Fire Hydrant of Freedom
Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities => Politics & Religion => Topic started by: Crafty_Dog on April 21, 2022, 02:29:12 PM
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Giving Taiwan its own thread:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mjx38mlgNmw&t=176s
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/taiwan-broadcaster-apologizes-for-accidental-false-alerts-reporting-chinese-invasion_4418981.html?utm_source=News&utm_campaign=breaking-2022-04-23-3&utm_medium=email&est=C2BSH51dYjVDdvtDb%2FbwcqqTgdckKPFfYfEQMxd%2BKhDfH4HIhyQQdhoRyGCxGw08KWy%2B
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Taiwan Can Learn from Ukraine in Defending Against Possible Chinese Invasion: Analysts
By J.M. Phelps April 24, 2022 Updated: April 25, 2022biggersmaller Print
Taiwan may be forced to confront a saturation of missile attacks and cyberattacks against critical infrastructure in a fight to maintain its de facto independence from the Chinese regime. Taking tips from Ukraine could prove to be beneficial to its survival, according to experts.
Russia is using a variety of cruise missiles and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to inflict damage to the Ukrainian military and country’s infrastructure. While Ukrainian defense forces remain intact, they have not been able to stop the ability of the Russian military to conduct the missile attacks.
Retired rear admiral Mark Montgomery, who serves as senior director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation and senior fellow at Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told The Epoch Times there is “a lesson here for Taiwan to learn,” explaining that it is imperative the small East Asian country to boost its short-range to medium-range air defense capabilities against both cruise missiles and SRBMs as a possible invasion from China looms closer.
The Chinese regime views Taiwan as part of its territory, even though the island has been governed as a separate entity for more than seven decades. Beijing has vowed to take control of the island by force, if necessary.
In February, the United States approved a possible $100 million sale of equipment and services to Taiwan to “sustain, maintain, and improve” its Patriot missile defense system. According to the statement by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the proposed upgrades to the air defense would “help improve the security of the recipient and assist in maintaining political stability, military balance, economic and progress in the region.”
Unlike Ukraine, Taiwan faces a substantial threat from the sea. To that end, Montgomery said the land-based version of the Harpoon Black II anti-ship missile would “do a lot of damage to an inbound [naval] invasion force.” As part of a recently awarded Harpoon Coastal Defense System (HCDS) contract for Taiwan, nearly $500 million dollars was granted to Boeing to begin the process of supplying “100 launcher transporter units, 25 radar units, and HCDS training equipment.”
Protect Against Cyberattacks
On the heels of the Russian invasion of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, Russia managed to knock out electric power for tens of thousands of citizens in western Ukraine. In the following years, an onslaught of cyberattacks against Ukrainian government agencies, the country’s banking system, and more have ensued.
“Clearly, the Ukrainians have upped their cyber protection game, as [the Eastern European country] has become much better at fending off [Russian cyberattacks] in 2022 than was done in the years past,” according to Montgomery. “Taiwan can learn from that.”
Yet one day before the invasion, Ukraine’s military and infrastructure came face to face with a massive Chinese cyberattack, according to a report.
Meanwhile, Taiwan government agencies alone receive about 2.5 million cyberattacks and probes per day from China, an official has said.
A mass power outage in Taiwan in early March further reinforces Montgomery’s concern about cyberwarfare. While a blackout has been attributed to “operational negligence,” he said the Chinese regime will not cease to look for vulnerabilities to the island’s government agencies and critical infrastructure. “Taiwan has no choice but to improve their cyber protection game,” Montgomery said.
Utilize the Civilian Population
Ukrainian civilians have been trained for war as a second-tier line of defense, participating in drills to bolster their fighting capabilities and assist the Ukrainian military. According to global security expert Benjamin Varlese, “the use of civilians to assist in protecting the country has been an effective strategy.” Not only have civilians offered first aid to the injured, but they’ve also been successful in stalling Russian military advances, he said.
In the event of an attack from China, Taiwan has also been teaching first aid and preparing its citizens to assist the island’s armed forces.
“Taiwan’s citizens could definitely be used to slow an invasion from China, forcing what could be a speedy military invasion into a much lengthier insurgency,” Varlese said.
“Any such delay to an invasion could cause the Chinese regime to take a tactical pause and force them to rethink their strategies,” he added.
According to Varlese, “the window is narrow as the Russia Ukraine conflict unfolds” as the Chinese regime currently finds itself “not quite as ” as it was prior to the conflict, having seen the West’s unifying response to Moscow’s aggression.
“Before things start escalating more dramatically, a civilian population that administers more than first aid is clearly something that should be given serious consideration as a deterrent.”
Thwarting the Financial Burden
As Taiwan’s most formidable ally, the United States is witnessing the burgeoning cost of money and lives attributed to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, according to Montgomery.
“It’s very expensive to address the invasion and impact of an authoritarian state like Russia, and the same would hold true for China,” he said.
As of April 22, Washington has committed $3.4 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the start of the invasion, and more than $4 billion since the start of the Biden administration, according to the Pentagon.
Should Russia fail, Montgomery warned about the future cost to rebuild Ukraine after the invasion is over. “It’s clear that we would have been much better served by investments and sanctions made left of bang, ahead of the crisis, as this might have deterred Russia,” he said.
But because Russia was not deterred, Montgomery said, “the United States is now going to be spending a lot more money cleaning up the mess.”
The decision to fully invest in protecting Taiwan cannot wait, according to Montgomery. “The U.S. can’t wait on exquisite intel, but the lesson from Russia is that deterrence requires action ahead of the crisis, [adding that] it’s too late once the crisis starts.”
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One China, One Taiwan
Welcome to the Tuesday, a weekly newsletter about many things and even some thangs. To sign up for NRPlus and receive the Tuesday on the regular as a paid-up National Review subscriber, please click right here.
The Most Dangerous Fiction
It is a little bit surreal to hear China’s rulers and their servants talk about Taiwan. It is a little like a little kid who is very, very committed to his imaginary friend.
In the recent session of China’s rubber-stamp ersatz parliament, there were many energetic denunciations of “separatist” elements seeking “independence” for Taiwan, according to English-language media reports. When former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe wrote a Los Angeles Times op-ed comparing Taiwan’s situation vis-à-vis China to Ukraine’s relationship with Russia, the Chinese consul general in Los Angeles wrote angrily to the newspaper:
The situations in Taiwan and Ukraine cannot be compared. Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, where the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government. This One-China Principle is explicitly stated in both joint communiqués for establishing China-U.S. and China-Japan diplomatic ties.
In one sense, the consul general is absolutely right. In another sense, he is absolutely full of it.
There is a considerable degree of ritual in Beijing’s fretting about the “independence” of Taiwan, which has been an independent country — and a thriving democracy with a sophisticated economy — for many years now. Likewise, to call the Taiwanese “separatists” is very strange in that Taiwan has been separate from Beijing for decades and decades.
On the other hand, it is the case that both the United States and China — and Japan — officially buy into the “One China” policy, which is a fundamental part of the basis of diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing. Under “One China,” Washington officially acknowledges just what the consul general says: “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, where the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government.” Washington has no official relations with Taipei — Taiwan in fact has normal diplomatic relations with only a baker’s dozen of countries, mostly small and obscure ones (Nauru, Palau, etc.) a few more prominent ones (Belize, Guatemala, Haiti) and one of great symbolic importance: the Holy See.
The United States maintained relations with Taiwan for decades after its establishment until President Jimmy Carter suddenly abandoned Taiwan in 1979 to pursue a closer relationship with the so-called People’s Republic of China on the theory that Beijing could be a reliable part of a united front against Moscow and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, then our chief global adversary. The United States maintains robust political, cultural, economic, and military relations with Taiwan, a country that, as far as the official story in Washington is concerned, does not exist. The two nations do more than $100 billion in trade annually, but Washington does not recognize the government in Taipei.
There is a delusional Taiwanese version of the “One China” policy, too, the official view of the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party or KMT) that there is one China and that the regime in Taipei is the legitimate government of all of it. KMT traditionally opposes “Taiwanization” and emphasizes closer relations with Beijing — not exactly what you’d expect from an anticommunist nationalist party, but it is a complex situation. The center-left Democratic Progressive Party, which currently runs the show in Taipei, also calls itself a nationalist party, but the nation it means is Taiwan, not a notional unified China.
Washington accepted the One China fiction as a Cold War expedient, but the expedient has outlived its expediency. As I noted in an earlier newsletter, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was an act of naked international aggression, but a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be — on paper, as a formality, in the official view of the United States — an internal matter, Beijing taking extraordinary measures to reincorporate a breakaway province. That isn’t how things actually stand, of course, but the “One China” fiction matters — for one thing, it provides Beijing with a fig leaf if not a moral permission slip, and, for another, it actually encourages Beijing to believe that it can act as though “One China” described the real world. Washington calls its Taiwan policy one of “strategic ambiguity,” and, while ambiguity certainly has its uses, it is also dangerous.
Shinzo Abe writes:
Russia’s invasion is not only an armed violation of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty, but also an attempt to overthrow the government of a sovereign state with missiles and shells. On this point, there is no controversy in the international community over the interpretation of international law and the UN Charter. While the extent to which countries participate in sanctions against Russia has differed, no country has claimed that Russia is not in serious violation of international law.
By contrast, China claims that Taiwan is “part of its own country,” and the US and Japanese position is to respect this claim. Neither Japan nor the US has official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and most countries around the world do not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state. Unlike in Ukraine, Chinese leaders could claim that any invasion of Taiwan that China launches is necessary to suppress anti-government activities in one of its own regions, and that such acts therefore would not violate international law.
When Russia annexed Crimea, the international community ultimately acquiesced, even though Russia had violated Ukrainian sovereignty. Given this precedent, it is not surprising that Chinese leaders may very well expect the world to be more tolerant should they, too, adopt the logic of “regional” — rather than national — subjugation.
This logic has made strategic ambiguity untenable.
Under the Biden administration and a surprisingly robust bipartisan congressional consensus, the United States has — to its credit — undertaken unexpected and extraordinary measures to support Kyiv against the predations of Vladimir Putin. Putin complains that the United States is conducting a proxy war against Russia, and Putin is not far from wrong. President Biden dices it pretty fine when he insists, “We’re not attacking Russia; we’re helping Ukraine defend itself against Russian aggression.”
While there are critical lacunae in the U.S. and EU sanctions regime, the United States and our European allies are doing everything short of sending regular troops into the battle. Weapons and equipment supplied by the United States and European governments are being used by a Ukrainian military that is — and should be — conducting operations not only inside Ukraine but also inside Russia. It seems likely that at some point Moscow will decide that the United States is an undeclared belligerent in the Ukraine war, and, if that time comes, Moscow will have a pretty good case. The United States and the Biden administration are right to take a hard line here, but we should as a country be clear in our own minds about what that means. While it is something close to a metaphysical certainty that U.S. forces would sweep the Russians off the battlefield like toy soldiers in a direct confrontation between conventional forces, there are obvious risks to such a confrontation (Putin has a considerable nuclear arsenal) and non-obvious risks as well.
In many important ways, our current confrontation with Moscow is a useful test run for our likely future confrontation with Beijing. It is certainly a useful one for Beijing, which now has a good understanding — one hopes it is a sobering understanding — of the likely scope and intensity of U.S. and European sanctions that might be deployed against a too-adventurous China, and the capabilities and limitations of what the Western world can bring to the fight short of putting troops in the field. President Biden is not exactly an inspiring or energetic leader — or, in many regards, even a credible one — but the country is in some ways less divided than had been supposed, and when figures such as Tucker Carlson and J. D. Vance attempted to pull a cynical Charles Lindbergh on the Ukraine war, they got their fingers burned. Joe Biden, Boris Johnson, Emmanuel Macron, Olaf Scholz, and Ursula von der Leyen all together might not add up to one Winston Churchill, but there is reason to think that we can manage in this case without one. This isn’t an age of heroes, but there is still work to be done.
Which brings us back to the tense Taiwan Strait.
Senior figures in the Biden administration have been holding talks with their U.K. counterparts with the goal of developing a better-coordinated policy on China and Taiwan. Similar outreach has been undertaken toward our European partners. The new AUKUS security bloc was launched with an eye toward China, too. There are many in Washington, London, and Brussels — and Taipei — who worry that the war in Ukraine is a prelude.
From the Financial Times:
In a sign of the enhanced co-operation with the UK, the HMS Queen Elizabeth, a British aircraft carrier, last year spent more than six months deployed in the Indo-Pacific. Heino Klinck, a former top Pentagon Asia official, welcomed the US-UK consultations on Taiwan. He said they came on the heels of European naval deployments in the Indo-Pacific that increased last year after the Trump administration had held discussions with European allies about boosting operations in the South China Sea.
“Deterring Chinese aggression against Taiwan is in everyone’s interest. It is not just an Indo-Pacific issue, it is a global issue,” said Klinck. “US military planners are not counting on Germany or France sending warships, or Britain sending a carrier in the case of a conflict over Taiwan. But when those countries send ships to the South China Sea, or transit the Taiwan Strait, it sends a strong signal to China.”
A senior Taiwanese official said Taipei was aware of the US efforts to involve more allies in its Taiwan planning. “They’ve been doing it with Japan and Australia, and now they’re trying to do it with Britain,” he said.
It surely is the case that “deterring Chinese aggression against Taiwan is in everyone’s interest.” It is in Beijing’s interest, to begin with, even if Beijing doesn’t know it.
And so the HMS Queen Elizabeth patrols the Indo-Pacific, and the bland old men who sit behind desks in the world’s capitals move their chessmen around the board. The situation is a complex one. But I cannot help thinking that we might simplify it a great deal by dispensing with the lie — which is what the “One China” policy is. Perhaps it was true in some sense at some time. But the fact is that Taiwan today is as much of a real country as Germany or France or the United States.
If we mean to take seriously our historical commitment to Taiwan, then the thing to do is to be plain about the fact that we’d think of China’s invading Taiwan the same way as we’d think of its invading one of these.
But that isn’t true, either.
And Furthermore . . .
Sovereignty is a subject that seems to draw to itself all sorts of funny little fictions. We pretend that China and Taiwan are one country and that Taiwan isn’t sovereign. We treat countries such as Pakistan as sovereign even though the government doesn’t actually control much of the country. I think about this sometimes in the case of the U.S. government’s relationship with the Indian nations, whose sovereignty is an official fiction to which we remain very strongly committed. I am no expert on native issues and am entirely open to the argument that Washington should take tribal sovereignty seriously, but Washington doesn’t — see, for example, how little tribal sovereignty means when it comes to the so-called War on Drugs. I can’t help thinking that some kind of rectification is needed, that we should either stop pretending we believe in tribal sovereignty or start acting like we do.
And Further-er-more . . .
There is a scene in The Lion in Winter that perfectly encapsulates the might-makes-right politics that we liberals and idealists are always trying to get past but never can. In a testy confrontation between Henry II of England and his French counterpart, Philip II, Hank the Deuce insists that a certain French territory is his. “By whose authority?” Philip demands. “It’s got my troops all over it,” Henry answers. “That makes it mine.
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Deter China by Turning Taiwan Into a Porcupine
Western allies should accelerate the sale of F-16s, missiles, drones and other force-multiplier weapons.
By Phil Gramm and Roger Wicker
May 4, 2022 12:38 pm ET
The paramount lesson from the Russian invasion of Ukraine is that repeated threats of economic sanctions didn’t deter Vladimir Putin from launching an all-out invasion. This offers a warning for Taiwan, the U.S. and their allies as threats from China loom.
The long history of sanctions, embargoes and economic blockades strongly suggests they are difficult to enforce, entail significant costs to the nations imposing them, and trigger market forces that eventually override them. Benefits flow to countries that don’t enforce the sanctions. The enforcement challenges grow significantly if the economy of the targeted nation is large, and as the size of the target country increases, the deterrent effect of threatening sanctions loses credibility.
Since the Chinese economy—one-sixth of the world’s economy—is 10 times as large as the Russian economy, effective sanctions would be virtually impossible to enforce. Relying on threatened sanctions to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan could therefore entice aggression that could pull the U.S. into a war with China, an event that would alter the course of world history.
Thankfully, there is a far more effective deterrent. Taiwan is an island roughly 100 miles off the coast of mainland China. Unlike Ukraine, a large land army can’t be massed along its border. But because it is an island, supplies also can’t be delivered to an adjacent neighbor and clandestinely driven across the border. Any supplies delivered after an attack would have to be flown in or delivered by ship, putting the supplier directly in harm’s way. Supplying Taiwan on anything like the scale we have supplied Ukraine during a Chinese attack would be a logistical nightmare.
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When China was an economic basket case, 100 miles of ocean was more than enough deterrent. But with China now an economic and military powerhouse, Taiwan’s lack of preparedness is increasingly dangerous.
Taiwan’s economy is two-thirds larger than Israel’s, but Taiwan spends almost two-thirds less as a percentage of gross domestic product on defense. U.S. support can’t be allowed to abet Taiwan’s neglect of its own defense. As Machiavelli observed, “nothing is so weak and unsustainable as a reputation for power which is not based on one’s own strength.”
The good news is that modern technology makes it relatively easy for Taiwan to afford weapons that would make the cost of invasion exceed any reasonable benefit. Ukraine’s valiant resistance has shown how highly motivated defenders with high-tech weapons can scramble the calculus of military power. Like David’s smooth stone that slew Goliath, two Ukrainian Neptune missiles sank the flagship of the Russian navy in the Black Sea. With 400 U.S. Harpoon missiles, costing only 0.3% of its GDP, Taiwan could imperil any Chinese warship in the Taiwan Strait. Modern sea mines are even less expensive, and Turkish Bayraktar drones, which have been so effective in Ukraine, cost less than $2 million each. Two hundred fifty million dollars would buy 5,000 Switchblade drones, which could devastate landing craft, armored vehicles, and small assault ships.
Taiwan already has two Patriot missile battalions and for $3 billion could double its air and missile defense. Stinger missiles, used to great effect in Ukraine, cost only $400 million for 1,000 missiles. Taiwan will have more than 200 F-16 fighter jets by 2026, including almost 70 of the newest Block 70 aircraft. With additional F-16s and other aircraft being retired from the U.S. Air Force, more aircraft could be made available at their depreciated value.
If the U.S. and its allies are willing to accelerate the sale of these and other force-multiplier weapons at cost, Taiwan could totally upgrade and harden its defenses by simply raising its defense budget from 2% to 3% of GDP. At that level, Taiwan could fund all these weapon purchases over a five-year period. Sustaining its defense outlays at 3% of GDP would allow Taiwan to continue modernizing its defenses while spending at a level roughly equal to Israel’s defense expenditures in real dollar terms.
With these investments, Taiwan should focus heavily on training for new weapons systems. It should also consider transforming its army from the current conscript system into a smaller voluntary force that would better accommodate a defense system based on the power of modern technology. Citizens who would have otherwise been drafted could be trained in high-end weaponry and kept in reserve or home-guard forces that could be activated in emergencies.
The primary objective of the U.S., its allies and Taiwan isn’t to repel a Chinese attack but to prevent it from ever occurring. Effective deterrence is the key to national security.
Any wolf has the ability to kill a gentle porcupine. And yet such an attack virtually never occurs in nature. The defense of the porcupine’s quills, which can rip through the predator’s mouth and throat, is the deterrent that protects the small creature in the violent woods. Through the force-multiplying miracle of modern weapons, we can help make Taiwan a porcupine and deter aggression that could have profoundly negative consequences for Taiwan, China and the world.
Mr. Gramm is a former chairman of the Senate Banking Committee and a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Wicker, a U.S. senator from Mississippi, is in line to become the chairman of the Armed Services Committee if Republicans control the Senate next year.
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/sen-marco-rubio-introduces-bill-to-fast-track-arms-sales-to-taiwan_4451729.html?utm_source=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2022-05-08&utm_medium=email&est=8%2BYldawU0VBuYSDHuXEv6oLQhS8qH4vT4KAkPNHQBhUHBVTsV%2FbGlF6rVFoX68rzT5UJ
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First Taiwan, then the U.S.?
Why Americans should care about the island’s freedom
By Tiffany Meier
Will Americans be embroiled in another war? With the Russian war on Ukraine, many experts are now predicting Taiwan is doomed to fall to the Chinese Communist Party. But it’s not that simple. Bradley Thayer, Founding Member of the Committee on Present Danger: China told me, “Taiwan is in some respects a linchpin, economic linchpin, militarily it is a linchpin, and in the ideological struggle against the Chinese regime, it is as well.”
Let’s look at those three areas. On the economic front, Taiwan produces nearly 90% of the world’s high-end semiconductors, also known as microchips.
These chips are found in everything from phones, cars, computers, AC units, even military gear like fighter jets. If Taiwan were to fall to China, there would be a massive disruption across the supply chain. Even without a war, there already is.
I spoke with Keith Krach, former undersecretary of state, who said semiconductors are “literally the base of everything. It’s the most important industry in the world.”
Now semiconductors aside, let’s consider the second factor: Taiwan’s role as a strategic player.
Taiwan is part of what’s known as the First Island Chain, which stretches from Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines. If Taiwan were no longer free, the Chinese regime would be able to break through that First Island Chain and access the Pacific Ocean.
Now the reason that would be perilous is first, the Pacific Ocean has deep enough waters that China’s nuclear-armed submarines would be able to bypass U.S. detection and launch a surprise assault on U.S. shores.
Right now, the U.S. is able to track China’s submarines and stop them, were they to try and launch an assault.
Second, if Taiwan were to fall, the neighboring countries would rush to strike a deal with China in order to preserve their own safety as much as possible. That would mean a massive loss in allies to the U.S. in that region.
Now, when it comes to the question of whether America would defend Taiwan, the issue of “strategic ambiguity” comes up. Under that, the U.S. just has to make sure Taiwan has the means to defend itself. Hence the increase in arms sales to Taiwan.
But “strategic ambiguity” creates an aura of uncertainty. And what the Ukraine war has pushed to the forefront is the need for deterrence from strength. Not deterrence through uncertainty. And before we get into the third, and arguably the most important factor when it comes to Taiwan, let’s take a moment to see what the Russian war on Ukraine has taught us.
That war has taught Beijing and Taiwan lessons, both good and bad for each side. The resilience seen in Ukraine is a good indicator for Taiwan’s spirit to fight and defend its freedoms if the Chinese regime were to launch an invasion.
In war, there is the weighing of odds. If it’s just Beijing vs. Taiwan, those odds are looking pretty good for the Chinese regime. But if it’s Beijing vs. Taiwan and Japan and Australia backed by U.S. military might, suddenly those odds don’t look so good anymore.
But all that aside, there’s a third factor, maybe the most important one, when it comes to Taiwan.
Keith Krach told me, “There will always be a need to defend Taiwan. And the reason is, they are a role model of democracy in that region.”
“They also dispel Xi [Jinping’s] myth that the Chinese culture cannot survive a democracy and it needs an authoritarian government,” he added.
And because of that, the Chinese communist regime will forever see a free Taiwan as a thorn in its side and try to squash it. Obliterate it.
But more than trade and military might, what the Chinese regime fears most is Taiwan’s ideological threat. That threat stems from freedom, whether that’s freedom of religion, of the press, or equality before the law; in other words, the bastions of Democracy.
The Chinese regime is afraid of those freedoms, as that would allow the Chinese people to rise up against authoritarian rule, a rule of fear.
In fact, Taiwan showcases a second China. One not ruled by an iron fist of fear. But if Beijing were to snuff out Taiwan, it’s not just the ideological front. It’s not just the loss of a Democratic ally, albeit an unofficial one.
It would be the loss of life, as we know it. World economies would be askew and there would be a major shift in world powers. If America loses the Pacific power, it will mark the end to America’s position as the leader of the free world
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https://www.nationalreview.com/news/suspect-in-california-church-shooting-motivated-by-anti-taiwan-sentiment-police-say/?utm_source=email&utm_medium=breaking&utm_campaign=newstrack&utm_term=27735037
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https://www.nationalreview.com/news/suspect-in-california-church-shooting-motivated-by-anti-taiwan-sentiment-police-say/?utm_source=email&utm_medium=breaking&utm_campaign=newstrack&utm_term=27735037
That was my wife's first thought.
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https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/the-navys-latest-shipbuilding-plan-may-sink-americas-pacific-ambitions?mkt_tok=ODI0LU1IVC0zMDQAAAGEfO9IxgANq7dChNDVnh7RgmQov56PK_iVzd8QPDDGaEYNJPjuIQGiGNbwTA1-HOjyfTD_JhkkkxBg_gO9_ZO0ZYq-4VRo_hbi8MazYCLnslICs_37
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TOKYO—President Biden said the U.S. would respond militarily to defend Taiwan if China tries to take it by force, sparking uncertainty over whether the U.S. was moving away from its longstanding policy of strategic ambiguity and prompting a clarification from the White House.
Mr. Biden’s comments were met with anger from Beijing and praise from Taipei. They were also part of a pattern: In August and October of last year, the president answered questions on Taiwan by suggesting a break in U.S. policy toward the democratically self-ruled island, only to have aides jump in to say nothing had changed.
This time, he chose a venue much closer to Beijing. Mr. Biden spoke Monday alongside the Japanese prime minister in Tokyo during his first trip to Asia as commander-in-chief.
The president was asked if the U.S. would get involved militarily in response to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan after declining to send American troops to Ukraine to fight Russia’s invasion.
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“Yes. That’s the commitment we made,” he said.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin raised his voice when asked at a regular briefing about Mr. Biden’s remarks and said Beijing was strongly dissatisfied by them.
China “has no room for compromise and concession” on core concerns like Taiwan and “will take firm action to safeguard its sovereignty and security interests,” Mr. Wang said. “We do what we say.”
Mr. Biden, in his Monday remarks, stressed that the U.S. remains committed to the bedrock “One China policy,” which recognizes the present rulers as the only legitimate government and acknowledges—but doesn’t endorse—Beijing’s claim that Taiwan is a part of the nation. But the president said that policy doesn’t give China the right to forcefully take over the island.
“We agree with the One China policy and all the attendant agreements we made. But the idea that it can be taken by force, just taken by force, would just not be appropriate,” Mr. Biden said. “It would dislocate the entire region and be another action similar to what happened in Ukraine. So, it’s a burden that is even stronger.”
He also played down the possibility that China would try to take Taiwan.
“My expectation is that it will not happen, it will not be attempted,” Mr. Biden said, adding that it is important for world leaders to send a strong message that there will be consequences if Beijing takes such action.
Taiwan is thankful to the U.S. for its “rock solid” commitment, foreign ministry spokeswoman Joanne Ou said.
“Our government’s determination to firmly defend Taiwan’s freedom, democracy and security has never changed, and we will continue to improve self-defense capabilities,” she said in a written statement.
Responding to Mr. Biden’s comment, a White House official underscored the president’s assertion that American policy toward Taiwan hasn’t changed. The official said Mr. Biden was referring to the U.S. obligation to bolster Taipei’s ability to defend itself, which is enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act.
The act, passed in 1979, portrays any attempt to determine Taiwan’s political future through anything other than peaceful means as a threat to American interests. Congress is committed to selling defensive weapons to Taiwan, but Washington has previously avoided saying whether it would intervene directly in the event of an invasion.
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different levels of commitment or no real commitment
very confusing :
https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2022/05/23/white-house-cleans-up-after-biden-again-claims-u-s-has-military-commitment-with-taiwan/
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/taiwan-not-included-in-launch-of-new-biden-indo-pacific-pact_4482470.html?utm_source=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2022-05-23&utm_medium=email&est=IRC9Y9tDR3ne%2FSnV1bbY%2F%2FzvcE752rpeBLb0nDWxQ1YFKIyC72DWQCf5cwbW26L52DIr
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Whomever "clarifies" Biden's statements is the real president.
That wasn't elected.
Be sure to VOTE HARDER!
different levels of commitment or no real commitment
very confusing :
https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2022/05/23/white-house-cleans-up-after-biden-again-claims-u-s-has-military-commitment-with-taiwan/
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/intimidation-and-confusion-on-the-taiwan-strait_4491419.html?utm_source=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2022-05-28&utm_medium=email&est=U7C70NY5IukOLuPReVzsbEHapWJNdG89f4ewM93bOp8MXpn%2Bpfm9zO%2BUvVr5VMb5%2BYCs
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/historic-breakthrough-us-taiwan-announce-new-trade-initiative_4505302.html?utm_source=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2022-06-02&utm_medium=email&est=I0fOk1ZWe3UsECwjBGkBc%2B%2FauKH3fsZNuo6mQdHwqLEIk%2BBkpV65XmRxe%2B0rOkQDIKRk
https://www.theepochtimes.com/us-national-guard-to-work-with-taiwan-tsai_4506573.html?utm_source=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2022-06-02&utm_medium=email&est=9e6uvJ7VwlY%2FydXrRgWbXGOa5HKwFSRRNDa8FkVSZ%2B%2FwAmr6%2BgzFwCLitm7j%2BNfYKrf3
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18594/help-taiwan
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Pentagon chief Lloyd Austin spoke to his Chinese counterpart Friday in Singapore at the annual conference of global defense officials known as the Shangri-La Dialogue. The two military leaders spoke about Russia's Ukraine invasion, and the regional nuclear threat posed by North Korea.
Austin also "reaffirmed the importance of peace and stability across the Strait, opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo, and called on the PRC to refrain from further destabilizing actions toward Taiwan," according to the Defense Department's readout.
Afterward, China's Defense Ministry got all worked up and promised it "will definitely not hesitate to start a war, no matter the cost" should anyone "dare to split Taiwan from China." That's according to a blistering statement from Defense Ministry spokesman Wu Qian, via Agence France-Presse.
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second
Beijing Should Seize Taiwan and TSMC When Facing ‘Destructive’ US Sanctions: Chinese Economist
By Frank Yue June 9, 2022 Updated: June 9, 2022biggersmaller Print
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A senior Chinese economist at a U.S.-China forum proposed that Beijing take over Taiwan and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC) if Washington sanctions Beijing as it has Moscow.
“If the United States and the West impose destructive sanctions on China as they treat Russia, we must recover Taiwan,” said China’s economist Chen Wenling on May 30 at a forum hosted by the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, according to state outlets. “Especially in the reconstruction of industry and supply chains, we must seize TSMC, a firm that inherently belongs to China.”
Chen is the chief economist at the China Center for International Economic Exchanges, a state think tank overseen by China’s top economic planning agency National Development and Reform Commission. Her comments came as TSMC, a global leader in semiconductor production, becomes increasingly important amid the global chip crunch.
“They are speeding up the transfer to the United States to build six factories there,” she added. “We must not let all the goals of the transfer be achieved.”
The Chinese regime sees Taiwan as part of its territory and has threatened war to bring the island into its fold. The self-ruled island is a de-facto independent country, with its own democratically-elected government, military, constitution, diplomacy, and currency.
Meanwhile, Chen urged Beijing to openly support Moscow to the best of its ability, citing a recent joint air force drill between the two allies as an example.
“China and Russia may be united by matching the Belt and Road Initiative and the broad Eurasia alliance raised by Putin,” said the expert. “That will form a strategic depth belt for our country, an economic belt along the Silk Road, and an energy security belt, which will serve [China] as a major buffer for security concerns in the future.”
On Feb. 24, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which the Kremlin calls “a special military operation.” As of June 8, 4,266 civilians have been killed, including 67 children, and 5,178 injured in Ukraine, with over 6.5 million people fleeing to neighboring countries, according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Additionally, Chen said that China could hit its rival hard in a way most unfavorable to the opponent when the reform achievements it has made over the past 40 years are at risk.
Taiwan legislator Wang Ting-Yu dismissed her speech as “irresponsible and provocative” in an interview with Radio Free Asia.
“The idea of taking over Taiwan and TSMC by force highlights China’s ignorance, arrogance, and aggressiveness,” Wang said. “Further, it signals they [Chinese authorities] would risk being perceived to be an enemy to the world for [its] economic interests.”
Internet user Zhao Ming tweeted that Chen can hardly be called an economist, as he said she shows no common sense in her field. “Economics promotes the free movement of talent, capital, and technology while Chen Wenling’s mindset is heavily preoccupied with looting.”
The Epoch Times could not reach Chen Wenling for comment by press time.
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FA is the epitome of the foreign affairs establishment:
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https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-06-16/consequences-conquest-taiwan-indo-pacific?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=The%20Consequences%20of%20Conquest&utm_content=20220616&utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017
The Consequences of Conquest
Why Indo-Pacific Power Hinges on Taiwan
By Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Caitlin Talmadge
July/August 2022
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-06-16/consequences-conquest-taiwan-indo-pacific
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Of all the intractable issues that could spark a hot war between the United States and China, Taiwan is at the very top of the list. And the potential geopolitical consequences of such a war would be profound. Taiwan—“an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender,” as U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur once described it—has important, often underappreciated military value as a gateway to the Philippine Sea, a vital theater for defending Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea from possible Chinese coercion or attack. There is no guarantee that China would win a war for the island—or that such a conflict wouldn’t drag on for years and weaken China. But if Beijing gained control of Taiwan and based military assets there, China’s military position would improve markedly.
Beijing’s ocean surveillance assets and submarines, in particular, could make control of Taiwan a substantial boon to Chinese military power. Even without any major technological or military leaps, possession of the island would improve China’s ability to impede U.S. naval and air operations in the Philippine Sea and thereby limit the United States’ ability to defend its Asian allies. And if, in the future, Beijing were to develop a large fleet of quiet nuclear attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines, basing them on Taiwan would enable China to threaten Northeast Asian shipping lanes and strengthen its sea-based nuclear forces.
Clearly, the island’s military value bolsters the argument for keeping Taiwan out of China’s grasp. The strength of that case, however, depends on several factors, including whether one assumes that China would pursue additional territorial expansion after occupying Taiwan and make the long-term military and technological investments needed to take full advantage of the island. It also depends on the broader course of U.S. China policy. Washington could remain committed to its current approach of containing the expansion of Chinese power through a combination of political commitments to U.S. partners and allies in Asia and a significant forward military presence. Or it might adopt a more flexible policy that retains commitments only to core treaty allies and reduces forward deployed forces. Or it might reduce all such commitments as part of a more restrained approach. Regardless of which of these three strategies the United States pursues, however, Chinese control of Taiwan would limit the U.S. military’s ability to operate in the Pacific and would potentially threaten U.S. interests there.
But the issue is not just that Taiwan’s tremendous military value poses problems for any U.S. grand strategy. It is that no matter what Washington does—whether it attempts to keep Taiwan out of Chinese hands or not—it will be forced to run risks and incur costs in its standoff with Beijing. As the place where all the dilemmas of U.S. policy toward China collide, Taiwan presents one of the toughest and most dangerous problems in the world. Simply put, Washington has few good options there and a great many bad ones that could court calamity.
TAIWAN IN THE BALANCE
A Chinese assault on Taiwan could shift the military balance of power in Asia in any number of ways. If China were to take the island swiftly and easily, many of its military assets geared toward a Taiwan campaign might be freed up to pursue other military objectives. China might also be able to assimilate Taiwan’s strategic resources, such as its military equipment, personnel, and semiconductor industry, all of which would bolster Beijing’s military power. But if China were to find itself bogged down in a prolonged conquest or occupation of Taiwan, the attempt at forced unification might become a significant drag on Beijing’s might.
Any campaign that delivers Taiwan to China, however, would allow Beijing to base important military hardware there—in particular, underwater surveillance devices and submarines, along with associated air and coastal defense assets. Stationed in Taiwan, these assets would do more than simply extend China’s reach eastward by the length of the Taiwan Strait, as would be the case if China based missiles, aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, or other weapons systems on the island. Underwater surveillance and submarines, by contrast, would improve Beijing’s ability to impede U.S. operations in the Philippine Sea, an area that would be of vital importance in many possible future conflict scenarios involving China.
The most likely scenarios revolve around the United States defending its allies along the so-called first island chain off the Asian mainland, which starts north of Japan and runs southwest through Taiwan and the Philippines before curling up toward Vietnam. For example, U.S. naval operations in these waters would be essential to protecting Japan against potential Chinese threats in the East China Sea and at the southern end of the Ryukyu Islands. Such U.S. operations would also be important in most scenarios for defending the Philippines, and for any scenario that might lead to U.S. strikes on the Chinese mainland, such as a major conflagration on the Korean Peninsula. U.S. naval operations in the Philippine Sea will become even more important as China’s growing missile capabilities render land-based aircraft and their regional bases increasingly vulnerable, forcing the United States to rely more heavily on aircraft and missiles launched from ships.
If a war in the Pacific were to break out today, China’s ability to conduct effective over-the-horizon attacks—that is, attacks targeting U.S. ships at distances that exceed the line of sight to the horizon—would be more limited than commonly supposed. China might be able to target forward-deployed U.S. aircraft carriers and other ships in a first strike that commences a war. But once a conflict is underway, China’s best surveillance assets—large radars located on the mainland that allow China to “see” over the horizon—are likely to be quickly destroyed. The same is true of Chinese surveillance aircraft or ships in the vicinity of U.S. naval forces.
Chinese satellites would be unlikely to make up for these losses. Using techniques the United States honed during the Cold War, U.S. naval forces would probably be able to control their own radar and communications signatures and thereby avoid detection by Chinese satellites that listen for electronic emissions. Without intelligence from these specialized signal-collecting assets, China’s imaging satellites would be left to randomly search vast swaths of ocean for U.S. forces. Under these conditions, U.S. forces operating in the Philippine Sea would face real but tolerable risks of long-range attacks, and U.S. leaders probably would not feel immediate pressure to escalate the conflict by attacking Chinese satellites.
If China were to wrest control of Taiwan, however, the situation would look quite different. China could place underwater microphones called hydrophones in the waters off the island’s east coast, which are much deeper than the waters Beijing currently controls inside the first island chain. Placed at the appropriate depth, these specialized sensors could listen outward and detect the low-frequency sounds of U.S. surface ships thousands of miles away, enabling China to more precisely locate them with satellites and target them with missiles. (U.S. submarines are too quiet for these hydrophones to detect.) Such capabilities could force the United States to restrict its surface ships to areas outside the range of the hydrophones—or else carry out risky and escalatory attacks on Chinese satellites. Neither of these options is appealing.
Washington has few good options on Taiwan and a great many bad ones that could court calamity.
Chinese hydrophones off Taiwan would be difficult for the United States to destroy. Only highly specialized submarines or unmanned underwater vehicles could disable them, and China would be able to defend them with a variety of means, including mines. Even if the United States did manage to damage China’s hydrophone cables, Chinese repair ships could mend them under the cover of air defenses China could deploy on the island.
The best hope for disrupting Chinese hydrophone surveillance would be to attack the vulnerable processing stations where the data comes ashore via fiber-optic cables. But those stations could prove hard to find. The cables can be buried on land as well as under the sea, and nothing distinguishes the buildings where data processing is done from similar nondescript military buildings. The range of possible U.S. targets could include hundreds of individual structures inside multiple well-defended military locations across Taiwan.
Control of Taiwan would do more than enhance Chinese ocean surveillance capabilities, however. It would also give China an advantage in submarine warfare. With Taiwan in friendly hands, the United States can defend against Chinese attack submarines by placing underwater sensors in key locations to pick up the sounds the submarines emit. The United States likely deploys such upward-facing hydrophones—for listening at shorter distances—along the bottom of narrow chokepoints at the entrances to the Philippine Sea, including in the gaps between the Philippines, the Ryukyu Islands, and Taiwan. At such close ranges, these instruments can briefly detect even the quietest submarines, allowing U.S. air and surface assets to trail them. During a crisis, that could prevent Chinese submarines from getting a “free shot” at U.S. ships in the early stages of a war, when forward-deployed U.S. naval assets would be at their most vulnerable.
If China were to gain control of Taiwan, however, it would be able to base submarines and supporting air and coastal defenses on the island. Chinese submarines would then be able to slip from their pens in Taiwan’s eastern deep-water ports directly into the Philippine Sea, bypassing the chokepoints where U.S. hydrophones would be listening. Chinese defenses on Taiwan would also prevent the United States and its allies from using their best tools for trailing submarines—maritime patrol aircraft and helicopter-equipped ships—near the island, making it much easier for Chinese submarines to strike first in a crisis and reducing their attrition rate in a war. Control of Taiwan would have the added advantage of reducing the distance between Chinese submarine bases and their patrol areas from an average of 670 nautical miles to zero, enabling China to operate more submarines at any given time and carry out more attacks against U.S. forces. Chinese submarines could also make use of the more precise targeting data collected by hydrophones and satellites, dramatically improving their effectiveness against U.S. surface ships.
UNDER THE SEA
Over time, unification with Taiwan could offer China even greater military advantages if it were to invest in a fleet of much quieter advanced nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines. Operated from Taiwan’s east coast, these submarines would strengthen China’s nuclear deterrent and allow it to threaten Northeast Asian shipping and naval routes in the event of a war.
Currently, China’s submarine force is poorly equipped for a campaign against the oil and maritime trade of U.S. allies. Global shipping has traditionally proved resilient in the face of such threats because it is possible to reroute vessels outside the range of hostile forces. Even the closure of the Suez Canal between 1967 and 1975 did not paralyze global trade, since ships were instead able to go around the Cape of Good Hope, albeit at some additional cost. This resiliency means that Beijing would have to target shipping routes as they migrated north or west across the Pacific Ocean, likely near ports in Northeast Asia. But most of China’s current attack submarines are low-endurance diesel-electric boats that would struggle to operate at such distances, while its few longer-endurance nuclear-powered submarines are noisy and thus vulnerable to detection by U.S. outward-facing hydrophones that could be deployed along the so-called second island chain, which stretches southeast from Japan through the Northern Mariana Islands and past Guam.
Similarly, China’s current crop of ballistic missile submarines do little to strengthen China’s nuclear deterrent. The ballistic missiles they carry can at best target Alaska and the northwest corner of the United States when launched within the first island chain. And because the submarines are vulnerable to detection, they would struggle to reach open ocean areas where they could threaten the rest of the United States.
Seizing Taiwan would offer Beijing the kind of military option that previous great powers found very useful.
Even a future Chinese fleet of much quieter advanced nuclear attack or ballistic missile submarines capable of evading outward-facing hydrophones along the second island chain would still have to pass over U.S. upward-facing hydrophones nestled at the exits to the first island chain. These barriers would enable the United States to impose substantial losses on Chinese advanced nuclear attack submarines going to and from Northeast Asian shipping lanes and greatly impede the missions of Chinese ballistic missile submarines, of which there would almost certainly be fewer.
But if it were to acquire Taiwan, China would be able to avoid U.S. hydrophones along the first island chain, unlocking the military potential of quieter submarines. These vessels would have direct access to the Philippine Sea and the protection of Chinese air and coastal defenses, which would keep trailing U.S. ships and aircraft at bay. A fleet of quiet nuclear attack submarines deployed from Taiwan would also have the endurance for a campaign against Northeast Asian shipping lanes. And a fleet of quiet ballistic missile submarines with access to the open ocean would enable China to more credibly threaten the continental United States with a sea-launched nuclear attack.
Of course, it remains to be seen whether China can master more advanced quieting techniques or solve a number of problems that have plagued its nuclear-powered submarines. And the importance of the anti-shipping and sea-based nuclear capabilities is open for debate, since their relative impact will depend on what other capabilities China does or doesn’t develop and on what strategic goals China pursues in the future. Still, the behavior of past great powers is instructive. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union both invested heavily in attack submarines, and the latter made a similar investment in ballistic missile submarines. The democratic adversaries of those countries felt deeply threatened by these undersea capabilities and mounted enormous efforts to neutralize them. A Chinese seizure of Taiwan would thus offer Beijing the kind of military option that previous great powers found very useful.
NO GOOD OPTIONS
A fuller understanding of Taiwan’s military value clearly bolsters the argument in favor of keeping the island in friendly hands. Yet just how decisive that argument should be depends, in part, on what overall strategy the United States pursues in Asia. And whatever approach Washington adopts, it will have to contend with challenges and dilemmas stemming from the military advantages that Taiwan has the potential to confer on whoever controls it.
If the United States maintains its current strategy of containing China, retaining its network of alliances and forward military presence in Asia, defending Taiwan could be extremely costly. After all, the island’s military value gives China a strong motive for seeking unification, beyond the nationalist impulses most commonly cited. Deterring Beijing would therefore probably require abandoning the long-standing U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity about whether Washington would come to the island’s defense in favor of a crystal-clear commitment of military support.
But ending strategic ambiguity could provoke the very crisis the policy is designed to prevent. It would almost certainly heighten pressures for an arms race between the United States and China in anticipation of a conflict, intensifying the already dangerous competition between the two powers. And even if a policy of strategic clarity were successful in deterring a Chinese attempt to take Taiwan, it would likely spur China to compensate for its military disadvantages in some other way, further heightening tensions.
Alternatively, the United States might pursue a more flexible security perimeter that eliminates its commitment to Taiwan while still retaining its treaty alliances and some forward-deployed military forces in Asia. Such an approach would reduce the chance of a conflict over Taiwan, but it would carry other military costs, again owing to the island’s military value. U.S. forces would need to conduct their missions in an arena made much more dangerous by Chinese submarines and hydrophones deployed off the east coast of Taiwan. As a result, the United States might need to develop decoys to deceive Chinese sensors, devise ways to operate outside their normal range, or prepare to cut the cables that connect these sensors to onshore processing centers in the event of war. Washington would almost certainly want to ramp up its efforts to disrupt Chinese satellites.
Should the United States take this approach, reassuring U.S. allies would become a much more arduous task. Precisely because control of Taiwan would grant Beijing significant military advantages, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea would likely demand strong demonstrations of a continuing U.S. commitment. Japan, in particular, would be inclined to worry that a diminished U.S. ability to operate on the surface of the Philippine Sea would translate into enhanced Chinese coercion or attack capability, especially given the proximity of Japan’s southernmost islands to Taiwan.
Over the longer term, U.S. allies in the region would also likely fear the growing Chinese threat to shipping routes and worry that a stronger sea-based Chinese nuclear deterrent would reduce the credibility of U.S. commitments to defend them from attack. Anticipation of these dangers would almost certainly drive U.S. allies to seek greater reassurance from the United States in the form of tighter defense pacts, additional military aid, and more visible U.S. force deployments in the region, including of nuclear forces on or near allies’ territory and perhaps collaborating with their governments on nuclear planning. East Asia could come to look much like Europe did in the later stages of the Cold War, with U.S. allies demanding demonstrations of their U.S. patron’s commitment in the face of doubts about the military balance of power. If the Cold War is any guide, such steps could themselves heighten the risks of nuclear escalation in a crisis or a war.
Finally, the United States might pursue a strategy that ends its commitment to Taiwan and also reduces its military presence in Asia and other alliance commitments in the region. Such a policy might limit direct U.S. military support to the defense of Japan or even wind down all U.S. commitments in East Asia. But even in this case, Taiwan’s potential military value to China would still have the potential to create dangerous regional dynamics. Worried that some of its islands might be next, Japan might fight to defend Taiwan, even if the United States did not. The result might be a major-power war in Asia that could draw in the United States, willingly or not. Such a war would be devastating. Yet upsetting the current delicate equilibrium by ceding this militarily valuable island could make such a war more likely, reinforcing a core argument in favor of current U.S. grand strategy: that U.S. alliance commitments and forward military presence exert a deterring and constraining effect on conflict in the region.
Ultimately, however, Taiwan’s unique military value poses problems for all three U.S. grand strategies. Whether the United States solidifies its commitment to Taiwan and its allies in Asia or walks them back, in full or in part, the island’s potential to alter the region’s military balance will force Washington to confront difficult tradeoffs, ceding military maneuverability in the region or else risking an arms race or even an open conflict with China. Such is the wicked nature of the problem posed by Taiwan, which sits at the nexus of U.S.-Chinese relations, geopolitics, and the military balance in Asia. Regardless of what grand strategy Washington pursues, the island’s military value will present some hazard or exact some price
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Refueling strategy: It's a military pilot's worst nightmare: your aircraft is running dangerously low on fuel, but the tanker that's supposed to meet you for your airborne refueling never shows up. That's the situation U.S. pilots could face in a conflict against China unless the Pentagon quickly makes some changes in its investment priorities and operational concepts, Hudson Institute senior fellow Timothy Walton writes in Ideas.
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18640/taiwan-china-missiles
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Third
The Consequences of Conquest
Why Indo-Pacific Power Hinges on Taiwan
By Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Caitlin Talmadge
July/August 2022
Chinese fighter jets taking off in the Yellow Sea, December 2016
AFP / STR / Getty Images
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-06-16/consequences-conquest-taiwan-indo-pacific
Of all the intractable issues that could spark a hot war between the United States and China, Taiwan is at the very top of the list. And the potential geopolitical consequences of such a war would be profound. Taiwan—“an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender,” as U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur once described it—has important, often underappreciated military value as a gateway to the Philippine Sea, a vital theater for defending Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea from possible Chinese coercion or attack. There is no guarantee that China would win a war for the island—or that such a conflict wouldn’t drag on for years and weaken China. But if Beijing gained control of Taiwan and based military assets there, China’s military position would improve markedly.
Beijing’s ocean surveillance assets and submarines, in particular, could make control of Taiwan a substantial boon to Chinese military power. Even without any major technological or military leaps, possession of the island would improve China’s ability to impede U.S. naval and air operations in the Philippine Sea and thereby limit the United States’ ability to defend its Asian allies. And if, in the future, Beijing were to develop a large fleet of quiet nuclear attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines, basing them on Taiwan would enable China to threaten Northeast Asian shipping lanes and strengthen its sea-based nuclear forces.
Clearly, the island’s military value bolsters the argument for keeping Taiwan out of China’s grasp. The strength of that case, however, depends on several factors, including whether one assumes that China would pursue additional territorial expansion after occupying Taiwan and make the long-term military and technological investments needed to take full advantage of the island. It also depends on the broader course of U.S. China policy. Washington could remain committed to its current approach of containing the expansion of Chinese power through a combination of political commitments to U.S. partners and allies in Asia and a significant forward military presence. Or it might adopt a more flexible policy that retains commitments only to core treaty allies and reduces forward deployed forces. Or it might reduce all such commitments as part of a more restrained approach. Regardless of which of these three strategies the United States pursues, however, Chinese control of Taiwan would limit the U.S. military’s ability to operate in the Pacific and would potentially threaten U.S. interests there.
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But the issue is not just that Taiwan’s tremendous military value poses problems for any U.S. grand strategy. It is that no matter what Washington does—whether it attempts to keep Taiwan out of Chinese hands or not—it will be forced to run risks and incur costs in its standoff with Beijing. As the place where all the dilemmas of U.S. policy toward China collide, Taiwan presents one of the toughest and most dangerous problems in the world. Simply put, Washington has few good options there and a great many bad ones that could court calamity.
TAIWAN IN THE BALANCE
A Chinese assault on Taiwan could shift the military balance of power in Asia in any number of ways. If China were to take the island swiftly and easily, many of its military assets geared toward a Taiwan campaign might be freed up to pursue other military objectives. China might also be able to assimilate Taiwan’s strategic resources, such as its military equipment, personnel, and semiconductor industry, all of which would bolster Beijing’s military power. But if China were to find itself bogged down in a prolonged conquest or occupation of Taiwan, the attempt at forced unification might become a significant drag on Beijing’s might.
Any campaign that delivers Taiwan to China, however, would allow Beijing to base important military hardware there—in particular, underwater surveillance devices and submarines, along with associated air and coastal defense assets. Stationed in Taiwan, these assets would do more than simply extend China’s reach eastward by the length of the Taiwan Strait, as would be the case if China based missiles, aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, or other weapons systems on the island. Underwater surveillance and submarines, by contrast, would improve Beijing’s ability to impede U.S. operations in the Philippine Sea, an area that would be of vital importance in many possible future conflict scenarios involving China.
