity among Saudi citizens — many of whom support his anti-corruption drive — to provide the mandate he needs to rewrite the kingdom's social contract against the wishes of its leaders.
After all, in a post-oil era, Saudi Arabia can no longer afford to offer the type of generous handouts that have long kept a healthy distance between the country's government and those being governed. Instead, the kingdom will need a different social contract that demands more trust between Saudi citizens and officials. Bin Salman is well aware of this need, and to a point he has been successful in his pursuit of the strength required to fulfill it. But only time will tell whether he will achieve the same success in cultivating his people's confidence in those who rule them.
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*With the accidental :wink: ? helicopter crash it may be worth noting that some or all on board had dealings with the Podesta Group.
Al-Arkancide?
Ron Brown unavailable for comment.
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Billionaires are not going to take this lying down:
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-10-03-are-saudi-reforms-doomed-to-fail/#.WgRhKVw-epo
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-economy-total/oil-major-total-sees-challenges-to-saudi-reform-drive-idUSKBN1D22TH
" The kingdom has also sunk hundreds of millions of dollars into the development and construction of a new Red Sea beach resort which “allows” women to dress in swimwear, "
Wow! I am waiting for a pin up calendar : " The girls of Saudi Arabia " (hasn't anyone with wondered what is under all those black robes?)
ps: I hope I don't get beheaded for the thought.
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http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Our-World-Pining-for-fig-leaves-514163
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second post
Highlights
Despite the recent hype surrounding so-called new cities, the concept has ample precedent throughout history.
The challenge new cities face is attracting businesses and people to relocate there, either with government policy or with seamless connection to an existing economic center.
Saudi Arabia will probably struggle to meet these criteria and, by extension, to achieve its goals for Neom, the high-tech megacity it plans to build.
With all the news coming out of Saudi Arabia over the past few weeks, it would be easy to overlook the announcement of the country's latest proposal for a new megacity. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman recently revealed his plan for a $500 billion project to build a brand-new, robot-powered metropolis that, according to a promotional video, "will change the way we live and work, forever." Neom, as the city is to be named, is in many respects like several other so-called new cities proposed or underway in Saudi Arabia and around the world. China unveiled a similar plan this year to turn land 100 kilometers (about 60 miles) south of the capital into a megacity, the Xiongan New Area, that is intended to serve as the new site of Beijing's nongovernmental functions. Not to be outdone, India's prime minister has launched the "Smart Cities" program, which aims to construct 100 new urban areas across the country. New cities are being promoted as the wave of the future.
Despite the name and the timing of these announcements, however, "new cities" aren't really so new. History is full of examples of governments and urban planners creating cities out of nothing, with varying degrees of success. A look back at the triumphs and troubles of new cities past sheds light on the prospects of future developments of the sort, including Neom.
Building for a New Political Landscape
Perhaps the most common and recognizable form of new city is the master-planned political capital. For countries with disparate and often competing regions and interest groups, founding a new national capital is a natural solution. If an established major city were named the capital, the government could be perceived to favor that city and its interests over those of other parts of the country. A new city, on the other hand, could serve as neutral territory among the nation's various interest groups. The strategy has a good track record. Washington, D.C., which came about as a compromise between the northern and southern United States, offers the most famous modern example. But the capitals of countries such as Brazil, Australia, Pakistan and Nigeria all arose from similar considerations. The presence of a national government in a city provides a strong growth stimulus for that place, provided the organs of government fully relocate there.
Governments develop the second kind of new city to slide around their own regulations. Countries may establish special economic zones — areas in which trade is more open — as a comfortable middle ground between strict government control over the economy and liberalization. For the leaders of states with heavily regulated economies, embracing free trade nationwide may seem like an invitation to economic and social upheaval. Special economic zones offer some benefits of global trade while minimizing the risks. Establishing the zones in existing major cities, however, would entail some of the same social and economic challenges that widespread liberalization would pose, and it could also give certain interest groups in the country an advantage over others. To avoid these problems, governments in this position often opt to develop new cities for special economic zones to mitigate the fallout on existing cities.
Shenzhen, China, exemplifies this tactic. In 1980, the city — then a tiny market town with a population of 30,000 — became the center of China's first special economic zone, opened to facilitate more liberal trade with the international community. Today, Shenzhen is home to more than 10 million people, a prominent outpost in China's growing high-tech economy and the country's most successful new city. Much of its staggering growth owes to the specific economic conditions under which it was founded. One could argue that a more economically open zone in 1980s China — an enormous country whose reclusion was the only constraint on its latent manufacturing capacity — was bound to boom no matter its location. Absent these conditions, a special economic zone probably couldn't achieve the same results. Adding a zone with marginally more liberal trade regulations likely would yield only a marginal gain for countries that already have mostly liberalized their economies. By the same token, states without very much economic potential locked away under restrictive policies won't derive much benefit from creating a special economic zone.
Building for the Modern World
A third kind of new city has less to do with government and politics than it does with logistics. Many cities around the world sprang up long before the dawn of modern business, and, as a result, they are ill-suited to the demands of today's industries. Older cities are often overcrowded, hard to navigate, and short on the physical space and amenities modern companies need for their day-to-day operations. Building a new city nearby offers a way to alleviate these problems while also relieving some of the population pressure on the established urban hubs. In India, the city of Delhi has undergone this process at least twice in its history: New Delhi formed in the early 20th century to ease the crowding in Old Delhi, and in the late 20th century, the city of Gurgaon developed with a similar goal in mind. Shanghai's Pudong district is an archetypal example of this pattern. Located just across the river from historic Shanghai, Pudong provided the modern amenities — and impressive skyline — the city needed to thrive in the 21st century.
The practice of building new cities to complement or upgrade existing ones isn't limited to the developing world, either. Many European capitals have added modern high-rise business districts, such as Canary Wharf in London and La Defense in Paris. Dozens of master-planned regional subcenters, such as Century City and Irvine, sprouted up across the Los Angeles area in the latter 20th century, seeking to supplant and improve on the old urban core. Many advanced economies have gone even further and largely "redeveloped" their traditional urban cores, flattening what was there and rebuilding to improve the areas for modern business.
Putting Neom in Context
Of these three strategies, Saudi Arabia's plan for Neom most closely fits the third. The kingdom's megacity is meant to be a modern environment built to accommodate the modern world more effectively than its other urban centers can. I recently spoke with Shirish Patel, an experienced Indian urban planner and one of the chief architects of Navi Mumbai, about how to develop such places. By the 1970s, Bombay, as it was then called, was running out of room to build adequate housing and transportation infrastructure, situated as it is at the tip of a long, narrow island. Patel and his colleagues decided to build a well-planned new metropolis, Navi Mumbai, across the bay from the old city center to extend and ultimately supersede it.
During our conversation, Patel identified three key conditions that are critical for a new city to be successful, if it's not planned as a political center. First, a substantial number of business operations must move there. Second, the new city must offer convenient transportation to a vibrant established economic area, facilitating the transfer of business activity. Finally, a special regulatory environment could help make the new place more attractive to people and companies. Navi Mumbai struggled to achieve these fundamental goals, though the city generated enough revenue to finance its construction. The bridge and high-speed ferry proposed to connect the old and new Mumbai never materialized; businesses kept the bulk of their operations back in the old city, moving mainly back offices to Navi Mumbai. And while the government provided some incentives to draw residents and businesses across the bay, it neutralized that effort by continuing to encourage development in the old city center.
Considering what it takes for a new city to thrive, Neom's chances for success look dim. Saudi Arabia is not planning to move its capital to the new development. A special economic zone around Neom would do little for the city's prospects, since the kingdom’s economy is already mostly open to the world. Furthermore, Neom will be located far from the other cities in the country, meaning it won't be able to lean on their economies very much as it works to build its own.
Given the factors working against it, Neom's best hope is that major domestic and international businesses relocate there. The Saudi government may try to cajole the country's companies to set up shop in the city. But what will encourage the rest of the world's businesses to move in? Most multinational corporations currently maintain their regional headquarters across the border in the United Arab Emirates. Persuading them to uproot their operations from the neighboring state, with its established cluster of business and financial hubs, its comparatively liberal society and its relatively warmer ties with the region's Shiite communities, will be a steep task for Riyadh.
A new city called Neom may well come to fruition in some form or another. The odds are slim, however, that it will live up to its promises as a sprawling urban landscape 33 times the size of New York City, spanning three countries and pioneering nine different cutting-edge industries. Contrary to what the promotional video touts, Neom will probably never become the "place where we can prepare together for the next era of human progress." Nevertheless, it will provide a valuable lesson to future city builders.
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second post
The recent spate of arrests in Saudi Arabia caught global businesses and diplomats off guard. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman rounded up dozens of the kingdom's most influential people, including members of the royal family, and reportedly threw them in five-star detention at Riyadh's Ritz-Carlton Hotel on suspicions of corruption. Bin Salman also recently ordered the arrests of prominent clerics, activists and scholars. Continuing a pattern the young crown prince has established in his rise to power, the surprise move demonstrates bin Salman's intention to tighten his grip over Saudi Arabia's political, economic and security institutions.
As the dust settles, international investors are wondering what will be the fallout of the corruption accusations against Prince Alwaleed bin Talal bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, one of the world's wealthiest entrepreneurs and a cousin of bin Salman. Bin Talal's Kingdom Holding Company (KHC) manages more than $12.5 billion in investments across 13 distinct sectors worldwide, according to its website. In addition, the prince, one of Twitter's top five shareholders, invested $300 million in the social media platform in 2011 and holds stakes in Apple Inc., Citigroup Inc. and the Walt Disney Co, as well. But bin Talal, whom Forbes calls one of the world's most intelligent and creative investors, is famous not only for his investments in banking, real estate and media. He is also renowned as a philanthropic mogul, and his arrest sent shock waves through that powerful and prestigious amalgam of public and private sectors.
Portrait of a Philanthropist
In 2014, the Wealth-X and UBS Billionaire Census ranked Saudi Arabia 10th among the 40 countries and territories with the most billionaires in their populations. The report counted 57 billionaires in the kingdom — bin Talal among them — whose collected wealth totaled $166 billion. The Saudi prince fits the international profile of an ultra-high net worth individual who is philanthropic. One of 35 percent of the world's billionaires with his own foundation, bin Talal is active in the philanthropic sphere, contributing to numerous charities. And like others in this category of philanthropists, he sees his giving as a means to preserve his culture and values for future generations. But rather than channeling the bulk of his philanthropic contributions into one or two causes, like education and health — as many of his peers do — bin Talal gives to more than 100 organizations through his foundation, Alwaleed Philanthropies.
Alwaleed Philanthropies supports an array of causes, including health, women's empowerment, education, cross-cultural bridge building and disaster relief. In 2013, the organization donated 1.5 million Saudi riyals (about $400,000 at the time) to address the harsh conditions in which some 46,000 Syrian refugees were living after a winter storm froze much of the Middle East. Partnering with other charitable organizations such as Food Banking Regional Network and Save the Children, bin Talal's foundation provided "food, medicine and clothing," along with health care services, to people living in refugee camps, according to a press release from Alwaleed Philanthropies' website.
Sometimes the aid isn't welcome. During a ceremony of condolence at ground zero in October 2001, for example, bin Talal offered a check for $10 million to assist New York City in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Then-Mayor Rudy Giuliani refused the gift, citing the prince's comment that the United States needed to "address some of the issues that led to such a criminal attack." Bin Talal's statement continued:
"While the U.N. passed clear resolutions numbered 242 and 338 calling for the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip decades ago, our Palestinian brethren continue to be slaughtered at the hands of Israelis while the world turns the other cheek."
Although some observers characterize the prince as a candid, flamboyant social liberal, the motive behind his philanthropy is based in his faith. On his website, bin Talal quotes the Prophet Muhammad, saying, "The wealth of a man will not diminish by Sadaqah (charity)." He goes on to assert the role of personal responsibility in managing global crises:
"The myriad challenges facing the world cannot be left to governments alone. It requires the concerted efforts of each and every one of us who can participate in the search for solutions on both a local and a global scale. … Alwaleed Philanthropies supports and initiates projects around the world, regardless of gender, race or religion. We collaborate with a range of philanthropic, governmental and educational organizations to combat poverty, empower women and the youth, develop communities, provide disaster relief and create cultural understanding through education. Together, we can build bridges for a more compassionate, tolerant and accepting world."
Laying a Broad Foundation
The foundation partners with a diverse array of organizations, including the Danish Refugee Council, the New Zealand Red Cross and the King Hussein Cancer Center in Amman, Jordan. In December 2005, bin Talal gave $20 million to expand Georgetown University's Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, which was subsequently renamed in his honor. The endowment was the second-largest single gift in the university's history, according to the center's website. In response to the prince's arrest, John Esposito, the center's director, told me:
"In light of the 9/11 attacks, the impact and importance of Muslim-West relations was magnified. Alwaleed generously endowed new centers ... (in the Middle East and North Africa) in American Studies so that students in (the) Arab world would understand America and the West better and then four centers (in the West) so that students in (the United States, United Kingdom and Europe) would understand Islam and Muslim-West relations better."
In 2015, bin Talal even pledged to donate his $32 billion fortune to charity after his death. He has said of his foundation's activities:
"Our work is only just beginning. With the mounting problems of understanding, equity, poverty and disasters facing the world, our work is more necessary than ever before. Building on our proven history, we will continue to play an active role, finding intelligent solutions to the world's most pressing issues with empathy, dedication and commitment."
An Arrest Felt Round the World
Since the cascade of high-profile arrests in Saudi Arabia, thousands of bank accounts in the kingdom have been frozen. Saudi Attorney General Saud al-Mojeb insists that the frozen accounts are strictly personal and that businesses and financial institutions will be "free to continue with transactions as usual." But under which category will Alwaleed Philanthropies be assessed? Already, KHC's shares have plummeted on the Saudi stock exchange, despite al-Mojeb's assurances Nov. 9 that the corruption sweeps wouldn't hurt business in the kingdom.
The challenges of understanding, equality, poverty and disaster are on the rise worldwide, and governments are not positioned to solve the existential problems of hunger, homelessness and climate change. Though bin Talal's philanthropic efforts can't cure all of the world's ills, they make a difference in a handful of crucial areas. Where will his beneficiaries look if his accounts are frozen, and if his promised $32 billion posthumous charitable gift shrinks or evaporates? To what degree will other philanthropists of his financial stature step in? Even without the recent arrests in Saudi Arabia, we are already standing at the breech.
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Saudi Arabia's Strategic Miscalculation in Yemen
by Hilal Khashan
Stratfor Worldview
November 10, 2017
http://www.meforum.org/7008/saudi-arabia-makes-strategic-miscalculation
Saudi Arabia is embroiled in a war in Yemen that it can't win.
Saudi Arabia seems to have bitten off more than it can chew in Yemen. On March 26, 2015, the kingdom launched Operation Decisive Storm, a broad Arab-Islamic initiative ostensibly aimed at reinstating the government of Yemeni President Abd Rabboh Mansour Hadi, whom insurgents had forced from the capital, Sanaa, a month earlier. More than two and a half years on, Saudi Arabia is no closer to its goal, embroiled in a war that it can't win.
How did the country wind up making such a strategic blunder? Going into the conflict, its leaders were well aware of the steep odds against the operation's success — of Yemen's unconquerable terrain and intractable tribal machinations. The Saudis tend to equivocate in their explanations of what drove them to intervene in the war-torn country in the first place. But a look at the kingdom's history and founding ideology offers insight into Riyadh's dilemma in Yemen.
A Legacy of Conquest in the Arabian Peninsula
Saudi Arabia's history is one of bloodshed. The alliance that Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab formed in the mid-18th century with the founder of the first Saudi state, Muhammad ibn Saud, established the kingdom's policy to pursue its objectives by force rather than diplomacy. By the end of the 1700s, Wahhab's followers would put that policy into action. They invaded Kuwait in 1793, laid siege to Ras al-Khaima (now part of the United Arab Emirates) in 1799, entered Bahrain in 1801, attacked Karbala, in modern-day Iraq, in 1802, and briefly took Basra and Jeddah the next year. In 1818, the Egyptian army destroyed the Saudi state, but the country emerged in its modern incarnation at the turn of the 20th century.
And like its predecessors (including the second Saudi state, which lasted from 1824 to 1891), the new kingdom had a penchant for war. The Saudis brought the Hashemite Kingdom of Hejaz to its demise in the 1920s through a series of gruesome massacres, and the next decade, they took on Yemen. During the war of 1934, Saudi Arabia seized Asir, Jizan and Najran from its southwestern neighbor, driving a permanent wedge between the two countries. Abdulaziz ibn Saud, founder of the modern Saudi state, reportedly told his sons on his deathbed nearly 20 years later that to maintain their country's strength, they must keep Yemen weak.
Origins of a Conflict
When a group of revolutionaries deposed Yemen's monarch in 1962, a civil war broke out between Yemeni royalists and advocates of a republican system of government. Saudi Arabia's leaders, worried that the political upheaval could seep into their territory, sided with the royalists in the eight-year conflict.
Saudi-backed royalists in Yemen, 1962.
After the two sides reached a compromise to end the war, Riyadh's military involvement in Yemen gave way to a subtler intervention. Saudi Arabia worked to buy influence with the country's various tribes and in the 1990s threw its weight behind Islah, an Islamist party with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, to counter President Ali Abdullah Saleh's General People's Congress.
Around the same time, the Houthi movement emerged among Yemen's Zaidi Shiite population, preaching peace, tolerance and cultural openness. The movement had evolved into an insurgency by the early 2000s, despite its pacifist claims, and in November 2009, the Houthis seized a mountainous section of Saudi Arabia's Jizan province, near the border. From Saudi Arabia's perspective, the incursion — retaliation against Riyadh for allegedly allowing Yemeni army units onto Saudi territory to carry out strikes against the Houthis — violated the tacit conditions of the truce it made with Yemen after the 1934 war. And so, it struck back, launching its first military offensive in nearly two decades. Though the brief conflict highlighted the limitations of their military capabilities, the Saudis nevertheless felt certain that a full-blown war was inevitable.
The alliance between Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the founder of the first Saudi state established the kingdom's policy to pursue its objectives by force.
Houthi fighters in Sanaa, shortly after their capture of the Yemeni capital in September 2014.
The Yemeni Revolution of 2011 laid the groundwork for the next clash. The uprising, during which Saleh stepped down from power, filled many Yemenis with hope that their country would establish a modern, independent political system. But the transition fell short of the population's expectations: The new president, Hadi, encountered numerous challenges to his rule, and Yemen soon descended into chaos. A few years later in September 2014, the Houthis took control of Sanaa, and in February 2015, they unveiled a constitutional declaration to transform the country's political system.
For the Saudi government — which views the monarchy's continuity as the key to the kingdom's security — the Houthis' revolution hit too close to home. Riyadh worried that the Houthi takeover in Sanaa would galvanize Saudi Arabia's Zaidi and Ismaili Shiite population near the Yemeni border. In addition, the Houthis' long-standing ties with Iran heightened the kingdom's concerns over Tehran's expanding influence in the region. Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners, including the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Jordan and Pakistan, began their operation against the Houthis the following month. If air power could achieve spectacular victories in the Six-Day War of 1967 and in Desert Storm in 1991, the Saudis reasoned, an air campaign would work in Yemen, as well.
A Coalition of Uncommon Interests
Compared with the coalition's leader, however, its other members had less at stake in Yemen. Most of Saudi Arabia's partners, in fact, were reluctant to join the operation at all. Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan and Morocco limited their involvement in the war against the Houthis. Egypt and Pakistan refused to send ground troops to the fight. Sudan, by contrast, sent thousands of troops to Yemen, if only so that Riyadh would intercede on its behalf and persuade Washington to suspend the sanctions against it. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were the only states in the coalition invested in the war.
But even they had different reasons for entering the conflict. Saudi Arabia's aims for Operation Decisive Storm and its successor, Operation Restoring Hope, were to crush the Houthis, sever their ties to Iran and secure the Saudi-Yemeni border in Jizan and Najran. The United Arab Emirates, on the other hand, had its own priorities in mind. Abu Dhabi, unlike Riyadh, isn't interested in driving the Houthis out of the Yemeni capital. Emirati leaders fear that doing so could give Islah — which they view as a threat to their own stability — a place in Yemen's political future. After making a perfunctory bid to train Yemeni troops for an offensive to retake Sanaa, Emirati forces turned their attention instead to southern Yemen. There, they worked to secure control of the Arabian coast and the strategic Bab al-Mandab Strait, a critical conduit for international trade. The United Arab Emirates is also keen on preventing the Yemeni port of Aden from competing with the Jebel Ali port, near Dubai.
The War That Cannot Be Won
Because of their diverging interests in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have differing levels of commitment to the conflict, too.
Saudi Crown Prince and Defense Minister Mohammed bin Salman
Abu Dhabi's crown prince announced on Twitter in June 2016 that his country would end its military involvement in Yemen, though it would continue "monitoring political arrangements" and "empowering Yemenis in liberated areas." Saudi troops, meanwhile, have continued their fight in the state, pursuing goals that seem more distant by the day.
Saudi Defense Minister Mohammed bin Salman knows the kingdom will probably never defeat the Houthis in Yemen. Saleh tried and failed to rout the movement six times between 2004 and 2010. And despite adamant declarations to the contrary, bin Salman wants to end Operation Restoring Hope. The young crown prince already has undertaken unprecedented reforms to modernize the Saudi economy, empower the country's women, and combat corruption and nepotism. But he has yet to overcome the legacy of blood and iron on which Saudi Arabia was built.
Hilal Khashan is a professor of political science at the American University of Beirut and a fellow at the Middle East Forum.
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A History of the Saudis’ Rise on the Arabian Peninsula
Nov. 16, 2017 Only the Saudis have managed to maintain long-term control over much of the peninsula.
Summary
Saudi Arabia is in a state of flux. A royal family purge, including the arrests of several high-profile elites; economic malaise, due to a dramatic slump in oil prices; and social reforms, including expanding rights for women, have all combined to create a sense of uncertainty around the kingdom’s future.
But Saudi Arabia, and its previous incarnations, has faced down serious challenges before. Although the modern Saudi state was founded less than a century ago, the Saudi clan has dominated the Arabian Peninsula for nearly three centuries. Various empires and tribes have sought to bring the region under their rule, leading to disintegration and a constant struggle for power throughout much of its history. Only the Saudis have managed to maintain long-term control over much of the Arabian Peninsula.
But the two principal factors that Saudi power rests on – religion and oil – are not what they used to be. The peninsula is thus likely to fragment once again – a condition that was the historical norm prior to the Saudis’ reign. In this report, we look at the foundations of the kingdom, the rise of the Saudis on the Arabian Peninsula and how the country got to where it is today.
Defining the Arabian Peninsula
The modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the heart of the Arabian Peninsula, which stretches from the Levant in the north to the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea in the south, and from the Red Sea in the west to the Persian Gulf in the east. Contemporary Saudi Arabia is composed of two main, very distinct regions: Hejaz, a cosmopolitan area located along the Red Sea, and Nejd, an arid, desert area consisting of multiple valleys buried in the interior of the peninsula. Nejd begins where the mountains of Hejaz taper off and extends to the oasis region of Hasa along the eastern coast. The Nafud and Rub al-Khali deserts constitute its northern and southern peripheries, respectively.
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In 622, the entire peninsula was brought under the control of the first ever Muslim polity (founded in Medina while the Prophet Muhammad was still alive), but the area broke up after his death a decade later. Immediately after assuming his position as the first caliph, Abu Bakr faced rebellion from several tribes, many of which hailed from Nejd. Though these rebellions were put down, Arabia would quickly lose its significance within the caliphate as it extended its reach into the areas taken from the Byzantine and Sassanid empires. The political capital shifted to Damascus and then to Baghdad, leaving Arabia – particularly Hejaz – as an important religious component of the caliphate but far from its political center.
For much of Islamic history, the various imperial dominions that held power in the Middle East – the Umayyads, the Abbasids, the Fatimids, the Ayubids, the Mamluks, the Ottomans – sought control over the Hejaz region, which contains the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, because of its religious significance. Powers that dominated the Persian Gulf exercised influence on the east coast of the peninsula. But Nejd was an obscure, mysterious and foreboding place located deep in the interior of Arabia and closed off from the rest of the world. All of this would change in the mid-18th century, when the Saudi clan and the Wahhabi sect emerged from the region.
Saudi Rule Emerges
For centuries, the tribes in Nejd constantly fought for power. Meanwhile, beginning in the late 10th century, Mecca and Medina in Hejaz were managed by Arab rulers known as sharifs from the Hashemite clan (whose descendants rule modern-day Jordan). It was not until the Ottomans established their control on both the west and the east coasts of the Arabian Peninsula in the mid-16th century that Nejd became the focus of a major power. The empire wanted to control the interior of the peninsula, but the inhospitable terrain and low return on investment made it a low priority.
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The Ottomans dedicated far more resources to expanding into Europe and pushing northward beyond the Black Sea basin. Nevertheless, they had an opportunity to expand into Nejd because they controlled both coasts, since the region was far more accessible from Hasa in the east than it was from the west. (Previous empires maintained power only in Hejaz.) But the Ottomans were held back by their need to focus on the wars with the Safavid Empire north of the Persian Gulf.
By the late 17th century, Ottoman power began to wane. The empire’s authority in Arabia never extended far beyond the coasts. In fact, its local allies on the coasts, including the sharifs in Hejaz, became increasingly independent. By the early 18th century, tribes from both Hejaz in the west and Hasa in the east tried to expand into Nejd, heightening the tribal conflict in the region. Meanwhile, the decline of the Ottoman Empire left the economy in Arabia in shambles. The tribes in control of the oasis towns of Uyaina, Qasim, Diriyah and Riyadh sought to defend their holdings.
Diriyah, located on the outskirts of Riyadh, became a pivotal town when Saud bin Muhammad, the founder of the Saudi dynasty, became its emir in the 1710s. When he was killed in 1725, his son, Muhammad bin Saud, succeeded him as emir, but not before a bitter power struggle involving tribal warlords from neighboring areas. An economic downturn led to a decline in commerce, which intensified tribal warfare and anarchy in the interior. Another generation would pass before order would be established.
During this time, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the ultraconservative branch of Islam known as Wahhabism or Salafism, returned to his native Nejd after studying at seminaries in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Egypt. He began preaching a puritanical interpretation of Islam, which conflicted with the prevailing Sunni creeds at the time.
He was forced to flee and, in 1744, settled in Diriyah, in Nejd region. He entered into a pact with its ruler, Muhammad bin Saud. This was the foundation of the alliance between the Saudis and the Wahhabis that continues today. Together, they oversaw the founding of the First Saudi State in 1744 and launched a jihad to spread the new ideology throughout Nejd and beyond. This was a turning point in the history of the Saudis; without the Wahhabi religious ideology, they would have been just another warlord clan among many in Nejd. The goal was to first conquer all of Nejd and then move on to Hejaz, freeing it from Ottoman rule. By 1808, both regions had been brought under the authority of the First Saudi State.
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The Saudi-Wahhabi alliance posed a major threat to the Ottomans, whose power had declined by the early 19th century. The Ottomans had lost control of Egypt to an Albanian governor, Muhammad Ali Pasha, on whom they had to rely to confront the Saudi threat. In 1811, Muhammad Ali Pasha sent a task force led by his son Ibrahim Pasha to retake Hejaz from the Saudis.
After seven years of war, the Egyptians destroyed the First Saudi State. The Egyptians, however, weren’t interested in maintaining an enduring presence in Nejd. This enabled the Saudis to regroup six years later under the leadership of Turki bin Abdullah, the grandson of Muhammad bin Saud, and seize control of Riyadh from the invading forces, leading to the establishment of the Second Saudi State in 1824. This state was much smaller and weaker than its predecessor because of internal strife and the Egyptians and Ottomans’ support of rival tribes, especially the al-Rasheeds of the northern Hail region. In 1891, the al-Rasheeds were triumphant and the Saudis were driven into exile in Kuwait.
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Founding the Modern Kingdom
A decade later in 1901, Abdulaziz bin Abdulrehman, the future founder of the modern Saudi kingdom and the son of the last ruler of the Second Saudi State, sought to reconquer the lands of his forefathers. He took control of Riyadh in 1902 but didn’t seize the east coast from the Ottomans until 1913. Abdulaziz also wanted to take control of Kuwait, but the British opposed the move. They didn’t want to jeopardize relations with other rulers they supported, especially the Hashemites, who had helped London defeat the Ottoman Empire.
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire along with the British and French move to divide their Arab holdings weakened the position of the Hashemites, and in 1923, the British allowed Abdulaziz to move on Hejaz. Until then, Abdulaziz had been taking control of territory around the Hejaz region, including the region of Asir – south of Hejaz and north of Yemen – which he conquered in 1920. But six years later, his forces took Hejaz. With the holy cities firmly in their hands, the Saudis could now claim to be not just rulers of an Islamic state but also leaders of the Islamic world.
In 1927, the British recognized the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd via the Treaty of Jeddah. The two regions would remain separate domains for five years, at which point they were formally unified during the founding of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. By the early 1930s, the Saudis were in firm control of much of the Arabian Peninsula. This was a historic moment, for until then, no single regime since the time of the prophet could claim authority over the entire area.
But the kingdom was still a weak state that relied on the British for its security needs. Islam alone would not be enough to maintain stability and unity in the country over the long term, especially given the fragmentation of the Muslim world. The third Saudi incarnation was threatened by the emergence of competing forces, especially secular Arab nationalism in Egypt and Baathism in Iraq and Syria, during the interwar period.
The Saudis had tried and failed twice before to hold on to control of a Saudi state. What made this time different, however, was the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia in 1938 by Standard Oil. Production did not begin until 1949, and it took another decade for the oil sector to be nationalized, but the Saudis eventually became the world’s largest producers of crude oil. Together, the country’s rich oil reserves and religious primacy in the Muslim world helped sustain the Saudi monarchy for decades. In addition, the wealth created from the oil sector enabled the kingdom to project power and influence throughout the region and beyond. Following the end of World War II, the United States effectively became the Saudis’ security guarantor, making up for the fact that the kingdom’s military, despite its massive oil wealth, was weak.
Abdulaziz bin Abdulrehman didn’t live to see his kingdom flourish. His sons took over the monarchy after his death in 1953, but they had many internal problems to contend with – both from within the royal family and from radical elements of the religious establishment. These resulted in multiple crises over the decades, including the 1964 forced abdication of Abdulaziz’s first successor, King Saud bin Abdulaziz; the 1975 assassination of King Faisal bin Abdulaziz, who succeeded Saud; the 1979 siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by religious extremists; dissident movements in the 1990s; and the rise of al-Qaida in the 2000s and the Islamic State in the 2010s.
Uncertainty Ahead
To be sure, the Saudis have faced significant domestic crises in the past. But they now must also deal with numerous external problems: the proliferation of jihadism, the erosion of state authority in the Arab world, the rise of Iran and its Shiite Arab allies, an emergent Turkey and the divergence of interests with the United States. All of this comes at a time when the kingdom is at a historic impasse, with power shifting to the third generation of Saudi monarchs. Making matters worse is that funds from the kingdom’s most important revenue source, oil, are drying up because of depressed oil prices.
Members of the Saudi royal family perform prayer on the first day of Eid al-Fitr in the Great Mosque in the old City of Riyadh on Aug. 19, 2012. FAYEZ NURELDINE/AFP/Getty Images
The Saudis are having to burn through cash to maintain stability at home. With a large youth population – at least two-thirds of all citizens are under the age of 30 – the social and cultural fabric of the country is shifting. Religion unified warring tribes in the past, but its less likely to hold together the more modern and youthful kingdom that’s emerging today. If anything, it can be used by jihadist extremists to challenge the Saudis’ leadership role in the Muslim world.
For these reasons, the crown prince and future king, Mohammed bin Salman, has been making unprecedented moves against the religious establishment as well as the royal family itself, including imposing social reforms and arranging the arrests of dozens of princes and senior officials. For now, it seems the young prince doesn’t face any serious resistance, but it’s still early in the process. Whether the Saudis can survive this test as they have survived other challenges over the past 300 years remains to be seen.
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Regardless of what happens to the Saudi monarchy, the Arabian Peninsula as a whole is already showing signs of fracture; the war in Yemen and the Arab blockade of Qatar are just two signs of this fragmentation. The crisis in Saudi Arabia threatens to accelerate that process. But this is nothing new; the relative resilience of the Saudi regimes of the past 300 years have actually been an anomaly.
Arabia has been geopolitically significant at two points in history: in the 7th century with the rise of Islam and in the 20th century with the discovery of oil. At other points, only the region’s coastal areas were relevant. The weakening of the Saudi state will return the peninsula to this state of affairs, with the coasts once again becoming the centers of power and the interior becoming a broken remnant of its former self.
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Second post
Nov. 16, 2017 Iran has been quiet about Moscow and Riyadh’s newfound friendship – and the weapons that friendship has procured.
By Jacob L. Shapiro
Last month, well before Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman purged the government of potential rivals, his father, King Salman, did something unprecedented as well: He visited Russia, Saudi Arabia’s erstwhile enemy. After the visit came the usual slew of announced business deals that promise a lot but deliver little. On Nov. 13, however, Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation announced that it would provide Saudi Arabia with its sophisticated S-400 air defense missiles. King Salman’s visit appears to have delivered real cooperation.
A Relationship Redefined
That Saudi Arabia and Russia would redefine the nature of their relationship is surprising in its own right. These were two countries firmly on opposite ends of the Cold War. But even more jarring is that Iran, Saudi Arabia’s regional rival, has been silent. Iran and Russia have a complicated relationship in their own right, one marked for centuries by suspicion and distrust. But in recent years they had set aside their differences, becoming military allies to save Bashar Assad and destroy the Islamic State. Now, Russia is promising to supply Iran’s biggest enemy with air defense missiles – and Iran hasn’t made a peep. Something doesn’t add up.
Consider Russia’s position in the Middle East. Most observers claim that by partnering with Iran to save the Assad regime, Russia enhanced its influence in the region at the expense of the United States. This is a misunderstanding. Russia’s intervention was actually pretty limited. At the height of its involvement, it had only 30-75 fighter jets and helicopters operating in the country. Its commitment was small but successful, insofar as it prevented the Syrian government from falling and the Islamic State from rising.
But it did not undermine U.S. strategic goals in the Middle East. If anything, it enhanced them. When the Syrian civil war started, the U.S. was determined to remove Assad. Yet there weren’t enough moderates for it to train and arm, and in any case, the Islamic State looked as though it may take Damascus for itself. And so the United States prioritized its fight against IS over its fight against Assad. Russia was, in effect, helping the U.S. do its dirty work. For all the bluster surrounding their relations, the U.S. and Russia have been coordinating their efforts in Syria in pursuit of a common goal for years.
Russian S-400 Triumph medium-range and long-range surface-to-air missile systems ride through Red Square during the Victory Day military parade in Moscow on May 9, 2017. NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA/AFP/Getty Images
Now that Assad has been saved and the Islamic State’s caliphate vanquished, the question is: What comes next? With IS out of the picture, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Israel, Russia, Turkey and Iran – which had if nothing else a common enemy – no longer have a reason to cooperate with one another. Life after IS is actually more difficult for Russia than life with it. Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are all competing to fill the power vacuum left by the group’s departure, and Russia’s long-term interests don’t align with any of theirs.
Unlike the Islamic State, all three countries have the power to threaten Russian interests directly. Take Turkey, for example. It can cut off Russia’s access to the Mediterranean by closing the Bosporus. It competes with Russia in the Caucasus. And as it strengthens, it will begin to project power into the Balkans, another region in Russia’s sphere of influence.
Iran, like Turkey, has interests in the Caucasus. It also shares a border with Central Asia and Afghanistan – another Russian sphere of influence where Iran can cause serious problems for Moscow.
And Saudi Arabia, for its part, poses two challenges of its own. First, Saudi Arabia can still influence global oil prices, where even small fluctuations can hurt the Russian economy. Second, Saudi Arabia is the worldwide leader in exporting jihadism, a threat to a country like Russia, which has a large minority Muslim population that is fast increasing.