The most likely scenarios revolve around the United States defending its allies along the so-called first island chain off the Asian mainland, which starts north of Japan and runs southwest through Taiwan and the Philippines before curling up toward Vietnam. For example, U.S. naval operations in these waters would be essential to protecting Japan against potential Chinese threats in the East China Sea and at the southern end of the Ryukyu Islands. Such U.S. operations would also be important in most scenarios for defending the Philippines, and for any scenario that might lead to U.S. strikes on the Chinese mainland, such as a major conflagration on the Korean Peninsula. U.S. naval operations in the Philippine Sea will become even more important as China’s growing missile capabilities render land-based aircraft and their regional bases increasingly vulnerable, forcing the United States to rely more heavily on aircraft and missiles launched from ships.
If a war in the Pacific were to break out today, China’s ability to conduct effective over-the-horizon attacks—that is, attacks targeting U.S. ships at distances that exceed the line of sight to the horizon—would be more limited than commonly supposed. China might be able to target forward-deployed U.S. aircraft carriers and other ships in a first strike that commences a war. But once a conflict is underway, China’s best surveillance assets—large radars located on the mainland that allow China to “see” over the horizon—are likely to be quickly destroyed. The same is true of Chinese surveillance aircraft or ships in the vicinity of U.S. naval forces.
Chinese satellites would be unlikely to make up for these losses. Using techniques the United States honed during the Cold War, U.S. naval forces would probably be able to control their own radar and communications signatures and thereby avoid detection by Chinese satellites that listen for electronic emissions. Without intelligence from these specialized signal-collecting assets, China’s imaging satellites would be left to randomly search vast swaths of ocean for U.S. forces. Under these conditions, U.S. forces operating in the Philippine Sea would face real but tolerable risks of long-range attacks, and U.S. leaders probably would not feel immediate pressure to escalate the conflict by attacking Chinese satellites.
If China were to wrest control of Taiwan, however, the situation would look quite different. China could place underwater microphones called hydrophones in the waters off the island’s east coast, which are much deeper than the waters Beijing currently controls inside the first island chain. Placed at the appropriate depth, these specialized sensors could listen outward and detect the low-frequency sounds of U.S. surface ships thousands of miles away, enabling China to more precisely locate them with satellites and target them with missiles. (U.S. submarines are too quiet for these hydrophones to detect.) Such capabilities could force the United States to restrict its surface ships to areas outside the range of the hydrophones—or else carry out risky and escalatory attacks on Chinese satellites. Neither of these options is appealing.
Washington has few good options on Taiwan and a great many bad ones that could court calamity.
Chinese hydrophones off Taiwan would be difficult for the United States to destroy. Only highly specialized submarines or unmanned underwater vehicles could disable them, and China would be able to defend them with a variety of means, including mines. Even if the United States did manage to damage China’s hydrophone cables, Chinese repair ships could mend them under the cover of air defenses China could deploy on the island.
The best hope for disrupting Chinese hydrophone surveillance would be to attack the vulnerable processing stations where the data comes ashore via fiber-optic cables. But those stations could prove hard to find. The cables can be buried on land as well as under the sea, and nothing distinguishes the buildings where data processing is done from similar nondescript military buildings. The range of possible U.S. targets could include hundreds of individual structures inside multiple well-defended military locations across Taiwan.
Control of Taiwan would do more than enhance Chinese ocean surveillance capabilities, however. It would also give China an advantage in submarine warfare. With Taiwan in friendly hands, the United States can defend against Chinese attack submarines by placing underwater sensors in key locations to pick up the sounds the submarines emit. The United States likely deploys such upward-facing hydrophones—for listening at shorter distances—along the bottom of narrow chokepoints at the entrances to the Philippine Sea, including in the gaps between the Philippines, the Ryukyu Islands, and Taiwan. At such close ranges, these instruments can briefly detect even the quietest submarines, allowing U.S. air and surface assets to trail them. During a crisis, that could prevent Chinese submarines from getting a “free shot” at U.S. ships in the early stages of a war, when forward-deployed U.S. naval assets would be at their most vulnerable.
If China were to gain control of Taiwan, however, it would be able to base submarines and supporting air and coastal defenses on the island. Chinese submarines would then be able to slip from their pens in Taiwan’s eastern deep-water ports directly into the Philippine Sea, bypassing the chokepoints where U.S. hydrophones would be listening. Chinese defenses on Taiwan would also prevent the United States and its allies from using their best tools for trailing submarines—maritime patrol aircraft and helicopter-equipped ships—near the island, making it much easier for Chinese submarines to strike first in a crisis and reducing their attrition rate in a war. Control of Taiwan would have the added advantage of reducing the distance between Chinese submarine bases and their patrol areas from an average of 670 nautical miles to zero, enabling China to operate more submarines at any given time and carry out more attacks against U.S. forces. Chinese submarines could also make use of the more precise targeting data collected by hydrophones and satellites, dramatically improving their effectiveness against U.S. surface ships.
UNDER THE SEA
Over time, unification with Taiwan could offer China even greater military advantages if it were to invest in a fleet of much quieter advanced nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines. Operated from Taiwan’s east coast, these submarines would strengthen China’s nuclear deterrent and allow it to threaten Northeast Asian shipping and naval routes in the event of a war.
Currently, China’s submarine force is poorly equipped for a campaign against the oil and maritime trade of U.S. allies. Global shipping has traditionally proved resilient in the face of such threats because it is possible to reroute vessels outside the range of hostile forces. Even the closure of the Suez Canal between 1967 and 1975 did not paralyze global trade, since ships were instead able to go around the Cape of Good Hope, albeit at some additional cost. This resiliency means that Beijing would have to target shipping routes as they migrated north or west across the Pacific Ocean, likely near ports in Northeast Asia. But most of China’s current attack submarines are low-endurance diesel-electric boats that would struggle to operate at such distances, while its few longer-endurance nuclear-powered submarines are noisy and thus vulnerable to detection by U.S. outward-facing hydrophones that could be deployed along the so-called second island chain, which stretches southeast from Japan through the Northern Mariana Islands and past Guam.
Similarly, China’s current crop of ballistic missile submarines do little to strengthen China’s nuclear deterrent. The ballistic missiles they carry can at best target Alaska and the northwest corner of the United States when launched within the first island chain. And because the submarines are vulnerable to detection, they would struggle to reach open ocean areas where they could threaten the rest of the United States.
Seizing Taiwan would offer Beijing the kind of military option that previous great powers found very useful.
Even a future Chinese fleet of much quieter advanced nuclear attack or ballistic missile submarines capable of evading outward-facing hydrophones along the second island chain would still have to pass over U.S. upward-facing hydrophones nestled at the exits to the first island chain. These barriers would enable the United States to impose substantial losses on Chinese advanced nuclear attack submarines going to and from Northeast Asian shipping lanes and greatly impede the missions of Chinese ballistic missile submarines, of which there would almost certainly be fewer.
But if it were to acquire Taiwan, China would be able to avoid U.S. hydrophones along the first island chain, unlocking the military potential of quieter submarines. These vessels would have direct access to the Philippine Sea and the protection of Chinese air and coastal defenses, which would keep trailing U.S. ships and aircraft at bay. A fleet of quiet nuclear attack submarines deployed from Taiwan would also have the endurance for a campaign against Northeast Asian shipping lanes. And a fleet of quiet ballistic missile submarines with access to the open ocean would enable China to more credibly threaten the continental United States with a sea-launched nuclear attack.
Of course, it remains to be seen whether China can master more advanced quieting techniques or solve a number of problems that have plagued its nuclear-powered submarines. And the importance of the anti-shipping and sea-based nuclear capabilities is open for debate, since their relative impact will depend on what other capabilities China does or doesn’t develop and on what strategic goals China pursues in the future. Still, the behavior of past great powers is instructive. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union both invested heavily in attack submarines, and the latter made a similar investment in ballistic missile submarines. The democratic adversaries of those countries felt deeply threatened by these undersea capabilities and mounted enormous efforts to neutralize them. A Chinese seizure of Taiwan would thus offer Beijing the kind of military option that previous great powers found very useful.
NO GOOD OPTIONS
A fuller understanding of Taiwan’s military value clearly bolsters the argument in favor of keeping the island in friendly hands. Yet just how decisive that argument should be depends, in part, on what overall strategy the United States pursues in Asia. And whatever approach Washington adopts, it will have to contend with challenges and dilemmas stemming from the military advantages that Taiwan has the potential to confer on whoever controls it.
If the United States maintains its current strategy of containing China, retaining its network of alliances and forward military presence in Asia, defending Taiwan could be extremely costly. After all, the island’s military value gives China a strong motive for seeking unification, beyond the nationalist impulses most commonly cited. Deterring Beijing would therefore probably require abandoning the long-standing U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity about whether Washington would come to the island’s defense in favor of a crystal-clear commitment of military support.
But ending strategic ambiguity could provoke the very crisis the policy is designed to prevent. It would almost certainly heighten pressures for an arms race between the United States and China in anticipation of a conflict, intensifying the already dangerous competition between the two powers. And even if a policy of strategic clarity were successful in deterring a Chinese attempt to take Taiwan, it would likely spur China to compensate for its military disadvantages in some other way, further heightening tensions.
Alternatively, the United States might pursue a more flexible security perimeter that eliminates its commitment to Taiwan while still retaining its treaty alliances and some forward-deployed military forces in Asia. Such an approach would reduce the chance of a conflict over Taiwan, but it would carry other military costs, again owing to the island’s military value. U.S. forces would need to conduct their missions in an arena made much more dangerous by Chinese submarines and hydrophones deployed off the east coast of Taiwan. As a result, the United States might need to develop decoys to deceive Chinese sensors, devise ways to operate outside their normal range, or prepare to cut the cables that connect these sensors to onshore processing centers in the event of war. Washington would almost certainly want to ramp up its efforts to disrupt Chinese satellites.
Should the United States take this approach, reassuring U.S. allies would become a much more arduous task. Precisely because control of Taiwan would grant Beijing significant military advantages, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea would likely demand strong demonstrations of a continuing U.S. commitment. Japan, in particular, would be inclined to worry that a diminished U.S. ability to operate on the surface of the Philippine Sea would translate into enhanced Chinese coercion or attack capability, especially given the proximity of Japan’s southernmost islands to Taiwan.
Over the longer term, U.S. allies in the region would also likely fear the growing Chinese threat to shipping routes and worry that a stronger sea-based Chinese nuclear deterrent would reduce the credibility of U.S. commitments to defend them from attack. Anticipation of these dangers would almost certainly drive U.S. allies to seek greater reassurance from the United States in the form of tighter defense pacts, additional military aid, and more visible U.S. force deployments in the region, including of nuclear forces on or near allies’ territory and perhaps collaborating with their governments on nuclear planning. East Asia could come to look much like Europe did in the later stages of the Cold War, with U.S. allies demanding demonstrations of their U.S. patron’s commitment in the face of doubts about the military balance of power. If the Cold War is any guide, such steps could themselves heighten the risks of nuclear escalation in a crisis or a war.
Finally, the United States might pursue a strategy that ends its commitment to Taiwan and also reduces its military presence in Asia and other alliance commitments in the region. Such a policy might limit direct U.S. military support to the defense of Japan or even wind down all U.S. commitments in East Asia. But even in this case, Taiwan’s potential military value to China would still have the potential to create dangerous regional dynamics. Worried that some of its islands might be next, Japan might fight to defend Taiwan, even if the United States did not. The result might be a major-power war in Asia that could draw in the United States, willingly or not. Such a war would be devastating. Yet upsetting the current delicate equilibrium by ceding this militarily valuable island could make such a war more likely, reinforcing a core argument in favor of current U.S. grand strategy: that U.S. alliance commitments and forward military presence exert a deterring and constraining effect on conflict in the region.
Ultimately, however, Taiwan’s unique military value poses problems for all three U.S. grand strategies. Whether the United States solidifies its commitment to Taiwan and its allies in Asia or walks them back, in full or in part, the island’s potential to alter the region’s military balance will force Washington to confront difficult tradeoffs, ceding military maneuverability in the region or else risking an arms race or even an open conflict with China. Such is the wicked nature of the problem posed by Taiwan, which sits at the nexus of U.S.-Chinese relations, geopolitics, and the military balance in Asia. Regardless of what grand strategy Washington pursues, the island’s military value will present some hazard or exact some price
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18640/taiwan-china-missiles
We are on the razor's edge of WWIII, even if most people have no idea.
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Hat tip YA:
https://drpippa.substack.com/p/taiwan
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Heavy pressure is being put on Pelosi not to visit Taiwan. The pressure is coming from the White House, Congress cowards (Rep McCaul invited to go with Pelosi to show bipartisan support is too busy) AND the Pentagon
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End the ambiguity and guarantee Taiwan’s security
Alarm bells should be ringing in the White House
By Daniel N. Hoffman
Speaking at the Aspen Security Forum last week, CIA Director William Burns observed that Russia’s brutal war on Ukraine “probably affects less the question of whether the Chinese leadership might choose some years down the road to use force to control Taiwan, but how and when they would do it.”
The chief of the CIA — the agency whose mission is to recruit spies, steal secrets and produce all-source analysis on the wickedly challenging worldwide threats to our national security — was delivering a stark warning.
But the intelligence community does not make policy decisions. That’s a job for President Biden and his foreign policy team.
Nevertheless, alarm bells should be ringing in the White House.
That’s because it is becoming clearer by the day that Taiwan is sitting at the epicenter of the geopolitical fault line between democracy and dictatorship.
China is militarizing the South China Sea, aggressively expanding its nuclear arsenal and developing sophisticated cyberwarfare and space capabilities. Beijing is also mounting full-throttled espionage operations against the U.S. and our allies. China counterfeits U.S. products and steals trade secrets by requiring U.S. companies to share technology in return for market access. Chinese theft of intellectual property costs the U.S. economy billions of dollars annually.
Listen to FBI Director Christopher Wray: “From a counterintelligence perspective, China represents the broadest and most challenging threat we face as a country.”
Adm. John Aquilino, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, has emphasized that China now boasts the world’s second-largest defense budget after the U.S. and is rapidly modernizing its military force with weapons systems that include the J-20 stealth fighter, hypersonic missiles and two aircraft carriers, with a third under construction.
Communist China has long claimed Taiwan is a “breakaway province” to be reunited by force if necessary — despite having never ruled it. The People’s Liberation Army routinely deploys its warplanes across the Taiwan Strait into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, which is fewer than 125 miles from China’s southeastern coast. China menacingly conducts combat readiness drills near Taiwan and, as a matter of policy, seeks to isolate Taiwan diplomatically.
Annexing Taiwan would extend the PRC’s reach into the East China Sea and signifi cantly increase the threat to Japan and Guam. Equally worrisome, China would subsume Taiwan’s vibrant economy and high-tech industry, including its world-class semiconductor factories, on which the U.S. and its allies rely to power everything from smartphones to cars.
U.S. credibility in the region and beyond would take a disastrous hit.
Deterring a Chinese attack on Taiwan is clearly in the U.S. national interest.
While China has significant maritime and air superiority, Taiwan is highly defensible, especially with a commitment to small-unit tactics such as the ones Ukraine has successfully deployed against Russia, along with asymmetric defensive tactics that include mines, and U.S.-made Javelin and Stinger missiles and sophisticated coastal missile defense systems.
Gathering intelligence on China’s plans, including destructive cyberattacks, would also be critical. China would seek to deny Taiwan any warning before launching what would be one of the largest amphibious assaults in history.
The goal for Washington and Taipei is to make Taiwan a hard target, one too costly in spilled blood and lost treasure for China to invade.
Again, the Ukraine example is instructive: The West’s failure to deter the Kremlin resulted in the most destructive land war in Europe since World War II.
After Russia invaded Ukraine, the late Japanese former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called on the Biden administration to abandon the U.S. government’s long-held “strategic ambiguity” position regarding defense policy regarding Taiwan. On three occasions, most recently at a press conference during his May 2022 visit to Japan, Mr. Biden flatly answered the U.S. would respond militarily to defend Taiwan if China attacked.
Under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. pledges only to sell Taiwan only defensive weapons. There is no binding agreement to defend Taiwan even if Mr. Biden said “that was the commitment we made.” Each time the president said it, his own administration aides walked back his words and denied Mr. Biden was changing official policy. The Biden administration would do well to consider Abe’s extraordinary legacy, his warnings about the growing threat of China’s aggression, and the necessity of reexamining the policy of “strategic ambiguity,” which may actually the likelihood of war because of its inherent uncertainty and potential for miscalculations on all sides. Building on the high level of bipartisan consensus to deter China, Mr. Biden should enhance collaboration with regional allies such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and India. And U.S. intelligence agencies, the State Department and the Pentagon should assess whether a commitment to defend Taiwan’s territorial integrity — replacing “strategic ambiguity” with “strategic certainty” — might in fact be the surest way to deter China. Daniel N. Hoffman is a retired clandestine services officer and former chief of station with the Central Intelligence Agency. His combined 30 years of government service included high-level overseas and domestic positions at the CIA. He has been a Fox News contributor since May 2018. Follow him on Twitter @ DanielHoffmanDC.
China would seek to deny Taiwan any warning before launching what would be one of the largest amphibious assaults in history.
THE BIG
PICTURE
BY DANIEL N. HOFFMAN
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China’s Xi Threatens Biden Over Taiwan in 2-Hour Phone Call: ‘Playing With Fire Will Set You on Fire’
By Andrew Thornebrooke July 28, 2022 Updated: July 28, 2022biggersmaller Print
President Joe Biden held a phone call with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping on July 28. The call was the fifth of its kind between Biden and Xi and lasted more than two hours.
The call occurred amid a myriad of tensions that have caused Sino–U.S. relations to fall to their lowest point in decades. Despite a decreasing willingness by the CCP to negotiate on most issues, the White House stated that it’s important to keep the lines of communication open between the two powers.
“The President wants to make sure that the lines of communication with President Xi remain open, because they need to,” said White House national security spokesperson John Kirby. “There’s issues where we can cooperate with China on, and then there’s issues where, obviously, there’s friction and tension.
“This is one of the most consequential bilateral relationships in the world today, with ramifications well beyond both individual countries. The president clearly understands that, and we’re going to continue to work on that relationship.”
Chinese state-owned media outlets stated that the exchange was “candid and in-depth” and that the two leaders promised to stay in communication.
Xi reportedly told Biden that it was the duty of “the two major powers” to manage global security and urged Biden to not view the CCP through the lens of “strategic competition.”
Biden is currently contending with the need to adequately address China’s status as a rising power while simultaneously mitigating the regime’s increasingly hostile behavior.
To that end, Xi’s conversation with Biden focused heavily on Taiwan.
“Playing with fire will set you on fire,” Xi told Biden. “I hope the U.S. can see this clearly.”
A readout of the call released by the White House downplayed the exchange and said merely that the United States’ policy in recognizing the CCP as the sole entity governing China hasn’t changed.
“The call was a part of the Biden Administration’s efforts to maintain and deepen lines of communication between the United States and the PRC and responsibly manage our differences and work together where our interests align,” the readout said, referring to the acronym for the regime’s official name, the People’s Republic of China.
“On Taiwan, President Biden underscored that the United States policy has not changed and that the United States strongly opposes unilateral efforts to change the status quo or undermine peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.”
The CCP maintains that Taiwan is a breakaway province of China. Xi has vowed to unite the island with the mainland and hasn’t ruled out the use of force to do so. For its part, Taiwan has been self-governed since 1949, has never been under CCP control, and boasts a thriving democracy and market economy.
The United States doesn’t have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan but is bound by a treaty to provide it with the arms necessary for its self-defense. The government also maintains a doctrine of “strategic ambiguity,” in which it will neither confirm nor deny whether it would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion.
Epoch Times Photo
A view shows naval vessels on the water as part of Taiwan’s main annual “Han Kuang” exercises, as 20 naval vessels including frigates and destroyers fired shells to simulate intercepting and attacking an invading force, off Taiwan’s northeastern coast, in Yilan, Taiwan, on July 26, 2022. (REUTERS/Ann Wang)
Tensions over the Taiwan issue grew over the past week amid speculation that House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) is planning a personal visit to the island nation.
The CCP subsequently threatened “forceful measures” against the United States and Taiwan should the trip take place. Following the remarks, Biden publicly said such a trip was “not a good idea” and suggested that the military was against it.
Biden’s statements raised eyebrows from legislators and experts alike, who believed that they overstepped the bounds of both the president and the military in attempting to control the personal travel of a sitting member of Congress.
Pelosi said the administration may have believed that China would shoot down her plane if she visited Taiwan.
The back and forth was just one incident in a growing line of bellicose and, at times, hostile rhetoric emanating from the highest echelons of the CCP.
In May, China’s defense minister said the CCP would “not hesitate to start a war no matter the cost” to prevent Taiwan’s de facto independence from being recognized internationally.
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third
Japan Discusses Preparations for Conflict in a Rare Visit to Taiwan
By Dorothy Li July 28, 2022 Updated: July 28, 2022biggersmaller Print
A high-level Japanese delegation visited Taiwan to discuss preparations for potential conflicts as the self-governed island is bearing increased military pressures from the communist regime in Beijing.
“We need to think ahead about what kind of situations could happen,” Shigeru Ishiba, lawmaker and former Japanese defense minister, said during a meeting with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen on July 28. “And after it happens, what kind of laws and agreements we should prepare, and what kind of armed forces we could employ to address the resulting issues.”
“We need to work together to reach consensus on this ahead of anything that could happen,” Ishiba said at the Presidential Office in Taipei.
Ishiba led the bipartisan delegation of Japanese lawmakers who arrived in Taiwan on July 27 for a four-day visit. The trip was focused on discussing regional security, which the Japanese lawmaker described as “rare.”
The trip came amid rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait as Beijing has ramped up military harassment around Taiwan by continuing to send warplanes to fly near the island on a regular basis for the past two years.
The Chinese regime views the self-ruled island roughly 100 miles off the mainland as its own territory to be taken by force, if necessary.
Following reports that Pelosi was planning a trip to Taiwan, the regime has threatened “forceful measures” against the United States and Taiwan.
The regime’s provocation also drew the attention of neighboring Japan, which devoted significant space of this year’s defense report to Taiwan.
Taiwan Welcomes Japanese Visit
The visit by Japanese lawmakers was welcomed by Tsai, who expressed hopes of bolstering ties with Japan to uphold regional security.
“Defending Taiwan is not just about defending our own sovereignty,” said Tsai. “In terms of regional strategic security, it is also about Taiwan’s position as a critical line of defense in the first island chain.”
The first island chain, situated east of mainland Asia, is a string of islands spanning the Japanese archipelago through Taiwan to Indonesia, access to which is vital for global supply lines.
“We will continue to deepen cooperation with Japan and other democratic partners in order to jointly maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific,” said Tsai.
The group’s visit also includes meetings with Su Tseng-chang, president of Taiwan’s Executive Yuan, and representatives from Taiwan’s Defense Ministry.
Ishiba was accompanied by former Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada, and two other Japanese lawmakers, Akihisa Nakashima and Takayuki Shimizu, who are all members of a cross-party national security group.
Ishiba said Japan has a responsibility to the Indo-Pacific region to promote regional security, economic development, and the rule of law.
“It cannot just be at the level of thought, just words spoken out of one’s mouth,” he said. “Japan must take on concrete responsibilities in the Asia region.”
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Often, I am not a fan of FA, but this one offers a lot to consider:
How to Survive the Next Taiwan Strait Crisis
Washington Must Be Ready For a Showdown With or Without a Pelosi Trip
By David Sacks
July 29, 2022
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-survive-next-taiwan-strait-crisis
“The military thinks it’s not a good idea right now.” That was U.S. President Joe Biden’s observation in late July about House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s planned trip to Taiwan, which is reportedly scheduled for next month. Such trepidation seems to be well warranted. Pelosi herself acknowledged as much; when asked about the president’s remarks, she said, “maybe the military was afraid our plane would get shot down or something like that by the Chinese.” Those statements reveal that the United States likely has intelligence or a private warning from China that it is planning an unprecedented, highly escalatory response if Pelosi does indeed visit Taipei.
A two-hour phone call between President Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping on July 28th appears to have done little to defuse the situation. China’s official summary of the conversation quoted Xi warning President Biden that “[t]hose who play with fire will perish by it.”
Pelosi’s potential visit leaves U.S. policymakers with few good options. If she cancels the trip, it would likely embolden China to increase its coercion of Taiwan and deal a blow to the Taiwanese public’s confidence in their future. On the other hand, a visit would probably provoke a crisis, as China would feel compelled to respond lest its threats be seen as hollow. It would be wrong to think, however, that Pelosi’s travel plans will determine whether a showdown materializes in the Taiwan Strait. In reality, the United States and China are barreling toward such a crisis—and it will be far riskier than previous standoffs. China, possessing significant military capabilities and less concerned about preserving its relations with the United States, is now far more willing to respond to a perceived provocation with escalation than it was during previous crises.
Given the probability of a crisis or even a conflict, the United States should prioritize ensuring that it has the capability to come to Taiwan’s defense and helping Taiwan ready itself for a potential invasion. This agenda, more than symbolic gestures, should guide the U.S. approach in the critical years ahead.
NOT THE FIRST TIME
For all the attention that Pelosi’s trip is attracting, it is not unprecedented. There have been similar visits in the past, which are fully consistent with the U.S. one-China policy, under which the United States recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, acknowledges (but does not endorse) China’s position that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China, and maintains unofficial relations with Taiwan. Pelosi is not the first Speaker of the House to visit: Newt Gingrich met with Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui in Taipei in 1997. To be sure, Gingrich was a Republican Speaker during a Democratic administration; Pelosi and Biden, in contrast, belong to the same party. For that reason, Chinese officials believe she is acting in coordination with the White House.
Still, congressional delegations routinely visit Taiwan. Past administrations have sent cabinet-level officials to the island; in 2020, Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar visited Taipei. Pelosi would travel on U.S. military aircraft, but that is also nothing new; in June 2021, for instance, three U.S. senators arrived in Taiwan aboard a U.S. Air Force plane.
What sets Pelosi’s visit apart is that it would occur at a time when Beijing believes that the United States is moving away from its one-China policy. And there have been noticeable changes in U.S. diplomacy toward Taiwan in recent years. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo sent his congratulations to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen on her inauguration in 2020. The Trump administration hosted Taiwan’s diplomats at the State Department and in other federal government buildings, which has remained the practice during the Biden administration. Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly referred to Taiwan as a “country.” The Biden administration extended an invitation to Taiwan’s representative in the United States to attend Biden’s inauguration and invited Taiwan to participate in its Summit for Democracy. Administration officials also leaked to the media that U.S. military personnel are in Taiwan training its forces. None of these moves are tantamount to diplomatic recognition, but Beijing may view Pelosi’s trip as an opportunity to send a message that the United States must stop what China sees as an intentional pattern.
Beijing believes that the United States is moving away from its one-China policy.
Aside from attempting to halt the strengthening of U.S.-Taiwanese ties, China’s reaction to Pelosi’s potential visit is in part the product of unfortunate timing. Chinese President Xi Jinping will be seeking an unprecedented third term as head of the Chinese Communist Party this fall. He likely fears that high-level, public U.S. support for Taiwan would make him look weak and not in control of critical relationships and undermine his standing.
More important, Beijing’s reaction reveals its growing comfort with the prospect of a crisis over Taiwan. As Xi faces economic headwinds at home and growing resentment over his strict zero-COVID policy, he may have concluded that a Taiwan crisis could rally the public and shore up his popularity. Xi may also have decided that international support for Taiwan is growing too strong, especially in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Both Taiwan and Ukraine are relatively young democracies that exist next to much larger authoritarian neighbors with long-standing designs on their territory; leaders around the world have taken note of the parallels. Xi may feel he needs to deter countries from working with Taipei to increase its defenses and resilience. He could also find Pelosi’s visit to be an advantageous pretext for large-scale military exercises, which could test the People’s Liberation Army’s preparedness for complex operations. That could provide him clues as to whether China’s military would fare better than Russia’s did in Ukraine and gauge how the United States and Taiwan would react.
CHINA ARMS UP
The last Taiwan Strait crisis occurred more than a quarter century ago. The instigating event was the 1995 address Lee gave at his alma mater, Cornell University, on what he dubbed “Taiwan’s democratization experience.” The fact that the Taiwanese president was granted a visa to visit the United States after Secretary of State Warren Christopher assured his Chinese counterpart that Lee would not be allowed to enter the country enraged Beijing. In retaliation, the Chinese military conducted missile tests and exercises in the Taiwan Strait. This prompted Secretary of Defense William Perry to announce that the United States would dispatch two aircraft carrier strike groups to the area, demonstrating that the United States was prepared to intervene to repel a Chinese invasion.
Since then, China has developed a more robust toolkit to punish Taiwan. Whereas Taiwan’s military budget exceeded China’s in 1994, China now outspends Taiwan by a factor of 20. In recent years, China has become bolder in its coercive military maneuvers: look no further than its near-daily incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. To send a message, China will now have to do something that rises significantly above that kind of baiting, which means its options are increasingly escalatory.
In addition to its military advantage, China has significantly more leverage over Taiwan’s economy. At the time of the 1995–96 crisis, Taiwan’s exports to the mainland accounted for one-third of one percent of its total exports; today, that figure is 30 percent. China could choose to cut off its market to many Taiwanese goods, a move that would be difficult for Taiwan—or the United States—to counter.
It is not just relations between China and Taiwan that have evolved. During previous crises, China had an overriding interest in preserving a constructive relationship with the United States. This was true during the 1995–96 crisis, the standoff sparked by the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and an incident in 2001, when a Chinese fighter jet collided with a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. In all these cases, Chinese leaders ultimately sought a way to de-escalate tensions. Now, however, with U.S.-Chinese relations in a free fall, Xi may believe there is little left to preserve.
TROUBLE AHEAD
A far more dangerous era for cross-strait relations is in the offing. Xi has set an objective of achieving China’s “great rejuvenation” by 2049; unification with Taiwan is a precondition for that goal. And he may want to move more rapidly than that timeline suggests: Xi is unlikely to live to see 2049 (he would be approaching 100 years old) and has said that this issue cannot be passed from generation to generation. That implies he would like to at least make significant progress on the question of Taiwan’s status or resolve it altogether on his watch. As CIA Director William J. Burns recently said, “I wouldn’t underestimate President Xi’s determination to assert China’s control—the People’s Republic of China’s control—over Taiwan. . . . I think the risks of that become higher, it seems to us, the further into this decade that you get.” After cementing his rule at the upcoming Party Congress and having sidelined rivals and placed loyalists in critical positions, Xi will have a freer hand for pursuing his objectives.
To head off the worst possible outcomes of this dangerous new phase, the Biden administration should initiate a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. This is overdue, given that the last such review took place in 1994, and there have been significant changes in cross-strait dynamics in the intervening years. A guiding principle of U.S. policy should be deterring a Chinese attack on Taiwan. To that end, the United States should make clear that it would use force in coming to Taiwan’s defense.
The U.S. government should improve Taiwan’s combat capabilities.
In addition to such assurances, the U.S. government should improve Taiwan’s combat capabilities. The United States should assist Taiwan in reforming its reserve forces and developing territorial defense forces while pushing Taipei to increase its defense spending and invest in asymmetric capabilities such as missiles, sea mines, and portable air defenses. U.S. policymakers must also work with Taiwan to prepare its civilian population for a potential Chinese attack. This would entail planning for how to maintain adequate food, fuel, and medical supplies during a conflict.
Meanwhile, to lower the chances of a conflagration, the United States should reconsider gestures that will inflame tensions but do not meaningfully increase deterrence or Taiwan’s resilience. Bilateral security cooperation between the United States and Taiwan will need to grow in the coming years, but such activities should not be made public. High-level U.S. officials should visit when there is a substantive reason for doing so, such as discussing U.S.-Taiwanese trade relations or cooperation on global health issues. If the United States believes that a crisis is brewing, a high-level symbolic trip could be useful to send a signal to China, but until that day arrives senior officials should not touch down in Taipei just for the sake of doing so.
By that standard, Pelosi’s planned visit is ill advised. Although Taiwan is unlikely to secure any tangible gains, it will bear the brunt of any Chinese response. But Pelosi seems unlikely to cancel her trip; she may feel that this is her last opportunity to show her support for Taiwan, given that she is unlikely to remain Speaker following the midterm elections. Plus, a bedrock of her political career has been taking a tough stance on China. Now that the visit has become public and there is significant bipartisan support in Congress for her trip, there will also be political fallout if her plans end in a cancellation.
The best outcome, then, would be for Pelosi to delay her trip until after the midterms but before the next session of Congress, which would coincide with the aftermath of China’s Party Congress. Xi will likely sell any delay as a Chinese victory, much as Chinese President Jiang Zemin cast the 1995–96 crisis in the same light, and Pelosi would still be able to count a trip as part of her legacy. In the meantime, Pelosi could introduce legislation that would increase Taiwan’s defense capabilities, potentially including provisions such as prioritizing arms deliveries to the island or starting a foreign military financing program with Taipei. A bill could also grant the Biden administration authority to negotiate a comprehensive trade deal with Taiwan. In preparing for a future crisis over Taiwan, such substantive measures would be far more meaningful than any symbolic gesture
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https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/2504075/pelosi-may-soon-land-in-taiwan
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Somehow, I think Pelosi will go to Taiwan. US credibility is at stake.
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Somehow, I think Pelosi will go to Taiwan. US credibility is at stake.
Like in Afghanistan?
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Especially after Afghanistan.
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Especially after Afghanistan.
Prepare for the world to laugh at us again.
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Oh, it is much worse than that.
Prepare to have our assumptions shattered.
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Oh, it is much worse than that.
Prepare to have our assumptions shattered.
What assumptions would those be?
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That we are immune to the laws of nature.
We assume that we are not set up to fall very fast and very far.
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"Somehow, I think Pelosi will go to Taiwan. US credibility is at stake."
I was thinking that too
They expressly took Taiwan off the publicly released Asian trip itinerary
so they could sneak her in under their noses
but ......
then perhaps they could not get her out! :)))
or she sneaks out in a raft at night to a submarine... ...dressed as a man........
But does she have the guts to go ?
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What a strange issue. Yes, she should be free to travel there. China would be crazy to shoot first in this war, for no reason and no gain, and I don't think crazy is their problem. If taking Taiwan by force is their goal, a stupid air fight with the USA isn't their best first step.
Pelosi is irrelevant; China would have done better to ignore her.
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What a strange issue. Yes, she should be free to travel there. China would be crazy to shoot first in this war, for no reason and no gain, and I don't think crazy is their problem. If taking Taiwan by force is their goal, a stupid air fight with the USA isn't their best first step.
Pelosi is irrelevant; China would have done better to ignore her.
You don't need to agree with a culture, but you'd better understand their worldview. Especially when they have nukes.
https://www.china-mike.com/chinese-culture/cult-of-face/
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https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/2522859/taiwan-situation-serious
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pasting GM's post here as well:
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/ballistic-missiles-soar-over-taiwan-hundreds-pla-fighters-breach-airspace-5-day-drills
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We should have a President (here) who can effectively call out the Chinese regime's dangerous BS.
Reunify WHAT? When was the Island nation of Taiwan under the tyrannical government of the Chinese Communist Party?
FIRST, hold free and fair elections on the Mainland. Then have the reunification vote on BOTH sides of the Strait.
Why can't someone say that aloud?
Let's get both Russia and China off the UN security council or just leave them out of the organization that replaces it. Russia invaded and occupies its neighbor and China is shooting missiles over, blockading and threatening theirs. Aren't these violations of 'international law'?
PS. But I'm glad they did not shoot down Pelosi and her entourage.
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The US doesn’t hold free and fair elections, why should anyone else?
https://www.moonofalabama.org/2022/08/how-pelosis-visit-hurts-taiwan.html
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https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/ballistic-missiles-soar-over-taiwan-hundreds-pla-fighters-breach-airspace-5-day-drills
The US doesn’t hold free and fair elections, why should anyone else?
https://www.moonofalabama.org/2022/08/how-pelosis-visit-hurts-taiwan.html
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... free and fair elections, why should anyone...?
It beats living under tyranny.
Every time it's tried.
Taiwan has it.
Why should they downgrade?
Because somebody stuffed ballot boxes here?
Doesn't make sense.
I'd rather fight for free and fair elections.,
cue up Beatles song, Here, There, Everywhere.
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... free and fair elections, why should anyone...?
It beats living under tyranny.
Every time it's tried.
Taiwan has it.
Why should they downgrade?
Because somebody stuffed ballot boxes here?
Doesn't make sense.
I'd rather fight for free and fair elections.,
cue up Beatles song, Here, There, Everywhere.
Ask the J6 prisoners about living under tyranny.
"Because somebody stuffed ballot boxes here?"
Let's be clear, the DOJ/FBI, other LE agencies, the US Intelligence community and the US Military staged a coup and ended the American Republic.
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"Let's be clear, the DOJ/FBI, other LE agencies, the US Intelligence community and the US Military staged a coup and ended the American Republic."
don't forget to add our free and honest press holding those people accountable as arbiters of the truth! :roll:
But I agree with Doug.........
at least here this is some push back though not enough
where as in CCP land it is worse.
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"Let's be clear, the DOJ/FBI, other LE agencies, the US Intelligence community and the US Military staged a coup and ended the American Republic."
don't forget to add our free and honest press holding those people accountable as arbiters of the truth! :roll:
But I agree with Doug.........
at least here this is some push back though not enough
where as in CCP land it is worse.
The PRC is worse, for now.
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https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/chinas-war-drills-disrupt-container-ship-traffic-taiwans-top-ports
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https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/chinas-war-drills-disrupt-container-ship-traffic-taiwans-top-ports
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/chinese-ambassador-called-white-house-after-overnight-sanctions-we-do-not-want-crisis
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Another Way to Help Taiwan—and America
The U.S. can ease the pressure of China’s economic coercion with a bilateral trade deal.
By The Editorial BoardFollow
Aug. 5, 2022 6:25 pm ET
China is trying to show the world this week that it can isolate Taiwan, with a show of live-fire military exercises and trade restrictions. One non-military way the U.S. can respond is by expanding economic and free-trade ties with the island democracy.
Beijing claims its escalations are a response to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan this week. After meeting with President Tsai Ing-wen, the House Speaker said she discussed “a trade agreement that might be possible and soon.” That’s good news, and the Democrats now running Washington could move with dispatch to help Taiwan withstand China’s economic coercion.
With $114.1 billion in two-way trade, Taiwan was America’s eighth largest merchandise trading partner last year, outpacing India, France and Italy. Taiwan was the 10th largest U.S. export market and the seventh largest source of imports. But there’s room to grow, and Taiwan made a goodwill overture with its recent removal of barriers to U.S. beef and pork. Taiwan’s agricultural imports from the U.S. in 2021 rose 18% to $3.94 billion.
Yet the White House has been slow to move on a Taiwan trade deal, as it also has been on trade in the entire Asia-Pacific region. In May the Biden Administration launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework as a way to deepen U.S. economic engagement. Taiwan’s chief trade negotiator said this spring that it hoped to become a “full member.” But the island was excluded from the framework.
Taiwan’s consolation prize is a U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade launched in June. But this effort overlaps with the existing U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue. Neither the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework nor the U.S.-Taiwan trade initiative include negotiations on market access, which limits their economic impact.
Far better would be a bilateral free-trade deal. And if Mrs. Pelosi is serious about countering China’s attempt to isolate Taiwan, she could support renewal of the expired trade promotion authority that allows the White House to fast-track trade deals in Congress.
The Congressional Research Service has identified Taiwanese barriers to agriculture, digital services, biotech and medical devices as among the U.S. trade concerns. Trade promotion authority would facilitate negotiations over these issues and reassure Taiwan that Congress won’t rewrite a deal once it is signed by the Biden Administration.
China’s pressure campaign underscores the urgency as it conducts live-fire exercises in six areas around Taiwan. This is an escalation compared to China’s exercises in 1995 and 1996 in a previous Taiwan Strait crisis. The disruption to air and ship traffic amounts to a temporary blockade. Beijing knows its military intimidation can change the risk calculus of business and deter foreign investment in Taiwan.
On Monday China barred shipments from more than 100 Taiwanese food exporters. Later in the week it banned Taiwanese citrus, as well as two kinds of fish. Bloomberg reports that Beijing has now blocked nearly a third of Taiwanese food items.
China is Taiwan’s largest trade partner, and Beijing is betting that Taiwanese businesses will push for conciliation with the Mainland if it increases the economic pain. A trade deal with the U.S. would reassure Taiwanese that the U.S. will stay engaged economically. And it would also reassure the rest of Asia, especially Japan and the Asean countries of Southeast Asia, that the U.S. is there to stay
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second
What to Make of China's Military Drills Near Taiwan
10 MIN READAug 5, 2022 | 22:02 GMT
China's military drills in response to U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan will not trigger an immediate military escalation, though they underscore Beijing's options for political, military and economic retaliation against the United States, Taiwan and other rivals, as well as the limitations of regional stabilization efforts. Pelosi met with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen in Taipei on Aug. 3 after arriving on the island a day earlier. In response, China's defense ministry announced live-fire drills for Aug. 4-7 in six areas in the waters surrounding Taiwan. Then on Aug. 4, Taiwan's Maritime and Port Bureau claimed that China had added a seventh area and extended the maritime drill through to 10 am local time on Aug. 8. The drills have so far involved Chinese naval and aerial incursions across the Taiwan Strait median line (a de facto dividing line between the two countries) and missile tests in the designated areas. Amid the first day of these drills on Aug. 4, Japan's defense ministry reported that at least four missiles had flown directly over Taiwan's capital city of Taipei before landing in the waters east of Taiwan, and five missiles had landed within Japan's claimed exclusive economic zone, though all were still within predetermined drill areas.
The live-fire drills are targeting waters north of Taiwan (near the port cities of Taipei and Keelung), as well as in the Taiwan Strait west of the island and in the sea east of the island. To Taiwan's south, exercises are also being held off the coasts of Kaohsiung and Anping, as well as in an area further out in the Luzon Strait.
The last time China conducted live-fire drills of this scale was in 1995-1996, but they were farther from Taiwan's shores and concentrated primarily on the areas west of Taiwan, not further afield in the seas east of Taiwan. The areas designated for the current drills, however, overlap in some places with Taiwan's territorial waters, and thus missile strikes in these waters can qualify as acts of aggression, although Taiwan and foreign powers will be motivated to respond to these drills with restraint.
The drills are primarily intended to both express Beijing's dismay with the U.S. diplomatic trip to Taiwan and convince Taipei that such collaboration with the outside world is not worth bearing Beijing's retaliation. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Beijing has viewed Taiwan as its sovereign territory and pledged to ''reunify'' with Taiwan by whatever means necessary, including the use of force. When foreign dignitaries counter this narrative by visiting Taiwan and de facto supporting the island's sovereignty, Beijing has often responded with sanctions, trade restrictions, shows of military force, and freezes on diplomatic channels. As with previous military drills, Beijing intends to deter the Taiwanese government and people from moving toward de jure independence and closer defense relations with the United States.
More broadly, China's latest drills are meant to remind its rivals of the military and economic costs of supporting Taiwan. For Beijing, these drills can help deter Asian and Western businesses from supporting Taiwan's sovereignty by showing the wide-scale disruption China can cause to global shipping in the Taiwan Strait in response to developments involving the island. The expansion of the geographic area and duration of drills, moreover, signals China's ability to impose a de facto embargo on Taiwan's main ports in future, and thereby decimate global maritime traffic. Indeed, China's state news and military coverage of the drills has directly confirmed this intent by stating the drills would provide training for implementing a ''maritime blockade'', ''air-to-air interception'', and the ''sealing and control'' of Taiwan and the surrounding waters. China is also attempting to deter foreign involvement in Taiwanese affairs by showing Japan and the United States the military costs of intervening in a future Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
The opinions of Chinese nationalists, concerns over Xi Jinping's legacy, and the symbolism of the 95th anniversary of the People's Liberation Army (coincidentally on Aug. 1) likely informed Beijing's decision to respond as strongly as it did with the military drills. Prior to Pelosi's visit, Chinese leaders had communicated through backchannels to the White House that Beijing might impose a no-fly zone to stop Pelosi from entering Taiwanese airspace. This ultimately did not happen, as she arrived safely in Taipei on Aug. 2 after being escorted by U.S. Air Force planes. Thus, the drills are partially aimed at shoring up the Chinese government's legitimacy with nationalist citizens, who criticized their military for failing to prevent Pelosi from visiting the island, by showing that China can still defend its interests in Taiwan. In addition, the drills will help bolster the military bona fides of President Xi Jinping himself before he and other top leaders deliberate on the composition of China's next Politburo (the Chinese Communist Party's top decision-making body) ahead of the 20th Party Congress, which will be held sometime this Fall.
In addition, the drills have tactical benefits for China's wartime readiness by enabling its military to practice ''short of war'' coercion methods, as well as some of the preliminary steps necessary for a future Taiwan invasion (including embargos, coordinated missile strikes, and anti-access and aerial denial campaigns). From a logistical standpoint, China's military is not prepared to invade Taiwan — which would be one of the largest and most complex amphibious landing operations in world history — and simultaneously counter the likely large-scale conflict with the United States that would ensue. Recent U.S. military estimates go so far as to suggest China will not be militarily ready to launch an invasion of Taiwan before 2027. But the current drills do give China's military experience with mass mobilization of forces (as seen in social media videos of Chinese, self-propelled howitzers and missile platforms driving on the highways and beaches of Xiamen), as well as joint operations between the PLA Air Force, Navy, Rocket Forces, and Strategic Support Forces (in charge of logistics, cyber operations and propaganda). These experiences are critical in preparing for a future Taiwan invasion, which would require all of China's military branches to respond with force coordination and resource mobilization on a scale that the People's Republic of China hasn't had to muster since its founding in 1949. Nonetheless, the current drills fall short of a proper dress rehearsal for an invasion, which would also require practicing other, more intricate aspects (like the mass mobilization, training, and equipping of civilian resources) that such an ambitious operation would require.
To occupy Taiwan, China would need to deploy millions of troops, ensure they land safely on Taiwan's shores, and then have those troops establish a beachhead with secure supply lines back to the mainland. The sheer amount of manpower, vehicles and logistical capabilities this would require would be a herculean effort even without U.S. intervention. But with an invasion likely to draw in the United States, China must also ensure its military is armed and ready to fend off the most powerful military in the world.
Despite these tactical benefits, the risks of these drills are great for China, with Taiwanese politics and Western stances toward China looking set to skew further out of Beijing's favor. Though the commercial disruptions from four days of drills will be fairly limited, China's drills will reinvigorate the sense in Western and some Asian governments of how large a threat China is to regional stability, potentially prompting even more U.S. and European policies aimed at decoupling from China. For Taiwanese politics, these drills could also backfire on China by driving the island's less China-friendly ruling party to win more seats in November local elections. More immediately, though, the risk of an accidental collision between Chinese and Taiwanese military vehicles at sea or in the air is worth watching, as it could stoke a political crisis on par with the April 2001 EP-3 spy plane incident, during which a Chinese fighter pilot collided with a much-larger U.S. spy plane while trying to ward off the American aircraft. While unlikely to trigger a broader military conflict, such a collision could further deepen Chinese tensions with Taiwan and the United States and prompt even more economic retaliation or a political crisis, as the EP-3 incident did.
In the lead-up to Taiwan's 1996 presidential election, China tried to use live-fire drills to deter the Taiwanese citizens from voting for Lee Teng-hui. But the drills ended up having the opposite effect by surging support for Lee, helping him to ultimately win the race.
So far, the international response to the drills has largely remained non-escalatory, with minimal military and economic retaliation. In response to the drills, Taiwan has readied its forces across the island. Taipei has also scrambled aircraft and vessels to ward off China's air force and naval assets from passing too far beyond the Taiwan Strait median line. While the Taiwanese government has claimed the military would respond with appropriate measures to any violations of the island's sovereignty, Taipei has so far acted with heavy restraint — using only the minimal force necessary to respond to Chinese provocations. The United States, too, has acted with general calm, sending aircraft carriers to the near seas before and after Pelosi's visit, but not responding directly to any of China's tactical military moves amid the drills. As for businesses, some shipping vessels and South Korean airlines have already diverted or canceled routes, respectively, in the region. The short duration of the drills and the relative ease of altering maritime routes to avoid the areas where they're being conducted (along with the fact that ships can still access Taiwan's ports) will limit disruptions to global supply chains.
Pelosi's visit comes as the United States and China are trying to both maintain military deterrence in the Western Pacific, as well as protect their interests in Taiwan, without escalating into a greater conflict. Nonetheless, while Washington and Beijing suspect military conflict may eventually materialize amid their strategic competition, both have also sought to avoid unnecessary escalation in the region that could trigger a conflict between the world's two largest superpowers with unpredictable consequences.
But Pelosi's visit and China's reaction nonetheless highlight the risk of short-term political decisions overriding long-term strategies aimed at avoiding conflict. The near-term invasion threat remains remote, though China could still expand military drills or economic retaliation measures (e.g. with additional trade restrictions, goods boycotts, etc.) in the coming days. But Pelosi's visit and China's reaction reveal the danger of short-term political agendas overriding long-term strategic goals to manage tensions. For Taiwan, this strategic goal is to secure de facto sovereignty, even if de jure independence is out of reach. This is similar to the U.S. goal of maintaining Taiwanese sovereignty to hold back China's projection of force deeper into the Pacific that would threaten U.S. military dominance. China's ultimate goal, meanwhile, is to reunite with Taiwan in the long-term, ideally peacefully, though with force if necessary. While cost-benefit analysis and long-term management of growing tensions will continue to drive the broad brushstrokes of Chinese, Taiwanese and U.S. policies, these more pragmatic efforts will continue to be punctuated by political exigencies. Such events will threaten economic and military stability in the short term, and in the process, test the commitment of various governments to their security pledges.
Pelosi's visit appeared to be her own choice, not a policy decision by the White House, and went against the concerns of the U.S. military. But because of the optics of not wanting to appear weak, Washington eventually gave its support for her visit once it was formally announced.
A future risk may come from the pro-independence wing of Taiwan's ruling party, which has been known to push for legislation that would formalize Taiwan's sovereignty. Beijing tends to respond strongly to these efforts (for example, with bans on certain Taiwanese exports) despite the desire by both sides to maintain stability and avoid unnecessary provocation.
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https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/chinas-war-drills-disrupt-container-ship-traffic-taiwans-top-ports
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/chinese-ambassador-called-white-house-after-overnight-sanctions-we-do-not-want-crisis
https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/taiwan-says-chinas-drills-are-simulating-full-attack-island
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Nancy may have triggered it, but she did not "do this". American weakness and appeasement did this.
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second
China's Live-Fire Drills Over Taiwan Presage Embargoes
1 MIN READAug 5, 2022 | 20:13 GMT
A woman in Beijing uses her mobile phone as she walks in front of a large screen showing a news broadcast about China's military exercises encircling Taiwan on Aug. 4.
A woman in Beijing uses her mobile phone as she walks in front of a large screen showing a news broadcast about China's military exercises encircling Taiwan on Aug. 4.
(NOEL CELIS/AFP via Getty Images)
In response to U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan on Aug. 2-3, China announced live-fire drills that began on Aug. 2 and would expand to six areas in the waters around Taiwan from Aug. 4-7. These areas are concentrated around Taiwan's key ports and in regional trade thoroughfares, like the Taiwan Strait and Luzon Strait, and effectively bar maritime and air traffic. They are also closer to Taiwan (with some areas just 10 miles — 16 kilometers — away from the coast) than the last time China launched similar drills in 1995-1996. Their geographic placement is intended to warn Taiwan of the economic pain China could impose if the United States, Japan and Taiwan continue to contravene Beijing's sovereignty claims over Taiwan. In future crises, Beijing could impose an unofficial blockade on Taiwan's ports by expanding the geographic area and/or duration of such live-fire drills, which would not only threaten to crater the Taiwanese economy but also impede some of the world's busiest shipping lanes.
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https://dailycaller.com/2022/08/05/chinas-taiwan-wargames-threaten-disruptions-global-supply-chain/?utm_medium=email&pnespid=5ro6BSccMrgah.ibqia0AYid5Qr0WJF7fO6mnu549gBm9WVZ4V26_MZq0PAcwDsg.e5oCWzc
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https://www.dailywire.com/news/top-taiwan-defense-official-in-charge-of-missile-production-found-dead-in-hotel-report?itm_source=parsely-api?utm_campaign=daily_shapiro&utm_medium=email&utm_source=housefile&utm_content=daily
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https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/chinas-war-drills-disrupt-container-ship-traffic-taiwans-top-ports
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/chinese-ambassador-called-white-house-after-overnight-sanctions-we-do-not-want-crisis
https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/taiwan-says-chinas-drills-are-simulating-full-attack-island
https://www.theburningplatform.com/2022/08/05/china-sanctions-pelosi-halts-us-talks-including-military-ties-as-jets-breach-taiwan-median-line/
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https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/chinas-war-drills-disrupt-container-ship-traffic-taiwans-top-ports
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/chinese-ambassador-called-white-house-after-overnight-sanctions-we-do-not-want-crisis
https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/taiwan-says-chinas-drills-are-simulating-full-attack-island
https://www.theburningplatform.com/2022/08/05/china-sanctions-pelosi-halts-us-talks-including-military-ties-as-jets-breach-taiwan-median-line/
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/20-total-chinese-taiwan-warships-close-quarters-standoff-strait-drills-wind-down
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https://www.zerohedge.com/technology/unthinkable-us-china-crisis
https://dailycaller.com/2022/08/05/chinas-taiwan-wargames-threaten-disruptions-global-supply-chain/?utm_medium=email&pnespid=5ro6BSccMrgah.ibqia0AYid5Qr0WJF7fO6mnu549gBm9WVZ4V26_MZq0PAcwDsg.e5oCWzc
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So, our pitch to TMSC is to set up shop here so we can abandon Taiwan to China?
We might want to think a bit deeper on this , , ,
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So, our pitch to TMSC is to set up shop here so we can abandon Taiwan to China?
We might want to think a bit deeper on this , , ,
More like, set up shop here or we will.
But maybe, sadly, we don't have the expertise to do that.
I don't understand why high tech automated manufacturing needs to be in lower wage countries.
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https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/chinas-war-drills-disrupt-container-ship-traffic-taiwans-top-ports
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/chinese-ambassador-called-white-house-after-overnight-sanctions-we-do-not-want-crisis
https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/taiwan-says-chinas-drills-are-simulating-full-attack-island
https://www.theburningplatform.com/2022/08/05/china-sanctions-pelosi-halts-us-talks-including-military-ties-as-jets-breach-taiwan-median-line/
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/20-total-chinese-taiwan-warships-close-quarters-standoff-strait-drills-wind-down
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/china-extends-taiwan-drills-past-sunday-deadline-says-training-under-real-war
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Dont know if this is true..US preparing for deployment ?
https://youtu.be/lZ_sGHGUbfs
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https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/08/china-taiwan-tensions-flare-us-faces-shrinking-window-deter-conflict/375514/
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second
China Launches New Military Drills, Threatens to Continue Crossing Median Line of Taiwan Strait
By Andrew Thornebrooke August 8, 2022 Updated: August 8, 2022 biggersmaller Print
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced a new round of invasive military drills around Taiwan on Aug. 8, in a further challenge to the island’s sea and air space.
The statement follows just one day after the scheduled end of the CCP’s largest military exercises around the island, ostensibly begun in protest against last week’s visit to Taiwan by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.).
China’s Eastern Theater Command, which oversees the portion of the mainland closest to Taiwan, said the new drills would focus on anti-submarine and sea assault operations. In an unprecedented escalation, the CCP also stated that it will regularly commence military drills on Taiwan’s side of the Taiwan Strait.
CCP Aggression
The move is likely to be seen as a major provocation by the international community, as the CCP has historically been reticent to cross the median line of the strait. CCP authorities also ceased communications between Chinese and U.S. military leaders within the theater late last week, increasing the possibility of miscommunication.
Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry condemned the move, saying that China is deliberately creating crises. It demanded that CCP leadership stop its hostile military actions and “pull back from the edge” of conflict.
“In the face of military intimidation created by China, Taiwan will not be afraid nor back down, and will more firmly defend its sovereignty, national security, and free and democratic way of life,” the ministry said in a statement.
The comment echoed language used by the White House last week, which accused the CCP of manufacturing crises to justify an increase in military intimidation of Taiwan.
The CCP claims that Taiwan is a rogue province that must be united with mainland China, and hasn’t ruled out the use of force to accomplish that goal. However, Taiwan has been self-governed since 1949 and has never been controlled by the CCP.
CCP leadership has fumed over Pelosi’s trip for nearly a week, going so far as to launch 11 ballistic missiles over Taipei, Taiwan’s capital city, for the first time, some of which fell into the waters of Japan’s exclusive economic zone. Despite the furor, it isn’t unusual for congressional delegations to visit Taiwan.
International forums, including the Group of Seven (G-7) industrial nations and the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations, also condemned the CCP’s aggression in the region and urged the regime to pursue a peaceful outcome to tensions.
“There is no justification to use a visit as [a] pretext for aggressive military activity in the Taiwan Strait,” the G-7 said in a statement. “We call on the PRC [People’s Republic of China] not to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the region, and to resolve cross-Strait differences by peaceful means.”
The duration and precise location of the latest drills aren’t yet known. Taiwan has already eased some flight restrictions near the six earlier Chinese exercise areas surrounding the island, which interfered with international travel.
Taiwan’s Defense Ministry stated that it detected 39 Chinese military aircraft and 13 naval vessels in and around the Taiwan Strait on Aug. 8. It noted that 21 Chinese aircraft entered Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, including fighter jets that crossed the median line in the northern part of the Taiwan Strait.
Beyond the firing of 11 ballistic missiles, Chinese warships, fighter jets, and drones maneuvered extensively around the island, drawing responding forces from Taiwan’s military.
Shortly before the first set of exercises ended on Aug. 7, about 10 warships each from China and Taiwan maneuvered around one another in close quarters near the median line of the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan’s Defense Ministry stated that the CCP’s newly designated no-fly zones encircling the island had “compressed” Taiwan’s training space and would affect the normal operation of international flights and air routes for the foreseeable future.
Andrew Thornebrooke is a reporter for The Epoch Times covering China-related issues with a focus on defense, military affairs, and national security. He holds a master's in military history from Norwich University.
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Ships, aircraft and live fire are just one mistake away from war.
second
China Launches New Military Drills, Threatens to Continue Crossing Median Line of Taiwan Strait
By Andrew Thornebrooke August 8, 2022 Updated: August 8, 2022 biggersmaller Print
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced a new round of invasive military drills around Taiwan on Aug. 8, in a further challenge to the island’s sea and air space.
The statement follows just one day after the scheduled end of the CCP’s largest military exercises around the island, ostensibly begun in protest against last week’s visit to Taiwan by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.).
China’s Eastern Theater Command, which oversees the portion of the mainland closest to Taiwan, said the new drills would focus on anti-submarine and sea assault operations. In an unprecedented escalation, the CCP also stated that it will regularly commence military drills on Taiwan’s side of the Taiwan Strait.
CCP Aggression
The move is likely to be seen as a major provocation by the international community, as the CCP has historically been reticent to cross the median line of the strait. CCP authorities also ceased communications between Chinese and U.S. military leaders within the theater late last week, increasing the possibility of miscommunication.
Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry condemned the move, saying that China is deliberately creating crises. It demanded that CCP leadership stop its hostile military actions and “pull back from the edge” of conflict.
“In the face of military intimidation created by China, Taiwan will not be afraid nor back down, and will more firmly defend its sovereignty, national security, and free and democratic way of life,” the ministry said in a statement.
The comment echoed language used by the White House last week, which accused the CCP of manufacturing crises to justify an increase in military intimidation of Taiwan.
The CCP claims that Taiwan is a rogue province that must be united with mainland China, and hasn’t ruled out the use of force to accomplish that goal. However, Taiwan has been self-governed since 1949 and has never been controlled by the CCP.
CCP leadership has fumed over Pelosi’s trip for nearly a week, going so far as to launch 11 ballistic missiles over Taipei, Taiwan’s capital city, for the first time, some of which fell into the waters of Japan’s exclusive economic zone. Despite the furor, it isn’t unusual for congressional delegations to visit Taiwan.
International forums, including the Group of Seven (G-7) industrial nations and the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations, also condemned the CCP’s aggression in the region and urged the regime to pursue a peaceful outcome to tensions.
“There is no justification to use a visit as [a] pretext for aggressive military activity in the Taiwan Strait,” the G-7 said in a statement. “We call on the PRC [People’s Republic of China] not to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the region, and to resolve cross-Strait differences by peaceful means.”
The duration and precise location of the latest drills aren’t yet known. Taiwan has already eased some flight restrictions near the six earlier Chinese exercise areas surrounding the island, which interfered with international travel.
Taiwan’s Defense Ministry stated that it detected 39 Chinese military aircraft and 13 naval vessels in and around the Taiwan Strait on Aug. 8. It noted that 21 Chinese aircraft entered Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, including fighter jets that crossed the median line in the northern part of the Taiwan Strait.
Beyond the firing of 11 ballistic missiles, Chinese warships, fighter jets, and drones maneuvered extensively around the island, drawing responding forces from Taiwan’s military.
Shortly before the first set of exercises ended on Aug. 7, about 10 warships each from China and Taiwan maneuvered around one another in close quarters near the median line of the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan’s Defense Ministry stated that the CCP’s newly designated no-fly zones encircling the island had “compressed” Taiwan’s training space and would affect the normal operation of international flights and air routes for the foreseeable future.
Andrew Thornebrooke is a reporter for The Epoch Times covering China-related issues with a focus on defense, military affairs, and national security. He holds a master's in military history from Norwich University.
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August 9, 2022
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The Fallout Over Taiwan
By: George Friedman
U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit to Taiwan predictably sparked outrage in China, which responded by flexing its muscles through some not-at-all subtle military exercises. The two important questions here are why did Pelosi go to the island in the first place, and why does Beijing care enough to deploy its fleet?
The Pelosi aspect is far more interesting but much less important. We don’t know exactly why she visited Taiwan. Some claim she went because of her long-standing opposition to Chinese human rights violations, rooted in an increasingly Chinese electoral base in her district. Others claim that she felt there was nothing to lose if the Republicans take back the House in November. Some accounts say she went in defiance of the Biden administration, while others say she was an agent of the administration. One argument goes that the administration thought that a provocative visit by someone not technically in the administration, and therefore deniable, would move the Chinese in U.S.-Chinese negotiations, by showing that the U.S. was prepared to be assertive.
Whatever the case, her visit triggered a very loud but fairly insignificant response from China. A great many ships and planes fired a great deal of ordnance, none of which struck Taiwan or a hostile vessel. The response demonstrated that China does, in fact, have a navy, but it did not show how the balance of power might change if Beijing, for example, shot down an incoming missile while forcing a U.S. submarine to surface.
Beijing has issued repeated warnings on Taiwan, but over time such warnings lose their meaning. So they capitalized on Pelosi’s visit to increase the volume of the warning dramatically. The size of the force displayed and the expressions of China’s rage gave a sense of apocalypse, generating the specter of Chinese power and denoting Beijing’s intentions that such U.S. provocations may elicit. It also created a sense among Americans, reasonable or not, that China is a force that might not be contained. For Beijing, the stakes were low. If it failed to deliver any of these messages, little was lost.
More important is that China canceled several of the channels that were connecting China to the U.S., causing Washington to complain about their closure and thus making the administration appear to need them. This is no minor feat. Exports are the backbone of the Chinese economy. For all the tension between the United States and China, the United States purchases over 17 percent of Chinese exports, making it the largest purchaser of Chinese goods. China is going through a significant economic crisis, one that is accompanied by increasingly aggressive actions against officials who don’t toe the line, and it is enduring increasingly difficult efforts to find other customers. President Xi Jinping is facing questions about his stewardship, the future of which may be revealed at the all-important Party Congress in November.
Xi simply cannot risk a significant break with the United States right now. He has no lever with which to punish the United States economically. The United States, on the other hand, has at least two: cutting imports from China, and threatening its many dollar-denominated dealings. China is aware that the first line of any battle plan is the use of economic sanctions, and now would be a particularly bad time for them. It’s the last thing Xi needs before the November meeting.
Of course, it’s true that a war over Taiwan could distract the Chinese population from their economic woes. The Chinese are patriotic, and thus may be well prepared to accept war’s hardships. And it’s certainly possible they see Xi’s military drills as a sign of strength. The problem is there’s no guarantee China would win. China could invade Taiwan, face an American response, and win the first battle but lose the war. So far, the performance off Taiwan's shores has been measured and rehearsed, carefully calibrated not to trigger an American economic response. The U.S. has even canceled a planned missile test so as not to further anger China.
Pelosi has made her gesture, or the administration asked her to do it. China has made its counter gesture. But China going to war with the U.S. over Taiwan risks serious economic disruption and possible defeat, all to take an island that is a minor step for breaking out of the South China Sea. It could happen, but it does not seem that China’s appetite for danger is high. Nor is America’s.
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Stratfail.
If nations/their leaders were perfectly logical and rational, human history would have much fewer wars. If I recall correctly, Germany and the UK were the closest trading partners right before WWII.
August 9, 2022
View On Website
Open as PDF
The Fallout Over Taiwan
By: George Friedman
U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit to Taiwan predictably sparked outrage in China, which responded by flexing its muscles through some not-at-all subtle military exercises. The two important questions here are why did Pelosi go to the island in the first place, and why does Beijing care enough to deploy its fleet?
The Pelosi aspect is far more interesting but much less important. We don’t know exactly why she visited Taiwan. Some claim she went because of her long-standing opposition to Chinese human rights violations, rooted in an increasingly Chinese electoral base in her district. Others claim that she felt there was nothing to lose if the Republicans take back the House in November. Some accounts say she went in defiance of the Biden administration, while others say she was an agent of the administration. One argument goes that the administration thought that a provocative visit by someone not technically in the administration, and therefore deniable, would move the Chinese in U.S.-Chinese negotiations, by showing that the U.S. was prepared to be assertive.
Whatever the case, her visit triggered a very loud but fairly insignificant response from China. A great many ships and planes fired a great deal of ordnance, none of which struck Taiwan or a hostile vessel. The response demonstrated that China does, in fact, have a navy, but it did not show how the balance of power might change if Beijing, for example, shot down an incoming missile while forcing a U.S. submarine to surface.
Beijing has issued repeated warnings on Taiwan, but over time such warnings lose their meaning. So they capitalized on Pelosi’s visit to increase the volume of the warning dramatically. The size of the force displayed and the expressions of China’s rage gave a sense of apocalypse, generating the specter of Chinese power and denoting Beijing’s intentions that such U.S. provocations may elicit. It also created a sense among Americans, reasonable or not, that China is a force that might not be contained. For Beijing, the stakes were low. If it failed to deliver any of these messages, little was lost.
More important is that China canceled several of the channels that were connecting China to the U.S., causing Washington to complain about their closure and thus making the administration appear to need them. This is no minor feat. Exports are the backbone of the Chinese economy. For all the tension between the United States and China, the United States purchases over 17 percent of Chinese exports, making it the largest purchaser of Chinese goods. China is going through a significant economic crisis, one that is accompanied by increasingly aggressive actions against officials who don’t toe the line, and it is enduring increasingly difficult efforts to find other customers. President Xi Jinping is facing questions about his stewardship, the future of which may be revealed at the all-important Party Congress in November.
Xi simply cannot risk a significant break with the United States right now. He has no lever with which to punish the United States economically. The United States, on the other hand, has at least two: cutting imports from China, and threatening its many dollar-denominated dealings. China is aware that the first line of any battle plan is the use of economic sanctions, and now would be a particularly bad time for them. It’s the last thing Xi needs before the November meeting.
Of course, it’s true that a war over Taiwan could distract the Chinese population from their economic woes. The Chinese are patriotic, and thus may be well prepared to accept war’s hardships. And it’s certainly possible they see Xi’s military drills as a sign of strength. The problem is there’s no guarantee China would win. China could invade Taiwan, face an American response, and win the first battle but lose the war. So far, the performance off Taiwan's shores has been measured and rehearsed, carefully calibrated not to trigger an American economic response. The U.S. has even canceled a planned missile test so as not to further anger China.
Pelosi has made her gesture, or the administration asked her to do it. China has made its counter gesture. But China going to war with the U.S. over Taiwan risks serious economic disruption and possible defeat, all to take an island that is a minor step for breaking out of the South China Sea. It could happen, but it does not seem that China’s appetite for danger is high. Nor is America’s.
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As I often note, I have high regard for GF.
Though he makes good points, I found this piece distinctly too sanguine.
I posted it anyway, because he is always worth considering.
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18791/us-policy-taiwan
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https://link.govexec.com/view/5f73565a310c0c35225d2a5bh342q.11ur/6c830526
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Translate to
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CHINA
China renews war games around Taiwan after visit
U.S. congressional delegation trip to Taipei angers Beijing
BY BILL GERTZ THE WASHINGTON TIMES
China’s military is continuing provocative military exercises that U.S. officials say are intended to coerce and intimidate Taiwan, a key regional ally.
Spokesmen for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) were quoted in Chinese state media as saying continued military exercises around Taiwan are meant to signal that Beijing will “crush” any attempts at Taiwan independence or foreign intervention.
PLA Senior Col. Shi Yi, spokesperson for China’s Eastern Theater Command, said the multiunit joint combat readiness exercises and drills began Monday. The renewed exercises come after days of war games that followed the recent visit to Taiwan by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi.
The latest action appeared to be a response to another congressional delegation that visited to Taiwan on Sunday, led by Rep. Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts Democrat.
Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Wu Qian said the latest congressional visit violated the “One China” principle and infringes on sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Military officials in Taiwan, formally called the Republic of China (ROC), reported detecting five PLA naval vessels and 30 PLA aircraft on Monday. A total of 15 aircraft were detected flying east of the median line dividing the 100-mile Taiwan Strait between China and Taiwan.
“We condemn PLA for jeopardizing the peace and security of our surrounding region with announcements of military drills,” Taiwan’s Defense Minister tweeted.
“#ROCArmedForces monitor activities around our surrounding region and respond to every situation with professionalism to #ProtectOurCountry,” the post stated.
China’s continued war games come as an American aircraft carrier strike group led by the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan is conducting operations in the nearby Philippine Sea.
The carrier strike group is expected to transit the Taiwan Strait in the coming days in a U.S. show of support for Taiwan.
On Friday, Kurt Campbell, the senior White House policy official on China, said Beijing exploited the Pelosi visit to “launch an intensified pressure campaign against Taiwan and to try to change the status quo, jeopardizing peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and in the broader region.”
“China has overreacted, and its actions continue to be provocative, destabilizing, and unprecedented,” Mr. Campbell said.
Chinese military activities in recent days have included firing at least 11 missiles into waters around Taiwan and declaring exclusion zones around Taiwan that have disrupted civilian, air and maritime traffic.
PLA aircraft crossings of the median line have also disrupted the status quo between the two sides of the strait.
Mr. Campbell told reporters that President Biden ordered the USS Ronald Reagan to remain in the region during the provocative Chinese activities, Mr. Campbell told reporters.
“China’s actions are fundamentally at odds with the goal of peace and stability,” Mr. Campbell said. “They are part of an intensified pressure campaign against Taiwan, which has not ended, and we expect it to continue to unfold in the coming weeks and months. The goal of this campaign is clear: to intimidate and coerce Taiwan and undermine its resilience.”
Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told The Washington Times in an interview over the weekend that China is among several nations that sense weakness from the Biden administration. “Deterrence depends on both capabilities and intention, and the administration has not shown the intention to protect the things that matter,” said Mr. Pompeo, who added that China is increasingly aggressive in advancing its interests regarding Taiwan.
Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen met with U.S. Congress members in Taipei, Taiwan, on Monday. The delegation visited parliament Monday in a further sign of support for the self-governing island. TAIWAN PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE VIA ASSOCIATED PRESS
China announced more military drills around Taiwan as the selfgoverning island’s president met with members of a delegation
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https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/08/20/nancy-pelosi-biden-taiwan/?utm_campaign=wp_post_most&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_most&carta-url=https%3A%2F%2Fs2.washingtonpost.com%2Fcar-ln-tr%2F37b3cfa%2F630105d01930ae1d2058fe55%2F61cdf026ae7e8a4ac205b2b3%2F11%2F70%2F630105d01930ae1d2058fe55&wp_cu=10fdb05edea8f32c1b02f6dfec609335%7CD462DD329F9C56B3E0530100007F597F
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https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/08/20/nancy-pelosi-biden-taiwan/?utm_campaign=wp_post_most&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_most&carta-url=https%3A%2F%2Fs2.washingtonpost.com%2Fcar-ln-tr%2F37b3cfa%2F630105d01930ae1d2058fe55%2F61cdf026ae7e8a4ac205b2b3%2F11%2F70%2F630105d01930ae1d2058fe55&wp_cu=10fdb05edea8f32c1b02f6dfec609335%7CD462DD329F9C56B3E0530100007F597F
Sort of looks like the whole thing was set up to reveal Biden is not in charge.
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Well, in our system of government, the President is not in charge of the Congress, yes?
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/us-and-taiwan-brace-for-continued-chinese-military-threats-as-more-international-leaders-visit-taiwan_4676343.html?utm_source=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2022-08-21&utm_medium=email&est=FvlXaP5%2FQxKwQ6cWNbz48UzfNPycAhJckO1%2Ff1OFx0w0VLMsoz8nuSUDNtw1d3V0RxNs
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Well, in our system of government, the President is not in charge of the Congress, yes?
Yes, but...
She is second in the line of succession to be President, an executive branch role. A totalitarian dictator may not fully appreciate our separation of powers.
She is of the same party as the President and he is considered the head of the party, (Party requires loyalty where Xi comes from.)
She is "in charge" of getting his legislation passed, And he has no control over her.
He is supposed to be "leader of the free world". Instead is not even in control of his own party.
Or they see him as duplicitous, said he would get this visit stopped and didn't.
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Well, in our system of government, the President is not in charge of the Congress, yes?
Yes, but...
She is second in the line of succession to be President, an executive branch role. A totalitarian dictator may not fully appreciate our separation of powers.
She is of the same party as the President and he is considered the head of the party, (Party requires loyalty where Xi comes from.)
She is "in charge" of getting his legislation passed, And he has no control over her.
He is supposed to be "leader of the free world". Instead is not even in control of his own party.
Or they see him as duplicitous, said he would get this visit stopped and didn't.
It was a USAF aircraft. Biden could have denied her the plane. Trump would have.
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Or maybe Trump would have told Xi to go get fuct.
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/china-lodges-complaint-following-indiana-governor-holcombs-taiwan-visit_4680097.html?utm_source=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2022-08-23&utm_medium=email&est=%2B%2BusGsebiSIB%2B1333Kul%2FVLLXz0iL%2Fr7UHSFA5yg5B%2BHW3Irkw3v8VExbHItYSBG4H99
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The self-ruled island is planning to increase its military spending by nearly 14 percent.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Taiwanese defense. Taiwan proposed increasing its defense spending next year by 13.9 percent compared to this year. This would bring Taiwan’s total defense budget to $19 billion, including an additional $3.6 billion for fighter jets and other equipment. The proposal comes as tensions rise between Taiwan and China.
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https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/28/china-us-navy-taiwan-strait-pelosi/?utm_campaign=wp_post_most&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_most&carta-url=https%3A%2F%2Fs2.washingtonpost.com%2Fcar-ln-tr%2F37c53b0%2F630b8ca61930ae1d206a9d6e%2F61cdf026ae7e8a4ac205b2b3%2F49%2F72%2F630b8ca61930ae1d206a9d6e&wp_cu=10fdb05edea8f32c1b02f6dfec609335%7CD462DD329F9C56B3E0530100007F597F
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Taiwan Starts Two-Day Defensive Drills as Tensions With China Remain High
The ‘Heaven’s Thunder’ maneuvers, planned months in advance, come as Beijing continues exercises around the self-governed island
By Joyu WangFollow
in Taipei and Karen HaoFollow
in Hong Kong
Updated Aug. 9, 2022 4:45 pm ET
Taiwan’s military fired dozens of shells off its southern coast on Tuesday in a simulation of a defense of the island, as Taiwan followed up nearly a week of Chinese military drills with preplanned defensive maneuvers of its own.
Taiwan kicked off its two-day military exercise—known as Tianlei, which can be loosely translated as “Heaven’s Thunder”—with an hour-long live-firing drill involving more than 700 troops, according to Taiwan’s Eighth Army Corps, with 38 howitzers firing 114 shells into the waters.
The annual drills, while planned months in advance, come amid tensions across the Taiwan Strait that are their highest in decades. China’s Communist Party, which claims Taiwan as part of its territory, was angered by a visit to the island last week by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, the highest-ranking visit by a U.S. official in a quarter-century.
In response, China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army, said that it would stage four days of military exercises around Taiwan’s main island, which Taiwanese and Chinese defense ministries said showed China seeking to establish an air and sea blockade and simulating an attack on the island.
On Monday, Beijing said it was indefinitely extending its Taiwan drills, which have disrupted one of the busiest shipping and air trade routes in the region. The PLA’s Eastern Theater Command, which oversees operations closest to Taiwan, said Monday’s drills focused on joint anti-submarine and sea assault operations around the island, while Tuesday’s joint air and sea exercises were focused on containment and support.
“Drills like these will not stop and are expected to become routine until reunification, as the Chinese mainland shows its determination to push forward the reunification process,” read an article published Monday in the Global Times, a state-run tabloid, citing unnamed experts.
“The drills not only lock the island from inside out, but also from the outside in, telling external forces that the PLA has powerful area denial capabilities in the region that even the U.S. cannot rival,” the article continued.
Taiwan’s military fired dozens of shells off its southern coast on Tuesday in a simulation of a defense of the island.
Aug. 4-7: Areas with Chinese military
exercises and training activities
Detail
Taipei
CHINA
TAIWAN
Aug. 9-10: Approximate location
of Taiwan’s annual drills
150 miles
150 km
Sources: Xinhua News (areas of China’s military exercises); Taiwan’s Military News Agency (Taiwan’s drill location)
Emma Brown, Yuriko Schumacher/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
In a news release Tuesday, Taiwan’s defense ministry said China extending its drills beyond the original four-day duration showed that the threat of force hadn’t diminished.
Meanwhile, Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu described China’s extension of its four-day exercises as a sign that Beijing couldn’t be trusted.
“Its ambitions and impact is extending far beyond Taiwan,” Mr. Wu told reporters in Taipei on Tuesday, pointing to Beijing’s growing influence in the South Pacific and throughout and beyond Asia. He described Mrs. Pelosi’s visit as merely an excuse for China’s actions around Taiwan.
“If you look at the preparation of its military exercises, including missiles, large-scale naval and air joint military exercises, drones, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, all of these combined—this isn’t something you can prepare in a matter of days,” he said. “China has been preparing for this for a long time.”
Alessio Patalano, a professor of war and strategy in East Asia at King’s College London, said announcing an extension to the exercises appeared to be part of Beijing’s psychological warfare strategy.
The PLA’s annual summer exercises have traditionally lasted two to three weeks, and the Taiwan drills, which serve as those exercises this year, should be no different, Mr. Patalano said. By framing what the PLA had already planned to do as “an extension,” he said, Beijing was able to accomplish three goals: “Scare the Taiwanese, put the Americans in their place, and advance their point of view in changing the status quo, preventing any others from doing anything about it.”
A day earlier in Beijing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin played down the extension of the military exercises. “China’s position is justified, reasonable and lawful; our measures are firm, strong and measured; and China’s military exercises are open, transparent and professional,” he said.
Before Mrs. Pelosi’s trip, Chinese leader Xi Jinping had warned President Biden during a phone call of unspecified countermeasures should her visit proceed. Mrs. Pelosi had also been warned in briefings with senior White House and Pentagon officials about the lasting damage her trip could cause to U.S.-China relations, though she was never asked to scotch the trip entirely, according to a U.S. official with knowledge of the discussions.
Chinese state media videos and a map of live-fire exercises around Taiwan have displayed Beijing’s strategy to impose an aerial and maritime blockade on the island. Here’s how China could threaten both Taiwan and global trade in case of a military conflict. Illustration: CCTV
In television interviews Tuesday, Mrs. Pelosi said the trip was worth taking and that Mr. Xi was acting out because of his own insecurities.
“He has problems with his economy. He is acting like a scared bully,” she said on MSNBC’s “Morning Joe.”
On Tuesday, 45 Chinese warplanes and 10 warships were involved in a joint operation near Taiwan, Taiwan’s defense ministry said in a release, adding that 16 of the aircraft crossed the so-called median line that bisects the Taiwan Strait, a notional boundary that Taipei says demarcates areas of de facto control but which Beijing says it doesn’t recognize.
“The median line has a psychological meaning,” said Shu Hsiao-huang, a Taipei-based associate research fellow at the military-backed Institute for National Defense and Security Research.
“If [Chinese planes] enter our airspace and we don’t prepare a response,” Mr. Shu said, “it’s like throwing a frog into boiling water.”
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We'll see what comes of this , , ,
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TAIWAN
Biden plans to request $1.1 billion arms sale to Taiwan
BY JOSEPH CLARK THE WASHINGTON TIMES
President Biden is planning to ask Congress to approve a $1.1 billion arms sale to Taiwan, according to reports, as tensions between the U.S. and China surge in the wake of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei earlier this month.
Details of the proposed sale come in the wake of transit by U.S. warships through the Taiwan Strait on Sunday. It was the first such move since Beijing commenced a series of highly provocative military exercises in the waters surrounding Taiwan in response to Mrs. Pelosi’s brief visit to the self-governing island 100 miles off of China’s mainland.
The expected package, which includes 60 anti-ship missiles totaling $355 million, 100 air-to-air missiles totaling $85.6 million and a $655.4 million contract extension for surveillance radar, was first reported by Politico, which cited sources with direct knowledge of the proposal.
The White House has yet to publicly confirm the proposed deal.
A National Security Council spokesperson said they had “nothing to preview at this time,” but added, “we will continue fulfilling our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan’s self-defense.”
Taiwan’s status is likely to be a hot topic of discussion at the much-anticipated next Chinese Communist Party National Congress, which officials in Beijing revealed Tuesday will open Oct. 16 in the Chinese capital. The gathering, held every five years, is expected to anoint Chinese President Xi Jinping to an unprecedented third five-year term as head of both the party and the government.
Also to be closely watched will be the composition of the party’s all-powerful seven-member Politburo Standing Committee, and whether Mr. Xi will be able to install more of his allies in key positions.
Mr. Xi’s two predecessors had both served two five-year terms, the Associated Press reported, but the current president has shown no sign of relinquishing power, while taking control over the economy and other fields previously assigned to the premier and others. Analysts have said Mr. Xi is under particular pressure from nationalist elements in the ruling party to be seen as taking a tough line on Taiwan in the weeks before the congress convenes.
Mr. Xi has vowed to claim Taiwan as a part of sovereign Chinese territory, either peacefully or by force, and Chinese officials say the U.S. side is breaking the long status quo with moves that Beijing says violate the longstanding “one China” policy.
The proposed arms sale sparked further outrage in Beijing. The Chinese Communist Party-backed Global Times on Tuesday called the move “yet another ill-intended provocation that will only escalate tensions in the region.”
The arms deal would require approval by the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees. Lawmakers from both committees are likely to sign off on the deal.
Sen. Robert Menendez, New Jersey Democrat and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, recently co-sponsored legislation with Sen. Lindsey Graham, South Carolina Republican, that would significantly increase U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation.
Beijing claims Taiwan as part of China. The government in Taipei, which formally calls itself the Republic of China, is denounced as an illegitimate renegade.
China’s military maneuvers signal a rise in tensions that could cast a shadow over Beijing’s relations with the West for the foreseeable future, and sparked fears that the Chinese military could move to seize Taiwan by force in the foreseeable future.
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"President Biden is planning to ask Congress to approve a $1.1 billion arms sale to Taiwan. ...
The expected package, which includes 60 anti-ship missiles totaling $355 million, 100 air-to-air missiles totaling $85.6 million and a $655.4 million contract extension for surveillance radar, was first reported by Politico, which cited sources with direct knowledge of the proposal."
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I enjoy praising them in those rare moments when they get something right - and this is one example.
"bipartisan foreign policy" means a mutual effort, under our indispensable two-party system, to unite our official voice at the water's edge so that America speaks with maximum authority against those who would divide and conquer us and the free world
'Politics Ends at the Water's Edge'
Sen. Vandenberg, 1947
http://www.bartleby.com/73/634.html
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https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-businessman-offers-funds-train-civilian-marksmen-2022-09-01/
https://www.ibtimes.com/taiwan-shoots-down-chinese-drone-warns-counterattack-if-china-intrudes-territorial-waters-3608664
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Time Is Running Out to Defend Taiwan
Why the Pentagon Must Focus on Near-Term Deterrence
By Michèle Flournoy and Michael Brown
September 14, 2022
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/time-running-out-defend-taiwan
Chinese President Xi Jinping has made it abundantly clear that “reunifying” Taiwan with mainland China is a legacy issue for him, something he intends to accomplish on his watch through political and economic means or, if necessary, through military force. Right now, he is preoccupied with the COVID-19 crisis, the slowing growth of the Chinese economy, and the upcoming 20th Party Congress, where he hopes to secure a third term as chair of the Chinese Communist Party. But once these immediate concerns are addressed, it is possible that sometime in the next five years Xi will consider taking Taiwan by force, either because nonmilitary efforts at reunification have fallen short or because he believes his chances of success will diminish if he waits and U.S. military capabilities grow.
The long-standing U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” deliberately leaves uncertain whether and under what circumstances the United States would defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion. But it is clearly in the United States’ interest to deter China from attempting such an operation in the first place. As the scholar Hal Brands noted in a July report for the American Enterprise Institute, a Chinese assault on Taiwan that draws a U.S. military response is likely to ignite a long conflict that escalates beyond Taiwan. Like great powers that have gone to war in the past, the United States and China would grow more committed to winning as a conflict progressed, each making the case to its public that it has too much to lose to stop fighting. Given that China and the United States both have substantial nuclear arsenals, preemptively deterring a conflict must be the name of the game. To do so, the United States must help Taiwan modernize and enhance its self-defense capabilities while also strengthening its own ability to deter China from using force against the island.
The good news is that the Biden administration’s new National Defense Strategy, transmitted to Congress in March and due to be released in unclassified form in the coming months, reflects the need to move with greater speed and agility to strengthen deterrence in both the near and long term. The strategy reinforces the focus on a more aggressive China as the United States’ primary threat and emphasizes a new framework of “integrated deterrence,” drawing on all instruments of national power as well as the contributions of U.S. allies and partners to deter future conflicts that are likely to be fought across multiple regions and domains. It also identifies a number of technologies that will be critical for maintaining the U.S. military’s edge—including artificial intelligence, autonomy, space capabilities, and hypersonics—and calls for more experimentation to prepare for future warfighting. And it rightly aspires to bolster the United States’ military position in the Indo-Pacific and substantially deepen its relationships with important allies and partners.
But a critical piece of the deterrence puzzle is still missing: a focused Department of Defense-wide effort to dramatically accelerate and scale the fielding of new capabilities needed to deter China over the next five years. The Pentagon is developing both offensive and defensive capabilities that will take decades to design, build, and deploy. But emerging dual-use technologies are changing the character of warfare much faster than that. This is already evident in Ukraine, where commercial satellite imagery, autonomous drones, cellular communications, and social media have shaped battlefield outcomes. For example, satellite imagery created with synthetic aperture radar, which can see through clouds and at night, has provided a nearly real-time view of Russian movements, enabling Ukraine and NATO countries to counter Kremlin misinformation and sometimes giving Ukrainian forces a tactical advantage. Using this satellite imagery, drones have been able to collect valuable intelligence and serve as effective antitank weapons. Geolocation data has enabled the Ukrainian military to target Russian generals who carelessly used their cell phones. Cell phones have also enabled Ukrainians to document atrocities, while social media has bolstered the Ukrainian resistance and international support for its cause. Many technologies that were previously available only to governments are now readily available to individuals, including in countries that are hostile to the United States. To harness the power of these new technologies, the U.S. military must adopt new capabilities much more swiftly than it has in the past.
China—which leads the world in the manufacture of small drones and advanced telecommunications—already exhibits this sense of urgency. It compels its private companies to work closely with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to accelerate the development and adoption of new technologies and concepts. For decades, China has carefully studied U.S. capabilities, even stealing the designs for many major U.S. weapons systems. Now, it is rapidly modernizing the PLA, exploiting asymmetries between U.S. capabilities and its own in order to diminish Washington’s military advantage. It also makes use of innovations from its commercial sector. For example, the PLA uses commercially derived artificial intelligence technologies to power drone swarms and underwater autonomous vehicles. It also draws on leading private companies for electronic warfare tools, virtual reality technologies for training, and sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
Although the Pentagon leadership deserves credit for strengthening U.S. strategy and enhancing U.S. force posture and activities in the Indo-Pacific region, the bottom line is that the U.S. military is simply not moving fast enough to ensure that it can deter China in the near term. If Washington wants to deny Beijing the ability to blockade or overrun Taiwan in the next five years, it must step up the pace and scale of change and adopt a new approach: relentless leadership and focus at the top of the Department of Defense to make deterring China a daily priority, immediate investments in rapidly fielding promising prototypes at scale, greater integration of commercial dual-use technologies, and an emergency effort to solve the most critical operational problems the United States would face in deterring and defeating a Chinese assault on Taiwan. Such a crash effort is not without precedent. Consider the Pentagon’s urgent endeavors to increase unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to counter terrorism after 9/11 and the rapid fielding of mine-resistant vehicles to protect U.S. troops from improvised explosive devices during the war in Iraq.
Planning for a blockade or invasion of Taiwan has long been the highest priority for the PLA, shaping everything from its acquisition priorities to its exercises to its military posture. This possibility has also motivated decades of Chinese investment in “anti-access/area-denial” capabilities designed to prevent U.S. forces from projecting power into the region to defend Taiwan. Many of the PLA’s new capabilities are now coming online at scale, significantly complicating the U.S. military’s operational challenges. Yet many of the U.S. military’s most promising capabilities to counter China in the event of a conflict over Taiwan will not be ready and fully integrated into the force until the 2030s. This creates a window of vulnerability for Taiwan, most likely between 2024 and 2027, in which Xi may conclude he has the best chance of military success should his preferred methods of political coercion and economic envelopment of Taiwan fail. Indeed, thanks to the PLA’s substantial investments, the U.S. military has reportedly failed to stop a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in many war games carried out by the Pentagon.
NEED FOR SPEED
To deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan in the next two to five years, the United States must immediately reorient U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific. Acquisition processes that worked well for the United States during the Cold War are ponderous and leave the Pentagon ill-equipped to compete in a period of profound technological disruption against a faster-moving, more capable adversary than the Soviet Union. Coming from diverse backgrounds in the executive branch and private sector, we are united in our view of what needs to be done to provide the best deterrence against China and, if necessary, the best defense of Taiwan.
First, the Pentagon’s leadership must urgently address the gap between what the United States has and what it needs to deter China in the near term. With the commanders of the military’s geographic and functional combatant commands focused on current operations and the chiefs of the military services focused on building the capabilities they will need in the 2030s and beyond, the Department of Defense has no accountable senior leader solely focused on improving the United States’ ability to deter Chinese aggression in the 2024–27 timeframe. Accordingly, the U.S. secretary of defense should create a senior civilian or general officer position that reports directly to him and has the singular mission of driving the changes necessary to achieve this objective. This official would need to have prior Pentagon experience, deep understanding of U.S. military operations, comfort with new technology, a reputation for driving change, and the resources and backing to create an empowered, effective, and collaborative team.
Job number one would be to lead an intensive, department-wide sprint to identify the most consequential problems associated with deterring an attack on Taiwan; determine which currently unfunded priorities should receive more resources (such as addressing critical munitions shortages); canvass the different branches of the military, the units of the Pentagon dedicated to innovation, and defense and commercial firms for solutions; and then work with leaders in Congress to reallocate funds to ensure these capabilities are fielded within the next two to five years. Success would be measured by the new capabilities deployed into the hands of U.S. warfighters and the speed at which this is done—not by the number of experiments and demonstrations that are performed.
The U.S. military’s most promising capabilities to counter China will not be ready until the 2030s.
One initial area of focus could be rapidly fielding large numbers of smaller autonomous systems to augment conventional capabilities at low cost. For example, small autonomous systems for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance could be deployed to create a vast and much more resilient sensor network that improves U.S. situational awareness across the Indo-Pacific. Similarly, swarms of small, AI-enabled expendable strike systems could be brought online, enabling U.S. forces to confound and overwhelm an adversary in any number of situations. Such off-the-shelf systems can be fielded quickly and cheaply with easy-to-upgrade software.
The United States could also improve its ability to hold Chinese naval forces at risk and thereby deter them from crossing the Taiwan Strait by arming U.S. bombers deployed to the Indo-Pacific with large numbers of long-range antiship missiles, as the Pentagon’s Strategic Capabilities Office has demonstrated. Urgently funding the scaling and deployment of such innovations should be among the Department of Defense’s highest priorities in the next two to five years, yet few have been fully funded in the most recent budget request. Ideally, some of these efforts could be undertaken jointly with the capable militaries of U.S. allies.
The Pentagon should also accelerate and scale up its security assistance to Taiwan, making the island more of an indigestible “porcupine” and improving its ability to slow down and impose costs on any aggressor. In particular, the United States should assist Taiwan with operational planning, war-gaming, and training while also helping Taiwan leverage commercial capabilities to improve its situational awareness and acquire critical asymmetric capabilities such as air and missile defenses, sea mines, armed drones, and antiship missiles. U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan indicated at the Aspen Security Forum in July that planning for such an effort is already underway, but hardening Taiwan’s defenses in the two- to five-year time frame will require more hands-on, determined leadership to overcome persistent bureaucratic obstacles and delays. The Biden administration’s recent announcement that it will sell both Harpoon and Sidewinder missiles to Taiwan is a promising first step.
To augment current U.S. capabilities, the Department of Defense should adopt a “fast-follower” strategy to accelerate the adoption of commercial technologies that solve key operational problems. Private companies are leading the development of cutting-edge technologies such as AI and autonomous systems, so the Pentagon must be fast to follow these commercial innovators and make itself a more attractive customer by streamlining the acquisition process for commercial technologies. Deterring a Chinese assault on Taiwan, or defending against one, will require rapidly fielding a range of new capabilities from commercial dual-use suppliers. Commercial technologies such as advanced secure communications, AI software, small drones, and synthetic aperture radar satellite imagery can deliver novel capabilities at a fraction of the cost of technologies developed to meet military requirements and specifications—and in one to two years instead of one to two decades. Accelerating the early adoption of commercial technologies such as these will help the Pentagon erode Beijing’s confidence in its ability to take Taiwan by force.
FOLLOWING FAST
Instituting a fast-follower strategy would require overhauling the Pentagon’s outdated, cumbersome, and painfully slow procurement processes to deal more efficiently with commercial technology vendors. Currently, the department spends years developing detailed specifications for nearly every capability that it procures—whether or not that capability is already available off the shelf. And if a system does not meet a specified military requirement, finding funding to buy it from a commercial vendor can be difficult, even if it clearly meets a priority operational need. Given the urgency and gravity of the challenge posed by China, the Pentagon must innovate to dramatically speed up the procurement process for commercial technologies.
To that end, the Pentagon should designate units that can assess, budget for, and procure specific commercial capabilities such as small drones and counterdrone capabilities that are not designed with a specific branch of the military in mind. Doing so will require training a new cadre of acquisition professionals who specialize in the rapid procurement and integration of commercial technologies. It will also require keeping pace with private-sector innovation so that U.S. warfighters can be outfitted with the latest technology.
These Pentagon procurement units should follow commercial best practices, maximizing competition among vendors while also minimizing the costs for vendors to participate. The Defense Innovation Unit, which works to accelerate the adoption of commercial technology, already exclusively uses these practices, drawing an average of 43 vendors to each of its 26 competitive solicitations last year. Using a special authorization from Congress known as Other Transaction Authority, the Department of Defense can also eliminate requirements for vendors to recompete for contracts once they have successfully competed with a prototype; these vendors could proceed immediately to follow-on production contracts to scale the new capability.
Finally, the Pentagon should deepen its collaboration with U.S. allies in procuring critical capabilities, sourcing commercial technology from these countries, and selling proven technologies to their militaries. Prevailing in its competition with China will require the United States to innovate beyond its borders and collaborate with allies to field joint capabilities. The easiest, fastest way to do this is with commercial technologies that are unclassified and therefore easily shareable, as the war in Ukraine has demonstrated.
NOW OR NEVER
Many analysts will say that the Department of Defense is already modernizing the U.S. force and investing in technology and innovation to compete with China. And it is true that the Pentagon is moving in the right direction. But it must make bigger changes—and faster. Most of the department’s investments in research and development will not yield fielded capabilities in the two- to five-year period that is critical for deterring China.
To effectively prepare for the approaching window of vulnerability in which Xi may conclude he has the best chance of taking Taiwan by force, the Pentagon must do a better job of balancing its need to invest in long-term capabilities with what it needs today. In so doing, it can create an element of strategic surprise, a stronger deterrent, and a more modern force that combines traditional large weapons platforms with new and transformative capabilities. If the Pentagon fails to adopt a new vision of warfighting, and the PLA succeeds, the United States will find itself with plans and platforms to fight the last war instead of the one it may face next.
Xi has likely learned a dangerous lesson from Russia’s mistakes in Ukraine—namely, that if he wants to take Taiwan by force, he needs to go big and move fast. A potential conflict over the island could therefore unfold much more rapidly than the war in Ukraine, with China attempting to create a fait accompli within days. Therefore, the United States needs to dramatically strengthen deterrence and undermine Beijing’s confidence in its ability to succeed.
The U.S. Congress has already recognized the need to rapidly improve deterrence by funding the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which aims to provide the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command with the capabilities it urgently needs. The head of that command, Admiral John Aquilino, has repeatedly stated that he is most interested in additional capabilities that can be fielded in the next few years—not those that can be delivered decades from now.
The stakes could not be higher, and the clock is ticking. The United States is running out of time to deploy the new capabilities and operational concepts it needs to deter China in the near term. The Department of Defense still has time to make the necessary changes—but only if it acts with greater urgency and focus now.
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Support for Taiwan. The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a bill that would bolster U.S. military support for Taiwan. The Taiwan Policy Act would provide around $4.5 billion in weapons and security assistance over the next four years and designate the self-ruled island a “major non-NATO ally.”
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How much of that will be spent on LGBTQPedo training?
Support for Taiwan. The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a bill that would bolster U.S. military support for Taiwan. The Taiwan Policy Act would provide around $4.5 billion in weapons and security assistance over the next four years and designate the self-ruled island a “major non-NATO ally.”
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I'm thinking the Taiwanese would tend to blow that off.
Regardless, declaring Taiwan to be a "Major Non-NATO Ally" would be a good thing.
Sending arms, which would require a bipartisan vote, would be a good thing not only for the weapons themselves, but also for FY to the ChiComs.
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https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/09/air-force-secretary-china-would-be-making-enormous-mistake-invade-taiwan/377371/
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What Could Push China to Invade Taiwan
9 MIN READSep 20, 2022 | 16:09 GMT
China is unlikely to invade Taiwan in the next 5-10 years, but several drivers could change Beijing's reasoning and push China toward a more aggressive strategy. Based purely on a strategic cost-benefit analysis of everything from economics and politics to technology considerations and alliance dynamics, it seems likely that Beijing will delay an invasion of Taiwan for years, if not decades. In the meantime, Beijing will attempt to coerce Taiwan into giving up its dreams of sovereignty and to convince the West that conflict over Taiwan is not worth the trouble. If myriad geopolitical drivers push China toward escalation, however, China could wield such coercive tactics as widespread cyber attacks against Taiwan, a de facto blockade of Taiwan's ports (an extended version of the military drills that followed U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit in August), a trade war targeting Taiwan's non-electronic exports, or restricted trade in essential goods with Taiwan's Kinmen or Matsu Islands, which are within miles of the Chinese coast. In the long term, Chinese authorities believe that U.S. power is in decline and that China's is rising, and thus that time is on their side. The following constraints make a Taiwan invasion unlikely in the near term.
Military ascendance: China's military power has risen in recent years following higher expenditures and greater advances in technology, while the U.S. military is geographically overstretched and overburdened with human capital and maintenance costs relative to technological research. However, an invasion over the next few years could result in the West imposing heavy trade and financial sanctions on China that would crater China's economy given the depth of its reliance on Western markets.
Costs of invasion: Moreover, China's military is likely not yet ready for the invasion, given the herculean task of such a large amphibious invasion and the likelihood of U.S., Japanese and Australian military intervention, not to mention the potential for NATO involvement. The devastating loss of great numbers of military assets alone, accrued over decades of military modernization, might be enough to dissuade China from invasion, at least until the late 2020s when China will have better capabilities and thus a better chance of achieving a fait accompli on Taiwan.
Risk of failure: Domestic politics also might dissuade Beijing from conducting an invasion, as the failure to militarily take Taiwan could lead to the downfall of the Chinese Communist Party — or at least of its current leader, President Xi Jinping. In such a case, Xi would be harangued for failing to achieve the so-called reunification of China, one of the great missions of the Party since its founding in 1949.
Technological dependence: China relies on Taiwanese exports of high-end semiconductors, and the destructiveness of an invasion (not to mention Taiwan's own potential plans to scuttle factories rather than hand them over to Beijing) could set China's technological development back decades.
Despite these constraints, a number of long-term strategic drivers may make military action against the island seem like an attractive option to Beijing. A combination of these drivers could push China to accelerate its timeline for a Taiwan invasion much earlier than 2049, which is Xi's current milestone for China achieving national rejuvenation, in part through reunification with Taiwan.
Bad intel: Xi has wielded his anti-corruption campaign to purge political dissent and surround himself with "yes men" over the last 10 years. This means his information flows may be biased heavily toward affirmation, which risks China taking inadvisable policy moves.
Military inexperience: Most Chinese generals have never fought in a war, while a select few fought during China's last major conflict, the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, which was prior to China's military modernization. Thus, China's battlefield systems, especially its joint operation systems predicated on nationwide coordination of military theaters, are ill-tested for combat, and its soldiers and generals are unaware of their true capabilities outside of training, drills and observation of other countries' military engagements. As a result, Chinese military leaders may have a poor grasp of their combat capabilities, while nationalism through propaganda may add unbridled optimism to this ignorance.
Xi's self-image: Xi sees himself as a pivotal character in China's history, having enshrined "Xi Jinping Thought" in the Party constitution (alongside "Mao Zedong Thought") and deemed himself the helmsman of China's great rejuvenation into the world's leading superpower. Xi also thoroughly integrated the "Two Establishments" — which situate Xi as the core of the CCP and Xi's ideas as the foundation of China's "new era" — into all state policy. Therefore, his claim that China's national rejuvenation hinges upon reunification with Taiwan may motivate him to attempt to make significant progress on "the Taiwan question" to cement his legacy.
Fear of economic decline: A period of sustained economic decline could lead Beijing to believe that time is no longer on its side vis-a-vis Chinese ascendance and Western decline, and thus that China's ability to retake Taiwan may be at its zenith. This could prompt a "now or never" moment for a Taiwan invasion, particularly given Xi's more aggressive temperament (compared with previous leaders) and concerns about his personal legacy.
Taiwan's rearming: The longer Beijing waits to attack Taiwan, the more arms Taipei will be able to amass through security agreements like the $1.1 billion U.S. arms deal signed on Sept. 6 for missiles and surveillance support. To circumvent this "poison shrimp" strategy, whereby Taiwan makes itself too costly to invade, Beijing may opt for military action on Taiwan sooner rather than later.