Russia has met these challenges not by choosing one country to align with but by trying to forge better relationships with all of them. Its relationship with Turkey is rocky but sustainable. (In fact, in September, Turkey signed its own agreement to receive S-400s from Russia.) Its relationship with Iran is solid but not without drama. A Russian announcement in August 2016 that it was using an Iranian air base for attacks in Syria set off a short-lived political controversy in Iran, sparking backlash from Iranian politicians who felt Russia’s use of the base violated Iran’s Constitution. Now Russia is reaching out to Saudi Arabia, and besides the agreements on military cooperation, Moscow secured a promise from King Salman during his visit last month to stop Saudi proselytizing to Muslims in Russia.
Russia is cultivating other ties too. Officials from Moscow have met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu several times this year and have kept lines of communication open over Hezbollah’s potential acquisition of advanced weaponry. Russia has also expressed some support for various Kurdish groups vying for independence in the region. Moscow has, for example, kept open its embassy in Irbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, throughout the contentious independence referendum.
And while Russia has said it does not support the PYD, the Kurdish political party in northern Syria, in its push for independence, it nonetheless invited the group to a congress comprising all relevant parties to discuss Syria’s future – much to the chagrin of Turkey, Iran and anti-Assad Syrian opposition groups.
Silence and Blindness
Russian foreign policy can be disruptive, but it would be a mistake to think of it as monolithic or unchanging. The Cold War, for all its faults, simplified foreign policy. (Simple doesn’t mean easy.) It was unclear whether the U.S. or USSR was more powerful. Regions like the Middle East became battlegrounds to see which one was. The U.S. had its allies (Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey) and the USSR had its allies (Egypt, Syria, Iraq). Sometimes countries switched sides, but ultimately it was a zero-sum game, with each side trying to weaken the other.
But the Cold War has been over for more than two decades. Today’s Russia is not yesterday’s Soviet Union. The U.S. and Russia actually share some long-term interests in the Middle East. Neither wants to see any one country dominate the entire region. Washington and Moscow want parity; they prefer that the region’s countries compete with one another rather than cause problems for them. In a perfect world, the U.S. would be embroiled in the Middle East and Russia would be free. But theirs is not a perfect world, so Moscow’s primary objective is to make sure the problems and ambitions of the Middle East stay in the Middle East.
This altogether different strategy of containment brings us back to Iran – and its silence on the budding Saudi-Russia friendship. Iran does not think it needs to attack Saudi Arabia head on. The government in Tehran believes Saudi Arabia will eventually collapse under the weight of its own problems, and that, in the meantime, the best thing Iran can do is engage Saudi Arabia in expensive and time-consuming proxy wars. Iran may not particularly like Russia’s providing Saudi Arabia with S-400s, but it can look past this particular issue because none of its red lines have been crossed. Russia is, after all, still playing an important role in helping the Assad regime – a key Iranian ally – retake the parts of Syria it has lost in the war. That is worth more right now than a public denunciation of some missile acquisitions.
But just because Iran is silent doesn’t mean it is blind to what’s happening. And just because Iran and Russia have cooperated in recent years doesn’t mean their relationship is ironclad. Russia cannot be everything to everyone in the region, and at some point it will be forced to make difficult decisions. In the meantime, pragmatism reigns. By improving relations with Saudi Arabia, Russia is hedging the bets it placed on Iran. By keeping quiet, Iran continues to reap what benefits it can from Russia’s moves. News about the S-400s doesn’t change much, but it underscores just how quickly change can come
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The Rapid Rise of Mohammed bin Salman
By Jay Ogilvy
Board of Contributors
Jay Ogilvy
Jay Ogilvy
Board of Contributors
Saudi Defense Minister and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, center, stands for a photo-op with his counterparts from other countries in Saudi Arabia's Islamic Military Counterterrorism Coalition at a meeting in Riyadh.
(FAYEZ NURELDINE/AFP/Getty Images)
Contributor Perspectives offer insight, analysis and commentary from Stratfor’s Board of Contributors and guest contributors who are distinguished leaders in their fields of expertise.
Something extraordinary is happening in Saudi Arabia. The new crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, or MbS, as many call him, has embarked on changes that could alter the world.
Breaking Taboos
His ambitious plan for the kingdom's future, Saudi Vision 2030 — worked out with help from the consulting firm McKinsey & Co. — envisages a whole panoply of reforms. The measures range from health care and education initiatives to a $500 billion project to build a new city to proposals for treating the Saudi economy's "addiction to oil." Along with reform, MbS is taking on his country's cultural and political taboos. He wants to break the taboo against selling off any part of the Saudi Arabian Oil Co., better known as Saudi Aramco, by floating an initial public offering for less than 5 percent of the huge company. Proceeds from the sale would go toward creating the world's largest sovereign investment fund, which, as MbS described in his first interview on Al-Arabiya television, would "take control over more than (10) percent of the investment capacity of the globe" and "own more than (3) percent of the assets on Earth." MbS is also breaking the long-standing taboo that forbids women from driving.
And perhaps most significant, he wants to break the hold of the hard-line Wahhabi clerics who came to power in 1979, when militants occupied Mecca's Grand Mosque at the time of the Islamic revolution in Iran. Public entertainment has been banned since then, but MbS will bring it back. As he said to a gathering of some 3,500 visitors he hosted at an economic development conference Oct. 24, Saudis "are returning to what we were before — a country of moderate Islam that is open to all religions and to the world ... We will not spend the next 30 years of our lives dealing with destructive ideas. We will destroy them today." He then vowed to "eradicate the remnants of extremism very soon."
MbS doesn't stop at tough talk; he's equally fond of tough action. In early November he had his minions round up more than 200 of the kingdom's rich and powerful, including 11 princes, and imprison them in the lap of luxury at Riyadh's Ritz-Carlton hotel on corruption charges. "My father (King Salman) saw that there is no way we can stay in the G-20 and grow with this level of corruption," MbS said in an interview with Thomas Friedman. "In early 2015, one of his first orders to his team was to collect all the information about corruption — at the top. This team worked for two years until they collected the most accurate information, and then they came up with about 200 names." The crown prince told Friedman that 1 percent of the people arrested for corruption were able to prove their innocence, and 4 percent insisted they would try to do so in court. Yet the remaining 95 percent of the detainees agreed to return a total of about $100 billion to the kingdom's coffers. As Friedman put it tersely, "You don't see that every day."
Sharp Elbows
The anti-corruption campaign is hardly the crown prince's only tough action. His main rival for the throne once his father dies is said to be under house arrest. The Saudi air campaign in Yemen, meanwhile, is creating a humanitarian disaster. In a long piece in Buzzfeed on Nov. 27, Borzou Daragahi quotes a Western diplomat who served for years in Saudi Arabia:
"There were all sorts of stories about his personal behavior. It was ambition. He had very sharp elbows. That's what people thought of him, and they didn't want to cross him. What you see is someone who is incredibly ambitious and is prepared to put heat on people to get his own way."
Another person interviewed for the same piece confirms the diplomat's assessment:
"He doesn't even say, 'Hi' … He says, 'You. What do you have? You. What do you have?' He doesn't have time for niceties. He just gets into business. He's on some kind of turbocharge. He's hyper and he wants to get things done and he doesn't want anyone to stand in his way. If anyone stands in his way, he takes them out."
These accounts don't describe a nice person. In fact, some people in and out of the kingdom see the crown prince as a bully. (He has, however, won over the kingdom's vast youth population, a largely underemployed, increasingly well-traveled, foreign-educated group with waning patience for the heavy hand of the Wahhabi fun police.) But hold on. There may be another interpretation of the young crown prince's haste. Yes, he is a man in a hurry. Then again, Saudi Arabia is in so many ways behind on the arc of history — as a country, as an economy and as a society — that the shake-up MbS is carrying out may be just the kind of "turbocharge" it needs.
When asked how much risk would be involved in his Public Investment Fund, he responded, in characteristic fashion, by asking, "What will the size of the risk be if we did not take such a step?"
Mohammed bin Salman's Growing Power
Thinking Big in a Hurry
Is it a power-hungry personal ambition that drives MbS, or is it a sense of mission? Much of what I read about him reminds me of another man in a hurry, Elon Musk, the founder of Tesla, Space-X, SolarCity and the Boring Company. Like MbS, Musk is known for working incredibly long hours. And like MbS, Musk is very demanding of his employees. Interviewed by Ashlee Vance for his book on Musk, a senior employee at Tesla said, "Some people thought Elon was too tough or hot-tempered or tyrannical … (b)ut these were hard times, and those of us close to the operational realities of the company knew it. I appreciated that he didn't sugarcoat things." Vance summarizes Musk's drive for excellence:
"Either you're trying to make something spectacular with no compromises or you're not. And if you're not, Musk considers you a failure. This position can look unreasonable or foolish to outsiders, but the philosophy works for Musk and constantly pushes him and those around him to their limits."
Neither man is shy about splashing money around. Musk took delivery of a McLaren sports car, one of only 62 in the world. While on vacation on the French Riviera, MbS took a fancy to a 134-meter (440-foot) yacht and sent his agents aboard to buy it for $550 million the same day. If it ends up serving as a roving embassy where the crown prince can entertain other heads of state in a secure environment, it might actually be a good investment, not a frivolous whim.
Both men think big — really big. But that is precisely what some challenges demand. The barriers to entry in the space industry and the automobile industry are immense. You can't get into those industries by taking small, incremental steps. That's why Khalid Al-Dakhil, a Saudi author, historian and columnist for pan-Arab newspaper Al-Hayat, may have gotten it wrong by saying, "When you want to make changes, especially political and constitutional, you always face resistance. So you want to take it step by step."
As Brinley Burton wrote for NBC News, "'Transformation' is a mantra that follows MbS around." Likewise, Google co-founder Larry Page, one of Musk's good friends, says, "That's why I find Elon to be an inspiring example. He said, 'Well, what should I really do in the world? Solve cars, global warming, and make humans multiplanetary.' … (N)ow he has businesses to do that."
Some understand the truly systemic dimensions of the struggle in the kingdom. "We are witnessing an emergence of a new social contract in Saudi Arabia, economically and socially," Ibrahim al-Assil, a fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, said to Newsweek. "Saudi Arabia is facing many challenges in a region that is full of turmoil and conflicts. Economic reforms won't be sufficient if it's not accompanied by social reforms."
Machiavelli's (Crown) Prince
The sheer scale of the interlinking challenges that MbS is facing call to mind a famous quotation from Niccolo Machiavelli: "One always ought to remember that there is nothing more difficult to undertake, nor more dangerous to administer, nor more unlikely to succeed, than to introduce a new political order." Machiavelli is, of course, famous for endorsing the kind of "sharp elbows" that MbS and Musk wield. As he put it:
"It is essential to understand this: that a prince — and especially a 'new' prince — cannot always follow those practices by which men are regarded as good, for in order to maintain the state he is often obliged to act against his promises, against charity, against humanity, and against religion."
The descriptor "Machiavellian" is often associated with treachery. But we owe to our own Philip Bobbitt a reinterpretation of Machiavelli that shows how he crafted his philosophy entirely in the service of the public good. He was not interested in defending the power of the prince for his own sake; he was interested in the good of the whole. As Bobbitt notes in his book Garments of Court and Palace: Machiavelli and the World That He Made, "Then, as now, the emergence of a new constitutional order loomed over men whose eyes were firmly fixed on the ground, even as it was shifting beneath them."
Like Friedman in his Nov. 8 New York Times column on MbS, I worry that the Saudi crown prince's ambition and the bad advice of others might lead to war with Iran. And yet, like Friedman in a later column from Nov. 23 — written just after spending over three hours with MbS — I come away rooting for the man.
I'll give the last word to Friedman, whose words, published on Thanksgiving morning, probably didn't get the exposure they deserve:
"I never thought I'd live long enough to write this sentence: The most significant reform process underway anywhere in the Middle East today is in Saudi Arabia. Yes, you read that right. Though I came here at the start of Saudi winter, I found the country going through its own Arab Spring, Saudi style.
"Unlike the other Arab Springs, all of which emerged bottom up and failed miserably, except in Tunisia, this one is led from the top down by the country's 32-year-old crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, and, if it succeeds, it will not only change the character of Saudi Arabia but the tone and tenor of Islam across the globe."
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Saudi Arabia released 23 of some 200 individuals detained in November under Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's anti-corruption crackdown, Reuters reported Dec. 26. The individuals were held in the Ritz Carlton and secured their release after agreeing to a settlement with the government to relinquish assets and money in exchange for their freedom. Other suspects will be released in the coming days and trials are expected to begin for those who deny the corruption charges. Those detained in November included members of the royal family, prominent businessmen and government officials.
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The Price of Freedom for Saudi Arabia’s Richest Man: $6 Billion
Talal is trying to hold on to his company after crown prince’s corruption crackdown
Margherita Stancati in Riyadh,
Updated Dec. 23, 2017 2:50 p.m. ET
Saudi authorities are demanding at least $6 billion from Saudi Prince al-Waleed bin Talal to free him from detention, people familiar with the matter said, potentially putting the global business empire of one of the world’s richest men at risk.
The 62-year-old prince was one of the dozens of royals, government officials and businesspeople rounded up early last month in a wave of arrests the Saudi government billed as the first volley in Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s campaign against widespread graft.
The Saudi government has disclosed few details of its allegations against the accused, many of whom have since been released from detention in a makeshift prison at the Riyadh Ritz-Carlton after negotiating financial settlements. The $6 billion Saudi officials are demanding from Prince al-Waleed, a large stakeholder in Western businesses like Twitter, is among the highest figures they have sought from those arrested, some of the people familiar with the matter said.
Business Empire
Prince al-Waleed bin Talal has built a vast network of holdings across the world.
The Price of Freedom for Saudi Arabia’s Richest Man: $6 Billion
The prince’s fortune is estimated at $18.7 billion by Forbes, which would make him the Middle East’s wealthiest individual. But Prince al-Waleed has indicated that he believes raising and handing over that much cash would be an admission of guilt and would require him to dismantle the financial empire he has built over 25 years, other people said.
Prince al-Waleed is talking with the government about instead accepting as payment for his release a large piece of his conglomerate, Kingdom Holding Co., people familiar with the matter said. The Riyadh-listed company’s market value is $8.7 billion, down about 14% since the prince’s arrest. Kingdom Holding said in November that it retained the support of the Saudi government and that its strategy “remains intact.”
Prince al-Waleed, currently chairman of the company, would want to stay on in a leadership role in the new state-backed company, one person close to him said.
“Keeping [the empire] under his control, that’s his battle,” the person said.
According to a senior Saudi official, Prince al-Waleed faces accusations that include money laundering, bribery and extortion. The official didn’t elaborate.
Salah Al-Hejailan, a lawyer who has worked with Prince al-Waleed in the past and remains in contact with his family, said that “there are no formal accusations” against the prince, and that the prosecutor would only open a judicial case against him if no understanding is reached.
The Saudi government is merely “having an amicable exchange to reach a settlement” with the tycoon, said Mr. Al-Hejailan, adding he wasn’t currently retained by Prince al-Waleed.
A hallway of the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, where dozens of royals, officials and businesspeople have been detained since early November.
A hallway of the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, where dozens of royals, officials and businesspeople have been detained since early November. Photo: GIUSEPPE CACACE/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
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The prince has indicated to people close to him that he is determined to prove his innocence and would fight the corruption allegations in court if he had to.
“He wants a proper investigation. It is expected that al-Waleed will give MBS a hard time,” said a person close to Prince al-Waleed, referring to the crown prince by his initials, as many do.
Kingdom Holding, the Saudi Royal Court and the Saudi Embassy in Washington didn’t respond to requests for comment.
Saudi officials have said they expect the state to receive tens of billions of dollars from settlements with those arrested last month. Prince Miteb bin Abdullah, once seen as a leading contender to the throne, paid more than $1 billion to secure his release in a settlement with the government, said senior Saudi government advisers.
The detentions are part of a large-scale shake-up of Saudi society engineered by 32-year-old Prince Mohammed. He is also allowing women to drive next year, opening movie theaters for the first time in decades and orchestrating the public listing of the state’s oil company to raise cash for an economic transformation.
Prince Mohammed has also moved quickly to consolidate power in a royal family in which different branches often ran pieces of the government as private fiefs. In the past two years, the crown prince has taken control of internal security services, national defense and the economy from uncles and cousins who had long been in power.
Prince al-Waleed, a cousin to the crown prince, has never been seen as a contender for the throne because his father, Prince Talal bin Abdulaziz, called for liberal social and political reforms in the 1960s and fell out of favor.
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Like his father, Prince al-Waleed has long been an outspoken advocate for social reforms, such as allowing women to drive. He is also a sort of independent Saudi ambassador to the global business world, amassing big stakes in companies such as Apple, General Motors and News Corp. (all of which he has sold). News Corp is the owner of The Wall Street Journal. Currently, he is a major shareholder in Twitter, the ride-sharing service Lyft, AccorHotels and the Four Seasons Hotel & Resorts. His company’s skyscraper, Kingdom Centre, is one of Riyadh’s most striking landmarks.
Some people close to Prince al-Waleed say they believe his high profile helped turn Prince Mohammed against the tycoon. Kingdom Holding has long acted like an arm of the Saudi state, striking deals that could have also been done by the crown prince or the kingdom’s own sovereign-wealth vehicle, the Public Investment Fund.
On a holiday that took him through nine countries this summer, Prince al-Waleed met the president of Portugal and the prime minister of Albania. In September, he sat down with French President Emmanuel Macron to discuss a “strategic alliance” with France, according to a news release about the meeting issued by Kingdom Holding.
Kingdom had been talking to France’s sovereign-wealth fund, its partner in a $400 million fund to invest in Saudi businesses, about bringing the Saudi government into the deal, people familiar with the matter said, adding there had been no progress on the matter since the prince’s arrest. A spokesman for the French fund declined to comment.
Inside the Ritz-Carlton, Prince al-Waleed has been allowed limited communication, is eating what people close to him call his “diet food” and exercising.
Prince al-Waleed’s arrest took his international business partners by surprise and cast uncertainty over the future of his company. Prince al-Waleed had expressed support for Prince Mohammed’s reform plans, and Kingdom Holding appeared likely to play a role in carrying out pieces of the economic and social change under way. Now the prince’s international business dealings have stalled, though the Kingdom board met in Riyadh on Wednesday, its first publicly announced meeting since Prince al-Waleed’s arrest.
Prince al-Waleed’s media company Rotana had been in talks with French conglomerate Vivendi to set up a joint venture with Saudi Public Investment Fund to sell music and open cinemas in Saudi Arabia, according to people familiar with the matter. But his arrest has scuttled any further discussions, they said. A Vivendi representative confirmed that Prince al-Waleed and Vivendi Chairman Vincent Bolloré held talks but said the venture was “not followed up” and “is not on agenda.”
It appears unlikely Prince al-Waleed had any inkling he was under investigation or faced imminent arrest, according to people close to him.
About a month before the arrests, he sent a text message—reviewed by the Journal—to Bakr bin Laden, the chairman of the massive construction firm Saudi Binladin Group, congratulating him on having been cleared of wrongdoing in relation to a crane collapse in Mecca. Prince al-Waleed told Mr. bin Laden in that message that it was now time to get back to work on the Jeddah Tower, a partnership with Kingdom Holding that would be the world’s tallest building when completed.
The tower remains unfinished. Mr. bin Laden is detained at the Ritz with the prince.
Write to Margherita Stancati at margherita.stancati@wsj.com, Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com and Benoit Faucon at benoit.faucon@wsj.com
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Saudi Arabia's 2018 budget calls for spending a record amount of money, and based on precedent, actual spending will likely eclipse that figure.
About 20 percent of the budget is devoted to military spending, but it also includes a substantial increase in spending on programs benefiting the populace.
The careful introduction of new tax measures and a levy on expatriate workers are part of the government's unprecedented push to expand non-oil revenue.
Saudi Arabia laid out the biggest spending plan in the kingdom's history in absolute terms when the government published its 2018 budget in late December. After two years of austerity measures and budget deficits following the oil price dive in 2014, the sizable amount of slated expenditures for this year could seem counterintuitive. Yet the amount of planned spending fits with the current turning point for the Saudi economy, which ranks as the world's 20th largest in terms of gross domestic product, and meshes with plans laid out by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for the country's long-term economic future. But the budget also extends state support to Saudi citizens even though weaning its citizenry from their reliance on subsidies is a long-term reform goal. Moreover, to pay for its spending plan, the government is counting on untested new revenue sources, including newly instated taxes.
A Familiar Spending Strategy
The 2018 budget follows familiar patterns of heavy state-backed development, which has been the story of Saudi Arabia's economic growth since the 1950s. As in the past, the 2018 plan calls for high government expenditures relative to GDP, with a total projected outlay of 978 billion riyals ($261 billion). And if the usual practice holds, actual expenditures are guaranteed to eclipse the budgeted amount. The major breakdown of projected spending reveals a pattern that could also have been expected in previous decades. In 1970, the year Saudi Arabia first published a five-year economic development plan and began to take a strategic approach to its budgets, it spent the most on defense, public utilities, education and transportation investments. Similarly, defense spending, at 21 percent of total expenditures, represents the largest slice of the 2018 plan. In addition, the kingdom is increasing the amount of money spent on infrastructure by 86 percent and is boosting the amount devoted to municipal services. Even in the midst of aggressive economic reform, Saudi Arabia is spending big.
Saudi Arabia: Spending Estimates by Sector
The government in Riyadh continues to view its spending as a necessary bridge to keep the economy moving and spur growth until it can lean more on the private sector. While the budget expansion may be expensive today, the state views it as a logical investment in developing the non-oil sectors of its economy with an eye toward culling the budget deficit by 2023. The spending plan relies on the assumption that oil prices will remain stable enough through 2018 to enable the government to funnel oil and non-oil revenue into developing industries such as manufacturing, mining, tourism, finance and technology. Its goal also includes shoring up state-backed enterprises like the postal service, airports and utility companies, all with an eye toward a privatization push beginning over the next year.
An Optimistic Commitment to Reform
Saudi Arabia's willingness to spend big signals optimism that its economic reform efforts so far are working. The kingdom managed to reduce its budget deficit in 2017 to 230 billion riyals (8.9 percent of its 2017 GDP) from the 2016 shortfall of 297 billion riyals, which represented 12.8 percent of GDP. The projected deficit for 2018, 195 million riyals, would represent a further drop. The shrinking deficits help make the goal of erasing budget deficits by 2023 more realistic, though this will, of course, depend on the price of oil. Price increases over the past year and the stability offered by the OPEC production deal helped Saudi oil revenue reach 440 billion riyals in 2017, a trend that Saudi Arabia is confident will continue. Although the goal of its economic reform plan is to decrease the kingdom's dependence on its oil industry, oil revenue will remain a key component of the Saudi economy for many years to come.
Saudi Arabia's Proposed Aggressive Deficit Reduction
Similarly, 2017 achievements with respect to non-oil revenue helps make 2018 goals seem more realistic. In achieving revenue of 256 billion riyals in 2017, Saudi Arabia exceeded its goal for non-oil income by roughly 30 percent. Growth in that area is expected to continue in 2018, with projected non-oil revenue of 291 billion riyals. Even if it doesn't hit that level, continuing growth in non-oil sectors will be crucial for Saudi Arabia to be able to moderate the rate that it must spend its foreign exchange reserves. The initial public offering of Saudi Aramco, expected to occur later this year or in 2019, will be another means by which Saudi Arabia hopes to increase non-oil revenue. The proceeds of the sale are destined to swell the coffers of one of the country's sovereign wealth funds, the Public Investment Fund, eventually enabling it to generate even more non-oil revenue. But significant returns on non-oil investments made by the fund could take years to materialize.
Prioritizing Saudi Citizens
One major way Saudi Arabia hopes that big spending will pay off is in maintaining and deepening the population's trust in the government. Programs benefiting its citizens in 2018 include a 32 billion riyal cash transfer program designed to offset the cost of new taxes for lower- and middle-income families, and a 169 percent increase in spending on economic resources and public programs. Saudi Arabia will carefully communicate to its citizens which austerity measures it will stick with and which will be repealed or adjusted — another familiar aspect of Saudi budgeting. Based on past reactions, government officials are wary of the social unrest that could result from reducing welfare programs too fast, despite their steep price tag.
Saudi leaders are also sensitive to public perception of government spending priorities, especially since the amount it has budgeted for defense in comparison to what it plans to spend on other domestic needs, like education, risks upsetting Saudis. The total bill for the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen is unknown, but it's part of the reason that Saudi Arabia continues to divert at least a fifth of total government expenditures to the military. As the Yemen conflict gradually grows more unpopular, so too does the likelihood that Saudi citizens will find ways to decry their government's spending plans.
New (and Risky) Measures
An increasing reliance on tax revenue represents an area in which Saudi authorities are breaking from the budgetary norm, presenting the risk that they could be moving too swiftly to achieve their goals. The country will seek to double the amount of non-oil revenue derived from taxes from 97 billion riyals today to 189 billion riyals by 2020. The issue of taxation, however, is so sensitive in Saudi Arabia that the Ministry of Finance has taken care to promise "no new taxes" over the remainder of 2018 beyond those it has already announced. While an income tax isn't part of the plan, a 5 percent value-added tax and new excise taxes took effect Jan. 1. The government's careful approach to the issue stems in part from the fact that the introduction of any new taxes shifts citizens' expectations of their government and introduces the issue of government accountability in a way that Saudi leaders haven't had to deal with before.
It's clear that the government doesn't want to hit its own citizens with too many financial burdens even though it's willing to squeeze expatriates for money.
One other source of new non-oil revenue will come from a levy imposed on Saudi businesses that employ workers from other countries. That income stream is a pillar of what the Saudi government terms "maximizing government revenues." The levy is essentially a monthly tax on businesses that will increase annually. The rates that the businesses will be charged fluctuate depending on the ratio of expatriate employees to Saudi ones and are designed to bring in tens of millions of riyals in revenue in its first year, increasing to hundreds of millions in future years. Beyond revenue, the levy represents an effort to increase employment of Saudis and reduce the country's unemployment rates from 12.6 percent currently to 10.6 percent by 2020. The effort to counter austerity measures with heavy spending only extends to Saudi nationals, not to expatriates. It's clear that the government doesn't want to hit its own citizens with too many financial burdens even though it is willing to squeeze expatriates for money, knowing they have less leverage to demand anything in return from the government. The new levy could backfire if it quickly reduces Saudi businesses' willingness to hire expatriates or stokes expatriate flight from the kingdom. Unless Saudi citizens possess the job skills to replace foreign workers who leave private companies, private sector productivity could drop at companies struggling to balance employment ratios.
Another new and risky aspect of this year's budget is its emphasis on public-private partnerships. Saudi Arabia aims to increase private sector's contribution to the kingdom's GDP from current levels of around 40 percent to 65 percent by 2030. This will require significant cooperation between private sector businesses and the government. The extent to which those businesses will buy into in the government's plan and trust what it's doing is unknown, but cash incentives promised by Riyadh will certainly help persuade them to cooperate. The government, however, has failed to issue clear regulations, instructions or guidelines for exactly how the private sector is expected to use the cash. It hasn't addressed exactly how international investors can participate, either. The uncertainty introduces risk: Because private sector businesses don't know how to move forward, privatization plans are likely to hit snags as companies struggle to adapt.
Between managing domestic, social and political changes and pursuing an aggressive foreign policy, Saudi leaders have their work cut out for them. The country's large economy gives them the ability to pursue so many projects at the same time. Because the kingdom is a mover and shaker in the Middle East, it's critical to follow where its economy succeeds, and where it falters. An examination of the spending laid out in its 2018 budget shows that although Saudi Arabia is making progress toward shifting the onus of its economy to the private sector, the state is still the primary engine of growth and will remain so for a long time to come.
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Saudi Arabia: Corruption Crackdown Moves One Prince to a Harsher Prison
(Stratfor 2018)
In Stratfor's 2018 Annual Forecast, we noted that Saudi Arabia will wrestle with tricky reforms at home under the guidance of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Specifically, we said that the kingdom will take notable strides toward designing a new social contract that adjusts what citizens expect of their government, and vice versa. The recent developments in the anti-corruption crackdown are part of this social contract.
See 2018 Annual Forecast
Saudi Arabia is taking its anti-corruption crackdown seriously. Saudi billionaire investor Prince Alwaleed bin Talal bin Abdulaziz al-Saud was transferred to the maximum security al-Ha'ir Prison on Jan. 13, where several al Qaeda and Islamic State suspects are also held. It's a marked change in venue: Bin Talal was previously confined at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel. Reports have emerged that bin Talal had made a counteroffer of unspecified terms for his release, rumored to involve him offering assets of his choosing. But Saudi Arabia's attorney general turned him down, and now bin Talal will remain in al-Ha'ir until the next round of negotiations.
Bin Talal is the highest profile holdout from the initial November crackdown. But recent arrests prove that the Saudi government isn't done targeting its royals as it cracks down on corruption and reworks the country's wasta, or social influence networks, to better favor Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
It appears bin Talal was hoping the international investor community and his powerful foreign friends would pressure the Saudi government to release him. But while investors and two former French presidents have expressed concern about bin Talal's detention, no movement to free him has emerged.
Instead, his transfer to al-Ha'ir shows the Saudi government is unconcerned with international opinions. Rejecting bin Talal's initial counteroffer also shows the government is willing to play hardball to extract what it sees as fair compensation for the crimes the prince is charged with. But there's little incentive for the government to hold him indefinitely or drag the matter on to a formal trial. A settlement would speed things along calmly as Saudi Arabia embarks on an ambitious reorganization of the country's economy and society. Bin Talal's case could still upend that calm, however, as the community of international investors look to see if his arrest is related to an authentic corruption purge — in which case a stronger rule of law with better investment conditions will emerge — or if he's simply been targeted for political reasons.
But with no political power in Saudi Arabia, bin Talal has to make a deal. That means negotiating what price he must pay to leave his new, more austere jail.
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Saudi Reforms Get a Boost From Google
Alphabet’s interest in the kingdom is a signal that Crown Prince Mohammad is serious about change.
By Karen Elliott House
Feb. 4, 2018 3:56 p.m. ET
5 COMMENTS
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Since Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman announced his intention to transform this country nearly two years ago, Saudis and foreigners alike have questioned whether he is serious or merely enjoying power. The time for doubt is over. Last week’s news that Alphabet, Google’s parent company, is in talks to build a tech hub in the kingdom is only the latest sign. Look for more such initiatives when the crown prince visits the U.S. in early March.
Whatever one may think about Saudi Arabia or its new young strongman, there is no longer any dispute as to his resolve. Prince Mohammed is determined not just to reform the country but to wrench Saudis out of a 30-year torpor that he rightly sees as inexorably leading them toward poverty and instability. The radical change he is imposing isn’t a choice: It is the only choice.
He has inherited a nation of 22 million spoiled children, each of whom wants a cushy life in the national nursery that oil-rich Saudi Arabia used to be. But with crude oil crashing to $26 a barrel in 2016—and even now at almost $70 a barrel—Riyadh can no longer afford the pacifiers to tranquilize its population, not to mention the 10 million foreign workers who have tended to Saudi citizens’ every need.
Prince Mohammed’s Saudi Vision 2030 is a push away from dependence on government and toward self-reliance. To jump-start the transformation, he has instituted social changes no one could have imagined only a few years ago: Saudis are now free to attend concerts and cinemas, and in June women will be driving, all of which were previously forbidden by religious authorities backed by royal rulers.
More significantly, Prince Mohammed has rounded up prominent people accused of financial corruption—royal cousins, cabinet ministers, businessmen—and forced them to turn over what the government says will be $106 billion in exchange for their freedom.
These are shocking tactics in a country accustomed to royal rule through laborious consensus-building among the senior princes. But the truth is that most of these senior princes are now dead. More to the point, that unwieldy method of governance failed for 30 years to wean the country off oil dependence, despite repeated commitments to that end. Prince Mohammed knows the folly of doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result.
Almost since the founding of modern Saudi Arabia in 1932, its stability has rested on three pillars: unity among the royals, their symbiotic cooperation with the Wahhabi religious establishment, and oil wealth. The new crown prince has upended each of these pillars—arresting and humiliating his royal relatives, insisting on moderate Islam and a more open society, and imposing high taxes on the cheap oil that Saudis regard as their birthright.
During my January visit, Saudis were in shock at the social, political and economic changes. In a single week last month, electricity prices tripled, gasoline prices doubled (to roughly $2 a gallon), and the first-ever value added tax, of 5%, was imposed. If asked Ronald Reagan’s famous 1980 debate question—“Are you better off than four years ago?”—almost all Saudis over 30 would say “no.”
The arrests of elite princes and businessmen, as well as conservative religious sheikhs, have chilled older Saudis. During my visit, more than one old acquaintance declined to meet me for “health” reasons and other polite excuses. But Prince Mohammed’s constituency is not the royal family or the religious sheikhs. It’s the 70% of Saudis who are under 30. He essentially is playing generational Robin Hood—taking from the elite who for decades helped themselves to the nation’s oil revenues, while freeing the young from the smothering hand of Wahhabi sheikhs who sapped Saudi initiative by controlling every aspect of daily life. The crown prince clearly hopes that if citizens are allowed to manage their lives, they will take responsibility for their livelihoods.
This is a brave gamble, but without significant change Saudi Arabia’s future looks dark. The economy is growing more slowly than the population. Domestic oil consumption is rising nearly 6% a year, a trend that would leave Saudis consuming all the Kingdom’s oil production—with none left for export—by 2030. The economy shrank 0.5% last year and is estimated to grow only 1.6% in 2018, according to the International Monetary Fund, though the Saudi government projects faster growth of 2.7%. The official unemployment figure is 12.7% nationally, but it’s nearly double that for men between 20 and 29 and 33% for young women in that age group.
Prince Mohammad’s economic transformation represents a huge task. If that isn’t enough, he also confronts a hegemonic and meddling Iran, a feud with Qatar, and a war in Yemen. Knowing the price Saudi Arabia has paid for decades of dithering, the crown prince has dared to impose rapid top-down change. Inevitably he will make some mistakes. Those he can repair. More troublesome is that some Westerners whose investment and support he seeks may insist on seeing Saudi Arabia as stuck like a fossil in its past Wahhabism and limited personal freedoms. While the Saudis are far from perfect on human rights, the West should acknowledge that the recent progress is real.
The biggest risk remains the economy: It is far from clear that Prince Mohammed can transform the country fast enough to meet the pent-up ambitions of young Saudis. The West has a stake in doing what it can to assure his success. A collapse that turns Saudi Arabia into another chaotic Iraq or theocratic Iran would be a disaster for the region and the world. Right now, the young prince with his agenda for radical change is Saudi Arabia’s best, and probably only, shot at moderate—and modernizing—reform.
Ms. House, a former publisher of The Wall Street Journal, is author of “On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines—and Future” ( Knopf, 2012).
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https://clarionproject.org/saudi-cleric-abayas/
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https://clarionproject.org/saudi-cleric-abayas/
Nice to see progress.
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Indeed; as previously noted here, it comes in the aftermath of Bin Salman responding to President Trump's call to cast out the whackos.
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The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has taken key steps toward building a more entrepreneur-friendly economy. On Feb. 18, Riyadh's Cabinet approved the country's first-ever bankruptcy law, and the government later declared that it would soon allow women entrepreneurs to start businesses without male guardianships. Both actions help to unshackle Saudi talent as the government banks its economic future on cultivating a vibrant private sector.
The proposals, whose full details and pace of implementation remain unclear, underscore two key aspects of Saudi reform strategy. First, these reforms are among several delayed necessities for the country's financial health. The country has suffered from a lack of formal bankruptcy regulations for years, as businesspeople in disputes with creditors often skipped the country to avoid possible jail sentences. And Saudi women have been taking on jobs and managing businesses under the radar, especially in rural areas, for decades. Second, the proposals indicate that the government is more willing than ever to shake off old restrictions that enormously benefited traditional social influencers, particularly creditors and men.
The newly unveiled bankruptcy law aims to make investment less risky in the kingdom, allowing businesses to rely less on personal connections and more on transparent laws. Investors were at the mercy of their creditors. Business relationships resembled a patronage system where the creditor's personality served as an extra element of risk. Thus, investors have typically been either quite conservative or, alternatively, more willing to flee the country and abandon their debts. Both outcomes compromised the Saudi economy, limiting the pursuit of risky but potentially innovative ideas. This new bankruptcy law will shift the mentality away from such risk aversion, while allowing creditors who are still owed money to recover some of their losses.