Taiwan's politicization: With each generation, the Taiwanese people grow more opposed to living under Chinese rule. Meanwhile, the opposition Kuomintang party in Taiwan, which is traditionally friendly toward Beijing, is losing ground in elections and adjusting poorly to this pro-sovereignty shift in Taiwanese sentiment. Thus, Beijing may be motivated to invade sooner, before the populace becomes even more anti-China and difficult to rule over, akin to the pro-democracy camp in Hong Kong.
Shorter-term tactical events also could motivate China to escalate military action against Taiwan and permanently change the status quo of cross-strait interaction, as evidenced by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's recent visit to Taipei. Pelosi's Aug. 2-3 visit prompted Beijing to launch live-fire military drills in areas closer to Taiwan's coast than ever before — demonstrating China's ability to enforce a blockade of Taiwan's ports — and conduct regular crossings of the Taiwan Strait median line. Similar events may drive China to escalate its use of economic and military coercion against Taiwan, which could push China further up the escalation ladder toward invasion. Other particularly provocative events, however, could prompt China to forgo coercion entirely in favor of a military invasion on an accelerated timeline.
High-level visits: Like Pelosi's visit, other major world leaders, including heads of parliament or even heads of state, could visit Taiwan for political reasons, despite the cautions of their national security advisors. China could once again use backchannels to communicate the unprecedented moves of military coercion it would take (e.g., the no-fly zone over Taiwan it threatened ahead of the Pelosi visit) to deter or punish these actions.
Congressional bills: Akin to the Taiwan Policy Act currently floating through the U.S. Senate, which would designate Taiwan a major non-NATO ally, other legislatures could pass bills that would upend the uneasy stability across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's own pro-independence wing of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is one major source of such disruptive bills, though the pro-status-quo wing of the DPP usually counters its legislative efforts. Such efforts also could prompt China to up its military coercion of Taiwan (e.g., through live-fire drills).
Chinese nationalism: As Beijing relies more heavily on pro-China propaganda and anti-Western messages to deflect internal criticism over policy failures (e.g., the "zero COVID" policy) and external criticism over human rights issues (e.g., in Xinjiang), zealous Chinese nationalists could force Beijing's hand by waging protests that call on the government to take aggressive action toward Taiwan. This could result in new Chinese trade restrictions or military activities around the island.
Accidental collision: China's increased pace of military overflights of Taiwan's air defense identification zone (ADIZ), as well as flights and naval navigations past the Taiwan Strait median line, regularly prompt Taiwanese military responses. These encounters risk accidental collisions, especially given the recent dare-devil tactics of Chinese fighter pilots, which could spark a political crisis on par with the EP-3 spy plane incident of 2001, especially if loss of life occurs.
China's red lines: Beijing has a number of policy "red lines" that, if crossed, would heighten its threat perception of Taiwan to justify escalated activity, up to and potentially including an invasion. These include a U.S. formal defense agreement with Taiwan, U.S. stationing of troops in Taiwan (akin to bases in Okinawa), Washington abandoning strategic ambiguity in favor of a clear stance on exactly what Chinese actions would prompt U.S. military intervention on behalf of Taiwan, Taiwan declaring constitutional independence, a pro-independence candidate winning the Taiwan presidential election in 2024, an indefinite withdrawal by both of Taiwan's main political parties from any future reunification talks with China, and global recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign country.
Several events could indicate changes in these long- and short-term drivers of a potential invasion and in the status quo of China-Taiwan relations. It will be important to look out for the following events as China-Taiwan tensions continue to develop, as they could trigger Chinese coercive action or, in the worst-case scenario, escalate into a full-fledged invasion.
Protests: China could experience protests with hundreds of participants outside of key U.S. or European embassies or consulates in China's major cities like Beijing, Shanghai or Guangzhou.
Organizational admission: Major international bodies like the World Health Organization could decide to admit Taiwan as a member even though China normally predicates its own membership on the exclusion of Taiwan.
International recognition: The United States and other countries could ditch their own versions of the vague "one China" policy, effectively indicating their recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign country. On a less extreme note, more countries could establish "Taiwan representative offices," as Lithuania did in November 2021, which Beijing likens to recognizing Taiwan's sovereignty.
Arms sales: The United States could escalate its arms sales to Taiwan significantly enough to alter the cross-strait power balance or threaten China's coastal security (e.g., through the sale of hypersonic missiles).
U.S. policy specificity: The Biden administration could go beyond recent statements about a U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan from an "unprecedented attack" by laying out exactly what Chinese activities would trigger U.S. military invention.
Escalating rhetoric: Xi could make additional statements indicating that Taiwan's reunification is necessary for China's national development, and he could associate reunification with other national goals (such as China's goals for technological supremacy in key fields).
Slow economic growth: China's annual gross domestic product growth could stay below 3% for years while youth unemployment remains high at around 20% and real estate sale prices stagnate.
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second
The U.S. and Canadian navies sailed through the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea together, officials from the U.S. Navy's Japan-based 7th Fleet announced Tuesday and Wednesday, respectively.
Tuesday's Taiwan Strait transit was the U.S. Navy's fourth this calendar year, with previous trips in late February, July, and August.
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More drills. Taiwan plans to increase the frequency of live-fire drills, according to recent reports. Exercises will be held once every month in Penghu county in the Taiwan Strait and once every two months on the islands of Kinmen and Matsu, close to China. Previously, drills took place every three or four months on Penghu. The reports follow massive Chinese military maneuvers held last month.
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/chinas-military-shares-key-weakness-with-russia-report_4751499.html?utm_source=China&src_src=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2022-09-25&src_cmp=uschina-2022-09-25&utm_medium=email&est=nO6uI5CDzyoYBERPBQTg8THExDRDtgRfMm9TSGIIwKvKZKz77%2FMVCtVgeurTe%2FQPSG87
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To last longer against a Chinese blockade, the U.S. wants to make Taiwan a "giant weapons depot," the New York Times reported Wednesday. "Smaller, more mobile weapons" are being prioritized in U.S. officials' planning sessions, according to the Times. That could include Stingers and Javelins, e.g. "The goal now, officials say, is to ensure that Taiwan has enough arms to defend itself until help arrives," since logistics lines into Taiwan will be contested in ways Ukraine is not.
"One proposition would involve sending U.S. cargo planes with supplies from bases in Japan and Guam to Taiwan's east coast," the Times reports. "That way, any Chinese fighters trying to shoot them down would have to fly over Taiwan and risk being downed by Taiwanese warplanes." Continue reading, here.
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aiwan Expands ‘1st Strike’ Definition, Will Retaliate Against CCP Air Incursions
By Andrew Thornebrooke October 5, 2022 Updated: October 5, 2022biggersmaller Print
Taiwan is expanding its definition of a “first strike” for the purposes of determining whether to militarily retaliate against Chinese aggression, according to a top defense official.
The government of Taiwan now will consider significant incursions into its airspace by Chinese aircraft and drones to constitute a first strike in the same manner as a missile attack, defense minister Chiu Kuo-cheng told lawmakers on Oct. 5.
Chiu said the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) recent aggression necessitated the expanded definition. He added that CCP crossings of the median line, the midpoint of the Taiwan Strait, are an effort to create a new norm for intimidation and harassment.
“The median line was supposed to be a tacit agreement for everyone,” Chiu said. “That tacit agreement has been destroyed.”
The median line was decided upon as a buffer zone by the United States in the 1950s as a means of de-escalating conflict between communist China and Taiwan. Since then, both sides generally have respected the boundary.
However, in the past several months, CCP forces under Xi Jinping have initiated an aggressive campaign to “normalize” a military presence on Taiwan’s side of the waterway.
Taiwan previously held that it wouldn’t strike militarily against China unless China struck first. Until now, that meant that CCP forces would need to strike the island with a missile.
Chiu said on Oct. 5 that Taiwan would now respond to a broader range of threats.
“We initially said we do not make the first strike … if they haven’t done the first strike, which means firing a projectile or a missile,” he said. “But the situation has obviously changed.”
“Of course, we have a red line,” he added. “We absolutely will respond.”
Chiu also condemned the CCP for its efforts to unilaterally change the status quo through military force and intimidation and said that the Taiwanese people were prepared to defend themselves.
“They want to build a new normal,” Chiu said. But “we will stand firm when they come. We do not give in.”
Taiwan Will Defend De Facto Independence
The CCP claims that Taiwan is a rogue province of China that must be united with the mainland by any means necessary. Its leadership has openly threatened to “start a war” to ensure that Taiwan’s independence isn’t internationally recognized.
Taiwan has been a self-governing democracy since 1949 and has never been controlled by the CCP. Moreover, it boasts a thriving market economy and is the world’s leading manufacturer of advanced semiconductors, which are used to build everything from pickup trucks to hypersonic missiles.
In August, the CCP used a visit to Taiwan by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi as a pretext to initiate unprecedented military drills. Those exercises included the firing of ballistic missiles over Taiwan and into the waters of Japan’s exclusive economic zone.
Taiwanese leadership has said that the exercises and the CCP’s ongoing military presence are preparation for an invasion of the island.
Most Taiwanese reject the suggestion that the island should come under the control of the CCP, and the island has put up a spirited resistance to continued efforts to intimidate it into submission, such as the CCP’s campaign of air and sea incursions.
To date, CCP forces have largely only made incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, in which aircraft are required to identify themselves to Taiwanese authorities. They haven’t launched a full incursion into the island’s airspace.
Chiu’s comments indicate that if the CCP pursues such an aggressive course of action, Taiwan’s military could respond with lethal force up to and including a missile strike against the mainland.
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They better be working on some nukes.
aiwan Expands ‘1st Strike’ Definition, Will Retaliate Against CCP Air Incursions
By Andrew Thornebrooke October 5, 2022 Updated: October 5, 2022biggersmaller Print
Taiwan is expanding its definition of a “first strike” for the purposes of determining whether to militarily retaliate against Chinese aggression, according to a top defense official.
The government of Taiwan now will consider significant incursions into its airspace by Chinese aircraft and drones to constitute a first strike in the same manner as a missile attack, defense minister Chiu Kuo-cheng told lawmakers on Oct. 5.
Chiu said the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) recent aggression necessitated the expanded definition. He added that CCP crossings of the median line, the midpoint of the Taiwan Strait, are an effort to create a new norm for intimidation and harassment.
“The median line was supposed to be a tacit agreement for everyone,” Chiu said. “That tacit agreement has been destroyed.”
The median line was decided upon as a buffer zone by the United States in the 1950s as a means of de-escalating conflict between communist China and Taiwan. Since then, both sides generally have respected the boundary.
However, in the past several months, CCP forces under Xi Jinping have initiated an aggressive campaign to “normalize” a military presence on Taiwan’s side of the waterway.
Taiwan previously held that it wouldn’t strike militarily against China unless China struck first. Until now, that meant that CCP forces would need to strike the island with a missile.
Chiu said on Oct. 5 that Taiwan would now respond to a broader range of threats.
“We initially said we do not make the first strike … if they haven’t done the first strike, which means firing a projectile or a missile,” he said. “But the situation has obviously changed.”
“Of course, we have a red line,” he added. “We absolutely will respond.”
Chiu also condemned the CCP for its efforts to unilaterally change the status quo through military force and intimidation and said that the Taiwanese people were prepared to defend themselves.
“They want to build a new normal,” Chiu said. But “we will stand firm when they come. We do not give in.”
Taiwan Will Defend De Facto Independence
The CCP claims that Taiwan is a rogue province of China that must be united with the mainland by any means necessary. Its leadership has openly threatened to “start a war” to ensure that Taiwan’s independence isn’t internationally recognized.
Taiwan has been a self-governing democracy since 1949 and has never been controlled by the CCP. Moreover, it boasts a thriving market economy and is the world’s leading manufacturer of advanced semiconductors, which are used to build everything from pickup trucks to hypersonic missiles.
In August, the CCP used a visit to Taiwan by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi as a pretext to initiate unprecedented military drills. Those exercises included the firing of ballistic missiles over Taiwan and into the waters of Japan’s exclusive economic zone.
Taiwanese leadership has said that the exercises and the CCP’s ongoing military presence are preparation for an invasion of the island.
Most Taiwanese reject the suggestion that the island should come under the control of the CCP, and the island has put up a spirited resistance to continued efforts to intimidate it into submission, such as the CCP’s campaign of air and sea incursions.
To date, CCP forces have largely only made incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, in which aircraft are required to identify themselves to Taiwanese authorities. They haven’t launched a full incursion into the island’s airspace.
Chiu’s comments indicate that if the CCP pursues such an aggressive course of action, Taiwan’s military could respond with lethal force up to and including a missile strike against the mainland.
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There is also the matter of that massive Chinese dam that they could take out and by so doing kill , , , millions?
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https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-appeal-for-longer-range-missiles-presents-fresh-test-of-biden-administration-support-11665083684?mod=hp_lead_pos5
WASHINGTON—Flush with recent battlefield successes, Ukrainian officials are pressing their case for acquiring longer-range missiles to strike deeper into Russian-held territory, including Crimea, raising questions about how aggressively the Biden administration will support Kyiv’s war aims.
U.S. officials have urged Ukraine to focus on its battles in the eastern and southern part of the country, particularly around Kharkiv and Kherson, where it has made its largest gains since Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion. Meanwhile, Ukrainian officials are reviving their pleas for more weaponry, including advanced systems like the U.S. Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, congressional and U.S. officials said.
Those long-range missiles are wanted, in part, to strike into Crimea, which Russia is using as a base to launch Iranian-made drones, congressional and Ukrainian officials said. President Biden has so far declined to provide Ukraine with the ATACMS, which would be capable of reaching deep into Russian territory.
The recent Ukrainian military offensive has pushed Russian troops from the Kharkiv region and reached deep into the northern part of the Donetsk region. Those gains may embolden Kyiv to try to press into Crimea, which Russia illegally annexed in 2014.
The administration’s reluctance to provide these long-range missiles reflects a deeper dispute, in part, over how to support Ukraine without risking a broader conflict with Russia, whose leaders have been hinting they may resort to nuclear weapons.
“The reason we are not giving them these weapons is disagreement over striking targets in Crimea,” a congressional official said.
President Biden has so far declined to provide Ukraine with the U.S. Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS.
PHOTO: WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Ukraine’s defense attaché in Washington, Maj. Gen. Borys Kremenetskyi, said Thursday that Russia was mainly using the Iranian-provided drones to attack civilian infrastructure. He added that Ukraine was using air defense systems to blunt the threat but was also looking to attack the sites from which the drones are being flown and controlled.
The Russian Embassy didn’t respond immediately to a request for comment.
While Himars, a U.S. mobile rocket launcher already provided to Kyiv, is an effective system for this purpose, he added that Ukraine wants to acquire longer-range systems that could be fired from the Himars launcher. He didn’t mention the ATACMS missile by name and declined to discuss targets in Crimea.
“We are looking for long-range missiles for Himars,” he told a webinar hosted by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. “We need to hit some targets on the occupied Ukrainian territory. ”
The Biden administration recognizes Crimea as part of Ukraine, and has vowed to support Kyiv’s efforts to restore all of its original territory. In August, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky vowed that Ukraine would take back Crimea “by ourselves, without consultation with any other country in the world.”
U.S. officials argue longer-range missiles aren’t necessary for Ukraine’s current fight, and believe Moscow would see it as an escalation at a time when senior Russian leaders have raised the specter of using the country’s nuclear arsenal.
“We are not going to send to Ukraine rocket systems that can strike into Russia,” Mr. Biden said in May.
The Russian Foreign Ministry warned last month that if Washington supplied Kyiv with longer-range missiles it would cross a “red line” and become “a party to the conflict.” With other U.S.-provided weapons, Mr. Zelensky’s government appears to have abided by U.S. insistence that it not use American arms to strike Russia itself.
The U.S. is also increasingly mindful of its own inventories of weaponry, after pumping almost $17 billion in arms to Ukraine in the past eight months.
Lockheed Martin is currently making about 400 ATACMS a year and could expand production to 500, according to people familiar with production of the missiles. Most of the missiles are being produced for foreign military sales. Taiwan, for example, is set to receive dozens of ATACMS.
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https://qz.com/1518787/taiwans-indigenous-people-remind-xi-jinping-it-has-never-belonged-to-china/?fbclid=IwAR2B8R7kvm-u4XWv4f6DC7GtpInKMkEr4rzFlhsrEFTsHAfNtr0AyKVb44w
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China’s Threat to Taiwan Semiconductors
Why aren’t American asset managers paying attention to the risks from an invasion of the island?
By Vivek Ramaswamy and Mike Pompeo
Oct. 10, 2022 1:28 pm ET
Xi Jinping’s all-but-certain installation for a third term as leader of the Chinese Communist Party marks an important milestone in the party’s progress toward annexing Taiwan. That creates significant risks for U.S. investors—many of which have been overlooked.
Mr. Xi has unambiguously stated that reacquiring Taiwan is a pillar of his national rejuvenation platform and a vital national objective. It’s also critical to his personal legacy. Mr. Xi’s ambitions have been checked by his need to secure a third term, as he likely feared international backlash that could threaten his grip on power. After this month, his calculus may change. Taiwan’s annexation could allow him to assert dominance and divert attention away from China’s domestic problems. Mr. Xi may be disinclined to wait, given the risk of a more assertive president in Taipei in May 2024 or Washington in January 2025. Beijing’s recent rhetoric has been consistent with this hypothesis.
Taiwan’s primary defense is its economic influence, not its military. The country’s dominant position in the semiconductor industry—what President Tsai Ing-wen calls Taiwan’s “silicon shield”—serves as a useful protection against Chinese aggression. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. produces more than half of the world’s advanced semiconductors and 90% of the most advanced chips. TSMC is the exclusive producer of the most advanced semiconductors that power Apple’s iPhones, AMD’s advanced CPUs and Qualcomm’s snapdragon chip used in many Android phones.
If China were to invade Taiwan, TSMC’s lights would likely go out. “If you take a military force or invasion, you will render the TSMC factory inoperable,” TSMC chairman Mark Liu told CNN in July. A material disruption to the industry would send shock waves across global supply chains, rendering manufacturers unable to make everyday products.
Though financial analysts and think-tank experts have suggested this could deter China from invading Taiwan, there are other ways for Beijing to achieve its aims without jeopardizing TSMC’s capabilities. A naval blockade, for example, could bully Taiwan’s leadership into surrendering without Chinese troops setting foot on the island.
No matter how it is achieved, the annexation of Taiwan would spell disaster for U.S. interests. If TSMC can’t produce chips, the global economy will tank. If TSMC is still able to produce chips but China dictates the terms of access, companies that rely on TSMC and other Taiwanese semiconductor companies will be left at the mercy of Beijing’s demands.
The U.S. has already experienced the pain of such scarcity. A chip shortage in 2021 cost the auto industry an estimated $210 billion in revenue. A recent study estimates that a one-year disruption in the production of semiconductors in Taiwan would lead to a $490 billion drop in revenue for electronic-device makers, not counting fallout for sectors that aren’t directly reliant on semiconductors.
U.S. semiconductor stocks may offer a reasonable hedge for investors, but only if the companies are sufficiently prepared. U.S. companies should invest in semiconductor technology now to meet the demand that’s expected to grow 80% by 2030. If China annexes Taiwan, U.S. manufacturers could seize on a market dislocation by increasing domestic production while chip prices soar. Though America’s semiconductor industry isn’t as advanced as Taiwan’s, increased investments could change that. And if China bides its time until the U.S. Navy retires more ships as part of its “divest to invest” strategy in the coming years, that will afford U.S. manufacturers even greater flexibility to prepare.
If such investments aren’t made and China annexes Taiwan, U.S. semiconductor firms will face pain in the market and punishment from plaintiffs’ lawyers for failing to act on a known material risk factor.
The better prepared U.S. semiconductor companies are to fill the supply gap created by Chinese annexation of Taiwan, the more reluctant China may be to follow through on its plans. Mr. Xi’s motivations aren’t principally economic, but a rational leader weighs costs and benefits before taking action.
Yet amid rising tensions, the world’s largest asset managers, many of which regularly warn U.S. portfolio companies about risks relating to climate change and board diversity, are conspicuously silent about Taiwan-related risks. The most notable example is BlackRock, whose website raves about the importance of Chinese investments with little mention of Taiwan. In July the firm told investors that “geopolitical events typically have a modest and short-lived impact on markets and economies” and that “we do not see a military confrontation [between China and Taiwan] as imminent.” This came even as China announced military exercises in response to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan.
BlackRock’s behavior is unsurprising and may itself be part of China’s long-term strategy of influencing U.S. companies to advance its geopolitical goals. BlackRock has been eyeing the lucrative Chinese asset-management market for years. In 2019 CEO Larry Fink described China as “one of the largest future growth opportunities for BlackRock” and said the firm is “focused on building an onshore presence.”
But access doesn’t come cheap. Following Mr. Fink’s comments, BlackRock lobbied the U.S. government for policies favorable to China, such as lower tariffs. In August 2020, BlackRock became the first foreign company to win preliminary approval to offer mutual funds in China. In summer 2021, at the height of the selloff in Chinese stocks, China’s securities regulator summoned BlackRock executives to a meeting, after which BlackRock urged investors to triple their assets allocated to Chinese companies. Two weeks later, BlackRock launched its Chinese mutual funds. BlackRock would endanger its business if it alienated the Chinese government by openly warning U.S. investors and companies about Taiwan-related risks.
The effect of these admonitions is subtle but real. BlackRock is the second-largest shareholder of Intel, one of America’s largest and most advanced semiconductor companies. BlackRock includes Intel in its “Climate Focus Universe”—a selection of companies that BlackRock has targeted to demand “climate adaptation strategies” and “rigorous GHG [greenhouse-gas] emissions reduction targets.” This campaign has proved fruitful: Intel regularly touts its sustainability efforts, including committing to net-zero emissions by 2040, but it says little about the company-specific risks and opportunities posed by Taiwan’s potential annexation.
BlackRock’s silence demands a market response. While the consequences of China’s annexation of Taiwan would go far beyond stocks or the economy, market actors can make a difference. U.S. semiconductor companies and their investors can protect against Taiwan-related risks now by investing in a silicon shield of their own.
Mr. Ramaswamy is executive chairman of Strive Asset Management, which holds semiconductor companies through its new U.S. Semiconductor ETF, SHOC. Mr. Pompeo served as director of the Central Intelligence Agency (2017-18) and secretary of state (2018-21).
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Very insightful.
On an aside, Pompeo is very hawkish toward defending Ukraine against Russia, almost saying win at all costs, a view not popular here. But in this piece he and a sharp coauthor are urging smart steps to take in preparation for war.
Same challenge for the invading force exists in both conflicts. If you want to end up owning the country, don't destroy it. China can't build iphones for example with Taiwan chips. China can't afford a manufacturing meltdown during their housing crisis, but this is their best window to take what they want most, and like Russia, don't seem to care about the cost.
Are your investments protected against a war in China? Oops, too late.
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No surprise that something coming from Pompeo is insightful. Nor does it surprise that he does not engage in "woulda, coulda, shoulda" or partisan pot-shottery.
"On an aside, Pompeo is very hawkish toward defending Ukraine against Russia, almost saying win at all costs, a view not popular here."
Speaking for myself, as I just mentioned on the Ukraine thread, in my opinion there is no going back to the status quo ante and where are in a terrible game of chicken. Feckless stupidity got us here, but that does not necessarily determine what we should be doing now. Not at all clearing to me that conceding the game of chicken here and now is the best call.
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Understand that both Putin and Xi will reduce Taiwan/UKR to ash if required to do so to "win".
Better understand the mindsets involved when playing nuclear poker.
Very insightful.
On an aside, Pompeo is very hawkish toward defending Ukraine against Russia, almost saying win at all costs, a view not popular here. But in this piece he and a sharp coauthor are urging smart steps to take in preparation for war.
Same challenge for the invading force exists in both conflicts. If you want to end up owning the country, don't destroy it. China can't build iphones for example with Taiwan chips. China can't afford a manufacturing meltdown during their housing crisis, but this is their best window to take what they want most, and like Russia, don't seem to care about the cost.
Are your investments protected against a war in China? Oops, too late.
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"Understand that both Putin and Xi will reduce Taiwan/UKR to ash if required to do so to "win"."
Agreed that Putin is quite willing to go full Grozny, but it is not clear to me that China would do the same to Taiwan. A naval blockade would be a far smarter option for them. It would trigger HUGE economic for America and the West and Taiwan, who does 60% of its trade with China, would likely fold sooner or later, meaning that China would then access TMSC.
And, my investments have been out of Chinese related companies for about 5 years now.
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Just as the PRC is grinding the Uighers into dust, to be remade into Han Chinese, the PRC is willing to kill every Taiwanese and refill the island with people from the mainland.
"Understand that both Putin and Xi will reduce Taiwan/UKR to ash if required to do so to "win"."
Agreed that Putin is quite willing to go full Grozny, but it is not clear to me that China would do the same to Taiwan. A naval blockade would be a far smarter option for them. It would trigger HUGE economic for America and the West and Taiwan, who does 60% of its trade with China, would likely fold sooner or later, meaning that China would then access TMSC.
And, my investments have been out of Chinese related companies for about 5 years now.
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Investments are out of these companies that manufacturebin China, and everything that could be hurt by their collapse? :wink:
AT&T
Abercrombe & Fitch
Abbott Laboratories
Acer Electronics
Ademco Security
Adidas
ADI Security
AGI- American Gem Institute
AIG Financial
Agrilink Foods, Inc. (ProFac)
Allergan Laboratories
American Eagle Outfitters
American Standard
American Tourister
Ames Tools
Amphenol Corporation
Amway Corporation
Analog Devices, Inc.
Apple Computer
Armani
Armour Meats
Ashland Chemical
Ashley Furniture
Associated Grocers
Audi Motors
AudioVox
AutoZone, Inc.
Avon
Banana Republic
Bausch & Lomb, Inc.
Baxter International
Bed, Bath & Beyond
Belkin Electronics
Best Buy
Best Foods
Big 5 Sporting Goods
Black & Decker
Body Shop
Borden Foods
Briggs & Stratton
Calrad Electric
Campbell 's Soup
Canon Electronics
Carole Cable
Casio Instrument
Caterpillar, Inc.
CBC America
CCTV Outlet
Checker Auto
CitiCorp
Cisco Systems
Chiquita Brands International
Claire's Boutique
Cobra Electronics
Coby Electronics
Coca Cola Foods
Colgate-Palmolive
Colorado Spectrum
ConAgra Foods
Cooper Tire
Corning, Inc.
Coleman Sporting Goods
Compaq
Crabtree & Evelyn
Cracker Barrel Stores
Craftsman Tools (see Sears)
Cummins, Inc.
Dannon Foods
Dell Computer
Del Monte Foods
Dewalt Tools
DHL
Dial Corporation
Diebold, Inc.
Dillard's, Inc.
Dodge-Phelps
Dole Foods
Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.
Dow-Corning
Eastman Kodak
EchoStar
Eclipse CCTV
Edge Electronics Group
Electric Vehicles USA, Inc.
Eli Lilly Company
Emerson Electric
Enfamil
Estee Lauder
Eveready
Family Dollar Stores
FedEx
Fisher Scientific
Ford Motors
Fossil
Frito Lay
Furniture Brands International
GAP Stores
Gateway Computer
GE, General Electric
General Foods International
General Mills
General Motors
Gentek
Gerber Foods
Gillette Company
Goodrich Company
Goodyear Tire
Google
Gucci
Guess?
Haagen-Dazs
Harley Davidson
Hasbro Company
Heinz Foods
Hershey Foods
Hitachi
Hoffman-LaRoche
Holt's Automotive Products
Hormel Foods
Home Depot
Honda Motor
Hoover Vacuum
HP Computer
Honda
Honeywell
Hubbell Inc.
Huggies
Hunts-Wesson Foods
ICON Office Solutions
IBM
Ikea
Intel Corporation
J.C. Penny's
J.M. Smucker Company
John Deere
Johnson Control
Johnson & Johnson
Johnstone Supply
JVC Electronics
KB Home
Keebler Foods
Kenwood Audio
KFC, Kentucky Fried Chicken
Kimberly Clark
Knorr Foods
K-Mart
Kohler
Kohl's Corporation
Kraft Foods
Kragen Auto
Land's End
Lee Kum Kee Foods
Lexmark
LG Electronics
Lipton Foods
L.L. Bean, Inc.
Logitech
Libby's Foods
Linen & Things
Lipo Chemicals, Inc.
Lowe's Hardware
Lucent Technologies
Lufkin
Mars Candy
Martha Stewart Products
Mattel
McCormick Foods
McDonald's
McKesson Corporation
Megellan GPS
Memorex
Merck & Company
Michael's Stores
Mitsubishi Electronics
Mitsubishi Motors
Mobile Oil
Molex
Motorola
Motts Applesauce
Multifoods Corporation
Nabisco Foods
National Semiconductor
Nescafe
Nestles Foods
Nextar
Nike
Nikon
Nivea Cosmetics
Nokia Electronics
Northrop Grumman Corporation
NuSkin International
Nutrilite (see Amway)
Nvidia Corporation (G-Force)
Office Depot
Olin Corporation
Old Navy
Olympus Electronics
Orion-Knight Electronics
Pacific Sunwear, Inc.
Pamper's
Panasonic
Pan Pacific Electronics
Panvise
Papa Johns
Payless Shoesource
Pelco
Pentax Optics
Pep Boy's
Pepsico International
PetsMart
Petco
Pfizer, Inc.
Philips Electronics
Phillip Morris Companies
Pier 1 Imports
Pierre Cardin
Pillsbury Company
Pioneer Electronics
Pitney Bowes, Inc.
Pizza Hut
Plantronics
PlaySchool Toys
Polaris Industries
Polaroid
Polo (see Ralph Loren)
Post Cereals
Price-Pfister
Pringles
Praxair
Proctor & Gamble
PSS World Medical
Pyle Audio
Qualcomm
Quest One
Radio Shack
Ralph Loren
RCA
Reebok International
Reynolds Aluminum
Revlon
Rohm & Hass Company
Samsonite
Samsung
Sanyo
Shell Oil
Schwinn Bike
Sears-Craftsman
Seven-Eleven (7-11)
Sharp Electronics
Sherwin-Williams
Shure Electronics
Sony
Speco Technologies/Pro Video
Shopko Stores
Skechers Footwear
SmartHome
Smucker's (see J.M. Smucker's)
Solar Power, Inc.
Spencer Gifts
Stanley Tools
Staple's
Starbucks Corporation
Steelcase, Inc.
STP Oil
Sunkist Growers
SunMaid Raisins
Sunglass Hut
Sunkist
Subway Sandwiches
Switchcraft Electronics
SYSCO Foods
Sylvania Electric
3-M
Tai Pan Trading Company
Tamron Optics
Target
TDK
Tektronix, Inc
Texas Instruments
Timex
Timken Bearing
TNT
Tommy Hilfiger
Toro
Toshiba
Tower Automotive
Toyota
Toy's R Us, Inc.
Trader Joe's
Tripp-lite
True Value Hardware
Tupper Ware
Tyson Foods
Uniden Electronics
UPS
Valspar Corporation
Victoria 's Secret
Vizio Electronics
Volkswagen
VTech
Walgreen Company
Walt Disney Company
Walmart
WD-40 Corporation
Weller Electric Company
Western Digital
Westinghouse Electric
Weyerhaeuser Company
Whirlpool Corporation
Wilson Sporting Goods
Wrigley
WW Grainger, Inc.
Wyeth Laboratories
X-10
Xelite
Xerox
Yahoo
Yamaha
Yoplait Foods
Yum Brands
Zale Corporation
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Note how many of these companies (Retailers) dropped MyPillow because OrangeManBad but have no moral objection to the PRC.
Investments are out of these companies that manufacturebin China, and everything that could be hurt by their collapse? :wink:
AT&T
Abercrombe & Fitch
Abbott Laboratories
Acer Electronics
Ademco Security
Adidas
ADI Security
AGI- American Gem Institute
AIG Financial
Agrilink Foods, Inc. (ProFac)
Allergan Laboratories
American Eagle Outfitters
American Standard
American Tourister
Ames Tools
Amphenol Corporation
Amway Corporation
Analog Devices, Inc.
Apple Computer
Armani
Armour Meats
Ashland Chemical
Ashley Furniture
Associated Grocers
Audi Motors
AudioVox
AutoZone, Inc.
Avon
Banana Republic
Bausch & Lomb, Inc.
Baxter International
Bed, Bath & Beyond
Belkin Electronics
Best Buy
Best Foods
Big 5 Sporting Goods
Black & Decker
Body Shop
Borden Foods
Briggs & Stratton
Calrad Electric
Campbell 's Soup
Canon Electronics
Carole Cable
Casio Instrument
Caterpillar, Inc.
CBC America
CCTV Outlet
Checker Auto
CitiCorp
Cisco Systems
Chiquita Brands International
Claire's Boutique
Cobra Electronics
Coby Electronics
Coca Cola Foods
Colgate-Palmolive
Colorado Spectrum
ConAgra Foods
Cooper Tire
Corning, Inc.
Coleman Sporting Goods
Compaq
Crabtree & Evelyn
Cracker Barrel Stores
Craftsman Tools (see Sears)
Cummins, Inc.
Dannon Foods
Dell Computer
Del Monte Foods
Dewalt Tools
DHL
Dial Corporation
Diebold, Inc.
Dillard's, Inc.
Dodge-Phelps
Dole Foods
Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.
Dow-Corning
Eastman Kodak
EchoStar
Eclipse CCTV
Edge Electronics Group
Electric Vehicles USA, Inc.
Eli Lilly Company
Emerson Electric
Enfamil
Estee Lauder
Eveready
Family Dollar Stores
FedEx
Fisher Scientific
Ford Motors
Fossil
Frito Lay
Furniture Brands International
GAP Stores
Gateway Computer
GE, General Electric
General Foods International
General Mills
General Motors
Gentek
Gerber Foods
Gillette Company
Goodrich Company
Goodyear Tire
Google
Gucci
Guess?
Haagen-Dazs
Harley Davidson
Hasbro Company
Heinz Foods
Hershey Foods
Hitachi
Hoffman-LaRoche
Holt's Automotive Products
Hormel Foods
Home Depot
Honda Motor
Hoover Vacuum
HP Computer
Honda
Honeywell
Hubbell Inc.
Huggies
Hunts-Wesson Foods
ICON Office Solutions
IBM
Ikea
Intel Corporation
J.C. Penny's
J.M. Smucker Company
John Deere
Johnson Control
Johnson & Johnson
Johnstone Supply
JVC Electronics
KB Home
Keebler Foods
Kenwood Audio
KFC, Kentucky Fried Chicken
Kimberly Clark
Knorr Foods
K-Mart
Kohler
Kohl's Corporation
Kraft Foods
Kragen Auto
Land's End
Lee Kum Kee Foods
Lexmark
LG Electronics
Lipton Foods
L.L. Bean, Inc.
Logitech
Libby's Foods
Linen & Things
Lipo Chemicals, Inc.
Lowe's Hardware
Lucent Technologies
Lufkin
Mars Candy
Martha Stewart Products
Mattel
McCormick Foods
McDonald's
McKesson Corporation
Megellan GPS
Memorex
Merck & Company
Michael's Stores
Mitsubishi Electronics
Mitsubishi Motors
Mobile Oil
Molex
Motorola
Motts Applesauce
Multifoods Corporation
Nabisco Foods
National Semiconductor
Nescafe
Nestles Foods
Nextar
Nike
Nikon
Nivea Cosmetics
Nokia Electronics
Northrop Grumman Corporation
NuSkin International
Nutrilite (see Amway)
Nvidia Corporation (G-Force)
Office Depot
Olin Corporation
Old Navy
Olympus Electronics
Orion-Knight Electronics
Pacific Sunwear, Inc.
Pamper's
Panasonic
Pan Pacific Electronics
Panvise
Papa Johns
Payless Shoesource
Pelco
Pentax Optics
Pep Boy's
Pepsico International
PetsMart
Petco
Pfizer, Inc.
Philips Electronics
Phillip Morris Companies
Pier 1 Imports
Pierre Cardin
Pillsbury Company
Pioneer Electronics
Pitney Bowes, Inc.
Pizza Hut
Plantronics
PlaySchool Toys
Polaris Industries
Polaroid
Polo (see Ralph Loren)
Post Cereals
Price-Pfister
Pringles
Praxair
Proctor & Gamble
PSS World Medical
Pyle Audio
Qualcomm
Quest One
Radio Shack
Ralph Loren
RCA
Reebok International
Reynolds Aluminum
Revlon
Rohm & Hass Company
Samsonite
Samsung
Sanyo
Shell Oil
Schwinn Bike
Sears-Craftsman
Seven-Eleven (7-11)
Sharp Electronics
Sherwin-Williams
Shure Electronics
Sony
Speco Technologies/Pro Video
Shopko Stores
Skechers Footwear
SmartHome
Smucker's (see J.M. Smucker's)
Solar Power, Inc.
Spencer Gifts
Stanley Tools
Staple's
Starbucks Corporation
Steelcase, Inc.
STP Oil
Sunkist Growers
SunMaid Raisins
Sunglass Hut
Sunkist
Subway Sandwiches
Switchcraft Electronics
SYSCO Foods
Sylvania Electric
3-M
Tai Pan Trading Company
Tamron Optics
Target
TDK
Tektronix, Inc
Texas Instruments
Timex
Timken Bearing
TNT
Tommy Hilfiger
Toro
Toshiba
Tower Automotive
Toyota
Toy's R Us, Inc.
Trader Joe's
Tripp-lite
True Value Hardware
Tupper Ware
Tyson Foods
Uniden Electronics
UPS
Valspar Corporation
Victoria 's Secret
Vizio Electronics
Volkswagen
VTech
Walgreen Company
Walt Disney Company
Walmart
WD-40 Corporation
Weller Electric Company
Western Digital
Westinghouse Electric
Weyerhaeuser Company
Whirlpool Corporation
Wilson Sporting Goods
Wrigley
WW Grainger, Inc.
Wyeth Laboratories
X-10
Xelite
Xerox
Yahoo
Yamaha
Yoplait Foods
Yum Brands
Zale Corporation
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Well played!
No, I have not taken it anywhere near that far.
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18999/china-attack-taiwan?fbclid=IwAR0eNOchjXxoRzK8Z4rSYBDRKuf7eKbRVZs9iurtglmbE14xGNYt_SEj6OA
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18999/china-attack-taiwan?fbclid=IwAR0eNOchjXxoRzK8Z4rSYBDRKuf7eKbRVZs9iurtglmbE14xGNYt_SEj6OA
Who is holding the PRC responsible for COVID?
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https://www.defenseone.com/business/2022/10/commercial-planes-ships-would-play-large-role-pacific-war-transcom-head-says/378524/
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second
TAIWAN
IN CASE OF EMERGENCY
Distant thoughts of confrontation with China grow closer to genuine fear of losing freedom
First of three parts
BY GUY TAYLOR THE WASHINGTON TIMES
TAICHUNG, TAIWAN
Elsa Lin has been doing serious soulsearching about what might become of her life and how she would respond if a once-unthinkable war with China breaks out.
“My parents think it will be better for me to leave the country if the war ever takes place,” Ms. Lin said in a recent interview. “They think if things continue to escalate, I should leave.”
The 28-year-old has lived nearly her whole life in Taiwan, and she said the island democracy flourishing around her since her childhood is too valuable to abandon.
“I am proud of being Taiwanese, and if China attacks Taiwan just like Russia did Ukraine, I fear we would lose our freedom,” Ms. Lin told The Washington Times. “If we are attacked, I will fight. I will be volunteering to fight.”
She is grappling with a decision confronting Taiwan’s nearly 24 million people as Beijing increases its threat to absorb the island democracy by any means necessary, including a military invasion, to force it under the control of the Communist Party-ruled government of mainland China.
The national soul-searching has intensified since August when China dramatically expanded the scope of its military drills and missile tests
near Taiwan in response to a visit by a U.S. delegation headed by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. Many Taiwanese see the expansion of aggression as a sign that Beijing is practicing to invade.
Fears that China’s autocratic government will turn to military force seem more rational after eight months of violent imagery from Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine.
“After Ukraine, people’s mindset has changed,” said Betty Chen, a 40-yearold Taiwanese woman who works as an English-language translator for highprofi le clients in Taipei.
“Seeing this example in Ukraine, we know that war can really happen,” said Ms. Chen. “Nobody wants war, but we cannot ignore the possibility, especially after Ukraine. I think we’ve become more and more aware of that.”
China’s success in ratcheting up pressure against a vibrant pro-democracy independence movement in Hong Kong in recent years has added to concerns that Beijing feels increasingly emboldened to wipe out the free political society in Taiwan.
The Chinese Communist Party has made a goal of absorbing Taiwan since the early 1950s, when American support helped the fleeing Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) of Chiang Kai-shek find sanctuary for a government in exile on the island after its defeat by Mao Zedong’s forces on the mainland. U.S. military power deterred China’s new leaders from attacking Taiwan.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has pushed the goal back into the global spotlight. In 2019, he warned that Beijing could use force to dissolve Taiwan’s democracy. The heightened military drills and China’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have increased concern that Mr. Xi may be preparing for war.
Most Taiwanese say they want peace with China, and some say the island should avoid war at any cost. Regardless, the independence-leaning government of President Tsai Ing-wen, along with influential leaders of Taiwan’s economy with strong ties to both mainland China and the United States, are scrambling to prepare the island’s citizenry for a potential invasion.
“Putting it very simply, [Chinese offi cials] talk about it and they practice for it, and therefore the threat for Taiwan is real,” said Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu.
“We sense it and we understand the urgency, and therefore we also try to prepare for the worst possible day to come,” Mr. Wu recently told foreign journalists visiting Taiwan through a program sponsored by the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
“What we need to do is to make ourselves fully prepared so that whenever China thinks the conditions are right for them to attack against Taiwan, we are prepared and we are able to defend ourselves,” he said. “If you look at the Ukrainian people, their will to defend their freedom, they are truly inspirational to the Taiwanese people.”
Among the most inspired is Taiwanese billionaire Robert Tsao, founder of the microchip manufacturing giant United Microelectronics Corp., who has publicly pledged $100 million to bolster the island democracy’s defense.
Mr. Tsao has said in interviews that he seeks to finance advanced drone development for Taiwan’s military.
Another $31 million is being channeled into an effort to expand and improve the civilian defense force. Local-level training organizations have begun offering public courses on tying tourniquets, countering Chinese disinformation operations and other warfare skills.
Civilian defense training is at an early stage, and it’s unclear whether public interest is high enough to produce tens or hundreds of thousands of civilian soldiers — let alone integrate the force effectively with Taiwan’s national military.
The status of and public faith in the Taiwanese military are sensitive subjects.
Since China increased military aggression in August, 59% of Taiwanese said they have confidence in the national army’s ability to defend the island in the event of a Chinese attack, according to a poll by the government-connected Institute for National Defense and Security Research.
After Mrs. Pelosi’s visit, roughly 50% of those polled said they believed the United States would send troops to help Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion.
The poll also found that about 41% believe the most important way for Taiwan to protect itself is to strengthen the island’s national defense capabilities.
The Tsai government has responded by pushing for a 14% increase in defense spending for the coming year, with line items for a “special” defense ministry fund and new fighter jets.
Although the increase would bring Taiwan’s annual military budget to more than $19 billion, it’s a drop in the bucket compared with the nearly $230 billion that mainland China earmarked for its military in 2022.
Some Taiwan-based observers are skeptical of the island’s defense system.
“The Taiwanese military is woefully unprepared for an invasion by China,” said Wendell Minnick, a longtime Taiwan- based American journalist covering security issues in Asia.
Critics in Washington and Taipei point to the uncertain quality of Taiwanese soldiers compared with the battlehardened and NATO-trained troops Ukraine has deployed to counter Russian aggression.
Until August, the fear of an imminent Chinese invasion of Taiwan was receding and the mandatory term of military training and service for draftees fell from as long as two years to just four months.
At the same time, many of the bigticket items on the Taiwanese Defense Ministry’s shopping list, such as nextgeneration F-16 fighter jets from the United States, may not be deployable for years.
“It’s a popular idea for the news media that Taiwan could emulate Ukraine in the event of a Chinese invasion,” said Mr. Minnick, “but it’s not accurate.”
Many young adults in Taiwan have brought a psychological sea change in attitudes.
“The younger generation in Taiwan has more ideas about the political issues, and there are more and more people who believe that we have to stand up against China [and] prepare for war,” said Cynthia Yang, a 26-year-old professional working in the Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturing industry.
“There are a lot of activities preparing civil defense. There are civil defense organizations already,” said Ms. Yang, who spends time off work as the youth representative of the Taiwan United Nations Alliance, a nongovernmental organization whose self-described mission is to counter Chinese “bullying and coercion,” which have kept the island democracy from membership in the United Nations.
The alliance operates out of a Christian church in Taipei that hosts civilian defense training sessions.
Ms. Yang said many Taiwanese don’t want to openly declare the island as an independent, sovereign nation because they fear it will trigger a severe backlash from China.
“They are afraid of invasion from China,” she said. “They are afraid it would trigger the war directly because that’s what the Chinese government has been saying … that [Beijing] will use all means to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence.”
Ms. Yang, Ms. Lin and others say the rising Taiwanese generation represents a new kind of thinking.
“Among my friends who have a bit more education, we have a little more time to pay attention to the international situation and politics,” said Ms. Lin. Apart from a year of university study in Europe, she has lived her whole life in Taiwan. She was coming of age as political liberties flourished after the first democratic presidential elections in 1996.
“Some of Taiwan’s citizens think politics are not important — that it’s better to just live your stable life, just work and earn money,” Ms. Lin said. “But from what I know, my friends, we want a little bit more than that. We want our freedom. We know that it is important and it is special.”
“We are in Taiwan, not China. We have freedom of speech,” she said. “If China becomes more aggressive, we will fight back. We will absolutely make some noise.
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Naval commander: U.S. grows stronger in defense of Taiwan
Sees China moves as ‘rehearsals’
BY BILL GERTZ THE WASHINGTON TIMES
The commander of the world’s largest naval force component says there should be no ambiguity about the operational capabilities of the U.S. Navy’s warships and other naval forces to defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack.
Adm. Sam “Pappy” Paparo, U.S. Pacific Fleet commander, said in an interview with The Washington Times that his forces are ready to defend Taiwan from a Chinese military move.
The prospect appears increasingly likely under the aggressive policies of Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Asked about comments from Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Monday that China appears to be narrowing its timetable for taking action against Taiwan, which Beijing claims as part of its sovereign territory, Adm. Paparo said: “This is a decade of concern, so I absolutely see the logic of in the secretary’s discussion.”
Recent Chinese military efforts and drills in preparation for a Taiwan invasion or other military action can be seen as “rehearsals” of the People’s Liberation Army, he said.
On the potential for a conflict with China in the Taiwan Strait, Adm. Paparo said: “The first thing I will say is, we’re ready today. We’ll be ready tomorrow. We’ll be ready next week and next year. There’s not a single day that we’re not going to be working to get readier.”
U.S. policy since the 1970s recognizes that there is a single China but says differences over Taiwan’s sovereignty and its relationship to the mainland must not be resolved by force, he said.
The four-star admiral said he could offer “no opinion on the policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’” regarding how the U.S. military would respond to a Chinese move against Taiwan.
“But,” he added, “what I can offer you is operational clarity.”
Under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, he said, “I’m required to have the capability to thwart any invasion of Taiwan, any effort to resolve the matter by force, and on that, there is no ambiguity. There is just perfect clarity that I’m confident in our ability to do that with our joint capabilities that are capable of deploying quickly to the point where they are operating dynamically in the battle space and imposing intolerable costs to an adversary.”
The U.S. enacted the law to support Taiwan after the Carter administration switched formal diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The Taiwan Relations Act states that U.S. recognition of the People’s Republic of China was preconditioned on the future of Taiwan, now a thriving island democracy of nearly 24 million people, being settled by “peaceful means.” The law also states that it is U.S. policy “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” that endangers the security, social and economic system of the people of Taiwan.
“Strategic ambiguity” is not a formal U.S. policy. It was first discussed in congressional testimony by a Pentagon official in 1995.
President Biden has called the policy into question. In September, he said the United States would send military forces to defend Taiwan in the case of an “unprecedented attack” by China.
It was the fourth time the president made the statement. After each mention, the White House insisted that the comments did not represent a change in longstanding U.S. policy. Still, the president’s repeated statements have led to official protests from Beijing and widespread perceptions that the strategic ambiguity approach is a thing of the past.
Chinese leaders accuse the Biden administration of trying to change the status quo regarding Taiwan and have repeatedly stated that the use of force against Taiwan remains an option.
On Sunday, Mr. Xi said efforts to take control of Taiwan, which split from the mainland during a civil war in 1949, was one of the Chinese Communist Party’s highest priorities.
Although China has built up its navy and strategic forces under Mr. Xi, Adm. Paparo said in the interview that the People’s Liberation Army has several major weaknesses and vulnerabilities.
“One, they have no friends. No allies and partners,” he said.
Beijing has a “passing friendship” with Russia that is limited in scope and ties to North Korea that are not strong.
“Their second weakness is a lack of experience in the combat areas that would be required for them to gain the advantages,” Adm. Paparo said.
“But on that front, they are working their way through that,” he said, “and they’re attempting to learn and grow in those capabilities.”
Finally, he said, China has a more profound weakness: “the utter absurdity and weakness of their cause in their malign intentions.”
The commander leads the world’s largest fleet command, covering 100 million square miles of territory from the West Coast of the United States to the Indian Ocean.
His command includes about 200 ships and submarines, nearly 1,200 aircraft and more than 130,000 sailors and civilians. The fleet is under the administrative control of the Navy’s chief of naval operations and operationally is under the Hawaii-based Indo-Pacific Command.
Its legendary commanders include Adm. Chester Nimitz and Adm. Raymond Spruance.
Adm. Paparo, a Navy pilot by training, said the Chinese military’s drive to develop war-fighting experience has prompted him to increase joint fighting efforts for U.S. forces.
The Pacific Fleet recently augmented its two numbered fleets, the 7th Fleet and 3rd Fleet, with Fleet Information Warfare Command-Pacific. The unit is designed to oversee information warfare, including cyberattacks and strategic messaging. The new command coordinates communications and messaging with the Indo-Pacific Command and the office of Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.
Once again, a main target of the initiative is China.
The information warfare center is “always working toward characterizing [China’s] ability to see, understand, decide and act in the battlespace, and we’re ready to frustrate their ability to do those things,” Adm. Paparo said.
He said the new information battlefi eld and the struggle between competing value systems are increasingly important.
“I have faith in the principles of a free and open Indo-Pacific, in the principles of sovereignty, of human dignity, human rights, self-determination, freedom of the seas, freedom of the skies, freedom in space,” he said. “I have absolute belief in that. I have absolute belief in the values of the allies and partners, and those values in and of themselves are an info op.”
“In our adversaries,” he said, “it’s usually the converse.”
The commitment to democratic openness and a free, sometimes critical press may have short-term disadvantages in the information wars, the admiral said, but in the long term, “our principles of being truthful and authentic, and our long-term principles of freedom of the press will prevail because people are smart.”
Within the U.S. military, the Pacific Fleet is known as a joint task force that must be ready to conduct operations in both kinetic and non-kinetic combat scenarios. As part of a broader Pentagon strategy, the Pacific Fleet, like other military components, plans to leverage hightechnology advances in weapons and other capabilities, the commander said.
Key areas include electronic warfare to counter command and control communications, intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance while protecting Navy command and control.
The Navy also is developing “longrange fires” — advanced strike weapons, and improved abilities to “maneuver dynamically in that environment,” Adm. Paparo said.
Another key area will be improvements in the fleet’s ability to execute precise and timely logistics, he said.
Earlier, during a speech at a conference on information operations, Adm. Paparo said the use of information tools is “first, middle and last” in the effort to prevent war and deter adversaries. The military, in combination with allies and partners, aims to respect the rule of law and international norms while championing freedom, rights and liberties.
Deterring China, as well as hostile powers such as Russia and North Korea, means opposing “expansionism and seizure of land, seas, nutrients and mineral resources by coercion and/or military actions,” Adm. Paparo said.