Meanwhile, the announcement about female Saudi entrepreneurs marks another step toward encouraging economic independence for women. Though women informally run businesses throughout the kingdom, they always run the risk of being punished by religious authorities, male guardians or rival businesses. Implementing the new change will help Saudi society shift away from the patron-dependent model that has long slowed women's advancement. Details of the new proposal remain scarce, but the imperative of employing more women is clear: Female unemployment in the country is nearly double that of men. Of course, Saudi conservatives who have up to now kept quiet about the pace of social change may consider a female boss to be a bridge too far. By refusing to take certain jobs or escalating their complaints to the national stage, these conservatives may compel the Saudi government to reflect on the challenges it is creating for itself.
With all its new reforms, Riyadh is surely keeping in mind the rapid social changes of the 1970s — which contributed to the assassination of King Faisal in 1975 and the Grand Mosque siege in 1979. But Saudi Arabia will endure the risk as Vision 2030 unfolds, embracing potential pain in the hope of making powerful gains.
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Saudi Arabia on the Sidelines
Mar 1, 2018
By Jacob L. Shapiro
No region has been as active thus far in 2018 as the Middle East. The action has been driven by Iran, which is seeking to fill the vacuum left by the Islamic State’s defeat in Syria and Iraq. Amid the fighting and diplomatic horse-trading, one actor has been conspicuously silent for the past two months, the last major Sunni Arab power still standing in Iran’s way: Saudi Arabia. That silence ended this week. On Feb. 26, Saudi Arabia reshuffled its top military commanders, and on Feb. 28, it hosted Lebanon’s prime minister in Riyadh for a friendly visit. Neither event bodes well for Saudi Arabia’s future, which is looking more uncertain every day.
Saudi Arabia’s occultation was particularly notable because of its suddenness. In November 2017, it seemed like events in Saudi Arabia might be the most important in the region after the Islamic State’s defeat. That was the month when Saudi Arabia removed the economy minister and the head of the National Guard, set up a new anti-corruption agency, held numerous Saudi princes in a Ritz-Carlton hotel for ransom and threatened to declare war on Lebanon. The November political reshuffles suggested that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was quelling a potential threat to his newly confirmed succession to the throne. The Lebanon affair became an embarrassment because it showed that Riyadh was out of touch with the limits of its own power.
Relegated to the Sidelines
Since these developments, Saudi Arabia has been relegated to the sidelines. At the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Saudi Arabia was a major sponsor of anti-Assad rebel groups. Now, Saudi Arabia is a spectator watching Iran, Turkey, Israel, Russia and the U.S. compete to reshape the region. Saudi Arabia’s benching is not for lack of interest; it’s for lack of ability. The kingdom is mired in a protracted conflict in Yemen and, up until November, was burning through its foreign reserves. (An increase in the price of oil has helped matters in recent months, but it’s a temporary state of affairs, and Saudi Arabia continues to run a budget deficit.)
Suffice to say, there is not much Saudi Arabia can do now in Syria. Instead, Saudi Arabia has been focusing on internal affairs. The most important of these has been extorting money from princes and other officials picked up in the anti-corruption drive to replenish state coffers. But there have been other notable, albeit small, developments. In January, the kingdom ended a 35-year ban on the public screening of movies when “The Emoji Movie” was shown on a projector in a tent. Last week, Saudi Arabia’s General Entertainment Authority chief announced that $64 billion would be spent in the next 10 years on entertainment projects such as movie theaters and an opera house.
Those may seem like frivolous developments, but they aren’t. They speak to the depths of Saudi Arabia’s challenges: $64 billion is about 10 percent of Saudi Arabia’s 2017 gross domestic product – a luxurious sum for a government in dire financial straits. But of course, the issue here isn’t just entertainment. It’s keeping the Saudi population pliant as the new crown prince reshapes the kingdom’s economic and political structure away from government handouts to an ever-expanding circle of royalty and oil payoffs to keep tribes invested in the system. Bread and circuses helped maintain the Roman Empire for centuries after its prime. The crown prince believes he just has to get to 2030, by which point his “Vision 2030” will have fixed all of Saudi Arabia’s problems.
That is all nice in theory, but it is much harder in practice. Even were we to grant that his plans could fix what ails Saudi Arabia (hint: we think it’s a pipe dream), every move he makes creates new enemies among the more conservative and religious parts of Saudi society, or simply among the princes who have been on the losing end of the anti-corruption drive. If the prince is to survive his reform drive, he will need the Saudi military on his side, which is exactly what the most recent reshuffling is designed to ensure. On Feb. 26, the Saudi Press Agency issued a short release that announced the termination and retirement of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commander of the Air Defense Forces, and the commander of the land forces. Nearly all were replaced by relatively unknown officers whose main qualification is likely loyalty to the new crown prince.
Dangerous Foreign Threats
Serious though Saudi Arabia’s internal issues are, its foreign threats are even more dangerous. 2017 was a disastrous year for the kingdom’s foreign policy. Saudi Arabia tried to prevent Qatar from deepening its relationship with Iran – it failed. Saudi Arabia tried to get its allies in Lebanon to declare war on Hezbollah, and instead revealed how little the Saudis’ desires matter on the ground in Beirut. Saudi Arabia made little headway in the Yemeni civil war, and watched Iranian-backed Shiite militias, legitimized in Iraq in 2016, win important victories on the ground in Syria. Even the Islamic State’s defeat, which Saudi Arabia greatly wanted, did not come without its own attendant threats: Saudi Arabia is an enticing target for future IS operations.
It is not a surprise, then, that Saudi Arabia has decided to rethink its strategy. It replaced threats to the Lebanese prime minister with an invitation to come to Riyadh, and no doubt promised to deliver large sums of what Saudi Arabia has always purchased its allies with: money. When Iraq recently asked for money to help finance its reconstruction after the war against IS, Saudi Arabia pledged $1.5 billion, and would likely pledge much more if it meant Iranian influence in Iraq could be reduced. Money is ultimately all Saudi Arabia has to offer, and this explains why Saudi Arabia is collecting funds from its own princes even while it still retains more than about $500 billion in foreign reserves. Saudi Arabia sees the domestic and foreign challenges it faces and knows that even a sum as large as $500 billion isn’t going to be enough to solve them.
The irony about Saudi Arabia is that besides Israel, it has the region’s best-equipped military, but few forces. Having the equipment, however, isn’t enough – someone has to use it. Until Saudi Arabia can solve that problem, it is not going to be a major player because, while Saudi Arabia is looking for proxies to take its money, Turkey and Iran are providing their proxies with armor and artillery support. That’s why it doesn’t matter if Saudi Arabia develops a military-industrial complex (which it is trying to do) or that Saudi Arabia increased its defense budget by 9 percent in 2017 and will increase it by a projected 12 percent in 2018. At this point, the best-case scenario for Saudi Arabia is to break out the popcorn, root for Turkey and hope Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s reforms work. The worst-case scenario is a Saudi civil war. Hope is never a good policy. Replacing military commanders is a better one, but it doesn’t fix the underlying problem. It only buys the crown prince time – and the clock is ticking.
The post Saudi Arabia on the Sidelines appeared first on Geopolitical Futures.
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Saudi Arabia:
Saudi Arabia has broken its relative silence. King Salman fired his military chief and several other top commanders, with no public explanation. Is this another move to prevent a coup? Will we see any changes in Saudi behavior after this military reshuffle? In other news, Lebanon’s prime minister said he was invited to visit Saudi Arabia.
• Findings: There are three theories about the recent military shakeup. One is general dissatisfaction with the war in Yemen. A second is removing potential challenges to the king’s power. Media site Al Monitor suggests that the new deployment of Pakistani guards to Saudi Arabia is meant to protect the royal family. A third explanation is to reduce dissent among potential challengers to the regime – some of the appointments included descendants of King Salman’s brothers, who presumably might feel aggrieved by being sidelined in the accession line. Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s visit, meanwhile, is something to monitor. A Saudi envoy on a four-day trip to Lebanon delivered the invitation to Hariri, who accepted quickly. It does seem like Hariri was coerced into resigning. The New York Times spoke with unnamed Saudi officials who seemed to corroborate this story. Hariri claimed when he rescinded his resignation on Dec. 4 that all issues had been resolved after Hezbollah promised to stay out of the affairs of other Arab states. It seems there are two possible explanations: One, Hariri feels comfortable in his position now because Riyadh couldn’t force him to resign a second time. Two, the military reshuffles somehow put new pressure on Lebanon and Hezbollah that didn’t exist before.
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Stratfor Worldview
Mar 14, 2018 | 19:40 GMT
Saudi Arabia: Cabinet Approves New Nuclear Policy
The Big Picture
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has been spearheading efforts to reduce Saudi Arabia’s reliance on oil and to diversify and liberalize the economy. These efforts include developing nuclear energy, and Stratfor’s 2018 Annual Forecast highlights the obstacles that bin Salman will confront as he pursues his agenda.
See 2018 Annual Forecast
See The Saudi Survival Strategy
On March 13, the Saudi Cabinet approved a new national nuclear policy in advance of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman's visit to Washington on March 19-22, during which he is expected to push for a nuclear deal with the United States. Though Saudi Arabia’s policy clearly states that any nuclear activities will be purely peaceful and that the kingdom will follow all international laws in this regard, it also commits the country to best practices for handling nuclear waste and for developing a national capability in the nuclear industry. These guidelines suggest that Saudi Arabia could be planning activities that could lead to nuclear proliferation.
Saudi Arabia is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the foundational global treaty for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. But its references to handling nuclear waste and developing a national capability indicate it plans to take a different path than did the other internationally approved nuclear program in the Middle East: that of the United Arab Emirates. The United Arab Emirates adheres to the most stringent standards on nuclear energy, eschewing in-country enrichment and reprocessing, two key aspects of the fuel cycle that can potentially lead to proliferation activities. The Emirati government even went so far so as to enshrine these commitments into domestic law. It appears that Saudi Arabia aims to own these parts of the fuel cycle, which it has acknowledged before. But its exact intentions will be made known over the next few months.
There is uncertainty on the U.S. side of the equation as well. It has been rumored that U.S. Energy Secretary Rick Perry will be switching roles, which could slow down negotiations with Saudi Arabia. If Perry is replaced by someone with more of a scientific background, it could limit the number of concessions the United States is willing to make in nuclear talks with Saudi Arabia. The United States also faces pressure from several key allies, most notably Israel, to avoid striking a permissive nuclear deal with the kingdom.
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http://thehill.com/policy/international/379224-senate-trump-clash-over-saudi-arabia?userid=188403
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http://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-crown-prince-jared-kushner-relationship-2018-3
More than one aspect to this story-- among them the image of the apparent actual leader of Saudi Arabia and an Orthodox Jew working together.
That said, my sense of Kushner is of a princeling of , , , unknown moral character in way over his head , , ,
If accurate, this unsourced article sheds light on Kushner losing his Top Secret clearance.
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http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/258347/teaching-hebrew-in-saudi-arabia
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second post
Fascinating piece
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/04/09/a-saudi-princes-quest-to-remake-the-middle-east?mbid=nl_Daily%20040218&CNDID=50142053&spMailingID=13239773&spUserID=MjAxODUyNTc2OTUwS0&spJobID=1380145740&spReportId=MTM4MDE0NTc0MAS2
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http://carolineglick.com/our-good-fair-weathered-saudi-friend/
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By Xander Snyder
Saudi Arabia is in a race against time to implement massive reforms that it hopes will minimize its economy’s dependence on oil and, in doing so, insulate it from social unrest once oil prices inevitably fall. And the government must do this without surrendering its control of the country. It’s a tall order for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the heir apparent to the kingdom who, by all accounts, appears to have consolidated enough power to at least try to pull it off.
There’s plenty of reasons to doubt that he will actually succeed, but that’s a problem for a later day. Right now, Brent crude is at about $75 per barrel, slightly above what the International Monetary Fund lists as Saudi Arabia’s breakeven point, giving the government some more revenue and thus a little more breathing room to change its ways.
Time and Money
It’s hard to say how long that will last, though. Prices have been rising, thanks to a combination of OPEC cuts, production agreements between Saudi Arabia and Russia, decreased U.S. inventories, and fears that a U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal will take Iranian supply offline. And they have gone up despite increased U.S. shale production – which counterintuitively makes sense, considering shale producers will up production as soon as oil prices exceed their own breakeven points, which tend to range between $35 and $70 per barrel.
Increasing production, however, takes time and money. The cost to finish uncompleted wells must be accounted for, as must the cost of transportation to market. Pipelines are a good option in this regard, but some pipelines are nearly at maximum capacity. (The delays have prompted producers to offer discounts of as much as $9 per barrel, according to some reports.) Another option is to transport by truck, something that requires more time and money. Other cyclical factors, including the demand for components such as the sand used to fracture a well, likewise drive costs up and forestall oil coming to market.
The delays mean that oil prices will stay high until shale producers can overcome their short-term barriers to production. As it happens, they are beginning to do just that. The number of active rigs in the U.S. has been increasing steadily since the middle of 2016. (As of April 2018 that number is 1,013.) Production has predictably surged. In May, the Energy Information Administration estimates that U.S. oil production will increase to 7 million barrels per day, a 15 percent increase compared to last May.
So while $75 per barrel of oil may allay some of Saudi Arabia’s immediate financial concerns, the long-term trend remains: More U.S. production will drive prices down. Saudi Arabia knows this and so must move quickly to take advantage of the current high prices. How quickly it acts depends on how much money it actually needs to fund its ambitious reforms.
Believable Rumors
And how much money it will earn remains to be seen. The International Monetary Fund puts Saudi Arabia’s breakeven price at $73 per barrel, in theory netting Riyadh a nice budget surplus at current prices. There are, however, some issues with the IMF’s breakeven figure. For starters, the formula it uses to calculate this figure is publicly available. Second, according to a paper published by the Council on Foreign Relations, IMF estimates vary by as much as 20 percent, even in the same year. Either way, as shale production responds to the market, oil prices are likely to decline, putting greater strain on the Saudi budget.
It’s no wonder, then, that the Saudi government is desperately trying to diversify its sources of non-oil revenue. And it has been somewhat successful, so long as you don’t look too closely. Non-oil revenues as a percent of the government’s total budget have increased from 8 percent in 2012 to almost 37 percent in 2017, an annualized growth rate of about 20 percent.
Still, in this same period, oil revenue has decreased so much that the total budget has declined by almost 45 percent, from about $330 billion to $185 billion (using the current riyal/USD exchange rate). In other words, the non-oil share of revenue appears to have increased so much primarily because its total budget has shrunk nearly by half. If Saudi Arabia was earning as much in non-oil revenues in 2012 as it is today, then non-oil would account for a much smaller share of the budget, about 18 percent.
(click to enlarge)
The Saudi government expects spending to outpace revenue in 2018, estimating a deficit of more than $50 billion, or roughly 7 percent of gross domestic product. Aside from raising taxes – something it has steadily done despite the political risks – there are only three ways it can account for this shortfall: dip into its reserves, seek foreign investment or confiscate assets from the elite. As of February 2018, Saudi Arabia had approximately $487 billion in reserves, a 5 percent decline from last February and a 33 percent decline from its peak in 2014. If the kingdom were to maintain deficit spending at the same rate as is anticipated in 2018, it would have about 10 years of runway. Of course, if oil revenue declines without a commensurate decrease in its reform expenditures, the deficit will grow, and its cushion will shrink.
Unsurprisingly, Saudi Arabia prefers to raise foreign investment. The most publicized measure in that regard is the initial public offering of Saudi Aramco. This offering, however, continues to be delayed, and while the Saudi energy minister may be citing “litigation and liability” complexities, the real reason is most likely the inability of Saudi Arabia’s bankers to reach the $2 trillion valuation that Mohammed bin Salman has sought. At that valuation, the anticipated sale of 5 percent of the company would raise $100 billion for Saudi Arabia, while somewhat more conservative market valuation estimates, ranging from about $500 billion to $1 trillion, would raise only between $25 billion and $50 billion.
Riyadh has also turned to the debt markets, issuing $17.5 billion in its first dollar-denominated debt offering in 2016, and another $11 billion this month. Though Moody’s A1 rating may give some assurance to investors, the reality is that Saudi Arabia remains bogged down in a proxy war in Yemen and preoccupied by Iran, its regional rival that is well positioned to gain more power. Any new developments in the broader Middle Eastern conflict that threatens to lure Saudi Arabia in either financially or otherwise – say, a war between Iran and Israel – is sure to make foreign investors wary and limit Saudi Arabia’s access to external capital.
Saudi Arabia has also confiscated assets from its elite. The arrest of 400 oligarchs last year netted $106 billion in confiscated wealth, according to the Saudi attorney general. This no doubt helps to plug the gap for now, but there are limits to how much the government can seize without facing a more concerted resistance.
All told, Saudi Arabia isn’t on the brink of collapse, but nor are the rumors of a palace coup from last weekend all that surprising. They attest to the difficulty of the government’s position. It needs to radically transform its political-economy in a relatively short time, all while it contends with regional security threats. The need to move quickly, then, is paramount, since a divided, weak homefront will preoccupy the regime’s focus and prevent it from confronting its external threats effectively.
A lot must go right for Saudi Arabia to achieve its far-reaching reform goals, and in the annals of history, countries are rarely so lucky.
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Two years ago Mohammed bin Salman, then Saudi Arabia's deputy crown prince, became the highest-profile Arabic-speaking millennial since Gazan singer Mohammed Assaf won the Arab Idol competition in 2013. Announcing his "pride in the historical and cultural legacy of our Saudi, Arab, and Islamic heritage," the young royal articulated a new economic plan for his nation, Vision 2030. The plan aims to achieve three of Saudi Arabia's overarching goals — a vibrant society, a thriving economy and an ambitious nation — and it is turning heads in and beyond the kingdom. At home and abroad, the prospect of profit under Vision 2030 is tantalizing capital investors. The promise of a more open society also has captured the imagination of many Saudi citizens, who long for less censorship, more respect for indigenous arts and culture, protection for the peninsula's varied flora and fauna, and a few movie theaters.
As with any great plan, the requirements and repercussions of enacting Vision 2030 are beginning to emerge. While many observers are anticipating the momentous challenges of transitioning the Saudi economy as outlined in Saudi Vision 2030 — including the unprecedented step of privatizing part of the state oil company — a look at one small endeavor hints at some of the obstacles that lie ahead.
The Secret Garden
Some 45 kilometers (28 miles) outside Abha, the capital of Saudi Arabia's southwestern Asir province, past the nearby King Khalid Air Base and off a shabby asphalt road piled on either side with plastic bottles, there awaits a surprising sight (and smell): hectares on end of blooming pink roses. The industrial garden, called Ward At Taif, manufactures rose waters and oils for sought-after aromatic products such as perfumes and incense. The small business takes its name from Taif, a city in Mecca province already famous for its roses. And not coincidentally, Ward At Taif sits at exactly the same elevation as Taif, just over 2,000 meters above sea level. Asir province is on a high plateau that regularly receives more rainfall than the rest of the country. It boasts blissfully sunny temperatures ranging from 15 to 32 degrees Celsius (60 to 90 degrees Fahrenheit) — prime conditions for cultivating roses.
Sunday through Thursday workers come and pick. They pull flower head after flower head from thorny bushes and toss them into 5-kilogram (11-pound) plastic baskets. They are paid daily for harvesting 25 kilograms of rose petals and receive bonus pay for each additional kilogram. The workers are foreign, mostly Egyptian. The line manager, Ashraf Barakat, is a professional engineer from Egypt.
Once the baskets are full, workers transport them to a processing plant onsite. There, 25 kilograms of rose petals at a time boil for 10 to 12 hours in copper vats imported from Syria and Egypt. The scented steam is distilled through cooling pipes and eventually condenses into liquid, dripping into clear, sanitized bottles that collect 10 liters (about 2.6 gallons) of rose water each.
Rising to the top of each bottle like cream is rose oil — just a few milliliters. "It's as expensive as gold," Barakat says. "The custodian of the holy mosques washes the inside of the Kaaba walls with [rose oil] once a year." Other rose products are similarly in-demand, if less rarefied. Herbalists claim tinctures made from the petals may be effective for treating depression, anxiety and insomnia, and rosehip — the round part of the flower just below the petals — is rich in vitamin C.
Roses aren't the alternative to oil exports Saudi Arabia is looking for to diversify its economy under Vision 2030. But they highlight an important part of the solution: For the plan to succeed, Saudi citizens must learn and practice professions that international workers currently perform in the kingdom. Those jobs include skilled professions as well as unskilled manual labor, such as rose harvesting. Vision 2030 describes Saudi Arabia's employment predicament over the past decade, and an ambitious proposal to address it:
"The retail sector achieved an annual growth rate in excess of 10 percent. It currently employs 1.5 million workers, of which only 0.3 million are Saudis.
We aim to provide job opportunities for an additional million Saudis by 2020 in a growing retail sector that attracts modern, local, regional, and international brands across all regions of the country."
As for other workers around the world, promotion may come from the entry level, with merit-based rewards. A rose petal picker may go on to manage a factory like Ward At Taif, and somewhere along that road he or she may have a chance to take a school loan for a degree in mechanical engineering.
Every Rose Has Its Thorn
Of course, putting Vision 2030 in action won't be quite as simple as that. What is the road for Saudi nationals to take jobs such as harvesting rose petals or to become qualified operations managers at such a plant? And what will become of the international laborers currently working these jobs? These are people who send much-needed money home to their families in more than 100 other countries. Today 11 million foreigners work in the kingdom, according to Arab News. That's almost one-third of the country's total population. Some of these migrants harvest roses. Some build skyscrapers. Some are chauffeurs, employed full-time by families to drive women where they need to go. What will become of them once women start to drive legally on June 24?
The leaves of dozens of rose bushes at Ward At Taif vibrate as an F-15 from the nearby air base flies over, perhaps on a mission to Yemen. The economic ripples of Vision 2030 will take longer to be felt around the world. Still, it's not too soon for predictions, analysis and preparation for the effects of this bold vision.
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https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Saudi-Arabia-stops-new-business-with-Germany-over-its-pro-Iran-policy-558431
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https://www.memri.org/reports/shift-saudi-medias-attitude-israel-%E2%80%93-part-ii-saudi-writer-who-visited-israel-we-want-israeli
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By Jacob L. Shapiro
After months of relative silence from Saudi Arabia, this was a noisy weekend. For the second time since he was named heir to the throne last June, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman announced a major Cabinet reshuffle, this time focusing on ministries related to culture, Islamic life and social development. Just one day earlier, French newspaper Le Monde reported that the crown prince had sent a letter to French President Emmanuel Macron threatening to attack Qatar, the target of last year’s Saudi-led blockade, if Doha acquired Russian-made S-400 air defense systems. Last but not least, Israeli news site News1 published an article about Saudi Arabia’s plans to develop nuclear weapons capabilities, potentially with help from Pakistan or Israel.
These stories point to the intense internal and external pressures Saudi Arabia is facing, even with the recent spike in oil prices. The Cabinet reshuffle is further evidence of Mohammed’s attempt to win the loyalty of the Saudi bureaucracy. The first salvos in this campaign were aimed at the military and wealthy Saudi citizens – two groups that could have been hotbeds of dissent against the young crown prince. Now Mohammed is turning to some of the ministries that will be responsible for implementing the reforms upon which he is staking both his life and his country’s future.
Saudi Plans Backfire
Mohammed has managed to install individuals loyal to him at many levels of Saudi Arabia’s political, military and religious structure, and the most surprising thing is that he has done so without creating significant backlash against his rule. Perhaps his opponents are biding their time, or perhaps there is a consensus within the ruling elite over the direction the country must take. Mohammed is by no means out of the woods – his position remains extremely precarious – but each step he takes allows him to cement his authority even further. He will need all the support he can get as he tries to transform Saudi Arabia from a tribal petrostate to a mature, 21st-century nation.
Le Monde’s report on the Saudi threat to attack Qatar is not nearly as heartening. This time last year, Saudi Arabia initiated a coordinated diplomatic assault against Doha to get Qatar, which was getting cozy with Riyadh’s main rivals Iran and Turkey, to fall back in line. Riyadh had no intention of allowing Qatar to become a fifth column in the Gulf, which Saudi Arabia views as its sphere of influence. So Saudi Arabia got its allies, including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt and Yemen, to sign on to a plan to isolate Qatar economically and financially.
But the plan backfired. Qatar didn’t bend, Al-Jazeera didn’t shut down, and the U.S. didn’t stop using Qatar as its forward headquarters for U.S. Central Command. In fact, Qatar’s economy grew stronger after the initial shock wore off, and its relationship with Turkey has deepened, with Qatar even agreeing in March to allow Turkey to establish a naval base in the country. Qatar also hasn’t stopped dealing with Iran on a pragmatic basis, restoring full diplomatic relations with Tehran two months after Saudi Arabia’s aborted attempt to bring Doha to its knees. Indeed, the Saudi strategy actually demonstrated Saudi Arabia’s fundamental weakness, not its strength.
If the report from Le Monde is true, Saudi Arabia is now pressing the issue once more. If Qatar were to acquire the S-400 system, it would help negate Saudi Arabia’s only real military advantage over its neighbors – its formidable air power, built through years of acquisitions of U.S. military hardware. Saudi Arabia has already seen what Russian involvement in the Middle East can mean for Saudi interests; Moscow’s intervention in Syria is the primary reason Bashar Assad’s regime survived, spoiling both Saudi and Turkish hopes to replace Assad with a Sunni leader. Saudi Arabia does not want Russia to prop up yet another Middle Eastern regime hostile to Saudi interests, especially not one with which Saudi Arabia shares a border.
But Saudi Arabia is playing a dangerous game here, one that it may not be able to win. On the one hand, Riyadh can’t look much weaker than it already does when it comes to Qatar, so there is little lost in making the threat and not following through. But following through on the threat would be dangerous because Riyadh could find itself not just stoking tensions further with Iran but even forcing Turkey – which already has a military base in Qatar in addition to the naval base that was agreed to – to directly oppose Saudi moves.
Nuclear Arms Race
The Israeli media report that Saudi Arabia may pursue nuclear weapons if it becomes clear that Iran has done the same is based mostly on conjecture and inference. There is no evidence that Pakistan is stockpiling nuclear bombs to transfer to Saudi Arabia should an arms race begin in earnest, only unconfirmed reports. Furthermore, the headline attracting most of the attention – that Israel might be transferring nuclear information to Saudi Arabia – is based not on evidence but on what the author describes as a “reasonable assumption” based on Israel’s interest to cultivate closer ties to Saudi Arabia.
It’s still notable, however, that a potential Saudi move to acquire nuclear weapons is being talked about at all. Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister told CNN in May that the country would absolutely pursue a nuclear weapons program should Iran restart its own program following the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. And since most indications suggest Iran never intended to fully give up its nuclear weapons program in the long term, even if it was willing to suspend uranium enrichment in the short term, a nuclear arms race between the Middle East’s major powers is a matter of when, not if.
Indeed, there is perhaps no country outside of Israel for which nuclear weapons would be more valuable than Saudi Arabia, especially if the United States pulled back from the region in the future. Of the major Middle Eastern powers vying for regional supremacy, Saudi Arabia is by far the weakest, and nuclear weapons are a tremendous equalizer. In other words, though we cannot confirm the veracity of the Israeli report, we also cannot find much fault in the underlying logic of its prediction.
Though Saudi Arabia has taken its licks in recent years, it remains a rich petrostate with formidable if limited conventional military capabilities and a history of relying on proxies to do its bidding. Riyadh no doubt still favors this strategy, as evidenced most recently by reports in Turkish media suggesting that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are working to create a new Arab militia in northeastern Syria that might be sympathetic to Saudi interests. The problem for Saudi Arabia is that this strategy has consistently failed to bring about an improvement in its overall strategic position, and in all directions, Saudi Arabia faces enemies stronger than itself. The crown prince can shuffle his Cabinet all he wants, but even if he can transform Saudi Arabia – a herculean task in its own right – his country is not even powerful enough to get Qatar to toe the line.
In that sense, these three reports from the weekend offer a window into the imminent challenges Saudi Arabia is facing – and it’s not a pleasant view.
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The beginning of this week brought good news for the Saudi economy. Government data, after all, showed surprising gross domestic product growth in non-oil sectors. Or so it seemed. Recently released unemployment figures tell a different story. Unemployment has edged to 12.9 percent, a record high and almost double the unemployment rate at the beginning of 2018. Rates such as these are never good, but they are especially problematic for a country with a young population in the middle of government efforts to transform not just the economy itself but the very culture of the state.
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http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2018/08/31/joel-c-rosenberg-mohammed-bin-salman-is-33-here-are-21-impressive-reforms-already-underway.html
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http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2018/08/31/joel-c-rosenberg-mohammed-bin-salman-is-33-here-are-21-impressive-reforms-already-underway.html
Pretty impressive!
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https://pjmedia.com/spengler/german-press-reveals-saudi-spook-saga-behind-khashoggi-disappearance/
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https://pjmedia.com/spengler/german-press-reveals-saudi-spook-saga-behind-khashoggi-disappearance/
That he is a spy and ISIS contact makes sense but still probably doesn't excuse torture and dismemberment. I will keep an open mind as the facts emerge.
The US MSM narrative is that this is Trump's fault because he criticizes journalists, but not the fault of the other side in the US who call for and applaud violence against political opponents.
Maybe its not anyone in the US's fault. Maybe we're just not being culturally sensitive to their ways.
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http://www.aei.org/publication/mohammed-bin-salman-and-the-khashoggi-disaster/?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiT0dSaFpXTTNZV0psTW1VeCIsInQiOiJONXAzQWEzN1o4NVwvRVwvTVFRd3ZyYkppVFNmWVFyV1pQTmVKMEhkdXVvQmFhdFh4R0J3enNUMittWWZiZ3M5ZnlzZWhaVVZTOHhsK09VeFY3SXR6WTNWM3ZwcDNRUU5GNmFPWDhYVVVhdlwvY1paMmFhMmhQR1BlVVdZXC95eEtDNmsifQ%3D%3D
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second post
Why Kill Jamal Khashoggi?
The most charitable interpretation is that this was an abduction that went horribly wrong.
158 Comments
By Karen Elliott House
Oct. 14, 2018 3:49 p.m. ET
Protesters outside the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, Oct. 9.
Protesters outside the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, Oct. 9. Photo: ozan kose/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
The case of the vanished and apparently murdered Saudi activist and writer Jamal Khashoggi is a tale with a victim and villains, but no heroes.
Mr. Khashoggi, a longtime retainer of the Saudi royal family and more recently a critic of the regime, entered the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, Oct. 2, seeking documents relevant to a divorce. The Turkish government claims to have proof that a Saudi hit squad murdered him inside the consulate, chopped his body to bits, and dispatched the remains in a black van to a private plane headed for Saudi Arabia. Portions of this plot remain unverified but there seems little doubt Mr. Khashoggi is dead.
The primary villain apparently is Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who runs every aspect of Saudi Arabia and without whose authorization nothing of consequence takes place. But this sordid episode isn’t best thought of as the clash between an autocratic ruler and a democratic hero. It is more of an internecine conflict.
Mr. Khashoggi, notwithstanding his credentials as a columnist for the Washington Post, spent most of his adult life working with and for the Al Saud family and its media properties. He also did stints for Saudi intelligence, headed for part of the time by Prince Turki al-Faisal, who later served as ambassador to the U.S. Mr. Khashoggi’s early claim to fame was interviewing Osama bin Laden in 1980s Afghanistan, where both were allied with the anti-Soviet mujahedeen. Mr. Khashoggi broke with bin Laden in the 1990s and after 9/11 became Riyadh’s favorite example of a reformed Islamic fundamentalist, often produced for visiting Westerners to outline his conversion. But under King Salman and the crown prince, Mr. Khashoggi became an outcast, accused of supporting the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood. He moved to the U.S. in July 2017.
While Crown Prince Mohammed has made significant social and economic reforms, he has never claimed to be a democrat. Recently he acknowledged jailing 1,500 people, famously including the 300 relatives, ministers and business barons who were confined inside the Riyadh Ritz-Carlton. None of that, however, prepared those of us who knew him for the murder of a citizen in what is supposed to be the security of his nation’s consulate.
Kidnapping critics and returning them to Saudi Arabia isn’t new for this regime, though previously such incidents got little publicity because no one died. Perhaps the crown prince thought he could again escape any consequences. After all, Russia’s Vladimir Putin has poisoned dissidents in London; China’s Xi Jinping runs an archipelago of re-education camps; and Turkey’s increasingly despotic Recep Tayyip Erdogan—who is leveling the charges at the Saudis—has jailed thousands with little or no international consequence. Perhaps the world will soon forget a political murder.
But there surely will be a lasting reputational price for the crown prince. With so much power over a largely pacific populace, why would he order or sanction what amounts to a mafia murder? Mr. Khashoggi wasn’t leading a civil rebellion against the regime. Nor was he a widely popular focus of dissent in the kingdom. He seemed to pose no serious threat to Crown Prince Mohammad’s rule.
That Mohammed bin Salman believes Mr. Khashoggi was a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, a transnational Islamist organization, and on the payroll of Qatar, a Saudi nemesis, seems more an excuse than a reason. Those who watch the crown prince closely say he is determined to pre-empt any hint of possible disruption before it can materialize. So Mr. Khashoggi’s decision to register in the U.S. a new political organization, Democracy for the Arab World Now, perhaps funded by Saudi regional rivals, might have triggered this action.
It seems clear that Mohammed bin Salman, accustomed to issuing orders on every aspect of Saudi life without question or contradiction, wanted to silence Mr. Khashoggi. When efforts to woo him back as an adviser failed, he was captured in Istanbul, where he hoped to marry his Turkish fiancée. The most charitable interpretation is that this was an abduction that went horribly wrong.
Now what? While the crown prince can ignore Saudi domestic opinion, he must care about his international image, especially among foreign investors, whose money he needs to realize his Vision 2030 economic reforms. Businessmen who had embraced him—such as Richard Branson, Uber’s Dara Khosrowshahi and Viacom ’s Bob Bakish—are stepping back. Many others won’t dare show up at this month’s investor conference the crown prince is hosting in Riyadh. The mass incarcerations at the Ritz-Carlton a year ago had dimmed the crown prince’s image. This blackens it.
While the crown prince doesn’t care about media or even congressional criticism, he must care about any U.S. action that significantly alters the fundamental U.S.-Saudi relationship—which has never been based on shared moral values but rather on mutual security. In a dangerous neighborhood, Saudi Arabia depends on American security guarantees; likewise, any radical evolution in Saudi Arabia would threaten all U.S. interests in the region. Most important, President Trump and Crown Prince Mohammed share a deep distrust of Iran, so that the U.S.-Saudi security relationship seems likely to hold for now.
But Congress may block weapons sales in support of the crown prince’s still-unsuccessful war in Yemen, where more than 6,000 civilians have died. Sen. Lindsey Graham has warned of a “bipartisan tsunami” in Congress if the Saudis are proved guilty of Mr. Khashoggi’s murder. Congress might even go beyond Yemen and block all weapons sales to Saudi Arabia, despite Mr. Trump’s opposition.
The more lasting effect likely will be a diminution of trust, leaving the U.S.-Saudi relationship resembling a loveless marriage in which neither side can afford to file for divorce.
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https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/16/opinions/impact-of-khashoggi-could-last-generations-robertson-opinion-intl/index.html?fbclid=IwAR0rdLceeqWuCnhPNz3NndkfNQtO75Nf16gAEuWXijzSmQier9_AHtdxKDs
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Don’t Ditch Riyadh in a Fit of Righteousness
By Walter Russell Mead, wsj today I believe
Paraphrasing, this is bad, very bad but don't hand the Middle East over to Iran because of this.
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Don’t Ditch Riyadh in a Fit of Righteousness
Khashoggi’s murder must be condemned. But Saudi Arabia still serves U.S. interests.
155 Comments
By Walter Russell Mead
Oct. 15, 2018 7:13 p.m. ET
A Turkish police officer at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Oct. 15.