The People’s Republic of China, he said, is seeking to gain global hegemony through the use of innocuous-sounding phrases like promotion of “common prosperity.”
“This is the system where the PRC is the center and ‘all affairs under heaven’ are determined through their autocracy,” Adm. Paparo said. “Not the rule of law is what we see in the PRC, but it is the ‘rule by law.’” Adm. Paparo rejected Mr. Xi’s claim that China’s drive for global power is about “national rejuvenation.”
“Let’s be clear about what rejuvenation means,” he said. “National rejuvenation means the party control of economies. It means military modernization to support the above, and it means the armed changing of international borders by force.”
The U.S. and its allies are seeking to block Chinese ambitions on a series of fronts: military expansion in the South China Sea, coercion and pressure against Taiwan and Japan’s Senkaku Islands, pressure on India’s border region, and repression of freedoms and liberties in Hong Kong, he said.
“This is not about containing PRC economic and military growth,” he said. “It’s about ensuring that we as a free and sovereign nation ensure their actions, behaviors do not disrupt the peace and stability of the region, or the international rules-based order which … has lifted 60% of the world out of poverty and lifts 160,000 human beings out of poverty each and every single day.”
Adm. Paparo is the second senior Pacifi c Fleet officer to warn of the growing danger of a military conflict over Taiwan.
In September, Vice Adm. Karl Thomas, commander of the Navy’s 7th Fleet, said China’s navy has grown large enough to blockade Taiwan.
Adm. Thomas said he does not know whether China will use its military against Taiwan but said U.S. forces must be ready. He urged that differences be settled peacefully.
“Clearly, if they do something that’s non-kinetic, which, you know, a blockade is less kinetic, then that allows the international community to weigh in and to work together on how we’re going to solve that challenge,” Adm. Thomas told The Wall Street Journal in September.
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The US Navy can't even avoid crashing ships into things in peacetime.
But we have better drag queen shows than the PLAN!
Naval commander: U.S. grows stronger in defense of Taiwan
Sees China moves as ‘rehearsals’
BY BILL GERTZ THE WASHINGTON TIMES
The commander of the world’s largest naval force component says there should be no ambiguity about the operational capabilities of the U.S. Navy’s warships and other naval forces to defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack.
Adm. Sam “Pappy” Paparo, U.S. Pacific Fleet commander, said in an interview with The Washington Times that his forces are ready to defend Taiwan from a Chinese military move.
The prospect appears increasingly likely under the aggressive policies of Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Asked about comments from Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Monday that China appears to be narrowing its timetable for taking action against Taiwan, which Beijing claims as part of its sovereign territory, Adm. Paparo said: “This is a decade of concern, so I absolutely see the logic of in the secretary’s discussion.”
Recent Chinese military efforts and drills in preparation for a Taiwan invasion or other military action can be seen as “rehearsals” of the People’s Liberation Army, he said.
On the potential for a conflict with China in the Taiwan Strait, Adm. Paparo said: “The first thing I will say is, we’re ready today. We’ll be ready tomorrow. We’ll be ready next week and next year. There’s not a single day that we’re not going to be working to get readier.”
U.S. policy since the 1970s recognizes that there is a single China but says differences over Taiwan’s sovereignty and its relationship to the mainland must not be resolved by force, he said.
The four-star admiral said he could offer “no opinion on the policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’” regarding how the U.S. military would respond to a Chinese move against Taiwan.
“But,” he added, “what I can offer you is operational clarity.”
Under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, he said, “I’m required to have the capability to thwart any invasion of Taiwan, any effort to resolve the matter by force, and on that, there is no ambiguity. There is just perfect clarity that I’m confident in our ability to do that with our joint capabilities that are capable of deploying quickly to the point where they are operating dynamically in the battle space and imposing intolerable costs to an adversary.”
The U.S. enacted the law to support Taiwan after the Carter administration switched formal diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The Taiwan Relations Act states that U.S. recognition of the People’s Republic of China was preconditioned on the future of Taiwan, now a thriving island democracy of nearly 24 million people, being settled by “peaceful means.” The law also states that it is U.S. policy “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” that endangers the security, social and economic system of the people of Taiwan.
“Strategic ambiguity” is not a formal U.S. policy. It was first discussed in congressional testimony by a Pentagon official in 1995.
President Biden has called the policy into question. In September, he said the United States would send military forces to defend Taiwan in the case of an “unprecedented attack” by China.
It was the fourth time the president made the statement. After each mention, the White House insisted that the comments did not represent a change in longstanding U.S. policy. Still, the president’s repeated statements have led to official protests from Beijing and widespread perceptions that the strategic ambiguity approach is a thing of the past.
Chinese leaders accuse the Biden administration of trying to change the status quo regarding Taiwan and have repeatedly stated that the use of force against Taiwan remains an option.
On Sunday, Mr. Xi said efforts to take control of Taiwan, which split from the mainland during a civil war in 1949, was one of the Chinese Communist Party’s highest priorities.
Although China has built up its navy and strategic forces under Mr. Xi, Adm. Paparo said in the interview that the People’s Liberation Army has several major weaknesses and vulnerabilities.
“One, they have no friends. No allies and partners,” he said.
Beijing has a “passing friendship” with Russia that is limited in scope and ties to North Korea that are not strong.
“Their second weakness is a lack of experience in the combat areas that would be required for them to gain the advantages,” Adm. Paparo said.
“But on that front, they are working their way through that,” he said, “and they’re attempting to learn and grow in those capabilities.”
Finally, he said, China has a more profound weakness: “the utter absurdity and weakness of their cause in their malign intentions.”
The commander leads the world’s largest fleet command, covering 100 million square miles of territory from the West Coast of the United States to the Indian Ocean.
His command includes about 200 ships and submarines, nearly 1,200 aircraft and more than 130,000 sailors and civilians. The fleet is under the administrative control of the Navy’s chief of naval operations and operationally is under the Hawaii-based Indo-Pacific Command.
Its legendary commanders include Adm. Chester Nimitz and Adm. Raymond Spruance.
Adm. Paparo, a Navy pilot by training, said the Chinese military’s drive to develop war-fighting experience has prompted him to increase joint fighting efforts for U.S. forces.
The Pacific Fleet recently augmented its two numbered fleets, the 7th Fleet and 3rd Fleet, with Fleet Information Warfare Command-Pacific. The unit is designed to oversee information warfare, including cyberattacks and strategic messaging. The new command coordinates communications and messaging with the Indo-Pacific Command and the office of Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.
Once again, a main target of the initiative is China.
The information warfare center is “always working toward characterizing [China’s] ability to see, understand, decide and act in the battlespace, and we’re ready to frustrate their ability to do those things,” Adm. Paparo said.
He said the new information battlefi eld and the struggle between competing value systems are increasingly important.
“I have faith in the principles of a free and open Indo-Pacific, in the principles of sovereignty, of human dignity, human rights, self-determination, freedom of the seas, freedom of the skies, freedom in space,” he said. “I have absolute belief in that. I have absolute belief in the values of the allies and partners, and those values in and of themselves are an info op.”
“In our adversaries,” he said, “it’s usually the converse.”
The commitment to democratic openness and a free, sometimes critical press may have short-term disadvantages in the information wars, the admiral said, but in the long term, “our principles of being truthful and authentic, and our long-term principles of freedom of the press will prevail because people are smart.”
Within the U.S. military, the Pacific Fleet is known as a joint task force that must be ready to conduct operations in both kinetic and non-kinetic combat scenarios. As part of a broader Pentagon strategy, the Pacific Fleet, like other military components, plans to leverage hightechnology advances in weapons and other capabilities, the commander said.
Key areas include electronic warfare to counter command and control communications, intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance while protecting Navy command and control.
The Navy also is developing “longrange fires” — advanced strike weapons, and improved abilities to “maneuver dynamically in that environment,” Adm. Paparo said.
Another key area will be improvements in the fleet’s ability to execute precise and timely logistics, he said.
Earlier, during a speech at a conference on information operations, Adm. Paparo said the use of information tools is “first, middle and last” in the effort to prevent war and deter adversaries. The military, in combination with allies and partners, aims to respect the rule of law and international norms while championing freedom, rights and liberties.
Deterring China, as well as hostile powers such as Russia and North Korea, means opposing “expansionism and seizure of land, seas, nutrients and mineral resources by coercion and/or military actions,” Adm. Paparo said.
The People’s Republic of China, he said, is seeking to gain global hegemony through the use of innocuous-sounding phrases like promotion of “common prosperity.”
“This is the system where the PRC is the center and ‘all affairs under heaven’ are determined through their autocracy,” Adm. Paparo said. “Not the rule of law is what we see in the PRC, but it is the ‘rule by law.’” Adm. Paparo rejected Mr. Xi’s claim that China’s drive for global power is about “national rejuvenation.”
“Let’s be clear about what rejuvenation means,” he said. “National rejuvenation means the party control of economies. It means military modernization to support the above, and it means the armed changing of international borders by force.”
The U.S. and its allies are seeking to block Chinese ambitions on a series of fronts: military expansion in the South China Sea, coercion and pressure against Taiwan and Japan’s Senkaku Islands, pressure on India’s border region, and repression of freedoms and liberties in Hong Kong, he said.
“This is not about containing PRC economic and military growth,” he said. “It’s about ensuring that we as a free and sovereign nation ensure their actions, behaviors do not disrupt the peace and stability of the region, or the international rules-based order which … has lifted 60% of the world out of poverty and lifts 160,000 human beings out of poverty each and every single day.”
Adm. Paparo is the second senior Pacifi c Fleet officer to warn of the growing danger of a military conflict over Taiwan.
In September, Vice Adm. Karl Thomas, commander of the Navy’s 7th Fleet, said China’s navy has grown large enough to blockade Taiwan.
Adm. Thomas said he does not know whether China will use its military against Taiwan but said U.S. forces must be ready. He urged that differences be settled peacefully.
“Clearly, if they do something that’s non-kinetic, which, you know, a blockade is less kinetic, then that allows the international community to weigh in and to work together on how we’re going to solve that challenge,” Adm. Thomas told The Wall Street Journal in September.
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Gen. Keane says our war games say we would lose fast and hard.
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that has to be a 2022 window or potentially a 2023 window, I can’t rule that out."
- Admiral Mike Gilday, chief of US naval operations
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/467c873a-5078-11ed-af60-3f894fe60060?shareToken=498e92d19ecdcf50907d43b29a80393b
China could invade Taiwan this year, US military chief warns
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/ ^ | October 20 2022 | Didi Tang and Richard Lloyd Parry report
China could invade the self-governed island of Taiwan as soon as this year, a senior US naval commander said. Admiral Mike Gilday, chief of US naval operations, raised the prospect of imminent war yesterday at a discussion hosted by the Atlantic Council in Washington. He was asked about recent official US assessments that China is building the capability to seize Taiwan by 2027. “When we talk about the 2027 window, in my mind that has to be a 2022 window or potentially a 2023 window,” Gilday said. “I can’t rule that out. I don’t mean at all to be alarmist...
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The PRC sees the fake and gay US military and our bumbling leadership and can't believe their luck.
that has to be a 2022 window or potentially a 2023 window, I can’t rule that out."
- Admiral Mike Gilday, chief of US naval operations
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/467c873a-5078-11ed-af60-3f894fe60060?shareToken=498e92d19ecdcf50907d43b29a80393b
China could invade Taiwan this year, US military chief warns
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/ ^ | October 20 2022 | Didi Tang and Richard Lloyd Parry report
China could invade the self-governed island of Taiwan as soon as this year, a senior US naval commander said. Admiral Mike Gilday, chief of US naval operations, raised the prospect of imminent war yesterday at a discussion hosted by the Atlantic Council in Washington. He was asked about recent official US assessments that China is building the capability to seize Taiwan by 2027. “When we talk about the 2027 window, in my mind that has to be a 2022 window or potentially a 2023 window,” Gilday said. “I can’t rule that out. I don’t mean at all to be alarmist...
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The ‘Anti-Navy’ the U.S. Needs Against the Chinese Military
The U.S. is set to be weakest when the People’s Liberation Army aims to be strongest.
By Mike Gallagher
Oct. 25, 2022 6:14 pm ET
As Xi Jinping secured a third term as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, U.S. foreign policy entered a window of maximum danger. In a speech to the 20th Party Congress, Mr. Xi made clear that unification with Taiwan “must” and “can, without doubt, be realized.”
Secretary of State Antony Blinken admitted that Mr. Xi is moving on a “much faster timeline” to take Taiwan, and Chief of Naval Operations Michael Gilday said he couldn’t rule out an invasion in 2022 or 2023. Domestically, Mr. Xi’s problems—a structural economic slowdown, skyrocketing household debt, and the demographic buzzsaw of the largest group of retirees in human history—will all get worse in the 2030s.
At the same time, Mr. Xi faces an American military that is growing weaker within the decade. As the Heritage Foundation’s recently released 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength makes clear, because of inadequate budgets, truncated modernization and degraded readiness, the U.S. military is set to be weakest when the People’s Liberation Army aims to be strongest. The report, which for the first time rated the overall state of the U.S. military as “weak,” rated the Navy and Air Force—the two priority forces in the Indo-Pacific—as “weak” and “very weak,” respectively.
Rather than gambling the fate of the free world on Mr. Xi’s restraint, we must learn the lessons from Ukraine and put American hard power in Mr. Xi’s path before it is too late. Long-term investments to rebuild American military superiority in general, and maritime superiority in particular, are critical. But the reality is we won’t be able to build the Navy the nation needs within the next five years.
What we can do now is build an anti-navy—asymmetric forces and weapons designed to target the Chinese Navy, deny control of the seas surrounding Taiwan, and prevent the PLA’s amphibious forces from gaining a lodgment on the island.
The first step in assembling this anti-navy is to build up long-range ground-launched conventional missiles in three rings across the Pacific: (1) the First Island Chain, (2) the Second Island Chain plus the Central Pacific islands, and (3) the outer edges of the theater, including Alaska, Hawaii, and Australia.
As a new report from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments argues, in the first ring we need shorter-range antiship and air-defense missiles such as the Naval Strike Missile, Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile and SM-6. These weapons would be operated by the Army and Marine Corps, especially in the Southern Japanese and Northern Philippine Islands. Wherever possible, the weapons should be containerized to confuse Chinese targeting.
In the second ring, we need extended-range Maritime Strike Tomahawks and other intermediate-range missiles. In the third ring we need longer-range intermediate missiles with advanced energetic materials in places like Alaska and Australia’s Northern Territory.
The point is that the PLA Rocket Force (China’s anti-navy) has fielded low-cost weapons to keep American ships out of the fight and target American forces concentrated in a few, fixed locations. We must use this logic against China, building an anti-navy that can sink PLA ships and amphibious landing craft at port, in the Taiwan Strait and on Taiwan’s beaches. Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles cost only about $4 million a unit but could destroy Chinese ships that cost the PLA hundreds of millions of dollars to build. For once, U.S. forces would be on the right side of the cost equation.
The second step in building an anti-navy is to stockpile munitions before the shooting starts. At current rates, it could take two years to boost Javelin production from 2,100 to 4,000 missiles annually. In many cases Chinese companies are the sole source or a primary supplier of key materials used in our missiles. To fix this, the Pentagon should stop buying minimum sustaining rates of critical munitions and start maxing out the capacity of active production lines through multiyear procurement contracts. Drawing on the lessons of Operation Warp Speed, we can modernize the Defense Production Act and use it to provide direct project financing, automatic fast-tracking of permits, and investments in defense workforce training.
The third step is to turn the talk about arming Taiwan to the teeth into reality. This starts with moving Taiwan to the front of the Foreign Military Sales line and clearing the backlog of $14 billion in FMS items that have been approved but not delivered. Congress can go further by providing direct financial assistance to Taiwan and giving the Pentagon the same drawdown authority to provide defense supplies directly to Taiwan that it already has with Ukraine. Rather than demilitarizing hundreds of Harpoon missiles or putting them into deep storage, for instance, the Pentagon could use a Taiwan drawdown authority, make any necessary modernizations and certifications, and send these missiles, along with launchers, to Taiwan.
These steps can deter war within the window of maximum danger. If Republicans gain control of Congress, preventing the same deterrence failure we saw in Ukraine from playing out in Taiwan must be our top priority.
Congress needs to bend the Pentagon bureaucracy, in service of a defense strategy that prioritizes hard power. Doing so demands we understand the paradox of deterrence: that to avoid war, you must convince your adversary that you are both capable and willing to wage war.
If we ignore the hard lessons about hard power that we have learned in Ukraine, if we succumb to the utopian path of disarmament, and if we allow the fear of escalation to dominate our decisions, we will feed Mr. Xi’s appetite for conquest and invite war. By choosing to put an anti-navy in Mr. Xi’s path, we can deter war in the short term and buy time to build a Navy that defeats communism over the long term.
Mr. Gallagher, a Republican, represents Wisconsin’s Eighth Congressional District.
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Taiwan and the U.S. Need Statesmanship, Not Partisanship
Without a comprehensive strategy, the island and the West will face a mounting peril from Beijing.
By John Bolton
Nov. 28, 2022 6:26 pm ET
Taiwan’s local elections on Saturday weren’t exactly held under fire, but the threat from China was palpable enough. The island’s competitive voting contrasted sharply with the Chinese Communist Party’s National Congress in October, which effectively made Xi Jinping president for life. Videos of Mr. Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, being forcibly removed from the convention are historic, now underlined by scenes of the Chinese government repressing public protest over its draconian zero-Covid policies.
Taiwan’s local elections typically don’t foretell how the public will vote for the national government. Take President Tsai Ing-wen, who as head of the Democratic Progressive Party won re-election in 2020 by wider margins than in 2016, even though the Chinese Nationalist Party—the Kuomintang, or KMT—made significant inroads in 2018. The KMT again made major gains this election, including Taipei’s mayoralty, despite the DPP’s effort to nationalize the elections by stressing Beijing’s threat.
While Taipei’s domestic politics mirror those of other industrial democracies, few countries face so imminent an existential threat. National attention now turns to 2024, when Ms. Tsai’s last term ends. Shortly after Saturday’s results, Ms. Tsai resigned as DPP leader, opening the way for a new party chairman. All of Taiwan’s political leaders should emulate her approach: less partisanship and more statesmanship for crafting strategies to deter Beijing’s threat to Taiwan and the entire Indo-Pacific.
In the U.S., both parties recognize that Taipei expects Washington to help with the Chinese threat. Nevertheless, it is imperative that America convey its expectations of Taiwan and synchronize strategies. Prioritizing these conversations will decrease isolationist sentiment in the U.S., most recently on display in disagreements over arming Ukraine against Russia. America aids Ukraine because it advances our strategic interests, and Ms. Tsai and other Taiwanese leaders must make their case vigorously, as President Volodymyr Zelensky has done.
By demonstrating seriousness of purpose, Taiwan can refute one canard still alive in Washington: that Taiwan’s citizens are insufficiently committed to their own defense. Geostrategist Edward Luttwak recently wrote in these pages of “the persistent fecklessness” of Taipei’s military preparedness, while its “youth can continue to play video games.” Such criticism is unjustified and corrosive, as Taiwan can’t open itself to criticism that it is free-riding on U.S. political and military aid.
America must stop treating Taiwan’s defense as an exercise in developing a lengthy list of weapons systems to provide. Strategy is more than list-making, however estimable the list, especially given our recent failure to prioritize budgetary and operational matters. In the Ukraine case, the U.S. faces daunting logistical challenges in delivering weapons to Kyiv while also restarting or accelerating production lines to meet the needs of itself and endangered allies such as Taiwan. Promising weapons that are unavailable for several years is empty virtue-signaling. The depletion of U.S. arsenals directly affects our own security, a vulnerability that Washington can no longer ignore.
Taipei urgently needs comprehensive political thinking, too. Its political leaders and diplomats—many of whom are up against Beijing’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy—must begin planning and acting at higher strategic levels than before, integrating existing bilateral efforts into a global grand strategy. The same goes for the U.S. and its allies, who need more-comprehensive strategies to defeat the existential Chinese threat. China has a strategy and is obviously executing it.
Beyond Taiwan, Washington rightly has expectations of other Indo-Pacific allies. We must fully integrate Taiwan into rapidly emerging Indo-Pacific political and military structures for deterrence purposes. Taiwan isn’t merely a “customs territory” but a functionally independent state. Though most nations resist entertaining full diplomatic recognition for Taiwan, this isn’t currently an imperative. Significantly enhancing substantive, near-term political ties is both feasible and more important than the trappings of full diplomatic recognition. Israel has long mastered this complicated role-playing, and Taiwan and its Indo-Pacific neighbors have quietly engaged in the minuet for years.
Now, however, is the time for diplomatic rock ’n’ roll. Let’s prevent whining from isolationists that America didn’t realize what it was undertaking if, sooner rather than later, China provokes a crisis in Taiwan. Taipei is the epicenter of what for Washington could be another “present at the creation” moment—as Harry Truman’s secretary of state, Dean Acheson, described the beginning of the postwar world. The U.S. and all its allies must be ready to perform.
Mr. Bolton is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.” He served as the president’s national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the United Nations, 2005-06.
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Considering a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan, Part 1
9 MIN READDec 2, 2022 | 16:00 GMT
Editor’s Note: This is the first of a two-part column exploring the challenges China would face in a theoretical invasion of Taiwan and the areas where Beijing has already improved its capabilities for such an ambitious military operation. The primary author, Zeke Cooper, is an Applied Geopolitics Fellow at RANE who has conducted significant research on China-Taiwan relations.
We’ve assessed that China is unlikely to invade Taiwan in the next five years. However, as cross-Strait tensions rise, it is important to review the evolution of China’s information and military capabilities, a key factor in forecasting both the likelihood and outcome of any potential conflict. The below analysis is not a full assessment of China’s political will for an invasion, nor is it a full assessment of China’s military capability and capacity. Rather, it’s an exercise to test and challenge our internal assumptions and identify areas for deeper focus.
The Taiwan Question
In August, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) published a white paper entitled “The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era.” The document reiterated the long-held position that the island is a part of the People’s Republic of China, stating that “resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China's complete reunification is a shared aspiration of all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation.”
This assertion lies at the heart of Beijing’s “right” to stop any move toward formal Taiwanese independence, and has been informally codified internationally through the willingness of many countries to adhere to Beijing’s “One China” policy. While Chinese President Xi Jinping’s stated goal remains peaceful reunification, the Chinese leadership does not rule out military options and has stepped up defense reforms, arms procurement and training to ensure China has sufficient capabilities in a future Taiwan war scenario.
Russia’s ongoing conflict in Ukraine has reinvigorated assertions in Western media and political spheres that China may be preparing to invade Taiwan. But the Ukraine conflict has also reminded Beijing of the difficulties of using war to achieve political aims. A direct comparison between Ukraine and Taiwan is also flawed. Taiwan represents a maritime military operation, a different logistical consideration from Russia’s land war in Ukraine. Taiwan’s separation from mainland China also occurred decades before Ukraine’s from Russia, and Moscow has been engaged in direct military action and occupation of parts of Ukraine since at least 2014. On the other hand, NATO — which sits astride Ukraine — includes several former members of the Soviet Union or former East Bloc countries, potentially limiting Russia’s willingness to press the Ukraine crisis beyond that nation’s borders. The Indo-Pacific has no such formal multilateral alliance, and the maritime space may provide China with additional room for military operations and an easier ability to disrupt foreign military supplies to the island.
Any Chinese action must consider not only the maritime nature of the conflict but also the role of the United States. Beijing must either deter or degrade U.S. capabilities to be successful in using military coercion to shape Taiwan’s political future. For Beijing, that is both a physical and political task — the former demonstrating China’s military capabilities and reach, and the latter its use of information as a tool of political warfare to shape the environment. China has substantially increased its deterrence capability over the past two decades, raising the cost of U.S. intervention, but Beijing must still consider U.S. political will.
As we review a theoretical war over a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, we will look at three basic phases: Shaping the Environment, the Initial Invasion, and Consolidating Gains. Each phase focuses on different Chinese capabilities, and different aspects of potential U.S. or international intervention.
Shaping the Environment
China considers warfare a constant reality, even if not always carried out by force. The CPC has invested heavily in narrative warfare, designed to shape the perceptions of rivals from peacetime through kinetic warfare. One construct is the so-called three warfares (sanzhan), consisting of psychological warfare (xinlizhan), public opinion warfare (yulunzhan) and legal warfare (faluzhan). The first targets perceptions abroad, creating uncertainty and disunity in opposing societies and governments. The second focuses heavily on domestic propaganda, ensuring national political and social cohesion and support. And the third focuses on shaping Chinese actions within global legal frameworks, even if Beijing’s own interpretations are somewhat unique.
Domestically, China would use information operations and narrative warfare to shape public perceptions and build support for any future conflict. By drawing on historical examples from the so-called “century of humiliation” that China suffered at the hands of foreign powers from the 1840s-1940s, the CCP would continue to promote narratives that it aims to protect Taiwan from foreign influence. The CCP might portray the Taiwanese government as captured by so-called “separatists” and oppressive to its people, and thus justify the invasion under a humanitarian pretense. Under such conditions, Chinese nationalists would champion a forceful reunification with Taiwan in order to supposedly save it from foreign domination.
Already, Beijing emphasizes that any change in the status quo around Taiwan is driven by Western “interference,” and that it is the West, led by the United States, which is ratcheting up tensions and goading Taiwan to break from China. This places blame for any outbreak of conflict on the United States and allows Beijing to assert it is in a defensive war, something that will resonate more strongly domestically than an offensive operation. Beijing has already used this narrative to defend Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an act of “self-defense.”
China would also use information operations in Taiwan to discourage political unity and reduce support for any formal move toward de jure independence. Simple narratives the CPC would likely deploy include highlighting the close cultural and historical ties between Taiwan and the mainland, the economic advantages of close cooperation, and the physical devastation of a potential invasion.
The narrative of defending Taiwan from outside meddling also helps China shape international views — predominantly among developing nations in the global south, potentially weakening condemnation in the United Nations and reducing support for any Western sanctions or other coercive or punitive measures against Beijing. While Beijing’s overseas information operations have not been as sophisticated as those of Russia, Chinese capabilities are improving; in particular, they have been more effective in both Chinese-language areas and in countries still struggling with postcolonial identities (especially in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America).
Information warfare and physical warfare intersect in Beijing’s positioning of military assets, demonstration of capabilities and assertion of doctrine. Perceptions of China’s capabilities and political will in both Taiwan and elsewhere are shaped by China’s efforts to demonstrate greater range, accuracy and maneuverability of longer-range anti-ship missiles, build up artificial islands in the South China Sea as bases of operations for anti-ship and/or anti-aircraft systems, carry out frequent air incursions around Taiwan, and conduct expanded combined arms exercises near the island. For China, these actions are both part of the preparation for any theoretical conflict that may erupt, but also ways to avoid confrontation in the first place by showing the supposed costs that would follow Taiwan moving closer to de jure independence.
On the one hand, repeated incursions by Chinese fighter jets over Taiwan overwhelm and desensitize Taiwan’s sensors to Chinese violations of their airspace and give Chinese forces valuable knowledge. Over 900 Chinese military aircraft entered Taiwan’s southwestern airspace last year — more than double the roughly 380 aircraft that did so in 2020. And in just August 2022 alone, 446 Chinese aircraft entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in response to U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s controversial visit to Taiwan. By probing the weapons engagement zones of integrated air defense systems, China’s military — known as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) — could develop a profile of Taiwan’s defensive tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to exploit in a future conflict.
On the other hand, if Beijing can show that it has the ability to quickly overwhelm Taiwanese defenses, or deter and disrupt U.S. military activity in the region, it can weaken Taiwanese confidence in active U.S. support and create uncertainty inside the United States itself — raising questions of the cost-benefit analysis of facing off against China just to preserve Taiwan’s de facto independence.
Preparations for potential conflict in Taiwan would need to begin months or even years before the operation. Resources, personnel and material would be marshaled from across mainland China and staged near sea and air points of departure. China understands it will be impossible to conceal the movement of forces from the overhead intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems. Civilian and military space-based sensors will observe areas of interest to provide indications and warnings of an impending attack. Thus, obfuscation rather than concealment will be China’s strategy.
Rather than conceal troop and equipment movements, the PLA will conduct a series of large-scale exercises to desensitize allied sensors, increasing the likelihood that the movement of large numbers of personnel and resources would be interpreted as routine or escalating exercises rather than staging for an invasion. However, the presence of medical infrastructure, recovery equipment or salvage vessels might be a reliable indicator of imminent action, as would the wide-scale retrofitting of commercial cargo vessels to carry military assets (e.g. with heavy-duty decking). This plan might also suffer from the fact that Russia tried nearly this precise same strategy before invading Ukraine, which U.S. intelligence officials repeatedly warned publicly was a thinly veiled preparation for an attack.
This active phase of environment shaping has the greatest potential for accidental escalation. The PLA would likely conduct larger and longer operations closer to the territorial waters of Taiwan, especially live-fire exercises involving forces off the east coast of the island, which signal Beijing’s willingness and capability to interfere with any foreign reinforcement of Taiwan’s capabilities. Beijing might also dispatch a constant rotational seaborne presence on Taiwan’s east coast to validate its ability to cordon off the island and potentially disrupt U.S.-led forces if hostilities break out. Taiwanese forces may amend their TTPs to meet or closely observe Chinese vessels or aircraft within their territory. The United States would likely increase its freedom of navigation operations, defense training and exercises, and close surveillance of the waters near Taiwan. The heightened pace of activity increases the risk of miscalculation or accidental collision, something that in a tense environment could lead to rapid escalation.
In the second part of this column, we’ll look at what an initial invasion of Taiwan may look like and the steps China needs to take to consolidate its gains should such an invasion succeed.
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https://www.nationalreview.com/news/chinese-military-sends-planes-ships-toward-taiwan-in-show-of-power/?utm_source=email&utm_medium=breaking&utm_campaign=newstrack&utm_term=30084462
Looks like they may not be impressed by our efforts in Ukraine.
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https://www.aier.org/article/a-secret-war-in-the-making-americans-should-not-die-to-defend-taiwan/
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/u-s-sails-warship-through-taiwan-strait-as-china-watches-sternly/ar-AA163h8U?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=1c5fa80aa46b4b5ea4f8e1d6628be2b8
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Beijing's Taiwan saber-rattling continues: China flew nearly 60 aircraft close to Taiwan—and just as a group of German lawmakers visited the self-governing island that China's Communist leaders claim as they own. Along with four navy vessels, Beijing's military spread out to cover three of the four cardinal approaches to the island. China says it was practicing "land-strikes and sea assaults," according to a statement from its Eastern Theater Command.
Twenty-eight of those aircraft "crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait, and entered Taiwan's southwest air defense identification zone," according to Taiwan's military, which called the actions an "irrational provocation" that threatens the security of the Taiwan Strait. (The U.S. Navy transited that strait on Thursday.)
Christmas Day was the last time a comparable number of Chinese aircraft flew near Taiwan, when 71 aircraft and 7 naval vessels bracketed the island's western and northwestern approaches.
"We seek neither escalation nor conflict!" Taiwan's military tweeted just a few hours after the Monday activity. Reuters and the Associated Press have more.
New: Another think tank just reviewed two dozen war scenarios for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in 2026, and found it would be especially deadly for all sides—China, Taiwan, and the U.S., which would presumably rush to Taipei's defense. The two main questions asked by analysts in their wargame included, "would the invasion succeed and at what cost?" according to CNN. The answers are "no," and "enormous" costs, according to the think tankers at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.
"In most scenarios, the US Navy lost two aircraft carriers and 10 to 20 large surface combatants" in the notional fighting, CNN reports. What's more, "Approximately 3,200 US troops would be killed in three weeks of combat," which is "nearly half of what the US lost in two decades of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan." CSIS also estimated China would lose about 10,000 troops as well as 155 aircraft and 138 ships.
And Taiwan? The island's army would lose about 3,500 soldiers, and all of the navy's 26 destroyers and frigates would be lost. Japan, too, would suffer—including the probable loss of "more than 100 combat aircraft and 26 warships," according to CNN. Read on, here.
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https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/jan/9/us-defeats-china-simulated-war-over-taiwan-costs-a/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=morning&utm_term=newsletter&utm_content=morning&bt_ee=GUOTbXjtfWHRTFf%2FHBRYW4TWHnQrievuMQeFaci6reV%2FT9fi5sBC0swCy0ImnP0a&bt_ts=1673355021525
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https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/jan/9/us-defeats-china-simulated-war-over-taiwan-costs-a/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=morning&utm_term=newsletter&utm_content=morning&bt_ee=GUOTbXjtfWHRTFf%2FHBRYW4TWHnQrievuMQeFaci6reV%2FT9fi5sBC0swCy0ImnP0a&bt_ts=1673355021525
We kept hearing otherwise. I like this analysis better. Previous simulations mentioned US versus China without mentioning allies such as Japan. This is more realisti, IMHO.
"Such losses would damage the U.S. global position for many years."
- I believe it would hurt China's position worse as the aggressor and perhaps the loser.
Important point, 'limiting the attacks on the China mainland.'.
If both sides can contain the war to the straits, to Taiwan and to the military facilities we might avoid total Armageddon..
The casualty counts seem realistic.
I presume China's calculations are similar and that is why they haven't attacked yet.
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Are American people up to the costs in lives and equipment?
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Are American people up to the costs in lives and equipment?
No. Looks like they didn't figure that in. If we were up for it, that is the deterrent. If we aren't, then they will strike. The casualties are all in the first 3 weeks? How does it even get debated in Congress in that time? The simulation is a hypothetical, I guess.
In a future war with China, we will wish we hadn't given up the strategic island of Taiwan back in 2023. And giving up Taiwan makes that future war more likely.
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https://www.foxnews.com/world/war-game-suggests-u-s-needs-bolster-taiwans-defenses-now-avoid-heavy-casualties?fbclid=IwAR1eLpH4MOVggniA3nazZeeeR5YzEslQBk4G-X1xwq6iuh2aps5OgnHtEKE
"Mark Cancian, the author behind the war game report, said the U.S. needs to do more to bolster Taiwan's security in the Pacific, saying the U.S. cannot send weapons after the invasion like it did in Ukraine. ''Chinese air and naval capabilities are strong enough that they can prevent any reinforcements from getting on to Taiwan. So, Taiwan will need to have all of its equipment before the conflict begins,'' Cancian told Fox News."
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https://dailycaller.com/2023/01/20/national-guard-training-taiwan-military-china/?utm_medium=email&pnespid=suR7DnRfMq5CyPnM9jWzSMPVvkqiDcEsPLTkx7Jw8BNmEiewA.ZdlqnQNBPF7eUtjTlbDbyB
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Taiwan’s Urgent Task
A Radical New Strategy to Keep China Away
By Michael Brown
January 25, 2023
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/taiwan-urgent-task-new-strategy-to-keep-china-away
Since the Ukraine war began, a growing number of U.S. officials have stressed the urgency of deterring Chinese military action against Taiwan. President Xi Jinping’s comments in October reinforced this view when he declared that China was prepared to take “all measures necessary” against foreign “interference” on the island and that “the wheels of history are rolling on toward China’s reunification” with it. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned that Beijing may intend to seize Taiwan on a “much faster timeline” than previously thought.
Despite this assessment, the United States has not devoted sufficient attention to the current approach to deterrence—and whether it is adequate to meet an accelerated threat. For years, Taiwan has been preparing for a conventional war with China, for which it has acquired big military hardware from the United States, such as Abrams tanks and F-16 jets. But Taiwan cannot match China in these categories, and a direct military confrontation is one that it cannot win. Moreover, despite its long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity, Washington has suggested that it would come to Taiwan’s aid if China invaded. Yet the United States has not taken adequate steps to put military resources in place and increase its own capacity to resupply those resources in anticipation of such an event.
A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would not resemble the Ukraine conflict in which the United States and its allies have been able to build economic sanctions and supply Ukraine with increasingly powerful weapons over many months. Given Taiwan’s location—only 100 miles from the Chinese mainland and 5,000 miles from the headquarters of the United States Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii—Washington would not have time to prepare a response once an invasion was underway. Were the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense without sufficient planning, the outcome could be truly catastrophic. If China and the United States go to war, there would be few incentives for either side to back down and numerous paths to rapid escalation. With the prospect of a historically destructive conflict looming, ensuring effective deterrence is the most critical U.S. national security challenge in Asia, and by far the most urgent.
Given the growing threat of an invasion, deterring China will require a far more proactive approach. Taiwan must redesign the way that its forces are organized, armed, and deployed so that it can deny China a rapid victory. At the same time, Washington needs to evolve its own policy, making clear that direct military support is available to Taiwan today and would be strengthened if an invasion were to take place. Above all, by their actions and preparations, the United States and Taiwan must seek to significantly raise the uncertainty in Xi’s mind about whether military action against the island would succeed. Deterrence failed in Ukraine, and the United States must ensure that it does not fail in Taiwan.
THE PANDA AND THE PORCUPINE
Any effective deterrence strategy against China must begin with Taiwan’s own defenses. The United States needs to signal to Beijing that Taiwan will resist an invasion just as fiercely and creatively as Ukraine has. To be credible, Taiwan should double the proportion of its budget reserved for defense and double its current troop strength of 169,000. At present, Taipei spends about $19 billion on defense, a figure that pales in comparison with China’s $293 billion. And although Taiwan will not be able to close the gap with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), it can greatly increase deterrence with a stronger and more prepared military. The goal must be to deny easy access to the island and cause significant damage to attacking Chinese forces, buying time for the United States and allies to assist.
But U.S. and Taiwanese officials must also recognize the lopsided threat Taiwan faces. Historically, Taiwan has spent its defense budget on equipping its military for a head-on conflict with China, including through the extensive purchase of U.S. tanks and fighter jets. But given the overwhelming numbers of tanks, ships, and airplanes that China can now field, this is not an effective use of procurement funds. For example, although Taiwan now has 400 fighter jets and 800 tanks, its forces are dwarfed by China’s 1,600 fighters and 6,300 tanks. China also has 450 bombers, nine nuclear submarines, two aircraft carriers, and other equipment that Taiwan does not possess. And in terms of manpower, China has a standing army of more than two million soldiers—nearly 12 times as many as Taiwan.
Faced with this dramatic force disparity, Taiwan would be better off developing asymmetric capabilities that can thwart superior firepower. The Taiwanese government could, for example, purchase the data as a service (DaaS) from dedicated commercial satellites, which could provide imagery of what and how many Chinese forces are amassing to provide as much early warning as possible. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites, for example, can provide images of the earth with resolution down to a third of a meter and, unlike traditional optical satellites, can operate through cloud cover and at night. SAR images have become a game changer for Ukrainian forces, giving Kyiv a real-time view of Russian tanks, trucks, and ground forces. Moreover, since this technology is available commercially, neither the Taiwanese nor the U.S. military need to own the satellites or the rockets to launch them.
Swarming drones and autonomous undersea vessels could help thwart China’s invasion plans.
Taiwan should also build a resilient and flexible communications network. Ukraine has shown the effectiveness of SpaceX’s Starlink system, which has allowed the country to withstand repeated attacks on its infrastructure without losing communications for its military or its citizens. Taiwan should establish a similar space-to-ground system to ensure uninterrupted communications availability during an invasion. Additionally, Taiwan should invest more resources into both cyberdefenses—to protect its critical infrastructure—and, with the assistance of U.S. Cyber Command, offensive cyber-capabilities to disrupt PLA operations during an attack.
As Ukrainian forces have demonstrated, Taiwan can strengthen its military with smaller, smarter weapons. Admiral Lorin Selby and I, as well as former State Department senior adviser James Timbie and Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., have argued that Taiwan could enhance its forces by acquiring “a large number of small things”—weapons that can provide robust deterrence against an invading force, serving as a hedge to the large weapons platforms China is expecting to encounter. Examples of these include smart mines (which can be turned on and off); over-the-horizon, long-range antiship missiles (Harpoons); Javelin antitank missiles; and antiaircraft defenses such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). All of these weapons have proven valuable in Ukraine. For Taiwan to be able to use them, however, they will need to already be in place at the time of a Chinese attack.
Yet another way for Taiwan to enhance its deterrence would be to acquire more unmanned military systems. Such autonomous technology includes small drones that can swarm in the air; solar-powered surface vessels for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and undersea vessels that can gather intelligence or intercept enemy vessels. A combination of these systems would give Taiwan more comprehensive intelligence and, potentially, the power to intercept vessels across the Pacific—capabilities it currently lacks. The United States is already demonstrating the benefits of such technologies today with the navy’s Task Force 59, set up to integrate unmanned systems, sensor data, and artificial intelligence into maritime operations. Combined with enhanced satellite imagery, these capabilities would hinder the ability of China’s naval forces to project power or operate undetected in Taiwanese waters.
But asymmetric and autonomous capabilities alone will not be enough to withstand a Chinese invasion. Taiwanese forces will also need immediate access to fuel, munitions, food, and medical supplies to sustain their defense efforts in the opening phase of any attack. The United States should preposition these supplies to be accessible before a potential Chinese offensive or naval blockade. Currently, for example, Taiwan has only a seven-day fuel supply—for all its needs as a nation—concentrated in tanks on its west coast. By distributing ample fuel and other supplies around the island as well as on nearby islands, the United States and its allies can help Taiwan withstand an initial attack and prevent China from blocking crucial supply lines. The goal should be to transform Taiwan into what many have called an indigestible porcupine, brimming with asymmetric military capabilities that would surprise and frustrate any invading force.
STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY, PRACTICAL COMMITMENT
As Beijing steps up its pressure on Taiwan, the United States has confronted a growing dilemma. On the one hand, U.S. President Joe Biden has repeated publicly four times that the United States will not stand idly by if China moves to seize Taiwan. But on the other hand, according to its long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity, the United States is not explicitly committed to defending the island, reserving instead the right to respond if an attack occurs. Clearly, this wait-and-see approach no longer serves U.S. interests. If the United States is not prepared in advance with prepositioned materiel on the island and the immediate capacity to resupply Taiwan, the administration’s statements become empty rhetoric. Yet abandoning strategic ambiguity as a policy would be a direct provocation to Beijing and would likely lead to an escalatory response.
Fortunately, the United States has another option. Without formally changing policy, Washington can provide Taiwan the military resources it needs before an invasion occurs. In doing so, the U.S. government can demonstrate to Beijing that China will face stiff resistance to any military action and that it is ready to supply the island with war materiel for an extended conflict. As a first step, the United States needs to stockpile on Taiwan such weapons as Harpoons, Stingers, Javelins, and HIMARS launchers. At the same time, Congress should authorize the Pentagon to aggressively ramp up production of these systems.
Equally important, Washington must eliminate the bottlenecks it has faced in supplying missiles and other munitions to Ukraine. A crucial vulnerability has been the production of so-called energetics—a broad category of explosives, propellants, and other material needed for ammunition, rocket and missile motors, and other devices. Because the United States has not fought a sustained conflict with a peer competitor in years, it has severely underinvested in energetics production, with the result that the Defense Department has struggled to resupply Stinger missiles to Ukraine. In the case of Taiwan, such a delay could prove devastating, as even a few weeks could determine the outcome of the war.
The United States should pre-position war materiel on and around Taiwan.
To avoid these logjams, the Pentagon needs to break the paradigm of single-year defense appropriations, which have in the past limited its ability to invest in greater production capacity. As William LaPlante, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, has observed, by moving to multiyear appropriations, the U.S. would be far better equipped to increase production capacity of energetics in a sustained way. Representative Mike Gallagher from Wisconsin, a Republican member of the House Armed Services Committee and chair of the House’s new Select Committee on China, has further suggested using the Defense Production Act to achieve more rapid stockpiles of munitions, provide project financing for munitions vendors, fast-track permits for vendors to expand capacity, and invest in workforce training. As the COVID-19 crisis made clear, the Defense Production Act gives the president broad authority to mobilize the private sector to meet a national emergency. To prepare for an extended conflict with China, the government needs to identify now which manufacturers will need to be tapped and for what items. Having such plans in place with preapproved funds to pay for them would itself have an important deterrent value.
In addition, Congress should give top priority to delivering the $19 billion in arms that Taiwan has already ordered, including Harpoon and Javelin missiles. Congress should also provide Taiwan the same drawdown authority to deliver weapons from current U.S. stockpiles as Ukraine has and appropriate funds for direct military assistance as it has with Ukraine. This would enable the Pentagon to send military supplies directly to Taiwan as well as weapons that might otherwise be decommissioned.
Lastly, the administration must continue its efforts to strengthen regional alliances such as AUKUS, the trilateral security pact among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), a coalition including Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. Beijing needs to know that a united front stands ready to assist Taiwan in the event of an unprovoked attack. Washington and its allies should also declare in advance a set of financial sanctions and trade embargoes that would be triggered by any Chinese military action against Taiwan. Such a declaration would clearly signal to Beijing the severe economic crisis that an unprovoked attack would cause—a prospect that may, in fact, be more persuasive in deterring the Chinese leadership than fear of U.S. military action.
LESS RED TAPE, MORE DETERRENCE
In addition to improving its military stockpiles and munitions capacity, the U.S. Department of Defense should accelerate its own development of the asymmetric systems that will help transform Taiwan into a porcupine. One type of such technology is small, unmanned electric aircraft. Currently in development as air taxis, these aircraft do not need runways and can amplify Taiwan’s air forces at relatively low cost. Other examples include autonomous floating barges that could serve as logistics platforms and could be positioned where needed; underwater drones that can gather intelligence or intercept enemy vessels; and small satellites serving as multispectral sensors, providing Taipei with precise images of enemy force movements within a large radius of the island.
A crucial advantage of these new technologies is the element of surprise they would bring to Taiwan’s military response. After all, the Chinese military has stolen U.S. aircraft designs and studied U.S. military operations around the globe for decades to prepare for a potential conflict. But since many of the asymmetric systems are new and can be fielded in only one to two years, they introduce capabilities that China is little prepared for. The more these systems create uncertainty and the greater their number, the more difficult it will be for the Chinese military to have confidence in its invasion plans. At the same time, these commercial capabilities also have the benefit of being lower cost than traditional defense platforms, and since they are unclassified, they can be readily shared with U.S. allies. In short, the United States can intensify deterrence without a dramatic shift in official policy and without enormous cost—provided it acts now.
The Pentagon needs to get new technologies to Taiwan faster.
In order to help Taiwan acquire these new systems, the U.S. Department of Defense will need to significantly streamline its procurement process. Currently, the department buys commercial items such as small drones the same way it buys fighter jets: after specifying what it wants to buy, the department enters a lengthy acquisition process with the desired weapon system funded through multiyear program requests. This means that even when funds are planned and agreed upon at the Pentagon, it can take years before Congress appropriates the money. In fact, on average, planning for every dollar the Pentagon spends begins 24 to 30 months earlier. To reform this process for commercial items, the Pentagon needs to eliminate unnecessary steps, such as the requirement to define the specifications for items that the commercial world is already building. It also needs to leverage more efficient federal purchasing mechanisms—such as Other Transaction Authority—and ask Congress for enough budget flexibility to buy lots of small things in a given fiscal year.
With such reforms in place, the U.S. government should be able to quickly identify the most valuable commercial technologies, determine which vendors can best provide them, and allocate funds to acquire them on a cycle that keeps apace with the development of new systems. For Taiwan, this would open up a host of new technologies from U.S. vendors that could be immediately deployed for enhanced defense.
Finally, the Defense Department should include Taiwan in its joint military exercises. Today’s exercises in the Indo-Pacific involve many nations’ forces, including those of Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Yet they do not include Taiwan. Although China would regard such participation as provocative, U.S. diplomats can point out that the Chinese initiated the provocation by increasingly flying into Taiwanese airspace and crossing the maritime line dividing China and Taiwan with growing frequency.
CHANGING XI’S CALCULUS
Some of these steps will take years to complete. But by initiating them now, the United States can signal to Beijing, and to Xi in particular, that invading or blockading Taiwan would set off a confrontation that China could lose. By making the island difficult to conquer, Taiwan and the United States may be able to change Chinese thinking about an invasion, persuading Xi that it would be far better to continue strong rhetoric about reunification than to succumb to self-imposed pressure to seize Taiwan by force.
Beijing already has reasons to avoid a new geopolitical crisis. After all, Xi is already contending with many challenges at home, including dramatically slower economic growth (in part due to Beijing’s failed zero-COVID policies), an increasingly skeptical set of trading partners, and the biggest aging demographic crisis of any nation in history. And these leave aside the dire economic implications of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan: beyond the costs of a war, if China cannot get semiconductors from Taiwan, it would precipitate a collapse of the 70 percent of the world’s electronics that China produces and largely exports. If the United States and other countries lose access to semiconductors, a global depression will result. An unsuccessful effort to seize Taiwan, on top of these other challenges, might mean the end of Xi’s tenure in power and, possibly, the end of the Chinese Communist Party as the ruling regime.
But if the West appears complacent or distracted, Xi may see opportunity. To change his calculus, Taiwan, the United States, and its allies must show they are resolute about thwarting an invasion. With China’s increasingly bellicose declarations about retaking the island, time is running out for Washington to demonstrate commitment through action.
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Taiwan, U.S.: House Speaker McCarthy Plans Visit to Taiwan This Spring
1 MIN READJan 24, 2023 | 20:47 GMT
What Happened: The Pentagon is planning for U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy to visit Taiwan later this year, and the White House says the visit will likely happen in the spring, Punchbowl News reported Jan. 23.
Why It Matters: If McCarthy's visit is confirmed and carried out, it could normalize house speaker visits to Taiwan and spur a Chinese response similar to that seen when former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022, potentially including more live-fire military drills around Taiwan. These events could sully recent U.S.-China efforts to ease tensions and sway Taiwanese politics ahead of the January 2024 presidential election. However, it is unclear whether Taiwanese citizens would blame the ruling and comparatively anti-China Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for escalating the conflict with China or rally behind the party in the face of Chinese aggression, as they did leading up to the January 2020 election.
Background: China responded to Pelosi's visit to Taiwan with the largest live-fire drills near Taiwan in a quarter century.
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"Independent Taiwan. Eighteen House Republicans introduced a resolution calling on the U.S. to recognize Taiwan as a sovereign, independent state and to resume formal diplomatic ties. It also calls for the establishment of a bilateral free trade agreement. The new speaker of the House is expected to visit Taipei in April."
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U.S. General Warns Country Could Be at War with China by 2025
By BRITTANY BERNSTEIN
January 28, 2023 11:48 AM
A four-star Air Force general said in a memo on Friday that he believes the U.S. will be at war with China by 2025, according to a new report.
“I hope I am wrong,” General Mike Minihan, who leads the Air Mobility Command (AMC), said in a memo to AMC personnel obtained by NBC News.
“My gut tells me we will fight in 2025,” he added. “[Chinese President] Xi [Jinping] secured his third term and set his war council in October 2022. Taiwan’s presidential elections are in 2024 and will offer Xi a reason. United States’ presidential elections are in 2024 and will offer Xi a distracted America. Xi’s team, reason, and opportunity are all aligned for 2025.”
He went on to tell personnel to accept increased risk in training in preparation for a “China fight.” Minihan also says during the month of February, all personnel should “fire a clip into a 7-meter target with the full understanding that unrepentant lethality matters most. Aim for the head.”
He called on those in his command to update their records and emergency contacts to “ensure they are legally ready and prepared” in March.
AMC has almost 50,000 service members and nearly 500 planes and is responsible for transport and refueling, per NBC.
A Defense Department spokesperson disputed Minihan’s comments, saying they are “not representative of the department’s view on China.”
“The National Defense Strategy makes clear that China is the pacing challenge for the Department of Defense and our focus remains on working alongside allies and partners to preserve a peaceful, free and open Indo-Pacific,” Defense Department press secretary Brigadier General Patrick Ryder told NBC News.