A Turkish police officer at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Oct. 15. Photo: tolga bozoglu/epa-efe/rex/Shutterstock
The murder (if that’s what it was) of Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, was a horror in itself, and a greater horror still in what it threatens to unleash. The Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the ayatollahs of Iran are huddled over the corpse, hoping to turn a political profit from the death of an innocent man.
Mr. Khashoggi was a thorn in the flesh of the hyperactive crown prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammad Bin Salman, a man who faces a concatenation of problems the likes of which the House of Saud has rarely seen. Iran, hostile, arrogant and ambitious, has ruthlessly carved a “Shia crescent” from Baghdad through Damascus to Beirut. A gusher of American oil and natural gas has diminished OPEC. Turkey, sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood and harboring dreams of restoring its old Ottoman glory, seeks to displace Saudi Arabia as the voice of the Sunni world. Russia has reasserted itself in the region. And inside Saudi Arabia, a growing population with high expectations demands more opportunity and better governance from a traditional monarchy largely unprepared for the 21st century.
It was out of this turmoil and fear that the MBS phenomenon emerged. At home and abroad, the Saudis attempted a series of frenzied initiatives, including a war in Yemen and the privatization of Aramco, to improve their position. Meanwhile, MBS stroked gullible American elites into the belief that he was a democrat.
It worked for a while; gullibility is America’s most plentiful natural resource. But after Mr. Khashoggi’s death, even the most naive observer can see that the crown prince is at best a modernizing autocrat, using dictatorial power to drag his country into the future: Peter the Great, not Thomas Jefferson. At worst, he could end like Phaethon, the Greek demigod who lost control of his horses while foolishly trying to drive the chariot of the sun.
The Saudi transformation is not going smoothly. Aramco’s privatization has been delayed and the ambitious Vision 2030 goals for economic renewal seem increasingly elusive. MBS’s foreign policy looks more chaotic than inspired, and the blunder in Istanbul was not the first false step. The arrest of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri last year and the failed diplomatic standoff with Qatar were not the strokes of a master. Nor is the kingdom’s ill-planned and poorly executed Syria strategy or its intervention in Yemen, which has created a humanitarian disaster without notably advancing Saudi interests.
The Khashoggi affair is more of the same. But more than other MBS-era blunders, this episode may be an existential threat to the international prestige he has been working assiduously to build—even as the Saudis appear to be cooking up an exculpatory cover story.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, flying to Riyadh at short notice to bring some order to the chaos, is well acquainted with the hard facts of the Middle East. He knows the crown prince’s Saudi Arabia is not an authoritarian caterpillar metamorphosing into a liberal butterfly. But neither are Turkey and Iran. And on crucial issues, U.S. and Saudi interests are aligned. The U.S. wants to ensure that no single power, inside or outside the Middle East, has control over the world’s oil spigot. That means Saudi Arabia must remain independent and secure.
There are two things the U.S. should not do. One is sweep Mr. Khashoggi’s murder under the rug. His disappearance has damaged Saudi Arabia’s standing, including in Congress. Mr. Pompeo needs to deliver a clear message that this behavior weakens and ultimately endangers the alliance. He should not be deterred by Saudi threats. Like the American Confederates who overestimated the power of King Cotton in the 1860s, the Saudis tend to overestimate King Oil’s power today.
But to do what the Iran-deal chorus and the Erdogan and Muslim Brotherhood apologists want—to dissolve the U.S.-Saudi alliance in a frenzy of righteousness—would be an absurd overreaction that plays into the hands of America’s enemies. It could also stampede the Saudis into even more recklessness. France was not expelled from the European Community or NATO in 1985 when its agents sank the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior, killing an innocent man in the process.
Without lionizing, ostracizing or enabling MBS, Mr. Pompeo needs to get to the heart of the matter: Saudi insecurity. To restore balance and sobriety to its foreign policy, Saudi Arabia needs to calm down, and only the U.S. can provide the assurances to make that possible. Among other things, this entails coordinating with the Saudis (and the Israelis) on a policy aimed at containing Iran and stabilizing the region. It also involves encouraging the economic transformation the Saudis seek at home. Even as he responds with appropriate gravity to a serious provocation, Mr. Pompeo must give Saudi authorities the confidence that sober and sensible policies will bring continuing American support for the kingdom’s independence and reform.
Appeared in the October 16, 2018, print edition.
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https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/10/saudi-arabia-jamal-khashoggi-affair-us-government-in-dark/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202018-10-17&utm_term=NR5PM%20Actives
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https://pjmedia.com/spengler/german-press-reveals-saudi-spook-saga-behind-khashoggi-disappearance/
That he is a spy and ISIS contact makes sense but still probably doesn't excuse torture and dismemberment. I will keep an open mind as the facts emerge.
The US MSM narrative is that this is Trump's fault because he criticizes journalists, but not the fault of the other side in the US who call for and applaud violence against political opponents.
Maybe its not anyone in the US's fault. Maybe we're just not being culturally sensitive to their ways.
Exactly! Suddenly judging the muslim world by western standards isn't intolerant and xenophobic?
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"That he is a spy and ISIS contact" .. Muslim Brohood...
Now we know how he got a job with the Wcompost.
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https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45906396?fbclid=IwAR2zjUpnjacHYMOpPTyxAfttaTUT5rGYSZDE0sO02M4qorHL8v4YDmS6pt0
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https://nypost.com/2018/10/18/why-the-saudis-despised-jamal-khashoggi/?fbclid=IwAR1IWOOcmGtskPjOblJ59eEJb6hUEEX8kqQIkAehQRYKjFeUocDlyhfTMQQ
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By GPF Staff
Saudi Arabia Reaches Its Moment of Reckoning, the Quad Keeps Things Informal
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From the Forecast: “Saudi Arabia is mired in a political crisis. It started with the fall of oil prices but has reached a point that even a recovery wouldn’t put a stop to it. The dip has made it abundantly clear to Riyadh that its control over oil prices is not what it was during OPEC’s heyday and that it has no choice but to transform its economy. Change, though, is anathema to those who benefit from the status quo, and serious political instability will follow. Dealing with Iran amid ambitious reconstruction plans and a political crisis will be more than Saudi Arabia can handle. It will seek out allies, but its traditional partners – the United States, Israel and the United Kingdom – aren’t eager to team up with the Saudis on this issue.”
Update: In the Sept. 7 installment of the Forecast Tracker, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia played a leading role, not because of anything that had happened, but rather because of what hadn’t happened. At the beginning of the year, we expected the myriad challenges facing the country, including low oil prices and jihadist threats, to overwhelm the kingdom’s ability to set effective foreign policy for the region that would wind down the war in Yemen, push back against Iranian influence and increase the strength of a Saudi-led Arab regional coalition. We also expected that traditional Saudi allies like the United States wouldn’t be willing to go along with Riyadh’s more ambitious plans.
For much of this year, that forecast seemed to be trending off track. Enter one Jamal Khashoggi. It’s not polite to speak ill of the dead, and it is now all but certain that Khashoggi is no longer among the living. But sometimes the truth is more important than decorum. Before becoming a media darling of the West, Khashoggi was a Saudi journalist who had ties to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida and who, for a long stretch of time between journalism jobs, worked for Saudi intelligence. He also comes from an old and powerful Saudi family that traded in military weapons, and while the sins of an uncle shouldn’t be foisted off on a nephew, all men are, on some level, prisoners of their upbringing.
It says something about the fickleness of human beings that Saudi Arabia’s destructive war in Yemen and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s crackdown on his fellow princes and their wealth generated little more than apathy and punchlines in Western media but that Khashoggi’s disappearance has galvanized significant anti-Saudi feelings around the world. Most important among the kingdom’s newfound critics are the United States, where even conservative lawmakers are calling for Salman’s head, and Turkey, which is understandably upset that Riyadh would do its dirty work on Turkish soil. In that sense, our forecasting abilities were limited. Based on Saudi Arabia’s position in the Middle East and the tactics it was using to secure its interests, we expected significant blowback against it. We just didn’t realize it would take a case like Khashoggi’s to light the match.
But the match has indeed been lit. The pressing matter now will be the future of the kingdom, and specifically of its crown prince. Once a Western media darling himself for his desire to bring Saudi Arabia into the 21st century (and his purported aims to liberalize the country), Salman is now facing scrutiny on the world stage, and his image has been tarnished. Until now, no faction inside Saudi Arabia has meaningfully challenged his centralization of power. But there are many potential factions that could do so, chief among them the clerical establishment and the military. If the Saudi crown prince cannot rehabilitate his international reputation, these factions may at last have the opportunity they’ve been waiting for to strike back against the young Salman.
Then again, the Khashoggi storm may pass without much fanfare or action once Saudi Arabia produces an explanation for his death. Media cycles these days treat consumers like they have short attention spans. Even so, this story is about much more now than Khashoggi or MbS. This is about the future of Saudi Arabia. It’s a future that factions in the kingdom – some reformist, some traditionalist – are contesting, a future that depends on the continued steadfast support of an outside patron, a role that for many decades now has been played by the United States. That it is even being discussed openly in the U.S. that the alliance with Saudi Arabia may have outlived its usefulness is a sign of how dire the situation has become and reflects the kinds of issues we expected to dominate this year for Riyadh. The watershed has come later than we thought and in a form we didn’t expect, but it’s here now and Saudi Arabia has limited tools at its disposal to deal with it.
(click to enlarge)
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https://www.patreon.com/posts/22203075
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https://www.patreon.com/posts/22203075
Good points there. What are Trudeau and Merkel going to do to westernize and civilize, maybe Christianize Wahhabi Saudi? This has turned into a media opportunity to challenge and criticize Trump. Trump didn't kill him.
Rand Paul on Fox News Sunday went on a two point rant, this was awful and we have no business in the Middle East. He gets the captain obvious part right and the more difficult part dead wrong.
The question really is, what must Trump do to placate his critics in the media so they will move on to their next outrage..
How many time do we hear Khashoggi was a journalist and a Washington post reporter? What else was he?
I've heard maybe a hundred times more about him already than I ever heard about beheaded WSJ reporter Daniel Pearl who really was a journalist.
Venezuelan dissident Fernando Alban is just as dead in last week's news. Where is the equal outrage?
https://www.apnews.com/d1ef4f6c6a2c4aaf9d990b1002a8f5d8
Maybe he just fell off the 10th floor of police headquarters.
But it doesn't further the chosen narrative.
Trump needs Saudi to counter the Iranian threat. That our allies aren't so perfect is not a new reality in the Middle East. Yes, we should use our leverage to make things better there. Can't do that if you leave the Middle East to Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and Russia.
The Leftist media need to save face for their support for the brutal Chavez-Maduro-Castro regime in dictatorial socialist Venezuela. But they could at least report the news. The "socialists" they supported all these years are slaughtering their critics.
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Why Turkey Isn't Burning Bridges With Saudi Arabia Over Khashoggi
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan speaks about the slaying of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi during a weekly parliamentary address on Oct. 23 in Ankara.
(Getty Images)
The fallout from the Khashoggi affair underlines a larger battle between Turkey and Saudi Arabia for influence throughout the Sunni world that will continue in the religious, political and economic spheres.
Turkey may be trying to use its muted response to coax Saudi Arabia into stopping its cooperation with Iraqi and Syrian Kurds, or possibly into to reducing Saudi economic pressure on Qatar, Turkey's major regional ally.
Their slowly growing defense and economic ties will mitigate the chances of a complete rupture between Ankara and Riyadh.
For weeks, allegations of criminality and a cover-up have consumed the Turkish media after Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was killed at Riyadh's consulate in Istanbul on Oct. 2. Three weeks later, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan told parliament that Saudi authorities had planned the dissident's slaying. Erdogan has a penchant for bombast, but the speech was understated, and the president even issued a cordial appeal to Saudi King Salman to cooperate in exposing the truth in the Khashoggi affair. Conspicuously, Erdogan elected not to mention the elephant in the room: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is widely believed to have played a role in the killing.
The Big Picture
Among the major states of the Middle East, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are rivals competing for dominance in the Sunni Muslim world. The fallout over the violent death of a Saudi journalist in Turkey has given Ankara some leverage against Riyadh, which it will use carefully.
See Rebalancing Power in the Middle East
See The Saudi Survival StrategySee Turkey's Resurgence
The speech and the steady leak of information from Turkish authorities strengthen the view that Erdogan is trying to carefully pressure Saudi Arabia, whose worldview and regional policies are at odds with Turkey's. Erdogan isn't going so far as to risk destroying relations with Saudi Arabia — especially given the prospect that the crown prince could emerge from the scandal — but if international pressure against the crown prince rises, Erdogan is well-positioned to join in the campaign. For the moment, Turkey is seeking to alter the balances within the Saudi royal family by emphasizing that the king is a credible partner while explicitly questioning who instigated the killing, all without mentioning the crown prince by name.
The antagonism between the crown prince and the president is mutual. In comments earlier this year to the Egyptian press, the crown prince called Turkey, Iran and political Islam an "axis of evil." Basically, the two leaders are revisiting a familiar history of Saudi-Turkish rivalry, which goes back decades. Economic priorities might prevent each side from damaging an otherwise productive relationship, but that doesn't mean each won't try to capitalize on the other's moments of weakness and public relations stumbles — particularly in the way Turkey appears to building leverage against Saudi Arabia in the Khashoggi killing.
Who Leads the Sunni World?
At its core, the conflict is driven by their differing political visions for the Sunni world, as well as the struggle between the visions to get the upper hand. For Saudi Arabia, which is the custodian of Islam's two holiest cities, Turkey's challenge is seen as an attack on the legitimacy of the Saud family as rulers. For Turkey, whose sultans once held the same cities as the caliphs of the Sunni world, it is an opportunity to secure soft power in the Muslim world for decades to come.
At its core, the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Turkey is driven by their differing political visions for the Sunni world.
The question of leadership in the Sunni world has been in flux since the nascent Turkish Republic abolished the caliphate in 1924. In the republican Turkish view, it is authentic expressions of Islamic thought, as espoused by morally upright Muslim citizens, that ought to guide and rule the Sunni world. The Saudis, in contrast, believe that traditional and clear hierarchies, with authority vested in Riyadh-appointed members of the ulama (Muslim clerics), should guide the Sunni world. In essence, Turkey posits that the legitimacy for leadership comes from the grassroots authenticity of everyday Muslims, while Saudi Arabia claims that it is based on the hierarchy of tradition.
This worldview explains Riyadh's abhorrence of movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, which holds views similar to Turkey and which has received political protection from Ankara. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, for example, has operated out of Turkey since Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi seized power from Mohammed Morsi, a member of the group, in 2013. Turkey's worldview appeals to Muslims anywhere who believe that it is not tradition or social deference that must determine leadership, but commitment to the Islamic faith.
This is a direct political threat to the Saudi royal family's legitimacy; the more Saudis are exposed to such thinking, the more they may question the tribal-cum-wasta ("influence") social contract that underpins much of the monarchy's authority. While the Saudis also claim to be pursuing true and authentic representations of Islam, their insistence on royal privilege and prerogative opens them to criticism that their religious scruples are not as consistent as they say. This creates a soft power contest between the two, and Riyadh hopes to keep this Turkish-derived influence as far away from Saudi subjects as possible.
Rival Camps
Because Turkey and Saudi Arabia view themselves as the Muslim world's pre-eminent Sunni powers, they are broadly aligned on many foreign policy issues. For instance, both countries want to contain the spread of Iranian hegemony in the region, perceiving Persian power as a threat to their own ability to lead the Middle East and the Muslim world. This makes the two powers natural allies to the United States' growing efforts to contain Iran's influence. Washington's increasing reliance on the two to help contain Iran rests on existing U.S. dependence on the pair to bolster regional counterterrorism efforts. Both Saudi Arabia and Turkey have, after all, committed to fighting the Islamic State alongside the United States.
But despite their broad alignment on Iran, Ankara and Riyadh have very different relationships with Tehran. While Saudi Arabia avoids as much contact with Iran as possible, Turkey shares a border and an economic and strategic relationship with the country. This might expose Turkey to certain risks (for instance, the risk of suffering harsher U.S. sanctions on Iran in the coming months and years if Turkish companies continue to trade with Iranian entities), but it also provides Ankara a certain freedom to maneuver that Riyadh does not enjoy, such as in the Syria conflict. Moreover, Turkey and Iran's shared border and large Kurdish populations also give the pair common cause to contain Kurdish separatism.
Turkey and Saudi Arabia further have an interest in supporting the same political causes across the Sunni world, albeit from different angles. The two countries support Palestinian statehood but have pursued contrasting approaches to economic and political aid for the community. Turkey is closer to Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot that rules Gaza, while Saudi Arabia primarily backs Fatah, the Palestinian faction that controls the West Bank and which is hostile toward Hamas. Turkey is also publicly healing its rift with Israel, which will broaden its ability to extend support to the Palestinians, at a time when Saudi Arabia has kept its ties with Israel as quiet as possible while expressing public support for the Palestinian cause.
Turkey and Saudi Arabia have also staunchly opposed Syrian President Bashar al Assad throughout most of the Syrian civil war, but they have supported different rebel groups in the conflict. In this, Saudi Arabia's recent support for the Syrian Kurds has particularly irked Turkey, which view such rebel groups as terrorists.
Competition and Conflict
The Iranian-Saudi rivalry has attracted much attention, but the Turkish-Saudi rivalry — nuanced though it is — is also producing real policy effects, drawing regional Sunni countries into either the Ankara or Riyadh camp. Because Turkey's political model threatens governments such as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, the two states have aligned themselves with Saudi Arabia's regional endeavors. But other Sunni governments, such as Qatar, have grown closer to Turkey because Doha supports Islamist politics as a means of forming deeper connections to global Muslim communities. A few, such as Jordan and Lebanon, try to benefit from both.
Further afield in Africa, the two powers have sought to build the political, religious, economic and security influence that could bolster political legitimacy on the continent. In the Horn of Africa and across North Africa, both countries are opportunistic, taking advantage of political openings, as in Somalia, where Turkey supports political forces opposed to rivals backed by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. In Tunisia, Turkey has tried to support the Islamist Ennahda party to help it counter more secularist parties, prompting Saudi Arabia's (somewhat unsuccessful) efforts to back the latter. Saudi Arabia has also sought to weaken Turkey's ability to make Africa an export market by undercutting Turkish efforts with donations or investments. By strengthening African economies, Saudi Arabia can help give them the strength to push for a harder bargain with Turkey or to seek imports from elsewhere.
As rivals, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have found ways to needle each other at points of weakness. Because preventing the development of an autonomous Kurdish polity is Turkey's primary security objective, Ankara is increasingly nervous about Saudi and Gulf efforts to connect with Kurds in Iraq and Syria. Saudi Arabia also deeply opposes Turkey's support for Qatar, which helped provide a political and security lifeline at the beginning of the June 2017 blockade. Riyadh especially wants to prevent Ankara from bolstering its military presence in Qatar. What's more, the two have also supported different communities within the crowded and complex political spectrum in Lebanon, in some ways inflaming Beirut's political problems.
Neither Turkey nor Saudi Arabia has a significant interest in stirring political waters that could upend valuable economic ties.
Economic Ties
Despite the rivalry, Saudi Arabia and Turkey's burgeoning economic ties might mitigate the possibility of a serious rift — particularly in the realm of defense. Turkish-Saudi defense collaboration began in September 2013, when the two countries ratified a cooperation agreement. Late in 2017, Aselsan Corp., one of Turkey's most important defense companies, formed a joint venture with Saudi Arabia's Taqnia called Saudi Defense Electronics Co. (SADEC), which focuses primarily on electronics, including jammers, radars, electronic warfare suites and infrared receivers. As part of the joint venture, Aselsan and Taqnia have commenced construction on a factory in Saudi Arabia.
Turkey has not yet made any major arms sales to Saudi Arabia, although Ankara has been negotiating the sale of unmanned aerial vehicles to Saudi Arabia and has entertained hopes of selling its Altay tank, as well as other weapons and equipment. Because bilateral defense ties remain in their infancy, a serious rift between Turkey and Saudi Arabia would not upend any current arms deals, but it would certainly hinder Ankara's ambitions of expanding into the lucrative Saudi market, meaning neither side would benefit from a profound rupture in relations.
In terms of trade, the relationship is not massive (the two conducted just $4.7 billion in largely balanced trade last year), yet both governments have pledged to increase trade and investment in sectors that matter to both. Accordingly, neither country has a significant interest in stirring political waters that could upend valuable economic ties. Turkish construction firms, which represent a strategic sector for Ankara, have won contracts to build Saudi Arabian housing projects — the number of which is set to grow substantially under Riyadh's Vision 2030. Saudi tourists, whose numbers have also been increasing yearly, have also buoyed the Turkish economy by spending big when visiting Turkey. Saudi citizens have also been at the forefront of a campaign to gobble up Turkish real estate, highlighting just how important the kingdom's customers are to the economic sector for Ankara. (Naturally, some of Riyadh's influence over Ankara through the real estate market is mitigated by the $1 billion in investments that Qatar, an even bigger foe of Saudi Arabia, has made in Turkey's housing market in the past three years.)
Keeping Calm, for Now
For now, Riyadh is playing it safe with Ankara as it tries to defuse the Khashoggi crisis. So what, ultimately, does Turkey want as it dangles the journalist's case over Saudi Arabia? Economically, Turkey could be quietly soliciting Saudi financial support in exchange for an end to the media pressure on the crown prince or it might even be soliciting some diplomatic relief for Doha, which remains under the Gulf Cooperation Council's blockade. Politically and security-wise, Turkey is also seeking a channel to contain Saudi support for the Kurds.
Ultimately, however, much of the Saudi-Turkish rivalry fits into the political and soft power spheres, in which personalities like Mohammed bin Salman and Erdogan compete for prestige and Ankara and Riyadh attempt to win the hearts and minds of the Sunni world. For now, Turkey appears to see the benefit in not rocking the boat with Saudi Arabia— but that's no guarantee that it won't change its mind.
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Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Why is everyone defending a Muslim Brotherhood agent? We know it's all selective condemnation by the media. I was in the UAE when the government deported 200 of them for plotting to undermine and overthrow the government. They were planning violent Jihad attacks (one was carried out, but not recognised as such by most), and placing agents all over in positions of influence.
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Charles Blanchard
Charles Blanchard I’m wondering why anyone would defend what might have been the stupidest op in the history of the world. The Muslim brotherhood is hardly monolithic anyway. Aren’t saudi’s Allies in Yemen an offshoot of the Muslim brotherhood?
Anyway if MBS was behind it and is now planning to execute the people that carried it out, he seems to me to be a poor leader to get behind. Not exactly the George Washington of the Middle East.
Manage
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Chad McCoy
Chad McCoy Lloyd De Jongh he's been misreported as being a US citizen so it appears US member of the press was murdered. There's more to this, freedom of the press, assassination, humans rights, and the extending drama provided to the media by the Saudis.
Manage
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Marc Denny
Marc Denny Chad McCoy Ummm , , , You sure about that? The reporting I've seen has him as having had legal residence, not US citizen.
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Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh The Ikhwan has been infiltrating the US successfully for a long time, working through dozens of front organisations. Hussein Obama was an enabler of theirs. They have an agenda right out of the 7th century, I'm surprised anyone would want to defend the…See More
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d
============================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh The Ikhwan would love to see an even more Salafist government in Saudi, so they are making hay out of this. It's sheer coincidence that it's made the news to this extent and is used to attack the enemies of the Ikhwan and the Orange Man Bad. It's not a…See More
1
Manage
Haha
· Reply · 1d
===========================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh I didn't feel some of my girlfriends would cheat on me either, but it turned out otherwise. US media is largely unreliable and dishonest, Obama was an enabler of numerous Islamic causes and groups. In Iraq I was there for his ISIS bombing campaign. Sur…See More
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d
===========================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh The military doesn't run off and do their own thing. They follow orders. The above are your statements, not mine. Those are good questions, but why is your FBI so corrupt? Is it indicative of mismanagement from the Obama era? https://www1.cbn.com/ibrahim-21
Manage
www1.cbn.com
Obama’s Brother: Muslim Brotherhood Leader?
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==========================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Admiral Lyons make a series of very strong statements here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cLiYxi89QMw
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youtube.com
ADMIRAL LYONS reveals Obama's Anti-US, Pro-Islam…
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====================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh More from Admiral Lyons: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GqkZBWd6-nI
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youtube.com
4-Star Admiral Slams Obama: Muslim Brotherhood…
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· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d
===========================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh They follow orders. And when ordered to bomb empty fields they did exactly that. The US media dutifully reported that ISIS was being hammered. By dust thrown up by bombs dropped 2km away, after a leaflet drop gave them notice in advance.
Manage
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· Reply · 1d · Edited
===================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Admiral Lyons make a series of very strong statements here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cLiYxi89QMw
Manage
youtube.com
ADMIRAL LYONS reveals Obama's Anti-US, Pro-Islam…
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· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d
==================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh More from Admiral Lyons: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GqkZBWd6-nI
Manage
youtube.com
4-Star Admiral Slams Obama: Muslim Brotherhood…
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===============================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Do you take on board the words of one of your senior military men?
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Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh I haven't listened to this one yet: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5zT8tF41KDI
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youtube.com
4-Star Admiral Accuses Barack Obama Of Treason
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====================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Got their asses handed to them militarily, which was no surprise. However, the neutered FBI and other intelligence agencies had their anti-Jihad Islamic terror programs gutted by Obama. People who spoke out were fired. Europe is no better, I have some …See More
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d
===================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Pro-Islam is anti-US. Obama was no friend to the US police, or race relations. The decline of race relations is Obama's fault, as is the rise of AntiFa, unchecked migration, the rise of ISIS, transgender madness and other events happened on his watch. Funding Iran, allowing the Ikhwan to infiltrate the US government, those are not pro-US moves.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d
===========================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Do you need an ISIS membership card to prove that ISIS is embedding people into migrant caravans, or a Hezbollah ID to prove that they are training drug cartel members, infiltrating their people via these means and funding efforts to move weapons and d…See More
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d · Edited
===============================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh ISIS has training camps in South Africa. Do you expect a logo on the wall and a flag above the house? Left wing propaganda consists in denying that there are enemies of the US and freedom at work. Am I a right wing propagandist?
Manage
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· Reply · 1d
=======================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh https://orientxxi.info/.../barack-obama-lackey-of-egypt-s...
Manage
orientxxi.info
Barack Obama, “lackey” of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood
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=======================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh So are you claiming that Admiral Lyons is wrong? He's military, of long standing.
Manage
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· Reply · 1d
==================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Lyons reveals Obama's pro-Islamic, pro-Iranian stance. Which by default, is anti-American. When all you have is the headline to criticise... Did Obama send pallets of cash to the Iranians? Did he give ISIS free reign? Did he allow the Ikhwan to propoga…See More
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d
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Awesome!
Like
· Reply · 1d
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Why is everyone defending a Muslim Brotherhood agent? We know it's all selective condemnation by the media. I was in the UAE when the government deported 200 of them for plotting to undermine and overthrow the government. They were planning violent Jihad attacks (one was carried out, but not recognised as such by most), and placing agents all over in positions of influence.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d · Edited
=================
Charles Blanchard
Charles Blanchard I’m wondering why anyone would defend what might have been the stupidest op in the history of the world. The Muslim brotherhood is hardly monolithic anyway. Aren’t saudi’s Allies in Yemen an offshoot of the Muslim brotherhood?
Anyway if MBS was behind it and is now planning to execute the people that carried it out, he seems to me to be a poor leader to get behind. Not exactly the George Washington of the Middle East.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d
====================
Chad McCoy
Chad McCoy Lloyd De Jongh he's been misreported as being a US citizen so it appears US member of the press was murdered. There's more to this, freedom of the press, assassination, humans rights, and the extending drama provided to the media by the Saudis.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d
====================
Marc Denny
Marc Denny Chad McCoy Ummm , , , You sure about that? The reporting I've seen has him as having had legal residence, not US citizen.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d
==============================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh The Ikhwan has been infiltrating the US successfully for a long time, working through dozens of front organisations. Hussein Obama was an enabler of theirs. They have an agenda right out of the 7th century, I'm surprised anyone would want to defend the…See More
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d
============================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh The Ikhwan would love to see an even more Salafist government in Saudi, so they are making hay out of this. It's sheer coincidence that it's made the news to this extent and is used to attack the enemies of the Ikhwan and the Orange Man Bad. It's not a…See More
1
Manage
Haha
· Reply · 1d
===========================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh I didn't feel some of my girlfriends would cheat on me either, but it turned out otherwise. US media is largely unreliable and dishonest, Obama was an enabler of numerous Islamic causes and groups. In Iraq I was there for his ISIS bombing campaign. Sur…See More
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d
===========================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh The military doesn't run off and do their own thing. They follow orders. The above are your statements, not mine. Those are good questions, but why is your FBI so corrupt? Is it indicative of mismanagement from the Obama era? https://www1.cbn.com/ibrahim-21
Manage
www1.cbn.com
Obama’s Brother: Muslim Brotherhood Leader?
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d
==========================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Admiral Lyons make a series of very strong statements here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cLiYxi89QMw
Manage
youtube.com
ADMIRAL LYONS reveals Obama's Anti-US, Pro-Islam…
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d
====================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh More from Admiral Lyons: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GqkZBWd6-nI
Manage
youtube.com
4-Star Admiral Slams Obama: Muslim Brotherhood…
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d
===========================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh They follow orders. And when ordered to bomb empty fields they did exactly that. The US media dutifully reported that ISIS was being hammered. By dust thrown up by bombs dropped 2km away, after a leaflet drop gave them notice in advance.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d · Edited
===================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Admiral Lyons make a series of very strong statements here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cLiYxi89QMw
Manage
youtube.com
ADMIRAL LYONS reveals Obama's Anti-US, Pro-Islam…
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d
==================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh More from Admiral Lyons: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GqkZBWd6-nI
Manage
youtube.com
4-Star Admiral Slams Obama: Muslim Brotherhood…
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d
===============================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Do you take on board the words of one of your senior military men?
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d
=================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh I haven't listened to this one yet: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5zT8tF41KDI
Manage
youtube.com
4-Star Admiral Accuses Barack Obama Of Treason
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d
====================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Got their asses handed to them militarily, which was no surprise. However, the neutered FBI and other intelligence agencies had their anti-Jihad Islamic terror programs gutted by Obama. People who spoke out were fired. Europe is no better, I have some …See More
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d
===================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Pro-Islam is anti-US. Obama was no friend to the US police, or race relations. The decline of race relations is Obama's fault, as is the rise of AntiFa, unchecked migration, the rise of ISIS, transgender madness and other events happened on his watch. Funding Iran, allowing the Ikhwan to infiltrate the US government, those are not pro-US moves.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d
===========================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Do you need an ISIS membership card to prove that ISIS is embedding people into migrant caravans, or a Hezbollah ID to prove that they are training drug cartel members, infiltrating their people via these means and funding efforts to move weapons and d…See More
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d · Edited
===============================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh ISIS has training camps in South Africa. Do you expect a logo on the wall and a flag above the house? Left wing propaganda consists in denying that there are enemies of the US and freedom at work. Am I a right wing propagandist?
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d
=======================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh https://orientxxi.info/.../barack-obama-lackey-of-egypt-s...
Manage
orientxxi.info
Barack Obama, “lackey” of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood
Like
· Reply · Remove Preview · 1d
=======================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh So are you claiming that Admiral Lyons is wrong? He's military, of long standing.
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d
==================
Lloyd De Jongh
Lloyd De Jongh Lyons reveals Obama's pro-Islamic, pro-Iranian stance. Which by default, is anti-American. When all you have is the headline to criticise... Did Obama send pallets of cash to the Iranians? Did he give ISIS free reign? Did he allow the Ikhwan to propoga…See More
Manage
Like
· Reply · 1d
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Yes, Lloyd brings a lot to bear. I keep working on getting him to post here regularly.
==================
On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines – and Future
By Karen Elliott House
The fragility of Saudi society is often attributed solely to its dependency on oil revenues. This is an oversimplification. Today, Saudi Arabia is facing problems that have been built into the very fabric of its society for hundreds of years. Indeed, long before oil was discovered, the Arabian Peninsula was held together by a combination of faith and the ruler’s largess. In exchange for accepting the rule of the monarch, Saudis mostly stayed out of popular politics.
Saudi Arabia’s social contract hinges on the mutual legitimization of religious and secular power. This duality is no coincidence. Muhammad bin Saud, who founded the first Saudi state in 1744, sought to unite a disparate group of tribes spread over the vast Arabian Peninsula into a single entity. This required casting off Ottoman rule, and to do so, he needed a unified force. To overcome the multiplicity of tribal interests that stood between Saud and a loyal, unified force, he looked to religion. At the time, some religious scholars believed that Islam had lost its way, but a reform movement led by Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab sought to purify the religion by returning it to its roots. In exchange for spreading Wahhab’s reformist version of Islam, Saud’s new state was granted religious legitimacy.
While the first Saudi state would not last long into the 19th century, its two subsequent incarnations – the last of which is the current Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – were also founded on the premise of the Saudis’ right to rule. Yet the need to unite through faith reveals a reality of Saudi society the rules would rather avoid: It is extremely divided. For example, Saudi Arabia is a majority Sunni country, but it has a large Shiite population. In addition, people in the country’s central Nejd region – long isolated from the outside world by deserts – often do not see eye to eye with those in Hejaz, which sits on the Red Sea and is thus highly influenced by trade and the ideas that so often accompany it.
Oil wealth alleviated much of Saudi Arabia’s poverty. Yet with greater wealth came higher expectations as a new generation became accustomed to ever greater levels of government subsidies. To meet these expectations, Saudi Arabia’s leaders must somehow diversify the country’s economy away from the oil industry. Yet the deeply ingrained religious elements in Saudi society create massive constraints and dislocations that will be difficult to overcome. Men often see themselves as above the jobs that are available yet are unqualified for the jobs they want. Women are allowed to work but face substantial religious restrictions limiting the types of jobs that can hold. The resultant gap is filled by immigrant laborers, paid wages that would be unacceptable to many Saudis. The workforce (excluding the military) thus has twice as many foreign workers as it has Saudis.
Saudi Arabia must transform its economy to solve these problems. Yet doing so requires reforms that would also fundamentally transform its society, which threatens the religious-political social contract that has since its inception been the linchpin of Saudi unity. To survive, Saudi Arabia must first risk peeling off the glue that has held it together for centuries.
“On Saudi Arabia” is an impressive effort to outline the dysfunction in Saudi society that poses a major threat to the ruling family. Through years of on-the-ground interviews, Karen Elliot House paints a picture of day-to-day life for different types of people in Saudi society. But she does not omit the high-level analysis that’s required to put these experiences into the context necessary to walk away with a fuller understanding of where the country sits at this particular moment in history, and why it faces the challenges it does today.
Xander Snyder, analyst
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Third post of the day
https://amgreatness.com/2018/11/19/big-medias-power-games-and-the-khashoggi-affair/
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Trump’s Pick for Saudi Ambassador is Expert on Hezbollah and Iran
by Seth J. Frantzman
The Jerusalem Post
November 15, 2018
https://www.meforum.org/articles/2018/trump’s-pick-for-saudi-ambassador-is-expert-on-hez
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https://globalnews.ca/news/4545784/jamal-khashoggi-osama-bin-laden/?fbclid=IwAR2Whti61AIY7H7bwfrG4nbQZRlASgLda9JhR1WG_SXzPtlEfQekGNb7Th8
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https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/11/saudi-arabia-alliance-requires-realpolitik/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202018-11-21&utm_term=NR5PM%20Actives
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https://www.patreon.com/posts/22884900
Hat tip to Michael Yon for the find.
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https://www.patreon.com/posts/22884900
Hat tip to Michael Yon for the find.
Yup.
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"https://www.patreon.com/posts/22884900"
These same high and holy LEFTist MSM phonies and their email network Democrat pols had little problem when AMERICANS were murdered by a violent mob in Benghazi did they? When Obrock's soldiers went out and completely lied about who was responsible (right before an election ) to cover up the truth and Hillary , (the terrible) stated that it was too bad they died they knew their jobs were risky to start with we heard nothing from MSM. They mocked the Benghazi investigators and the Repubs who were the only ones who would dare question Obama (the self proclaimed "great").