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US Must Shift Focus Away From Europe to Deter China War for Taiwan: Hawley
Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) looks on during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on voting rights on Capitol Hill in Washington on April 20, 2021. (Evelyn Kockstein/Pool/AFP via Getty Images)
Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) looks on during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on voting rights on Capitol Hill in Washington on April 20, 2021. (Evelyn Kockstein/Pool/AFP via Getty Images)
Andrew Thornebrooke
The United States would lose a war against China over the future of Taiwan unless it shifts its defense priorities away from Europe, according to one senior Republican.
Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) said the United States had overextended itself with its support for Ukraine’s defense against the Russian invasion, and that it would not be able to deter China without first pulling back from Ukraine.
“China is on the march and we are not at this moment prepared to stop them,” Hawley said during a Feb. 16 talk with the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank.
“If China were to invade Taiwan today, they would prevail.”
Hawley blamed the current U.S. dedication to providing arms and other aid to Ukraine on what he deemed to be a wish for “liberal empire” by neoconservatives and globalists.
He said the ambition of promoting democracy and liberal values throughout the world was not sustainable and U.S. military power was a finite resource drained by the effort.
“The core problem is our actions in Ukraine are directly affecting our ability to deter our most pressing adversary in the Pacific,” said Hawley.
The senator further claimed that the war in Ukraine and one for Taiwan would require “many of the same weapons,” though reports exploring the issue of munitions availability for a war in Taiwan suggest that this is not true.
Likewise, Hawley lambasted the Biden administration for placing a higher premium on combating climate change than preparing for the real possibility of war with China. The idea garnered increased traction when Hawley’s speech was itself interrupted by a protester who shouted that climate change, not China, was the enemy.
‘A Dark Future’
Hawley warned that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which rules China as a single-party state, had been plotting a Taiwan takeover for a long time. CCP leader Xi Jinping, he noted, has frequently made claims swearing to follow through on that ambition.
“Invading Taiwan has been Xi’s goal for years,” Hawley said.
“My worry is if we do not change course we may not be able to do anything about it.”
The CCP falsely claims that Taiwan is a breakaway province of China that must be united with the mainland. Taiwan has never been controlled by the CCP, however, and its democratic government is a continuation of that which the CCP sought to overthrow during the Chinese Civil War.
For its part, the United States formally recognizes, but does not endorse, the CCP’s position, and maintains legal obligations to provide Taiwan with weapons for its self-defense.
Taiwan is also a major trade partner of the United States, and manufactures the vast majority of its advanced semiconductor chips, which are used in everything from modern pickup trucks to hypersonic missiles.
The United States and the world share an economic reliance on both Taiwan and China, Hawley said, and a Chinese communist invasion of the island would be catastrophic, possibly laying the groundwork for the erosion of the United States itself.
“By some estimates, war over Taiwan would send us into a deep recession with no clear way out,” Hawley said.
Likewise, Hawley said, by breaking through the First Island Chain spanning Japan to Indonesia, China would be able to secure its military presence throughout the world and spread its campaign of coercion, intimidation, and domination.
“Imagine a world where Chinese warships could patrol Hawaii’s waters,” Hawley said, “and Chinese submarines could stalk the California coastline. Imagine a world where the People’s Liberation Army has military bases in central and South America. Imagine a world where Chinese forces operate freely in the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean.”
“That’s the future we will be facing if we are not able to finally stop China. It is a dark future. It is an increasingly plausible future. But it is not an inevitable future.”
New Foreign Policy Strategy Needed
Hawley said the United States would need to pursue a nationalist foreign policy to prevent that dark future from coming to pass, a policy which approached the geopolitical situation with “clear-eyed realism” and recognized that deterring China’s invasion of Taiwan should be America’s “top foreign policy priority.”
As such, he said, the nation’s defense spending and posture should be oriented to the Pacific, not Europe, and the United States would need to scale back or even end its commitment to Ukraine.
“Strengthening deterrence in the Indo-Pacific means scaling back our military commitments in Europe,” Hawley said.
This would not mean abandoning the NATO alliance, he added. Rather, Hawley argued that the United States and its NATO allies would need to come up with a more equitable burden sharing arrangement, in which European powers took first priority in responding to threats in Europe and the United States did so to threats in the Indo-Pacific.
“The current policy of the United States pretending it can do everything for the Europeans in Europe and it can do everything [in] the rest of the world [and] in Asia is simply fanciful and it cannot be sustained,” Hawley said.
“Europe is important to us, but it is not the key, and it is time we told our NATO allies that bluntly.”
Ultimately, Hawley said, the repositioning of American defense priorities from Europe to the Indo-Pacific was paramount to preventing a catastrophic conflict between the United States and China.
Only by conserving the resources being expended in Ukraine and elsewhere, he said, could that deterrence be assured.
“If we do not stop China in Asia, nothing else we do against China anywhere else will matter very much,” Hawley said.
“This country is the strongest country on the face of the earth… We will prevail. But we must make the choices now to make sure that possibility becomes a reality.”
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Updating Our Assessment of the Evolving Taiwan-China Relationship: Politics
12 MIN READFeb 17, 2023 | 18:27 GMT
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen (left) and Vice President William Lai attend a ceremony to mark the island's National Day in front of the Presidential Office in Taipei on Oct. 10, 2022.
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen (left) and Vice President William Lai attend a ceremony to mark the island's National Day in front of the Presidential Office in Taipei on Oct. 10, 2022.
(SAM YEH/AFP via Getty Images)
Editor's Note: This assessment is an update to part two in a series that explores China-Taiwan relations through the lens of Taiwan's economy, politics, military affairs and regional relations. Since the original piece was published in September 2021, much has changed in Taiwanese politics that warrants a reexamination.
Taiwanese politics hinges on issues of sovereignty and economic growth, with an increasingly centrist society constraining the improvement of relations with both the United States and China. Meanwhile, Beijing will continue to wield coercive policies no matter which party governs Taipei. At the heart of Taiwanese politics are two parties looking to redefine themselves in light of a changing society. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and opposition Kuomintang (KMT) are trying to significantly alter their agendas ahead of Taiwan's January 2024 presidential and legislative elections to satisfy the complex demands of a largely politically independent populace that is disenchanted with its limited choices for electoral representation. These demands range from national issues like economic growth and defending Taiwan's sovereignty from Chinese aggression, to local concerns like corruption and public health management.
The DPP paints itself as the defender of Taiwan's sovereignty against China's political, military and economic coercive efforts. But this stance sometimes places the party at odds with Taiwan's economic growth, as China is the island's top trade partner. The DPP suffered a significant loss to the KMT in local elections held in November 2022, but these elections are often focused on parochial issues like city management of COVID-19 and corruption scandals. Nonetheless, the party's leadership and public image were weakened in November when President Tsai Ing-wen resigned as chair of the DPP following the electoral loss.
The KMT has been traditionally friendlier to China and acts as the face of Taiwanese business interests, which want to maintain cross-strait relations insofar as they facilitate trade and investment. But the party has struggled to shake its geriatric image among Taiwan's youth. The KMT has also struggled to firm up its noncommittal stance on Taiwanese sovereignty over the last 10 years amid Chinese President Xi Jinping's adamance about pursuing cross-strait reunification — a prospect widely unpopular among Taiwanese citizens. Taiwan's economic downturn may play in the KMT's favor in the 2024 ballot, but sovereignty issues are also more salient in national elections, and success in local elections traditionally does not translate to electoral gains at the national level.
Taiwan's two-party system has always been somewhat fragmented, with third parties like the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) periodically gaining significant sway in politics. As of 2022, the TPP (which was only founded in 2019) had garnered 8.2% of public support. This is partially driven by the bulk of Taiwanese people identifying as politically independent, wanting to preserve Taiwan's economic prospects and its sovereignty. For TPP leader Ko Wen-je, catering to this broad constituency has meant supporting cross-strait business ties while criticizing China's military aggression.
Over the past decade, Beijing's stance toward Taiwan has become increasingly threatening, with President Xi pushing cross-strait reunification on Beijing's terms and leaving Taiwan's political parties with little room for negotiation. Since coming to power in 2012, Xi has publicly asserted that reunification with Taiwan can only take place under China's ''one country, two systems'' governing model, in which Beijing allows limited (faux) political autonomy for regions like Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet. This has broken a decades-old, unspoken agreement between Taipei and Beijing that both would allow the other to maintain their own visions of what amicable reunification might look like. It has also forced the more pro-China KMT into a corner, given that Taiwanese citizens are uniformly opposed to the one country, two systems model. In addition, Xi has directly associated cross-strait reunification with his ''great rejuvenation'' goal of restoring China's place as a leading global superpower, which involves showing the world the supremacy of the socialist model and Chinese ''democratic centralism'' (one-party politics) — systems that Xi has directly contrasted to Western capitalism and democratic liberalism. And he has positioned himself in Chinese Communist Party doctrine as the one and only person who could lead China to achieve this rejuvenation. This ideology and one-man rule stand in direct opposition to Taiwan's healthy democracy and capitalist markets, a rare combination in Asia and a system of which Taiwanese citizens are quite proud. Moreover, in the face of recent DPP presidential wins and Western (especially U.S.) efforts to strengthen ties with Taiwan, Beijing has resorted to greater military coercion in hopes of convincing Taipei to stop pushing the sovereignty issue and convincing the West that closer ties with Taiwan are not worth risking war with China. This military coercion has led many Taiwanese to believe that China is a bully that can't be reasoned with, though some contest that Taipei's efforts to strengthen ties with the West are unnecessarily provocative to China.
Since former President Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) stepped down and current President Tsai Ing-wen (DPP) assumed office in 2016, Beijing has treated Taipei as a radical government run by ''separatists.'' Since then, China has cut off cross-strait diplomatic channels, shut Taiwan out of international institutions, and poached Taiwan's few formal diplomatic partners. This is despite Tsai's pro-status-quo stance and her efforts to forestall policy actions by pro-independence legislators within the DPP that could provoke China.
Since 2017, the United States and (to a lesser extent) European partners like the United Kingdom, Germany and France have increased the frequency of their diplomatic visits to Taiwan. This culminated in then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's trip to Taipei to meet with Tsai in August 2022, the first such visit by a sitting House Speaker in a quarter-century.
In the last three years, Beijing has increasingly wielded military coercive methods against Taiwan. These have included more frequent and larger incursions by People's Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone, amphibious landing drills and positioning PLA Navy vessels off Taiwan's coasts, along with the live-fire military drills conducted following Pelosi's controversial visit in August (which involved missile strikes just outside of Taiwan's territorial waters).
In August 2022, Beijing published its third white paper on Taiwan (the first update since 2000), which stated that one country, two systems is a basic principle ''for resolving the Taiwan question'' and ''the best approach to realizing national reunification."
According to polls, Taiwan's next election could produce a divided legislature, which would result in policy gridlock on economic and national security matters. It is far from certain whether likely DPP candidate (and current Taiwanese Vice President) William Lai will be able to beat likely KMT candidate (and current New Taipei mayor) Hou You-ih in the 2024 presidential election. And the TPP's Ko Wen-je could split the vote for either of the two main parties or throw his support behind one of them. A November Formusa poll shows Hou (33.8%) barely losing to Lai (34.3%), but a December poll by Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation shows Hou winning handily (38.7%) over Lai (29%), while both polls showed Ko garnering 14-18% of the vote. If this close race continues, the Legislative Yuan could be divided, with the KMT or DPP reliant on a coalition with the TPP to secure a majority of votes. In light of Taiwan's antagonistic politics, a divided legislature could make passing legislation even harder over the next four years, holding up bills to expand Taiwan's economic ties (e.g. via trade pacts with the United States) or preventing talent poaching in the island's crucial semiconductor sector. Over the next year, several developments could yet sway the election results, including:
An economic downturn. The DPP could manage the economy poorly and/or get blamed for a slowdown in Taiwanese exports stemming from a global economic downturn over 2023.
Fumbled messaging on sovereignty. The KMT could lose support if it fails to offer a solid stance on Taiwan's sovereignty for the centrist majority of voters who care more about cross-strait issues in national elections than they do in local ones.
Increased Chinese aggression. Beijing could scuttle the KMT's chances if it launches more military drills around Taiwan, e.g. in response to a possible visit by U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy to the island. In addition, China could crack down again on Hong Kong (which swayed Taiwan's 2020 presidential election toward the DPP) by, for example, expanding the implementation and enforcement of the National Security Law to target more citizens with trumped-up charges of sedition and subversion.
If the DPP is re-elected in 2024, China will continue increasing military coercion against Taiwan, while a KMT win could bring limited cross-strait cooperation. But in either case, questions of sovereignty would linger and the U.S.-China competition for Indo-Pacific dominance would persist. If the DPP is able to extend its eight-year reign, the prospects for peaceful reunification with China would remain slim to none. To express its dismay over this reality, Beijing would increasingly wield military coercion against the new Lai administration, including increased overflights of Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and naval drills around Taiwan, as well as live-fire military drills whenever Beijing wished to reprimand Taipei and/or Western capitals for particularly egregious provocations around Taiwan. This would deepen Western concerns about China's military predations vis-a-vis Taiwan and further justify the actions of a growing coalition of countries, led by the United States, to expand their security footprint in the Indo-Pacific and prevent China from achieving regional predominance. If the KMT wins, cross-strait relations would improve, with Hou pursuing deeper trade relations with China and Beijing resuming diplomatic channels. But the lingering question of sovereignty would limit the extent of this rapprochement. Hou, like Taiwan's previous KMT president Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2016), would be bound by the Taiwanese voters' distrust of China to limit any political negotiations that might suggest Taiwan's lack of statehood. Thus, Beijing would maintain economic coercion (especially customs restrictions) and limited military coercion (e.g. ADIZ overflights) as tools of leverage against Taiwan, particularly as Xi ages and becomes impatient with the lack of progress he's seen on reunification since taking office in 2012. The KMT may reduce the pace of diplomatic visits with Western nations as a means of easing tensions with China, but this wouldn't keep the United States (and China) from continuing to prepare for an eventual military confrontation in the Indo-Pacific. Hou's leadership may also reduce Europe's security concerns around Taiwan in the short term, leading to a reduction in European countries' freedom of navigation operations. But the persistence of cross-strait tensions, even under KMT leadership, would still sustain the slow, long-term expansion of the Western military presence in the Indo-Pacific.
Shifting domestic sentiment and party preferences will prevent the KMT and the DPP from pursuing extreme policies regarding the country's relations with China, making Taiwanese politics a game of pandering to moderates. A steadily growing Taiwanese identity and comparative societal apathy about cultural ties to China, as well as the desire among Taiwanese people to maintain their country's de facto independence, will prevent Taiwan's political parties from growing too close to Beijing. Meanwhile, the rising popularity of the third-party TPP could win it a spot as a minority coalition partner in the legislature. These political and ideological shifts could quash policies that would either provoke or align too closely with China, stopping the DPP from passing pro-sovereignty legislation (e.g. constitutional changes that would reduce references to reunification) and preventing the KMT from making political concessions to China in the midst of trade negotiations. Within this context, any perceived sovereignty concessions made by Taipei could prompt renewed unrest and activist political movements in Taiwan (like the Sunflower Student Movement of 2014, which nurtured a generation of DPP supporters). Besides amplifying the DPP's agenda, this could herald a new freeze in cross-strait relations. These combined constraints will also increasingly force Taiwanese presidents and lawmakers to pitch toward centrist voters, rather than toward hard-liners on either side, in order to get in office and stay in office.
The political imperative of providing economic growth will drive Taipei under any administration to optimize trade and investment ties with both Beijing and Washington, though political sensitivities will complicate this comprehensive approach. Taiwan's need for economic growth will prevent its political parties from adopting a U.S.-style limited sectoral decoupling with China, which is unrealistic given that China purchases nearly 38% of Taiwan's exports as of November 2022. And Taipei's deepening supply chain connections with the United States and Europe, particularly in the crucial chips sector, will require that Taipei nurtures Western ties as well. But any efforts by Taipei to progress on a trade and investment agreement with the United States — a priority of the DPP — could reduce the chances of Taipei expanding similar ties with Beijing, given the latter's stance that foreign trade agreements with Taipei should be negotiated via Beijing. The converse case is likely not true, however; if Taipei pursued expanded trade and investment ties with Beijing first — a key focus of the KMT — and then sought the same with the United States, Washington would engage in bilateral talks to maintain the strategic relationship (but such talks could still ruin Taipei's newly expanded ties with Beijing post hoc). Any failure by Taipei to manage either the sovereignty or economic growth issues could prompt political turnover and potentially even greater support for Taiwan's third parties. And both the KMT and DPP's approach toward balancing economic ties with China and the United States will carry that risk.
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and only if it does not annoy the Chinese:
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U.S. to Expand Troop Presence in Taiwan for Training Against China Threat
The Pentagon is helping Taiwan focus on tactics and weapon systems that would make the island harder to assault
Taiwanese military personnel trained at a base in Taoyuan, Taiwan, this week. The U.S. is working to help Taipei defend itself without provoking Beijing.
By Nancy A. YoussefFollow
and Gordon LuboldFollow
Feb. 23, 2023 7:00 am ET
WASHINGTON—The U.S. is markedly increasing the number of troops deployed to Taiwan, more than quadrupling the current number to bolster a training program for the island’s military amid a rising threat from China.
The U.S. plans to deploy between 100 and 200 troops to the island in the coming months, up from roughly 30 there a year ago, according to U.S. officials. The larger force will expand a training program the Pentagon has taken pains not to publicize as the U.S. works to provide Taipei with the capabilities it needs to defend itself without provoking Beijing.
The number of American troops, which has included special-operations forces and U.S. Marines, has fluctuated by a handful during the past few years, according to Defense Department data. The planned increase would be the largest deployment of forces in decades by the U.S. on Taiwan, as the two draw closer to counter China’s growing military power.
Beyond training on Taiwan, the Michigan National Guard is also training a contingent of the Taiwanese military, including during annual exercises with multiple countries at Camp Grayling in northern Michigan, according to people familiar with the training.
The expanded training, both in the U.S. and in Taiwan, is part of a gathering U.S. push to help a close partner prepare to thwart a possible invasion by China. The U.S. officials said the expansion was planned for months, well before U.S.-China relations plummeted anew this month after a suspected Chinese spy balloon traversed North America for more than a week before being shot down by the Air Force.
With a decades-old military buildup gaining momentum, China’s People’s Liberation Army is increasingly engaging in aggressive maneuvers, sending planes and ships near Taiwan. Following Russia’s full-on invasion of Ukraine last year, the Pentagon has redoubled efforts to get Taiwan to adopt what some military specialists call a “porcupine” strategy, focusing on tactics and weapons systems that would make the island harder to assault.
The additional troops will be tasked with training Taiwan forces not only on U.S. weapons systems but on military maneuvers to protect against a potential Chinese offensive, the U.S. officials said. The officials declined to provide other details about the deployment, which hasn’t been previously reported.
Beijing has been unnerved by the U.S. and Taiwan’s greater coordination on defense, accusing Washington of undermining previous commitments to maintain unofficial relations with Taipei. When The Wall Street Journal first reported in 2021 on the previously unpublicized training of Taiwan’s forces by a small American military contingent, China’s Foreign Ministry said Beijing would take unspecified steps to protect its interests.
“One of the difficult things to determine is what really is objectionable to China,” said one of the U.S. officials about the training. “We don’t think at the levels that we’re engaged in and are likely to remain engaged in the near future that we are anywhere close to a tipping point for China, but that’s a question that is constantly being evaluated and looked at specifically with every decision involving support to Taiwan.”
A spokesman at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, which is responsible for U.S. military operations in the Asia-Pacific, declined to comment. The White House had no immediate comment, and the Pentagon declined to comment about the additional forces.
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We could teach them how to win a war, but the last Americans to actually do that are in their 80’s.
and only if it does not annoy the Chinese:
===========================================
U.S. to Expand Troop Presence in Taiwan for Training Against China Threat
The Pentagon is helping Taiwan focus on tactics and weapon systems that would make the island harder to assault
Taiwanese military personnel trained at a base in Taoyuan, Taiwan, this week. The U.S. is working to help Taipei defend itself without provoking Beijing.
By Nancy A. YoussefFollow
and Gordon LuboldFollow
Feb. 23, 2023 7:00 am ET
WASHINGTON—The U.S. is markedly increasing the number of troops deployed to Taiwan, more than quadrupling the current number to bolster a training program for the island’s military amid a rising threat from China.
The U.S. plans to deploy between 100 and 200 troops to the island in the coming months, up from roughly 30 there a year ago, according to U.S. officials. The larger force will expand a training program the Pentagon has taken pains not to publicize as the U.S. works to provide Taipei with the capabilities it needs to defend itself without provoking Beijing.
The number of American troops, which has included special-operations forces and U.S. Marines, has fluctuated by a handful during the past few years, according to Defense Department data. The planned increase would be the largest deployment of forces in decades by the U.S. on Taiwan, as the two draw closer to counter China’s growing military power.
Beyond training on Taiwan, the Michigan National Guard is also training a contingent of the Taiwanese military, including during annual exercises with multiple countries at Camp Grayling in northern Michigan, according to people familiar with the training.
The expanded training, both in the U.S. and in Taiwan, is part of a gathering U.S. push to help a close partner prepare to thwart a possible invasion by China. The U.S. officials said the expansion was planned for months, well before U.S.-China relations plummeted anew this month after a suspected Chinese spy balloon traversed North America for more than a week before being shot down by the Air Force.
With a decades-old military buildup gaining momentum, China’s People’s Liberation Army is increasingly engaging in aggressive maneuvers, sending planes and ships near Taiwan. Following Russia’s full-on invasion of Ukraine last year, the Pentagon has redoubled efforts to get Taiwan to adopt what some military specialists call a “porcupine” strategy, focusing on tactics and weapons systems that would make the island harder to assault.
The additional troops will be tasked with training Taiwan forces not only on U.S. weapons systems but on military maneuvers to protect against a potential Chinese offensive, the U.S. officials said. The officials declined to provide other details about the deployment, which hasn’t been previously reported.
Beijing has been unnerved by the U.S. and Taiwan’s greater coordination on defense, accusing Washington of undermining previous commitments to maintain unofficial relations with Taipei. When The Wall Street Journal first reported in 2021 on the previously unpublicized training of Taiwan’s forces by a small American military contingent, China’s Foreign Ministry said Beijing would take unspecified steps to protect its interests.
“One of the difficult things to determine is what really is objectionable to China,” said one of the U.S. officials about the training. “We don’t think at the levels that we’re engaged in and are likely to remain engaged in the near future that we are anywhere close to a tipping point for China, but that’s a question that is constantly being evaluated and looked at specifically with every decision involving support to Taiwan.”
A spokesman at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, which is responsible for U.S. military operations in the Asia-Pacific, declined to comment. The White House had no immediate comment, and the Pentagon declined to comment about the additional forces.
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For the record I would assert that eventually American arms DID win in Iraq, only to have Baraq & Biden throw it away.
Anyway, I'm not sensing a will to fight for freedom comparable to the Ukes' will.
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Updating Our Assessment of the Evolving Taiwan-China Relationship: Politics
12 MIN READFeb 17, 2023 | 18:27 GMT
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen (left) and Vice President William Lai attend a ceremony to mark the island's National Day in front of the Presidential Office in Taipei on Oct. 10, 2022.
(SAM YEH/AFP via Getty Images)
Editor's Note: This assessment is an update to part two in a series that explores China-Taiwan relations through the lens of Taiwan's economy, politics, military affairs and regional relations. Since the original piece was published in September 2021, much has changed in Taiwanese politics that warrants a reexamination.
Taiwanese politics hinges on issues of sovereignty and economic growth, with an increasingly centrist society constraining the improvement of relations with both the United States and China. Meanwhile, Beijing will continue to wield coercive policies no matter which party governs Taipei. At the heart of Taiwanese politics are two parties looking to redefine themselves in light of a changing society. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and opposition Kuomintang (KMT) are trying to significantly alter their agendas ahead of Taiwan's January 2024 presidential and legislative elections to satisfy the complex demands of a largely politically independent populace that is disenchanted with its limited choices for electoral representation. These demands range from national issues like economic growth and defending Taiwan's sovereignty from Chinese aggression, to local concerns like corruption and public health management.
The DPP paints itself as the defender of Taiwan's sovereignty against China's political, military and economic coercive efforts. But this stance sometimes places the party at odds with Taiwan's economic growth, as China is the island's top trade partner. The DPP suffered a significant loss to the KMT in local elections held in November 2022, but these elections are often focused on parochial issues like city management of COVID-19 and corruption scandals. Nonetheless, the party's leadership and public image were weakened in November when President Tsai Ing-wen resigned as chair of the DPP following the electoral loss.
The KMT has been traditionally friendlier to China and acts as the face of Taiwanese business interests, which want to maintain cross-strait relations insofar as they facilitate trade and investment. But the party has struggled to shake its geriatric image among Taiwan's youth. The KMT has also struggled to firm up its noncommittal stance on Taiwanese sovereignty over the last 10 years amid Chinese President Xi Jinping's adamance about pursuing cross-strait reunification — a prospect widely unpopular among Taiwanese citizens. Taiwan's economic downturn may play in the KMT's favor in the 2024 ballot, but sovereignty issues are also more salient in national elections, and success in local elections traditionally does not translate to electoral gains at the national level.
Taiwan's two-party system has always been somewhat fragmented, with third parties like the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) periodically gaining significant sway in politics. As of 2022, the TPP (which was only founded in 2019) had garnered 8.2% of public support. This is partially driven by the bulk of Taiwanese people identifying as politically independent, wanting to preserve Taiwan's economic prospects and its sovereignty. For TPP leader Ko Wen-je, catering to this broad constituency has meant supporting cross-strait business ties while criticizing China's military aggression.
Over the past decade, Beijing's stance toward Taiwan has become increasingly threatening, with President Xi pushing cross-strait reunification on Beijing's terms and leaving Taiwan's political parties with little room for negotiation. Since coming to power in 2012, Xi has publicly asserted that reunification with Taiwan can only take place under China's ''one country, two systems'' governing model, in which Beijing allows limited (faux) political autonomy for regions like Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet. This has broken a decades-old, unspoken agreement between Taipei and Beijing that both would allow the other to maintain their own visions of what amicable reunification might look like. It has also forced the more pro-China KMT into a corner, given that Taiwanese citizens are uniformly opposed to the one country, two systems model. In addition, Xi has directly associated cross-strait reunification with his ''great rejuvenation'' goal of restoring China's place as a leading global superpower, which involves showing the world the supremacy of the socialist model and Chinese ''democratic centralism'' (one-party politics) — systems that Xi has directly contrasted to Western capitalism and democratic liberalism. And he has positioned himself in Chinese Communist Party doctrine as the one and only person who could lead China to achieve this rejuvenation. This ideology and one-man rule stand in direct opposition to Taiwan's healthy democracy and capitalist markets, a rare combination in Asia and a system of which Taiwanese citizens are quite proud. Moreover, in the face of recent DPP presidential wins and Western (especially U.S.) efforts to strengthen ties with Taiwan, Beijing has resorted to greater military coercion in hopes of convincing Taipei to stop pushing the sovereignty issue and convincing the West that closer ties with Taiwan are not worth risking war with China. This military coercion has led many Taiwanese to believe that China is a bully that can't be reasoned with, though some contest that Taipei's efforts to strengthen ties with the West are unnecessarily provocative to China.
Since former President Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) stepped down and current President Tsai Ing-wen (DPP) assumed office in 2016, Beijing has treated Taipei as a radical government run by ''separatists.'' Since then, China has cut off cross-strait diplomatic channels, shut Taiwan out of international institutions, and poached Taiwan's few formal diplomatic partners. This is despite Tsai's pro-status-quo stance and her efforts to forestall policy actions by pro-independence legislators within the DPP that could provoke China.
Since 2017, the United States and (to a lesser extent) European partners like the United Kingdom, Germany and France have increased the frequency of their diplomatic visits to Taiwan. This culminated in then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's trip to Taipei to meet with Tsai in August 2022, the first such visit by a sitting House Speaker in a quarter-century.
In the last three years, Beijing has increasingly wielded military coercive methods against Taiwan. These have included more frequent and larger incursions by People's Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone, amphibious landing drills and positioning PLA Navy vessels off Taiwan's coasts, along with the live-fire military drills conducted following Pelosi's controversial visit in August (which involved missile strikes just outside of Taiwan's territorial waters).
In August 2022, Beijing published its third white paper on Taiwan (the first update since 2000), which stated that one country, two systems is a basic principle ''for resolving the Taiwan question'' and ''the best approach to realizing national reunification."
According to polls, Taiwan's next election could produce a divided legislature, which would result in policy gridlock on economic and national security matters. It is far from certain whether likely DPP candidate (and current Taiwanese Vice President) William Lai will be able to beat likely KMT candidate (and current New Taipei mayor) Hou You-ih in the 2024 presidential election. And the TPP's Ko Wen-je could split the vote for either of the two main parties or throw his support behind one of them. A November Formusa poll shows Hou (33.8%) barely losing to Lai (34.3%), but a December poll by Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation shows Hou winning handily (38.7%) over Lai (29%), while both polls showed Ko garnering 14-18% of the vote. If this close race continues, the Legislative Yuan could be divided, with the KMT or DPP reliant on a coalition with the TPP to secure a majority of votes. In light of Taiwan's antagonistic politics, a divided legislature could make passing legislation even harder over the next four years, holding up bills to expand Taiwan's economic ties (e.g. via trade pacts with the United States) or preventing talent poaching in the island's crucial semiconductor sector. Over the next year, several developments could yet sway the election results, including:
An economic downturn. The DPP could manage the economy poorly and/or get blamed for a slowdown in Taiwanese exports stemming from a global economic downturn over 2023.
Fumbled messaging on sovereignty. The KMT could lose support if it fails to offer a solid stance on Taiwan's sovereignty for the centrist majority of voters who care more about cross-strait issues in national elections than they do in local ones.
Increased Chinese aggression. Beijing could scuttle the KMT's chances if it launches more military drills around Taiwan, e.g. in response to a possible visit by U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy to the island. In addition, China could crack down again on Hong Kong (which swayed Taiwan's 2020 presidential election toward the DPP) by, for example, expanding the implementation and enforcement of the National Security Law to target more citizens with trumped-up charges of sedition and subversion.
If the DPP is re-elected in 2024, China will continue increasing military coercion against Taiwan, while a KMT win could bring limited cross-strait cooperation. But in either case, questions of sovereignty would linger and the U.S.-China competition for Indo-Pacific dominance would persist. If the DPP is able to extend its eight-year reign, the prospects for peaceful reunification with China would remain slim to none. To express its dismay over this reality, Beijing would increasingly wield military coercion against the new Lai administration, including increased overflights of Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and naval drills around Taiwan, as well as live-fire military drills whenever Beijing wished to reprimand Taipei and/or Western capitals for particularly egregious provocations around Taiwan. This would deepen Western concerns about China's military predations vis-a-vis Taiwan and further justify the actions of a growing coalition of countries, led by the United States, to expand their security footprint in the Indo-Pacific and prevent China from achieving regional predominance. If the KMT wins, cross-strait relations would improve, with Hou pursuing deeper trade relations with China and Beijing resuming diplomatic channels. But the lingering question of sovereignty would limit the extent of this rapprochement. Hou, like Taiwan's previous KMT president Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2016), would be bound by the Taiwanese voters' distrust of China to limit any political negotiations that might suggest Taiwan's lack of statehood. Thus, Beijing would maintain economic coercion (especially customs restrictions) and limited military coercion (e.g. ADIZ overflights) as tools of leverage against Taiwan, particularly as Xi ages and becomes impatient with the lack of progress he's seen on reunification since taking office in 2012. The KMT may reduce the pace of diplomatic visits with Western nations as a means of easing tensions with China, but this wouldn't keep the United States (and China) from continuing to prepare for an eventual military confrontation in the Indo-Pacific. Hou's leadership may also reduce Europe's security concerns around Taiwan in the short term, leading to a reduction in European countries' freedom of navigation operations. But the persistence of cross-strait tensions, even under KMT leadership, would still sustain the slow, long-term expansion of the Western military presence in the Indo-Pacific.
Shifting domestic sentiment and party preferences will prevent the KMT and the DPP from pursuing extreme policies regarding the country's relations with China, making Taiwanese politics a game of pandering to moderates. A steadily growing Taiwanese identity and comparative societal apathy about cultural ties to China, as well as the desire among Taiwanese people to maintain their country's de facto independence, will prevent Taiwan's political parties from growing too close to Beijing. Meanwhile, the rising popularity of the third-party TPP could win it a spot as a minority coalition partner in the legislature. These political and ideological shifts could quash policies that would either provoke or align too closely with China, stopping the DPP from passing pro-sovereignty legislation (e.g. constitutional changes that would reduce references to reunification) and preventing the KMT from making political concessions to China in the midst of trade negotiations. Within this context, any perceived sovereignty concessions made by Taipei could prompt renewed unrest and activist political movements in Taiwan (like the Sunflower Student Movement of 2014, which nurtured a generation of DPP supporters). Besides amplifying the DPP's agenda, this could herald a new freeze in cross-strait relations. These combined constraints will also increasingly force Taiwanese presidents and lawmakers to pitch toward centrist voters, rather than toward hard-liners on either side, in order to get in office and stay in office.
The political imperative of providing economic growth will drive Taipei under any administration to optimize trade and investment ties with both Beijing and Washington, though political sensitivities will complicate this comprehensive approach. Taiwan's need for economic growth will prevent its political parties from adopting a U.S.-style limited sectoral decoupling with China, which is unrealistic given that China purchases nearly 38% of Taiwan's exports as of November 2022. And Taipei's deepening supply chain connections with the United States and Europe, particularly in the crucial chips sector, will require that Taipei nurtures Western ties as well. But any efforts by Taipei to progress on a trade and investment agreement with the United States — a priority of the DPP — could reduce the chances of Taipei expanding similar ties with Beijing, given the latter's stance that foreign trade agreements with Taipei should be negotiated via Beijing. The converse case is likely not true, however; if Taipei pursued expanded trade and investment ties with Beijing first — a key focus of the KMT — and then sought the same with the United States, Washington would engage in bilateral talks to maintain the strategic relationship (but such talks could still ruin Taipei's newly expanded ties with Beijing post hoc). Any failure by Taipei to manage either the sovereignty or economic growth issues could prompt political turnover and potentially even greater support for Taiwan's third parties. And both the KMT and DPP's approach toward balancing economic ties with China and the United States will carry that risk.
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https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/22/technology/tsmc-arizona-factory-tensions.html
40 bill $ investment in Arizona
I don't know how anyone could be a holder of any Taiwanese company these days
for obvious reasons
Just suppose TSM builds Az. facility for 40 bill.
Then CCP take it over
do we then take over the Az facility - close it down?
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I can't see the article. May I ask you to paste it here?
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I can't see the article. May I ask you to paste it here?
Inside Taiwanese Chip Giant, a U.S. Expansion Stokes Tensions
Employee doubts are rising about Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s $40 billion investment in an Arizona factory.
A banner saying “Made in America” hangs between American and Arizona flags on the side of a yellow building. Several mechanical lifts are on the expansive property.
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company is upgrading and expanding a factory it is building in Phoenix, a vital project for U.S. tech strategy.Credit...Adriana Zehbrauskas for The New York Times
John LiuPaul Mozur
By John Liu and Paul Mozur
John Liu and Paul Mozur, who are based in Seoul, interviewed dozens of semiconductor experts on the geopolitics of Taiwan’s chip making.
Feb. 22, 2023
阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the world’s biggest maker of advanced computer chips, is upgrading and expanding a new factory in Arizona that promises to help move the United States toward a more self-reliant technological future.
But to some at the company, the $40 billion project is something else: a bad business decision.
Internal doubts are mounting at the Taiwanese chip maker over its U.S. factory, according to interviews with 11 TSMC employees, who declined to be identified because they were not authorized to speak publicly. Many of the workers said the project could distract from the research and development focus that had long helped TSMC outmaneuver rivals. Some added that they were hesitant to move to the United States because of potential culture clashes.
Their concerns underline TSMC’s tricky position. As the biggest maker of chips that power everything from phones to cars to missiles, the company is strategically important with highly coveted technical know-how. But caught in a deepening battle between the United States and China over technological leadership, TSMC has tried to hedge its bets — only to find that its actions are creating new kinds of tensions.
Its factory expansion in the northern outskirts of Phoenix is meant to bring advanced microchip production closer to the United States and away from any potential standoff with China. Yet the effort has stoked internal apprehension, with high costs and managerial challenges showing how difficult it is to transplant one of the most complicated manufacturing processes known to man halfway across the world.
The pressure for the Arizona factory to succeed is immense. Failure would mean a setback for U.S. efforts to cultivate the advanced chip manufacturing that mostly moved to Asia decades ago. And TSMC would have spent billions on a plant that did not produce enough viable chips to make it worth the effort.
Image
Workers inside the under-construction chip factory.
TSMC initially pledged $12 billion toward the Arizona project and increased that to $40 billion last year.Credit...T.J. Kirkpatrick for The New York Times
“TSMC’s investment in the U.S. from a business perspective makes no sense at all,” said Kirk Yang, chairman of the private equity firm Kirkland Capital and a former tech analyst, citing lofty costs. He added that TSMC might have been forced to set up a factory in the United States because of political considerations, but “so far, the Phoenix project has yielded very little benefit for TSMC or Taiwan.”
The Arizona project is TSMC’s first major concession to rising global concerns in recent years about the geopolitics of chip production, driven partly by fears over China’s hostile posture to Taiwan and over a chip shortage.
The chip giant, which has long had almost all its factories in Taiwan, is now also building a facility in Japan. European policymakers have rolled out plans to attract a TSMC factory, and the company is in the final stages of making a decision about that plant, two people with knowledge of the matter said.
Nina Kao, a TSMC spokeswoman, did not directly address the internal concerns over the Arizona investment. But in an email, she said the decision on the U.S. factory location had been based on various factors, including customer demand, market opportunity and the chance to tap global talent.
The Global Race for Computer Chips
A Ramp-Up in Spending: Amid a tech cold war with China, U.S. companies have pledged nearly $200 billion for chip manufacturing projects since early 2020. But the investments have limits.
Crackdown on China: The United States has been aiming to prevent China from becoming an advanced power in chips, issuing sweeping restrictions on the country’s access to advanced technology.
Arizona Factory: Internal doubts are mounting at Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the world’s biggest maker of advanced chips, over its investment in a new factory in Phoenix.
CHIPS Act: The sprawling $280 billion bill passed by U.S. lawmakers last year gives the federal government new sway over the chips industry.
Ms. Kao added that TSMC was strengthening its training to integrate overseas talent into its corporate culture. The company will “actively listen and provide change where needed,” she said.
Image
A semiconductor wafer on display at TSMC’s museum in Taiwan.
Chips, which are made from silicon wafers like this one, are a foundational technology and help power computers, refrigerators, phones and many other items.Credit...Lam Yik Fei for The New York Times
TSMC announced the Arizona factory in May 2020, initially pledging $12 billion toward it. In December, the company increased that to $40 billion, with plans to upgrade the factory with more advanced — though not the most advanced — chip-making technology. The plant is expected to begin producing microchips by 2024, and the company said it would later add a second factory to the site.
The project is challenging. In an earnings call last month, TSMC said the U.S. construction could be at least four times the cost in Taiwan, driven by labor expenses, permits, regulatory compliance and inflation. Wendell Huang, TSMC’s chief financial officer, said the American investment could hurt TSMC’s profitability this year.
“TSMC recognizes that there is a cost gap between fabs in Taiwan and those overseas,” Ms. Kao said, using shorthand for a fabrication plant, or factory. She added that the company still anticipated robust gross margins over the long term.
TSMC also needs suppliers close by to provide the Arizona plant with raw materials, equipment and critical parts. Yet some suppliers that are trying to join it there said they were experiencing labor challenges and high costs.
Calvin Su, the president of Chang Chun Arizona, a chemical supplier that invested in its own $300 million factory in Casa Grande, Ariz., about an hour’s drive from Phoenix, said its factory construction cost was 10 times the cost in Taiwan. The costs were fueled by an unfamiliarity with U.S. regulations and building permits, as well as an insufficient supply of production materials, he said.
Image
A man stands next to a garden where red, lowercase letters form a TSMC sign. Another worker walks past him.
An American worker pausing outside a TSMC factory in Tainan, Taiwan. Some Taiwanese employees said they were concerned about cultural differences with U.S. workers.Credit...Lam Yik Fei for The New York Times
Michael Yang, chairman of the CTCI Corporation, an engineering and construction contractor for the Taiwanese chip giant, said the Arizona factory’s construction cost was “far beyond” his client’s expectation. On top of rising inflation, the chip maker is competing with Intel — which is also expanding in Arizona — for skilled labor and construction equipment, he said.
“When we reported our quotation in the beginning, the client replied: ‘Are you insane?’ But that’s just the way it is,” Mr. Yang said.
Some TSMC engineers said they were concerned about how the Arizona factory would blend American and Taiwanese employees. In Taiwan, engineers work long hours and weekend shifts, joking that they “sell liver” to work for the chip manufacturer, they said. Such sacrifices may be less appealing to employees in the United States, they said.
Wayne Chiu, an engineer who left TSMC last year, said he had thought about joining the company’s overseas expansion drive but lost interest after realizing he would likely have to pick up the slack for U.S. hires.
“The most difficult thing about wafer manufacturing is not technology,” he said. “The most difficult thing is personnel management. Americans are the worst at this, because Americans are the most difficult to manage.”
Three TSMC employees who trained American engineers said it was difficult to standardize practices among them. While Taiwanese workers unquestioningly follow what they are told to do, American employees challenged managers, questioning if there might be better methods, they said.
Some Americans struggled when assigned multiple tasks, sometimes rejecting a new assignment instead of working harder to complete everything, one TSMC engineer in Arizona said. Taiwanese workers believe that those who work in Phoenix will shoulder greater responsibilities than their American colleagues, eight employees said.
Image
The sun glows in a hazy sky above a factory next to a pond.
The Tainan chip factory. TSMC’s founder said in the past that Taiwan provided the company with advantages that couldn’t be matched in the United States.Credit...Lam Yik Fei for The New York Times
TSMC’s first American investment more than two decades ago has also served as a cautionary tale.
In the late 1990s, Morris Chang, the company’s founder, pushed an ambitious overseas expansion plan and created a chip-making subsidiary, WaferTech, in Washington State. Despite pledging to build multiple factories there, Mr. Chang stopped at one after “a series of ugly surprises,” including high costs and a shortage of skilled labor, he said in a podcast with the Brookings Institution last year.
Mr. Chang has questioned the U.S. effort to reshape the global semiconductor supply chain, saying at a public forum in 2021 that the advantages in Taiwan underlying TSMC’s success could not be replicated in the United States.
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In the Brookings Institution podcast, he also argued that the $52 billion in U.S. government subsidies earmarked by the CHIPS Act, a federal funding package to stoke domestic production of advanced chips, would not be enough to jump-start the industry. He called it an “expensive exercise in futility.”
But at TSMC’s announcement of the Phoenix factory expansion in December, Mr. Chang appeared to have come around. This time, he said, the company is “far more prepared.”
In an email to The New York Times, Mr. Chang said he stood by his remarks in last year’s podcast and at the December event in Arizona. He declined to comment further.
Image
A large, gnarled tree truck rises behind a man standing in a woodsy park.
“The most difficult thing about wafer manufacturing is not technology,” said Wayne Chiu, a former TSMC worker. “The most difficult thing is personnel management.”Credit...Lam Yik Fei for The New York Times
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Thank you Doug.
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"TSMC said the U.S. construction could be at least four times the cost in Taiwan, driven by labor expenses, permits, regulatory compliance and inflation."
- There's the problem. People ask why they aren't already made in the USA.
- Fix that and we wouldn't have to subsidize THIS.
The article goes on to question if American workers can hack challenging work. Kind of sad but true.
If we can't compete in the world market, just say so.
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More than market criteria are involved here.
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More than market criteria are involved here.
Right. But 4-fold higher in costs means only government money or mandate can make them build here. Will people pay 4-fold more for devices? (No.) Gone is the market.
Weren't almost all of those devices they are building invented here?
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Don't know about four fold, but granted the greater cost here. That said, the question remains: How do we have production secure from hostile actors?
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Don't know about four fold, but granted the greater cost here. That said, the question remains: How do we have production secure from hostile actors?
While we worry about chips, the PRC produces most of our pharmaceuticals.
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Funny you should mention that-- not twenty minutes ago I was having a REALLY interesting geopolitical conversation with a REALLY interesting person (will tell you next time we talk-- no need to name drop here on the forum) in which it came up that I was no longer a Libertarian.
"Why?"
"A) Immigration
B) Trade-- national security implications, e.g. witness how we now depend on China for our pharmaceuticals."
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How to avoid war over Taiwan
A superpower conflict would shake the world
Mar 9th 2023
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Europe is witnessing its bloodiest cross-border war since 1945, but Asia risks something even worse: conflict between America and China over Taiwan. Tensions are high, as American forces pivot to a new doctrine known as “distributed lethality” designed to blunt Chinese missile attacks. Last week dozens of Chinese jets breached Taiwan’s “air defence identification zone”. This week China’s foreign minister condemned what he called America’s strategy of “all-round containment and suppression, a zero-sum game of life and death”.
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As America rearms in Asia and tries to galvanise its allies, two questions loom. Is it willing to risk a direct war with another nuclear power to defend Taiwan, something it has not been prepared to do for Ukraine? And by competing with China militarily in Asia, could it provoke the very war it is trying to prevent?
No one can be sure how an invasion of Taiwan might start. China could use “grey-zone” tactics that are coercive, but not quite acts of war, to blockade the self-governing island and sap its economy and morale. Or it could launch pre-emptive missile strikes on American bases in Guam and Japan, clearing the way for an amphibious assault. Since Taiwan could resist an attack on its own only for days or weeks, any conflict could escalate quickly into a superpower confrontation.
Rather than the trenches and human-wave attacks seen in Ukraine, a war over Taiwan could involve a new generation of arms, such as hypersonic missiles and anti-satellite weapons, causing untold destruction and provoking unpredictable retaliation. The economic fallout would be devastating. Taiwan is the world’s essential supplier of advanced semiconductors. America, China and Japan, the three largest economies, and among the most interconnected, would deploy sanctions, crippling global trade. America would urge Europe and its other friends to impose an embargo on China.
War is no longer a remote possibility, because an unstated bargain has frayed. Since the 1970s America has been careful neither to encourage Taiwan formally to declare independence nor to promise explicitly to defend it. While not ruling out force, China has said it would favour peaceful reunification. But those positions are changing. President Xi Jinping has told the People’s Liberation Army to be ready for an invasion by 2027, says the cia. President Joe Biden has said that America would defend Taiwan if China were to attack (aides say policy is unchanged). The military balance no longer so clearly favours America as it did in the 1990s. And public opinion has shifted in Taiwan, not least because of how China has snuffed out freedoms in Hong Kong. Only 7% of Taiwanese favour reunification.
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America and China are preparing for a war over Taiwan
Special report: Frontline Formosa
Both sides are shoring up their positions and trying to signal their resolve, with destabilising consequences. Some acts generate headlines, as when Nancy Pelosi, then speaker of the House of Representatives, visited Taipei last year; others are almost invisible, such as the mysterious severing of undersea internet cables to remote Taiwanese islands. Diplomacy has stalled. Top American and Chinese defence officials have not spoken since November. During the recent spy-balloon incident, a “hotline” failed when China did not pick up. Rhetoric aimed at domestic audiences has grown more martial, whether on the American campaign trail or from China’s top leaders. What one side sees as a defensive act to protect its red lines, the other sees as an aggressive attempt to thwart its ambitions. Thus both sides are tempted to keep hardening their positions.
It is unclear how far America would go to defend Taiwan. The island is not a domino. China has some territorial designs beyond it, but does not want to invade or directly rule all of Asia. And as our special report explains, it is unclear how many Taiwanese see China as a real threat, or have the stomach for a fight.
The Taiwanese, like the Ukrainians, deserve American help. The island is admirably liberal and democratic, and proof that such values are not alien to Chinese culture. It would be a tragedy if its people had to submit to a dictatorship. If America walked away, the credibility of its security umbrella in Asia would be gravely in doubt. Some Asian countries would accommodate China more; South Korea and Japan might seek nuclear weapons. It would boost China’s worldview that the interests of states come before the individual freedoms enshrined in the un after the second world war.
But the help Taiwan receives should aim to deter a Chinese attack without provoking one. America needs to consider Mr Xi’s calculus. A blanket American security guarantee might embolden Taiwan to declare formal independence, a red line for him. The promise of a much larger American military presence on Taiwan could lead China to invade now, before it arrives. A botched invasion, however, would cost Mr Xi and the Communist Party dearly. America needs to calibrate its stance: reassure Mr Xi that his red lines remain intact, but convince him that aggression carries unacceptable risks. The goal should not be to solve the Taiwan question, but to defer it.
Taiwan has avoided provocation. Its president, Tsai Ing-wen, has not declared independence. But it needs to do more to deter its neighbour, by boosting defence spending so that it can survive longer without American help, and by preparing its citizens to resist grey-zone tactics, from disinformation to vote-rigging. For its part, America should try harder to reassure China and to deter it. It should avoid symbolic acts that provoke China without strengthening Taiwan’s capacity to defend itself. It should keep modernising its armed forces and rallying its allies. And it should be prepared to break a future blockade, by stockpiling fuel, planning an airlift, providing backup internet links and building an allied consensus on sanctions.
America and today’s Chinese regime will never agree about Taiwan. But they do share a common interest in avoiding a third world war. The first 15 years of the American-Soviet cold war featured a terrifying mixture of brinkmanship and near-catastrophic mistakes, until the Cuban missile crisis prompted a revival of diplomacy. This is the terrain the world is now on. Unfortunately, the potential common ground between America and China on Taiwan is shrinking. Somehow, the two rival systems must find a way to live together less dangerously. ■
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Mar 6th 2023
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In 2021 lithuania allowed Taiwan to open a representative office in Vilnius under its own name, not “Chinese Taipei”, as most de facto embassies are called. An infuriated China shut the Lithuanian embassy in Beijing, revoked its diplomatic visas and stopped trade. Lithuania’s economy suffered. But it did not change course. In November 2022 it opened a trade representative office in Taipei. Taiwan said it would invest €10m ($9.9m) in Lithuania’s chip industry. Some west Europeans complained about a lack of warning. But the Czech president, Petr Pavel, wants to meet Taiwan’s president. Joseph Wu, the foreign minister, says most people do not see Lithuania as a warning against upsetting China. “They look at Lithuania and think, ‘China shouldn’t have done that.’ ”
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That is the change in thinking Taiwan needs. For decades China has tried to isolate it, keeping the roc out of international institutions and regional trade pacts. China has used its economic power to scare firms and governments from even using the name “Taiwan”. That may be understandable for poor countries in need of Chinese money. But rich, democratic countries should not let China dictate their relations with Taiwan. Doing so only strengthens China’s belief that it will enjoy impunity if it invades.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a wake-up call. Nearly 200 foreign officials came to Taiwan in 2022, many eager to discuss how to contain Chinese aggression. Such visits have accelerated since Nancy Pelosi’s trip of August 2022, despite China’s show of force that followed. Ms Pelosi’s successor as house speaker, Kevin McCarthy, has promised to go to Taiwan. That could provoke China again. Mr Wu promises a welcome for Mr McCarthy—and indeed anyone else. “They cannot dictate how we make friends with the international community,” he says. Such visits boost confidence, which is what the Taiwanese need most. “Any kind of gesture, however symbolic, allows Taiwanese people to understand that we are not alone,” he adds.
A visitor walks pass by Lithuanian Products Center at Taipei World Trade Center where many products are presented for local agents, in Taipei, Taiwan, February 15, 2023
Analysts are divided over how best to help Taiwan. Some actions are symbolic not substantive, says Bonnie Glaser of the German Marshall Fund. The national defence authorisation act of 2018 allowed American warships to call at Taiwan’s ports, for example. Yet that would provoke a punitive response without improving Taiwan’s defences, says Ms Glaser. Renaming Taiwan’s de facto embassy in Washington or designating it as a non-nato ally, both of which were proposed but dropped from a congressional bill in 2022, might create openings for Beijing to change the status quo in the Taiwan strait more in its favour.
“Of course we should not let Beijing define what we do and don’t do,” says Ms Glaser. But foreign governments should balance how China responds to acts of support against how they will bolster Taiwan’s security. The most important way to do this is military help. Aside from arms sales, America is trying to improve training. European countries could do the same. If Taiwan decided to form territorial defence forces, they could learn from European experience. Asian countries might provide real-time intelligence to Taiwan in war, especially if undersea cables were cut.
The least confrontational yet most underutilised tools to strengthen Taiwan are economic. “I’d rather see a bilateral trade agreement than any of the sexiest, biggest weapons systems the United States could come up with to sell Taiwan,” says Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of the us-Taiwan business council. Despite resistance to free-trade deals in America, there is rare bipartisan consensus on the need to support Taiwan. A study by the Heritage Foundation finds that a free-trade agreement would benefit both economies. More important, it would set a precedent for other countries.
The other form of messaging that matters is to China. America and its allies should clearly communicate the cost of any use of force against Taiwan. They should let China know it will be isolated and subject to sanctions just as Russia was after its attack on Ukraine. Some say America should end its strategic ambiguity altogether and tell China it will fight for Taiwan. Others argue that greater clarity might merely heighten the risk of war. The Biden administration has chosen to let actions speak louder than words. The formation in 2021 of aukus, a security pact between Australia, Britain and America, was a signal of stronger military determination in the Indo-Pacific. So was the expansion of American military co-ordination with Japan and the Philippines announced earlier this year.
This special report has argued that Taiwan’s own people must determine their future. But many of the actions they take on the economy, identity, politics and defence need to be bolstered by greater support from the rest of the world. Taiwan should be included in trade pacts, allowed into international institutions and given greater military and diplomatic assistance.
Taiwan endures China’s economic, military, and psychological threats, as well as social fissures from its own history. This is a moment for Taiwanese democracy to prove its resilience. Its people overcame an authoritarian past. They now have to ward off an authoritarian future. They should not be left to stand alone. ■
photos: i-hwa cheng
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How to avoid war over Taiwan
A superpower conflict would shake the world
Mar 9th 2023
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Europe is witnessing its bloodiest cross-border war since 1945, but Asia risks something even worse: conflict between America and China over Taiwan. Tensions are high, as American forces pivot to a new doctrine known as “distributed lethality” designed to blunt Chinese missile attacks. Last week dozens of Chinese jets breached Taiwan’s “air defence identification zone”. This week China’s foreign minister condemned what he called America’s strategy of “all-round containment and suppression, a zero-sum game of life and death”.
As America rearms in Asia and tries to galvanise its allies, two questions loom. Is it willing to risk a direct war with another nuclear power to defend Taiwan, something it has not been prepared to do for Ukraine? And by competing with China militarily in Asia, could it provoke the very war it is trying to prevent?
No one can be sure how an invasion of Taiwan might start. China could use “grey-zone” tactics that are coercive, but not quite acts of war, to blockade the self-governing island and sap its economy and morale. Or it could launch pre-emptive missile strikes on American bases in Guam and Japan, clearing the way for an amphibious assault. Since Taiwan could resist an attack on its own only for days or weeks, any conflict could escalate quickly into a superpower confrontation.
Rather than the trenches and human-wave attacks seen in Ukraine, a war over Taiwan could involve a new generation of arms, such as hypersonic missiles and anti-satellite weapons, causing untold destruction and provoking unpredictable retaliation. The economic fallout would be devastating. Taiwan is the world’s essential supplier of advanced semiconductors. America, China and Japan, the three largest economies, and among the most interconnected, would deploy sanctions, crippling global trade. America would urge Europe and its other friends to impose an embargo on China.
War is no longer a remote possibility, because an unstated bargain has frayed. Since the 1970s America has been careful neither to encourage Taiwan formally to declare independence nor to promise explicitly to defend it. While not ruling out force, China has said it would favour peaceful reunification. But those positions are changing. President Xi Jinping has told the People’s Liberation Army to be ready for an invasion by 2027, says the cia. President Joe Biden has said that America would defend Taiwan if China were to attack (aides say policy is unchanged). The military balance no longer so clearly favours America as it did in the 1990s. And public opinion has shifted in Taiwan, not least because of how China has snuffed out freedoms in Hong Kong. Only 7% of Taiwanese favour reunification.
Both sides are shoring up their positions and trying to signal their resolve, with destabilising consequences. Some acts generate headlines, as when Nancy Pelosi, then speaker of the House of Representatives, visited Taipei last year; others are almost invisible, such as the mysterious severing of undersea internet cables to remote Taiwanese islands. Diplomacy has stalled. Top American and Chinese defence officials have not spoken since November. During the recent spy-balloon incident, a “hotline” failed when China did not pick up. Rhetoric aimed at domestic audiences has grown more martial, whether on the American campaign trail or from China’s top leaders. What one side sees as a defensive act to protect its red lines, the other sees as an aggressive attempt to thwart its ambitions. Thus both sides are tempted to keep hardening their positions.
It is unclear how far America would go to defend Taiwan. The island is not a domino. China has some territorial designs beyond it, but does not want to invade or directly rule all of Asia. And as our special report explains, it is unclear how many Taiwanese see China as a real threat, or have the stomach for a fight.
The Taiwanese, like the Ukrainians, deserve American help. The island is admirably liberal and democratic, and proof that such values are not alien to Chinese culture. It would be a tragedy if its people had to submit to a dictatorship. If America walked away, the credibility of its security umbrella in Asia would be gravely in doubt. Some Asian countries would accommodate China more; South Korea and Japan might seek nuclear weapons. It would boost China’s worldview that the interests of states come before the individual freedoms enshrined in the un after the second world war.
But the help Taiwan receives should aim to deter a Chinese attack without provoking one. America needs to consider Mr Xi’s calculus. A blanket American security guarantee might embolden Taiwan to declare formal independence, a red line for him. The promise of a much larger American military presence on Taiwan could lead China to invade now, before it arrives. A botched invasion, however, would cost Mr Xi and the Communist Party dearly. America needs to calibrate its stance: reassure Mr Xi that his red lines remain intact, but convince him that aggression carries unacceptable risks. The goal should not be to solve the Taiwan question, but to defer it.
Taiwan has avoided provocation. Its president, Tsai Ing-wen, has not declared independence. But it needs to do more to deter its neighbour, by boosting defence spending so that it can survive longer without American help, and by preparing its citizens to resist grey-zone tactics, from disinformation to vote-rigging. For its part, America should try harder to reassure China and to deter it. It should avoid symbolic acts that provoke China without strengthening Taiwan’s capacity to defend itself. It should keep modernising its armed forces and rallying its allies. And it should be prepared to break a future blockade, by stockpiling fuel, planning an airlift, providing backup internet links and building an allied consensus on sanctions.
America and today’s Chinese regime will never agree about Taiwan. But they do share a common interest in avoiding a third world war. The first 15 years of the American-Soviet cold war featured a terrifying mixture of brinkmanship and near-catastrophic mistakes, until the Cuban missile crisis prompted a revival of diplomacy. This is the terrain the world is now on. Unfortunately, the potential common ground between America and China on Taiwan is shrinking. Somehow, the two rival systems must find a way to live together less dangerously.
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Taiwan Will Continue to Vex U.S.-China Ties, Despite Low-Key Tsai-McCarthy Visit
9 MIN READApr 7, 2023 | 20:34 GMT
While China's response to a meeting between high-ranking U.S. and Taiwanese officials was relatively modest, the trajectory of China-U.S. and China-Taiwan relations remains escalatory. This will perpetuate the risk of cross-strait incidents, pose a pervasive threat of Chinese military coercion against Taiwan, and increase constraints on U.S.-China trade ties. On April 5, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen met with U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy at the Ronald Reagan Library in the Californian city of Simi Valley, marking the first time a sitting Taiwanese president has met with the leader of the U.S. House of Representatives on U.S. soil since 1979. Tsai and McCarthy were joined by 17 other U.S. lawmakers, including 10 members of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. In a joint statement released after the meeting, McCarthy reiterated the need for the United States to deliver arms sold to Taiwan on a ''very timely basis'' and strengthen trade and technology cooperation, while Tsai heaped praise on the U.S. partnership. Both sides also emphasized the need to preserve freedom and democracy from outside threats, though neither leader explicitly named China. In response to the McCarthy meeting, China has conducted limited military activities around Taiwan, including a Taiwan Strait patrol and a naval voyage east of Taiwan.
Tsai's recent trip to California was potentially the most high-profile visit by a Taiwanese president to the United States since the island's then-President Lee Teng-hui gave a commencement speech at Cornell University in 1995, which sparked the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. It was also only the third time a Taiwanese president has ever sat down with a U.S. House speaker (regardless of location), with the second being Tsai's meeting with McCarthy's predecessor, Nancy Pelosi, in Taipei just eight months ago.
On April 6, the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) of China's Fujian province (which lies just across the strait from Taiwan) announced on its WeChat page that it would be conducting ''on-site inspections'' of cargo and construction ships during patrols of the central and northern portions of the Taiwan Strait, with the MSA's largest ship, the Haixun 06, leading the operations. The Taiwanese military is tailing the Haixun 06 and has advised ships in the strait to ignore any requests from China to board their vessels and notify Taiwan's Coast Guard if they receive such requests.
On April 5, China sailed its Shandong aircraft carrier 200 miles east of the southernmost tip of Taiwan, accompanied by a frigate and a support ship. The USS Nimitz aircraft carrier is in the region as well, sailing 400 miles east of Taiwan according to the island's defense minister, though the U.S. military has not yet associated its presence with that of the Shandong.
There have been few updates from Taiwanese or Chinese authorities following an April 2 pledge by the People's Liberation Army's Eastern Theater Command (PLA ETC) to host live-fire drills in the East China Sea, which involved two destroyers and a frigate.
China's military response to the Tsai-McCarthy has been modest due to a combination of political, diplomatic and economic calculations. In response to the August 2022 Pelosi-Tsai meeting, Beijing pledged to conduct live-fire military drills as soon as Pelosi arrived in Taipei and then fulfilled that pledge after she left, marking the largest live-fire drills around Taiwan in nearly 30 years. Prior to Pelosi's arrival in Taiwan, Beijing had also communicated through backchannels to Washington that it might impose a no-fly zone around Taiwan to stop the visit, though this did not happen. So far, China's response to the McCarthy meeting has been much tamer, with Beijing making no such explicit pledges of military action, although generic threats about ''severe consequences'' abounded. This more muted response is likely the result of several considerations on China's part, including:
The reduced symbolic threat posed to Chinese sovereignty. Beijing views a top foreign official visiting Taiwan (as Pelosi did over the summer) as a much greater affront to China's sovereignty — and thus more worthy of a greater response — compared with the Taiwanese president traveling abroad to meet with such an official (as Tsai recently did to sit down with McCarthy). This is also why it's more common for foreign governments to host Taiwanese delegations, which is less likely to trigger Chinese retaliation than the other way around. Tsai, for example, has visited the United States seven times (including the latest trip to California) since taking office in 2016.
The risk of straining China-EU ties. In addition, the McCarthy-Tsai meeting coincided with visits to China from French President Emmanuel Macron and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Beijing has been on a campaign to repair its diplomatic relations with Europe for at least the last six months in order to prevent the U.S. containment camp from gaining participants, and an aggressive military retaliation against Taiwan during the French and EU leaders' visits would have risked sullying those efforts. However, this also raises the potential of China waging a stronger response in the coming days now that Macron and von der Leyen have left.
The potential for political backlash in Taiwan. An aggressive military reaction to the McCarthy-Tsai meeting would also threaten China's political interests in Taiwan by potentially extending the reign of Tsai's more China-skeptic Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Taiwan will hold presidential and legislative elections in January 2024, where Beijing is hoping for a victory by the opposition (and comparatively more China-friendly) Kuomintang party. But any action that boosts the Taiwanese electorate's threat perception of China before then could sway the vote in favor of the DPP — a phenomenon China has already witnessed firsthand, with its heavy-handed crackdown on Hong Kong protesters in 2019, widely believed to have contributed to Tsai's reelection in January 2020.
Despite Beijing's prudence regarding the Tsai-McCarthy meeting, the strategies of China and the United States toward Taiwan will remain escalatory in nature, presenting frequent political crises in cross-strait relations, risks of maritime incidents, and roadblocks to improved U.S.-China economic ties for the foreseeable future. Since Tsai came to power in 2016, China's strategy toward Taiwan has gradually evolved from economic coercion to military coercion. The United States, for its part, has also attempted to change the status quo by pursuing greater unofficial diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Together, their actions will drive developments in Indo-Pacific security and China-U.S. economic ties in the coming years. China's latest inspection campaign against commercial vessels transiting the Taiwan Strait — combined with the Chinese military's aerial incursions across the strait's median line (which for decades has served as the de facto maritime border separating Taiwanese and Chinese waters) — raises the chance of a collision and subsequent military standoffs. Such incidents could cause political crises, with each side demanding myriad forms of redress, but are unlikely to escalate into a greater military conflict given both Taiwan and China's hesitance to unnecessarily invoke the high economic and human costs of war. High-level meetings between U.S. and Taiwanese officials will regularly present roadblocks to U.S.-China economic ties, with each visit deepening mutual distrust in the Sino-American relationship in the months leading up to and following the event, while solidifying the long-term perception that non-economic issues cannot be treated separately from the broader U.S.-China relationship. Beijing's military coercion of Taiwan will heighten Europe's threat perception of China as well, particularly regarding peace in the Indo-Pacific and supply chain stability for critical goods like Taiwan's world-class semiconductor chips. This will increase the likelihood of more European trade restrictions on China akin to the Netherlands' recent export ban on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment. But new trade deals between China and European countries, like French President Macron's recently signed aerospace and nuclear energy deals in Beijing, will still be possible. And China's relationship with the European Union, in particular, will likely remain deeply nuanced and sometimes contradictory, as the bloc consists of 27 member states and multiple supranational institutions with different strategies and interests regarding Beijing.
China's strategy toward Taiwan since Tsai was elected in 2016 has been to wield coercion to achieve political concessions in Taipei. From 2016 to 2019, Beijing deployed economic tools, like import restrictions and non-tariff barriers, against politically connected sectors of Taiwan's economy (e.g. agriculture), in an effort to erode the electoral support of Tsai and the DPP. But since Tsai's reelection in January 2020, Beijing has shifted to a strategy of military coercion — which has included growing aerial incursions into Taiwan's aerial defense identification zone, more naval deployments off of Taiwan's southeast and northeast coasts, and the live-fire drills in August 2022. Such actions are aimed at demonstrating China's willingness to militarily uphold its views on sovereignty over Taiwan in the hopes of convincing Taipei and Western capitals that supporting Taiwanese sovereignty is not worth risking war with China.
The United States, meanwhile, has slowly attempted to change the status quo in its relations with Taiwan over the past two years. Between Oct. 2021 and Sept. 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden claimed at least three times that the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion — a stance not supported by documents that codify Washington's unofficial ties with Taipei, like the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. And McCarthy and his predecessor Pelosi's recent meetings with Tsai show that, amid the current U.S. political environment of bipartisan opposition to China, short-tenured leaders in the House of Representatives are content to use diplomatic visits to gain electoral support, despite the White House's reservations about the escalatory nature of such visits.
While China could temporarily soften its position on Taiwan if the KMT wins the presidency, Beijing will continue to grow impatient with a lack of progress in cross-strait reunification and may still resort to military coercion. China's continued reliance on military coercion will support the DPP's dominance in Taiwanese politics, regardless of the outcome of the 2024 elections. This makes the prospects for improvement in cross-strait ties unlikely, especially as Chinese President Xi Jinping's position on the issue is becoming increasingly intolerant. If the KMT wins the election, U.S. representatives may have to settle for a slower pace of U.S.-Taiwan meetings, and China could temporarily soften its military coercive strategy against Taiwan. But even then, the KMT would have to conduct a balancing act between improving trade ties with Beijing and representing the views of increasingly sovereignty-conscious Taiwanese citizens. Thus, a KMT presidency might look more like the second term of former President Ma Ying-jeou (2012-2016), in which the cross-strait relationship was plagued by political gridlock and Beijing grew increasingly impatient at the lack of progress on peaceful reunification with Taiwan. Given Beijing's heightened willingness to use military coercion since 2020, such gridlock could eventually see Beijing again wield the military against a noncommittal KMT, even if this would happen on a less accelerated timeline than if the DPP stays in power.
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U.S. Navy conducts warship passage in South China Sea
Operation held days after McCarthy-Tsai meeting
BY BILL GERTZ THE WASHINGTON TIMES
A U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer sailed through a disputed area of the South China Sea on Monday, pushing back against territorial claims by China amid rising bilateral tensions, the Seventh Fleet said in a statement.
The destroyer USS Milius sailed near Mischief Reef, part of the Spratly Islands where China has built up several military bases and deployed missiles in recent years.
The warship made the “freedom of navigation operation” (FONOP) within 12 nautical miles of the reef and then continued operations nearby, Seventh Fleet spokesman Lt. Luka Bakic said, in a symbolic demonstration to uphold “the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea.”
The USS Milius, he added, “demonstrated that Mischief Reef, a low-tide elevation in its natural state, is not entitled to a territorial sea under international law.”
A Chinese military spokesman said the Milius “illegally trespassed” without Chinese government approval. Chinese military aircraft and warships tracked and monitored the Milius, said a spokesman for the PLA southern theater command.
“China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and their adjacent waters,” the spokesman said. “The troops of the PLA southern theater command will always stay on high alert and resolutely safeguard China’s national sovereignty and security, as well as peace and stability in the South China Sea.”
China’s People’s Liberation Army said in a statement the three-day exercises prove Beijing is prepared to do what it takes to back up China’s claims to sovereignty over Taiwan.
“The theater’s troops are ready to fight at all times and can fight at any time to resolutely smash any form of ‘Taiwan independence’ and foreign interference attempts,” the Chinese military statement said Monday.
The Navy claims that a submerged reef at high tide is not recognized as a maritime sovereign territory. China’s landreclamation efforts, installations and structures on Mischief Reef “do not change this characterization under international law,” Lt. Bakic said. Satellite photographs of Mischief Reef have shown whaappearrs to be cruise missile deployments as well as a long runway.
The latest FONOP came just as Chinese military forces ended large-scale wargames north of the sea near Taiwan, exercises that state media said simulated multi-directional Chinese military attacks on the island democracy and reflected Beijing’s anger over last week’s meeting between House Speaker Kevin McCarthy and Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen in California. Taiwan’s Defense Ministry, which monitored the Chinese exercises, said a total of 232 Chinese military aircraft and 32 military vessels were detected near Taiwan between Saturday and the end of the exercises on Monday.
During this period, 134 military aircraft crossed the median line down the 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait.
China has limited contacts with U.S. military counterparts as tensions have ramped up over Taiwan and other issues. A Pentagon spokesman said China continued to reject talks with senior U.S. defense and military leaders.
“While we will continue to maintain open channels of communication with the PRC, the PRC continues to decline requests for engagement with the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff,” Pentagon spokesman Chris Meagher told reporters Monday. “Lines between our militaries are particularly important in scenarios like this, and we call on Beijing to engage us in this channel.”
U.S. defense officials have said the planes crossing the media line were violating the fragile status quo between China and Taiwan that has kept the peace between the two rivals since Nationalist forces fled the mainland to Taiwan during a civil war in 1949.
Chinese state media described the exercises as “encirclement combat alert patrols” by PLA forces of the Eastern Theater Command, exercises that “pressured the island from all four directions” using an aircraft carrier, long-range rockets, warships and fighter jets and conventional missiles.
It was the second time the Chinese military conducted aggressive exercises near Taiwan in response to a meeting with a senior House leader. In August 2022, the Chinese conducted the largest military exercises in decades around Taiwan after then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan and met with Mrs. Tsai.
The Chinese exercises during the weekend practiced seizing control of sea, air and information domains using joint forces. Video posted on Chinese state media showed a graphic with the locations of medium- and short-range missile firings from China that landed in areas around Taiwan.
Actual rocket and missile launches also were shown in videos of the exercises.
The Chinese Communist Party-affiliated outlet Global Times stated that the aircraft carrier strike group led by the carrier Shandong and its jets “practiced assaults on fleeing hostile vessels and a maritime blockade while other forces conducted blockade and joint strike drills.”
Chinese units also practiced electronic warfare operations, including suppression of radar and anti-missile defenses on Taiwan.
• Ben Wolfgang contributed to this report.
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China Eyes Commercial Ships in a Move to Intimidate Taiwan
An ‘inspection’ flotilla could be the first step in a blockade of the island. The world needs to be ready.
By Elisabeth Braw
April 11, 2023 1:00 pm ET
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Kevin McCarthy and Tsai Ing-wen at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, Calif., April 5.
PHOTO: RINGO H.W. CHIU/ASSOCIATED PRESS
When House Speaker Kevin McCarthy and Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen met in California last week, Beijing expressed its displeasure. It did so by sending patrol vessels to the Taiwan Strait, where Chinese authorities said the vessels might conduct inspections. China could use such inspections to block this vital trade artery. Friendly navies should signal support for Taiwan’s navy. Governments should create an early-warning system for the shipping world, so vessels take alternate routes.
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“A fleet led by the advanced Haixun 06 patrol ship continued to carry out its patrol task in the central part of the Taiwan Straits on Thursday, the second day of its three-day special operation,” the state newspaper China Daily reported April 6. Beijing made clear that the flotilla, which arrived hours before Ms. Tsai met with Mr. McCarthy, might inspect cargo vessels traveling through the Strait.
The Taiwan Strait, the main passage for cargo moving between Southeast Asia and Japan, South Korea and Northern China, is one of the world’s busiest waterways, traversed every year by almost half the world’s container ships. Though the strait is 200 nautical miles wide, only a stretch of 15 miles is deep enough for modern ships. Beijing says it has “sovereignty and jurisdiction” over the strait, which Taiwan and countries including the U.S. consider international waters. Since 1955, coexistence has been possible thanks to the “median line” drawn through the waters by U.S. Air Force Gen. Benjamin Davis, which functions as an unofficial maritime border.
Taiwan instructed shipping lines not to comply with any inspections by the Haixun 06-led flotilla. “This is a virtual blockade,” said retired Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, a former director of operations at U.S. Pacific Command. “It’s a way for China to make shipping companies and insurers stay away from Taiwan.”
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This time, the fleet reportedly conducted no inspections—but next time it might. Inspections would wreak havoc on the 240 ships that travel through the strait on an average day. “Ten ships an hour in a 15-mile area means they could quickly back up if not carefully managed,” said Neil Roberts, secretary of the Joint War Committee, a maritime-insurance body that classifies risks. Through such maneuvers, China would be marking the Taiwan Strait as its exclusive economic zone and could create a blockade. The strait passage is essential not only for countries in the region but global supply chains, which depend on parts and assembly in Southeast Asia and Northern China.
“It will be a major issue if it escalates, and clearly the war market is keeping watch, but so far the status quo has been maintained,” said Simon Lockwood, a maritime expert with insurance broker Willis Towers Watson. “China may want full control of Taiwan, but it also needs maritime trade.” In 2021—the latest year for which data are available—merchant ships from around the world made 260,464 calls in Chinese ports. Shipping companies’ challenge, though, is that Xi Jinping may need clout more than maritime trade. The Chinese leader has shown he is willing to sacrifice economic success to strengthen his power and has clipped the wings of China’s most prominent tech firms. When Mr. Xi was elected to a third term last fall, shares of Chinese tech giants plunged.
If Ms. Tsai keeps meeting with foreign leaders, Mr. Xi could blockade Taiwan with inspection flotillas. Because it would be ship inspections, not a military assault, neither Taiwan nor its allies would be able to retaliate in a meaningful way. Because China also claims sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, countries including Vietnam and the Philippines (and the vast amounts of global shipping going to and from them) could risk similar disruption if Beijing feels aggrieved by their governments.
We should prepare for such a scenario. Weeks before acts that might rile Beijing, governments should alert the Joint War Committee and other maritime organizations so that ships can take alternate routes. But because Beijing wants to frighten the shipping industry—which transports 80% of the world’s trade—away from Taiwan, the first step is for friendly navies to signal their support of the island. “The U.S. Navy should conduct joint exercises with the Taiwanese Navy, and we could conduct them near ports,” Adm. Montgomery said. The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 2023 includes expanded U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation.
China further avenged Ms. Tsai’s meeting with Mr. McCarthy by conducting a simulated military attack on Taiwan. The U.S. military is used to defanging such threats through exercises; it is currently conducting a preplanned one with the Philippines in the South China Sea. But China has been able to sow fear of nonmilitary disruption because other countries have few plans to handle the resulting chaos. Together, governments and the shipping industry can blunt China’s inspection threats. And there would be no point sending an “inspection fleet” to the Taiwan Strait if it couldn’t carry out its mission.
Ms Braw is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and an adviser to Gallos Technologies.
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https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/warren-buffett-says-unusually-quick-002444050.html
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Worth noting!
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/opinion/wsj-opinion-the-republican-foreign-policy-threat-to-democracy/vi-AA19N5ed?ocid=winp1taskbar&cvid=83d7aa6ff4f7400c8d12937b96b30fe6&ei=12
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/opinion/wsj-opinion-the-republican-foreign-policy-threat-to-democracy/vi-AA19N5ed?ocid=winp1taskbar&cvid=83d7aa6ff4f7400c8d12937b96b30fe6&ei=12
WSJoke
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https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/3851350/china-preparing-for-war
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/war-would-bring-disaster-to-china-too-taiwan-presidential-contender-says/ar-AA19U1k3?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=ce954d47775e4afea13f88c710ee9096&ei=55
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https://dailycaller.com/2023/04/15/leaked-documents-pentagon-chinese-invasion-taiwan/?utm_medium=email&pnespid=7aN.UylCOPwa2KCdpjm3DciS4hmhV5hnNbS1wrBp8BpmI3SHrejFJVRTdX_UibPz456I6qnH
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/19581/china-taiwan-invasion-biden
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https://www.armstrongeconomics.com/world-news/war/china-v-taiwan-the-draft-begins/ (https://www.armstrongeconomics.com/world-news/war/china-v-taiwan-the-draft-begins/)
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https://www.foxnews.com/world/china-says-hopes-believes-germany-will-support-peaceful-reunification-taiwan?utm_source=piano&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=rundown&pnespid=7eZ2DydMPqQRxaSatGS7H83SoA_sTop_fbXlzrI39ABm4VdMshvdyYfjfO0oi80x_Ub_CRAR
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https://www.foxnews.com/world/china-says-hopes-believes-germany-will-support-peaceful-reunification-taiwan?utm_source=piano&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=rundown&pnespid=7eZ2DydMPqQRxaSatGS7H83SoA_sTop_fbXlzrI39ABm4VdMshvdyYfjfO0oi80x_Ub_CRAR
Well, China hasn't destroyed any of Germany's energy pipelines.
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Lawmakers’ Wargame Shows ‘Catastrophic’ Results in US-China Conflict
Lawmakers in a new House select committee on China (L-R) Rep. Jake Auchincloss (D-Mass.), Rep. Haley Stevens (D-Mich.), committee Chairman Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.), and Rep. Carlos Gimenez (R-Fla.) gather for a tabletop wargame exercise in the House Ways and Means Committee room in Washington on April 19, 2023. (Ellen Knickmeyer/AP Photo)
Andrew Thornebrooke
By Andrew Thornebrooke
April 24, 2023Updated: April 24, 2023
Lawmakers tasked with overseeing the United States’ strategic competition with China’s communist regime have conducted a wargame simulating a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and the U.S. response.
The House Select Committee on Strategic Competition with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) participated in the wargame, hosted by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) think tank on April 19.
“We’re going to explore what happens in the very grim scenario in which deterrence fails in the Indo-Pacific,” Select Committee Chair Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) said according to prepared remarks.
“This is not a possibility we wish to contemplate, but one we must.”
‘Sobering Lessons’
The wargame sought to examine the potential course of events that could take place should the CCP invade Taiwan in 2027, with the Select Committee members playing for the United States and CNAS experts playing for China.
Over two and a half hours, the wargame simulated high-level strategic and operational maneuvers from both sides, including diplomatic, economic, and military actions in which the U.S. side sought to counter the CCP invasion.
The game was ultimately cut short because of time constraints, but its conclusions nevertheless presented the Select Committee with a sobering reality: Resupplying Taiwan with arms and other critical supplies after a CCP blockade had been imposed was not possible.
Likewise, without additional basing options with regional allies, the U.S. side risked immense casualties and its stockpiles of long-range missiles being depleted in short order.
Therefore, Gallagher said that the only solution was to arm Taiwan “to the teeth” now, or allow for CCP conquest later.
“We recognize the paradox of deterrence: that to achieve peace, sometimes you must prepare for conflict,” Gallagher said.
“I know the members of this committee will dig into the lessons we can learn from what may be some sobering outcomes of this game.”
China-US War ‘Catastrophic for Humanity’
Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.), who also participated in the wargame, said that the experiment allowed the Select Committee to come to better grips with just how devastating a war between the world’s two largest economies would be.
“The overall lesson is that a war with China would be devastating and catastrophic for humanity,” Khanna said during an interview with NBC.
“There is no winner in this.”
Khanna noted that, in the wargame, the United States and China do not have open lines of communication, leading to increased escalations. This reflects the fact that the U.S. and China do not engage in virtually any of the protocols used by the United States and Soviet Union to manage crises during the first Cold War.
Likewise, for every consequence the United States was willing to impose on China in the game, the CCP regime had its own response prepared.
In response to being booted from the SWIFT international banking system, for example, the Chinese side cut the United States off from all Chinese battery technology, used in everything from iPhones to electric vehicles.
“They’re factoring in all of the economic consequences,” Khanna said, adding that the CNAS team did well in accurately portraying CCP decision-making.
CCP Preparing for War
The CCP claims that Taiwan is a part of China that must be united with its rule by any means necessary. CCP leader Xi Jinping has ordered the military wing of the party to achieve the capability to invade and conquer Taiwan by 2027.
That fact, Gallagher said, was reason enough for Congress to begin more seriously contending with the devastating scenario.
“Xi Jinping is not shy about sharing his intentions to take Taiwan—through political warfare if possible, through actual warfare if necessary,” Gallagher said.
“The People’s Liberation Army has been preparing for a Taiwan invasion for decades. The PLA rocket force and PLA Navy are purpose-built for cross-strait battle and for denying regional access to Taiwan’s friends.”
To that end, Gallagher said that the only way to deter a CCP invasion of the island was to arm Taiwan and take other, decisive actions to mitigate the CCP’s ability to wage war.
“We seek peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and the continuation of a relationship that has enabled both Taiwan and China to grow their economies and integrate their societies with the world through high-tech commerce.”
“Deterring war is the only path to peace and stability, and it is incumbent upon elected officials to take decisive action to do so before it’s too late,” Gallagher said.
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https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/03/lower-rhetoric-china-says-milley/384693/
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pre Biden $
Post Biden $ $ => ¥
oh yes , "we're back "
what a joke ...
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April 28, 2023
China's military just deployed a few drones to harass Taiwan, along with the more typical ensemble of jets and navy ships flying and sailing close to the self-governing island that Beijing's leaders claim as their own.
More than three dozen Chinese aircraft buzzed the island as the sun rose Friday in what the Wall Street Journal calls "biggest deployment since China sent 91 aircraft and a dozen vessels to greet Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen the day after her return from a visit to the U.S. this month."
One of the drones flew around the island, while the other went halfway before doubling back, according to maps provided by Taiwan's military and shared on Twitter. For the record, Chinese combat drone flights near Taiwan have happened at least 16 times this calendar year—out of nearly 112 air and naval harassment operations Beijing has carried out since January; its reconnaissance drone flights near Taiwan have occurred 32 separate times over that same period.
For a sense of how perpetual the harassment is: Chinese aircraft and ships have flown or sailed close to Taiwan on all but six of 118 days this year, according to Taiwan's military. (Beijing took two days off in April, three in March, and one in February.)
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Half of the 38 aircraft deployed Friday "crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait or entered Taiwan's southwest, southeast, and northeast ADIZ," or air defense identification zone, which extends beyond a country's borders for national security alerts, but remains legally international airspace, Taipei's defense ministry said.
Bigger picture: "Two years ago, it would have been a major political event if any Chinese warplane crossed the median line," but now it happens almost every day, which shows China is "chipping away at [international] norms bit by bit," Wen-ti Sung, a political scientist at Australian National University, told the Journal.
Also: The U.S. Navy sent a sub-hunting P-8A Poseidon aircraft through the Taiwan Strait on Friday. "The aircraft's transit of the Taiwan Strait demonstrates the United States' commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific," the Navy's Japan-based Seventh Fleet said in a statement, and emphasized, "By operating within the Taiwan Strait in accordance with international law, the United States upholds the navigational rights and freedoms of all nations."
Another thing: The U.S. and Philippine militaries witnessed some of the limits of HIMARS long-range artillery use in a naval environment this week during joint drills in the South China Sea. The U.S. tried to sink a ship 12 miles away using half a dozen HIMARS rounds, but the artillery missed on all six attempts. The practice ship eventually sank after F-16 jets, A-130U gunships, and F-35 jet fighters all targeted it, the Journal reported separately on Wednesday from the Philippines.
One reason it matters: The CEO of HIMARS-maker Lockheed Martin said in March that several unnamed countries in the Pacific have shown interest in acquiring the U.S.-made artillery system after its performance in Ukraine striking Russian ammo depots in occupied territory over the summer.
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https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/05/blame-global-demand-parts-shortages-taiwans-tardy-f-16s-us-says/386134/
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Seems to me like several passages here get cause and effect reversed. Nonetheless, plenty of interesting info.
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The Evolving Taiwan-China Relationship, Part 4: Diplomatic Relations
May 19, 2023 | 17:17 GMT
Then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (center left) walks alongside Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen after arriving at the president's office in Taipei on Aug. 3, 2022.
Then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (center left) walks alongside Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen after arriving at the president's office in Taipei on Aug. 3, 2022.
(Chien Chih-Hung/Office of The President via Getty Images)
Editor's Note: This assessment is the fourth and final part in a series exploring China-Taiwan relations through the lens of economics, politics, military affairs and diplomatic relations.
Taiwan's shifting diplomatic ties hold great potential to accelerate China's military and economic coercive efforts and catalyze the decoupling of global supply chains, though they're unlikely to spur a Chinese invasion any time soon. Over the past five decades, most countries have switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, partly in order to gain access to the Chinese market (which Beijing still predicates on diplomatic non-recognition of Taipei). Now, only 13 small nations in the Pacific Islands, the Caribbean and Latin America formally recognize Taiwan, and even these relations are under threat. Taiwan has also been excluded from participation in most international institutions, including the World Health Assembly (WHA). But in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the West appears to be reconsidering the value of preventing revanchist military aggression against smaller nations, especially those that are strategically located like Taiwan. The trade disruptions caused by the ongoing war in Ukraine have also renewed the United States and its allies' focus on bolstering supply chain resilience, even if it means putting them on an economic collision course with China. This has resulted in growing political support for Taiwan from the United States, Japan and, to a lesser extent, Europe.
Many Western legislators have expressly stated that "Taiwan is the next Ukraine" and have thus called for a reexamination of ties with China, as happened for Europe's ties with Russia in the wake of last year's Ukraine invasion. However, in countries that are deeply dependent on Chinese trade, many leaders (including German Chancellor Olaf Scholz) and business lobbies have expressed concerns about a hasty reorientation away from the Asian superpower.
In the developed world, there is growing momentum to pass policies focused on supply chain security, which may include reducing trade reliance on China. For advanced economies, the strategic importance of Taiwan's independence is also becoming more apparent due to the sheer volume of global trade (particularly of high-end semiconductors) that flows from and around the island and the wide-scale destruction of a would-be Chinese invasion. Nonetheless, most governments remain mum about their willingness to support Taipei militarily in such a scenario.
The U.S. relationship with Taiwan has for decades been based on a gentleman's agreement to protect Taiwan from Chinese aggression, and this relationship has frequently stirred U.S.-China tensions. Taiwan's diplomatic relationship with its most important partner, the United States, has been complicated since Kuomintang (KMT) forces first administered the island in 1945. Washington and Taipei signed a Mutual Defense Treaty in 1955, after China's attempted aggression against Taiwan during the Korean War. But starting with U.S. President Nixon's visit to China in 1972, Washington aimed to improve relations with China to counter the Soviet Union amid the Cold War. In January 1979, the United States officially recognized the People's Republic of China as the sole government of China, including Taiwan. But driven by concerns for Taiwan's security, Congress simultaneously passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), a framework for U.S.-Taiwan unofficial relations to this day. The TRA establishes de facto embassies and pledges that Washington will provide Taiwan with the means necessary (including arms) to defend itself and maintain the capacity of the U.S. military to protect the people of Taiwan. But the TRA critically does not promise that the United States will defend Taiwan in the event of war with China. Though the United States pledged to China it would not officially recognize Taiwan, Washington liberally interprets the scope of its ties with Taiwan, while Beijing interprets them more rigidly, and this difference of opinion has prompted cross-strait action in the past.
In recent years, the United States has expanded its informal legislative, military and trade ties with Taiwan, which has been the primary external driver of China's latest military activity against Taiwan. The United States has begun to send stronger signals about its commitment to Taiwan as its threat perception of China has grown alongside Beijing's expanding military brinkmanship in the Indo-Pacific maritime space. Perhaps most notably, the last two U.S. House Speakers have met with Taiwan's leader: Kevin McCarthy sat down with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen in April 2023, as did his predecessor Nancy Pelosi in August 2022. While domestic political jockeying partly drove these meetings, both McCarthy and Pelosi affirmed their support for democracy and peace in the Indo-Pacific in their discussions with Tsai. In addition, between October 2021 and September 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden contradicted U.S. commitments in the TRA on three separate occasions by saying the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. Each time, his words prompting diplomatic protests from Beijing and clarifications from the White House that the U.S. position on Taiwan hadn't changed. On November 2022 and January 2023, Washington and Taipei also held rounds of negotiations to discuss a potential trade agreement, with a preliminary agreement expected to be signed in the coming weeks. Furthermore, on May 9, the U.S. State Department for the first time since 1994 did not add the caveat "where statehood is not a requirement" in its annual announcement pushing for Taiwan's participation in international institutions. These expanding U.S. interactions, particularly the legislative component, are the main external driver of China's recent uptick in military coercion against Taiwan, along with internal drivers like Beijing’s growing impatience with the lack of political reunification negotiations with the government in Taipei.
Since 2020, in response to Tsai's presidency and U.S. interactions with Taiwan, China has swapped out economic coercion for military coercion as its primary tool for political leverage against Taiwan. The primary goal of this strategy is to send a message to Taipei, Washington and the developed world at large that China's military power in the strait reigns supreme, and that supporting Taiwan's continued de facto independence and growing diplomatic engagement with the world is not worth sparking a global war. This military coercion has taken the form of increasingly frequent and high-tech aerial and naval incursions into Taiwan's air defense identification zone (ADIZ), as well as occasional live-fire drills around the island. The Chinese military Aug. 2022 live-fire drills also constituted a de facto (if partial) two-week blockade against Taiwan, following Pelosi's trip to Taipei.
Following the United States, Taiwan's next most important relationship is with Japan, mainly due to the two countries' shared history. But Japan has traditionally tried to avoid interactions with Taiwan that would provoke a response from China. Though Taiwan was a Japanese colony between 1895 and 1945, Japan's legacy in the country is not as controversial as in other Southeast and East Asian countries (such as Korea) and Taiwan-Japan relations are exceptionally good. Though their occupation was far from controversy-free, the Japanese colonizers built highways and railways and established a modern school system, and to this day Japanese culture holds a large sway in Taiwan, including in the architectural, culinary and fashion realms. After the U.N. General Assembly passed a motion to recognize China instead of Taiwan on the world stage in 1972, Japan established diplomatic ties with China, partly because China offered to renounce its demand for World War II reparations from Japan. This involved claiming Taiwan was a part of China, but Tokyo has since maintained informal relations with Taipei, primarily through economic and cultural exchanges. Like most countries, however, Japan's trade with Taiwan is limited by a lack of a free trade agreement. This is because Beijing has for decades wielded market access to China as a sword of Damocles that hangs over any country considering negotiating trade and security pacts directly with Taiwan. Japan has had little in the way of an outward-facing military in the last 75 years and thus has not wielded its military to prevent China from aggressing against Taiwan, unlike the United States. The Japanese government has been careful to minimize tensions with China over Taiwan, as seen following the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, when Tokyo explicitly thanked every nation that supported the disaster relief and recovery efforts, except for Taiwan, despite Taiwan being the top donor of earthquake aid. Due to this low-profile approach, Japan-Taiwan relations have not been a major driver of Beijing's coercive efforts against Taiwan.
Japan, however, has begun slowly shifting away from its low-profile approach to Taiwan, raising the prospect that Tokyo could spur more Chinese military coercion against Taiwan, as well as provoke legal retaliation against Japanese companies and citizens. Japan's increasing wariness of China's assertive maritime presence around Taiwan and in the East China Sea has recently seen Tokyo's legislative engagement, rhetoric and military stance on cross-strait tensions become more overtly pro-Taipei. Over the past few years, Japan has committed itself to rebuilding its army and becoming a military power in its own right in the Western Pacific, rather than just a staging ground for U.S. troops. Current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has pitched this military normalization as necessary amid changing security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, including North Korea's nuclear expansion and China's threats toward Taiwan. Kishida on May 5 claimed that ''stability in the Taiwan Strait is critical not only for Japan's security, but also for the stability of international society'' and that Japan's fellow Group of 7 (G-7) nations must ''never tolerate a unilateral attempt to change the status quo by the use of force in the Indo-Pacific.'' In addition, on Dec. 10, the chairperson of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party's Policy Research Council met with Tsai in Taipei, the highest level Japan-Taiwan diplomatic meeting since 2003. If Tokyo expands the scope of its diplomatic interactions with Taiwan (e.g. with a Pelosi-level visit), takes its rhetoric about the importance of Taiwan to more global fora, and/or expands its economic or military cooperation with Taipei, China may wield military coercive tools against Taiwan (akin to the live-fire drills it conducted in August and April). Beijing could also target more Japanese firms or individuals with fines, import restrictions, or arbitrary detentions.
Europe's informal engagement with Taiwan is also growing, but is less likely to prompt Chinese military action around Taiwan. Though not as dynamic as U.S. and Japanese relations with Taiwan, other nations, particularly in Europe, are slowly changing their approach toward the island nation, mainly via high-level rhetoric and legislative visits, and by establishing new diplomatic missions. These moves are driven by a desire to deter China (which European countries increasingly see as a military threat), as well as a growing recognition that a Chinese invasion could jeopardize global supply chains, given around half of the world's container fleet and 88% of the world's largest container ships sailed through the Taiwan Strait in 2022. But while parliamentary leaders of some smaller nations (like the Czech Republic) have visited Taiwan, the larger, more powerful nations in Europe — namely, Germany, France and the United Kingdom — have refrained from replicating U.S. high-level legislative visits and have not suggested significant changes to their trade or defense ties with Taiwan. In China's eyes, Europe's informal attempts to move closer to Taiwan are thus not as escalatory as those of the United States or Japan, and are in turn less likely to trigger a forceful response from Beijing.
Many European leaders have warned China against using force against Taiwan in recent years, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen doing so just last month. European parliamentary delegations continue to visit Taiwan, including delegations from the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic in November and February, respectively.
In November 2021, Lithuania established a Taiwan (not ''Taipei'') Representative Office in Vilnius. In response, China silently slashed trade with Lithuania by 80% over 2022, which also impacted shipments from other European nations en route to China via Lithuania. The European Union is now suing China through the WTO for this move.
As foreign ties with Taiwan deepen, Beijing will similarly expand its tools for coercion, including demonstrations of force and expanding economic channels of retaliation, with a number of events in the coming years serving as likely triggers of Beijing's retaliation. The most obvious of China's retaliatory methods include incursions into Taiwan's ADIZ — including more platforms and new geographical areas — and occasional demonstrations (if not full use) of its blockade capabilities. So far, Beijing has largely avoided retaliating against Western companies operating in Taiwan and China in an attempt to preserve China's business environment. But if increased military coercion fails to deter countries from further deepening ties with Taiwan, China may start to target Western firms doing business in Taiwan and China via fines, court cases, visa revocations and exit bans. There are a number of diplomatic triggers that could prompt Beijing to take such escalatory steps, including: more high-level diplomatic meetings with Taiwan's leaders; expanded U.S. military involvement with Taiwan (including training and arms sales); the election of a Republican president in the United States in November 2024; a formal trade agreement between Taiwan and the United States or Canada; and more explicit commitments to defend Taiwan by Washington or other capitals (e.g. Tokyo).
The outcome of Taiwan's January 2024 presidential election could act as a catalyst or an inhibitor for China's retaliations to Taiwan's diplomatic interactions. If the pro-sovereignty Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) wins, the severity of China's responses to foreign interactions with Taipei will grow and Beijing's threshold for retaliation will decrease. Conversely, a win by the opposition KMT would decrease China's reactivity and the severity of its responses. A win by the third-party Taiwan People's Party (TPP), however, would be uncharted territory for China, and so Beijing would likely act with restraint early on to test the new administration, but could turn to military and economic coercion if the TPP's stance toward diplomatic interactions begins to resemble the ruling DPP's.
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https://themessenger.com/news/the-u-s-is-preparing-evacuation-plans-for-american-citizens-in-taiwan-exclusive
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EXCLUSIVE: Republican Letter Asks Blinken to Visit Taiwan En Route to China
Andrew Thornebrooke
By Andrew Thornebrooke
June 16, 2023Updated: June 16, 2023
A group of Republican lawmakers is urging Secretary of State Antony Blinken to visit Taiwan as he travels to communist China.
The lawmakers, led by Rep. Tom Tiffany (R-Wis.), say that the stopover is necessary to demonstrate that China’s communist regime cannot dictate the terms of U.S. alliances and partnerships, according to a copy of the letter obtained by The Epoch Times.
“As you prepare for your trip to the People’s Republic of China, we are writing to once again request that you consider adding a stopover in Taiwan to your itinerary,” the letter says.
“It would send a clear message that the United States does not need a permission slip from the Chinese Communist Party to meet with our friends and allies in Taiwan—or anywhere else.”
The letter, which was also signed by Republican lawmakers Buddy Carter (Ga.), Dan Crenshaw (Texas), Byron Donalds (Fla.), Nancy Mace (S.C.), Andy Ogles (Tenn.), and Scott Perry (Penn.), further encourages Blinken to assuage both Taiwanese and American concerns about delays in shipments of weapons to the island.
Taiwan Key to US Security in Indo-Pacific
Asked about the letter, Tiffany said the Biden administration needed to increase engagement with Taiwan or else risk damaging vital U.S. interests in favor of appeasing China without apparent benefit.
“Taiwan is a key U.S. economic and security partner in the region,” Tiffany told The Epoch Times.
“Avoiding high-level coordination and communication to try and appease Beijing doesn’t reduce tensions in the region, it only encourages more Chinese bullying and brinksmanship.”
The issue of U.S. communications with Taiwan has been a sticking point in Sino-American relations since then-President Richard Nixon first visited China in 1972.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which rules China as a single-party state, claims democratic Taiwan is part of its territory. The regime has never controlled any part of Taiwan, but CCP officials have nevertheless vowed to start a war to ensure the island’s de facto independence is not recognized internationally.
Since 1979, the United States has maintained an uncomfortable balance in its relations with China and Taiwan.
On the one hand, the United States formally recognizes but does not endorse the CCP’s claims to Taiwan. As such, it does not maintain formal ties with the island government, though it does have deep economic ties there.
On the other hand, the United States does maintain legal obligations to sell Taiwan the weapons it needs to defend its de facto independence from CCP aggression. Washington also maintains agreements with Beijing that neither side shall attempt to unilaterally change this status quo.
Despite the lack of formal ties, the United States and Taiwan have enjoyed robust informal dialogues for decades. Tiffany believes the Biden administration is overly eager to appease the CCP by slowing down such informal ties.
“It has been U.S. policy for many years to encourage and facilitate meetings between senior U.S. officials and their counterparts in Taiwan,” Tiffany said.
“By ignoring that policy and operating under outdated, self-imposed restrictions, the Biden administration is allowing the CCP to dictate who American leaders can and can’t talk to, and that is wrong.”
The letter also encourages Blinken to visit Taiwan to assuage any unease arising from U.S. failures to deliver weapons systems that the island has purchased.
There is currently a $14 billion backlog of weapons systems that Taiwan has purchased from the United States but has still not received. Some of those orders go as far back as 2019.
For Tiffany, a Blinken stopover in Taiwan would greatly ease Taipei’s worries and could go a long way in creating transparency for Taiwanese and American officials regarding what the Biden administration is doing to solve the problem.
“Taiwan has demonstrated an enduring commitment to their own national defense through regular arms purchases, so when the deliveries of those systems are delayed, that’s deeply concerning,” Tiffany said.
“Policymakers on both sides of the Pacific deserve a clear explanation about what is holding up these transfers, and what the Biden administration is doing to solve the problem.”
Epoch Times Photo
L-R) Then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi participates in a ceremonial swearing-in with new Rep. Tom Tiffany (R-Wis.), with wife Christine, at the U.S. Capitol in Washington on May 19, 2020. (Drew Angerer/Getty Images)
Blinken Trip ‘Counterproductive and Dangerous’
Blinken is currently scheduled to meet with senior Chinese officials during a series of talks in Beijing on June 18 and 19. He will seek to reestablish regular communications between the United States and the CCP regime.
The visit is part of a larger effort by the Biden administration to erect guardrails around the two powers’ increasingly bitter competition, according to State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller.
“Intense competition requires intense and tough diplomacy to ensure that competition does not veer into confrontation or conflict, and that’s what we intend for this visit,” Miller said during a June 14 press briefing.
Miller added that Blinken would seek to achieve three broad objectives in Beijing: reestablishing normal communications, championing U.S. values and interests, and identifying potential avenues for mutual cooperation.
The visit comes during a CCP-imposed blackout of military-to-military communications between the two powers, which U.S. officials say risks a catastrophic miscalculation that could lead to conflict.
Some in Congress, like Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), believe that the Blinken trip could do well in resetting those lines of communication and easing tensions.
“I hope that we can create some level of communication, particularly on the defense side, so that we can deconflict,” Menendez told The Epoch Times.
“Right now, the Chinese military leadership is unwilling to engage with ours, and that’s a problem, especially with the risky behavior that they’ve taken.”
Many in Congress, however, consider the administration’s push for talks without preconditions to be ill-advised, particularly given the rise in CCP military aggression in the region and the regime’s continued campaign of spying and repression against ethnic Chinese living in the United States.
Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.), who chairs the bipartisan Select Committee on the CCP, is among them.
“The attempts by the administration to revive engagement after it’s failed for 20 years, I just don’t know what that achieves other than to force us to slow walk certain defensive actions,” Gallagher told NTD, a sister media outlet of The Epoch Times.
“My view is [Blinken] shouldn’t be going right now, particularly in light of the revelations we saw last week about a CCP investment in Cuba for a massive spying station right in our own neighborhood.”
To that end, Gallagher said the Blinken-China visit would not do anything to meaningfully help the United States in its competition with China and could even set U.S. security back.
“Time and time again, engagement, particularly engagement just for the sake of engagement, has undermined the urgency we need to actually win the competition,” Gallagher said.
“The fact that the Biden administration is revising diplomatic and economic engagement as a core pillar of our grand strategy, I think, is counterproductive and dangerous.”
Others in Congress view the trip as a wasted opportunity. Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.), for example, told The Epoch Times that Blinken’s visit had great potential but would likely amount to nothing more than the administration “kowtowing to China.”
“I hope that what [Blinken] accomplishes is he goes over there and tells them that the trade deficit is unacceptable. We’re not going to allow them to cheat anymore on trade, we’re not gonna allow them to steal our jobs, and we’re gonna get that deficit down to zero,” Hawley said.