Now with an Arabian guy who may have done some side work for the Bezos' WP who was obviously murdered by the Salman guy in a foreign country should prompt undercutting the interests of our entire country which would only help enemy Iran and its' proxies.
No fake news there! sarcasm
No distortion of the facts by Leftist Media ! sarcasm.
Anything simply to make Trump look bad ! NO sarcasm - just truth.
the MSMedia absolutely the enemy of half the people of this country and factually of most in this county though some refuse to admit it.
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Its Breitbart but it is interesting:
https://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2018/11/23/caroline-glick-trump-jamal-khashoggi/
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From a link in Glick's colummn:
Kashoggi mourned Osama bin Laden's death.
"[Kashoggi] first drew international attention for interviewing a young Osama bin Laden"
"Mr. Khashoggi’s first claim to fame was his acquaintance with Osama bin Laden. Mr. Khashoggi had spent time in Jidda, Bin Laden’s hometown, and, like Bin Laden, he came from a prominent nonroyal family. "
"Mr. Khashoggi cheered for the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan, which was supported by the C.I.A. and Saudi Arabia. So when he got an invitation to see it for himself from another young Saudi, Bin Laden, Mr. Khashoggi jumped at the chance."
Years later, after American commandos killed Bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011, Mr. Khashoggi mourned his old acquaintance and what he had become.
“I collapsed crying a while ago, heartbroken for you Abu Abdullah,” Mr. Khashoggi wrote on Twitter, using Bin Laden’s nickname. “You were beautiful and brave in those beautiful days in Afghanistan, before you surrendered to hatred and passion.”
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/14/world/middleeast/jamal-khashoggi-saudi-arabia.html
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For the record, I did not take to twitter to mourn Osama bin Laden's death nor did anyone I know. This 'journalist' did not deserve brutal murder but his life and work deserve some scrutiny.
A brief recap on what his friend/acquaintance Osama bin Laden did before Kashoggi mourned his death. Killing Americans since at least 1993:
1991: Bin Laden expelled from Saudi Arabia.
Feb 1993: The first World Trade Center bombing. The first al-Qaeda terrorist attack on America was carried out killing six and injuring hundreds. Six Muslim radicals, whom the US officials suspect have links to bin Laden, are eventually convicted for the bombing.
Americans killed.
1994: The Saudi government revokes bin Laden citizenship and freezes his assets after he issued fatwas, or Islamic religious pronouncements, denouncing both the royal family and the United States.
Nov 1995: A truck bomb exploded near the Saudi National Guard Communications Center in central Riyadh, killing five American soldiers and two Indian police. The attack is attributed to bin Laden's group, which did not claim responsibility but made clear its support for those responsible.
Americans killed.
June 1996: A truck loaded with explosives destroyed a building at the US military base of Khobar in Saudi Arabia. Nineteen American servicemen were killed and 386 were wounded.
Americans killed.
August 1996: Bin Laden formally declared a holy war against the US forces.
Declared war against America.
August 1998: Suicide bombings on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania kill 224 people including 12 Americans. The United States indicted bin Laden for role in embassy bombings.
Americans killed.
2000: The destroyer U.S.S. Cole was attacked while refueling in Yemen. Seventeen sailors were killed.
Americans killed.
Sept 11, 2001: Two hijacked US airliners crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York and a third hijacked plane crashed into the Pentagon outside Washington, killing more than 3,000 people.
Americans killed.
Sept 13, 2001: the US government named bin Laden as a principal suspect for coordinating the attacks in New York and Washington.
Dec. 26, 2001 - Bin Laden said in a video that the 9/11 suicide attacks were intended to stop the US support for Israel.
Nov. 2002 - Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for three suicide car bombs which blew up the Mombasa Paradise resort hotel full of Israelis, killing 15 other people and wounding 80.
Israelis killed.
2003-2007: Al-Qaeda continued to release time-sensitive and professionally-verified videos demonstrating Bin Laden's continued survival as recently as August 2007.
September 2007: Osama bin Laden appeared in his first videotape in nearly three years, to mark the sixth anniversary of the September 11 attacks on the United States.
Jan. 24, 2010 - Bin Laden claimed responsibility for the failed Dec. 25 bombing of US airliner in an audio tape and threatened more strikes on US targets.
Tried to kill Americans.
Aug. 2010 – US gets initial lead on Osama’s hideout in Pakistan and President Barack Obama ordered an all-out mission to capture him alive or kill him.
May 1, 2011: President Barack Obama announced late night on Sunday that Osama bin Laden was killed in a firefight with U.S. forces in Pakistan and his body was recovered.
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Who else in American 'mainstream' media mourned the death of Osama bin Laden. The turn to "hatred and passion" was not a recent, minor or incidental event in his life. It was his life's work.
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“I collapsed crying a while ago, heartbroken for you Abu Abdullah,” Mr. Khashoggi wrote on Twitter, using Bin Laden’s nickname. “You were beautiful and brave in those beautiful days in Afghanistan, before you surrendered to hatred and passion.”
What meaning do you give to the last seven words of that sentence?
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“I collapsed crying a while ago, heartbroken for you Abu Abdullah,” Mr. Khashoggi wrote on Twitter, using Bin Laden’s nickname. “You were beautiful and brave in those beautiful days in Afghanistan, before you surrendered to hatred and passion.”
What meaning to you give to the last seven words of that sentence?
Good question. Getting at that is why I posted the whole quote where Glick only wrote that he mourned the loss.
Taken literally, he is only celebrating the life of a good man before he "surrendered to hatred and passion" like a friend of Hitler might still consider him bold and beautiful before all the Nazi stuff. I find it outrageously offensive even with the qualification though a neutral party might say he is technically not supporting the acts for which Osama bin Laden is known. Calling him by a private, endearing nickname (through US based Twitter) after nearly 20 years of devastating terror war against the US is something beneath poor taste though it was nuanced.
I posted that timeline of terror to add the context that terror, killing Americans and inspiring others to try to destroy America and Americans was not some minor or insignificant part of "brave and beautiful" "Abu Abdullah's" life.
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I was a tremendous admirer of WSJ editorialist in the late 70s early 80s and then author of "The Way the World Works" which the WSJ called "one of the 100 most important books of the 20th century" but during his final years he became an anti-semitic crank and apparently a stooge of Saddam Hussein in the run up to the Iraq War. Does that change that I think TWTWW to be a brilliant book?
Even Konrad Lorenz, whom I admired to the point of naming my son after him, turned out to have had his Nobel prize revoked or something like that because the Nazis used some of genetic work to bolster their theories. I've read deeper than most in his works, yet I saw nothing for myself of Nazism.
Here the quote shows only that Kashoggi remembered the man with whom he went to war-- is there a stronger bond?-- yet he still saw him as having surrendered to hatred and passion.
As best as I can tell Kashoggi was Muslim Brotherhood, with all the hatred and fascism that implies, but that impression does not rest on this quote.
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Well expressed! I went looking for evidence that he is MB or jihad supporting but he was not going to openly put that it a tweet.
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Tablet is very much a Dem/Progressive publication, but here it forthrightly defends President Trump
https://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/middle-east/275697/trump-saudi-arabia?utm_source=tabletmagazinelist&utm_campaign=87e63bf5ce-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_12_07_03_29&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_c308bf8edb-87e63bf5ce-207194629
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" Tablet is very much a Dem/Progressive publication, but here it forthrightly defends President Trump "
of course , who if they are really being honest thinks we should ditch our whole Mid East policy for this one freakin guy?
(only the trump deranged . they go to bed unable to sleep they can't focus during the day with 24 hr hate of Trump and thus us)
oBama did business with China though they murder and torture and imprison all those who go against the Party.
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https://spectator.us/jamal-khashoggi-time-person-year/
I don't know the author or the accuracy.
"Khashoggi represented everything that is repressive and repugnant about journalism in the Arab world. Why is he so honored?"
"Khashoggi became rich working for a Saudi royal family that was, and remains, among the world’s worst persecutors of journalists. He edited government-controlled Saudi newspapers, which are without exception regime propaganda outlets, and headed TV news channels that were owned by Saudi princes.
Then he outdid himself by working as a media adviser to a senior Saudi prince in London and Washington. He embraced with unbridled enthusiasm his role of justifying Saudi regime atrocities in the Western media. He even denied on the BBC that anyone was ever tortured in Saudi Arabia."
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We've heard about the brutality of his murder. I don't know if we've heard the motive. He knew something...
We heard over and over he was a "journalist". I somehow don't think that was all of it.
I'm not justifying torture or gruesome murder in the least, just want to get at the whole story someday.
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The Senate on the Saudis
A phony gesture on War Powers but a useful statement on Khashoggi.
54 Comments
By The Editorial Board
Dec. 13, 2018 7:21 p.m. ET
Senator Bernie Sanders speaks after the senate voted on a resolution ending U.S. military support for the war in Yemen on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., Dec. 13.
Senator Bernie Sanders speaks after the senate voted on a resolution ending U.S. military support for the war in Yemen on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., Dec. 13. Photo: joshua roberts/Reuters
Donald Trump scrambles political categories, and the latest evidence is Thursday’s Senate vote to end U.S. military support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen. The President who is so often criticized for wanting to retreat from the world and not standing by allies was rebuked for refusing to abandon an ally in a proxy war with Iran.
The Senate voted 56-41 for a bill sponsored by Vermont Socialist Bernie Sanders and Utah Republican Mike Lee to invoke the 1973 War Powers Resolution and yank U.S. troops home within 30 days. Never mind that the Pentagon says U.S. forces assisting the Saudis aren’t in harm’s way and thus the War Powers Resolution doesn’t apply. We’d go further and say this is also an unconstitutional intrusion on a President’s power as Commander in Chief.
But all 49 Democrats voted for it, as did seven Republicans. They had the political luxury of knowing the bill is going nowhere in the House this year. There’s nothing more senatorial than voting for something you know won’t pass and calling it an “historic victory,” as Mr. Sanders did.
The more useful effort was a resolution sponsored by Tennessee Sen. Bob Corker that condemned the Saudi murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and held Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman responsible. The resolution passed unanimously, and while it won’t change U.S. policy, it is a warning to the White House and Saudis that America has values as well as interests to defend. The President’s political freedom narrows when Democrats control the House next year. Mr. Trump could lose control over foreign policy, and the U.S.-Saudi alliance, if he doesn’t somehow recognize the bipartisan disgust at the Khashoggi murder.
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https://securitystudies.org/jamal-khashoggi-and-qatar-in-the-echo-chamber/
His columns and paychecks came right out of enemy propoganda.
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https://securitystudies.org/jamal-khashoggi-and-qatar-in-the-echo-chamber/
His columns and paychecks came right out of enemy propoganda.
http://ace.mu.nu/archives/378858.php
December 26, 2018
Washington Post More or Less Confirms That Jamal Khashoggi Was a Paid Qatari Intelligence/Propaganda Asset
I can see how American "journalists" would regard this as the normal state of affairs and not really that different from a plain ol' "journalist."
Many journalists in the US are paid by Fusion GPS to plant Fusion stories, which in turn were funded by interested parties including foreign governments.
Quotes from the Washington Post below, with commentary added by streiff from RedState.
Perhaps most problematic for Khashoggi were his connections to an organization funded by Saudi Arabia’s regional nemesis, Qatar. Text messages between Khashoggi and an executive at Qatar Foundation International show that the executive, Maggie Mitchell Salem, at times shaped the columns he submitted to The Washington Post, proposing topics, drafting material and prodding him to take a harder line against the Saudi government. Khashoggi also appears to have relied on a researcher and translator affiliated with the organization, which promotes Arabic-language education in the United States.
...
Khashoggi was never a staff employee of the Post, and he was paid about $500 per piece for the 20 columns he wrote over the course of the year. He lived in an apartment near Tysons Corner in Fairfax County that he had purchased while working at the Saudi Embassy a decade earlier. [Note: how did he live in the DC Metro area for about $10K/year?]
Khashoggi also appears to have accepted significant help with his columns. Salem, the executive at the Qatar foundation, reviewed his work in advance and in some instances appears to have proposed language, according to a voluminous collection of messages obtained by The Post. [Journalists accepting "significant help" from government operatives in writing stories is a fact of how journalism is conducted in the Middle East, the Post eliding over this speaks volumes.]
In early August, Salem prodded Khashoggi to write about Saudi Arabia's alliances "from DC to Jerusalem to rising right wing parties across Europe...bringing an end to the liberal world order that challenges their abuses at home."
Khashoggi expressed misgivings about such a strident tone, then asked, "So do you have time to write it?"
So in other words, Khashoggi was largely just a frontman for anti-Saudi propaganda written by an operative of the Saudi's chief Arab rival, Qatar.
"I'll try," she replied, although she went on to urge him to "try a draft" himself incorporating sentences that she had sent him by text. A column reflecting their discussion appeared in The Post on Aug. 7. Khashoggi appears to have used some of Salem's suggestions, though it largely tracks ideas that he expressed in their exchange over the encrypted app WhatsApp.
Other texts in the 200-page trove indicate that Salem’s organization paid a researcher who did work for Khashoggi. The foundation is an offshoot of a larger Qatar-based organization. Khashoggi also relied on a translator who worked at times for the Qatari embassy and the foundation.
...
On Oct. 3, one day after Khashoggi's death, while his fate remained uncertain, his researcher contacted The Post to say that he had a draft of a column that Khashoggi had begun writing before his disappearance. It was published two weeks later. [The likelihood that Khashoggi's last column was ghostwritten to take advantage of his disappearance by making him appear to be an Arabian Thomas Jefferson approaches certainty.]
streiff quotes Dave Reaboi of the Strategic Studies Group noting that it doesn't make sense for the Washington Post to reveal that the man they've been painting as a patriotic martyr for two months was in fact a shabby operative working for a government hostile to his native country except if the Washington Post knew that there were rumors about these texts and possible payments to Khashoggi and they sought to get ahead of a story they knew could no longer be suppressed.
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Where Is Crown Prince Mohammed?
Out of public view, he attempts to control Saudi society with a combination of dread and circuses.
57 Comments
By Karen Elliott House
Feb. 11, 2019 6:44 p.m. ET
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
This is the winter of Mohammed bin Salman’s discontent. The young crown prince is beset on all sides by problems that would depress or deter most leaders, but there is no sign that his optimism or energy are flagging. Whether sheer determination will be enough to secure his success, however, seems more in doubt than ever.
Many of the crown prince’s challenges come from overseas. His international reputation is stained by the killing of Saudi columnist Jamal Khashoggi. The U.S. Congress is increasingly determined to block arms sales to Riyadh for its stalemated war in Yemen. Then there’s the Saudis’ festering feud with Turkey, and their cold war with Iran. Finally, a global economic slowdown could erode oil demand, lower prices and diminish the revenue the kingdom badly needs to fund its biggest budget ever.
But the crown prince’s international challenges pale in comparison with those at home. His Vision 2030 plan to transform the kingdom foresees a vibrant private sector to wean the country off its dependence on oil revenues and its citizens off dependence on government. This vision—the product of more than $1 billion in consulting fees—already is proving overly ambitious in scope and time.
Over the past two years, consumer spending has collapsed and more than a million migrant residents have returned to neighboring South Asian countries as a result of the crown prince’s reforms. The Saudi private sector, long dependent on government contracts, was knocked to its knees by the government’s decision to halt contract payments to assess corruption. Riyadh’s moves to slash energy subsidies and raise non-oil revenues—by imposing levies on foreign workers as well as assessing a value-added tax on most sales—have also hit the economy hard.
In the capital, the heady optimism of previous years is giving way to a realization that change won’t be quick or painless. “We are trying to correct 50 years of bad policies in three to five years,” says one businessman. “It can’t be done.” An economist says of the crown prince: “The consultants sold him a development plan that can’t be done on the timetable given. It took South Korea 30 years to develop, why should Saudi think we can do it in 15?”
The crown prince has two responses to the dimming prospects of his reform program. On one hand, he seeks to distract Saudis with circuses. He has imported rock stars for concerts, has started construction near Riyadh of a new entertainment city three times the size of Disney World, and is developing a tourist industry that could open Saudi Arabia for the first time to millions of foreign visitors. These initiatives risk offending the most conservative Saudis while frustrating middle-class families for whom the new entertainment is unaffordable. Tickets to see Mariah Carey perform last month went for $80 to $500. The average office manager earns $4,000 a month but ordinary workers earn half that.
Yet while the crown prince gives with one hand, he takes with the other. Saudi Arabia has never been an open society, but the current government is clamping down on almost every form of actual and potential opposition. The space for public discussion—much less criticism—has over the past two years narrowed to nonexistent, even on social media. A liberal Saudi who used to tweet regularly says he has quit for fear that anything could lead to arrest. A conservative Saudi notes that “such exaggerated security control makes people ready to explode.”
But neither dread nor circuses are solving the problem. One father tells me he abhors that bargain. His teenage son has been in prison for two years because teachers reported to authorities a remark deemed treasonous. “When I visit him, I see Saudi mothers dressed in tight jeans and bare faces visiting their sons in prison,” he says. “I wonder, do they believe the freedom to dress like that is a fair trade for their sons having no freedom to speak?”
To be sure, not all Saudis feel alienated. Young women, especially, enjoy a measure of personal freedom that seemed unimaginable a year ago. More are moving into significant jobs. Crown Prince Mohammed is personally popular with progressive young Saudis who want the kingdom to enter the 21st century. Many have his smiling face as the screen saver on their iPhones.
Even businessmen disappointed with the pace of progress still credit the crown prince with his economic reform—notwithstanding the wreckage in the private sector along the way. The young ruler also has the support of the two men who matter most: President Trump and King Salman, who has given no indication of abandoning his ambitious son.
Since the Khashoggi killing, the king has assumed a more active public role, meeting foreign dignitaries without his son at his side. But by all indications the crown prince remains entirely in control of the levers of power. Government ministers still are hauled in regularly to report to him. Some are fired for failing to meet the targets of the Vision 2030, plan, whose 1,300 initiatives are tracked and reported quarterly to him by a new government entity.
The kingdom’s religious conservatives have been silenced if not entirely subdued. And members of the extended Al Saud family have been reduced to playing roles in a supportive chorus or sitting silently in their palaces. A royal relative as prominent as Prince Al Waleed bin Talal, who once strutted on the Saudi stage, now appears publicly as a hapless courtier. No one has failed to grasp the message the crown prince sent by incarcerating his royal relatives in the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in November 2017 and freeing most only after taking $106 billion.
If the royal family is quieted, normal Saudi families face a new type of tension. This is a society in which men traditionally have ruled while women and children obeyed. No longer. Male domination is under challenge as more women seek financial independence. When men object, women can and do cite royal decrees affirming their rights to work and drive without a male guardian’s consent. “On the outside we hear change, change,” says a Saudi sociologist. “But inside the walls of every house there is war about who gets to make decisions.”
This is the winter of discontent not only for the crown prince, but also for the society he rules. Still, the chaos in surrounding states seem to resign most Saudis to grudging patience with their prince.
Ms. House, a former publisher of The Wall Street Journal, is author of “On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines—and Future” (Knopf, 2012).
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I've not read this with care yet, but what I have read shows not a little bit of superficiality but OTOH there most certainly is something to keep an eye on here.
https://www.truthdig.com/articles/giving-the-bomb-to-saudi-arabias-dr-strangelove/
OTOH, this is just stupid: "Iran, a mortal enemy of Saudi Arabia, will have no choice but to begin a nuclear weapons program if the Saudis build nuclear reactors. "
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...
OTOH, this is just stupid: "Iran, a mortal enemy of Saudi Arabia, will have no choice but to begin a nuclear weapons program if the Saudis build nuclear reactors. "
Yes, just stupid. Iran doesn't need another motive; they have been pursuing this decades and had the completion of their nuclear path paved by the Obama Iran deal. The problem now is vice versa.
They call Kushner the half-wit son-in-law, then write this: "Iran, is closely monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)." Who then is the half-wit? If the IAEA really had control over these things, the threat of Saudi going from power generation to weapons would be nil.
Saudi's most immediate motive is Iran's pursuit and the world non-proliferation agreement was wrecked by the free world tolerating the programs of NK, Pakistan, Iran and others.
The article starts with this point: "...decision to share sensitive nuclear technology with Saudi Arabia and authorize U.S. companies to build nuclear reactors in that country."
Can't we separate those decisions, build and operate a carbon-free nuclear power plant in Saudi at their expense without sharing all the technology? Why not lease the land and sell them the energy or charge them the costs?
Prior to Obama paving Iran's path we were speculating that Bush-Cheney would conduct an Ozarik-like strike on Iran's facilities before they left office and they didn't. Cheney lost influence in the second term and Bush lost or never had the nerve. Like Clinton on NK, Bush kicked the can down the road, left the world more dangerous. Now the goal of non-proliferation is in the rear view mirror. India needed nuclear because of Pak, or is it the other way around? Japan needs nuclear because of NK and China. Saudi because of Iran. Israel because of existential threat from all directions and so on. Put all those "secrets" back in the bottle? Good luck. I doubt Saudi needs US help. If snubbed by the US they can change their alliances.
Meanwhile there is a power generation issue on earth between nuclear power and fossil fuels. Which one is really the existential threat? IF it really is fossil fuels, we better start building the nuclear plants.
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Why the U.S. and Saudi Arabia Are Destined to Diverge
By Matthew Bey
Senior Global Analyst, Stratfor
Matthew Bey
Matthew Bey
Senior Global Analyst, Stratfor
U.S. President Donald Trump leads a U.S. delegation at a working lunch with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and his aides.
(KEVIN DIETSCH - Pool/Getty Images)
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Highlights
The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States has long been a volatile one, but that volatility will become more frequent in the coming decades, outgrowing some of the personal relationships that provide its framework today.
U.S.-Saudi cooperation has always been based on common interests rather than common needs. While those interests have changed over time, they are now entering a phase in which they will not be as closely aligned.
The shale revolution and its effect on global energy markets is driving Saudi Arabia ever-closer to Russia and China economically and politically.
An ascendant China will force the United States to complete its pivot toward Asia, with a resulting reduction in the attention it pays toward the Middle East. More and more often, Riyadh will struggle to get on the same page as Washington in balancing against China.
President Donald Trump's current enthusiasm for Saudi Arabia notwithstanding, the relationship between the United States and perhaps its most important ally in the Middle East is undergoing a significant transformation. U.S. political pressure on Saudi Arabia is rising, led by a growing congressional discomfort over the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen and the circumstances surrounding the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, but that is just the tip of the iceberg.
Beneath the surface of the politics of the day, a pair of more significant geopolitical shifts is helping pull the longtime allies apart: the evolution of the global system away from U.S. dominance toward an intensifying, near-peer competition with China, as well as the fundamental reshaping of the global oil and gas markets upon which Saudi Arabia has built its wealth and power. As both countries adjust to these changing dynamics, their shared strategic relationship will evolve away from the foundation of oil, counterterrorism and the mutual desire to contain Iran. It's likely that, as those changes play out, the countries' future priorities will not align as they have in past decades.
The Big Picture
The fundamental relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia is changing dramatically and will continue to undergo significant shifts over the next two decades. Their alliance has always been beset by complications — becoming downright antagonistic at times — but the distance will only grow as their mutual strategic importance declines in the coming years.
See The U.S. and the Balance of Power
See The Saudi Survival Strategy
A Relationship Built on Pragmatism
Despite their obvious differences, Saudi Arabia and the United States have maintained a nearly eight-decade friendship. From the beginning, the U.S.-Saudi relationship has rested on mutual needs, not necessarily shared values. A meeting in the waning weeks of World War II aboard the USS Quincy between U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz (better known in the West as Ibn Saud) set the stage for their countries' close ties. The stark contrast between the lands that they governed could not have been more apparent. Roosevelt, arguably the leader of the world's most powerful and industrially advanced country, had just attended the Yalta Conference, where he helped decide the postwar future of the globe. King Abdulaziz, on the other hand, came from one of the least developed countries in the Middle East, its oil industry still in its infancy.
Almost three-quarters of a century later, the countries' differences remain just as stark. The United States, which touts one of the world's most liberal economies, is a democracy that prides itself on religious and cultural tolerance. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, a state that derives legitimacy from a religious foundation, is one of the world's last remaining absolute monarchies with little space for political opposition. Although Saudi Arabia has worked to shed its image of intolerance, there's only so much it can do. Unlike U.S. relationships with allies that possess a shared set of values, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, Saudi-U.S. ties are based on pragmatism at their core. Although they share interests in certain areas, significant disagreements on others will remain.
History has borne this out.
At the time of the USS Quincy meeting, Saudi Arabia had been looking to establish a close alliance with an outside patron capable of pushing back against colonial interests in the Middle East. The United Kingdom, which controlled most of the surrounding Middle Eastern territory, certainly eyed the monarchy's newfound oil reserves. The United States, meanwhile, also wanted access to Saudi Arabia's oil but had little desire to forge a colonial empire. This drove the two together, as did mutual opposition to the rise of communism, which threatened the legitimacy of the monarchy. But their relationship over the next three decades was not without its complications. As far as Saudi Arabia was concerned, the United States would not drop its support for Israel and would not budge far enough on the Palestine issue, eventually leading to two oil embargoes.
The fall of the shah of Iran in 1979 pushed their relationship in a different direction. This time, the United States and Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia found themselves on the same side of the issue — with the Shiite-led Islamic Republic of Iran on the other. The Americans and the Saudis still were fighting communists, as their cooperation against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan evidenced, although once the Soviet Union collapsed, so did the battle against communism as a unifying priority. Just a few years after the Cold War ended, however, another common foe emerged: Iraq's Saddam Hussein. The Gulf War and subsequent U.S. dual containment policy targeting both Iraq and Iran in the 1990s brought the United States and Saudi Arabia closer together. But other events over the years have also pushed them apart. The Iran-Contra affair complicated the relationship in the 1980s, while the rise of the global jihadist movement emanating from the Wahhabism sect, which is closely identified with Saudi Arabia, added another wrinkle, particularly after 9/11.
This timeline shows key events in the U.S.-Saudi relationship.
For most of their history as allies, Saudi Arabia has needed the United States more than vice versa. From the beginning, King Abdulaziz needed the United States to provide a counterweight to the United Kingdom. Later, the United States provided a powerful buttress girding the monarchy against populist movements, including communism. Today, Saudi Arabia counts on Washington to support its struggle against Iran and help it battle transnational militant groups. At every step, Saudi Arabia has had to appeal to the United States by proving its utility to Washington.
A World that is Shaken, not Stirred
Two significant geopolitical shifts are altering the fundamental way that Saudi Arabia and the United States interact: the dramatic transformation in global energy markets and the rise of China, which is reducing the dominance of the U.S.-led Western order that emerged after the Cold War.
The shale revolution in the United States is driving U.S. crude oil production to record levels — more than 12 million barrels per day (bpd) — far eclipsing the 5 million bpd it produced just a decade ago. Rystad Energy projects that by 2025, the United States will become a net exporter of crude, with production of about 16 million bpd. And 2018 marked the first time in three decades that the United States imported less than 1 million bpd from Saudi Arabia.
Unsurprisingly, the astronomical rise in U.S. oil production has caused major ripples in global oil markets, contributing to the glut that caused oil prices to plummet below $100 a barrel in 2014. Riyadh's desire to balance the increasing U.S. supplies has prompted it to lead the effort by OPEC and other major producers to trim production — something that has driven Saudi Arabia closer to Russia. The close cooperation that both countries must achieve in order to micromanage oil markets is driving their political cooperation on other levels as well.
These graphs show oil production in the United States and Saudi Arabia.
As the United States' thirst for its oil decreases, Saudi Arabia has pivoted more forcefully to Asia to find alternative markets. Increasing Chinese consumption and falling production make it an attractive substitute. Thus, China, along with the rest of Asia, represents Saudi Arabia's oil market of the future. And as with Russia, the growing economic interdependence is driving political cooperation at the highest level between Riyadh and Beijing.
To be clear, even though U.S. dependence on oil from Saudi Arabia and the Middle East has fallen, that does not mean that it is losing significant interest in maintaining stable energy production in the region. Any crisis in the Middle East that would reverberate through the global economy would bring the United States – which is deeply tied to the global financial system – down with it. Beyond 2030, however, even this could shift as alternative energy sources, electric vehicles and battery technology continue to alter the structure of energy geopolitics.
Toward a Multipolar World
After the Cold War ended, the United States was left standing as the global system's dominant power. But with China's emergence, that is evolving into a more multipolar structure, and the United States has, naturally, refocused its attention on countering its rising rival. This includes not only economic competition – as the trade war represents – but also shifting its security posture away from places like the Middle East to free resources to manage the burgeoning great power competition.
In fact, it is this shift in focus, especially the U.S. overtures to Iran under President Barack Obama, that concerns the Saudis the most. For Obama, striking the nuclear deal with Iran meant reducing the risk that yet another Middle Eastern conflict would draw in the United States. But for Saudi Arabia, the deal meant losing its close U.S. support in its campaign against its regional nemesis. With a new administration in the White House came a shift in U.S. attitude back toward more hostile relations with the Islamic republic. Over the next two decades, however, the prospect of at least a partial normalization with Iran will present a tantalizing option for U.S. presidents as national priorities continue to change.
The new normal of relations with the United States will present a difficult adjustment for most regional powers like Saudi Arabia. Absent an emerging need, Riyadh may find itself filling a lesser role in the grand U.S. strategy than it has for nearly a century. Saudi Arabia's increasing economic interconnectivity with China and Russia may also mean that soon, for the first time since that initial meeting between FDR and King Abdulaziz, the kingdom may find itself dropping down the list of U.S. strategic partners.
Unlike U.S. relationships with allies that possess a similar set of values, Saudi-U.S. ties at their core are based on pragmatism.
A Relationship that Bends but not Breaks
Even if Saudi importance in the eyes of the United States declines, their relationship would not necessarily reach a breaking point, but it would certainly become more volatile. Status as a less important partner would mean that the amount of political capital a U.S. president would be willing to invest in Saudi Arabia will decline, both domestically and internationally.
But perhaps the biggest consequence for Saudi Arabia over the next two decades will be the likely inevitability that Tehran and Washington will one day reach some form of understanding. A strategic reversal on Iran would make sense for the United States on several levels as the global picture changes. For one, Iran would be more inclined to cooperate with the United States and India in South and Central Asia, particularly as Pakistan and China's cooperation on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor deepens. In the short term, progress on the U.S.-Iran relationship is likely to be minimal, but significant generational shifts in both countries will bring to power additional political leaders whose views are not as colored by the immediate events surrounding the Islamic Revolution and subsequent U.S.-Iran hostage crisis. U.S. detente with Iran would allow Tehran to consolidate the regional gains it has made in places like Iraq, meaning that the competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia for regional hegemony would likely increase.
The potential decline of the U.S. role as a security guarantor will continue to force Riyadh to diversify its relationship with the other power poles in the global system. This is already happening in the area of weapons sales. Saudi Arabia is trying to build an indigenous defense industry, and while the United States is reluctant to include the technology transfer rights that would accelerate that process in its arms deals with the kingdom, China and Russia are more than willing to do so. That said, there are significant limitations to how far and how quickly Saudi Arabia can diversify away from U.S. weapons suppliers. Nevertheless, a Saudi turn toward U.S. rivals will certainly alienate Washington, as happened with a drone factory that China built in Saudi Arabia to serve the local market.
Another key area to monitor will be how Saudi Arabia moves forward with its nuclear energy ambitions. It has been negotiating with the United States, China, Russia and others over the construction of nuclear power plants in the country. But the kingdom has demanded that much of the fuel enrichment and reprocessing cycle remain under its control, an idea that has not sat well with Washington over concerns that it could allow Riyadh to develop nuclear weapons. But if the United States is unwilling to budge on its position, Saudi leaders will certainly consider a deal with China or Russia, which may not adhere to the same standards.
The kingdom's human rights record is also likely to increase the distance between Saudi Arabia and the West. The outcry against the Saudi war in Yemen and Khashoggi has been growing in the U.S. Congress. But no real change in Saudi behavior can be expected as long as oil prices remain low and the kingdom continues to struggle to implement long-term economic reform under Saudi Vision 2030. That means that as the U.S. need for a close relationship with Saudi Arabia declines, Washington's responses to such issues are likely to become increasingly harsh.
While the Saudi-U.S. relationship is not destined to crash, it will grow increasingly rocky over the next two decades as the imperatives that brought them together continue to change. The countries will continue to cooperate on key issues, especially if resurgent transnational terrorist groups like Islamic State or al Qaeda target the West, again derailing the U.S. pivot to Asia. But in the end, the Saudi-U.S. relationship will always be defined by mutual interests, not mutual values. That means that as the global system evolves to a place in which neither needs as much from the other, their friendship is unlikely to be as steadfast.
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https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-saudi-nuclear-idUSKCN1R82MG?utm_campaign=trueAnthem%3A+Trending+Content&utm_content=5c9c2c233ed3f0000171fab6&utm_medium=trueAnthem&utm_source=facebook&fbclid=IwAR3eC2AZnarEAJbEH75S4Z2thAu2BEuWfLJSs43GtHxGgbYjjzRrC4ox47k
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/members-of-saudi-team-that-killed-khashoggi-received-training-in-us-report/ar-BBVqtsM?ocid=sf
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Saudi Arabia Is Changing Fast
Social liberalization has outpaced economic reform, but there doesn’t seem to be any turning back.
By Karen Elliott House
Nov. 4, 2019 6:12 pm ET
A woman runs in ‘The Happiest 5K on the Planet,’ in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Nov. 2. PHOTO: AMR NABIL/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
For Saudis these days, life is a roller coaster. Even as Iranian missiles threaten their national security and livelihood, previously unimaginable social freedoms accelerate. All this leaves some Saudis squealing with delight; others are frozen with fright.
During a three-week visit, the public delight is visible everywhere from the capital city to remote rural provinces like Jizan in the south and Tabuk in the north. Teenage Saudi girls scream hysterically at a performance here by the Korean boy band BTS. Young Saudi women with bared faces run a 5K through city streets clad only in short-sleeved T-shirts and tight leggings. Groups of young men and women relax together in Starbucks. Hotels are no longer permitted to ask Saudi couples for proof of marriage at check-in. All this change and more in a society where until very recently women, uniformly clad in floor-length abayas, couldn’t exercise, drive or appear in public with men other than close relatives.
This most puritanical of Islamic societies is increasingly mirroring Western mores as the government seeks to attract foreign tourists and investors whose money is needed to diversify the kingdom’s oil-dependent economy.
The regime no longer worries about the erosion of the kingdom’s distinctive culture. Its view is that in a world of ubiquitous social media all cultures are destined to blend and it is no longer feasible, let alone desirable, for Saudi Arabia to shut itself off from inexorable global trends.
Exactly how this is affecting the average Saudi is difficult to assess. Open debate and discussion aren’t allowed, leaving public opinion in a fog. Some Saudis undoubtedly are frightened by the arrests of even mild dissenters, the violent death of critic Jamal Khashoggi last year, and the public stripping in 2017 of prominent princes’ wealth and right to travel. Such fears are expressed only in deep privacy. The country is operating under what might be called the Thumper Rule, after the little rabbit in “Bambi” whose father teaches him, “If you can’t say something nice, don’t say nothing at all.”
“We are all riding in the back seat of a speeding car,” says one nervous Saudi. “We can’t see where we are going. We just pray the driver knows so we avoid crashing.” This is as close to overt criticism as Saudis dare get these days. Another Saudi sums things up this way: “We used to debate and never decide. Now we”—or rather, the king and crown prince—“decide but never debate.”
There is no doubt that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, 34, effective ruler of the kingdom, has decided to press ahead full speed with economic and social change (the former much tougher than the latter). Nothing will deter him. The crown prince, those close to him say, is absolutely convinced his reforms are essential and urgent. So in his view, debate is pointless. There is no possibility of reversing course—and no apparent concern about a conservative backlash. The once-powerful religious authorities have been reduced to mouthpieces for the regime and are widely ignored by the public. Even immediate foreign threats are more distraction than deterrent to Crown Prince Mohammed’s domestic agenda.