“But that’s not what he’s going to do. He’s going to go over there and beg and grovel.”
A State Department official declined to comment on the letter, saying the department does not comment on Congressional correspondence.”
Jackson Richman and Melina Wisecup contributed to this report.
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My Plan to Preserve Peace in the Taiwan Strait
As Beijing ratchets up military and economic tensions, we can never take our democracy for granted.
By Lai Ching-te
July 4, 2023 3:39 pm ET
My defining moment came as China’s military adventurism disrupted commercial shipping to Taiwan and threatened our shores with live fire exercises and missiles. I decided I had a duty to participate in Taiwan’s democracy and help protect this fledgling experiment from those who wished it harm.
That was 27 years ago.
I was a doctor at National Cheng Kung University Hospital when news broke of the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. This was during the runup to a presidential race, the first free election after decades of martial law during which activists had fought for democracy and freedom. Beijing wanted to send a message to those who supported Taiwan’s democratic reforms, preferring candidates more receptive to their authoritarian tendencies.
Thankfully, those candidates lost by a landslide. Our democracy has since flourished, but history has a way of repeating itself. After hanging up my white coat, I served in successive roles as an elected official—premier, vice president and now presidential candidate. I find myself in the same position as my predecessors. Consequently, my commitment to defending peace, our democratic achievements and the cross-strait status quo is stronger than ever.
A lot is at stake. President Xi Jinping has quashed dissent in Hong Kong, established “re-education” centers in Xinjiang, fomented conflict in the South China Sea, and stepped up military adventurism across the Taiwan Strait.
It’s unsurprising that in recent years there has been an outpouring of global support for peace in the Taiwan Strait. The invasion of Ukraine and growing strains of authoritarianism around the world have awakened the international community to the fragility of democracy. It can wither and die without proper care and attention.
Care must start at home. As a doctor, I never left patients without a treatment plan. As president, I will implement a four-pillar plan for peace that is clear-eyed about the challenges we face and ensures continued stability in the region.
First, we must build up Taiwan’s deterrence. Defense is the bedrock of our national security. Under President Tsai Ing-wen, we have increased defense budgets, reformed conscription and the reserve system, and supported new practices and capabilities within our military. These measures reduce the risk of armed conflict by raising the stakes and costs for Beijing. I will also expedite our transition into an asymmetric fighting force, focusing on cost-effective and mobile capabilities. I will seek greater cooperation with partners and allies, particularly in training, force restructuring, civil defense and information sharing.
Second, economic security is national security. In the years since democratization, Taiwan has become a high-tech powerhouse. As a former mayor of Tainan, I am proud to see semiconductors made both in the city and around Taiwan driving the next generation of technology. As premier, I spearheaded efforts to increase salaries, cut taxes and attract new investment.
Our economic achievements, however, have brought both opportunity and challenge. Trade dependencies toward China have created vulnerabilities that can be exploited through economic coercion. We must foster secure supply chains while pursuing trade agreements that encourage trade diversification. I will support innovative indigenous industries, cut unnecessary regulation, and strive to ensure that the fruits of economic growth are more evenly enjoyed.
The third pillar is based on forming partnerships with democracies around the world. This year Taiwan sent the first medical team from Asia to Ukraine, assisting war-wounded personnel and residents. Record numbers of parliamentarians, nongovernmental organizations, think tanks and official delegations have visited Taiwan, showing that despite Communist Party pressure, we do not stand alone.
The fourth pillar is steady and principled cross-strait leadership. In recent years, China has cut off exchanges in line with its insistence on the “1992 consensus” and the “one China” framework that Mr. Xi himself has called a road map for unification. Military tensions are rising, fueled by coercive People’s Liberation Army actions against Taiwan, Japan and our neighbors in the South China Sea.
Despite increased military and economic challenges, my top priorities remain pragmatism and consistency. I will support the cross-strait status quo—which is in the best interests of both the Republic of China, as Taiwan is formally known, and the international community. I will never rule out the possibility of dialogue without preconditions, based on the principles of reciprocity and dignity.
Much has changed since 1996, yet much remains the same. People’s Liberation Army fighter jets and naval vessels continue to move around Taiwan in a bid to influence our democratic elections. Economic tensions persist. We are reminded daily that we can never take our freedom and democracy for granted. But my commitment is as clear today as it was 27 years ago: I will always work toward peace and stability for the people of Taiwan and the international community.
Mr. Lai is vice president of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Democratic Progressive Party’s candidate for the 2024 presidential election
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/world/analysis-another-milk-tea-alliance-as-india-taiwan-deepen-ties-in-face-of-china-threat-5414134?utm_source=China&src_src=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2023-07-26&src_cmp=uschina-2023-07-26&utm_medium=email
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FRIDAY, JULY 28, 2023
7/28/2023 5:33:00 AMShare This Episode
Taiwan Is Key to Xi’s Chinese Dream
A.M. Edition for July 28. The second in our four-part series on China: “The State of Xi’s Chinese Dream.” Wall Street Journal deputy China bureau chief Josh Chin and reporter Joyu Wang trace the rapid growth of China’s military under Xi Jinping and how officials in Taipei and Washington are preparing for the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Plus, Donald Trump is indicted on more charges in the classified documents probe. And the Bank of Japan jolts markets after hinting it would tolerate higher interest rates. Luke Vargas hosts.
FULL TRANSCRIPT
This transcript was prepared by a transcription service. This version may not be in its final form and may be updated.
Luke Vargas: Trump is indicted on more charges in the classified documents probe, plus the Bank of Japan jolts markets after hinting it would tolerate higher interest rates, and our look at how far China is willing to go to retake Taiwan.
Josh Chin: It's one of the central contradictions of the China dream. Xi wants China to be seen as a responsible and respected global power, but he also wants China to be whole. And if you were to launch military action against Taiwan, he may or may not succeed on the first goal.
Luke Vargas: It's Friday, July 28th. I'm Luke Vargas for the Wall Street Journal, and here is the AM edition of What's News, the top headlines and business stories moving your world today. Donald Trump has been indicted on additional charges related to his handling of classified documents, including that he ordered a worker at his Mar-a-Lago resort to delete camera footage so that it couldn't be turned over to a grand jury. The additional charges from special counsel Jack Smith broadened an indictment that was brought by a Florida grand jury in June and come as Trump braces for separate federal charges over efforts to undo his 2020 election loss. A Trump spokesman described Smith as leading a witch hunt and called the new indictment part of a Department of Justice campaign to harass the former president. A spokesman for Smith declined to comment. The Democratic-led Senate has passed an $866 billion defense bill with broad bipartisan support. That puts the legislation on a collision course with the Republican controlled house, which narrowly voted earlier this month to add provisions to the bill restricting abortion access and transgender healthcare for troops. The Senate's National Defense Authorization Act for 2024 does share some central similarities with the House passed version; however, senators largely sidestepped the social issues that polarized the house a few weeks earlier. A surprise announcement by the Bank of Japan has roiled markets and sent treasury yields surging. The bank this morning said it would keep interest rates unchanged, but in a market shift to the BOJ's longstanding ultra loose monetary policy, new governor Kazuo Ueda said it would take a more flexible approach to yield curve control. And here to explain what that means is Wall Street Journal deputy finance editor, Quentin Webb. Quentin, what does yield curve control entail and what is the BOJ actually changing here?
Josh Chin: Hi there. So yield curve control entails controlling longer dated borrowing costs by keeping the 10-year yield of the equivalent of the treasury in a range. Until recently, the Bank of Japan has kept that in a range of up to 0.5%. And what the Bank of Japan has done now is said, actually while it retains that top level as a guideline, it won't buy bonds until they hit 1%. So effectively, it's gently raised the cap towards 1%, if you like, which represents a tightening of monetary policy in a country that has long been notable for its ultra loose policy.
Luke Vargas: That in some ways sounds like an incremental move, Quentin, and yet it's led to a pretty significant market reaction today. Why is that?
Quentin Webb: Part of the thinking here from investors is that as Japan allows yields to rise a bit further, you might see some of the huge holdings of foreign stocks and bonds that Japanese investors have being liquidated and some of that money repatriates to Japan. Don't forget that Japan holds more than a trillion dollars of US treasuries for instance. Many investors have funded international investments by borrowing in yen in what's called the carry trade. So they borrowed cheaply in yen and used the proceeds to invest overseas. So we may see some of that unwinding as well. The other part of the thinking is that this could be the first of several steps to normalize policy in Japan, not least because actually after many years of subpar inflation or outright deflation, in fact as well, Japan is finally seeing some signs that inflation is running at or above targets. So maybe in the medium term, Tokyo will shift towards more normal monetary policy.
Luke Vargas: That was Wall Street Journal Deputy Finance editor, Quentin Webb. Quentin, thanks.
Quentin Webb: Thanks a lot.
Luke Vargas: In the US, three crucial data points this morning are set to shed light on the state of the economy. That would be consumer spending figures, the Fed's preferred gauge for inflation and the employment cost index. And Journal reporter Amara Omeokwe says that last measure of what employers are spending to pay workers' wages and benefits is particularly important for the Fed.
Amara Omeokwe: Economists are expecting a slight slowdown in that index when looking at the second quarter compared with the first quarter. Now, wage growth has been slowing this year, but it is still pretty robust and that is something the Federal Reserve is watching closely because the labor market has been really tight. And so what the Fed is looking for is for that wage growth to kind of slow down as an indication that the labor market itself is slowing down because taken together, a slowdown in the labor market and a slowdown in wage growth would indicate to the Federal Reserve that inflation overall is also easing.
Luke Vargas: Meanwhile, it is a big day for oil companies with ExxonMobil and Chevron set to report second quarter results. And reporter Jenny Strasberg told me that Shell's results yesterday in which the company saw shrinking profits but still announced $3 billion in share buybacks could preview what's to come.
Jenny Strasberg: Exxon has already said that they expect some of the same factors to hit them. Weaker gas prices, lower refining margins, they said would eat about 4 billion off their earnings. Chevron already pre-announced its top line of 6 billion in profit. We're talking about roughly 50% decline from the peaks of record profits last year. So investors are watching to see whether the weaker environment is going to crater any of their pledges around share buybacks in dividends. Investors are still demanding a lot of cash looking for the companies to be very thrifty on their spending, and that is a theme across the industry.
Luke Vargas: In other earnings, Ford has delivered healthy Q2 profits, but is warning of delays to its EV production. The company earlier forecast yearly EV losses of $3 billion, but up that to four and a half billion yesterday amid stiff price competition. And Intel has returned to profitability after two quarters of record losses thanks to a PC rebound that's lifting chip demand. Analysts have been expecting another loss. Coming up, China's Xi Jinping has expanded the power of China's military, but will he risk damaging the country's reputation and potentially sparking a world war in his ambition to retake Taiwan? That's after the break. For the next three weeks, we are taking an in-depth look at China and how Xi Jinping's dream of transforming the country into a global superpower is progressing. This special series has already looked at how slowing economic growth figures into Xi's plans, and this week we're pivoting to geopolitics to look at how a decades long quest to expand the power of China's military is unfolding and how it's leading Xi's attention to focus on Taiwan. And here to do that, I'm joined now by the Journal's deputy China bureau chief, Josh Chin, as well as by reporter Joyu Wong, who's based in Taipei. Josh, we heard last week about how economic growth sits squarely within Xi's Chinese dream, whereas where military prowess fits within his plans as I sense less well understood. How does Xi see the importance of China's military?
Josh Chin: Right. Well, one of the first things Xi Jinping did after taking power in 2012 was order China's military, the People's Liberation Army, the generals to prepare to "fight and win wars". It was one of the earliest orders he gave. There was a common perception in China at the time that the military had grown complacent and corrupt, and Xi basically gradually replaced all of the people he had taken out with loyalists and put them in charge. Then in 2016, he launched the biggest military reorganization that China has seen since the 1950s. He scrambled the command structures, he slashed troops who were part of this sort of bloated bureaucracy, and he put himself in charge of a new joint battle command that was aimed at modernizing operations. For Xi, remaking the military was really important, partly in terms of projecting China's power abroad to help China regain what he sees as its rightful place at the top of the global order, sort of what we think of as the China dream. But it was also important to him in terms of reinforcing his own power at home so he could see that China dream project through.
Luke Vargas: And he's still seeing it through, Josh, our colleague Brian Spiegel reporting a few months ago, that China plans to increase military spending by more than 7% this year, the fastest growth in years. So clearly investments are continuing, which begs the question, where is the Chinese military now in terms of its capabilities?
Josh Chin: Right. So China now has one of the best equipped militaries in the world. It launched its third aircraft carrier last summer. The first one that it designed in China has more naval ships than the United States now, and it's also ahead of the US and the development of hypersonic missiles, which are a new sort of cutting edge missile technology that's really good at evading modern missile defenses. And those are advances that are driven by just huge amounts of spending. Official military expenditures are expected to reach 224 billion this year. That's still behind the US, which spent more than 870 billion in 2022. But military analysts say China likely spends quite a bit more than it actually says it does.
Luke Vargas: Okay. Incredibly well-equipped, but how able to fight and to win wars, those commands basically that Xi gave the military when he took office?
Josh Chin: Well, that's the big question for China, which is experience. China has 2.2 million active troops, but almost none of them have seen live action. The last war that China fought was a border skirmish with Vietnam in 1979. And experience matters, in particular because of the complexity of modern warfare. One example that military experts will point to is aircraft carriers. China now has three of them, but operating just one takes thousands of people. Each one of those people has their own job and they all have to work in concert, and then you add other ships in a carrier group that also have to work together. And then that carrier group, which has to coordinate with the Air Force and the army, the US military has been honing its ability to run these sorts of complex joint operations basically almost constantly since the start of the war on terror. China hasn't, and it's been trying to get experience for soldiers where it can, mainly by having them participate in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and other places. But if you talk to both Chinese and American defense officials and analysts, they will note that it's a big leap from that to say a major military operations like you would have in say a conflict over Taiwan.
Luke Vargas: All right. So speaking of Taiwan then, Joyu, you were there in the capital Taipei. How is Taiwan viewing this Chinese military buildup?
Joyu Wang: Well, we've seen (inaudible), especially for the past year that the Taiwanese government has been taking quite a few concrete step. I mean, one of the most notable example would be the government actually extended the conscriptions from four month to a year. Another thing we can see is they're spending more on the military weapons, and one of the things that they have been spending more would be on missiles. The governments last year approved the special budgets on buying more initial systems, but also on other weapons such as naval ships and also jet fighter. And according to the military analysts, we are expected to see the government will continue to spend more in the years ahead.
Luke Vargas: And Joyu, you have been speaking to members of the Taiwanese military. You've embedded with them even at times. Is it clear if Taiwan could actually take on China militarily were it to come to that?
Joyu Wang: These are questions that everyone here or in Beijing are trying to figure it out, but what we know according to the military analyst that we've spoke to that ... I mean, Taiwan by itself has its own strength in defending a possible invasion from China. One of the thing is geographical, the island itself is separated from the mainland and the oceans are really rough. I mean, that's only a few months of a year that be suitable for a possible landing. But of course at the same time, by being an island itself, Taiwan is also very vulnerable to a blockage. And this is something that the government is also taking notes of and also trying to play catchups on to make sure that its internet connections be working under a situation, and also it's like energy resurface as well. So these are just like a double-edged sort. It can help protecting Taiwan from an invasion, but also would put Taiwan in a kind of a vulnerability positions.
Josh Chin: And Luke, Joyu makes a good point there and probably because of all those factors, we've seen China recently actually start to practice not just for invading Taiwan, but to potentially blockade it. So we saw this last year when Nancy Pelosi was then the House speaker, visited Taipei and China very angrily responded by conducting live fire drills. But those included surrounding Taiwan with ships in a mock blockade. And since then, military analysts in the US and elsewhere have been studying that as a more likely possibility. One that makes it more difficult for the US to respond, because obviously in the case of an invasion, that's a really striking, really violent choice that would anger a lot of people and make it relatively easy for the US politically to get involved. But a blockade is much more ambiguous, it's much less dramatic, and it's much less clear that the American public or American allies will see that as cause to get involved. So that's now become a huge factor in all the strategic thinking around Taiwan.
Luke Vargas: Josh, what is the sense you're getting about Xi's urgency to act here?
Josh Chin: There've been a lot of dates thrown around, 2027, 2035. But one thing that's really important to think about is that there's an important tension at play inside China. Xi has made taking control of Taiwan a part of the China dream. He said it's a task that "should not be passed down from generation to generation", which some people take to mean that he wants to accomplish this before he dies, and he actually faces some domestic pressure to make good on his word. Many Chinese people, even if they're critical of the Communist Party, still feel strongly that China won't have recovered its former greatness unless it's made whole by capturing Taiwan. But it's questionable how eager Xi is actually to take military action in Taiwan, at least in the near future. I mean, it's a big step, right? This could ignite a much bigger conflict. It could involve the US. You could have potentially World War III. So it's a big gamble for him. What you're seeing now is that US is really eager to take advantage of that tension. They're trying to move as aggressively as they can to try to deter China from seriously considering an attack or a blockade. They're doing that by arming Taiwan, lining up support from allies in the region, and political analysts, foreign leaders, the Biden administration, they've all argued that Xi is very likely to damage China's standing globally if he does that.
Luke Vargas: That was Wall Street Journal deputy China bureau chief Josh Chin and reporter Joyu Wang in Taipei. Josh, Joyu, thank you both for the time.
Josh Chin: It's a real pleasure, Luke, thanks.
Joyu Wang: Yep, thank you.
Luke Vargas: And speaking of China's standing globally, on next Friday's episode, we'll look at how Xi Jinping's increasingly authoritarian regime is affecting foreign businesses and their future plans in the country. But until then, that was What's News for Friday morning. We'll be back tonight with a new show. I'm Luke Vargas for the Wall Street Journal. Have a great weekend and thanks for listening.
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July 31, 2023
The United States will send up to $345 million in unspecified weapons and military aid to Taiwan, the White House announced Friday. The package was authorized under President Biden's drawdown authority, which has been used for Ukraine aid but not yet for Taiwan. (Congress authorized the president to provide up to $1 billion of drawdown assistance to Taiwan in the 2023 budget.)
The package "will "address critical defensive stockpiles, multi-domain awareness, anti-armor, and air defense capabilities," a Defense Department spokesperson told the Washington Post. Reuters reported Saturday that four unarmed MQ-9A reconnaissance drones might be included; however, "their inclusion could fall through as officials work through details on removing some of the advanced equipment from the drones that only the U.S. Air Force is allowed access to."
"I strongly support President Biden's long-delayed choice to exercise the authority Congress provided him to arm Taiwan with real capabilities to defend itself," Republican Sen. Roger Wicker of the Armed Services Committee said in a statement. "This is exactly why Congress passed the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, which allows the administration to transfer substantial amounts of U.S. defense articles and services to Taiwan; I urge the president to make use of the remaining authority as soon as possible," he added.
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Vivek Ramaswamy Takes Nationalist Logic to Its Obvious, Horrifying Conclusion
By NOAH ROTHMAN
August 15, 2023 3:35 PM
Nationalist Republicans who oppose the continued provision of aid and lethal arms to Ukraine sometimes argue that the West’s commitment to degrading Russia’s capacity to project power abroad comes at a steep cost. America is a strained, reeling great power, they argue, and every dollar devoted to European security is one that is not spent on the more acute threat to U.S. dominance posed by China. Millennial GOP presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy has made many of these now rote arguments, but he has done the public a service by taking the nationalist line to its logical conclusion.
“Xi Jinping should not mess with Taiwan,” Ramaswamy told conservative radio host Hugh Hewitt on Monday. That is, “until we have achieved semiconductor independence,” the candidate continued, “until the end of my first term when I will lead us there.”
“After that,” Ramaswamy inadvisably added, “our commitments to Taiwan — our commitments to be willing to go to military conflict — will change after that, because that’s rationally in our self-interest. That is honest. That is true, and that is credible.”
He’s right about that. When an American president vacillates on his willingness to preserve the deterrent dynamics that make hostile foreign powers think twice about invading their neighbors, the world’s land-hungry despots stand up and take notice. Just ask Joe “minor incursion” Biden.
A purely libertarian conception of maximum economic efficiency would reject the market distortions necessary to repatriate critical defense-related industries back to American shores. Conservatives have traditionally been willing to absorb the economic inefficiency necessary to maintain a strong national defense. But the conceptually desirable effort to create a thriving domestic semiconductor industry has been complicated to the point of failure by this administration’s desire to pair that policy with populist immigration restrictions — a policy with which the populist right agrees. Perhaps the Taiwanese can breathe easier knowing we are so dedicated to self-sabotage that a potential President Ramaswamy will never be in a position to consign the Eastern Pacific to Chinese domination as he might like.
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But his comments are revealing, too, of how Republicans inclined toward nationalist populism invoke the Chinese threat only to bludgeon conventional conservatives with it. The logic of reducing our dependence on foreign manufacturers of defense-related components is that their utility to us diminishes as our dependence is reduced. That message is conveyed as much to our allies as our adversaries. Necessary though it might be, repatriating those industries must be paired with a robust commitment to an indissoluble relationship with our partners abroad, lest those who covet their lands get the wrong idea.
To hear the nationalist right tell it, the only combatants in a fight between the U.S. and China will be the U.S. and China. That is, of course, nonsense. America’s regional partners will man the front lines of that conflict: the Republic of Korea, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and, yes, Taiwan. They aren’t going to gamble their sovereignty on weak-kneed Washingtonians. Alliance structure suggests they will seek their own accommodations with the aggressor in their neighborhood if they cannot balance against it by aligning with the great power on the other side of the Pacific. China would have a much easier time turning the South China and Philippine Seas into Chinese lakes and putting an end to the U.S.-backed global maritime-trade regime if America signals that its interests are as parochial as Ramaswamy suggests they should be.
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Preserving that alliance structure is a complex task, but it would only become more so if America’s friends in the Pacific witnessed Washington throw its partners in Ukraine to the wolves. Preserving American hegemony means preserving its alliances, the breakdown of which would lead to the restoration of impenetrable spheres of influence. Those alliances are interconnected and interdependent. If a Republican president is willing to sacrifice one to expedience, perhaps he can be convinced or cajoled into giving up others. America’s near-peer competitors abroad would be foolish not to test that proposition.
Credit is due to Ramaswamy for articulating the logic of the nationalist position in ways more experienced and prudent political navigators have avoided. He said the quiet part out loud. It’s unlikely that China needed to hear the populist right’s logic spelled out in such unambiguous terms, but the populist right’s voters most certainly do.
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/19946/china-preparing-for-war
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Taiwanese army. Taiwan’s Defense Ministry released a report on the state of the self-ruled island’s military. The report indicates that, as a result of low recruitment and a low birth rate, problems have arisen with “unfitness for military service.” It proposes increasing quotas for enrollment in military schools to compensate for staffing shortages.
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https://amgreatness.com/2023/10/17/lessons-for-taiwan-u-s-capabilities-are-needed-now-to-defeat-intelligence-failure/
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How Joe Biden Can Deter China
Here are some ways Congress can prevent a war in the Pacific over Taiwan.
By
The Editorial Board
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Nov. 17, 2023 6:41 pm ET
Whatever else came out of this week’s meeting between Presidents Biden and Xi Jinping, there was no sign that China intends to cease its military aggression in the western Pacific. That raises the stakes for Mr. Biden to offer at long last a plan to deter an attack on Taiwan.
Mr. Biden has asked Congress for more than $105 billion in emergency funding for Ukraine and Israel, but Pacific deterrence is an afterthought. He is seeking a mere $2 billion in military sales for partners across the region. There’s also some money for American submarines and U.S. financing alternatives for developing countries pondering a loan from China.
Mr. Biden low-balled Taiwan and friends to try to conciliate Mr. Xi ahead of handshakes in San Francisco. But Beijing is responding to U.S. restraint by harassing American aircraft and unleashing water cannons on allied vessels from the Philippines. Mr. Biden’s diplomacy would be stronger if backed up by hard power. Here’s what a Pacific deterrent package might look like:
• More authority for Taiwan to buy weapons and draw down U.S. stocks. The U.S. has propped up Ukraine’s fight against Russia by pouring weapons over friendly borders for nearly two years. America will have no such strategic luxury in Taiwan. The window to arm the island is before sparks go up in the Strait. The $2 billion for regional friends isn’t sufficient for a fight that could happen at any time, and a serious request would add at least $2 billion more—directly for Taiwan.
These sales can be complemented by money for direct drawdowns from U.S. inventory. Eric Sayers and Dustin Walker of the American Enterprise Institute note that $650 million of such drawdown authority for Taiwan expired in fiscal 2023. Congress can approve more and include funding to replenish U.S. military stocks with newer weapons.
• A road map to speed up weapons deliveries. As a letter from Congress recently noted, the U.S. announced the sale of 400 Harpoon antiship missiles to Taiwan in October 2020. But the Navy didn’t enter a contract until April 2023. Press reports say deliveries may not be complete until 2029. One helpful item at the margin could be codifying that Taiwan can cut in line ahead of other partners for weapons deliveries.
• Buying bombs and missiles for U.S. forces in bulk. The first obligation of a Commander in Chief is to make sure U.S. forces are never unprepared for a fight. The U.S. doesn’t have enough long-range fires to prevail decisively in the Pacific, which weakens America’s ability to deter the Chinese Communist Party.
The U.S. still produces excellent weapons—such as the long-range antiship missile, which can skim the sea to elude missile defenses. The job now is to make thousands. Another crucial munition is Patriot interceptors, as air defense is now in high demand from the Middle East to Europe. Larger buys of everything from Stingers to the Army tactical missile system are insurance against another surprise like Ukraine and Israel.
• A plan to get the U.S. Navy to 66 attack submarines. Mr. Biden proposed $3.4 billion for the U.S. submarine industrial base, and the Australians are chipping in as part of the Aukus agreement. But the Biden Administration touts Aukus as a great success even as it’s at risk of collapsing absent a plan for the U.S. submarine fleet.
The U.S. Navy has only 49 attack hulls even as it says it needs 66, and the 30-year shipbuilding plan doesn’t expect the fleet to reach even 54 hulls until 2036. What’s missing as much as money is a Commander in Chief who tells voters why these stealthy subs are vital to deterring war with China.
Some in the Administration will argue that stiffening the U.S. Pacific deterrent is provocative. But the empirical record is the opposite: Beijing exploits U.S. timidity, whether by militarizing islands in the South China Sea or routinely crossing the median line in the Taiwan Strait to menace Taipei.
The Pacific is a higher-risk theater than the public appreciates, but the U.S. can still prevent a war over Taiwan. Mr. Biden doesn’t want to be remembered as the President who squandered America’s precious time to prepare.
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How Xi Could Get Taiwan without Firing a Shot
China's president Xi Jinping speaks at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in San Francisco, Calif., November 15, 2023. (Carlos Barria/Pool via Reuters)
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By HENRY OLSEN
November 17, 2023 5:55 PM
A political development on the other side of the Pacific could be more consequential on this question than the Chinese leader’s summit with President Biden.
The recent meeting between President Biden and Chinese president Xi Jinping has been touted as one that could reduce tensions between the two powers. Another meeting that took place on the other side of the Pacific, however, holds greater promise to reduce the risk of war in the near future: the agreement between two Taiwanese opposition parties to run a joint ticket in January’s presidential election. That decision might be better news for China than for America.
Taiwan’s vibrant democracy is often praised but more often misunderstood. Taiwanese voters have recently been supporting the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the large party most vocally supportive of Taiwanese de facto independence. But that has only developed since 2012.
That’s where the opposition announcement comes in. The DPP’s presidential candidate, Vice President Lai Ching-te, has been leading in the polls. Candidates for the two main competitors trail but, when combined, outpoll Lai by ten points or more. Taiwan’s president is elected by popular vote with no runoff; the person with the most votes, no matter how few, wins. If the joint ticket could hold onto that polling support, the opposition candidate would easily win the presidency.
The two parties involved, the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), have not chosen which of their parties’ nominees would head their joint ticket. But both have signaled a more conciliatory approach to managing relations with China than Lai Ching-te has. A victory by the KMT–TPP alliance would likely reduce the odds of President Xi’s ordering an invasion of the island nation in the near future and thus reduce the chances of a U.S.–China war.
Paradoxically, however, that might work to China’s long-term advantage. Its long-stated goal is to reunify Taiwan with the mainland, preferably peacefully but by war if necessary. A Taiwanese leader whose primary goal is to avoid invasion could thus be open to making significant concessions to China to prevent that calamity.
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Posting CCP's article here as well:
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/the-decadent-west-has-come-face-to-face-with-the-future-and-the-end-of-its-dominance/ar-AA1k9mrA?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=d9e18810c3854fbbb576f90a4654a65e&ei=9
For the purpose of this thread, this passage caught my attention:
"From the Chinese perspective, though, all that was fluff. The real business of the summit, as they saw it, was to make plain that they intended to annex Taiwan. Sure, they would rather do so without a war. To win without fighting is, as Sun Tzu says, the ultimate achievement. But Xi left Biden in no doubt that reunification is not some vague aspiration, but the policy on which he has staked his leadership.
"The Chinese autocrat is aware of American concerns about the economic impact. Taiwan produces most of the world’s semiconductors, especially the advanced models on which the global economy depends. How long, Xi asks, would it take the United States to build up a domestic manufacturing capacity? Five years? Fine, then use it. But understand that, after that, Taiwan will be reabsorbed."
This strikes me as a very penetrating observation that presents a very penetrating question:
Why aren't the hell we doing precisely that?!?
Isn't that what Vivek has proposed?
Yes we have taken some steps in that direction, but would it not make sense to commit to it full bore?
or would we rather play chicken with ou rstrategic ambuity as a strategy to back them off from a war which with ample reason they think they will win?
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Third
https://www.youtube.com/watch?si=lrlmdwOUSjIwtSGa&fbclid=IwAR1VBjEf6uq_Hu0LKmDH9TdPgiXLy2zAfBGI-gczO9WlZ-vmafekTctGABM&v=TyadJ6Ky3WU&feature=youtu.be
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Can we say that given American weakness, this is what happens?
TAIWAN
Cross-strait bonds hinge on election outcome
Challengers take softer China stance
BY ANDREW SALMON THE WASHINGTON TIMES SEOUL, SOUTH KOREA | A potentially game-changing linkup between two Taiwanese opposition parties to challenge the ruling Democratic Progressive Party has foundered — for now.
The alliance could have instantly made the forces favoring improved ties with China the front-runner in the coming vote, significantly impacting Taiwan’s future. During the eight-year rule of the DPP in Taipei, cross-strait relations have sharply deteriorated and Chinese military intimidation has escalated.
Voters on the democratic island, which lies in the shadow of China and is a critical hub in the global high-tech supply chain, go to the polls on Jan. 13 to elect their next president. President Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP, now completing her second four-year term, is constitutionally unable to run for a third.
The DPP’s presidential candidate, Lai Ching-te, also known as William Lai, leads polls with around 32% of voter support. He is seen as a hard-liner toward China.
The two opposition parties seeking
to win the presidency are considered more accommodating toward Beijing. Mr. Lai’s leading opponents are each polling at around 22%, suggesting a Lai victory unless they join forces.
Opposition hopes soared after the announcement of a plan Wednesday for Hou Yu-ih of the main opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and former Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) to agree to a joint campaign united behind a single candidate. The preliminary announcement of the alliance and the prospect of reduced friction between Beijing and Taipei sent the New Taiwan dollar to its highest price in a year in foreign currency markets.
According to Taipei media Taiwan News, the two opposition leaders could not agree Saturday on using polls to select the more promising presidential candidate.
Hopefuls must register their candidacies by Friday, giving Mr. Ko and Mr. Hou just days to find a compromise.
As the opposition unity drive foundered, Mr. Lau’s campaign steamed ahead. The DPP is expected to announce Monday that Hsiao Bi-khim, Taiwan’s popular diplomatic envoy to Washington, would join the party ticket as a vice presidential candidate.
U.S. united on Taiwan, Taiwanese divided With Washington deeply concerned that China will attempt to take over the democratic island, Taiwan is a linchpin of U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
On the security front, U.S. forces and their allies have established defenses in the northern Philippines and Japan’s southern islands to prevent China’s navy from blockading or surrounding Taiwan.
On the economic security front, Taiwan is a critical hub in the supply chain for cutting-edge semiconductors. Washington has identified chips as the key component to maintain the high ground over China in the competition for technological superiority.
In Washington, a strong posture against China is among the few political positions that Democrats and Republicans widely share.
Taiwan’s population, however, is divided. Critics of Ms. Tsai and Mr. Lai say they have gone too far in provoking Beijing.
“Lai’s support comes primarily from the more radical wing of the DPP, which favors a more insistent approach to Taiwan’s self-determination and national sovereignty,” according to the Asia Society Policy Institute. The KMT’s Mr. Hou has called Mr. Lai’s stance on China relations “reckless.”
The TPP’s Mr. Ko is seen as more middle of the road but has proposed building a bridge from one of Taiwan’s outlying islands to the nearby Chinese mainland.
China isn’t the only issue in the campaign. Voters are focused on a smorgasbord of domestic issues: stagnant wage growth, a sluggish economy, energy security and affordable housing for the younger generation.
Defending its record in these areas is more difficult for the two-term government. Mr. Koh is especially popular with younger voters, who consider the DPP the establishment and are put off by the even more establishmentarian KMT, whose roots date back to the first government of Chiang Kai-shek.
For the Biden administration and countries across the region also feeling the pressure of a more assertive China, the Taiwanese vote is attracting attention because of relations across the flashpoint Taiwan Strait. Chinese strategy toward Taiwan is hotly debated.
Multiple U.S. security figures, citing the buildup of Chinese naval and air forces, say China is amassing the capabilities and the will to attack the island. Chinese President Xi Jinping has reportedly told his commanders to build up the People’s Liberation Army to be strong enough to carry out a military operation against Taiwan by 2027.
Critics point to aggressive maneuvers by Chinese naval and air assets around Taiwan, which have increased massively since House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, California Democrat, infuriated Beijing with a visit to the island in 2022.
Others suggest that Beijing, which has not fought a hot war since 1979, has a regional “salami-slicing” strategy from the Himalayas to the South and East China seas. That strategy focuses on minimalist, gradual gains — more hybrid war than hot war.
At sea, it deploys undergunned vessels such as the coast guard and “maritime militias,” rather than its battle fleet, into tense waters. In the air, it probes and pilots aggressively but does not shoot.
Western arms executives have told The Washington Times of their frustration with Taipei, which they say is unwilling to do what is necessary to defend itself.
They also cite Taiwan’s short military conscription period — just one year — and its refusal to create a regular militia. Militias were critical to the defense of northern Ukraine in 2022.
“Any complacency or nonchalance on the part of the Taiwanese is maybe because they are reassured,” said Alexander Neill, a regional defense expert with the Pacific Forum. “Underpinning this is the Taiwan Relations Act: The U.S. is mandated to provide sufficient capability to defend Taiwan.”
At times, to the consternation of his aides, President Biden has stated repeatedly that the U.S. would defend Taiwan in the event of Chinese military action. Yet Washington has customarily been reluctant to have Taiwan acquire top-line military hardware.
“The DPP were constantly lobbying for new F-16 variants, and they complain about getting U.S. castoffs,” Mr. Neill said. “But as soon as Taiwan starts developing something that looks like a good offensive capability, the U.S. gets unnerved.”
For the Taiwanese, it’s a dilemma. “Some say we should not become a chess piece in the hands of America, but in reality, we need support as we are not powerful like Israel,” said one Taiwanese, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he did not have permission to speak to media. “Because of the U.S. trade war with China, we have to choose a side.”
China’s harsh crackdown on Hong Kong in 2019 shocked Taiwanese, but memories are short and youths do not necessarily share the older generation’s distrust of Beijing.
“The Hong Kong situation changed the game. It made us feel more at risk,” said the source. “But this mindset is now evaporating.”
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/taiwan-opposition-alliance-collapses-terry-gou-quits-race/ar-AA1krwpY?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=0fc549737f004ba9a53b60c68aaf7c88&ei=12
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/taiwan-draws-clear-us-versus-china-battle-lines-in-key-election/ar-AA1kxHWJ?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=a9e88fb76d25452b82219e534da5b005&ei=13
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/taiwan-soldiers-promising-surrender-to-china-among-10-charged-for-spying/ar-AA1kIZAd?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=077fcbe7471f46f8bdb83cec91203c3b&ei=18
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China Confronts a New Political Reality in Taiwan: No Friends
Interviews with top candidates in volatile three-way presidential race point to rising skepticism toward Beijing—whatever the outcome
By
Josh Chin
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Joyu Wang
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Updated Dec. 29, 2023 12:08 am ET
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TAIPEI—A drawing of Taiwan at the presidential campaign headquarters of the island’s ruling party shows strikingly little concern for north and south. Instead, the island is shown turned on its side, with China and the Taiwan Strait conspicuously absent.
The drawing reflects the worldview of the Democratic Progressive Party, which over the past eight years has sought to carve out an identity for the self-ruled island that is separate from mainland China. But it also represents a broader change in Taiwan that sits uneasily with Communist Party leaders 1,000 miles to the northwest in Beijing.
With voters set to cast their ballots for a new leader in a volatile three-way election next month, Taiwanese politics has shifted decisively, and perhaps irrevocably, away from China. The change in mood is evident in public-opinion polls—and even in the campaign of the opposition Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang.
Once an aggressive promoter of closer political and economic ties with Beijing, the KMT is striking a markedly different tone these days.
“I’ve never had an unrealistic idea about mainland China’s attitude toward us,” the party’s presidential candidate, Hou Yu-ih, said in an interview, one of three that The Wall Street Journal recently conducted with the leading candidates. “The most important thing is to handle our defense and economy in a way that at least prevents the other side from casually launching a war.”
At the campaign headquarters of the ruling party’s candidate and the current leader in the polls, Vice President Lai Ching-te, the word “China” is nowhere to be seen at all.
Instead, on a recent visit, volunteers from Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party beckoned passersby to witness denim-clad members of a local line-dancing team step, kick and spin to American country music under a green LED sign reading “TEAM TAIWAN.” Further back, a cartoon mural told the story of Lai’s adventures with his pet dog.
Taiwanese politics has shifted decisively away from China, according to opinion polls. PHOTO: YAN ZHAO/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Taiwan’s election next month has drawn nervous attention from capitals around the world for its bearing on the most sensitive point of friction between the U.S. and China.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping has made taking control of Taiwan a centerpiece of his quest to restore his country as a great power. It is a task, the 70-year-old Xi has said, that “should not be passed down from generation to generation.” On Tuesday, Xi told senior officials “We will resolutely prevent anyone from making Taiwan secede from China by any means.”
During a summit between Xi and President Biden in California last month, the two leaders spent substantial time discussing Taiwan.
In Taipei, Lai paints a picture of a Taiwanese public far less preoccupied with Beijing’s designs than political leaders in the Western world. Despite three years in which China’s military has sent jet fighters—often in the dozens—on nearly daily sorties in the airspace around Taiwan, many on the island have come to greet it all with a shrug.
“Taiwan is relatively calm—the stock market is going up and everyone’s living a normal life,” Lai said in an interview. “People view this situation with calmness and reason.”
Taiwan’s election has drawn nervous attention around the world for its bearing on the most sensitive point of friction between the U.S. and China. PHOTO: ANN WANG/REUTERS
The shifting political winds in Taiwan represent a cold new reality for Communist Party leaders in China. After Beijing crushed dissent in Hong Kong, there is little appetite in Taiwan for an arrangement in which China would peacefully assume political control of the island in exchange for a high degree of autonomy.
The proportion of people in Taiwan who identify primarily as Chinese has plummeted to below 3%, prompting even the party that had most ardently pursued peaceful political union with Beijing to do everything it can to shed its “pro-Beijing” label.
“Young people in Taiwan neither feel they are Chinese, nor do they have affection for anything Chinese—quite the contrary,” said Andrew Hsia, deputy head of the KMT.
While past Taiwan elections have turned on the question of whether to move toward or away from eventual unification with China, the candidates in January’s contest all agree that Taiwan’s only choice with China now is to play for time. The debate is over how.
In an interview in the southern city of Kaohsiung, home to Taiwan’s largest naval base, the KMT’s Hou accused the DPP of underplaying the deterioration of cross-strait ties and the risk of war.
“It wasn’t until the war in Ukraine and the war in Gaza that people started paying attention,” he said. “Taiwan needs to prepare—quickly.”
Hou, a charismatic former head of Taiwan’s national police agency, leans on his police experience in describing how he would use the party’s credibility with Beijing to buy time for Taiwan to build up its military deterrence.
“Facing an opponent, on the one hand, you have to be able to negotiate, while on the other hand, you need the power to fight,” he said.
KMT officials concede that the party is seen as old-fashioned by Taiwanese youth, who turned away from the party in 2014. That is when the last KMT president in office put his support behind a trade agreement with China that would have bound the two sides even more closely together—to a degree that turned off many younger voters.
Now, a new generation of younger voters has gravitated toward a third-party candidate, Ko Wen-je, whose views on China fall somewhere in the middle.
Ko, a doctor and former mayor of Taipei, has capitalized on disillusionment with the two traditional parties by positioning himself as a pragmatic politician focused on bread-and-butter issues such as high home prices and low wages. He described the KMT as “too submissive to China,” but, like Hou, he said that he thinks most Taiwanese underestimate the risks of war.
Even with hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese working in China—a legacy of last decade’s era of cross-strait engagement—official communication between Beijing and Taipei is virtually nonexistent, Ko said, adding: “This is really weird.”
Strong support from young people gives Ko some heft, but he has lost ground since an incipient deal to team up with Hou fell apart last month. In a Dec. 22-26 survey conducted by Formosa, a DPP-leaning pollster, 38.7% of respondents said they would vote for the DPP’s Lai, versus 29.7% saying they prefer the KMT’s Hou and an additional 16.6% backing Ko.
Lai was once an open supporter of Taiwanese independence—a history that makes leaders in both Beijing and Washington nervous—but has said he would stick to the status quo established over the past eight years under his boss, President Tsai Ing-wen, which rests on cultivating closer economic and military ties with the U.S. and other “like-minded countries” as a form of deterrence. Like Tsai, who can’t run again because of term limits, Lai holds open the possibility of communication with Beijing, though with caveats.
“In the interest of global peace and the mutual benefits of all countries in the world, Taiwan is willing to engage with China,” Lai told the Journal, as long as that dialogue is carried “under the premise of equal dignity and through the procedure of democracy.”
Under Tsai, the DPP has tried to calibrate its warnings about the threat from China to avoid scaring away international investors and otherwise undermining the Taiwanese economy. Some critics have said that the strategy contributes to a sense of complacency among Taiwanese people about the threat from China, which Lai denies.
None of Taiwan’s presidential candidates said how long they thought the island might need to hold out for the Chinese threat of forceful unification to dissipate.
Peace ultimately requires commitment from both sides, Lai said. “It’s not just Taiwan. China is also responsible.”
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Taiwan Says Chinese Lip-Syncing Probe Aims to Pull Rock Band to Beijing’s Side
Investigation into Mayday’s Shanghai concerts sparks accusations of political interference as Taiwanese election approaches
By
Joyu Wang
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Dec. 30, 2023 8:06 am ET
TAIPEI—A Chinese investigation into purported lip syncing by a rock band from Taiwan is aimed at pressuring the band into supporting Beijing’s stance on the island and is part of a broad effort to interfere in its politics, Taiwanese officials said.
Mayday, one of Taiwan’s most commercially successful rock bands, is under scrutiny from authorities in Shanghai after the band declined to publicly back the view that Taiwan is a part of China, the officials said.
Taiwanese officials made the allegation as the island prepares to hold a volatile three-way election next month to determine who will succeed President Tsai Ing-wen, a leader who has sought to carve out an identity for the island that is distinct from Beijing.
Taiwan’s government has accused Chinese authorities of using a range of tactics to interfere in the island’s politics in the run-up to the Jan. 13 election, including spreading disinformation on social media and using subsidized trips to mainland China to sway Taiwan’s voters.
“China always interferes in our elections, but this time is notably intense,” Vice President Lai Ching-te, the ruling party’s candidate, said at Saturday’s presidential debate in Taipei.
China has denied that it is trying to interfere in Taiwan’s elections. A spokeswoman for Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office has accused Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party of distorting the facts to gain political advantage. The office didn’t respond to a request for comment for this article.
In November, the head of Taiwan’s National Security Council said a series of investigations into Apple supplier Foxconn Technology was politically motivated, aimed at dissuading the company’s founder, Terry Gou, from running for the presidency as an independent candidate. Gou, who has since dropped out of the race, was seen as a candidate who could split the opposition vote, hurting the chances of defeating the ruling-party candidate. China said the investigations were a part of routine law enforcement.
“This time, the intensity is actually no less than that of Foxconn,” one of the Taiwanese officials said, referring to the accusations of lip syncing against Mayday. This is the first time Taiwanese authorities have seen such a top-down effort targeted at people in the entertainment industry, the official said.
The Shanghai Municipal Administration of Culture and Tourism started investigating eight performances by the band in Shanghai in November, according to a Chinese state media report on Dec. 4. The investigations came after posts appeared on Weibo, a Chinese social-media platform, accusing the band of lip syncing.
Lip syncing is considered a “deceitful act” under Chinese regulations. Violators can be fined up to 100,000 yuan, or about $14,000, or have their performing license revoked on a second offense.
Mayday, a pop-rock band from Taipei, has gone on several world tours and played some of the world’s biggest concert venues, including New York’s Madison Square Garden and Beijing’s “Bird’s Nest” National Stadium.
The five-piece band performs predominantly in Mandarin and has a huge fan base across the Chinese-speaking world. The band generates much of its revenue from mainland China. In one of the band’s longest world tours, about 40% of its shows were performed in Chinese cities.
Mayday’s record label, B’in Music, has rejected the lip-syncing accusations, describing them as malicious attacks and defamation. “Please believe in Mayday, believe in music,” the record label said in early December. The label didn’t respond to requests for comment for this article
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Why Taiwan’s Election Matters
Voters on the island are united in support of democracy, no matter who wins.
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The Editorial Board
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Jan. 8, 2024 6:20 pm ET
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The '2023 Reagan National Defense Survey' highlights China as the greatest national security threat to the U.S. and finds strong support for arming Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan. Images: Zuma Press/AFP/Getty Images Composite: Mark Kelly
Taiwan’s voters head to the polls Saturday in a presidential election that could echo far beyond its shores. The echoes will have more to do with the island’s commitment to its democracy than with the policies of any particular candidate.
This is an unusually consequential election because the Taiwan Strait has become one of the world’s geostrategic flash points. The mainland People’s Republic of China has been committed to absorbing Taiwan for decades, and President Xi Jinping has grown more aggressive in pressing Beijing’s claims. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Taiwan has come into focus as the other place where a large autocracy could be tempted to overrun a smaller, democratic neighbor.
Little wonder, then, that cross-Strait issues have swamped concerns such as inflation during Taiwan’s campaign. The front-runner in opinion polls, Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party, promises to continue the DPP’s tradition of assertiveness in defense of Taiwan’s democratic autonomy. Mr. Lai is vice president to term-limited incumbent Tsai Ing-wen, whose policy has been to let relations with Beijing cool somewhat while cultivating closer ties with allies such as the U.S.
There are important differences between Taiwan’s parties on these issues, but one shouldn’t exaggerate the gaps. Hou Yu-ih of the Kuomintang (KMT), currently running second, promises a more conciliatory approach toward Beijing. The KMT’s previous stints in power were marked by warmer trade ties with mainland China and less rhetoric likely to inflame Beijing.
Yet Mr. Hou insists he and the KMT aren’t pursuing a policy of unification with the mainland. He’s trying to present himself as the best candidate to maintain Taiwan’s democratic sovereignty while boosting the economy with better trade and investment ties to China. The same goes for third-party candidate Ko Wen-je, a doctor who says he can achieve better domestic governance and cross-Strait relations with a more technocratic approach and whose fresh presence is attracting younger voters.
The common theme is the desire of Taiwan’s voters to preserve their democracy even as they debate how. They understand the stakes after witnessing Hong Kong’s fate. Beijing has proven with its crackdown on freedom in that territory that “one country, two systems” really means the end of democracy. The Communist Party will always impose its own system.
If Mr. Lai wins as expected, Beijing is likely to go into blustering overdrive as it always does when Taiwan voters refuse to cooperate with the Party’s will. Commentators may present such a vote as a provocation. China already has stepped up threatening actions, including the dispatch of spy balloons over the island as Mr. Lai’s lead has firmed in opinion polls.
The affront to the Party isn’t Mr. Lai’s policies, and Taiwan’s voters won’t have stoked tensions with Beijing by electing him. The problem is that Beijing can’t tolerate Taiwan’s example of a thriving Chinese-speaking democracy in which voters settle political differences at the ballot box. If a conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, this will be why. And Taiwan’s voters know it as they head to the polls
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"They understand the stakes after witnessing Hong Kong’s fate. Beijing has proven with its crackdown on freedom in that territory that “one country, two systems” really means the end of democracy. The Communist Party will always impose its own system."
- The most underreported story of the century.
I hope Taiwan can stand strong.
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Trump, and the rest of the West, utterly failed to speak out when China broke its word to Hong Kong (and by so doing, to the British as well).
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/20302/taiwan-voters
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/20302/taiwan-voters
Excellent. Someone should call out this "reunification" bullsh*t. Taiwan, as I understand it, was never ruled by this totalitarian regime. Elect democracies on both sides of the Straits first and then discuss a consensual merger. It should take a super majority on both sides to change the status quo.
And remember Hong Kong. War crime describes what happened better than 'two systems'.
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/donald-trump-s-taiwan-remarks-spark-fury-and-concern/ar-BB1h2J1G?ocid=msedgntp&pc=HCTS&cvid=6eb438ca114741e49b8ee13ba9ccc1a0&ei=10
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I agree with the articles quoted criticisms of Trump on this.
Inconsistent for sure.
" In an interview with NBC News from September, Trump took a similar stance on the issue, stating that he would not say what his position on the matter would be, but also stated that sending U.S. troops to Taiwan would not be "off the table."
There is nothing I dislike more then those who state an option (usually military) is 'not off the table'
If this does not show weakness I don't know what does.
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Not with you in this case.
IMHO sometimes, here for example, strategic ambiguity has its merit.
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https://amgreatness.com/2024/02/04/taiwan-as-the-frog-in-the-pot-beijing-turns-up-the-heat-one-more-degree/
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=stw2k_N3-N4
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(7) CHINA’S HARSH WORDS ON TAIWANESE INDEPENDENCE: At the annual National People’s Congress of China, President Xi Jinping and Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi played “the carrot and the stick” narrative tactic for Taiwan.
“Whoever promotes Taiwan's independence will be liquidated by history. Anyone in the international community who supports Taiwan independence and plays with fire will get burned and suffer the consequences," Wang Yi said.
Why It Matters: This message of choosing the peaceful route or the warlike route will resonate with Taiwan. Strengthening anti-independence forces likely means promoting Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party members to reaffirm the 1992 Consensus, preventing an independence declaration. There are very few pro-unification forces in Taiwan, but China’s shaping operations could promote them into power as it seeks to degrade the U.S.-led international order. - J.V.
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(5) XI: NO ONE CAN STOP TAIWAN REUNIFICATION: Chinese President Xi Jinping told former Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou that no outside force could stop the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China.
“External interference cannot stop the historical trend of reunion of the country and family,” Xi said, according to Taiwanese media.
Why It Matters: Xi is likely correct that no one will stop reunification with Taiwan. I remain doubtful that the United States will militarily intervene in the defense of Taiwan, which is likely to meet the same fate as Hong Kong. The U.S. strategy appears to be delaying Chinese action on Taiwan until semiconductor manufacturing can begin in the United States. Meanwhile, the U.S. aims to enable Taiwan to defend itself from and resist a potential military invasion. China almost certainly prefers reunification through means beneath the threshold of conventional war. – M.S.