Thus change continues at a dizzying pace. The government is spending billions on bringing entertainment—wrestling, tennis, car racing, expensive restaurants, musical performers—to the kingdom to jump-start tourism. Joining a Saudi family for dinner, I am driven by golf cart through a park to the restaurant by a young Saudi woman with a bare face, cropped hair and no abaya. Such dress or employment for a Saudi woman was unthinkable even a few months ago. “I feel out of place in my own country,” says one Saudi woman in shock at seeing a Lebanese singer entering a Riyadh hotel in a sleeveless midthigh dress. Such “indecency,” unlike dissent, runs no risk these days.
Economic reform, unlike social change, will require massive investment as the nation transforms from an oil-dependent kingdom into a diversified economy. One big step to finance investment is the decision, announced days ago, to sell the public shares in Aramco, the kingdom’s oil company. The main threat to the reform agenda comes not from within Saudi Arabia but from outside. Shortly before dawn on Sept. 14, Iranian missiles and drones struck Saudi oil fields, knocking out 50% of the country’s production. Aramco restored most production within a few weeks, but the strike underscored the vulnerability of the Saudi economy.
“I wept the night of the attack,” admits Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, the new Saudi oil minister and a half-brother of Crown Prince Mohammed. “The next morning I wept tears of gratitude when our Aramco engineers assured us they could repair things quickly.”
Remarkably, hardly anyone I meet here speaks of the attack on the oil fields. If pressed, almost all Saudis insist the kingdom did the right thing by not retaliating. “We have too much to lose” is the typical comment. The truth is Saudi Arabia is in no position to go to war with Iran even if it were so inclined. The Saudi military is too weak, its U.S. ally too reluctant. And war would spell the end of ambitious domestic reforms.
To rule out retaliation, Saudi government officials insist the attack wasn’t really aimed at Saudi Arabia; they say the kingdom is simply a proxy for Iranian anger at the U.S. “This was not an attack on Saudi Arabia,” says the oil minister, “but an attack on every household in the world.” He insists the Iranians lash out at Saudi Arabia because they are feeling the pain of U.S. economic sanctions but can’t strike the U.S. directly.
Crown Prince Mohammed has privately called the Iran strike “super stupid,” insisting that Tehran, not Riyadh, is the loser. The evidence: Iran is more isolated than ever as Germany, Britain and France all blamed it for the attack—even though Europe hasn’t imposed sanctions on Tehran. Also, Saudi officials say the Houthis, whom Iran blamed for the attack, are now more willing to find a solution to the war in Yemen, which is draining Saudi Arabia’s finances as well as its international reputation. The Saudis are putting the best spin possible on the vulnerability revealed by Iran’s attack, but those at the top seem to believe it.
Meantime, the Saudi government is putting maximum pressure on the U.S. to provide additional military support to the regime. Failure to stand visibly with Saudi Arabia, say officials here, could encourage Iran to strike again and lead to higher oil prices for the U.S. and world-wide. Or the Saudis could opt to price oil in a currency other than the dollar, with severe ramifications for the U.S. and the global economy.
Crown Prince Mohammed is said to have been livid about the slow U.S. reaction but mollified by the Trump administration’s recent decision to dispatch 2,000 additional American troops to Saudi Arabia along with two Patriot missile batteries and a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, or Thaad. The American buildup looks intended to deter future Iranian aggression, but whether the Trump administration would engage or duck is anyone’s guess given the lack of a formal U.S.-Saudi mutual-security treaty. The Saudis are understandably nervous after President Obama failed to enforce his “red line” in Syria and President Trump made no response to Iran’s downing of an American drone in June or its attack on Aramco six weeks ago.
Ms. House, a former publisher of The Wall Street Journal, is author of “On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault Lines—and Future.”
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George Friedman's Thoughts: On My Visit to the United Arab Emirates
By: George Friedman
I spent last week in the United Arab Emirates, in the city of Dubai. Dubai sits on the edge of the Persian Gulf, which is called the Arabian Gulf by Arab states. This was not my first trip there, but I have never left the city, which means I have only seen the most modern part of the Arab world. I have only had glimpses of how this city interacts with the much larger part of the country that resembles what we think of when we speak of the Arabian Peninsula. Each time I come here I mention this to my hosts, and each time they want to immediately arrange a tour. There is never enough time, and I always promise them and myself to leave the city. I never have.
The meetings I attended this time were convened by the prime minister’s office, which asked me to speak on the shape of the world next year. I spoke to men in flowing white robes and to women in their covering. There is no doubt that power is held by the men, yet there were women who were ministers, and all spoke fluent English. My initial exposure to the idea of an Arab was the movie “Lawrence of Arabia,” made half a century ago about a time a century ago, celebrating an Englishman who thought he had moved beyond what he was born as to become nearly Arab himself. Lawrence was never an Arab; he was an Englishman trying to become one. Still, through the rich landscape of the movie, it was possible to be both utterly enchanted and thoroughly misled by the movie.
A Space Program on the Gulf
At the very least, even the Arab world moves on. In the midst of the pure white robes, a white I have rarely seen in America, I was introduced to a man who was the head of the United Arab Emirates’ space program. The idea that the UAE has a space program is startling, until you look at the city of Dubai. Wedged between the Gulf and the desert is a city of skyscrapers, all of an aggressively modern architecture. Many years ago, when I passed through the UAE on my way elsewhere, there were some buildings and streets, but in a generation, what has emerged is magnificent for its mere presence, and daunting for its almost inhuman size. I can think of no Arab city that approaches it in size, nor in its indifference to Arab style.
What is most striking is that it is a city that was thrown up with the speed of a Texas city, with little sentiment and no apology. Dubai challenges you to accommodate yourself to it, much as Houston does. Arabs are an enormously polite people. In “Lawrence of Arabia,” the prince comments that mercy is a passion for Lawrence (the Englishman) while for an Arab it is simply good manners; the king asks, which is the more powerful force? The idea of mercy as a matter of custom and propriety is the most striking concept in the movie. While Arabs violate the principle of mercy, as all humans violate their customs, they are as appalled by cruelty as an Englishman is appalled by bad table manners. The manners of those I met were flawless. But they also understand how to wage war, making them very much like the rest of the world.
Therefore, why shouldn’t they have a space program? The Emiratis have one of the most advanced air forces in the world. I also had a nice talk with their minister of artificial intelligence. Few countries have such an air force or such a minister. Why be shocked that they are looking to space, as well? What was interesting about their space program was the reason it began: falcons.
Falconry is a passion of the Arab elite. No matter how well trained, the falcon may choose to go where he will. And finding him is difficult, to say the least. The Emirati space program was started in order to track falcons. Tagging falcons with GPS trackers is one solution. But the Emiratis were more ambitious, wanting to know if the falcon was flying or at rest, and if flying, then at what angle. To do this, they needed to collect data from multiple satellites. The ancient sport of kings merged with the space age, and the man who made it possible spoke to me about his ambitions to put an Emirati satellite in orbit around Mars. He was quite serious, and is already talking to a private U.S. space company. He was not shy of outsourcing the mission and, as is often the case these days, project management is a bigger hurdle than engineering in going to Mars.
Speaking with a man who was dressed in the flowing robes still common in the Emirates, discussing the subtleties of falcons and planning a space mission in a place that had been regarded as hopelessly backward when I was young, reminded me of my age, and of how geopolitics and tradition intertwine, and take on a life of their own.
The Importance of the Strait of Hormuz
The United Arab Emirates rests on a bulge that juts out into the Gulf at the southern edge of the Strait of Hormuz. The northern landmass is Iran. The Persians and Arabs have had a very ancient feud over this waterway, but in the 1970s the Strait of Hormuz became a global issue. In 1971, I was taking a class in operations research required for my military modeling ambitions. My professor, well known for his trips to Washington, informed me that my concerns about the Soviets grabbing the city of Hamburg or China dominating Vietnam were all beside the point, not to mention simplistic. The only really significant point on the global stage, according to him, was the Strait of Hormuz and the countries on either side of it. I thought he was buying the cheap Kool-Aid again.
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In 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel, launching the Yom Kippur War. In solidarity with them, other Arab states declared an oil embargo. The price of oil soared, and the consumers of Arabian and Iranian oil were plunged into recession. This created a huge and complex problem for the United States. The countries that had imposed the embargo were also critical U.S. allies against the Soviets – including Iran, which would be a U.S. ally for another six years. Pressuring Arab states on oil prices could give the Soviet Union an opening. Doing nothing might do wonders for oil companies, but would end political careers. The lines waiting for gas at those stations that had any seemed to signal the end of civilization.
The key to this was the Persian (or Arabian) Gulf. The fear was that the oil flowing from Iran (which did not join the boycott but enjoyed the higher prices) and the Arab countries on the Gulf’s western coast (which included the UAE and which were also managing to sell oil at high prices) would have their supply lines cut off at the Strait of Hormuz. If the strait were closed, the effect on the United States’ enclosure of the Soviet Union would be shattered, along with its economy. The only force that could conceivably want to do this and had the ability was the Soviets. So, my professor’s dismissal of Europe turned out to be true. I never asked how he nailed that.
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It was at that time that the U.S. became fascinated by both sides of the Strait of Hormuz. After the fall of Iran’s shah, and an early Iranian flirtation with the Soviet Union (or one we thought we saw), holding open the Strait of Hormuz became a central concern for the United States. During the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, sinking tankers in the Gulf became a pastime. The U.S. was so concerned that it sent in naval convoys to escort tankers out of the Persian Gulf, and frankly stated that if either side attacked the convoys, it would mean war. Not long after, the U.S. did go to war with Iraq, and to this day is still toying with the idea concerning Iran.
The U.S. and Its Strategic Allies
And throughout this time, to this moment, the UAE and the city of Dubai remained key strategic assets to the United States. If Iran could take Dubai, it could block the Strait of Hormuz with little challenge. Today, the U.S. operates a major air base in Dubai, cooperates with the UAE’s air force and collaborates respectfully with the UAE on many fronts. The respect in this collaboration is important: The U.S. has trouble working respectfully with allies (a problem going far back in time), and while Arab states may fear Americans and Europeans, they have difficulty respecting them all the same. Oddly, the collaboration works. (Likely in part because the elevators work well in towering Emirati buildings, and for Americans, respect starts there.)
I have noted on several occasions that, throughout history, being a strategic necessity to the most powerful country in the region, be it Rome or Britain, carried with it some risk but also great rewards. After World War II, Germany, Japan and South Korea all were strategic assets to the U.S. All became enormously wealthy, not simply because they had favorable access to American markets and guaranteed access to natural resources, but also because of their own assets, particularly their human assets. This was not because of any virtue of the United States, but simply because the United States needed them to be strong because they were strategic.
The evolution of Dubai into a world-class city had something to do with this. But the need for the strategic alliance was mutual. The UAE needed the Strait of Hormuz open to sell the massive amounts of oil it had. And the U.S. needed Dubai to be robust. As with all such alliances, the interest was mutual. But Dubai did something unexpected.
Germany drew on its own assets, intellectual and cultural. Dubai, on the other hand, went against its inherent culture. It retained the falconer aristocracy, the desert wanderer seeking to be free to make his own way with his tribe. But Dubai went in a different direction. It understood that it was at the chokepoint of the world economy. It understood that it would be standing watch so long as the petroleum economy existed. And it understood that it had vast wealth to draw on. It proceeded to add to its oil economy and to use its strategic position to dramatically enhance its economy, beyond exporting oil.
Instead of the Emiratis sending their money to the Swiss, the Swiss came to Dubai asking for the money. In leaving the Dubai airport, there is a sign advertising a well-known private Swiss banking service. But Dubai has spent its wealth on real estate development to facilitate its rise as the Switzerland of the Middle East, not only in financial matters, but beyond Switzerland – in taking its ambitions in space.
It struck me on this visit how similar Dubai is to Israel. Both are in a way invented countries. Both are now financial and technical centers. Both have close ties with the United States and the rest of the advanced industrial world. Both retain and struggle with older traditions. Orthodox Jews and devout Muslims both circumscribe what is possible to women. In Dubai, I met a minister dressed in traditional garb. She was not more than 30, and perhaps younger. It reminded me of the first time I ran into an off-duty Israeli officer in a miniskirt. The struggle to retain and overcome their traditional lives ought to bind them together.
At this point, I should say that unfortunately they are torn apart by religion. But, in fact, that’s not true. They are aligned in many ways, from hostility toward Iran to business interests, and they make no bones about it. At one end of the Arabian Peninsula is the UAE. At the other end is Israel. In between there is wreckage and insecurity. I have watched both UAE and Israeli air force demonstrations. In a world where mass armies are less important than the sophistication of precision-guided munitions and acquisition of targeting intelligence, large forces simply represent ample targets. Agile forces with advanced munitions and intelligence will defeat them.
This points to an interesting geopolitical possibility. If Israel is the major economic and military power on the western end of the Arabian Peninsula, and the UAE is the economic and military power in the east, then collaboration between the two of them could define the region. That is shooting from the hip, of course, ignoring Turkey and Iran, or the U.S. and Russia. But after this visit it is less preposterous an idea than in the past. When you meet a man who is using space-based assets to track falcons, do not dismiss its significance.
The Arabian Peninsula was shaped by desert and a hunger for water which combined to create a sparse population clustered in small groups, distrustful of the intentions of others. To this day, the UAE contains rival emirs, who collaborate with one another but do not fully trust each other. But the eastern shore of the Arabian Peninsula is rich with oil, and the waters of the Gulf allow the peninsula’s states to sell that oil to the world. But to be rich and weak is the most dangerous thing in the world. So the Arab states of the peninsula have sought the ability to defend themselves from the world, mostly through dangerous alliances, and a few by creating their own power. But to be powerful in the modern world, you must become part of it, and this is what the UAE has done. It has created its own space program. Even if the program was started to find the falcons.
I repeat the saying of Malraux: Men leave their nations in very national ways.
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Saudi Arabia’s Security Dilemma
By: Hilal Khashan
The devastating attack less than two months ago on two major oil facilities near Saudi Aramco’s headquarters in Eastern Province revealed the extent of Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability to foreign threats, as well as its inability to defend itself.
Though the Houthis claimed responsibility for the attack, Saudi and U.S. officials blamed it on Iran. Much to the chagrin of the Saudi royals, U.S. President Donald Trump ruled out military retaliation, and Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan merely offered to help de-escalate the situation. Disillusioned with the unwillingness of its closest allies to respond more aggressively, Saudi officials resigned themselves to their inability to take charge of the situation. King Salman, who accused the Iran-supported Houthis of launching about 600 drones and ballistic missiles into Saudi Arabia in recent years, implored the international community to stop Iran’s aggression. The Saudis now find themselves in an unenviable position: After decades of relying on local and foreign partners to provide for their political and territorial security, they must now use their own resources to ward off the burgeoning threats they face in the Middle East.
Origins of the Dilemma
Saudi Arabia’s inadequacies when it comes to self-defense are a result of centuries of poor defense planning and lack of foresight. The rise in 1744 of the first Saudi state that aspired to expand beyond Arabia resulted from Muhammad bin Saud’s alliance with Muhammad bin Abdulwahab, the founder of the religiously austere Wahhabi movement. Wary Ottoman officials instructed closely allied Egypt to put an end to territorial and ideological threats emanating from Arabia. In 1818, Ibrahim Pasha’s army conquered the Saudi state and destroyed its capital, Diriyah. The second Saudi state, founded in 1824 by Turki bin Abdullah, made modest territorial claims but became incapacitated by internal feuds. In 1891, the pro-Ottoman Rashidi family took down the new Saudi state in the Battle of Mulayda. The Ottomans arranged for deposed ruler Abdulrahman al-Saud to settle in Kuwait in the hope that they could bring him under their wing, a move that the British did not oppose since they believed he could be useful in their plans for Arabia. His energetic son Abdulaziz, aka Ibn Saud, seized Riyadh in 1902 and set the stage for the emergence of the third Saudi state in 1932 with the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which he ruled until his death in 1953.
In order to avoid facing the same fate as the first two Saudi states, Ibn Saud understood that he needed the backing of a foreign power superior to the Ottoman Empire. He also understood that, if he was to achieve his territorial objectives, he would need a robust military force to replace the corrupt and untrustworthy tribal fighters. In 1912, he formed a Wahhabi indoctrinated military force called al-Ikhwan. It proved instrumental in enabling him to spread his control over four-fifths of the Arabian Peninsula from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea, and from British-held Iraq and Trans-Jordan in the north to Jizan and Najran in the south.
Thanks to British military and financial support, al-Ikhwan seized the Eastern Province and expanded Ibn Saud’s emirate beyond Najd. Sensing the impending demise of the Ottoman Empire and content with the battlefield impact of British aid, Ibn Saud signed in 1915 the Treaty of Darin with the United Kingdom. In addition to providing additional material resources to satisfy Ibn Saud’s ambitions, the treaty made his burgeoning state a British protectorate.
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The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War and its loss of Arab lands in West Asia created opportunities and challenges both for the British and Ibn Saud. Britain consolidated its grip on the tiny Arab sheikhdoms on the Persian Gulf, in addition to seizing Iraq and Palestine. But al-Ikhwan’s recurring raids on Iraqi Shiite religious sites in Najaf and Karaba created significant security issues for the British, who were also under pressure from Sharif Hussein, the king of Hejaz, to deliver on their promise to create an Arab kingdom in West Asia. The British struck a deal with Ibn Saud in the Uqair Protocol of 1922 to prevent al-Ikhwan from going into Iraq and Trans-Jordan, with the tacit understanding that they would not oppose his plans to conquer Hejaz.
Unlike Sharif Hussein, who entertained more ambitious territorial claims beyond the Arabian Peninsula, Ibn Saud had no desire to spread his kingdom outside Arabia and accepted British conditions to stay out of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the Trucial States, Oman and Yemen. Just before his kingdom was complete, Ibn Saud proposed in 1930 signing a treaty of friendship with Iran. Reza Shah, who did not want to develop a special relationship between the two countries, humiliated him by rejecting the proposal.
Ibn Saud did not like the British, even though they facilitated the establishment of his kingdom. He viewed their commitment to the Saudis as vague and fluid and resented their refusal to invest in Saudi Arabia’s promising oil industry. The Saudi king preferred to work with the Americans, who seemed to him to be generous, approachable and willing to take a calculated risk. In 1933, he signed a deal with Standard Oil of California, which ultimately struck oil in 1938. The momentous discovery paved the way in 1945 for a meeting between U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt and Ibn Saud aboard the USS Quincy. Subsequent developments in the Middle East showed that the two leaders had different expectations out of their historic meeting. Roosevelt’s focus was on Saudi Arabia’s spectacular hydrocarbon finds and the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, particularly after the horrors of the Holocaust were revealed. Ibn Saud, meanwhile, hoped that the United States would unconditionally defend Saudi Arabia against foreign threats in exchange for partnership on oil projects.
The unwillingness of the United States to side with Saudi Arabia in its 1952-55 dispute with British-backed tribes in Oman and the Trucial States (now UAE) over the Buraimi Oasis and its recognition in 1962 of the republican order in Yemen outraged the Saudi royals. They became particularly disillusioned with Washington after President John F. Kennedy did not take action against Egyptian air force raids on the Saudi cities of Najran and Jizan, save for some symbolic U.S. Air Force flights over Riyadh and Jeddah. Already threatened by the surge of Arab nationalism and the rise of leftist political parties, Saudi Arabia decided to adopt an aggressive regional policy to insulate the fragile kingdom from the implications of these emerging ideologies.
Failure of Regional Balancing Policy
In the 1950s, the Saudi royals feared that Aramco could serve as a hotbed of leftist and pan-Arab political affiliations. Though they valued its massive contribution to the country’s economy, they realized that Aramco functioned both as an oil company and a cultural center. The presence of thousands of politicized Arab workers, mainly Palestinians, Syrians, Sudanese and Bahrainis, proved decisive in mobilizing fellow Saudi workers in political parties and in labor movements. The liberalizing threat from within clashed with the patrimonial and ultraconservative nature of Saudi politics.
Saudi kings from the beginning of Saud bin Abdulaziz’s rule in 1953 until the death of King Abdullah in 2015 adopted a preemptive policy of intervening in inter-Arab affairs to defeat leftist and nationalist ideologies and to prevent Egypt and Iraq from dominating the Arab world, which would have compromised the kingdom’s stability. Thus, Saudi Arabia, along with Egypt, opposed the Baghdad Pact – a military alliance established in 1955 between several Middle Eastern states and the United Kingdom – because it would have enabled Iraq to emerge as the most influential Arab country. Iraq pulled out from the pact, renamed the Central Treaty Organization, after its 1958 republican coup.
The Saudis shifted their concern to Egypt after it merged during the same year with Syria to form the United Arab Republic. The Saudis even attempted to assassinate President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who rose to become the uncontested champion of Arab nationalism. But a year after the 1961 dissolution of the UAR, a republican coup took place in Yemen, and its leaders appealed to Nasser to send troops to consolidate their hold on the country. The stationing of the Egyptian army in Yemen, next to Saudi Arabia’s southern borders, and the defection of several Saudi air force pilots to Egypt, including the air force commander, sparked shock and fear within the Saudi royal family.
The 1967 Six-Day War in which Israel won a spectacular victory against the combined Arab armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan led to the withdrawal of the Egyptian military from Yemen by the end of the year. For a decade afterward, the Saudi ruling elite rested assured about the absence of foreign threats to the kingdom’s stability. Yet, they acted swiftly to clamp down on internal dissent movements that threatened to bring down the third Saudi state. Examples of this dissent in the 1960s included the rise of the Free Princes Movement, led by Talal bin Abdulaziz, who demanded the transformation of Saudi Arabia into a constitutional monarchy, and a coup attempt in 1969. The 1970s saw the assassination of King Faisal in 1975, the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979 by ultra-conservative Salafists and a Shiite mutiny in the Eastern Province.
The rise of the Islamic republic in Iran in 1979 and its aggressive goal of exporting its revolution to the Arab world placed Iraq and Saudi Arabia at the center of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s foreign policy. Instead of creating a unified Arab military coalition to deter Iran, the Saudis injudiciously pushed Iraq to wage a seamless war against it. One year into the quagmire, the Saudis took the lead in establishing the Gulf Cooperation Council, which the small Arab states in the Gulf joined reluctantly, despite their fears of Saudi dominance. The exclusion of Iraq from the GCC indicated that the Saudis feared the Baathist regime in Baghdad as much as Iran’s Islamic republic. The GCC failed to create a viable military force capable of deterring foreign threats, and despite allocating astronomical funds to armament, the Saudi armed forces remained a paper tiger at best.
The Saudi royals have over the years displayed inadequate analytical depth and foresight. They turned Iraq against Iran in the 1980-88 war, did not use their leverage to prevent the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and then planned with the United States to go to war to reinstate the independence of Kuwait. Immediately after the end of the 1991 Gulf War, Egypt and Syria committed themselves in the Damascus Declaration to preserve the territorial integrity of GCC member states, but Saudi Arabia dismissed the declaration’s offer of protection, unwilling to host Arab troops on its soil on a long-term basis.
When the Syrian uprising of 2011 turned into a civil war, Saudi Arabia hoped it would lead to the fall of the pro-Iran regime in Damascus. In 2013, it participated in the U.S.-led Military Operations Center, which armed Syrian opposition groups operating in southwest Syria. The primary motives of other participants in the MOC – including the U.S., Jordan and the UAE – centered on defeating radical Islamic rebels, not Bashar Assad’s regime. The MOC, therefore, played a decisive role in the collapse of the Saudi-backed Southern Front.
Impromptu decisions based on a lack of nuanced understanding of the determinants of foreign policy have often trapped Saudi decision-makers. In fact, their decision to go to war in Yemen has been more disastrous than even their operations in Syria. Yemen has humbled many foreign powers in the past, and Saudi Arabia is no exception. Saudi Arabia has not been able to raise a fighting army since modern British weapons made it possible for Ibn Saud to defeat the camel-riding al-Ikhwan desert warriors in the 1929 Battle of Sibilla. Its military weakness, xenophobic suspicion of its neighbors and crude diplomatic behavior not only blocked its claim to regional power status but threaten its very survival in the long run.
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https://www.meforum.org/60297/saudi-critics-should-revisit-sue-myrick-wake-up?utm_source=Middle+East+Forum&utm_campaign=b501e4bdca-MEF_Caschetta_2020_01_17_08_18&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_086cfd423c-b501e4bdca-33691909&goal=0_086cfd423c-b501e4bdca-33691909&mc_cid=b501e4bdca
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https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-07/saudi-aramco-slashes-crude-prices-kicking-off-price-war
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May 29, 2020 View On Website
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Saudi’s City of the Future Is a Mirage
By: Hilal Khashan
In October 2017, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman launched the New Future project, his vision of what would drive Saudi economic development in the post-oil era. The project, thereafter dubbed Neom, is a novel idea as far as the Saudis go; it’s a far cry from Prince Mohammed al-Faisal’s idea in 1977 to tow a 100 million-ton iceberg to the desert to solve a water shortage problem. But whereas the oil boom dashed al-Faisal’s iceberg dreams, the oil bust has convinced Salman that the future of Saudi prosperity lies in other industries, even a futuristic city that is believed to cost $500 billion.
The Case for Neom
The idea behind the city is to concentrate development and thus foster the accumulation of wealth and ensure the sustainability of growth. Each city would comprise an integrated metropolis consisting of economic clusters equipped with modern facilities providing services, logistics and residential quarters. The Saudis argue that economic cities such as Neom have a competitive edge because they attract capital for intelligent investments, largely because they require advanced digital and technological systems. The project, which would cover more than 26,000 square kilometers (10,000 square miles) of waterfront property near Jordan and Egypt, will also focus on renewable energy, water desalination, transport, food production and manufacturing, technical and digital science, advanced industrialization, media production, and recreation. As part of the framework for Vision 2030, Neom aims to transform Saudi Arabia into a cultural model worth emulating.
The Saudi Public Investment Fund, which owns the project, is marketing it as an ultramodern technological achievement found nowhere else on Earth. Promotional efforts also note that 70 percent of the world’s population would be able to access the city in less than eight hours, thanks to King Salman’s causeway that will connect Neom to Africa and Europe via Sinai. As a unique investment region, the project is exempt from Saudi laws and regulations, such as taxes, customs, and labor laws, and so is designed to attract more foreign direct investment. The execution of the first phase of the project is slated for 2025, and it will take 30-50 years to complete.
But the case for Neom is born of necessity as much as it is of ambition. Saudi Arabia has compelling reasons to search for new sources of revenue. Oil exports account for 87 percent of total exports, 70 percent of the budget, and 46 percent of gross domestic product. The advent of alternative energy sources such as electric cars is expected to dramatically reduce demand for hydrocarbons by 2025. Oil revenues are expected to drop by 33 percent in 2020 and 25 percent in 2021. The economy, therefore, is vulnerable to vagaries in the market, and always will be so long as it relies overwhelmingly on oil.
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Even now, the budget deficit continues to grow, leading to further borrowing and excessive debt levels. The last annual budget deficit exceeded $100 billion. Saudi Arabia has lost more than one-third of its foreign reserves since 2014. The most dramatic decrease occurred in March this year, with a $24 billion loss. The public sector is bloated, and the cost of maintaining it is high. The country’s expensive military expenditures are meaningless since it is unable to defend itself against foreign threats.
Economic diversification is a necessity because it reduces the financial consequences of fluctuating demand for hydrocarbons and unstable oil prices. Economic cities are Riyadh’s way of empowering the private sector and the long-sought-after solution to the dilemma of development.
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Indeed, Neom intends to achieve what 10 previous plans tried and failed to: economic development. Riyadh’s first five-year development plan, which meant to transform the kingdom into a welfare state, started in 1970. The second and third development plans focused on building the infrastructure of economic development. From the fourth through the ninth development plans (1985-2014), Saudi Arabia emphasized domesticating the workforce and focusing on human resource development. Government efforts encountered resistance because of public preference to seek employment in the public sector and aversion to manual or skilled labor and any position that assumed responsibility for making decisions.
The 10th development plan (2015-2019) set the stage for initiating the Neom project. It outlined the intention of transforming the kingdom into an international logistic center and launching grand economic initiatives without compromising Islam’s foundational values and tenets. In keeping with growing public demand and international pressure for political change, the plan paid lip service to the importance of citizenship and national belonging, strengthening the principles of justice and equality, and protection of human rights in accordance with Sharia law.
The 10th plan built on the principles of previous plans – that is, the exploration and development of economic diversification opportunities, investment in less water-intensive crops, development of a fisheries sector, and increasing human resource efficiency – though it differs in that it calls for the spread of information throughout the population, the activation of the role of economic cities, and the return of migrant capital to invest in productive sectors. It is also, notably, built on ideas introduced in the seventh and eighth development plans, which recognized that cities could create the economic development Riyadh needs. This is embodied in the creation of King Abdullah Economic City, north of Jeddah, in 2005 at an estimated cost of $100 billion. The blueprint of the project included the construction of a container harbor and an industrial valley and the expectation that it would create 1 million jobs. Other planned economic cities in the Northern Borders province and Jizan region concentrate on agriculture, food canning, vocational training, and storage. The government proposed that the economic cities in Mecca and Medina serve pilgrims in undertaking religious rites and providing high-end shopping. But these cities have either stumbled or atrophied, making Neom all the more consequential.
Science Fiction
Neom is a high-tech project that intends to provide advanced IT solutions. But its success is questionable in a country that scores low on the key indicators of a knowledge-based economy: skilled labor, incentives and motivation. Jamal Khashoggi, for example, was critical of Salman’s megaprojects, calling on him to launch smaller projects for the poor in Riyadh and Jeddah instead of complicated endeavors that don’t benefit local workers. He was killed inside a Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018.
Saudi Arabia is also very censorial, curbing what its subjects are allowed to access via the internet and making sure that connections are always slow. The free and uninterrupted flow of information is crucial in developing independent and critical thinking that Saudi formal education views with disfavor. Neom cannot possibly thrive in a politically repressive and culturally closed environment.
Then there is the pesky problem of financing. Saudi Arabia’s finance minister recently announced that the country would implement painful measures to slash public expenses, given the dramatic decline in oil revenues due to the coronavirus pandemic. The minister’s announcement led to a sharp decline of over 7 percent in the Saudi stock market. The unprecedented oil slump prompted Moody’s to downgrade Saudi outlook from stable to negative. It is difficult to imagine that the Saudis can lure foreign investment to take part in Neom under the existing financial, social and political conditions.
And even if they can, Neom is like a mirage in the desert. The project does not differ fundamentally from similar initiatives in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. The Port of Jebel Ali (Dubai) and the Hamad Port (Doha) are world-class seaports. The two countries have premier international airlines that Neom cannot dislodge. Contrary to Saudi Arabia’s promotion of Neom as a site that straddles three continents, its location, surrounded by a vast swathe of barren desert, has no unique value. If anything, it would cripple the flagging Jordanian economy and destroy its tourism sector, as well as Egyptian resorts in South Sinai. Neom is just too much for the Middle East and way beyond what it needs.
The risks associated with the implementation of the project are high, and its outcome is unpredictable. The Neom scheme is unsustainable and potentially catastrophic. The introduction of flying taxis and robots capable of performing any task nullifies the claim that Neom would create millions of jobs. Saudi Arabia needs to import all the required technology to transform Neom into a reality, which is too costly to make the project feasible, especially with unclear benefits. The plan does not benefit the local population that the government is coercing to vacate land needed for the project. Recently, the security forces killed a resident from the Huwaitat tribe because he refused to abandon his house and relocate.
In short, Neom is a project inspired by science fiction. It seems to have been influenced by the gated communities that American and British companies built in Saudi Arabia to keep their personnel disconnected from the locals. In November 2017, Salman ordered the arrest of hundreds of prominent Saudi princes and businessmen on the grounds of money laundering, embezzlement of public funds and corruption. He subsequently announced recovering $50 billion to the state’s coffers, ostensibly contributing to development projects like Neom. He expected to get a similar amount before closing the Ritz-Carlton dossier. There is little evidence that Neom is progressing except for the construction of five gigantic royal palaces serviced by a private airport and 10 helipads.
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Saudi Arabia, With China’s Help, Expands Its Nuclear Program
Kingdom harbors hopes for a civilian nuclear power program, but U.S. critics worry about its ambitions for nuclear weapons
Al Ula is a small city in northwest Saudi Arabia. The kingdom is said to be constructing a facility for extracting uranium yellowcake in a remote desert location in the city’s general vicinity.
PHOTO: AHMED YOSRI/REUTERS
By Warren P. Strobel, Michael R. Gordon and Felicia Schwartz
Aug. 4, 2020 5:14 pm ET
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WASHINGTON—Saudi Arabia has constructed with Chinese help a facility for extracting uranium yellowcake from uranium ore, an advance in the oil-rich kingdom’s drive to master nuclear technology, according to Western officials with knowledge of the site.
The facility, which hasn’t been publicly disclosed, is in a sparsely populated area in Saudi Arabia’s northwest and has raised concern among U.S. and allied officials that the kingdom’s nascent nuclear program is moving ahead and that Riyadh is keeping open the option of developing nuclear weapons.
Even though Riyadh is still far from that point, the facility’s exposure appears certain to draw concern in the U.S. Congress, where a bipartisan group of lawmakers has expressed alarm about Saudi nuclear energy plans and about Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s 2018 vow that “if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.”
It is also likely to cause consternation in Israel, where officials have warily monitored Saudi Arabia’s nuclear work.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman attended a Group of 20 summit in Hangzhou, China, in 2016.
PHOTO: STEPHANE DE SAKUTIN/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
The Saudi Energy Ministry said in a statement it “categorically denies” having built a uranium ore facility in the area described by some of the Western officials, adding that mineral extraction—including uranium—is a key part of the country’s economic diversification strategy.
The Saudi statement said the kingdom has contracted with the Chinese on uranium exploration in Saudi Arabia in certain areas. A spokesman declined to elaborate on the ministry’s statement.
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Saudi Arabia has no known nuclear-weapons program, operating nuclear reactors or capacity to enrich uranium. But it says it wants to acquire nuclear plants that Saudi authorities say will generate power and reduce its reliance on oil, its principal export.
Information about the yellowcake facility has been tightly held within U.S. and allied governments, the officials said, and some details couldn’t be learned—including whether it has begun operations. The site doesn’t violate international agreements the Saudis have signed, experts on nuclear nonproliferation said.
“Yellowcake” is a milled form of uranium ore which occurs naturally in Saudi Arabia and neighboring countries such as Jordan. It is produced by chemically processing uranium ore into a fine powder. It takes multiple additional steps and technology to process and enrich uranium sufficiently for it to power a civil nuclear energy plant. At very high enrichment levels, uranium can fuel a nuclear weapon.
The yellowcake facility may represent the kingdom’s “longer-term hedge against a nuclear Iran,” said Ian Stewart, of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. It is “another step in the direction of having an indigenous uranium enrichment program,” he added.
Olli Heinonen, the former deputy director of the International Atomic Energy Agency who is at the Stimson Center think tank, agreed the facility’s construction suggested the Saudis were trying to keep their options open. He said the yellowcake facility alone wouldn’t mark a significant advance unless the yellowcake is converted into a compound known as uranium hexafluoride and then enriched.
But Mr. Heinonen said of the Saudis, “Where is the transparency? If you claim your program is peaceful, why not show what you have?”
The Chinese embassy in Washington didn’t respond to a request for comment. Iran has denied it is interested in developing nuclear weapons. Iranian officials didn’t respond to a request for comment.
A State Department representative declined to say whether Washington has raised the issue with Riyadh, but said the U.S. has warned all its partners about the danger of engagement with China’s civilian nuclear establishment.
One Western official said the facility is located in a remote desert location in the general vicinity of al Ula, a small city in northwest Saudi Arabia.
Two officials said it was constructed with the help of two Chinese entities. While the identities of these entities couldn’t be learned, the China National Nuclear Corp. signed a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Arabia in 2017 to help explore its uranium deposits. A second agreement was signed with China Nuclear Engineering Group Corp. That followed a 2012 pact announced between Riyadh and Beijing to cooperate on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Saudi Arabia only has the most limited safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The country was among the last to sign the old version of a so-called Small Quantities Protocol in the 2000s, which doesn’t oblige it to disclose the yellowcake site to the agency.
The IAEA and Saudi Arabia have talked about replacing that agreement, although Riyadh hasn’t committed to the most advanced type of IAEA oversight accord. Known as the Additional Protocol, it allows widespread inspection of nuclear and nonnuclear facilities and has extensive reporting requirements.
The Vienna headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which enacts safeguards against nuclear weapons proliferation.
PHOTO: CHRISTIAN BRUNA/EPA/SHUTTERSTOCK
As of early 2020, more than 150 countries—including the U.S. and Iran, but not Israel—have signed Additional Protocols, according to the IAEA, which promotes peaceful uses of nuclear energy and enacts safeguards against nuclear weapons proliferation.
The Saudi Energy Ministry’s statement said the kingdom’s “nuclear program fully complies with all relevant international legal frameworks and instruments governing nuclear energy and its peaceful use.”
The Trump administration has discussed selling reactors and nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia, a close security ally. But U.S. arms-control negotiator Marshall Billingslea, restating U.S. policy, said at a July 21 congressional hearing that Saudi Arabia must first agree to requirements known as the “Gold Standard” of nuclear oversight.
That means the kingdom would need to forswear the enrichment of uranium, which is several steps beyond producing yellowcake. It also would need to refrain from reprocessing spent fuel, which could enable a nation to develop nuclear weapons, and would need to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol.
“The reason we do nuclear technology development deals with countries is so that they will commit to the Gold Standard and commit to a working relationship with the United States. The Saudis are trying to have it both ways, and we can’t allow them to get away with that,” Sen. Chris Murphy (D., Conn.), said in an interview.
“My guess is that one of the reasons to go to the Chinese is that it doesn’t come with the same controls that coordination with the United States does,” Mr. Murphy said.
The Saudis haven’t ruled out enriching uranium, even as they have insisted that any nuclear program they pursue will be peaceful.
The King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy, which oversees such work, states on its website “Saudi Arabia has Uranium resources that can be used to produce nuclear fuel for future National power reactors and for [the] uranium international market.”
Riyadh has expressed a desire to master all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. It is constructing with Argentina’s state-owned nuclear technology company a small research reactor outside of Riyadh.
In recent years, the Saudis have significantly expanded their nuclear workforce, experts say, through academic nuclear engineering programs and growing research centers.
In addition to its agreement with Argentina, the Saudis are collaborating with South Korea in refining the design of a small commercial reactor to be built in Saudi Arabia, and that could also be marketed to other nations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. It also has public cooperation agreements with Jordan on uranium mining and production.
Plans to issue tenders to construct its first two large nuclear power reactors, however, have repeatedly been delayed.
Israel, which doesn’t acknowledge its own nuclear weapons arsenal, has long been concerned about nuclear proliferation in the region.
“Every year or so we learn something new about Saudi’s nuclear appetite. It seems very big and if you combine their fears of Iran, fear of neglect by the U.S., their abundance of resources and the current management in Saudi Arabia, it’s quite dangerous,” said Yoel Guzansky, an expert on Israel’s relations in the region at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv.
—Laurence Norman, Stephen Kalin and Gordon Lubold contributed to this article.
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Saudi Arabia on the Brink of a Breakthrough
Its economy in trouble and its regional leadership challenged, Riyadh is in talks that would reshape the Middle East.
By: Caroline D. Rose
In the final weeks of November, Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy machine went into overdrive. Riyadh announced a series of defense and commercial agreements strengthening bilateral ties with Egypt, Iraq and the United States. But while Saudi diplomats were traveling around to increase Saudi Arabia’s influence in the Greater Middle East, recent meetings between Saudi and U.S. officials may well lead to a breakthrough closer to home in the Gulf.
A U.S. delegation visit to Riyadh during the first week of December seeks to hit two birds with one stone: putting an end to the more than three-year crisis between Gulf countries and Qatar, and starting the process of diplomatic normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. While the United States has had success getting countries like Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates to adjust their regional diplomatic policy, the Saudis have been the hardest to budge. The kingdom considers itself the natural, de facto leader of the Gulf and Sunni Arab world, and for some time reckoned it could not afford to lose political credibility by realigning itself with a historical rival (Israel) and a neighbor (Qatar) whose brand of religious ideology and independent foreign policy are considered a threat to Saudi regional influence. But a breakthrough is more likely than ever, as a combination of waning regional influence, financial constraints and shifting fault lines in the Middle East push Saudi Arabia to explore normalization with Israel and Qatar.
Leadership Contest
Saudi Arabia has traditionally been considered the effective ideological and religious leader of the Sunni Arab world. The country’s vast oil wealth, combined with its custodianship over Islam’s holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, and location at the crossroads of Red Sea and Persian Gulf trade routes, make it a natural Gulf power. Saudi Arabia was at the forefront of the Middle East’s modern political rifts, considering itself the moral and religious guardian of the Arab world in opposing Israeli annexations, upholding the Palestinian cause, taking the reins of the Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council, and later, in the years after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, leading its Sunni allies in countering Iran’s Shiite Crescent strategy.
But Saudi Arabia’s star is dimming. The kingdom’s over-reliance on its oil industry (where prices are stubbornly low due to COVID-19 and oversupply), demographic challenges, and a 2030 Vision reform program on shaky ground have chipped away at its regional credibility and relative strength with its neighbors. Additionally, the al-Saud royal family’s record on human rights and the country’s war in Yemen have alienated traditional partners like the U.S. and the EU. All the while, the UAE – a country less than 4 percent the size of Saudi Arabia – has made a series of ambitious foreign policy moves that have begun to overshadow Saudi Arabia as regional leader. The UAE has taken the lead in the ideological battle on political Islamism: Abu Dhabi has reportedly funded mercenaries and has armed the Libyan National Army against the Turkish- and Qatari-backed Government of National Accord in Libya; has been at the forefront of strengthening Gulf ties through the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum against Turkish expansionism in the Mediterranean; and, notably, was the first among its Gulf neighbors to initiate peace with Israel this year. Gone are the days when Riyadh could depend on its cultural soft power to maintain its Gulf hegemony and regional leadership.
While the Saudis have been on the sidelines, their Gulf peers have seen a flurry of economic and political opportunities from normalizing ties with Israel. In the four months since Israel and the UAE reached their agreement, they have signed a string of memorandums of understanding on banking and finance, commerce and trade infrastructure, and even an oil pipeline deal worth as much as $800 million that would transport Emirati oil to Europe via Israel’s ports of Eilat and Ashkelon. Bahrain, which also normalized ties with Israel, hasn’t been far behind, inking business cooperation deals with Israel’s Chamber of Commerce and aviation agreements. Both countries have proved that normalization can bring economic rewards at a time when most Gulf economies, particularly Saudi Arabia, desperately need diversification.
Riyadh is therefore in discussions with Washington about rapprochement with Israel. At first, Saudi Arabia worried that normalization with Israel would risk its regional legitimacy, but now it’s considering that the reverse may be true. An Israeli-Saudi peace deal could help Saudi Arabia catch up to its Emirati neighbor with a series of investment, commercial and infrastructure agreements that would create new regional trade and financial hubs between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. The U.S. and Israel have also reportedly hinted that joint custodianship over Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque would be on the table – something that would enhance Saudi Arabia’s reputation as the Islamic world’s religious guardian (but could also cause tensions with Jordan, the current sole custodian of Al-Aqsa). And, importantly, Riyadh would look to use normalization to position itself as a mediator for an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, which would score it major points among regional partners, the U.S. and the international community. For the kingdom, the political short-term and economic long-term payoffs are worth the risk of changing its traditional stance.
Countering Iran and Turkey
Political credibility and economic opportunity aside, the kingdom has another significant reason for normalization. By realigning with Israel and Qatar, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners would be able to further isolate two of their primary rivals in the region: Iran and Turkey.
For Israel and Saudi Arabia, Iran is a common enemy. As Iran has augmented its strategic depth in the region over the years, building a proxy network that extends from the Zagros Mountains to the Red Sea and Mediterranean, Saudi Arabia and Israel have found greater incentive to work together. Over the past two decades, the two countries expanded cooperation and intelligence-sharing behind closed doors, keeping relations ice-cold only on the surface. But as the Gulf begins to open up toward Israel, Saudi Arabia has an opportunity to expand its coalition against Iran beyond traditional Sunni Arab lines and include one of the top military powers in the region in its circle.
The same logic applies to the Gulf Cooperation Council’s broadening campaign against Turkish influence in the region. As Turkey has gotten more deliberate about expanding its influence and control, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf counterparts are recognizing that they share an interest with Israel in opposing Turkish expansionism. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and their Gulf partners (excluding Qatar, of course) have been vocal opponents of Turkey, accusing the ruling Justice and Development Party of supporting political Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood. And for Saudi Arabia in particular, Turkey’s neo-Ottoman approach and brand of Islamic identity politics is seen as a challenge to its leadership over the Sunni Muslim world. Meanwhile, Israel has had hostile relations with Turkey since the 2010 Gaza flotilla incident and has become engaged in an ideological war of words with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan over the status of Palestine. Israel has resented Turkish attempts to take up the torch of the Palestinian cause over the years; Ankara in September hosted mediation discussions between rival Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah, to encourage unity against Israel, and has been a vocal opponent of Israeli annexations and Israeli peace deals with Arab Gulf states. Israel is also a member of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, an emerging regional coalition that Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Gulf partners have begun to align with to amplify opposition to Turkish moves over maritime territory. When strategizing its next step against Turkey, Saudi Arabia is beginning to accept Israel as a natural partner.
Then there is the question of Qatar. Normalization with Qatar offers a different, but more delicate, opportunity for Saudi Arabia. Doha has a relatively positive relationship with Iran and an intimate partnership with Turkey, as well as a Sunni ideological platform that runs counter to Saudi domestic interests. Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners have criticized Qatar for alleged support of Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and have framed Qatar as an agent of foreign efforts to thwart regional stability through Islamist infiltration. Of course, intra-Gulf tensions infamously came to a head in 2017 when Gulf states severed diplomatic relations with Doha and enacted an air, sea and land blockade, isolating Qatar from its former Gulf allies. The ideological rivalry has by no means abated, particularly as Saudi Arabia and the UAE have countered Qatari influence in new theaters like Libya and have continued to accuse Doha of supporting Islamists. Shortly after the 2017 blockade, Qatar normalized relations with Iran and enhanced bilateral trade in gas and shipping. And since the diplomatic crisis, Qatar has become Turkey’s most reliable regional ally, offering Ankara financial relief through currency swap deals, investing in joint defense projects abroad and boosting trade relations. Unlike Israel, Qatar does not seem like a natural partner in broadening the regional coalition against Iran and Turkey. However, it could serve as a useful agent to isolate Saudi Arabia’s rivals.
As the sun sets on the current U.S. administration and Trump’s Middle East team scrambles to assemble a series of legacy-sealing deals before Jan. 20, 2021, Riyadh sees space for maneuver. By extending an olive branch and lobbying the U.S. to apply pressure on Doha, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners are working to rein in Qatari influence and convince it to end its engagement with Iran and Turkey. While the exact details of what a deal would look like are uncertain, Gulf countries have insisted since 2017 on a 13-point ultimatum that includes demands to close a Turkish military base on Qatari soil, sever all ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups, shut down diplomatic posts in Iran and limit Iranian-Qatari ties to trade and commerce that strictly complies with U.S. sanctions. Though Qatar has been reluctant to yield to these demands, the incentives for re-initiating relations with its Gulf neighbors are increasing. Thanks to Qatar’s mammoth-size gas reserves (the third largest in the world), ramped up domestic production, and boosted economic ties with the U.S. and Turkey, the 2017 blockade didn’t entirely devastate the Qatari economy. However, the logistical issues remain as Qatar is cut off from the countries where 60 percent of its imports (namely food and supplies) transit through. While Turkey and Iran have served as alternative supply routes, resolving the crisis with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries would ease these logistical conundrums as well as reintroduce Qatar into the Gulf’s expanding financial and trade hubs. If Doha was pressured to concede to such a deal, Turkey and Iran would be further isolated in the region. Of course, a snap decision on the Gulf crisis will likely not be ironclad, as tensions between Gulf states and Qatar linger beneath the surface, but it would put restrictions around Qatar’s foreign engagement – threatening to deprive Turkey of its sole regional ally, and weakening Iran’s foothold in the Gulf.
As meetings between U.S., Israeli, Qatari and Saudi officials continue into December, an opening between the Gulf’s de facto leader and its traditional rivals becomes more likely. With a precarious long-term economic outlook, waning religious and political credibility, and a fragmented regional campaign against Turkey and Iran, Saudi Arabia is indicating it no longer wishes to wait when it comes to peace with Israel and Qatar.
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Biden Brings More Skepticism Into the U.S.-Saudi Relationship
As the drivers bringing them together weaken, the United States and Saudi Arabia will become more conservative in deepening their strategic ties and more critical of one another’s differences. On Feb. 26, the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden released a report publicly blaming Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for the 2018 assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and imposed visa bans on 76 Saudis associated with the act under a new so-called “Khashoggi Policy.” This, along with other recent public statements and arms freezes, indicates Biden preparing to shift U.S.-Saudi ties away from his predecessor’s close personal relationship with the kingdom. The White House appears ready to press Saudi Arabia to engage in more restrained foreign policy, emphasizing U.S. human rights objectives in its Saudi dialogue. That pressure will undoubtedly clash with several of the kingdom’s own deeply set imperatives, creating pushback from Riyadh and turbulence in long-standing U.S.-Saudi ties.
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Important regional development: The Saudis have changed their tone when it comes to their open hostility toward Iran, according to an interview with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Here's the relevant passage, in full:
"At the end of the day, Iran is a neighboring country. All what we ask for is to have a good and distinguished relationship with Iran. We do not want the situation with Iran to be difficult. On the contrary, we want it to prosper and grow as we have Saudi interests in Iran, and they have Iranian interests in Saudi Arabia, which is to drive prosperity and growth in the region and the entire world. The problem that we have lies with certain negative behaviors they have, whether in terms of their nuclear program, their support of illegal militias in some countries in the region, or their ballistic missile program. We are working now with our partners in the region and the world to find solutions for these problems. We really hope we would overcome them and build a good and positive relationship with Iran that would benefit all parties."
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This seems like a really BFD!!!
Saudi Crown Prince's Decision May End his Country's Support for Wahhabism
by Hany Ghoraba
IPT News
June 10, 2021
https://www.investigativeproject.org/8891/saudi-crown-prince-decision-may-end-his-country
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Saudi Arabia has been a main proponent and Islamism and Wahabbism for decades.
But in an April interview broadcast on Saudi-owned Al Arabiya News, Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman indicated that support may be about to end. Saudi Arabia intends to disregard many of the unverified sayings attributed to Islam's prophet Muhammad that were passed from generation to generation without any verifiable source.
"We should engage in continuous interpretation of Quranic texts," bin Salman said, "and the same goes for the Sunnah of the Prophet PBUH, and all fatwas should be based on the time, place, and mindset in which they are issued."
Saudis should not idolize any scholar, even Mohamed Abdel Wahab, the Muslim theologian and founder of Wahhabism, bin Salman said.
The changes are vital if Saudi Arabia is to remain economically vibrant, he said.
"Now, we cannot grow, we cannot attract capital, we cannot have tourism, we cannot progress with such extremist thinking in Saudi Arabia. If you want millions of jobs, if you want unemployment to decline, if you want the economy to grow, if you want your income to improve, you must eradicate these projects for the other interest."
In Islam, the Prophet Muhammad's sayings, known as the hadith, are second in influence only to the Quran. Some hadith are verified and unchallenged. Scholars debate the validity of others. Bin Salman in this interview became the first Saudi official to acknowledge that.
This change could open the door to Saudi Arabia nullifying a majority of the hadiths on which many Islamists base their doctrine.
"When we commit ourselves to following a certain school or scholar, this means we are deifying human beings," bin Salman said.
The comments mark a stunning shift for Saudi Arabia, since Wahhabism has been a main component of its constitution and politics since its 1932 founding. Wahhabis remain a main challenge to the ruling House of al-Saud and have organized attempts to overthrow it, including the 1979 seizure of the grand mosque of Mecca.
Bin Salman's interview has had ripple effects. In Egypt, the grand imam of Al Azhar, the most prominent Sunni institution in the world, said that the hadith enjoyed too much emphasis.
"Calling to sanctify the jurisprudential heritage, and equating it with the Sharia leads to the rigidity of contemporary Islamic jurisprudence," said Ahmed al-Tayyib. For example, fatwas prohibiting interest on loans remain popular among Islamists based on old interpretations. But an Al Azhar fatwa stipulated that regular banking is permissible.
Other modern day-to-day activities fatwas are issued because of the confusion caused by adhering literally to old texts. Fatwas causing misogyny in Islamic societies based on unverified and weak hadiths, such as the false hadith, "A people who make a woman their ruler will never be successful," are being debunked with historical examples.
The Prophet's wife, Aisha, led the Muslim armies in the battle of Al-Gamal, wrote Syrian Islamic thinker Ahmed Al-Romh. Also, Egypt was briefly ruled in 1259 by Sultana Shajra al -Durr following the death of her husband, the last Ayyubid Sultan of Egypt.
Moreover, terrorist groups have used a statement attributed to Muhammad as inspiration. It says Muhammad was "ordered (by Allah) to fight against the people until they testify that none has the right to be worshipped but Allah and that Muhammad is Allah's apostle."
But scholars have determined that that hadith isn't valid, wrote Moroccan Islamic thinker Mohamed ibn Al-Azrak. It "contradicts reason and sound logic ... if they call us to fight the world and sever ties with the peoples of the world."
Decades of Saudi-financed Wahhabist proselytizing are felt throughout the world. King Fahd Al Saud, bin Salman's uncle, spent more than $75 billion in efforts to spread Wahhabi Islam during his 1982-2005 reign. That money helped establish 200 Islamic colleges, 210 Islamic centers, 1,500 mosques, and 2,000 schools for Muslim children.
But now some of those investments are seen as liabilities. The kingdom started reversing that policy and gave up control of some mosque and Islamic centers in the West, such as a Brussels mosque in 2018, which it had leased since 1969. The kingdom's aim was to change its reputation as main supporter of ultra-conservative Islam.
Muslim majority countries which had more tolerant and secular traditions, such as Indonesia, witnessed increasing levels of radicalism with the spread of Wahhabism.
Indonesia, with 270 million people, has the largest Muslim population in the world. More women there are wearing the niqab, thanks to Wahhabi interpretations of unverified hadiths, and not a direct instruction in the Quran. "The women who wear a niqab must never say she is wearing it because it is required by (Islamic) Sharia," Al Azhar's al-Tayyib said in 2017. "It is like wearing or taking off a ring."
In 2016, 500,000 Islamist protestors, organized by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) in Jakarta, accused the Christian governor of Indonesia's capital of blasphemy against Islam.
"The accusation came after Basuki Tjahaja Purnama referred to a Quranic verse while campaigning. He argued that some Islamists were using the verse to discourage Muslims from voting for a non-Muslim. But he was accused of insulting the Quran and Muslims. Purnama was sentenced to two years in prison sentence in April 2020.
In 2016, bin Salman announced Vision 2030, a blueprint for transforming Saudi Arabia into an industrial powerhouse. He wants expanded investment in tourism to be a key part of that vision. Tourism, mostly to religious sites, contributes $26.8 billion annually to the national GDP.
Meanwhile, the country is loosening its cultural grip. Movie theaters reopened after a 35-year ban imposed by King Fahd. Moreover, bin Salman told CBS in 2018 that women would no longer compelled by law to wear the hijab or niqab. "The decision is entirely left for women to decide what type of decent and respectful attire she chooses to wear," said bin Salman.
The Riyadh High Court in 2018 waived the requirement for women to wear full veil and restricted it to wearing a hijab. Following Salman's decision, women were seen in public walking around without any headwear.
Moreover, ancient archaeological sites, such as the Nabatean city ruins of Hegra, which were neglected for decades, were reopened for the public. Driving for women was permitted in 2017 by a royal decree.
That said, Saudi Arabia's human rights record is still criticized by a number of NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch. The country still represses dissidents, human rights activists, and independent clerics. These issues tarnish any reforms that the crown prince is undertaking.
It could be years before these religious and social reforms take root in full Saudi society. But if bin Salman's pledge to back away from Wahhabism takes root, radical Islamists have lost a key component used to spread their ideology.
IPT Senior Fellow Hany Ghoraba is an Egyptian writer, political and counter-terrorism analyst at Al Ahram Weekly, author of Egypt's Arab Spring: The Long and Winding Road to Democracy and a regular contributor to the BBC.
Copyright © 2021. Investigative Project on Terrorism. All rights reserved.
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April 28, 2022
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The Myth of the US-Saudi Strategic Alliance
Relations between the two countries are at an all-time low.
By: Hilal Khashan
U.S.-Saudi relations have been deteriorating since 2014, when the Obama administration announced its intention to reach an agreement with Iran on its nuclear program. The special relationship between the two countries goes back to February 1945, when U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt met with Saudi King Ibn Saud aboard the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal. There was nothing special about the two leaders’ agreement, often celebrated as the beginning of the most enduring alliance between the U.S. and an Arab country. It was a purely business transaction, providing the U.S. with reasonably priced oil in exchange for its pledge to defend Saudi Arabia against foreign threats. However, at times of heightened risk since then, the U.S. has chosen not to act on behalf of Saudi Arabia despite its monarchs’ pleas for military intervention. The souring of relations is unlikely to end the two countries’ economic and military cooperation, but their relationship is transitioning from the pretense of a strategic alliance into a mere partnership between two distant nations.
The Beginning
The U.S.-Saudi partnership began as a collaboration on their shared energy interests. Ibn Saud doubted Britain’s ability to strike oil in Saudi Arabia despite the readiness of the London-headquartered Iraq Petroleum Company to prospect there. He preferred to collaborate with the Standard Oil Company of California, signing an agreement with the firm in 1933. He also distrusted the British because of their close ties with his archrivals, the Hashemites in Iraq and Jordan. The U.S. established a legation in Jeddah in 1942, elevating it to an embassy in 1949. Ibn Saud urged the U.S. to open a consulate in Dhahran in 1944 to serve U.S. citizens employed by the Arabian American Oil Company, now known as Aramco. In 1943, he invited the U.S. to build an airfield in Dhahran, which the U.S. air force maintained until 1962. In 1944, the U.S. extended the wartime Lend-Lease program to Saudi Arabia.
Upon returning from the Yalta Conference, where he met with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet Premier Josef Stalin, Roosevelt met with Ibn Saud primarily to discuss his position on creating a Jewish state in Palestine, an issue on which Roosevelt had not made up his mind and which the Saudi king vehemently opposed. Reaching an agreement on the future of U.S.-Saudi relations did not feature prominently in Roosevelt’s thinking, yet he concluded an oil-for-protection deal upon the insistence of the Saudi king. In 1949, U.S. President Harry Truman refused to reach a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia, despite Ibn Saud’s urging. Instead, the two countries signed the 1951 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, which established the United States Military Training Mission in the kingdom.
Partner, not Ally
Despite cooperating with Washington on oil, security and military training, Saudi Arabia maintained an independent foreign policy. Unlike other Gulf Cooperation Council countries, it had reservations about the presence of U.S. troops on its territory, and when it needed to host them, it made their stay as short as possible. Its sensitivity to a permanent U.S. military presence explains why American presidents have referred to Saudi Arabia as a partner, not an ally. Washington has fostered much closer ties with GCC countries that allowed the establishment of U.S. military bases on their soil. Last January, for example, President Joe Biden designated Qatar a major non-NATO ally, a recognition that two other GCC members – Bahrain and Kuwait – had previously attained. These three countries host significant U.S. military assets: Bahrain is the seat of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, Kuwait accommodates 8,000 U.S. troops in eight bases, and Qatar permitted the U.S. to build the al-Udeid air base west of Doha in 1996.
U.S. Military Bases in Gulf Cooperation Council Countries
(click to enlarge)
Saudi Arabia was always reluctant to allow U.S. troops entry into the kingdom. In 1962, it did not renew the lease for the U.S. airfield in Dhahran, transforming it into a civilian airport. In 1990, the royal family was split over allowing the U.S. access to its territory after Iraq invaded Kuwait – though the faction led by the Saudi ambassador to Washington prevailed, paving the way for more than half a million U.S. troops to enter Saudi Arabia to reinstate Kuwait’s independence. Most of the troops left the country after the war. Some stayed in Kuwait, and others were stationed at the al-Udeid air base. When the U.S. decided to invade Afghanistan after Sept. 11, the Saudis did not allow the U.S. to use their territory for military operations. Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Saudis demanded that the U.S. immediately withdraw its forces.
For its part, the U.S. didn’t support the Saudi position in the 1952-1955 Buraimi Oasis dispute with the United Kingdom, calling on all parties to seek a diplomatic resolution. The British eventually divided the disputed area between the Sultanate of Muscat and Abu Dhabi. Washington failed to come to Riyadh’s aid after Egypt raided Saudi towns near the Yemeni border in response to Saudi support for Yemen’s royalists following a 1962 coup. The Saudis appealed for U.S. military support, but President John Kennedy recognized the new Yemeni republic. Kennedy sent eight F-100 jets that flew sorties over Jeddah to allay Saudi fears, but U.S. forces never took part in the fighting. Saudi Arabia imposed two oil embargoes on the West in response to the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In contrast to the first embargo, which had little impact on U.S. oil supplies, the second embargo had significant consequences and led to the reformulation of Washington’s Middle East policy, which included going to war against Iraq in 1991 after it invaded Kuwait.
The Saudis regard the current U.S. administration as an extension of Barack Obama’s presidency, which backed the Arab uprisings and angered late Saudi King Abdullah. The United States’ hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan and resumption of nuclear talks with Iran cast doubts in Riyadh about Biden’s willingness to defend Saudi Arabia against any future existential security threat.
Low Point
The Saudis likely understood the U.S. commitment to defend them against foreign threats as the offering of military support without comprehending the complex determinants of a superpower’s foreign policy imperatives. In 2014, Obama visited Saudi Arabia to ease Saudi fears about the Iran nuclear negotiations but couldn’t convince his Saudi interlocutors that Washington’s scaling down of its Middle Eastern presence was not an abandonment of its regional commitments. The U.S. wanted to avoid meddling in regional relations, expecting countries to manage their own affairs without outside intervention.
U.S.-Saudi relations reached a low point after the gruesome murder of Saudi opposition journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 and Biden’s election in 2020. During his election campaign, Biden viewed Saudi Arabia as a pariah state because of Khashoggi’s murder. The administration’s decision to release an intelligence report implicating Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the assassination infuriated MBS, who feared Biden might try to deny his accession to the Saudi throne.
The Biden administration finds MBS’ impulsive behavior problematic and has refused to engage with him. MBS destroyed the Saudi royals’ balance of power that persisted since the kingdom’s founding in 1932. He created a heavily centralized political system resembling that of Syria under Hafez Assad and Iraq under Saddam Hussein. MBS decided to get involved in the Yemeni war despite Egyptian and Pakistani warnings not to. He ordered Khashoggi’s assassination but has expressed exasperation with U.S. officials’ constant reference to the matter. Last year, he lashed out at U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan when he inquired about the Khashoggi case, angrily telling the senior U.S. diplomat to forget about increasing Saudi oil production. U.S. officials were also dismayed by MBS’ silent coup in 2017 that ousted and imprisoned Crown Prince Mohammad bin Nayef, who was viewed favorably in Washington for his efficient uprooting of al-Qaida militancy in Saudi Arabia.
MBS understands that he can’t deter the U.S. from striking an agreement with Iran and seems to have resigned himself to reaching a deal with Iran’s ayatollahs. He thought he could pressure Biden to recognize him as Saudi Arabia’s legitimate crown prince and future king, but instead, the Saudis’ stance on Russia’s war in Ukraine has further angered Washington. Riyadh has refused to condemn Moscow, calling instead for a peaceful resolution to the conflict and rejecting the U.S. request to pump more oil to offset the effect of sanctions on Russia. Biden responded by releasing 180 million barrels of U.S. strategic oil reserves in an unprecedented move. MBS is now waiting for the midterm elections in November, expecting to see a decline in the administration’s congressional support. He’s also pinning his hopes on Donald Trump’s possible return to the White House.
Here to Stay
With the declining U.S. demand for hydrocarbon imports, the historic relationship between Washington and Riyadh has lost its relevance. The U.S. accounts for less than 5 percent of Saudi oil exports, while the Far East and South Asia account for more than 70 percent. This, as well as the fundamental political disagreements with Washington, has led the Saudis to reevaluate their foreign policy.
Saudi Arabia's Crude Oil Exports to the U.S. Decrease
(click to enlarge)
MBS’ strategy now is to try to win the Biden administration’s recognition and restore even a semblance of friendly ties. He recently noted that Saudi Arabia has had strong relations with the U.S. – but then stressed that if Washington did not grab the lucrative business opportunities available in his country, other nations – namely China – would seize them. He emphasized that Saudi investments total more than $800 billion in the U.S. but less than $100 billion in China.
The Saudis, however, have no delusions that partnerships with Russia and China can supplant their traditional ties with the United States. The Saudi armed forces depend heavily on U.S. military equipment. Between 2015 and 2019, 73 percent of Saudi military procurement came from the United States. Between 2008 and 2020, the Saudis spent $147 billion on U.S. military purchases. It’s unthinkable that the Saudi military would accept relying instead on Chinese or Russian arms.
The U.S. also still has a need to keep Saudi Arabia close. The Ukraine war has demonstrated the vital role of hydrocarbons in global conflicts and power competition. Thus, as Russia and China challenge the U.S.-led Western hegemony, Washington will not allow Riyadh to drift into either’s orbit.
MBS says he doesn’t care what Biden thinks of him, but he is eager, if not desperate, to talk to the U.S. president. He recently called British Prime Minister Boris Johnson to discuss bilateral relations, likely in an effort to present himself as an internationally respected political figure. Though the U.S.-Saudi partnership will endure, the U.S. doesn’t regard MBS as an indispensable part of it.
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https://www.wsj.com/articles/alcohol-free-saudi-arabia-plans-champagne-and-wine-bars-at-neom-11663421529
I never thought of traveling as tourist to SA...
https://www.visitsaudi.com/en
as long as they work with Israel
it would be something I would consider .
topless beaches might bring in more tourists .....
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https://www.newsmax.com/us/saudi-arabia/2022/10/11/id/1091392/
best way they could do this is simply
drill in US
it ain't Saudis fault we are suffering from high gas prices
but they make easy scape goats
along with oil companies
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PsliZbzSR-8
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A Multipolar World Makes More Room for a U.S.-Saudi Split
undefined and Stratfor Middle East and North Africa Analyst at RANE
Ryan Bohl
Stratfor Middle East and North Africa Analyst at RANE, Stratfor
10 MIN READOct 27, 2022 | 14:00 GMT
Saudi and U.S. flags line the King Abdulaziz Road in the Saudi Red Sea port city of Jeddah on July 14, 2022.
Saudi and U.S. flags line the King Abdulaziz Road in the Saudi Red Sea port city of Jeddah on July 14, 2022.
(Photo by AMER HILABI/AFP via Getty Images)
To paraphrase the United Kingdom's long-serving Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston, the United States and Saudi Arabia are not permanent friends. Instead, their relationship has always been anchored by temporary alignments, born of the geopolitics of the era. In the final days of World War II as the Cold War dawned, a simple enough compact was born between them: Saudi Arabia would provide oil to stabilize the global energy market in exchange for U.S. military protection from Soviet-backed rivals that sought to overthrow the monarchy. This was possible because the world was in a bipolar moment in which states were pressured either into the communist East or the capitalist West, with little wiggle room in between for militarily weak but economically important countries like Saudi Arabia. Even with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the fundamentals of the compact remained the same: the Saudis gave oil, and the United States provided protection from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Iran and later al Qaeda.
This arrangement could not last. Over time, the United States began an energy pivot, both to produce more oil and to lessen its use of it. China rose as a growing competitor to the United States, drawing American strategic attention to Asia. The United States tried and failed to reorder the Middle East through nation-building, and Washington decided it was better to cut deals with rivals like Iran rather than remain locked in conflict. These were the ingredients that created an emerging multipolar world.
This era does not force Saudi Arabia to choose a side as cleanly as did the eras of the Cold War and the War on Terror. In fact, some of its greatest fault lines, like the U.S.-China confrontation and the Russia-Ukraine war, pose little direct threat to Riyadh itself. And so there is little reason for Saudi Arabia to use its oil heft on behalf of its U.S. friend; rather, there is all the more reason for Saudi Arabia to make what income it can from oil before technological developments and economic change reduce its value in the coming decades. And as Saudi Arabia and the United States remained destined to diverge, future events in the multipolar world will only drive them further apart.
The immediate context of OPEC+'s production cut
In July, U.S. President Joe Biden visited Riyadh and met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The trip came as a political about-face, as Biden had promised to isolate Saudi Arabia over human rights violations during his presidential campaign in 2020. But by 2022, that promise had become hard to keep. Gas prices had soared in the United States in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war, and the trip was aimed at convincing Riyadh to use its heft in the oil market to help lower prices and take some of the public pressure off the White House.
At first glance, the Biden administration seemed satisfied with the results of the trip, as it touted a supposed Saudi commitment "to support global oil market balancing for sustained economic growth." According to Washington, Saudi Arabia would help keep gas prices in America stable, thereby improving the Democratic Party's chances of holding at least part of Congress in otherwise difficult midterm elections in November, as well as staving off gas price-induced public war weariness that could threaten to affect U.S. policy toward Ukraine.
But Saudi Arabia did not see the visit the same way. Though the country did modestly increase output in August, a possible oil oversupply and a slowing global economy had changed minds by October, and Riyadh began to argue that market fundamentals should allow it to cut production to stabilize prices. That same month, OPEC+ agreed to a higher-than-expected 2 million barrel per day output cut, shocking the United States and spurring calls from Congress — and whispers from the White House — for retaliation against the Saudis for breaking their alleged promise.
Imperatives passing in the night
The production spat is just one of several ways the two countries no longer see eye-to-eye. Broadly, the United States believes Saudi Arabia, particularly under its brash crown prince, is too repressive to remain stable domestically, too willing to use force in places like Yemen without consideration for its impact on civilians, and that its old "oil weapon" is blunted in the face of increased U.S. output. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia believes Washington intends to draw down its forces in the region enough to embolden Iran, give heart to radicals like al Qaeda and the Islamic State, and allow the Houthi rebels in Yemen to strike Saudi Arabia at will.
Ukraine is another place where the countries' goals split. For the United States, the balance of power in Europe has been a critical geopolitical imperative since the end of World War II, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a great challenge to the security architecture that keeps the Continent stable. To this point, Washington is attempting to halt the Russian invasion without escalating to direct war, including by using the oil market against Russia, even though such a strategy could cost Americans at the pump. But for Saudi Arabia, the Russia-Ukraine war is distant, so whoever controls Ukraine is less relevant to Riyadh than its own economic transformation under its Vision 2030 plan, which aims to shift the country toward a sustainable post-hydrocarbon economy before the world evolves past the high demand for oil. Taking an economic loss on behalf of a European war does little to achieve such a goal.
The impossible task of corralling Saudi Arabia
The U.S. political system has now firmly turned on Saudi Arabia, and many politicians seeking to burnish their credentials on the Middle East, energy or U.S. foreign policy will likely continue to berate Riyadh rhetorically, regardless of the facts of the matter. (The OPEC+ production cuts did not, after all, cause a spike in oil prices, and American gas prices are dependent on more than just the global oil market, anyway.) But while U.S politicians will pledge to bring fire and fury to U.S.-Saudi relations, they will struggle to implement their promises, facing White House vetoes and Pentagon objections due to the U.S. need to counterbalance Iran in the Middle East, keep oil markets stable and remain a bulwark against radicalism. Even so, these politicians may find more wind in their sails if the next OPEC+ meeting in December results in yet more output cuts as the bloc prepares for recessions to hit the West in 2023. The optics of such an event would be particularly bad given that Europe will be in the midst of a tough and expensive winter as the Continent weans itself off Russian natural gas. But whatever measures the United States takes will be meant to strain relations, not wholly break them.
Saudi Arabia, for its part, will adjust in the face of such pressure and likely continue its pivot toward a combination of soft support for Ukraine and increased mediation of humanitarian deals, prisoner swaps and possible cease-fires, as Turkey has done. The latter effort is part of a bid to mold Saudi Arabia's image into that of a responsible and reasonable global player. Such an image will not convince anyone in Washington to ease off criticism if it is accompanied by more output cuts, but Saudi Arabia's efforts will improve its image elsewhere — like in the Global South, where oil price spikes hurt substantially more in impoverished countries. What Saudi Arabia will not do is jeopardize its economic transformation strategy.
As mistrust builds, the United States could decide to reduce military support for Saudi Arabia, and Riyadh might go to U.S. allies like France and the United Kingdom, as well as U.S. rivals like China, in response. But given that such a military adjustment would take years, if not a full decade, to realize, Saudi Arabia would in the meantime be in a vulnerable position. For instance, Riyadh might find it hard, if not impossible, to prop up its allies in Yemen, giving way to a Houthi military advantage and possibly even a Houthi-run northern state that is aligned with Iran on its southern border. Iran, which would no longer be concerned about triggering an immediate U.S. military response, would also likely be emboldened to strike Saudi Arabia in an escalated covert campaign. In this scenario, Iran would aim to undermine the monarchy and its ability to influence regional events in places where Tehran and Riyadh back opposite parties, like Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen.
And there is the matter of Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia's economic transformation program. Foreign investment and foreign workers are part of this strategy, but it is unclear how much foreign capital and labor will flow into Saudi Arabia when it appears that its great protector, the United States, is drawing back. Some sources of capital and labor — like fellow Gulf Cooperation Council states and the subcontinent — appear likely to back Vision 2030 no matter what the U.S.-Saudi relationship looks like, but they may rethink their positions if Saudi Arabia, shorn of U.S. forces, finds itself stuck in an elevated proxy conflict with Iran or a Houthi-run North Yemen.
Future rounds of deterioration
It is likely that going forward, the United States will again expect Saudi Arabia to act in American interests, believing (incorrectly) that they align with Saudi interests, and Riyadh will refuse to do so. For instance, Saudi Arabia will not go along with any attempts to impose a price cap on Russian oil, knowing that could affect the bottom line for Saudi exports as well. Riyadh is also unlikely to block Russian tourists or Russian businesses from entering or investing in Saudi Arabia short of the West expanding to a globally-disruptive secondary sanctions campaign. And Riyadh will keep up diplomatic contacts with Russia, even sending high-level delegations there, in spite of the optics that might cause in the West, to ensure that the country has working relations with a fellow oil power with which Riyadh so recently fought a price war in 2020.
Looming behind that growing tension could be a confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the United States over China. As China's threats to Taiwan increase and Washington attempts to deter and counter Beijing's economic and military growth, the United States will lean on partners like Saudi Arabia to corral Chinese power. In the event of a Chinese invasion or major military escalation over Taiwan, the United States would likely try to squeeze China's energy-dependent economy with restrictions or even bans on oil exports, but Saudi Arabia would balk at such a ban, given how much of the country's exports now flow to China. Such resistance would not be motivated by a desire to actively back China in its attempt to take Taiwan militarily, but it would again be due to the fact that such a distant war in Asia would be less important to Saudi Arabia than oil income. In the ever-more multipolar world, such a choice becomes strategically logical — even at the expense of relations with the United States.
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link goes to "page not found"
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I am seeing the piece I posted immediately above.
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ziGN8HXdj6U&t=5s
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https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Saudi-Arabia-Reiterates-Commitment-To-China-Regardless-Of-US-Concerns.html
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https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Saudi-Arabia-Reiterates-Commitment-To-China-Regardless-Of-US-Concerns.html
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We should have been isolating China against the rest of the world, not losing strategic allies to them.
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Well said.
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The Wall Street Journal.
China's Xi Jinping to Visit Saudi Arabia Amid Global Reshuffling
Stephen Kalin, Keith Zhai, Summer Said - 12h ago
WSJ
Chinese leader Xi Jinping is planning to visit Saudi Arabia before the end of the year, according to people familiar with preparations for the trip, as Beijing and Riyadh seek to deepen ties and advance a vision of a multipolar world where the U.S. no longer dominates the global order.
Officials are completing the details for a summit between Mr. Xi and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman that would underline Beijing’s growing influence in the Middle East, where the U.S. long reigned supreme, and growing links between the oil-rich Saudis and Washington’s top global rivals.
In the works for months, the trip is tentatively scheduled for the second week of December, these people said.
Beijing “attaches great importance to the development of China-Saudi relations, and places Saudi Arabia as a priority in China’s overall diplomatic policy,” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said late last month Chinese-Saudi relations have deepened in recent years in the economic realm, including a potential Chinese stake in state oil giant Saudi Aramco, and militarily through weapons sales.
The meeting comes at a time when large parts of the developing world have expressed reluctance to choose sides in the war between Russia and Ukraine, which has received Western backing, despite urging from Washington and European capitals.
Riyadh, in particular, has expressed a desire to put its own interests first on oil policy, in a way it says isn’t intended to benefit Russia. Saudi Arabia pushed for a significant cut in output by the OPEC+ group of oil-producing nations in an effort to keep petroleum prices from falling.
Higher prices for oil—a major Russian export—help Moscow pay for its war effort. The production cut last month also raised crude prices at a moment of high inflation just before the U.S. midterm elections, straining the kingdom’s relationship with Washington.
Saudi officials reject U.S. assertions that they are aligning with Moscow and say they don’t want to be forced to take sides between world powers as they did during the Cold War, when Saudi Arabia stood squarely in the American camp.
“There is this sort of realignment happening: Where does your future lie?” said Helima Croft, managing director of global commodity strategy research at RBC Capital Markets. For the Saudis, she said, “It is pushing them more toward a multifaceted set of relationships. They see their future in the East.”
With the world’s second-largest economy and a shared interest in countering the West, China might be Moscow’s most important partner as the Kremlin weathers Western economic sanctions and declining oil exports to Europe. Beijing hasn’t condemned the invasion and has accused the U.S. of inflaming the crisis but said it isn’t selling weapons to Russia.
Saudi Arabia has condemned the invasion and sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine but also sustained its oil alliance with Russia.
The strategic recalibration of Saudi foreign policy is bigger than the recent blowup with the Biden administration over oil production, said Ian Bremmer, president of the political-risk firm the Eurasia Group, as Riyadh looks for a counterweight to dependence on the U.S.
“This orientation of the Saudis and the Chinese towards each other is a long-term tipping point shift that is really going to matter economically, not just for this election cycle,” said Mr. Bremmer.
The Saudis once sold the U.S. over 2 million barrels of oil every day, but that has fallen to less than 500,000 barrels a day, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. The U.S. grew to become the world’s biggest oil producer, and China is now the biggest buyer of Saudi oil, followed by India.
The world’s top oil importer and biggest oil exporter are likely to meet at an important moment for global energy markets that could determine the future of Russia’s war effort.
Just before the Chinese leader lands in Saudi Arabia, the OPEC+ alliance led by Riyadh and Moscow will make a highly anticipated decision on crude production on Dec. 4, after cutting output by 2 million barrels last month. That will be followed by the planned implementation of a price cap on Russian oil by the Group of Seven wealthy nations and a European Union embargo on Russian crude.
Mr. Xi, who last month cemented his role as China’s leader for a third term, is expected to meet the leaders of other Persian Gulf and Arab countries in a visit that will likely feature pageantry and agreements demonstrating the countries’ deepening partnership.
When President Biden visited Saudi Arabia in July, he met with Prince Mohammed and joined a summit of friendly Arab nations but faced intense scrutiny back home over Riyadh’s human-rights records and came away with few concrete achievements.
The Chinese leader’s welcome is more likely to resemble the 2017 visit by then-President Donald Trump, who was feted by Prince Mohammed on his first trip abroad and then largely backed the Saudis, according to people familiar with the preparations.
Formal relations between China and Saudi Arabia only began in 1990 and were restricted mainly to oil: Saudi Arabia is China’s top supplier of crude and China is Saudi Arabia’s biggest customer, buying one out of every four barrels of oil the kingdom sells.
More recently, their courtship has intensified with discussions on selling a stake in state oil giant Saudi Aramco, including yuan-denominated futures contracts in Aramco’s pricing model, and even possibly pricing some Saudi oil sales to China in yuan.
Saudi Arabia, the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites, has publicly defended China’s policies in its western region of Xinjiang, giving cover to its crackdown on the Uyghur Muslim minority. At home, it is introducing Mandarin into the Saudi school curriculum.
China hasn’t demonstrated interest or ability in supplanting the broad American role in the Middle East, analysts say, and the Saudis don’t really want to replace the U.S. as their main security guarantor.
But Beijing has sold drones to Saudi Arabia, helped it manufacture ballistic missiles after the U.S. refused to do so over proliferation concerns, and helped construct a facility in the kingdom to fabricate uranium yellowcake, an early step along the path to a civil nuclear energy program or a nuclear-arms capability. The countries have also discussed building a naval base on the Red Sea, one of the world’s most strategic waterways.
Beijing maintains warm relations with Saudi Arabia’s rival Iran, which Riyadh could seek to leverage if Tehran agrees to a revived nuclear deal with the U.S. and other world powers.
The sense of China’s growing influence in the Middle East changes the calculus for Washington policy makers, who want to pivot to Asia but are loath to let Beijing establish a foothold in the strategic crossroads leading to Europe and Africa, said Jonathan Fulton, assistant professor of political science at Abu Dhabi-based Zayed University who studies China’s relations with Gulf states.
“If the U.S. finds it harder to leave the Gulf, that would be in China’s favor,” he said. “China probably thinks that nursing those perceptions helps.”
The China-Saudi relationship, while still largely transactional, has grown beyond just being a hedge for Riyadh to signal its displeasure with Washington, said Dr. Fulton.
The Saudis “aren’t trying to play one off the other so much as really trying to deepen what they’re getting out of both sides,” he said. “The U.S. has this binary right now, where it’s strategic competition: work with us or work with China. But most actors in the Gulf don’t seem to see it that way.”
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The Significance of Xi's Visit to Saudi Arabia
Chinese President Xi Jinping's trip to Saudi Arabia highlights the two countries' deepening economic, defense, cultural and educational ties, which could grant both sides greater freedom in foreign policy as Riyadh and Beijing each look for ways to withstand U.S. pressure. On Dec. 8, Chinese President Xi Jinping began a three-day trip to Saudi Arabia to kick off what he called ''a new era'' in Saudi-Chinese relations, which have been deepening since China began economic reforms in the 1980s. During the visit, Xi and Saudi King Salman signed a ''comprehensive strategic partnership agreement'' in which the two heads of state committed to holding biannual meetings and increasing their countries' cultural and tourism ties. The meeting yielded various deals to increase cooperation in fields spanning technology, education, energy and economic development as well. Xi also participated in a China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit on Dec. 9, where he pledged to use China's currency (the yuan) more to purchase China's oil and gas exports from the region, which are typically priced in U.S. dollars. The high-profile visit comes against the backdrop of strained Saudi-U.S. relations after the kingdom helped lead an OPEC+ production cut in October against Washington's advisement. China's relations with the United States have also hit new lows amid growing tensions over Taiwan.
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March 2, 2023
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Saudi Arabia’s Untenable Modernization Plan
It will be difficult even with more seasoned leaders than MBS.
By: Hilal Khashan
In 2016, when Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman launched a vision for Saudi development, he seemed sure that his country had everything it needed to create a competitive and sustainable industrial economy by 2030. He expressed confidence that ambitious young Saudi talents could achieve the momentous task. He estimated that, in 2035, the number of factories in Saudi Arabia would increase to 36,000. Reality has since set in. Though he continued to argue that another Saudi Arabia – that is, a fully developed country – was possible, he came to understand that Saudi economic development was a long way off.
The new Saudi Arabia he wanted to build required society to renounce extremism, rid its economy of oil dependence, build balanced international relations, unleash society's talents and eliminate corruption. Instead of fighting corruption, he gave it a new lease. Rather than promote new societal values, his plan excluded ideas that would be conducive to modernity. Vision 2030, including the yet-to-be-built Red Sea city of NEOM, lives only in MBS’s imagination.
Reinventing Corruption
In the 1950s and 1960s, Saudi Arabia’s public office was key to social advancement. After the oil boom of the 1970s, it became a way for Saudi royals to control society. The bureaucracy grew bloated by patronage, expanding irrationally. The effects were not immediately tangible economically or socially because the bureaucracy could still absorb more nationals, and the oil wealth could cover squandered expenses that had no economic or administrative necessity. The royal family meant to transform the state into a patriarch of society, which would be directly dependent on Riyadh for sustenance. This bureaucratic expansion was one of the most extensive social bribes of the 20th century.
During this period, the state carried out politically motivated development projects such as schools, hospitals, roads and bridges, many of which were random and wasteful. It also launched a movement to convince Saudis that they benefited from oil spoils. Since the private sector was still relatively immature, the state undertook the leadership of these projects through public institutions, becoming the employer of society, exercising control over economic activity and becoming an authoritarian state while maintaining its rentier state status. The bureaucracy swelled, forming centers of power around midlevel government officials who entered the private labor market by establishing companies they managed internally, benefiting from their relations with prominent princes to win contracts and tenders. Many Saudi commoners benefited from the oil boom by entering the real estate market and brokerage business and representing foreign companies to win quick and substantial fortunes.
In 2017, when he realized that more of his relatives opposed his installation as king than he thought, MBS moved against many of them under the pretext of financial corruption and theft of state funds. The idea behind arresting princes who were reluctant to support him was to warn them of the consequences of their opposition. Apprehending businesspeople and senior officials was to embellish the situation, as the Anti-Corruption Committee is nothing more than a tool for settling scores. Put simply, MBS covers up some loyal princes' corruption and targets others he distrusts. The Control and Anti-Corruption Authority answers only to MBS and refrains from acting against anyone except on his directive, even if it has documented evidence against them.
Corruption remains a critical problem in the rationalization of public policy because it was inherent to Saudi Arabia’s economic development. Made more pronounced by oil money, it became a structural feature of the rigid Saudi bureaucracy, subsequently institutionalizing the incidences of corruption. In the unlikely event MBS decides to fight the bureaucracy's structural corruption, he will risk antagonizing a class of beneficiaries that grew over decades and secured the regime's stability. If he chooses against reforming the public sector to maintain his authority, it will become impossible for him to implement his controversial economic objectives.
Bribery, favoritism and nepotism thus remain widespread. In just one month in 2021, the Control and Anti-Corruption Authority investigated 562 government personnel in administrative and criminal cases, arresting 136. In Saudi Arabia's traditional tribal society, nepotism and favoritism are part of everyday life. Controlling corruption is beyond the state's ability.
Unmodern Values
Saudi society suffers from sharp tribal, sectarian and regional divisions, which the state has reinforced by banning all spaces that unite people, such as unions, political parties and demonstrations. Instead of dealing with citizens, the state deals with tribal heads or regional notables. There are no formations for social integration in the country, making it much easier for the authorities to manage a large populace. Despite the deep regional divisions, the government neither invested in nation-building nor defined a national identity. On the contrary, it concretized divisions by relying on prominent Sunni families in Najd and Hijaz while excluding the predominantly Shiite Eastern Province and Ismaili south.
The government's policies did not promote the value of hard work among Saudi subjects. Despite its superficial technical and vocational training support, the government needed to do more to orient the youth toward productive occupations. The overwhelming majority of young people preferred a college education. Aversion to manual work caused a permanent dependence on expatriate labor and perpetuated the traditional social contempt for skilled and semi-skilled labor. Government welfare policies promoted extravagant consumer behavior and tolerated the chauvinistic tendency toward expatriate workers. Even so, the state secured a conservative and broad social base loyal to it. MBS stresses the need for Saudi Arabia's development to align with the country's cultural and historical norms and religious peculiarities –to reflect not the experiences of other countries but its own unique foundations and aspirations. Development therefore cannot occur at the expense of religious beliefs entrenched in the popular conscience or in official policies because Saudi Arabia has permanent responsibility toward Mecca's Grand Mosque.
Saudi youth view vocational work as degrading; they prefer unemployment. The Saudi government, which shyly encouraged young men to pursue vocational training to spur economic development, was simultaneously providing massive support to holders of college degrees with graduate scholarships in the U.S. and the U.K. Its policies promised them lucrative jobs in the public sector while giving meager salaries for technical workers, regardless of their qualifications and competence.
The private sector thus accumulated expertise and capital in the 1990s, and in doing so created an economic bourgeoisie. By 2010, the Saudi bourgeoisie no longer relied on government contracts to create its wealth because the economy that emerged during the oil boom created a dynamic private sector that weaned itself from reliance on government contracts. The private sector, in turn, produced a local bourgeoisie, not a national one, because it stood against all attempts to recruit a Saudi workforce, opting instead for foreign labor. The business class is copying the example of the state's social policies in producing generations of young people without skills, deepening the demographic problem, and perpetuating the values that the regime implanted during the boom era.
Even though many young Saudis support the policies of MBS, enthusiasm for him will cool unless they play a role in determining the future of the Kingdom. Saudis who attend university abroad often return to a country that has disjointed spaces marked by specific, government-controlled channels for social advancement rather than modern social and political avenues. Instead of being catalysts of change, these new workers are neutralized by an absence of voluntary civil society organizations, coerced into operating through the existing patronage system. MBS believes that adopting democracy as a system of government will lead to the kingdom's collapse. He has said democracy clashes with Saudi tribal society, its traditional culture and Islam, which, according to the Wahhabi doctrine adopted by Saudi Arabia, considers democracy blasphemy.
Challenges Ahead
This is all to say that, despite propaganda to the contrary, MBS is an immature leader who likely cannot achieve what he wants. Every speech he makes betrays a political cultural shallowness apparent to any fair observer. His reckless policies since going to war in Yemen in 2015 continue apace, especially regarding his Vision 2030 and its NEOM centerpiece.
Vision 2030 contains components circulated by senior Saudi officials four decades ago, namely focusing on the post-oil era, diversifying sources of income, encouraging investments, the need for austerity, ending the indiscriminate welfare state, addressing unemployment and creating a skilled local workforce. Implementing MBS's development plan, which depends on bustling private sector growth and new sources of state revenue via taxes and fees, is going to be difficult. His economic development project needs to address the issue of political participation within the framework of a new social contract.
NEOM may be the perfect distillation of the challenges ahead. Many observers agree it is a $500 billion bet to build a city in the desert. Others think it is little more than an attempt to polish MBS’s image and divert attention from his human rights violations. Like other megalomaniacal autocrats, he wants to build a futuristic city that people will remember for generations. In 2016, MBS said Saudi Arabia would achieve its development vision by 2030, but he later announced that it would witness only the completion of the project's first phase by then.
The enormity of MBS's development goals by 2030, including the painful deliverance from oil, is a challenge to his credibility. Given his excessive lifestyle, whether he dedicates more time to Saudi development or to his ambitious personal business needs must be clarified. After all, he owns many companies and a lot of real estate abroad, including the Louis XV palace ($300 million), a mega luxury yacht ($320 million) and Leonardo da Vinci's Savior of the World painting ($450 million).
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'Leonardo da Vinci's Savior of the World' painting
has its own interesting story. it. was thought to be lost and the painting a fake or copy
obtained by consortium or art dealers in '05
for $1,175 on a hunch.
later sold to the Saudi "prince " for $450.3 million in '17.
once is what found to be the original and not a fake or copy.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvator_Mundi_(Leonardo)
WOW
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Its interesting that the media is not talking about the China brokered thawing of relations between Saudia and Iran. Both countries will open embassies etc in each others countries. One or both countries will join BRICS. US losing importance/dominance in much of the world, China becoming the peace maker!. Geopolitics of the gulf region is changing, potential of the Houthi war against Saudis will go away. Not sure Israel will be thrilled about it though. US needs a regime change in Saudi Arabia :-)
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Fq3GTODXsAMhLNY?format=jpg&name=medium)
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For years I pounded the table here about the huge historical error that pulling out of Iraq would prove to be. What would the ME be like today had we stayed to finish the job of enabling the new democratically elected government to take root?
With Iran putting the finishing touches on going nuclear, , , , frankly it looks too late for Israel or us to do anything about it. Off the top of my head, I cannot say that it is a bad thing for Iran and SA to come to understanding.
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Saudi Arabia Warms Up to Iran
Beijing and Tehran seize on U.S. Democrats’ neuroses about an ally.
By The Editorial BoardFollow
March 10, 2023 6:44 pm ET
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Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman
PHOTO: AHMED YOSRI/REUTERS
We’re old enough to remember a time—roughly three years ago—when diplomatic breakthroughs in the Middle East meant good news for the U.S. Not so with Friday’s thawing relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which shows the cost of President Biden’s hostility to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS.
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Riyadh and Tehran are restoring diplomatic ties after cutting them in 2016. The deal, which was brokered by China, isn’t an alliance. Its near-term practical effect is likely to be limited to the reopening of embassies. But the symbolic import is hard to miss as Democrats in Washington do everything they can to harass and annoy the Saudis.
Mr. Biden came into office promising to isolate the Saudis, especially the young, reformist leader MBS. The U.S. cut off support for the Saudi-backed war against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. It toyed with ending arms sales to the Kingdom, and it sought to revive the Iranian nuclear deal the Saudis oppose as a threat to their security.
Worried about U.S. support, MBS hedged his security bets. He has courted China and flirted with selling oil in yuan, rather than dollars, and he has sought better relations with Russia. Now the Sunni Arab Kingdom is seeking a detente with its Shiite Persian neighbors. A genuine peace would be good for the region, but Iran’s support for terrorism and Shiite militias in Arab nations suggests its promises are suspect.
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Mr. Biden tried to mend relations with a visit to Riyadh that included the famous fist bump with MBS. But the Saudis don’t trust the Biden Administration or Congressional Democrats, who threatened retaliation when the Saudis refused to increase oil production last year.
The Kingdom isn’t a democracy, but compared to Iran it’s Switzerland. Instead of alienating the Saudis, the Biden Administration could be working to persuade the Kingdom to join the Arab nations opening relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords.
The Journal reports that Riyadh’s conditions for joining the accords might include U.S. security guarantees and support for a civilian nuclear program. The former is worth considering, since the U.S. would probably defend the Kingdom if it were attacked without formal guarantees. Assurances that the Iran nuclear deal is dead and that the U.S. won’t let Tehran acquire a nuclear weapon would also help.
Mr. Biden prides himself on his ability to build alliances, but he muffed it with the Saudis and our adversaries are taking advantage.
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In Search of U.S. Concessions, Saudi Arabia Reaches Out to China
Aug 28, 2023 | 21:43 GMT
Saudi Arabia's pursuit of uranium enrichment will likely remain a sticking point in U.S.-Saudi-Israel talks, which could push the kingdom to deepen its ties with China, as evidenced by Riyadh's recent talks with Beijing over a potential nuclear plant. According to an Aug. 25 report published by The Wall Street Journal, Saudi officials are considering a Chinese bid to build a civilian nuclear power plant in the kingdom, partially in the hopes of pressuring the White House to grant concessions on Riyadh's nuclear energy goals. The report comes after several Western news outlets reported earlier in August that the United States, Saudi Arabia and Israel are negotiating a mega-deal that would see Saudi Arabia recognize Israel in exchange for increased U.S. security guarantees and a civilian nuclear energy deal. U.S. President Joe Biden is also considering a face-to-face meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on the sidelines of the Sept. 9-10 Group of 20 (G-20) summit in New Delhi, India.
U.S. officials have stressed that a broad U.S.-Saudi-Israel agreement will be complicated to finalize and that they are only now starting to negotiate specific details of the deal, which they hope to hammer out over the next 9-12 months.
Meanwhile, the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) on Aug. 24 invited Saudi Arabia and five other countries to join their bloc starting on Jan. 1, 2024. China has led the BRICS expansion project.
For the United States, a mega-deal with Israel and Saudi Arabia would enable it to better concentrate on its strategic rival China, which Riyadh is seeking to exploit by demanding significant security and nuclear concessions as part of the agreement. The United States is hoping to use the mega-deal to limit Saudi Arabia from furthering its relationship with China, which has blossomed in recent years amid Beijing and Riyadh's growing strategic alignment (with the former in need of Saudi oil to fuel its economic development, and the latter in need of new foreign partners to reduce its reliance on the United States). As part of the U.S.-Israel-Saudi mega-deal, Washington is reportedly considering stipulations that would bar Riyadh from pricing its oil in yuan, restrict the kingdom's use of Chinese communications technology (like Huawei's 5G equipment), and disallow a Chinese military presence on Saudi soil. Several of these conditions run counter to Saudi Arabia's strategic interests in pursuing closer ties with China and Russia in a multipolar world, particularly as the United States and Europe continue to raise concerns about Saudi human rights violations and seek to reduce their consumption of fossil fuels — the bedrock of the Saudi economy. As a result, Riyadh will likely only agree to put guardrails on its relationship with China in exchange for significant security and nuclear concessions that would effectively make it impossible for the United States to criticize Saudi Arabia's human rights record or sanction the country for any reason due to defense commitments. In the face of Iran's continued nuclear development, Saudi Arabia would also likely insist that the United States either: 1) allow the kingdom to control enrichment so that it could develop nuclear weapons, 2) sign a defense agreement that would bring the United States to Saudi Arabia's aid in the event of a conflict, or 3) potentially bring Saudi Arabia under the U.S. nuclear umbrella where the United States would promise to defend Saudi Arabia using its own nuclear weapons in the event of an Iranian nuclear attack on Saudi Arabia.
In addition to potentially joining BRICS, Saudi Arabia joined the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a dialogue partner in March.
China mediated an Iran-Saudi Arabia normalization in March, showing its growing influence in the region.
Although the Biden administration has walked back promises to review its relationship with Saudi Arabia due to human rights abuses, the United States will likely continue to be more mindful of human rights, press freedoms and democratic rights over the long term. This means differences between the United States and Saudi Arabia will remain.
Saudi Arabia and China have expressed some skepticism toward the fast-paced energy transition away from fossil fuels. For example, Saudi Arabia and China aim to achieve net-zero emissions in 2060, which is 10 years later than most Western countries, including the United States. Moreover, the United States has become far less reliant on Saudi oil, whereas Saudi Arabia's exports to Asia now represent 76% of its total oil exports, with China importing between 1.5 to 2 million barrels per day each month.
The United States remains highly unlikely to let Saudi Arabia enrich uranium, reducing the prospects of a deal on the matter. One of the United States' core interests in the Middle East is limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But giving Saudi Arabia the functional ability to enrich uranium makes it more likely that the kingdom will develop nuclear weapons in the future without U.S. permission, exacerbating what would likely be a regional nuclear arms race between Iran, Saudi Arabia and potentially Egypt or Turkey. In 2018, the Saudi crown prince said that his country would ''without a doubt'' develop nuclear weapons if Iran did. However, to do so, Saudi Arabia would need to be able to enrich its own uranium as global enrichment powers like the United States would not transfer enriched uranium to Saudi Arabia for weapons development purposes. Saudi Arabia also does not have the capability to build nuclear power plants itself. And under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the United States can only export nuclear technology to countries that have signed a so-called 123 Agreement with nine nonproliferation criteria that must be met, including a prohibition on enriching or reprocessing without U.S. consent. But while Saudi Arabia could sign such an agreement, the U.S. Congress could overturn it if the deal is seen as not providing enough limits on Saudi nuclear activity.
Several recent 123 Agreements — including with Taiwan, the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam — have included a so-called ''gold provision'' in which the country involved agrees to forgo enriching or reprocessing uranium. In 2018, when then-President Trump was rumored to be exploring a potential weak 123 Agreement with Saudi Arabia, bipartisan legislation was quickly introduced to increase potential oversight of any such deal. This would likely occur again if the White House pursues a new 123 Agreement with Riyadh that doesn't include a ''gold provision'' or is otherwise widely seen as weak.
Without a nuclear deal involving enrichment, Saudi Arabia will likely demand concrete U.S. security guarantees, but several obstacles may keep them from materializing. If Saudi Arabia were to give up control of enrichment, it would still need a deterrent to protect itself from the nuclear threat posed by Iran, which has shown no interest in giving up its enrichment rights in nuclear talks with the West. But the only way for Saudi Arabia to establish the same level of deterrence would be through signing a defense treaty that brings the kingdom under the U.S. nuclear shield. However, Saudi Arabia and the United States have different values, government systems and levels of personal freedom, unlike virtually every other country with which the United States shares a defense treaty. A defense deal would also require the United States to place a significant amount of trust in the soon-to-be 38-year-old Crown Prince Mohammed, who has already in Washington's eyes proven to be a troublesome partner and reckless in some of his foreign policy endeavors (including the 2017-21 blockade and embargo of neighboring Qatar, home to the United States' Al Udeid Air Base, forward headquarters for the United States Central Command, or CENTCOM). Additionally, two-thirds of the U.S. Senate would need to approve a defense treaty with Saudi Arabia, which would be a tall order given that Congress has been more critical of the kingdom in recent years than the White House.
If it can't reach an agreement with the United States, Saudi Arabia may entertain a nuclear pact with China, but inking such a deal may still prove too risky for both Riyadh and Beijing. If the United States and Saudi Arabia do not reach an agreement on nuclear or defense agreements, the mega-deal with Israel may fall apart. To fulfill its desire for a nuclear deterrent, this could see Saudi Arabia turn toward China, which would not enforce as many proliferation restrictions as part of a nuclear deal compared with the United States. But such a deal has remained elusive, despite Riyadh and Beijing having had multiple opportunities to reach a nuclear agreement in recent years amid slowing talks with the United States and its allies. This is in part because China does not want to exacerbate a nuclear arms race in the Middle East (the source of most of China's crude oil imports), which means that even if Beijing allows Riyadh to be involved in the enrichment process, it may seek an informal promise from Saudi Arabia to not enrich uranium for military purposes. Moreover, a nuclear agreement with China would undermine Saudi Arabia's vital defense ties with the United States. While China is a growing economic partner, Saudi Arabia's overall defense relationship with China remains relatively limited and is nowhere near the level where it could adequately replace the kingdom's robust defense partnership with the United States. Given this, Riyadh may decide that it's better off not angering Washington than signing a deal with China.
Saudi Arabia could also try to sign an agreement with another enrichment power, but most other exporters of nuclear technology, like South Korea, would also require limitations on Saudi Arabia's enrichment capabilities. While Russian nuclear power company Rosatom may be willing to forego strict enrichment limits, Western sanctions would make cooperation with Russia difficult for Saudi Arabia.
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The Western response to Chinese belt and road, as proposed in the G20 (where Biden and Saudi MBS shook hands as opposed to the fist bump) is a sea and rail route to Europe.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/F5pS-m3XIAAngiV?format=jpg&name=small)
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BTW, this would eliminate Yemen as a choke point to the Suez Canal.
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October 5, 2023
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Saudi Arabia’s Strategy Behind Israel Normalization Talks
Iran plays a key role in Saudi thinking here.
By: Kamran Bokhari
Saudi Arabia’s efforts to forge diplomatic ties with Israel represent a new element in the kingdom’s ongoing campaign to manage regional instability. In exchange for normalizing relations, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is hoping to extract concessions for the Palestinians in the West Bank so that they can limit the turmoil that many expect will soon erupt within the Palestinian Authority. The last thing the Saudis want is for Palestinian militant group Hamas to exploit this situation and expand its control beyond the Gaza Strip, which would work to the advantage of Riyadh’s principal adversary, Iran. The challenge, however, is that mainstream Palestinian politics, centered on Hamas rival Fatah, is approaching an inflection point, making it extremely difficult to achieve substantive progress on this front.
Israel
(click to enlarge)
On Sept. 26, Saudi Arabia appointed its first ambassador to the Palestinian Authority. The move comes amid negotiations between the Saudis and Israelis on the establishment of diplomatic ties, which both MBS and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed in late September. In an interview with Fox News, the Saudi crown prince made his first public comments on the talks, saying negotiators were getting “closer to an agreement,” which he described as “the biggest historical deal since the Cold War.” Netanyahu confirmed the remarks and added that the two countries were on the cusp of “a historic peace.”
MBS’ most telling comment in the interview came when he was asked to shed light on what normalized relations would mean for the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. The future king, who also became prime minister a year ago after his father relinquished executive authority, said the Saudis and Israelis needed to resolve their differences on the Palestinian issue and, when pressed for more details, added only that he was working to “reach a place that will ease the life of the Palestinians.” This is a far cry from Riyadh’s official position since the 2002 Arab League summit in which former King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz offered Israel full diplomatic ties with all 22 Arab League members in exchange for the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and Israel’s withdrawal from the two territories, which it had seized in the 1967 war.
The shift in the Saudi position is understandable in light of the massive changes that have taken place in the two decades since then. Prior to the summit, many, including in Riyadh, had hope that an agreement could be reached, despite the failure of the 2000 Camp David talks between late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak as well as the outbreak of the Second Intifada that same year. But the Israeli and Palestinian political landscapes were in flux, which undermined any efforts toward a negotiated settlement to the decades-long conflict. The right-of-center Likud party, led by former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, had come to power, and on the Palestinian side, the radical Islamist Hamas movement was mounting a campaign of suicide attacks in Israel.
Hamas’ surge was made possible by Fatah’s decline, which was accelerated by Arafat’s death in 2004. That same year, Israeli intelligence, which had penetrated Hamas, conducted a series of targeted attacks eliminating many of its leaders and its ability to conduct terrorist attacks inside Israel. The following year, Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip, which aided Hamas’ efforts to emerge as a major competitor to Fatah. Hamas’ victory in the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006 set the stage for what has become an irreconcilable divide among the Palestinians, with Hamas controlling Gaza and Fatah ruling in the West Bank under the aegis of the internationally recognized Palestinian Authority.
Under these circumstances, any efforts toward a negotiated settlement by default will be centered on the West Bank. But even the West Bank could not form the nucleus of a future Palestinian state because of two key factors: the growth of Jewish settlements where some 700,000 Israelis reside, and the Palestinian Authority’s decline due to widespread corruption and factionalism among the Fatah elite. The 87-year-old president of the PA, Mahmoud Abbas, who also leads Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization, has sat at the apex of this autocratic edifice since he took over from Arafat 18 years ago. The fact that the three major Palestinian entities will soon be looking for a successor could plunge the West Bank into a crisis and create a vacuum that Hamas is eyeing as a historic opportunity to dominate the Palestinian political landscape.
Israel's Annexation Plan
(click to enlarge)
Cognizant of this state of affairs, MBS rather candidly said he was seeking some concessions from the Israelis that would improve conditions for Palestinians. His comment reflects the fact that the feud between Hamas and Fatah is no longer at the center of intra-Palestinian divisions, which have deteriorated to the point where even the future of the PA in the West Bank is mired in uncertainty. Thus, the Saudis have returned to managing the Palestinian issue after a 16-year break, which began following their failed effort to mediate between Hamas and Fatah in February 2007. Since then, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have seen little progress, largely because of the power struggle between the two Palestinian groups.
Meanwhile, Riyadh had been consumed with other critical issues such as the regional instability created by the 2011 Arab uprisings, the jihadist threat (especially from the Islamic State), the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood (especially in Egypt), Iranian expansionism and Turkey’s efforts to re-establish its influence in the Arab world. Many of these issues are no longer as pressing as they once were, though the threat posed by Iran, with which the Saudis have also agreed to normalize ties, remains a key concern.
Arab Countries that Recognize Israel
(click to enlarge)
Notably, the Iranian threat is one of the main motivators behind a potential Saudi-Israeli deal. The 2020 Abraham Accords, which led several of Saudi Arabia’s Arab allies to normalize relations with Israel, couldn’t have taken place without Saudi approval. The agreements were actually seen as a precursor to an eventual Saudi-Israeli deal. Unlike these other Arab states, however, the Saudis cannot establish relations with Israel without somehow addressing the Palestinian issue. But the Saudis realize that trying to get the Palestinians even limited autonomy is going to prove extremely difficult. They are therefore trying to reach an arrangement that minimizes Hamas’ ability to benefit from the emerging chaos in the West Bank, which Iran would certainly exploit.
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https://www.dailywire.com/news/saudi-arabia-publicly-acknowledges-defending-israel-from-iranian-attacks-reports?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=benshapiro&fbclid=IwAR1ra5h-fBJ7tq8gNYhgWhQXtZYfgtJJnQqy8U6lrWKdXiJ8KAGwE4qqmK0